Sea power rivalry: The influence of Admiral Gorshkov on American Naval Thought, 1963-1985

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Abstract

The US-Soviet sea power rivalry was an extraordinary example of how Americans thought about navies, argued about them, and responded to them. These debates played out in policy channels and public forums for decades. This dissertation examines the competing understandings of the Soviet Navy in the US during the later Cold War.

The Soviet naval threat posed an intellectual challenge as well as a national security threat. The Soviet Navy’s transformation under its long-time commander-in-chief, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, into a blue water navy caused great alarm in the US political and military establishments. Americans based their threat perceptions on what the Soviets wrote, what they built, and how they deployed and exercised their naval forces. This work traces the contributions of those who shaped American naval thought through analysing Gorshkov’s writings on sea power and by monitoring Soviet naval developments.

This dissertation examines the influence of Admiral Gorshkov on the leaders of American naval thought as they responded to his ambitions to counter American maritime supremacy beginning in the mid-1960s. It argues that the two schools – those who viewed the Soviet Navy as basically defensive in nature and those who saw it in primarily offensive terms – could both ultimately claim vindication. Experts who pointed to the Soviet Navy’s strategically defensive nature, based on a withholding strategy of its nuclear ballistic missile submarines in bastions, saw their viewpoint validated by the Maritime Strategy in the 1980s. Those who maintained that the Red Fleet was a significant offensive threat to national security and world peace implemented plans under President Reagan for a 600-ship navy to counter the Soviet Union’s rising naval power.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Advanced Research Projects</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>anti-submarine warfare</td>
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<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Captain</td>
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<td>CASN</td>
<td>CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>Center for Naval Analyses</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREST</td>
<td>CIA Records Search Tool</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>aircraft carrier</td>
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<td>CVN</td>
<td>nuclear aircraft carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of Naval Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>EZC</td>
<td>Elmo Zumwalt Collection</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOIA</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<td>GPO</td>
<td>US Government Printing Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HASC</td>
<td>House Armed Services Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCSEA</td>
<td>Incidents at Sea Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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<td>NPS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NHC</td>
<td>Naval Historical Collection</td>
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<td>Naval War College</td>
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<td>NWCR</td>
<td>Naval War College Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONI</td>
<td>Office of Naval Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPNAV</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM</td>
<td>Rear Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECNAV</td>
<td>Secretary of the Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>submarine-launched ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLOCs</td>
<td>sea lines of communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOSUS</td>
<td>Sound Surveillance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>nuclear ballistic missile submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSGN</td>
<td>nuclear cruise missile submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>nuclear attack submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>USND</td>
<td>Understanding Soviet Naval Developments</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNI</td>
<td>US Naval Institute</td>
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<td>USN</td>
<td>US Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
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<td>VTOL</td>
<td>Vertical Takeoff and Landing</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The seas and oceans have for long been a specific area of rivalry and armed conflict, entailing the creation of special arms systems and the birth of forces subsumed under the term “navy”.

- Admiral Sergei Gorshkov

Sea power rivalries and naval competitions between great powers are as old as history itself. In Ancient Greece, fear of Athenian sea power induced the land-focused Spartans to take to triremes during the Peloponnesian War. Later rivalries centered on valuable trade routes and the navies that protected them. Blue water navies were also expressions of grand plans and ambitions that extended far from home shores. One does not need to endorse Alfred Thayer Mahan’s version of sea power’s influence upon history and empire building to appreciate that navies capable of a global reach were one of the primary measures of power as well as important drivers and protectors of wealth. Even a famous Soviet admiral steeped in Marxist-Leninist theory recognized the significance of sea power and the special role of navies in history.

The US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War had its roots in these past models of thinking and patterns of the Whale versus the Elephant (or Bear, in this case). The United States took the traditional sea power role, while the Soviet Union assumed that of a continental power that could dominate the Eurasian heartland, yet despite its geographic constraints and vastly separated fleets, also wanted to breakout into the oceans. This rivalry from emerging Soviet sea power had a profound influence on American ‘naval thought’ – a term that simply means ‘thinking about navies’. The term encompasses not only the realm of strategy and policy for naval and civilian leaders, but also how American society as a whole defined and debated the role of navies in the public arena. It includes views on sea power and the naval balance expressed in congressional testimony, newspapers, and academic forums, as well as to detailed assessments in classified intelligence reports. It addresses the perceptions and misperceptions – especially the resulting fears and anxieties – of the Soviet naval threat and the decisions of how to respond to this challenge to US maritime supremacy.

Naval officers and civilian analysts were the main contributors to understanding the Soviet Navy. Much of the debate centered on the nature of the threat – whether it was

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2 Ibid.
primarily offensive or defensive – thereby resulting in two competing schools of thought. Moreover, it was not an exclusively American endeavor. Allied (especially British) experts also shaped American thinking, while the adversary exerted the greatest influence of all: Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov. The Soviet Navy’s commander-in-chief since 1956 provided the leadership and ideas to compete with the most powerful navy in history until his retirement in 1985. Admiral Gorshkov ‘won’ the war of words by driving the strategies and naval growth of both superpowers, yet it proved a hollow victory given the outcome of the Cold War.

The US entered a phase of acute naval rivalry with the USSR in the 1960s. The Soviet Navy underwent a transformation after the Cuban Missile Crisis when the sleek and modern ships from an ambitious building programme and Admiral Gorshkov’s ‘go to sea’ order in 1963 heralded a new era of Russian presence on the World Ocean. A navy that had fought the Second World War as a coastal defence force, which primarily protected the Red Army’s flanks and mainly posed a threat from the world’s largest fleet of submarines, suddenly had blue water surface capabilities with a global reach.

Meanwhile, the United States Navy fought the Vietnam War with mostly World War II-vintage vessels and faced its own challenges. The Navy entered the 1970s at a nadir of modernization, materiel readiness, and morale. It found that the Soviet Navy had overtaken it in total numbers and all ship classes except aircraft carriers and amphibious craft. The youngest-ever chief of naval operations (CNO), Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr, took the helm in 1970 and went into crisis mode over this transformation of the Red Fleet. Zumwalt immediately ordered an assessment of the Navy’s capabilities and missions. Looking at the changes by the late 1960s, Project SIXTY determined that the Soviet Navy had: (1) achieved ‘nuclear parity’; and (2) emerged from the decade with ‘a strong, worldwide-deployed [navy].’ Settling a naval rivalry by agreeing to parity, as had happened after World War I between the US and Britain, was a troubling prospect.

Many in navy circles and beyond raised the alarm over Soviet naval expansion. Yet to attack the enemy’s strategy, and not just its forces, they had to first grasp what that strategy was. This required understanding the Soviet use of its strategic forces – the withholding of its nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in bastions as a reserve – and the employment of its general purpose forces to protect Soviet submarines and to interdict Western sea lines of communication. The US Navy also needed to modernize its forces in a time of budget austerity.

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Modern navies had an advantage over other armed services in defence budget decisions from their vital peacetime sea power roles of securing the sea lanes, protecting freedom of navigation, and conducting naval diplomacy. However, navies mostly needed each other – i.e., to point to the rival’s technological progress and expanding missions in order to grow in a particular way or in an expedited manner. Costly buildups needed a compelling rationale, and the US Navy looked to the Soviet rivalry for theirs. The usual metric for naval development was how navies measured up against each other in light of their respective national mission requirements known as the naval balance or the maritime balance if merchant, fishing, and other ocean-going resources were included.

Yet, the naval balance – whether calculated as platform numbers or total tonnage – never provided the complete picture of the competition. The US-Soviet rivalry demonstrated how capabilities and intentions could be distorted through the lens of politics and propaganda as well as the practices of threat inflation and mirror-imaging. It also underscored a crucial aspect to rivalries: they were primarily shaped by personalities. No individual took a more personal and active role in fostering the superpower competition than Gorshkov. In that sense, he drove the naval developments to varying degrees and impacted naval thought on both sides, which illustrates why his legacy still merits a deeper examination.

This dissertation gives special attention to Admiral Gorshkov as the architect of the modern Soviet Navy. He played a central role in Cold War naval history that Western experts recognized at the time. Indeed, Gorshkov’s reputation reached mythic proportions. A 1981 news report of a Naval War College event remarked that one officer spoke of Gorshkov ‘in admiring tones approaching hero worship’. As the US analysed his approach to the American naval threat, Gorshkov struggled with his own efforts to build a balanced high-seas fleet in the face of opposition from Kremlin critics in the notoriously rigid communist planning system. The interplay between the American perceptions of the Soviet naval threat and Gorshkov’s implementation of his grand design was fundamental to shaping the course of the rivalry.

This dissertation examines the ways in which the US grappled intellectually with the Soviet naval problem during the later stages of the Cold War. It looks at a particularly challenging period in US history and details the strategy and policy implications along with the shifts in American naval thought. Above all, it presents the key individuals and their search for answers to the vital question of how the Soviets would employ their naval power in a conflict with the United States.

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The debates in the 1970s marked a transition toward a deeper strategic understanding and transformation of thought. The main ‘players’ included the naval and civilian analysts who figured out Soviet doctrine from writings and their knowledge of the Russian mindset. Other experts balanced this picture with analyses of major exercises like *Okean* and deployment patterns as well as projections of naval construction. This small number of specialists – Soviet naval studies was never a discipline in the strict sense, but rather an analytical subspecialty and a community of interest – were mainly centered in think tanks, strategy and planning branches of military organizations, and government agencies that performed intelligence and budgetary analyses.

The media also played a pivotal role in transmitting the evolving, and often inflated, threat picture to the American public. Political leaders in the White House, the Pentagon, and Congress exercised their executive and oversight roles in naval decision-making. Above all, the influence on perceptions resided with those leading the US Navy – especially admirals such as Elmo Zumwalt, Stansfield Turner, and Hyman Rickover – and senior civilian policymakers like John Lehman, whose views on Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy challenged their own political system at times. Their conclusions would alter US naval strategy and force structure and would carry through to the end of the Cold War. The overwhelming American response to Admiral Gorshkov came in the early 1980s with the Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship navy in the final stage of the rivalry.

**Literature Review**

There has been no thorough examination of how the US came to understand the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. The historiography is at once narrow and dispersed. Aspects of the topic are found in smaller sections of larger histories or individual articles in the past few decades. Not a great deal has been written on the subject of Soviet naval analyses since the Cold War ended. No studies have looked extensively or exclusively at the role of Admiral Gorshkov in influencing American naval thought until this dissertation, thus it will hopefully be a valuable contribution to Cold War historiography.

The focus of sources is on the US side – it is chiefly the American perspective of the rivalry under consideration – and some select USSR sources related to Gorshkov and to general Soviet naval history that provide the context and confirmations missing from American sources. The primary sources that form the intellectual corpus of American naval thought include think tank and intelligence reports, government publications, archival records, books, articles, news stories, congressional testimonies, and conference
proceedings. These sources reflect the various strains of thinking that affected government assessments and policies of the era. Notably, many of these original sources were open source – after all, the debates that shaped US policies and attitudes on navies happened in public and democratic forums – or were assessments that have since been declassified. To be sure, there are still many operational and technical details in government documents that have yet to be declassified, which is the nature of research on more recent Cold War subjects.

Fortunately, primary sources on Soviet naval analyses are now abundant. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) has released most of its influential reports. Of note, the center’s analysts not only wrote internal reports for US Navy sponsors but also made their views on the Soviet naval buildup known in government publications, books, journal articles, and at conferences. Relevant reports include Robert Herrick’s *Soviet Navy Commander-in-Chief Advocates Construction of a Much Larger Navy*, James McConnell’s *Admiral Gorshkov on the Soviet Navy in War and Peace*, and the *Admiral Gorshkov on ‘Navies in War and Peace’* compilation.5 The works of other leading thinkers on the Soviet Navy are found in the volumes from the Dalhousie University conferences from 1972-1974. This series of workshops organized by another influential analyst, former Royal Navy intelligence officer Michael McGwire, opened a robust dialogue among Soviet naval experts and resulted in scholarly output remarkable for both its breadth and depth.6

A 1989 report by James McConnell outlined the approaches to open source literature and offered a window into the methodology of studying Soviet intentions.7 The author’s interviews with analysts Bradford Dismukes and Robert Weinland yielded further insights, such as their motivations and intellectual influences, as well as the reception and resistance to their dissenting views. Discussions with key players such as Andrew Marshall from the Office of Net Assessment, by providing source material not otherwise available, were highly revealing of the behind-the-scenes decisions and the inspiration for them.

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For official assessments, apart from the Navy’s net assessments that have not been entirely declassified, there are the intelligence community’s national intelligence estimates and numerous other special reports on the Soviet naval forces that are now available through the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) database – CREST, or CIA Records Search Tool. In a sign of renewed interest in the subject, the CIA released a collection, ‘CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy’, in 2017. They unveiled these newly declassified reports at a public event, ‘Red Navy Revealed’, in Washington for the media and researchers. In particular, the records detailed interagency intelligence disputes over the priority of interdiction of sea lines of communication in Soviet strategy in the mid-1970s.

Other primary sources include reports, speeches, and testimony to Congress on the defence budgets and national security threats, as published in the Congressional Record and other Government Printing Office (GPO) reports. These documents showed how the Navy’s top leaders enunciated their vision to policymakers and to the public in response to questions on the Navy’s relevance and its expense. Admiral Zumwalt left behind much evidence of his thinking. His papers at the Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech University include materials from his time as CNO and correspondence on the Soviet Navy. His memoir, On Watch, is the classic source for his version of events and candid views, and Zumalt continued to write about Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy into his retirement. Admiral Stansfield Turner was the voice of reform during the 1970s. His ‘Missions of the US Navy’ reordered the missions and rewrote the terminology behind US naval strategy from Project SIXTY. Oral histories by the Naval Institute, including those for Zumwalt and Turner, also filled in gaps of knowledge and perspective.

The Navy’s evolving views on the rivalry are found in Understanding Soviet Naval Developments. Authored by the Office of Naval Intelligence, this publication from 1974-1991 outlined the Soviet naval threat to inform the public and to persuade Congress of the need for additional naval appropriations. Archival records from the Naval War

8 The main website is <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/> and citations can be found by searching on the record number [accessed 8 Aug 2018].
10 Also available online <http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/> [accessed 22 Aug 2018].
College also revealed how faculty and students addressed the Soviet Navy in lectures, conferences, and research.

Ideas on Gorshkov’s new navy began to be more widely publicized in books by the late 1960s. The most impactful was Robert Herrick’s *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice.* Other later notable works included Robert Bathurst’s *Understanding the Soviet Navy: A Handbook*, the edited volume *Naval Power in Soviet Policy, Soviet Naval Diplomacy* by Dismukes and McConnell, and Bruce Watson’s *Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956-1980.* General overviews included Normal Polmar’s *Guide to the Soviet Navy* (multiple editions) and the annual *Jane’s Fighting Ships.* Polmar’s Defense Department report in 1974 has thus far been the only American biography on Gorshkov. It stood out for its keen insight and tying advances in technology to perceived changes in strategy, as written by one of the West’s foremost experts on the Soviet naval armaments.

The US Navy’s professional literature offered the spectrum of views on the surge in Soviet sea power and the meaning of Gorshkov’s writings. Publications such as the *Naval War College Review, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Navy,* and *Sea Power* were good barometers of the intellectual faultlines and hot button issues of the day. America’s closest naval ally, Great Britain, and the Royal Navy-associated *Naval Review* provided alternative and refreshing perspectives on Soviet naval topics.

A range of journal articles also treated aspects of the US-Soviet rivalry during the Gorshkov era, as found in *Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Orbis, International Security,* as well as weekly news magazines such as *Time* and *Newsweek,* to name just a few. Analysts also published their findings in academic journals such as *Survival.*

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newspapers such as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* reflected the changing public perceptions on Gorshkov’s role in the transformation, while also contributing to the on-going debate. Defence correspondents closely monitored Soviet naval developments for years, thus articles by well informed reporters, such as Hanson Baldwin and Drew Middleton of the *Times* and George Wilson of the *Post*, are themselves a vital part of the historical record.

The secondary work that most directly informed this subject was *The Evolution of the US Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986* by the Naval War College’s maritime historian, John Hattendorf. He looked at American naval thinking on the Soviet Navy from 1967–1981. He laid out the intellectual environment of the era and outlined the contributions made by analysts and the controversies they stirred. However, he did not address Admiral Gorshkov’s specific impact. Hattendorf stated that his own work was just the first step: ‘The study and the three appendices are materials that contribute toward a future historical understanding and do not, in themselves, constitute a definitive history, although they are published as valuable tools toward reaching that goal. To reach closer to a definitive understanding, there are a variety of new perceptions that need to be added over time.’

There are no secondary works on the contributions of US experts, such as Robert Herrick or James McConnell, to Cold War naval thinking and no autobiographies or biographies on them. A small volume published by the Center for Naval Analyses included a brief reference to their research. One of the seminal thinkers on the Soviet Navy, the British academic and Royal Naval officer Michael MccGwire, was the subject of an essay by Donald C. Daniel, former director of the Naval War College’s Strategic Research Department, in Ken Booth’s *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*. Daniel cast MccGwire as an original thinker very much concerned that the West had fundamentally misread and overstated Soviet naval intentions, a mistake that he feared could potentially lead to nuclear conflict. MccGwire and McConnell were also the subject of a 1987 report, ‘Analysts in War and Peace: MccGwire, McConnell, and Admiral Gorshkov’, by political scientist Stephen M. Walt that looked back at their debate. Walt found that while McConnell was likely on firmer ground in his analysis and

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McGwire allowed his conclusions to run ahead of the evidence, much was still open to interpretation and centered upon drawing many inferences from Gorshkov’s writings.22

For the Cold War at sea, one must turn to more general naval histories because no single work covers the Soviet-American naval rivalry in its entirety or in any scholarly degree of detail.23 The recent work of greatest significance is former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s history of the Reagan era, Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea, that covered his views on the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov and the American response with the 600-ship navy.24 The book is useful in providing insights and vignettes from the architect of the Maritime Strategy, yet cannot be considered an objective history because the author is the primary actor in many of the events and decisions he describes. Oceans Ventured is a largely autobiographical account.

George Baer in One Hundred Years of Sea Power provided a condensed version of the rivalry and concluded that the US Navy was a service in crisis in the 1970s because it had become unmoored from any strategy and was adrift when it came to explaining the importance of sea power to national security.25 Lawrence Korb argued that it was more the degradation of American naval power due to the Vietnam War, antimilitarism, and the spiraling costs for shipbuilding than the outright supremacy of the Soviets that contributed to any perceived imbalance in the rivalry.26

The sources that best captured the intellectual debates were those that broadly addressed sea power and strategy. The most significant is Geoffrey Till’s Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, which underscored the limits of the Mahanian approach to strategy and history and its applicability to nuclear-armed navies.27 Bryan Ranft offered a brief but insightful synopsis on Admiral Gorshkov’s writings, while elsewhere Gorshkov is compared with Western naval thinkers such as Stansfield Turner on concepts such as command of the sea, sea control, power projection, and deterrence. Ranft and Till later provided superb analysis that tied all the threads of Soviet strategy and naval development together in The Sea in Soviet Strategy, one of the best overviews of the

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subject. They specifically addressed the ‘problems of interpretation’ in Soviet naval analyses and concluded that there were strengths and weaknesses to each approach (looking at hardware, literature, operations, etc.). Secondary sources on the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s are plentiful. Indeed, it has become its own subfield of study requiring its own guide. Retired US Navy Captain Peter Swartz, a participant in its creation and now chronicler of the Maritime Strategy, and his co-authors provided an extensive bibliography on the debates.

The Cold War at Sea conference at the Naval War College in 2004 and the subsequent special edition of the Journal of Strategic Studies offered the most recent reappraisal of the US-Soviet rivalry. Participants agreed that the rivalry had not been comprehensively studied and that ‘the naval histories that emerged so far have tended to be largely anecdotal and personal in nature, while more comprehensive studies of the Cold War have tended to ignore the naval dimension of the conflict.’ In addition, the conference included a debate on the quality of intelligence assessments of the Soviet Navy and arrived at the consensus that it suffered from ‘mood swings.’

Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg works on naval intelligence’s contributions to the Maritime Strategy credited the Center for Naval Analyses with changing perceptions. One of the analysts’ biggest contributions, they noted, was an end to the mirror-imaging of Soviet intentions by the ‘[s]low development of an interpretation that tried to move away from an ethnocentric view of the Soviet in American terms, and began to develop an interpretation in Soviet terms on the basis of the Soviet Union’s values and the view, aims, and objectives of its leaders.’ Admiral Gorshkov’s leadership also came in for reappraisal. Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, a former naval attaché and war college president, offered a highly personal view in ‘Gorshkov’s Gambit,’ which was based upon his interactions with the Soviet navy chief in Moscow. Kurth found Gorshkov to be an astute and extremely capable naval leader and credited him with most of the Soviet Navy’s achievements.

31 Ibid., p. 153.
However, he questioned whether Gorshkov’s global ambitions for his navy overreached and sped the Soviet Union along the path to its demise.

Sergei Chernyavskii of the Central Naval Museum in St Petersburg took a distinctly Russian and contrarian view of Gorshkov’s legacy in ‘The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions.’ While he conceded that the ‘Gorshkov phenomenon’ was unique historically, he argued that Sergei Gorshkov was no visionary and that any Soviet naval leader would have made the same decisions under the same political pressures of the communist system. The rivalry with the US helped Gorshkov create a powerful ocean-going fleet, Chernyavskii conceded, but also one that was ‘grossly unbalanced and virtually unsustainable.’

He also observed that the Soviet Union was always be behind as a naval power because of its severe deficiencies in basing and infrastructure that were often overlooked in Western assessments.

The recent 21st Century Gorshkov: The Challenge of Seapower in the Modern Era from the Naval Institute Press was a primer and brief overview of Gorshkov’s contributions as the architect of the Soviet Navy. It included excerpts from his writings that offered lessons for modern readers on teamwork, ethos, theory, naval art, and history. As its editor noted, ‘[t]he time is right for new, objective assessments of the confrontation that shaped most of the second half of the twentieth century, not only for theoretical or academic reasons but also for practical implications’.

While this dissertation is primarily concerned with US views, it must take primary and secondary sources on the Soviet Navy into account, especially those on Admiral Gorshkov. The commander-in-chief was a popular figure during the Cold War – he was the personification of the Soviet Navy – and there is considerable primary literature both by Gorshkov and about Gorshkov. His writings were a particular focus for the lens of American understanding, which many found to signal the arrival of a new naval doctrine to go with the growing Red Fleet. Gorshkov wrote to make the case in the Soviet Union for further naval expansion and for the navy’s elevation in the hierarchy of the Soviet armed forces. Much of what he wrote foreshadowed later changes that reflected his successes. However, his open source writings were not an easy read, given Gorshkov’s ambiguous and indirect arguments as required by Soviet doctrine and communist party control – what experts at US think tanks labeled as ‘esoteric communication’ or ‘latent content’.


A vital source was Gorshkov’s autobiography, *Vo flotskom stroii: voennye memuary*, which appeared as a posthumous publication in a very limited edition in 1996. There is no English translation edition. The volume contained insights into how Gorshkov perceived the American naval threat and revealed as much as can be expected from a hardened veteran of the communist system and its chief proselytizer for sea power. Several notable biographies of Gorshkov in Russian include the highly regarded *Glavkom* by Mikhail Monakov and *Admiral*, a thin volume by P. F Ablamonov.


This thesis concept began as a straightforward history of Soviet naval studies in the 1970s. Yet it quickly became evident that the thinking of that era was the product of the much greater and often distorting influences from the rivalry as a whole and the role of Admiral Gorshkov in particular. Looking at the individual analysts and reports would

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not have made sense without explaining the power of ideas at work and the long term trends in the bookends of the preceding and subsequent decades. Yet much remains of that initial inspiration. Moreover, the aforementioned sources had their limitations in terms of availability and thoroughness, yet together they formed a remarkable portrait of a historic Cold War competition.

The 1970s saw a grand intellectual exercise – an experiment in which admirals and analysts all played their parts and made for fascinating history in the process. The author is fortunate to have met and talked with a number of these analysts and documented their personal experiences while it was still possible. The Cold War generation is now departing the stage and their role deserves to be documented and widely discussed. This dissertation with its novel approach will hopefully serve as a key piece of that history, and be added to in the future as more of the archival records become declassified and the picture is made even richer.
CHAPTER 1 American Naval Thought and the Rivalry (1963-1969)

It appears particularly difficult for United States and British naval officers and writers, steeped as they are in the Mahanian tradition of naval operations by high seas fleets, to appreciate the position of a weaker naval power and think realistically about the problems involved in developing and implementing a strategically defensive strategy.

- Commander Robert Herrick

For all the concern in the United States about the Soviet naval threat after World War II, there were no overt signals that the Soviet Union intended to challenge US sea power until well into the 1960s. The years following the Cuban Missile Crisis marked a turning point in the Cold War at sea as the rivalry began to take shape. The modern, ocean-going Soviet Navy that surged into the Mediterranean and beyond was not the coastal defence-oriented force of previous decades. Yet it would take the US Navy and other observers much longer to make sense of the changes unfolding under Admiral Sergei Gorshkov's leadership.

The greatest postwar threat from the Soviet Navy, according to American naval thought, stemmed from its large numbers of submarines that could disrupt the sea lines of communication in wartime. This thinking was based on mirror-imaging and a replay of a German U-boat, guerre de course in the North Atlantic. However, the 1960s was also a time of transition for both Soviet and American navies into nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed forces that elevated them to a strategic status that was a marked departure from their earlier 20th century roles of convoy protection or interdiction. To the sea denial challenge from the Soviet Navy were added the missions of strategic nuclear strike and peacetime power projection, as evidenced by the Soviets’ increasing blue water capabilities. Growing Soviet presence around the globe also heralded the revival of naval diplomacy in an era of ‘violent peace’ that had elements of earlier gunboat diplomacy. As a result, navies needed new thinking that took these new realities into account. At the same time, the US Navy was entering the period in which it began to think about the Soviet Navy more

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1 Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, pp. xxxii-xxxiii.
2 Hattendorf, Evolution, p. 23.
strategically and viewed its expanding naval reach as a danger to US maritime supremacy. The result was a ‘golden age’ of Soviet naval analyses.

At the same time, a market for strategic ideas on the use of naval power in the nuclear era emerged in the US, Britain, and other allied nations. A new breed of defence intellectuals in think tanks and academia laid out the implications of the rise of the Soviet Navy. These thinkers formed the intellectual landscape of expertise during the Cold War and were the founders of a new field of Soviet naval studies. Examples included the work of Thomas W. Wolfe at RAND, Michael McCGwire in Britain and later in Canada and the US, and above all, the pioneers at the Center for Naval Analyses.4

The US Navy anchored this intellectual landscape that grew out of the 1960s. Its members included senior leaders, strategists, planners, intelligence officers, war college lecturers and students, as well as others in uniform with a keen professional interest in the Soviet Navy. The professional naval literature of the era reflected the burgeoning interest in the transformation of Russian sea power that unfolded only a few years after the Cuban Missile Crisis. In particular, the US Naval War College and the US Naval Institute played a key role as forums for these sailor-scholars.

At the forefront of this movement was a naval intelligence officer, Robert W. Herrick, who ignited a debate over Soviet naval strategy. Herrick insisted that Western analysts believed too much of Gorshkov’s propaganda and thereby helped to inflate the threat. Herrick, joined by others who were also steeped in open source literature, established the field of Soviet naval studies that proved so instrumental in understanding the threat throughout the 1970s and beyond. Their dissenting views emerged from the 1960s and would carry through to the debates of the 1970s over the nature of the Soviet Navy and the proper US responses.

**The Navy’s Think Tank**

The establishment of the Center for Naval Analyses in 1962 meant that there was now a federally funded think tank with a distinctly naval focus. The center traced its origins to the civilian scientists who pioneered the field of operations research on

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the German U-boat threat during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{5} The US Navy’s continuing need for operations research and systems analysis during the Cold War led to the formation of the Operations Evaluation Group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1945. The group worked directly for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), which had the analysts focus on, among other things, assessing Soviet future capabilities – particularly their anti-submarine warfare advancements to counter US submarines.\textsuperscript{6}

The cost to the Navy of wrong decisions on future weapons systems – complex systems like Polaris were a significant portion of the defence budget – and of inadequately preparing for Soviet naval developments spurred Admiral Arleigh Burke as the chief of naval operations to establish the Long-Range Studies Project in 1959. The project began as a small group of naval officers at the war college in Newport before adding civilian experts and moving to Cambridge, Massachusetts as the Institute of Naval Studies.\textsuperscript{7}

The Center for Naval Analyses resulted from the Secretary of the Navy’s decision to merge the Operations Evaluation Group with the Institute of Naval Studies. With the think tank’s establishment, the Navy Department had a single organization that would focus on both the short and long time horizons for highly technical issues as well as tactical- and strategic-level problems. The Center’s first major task came almost immediately as its analysts assisted with plans for the quarantine operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. It would then move onto providing support for naval operations in the Vietnam War. It also contributed to the evaluations of the operational effectiveness of the Navy’s hunter-killer groups to protect carriers from Soviet submarines.\textsuperscript{8}

By the late 1960s, the Center worked on strategic assessments that looked at a possible war at sea with the Soviets. This scenario was suddenly more pressing given the avowed intent from Gorshkov himself to challenge US supremacy with the emergence of a blue water navy.

\textsuperscript{8} Tidman, pp. 230-31, 247.
Initially, these assessments focused on a rerun of the World War II Battle of the Atlantic, this time against the emerging Soviet submarine threat. The appearance of the Backfire bomber [in the 1970s] and the introduction of new classes of large Soviet surface combatants were catalysts for more intricate scenarios. As a whole, these studies found that the fleet had made steady strides in coping with the submarine threat to US and allied ships.9

The center’s experts on Soviet naval doctrine came into their own in the early 1970s and were heavily engaged in the debates over the nature of the Soviet Navy and the meaning behind Gorshkov’s writings. Like the RAND analysts before them in the 1950s studying nuclear doctrine, those at the Center for Naval Analyses embraced a model of open source analysis combined with an open dialogue to arrive at what they believed was a better understanding of the Soviet naval threat.

**The Navy’s Home of Thought**

The intellectual landscape comprised of various branches of Soviet naval specialists began to take shape in the 1960s. Not surprisingly, current and former naval officers dominated this community of thinkers due to their obvious professional interest in the threat. In addition to the Center for Naval Analyses’ views, the Office of Naval Intelligence assessed Soviet Navy’s capabilities and intentions as they had since the early days in the Cold War.

In addition to the usual sources of technical intelligence and naval attachés, the Navy increasingly relied on scores of Russian linguists – military (including Naval Reserve support), civilian, and contractors – to exploit open source literature for developments in Soviet naval thought. In 1967, naval intelligence established an entire translation division to handle the volume of work that also included support to the war in Vietnam. By early 1970, the division regularly published and distributed through restricted government channels selected excerpts from *Morskoi Sbornik*, the digest of the Soviet Navy that senior naval leaders like Gorshkov used as their intellectual forum.10

Naval intelligence experts worked quietly behind the scenes and without recognition. For reasons of classification and their work providing operational intelligence to the Fleet, these analysts did not often play a visible and official role in

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public debates, except for the Director of Naval Intelligence. Nonetheless, a number of intelligence officers also pursued PhDs and thereby influenced the academic study of the Soviet Navy in international relations and other fields. Individuals with a background in naval intelligence and Russian studies proved integral to understanding the Soviet Navy as the Cold War progressed. Their experiences as naval attachés and staff officers in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to the views of these future leaders and leading thinkers within the US Navy.

For example, Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, director of naval intelligence from 1978-1982, served as an assistant naval attaché in Moscow in 1964. Shapiro was a Russian specialist who devoted his career to following the Soviet naval threat. At the dawn of the Reagan era, Shapiro emphasized that Gorshkov, who had been around since the early days of the Khrushchev era, should not be underestimated in what he could still accomplish with the Soviet Navy.¹¹ While a war college student in 1966, then-Commander Shapiro put his Russian language and analytical skills to use. He used his research paper, ‘The Soviet Naval Officer’, to educate the Navy on the value of open source literature in providing insights into their adversary. Shapiro walked readers of the Naval War College Review through the personnel issues raised in recent Morskoi Sbornik articles. According to Shapiro, numerous articles reflected Soviet leaders’ efforts to keep the focus on the human dimension of naval warfare during a time of a ‘revolution in military affairs’ and increased attention on technology and advanced weapons.¹²

Shapiro used these articles to highlight the political, professional, and personal qualities of Soviet naval officers that their American counterparts may never have considered or truly appreciated as important, yet were an integral part to understanding the Soviet Navy as a whole. He noted that the iron hand of the communist party that controlled naval personnel and the hardships and shortages within the Soviet system took their toll on an individual’s professional initiative and on their private lives.

Shapiro catalogued a lengthy list of shortcomings in professional knowledge and practical experience that, according to the Soviets, included outdated training, insufficient shipboard time, and a bare minimum proficiency in seamanship and ship

handling. He also covered serious leadership problems among officers that stemmed from a lack of initiative, decisiveness, discipline, and concern for subordinates. Gorshkov and other senior leaders were aware of this crisis by the mid-1960s and devoted a great deal of discussion in the military press to possible solutions.13 According to Shapiro, these leaders understood that these shortcomings were directly tied to combat readiness and would only be exacerbated by the rapid growth of the navy currently underway.

One of their most serious professional shortcomings was that Soviet naval officers did not have ‘the benefit of extensive operational experience since World War II’ compared with their American counterparts.14 One naval historian later pointed to a ‘young skipper’ problem that the Soviets themselves identified at the time.15 They realized that the inexperience of the younger generation of officers – many in the early 30s – had serious operational implications. These shortcomings would be somewhat mitigated by participation in more exercises and global operations, Shapiro noted, but effects would linger for years.

Shapiro concluded that a generational transformation was taking place among the younger officers. He claimed that a sudden change in their demeanor was characterized by ‘what can only be described as a “blue water look”’.16 These future leaders of the Soviet Navy were anxious to quickly learn to meet the demands of modern naval warfare. However, Shapiro was not optimistic for their chance of success. He concluded that these officers would have in the way of their progress, as always, the obstacle of the ‘stifling effect of party control in the navy’.17

Sumner Shapiro’s article was a remarkable step forward in American perceptions of the Soviet Navy in the 1960s. It broke new ground in its efforts to humanize the Soviet naval threat and to understand the psychology and motivations of the Russians without resorting to the usual rhetoric and mirror-imaging that was so prevalent at the time. Most important, Shapiro relied on Soviet evaluations of their own systemic problems while at the same time carefully weighing the truthfulness of

13 Ibid., p. 51.
14 Ibid., p. 75.
16 Shapiro, p. 79. See also Sumner Shapiro, 'The Blue Water Soviet Naval Officer', Proceedings, 97.2 (1971), 19-26.
17 Shapiro, 'Soviet Naval Officer', p. 79.
and impact of these revelations. His article also underscored that Cold War navies were truly a reflection of the societies and ideologies that produced them.

The Naval War College played a unique role in American naval thought in the 1960s. A core group of thinkers in Newport worked to ‘define with semantic precision the nature of naval strategy for modern warfare and to put in writing the core of what senior naval officers should understand intuitively and be prepared to develop into practical, operationally sound strategic plans for naval forces’. US views of the growing Soviet naval threat and the demands of being a Cold War sea power invariably made its way into their writings.

The group’s contributions to naval strategy centered on the theory of control. German-born historian Herbert Rosinski, who lectured on sea power and strategy at the war college, defined strategy in 1955 as ‘the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to obtain broad objectives’. However, Rosinski’s views on Soviet naval ambitions and their implications would remain a matter of speculation:

Rosinski’s untimely death in 1962 coincided with the dramatic rise in Soviet naval and maritime power. Had he lived he might well have joined with those contemporary writers and observers who ascribe a Mahan-Corbett lens to Admiral Gorshkov’s view of sea power and the role of navies in the late twentieth century. We can be certain that Rosinski would not have assumed such a lens. He would have analyzed Soviet actions and pronouncements before arriving at such a conclusion.

Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, the expert logistician from World War II, was part of the group. Eccles analysed the threat in 1969 for a Naval War College Review article in which he closely tied recent strategic thinking to the Soviet Navy. He determined that Russian expansion in all the major maritime spheres – to include naval, merchant, and fishing – constituted a significant and underestimated threat to US national interests. Marxist ideology, Russian nationalism, an expanding technological and economic base, and a ‘firm grasp of the fundamentals of strategy’

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18 Hattendorf, Evolution, p. 5.
further enhanced the Soviet Union’s application of maritime power.\textsuperscript{22} In turn, Eccles called for policy solutions grounded in ‘conceptual unity and coherence’ that reflected the ‘Rosinski concept of strategy being the art of control’.\textsuperscript{23}

Eccles’ most cogent and prescient insight was that the ‘equivocal nature of this threat’ would result in debates over how to counter Soviet maritime expansion. Part of Soviet strategy, he argued, was to skillfully play to this ‘diversity’ of opinion over policies and resources in the West by ‘attacking the decision processes of the opponents, and applying equivocal threats’.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, this strategy required a delicate balance between outright aggression and intentional obfuscation. Eccles noted that a potential flaw in the Russians’ approach was that they may yet miscalculate and overplay their hand by overhyping the threat, thereby making it ‘so unequivocal as to exert a unifying influence in our domestic wrangles and may also unify our allies. But, in most cases, we can expect the threat to be equivocal enough to divide both domestic and international opinion’.\textsuperscript{25}

Rear Admiral Joseph Caldwell (J. C.) Wylie was also influenced by Rosinski’s thinking on cumulative and sequential strategies. He authored the most famous work of the control theory school in 1967, \textit{Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control}. Wylie offered the vocabulary that, in his view, was lacking in the Navy’s discussions on strategy to date. His theory centered on generic references to ‘the enemy’. He had long maintained that ‘the aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy’.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, Wylie emphasized knowing the enemy’s perspective: ‘… it would appear that a fairly careful scrutiny of the opponent’s thought patterns and their underlying assumptions should be an early component of our own planning process. If we could deliberately make his theory invalid we have gone a long way toward making his actions ineffective.’\textsuperscript{27} In his commentary on the Gorshkov series of articles published in 1974, Wylie stressed that they were a ‘rare glimpse into the mind

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
of a very important man.'²⁸ He encouraged his fellow naval thinkers to get into the mind of their chief rival strategist.

Wylie may have been the US Navy’s ‘leading public strategist of the 1950s and ’60s’, however he did not lead the way in public dialogues on the Soviet Navy.²⁹ Indeed, his writings rarely discussed the rivalry, aside from the aforementioned commentary on the Gorshkov series. Another rare exception was his 1969 article that featured a brief case study of the US Sixth Fleet’s response during the Six Day War in June 1967. The control Wylie emphasized during a Middle East crisis was that of the signals sent to allies and adversaries. During this tense period, the Sixth Fleet carefully tailored its ship movements to signal the US intent to stay on the sidelines while under close observation by Soviet ships in the eastern Mediterranean.³⁰

Wylie underscored the importance of not taking military action in order to prevent misperceptions and potential escalation, especially when naval forces were in close proximity in a volatile environment. He argued that the signaling strategy worked as intended because the Sixth Fleet played its crucial role in US foreign policy. ‘While it is a highly effective combatant force,’ Wylie noted, ‘the Sixth Fleet is also a most sensitive and responsive diplomatic tool’.³¹ Wylie’s observations highlighted that the mission of naval diplomacy was becoming more central for both superpower navies as well as the focus of much policy and scholarly attention during the 1970s.

The Naval War College addressed the Soviet Navy in its curricula and publications throughout the 1960s. A dominant theme was the implications of the expansion of Soviet sea power in the Mediterranean. Lecturers began to cite Admiral Gorshkov as he increasingly became the face and voice of the Soviet naval power to the West. For example, the 1964-65 lectures on ‘The Soviet Military Structure’ referenced Gorshkov’s struggles within the Soviet military hierarchy as he tried to modernize the navy. The lecturer stated that, ‘[Gorshkov] has endured public sarcasm from such notables as Marshal Sokolovsky [author of 1962’s Military Strategy] who reportedly once asked the good admiral how it felt to be a member of an obsolete

²⁸ Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, p. 110.
²⁹ Hattendorf, Evolution, p. 262.
³¹ Ibid., p. 60.
service’. The lecture further noted that Gorshkov had made ‘a strong case’ in Pravda for a larger share of defence funds ‘and the continued viability of the Soviet Navy in the nuclear age […] Traditionally the Navy does not do well in the Soviet budget fight’. American naval officers in the audience likely identified with their Soviet counterparts, at least on the issue of budget battles and inter-service rivalries as a universal one for all navies to justify the costly expenditures.

In addition to annual lectures on Soviet sea power by staff intelligence officers, war college students heard presentations on Soviet naval history and strategy. These were similar to one in the 1950s but with less emphasis on the more narrow submarine threat like in World War II and more on the Soviet Navy as a global and nuclear force. Captain Franklin G. Babbitt’s lecture in 1969 mainly focused on Russian naval history because ‘the past is prologue’. The Soviet Navy believed this as well, he pointed out, because, ‘in recent years the Soviets have themselves increasingly acknowledged such debts to their tsarist predecessors’. Babbitt, a former assistant naval attaché in Moscow, used the history lesson to underscore that the Russian desire for great power status – specifically the use of their navy as a foreign policy tool – was merely a continuation of a long-held ambition. The appearance of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean and warm water ports elsewhere, Babbitt warned, meant that the US was ‘not viewing a transitory condition’.

Given the war college’s mission, strategy received considerable attention in lectures and student papers. Retired Captain Carl H. Amme Jr’s lecture in 1969 reflected the growing concern over Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Navy had adopted a ‘strategically defensive role’ to protect Russia’s flank in waters adjacent to Soviet gains in Europe, according to Amme, while it would use a

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32 Carl D. Peterson, Col USAF, ‘Soviet Military Structure’, (2 March 1964), NHC, RG 15 Lectures, Box 35, Folder 23, p. 34.
33 Carl D. Peterson, Col USAF, ibid. (23 February 1965), RG 15, Box 36, Folder 18, pp. 48-49.
‘somewhat more offensive strategy’ to expand Soviet influence in the Middle East.\(^{38}\) He further described the Soviet strategy to use its expanding maritime power to outflank ‘Western containment’ strategies in the region. He also took the view that, while the Soviet Union’s ‘subversive’ policies may have been politically and psychologically frustrating for the US, they were entirely within the bounds of international law. Indeed, these were the same actions that the Sixth Fleet pursued, he argued. ‘The breakout of the Soviet Navy from its geographical maritime confinement under the international principle of “freedom of the seas” – a principle staunchly defended by the United States – is merely to adopt time-honored practices that court little risk except in time of war’.\(^{39}\)

Captain Amme’s article appeared in a special edition of the *Naval War College Review* in June 1969. ‘Sea Power: A New Rival’ had a cover that prominently featured the new Soviet helicopter carrier, the *Moskva*, on patrol in the eastern Mediterranean. The issue showed that the US Navy fully recognized the emerging rivalry by the late 1960s. Naval War College president, Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, wrote in his introduction that, with the ‘truly phenomenal’ expansion of Soviet sea power, the US now faced ‘a worthy rival, competent on the sea and effective in its mission, growing in capability and ambition’.\(^{40}\) Colbert was most concerned about the Soviet rise at a time of American decline:

> The modern, innovative Soviet Navy and blossoming merchant marine have entered the arena with a huge but partly obsolescent US line of battle and a commercial fleet which, in the main, must be characterized as decrepit. Where the Soviet maritime policy has been unified and assertive, the comparable US approach has been divided and uncertain.\(^{41}\)

The volume explored the nature of the rivalry as a ‘nonbelligerent, cold war competition’ with a focus on the various aspects of Soviet sea power: naval, merchant, fishing, oceanographic research, and diplomacy. Numerous authors made the point that the new Soviet merchant and fishing vessels were easily re-tasked for military missions under control of the state, such as logistics and intelligence gathering. In that sense, the projection of sea power, as Colbert defined it, was much


\(^{40}\) Richard G. Colbert, Vice Admiral, US Navy, 'Challenge!', ibid., 1-3 (p. 1).

\(^{41}\) Ibid., p. 2.
more unified in the Soviet system than the American one. Admiral Gorshkov would make the same forceful argument within the decade in *The Sea Power of the State*.

The special rivalry volume included a review of Soviet maritime and naval capabilities by a professor and retired submarine commander, Edward L. Beach. Captain Beach was the winner of the Navy Cross in 1945 and the best selling author of the novel *Run Silent, Run Deep* in 1955. He proposed that, unencumbered by a legacy of Mahan-fostered concepts of control of the sea through a clash of opposing battle fleets, Soviet naval development was instead driven by the simple need to exist as a ‘fleet in being’, albeit one that was not confined to port but was free to roam the seas. ‘One could argue that it is this which has given rise to the “defensive” theory of the Soviet Navy, that this is responsible for the fact that the Soviets apparently see no requirement to match the Western fleets ship for ship, either in kind or number, and that therefore the Soviet Navy is not a threat to free world stability’. To the contrary, Beach argued, it was the US and other free world navies that had to defend the status quo. Beach also dismissed the view that a lack of aircraft carriers meant that the Soviet Navy was defensively oriented – countering Commander Robert Herrick’s thesis in *Soviet Naval Strategy*. This was true until a few years ago when, Beach countered, the Soviet Navy’s deeds and words proclaimed that it intended to go anywhere and to strike any target of its choosing.

Clearly not one to shy away from engaging an enemy, Captain Beach instead adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the Soviet naval threat. The proper response, he wrote, was for the US to adopt a ‘cool rational outlook’ and see where the course of becoming a major sea power took the Russians: ‘[t]he Soviet Union is barely beginning to experience some of the problems with which the rest of the maritime world has been coping for a long time’. Calling it ‘broadening’, Beach concluded that it would be beneficial for Soviet sailors and merchantmen, like those of other major navies, to experience the price of sea power such as hurricanes and the frustrations associated with port visits and local laws.

Beach’s assessment was most notable for his attempt to put the rise of the Soviet Navy into perspective for its American naval audience. The answer was not more threat inflation or alarmism, he warned; ‘[i]t cannot be that Russians are so

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42 Edward L. Beach, 'An Appraisal of Soviet Maritime-Naval Capabilities', ibid., 15-25 (pp. 20-21).
43 Ibid., p. 22.
44 Ibid., p. 24.
diabolically clever as we have been in the habit of painting them. Some of the maneuvers which to us have seemed so much to their advantage and so much against ours must really have been accidental or fortuitous; some of ours must occasionally seem pretty smart to them’. Beach also cautioned that it was ‘wrong to credit the Soviet Navy with superhuman perception because of its undeniable success in causing us concern’. 45

Indeed, Captain Beach was one of a vocal group of naval officers who questioned whether the threat was being exaggerated in attempts to explain the rapid growth of Soviet naval and maritime forces. It is further remarkable that they voiced these concerns in the Navy’s own professional literature. This group also included a civilian academic (a Princeton PhD) and naval reservist, Lieutenant Commander Benton V. Davis, who offered his interpretation of Soviet sea power through a geopolitical lens. His 1968 *Naval War College Review* article argued that Soviet naval and maritime grand strategy was, in fact, a ‘sophisticated synthesis’ of Mahan’s and Mackinder’s strategic views in a unique historical circumstance.46

Like Beach, Davis duly noted that what was being studied and debated was the perceived threat of the Soviet Navy and all the possible distortions those perceptions produced. Davis concluded that it was simply the nature of studying Soviet behavior during the Cold War and it was now the turn of Soviet sea power to attract the interest of professional and amateur ‘Kremlinologists’. He used a quote by Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, a naval historian and editor of the US Naval Academy’s alumni magazine, to illustrate this view:

> The Soviet Merchant Marine and the Soviet maritime “threat” have lately become popular subjects. One can pick up almost any periodical from *Time* to government handouts and find a piece in which the author is either wringing his hands, searching for a scapegoat, or trying to figure out what the Soviets are up to next using their new found might upon the seas to our disadvantage.47

Davis further noted that there was, in fact, a ‘spectrum of anxieties/unconcerns with respect to the possibility of a growing Soviet sea threat inimical to US interests’.48 These views ranged from the fear of the loss of American naval dominance to the belief that the growth of Soviet naval capabilities posed no special

48 Ibid., p. 2.
threat. In the middle of the spectrum was the view, according to Davis, that, ‘although the USSR is clearing making a determined and powerful bid to become the world’s dominant maritime and naval nation, there is still time for the United States effectively to counter this bid if decisive action is taken promptly’. Indeed, the majority of analysts and observers eventually occupied this middle ground in the coming years: the US must take steps to counter the Soviet naval threat before it was ‘too late’. However, if the US was in a long-term naval competition with the Soviets, the Navy was also competing with other domestic and national security budget priorities during the Vietnam War.

Like the Naval War College Review, the content of the US Naval Institute Proceedings reflected the growing concern over the transformation of the Soviet Navy. Both publications saw a marked increase in the number of articles on the Soviet Navy as a major topic of discussion and debate. Prior to 1963, the war college’s publication had only one article specifically devoted to the Soviet Navy. It saw a surge of interest in the 1960s (see Figure 1) in articles on Soviet or Russian naval history, naval strategy, and sea power. Proceedings was a sounding board for views on the Soviet naval threat, as well as a barometer for interest in the subject, which began to spike in 1967 (see Figure 2). Issued on a more frequent (monthly) basis than the quarterly Naval War College Review, the Naval Institute’s publication featured a broad range of articles on all aspects of Soviet sea power. Topics included history, maritime issues such as merchant shipping and fishing; shipbuilding and new platforms such as the Moskva helicopter-carrying heavy cruiser; the growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and the Arctic; and new capabilities such as amphibious landings and fleet logistics.

Writers in Proceedings, most of them current or former naval officers, also took an interest in personnel issues, such as officer training and the character of their leaders, to get at a deeper understanding of the Soviet Navy. Proceedings featured a

49 Ibid.
52 C. P. Lemieux, 'Soviet Officer Training', ibid., 90.742 (1964), 137-39; William C. Chapman, Captain, US Navy, 'Soviet Military Correspondence and Evening Courses', ibid., 90.742 (1964), 140-
Figure 1. Articles in Naval War College Review on the Soviet Navy

Figure 2. Articles in US Naval Institute Proceedings on the Soviet Navy


number of articles on the rise of Soviet sea power and what it portended for the US Navy. It is worth noting that Commander Robert Herrick was not the only American naval officer who argued that the Soviet Navy was strategically defensive and called for a more informed perspective on its ambitions. Commander H. G. Dudley, a destroyer commander and Naval War College graduate, wrote that, ‘… the Soviet Navy would seem prepared to wage the hottest of wars. Yet, for the foreseeable future, we can expect their Navy’s role to be offensive in Cold War and defensive in hot’.\(^{54}\) For Dudley, the key determinant of the Soviet naval threat was the hard line between war and peace. He concluded that ‘[t]he primary mission of Soviet naval forces in wartime is most likely the defense of the water approaches to the Soviet Union’.\(^{55}\)

Dudley’s position was, in fact, one that many other Soviet naval watchers took over the years, especially on the employment of its strategic missile submarine forces. It was also supported by reports that the Soviet Union had a mysterious new concept called the ‘blue belt of defence’, first announced by Defence Minister Marshal Malinovsky in April 1966. It was later determined to be a reference to the use of Soviet naval power, especially its new Polaris-type submarines (\textit{Yankees}) and other submarines, land-based naval aviation, and surface naval forces to encircle the Soviet Union.\(^{56}\) Western analysts would later postulate that forward deployed \textit{Yankees} with newly developed R-27K tactical ballistic missiles (NATO name SS-NX-13) were anti-ship weapons intended to target US carrier task forces, or possibly even employed against US submarines. However, these SLBMs never became operational due to 1972 SALT limitations whereby the Soviets gave priority to strategic over tactical ballistic missile numbers.\(^{57}\)

\textit{Robert Herrick and the Influence of Soviet Naval Strategy}

Robert Waring Herrick was one of the US Navy’s few experts on the Soviet Navy by the mid-1950s with both an academic background and intelligence


\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 48.


experience with the subject. After World War II, Herrick transitioned into the intelligence field with Russian language study followed by a tour in the Office of Naval Intelligence’s foreign branch. His next career moves cemented his future as a central and controversial figure in Soviet naval studies.

Herrick was one of Sovietologist Philip Mosely’s graduate students at Columbia University’s prestigious Russian Institute. The institute was one of America’s ‘extraordinary training programs’ in Soviet studies that evolved from the Office of Strategic Services model for interdisciplinary research during World War II that continued into the Cold War.58 Herrick fulfilled the coursework requirements for a PhD in international law and relations in 1954 and continued working on his dissertation until its completion in 1965.59

Herrick’s assignment as an assistant naval attaché in Moscow from late 1954 until 1957 proved crucial to his views on the Soviet Navy. Unusual for a Western student of Russian culture and history at the time, Herrick was able to travel widely in the Soviet Union to see its navy’s ships and meet its personnel, including the new and youthful commander-in-chief, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov.60 Most significant for his intellectual development was the opportunity to read the ‘voluminous’ naval literature and to amass a large library of open source materials unavailable in the West. According to Herrick, his early recognition of the Soviet system of ‘surrogate writing’ made it much more transparent to him what the Soviet Navy was thinking.61 The Center for Naval Analyses, Herrick’s future employer, also used surrogates as a window into Soviet intentions. The center defined it as ‘the Soviet practice of deliberate mirror imaging’ in their military literature that employed ‘foreign surrogates for their own views, capabilities, and military options’.62

Commander Herrick ended his naval career with academic and staff assignments at the Naval War College in the early 1960s. Herrick went to Newport as a student in the junior and senior courses and as the staff intelligence officer for three years as he finished his dissertation.63 He routinely briefed the latest Soviet naval developments as part of his duties. While everyone else fixated on submarines,

59 Herrick and Winkler, p. 4.
60 Ibid., p. 9.
61 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
63 Herrick and Winkler, p. 15.
Herrick recalled, he took a broader and more historically based view of the Soviet naval threat. In particular, he was appalled by the annual lecture on Soviet sea power in early 1963 that was, in his words, a ‘they're-coming-to-get-us’ pitch and ‘just kowtowing to the party line’. Herrick was referring to the standard lecture given since the early 1950s, with periodic updates, to war college students. The lecture began with an overview of Russian naval history before discussing the Soviet submarine threat in great detail.

Commander Charles Anderson, a naval aviator, gave the presentation to which Herrick so strenuously objected. Though Herrick took issue with Anderson’s characterization of Soviet naval thought, the lecture itself was quite even keeled, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Anderson concluded that the Soviet Union had become a sea power, ‘but not yet of sufficient stature to challenge the United States’ position of preeminence’. Moreover, the numerous Soviet submarines in wartime would pose a ‘very real challenge’ for the US Navy, however there was ‘an unknown quantity about them. The Soviet Union doesn’t have experience in the offensive use of submarines, and whether or not the upper echelon has truly broken away from emphasis on use of the navy as a defensive instrument is uncertain’.

Robert Herrick, on the other hand, was certain of the specific nature of the Soviet naval threat but first he had to get the US Navy to listen. To that end, he volunteered to give the Soviet sea power lecture for the next two years. Herrick’s version reflected his decade-long research and incorporated several chapters of his dissertation. Hanson W. Baldwin, a Naval Academy graduate like Herrick, was in the audience for the first lecture in 1963. Baldwin had been watching the Soviet Navy since the late 1940s as the military editor for the *New York Times* and was a regular at the war college’s strategy discussions, as well as being a friend of Arleigh Burke.

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64 Ibid.
Herrick later recalled that Baldwin told him at the time, "'You know Herrick that I disagree with you.' I merely replied: 'Yes I know Sir,' and left the podium'.

While Baldwin did not publish his thoughts on Herrick’s lecture, the two analysts were, in fact, in broad agreement with each other. Baldwin wrote in April 1963 that the Soviet Navy, while making progress to narrow the gap, still lagged far behind the US Navy in submarine technology and capabilities, especially in light of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the continuing difficulties with its nuclear submarine fleet. ‘[T]he Soviet Navy’s primary role today appears to be … a defensive role,’ he noted. In Baldwin’s view, however, the naval ‘defensive war’ was being pushed farther out to sea away from Soviet shores, and not primarily focused on close-in zone defence as Herrick maintained.

More significant, Herrick’s presentation apparently did not please his Navy superiors. According to Herrick, the president of the Naval War College gave him a dressing down while the deputy director of naval intelligence implied that his controversial views impacted his promotion chances. A chastised Herrick chose to retire instead. The author of a sensationalized account of the US Navy wrote that, for the admirals, ‘[Herrick’s] words fell like bombs. It was heresy’. To be sure, while not yet full-fledged heretic, Herrick’s lectures certainly established his reputation as a dissenter from his service’s prevailing views.

What did Commander Herrick say that was so shocking? His study of the Soviet Navy’s history, its leaders’ pronouncements and debates in the professional literature, as well as his own analysis of its force structure and capabilities, led him to conclude that the Soviet Navy was a strategically defensive and deterrent force. Indeed, without aircraft carriers, no truly offensive strategy was possible for the Soviet Navy. For Herrick, the Soviet Union’s unbalanced, inferior navy that lacked both surface striking forces and blue water-based airpower resulted in the adoption of a ‘fatally defective naval strategy’. Herrick pointed out that Admiral Gorshkov had his hands full in coping with both the anti-carrier and anti-Polaris missions, therefore

68 Herrick and Winkler, p. 16.
70 Herrick and Winkler, p. 16.
72 Robert W. Herrick, CDR, USN, 'USSR--Seapower's Challenge', (6 January 1964), NHC, RG 14, Box 56, p. 16.
even a ‘sound concept for defense of the USSR’s maritime frontiers’ had thus far proved elusive.\textsuperscript{73}

In addition to his own research, Robert Herrick was also strongly influenced by his discussions with the Soviet naval defector, Nicholas Shadrin, who began to give his own war college lectures during the same period.\textsuperscript{74} Shadrin, a Baltic Fleet destroyer captain formerly known as Nikolai F. Artamonov, had defected in 1959 and became intimately involved in the world of Soviet naval studies and its analysts as well as Cold War espionage and its spies. Herrick had been one of Shadrin’s debriefers from the Office of Naval Intelligence. He credited Shadrin with filling in some knowledge gaps in the historical narrative, saving him from ‘several egregious misinterpretations’ in the draft of his dissertation, and, in general, ‘confirm[ing] the fact that the Navy was defensive’.\textsuperscript{75} ‘Nick’ Shadrin would later go on to get his own doctorate on the Soviet Navy in 1972. However, he never waded as deeply as Herrick into the contentious debate over the Soviet Navy’s nature, other than his emphasis on the defensive zones closest to Soviet shores as the most critical and strongest.\textsuperscript{76}

Shadrin was an important link and resource for Soviet naval analysts for many years before his disappearance in 1975 while acting as a double agent for the US and was presumed dead.\textsuperscript{77}

Herrick’s sea power lectures in Newport were a milder version of his defensive thesis that grew more explicit over the next few years.\textsuperscript{78} While naval leaders may have disagreed with Herrick’s conclusions, they did not silence him, nor did anyone openly object until the publication of his first book. The war college staff continued to help him in his scholarly pursuits.\textsuperscript{79} In October 1964, Herrick participated in a prestigious academic conference in Munich on the Soviet Union’s military-technical revolution (or the Revolution in Military Affairs as it became widely known in the West). Herrick declared in his presentation that, ‘despite the application of modern nuclear and missile technology to the Soviet Navy, the

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Hurt, pp. 111-12.
\textsuperscript{78} Only Herrick’s 1964 lecture on Soviet sea power is available in the NHC archives.
\textsuperscript{79} Herrick, \textit{Soviet Naval Strategy}, p. xix.
strategies for its employment in cold and hot war are, respectively, deterrent and defensive rather than war-winning and offensive, as proclaimed by most Western publicists and widely accepted by the general public'.

Thus, the Navy afforded their renegade thinker the opportunity as a doctoral candidate to be associated with the leading scholars on the Soviet Union and to have his paper published in the conference’s edited volume. The *Naval War College Review* also published Herrick’s presentation in December 1964.

There were two distinct elements to Robert Herrick’s scholarship. The first was his contribution to the historical understanding of the Soviet Navy in the interwar period. His analysis of Soviet naval strategy after the Russian Revolution, thanks to his unique access to open source literature, was groundbreaking. He concluded that the strategy was cyclical and shaped by a combination of political-ideological determinations, economic necessities, and general attitudes toward naval power by communist party and army leaders. In the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet naval strategy vacillated between Old School thinking – a holdover from the Tsarist navy based on the tenets of Mahan and Corbett such as command of the sea and balanced fleets – and the Young School, which embraced *guerre de course*, with submarines and naval air as its main striking elements. The Young School was influenced by the French *Jeune Ecole* school. By 1937, according to Herrick, Joseph Stalin adopted a neo-Old School approach, even making plans to build carriers and battleships before being derailed by the Second World War and its aftermath.

However, it was the second element of Herrick’s analysis – his conclusions on postwar naval power – where the controversy arose. He applied the Old and Young School historical patterns to contemporary Soviet naval strategy and declared that it was ‘not “something new under the sun” brought about by the revolution in military affairs. Rather, it [was] a cheap wine of the Young School in the impressively designed and decorated bottles of the nuclear and missile age’. Moreover, Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s enthusiasm for a less costly, neo-Young School navy, centered around submarines, demanded ‘a strategically defensive naval strategy [that]

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82 Herrick, 'The Effect on Soviet Naval Strategy', p. 32.
renounces all future possibility of gaining and exercising command of the sea outside of the coastal areas that lie within range of shore-based air power. Only ‘Soviet publicists’ and Western writers, Herrick declared, believed that such a flawed strategy could ever be called offensive.

The publication of *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice* in 1968 marked the opening round of the debate over the nature of the Soviet Navy that was to last for more than a decade. The reactions to Robert Herrick’s book merit further consideration. Indeed, the receptiveness to or rejection of Herrick’s ideas proved to be an intellectual benchmark of American naval thought throughout a crucial period of the rivalry.

*Soviet Naval Strategy* was essentially an updated and expanded version of Herrick’s Columbia dissertation. As Herrick described the book effort, he ‘really laid it on in great detail’. However, those details caused quite a bit of consternation for the publisher, the US Naval Institute, which was established as independent forum for ‘the exchange of ideas’ on American sea power since 1873. Frank Uhlig Jr, an editor at the institute, knew Herrick personally. Uhlig was himself an early convert to the study of the Soviet Navy and was one of the first to publish on the topic in 1952. He first published Herrick’s work as the chapter ‘A View of Soviet Naval Strategy’ in the *1967 Naval Review*. Herrick once again stated his ‘no carriers, no contest’ conclusion that made for a ‘fundamental, qualitative’ difference between the two superpower navies and forced the Soviets into a defensive naval posture. Thus, the Naval Institute had already published Herrick’s dissenting views before *Soviet Naval Strategy* ever came out.

Nonetheless, the institute’s board of directors took issue with Herrick’s book. The board initially approved the manuscript for publication in October 1966, according to a memorandum by the editorial director. After the board’s approval, the newest board member, a Navy captain assigned to the Office of the Secretary of

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83 Ibid., p. 42.
84 Ibid., p. 50.
85 Herrick and Winkler, p. 16.
87 Frank Uhlig Jr, interviewed by author, 17 May 2012.
Defense, raised objections in January 1967 to Herrick’s main argument. He delayed the book’s publication until the board had a chance to review the book ‘in some detail’. Furthermore, the board of directors indicated to the editorial board that ‘some steps should be taken to ensure that the author’s conclusions not be given more weight than the thought of any individual writer deserved, and the wisdom of publishing the book as it existed was questioned further’.

To satisfy the captain’s concerns, the institute took the unprecedented step of issuing a disclaimer calling attention to the disagreement, yet ‘without unduly prejudicing Commander Herrick’s conclusions as an author’. The preface stated: ‘[t]hat his conclusions – forthrightly stated – are not shared by all thinkers on naval strategy will, of course, come as no surprise to the reader, for a rather wide range of conclusions may be drawn from the record’. It acknowledged that the board debated the meaning of ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ and whether the absence of Soviet aircraft carriers was the deciding factor.

The publisher further added that, while the board was not in unanimous agreement about Herrick’s conclusions, it ‘was unanimous in its decision to publish Commander Herrick’s book as a valuable reference work, a statement of one definitive point of view, and hence a useful catalyst for further study and analysis of the manner in which Soviet naval strategy is intended to further Soviet aims’. The institute also invited comments on the book to be submitted to its journal, Proceedings, to continue the discussion on Soviet naval strategy. Herrick, for his part, consented to the disclaimer, yet made it clear that he understood the motivations behind the decision. A New York Times article on the controversy in March 1968 quoted him as bluntly saying that, ‘[t]his current stress on the threat of the Soviet Navy is calculated to inspire appropriations and make exciting journalism’.

Soviet Naval Strategy featured essays by Admiral Arleigh Burke and Dr Raymond L. Garthoff, both eminently qualified experts on the Soviet threat and early supporters of Herrick’s research. Their contributions also suggested that the volume contained matters of import far beyond the publication of a bright naval officer’s dissertation. In the foreword, Burke offered his own views on Soviet naval

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92 Taylor.
93 Ibid.
94 Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, p. xi.
95 Ibid., pp. xi-xii.
development without endorsing or refuting Herrick’s thesis. He merely observed that, ‘[t]his analysis of Soviet naval capabilities and the author’s estimate of USSR intentions for their naval use are in accord with the prudent Soviet actions of the past’.97 Raymond Garthoff also applauded Herrick’s ‘important contribution’ to the field and his ‘courage to call his shots as he sees them’.98 Garthoff wrote that, ‘[w]hile not all will agree with [Herrick’s] conclusion that the Soviet naval strategy continues to be strategically defensive, anyone who is inclined to challenge this conclusion should first test his views against the data and argumentation in this study’.99

Herrick was uncompromising throughout the book in his stance that, without attack aircraft carriers, the Soviet Navy would remain primarily defensive in character.100 He repeated his earlier assertion that the Soviet Navy had such difficulties with its vital anti-carrier and anti-Polaris missions that, regardless of what their naval leaders such as Gorshkov proclaimed, even their defensive strategy was flawed. Herrick correctly assessed that the Soviets did not have an answer on how to counter Polaris. However, he erred in his assessment of the Soviet military literature on the anti-carrier mission. He labeled as propaganda the Soviet claims that nuclear-tipped missiles and torpedoes addressed the ‘organic defect’ of carriers and made them vulnerable.101 The larger message may have been to discredit US carriers but Herrick dismissed the truth behind the propaganda and the very real fears expressed by a weaker navy. The Soviets, as revealed decades later, had put that particular theory into frightening practice during the deployment of four Foxtrot submarines equipped with nuclear-tipped torpedoes during the Cuban Missile Crisis.102

A new addition to Herrick’s thesis was his discussion of Soviet naval propaganda and the role that perceptions played in magnifying the threat. He took issue with Western responses to Soviet claims of technological and operational superiority that further inflated the threat. He argued that these analyses distorted the true nature of the Soviet Navy:

98 Ibid., pp. xxiv-xxv.
100 Herrick, _Soviet Naval Strategy_, pp. 146-49.
101 Ibid., pp. 120-21.
Soviet naval propaganda has been extensively and successfully employed to hide the fact that of the USSR’s very great and potentially disastrous qualitative naval inferiority vis-a-vis the NATO naval forces. […] The failure of Western publicists not only to discredit such claims by refuting them with the readily available facts but to heap upon them the ridicule that they deserve all testifies to what purports to be a fundamentally ill-advised willingness to magnify the Soviet naval “threat” out of all proportions in order either to produce more sensational articles or to justify larger naval appropriations to a Congress and a public deemed incapable of understanding a reasoned appeal on the real facts of Soviet naval weakness and the advantages of keeping the lead in sea power that NATO now enjoys.103

Ultimately, Herrick’s strongly worded and fervently held positions on the Soviet Navy achieved what the institute’s board anticipated by stimulating debate within American naval circles. For some months afterward, the pages of Proceedings carried numerous reviews, both for and against, Herrick’s conclusions.104 Book reviews in academic journals over the next year also carried on an extensive debate on the topic.105 All agreed that Herrick made a valuable contribution to scholarship and noted that his critics could not ignore the specific evidence in his book. Most found he presented a compelling case that a strategically defensive Soviet Navy was true in the past, but they wondered how much that stance still held true for the current period of outward expansion. Thus, Herrick made a persuasive argument without being entirely convincing, especially in light of a new forward deployed Soviet strategy.

Some readers broadly agreed with Herrick but took issue with specific aspects of his argument. Lieutenant Commander David Cox, a PhD candidate at Tufts University, found that Herrick’s conclusion that Soviet naval strategy was deterrent and defensive was ‘basically correct’, but he did not draw a sharp enough distinction in the Soviet Navy’s missions in nuclear, general, and limited wars.106 Cox argued that, regardless of Gorshkov’s boasts to the contrary, Soviet forces were ‘a poor

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second even for use in general war conditions for which it had been designed. It is even more poorly equipped and prepared for limited or local warfare’.\textsuperscript{107}

In addition, the vaunted ability of the Mediterranean squadron to support Soviet foreign policy aims, according to Cox, was still debatable and needed further study. Moreover, the most likely reason that the Soviet Union’s defensive naval forces now stood farther out to sea in the eastern Med was ‘to counter the increased range of Western naval weapons. The weapons of greatest concern were the fast carrier strike force and the Polaris submarine’.\textsuperscript{108} The biggest threat, Cox concluded, was the Soviet Navy’s use as

an instrument for the projection of Soviet power and influence abroad [is the area where] the possibility of a direct Soviet-American confrontation is most apparent. Such a confrontation would very likely result not from a carefully calculated move by the Soviet Union, but rather from a miscalculation. It is for such an eventuality that American naval thinking should be prepared.\textsuperscript{109}

In Robert Herrick’s case, the marketplace for ideas worked as intended. He got his message out with the assistance of the Naval War College and the Naval Institute, both of whom performed their function as key facilitators of American naval thought. Competing views soon arrived and a multi-year debate began, while more nuanced views of the threat could already be found in the pages of professional literature. In that mission, all parties succeeded. No doubt Herrick was passionate in his beliefs, yet he was not as unorthodox or an outlier in his views as normally portrayed.

\textit{Conclusion}

Numerous writers throughout the Cold War acknowledged the obviously defensive nature of the Soviet Navy. It was often the more casual observers of Soviet naval affairs in the media or politicians that attributed the most offensive and ominous intentions to the Red Fleet. Yet the US Navy was not above leveraging the Soviet submarines threat to their advantage. They used the threat to argue for an increased budget since the early Cold War. However, the practice was not yet as blatant and heavily politicized to the degree that Herrick claimed. Nonetheless, the Soviet Navy’s

\textsuperscript{107} Cox, ‘Sea Power’, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
rapid modernization gave American naval leaders and its supporters a useful platform from which to argue for sustaining US naval superiority by reversing any decline.

Commander Herrick’s book received attention because of its uncompromising tone and timing as well as its groundbreaking scholarship. He came on the scene just as the Soviet Navy was undergoing a strategic sea change. In its deliberations, the Naval Institute’s board noted that Soviet naval forces seemed to be shifting from a continental to a global orientation. Indeed, Herrick was writing just as the Soviet Navy adopted a more aggressive, forward leaning posture in its presence missions, which pointed to greater blue water ambitions. As a result, Herrick’s defensive thesis appeared out of sync with current events. Nonetheless, he was fundamentally correct in his call for clearer perspectives on Soviet propaganda that disguised fundamental weaknesses in their naval forces. Admiral Gorshkov’s writing campaign for Western consumption was just beginning and would soon become a driving force behind US perceptions throughout the 1970s.

Robert Herrick was riding the bow wave of attention on the Soviet Navy that grew with each passing year. Other thinkers emerged after he made his forceful stand. Some echoed his views while others directly challenged them. Herrick continued to make significant contributions to Soviet naval studies for the remainder of his career. His legacy from *Soviet Naval Strategy* was to underscore the importance of carefully studying what the Soviets claimed in their professional writings and their propaganda. Moreover, he stressed that understanding the Soviet Navy was not only about comparing theory versus practice. It was also an analytical exercise in matching words to deeds, capabilities to intentions, and even fantasy to reality in the Cold War rivalry.

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CHAPTER 2 Gorshkov and Soviet Naval Ambitions (1963-1969)

The flag of the Soviet navy now proudly flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the US will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas.

- Admiral Sergei Gorshkov

By 1968, the Soviet Navy’s expansion and modernization, together with a growing global presence, seemed to confirm that all the dire warnings about the threat were finally coming true. The Red Fleet assumed the role of aggressor in American naval thought that had been forecast for so long. A driving force behind this perception was the words of the Soviet commander-in-chief. Yet beyond all of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov’s declarations, there were still unanswered questions about the Soviet Navy’s primary purpose, such as — what was it for? The Soviet Navy had arrived on the global scene in a dramatic way, but what was its strategic direction?

Admiral Gorshkov, whose writings became increasingly available in the US, provided clues to the expansion plan as part of his messaging aimed at both Soviet and Western audiences. In the midst of his usual bluster about Soviet strengths and American weaknesses was also candor about how far the Soviet Navy still had to go in order to match the US Navy’s combat readiness and operational effectiveness. Gorshkov conveyed the message that he expected the West to take the Soviet Navy’s new capabilities seriously and for the post-Khrushchev Soviet state to acknowledge that the investment in its new naval power was well founded.

The Soviet Navy no longer posed just a submarine threat by the mid-1960s. It became a multi-dimensional force that signaled a potential change in the naval balance as well as an expanding overseas presence that not only aggressively challenged US naval forces but also directly threatened vital US national security interests in key regions such as the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. As such, perceptions of the Soviet Navy moved from the sole preserve of experts and into the broader policy and media realms. It also increasingly became an issue for domestic political debates as well as a topic of research by think tanks and outside interest groups. The common thread in all the discussions was that the US Navy was losing its

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edge to its more ambitious Soviet counterpart. Admiral Gorshkov proved only too happy to encourage this view.

*Gorshkov on Soviet Naval Ambitions*

1968 proved to be a watershed year for more than just Robert Herrick’s controversial book, *Soviet Naval Strategy*. Admiral Gorshkov made the cover of *Time* magazine on 23 February 1968. The date alone was a mark of his success. At the height of the Vietnam War – less than a month after the Tet Offensive – the top Soviet admiral got his message through to the American people. *Time*’s cover story labeled Gorshkov’s expansion programme a ‘power play on the oceans’ and correctly observed that it was a problem that would confront the US long after the hostilities in Vietnam ended. The article noted that, ‘this may come as a surprise to most laymen – but not to US naval experts’. As the feature story in the largest news weekly in the US, *Time*’s in-depth coverage of Gorshkov showed that discussion of the Soviet naval threat by the late 1960s was transitioning into the realm of policy debates as well as popular media and culture. A Russian biography later confirmed that Gorshkov was pleased with the American article on his ‘versatile and far-reaching’ new fleet. He called it ‘a characteristic recognition’ of his navy’s achievements.

*Time* chronicled the dramatic transformation of the Soviet Navy for its four million readers. The story attributed the cause to Soviet humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the lesson of the value of surface naval power courtesy of the US Navy: ‘Shortly after the crisis, Khrushchev sent an order to [Admiral Gorshkov]: Create a surface fleet’. This narrative became the accepted explanation for the sudden expansion. However, researchers later challenged this view when they traced Soviet naval growth to the planned response to the Polaris threat that pre-dated the crisis.

The most visible change were the ‘sleek and modern’ ships compared to the aging US ones that toiled away in the waters off Southeast Asia. The article drew attention to the growing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean that threatened to outflank NATO and to the increasingly high stakes in the undersea competition. However, ‘the Russians [still lagged] well behind the US in submarine warfare’ and

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2 Ibid., p. 23.
4 ‘Russia: Power Play’, p. 27.
‘perhaps [in] the most important aspect of all: combat experience’. Of particular concern, *Time* noted, Soviet behavior had become ‘increasingly cocky’ as commanders maneuvered their ships into the middle of US formations in the Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan. The Soviet Navy’s task, according to the article, involved ‘a potentially lethal game of espionage and tag. Gorshkov’s fleet has expanded its activity on the seas by three hundredfold in the last ten years, and much of its effort is devoted to a determined policy of harassment, probing and provocation’.

The cover story made it clear that Gorshkov was the architect of this escalating rivalry and had ‘totally reshaped the Soviet Union’s once conservative strategy’. It included his ominous and now-famous declaration: ‘The flag of the Soviet navy now proudly flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the US will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas’. This quote was used throughout the years to underscore Gorshkov’s explicit challenge to American sea power. For example, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas H. Moorer used the quote in a speech in January 1969. In response to Gorshkov, the US needed to maintain its status as the world’s greatest sea power, particularly in light of the American preoccupation with Vietnam and the British withdrawal east of the Suez. ‘It would be a historic error’, *Time* warned, ‘if a nation as powerful as the US allowed a crisis elsewhere, no matter how troublesome, to distract it from its determination to retain the mastery of the sea that Admiral Gorshkov is so anxious to wrest from it’.

If Gorshkov’s name, if not his face, was familiar to the American public, it was from the media coverage of the Navy Day celebrations held every July in the Soviet Union. US newspapers in the 1960s carried quotes from the navy chief via the news agency TASS, the communist party official newspaper *Pravda*, and other Soviet press outlets. Gorshkov routinely threatened to strike the US and boasted of his navy’s growing capabilities in undersea warfare, even claiming that the Soviets had matched or surpassed the American navy in some areas.
Gorshkov warned of his ability to counter US submarines. He announced in early 1965 in a foreign affairs magazine that, thanks to a new underwater acoustic tracking system, the Polaris submarine fleet ‘lives in the shadow of Soviet power’. In remarks reminiscent of Khrushchev’s labeling American warships as ‘floating coffins’, Gorshkov threatened: ‘The Soviet navy carefully follows the movements of the missile-carrying submarines, knows the regions where they are stationed and keeps them covered by its missiles and multi-megaton warheads capable of turning them into common graves for US seamen’. However, US intelligence knew these claims to be false. An assessment that same month concluded that, ‘[p]robably the Soviet Navy’s most significant weakness […] lies in its almost complete inability to detect and destroy enemy submarines at sea’.

Indeed, Admiral Gorshkov’s public pronouncements did not match Soviet capabilities. While his threats may have sounded alarming to the average American and reassuring to a Russian reader, the US Navy’s reaction to his claims was to debunk them. Officials told the Washington Post that it was ‘purely propaganda aimed at this Nation’s superior sea power’. Indeed, the technology for ballistic missiles to hit moving (not fixed) targets simply did not exist; hence, Polaris subs remained ‘largely invulnerable’ and a crucial deterrent element of the American nuclear triad was not at risk.

Moreover, classified assessments reflected no such acoustic tracking system by the Soviets in existence like the SOSUS (sound surveillance system) array. A National Intelligence Estimate from October 1965 noted that the Soviet Navy was ‘seriously concerned about the Polaris threat to the homeland’. To that end, it was making improvements in its anti-submarine detection by the usual means such as sonar aboard ships and submarines, passive sonobuoys, magnetic anomaly detection gear on aircraft, and ‘shore based hydro-acoustic systems of limited range and effectiveness’. Any tracking, according to the report, focused on the coastal areas closest to Soviet naval bases and not the open ocean. The report concluded: ‘We believe that at present the Soviet ability to search for and detect a submerged

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13 Director of Central Intelligence, 'National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-65: Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces', (21 October 1965), CREST, Record 0000278467, p. 16. ‘Director of Central Intelligence’ and ‘National Intelligence Estimate’ hereafter ‘DCI’ and ‘NIE’.
submarine in open ocean areas is extremely limited. [...] Soviet capabilities to identify and destroy conventional submarines detected within range of an [anti-submarine warfare] platform are considered fair; those against nuclear submarines, poor.¹⁴

Media coverage of Gorshkov was readily available to Soviet naval experts in the original Russian. Analysts throughout the US government, thanks to vast translation resources focused on the foreign language press, routinely had access to his public statements and writings in English. According to research at the Naval Postgraduate School in the mid-1970s, the US translated over 50 Gorshkov-related articles from 1963-1969.¹⁵ This open source literature offered detailed articles by Admiral Gorshkov that revealed more of his perspective on Soviet naval developments – albeit heavily intermixed with propaganda – than just the occasional Navy Day quote in the press.

The first appeared in *Navy* magazine in March 1963. ‘Soviet Naval Notes’ was a translation of a February 1963 article in the military newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*). Gorshkov discussed the transformation that was underway well before the events in Cuba the previous October and was earlier revealed in Sokolovsky’s *Soviet Military Strategy* – essentially that the communist leadership had ensured that ‘the [radical] armament and organization of our Navy correspond to its increased role in the country’s defense and in the protection of its state interests’.¹⁶ Soviet naval thought, Gorshkov wrote, now reflected that the naval forces were no longer strictly tied to the support of land operations but must reply to any nuclear attacks with ‘crushing blows on naval and land objectives over the entire area of the world’s sea’.¹⁷

Admiral Gorshkov also addressed the lessons for his navy when the Soviet Union backed down from moving tactical nuclear warheads to Cuba through a quarantine line of American destroyers in 1962. The Soviet Navy simply did not have the surface forces and the operational reach to challenge the US Navy at the time. ‘The crisis in the Caribbean made the sailors of the fleet realize even more profoundly

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 17.
¹⁷ Ibid.
the great importance of party and government demands on the need of constant vigilance and high combat preparedness’.\textsuperscript{18} He acknowledged the need for more time at sea to provide crews with ‘moral-psychological and physical training’\textsuperscript{.19}

As always, Gorshkov’s attention turned to the Soviet Navy’s ‘main striking force for a war at sea’: its missile-carrying submarines. He emphasized their increasingly sophisticated combat capabilities, to include their ‘striking power, unlimited range, high speeds under water, great independence, great depth submersion, and suitability for hidden action’.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, he declared that it was time to credit his navy’s capabilities, not just its numbers: ‘… the might of the Navy is determined not only by the number of vessels but also by the combat properties of the ships and aircraft and by their being equipped with perfect technology and weapons. In this sense we possess the most modern Navy’.\textsuperscript{21} Quantity may have had a quality all its own during the Khrushchev era, yet Gorshkov now demanded that his service be evaluated more accurately and no longer viewed as inferior or weaker by default. However, it would take another decade before the qualitative improvements in ships and submarines from Gorshkov’s modernization efforts made its biggest impact on the West.

Most revealing was Gorshkov’s complaint that the US downplayed the Soviet Navy’s accomplishments and refused to acknowledge its technological advances, especially in the fields of nuclear power, ballistic missiles, and Arctic operations. In other words, the US was purposely presenting an erroneous threat perception to the American public:

Of course, it is not easy for the aggressors to part with their illusions; thus they do everything they can to minimize our achievements and advertise theirs. \textit{Until a short time ago even high figures in the Pentagon publicly doubted that the USSR had built atomic submarines and that they are capable of launching rockets while submerged.} Press accounts and books on the polar cruises of United States submarines are, to a considerable degree, subject to a desire to inflate the myth of the indestructible might of the American Navy.\textsuperscript{22}

Gorshkov was, in fact, correct that the US Navy as well as the intelligence community discounted the ability of early Soviet submarines to fire ballistic missiles

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 34.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 35.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 33.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid. Italics in original.
\end{itemize}
while submerged in the early 1960s. National intelligence estimates routinely noted that, while the Soviets were working on a submerged-launch system, its 40-to-50 long-range submarines of the diesel-powered Golf- and Zulu-classes and the nuclear Hotel-class could only fire its three SS-N-4 (NATO name Sark) missiles within minutes of surfacing. Also, any submerged test firings of a single missile in the early 1960s did not equate to a full operational capability, according to Norman Polmar, until after the liquid-propelled SS-N-5’s (NATO name Serb) successful underwater test launch in February 1962. Hence, earlier design and conversion challenges were overcome and the capability at least existed and could be deployed by 1963 – the time of Gorshkov’s complaint.23

The most comprehensive assessment of the Soviet Navy’s capabilities of the decade, produced in 1969, found that these early efforts with only three missiles per sub in no way equivalent to Polaris (with its 16 launch tubes) until the Yankee-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine programme began in 1964. The first sub of this new generation deployed in 1967, or seven years after the first Polaris missile-equipped submarine, USS George Washington, went on patrol.24 1967 also marked the same year that the US Navy’s Polaris force was complete – 41 submarines with 656 SLBMs in all compared to the 104 fielded by Soviet SSBNs.25

Navy magazine carried several more interviews with Admiral Gorshkov. In early 1965, the Soviet navy chief discussed the importance of combat training to improving the fleet’s overall readiness and proficiency. He had introduced ‘combat reality’ (i.e., training on the ‘sea and ocean expanses’), a performance-based competition among crews, and a renewed emphasis on safety to reduce the accident rate.26 Essentially, Gorshkov enunciated the need for more time at sea to instill a ‘blue water look’ in crews that Commander Sumner Shapiro wrote about in the Naval War College Review in 1966.27

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25 Polmar and Moore, p. 122, and discussion with Norman Polmar, 2 November 2018.


27 Shapiro, ‘The Soviet Naval Officer’, p. 79.
The Soviet Navy’s dilemma was that it had ‘built blue water ships long before it built the experience needed to conduct long range, blue water operations’.28 This problem would take time and effort to correct. The next Gorshkov interview published by Navy in 1968 revealed the results of extended cruises and of increased exposure to the open seas far from Russia’s coastal waters that were intended to close the proficiency gap. The admiral proudly reported that, ‘[a]ll naval personnel [received] the necessary hardening for long stays at sea. They had to be taught to serve with vigilance, initiative, inventiveness and endurance.’29 Gorshkov recognized the value of presence missions by the Mediterranean squadron both in building Soviet confidence and in eroding the Sixth Fleet’s influence.

The Gorshkov publication that garnered the most attention was a Morskoi Sbornik article in February 1967. ‘The Development of Soviet Naval Art’ looked back at Russian naval history to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Gorshkov then looked forward to a bright future for the Soviet Navy as its power grew along with its ‘international mission’ to restrain ‘imperialist aggression and ventures’. The navy had assumed a more prominent place in Soviet strategy, he boasted, after years of neglect by unnamed Soviet leaders who regarded the service as irrelevant after the ‘revolution in military affairs’.30 Gorshkov’s article also appeared during a time of heightened tensions between the American and Soviet navies in the Mediterranean.31 The English language edition of Soviet Military Review published an abridged version of the article in July 1967. Notably, it now contained a photo of tank landing ships conducting an amphibious exercise that was not part of the February version – in other words, before the Six-Day War in June.32

Gorshkov’s article contained information of particular interest to the West, such as why the Soviet Navy still did not possess attack carriers. Gorshkov proclaimed that, based on the American example in Korea, the Middle East, and now Vietnam, carriers were mainly platforms from which ‘imperialist’ navies waged ‘local

wars against the peoples of economically underdeveloped countries, which do not possess modern means of armed struggle’. He also noted that submarines and air forces have superior strategic and long-range strike capabilities compared to vulnerable aircraft carriers. Thus, he wrote, ‘we become more and more convinced that we have chosen the correct direction for the build-up of our Navy’.33

Admiral Gorshkov proclaimed that the absence of carriers did not define the nature or balance of his navy and indicated that it was simply a logical choice. However, in reality, it was Gorshkov’s most expedient explanation at the time. His later words and actions in the 1970s-1980s would demonstrate that this earlier message was likely for domestic political consumption and foreign obfuscation until he could gain support for building large-deck carriers of his own to contest for command of the seas near Soviet shores and project power on distant ones.

The overall tone of Gorshkov’s article was one of optimism and pride. He exclaimed that the Soviet Navy was entering a new era as an ocean-going navy and embracing a new way of thinking about naval power. The years of well-known disparagement of navies by Khrushchev and of naval theory not keeping pace with technological changes now gave way to enthusiastic pronouncements such as this one:

Today the Soviet Navy has colossal operational and strategic potentialities, which are by far superior to the potentialities that had been possessed by any, even most powerful, navy of the pre-nuclear epoch. [...] A navy, which for a long time could operate only in seas adjoining its own coast and accumulated experience in a continental war, during which it carried out chiefly tactical assignments in cooperation with land forces, now emerged on oceanic expanses. In this connection it needed absolutely new tactics, a new operational art and a theory of strategically employing its forces.34

Leonid Brezhnev’s assumption of the top communist party leadership role also filled Gorshkov with hope that a ‘channel [would] be opened for construction of new large ships’, especially anti-submarine cruisers. Brezhnev affirmed his commitment to an ocean-going fleet in his first official meeting with Gorshkov, whom he had known since the Black Sea theatre during World War II. Gorshkov recalled that, ‘We then burned with the desire to create advanced ships with new weapons – the visual representation of a “missile” fleet’.35

33 Sergei G. Gorshkov, ‘Soviet Naval Art’, Soviet Military Review.no. 7 (1967), 2-7 (p. 5).
34 Ibid., p. 6.
35 Gorshkov, Vo Flotskom Stroiu, p. 180.
Naval War College Review published excerpts of Gorshkov’s *Morskoi Sbornik* article in February 1969 – or two years after the original first appeared. The timing was significant. The issue was the war college’s rebuttal to Herrick’s *Soviet Naval Strategy* published the previous year. Vice Admiral Colbert, in his remarks as president, made reference to the recent controversy by an ‘authoritative source’ over whether the Soviet Navy still has a primarily defensive strategy. He pointed to the expansion into the Mediterranean as evidence that Russia is ‘a proven master at moving into any vacuum of power’ and will likely follow an aggressive ‘cold war’ strategy as it gains capabilities to pursue a ‘hot war’ offensive strategy. Further, he declared that it was the Naval War College’s mission to offer ‘a continuing appraisal in depth of Soviet maritime strategy versus US and Free World maritime strategy’. To that end, the institution would commence an ‘intensive program of research and study’ to further understand the factors now driving Soviet sea power.

The issue also featured a student research paper by Commander (later Rear Admiral) Robert B. Rogers that was the counter-argument to Herrick’s defensive thesis. His paper introduced Gorshkov’s article and refuted Herrick’s book. Rogers concluded that the Soviet Navy was moving away from a defensive orientation and onto a ‘new course’, as evidenced by its shift away from support to the Red Army and into the Mediterranean. Rogers also repeated the concern expressed in the Naval War College Review and Proceedings since 1960 that the Soviet Union may someday become the great land and sea power of Eurasia with far-reaching geopolitical implications – ‘[t]he fear that haunted both Mackinder and Mahan in their later writings’.

Rogers warned that the Soviet Navy was an ‘emerging threat’ that must be taken seriously: ‘A conservative estimate of current Soviet maritime endeavors serves no useful purpose. Such an estimate could engender complacency. […] Their navy no longer exists solely for defense of the homeland. It exists to protect Soviet interests at sea’. He determined that the ‘Soviet tactic of interposition’ limits the US Navy’s course of action and keeps it off balance. ‘In humiliation, the Soviets learned the true

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37 Ibid., p. 2.
meaning of seapower during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. They *intend* to turn the tables*.40

The edition presented Admiral Gorshkov as ‘one who would disagree with [the] assessment’ that the Soviet Navy is a defensive force. The review’s editors prefaced Gorshkov’s article by stating that, ‘until recently, there was little doubt that the [Soviet] navy was, in fact, an offshore extension of the army. Incongruously, and apparently because the Soviet Navy remains a distant second to the U.S. Navy, some authorities have concluded that it operates as a defensive force’. The editors found that Gorshkov’s description of Soviet naval development in the postwar era was not without obvious bias – he ‘may boast and perhaps overstate his navy’s capabilities to some extent’ – yet it was still worthy of study. They asked readers to ‘draw [their] own conclusions on the Soviet Navy’s role today’.41

Gorshkov wrote that Soviet Navy’s three main missions were: ‘carrying out offensive strategic missions in contemporary war, to sail the ocean expanses, and the readiness to engage fleets of the leading naval powers….’ The long-range strategic mission by submarines was, in addition to the Strategic Rocket Forces, ‘the most important weapon the Supreme Command had’.42 In addition, the fleet would be expected to conduct strikes against enemy shores and bases, amphibious landings, and disruption of sea lines of communications.43 It was in its defensive posture that the Soviet Navy had to directly engage American naval forces and was always considered the Soviets’ weakest capability by Western analysts.

Anti-Polaris submarine and anti-carrier defensive missions were, if anything, growing more important given projections for the US Navy’s growth by 1970, Gorshkov wrote. He noted that this threat is what drove the Soviet Navy’s own growth in response. ‘What this means is that the threat of an attack on our country from the oceanic lines has increased sharply. Therefore, the interests of strengthening our country's defensive capabilities […] demanded a considerable increase in the combat might of the Soviet Navy’.44 This was Gorshkov’s most significant statement and the most important clue to the future developments to come in the 1970s that many in the US Navy chose to downplay or ignore altogether.

40 Rogers, pp. 25-6. Italics in original.
42 Ibid., p. 41.
43 Ibid., p. 32.
44 Ibid.
Notably, Gorshkov provided an important distinction in terminology for American readers in his definition of a ‘balanced fleet’. For Western navies, a balanced fleet meant one that had an appropriate ratio of large combatants, including capital ships to smaller combatants, along with the right mix of surface, subsurface, and air assets. By any definition of the term, the Soviet Navy’s preponderance of submarines labeled it an ‘unbalanced fleet’ in the West, even before raising the carrier issue.

However, Gorshkov did not appear overly preoccupied with whether his navy was balanced or had an offensive or defensive strategy in the Western sense. He proclaimed that his fleet was balanced because it was, at long last, getting the right force structure ‘capable of successfully conducting combat operations under differing circumstances’. He further defined ‘a well-balanced fleet’ as one ‘which, in composition and armament, is capable of carrying out missions assigned to it, not only in a nuclear war, but in a war which does not make use of nuclear weapons, and is also able to support state interests at sea in peacetime’. It is worth noting that this earlier definition of a balanced fleet later no longer held true a few years later. The balanced, high-seas fleet that Gorshkov sought in the 1970s would include plans for aircraft carriers to contest for local command of the sea to protect Soviet submarines.

Gorshkov, in effect, announced that he and Soviet political leadership had corrected the vulnerabilities that led to the 1962 humiliation. Gorshkov closed with a sentiment that American naval officers could at least appreciate, if not heartily endorse: ‘Navymen see their responsible and honorable mission as one of providing for unity of theory and practice, of untiring seeking for new, ever more modern forms and methods for carrying on combat operations at sea’.

The February 1969 Naval War College Review showed that, by the close of the 1960s, the debate had begun in earnest within the US Navy over the nature of the Soviet naval threat. Gorshkov’s writings and those of analysts’ like Herrick fueled a debate that became central to shaping American naval strategy and thought. In one of the many twists of the Cold War, Admiral Gorshkov struggled his entire career to get the recognition he believed was due the Soviet Navy in the shadow of the Red Army and the Strategic Rocket Forces. However, in the United States, Soviet naval power was gaining considerable attention and grudging respect by policymakers, the press,

46 Ibid., p. 42.
and the public, due in large part to Gorshkov’s assertive words and his navy’s aggressive maneuvers. Gorshkov was becoming the symbol and voice of Soviet naval ambitions that would continue to rapidly change in the coming years. As such, his elevated status and impact in the Western press through his writings, as well as their use by the US Navy to justify larger budgets, further strengthened his hand at home to keep growing the Soviet Navy in a ‘curious symbiotic relationship’, according to former Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks.47

US Reactions to Soviet Naval Ambitions

Three major themes shaped American naval thought by the mid-1960s in reaction to Gorshkov’s ambitions. The first was the long-standing issue of the capabilities and employment of Soviet submarines and the state of US anti-submarine warfare. Second, the Soviet Navy’s permanent presence in the Mediterranean and its aggressive global posture captured headlines and seemingly demanded a strong response to the rising number of incidents at sea. Finally, the naval balance became a subject of intense political debate and proved to be the most contentious of the issues due to its implications for the defence budget, the influence of a presidential election year in 1968, and the ongoing involvement in the Vietnam War.

The Soviet Submarine Threat

For decades, the greatest fear for the US Navy was fighting another Battle of the Atlantic against hundreds of Russian subs while trying to support another war in Europe against a dominant land power. The Navy had planned for advanced Soviet submarines to arrive immediately after World War II with Soviet access to captured German Type XXI U-boats. The Whiskey-class diesel submarines based on German technology later appeared in large numbers – 218 by 1958, though still much smaller than the 300 anticipated by 1950 by US intelligence at the end of World War II.48 The difference between the actual number of Soviet postwar, long-range submarines and the number US expected to see by 1950 is an early, yet often unrecognized ‘gap’ in Cold War history. Unlike the Bomber Gap and the Missile Gap a decade later, the

first ‘submarine gap’ was not strictly about the numbers themselves but was also a gap in knowledge and expectations for the proficiency and pace of Soviet submarine production.49

While the Soviet submarine threat was exaggerated and hyped by the media during the early years of the Cold War in a manner that helped Navy officials in budget battles, the steps taken by the US Navy to invest in its anti-submarine warfare proficiency and technologies paid off when the undersea rivalry began in earnest in the 1960s.50 With each passing year, the undersea dynamic to the Cold War rivalry was getting more technologically advanced as the stakes grew ever higher. The first generation of Soviet nuclear submarines arrived at the end of the 1950s – including the November-class attack submarine and the ballistic missile-carrying Hotel-class. The general anxiety over the threat centered on the assumption that the next generation of Soviet nuclear submarines would have greater speeds and overall performance, employ improved missile technology, and – most worrisome – become quieter and harder to detect.

After years of warnings about Soviet submarines, a form of weariness took hold in Washington. According to defence correspondent John G. Norris: ‘Like the boy who cried wolf too often, the Navy is having some difficulty getting people to believe hard new evidence of a real and growing Russian submarine threat’. Norris’ piece was notable for recognizing the threat inflation aspect to the story, which was often lost in reporting on the Soviet Navy. He also captured the cynicism it evoked: ‘More often than not, the beginning of spring has been accompanied by news reports of Russian submarine “contacts” off our shores in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Skeptics noted that the reports coincided with congressional consideration of the defense budget’.51

The ‘out of sight, out of mind’ and secretive nature of Cold War submarine operations worked against the Navy during budget battles and in galvanizing public opinion. The situation convinced its leaders that they needed real-world events to

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publicize the dangers of complacency and to generate any action from policymakers. One such encounter, conveniently revealed by the Washington Post in mid-1968, ‘shook up the American intelligence community, intensified the Navy campaign in Congress to build new nuclear attack subs and handed Republicans a “submarine gap” campaign issue which presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon [was] expected to pick up’.52

In early January 1968, a November-class nuclear attack submarine off Hawaii, while in pursuit of USS Enterprise, was able to keep pace with the American nuclear-powered carrier and its task force that tried to outrun the sub.53 The activity itself was not out of the ordinary for the ‘deadly serious cat-and-mouse game that the US and Soviet navies have been playing under the sea for years’, according to the news story. However, in this case, the Soviet submarine, powered by its two reactors, surprised US naval intelligence with a speed that showed ‘Soviet subs were faster than we thought’.54

The successful chase by the first generation nuclear submarine heightened the fear of the unknowns of Soviet submarine development. It also called into question the US Navy’s own programmes. For fast-attack subs – as opposed to ballistic missile submarines that disappeared by going deep and staying silent – speed was essential to execute their missions, which included interception of other subs and surface ships. This incident pointed to a potential ‘speed gap’ in the undersea competition:

And so the future looked even more worrisome to American Navy leaders. They had learned earlier that the Russians were building three new types of nuclear attack submarines with a tear-drop-shaped hull for more speed. And even with the “old” nuclear power plant which had pushed the chase submarine, American Navy technicians claimed that the new Soviet subs would be faster than our own attack subs.55

Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, whose name was synonymous with the Navy’s nuclear propulsion programme as its head for three decades, used this discovery to the fullest advantage. He claimed that the US Navy was in danger of losing its edge if Congress did not approve the construction of a new and superior

53 The US believed that November-class subs had ‘a maximum speed of 23 to 25 knots. […] Available reports differ as to the speed reached by the task force – some sources say as high as 31 knots. This incident would have a profound effect on the US nuclear submarine program…’ Polmar and Moore, p. 79.
54 Wilson, 'A Fast Soviet Sub'.
55 Ibid.
design of high-speed attack submarines, the Los Angeles-class, in what would become one of the largest construction programmes in US naval history. Rickover also warned in his testimony in 1967-68 that the Soviet Navy was building a submarine fleet ‘second to none’ and could surpass the US in nuclear submarines within five years. He asserted: ‘We must produce whatever it takes to counter the Soviet submarine threat’.

Admiral Rickover also assailed the ‘torpid’ Pentagon and its bureaucratic neglect of vital programmes, which in his view meant that the Navy’s need for the world’s most advanced nuclear reactors should be at the top of their list.

Rickover and his allies won the debate by 1969, thanks to fear of the Soviet Navy’s actions and of the Pentagon’s inaction. He also had the support of Navy Secretary Paul Ignatius, who believed that increasing the number and quality of attack submarines was ‘terribly important’ in light of past neglect. In turn, Ignatius gained the support of the deputy secretary of defense and former navy secretary, Paul Nitze.

In the end, no one in Washington was willing to risk second-guessing the ‘Father of the Nuclear Navy’ – even at a projected cost of several hundred million dollars. As the Washington Post concluded: ‘As in the case of the missile gap during the 1960 presidential campaign, there is a chance that military leaders are overstating the Soviet threat. But Congress is not willing to take that chance nor does the Johnson Administration seem to want to make a stand on the issue. So new generations of submarines seem to be on their way’.

1967 was a pivotal year for the Soviet Navy with the arrival of their new generation of nuclear submarines. Norman Polmar noted in his 1974 biography of Admiral Gorshkov that the Soviet navy chief ‘[was] able to justify his own submarine construction programs on the basis of the survivability of undersea craft’. Gorshkov also benefitted from almost double the output (on average) of nuclear submarines from shipyards than the US per year during the 1960s: 15 to 8. Gorshkov later wrote in his autobiography that, ‘all our research and design capabilities focused primarily on ensuring the construction of nuclear-powered submarines’ of all major classes.

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59 Wilson, 'A Fast Soviet Sub'.
60 Polmar, Admiral Gorshkov, p. 116.
(ballistic missile, cruise missile, attack) as part of the seven year building plan from 1959-65. The next seven-year plan, beginning in 1966, also emphasized anti-submarine surface and sub-surface platforms ‘to combat the real and growing threat of submarines from the US and other leading countries of NATO’.61

The Soviet investment in quality over quantity showed in the new nuclear attack submarines, the Charlie- and Victor-classes. According to intelligence assessments, they ‘are quieter than earlier Soviet nuclear submarines, are capable of high submerged speeds, and have new lower frequency, active sonars’.62 While the maximum speed of more than 30 knots from the Victor-class rivaled that of the new Los Angeles-class, the second generation of Soviet nuclear submarines never became ‘truly quiet’ as expected in the early 1960s. Indeed, some intelligence analysts speaking off the record to the press revealed that they were ‘less concerned’ than Secretary of Defense Laird or Vice Admiral Rickover about the threat to US submarines from these ‘relatively noisy’ submarines that were still easy to detect. They estimated that the US was at least a decade ahead of the Soviets in anti-submarine warfare technology.63

According to a later study, the US held its ‘acoustic advantage’ over Russian subs throughout the 1970s.64 Yet, unbeknownst to the US at the time, the Soviets had confirmed the vulnerability of their noisy subs from the ability of the US to track them through SOSUS and other means thanks to the John Walker spy ring operating in the most secret communications sections of the US Navy. Improvements in the quieting and speed of Soviet subs would appear in the Alfa and Akula-classes of the 1980s. Other characteristics of these new subs also indicated that ‘naval security’ was a top priority. Armed with torpedoes, the fast Victors were sea denial platforms that could be used as interceptors and against Western sea lines of communication while the anti-ship cruise missiles of the Charlie-class pointed to a continuing focus on the anti-carrier mission. Indeed, ‘the threat posed by the ‘Charlie’/SS-N-7 system forced a wholesale revision in standard carrier battlegroup defensive tactics’.65

61 Gorshkov, Vo Flotskom Stroiu, pp. 175-76.
64 Cote, p. 45.
The modernization of the Red submarine fleet may have looked rapid to some American observers but it took until 1967-68 for the Soviet Navy to field its answer to the first Polaris submarine in 1960. The Yankee-class had 16 in-hull tubes for missiles that could be launched while submerged, although their range of 1,500 miles only equaled the first generation of Polaris missiles. Fortunately for America’s sub hunters, the Yankees were not as quiet as the George Washington-class SSBNs and became known as one of the noisiest and therefore easiest Soviet subs to detect.66

Soviet naval watchers in the West closely studied the employment of the USSR’s strategic missile submarine forces. There was evidence of a new concept, the ‘blue belt of defence’, by 1966 that was likely a reference to the coordinated use of Soviet naval power, especially its new Yankee-class and other submarines, land-based naval aviation, and surface naval forces to defensively encircle the Soviet Union. Soviet officers informed the US that it was a ‘combination of systems’ and not a reference to any particular weapons system. ‘On 29 April, Admiral Sergeyev, chief of the Soviet Main Naval Staff, informed the US Army attaché that the “Blue Belt is an “entire complex of several defensive systems which includes among other things, Soviet submarines.” He added that “obviously aircraft and missiles are also part of the complex”.67

The arrival of the Yankees, while anticipated for years by naval intelligence analysts, came at a time when the Soviet Navy was in the ascendant and thereby provided Admiral Gorshkov with another reason to boast of the Soviet Navy’s increasing capabilities. US intelligence expected the new submarines to have more regular out-of-area deployments with greater ranges due to more reliable engineering.68 The next generation of Soviet nuclear submarines provided the impetus for the US Navy to ensure that its own strategic forces and anti-submarine warfare doctrine were effective. With a large degree of confidence, the Navy concluded that its Polaris submarines were virtually invulnerable to Soviet detection and destruction. The executive director of anti-submarine warfare programmes (OP-95), Vice Admiral Charles B. Martell, told the media in 1965 that the Soviet Navy was ‘terribly far behind’ in its anti-submarine warfare capabilities, but was ‘making a major effort to

66 Beecher, 'New Soviet Subs'. See also Polmar and Moore, p. 169; Breemer, Soviet Submarines, p. 111.
catch up in the face of the threat to the Russian homeland posed by United States
Polaris missile submarines’. In other words, the Soviets had little strategic anti-
submarine capability just as the primary deep strike threat to the Soviet Union from
the sea transitioned from carriers to Polaris subs, which clearly drove much of
Admiral Gorshkov’s concerns.

On the technical side, the US Navy had good reason to believe it was on the
right track in keeping Soviet submarines at bay. This was in part due to the Soviet
Navy’s own lag in submarine technology, especially advances in sound dampening, as
well as the Navy’s long-term investment in research and resources. The 1960s
featured debates over how far the barrier strategy – with its reliance upon passive
acoustics at chokepoints – negated the need for WWII-era level of coordination
between air, surface, and subsurface units. Martell’s office decided on a two-tier
barrier strategy of a SOSUS array to act as a trip wire to alert anti-submarine
submarines and air assets to vector onto contacts and a back-up force of advanced
destroyers to hunt down any Russian subs that ‘leaked’ through the barrier.

The barrier strategy was tremendously expensive and needed policy and
public support, which introduced yet another political aspect to the Soviet submarine
threat. Navy leaders repeatedly emphasized to the media that the most the difficult
part of anti-submarine warfare was not the kill, but the hunt. In a story that revealed
anti-submarine programmes cost $3 billion a year (compared to $4.5 billion for the
entire nuclear deterrent force), Martell used an early Vietnam War parallel to guerrilla
warfare: ‘If you can find the enemy, you can destroy him. The tough part is to find
him’.

The US Navy’s top leaders were also engaged in efforts to address the Soviet
submarine threat. Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze discussed the state of US anti-
submarine warfare in a speech at the Naval War College in 1964. He told its
graduates that, ‘[t]his generation has not yet reduced to manageable proportions the
problem of the opacity of the seas. Submarines are detected only with great difficulty
and with large expenditures of forces. […] I am confident that it will remain a very


70 For details on this doctrinal debate over the barrier strategy, see Chapter 4 of Cote, pp. 41-43.

great challenge indeed to those of you charged with naval leadership in the seventies and eighties’. Nitze used these shortcomings in his public speeches and congressional testimony to underscore the need for increased investment. Yet the message, Nitze realized, was a mixed one that also drew attention to the vulnerability of carriers and further fueled the debate over how many attack carriers the US should build if they could not be adequately protected from the ‘peril’ of Soviet subs. Nitze also acknowledged before Congress in 1965 that perhaps he was being too pessimistic about recent progress, given that the US Navy trained against its own submarine forces that ‘have been in the forefront of both development and operational know-how since World War II. Thus, our own peacetime opposition has perhaps been more effective than a real enemy would be’.74

The final word on the Soviet submarine threat in the 1960s goes to Vice Admiral Martell: ‘We have a dangerous foe, and we must not downgrade him. Our simple objective is to maintain the lead in this deadly game. […] Meanwhile, an enemy who thinks he is catching up with us may try to find out by testing us with small provocations’.75

**Presence Missions and Provocations Playbook**

The Cold War at sea evolved into a series of provocations both large and small between the US and Soviet navies in the 1960s. While nothing surpassed the tensions of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the standoff in the Caribbean was merely the prelude to a rivalry that would increasingly become global and confrontational. Presence missions to project communist power provided irrefutable evidence to Admiral Gorshkov’s announcement of the navy’s emergence as a blue water fleet. He used his 1969 Navy Day address to underscore this global presence: ‘Ships of the Soviet navy sail in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, in the waters of the Arctic and Antarctic and in the Mediterranean, wherever it is required in the interests of our country security’.76 Moreover, these influence missions were often in the same waters as American

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74 Quoted in Cote, p. 44.
75 ‘Will the Soviets Provoke a War at Sea?’, *Naval Engineers Journal*, 79.1 (1967), 53-58 (p. 58).
warships and resulted in provocative acts between rival forces. Cases of what became known as ‘incidents at sea’ further fueled US concern over the risk of escalation.\textsuperscript{77}

The potentially dangerous combination of presence and provocation demanded the attention of the Navy’s leadership. As a measure of his concern, the director of naval intelligence, Rear Admiral Frederick J. Harlfinger II, invoked his right to enter a dissenting opinion in the classified national intelligence estimate on Soviet maritime power in 1969. He noted that the other agencies did not fully account for the powerful combination of ‘progressive Western disengagement from overseas commitments’ and the Soviet desire to ‘capitalize on these opportunities’ to use their maritime forces in the service of Soviet foreign policy. In his view, this trend was just the beginning for an emboldened Soviet Navy. He anticipated ‘that the expansion in Soviet maritime activity witnessed over the past decade will continue at an intensity greater than that foreseen in the estimate, particularly related to the emerging nations and the uncommitted world’.\textsuperscript{78}

Navy leaders’ public attitudes, however, often vacillated between concern and confidence. The \textit{New York Times} noted that ‘American and other alliance naval officers tend to discount the threat posed by the Soviet surface ships on a purely military basis. […] Confidence, at times seemingly tinged with complacency, pervades the comments of Western alliance commanders’.\textsuperscript{79} However, all agreed with Chief of Naval Operations Moorer’s conclusion that Gorshkov’s Soviet Navy was successfully taking a page from the American playbook. Moorer noted in a speech in August 1969: ‘Paradoxically, one of our own precepts has been that there is no better instrument of foreign policy or a means of establishing presence in a strategic area than by use of sea power. Evidently, the Soviets have watched us do this over the years and […] have profited as a result of our experiences, tactics and developments – perhaps, even more than we have in some respects’.\textsuperscript{80} Another news story said of a Soviet squadron’s port call in Cuba in mid-1969: ‘… the Soviet naval ensign is now flying 90 miles off the coast of Florida and that fact alone tingles the sensivities of American naval officers. To them, it is another example of how


\textsuperscript{78} DCI, ‘NIE 11-10-69’, p. 2 (footnote 1).


quickly the Russians are learning to use seapower for political and diplomatic ends. “They are taking a chapter right out of our own book,” one officer said.\textsuperscript{81}

The American news media was also filled with stories on the challenge to the Sixth Fleet’s once dominant presence. The consensus was that the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean was part of a more offensive and aggressive peacetime strategy on NATO’s southern flank.\textsuperscript{82} The Navy also received support from an unlikely ally in Congress, Stuart Symington. Symington was the first Secretary of the Air Force in 1947 – typically not a Navy-friendly background – and had been a Democratic senator from Missouri since 1953. He returned from Europe in 1966 and declared: ‘The Soviet naval threat in the European area “is real now, and still growing”’. Of note, the Soviets had torn ‘a leaf from the US Navy book on mobility’, as evidenced by these Mediterranean deployments.\textsuperscript{83}

The arrival of the helicopter-carrying cruiser \textit{Moskva} in the Mediterranean in 1967, followed by her sister ship the \textit{Leningrad} in 1968, ushered in a new era of naval operations in the region and a new round of hyperbole. The extensive media coverage of the \textit{Moskva} often referred to the new ship class as a ‘carrier’ or ‘helicopter carrier’ without noting the important distinctions between the Soviet version and American large-deck carriers.\textsuperscript{84} Although the platform could be used to support amphibious landing operations or as a command and control ship, the Soviet Navy’s employment of the \textit{Moskva}-class showed that anti-submarine warfare was its top priority. Along with other forces in the Mediterranean, they were forward deployed to protect the Soviet homeland from US submarines – in other words, on a defensive mission.\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, the \textit{Moskva}’s vaunted arrival was actually a much-delayed Soviet response to the presence of Polaris submarines, which first appeared in the Med in March 1963.\textsuperscript{86}

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\item\textsuperscript{85} DCI, ‘NIE 11-14-69’, p. 22.
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However, this fact did not prevent media stories from portraying the Moskva’s presence as anything but a dire threat to US submarines.87

Senior officers differed on Moskva’s operational impact. Admiral David Richardson, Sixth Fleet commander, interjected a note of caution into the ‘buzz’ in NATO circles and told the media that he was not terribly worried because ‘Russia has not acquired even a fraction of the striking power at our disposal’. Furthermore, the helicopters carried by the Moskva ‘are a serious but not unmanageable threat to Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean….’88 However, back in Washington, the conclusion of the new director of the anti-submarine warfare programme office, Vice Admiral Turner F. Caldwell Jr, was more ominous. Caldwell used the public release of photos of the Moskva ‘to illustrate what he described as Moscow’s effort to gain supremacy of the sea’.89 The new threat served as a backdrop to Caldwell’s unveiling of the new long-range anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft, the P3-C Orion.

In addition to the increasing numbers and new types of Soviet ships appearing in the Mediterranean, there were indications that the Soviet Union intended a more permanent presence through its diplomatic approaches to President Gamal Nasser’s United Arab Republic. Admiral Gorshkov’s participation on a state visit in May 1966 heightened US concerns over a future Soviet naval base in Egypt.90 Nasser was indeed under heavy pressure from the USSR with repeated visits by Gorshkov since 1961, when the Soviet Navy suddenly lost its submarine base in Albania.91 However, to reach such a formal arrangement would have made both Egypt and the Soviet Union look hypocritical, given their avowed polices on foreign bases and their imperialist connotations. Notably, the US also eschewed such formal basing agreements in the more volatile regions of the Mediterranean due to their ‘sticky political overtones’.92

The Soviets soon discovered that great power naval diplomacy was not always easy. In the end, Nasser refused Gorshkov’s overtures and the Soviet Navy settled for

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extended visits to Egyptian ports, advisers and military aid packages, and the use of offshore anchorages, according to analysts who later studied the Soviet pursuit of logistic support in the region.93 The Soviet Navy’s newfound ‘strategic mobility’ and ‘reach’ that Thomas Wolfe had warned about proved difficult to achieve in practice, yet still paid dividends from the investment.94

The Soviet Navy’s role during the Six-Day War underscored that its presence in the Mediterranean was not just for ‘showing the flag’ and exercising its freedom of navigation rights. According to reporter Neil Sheehan, the Soviet Navy’s true success was acting as a ‘fleet in being’ in the Mahanian tradition that impeded the American navy’s freedom of maneuver and limited US policy options. Soviet admirals, quoted in American newspapers, countered that their greatly expanded presence in the region was ‘for training purposes only’ or as ‘friends’ to look out for Arab countries’ interests.95 Indeed, Soviet determination to look after Arab allies and deter adversaries meant that its naval squadron, named the 5th Eskadra after June 1967, became a permanent presence in the Mediterranean for the remainder of the Cold War. This change came about not due to Gorshkov’s persuasions, but owing to Nasser’s suddenly beleaguered position and the disastrous outcome of the war with Israel. Egypt rewarded the Soviets with year-round basing facilities in Egypt, including the largest in Alexandria.96

The superpower naval forces kept a close eye on each other in the eastern Mediterranean during the Arab-Israeli conflict to see if either nation came to the direct aid of the belligerents, Israel (US) or Egypt (USSR). As strategist J.C. Wylie noted, it was an important ‘control theory’ signal that the Sixth Fleet sent to maintain a normal operations tempo and schedule.97 Soviet naval units, however, sent other signals, according to press reports, as US forces searched for possible Soviet submarines. Vice Admiral William I. Martin, Sixth Fleet commander, complained in early June that Soviet ships, in addition to shadowing the carrier USS America,

93 Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Report: Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War', (16 March 1970), pp. 27-28. Syria provided the other major port for the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean. For a history of Gorshkov’s visit to Egypt during the 1960s, see Dragnich, pp. 19-22; 28-32; 45-47.
94 See Wolfe, 'The Soviet Quest'.
97 Wylie, 'The Sixth Fleet', pp. 59-60.
frequently endanger[ed] our ships’ with their too-close monitoring that resulted in a near collision with the destroyer, USS *William C. Lawe*.98

There were certainly costs incurred from such a restrained US response in the face of the Soviet naval threat. The most notable was the tense and uncertain operating environment that resulted after the attack on the unescorted American intelligence collection ship, USS *Liberty*, by Israeli forces. The US response to the *Liberty* incident on 8 June 1967 was itself an exercise in diplomatic damage control involving naval forces not seen since the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Lyndon Johnson initially suspected and feared Soviet involvement in the attack. In one of the countless tragic moments of the Cold War, it was a relief to those in the White House Situation Room that it was not an attack by the Soviets or Egyptians, but rather by one of their own allies.

Later and calmer reflections concluded that the Soviet Navy was equally keen to not get drawn into a Middle East war or into an escalation with US forces.99 Even a hardliner like Admiral Moorer conceded that, even though the Mediterranean was awash with Soviet missiles, ‘… in the first place, the Soviets are not going to start World War III by sinking a ship’.100 It is worth noting that another naval casualty in October 1967 with a tie to the missile threat did, in fact, involve the loss of a warship. The sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* by two Soviet *Styx* anti-ship missiles fired from Egyptian missile boats triggered a radical reappraisal of tactics by the world’s navies.101 The standoff weapon’s effectiveness appeared to vindicate the Soviet Navy’s concentration on missiles as an alternative to aircraft carriers. Admiral Gorshkov later wrote with approval about British naval historian Geoffrey Till’s declaration that the *Eilat*’s sinking marked ‘the beginning of the naval missile era’.102

Navy Secretary Paul Ignatius noted in a 1968 speech that the American public ‘discovered that the Soviets indeed had a Navy’ thanks to the previous year’s war,

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102 Gorshkov, *Vo Flotskom Strou*, p. 189.
which ‘drew considerable attention to the capabilities of the Soviet Navy’. 103 His real concern over the Soviet Navy’s new presence missions was ‘the political and psychological importance [of] these operations. […] In any area in which the Soviets deploy naval forces in time of tension, they are able to influence events by the uncertainty of their intentions as well as by the capabilities that those forces represent’.104 Ignatius concluded: ‘… we can be sure of one thing. Admiral Gorshkov’s and other leaders’ pronouncements indicate that they want the Red Fleet to get out on the high seas and build up its operational effectiveness’.

One of the most forceful voices on the consequences of Soviet naval expansion was Admiral John S. McCain Jr, Commander of US Naval Forces Europe. McCain spoke to the press about Soviet naval ambitions to surpass American sea power, unlike Secretary Ignatius who did not see ‘a conscious effort ultimately to gain naval supremacy over the United States’.106 While calling it a ‘race for the mastery of the seas’, Admiral McCain also expressed his confidence that the Soviet Navy was still ‘no match for the 6th Fleet and other NATO forces in the Mediterranean’.107 Indeed, the US Navy’s superior submarines and numerous aircraft carriers, according to McCain, also kept the ‘balance of naval power […] in America’s favor’.108

The consequences of the Soviet Navy’s lack of operational experience played out in the waters of the Mediterranean and elsewhere. In part confidence building measures, intelligence collection, and calculated provocations, the Soviet Navy began to routinely shadow American naval forces around the globe. The increasing number of incidents included Soviet warships as well as their intelligence collector ships (AGIs) and fishing trawler variants acting as ‘tattletales’ in close proximity to US ships and operating near US coastlines and naval bases worldwide.

One of the more intense confrontations occurred in the Sea of Japan during joint US-Japanese anti-submarine exercises in May 1967. A destroyer, USS Walker, collided not once, but twice, with two different Soviet destroyers as they ‘dart[ed] in and out’ among the Seventh Fleet carrier task group and Japanese Maritime Self-

104 Ibid., p. 483.
105 Ibid.
107 'Russia Seen Seeking Global 'Bridge of Ships''.
Defence forces. The Walker’s commanding officer told the press that the collisions were not deliberate on the part of the Soviet captains, but rather the result of ‘miscalculation’. The US Navy’s investigation found that before the first collision, ‘[a]s the two ships closed, the officers on the bridge of the Soviet destroyer seemed unconcerned and, in fact, jovial until a minute or so before the collision. However, with collision imminent, several became very concerned’.

Provocations at sea, or ‘incident warfare’ according to a 1969 report to Congress, were another aspect of the Cold War rivalry. The wire services would run stories in which Soviet naval leaders complained of US ships and planes bumping and buzzing their ships. In these cases, the American navy was cast as reckless and irresponsible, with the seamanship and brinksmanship of their commanders to blame. To be sure, provocation was a two-way street. As Zumwalt recalled in his memoir:

Incidents at Sea can be described with a fair amount of accuracy as an extremely dangerous, but exhilarating running game of “chicken” that American and Soviet ships had been playing with each other for many years. Official Navy statements always have blamed the Russians for staring this game, but as any teen-aged boy knows, it takes two to make a drag race.

The US Navy, officially at least, took all of the incidents seriously on both a policy and operational level. Vice Admiral Martin stated that: ‘Seafaring nations for centuries have allowed ships to proceed peacefully on the high seas. […] This is quite new – to barge in on a formation’. The State Department also ‘caution[ed] the Soviet Union that the harassment, if continued, could have serious political results’. The head of the Soviet Navy was also not silent during these tense episodes. After the Walker collisions, Admiral Gorshkov wrote in Izvestia that it was the ‘American naval commanders [who] committed dangerous provocations and bumped into Soviet ships only 200 miles off the Soviet naval port of Vladivostok’. Moreover, the Soviet Navy was entirely justified to challenge US maneuvers so near its Pacific

110 Quoted in Winkler, Cold War at Sea, p. 52.
113 Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 391.
114 ‘Russia: Power Play on the Oceans’, p. 27.

Years later, Gorshkov recalled these early days of high-seas confrontations: ‘Threatening our country’s security, [the US Navy] at times violated the boundaries of Soviet territorial waters. American strategists were only waiting for the chance to create an unpleasant incident and accuse us of aggravating the situation in a particular region. […] In some cases, the behavior of the American ships bordered on bullying’.\footnote{Gorshkov, \textit{Vo Flotskom Stroiu}, p. 253.} Gorshkov noted that the US military leaders were even more unnerved by the presence of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean. The navy chief restated the reason for their mission: ‘American military leaders more than once and quite openly stated that “concentrated in the Mediterranean’s Sixth Fleet, nuclear submarines [were] in constant readiness to strike on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact”’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 254.}

Peacetime naval operations were unlike those of army and air force operations. Indeed, both navies grappled with the new tensions as they pursued their respective national security interests in close proximity in the same waters. Admiral Moorer also reacted to the rapidly changing operating environment. He was not so much concerned about Soviet provocations leading to a shooting war in the Mediterranean as he was about the growing number of submarines in the same sea. He later recalled that their presence meant more dispersed formations and an increased emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, intelligence, and electronic countermeasures.\footnote{Moorer, pp. 622-23, 881.} Moorer’s speeches included his oft-repeated public warnings about the emergence of Soviet sea power.\footnote{‘Navy Chief Cites Surge by Soviets’, \textit{Washington Post}, 22 November 1968, p. A7; James Reston, ‘The Pentagon Battle over Money and Strategy’, \textit{New York Times}, 22 August 1969, p. 34.}

He listed all the places that Soviet warships were operating as of their Navy Day in July 1969:

\begin{quote}
In addition to those we saw off Key West, a missile-carrying cruiser with escorts appeared off Zanzibar. Another cruiser stood off the coast of Finland. A Soviet helicopter carrier maneuvered in the Eastern Mediterranean. Scores of nuclear subs prowled the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans. Visits to Chile and Peru were being planned. And units of his Pacific Fleet returned from a six months
cruise in the Indian and Pacific Oceans covering more than 30,000 miles and visiting 30 states. This then, broadly, is the challenge.121

Moorer also pointed to Admiral Gorshkov’s ‘volubility’ about their ‘oceanic resurgence’, in which Gorshkov proclaimed: ‘For the first time in its history the Soviet nation has acquired a powerful ocean-going navy. It has become the world's greatest naval power, capable of taking its line of defense out into the ocean’. According to Moorer, ‘[t]hese pronouncements are not without some substance; to paraphrase an old adage, it might be said that, by their words, as well as their deeds, we shall or have come to know them’.122

US perceptions of Soviet naval ambitions were grounded in the reality of their deeds and more than just Gorshkov’s words. According to a post-Cold War study by Russian naval officers, there was a marked increase in the number of combat missions from 1965-70 (Figure 3). Cruise numbers nearly doubled in five years (from 117 to 224). The most visible change that caused the world to take notice was in out-of-area deployments of surface ships, which increased nearly fourfold. Diesel submarines still

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conducted the majority of subsurface patrols, although the number of diesel sub cruises decreased over the next decade: from a high of 110 in 1966 to 59 by 1976. Notably, the study’s authors acknowledged that numbers did not equate to proficiency and that the Soviet Navy presented a somewhat hollow threat: ‘At the same time the possession of the great amount of ships capable to work tasks at sea was not yet the same as an ocean-going navy build-up. The navy could be considered as ocean-going when being at sea the ships could fulfill tasks at the highest degree of preparedness in time of peace’.124

**The Politics of the Naval Balance**

Admiral Gorshkov escalated the war of words, while the growing presence of Soviet ships around the globe showed the power of actions. Yet these factors did not have the greatest impact on perceptions of the Soviet Navy. The changing naval balance was evidence of the power of numbers – i.e., the apparent certainty of counting what the Soviets built to sway arguments over more ambiguous and subjective sources such as writings. As such, the interpretability of these different types of evidence played a role in political decisions and strategy formulation. The trends in numbers and types of platforms captured headlines and often proved more compelling in debates than the nuances of Gorshkov’s articles or speculation over the Soviet Navy’s wartime or peacetime missions. Yet numbers alone never provided the entire competitive picture. Tom Brooks, former head of naval intelligence, distilled evidence down to three classic elements: what the Soviets said, what they built, and what they did. It was necessary to see how this triad related for a complete assessment:

If all three of those elements appear to be in consonance, you probably have a fairly good understanding of what the Soviet Navy is about. If these three contradict each other, something is probably wrong in your analysis. Looking at just one of these areas without taking the other two into account can be dangerous.125

The Soviet naval threat by the late 1960s emerged in US domestic politics in the form of defence budget battles, congressional scrutiny, think tank reports, and as a presidential election campaign issue. At the center of the controversy was the naval

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124 Ibid.
balance. The common presumption was that the naval forces of the Soviet Union were in ascendance while those of the United States were in relative decline, yet the US was still ahead for the time being. As a result, an earnest debate began in policy and public forums about what should be done to halt the Navy’s slide and correct the balance sheet.

It is worth noting that the perceived imbalance was years in the making and had its roots in investment decisions for both navies well before the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam. Because of the lengthy procurement cycle of design, funding, and construction, the current state of navies were expressions of policy decisions made years before in a different political and economic climate. They were, in essence, the manifestation of long-past threat perceptions. For example, on the Soviet side of the ledger, a seven-year building plan begun in 1959 under Khrushchev produced many of the impressive ships and subs that appeared after his ouster in 1964.

![Figure 4. Estimate of Soviet naval construction from NIE 11-10-69](image)

The most comprehensive national intelligence assessment to-date of Soviet sea power in June 1969 (National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-10-69) surveyed the last decade of Soviet naval construction. The report estimated that new tonnage figures (rounded to the nearest 500 tons) peaked in 1961 before rising again in 1966-67 (Figure 4). Overall, total construction nearly doubled from 1958 to 1968 (59,5000 to

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126 Ibid., p. 17, Table I.
112,000 tons). The total tonnage for the decade was over 1.5 million, with submarines making up 525,000, or 35% of Soviet naval construction. The next seven-year building plan, begun in 1966, placed ‘an emphasis on multipurpose surface warships designed for long-range operations’ as well as on the new classes of nuclear submarines, including the Yankee-class ballistic missile submarines.127

Thus, concurrent with the Soviet Navy’s humiliation in 1962 because of its lack of capabilities for a forward naval presence, the ships and submarines were already in the design or construction pipeline to correct these deficiencies. The outcome of Nikita Khrushchev’s failed gambit strengthened Admiral Gorshkov’s hand to use his growing naval forces to project Soviet power in a more assertive manner in the Brezhnev era and in a much-changed strategic environment.128

The Pentagon’s civilian leaders acknowledged that the sudden rise of the Soviet Navy was a top national security priority. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Navy Secretary Nitze spoke publicly about the possibility of a war at sea with the Soviets by the mid-1960s.129 Yet even as a naval war with the Soviet Union was becoming thinkable, the defence establishment still framed its response to the Soviet naval threat in relation to ongoing wartime demands and budgetary realities. Navy Secretary Ignatius later recalled the impact of Vietnam ‘on the legacy in the Navy – the Navy had exhausted a lot of its resources in the war and needed to be reconstituted, both with respect to ships and with respect to supporting equipment’.130 Admiral Moorer also warned Congress that the operational tempo of Vietnam left a depleted Sixth Fleet that was ‘below par in combat strength’ to face the Soviets. Moorer later qualified his remarks with reporters to stress that, ‘while the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean is an instrument of foreign policy, “it is not a threat in the sense of an all-out tactical engagement tomorrow morning”’.131

The state of the US Navy by the late 1960s also reflected the price paid, at the expense of its general purpose forces, for the costly yet necessary investment in the Polaris programme in the late 1950s to achieve an assured second-strike capability.

128 Harlan K. Ullman, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis and Soviet Naval Development: Myths and Realities’, \textit{NWCR}, XXVII.3 (1976), 45-56 (pp. 53-54).
Polaris, in turn, spurred the Soviets to pursue massive outlays in both a similar programme and in its own neglected anti-submarine warfare defences. In this manner, the fleet ballistic missile submarine became a cornerstone of Cold War naval competition.

In addition to the budget hit from Polaris, the US Navy had warned for years that it faced block obsolescence from a fleet comprised of more than three-quarters World War II-era ships. As these vessels neared the end of their 20-year service life, talk of a ‘warship gap’ began in 1962 as Navy officials testified before Congress that America urgently needed its own seven-year construction plan. Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth called for the production of 70 ships a year to replace over 500 ships in order to fulfill its missions into the 1970s.132 Moreover, the 1969 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships observed that the Soviet Navy proved willing and now able to fulfill the void left by the Royal Navy’s withdrawal east of Suez and American navy’s problem with block obsolescence, further amplified as a ‘naval crisis’ for the US by the national media.133

The continual comparison of the age of the American and Soviet fleets also generated some alarming headlines. In late 1968, Admiral Moorer drew attention to the fact that 80 percent of US ships were more than 20-years old, while 90 percent of Soviet ships were less than 15-years old.134 In addition, a 1968 Senate report from an investigation headed by another navalist legislator, Senator John C. Stennis, compared the American and Soviet submarine programmes and their projected capabilities into the 1970s. Stennis’ subcommittee found that the US was losing its qualitative edge with its aging submarine fleet and that, having conceded the numbers game long ago, a ‘delusion of qualitative supremacy’ remained instead.135

At the request of the House Armed Services Committee’s newly established subcommittee on sea power, the American Security Council explored the implications of the ‘changing naval balance’ in a report in late 1968. Retired Admiral Harry Felt, a former Pacific Fleet commander, headed the analysis team that determined that the Soviet Union’s ‘new oceanic vision’ had historic implications and that this ‘massive move of strategic power to the oceans dictates a rapid build-up and modernization of

134 ‘Navy Chief Cites Surge by Soviets’.
American sea power’. ‘The expanding commitments for the 1970’s,’ the authors argued, ‘cannot be met with naval forces created for commitments of the 1940’s and 1950’s’.\textsuperscript{136}

The American Security Council’s report provided side-by-side graphic comparisons of the American and Soviet naval forces. In contrast to American stagnation, the study painted a picture of a Soviet Navy that displayed ‘both technical excellence and professional zeal’ under Admiral Gorshkov’s ‘vigorous leadership’.\textsuperscript{137} The report emphasized the continued expansion of the Soviet submarine force as well as its innovative use of guided missiles by its surface forces to create a uniquely Russian concept of naval warfare. Gorshkov now possessed, in his own words, a new ‘oceanic fleet that can challenge the enemy in the open seas of the world’ and a new offensive strategy in the Soviet quest for naval supremacy.\textsuperscript{138}

The report recommended that the US should pay more attention to the Soviet Navy’s intentions than to its capabilities. As the new Soviet ships ‘crowd the seas’, it warned, ‘[w]hat counts, in the final analysis, is not the number of ships the Russians have today or the character of their naval hardware, but their purpose in creating a powerful ocean fleet’ that specifically included the ‘basic Communist goal of world domination’.\textsuperscript{139} Furthermore, the recent increase in incidents of harassment and pressure tactics by Soviet naval forces served the psychological purpose of ‘induc[ing] in the mind of the West the idea that the USSR is the boldest power on the high seas. […] [T]he Soviets have respect for strength, and contempt for lack of it’.\textsuperscript{140}

\textit{Soviet Sea Power} was another think tank report in 1969 to focus public attention on the growing threat.\textsuperscript{141} Not surprising for an organization founded by Admiral Arleigh Burke after his retirement, Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies entered the public policy fray on the issue. A driving force behind the sea power study was the view taking hold in Washington that the Soviet Navy was suddenly better than the US Navy at being a Cold War sea power after two decades of uncontested American dominance. Robert A. Kilmarx, the

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., pp. 7, 18.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., p. 31.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., pp. 35, 43.
project’s director, noted that, ‘the Soviet Union uses its naval power as a political
instrument much more precisely than the United States’.142

The report sought to answer a fundamental question: ‘Has the Soviet Union
shifted from its historic defensive-minded, army-dominated, coastal-oriented naval
posture to a balanced, comprehensive, global maritime policy aimed at gaining
supremacy as a sea power?’143 The write-up outlined the growth in Soviet naval
capabilities as touted by Admiral Gorshkov and used his words as supporting
evidence. It concluded that the Soviet Navy now favored offensive over defensive
uses of naval power in its operations as well as quality (and originality) over quantity
in its construction. Nonetheless, ambiguities over its offensive or defensive nature
remained.144

Notably, the center called on two of the more polarizing thinkers to participate
in the background paper: retired naval officers Commander Robert Herrick and
Captain Carl Amme. Both Herrick and Amme had written on the dangers of
overselling the Soviet naval threat. Herrick once again emphasized the view found in
his recently published Soviet Naval Strategy that its lack of carriers and its reliance
upon submarines meant that the Soviet Navy could only pursue sea denial, and not
command of the sea. He wrote:

The study’s failure to make a clearcut assumption on whether the
carrier has lost its key role leads to confusion over the nature of Soviet
strategy. The paper’s suggestion that the USSR’s grand design for
global maritime power should not be viewed exclusively in defensive
or offensive terms, since global power acquired in the name of defense
also creates capabilities for offensive operations, is true but wide of the
mark.145

Amme also wanted to clarify the debate by noting that Soviet naval strategy
must be seen in both its peacetime and wartime roles. It was the Soviets’ skillful
political and psychological use of naval power to gain influence in recent years that
garnered the most attention and caused ‘the understandable frustration we
experience’.146 Yet the Soviet Navy’s legitimate pursuit of freedom of the seas in the

144 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
145 Ibid., p. 125.
146 Ibid., p. 126.
Mediterranean and elsewhere, Amme reiterated, did not mean that Gorshkov now had the ability to control or to deny access to the US Navy in key regions.\footnote{See Amme, 'The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean Sea'.}

The study by Arleigh Burke’s think tank coincided with a presidential election year in 1968. Republican candidate and former vice president Richard M. Nixon became the third president in a row with naval service in the Pacific during World War II. On the campaign trail, and later in private discussions with his national security advisers as president, Nixon showed that he was comfortable with detailed discussions of the Soviet Navy, and was often more supportive of the US Navy’s roles and missions than those of the other military services. Nixon campaigned against the backdrop of a heightened sense of urgency about the Soviet submarine threat and talk of a looming 'gap' in attack submarines. One news story reported that, for whoever won the White House, the stark decision must be made to ‘either spend more money on anti-submarine-warfare (ASW) to keep ahead of the Russians in this cat-and-mouse game or allow some Soviet subs to go undetected’.\footnote{George C. Wilson, ‘Navy Seeks Funds for Sub Detection’, \textit{Washington Post}, 31 October 1968, p. A10.}

In early October, Nixon gave a major speech in Norfolk, Virginia – home to the Atlantic Fleet – in which he criticized Democrats for being too complacent about the Soviet Navy. Nixon told voters that his opponent and Johnson’s vice president, Hubert Humphrey, had compromised American naval strength through inaction. Nixon claimed in his speech that ‘the Soviet Union is making a very impressive bid to become the world’s number one sea power [while] the United States has not been doing what it should to keep them from overtaking us’.\footnote{Chalmers M. Roberts, ‘U.S. Naval Strength Compromised, Nixon Says’, ibid., 3 October, p. A2.} He further charged that during the Kennedy and Johnson era, ‘there was […] an open discounting of the Soviet naval threat. The strategic advantages gained in the 1950s began to melt away. There was an abrupt default on the Eisenhower commitment to a nuclear-powered Navy’.\footnote{New York Times Service, 'Nixon Hits 'Complacency' in Face of Soviet Naval Buildup', 3 October 1968.} Nixon then pointed to the rapidly aging US Navy ships: ‘I say that second best isn’t good enough’.\footnote{Associated Press, 'Nixon Raps Demos on Seapower 'Loss'', 3 October 1968.}

Yet by early 1969, when the rhetoric of the campaign trail met the budgetary realities in Washington, the new Republican administration faced its own difficult choices on the naval balance. The ways to address it entailed tremendous costs and...
political capital that even pro-sea power politicians like Nixon could not expend. The hiatus in naval shipbuilding continued due to the across-the-board defence cuts of the Vietnam drawdown. One analyst later calculated that the US built only 88 ships from 1966-1970 while the Soviets produced 209, or 237 percent more. American spending levels also remained below the pre-Vietnam spending levels of 1964 in constant dollars for eleven years.152

Thus, the US Navy found that, for the moment, it could do little to influence a change in policy or budget numbers, regardless of what Admiral Gorshkov said or the Soviet Navy did on the high seas. In a cynical but accurate description, the New York Times reported on the usual patterns to ‘the Pentagon battle over money and strategy’ in August 1969:

First, some military spokesman declassifies intelligence information about the rise of Soviet naval power. Next, some admiral makes a speech about the decline of America’s control of the seas. And finally, the Secretary of Defense announces some cuts in the defense budget, but warns that more cuts will damage the nation’s capacity to keep the peace.153

That month, Nixon’s new Pentagon team of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Navy Secretary John Chafee announced to Congress their plan to save $100 million by cutting 76 ships, or 10 percent of the fleet, from the Navy’s inventory. Secretary Chafee further warned that, although the Navy would still have more than 700 ships on its active roster, they would not have the same levels of defence posture and readiness after these significant cuts.154

Admiral Moorer, in a speech on 19 August, made a more nuanced argument than might be otherwise inferred from the New York Times article. Moorer fired back at those who claimed that the Navy played a ‘numbers game’ with the naval balance, especially with submarines, because there was no attempt to ‘match [the Soviets] ship for ship.’ He stated: ‘This would be foolish—in our Navy we have entirely different missions from what the Soviets see for their navy; consequently we do not think in terms of counterparts’. Nevertheless, Moorer acknowledged that the Navy’s current battle to keep its 15 attack carriers still depended, at least in part, on making a persuasive, threat-based argument. Carriers played a significant role in the Navy’s global mission to ‘…meet any challenge mounted against his nation’, he claimed: ‘I

152 Korb, pp. 337-38.
153 Reston.
believe our aircraft carriers are the key to our present superiority. With too few, or none, the Soviets would probably be the leading naval power’.155

The need to make drastic cuts in the defence budget resurrected the long-standing debate in Congress about the number, expense, and even the necessity of aircraft carriers. A Washington Post story noted the US Navy’s strategy to combat the criticisms aimed at their capital ship: ‘Using leaked documents, off-the-record briefings to newsmen and seminars in which speakers cannot be identified, the US Navy is briskly at work during the three-week Congressional recess attempting to protect the future of its aircraft carriers. At stake for the Navy, in effect, is its way of life’.156

The intersection of strong opinions on the Soviet Navy and on the utility of carriers further revealed the ideological fault lines that would only deepen in the 1970s. The most important and obvious divide was between those who took a more hardline, anti-communist position toward the Soviet threat in general and those who raised the issue of threat inflation, or simply wanted a clearer justification for the tremendous expense of carriers. One of the most vocal politicians was Senator Walter F. Mondale, a liberal Democrat from Minnesota and future vice president for Jimmy Carter. Mondale led the charge in questioning the rationale for carriers in order ‘to bring the issue out into the open’.157 In August 1969, he co-sponsored an amendment that required a ‘comprehensive study and investigation of the past and projected costs and effectiveness of attack aircraft carriers and their task forces’ before the $377 million in funds appropriated to build a new nuclear-power carrier (USS Dwight D. Eisenhower) could be expended.158

As part of his challenge to the Navy’s demand for 15 carriers, Mondale persuaded supporters who also questioned the need for so many carriers and who were willing to cross the political aisle or alter their opinion on the Soviet Navy.159 The carrier’s extensive use in the Vietnam War further validated its pivotal role in strike warfare in the minds of naval leaders, yet against their Cold War rival, justifications like those offered by Admiral Moorer became much weaker, according

159 Ibid., pp. 25054, 025057.
to critics such as Mondale. Indeed, relying upon the Soviet naval threat in making the case for nuclear-powered carriers proved problematic for two reasons that emerged during debates.

The first was the sense of the increasing vulnerability of the aircraft carrier in the modern missile and submarine age. Congressional critics and even supporters latched onto these threats as evidenced by events the previous year, especially the sinking of the Israeli destroyer by a Soviet anti-ship missile and the *November*-class submarine scare. Senator Mondale emphasized that the Navy leadership’s own testimony had described the danger to its surface fleet from Soviet cruise missiles. He also pointed to the diluted offensive capabilities of carrier task forces as they expended resources on anti-submarine warfare in the presence of Soviet submarines. Yet it still struck many in Congress as paradoxical that the Navy was willing to cut two of its anti-submarine carriers at a time when Soviet submarines increasingly threatened US forces. The Pentagon under McNamara, however, had decided that the barrier strategy against Soviet submarines worked well enough that additional funds should be directed toward more attack submarines and destroyer escorts.

The second carrier problem went to the crux of the rivalry: if the US was in competition with the Soviet Union and if the aircraft carrier was such a vital platform, critics asked, then why did the Soviets have no carriers? In other words, why was the naval balance so clearly unbalanced? The US Navy’s usual explanations of differences in geography and missions no longer satisfied some senators and reporters. According to one news story, ‘[t]op Navy men have no ready answer to those who wonder why, if carriers are so important, Russia has never built any and Great Britain and Australia, leading maritime nations, have built none since World War II’. Senator Mondale, who started the entire debate, did not go so far as to declare carriers obsolete. Nonetheless, he argued that even if they were still key to American superiority as Admiral Moorer claimed, 15 were still too many. He declared: ‘Regardless of the reasons for the Soviet decision not to build carriers, our Navy cannot have it both ways. Either carriers are not vital to a surface fleet and the

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160 Ibid., p. 25057.
162 Homan.
Soviet Navy is a threat without them, or else the Soviet’s surface fleet is not a significant naval threat’.163

Conclusion

As the 1960s drew to a close, there was the sense that the United States Navy had lost its edge over its more ambitious Soviet adversary as views were undergoing a sea change or were at least up for reconsideration. The crisis of confidence as a result of the Vietnam War extended to those who feared that not enough was being done about the Soviet threat. Stories of America’s naval unpreparedness and eroded power continued into the Nixon era and highlighted an issue that would not be easily resolved with a change in administrations.

It was not entirely bad news for the US Navy by the end of 1969. The Mondale-Case amendment to delay new carrier construction lost its impetus and construction began on the USS Eisenhower in mid-1970. The much-hated F111-B was scrapped in favor of the F-14 Tomcat, a mainstay of carrier aviation through the rest of the Cold War. Yet the toll of the Vietnam War on the Navy’s people and ships, morale and materiel conditions, had yet to be truly encountered and a decade of fears of a ‘hollow force’ lay ahead.

Some of the most dramatic events in the Cold War at sea happened in the 1960s and played out against the backdrop of the rise of the Soviet Navy and the emergence of Admiral Gorshkov as the face of the threat. Naval forces were on the leading edge of the superpower rivalry and interacting in ways that could escalate if not carefully controlled. However, the US Navy still searched for a more clearly defined and mobilizing message to gain support for its mission to retain American naval superiority. The Soviet Navy seemingly obliged when it shocked the world in the spring of 1970.

163 Ibid. See also Wilson, 'Restudy'.

CHAPTER 3 Gorshkov and the Analysts (1970-1974)

… [I]n this series of articles by Admiral Gorshkov, we have a rare glimpse into the mind of a very important man. It is not a complete psycho-intellectual analysis, not a blueprint, but a glimpse into a mind. It may turn out, when enough people have formed their opinions, to be a rather useful one because the most important element of intelligence in any adversary situation […] is some degree of insight into the mind of the opponent.

- Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie¹

The 1970s began with a series of unpleasant surprises for the West courtesy of the Soviet Navy, starting with a historic naval exercise. Okean shocked the US with its massive scale and demonstration of blue water naval capabilities. US frustrations mounted as the continued deployments of naval forces extended the Soviet Union’s global reach and pointed to a shift to a significant presence in the Indian Ocean and another attempt to return to the Caribbean via Cuba. These moves signaled a direct challenge not only to the US Navy, but also to the recently announced Nixon Doctrine and Western influence in key regions. In the era of strategic arms control and détente intended to reduce the superpower competition, reminders of the US-Soviet rivalry and perhaps even a looming naval race proved an unwelcome development as the US remained entrenched in the Vietnam War.

The Soviet Navy, as its units surged into all corners of the globe, provided ample evidence that its deeds matched its leader’s boastful words. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the commander-in-chief since the mid-1950s, was just entering the period of his most prolific writing that matched this new operational tempo. While major exercises and out-of-area deployments seemed to underscore the message of Gorshkov’s articles, experts like those at the Center for Naval Analyses dissected the content of his writings to arrive at the correct interpretation of Soviet strategy and policy. In turn, think tank reports and media coverage, as well as the assessments of the intelligence community and naval leaders, fueled the debates over the nature of the threat and created a demand filled by those engaged in Soviet naval studies – a dynamic group that continued to add new scholars and to offer alternative views over the years.

¹ Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, p. 110.
**Okean ‘70**

The Soviet Navy’s global maneuvers in the spring of 1970 were a wake-up call for the US Navy. The simultaneous demonstration across the ‘World Ocean’, as Gorshkov called it, revealed just how far the Soviet Union’s navy had come since its disastrous performance during the Cuban Missile Crisis less than a decade earlier. It was even further removed from the coastal defensive force that emerged from World War II. The defence ministry newspaper *Red Star* announced that ‘[f]or the first time in the history of both Soviet and world naval art, the forces disposed on different oceans will operate on a single concept’.²

*Okean*, Russian for ‘ocean’, unfolded in April-May 1970 and was the largest display of naval power thus far in the Cold War era. The Pentagon characterized the event for the press as ‘the first coordinated worldwide naval exercise in history’.³ It involved approximately 200 ships and submarines as well as hundreds of land-based aircraft from all four fleets operating as separate task forces under a unified command from Moscow. The maneuvers spanned the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as well as their adjoining seas and included simulated anti-carrier strikes within minutes of each other on opposite sides of the globe that demonstrated a remarkable proficiency in planning and execution.⁴ The exercise also featured anti-submarine warfare and amphibious operations.

Veteran naval commentator and retired *New York Times* military editor Hanson Baldwin pointed out that the US Navy had never attempted anything on this grand of a scale. Yet he left unnoted that the US did not have to prove its operational prowess to the world, unlike the Soviet challenger to the status quo.⁵ Nonetheless, the US Navy had to address many questions posed by the media and answer to the American public on the significance of the Red Fleet’s maneuvers. Indeed, ‘the Soviet exercise had sparked increased interest by the Navy in briefing members of Congress and their key supporters, usually in their home states and districts’ about the need for American sea power.⁶

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There were press reports by mid-April of an unusually high level of Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean in late March followed by a sharp increase in ships and aircraft in the Pacific and North Atlantic, which Navy spokesmen briefed as part of a worldwide ‘demonstration of muscle’. The Soviet Union gave the West advance notice with few specifics, beyond Admiral Gorshkov’s statement that they would be global maneuvers held in the open ocean far away from international shipping lanes. Yet even with forewarning, Okean’s scope came as a shock to NATO countries. ‘… [W]e did not expect to see so many ships’, a British Ministry of Defence official noted when an estimated 90 Soviet warships, including eight guided missile destroyers, appeared off the coast of Scotland in the North Sea. A wire service reporter labeled their presence an ‘armada’, which had its own historical connotations for the British Isles.

The Okean phases that garnered the most US attention were those in the North Atlantic and the Iceland-Faeroes gap that showcased the ‘High North’ as a major theatre of wartime operations as long anticipated by both superpower navies. Indeed, this maritime war at sea scenario foreshadowed the NATO exercise Ocean Venture '81 a decade hence and a key element of the US Maritime Strategy. The New York Times noted that, ‘[i]nterest in the Soviet exercise arises more from the area where it is being held than from the number and types of craft employed’.

The location was not surprising given that the Soviet Navy had conducted annual exercises in the Norwegian Sea since 1961. The previous largest naval exercise to date with Warsaw Pact navies from Poland and East Germany was on NATO’s Northern Flank in mid-July 1968. Codenamed Sever (‘north’), the joint command and staff exercise took place in the North Atlantic as well as the Barents, Norwegian, and Baltic Seas. Under Gorshkov’s command, the purpose was to ‘test the defenses of the east bloc against sea attack’ and to ‘demonstrate growing Soviet sea power’.

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In the even more ambitious Okean scenario, the Baltic Fleet played the role of the aggressor ‘southern’ force of NATO carrier groups that included the helicopter heavy cruiser *Leningrad*. The Northern Fleet forces under operational control from Murmansk ‘soundly defeated’ the southern forces, according to the Soviet press. The barrier defence included anti-ship missile strikes from surface ships and submarines as well as ‘heavy night attacks’ from land-based Tu-16 *Badger* bombers. Gorshkov and his first deputy Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov hosted Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko aboard the cruiser *Murmansk* in the Barents to witness the display of naval prowess. The defence minister also observed a submarine-launched missile firing and the successful repelling of an amphibious assault on the Rybachi Peninsula by the recently reestablished naval infantry.\(^\text{11}\)

The message of a powerful oceanic navy was paramount for the Soviet Union. The exercise received extensive coverage in the Soviet press and allowed Admiral Gorshkov, in one of the proudest moments of his long career, to proclaim that, ‘now on the chart of the world ocean, it is difficult to come upon regions where the ships of the Soviet fleet are unable to sail’.\(^\text{12}\) The *New York Times*’ Moscow correspondent noted that the stories on *Okean* reminded those familiar with naval history of the atmosphere surrounding the Great White Fleet at the turn of the century. Gorshkov’s avowed intention to ‘show the red flag of communism’ only deepened that impression.\(^\text{13}\)

In the case of this exhibition of naval power in 1970, Grechko and Gorshkov may have agreed with the diplomatic parallels in the displays – albeit with the stipulation that the earlier American one by Theodore Roosevelt was in the service of an ‘imperialist’ power to ‘bully’ weaker states. Indeed, the global maneuvers served multiple purposes for numerous audiences. Coming at the end of the eighth five-year plan, *Okean* was a ‘battle report’ to both the party and the public on their investment in the Red Banner fleets.\(^\text{14}\) For military observers and participants, *Okean* showcased strategy and warfighting skills, with the added benefit of power politics for the country’s communist elites.

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\(^{12}\) Daly, p. 286.


For Soviet naval commanders, *Okean* was a global command and control exercise to test combat readiness. Gorshkov later called *Okean* ‘the most widespread and comprehensive inspection of combat readiness of our fleet’. ‘Ocean voyages’, he wrote, were also the ‘school [for] the sailors in the next decades’.\(^\text{15}\) Norman Polmar, in his 1974 biography of Gorshkov, referenced a report that indicated the Soviet navy chief had direct tactical control of the exercise:

After examining the map of the situation, [Gorshkov] made a number of decisions according to reports. One point of a decision concerned submarines in a remote region of the maneuvers ….The commander-in-chief can direct the maneuvers from onboard ship and from a shore post, fully confident that the headquarters will implement his decisions…. The alternate courses were laid on the commander-in-chief's table.\(^\text{16}\)

The Central Intelligence Agency produced an English-language version of the Russian propaganda film, *Operation Ocean*, for use as a training film. The documentary featured *Victory at Sea*-style grainy video of ships in heavy seas and a swelling musical score. The narration emphasized the heroic and human element of the Soviet Navy’s operations, with the sailor ‘still the ship’s main engine’. The film echoed Gorshkov’s frequent message on the importance of the training and education that can only come from time at sea. Indeed, it was impossible to ‘develop a man’s courage without placing him in a situation which demands it’, according to the film, and *Okean* had provided these conditions.\(^\text{17}\)

Apart from the benefit for the morale and combat readiness of Russian sailors, *Okean* was also timed to coincide with the Lenin Centenary celebrations to emphasize the Red Fleet’s role in the service of the communist state and cause. Further evidence that the Soviet high command was ‘pleased with the exercise and wished the rest of the world to be impressed’, according to *Proceedings*, was the rapid publication of a book entitled *Okean* commemorating the event.\(^\text{18}\)

Defence Minister Marshal Grechko offered high praise in the book for the maneuvers, which he wrote ‘were evidence of the increased naval power of our socialist state, an indication that our fleet has grown and strengthened enough to

\(^{\text{15}}\) Gorshkov, *Vo Flotskom Stroiu*, p. 187.


\(^{\text{18}}\) Daly, p. 287.
defend our state interests on the vast expanses of the oceans’. Admiral Gorshkov emphasized that *Okean* showed the increased level of operational preparedness for Soviet naval units to operate ‘independently’ in remote parts of the ocean and for his naval staffs to control them. He reiterated that nuclear submarines and naval aviation formed the basis for the fleet’s combat power – without which ‘it is impossible to achieve any serious goals in the armed struggle at sea’.  

*Okean* also impressed the US Navy, just as Gorshkov intended. Vice Admiral Richard Colbert, Naval War College president since 1968, wrote that the exercise ‘not only highlighted the efficiency of the modern Soviet Navy, but it also demonstrated this fleet’s worldwide operational capability under highly sophisticated and centralized command and control systems’. The largest deployment since the Russian fleet that sailed to Tsushima in 1905, Colbert noted, supported Gorshkov’s boasts of a navy ‘equal to any strategic task’. Colbert had been warning of the rise of Soviet sea power his entire tenure at the war college. For him, ‘the lesson of Okean is clear. The Soviets are now clearly capable of interdicting our free world sea [lines of communication]’.  

To be sure, the transformation of the Soviet Navy into a global striking force was a truly remarkable achievement. Yet Admiral Gorshkov’s lesson for the US Navy was even more ominous than Colbert and others portrayed. Gorshkov offered it again in his Navy Day message in *Pravda* in 1972: the Soviet Navy was ‘an impressive factor deterring any attempts at sudden aggression against the Soviet Union’. Indeed, the real message based on the Northern flank maneuvers was not that the Soviet Navy was now the aggressor but that it was becoming a far better defender in order to thwart any US naval strategy designed to strike the Soviet Union. Gorshkov’s writings and other exercises in the 1970s would demonstrate the Soviet Navy’s growing interest in exerting command of the sea around the periphery of the Soviet Union.

While all US news reports picked up on the symbolism of the Soviet Navy’s debut on the world stage, only one noted the significant conclusion that it was

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20 Novikov, p. 12.


primarily a defensive show of force: ‘The Navy said that, in effect, the Russian fleet units—including some of the fleets newest guided missile warships – are “throwing a naval ring around the Eurasian continent.” This appeared to mean that the exercise – “a defense of the homeland exercise,” according to the spokesman in referring to a heavy concentration of Soviet ships in far northern waters’.23

*Okean* was, in all likelihood, the exercise of the ‘blue belt of defence’, first announced by Defence Minister Marshal Malinovsky at the party congress in 1966, which marked the Soviet Navy’s increased role in strategic defence.24 Robert Herrick’s report for the Center for Naval Analyses in 1973 traced the history of the little-understood concept. The 1970 naval exercise revived interest in the Soviet Navy’s probable role in the ‘belt’ around Eurasia. Herrick determined that, based on reporting out of Moscow, the concept was probably a ‘unified plan’ involving other branches of the armed services to defend against American ballistic missile submarines and strike carriers. In particular, the Soviet Air Defence Forces likely conducted a staff exercise during *Okean* that was not apparent to the West. Yet the high visibility of the Soviet Navy during the maneuvers showed the key role of their submarines (including ASW submarines), missile-firing ships, and land-based aviation in the defence zones.25 Herrick later stated that both *Okean* ’70 and ’75 exercises ‘seemed to be tactically defensive’ as well.26

*Okean* revealed the strategically defensive and forward deployed nature of the Soviet Navy, yet Gorshkov and others presented the exercise in a way to emphasize the navy’s offensive punch through its distant reach. The exercise also matched the geographic pattern of Soviet out-of-area activity in the early 1970s. An intelligence assessment of Soviet naval deployments in 1972 calculated that, of the ship-days out of home waters (38,230), more than three-fourths were for the primary mission of ‘defense against Western navies’ in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the northwestern Pacific.27 Yet *Okean* also distorted American assessments such as this one and caused a dispute between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Central

24 Bradsher.
26 Herrick and Winkler, p. 18.
27 Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Soviet General Purpose Naval Deployments Outside Home Waters: Characteristics and Trends [Intelligence Report]’, (June 1973), CREST, Record 0000309797, p. 9.
Intelligence Agency. Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Earl F. ‘Rex’ Rectanus complained in a series of memos to agency leaders of ‘analytical bias’ in the ‘unilaterally-produced articles’ on the Soviet Navy by new and inexperienced maritime analysts. In particular, the admiral took issue with a strategic research report on out-of-area ship days that concluded that deployments had ‘leveled off’ in the 1970s and that the period of rapid expansion of Soviet naval operations from the 1960s was now over.

Nonetheless, the Central Intelligence Agency did not back down in future assessments from its assertion that the ‘rapid growth rate’ in Soviet naval out-of-area operations had slowed since the late 1960s but held open the possibility that the arrival of more and numerous ships may bring a ‘moderate but steady increase’ in future distant operations. The National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Navy in 1974 recognized the pronounced effect these deployments and exercises such as Okean had on perceptions of the naval balance. In one of the most succinct summaries of the situation yet written about the issue, the intelligence report observed:

The Soviet Navy has been widely perceived as equal to or even superior to the US Navy, despite the many asymmetries in the two forces. This perception has given the Soviet Navy a degree of credibility which, while not always fully supported by its combat capabilities, has made it an important element in calculations of international political power.

The first Okean also allowed the US Navy to learn all it could about Soviet naval operations and called for the Navy’s own massive effort to collect and analyse the intelligence from the historic maneuvers. According to an organizational history, naval intelligence scrambled to adjust collection requirements to focus more assets on the sudden surge in Soviet naval activity, but could not fully take advantage of this rare opportunity. Nonetheless, the photographic reconnaissance of the tremendous number of Soviet naval platforms underway was of great benefit. The Navy contracted with Soviet naval expert Norman Polmar to assist with the detailed

30 Ibid., p. 7.
31 Packard, p. 55.
analysis of the participating units and with the production a classified summary of
\textit{Okean}.\textsuperscript{32}

The Soviet Navy’s global exercise in the spring of 1970 was a display of its
current capabilities for both domestic and foreign audiences. For years after, \textit{Okean}
also provided evidence of the Soviet Union’s naval ambitions and that the country
was ‘no longer content to be simply a land power’.\textsuperscript{33} As naval officer and scholar
Bruce Watson later wrote, the exercise and the even larger one in 1975 ‘…were the
most valid indicators of Soviet naval potential in the early and mid-1970s’.\textsuperscript{34}

The first \textit{Okean} was a galvanizing moment for American naval thought and
thus achieved its intended shock value for Gorshkov. While it did not alter the
strategic or mental landscape entirely, the Soviet Navy succeeded in once again
shifting perceptions of the rivalry in its favor. Soviet propaganda used this impression
of a serious threat – exaggerated or not – to the best advantage. According to Admiral
Gorshkov in his Navy Day remarks in \textit{Pravda} in 1971, Soviet naval exercises in
general ‘are proof of the Soviet Union’s ever-growing strength as a naval power. This
is not to the taste of inspirers of aggression … who are trying to frighten the world
public with the threat of Soviet fleets on the world’s oceans’.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{Red Star Rising at Sea: The Gorshkov Articles}

\textit{Red Star Rising at Sea} is, in essence, a time capsule of Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov’s thinking on strategy and the perceptions of US naval leaders during a
period of heightened anxiety over the rise of the Soviet Navy. The ‘Gorshkov
articles’, as they were known in the West, formed the basis for the book in 1974. The
11 articles attributed to Gorshkov first appeared in \textit{Morskoi Sbornik} under the heading
of ‘Navies in War and in Peace’. The series ran from February 1972 to February 1973
and totaled more than 54,000 words. It included several essays on the role of modern
navies, which were of supreme interest to American analysts, as well as numerous
ones on Russian and Soviet naval history from Tsarist times to the Second World
War.

\textsuperscript{32} Polmar, \textit{Norman’s Corner}.
\textsuperscript{34} Watson, \textit{Red Navy at Sea}, p. 29.
The Gorshkov articles came to the attention of the Naval Institute’s editorial board in May 1973. R. T. E. Bowler, a retired navy commander and the board’s secretary-treasurer, made the recommendation that English translations of the articles should be serialized in *Proceedings* (like their original format) and later bound together as a book. Bowler also suggested that each article be accompanied by a brief commentary ‘providing only the bare necessities for the reader who might be unfamiliar with what Admiral Gorshkov had to say.’ However, the institute was not alone in its interest. The board heard that the Center for Naval Analyses had already produced a report on the validity and purpose of the Gorshkov articles and that:

… essentially a difference of opinion as to what the articles really represent; there was a general conclusion from the analysis that they were not straightforward discussions, that there was considerable rhetoric in the articles, and that they did not shed any significant light on new Soviet developments. Basically, it was the conclusion of the analysis that the articles had been written by Gorshkov’s staff as a part of the internal struggle going on and to obtain more money for the (Soviet) navy.

Convinced of the articles’ intellectual value after further research into other publication and copyright issues, the board gave its formal approval for the series in August 1973 – with the stipulation that the commentaries come from senior US Navy officers. In addition, the editors chose Theodore Neely, an analyst at the Office of Naval Intelligence, for the demanding task of translating the articles from Russian on a tight production schedule. The result was an extremely readable and accessible English-language version of Gorshkov’s writings.

It is worth noting that the Naval Institute did not consider the decision to provide a platform for Admiral Gorshkov to be controversial one, unlike the decision taken in 1968 to publish Robert Herrick’s book that argued for the strategically defensive nature of Soviet naval strategy. Both offerings likely struck many readers as distortions of the truth and full of erroneous conclusions, yet they broadened the understanding of Cold War sea power and informed ongoing debates. The board’s justification came with the publication of the first Gorshkov article in the January 1974 issue of *Proceedings*. The editors wrote that because these were views the Soviet Navy’s top commander wished to share with his own officers, then ‘for that reason alone, they are considered to be of profound interest to the officers of his

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37 Ibid.
country’s principal rival at sea, the United States Navy’.

The publisher’s preface for *Red Star Rising at Sea* further explained:

> It is important that English-speaking people have the opportunity to read and consider the words of the leading spokesman of mid-century Soviet naval development, for in those words the reader will find not only an explanation of how the philosophy of Soviet seapower has developed over the last half-century but also a better understanding of the challenge which Soviet naval power poses for the future.

The Naval War College president, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, seconded the value of open literature and recommended that all commanding officers should encourage discussion of the Gorshkov series to better understand the ‘[stiff] competition’ that they faced in the Soviet Navy. The participation of so many prominent American naval leaders in the project – including five former chiefs of naval operations and two former directors of the naval history division – attested to their acknowledgement of Gorshkov’s significant contributions to Cold War naval thought.

Recently retired Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, who until July 1974 had been the chief of naval operations for four years, called the series ‘brilliant’, ‘thought-provoking’, and full of lessons that should not be ignored. To that end, he encouraged the ‘broadest possible dissemination’ as the Naval Institute published them in a single volume. However, Zumwalt departed from the general consensus of the other commentaries that the articles were an exercise in advocacy. Instead, he saw Gorshkov as speaking from authority in them:

> …What we are seeing in Gorshkov’s series is the rationale for decisions already taken by the Soviet hierarchy. Gorshkov is not advocating new departures in Soviet policy. He is recapitulating the arguments which have already proven persuasive in launching the Soviets on a campaign to acquire a naval force — in Gorshkov’s words —“second to none”.

Admiral Zumwalt as chief of naval operations cast the Soviet naval threat in the harshest terms possible and acted as his service’s most vocal advocate for reforms in response to it. As such, Zumwalt argued that Gorshkov had already convinced top Soviet leaders of the need for naval modernization and expansion years ago, while

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38 Gorshkov and Miller, p. 19.
40 Ibid., p. 137.
41 Ibid., introduction.
American admirals (like himself) still sought the authority from the civilian leadership to raise the navy from ‘its lowest ebb since before World War II’.⁴²

As the series title indicated, Admiral Gorshkov considered navies in both peacetime and wartime to demonstrate their indispensable role to great powers throughout history. His extensive use of history in the series was not unusual and reflected a larger trend within the Soviet establishment to employ historical research to further the development of military theory. Indeed, top military leaders mandated its use. Soviet classified literature, as reflected in top secret US intelligence reports of the era, revealed a Ministry of Defence order (No. 0010) to use historical experiences, especially the defeat of ‘German fascism and Japanese militarism’, to inform military-scientific thinking.⁴³ Evidence of this directive was apparent in the historical studies and discussions in both classified and unclassified journals. Gorshkov also had more latitude to make arguments about current operations through the use of historical case studies and proxies because military doctrine was controlled by the communist party leadership as the correct interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. However, what was remarkable in Gorshkov’s case was that he used history to not only advance military theory and science but also to elevate the Soviet Navy’s political and strategic standing within the armed forces.

Admiral Gorshkov was undeniably proud of Russia’s naval heritage that traced its roots back to Tsar Peter I and included such greats as Admiral Ushakov during the Napoleonic Wars.⁴⁴ The Soviet Union may have had an uneven and uneasy road to sea power, he argued, but it must rediscover and reinvest in that particular element of national greatness if it was to become a truly global power. Yet he found nothing noble or inspiring about other aspects to maritime history. By echoing Marx and not Mahan, Gorshkov cast the ambitions of other countries – Holland, Spain, England, France, Japan, and most recently, the United States – to pursue sea power and to build great navies as acts of aggression, the exploitation of resources, and the enslavement of underdeveloped peoples by imperialist greed.

Moreover, these countries had actively opposed Russia becoming a sea power, and often disparaged or openly thwarted its efforts. Western objections to a Russian

⁴² Ibid., p. 141.
⁴⁴ Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, p. 18.
navy continued to the present-day, according to Gorshkov. He took umbrage with a speech by Richard Nixon in August 1970 that pointed to the different military needs by the Soviet Union as a land power and the US as sea power. Gorshkov wrote: ‘One hardly has to say that Nixon’s speech, which is a modern-day version of the old attempts by English politicians to show Russia’s lack of need of a strong Navy, bears no relationship to the actual state of affairs and contradicts the interests of our state both past and present’. 45

Gorshkov’s own double standard throughout his writings whereby a Western navy was a ‘weapon of state policy’ and an ‘instrument of peacetime imperialism’ while the Soviet Navy’s role was one of ‘peace and friendship’ was a glaring hypocrisy frequently noted by American naval commentators.46 Gorshkov’s other history lessons also stood out as illogical to Western readers, yet likely resonated with his domestic naval audience who were well schooled in the narrative of the Great Patriotic War. His three articles on World War II consistently attributed the allied victory over Germany to the heroics of Soviet armed forces on the Eastern Front, particularly their sacrifices in the Battle of Stalingrad. He also argued that it was the Soviet declaration of war against Japan and not the US use of the atomic bomb that was the crucial tipping point and forced the Japanese surrender. Peter Vigor astutely pointed out that this ‘dual assertion’ by Gorshkov – that strong navies were both necessary as a general principle yet not crucial to deciding the outcome of World War II – was required of the Soviet system in which the communist party was infallible in matters of doctrine and employment of the navy and all other service arms. 47

Gorshkov downplayed the transformative role of carriers in naval warfare and determined that the Battle of Midway was not a turning point in the war.48 Perhaps most telling, Gorshkov gave only limited credit to the role of German U-boats in initially blunting American support to the European theatre. He declared that, although important to both sides, it was not a truly decisive campaign. Instead, he used the Battle of the Atlantic as a case study in failure. He wanted to illustrate for his Soviet superiors what happened to submarines ‘without the requisite combat support on the part of the other naval forces’ to target enemy sea lines of communication most

45 Ibid., pp. 8, 11-12, 17-20, 22.
46 Ibid., pp. 9, 21, 37, 119, 121.
47 Vigor, p. 53.
48 Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, p. 82.
effectively. The Battle of the Atlantic would become Gorshkov’s standard example of the need for a balanced, high-seas fleet to allow submarines to operate as intended. He was making the case in his writings for carriers as anti-submarine warfare platforms and to contest for local command of the sea to protect Soviet submarines.

Lacking an impressive track record in naval warfare like the US Navy and Royal Navy, and a firm theoretical foundation from thinkers such as Mahan and Corbett, Gorshkov had to repeatedly educate Soviet leaders on the importance of sea power. These included the same land-focused Red Army marshals and senior communist party members who cared little and thought even less about its significance except in the crudest terms of competition with West. As a Soviet naval expert observed in 1972, ‘Soviet maritime policy is still more concerned with the way other states use the sea than with using it for her own purposes’.  

Sea power was rooted in a strong navy, Gorshkov argued, and also extended to other masteries of the World Ocean such as commerce, research, and exploration – a theme he would more fully develop in *The Sea Power of the State*. For Western naval powers, acceptance of the higher purpose of sea power had been achieved long ago; what remained were debates over the varying degrees of investment and commitment to other maritime pursuits. From this perspective, the US Navy was fortunate to argue from a much stronger starting position than Gorshkov by comparison in their public debates before Congress, such as the need for 15 carriers or Rickover’s demands for new classes of submarines. Thus, this need to debate the virtue of specific platforms was not the fundamental flaw or weakness in the American approach that many admirals made it out to be but rather a core strength of Western naval power and a free and open society compared to the Soviet model.

To portray naval strength, Admiral Gorshkov employed polemical and assertive language throughout the articles, yet not in terms of a broader Soviet offensive strategy to attack the West apart from the strategic strike mission by ballistic missile submarines (which both navies viewed as symbols of strategic deterrence). If there was evidence to be found of offensive thinking, it was much more implicit. Instead, Gorshkov repeatedly emphasized the Soviet Navy’s main role in wartime as a counter-balance to the more powerful US Navy’s offensive strategy.

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49 Ibid., p. 80.
and in peacetime through the ‘active defense of peace’, a term which came directly from Brezhnev at the 24th Party Congress in 1971.51

He referred to the ‘ring of fire’ that the American Navy used to encircle the Soviet Union with its nuclear attack forces, especially its Polaris submarines.52 He also cited English-language open sources to underscore the American naval threat in contrast to the Soviet one that was repeatedly mischaracterized. For example, he twice referenced a July 1971 Newsweek article to highlight the offensive power of the US Navy’s carriers and submarines in the Mediterranean. Gorshkov pointed to the article as an example of the ‘high-flown propaganda’ in the Western press that portrayed the Soviet Navy as the aggressor with its ‘gunboat diplomacy’.53 Gorshkov countered that these port calls by warships were to strengthen the Soviet Union’s ‘international ties’ through friendship as its ‘plenipotentiaries’ – even the Okean global exercise in 1970s was ‘a demonstration of the defensive might of the great Soviet power who is standing guard over the peace and security of peoples’.54

The Gorshkov articles also shifted the debate on the naval balance in the US from one based on capabilities, which had been the primary focus since the late 1960s, to one that increasingly took intentions into account. Elmo Zumwalt used Red Star Rising at Sea as a clarion call for action:

Gorshkov has spelled out Soviet intentions for us. The issue is whether we are prepared to recognize the implicit threat in these intentions, and take the actions necessary to provide our nation with the wherewithal to counter and, in time, neutralize this threat; or whether we as a nation will persist in the hope that Soviet intentions can be rendered benign without the maintenance of countervailing US strength. With Soviet intentions now a matter of record, I do not think we can take that chance.55

As Soviet naval analysts delved into the specifics of the series, two interpretations of their purpose and of Gorshkov’s motivations emerged. Admiral Zumwalt in his conclusion acknowledged this ongoing debate as the ‘speculation in the West over the question of whether Gorshkov is announcing an approved strategy, or whether he is merely advocating such strategy in hopes of gaining its acceptance’. He determined that Gorshkov must be ‘going public’ with a major Soviet policy

51 Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea, pp. 21, 134.
52 Ibid., p. 118.
54 Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, p. 120.
55 Ibid., p. 141.
decision made in more ‘confidential forums’. As his evidence, Zumwalt pointed to recent naval construction programmes as well as his belief that Soviet leaders would not have allowed the articles to appear if they did not reflect existing policy. Thus, Zumwalt discounted the possibility that Gorshkov employed a more subtle and indirect way of persuasion – compared to Zumwalt’s very public advocacy and heated rhetoric for US naval interests – to shift a notoriously inflexible system into more flexible thinking.

**The Center for Naval Analyses on Gorshkov**

The commentaries by retired admirals in *Red Star Rising at Sea* were not the only views on the Gorshkov articles that shaped American naval thought, nor were they the most influential ones. The Center for Naval Analyses, established in 1962 as a non-profit and non-partisan think tank to work directly for the Department of the Navy, played a central role in the debates over Gorshkov’s writings through a number of publications. The center’s Institute of Naval Studies undertook the initial studies on the Gorshkov articles for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Systems Analysis Division (Op-96), which had been established in 1966 with then-Rear Admiral Zumwalt as its first director. The most widely available report in September 1974, ‘Admiral Gorshkov on “Navies in War and Peace”’, included the claim that it ‘adds to the understanding of the future roles and missions of the Soviet navy, and should be of value to all concerned with US defense planning’.

The 1974 report was a compendium of three distinct views from Soviet naval analysts that the center had published separately over the previous year – those of Robert Weinland, Michael MccGwire, and James McConnell. The consolidated report made clear that there were debates among these experts over the interpretation of the Gorshkov series and whether it heralded the arrival of a new Soviet naval doctrine. It made no attempt to come to a consensus view; rather, it let the analysts present their arguments according to their own unique viewpoints, methodology, and

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56 Ibid., p. 140.
58 Weinland, MccGwire, and McConnell, p. cover memo.
59 These were the full versions of the analysts’ reports. A compilation of their preliminary and shorter analyses was available after the 1973 Dalhousie naval conference in Ken Booth, ed., *Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments, 14-17 October 1973: Summary Report of Proceedings*, ed. by Ken Booth (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1974) (43-50).
areas of expertise. Much as the commentaries by senior admirals in *Red Star Rising at Sea* held a mirror up to their own worries vis-à-vis a rising Soviet Navy, the conclusions of those finely attuned to the nuances of Soviet open source literature and doctrinal debates revealed that there was often disagreement in their perceptions of Soviet naval developments beyond the writings themselves. The differences of opinion also underscored the strengths and weakness of relying upon textual analysis to detect major shifts in Soviet policies.

Robert Weinland, who joined the think tank in 1966, directed the studies of the Gorshkov articles and intended them as a serious and systemic analysis of the Soviet Navy that he believed had been lacking to that point. His own chapter was an abridged version of a lengthier study. It included a qualitative analysis of the articles’ word count and publication schedule. He believed that this data yielded clues to the articles’ purpose when compared with a timeline of domestic and international events such as the arms talks in Vienna and the 24th Party Congress in Moscow.

For Weinland, the key to understanding the articles centered on their timing. He concluded that the current political environment that had already placed limitations on the Soviet Navy – such as those of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks by mid-1972 – warranted drastic action by Gorshkov to prevent any further erosion of his hard-fought gains. Weinland noted that, while Gorshkov had some external supporters for the navy’s peacetime employment, it was not until mid-1974 that Marshal Grechko’s public statements endorsed the more ‘internationalist functions’ of the Soviet Navy. Thus, at the time of their publication in 1972-73, the stimulus was a state policy review that, to Weinland’s thinking, explained why ‘the articles seem to advance views at variance on critical points with established Soviet foreign and military policy’.

The Center for Analyses’ work on the Gorshkov articles reached the highest level of the Navy Department when Weinland briefed Secretary of the Navy, John W. Warner, in 1973. According to Weinland, Secretary Warner listened with great interest to the interpretations of Admiral Gorshkov’s views because of his own interactions with the Soviet admiral during the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA)
signing the previous year. Warner described the Soviet naval leader as actively involved in daily fleet operations. He told Weinland that Gorshkov’s morning routine included physically plotting the positions of US and Soviet ships as pieces on a large wooden relief map of the Mediterranean outside his main office.

The inclusion of the chapter by Professor Michael MccGwire must first be viewed within a broader context. MccGwire, a retired Royal Navy intelligence officer, had been at the forefront of shaping British views on the Soviet naval threat since the mid-1960s. He had ties to the American experts at the Center for Naval Analyses through his position at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Commander MccGwire, like US Navy intelligence officer Robert Herrick, gained notoriety at a time of increased Western interest in the Soviet Navy for his views that many considered contrarian. MccGwire repeatedly warned against misinterpreting or inflating the threat and he challenged the prevailing naval thought that usually presented a more aggressive Soviet Navy. Because of his multiple connections to government, academia, and think tanks, and due to his focus on open instead of classified sources, MccGwire arguably had more influence on US perceptions of the Soviet naval threat than many American analysts.

Termed the ‘MccGwire thesis’, according to an essay on his impact on naval thought, ‘…MccGwire in 1965-67 succeeded in getting the official British intelligence estimates rewritten, with a new picture of Soviet maritime objectives. This was that Soviet naval expansion was a move forward in strategic defence, supporting the traditional mission of defending the homeland against attacks from the sea’. MccGwire faced a similar reception as US dissenters like Herrick for his views on the Soviet Navy: ‘Both the British and US naval lobbies had strong interests in fostering the image of a Soviet fleet bent on world-wide power projection and challenging Western naval supremacy’.

Michael MccGwire made his central argument clear on the Gorshkov articles from his title: ‘Advocacy of Seapower in an Internal Debate’. He focused on the ‘cleavages’ within the Soviet system that were evident in the themes of the series. MccGwire concluded that Admiral Gorshkov’s direct participation in the effort – by not leaving the arguments to a surrogate in journals, as was common practice – signaled a real threat to the Soviet Navy and to its future force structure in the form of

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65 Weinland interview.
66 Booth, pp. 103-4.
opposition from both Brezhnev and Grechko. According to MccGwire, the navy’s need to demonstrate its worth for foreign policy, in terms of resource allocation, explained the showy Okean exercise in 1970. It also suggested that Gorshkov was more successful in securing a more assertive naval strategy than in additional shipbuilding: ‘other less explicit references reinforce the impression that in this series Gorshkov is trying to establish that there is a correct, offensively-oriented strategy which relies on a properly balanced fleet; and a misguided, defensively-oriented strategy which places primary reliance on submarines’.67

James McConnell’s chapter stood apart from the others, not only for his opinion that the articles represented authority instead of advocacy but also because his conclusion was the most significant and far-reaching in its impact on US perceptions of the Soviet naval threat. ‘Jamie’ to his colleagues, McConnell had an academic background in history and over twenty years of experience as an analyst, first with the National Security Agency (1952-63) and then with the Center for Naval Analyses since 1963 specializing in the Soviet military press. McConnell keenly watched developments in Soviet naval warfare – including exercises, deployments, and building programmes – and how the Soviet leadership represented them in open sources.

What McConnell determined had repercussions for the next decade and would help to radically change the US Navy’s views of the threat: the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov had quietly adopted a ‘withholding strategy’ of its submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missiles in case of war with the United States. He summed up his argument thusly:

One cannot help but be impressed by the attention that Gorshkov devotes to peacetime naval diplomacy in the series. […] But Gorshkov may be saying something more – that naval diplomacy will not cease even with the outbreak of general war. The Soviets may have decided on a “fleet-in-being” role for their SSBNs, i.e., they will withhold at least some of their SLBMs throughout the main combat period to conduct intra-war bargaining and influence the ensuing negotiations for peace. This is bound to be the most controversial part of my analysis. Taken singly, none of the many items of evidence on this head carry conviction; massed together, they make a case even if considerable reserve is still warranted.68

67 Weinland, MccGwire, and McConnell, p. 28.
68 Ibid., p. 74. Italics added.
McConnell was keenly aware that he had entered unchartered analytic territory with such a bold and public assertion that went far beyond an interpretation of Gorshkov’s writings and threatened to rewrite the US view – especially the US Navy’s view – of Soviet naval strategy and its response to it. Even among those who readily acknowledged the strategically defensive nature of the Soviet Navy, there was not a real sense of what a withholding concept actually meant or what precise form it might take in wartime.

McConnell laid out the compelling evidence in the form of a think piece describing what lead him to arrive at such a far-reaching conclusion. The three categories of clues were pronouncements by the Soviet military leadership; the technological feasibility of the strategy; and supporting evidence from the Gorshkov series and other examples from Soviet naval literature. First, McConnell compared Marshal Malinovsky’s words from the previous party congress in 1966 on the Soviet Navy’s strategic roles with those of Marshal Grechko after the 1971 conference.

Malinovsky put Soviet submarine forces on the same level as the Strategic Rocket Forces in their missions to deter aggression during peacetime and defeat the aggressor in wartime. Five years later, Grechko recognized Soviet submarines for their deterrent role during his annual Navy Day remarks, yet McConnell noted that the defence minister left out ‘decisively defeating’ the enemy in war. This omission was a subtle distinction to most Western readers. However, senior military leaders carefully chose their words in the Soviet system when it came to doctrinal declarations and any deviations carried great weight and implied politico-strategic decisions of an important nature to experienced Soviet watchers like McConnell.

Next, McConnell pointed to the feasibility of a withholding strategy because of the recent introduction of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (the SS-N-8, NATO name Sawfly) that had sufficient range to reach much of the US without ever leaving northern waters. Rather than ‘run the gauntlet of Western ASW forces through relatively narrow exits and then attempt to survive,’ McConnell wrote, some Soviet ballistic submarines could be held back within the much stronger anti-submarine defensive zone in coastal waters rather than risk the open ocean. This strategic reserve, heavily guarded by anti-submarine forces in what American
strategists and analysts soon termed ‘bastions’ or ‘sanctuaries’, would play a significant role in the formulation of the Maritime Strategy within the next decade.

Of note, US intelligence at the time corroborated the technological developments that made a withholding strategy possible. National intelligence estimates confirmed the 4,200 nautical mile-range of the SS-N-8 in test firings in late 1972, although there was some dispute as to its accuracy – the Navy assessed the missile as more accurate than other intelligence agencies. The new missile appeared along with new Delta-class ballistic missile submarines, an enlarged version of the Yankee-class, which had only 12 launch tubes to accommodate the larger SS-N-8. Such a vitally important strategic mission merited an outsized platform to match. Norman Polmar observed that with a 10,000-ton displacement and at almost 450 feet, the new Delta-class was at the time ‘the largest undersea craft ever constructed’.

For the immediate future, the Yankee-class still comprised the bulk of the Soviet Navy’s strategic submarine force – by late 1973, according to US estimates, there were 528 missile launchers on 33 submarines compared with 11 Delta-class with 122 launchers. Yankees would still need to patrol closer to US coasts given their shorter missile range of 1,600 nautical miles. Yet only a handful of operational Delta submarines as the ‘fleet-in-being’ were needed for the desired deterrent effect of holding US forces and territory at risk as McConnell postulated. US intelligence analysts were still unsure of the eventual employment of the Deltas, yet they noted the new sub’s initial patrol areas were in the Barents and Greenland Seas. The illustration in Figure 5 in the 1973 NIE showed the patrol areas in the Atlantic and Pacific of Soviet Yankee- and Delta-class submarines and their respective missile ranges.

Assessments also included language of a withholding scenario, but the possibility was not fully explored or evaluated: ‘[t]hey might, for example, attempt to develop sanctuary areas which could be screened off against hostile antisubmarine warfare (ASW) activities. Alternatively, they might take advantage of the SS-N-8’s range by using broad ocean areas’.

Moreover, a 1972 national intelligence estimate noted a declining number of Yankee-class subs on patrol off the US as a proportion of the total fleet. Indeed, the

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72 Polmar, Admiral Gorshkov, p. 121.
74 CIA, ‘NIE 11-8-73’, p. 17.
employment of the entire SSBN force was now in question. ‘Some 70 percent of the force is always in port and vulnerable to a surprise attack from a potential enemy. [...] This suggests that the Soviet plan would be to send more Y- and D-class units to sea in the event of a major political crisis in which a serious threat of nuclear war developed.’76 Thus, the concept of a surge and ‘break out’ of SSBNs during an escalation of tensions was recognized as an alternate or additional option to withholding in the early 1970s.

Admiral Gorshkov’s own words in the articles, according to James McConnell, reinforced the first two key pieces of evidence. He noted that throughout the series, Gorshkov makes his strongest case for the Navy’s peacetime roles while minimizing its role for achieving a decisive victory in war. Moreover, for the first time ever in open sources that McConnell could determine, Gorshkov declared that ‘missile-carrying submarines, owing to their great survivability in comparison with land-based launch systems, are an even more effective means of deterrence’.77

To McConnell’s mind, Gorshkov’s curious downplaying of anti-submarine warfare during World War II, and by inference its effectiveness against more
invulnerable US targets in the Cold War, made sense within the broader context of survivability and security. Anti-submarine warfare was still necessary but not sufficient to guarantee that Russian ballistic submarine forces could have a deterrent effect during the war termination phase. This desire to have a bargaining chip at war’s end also explained Gorshkov’s approval in his revisionist discussion of the Battle of Jutland and of ‘Jellicoe’s politico-strategic withholding strategy and indifference to “complete victory” in World War I.’

To that end, Gorshkov also emphasized the need to further safeguard these subs through investment in naval aviation and more surface ships for a balanced fleet – a theme McConnell noted in other Soviet writings.

On the growing importance of protecting the Soviet Navy’s nuclear deterrent and second strike capability – soon widely known as the ‘pro-SSBN’ mission – McConnell had support from previous reports by his colleagues, Robert Weinland and Bradford Dismukes, a naval reserve intelligence officer. A National Intelligence Estimate from 1974 also confirmed Soviet steps to ‘increase the survivability of their SSBN force’ by ‘constructing, near SSBN bases, tunnels suitable for concealment and protection of the submarines, and have built dummy SSBNs probably to conceal deployment levels during crises or to mislead NATO targeting’.

The classified editions of Military Thought available to US intelligence yielded further insight into Soviet views on protecting their ballistic missile submarines. In an early 1968 article about the employment of Soviet naval forces ‘in a war begun with non-nuclear weapons’, two senior naval officers made comments about the ‘enemy’ as a Western surrogate that clearly applied to the Soviet situation. They noted that, ‘nuclear missiles submarines are becoming the most important objective that its naval forces must defend, requiring the allocation for this purpose of large groupings that cannot in effect be used to fulfill tasks of an offensive nature’. In a further nod to a defensive strategic posture and the importance of bastions, they added: ‘the main nuclear force of navies—submarine missile carriers—change from strike forces to reserve forces which are compelled to remain close to the areas of

78 Weinland, MccGwire, and McConnell, p. 89.
81 Central Intelligence Agency, 'Military Thought (USSR): The Employment of Naval Forces at the Beginning of a War [Intelligence Information Special Report]', (17 April 1974), CREST, Record CIA-RDP10-00105R000100450001-6, p. 6.
their launching sites in anticipation of the use of nuclear weapons. Here there arrives the complex but extremely important task of protecting submarine missile carriers.

Moreover, Admiral Gorshkov argued in a classified article in early 1970 (i.e., before his ‘Navies in War and Peace’ series at the time of the Okean exercise) that it was time to view ‘ocean theaters’ that included coastal areas as independent and distinct from ‘continental theaters’ in terms of their ‘strategic significance’.

Remarkably, Gorshkov was in essence saying that wartime naval operations should be decoupled from land operations in the nuclear age and the navy be allowed to separately pursue its own operating concepts, as long as they followed a ‘unity of concept’ among the various theaters and helped the Soviet armed forces attain ‘common goals’. Such a plea (he used the phrase ‘in our opinion’) for a separate yet strategically important wartime role for Soviet naval forces, in light of McConnell’s contemporary thesis, likely included the option of a withholding strategy for ballistic missile submarines. On the other hand, such phrasing could also have served as evidence for those who argued that Gorshkov sought a more strategically offensive wartime role for the Soviet Navy. Either way, Gorshkov was likely advocating for a major change in strategic thinking in the Ministry of Defence’s in-house secret publication at least two years before his high profile articles in Morskoï Sbornik.

For his part, McConnell cautioned that he was not trying to ‘tortur[e] the texts’ nor make too much out of a few sentences by Gorshkov that may not bear on a withholding strategy. Nonetheless, he made the controversial conclusion the centerpiece of his own analysis because he determined that the theme of navies as wartime instruments of policy was not an ‘isolated expression’ but instead ‘pervades Gorshkov’s historical excursions into naval warfare’. As such, Gorshkov sought a political role in addition to a military role in war that went against the established writings of Sokolovsky for the past decade.

McConnell and other center experts knew that there would be objections from other analysts in the US Navy and within the intelligence community for many of their conclusions. As later noted, ‘[e]veryone involved with the analysis of this problem agreed that it was a matter of inference from defective or presumptive

\[\text{82} \text{ Ibid., p. 11.} \]
\[\text{84} \text{ Weinland, MccGwire, and McConnell, p. 77.} \]
evidence. The points could not be found explicitly in Gorshkov’s writings, but the analysts made interpretations from what they saw as “latent content”.85

The experts from the Center for Naval Analyses revisited the Gorshkov articles over the years. In 1975, four views (Weinland, Herrick, McCwire, and McConnell) came together in an article for *Survival*, a journal for the UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, which internationalized the analyses and put them before a more academic audience.86 This was a prime example of the debates over the strategic nature of the Soviet Navy beginning to inform discussion outside the narrow circle of Soviet naval experts by the mid-1970s. The *Survival* article was a summary of the principle findings of the Gorshkov article studies that emphasized their failure to ‘achiev[e] complete unanimity on the answers’.87 The authors were also candid that there was no verdict on who was correct after several years, as the ‘evidence necessary to confirm or deny the central propositions of any one – or all four – of these analyses has not yet emerged’.88

For the original and later researchers, the Gorshkov articles represented not only the source of debates over their purpose and content but also an opportunity to evaluate the analytical process and the soundness of their own methodology.89 Soviet naval experts were candid about the divisions within their ranks because the entire rationale for using open source literature as a useful tool to determine Soviet naval intentions was at stake, not just their own professional reputations – yet that aspect also played a role.

**The Rise of Soviet Naval Studies**

The publication of the Gorshkov articles was a formative moment in American naval thought. The Soviet penchant for ambiguity in military writings, coupled with the Western desire to understand Soviet intentions for the growing navy, produced an outpouring of competing interpretations. Indeed, the appearance of the articles inaugurated a minor field of study of Gorshkov’s writings as a rich resource of

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85 Hattendorf, *Evolution*, p. 27.
86 For a British audience, *RUSI Journal* had also recently carried an article by a senior lecturer in Soviet Studies at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, Peter Vigor. See Vigor.
87 Robert G. Weinland, Robert W. Herrick, Michael McCwire, and others, ‘Admiral Gorshkov’s Navies in War and Peace’, *Survival*, 17.2 (1975), 54-63 (pp. 54, 57).
88 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
material for researchers in the coming decades. The series promoted deeper and more nuanced analyses of Soviet naval strategy, while Gorshkov’s continued highly visible role invigorated the intellectual line of inquiry and a community of scholars and analysts later termed ‘Soviet naval studies’.

Soviet naval studies evolved from a general view of the threat based on academic insights and policy considerations that drew heavily on open source writings and analysis of fleet activities such as Okean rather than on classified intelligence assessments of technical capabilities or operational intelligence. The field by the early 1970s was decades in the making, heretofore pursued individually and in a disconnected and sporadic manner by scholars and analysts in their books, articles, and so forth. These efforts were sporadic and small in number, yet by the 1970s the popularity of the Soviet Navy as a research subject showed a marked increase by both volume and variety of topics.

The unclassified nature of the work also allowed for greater dissemination. As such, these analyses contributed to the national dialogue on how to respond to the Soviet naval challenge and the role of navies in promoting US policies. These expert views joined popular opinion in the ongoing political and ideological perceptions of the Soviet naval threat. Their findings often appeared in newspapers and congressional testimony. The growing interactions among experts took the form of public debates, as in the McConnell-McCwire case over the authoritativeness of the Gorshkov articles, and conferences that further increased the potential of Soviet naval studies to impact strategy and policy.

The three main components of the field included the work of think tanks, academia and other non-government-sponsored research, and assessments by the US Navy or the intelligence agencies – or their personnel in a professional or private capacity. These three strains came together, along with their disparate opinions, in the series of conferences held at Dalhousie University from 1972-1974 that brought

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92 The first edited volume in English was Malcolm George Saunders, ed., The Soviet Navy (New York: Praeger, 1958).
experts together in Halifax, Nova Scotia to discuss the Soviet Navy. Hosted by Michael MccGwire, the maritime workshops were an important milestone in the understanding of the Soviet Navy for the Western maritime alliance. The series brought experts together as an informal ‘Soviet naval studies group’ to discuss Soviet naval developments from numerous angles and perspectives.

The intellectual output from the Dalhousie naval conferences has endured. The edited volumes of the proceedings featured a wide range of topics for the world’s foremost experts and became an invaluable resource over the years. Indeed, one could not conduct research in the field without reference to one or more of the participants’ papers in the compendiums, which included discussions of Soviet policies, strategy, doctrine, employment of forces, shipbuilding programmes, and economic constraints.93

The intellectual landscape comprised of Soviet naval specialists began to take shape in the 1960s and fully developed throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These experts came from inside and outside the US Navy, as well as from outside the US in some cases. Figure 6 depicts this roadmap of expertise in their affiliations and connections. It also shows the main consumers of their insights. Not surprisingly, current and former naval officers dominated this community of thinkers due to their professional and vested interest in the threat. In addition to the Center for Naval Analyses’ views, the US Navy also had the Office of Naval Intelligence for assessing the Soviet Navy’s capabilities and intentions as they had since the early days in the Cold War. The following will consider several key individuals and their perspectives on the Gorshkov articles, the varied contributions of Norman Polmar, and the continuing influence of Robert Herrick.

By the early 1970s, Norman Polmar was becoming a virtual one-man think tank on the Soviet Navy. He had been an assistant editor at Proceedings from 1963-67 and the editor of the US section of Jane’s Fighting Ships from 1967-77, when he took over as the lead author of the Naval Institute’s The Guide to the Soviet Navy in 1977. Polmar also benefited from the appearance of the Gorshkov articles for his 1974 profile of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. Polmar’s 200-page biography of the Soviet navy chief for the Pentagon argued that Gorshkov was in favor of a developing a more

93 See Soviet Naval Developments, Soviet Naval Policy, and Soviet Naval Influence.
Figure 6. Intellectual Landscape of Soviet Naval Expertise

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94 Figure 6 was created with Gephi open-source network analysis and visualization software at <https://gephi.org> using Eigenvector centrality values that measures the influence of nodes within the network. [accessed 15 Jul 2018]
offensive naval strategy and that the ‘Navies in War and Peace’ series provided ‘an expression of the philosophy’ of what was becoming known in Western analytical circles as ‘gunboat diplomacy’. However, Polmar concluded that the articles were primarily used for the ‘internal education and clarification’ of the professional officer corps, as well as to ‘educate’ for those of the larger defence establishment because a condensed version of the series later appeared in *Voennaya Mysl* (*Military Thought*). In his view, it made no sense for Gorshkov to use the navy’s premier journal to disseminate propaganda or distorted information to the West because it would also cause confusion among its Soviet readership.

According to Polmar, the articles represented Gorshkov’s larger approach to controversial issues and how intellectually engaged he had been in his own professional literature in developing Soviet naval thought. Polmar pointed out that, in comparison to Gorshkov, ‘… of the nine Secretaries of the Navy and five Chiefs of Naval Operations that have directed the US Navy since 1956, only two men are believed to have written an article for publication while serving in office’. As a result, Polmar agreed with a former chief of naval operations, Admiral David L. McDonald, that Gorshkov was filling the void in Cold War naval thought as a ‘modern naval strategist’ left by American leadership:

Admiral Gorshkov and his American contemporaries have been cited and quoted continually, with many of their speeches being reproduced in various professional and public publications. However, it has been Admiral Gorshkov and not his American contemporaries who has brought to the published forum the arguments for naval forces (and general maritime activities).

Numerous American naval officers who specialized in Soviet naval issues went on to PhD-level studies and were a bridge between the military and civilian worlds studying the Soviet Navy. Gorshkov’s and other writings directly influenced their views on the subject. Retired navy commander Robert Herrick was one of the best-known examples, while others went on to influence naval thought in education and policy circles. Notably absent from the 1974 compilation on the Gorshkov

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96 Ibid., p. 185.
97 Norman Polmar, interviewed by author, 19 February 2016.
99 Polmar, *Admiral Gorshkov*, p. 188.
articles, Herrick had worked for the Center for Naval Analyses from mid-1972 – when Robert Weinland hired him for his thought-provoking views on the Soviet Navy – until June 1974, when he left to work at another think tank as a senior analyst until 1983.\textsuperscript{101} He would continue in his retirement years to produce monographs on the Soviet Navy based on his encyclopedic knowledge of the sources.\textsuperscript{102}

Herrick had previously offered his assessments in a published conference paper and two reports that outlined Gorshkov’s push for a larger and more balanced fleet.\textsuperscript{103} Herrick brought a trained eye in all the details of 20\textsuperscript{th} century Soviet naval history, based on his groundbreaking dissertation, to his analyses. He was able to write about current developments within the context of larger historical trends. For example, Herrick detected in Gorshkov’s arguments the ‘two deep-seated Russian emotions’: the exploitation of ‘the Russians’ obsessive fear of invasion’ and an appeal to their ‘messianic-imperialist instincts’.\textsuperscript{104}

However, Herrick’s most surprising conclusion was the possibility that Admiral Gorshkov may have been lobbying implicitly for a shift to a more offensive strategy, which turned out to be the conclusion of the directors of naval intelligence by the early 1980s. His finding was all the more curious given Herrick’s reputation for arguing that the Soviet Navy was fundamentally a defensive force due to its lack of fleet carriers.\textsuperscript{105} Other experts noted that Gorshkov ignored the carrier question altogether outside their historical context and as a political tool to impress Third World countries.\textsuperscript{106} Yet Herrick was watching one of key elements for understanding the Soviet Navy – its writings – that foreshadowed the major decisions on carriers undertaken in the 1970s by Soviet leaders at Admiral Gorshkov’s urging for a more oceanic strategy.

At the time, Herrick did not explore how such a seismic shift in Soviet naval thinking was possible without an equally radical change in force structure.

\textsuperscript{101} Herrick and Winkler, p. 21; Weinland interview.
\textsuperscript{102} Herrick, \textit{Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy, 1956-1986}.
\textsuperscript{103} Herrick, ‘Soviet Navy Commander-in-Chief’.
\textsuperscript{106} Weinland, McCGwire, and McConnell, p. 105; Smith, p. 28.
Unmentioned as evidence, two Kiev-class helicopter carriers were under construction in Black Sea shipyards as upgrades to the Moskva-class heavy cruisers. The Kiev was capable of both rotary and fixed-wing operations by shorter-range VTOL (vertical take off and landing) aircraft, but was a not catapult-equipped super carrier on par with the US conventional Kitty Hawk-class. Other experts at the Center for Naval Analyses had already speculated that the Kievs, although multipurpose platforms like the earlier Moskva-class, were primarily intended for a ‘pro-SSBN’ mission of protecting Northern Fleet submarines – a clearly defensive role. US intelligence also concluded that by 1975 or 1976 they would be heading anti-submarine task forces.

To be sure, Herrick was not alone in questioning a possible shift from a defensive strategy. He echoed the speculation in press reports and in Congress. Any mention of Soviet carriers under construction invariably reopened the debate in the US on the need for more carriers and what it all portended for the Cold War naval balance. Once again, the public discussion was often much more alarmist in tone than the measured assessments found in many top-level many intelligence reports and specialized analyses. Those who viewed the Soviet naval threat more ominously made their views known to the media. According to these insiders quoted in the New York Times in November 1973, the Soviet Navy was progressing from a defensive strategy to one of ‘global capability’:

Naval sources in Washington and London felt that the growth of a Soviet carrier force represents a significant shift in the global balance of power. The Russians are said to be moving from a fleet built to frustrate American operations to one capable of projecting Soviet power across the oceans of the world. […] Soviet naval doctrine is changing, Western intelligence sources report, as the composition of the fleet changes.

The same news story also showed that Admiral Zumwalt shared none of Gorshkov’s reticence in openly discussing aircraft carriers. It referred to Zumwalt’s remarks

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before a Senate committee that ‘its members would see the day when the Soviet Union has a larger carrier fleet than the United States’.110

However, other news stories injected caution into the development by noting that it would take another decade for the Soviets to develop advanced carriers and aircraft of the type currently in use by the US Navy, even if the new Kiev-class signaled the start of a much larger Soviet carrier programme.111 In the end, those who detected a sea change toward carriers and power projection were correct – yet progress was at an almost glacial pace. The Kremlin at Gorshkov’s urging approved construction of the first large-deck carrier in the mid-1970s but it would not be commissioned until the closing days of the Cold War.

**Conclusion**

Decades later, the reasons that Admiral Gorshkov took the unprecedented step of the ‘Navies in War and in Peace’ series is still not fully understood, and even his Russian naval historian biographer cannot explain.112 There remains the possibility that it was not the stark binary choice between authority or advocacy but rather a mixture of the two, together with Gorshkov’s openly declared objective to educate the naval professional readership of *Morskoi Sbornik*.

The Gorshkov articles could be seen, according to one naval historian, as the ‘product of a professional naval officer, brought up to accept established Soviet views on internal politics, the international system and overall strategy and seeking to advance the navy’s cause and influence within them’.113 Thus, Admiral Gorshkov spent an inordinate amount of time and attention in promoting the Soviet Navy and protecting its equities because his service was never truly secure in its position within the military hierarchy throughout the entire Cold War.

It was evident from Gorshkov’s writings, both implicitly and explicitly, that the Soviet system was far from the ideal form of government to grow a balanced, high-seas fleet, nor was a continental power like Russia the most reliable or fertile soil from which to project sea power over the long term. That the Soviet Union – so

112 Monakov, p. 569.
113 Ranft and Till, p. 69.
ideologically intent upon upending the world balance of power and crushing dissent in the process – could stand as the champion of sea power concepts such as freedom of the seas and of navigation was indeed a hard sell by Gorshkov. That he made the attempt was a sign of both his determination and desperation. He had to continually explain to the Kremlin what could not be done without sea power (to intervene, react when necessary to world events) as much as what could be done with adequate sea power. That the Soviet Union began building large-deck carriers in the 1980s was a sign of his ultimate success.

The US reaction to the articles revealed a great deal about perceptions of the Soviet rivalry and how they were either malleable or resistant to change. Most American admirals saw what they expected or wanted to see in Gorshkov’s writings. Soviet naval experts saw even more and agreed even less. Although McConnell and McCGwire debated virtually every detail of the Gorshkov articles in their scholarly rivalry, they essentially agreed upon the withholding strategy. The bigger challenge in the years ahead would be to convince the US Navy to see it the same way.
CHAPTER 4 Gorshkov and the Admirals (1970-1974)

Who, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt was asked, has been the most effective naval leader in modern times? The former chief of naval operations – himself a widely acclaimed naval leader – replied: Sergei G. Gorshkov.

- Quoting Admiral Elmo Zumwalt1

The Soviet naval challenge to the United States – for all its emphasis on ship numbers, advanced technology, and tactical experience – was, at its most fundamental level, a clash of forceful individuals, their strategic visions, and political wills. The personality-driven aspect to the rivalry was particularly evident in the early 1970s, when the United States Navy faced diminishing budgets and expanding commitments. Moreover, Navy leaders had to answer a growing number of skeptics who questioned the conclusion that the US was in danger of falling behind the Soviet Navy or would lose to it in a war at sea.

The US Navy’s stagnation in strategic thinking and the lingering problem of an over-extended and aging fleet demanded a radical change of course. Leaders with reputations for making bold decisions and holding strong intellectual positions such as Elmo ‘Bud’ Zumwalt and Stanfield Turner turned their attention to fixing the Navy’s force structure, its strategy, and some of its core institutions. Part of their decision calculus lay in their assessment of the Soviet naval threat. These two American admirals, both controversial and brash iconoclasts in their own right, stood in contrast with their more staid and enigmatic Soviet rival.

Admiral Sergei Gorshkov relished the chance to take the spotlight away from US naval power and put its supremacy into question. He lectured Soviet and Western audiences on the philosophy of sea power through a series of highly influential articles and a later book. The reaction of US admirals to Gorshkov’s writings in the early 1970s reflected American anxieties over the Soviet naval threat during a crucial period of Cold War naval history.

Zumwalt and Turner, in their leadership style and intellectual approach to the Soviet problem, were convinced of the need to upend their own service’s culture to adequately respond to Gorshkov’s challenge and the shifting strategic environment.

Zumwalt made dynamic changes to the overall direction of the US Navy while he was also the voice of doubt over America’s ability to counter an emboldened Soviet Navy. Turner marshaled the Navy’s intellectual capital by focusing on vital missions such as sea control and naval presence. Turner was the voice of reason with his assurances that this problem could be properly analysed and solved. Thus, the impact of Zumwalt and Turner on American naval thought – through Project SIXTY, Naval War College reforms, and their own prolific writings – was influenced by the equally radical changes by Admiral Gorshkov.

**Zumwalt**

No other naval officer as Nixon’s chief of naval operations would have approached the Soviet naval threat in quite the same compelling way as Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. To be sure, admirals who rose through the ranks had a healthy appreciation of the US-Soviet rivalry – in many ways they owed their careers to it – and they understood the Navy’s difficult strategic position by the early 1970s. Admiral Thomas Moorer, Zumwalt’s predecessor, repeatedly warned of the emergence of Soviet sea power. Yet no one else could have framed the growing challenge to America’s naval supremacy like Bud Zumwalt, whose personal and professional backgrounds shaped his views on the rivalry. The intellectual developments that fueled Zumwalt’s desire to change the course of the Cold War naval competition are reflected in the three key phases of his career: before, during, and after his time as the Navy’s most senior officer during an especially challenging time in its history.

**The Education of Elmo Zumwalt**

Elmo Zumwalt’s pre-disposition to take a hard anti-Soviet stance stemmed, by his own admission, from his long-standing interest in Soviet affairs and study of Russian history and language. His marriage to a woman from a White Russian family at the end of World War II likely played an important, if indeterminate, role. Zumwalt never discussed how much his Russian-speaking wife, Mouza, specifically influenced

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his own views on the Soviet Navy. However, he revealed in his memoir that it was
the combination of his new wife and the realization that the Soviet Union would be a
long-term existential threat that convinced him to stay in the Navy after 1945 and
make a career of it. ‘I concluded then that the USSR’s purpose was to achieve world
hegemony as soon as possible and as brutally as necessary’, Zumwalt wrote, ‘a
purpose the United States and its allies could thwart only if they stayed militarily
strong’.4

As a surface warfare officer, Zumwalt’s operational experiences and his
interactions with Soviet forces also influenced his thinking on how to deal with the
competition. He held five sea commands between 1945 and1966. In particular, his
destroyer and destroyer escort tours as a ‘tincan skipper’ gave him first-hand
knowledge of the submarine threat and the need for sufficient numbers of surface
ships for a sea control mission. He understood the implications of a strong Soviet
presence in the Mediterranean and he repeatedly conveyed his concerns on its impact
on the Nixon Doctrine.5 He also saw the need for the Incidents at Sea Agreement in
1972. While commanding USS Dewey, a guided-missile frigate, he experienced
firsthand the harassment of his ship by a Russian destroyer during a freedom of
navigation mission in the Baltic in 1961.6

The intellectual influences ashore were even greater for Zumwalt. As a
National War College student in 1961-62, Captain Zumwalt’s prize thesis, ‘The
Problem of the Next Succession in the USSR’, explored the post-Stalin power
struggles in the Kremlin and its lessons for the (likely) crisis to replace Khrushchev.
The paper came to the attention of NSC-68 author Paul Nitze, who became
Zumwalt’s mentor as a result.7 According to Zumwalt, Nitze brought him into the
International Security Affairs division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for

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3 Larry Berman, Zumwalt: The Life and Times of Admiral Elmo Russell "Bud" Zumwalt, Jr. (New
4 Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 25. See also Zumwalt Jr and Stillwell, p. 346.
5 Zumwalt, On Watch, pp. 301; 304-305.
6 Ibid., (pp. 391-393). See also Berman, pp. 124-125; Winkler, Cold War at Sea, p. 48.
7 Elmo. R. Zumwalt Jr, Captain, US Navy, ‘The Problem of the Next Succession in the USSR', The
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University,
his ‘knowledge of the Soviet mentality’ and put him to work directing and writing about arms control.8

Zumwalt was an honor graduate from a war college but he later claimed that he received a far more valuable education and the equivalent of ‘PhD in political-military affairs’ under Nitze’s tutelage and from the opportunity to study power relationships and to do strategic analysis in the Pentagon.9 Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Zumwalt correctly foresaw in his Proceedings article in November 1962 that the future strategic environment would be one in which sea power played an increasingly important role. ‘In the next 10 or 20 years, the medium through which the two superpowers increasingly are likely to apply their economic power will be the ocean of the world’, he wrote.10 As a result, there would continue to be a major role for balanced navies with sufficient surface ships such as destroyers and smaller escorts to protect vital sea lines of communication in war and peace. Zumwalt revealed the beginning of his thinking that would result in his advocacy of a primary sea control mission and the concept of a high-low mix of ship classes when he became the chief of naval operations less than a decade later.

Zumwalt also gained an appreciation for the role of analysis in assessing the naval balance. In 1966, Zumwalt became the first director of the Navy’s Division of Systems Analysis (Op-96). One of his office’s initial efforts was the Major Fleet Escort Study, which tackled block obsolescence and was intended to provide the justification for a new replacement class of destroyers. Zumwalt noted that McNamara’s Pentagon was less than pleased that their conclusion was the need for more, not fewer, escort ships in the future.11 The study was another foundational element for Zumwalt’s later push for the right mix of ships to replace the aging ones in a sea control mission.12

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9 Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 29.
Elmo Zumwalt returned to Washington from his command of brown water naval forces in South Vietnam in April 1970 to interview to be the next chief of naval operations. At the same time, in a moment of historic coincidence, Admiral Gorshkov was showing the world the power of the blue water Soviet Navy with the global exercise, *Okean*.13 ‘The summons’ for Zumwalt included a brief conversation with President Richard Nixon, in which they exchanged pleasantries as native Californians before turning to the topic of the Soviet Navy:

The President observed that he was quite concerned about the growing Soviet maritime capability, and that he understood from [Secretary of Defense] Laird that one of my strong points was that I had a healthy appreciation of that fact. I told him that I did, and that one of my principal objectives was going to be to try to persuade him and the Secretary to do more with regard to the Navy’s budget in the years ahead. He smiled and said he “hoped that I would be successful”.14

Zumwalt expressed his grave concern in the interviews about the state of neglect the US Navy had fallen into since World War II. After 1945, its ‘position of overwhelming naval superiority … had steadily eroded’ during the wars in Korea and Vietnam that delayed modernization. The vast Polaris submarine outlays and Johnson administration’s defence budget diversions further slowed replacements of the aging fleet.15 Zumwalt was not Admiral Moorer’s choice as his successor. However, as a surface warfare officer and ‘agent of change’, Zumwalt fit the bill as the candidate whom both Secretary Laird and Secretary of the Navy John Chaffee sought to modernize the service and to bring sweeping personnel reforms, especially with regard to race and gender. Thus, a host of reasons besides his hardline views on the Soviet Navy ultimately tipped the decision in Zumwalt’s favor over 35 more senior admirals.16

**Against a Fast-Rising Soviet Tide as CNO**

Elmo Zumwalt became the youngest chief of naval operations in history at age 49 in July 1970 and served until July 1974 – a month before the early end of the

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Nixon presidency from the Watergate scandal. Arguably, everyone got more than they bargained for in Bud Zumwalt’s leadership but everything they should have expected, given his reputation as an unorthodox thinker with a willingness to ‘rock the boat’. The flamboyant and charismatic aspects of Zumwalt’s personality that set him apart from his more conservative peers also meant that he relished the intellectual battles surrounding the dramatic social and strategic reforms he sought.17

Admiral Zumwalt proceeded to use his bold leadership style and candor in his attempt to mobilize policymakers and public opinion. War weariness, social unrest, distrust in government, and budget downturns of the Vietnam era all had an impact on morale and retention levels. Zumwalt’s personnel changes through a series of polarizing ‘Z-gram’ policy directives shook the entire Navy hierarchy. His repeated declarations that it was likely that American naval forces would lose to the Soviets in a conventional war at sea was also one of his most controversial and enduring legacies.

Zumwalt believed that he was ‘rowing against a fast-rising Soviet tide’, as one historian put it, as chief of naval operations.18 In remarks to fellow admirals after his selection on 23 April, Zumwalt set the tone for his tenure. He made it clear that the US Navy’s mission was to meet the Soviet challenge: ‘It is the Soviet diversion from [the] normal strategic form [of defending their homeland and avoiding a direct armed confrontation with US armed forces] that is the most remarkable aspect of the international security situation as we enter the decade of the 1970s. The Soviet Union has turned to the sea’. In reference to the vast array of warships then deployed in Okean, he noted: ‘[t]his concept is not that of a power possessed of the idea of employing naval forces in defensive roles’. 19

Admiral Zumwalt approached the Navy’s problems as ones that must be solved with the Soviet naval threat foremost in mind. To that end, his ambitious agenda centered on how to assess the Soviet problem, how to plan for it, and what to build to remedy the situation. Each approach complemented the other and served to reinforce Zumwalt’s overarching message: only dramatic changes and shocks to bring

the system out of complacency would save the US Navy from an uncertain and gloomy future against its Soviet rival.

The idea of a ‘probabilities’ campaign struck the new navy chief as the most effective way to illustrate the risk and to garner support inside and outside the Pentagon. As Zumwalt later wrote, ‘I could see no other way than through numbers to state the case plainly; adjectives just did not do the job’. He continued: ‘Politically, we all balked at even mentioning the possibility that America might lose a war. Emotionally, we all shrank from applying a procedure we were accustomed to associating with prize fights or football games to a life-and-death matter like fighting the Russians’.20

His ‘55 percent gambit’, rooted in his systems analysis days, was the announcement that the numerical odds were beginning to favor the Soviet Union. Zumwalt hoped it would be a powerful tool of persuasion to impact fiscal year 1972 budget decisions that would favor the Navy over the other services. Zumwalt summarized his presentation in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Nixon in August 1970:

My calculations […] were that as of 1 July 1970 the United States had a 55 percent chance of winning a major conventional war at sea, was heading toward a 45 percent chance as of 1 July 1971, and a considerably smaller one than that by 1 July 1972 if the budget levels under discussion were maintained because […] every budget cut of 1 percent meant a cut of several percent in the number of Navy ships and plans.’21

Zumwalt warned in an earlier memo for senior decision makers that ‘a ten percent budget reduction in FY 72 has reduced his confidence in any confrontation with the Soviet Navy from 55 percent to about 20 percent’. By Zumwalt’s calculations, the budget cuts equated to a 35 percent reduction of the active force of 794 to 514.22 Zumwalt also gave a nod to Soviet intentions in the midst of all the talk about budgets, ship numbers, and capabilities. ‘[He] emphasized that at issue is whether the restraint of the past will continue in light of changes in relative strength of the two

20 Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 281.
21 Ibid.
Admiral Zumwalt’s provocative characterization of deteriorating US naval superiority was met with growing skepticism in Washington. Service rivals such as Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland soon openly doubted Zumwalt’s comparisons because the US strategy was to fight as a wartime coalition with its NATO allies. The US Navy was, in Westmoreland’s opinion, still quantitatively and qualitatively superior to the Soviets. The US Air Force worried that the ‘bright and charismatic’ naval service chief would get a larger share of the defense budget with his ‘exaggerated’ claims of Russian naval power. Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans, like Westmoreland and many others, ‘was more optimistic than the Navy about the US abilities to handle the Soviet fleet’.

Even those normally supportive of naval matters such as Laird and Chafee strongly disagreed with Zumwalt’s methods. Laird took ‘flak’ from members of Congress after Zumwalt testified using his probabilities tactic. ‘In the future, when you say that the odds are less-than 50 percent that we will win’, Laird ordered Zumwalt, ‘add “unless we escalate to nuclear weapons”’. A chastised Zumwalt later recalled: ‘I did that in the future because that was obviously the thing you would have to do rather than lose the war’.

Ultimately, the only opinion that mattered was Nixon’s. Zumwalt met with the president during his visit to the Sixth Fleet in late September 1970 following the Jordanian crisis. He answered Nixon’s concerns about the decline vis-à-vis the Soviets and qualified his earlier analysis. Zumwalt explained that it was not the case that the Soviets were getting so much larger or better – ‘we still will be able to defeat the Soviet Navy in a fair fight in the middle of the ocean’. Rather, the US Navy must get temporarily smaller by rapidly retiring aging ships to preserve budget dollars in order to keep newer ships operating and get new ones constructed. Regardless of its

27 Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 304.
cause, Nixon countered that there was just not enough public or congressional support for the increases in the defence budget that Zumwalt was advocating.

Zumwalt was preaching to the converted given Nixon’s navalist sympathies. The president was essentially persuaded by the argument to keep US naval forces as strong as possible. The press had already confronted Nixon during a news conference in July 1970 about Gorshkov’s ‘saber rattling’ and his own admirals’ (including Rickover’s) belief that the US was not adequately prepared to face the Soviet threat. Nixon responded that, ‘what the Soviet Union needs in terms of military preparedness is different from what we need. They are a land power primarily, with a great potential enemy on the east. We are primarily, of course, a sea power and our needs, therefore, are different.’ Admiral Gorshkov latched on to this comparison and would quote it in his major works of the 1970s to promote his naval buildup in the face of Western opposition – which to Soviet thinking was all the more reason to pursue it. 28

Moreover, Soviet sea power caused significant foreign policy problems. Nixon concluded that Soviet presence in the Mediterranean in particular had created a ‘rapidly deteriorated’ position for the US in one of the world’s most volatile regions. 29 By December, he determined that there would be no further cuts to the Navy – especially to ensure keeping two carriers in the Med – and restored its fiscal year 1972 budget request to $24 billion. In his annual budget message to Congress in January 1971, Nixon cited the ‘formidable Soviet nuclear and conventional forces, including increased naval forces’ as the reason to slightly increase the total defence budget. 30

Admiral Zumwalt may have achieved his immediate goal of a budget correction with his probabilities campaign, yet his dire warnings cast him as an alarmist for the remainder of his time in office and beyond. To be sure, Zumwalt had some early supporters in Congress who echoed his concerns. A September 1970 presentation to the House by Armed Services Committee chairman L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina on ‘The Soviet Threat’ echoed Zumwalt’s concerns over the

‘sobering facts about Soviet naval strength’ and Gorshkov’s global ambitions. Rivers announced his fear that the US Navy was ‘fast becoming a second-rate naval power’.31

Yet Zumwalt’s perception of the Soviet naval threat was also the target of vocal critics such as Wisconsin Democrats Senator William Proxmire and Representative Les Aspin and led to numerous public disputes. Proxmire declared that the Department of Defense was ‘systematically distorting the size and threat of the Soviet navy’.32 Furthermore, the Soviet Navy remained ‘primarily defensive in nature’ and had ‘limited open ocean experience’, whereas the US Navy remained more powerful in nearly every category of comparison.33 He pointed to the lack of attack carriers in the Soviet inventory and questioned the need for more nuclear Nimitz-class carriers than the three currently under construction.34 Proxmire charged that, ‘the Pentagon’s buildup of the Soviet Navy is a strange but well-known technique. Clearly, if the Soviet Navy is suddenly that much of a threat, our own Navy has not been wisely using its funds….’35

Even Senator John C. Stennis, who was traditional supporter of the Navy as chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, called out an ‘overzealous’ Zumwalt and others who ‘oversold’ the threat.36 Stennis stated that he did not ‘accept the myth of a second class US Navy’ and pointed to the ‘structural asymmetry’ and different missions between the US and Soviet navies. Zumwalt’s number-based comparisons were misleading without the context of tonnage: the US had twice the tonnage of major surface combatants of the carrier-lacking Soviets. Moreover, Soviet naval missions and capabilities may have expanded in recent years, Stennis wrote, but these were still limited by comparison to the US in terms of

projecting air power and amphibious forces as well as sustaining operations beyond the Mediterranean.37

Indeed, Zumwalt wanted to have his argument both ways. He cut the number of obsolete ships for sound budgetary reasons, and then used the sudden reduction to cast the loss of ships as an operational weakness. Zumwalt proclaimed that ‘Admiral Moorer and I have sunk more US ships than any enemy admiral in history’.38 During Zumwalt’s watch, the total number of ships went from 769 in 1970 to below 500 (496) by 1975.39 At the same time, critics such as Stennis pointed out that the reduction was carefully planned and that the rate of more modern ships and submarines coming on line would soon accelerate.40

Defence reporters labeled Zumwalt’s statements as ‘scare talk’ and ‘crying wolf’ over the Soviet Navy.41 Even when he took his case directly to the public with media interviews, he was continually on the defensive. In a lengthy interview in 1971 that focused primarily on the Soviet naval threat, Zumwalt detailed why he was so concerned that the odds had turned against the US. He asserted that geopolitics were behind this shift: ‘The Soviets don’t need a Navy superior to ours to protect their vital interests. They only can aspire to have a Navy larger than ours for purposes of interfering with our vital interests’.42 Yet Zumwalt was also hard pressed to explain precisely why the Soviets were much of a rival to the US given their lack of carriers and battle-tested experience. Zumwalt’s counter-argument was to highlight the areas where there was both a quantitative and qualitative danger of the US falling behind: submarines and missiles.43

Zumwalt’s crisis of confidence and appearing publicly fearful of the Soviet Navy, especially during the nadir in American confidence in the military during Vietnam, would arguably not serve him well in the long run. To be sure, Zumwalt’s

40 Getler, 'Stennis Hits Warning’.
gloom was not atypical for some military thinkers in the West who found a shift in the balance of power toward the Soviet Union (or the ‘correlation of forces’ in the communist parlance) by the 1970s and that their military were on ‘top of the game’. 44 In the process, Zumwalt lost some traditional allies and created new skeptics along the way. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger determined that Zumwalt was being ‘parochial’ and unduly alarmist. Schlesinger had a report from his Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation that concluded it was the Soviet Navy’s turn to face block obsolescence from an aging fleet built largely in the 1950s construction boom.45

Even long-time supporters of the Navy such as journalist Hanson Baldwin questioned Zumwalt’s policies and noted that the Navy had lost its ‘conviction of excellence’ on his watch.46 Zumwalt acknowledged that naval excellence, as measured in ‘intangibles’, still favored the US:

I recognize that comparing the two navies principally on the basis of number of ships, weapons and aircraft may not constitute an accurate assessment of their relative strengths. Many intangibles must be considered—maritime tradition, battle experience, esprit-de-corps, battle readiness, logistic support. […] In many of these areas, the Soviet navy is largely untested, while the US Navy has proven itself in World War II, and in the most constant, high tempo operations, including combat, that we have conducted in the postwar years.47

Notably, Admiral Zumwalt often resorted to worst-case scenarios to the detriment of defending his Navy’s operational superiority, which often got lost in the heated rhetoric of the day. This practice put other Pentagon leaders on the defensive as they offered more realistic assessments. For example, Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Moorer’s posture statement to Congress in March 1973 declared: ‘The Soviet Union still cannot match our capabilities to project sea power and control the sea lines of communication. However, it already has a formidable capacity, particularly in its

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47 Shenfeld, p. 187.
large and varied antiship missile forces, to attack our sea power projection forces and
to sever our sea lines of communication.48

Events later in 1973 reinforced Moorer’s assessment of the real-world threat to
US forces. The large and aggressive Soviet naval response in the eastern
Mediterranean during the Arab-Israeli War in October created the most tense
superpower standoff at sea since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet 5th Eskadra
surface ships and submarines (96 total) eventually outnumbered the Sixth Fleet task
forces (60) and put up a credible sea-denial front. The Sixth Fleet Commander,
Admiral Daniel Murphy, reminded his counterpart, Admiral Yevgeny Volobuyev, via
semaphore of the recent Incidents at Sea Agreement and ‘not aim their guns and
missiles at US Navy ships’. 49

To an even larger degree than in 1967, the presence of Soviet naval forces
restricted the US response to military events on the ground and raised the political
stakes throughout the region.50 Due to the danger of escalation, Washington limited
the freedom of maneuver of US task groups to south of Crete until the end of October.
In turn, this restriction made US forces, including its three carriers, vulnerable to
cruise missile attack by simplifying the targeting for the less-experienced Soviet
forces.

When Zumwalt testified before Congress in February 1974, he used a
potential US-Soviet confrontation in the Mediterranean to show that the Sixth Fleet
‘would probably be defeated’ in a worst-case scenario. Zumwalt cited the fact that
only six land-based tactical aircraft from NATO were available to support the Sixth
Fleet during the recent October crisis. He further added that the Sixth Fleet would
probably not be able to ‘hold its own’ if (hypothetically) no US or NATO air forces
came to its aid against the Soviets and its Warsaw Pact allies. Zumwalt continued to
maintain that Gorshkov had the ‘upper hand’ in the Mediterranean that forced the US
‘to back down in the face of a Soviet ultimatum … partly because Gorshkov had US
ships outnumbered….’ 51

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48 United States Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations United States Senate, 93d Congress 1st
49 Goldstein and Zhukov, pp. 50, 53-54.
50 See Robert G. Weinland, ‘Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War’,
51 Wilson, ‘Soviet Navy Plans Better’.
Zumwalt’s testimony did not sit well with some in Congress. Senator Proxmire demanded to know why the Pentagon was giving inconsistent opinions about US capabilities. Zumwalt may well have been correct to question the availability or effectiveness of land-based allied air power against Soviet naval forces in the years before the emphasis on joint operations in the later 1980s. Yet lost in the debates was the recognition that Soviet naval forces found themselves in an even more precarious situation in the Mediterranean against a more powerful US Navy. In other words, Admiral Gorshkov required a best-case scenario and ‘ideal circumstances’ – a successful “’splendid’ all-out missile strike’ – in a direct confrontation with the Sixth Fleet.

Admiral Zumwalt relied on more than his own views to inform the naval debate. He used his managerial skills to assemble experts to think about the Soviet problem. One of his first steps in July 1970 was to establish the CNO Executive Panel. This group included policy luminaries such as Paul Nitze, active and retired officers (including Stansfield Turner and Soviet expert Bill Cockell from the Navy), and Soviet and national security experts like Henry Rowen, Albert Wohlstetter, and Thomas Wolfe (all RAND-affiliated at one time). Its members provided Zumwalt guidance on long-range concepts for the Navy and how to use Project SIXTY to execute a radical ‘rudder’ change from the current course of Navy programmes. Zumwalt later claimed that his panel of ‘brilliant analysts’ reinforced his view that the Soviet naval threat was ‘much more desperate’ than CIA analyses portrayed.

Admiral Zumwalt recognized the need for more analytical rigor in calculating risk than his simplistic probabilities approach. The net assessment concept was then taking root in the Pentagon – with the Office of Net Assessment established in 1973 under Andrew Marshall, who was also a member of the CNO Executive Panel – and critics such as William Proxmire kept demanding to see such assessments from the Navy. Marshall encouraged the military services to do more ‘net assessment-like

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56 Ibid., p. 10.
57 Congressional Record: (Volume 118 - Part 16), pp. 20486, 20488.
analyses’ and the Navy was the only service that created its own net assessment office. Zumwalt established his Net Assessment Group in spring 1973 to gauge US effectiveness against the Soviet Navy in a ‘number of situations: general war, limited wars at sea, and various kinds of crises in the Third World’. These situational snapshots were then used to develop policy and run computer simulations.

Zumwalt gave the daunting job of producing the Navy’s first net assessment to Rear Admiral Harry D Train II, head of the Systems Analysis Division. Zumwalt realized what he was asking for with an assessment of two navies with dissimilar geographic situations and missions. ‘A net assessment must attempt to do what the tired metaphor about comparing apples and oranges says shouldn’t be done, at least to the extent of estimating whether the side armed with apples or the side armed with oranges is the side more likely to win the fight’.

Train’s team compared the force structure of the US and Soviet navies over a ten-year period – the past five and the next five. They assessed the forces in the major areas of naval power: mission requirements, individual offensive and defensive capabilities, warfare areas, and potential conflict scenarios and probable outcomes. The Navy presented the briefing, with numerous charts for every category of capability imaginable, to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in the fall of 1973 and to the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 1974. Zumwalt called the assessment ‘well worth the effort’ because it formed the foundation for his fiscal year 1975 budget request.

‘Net Assessment of the United States and Soviet Navies’ covered only the missions of general purpose naval forces – not the strategic deterrence mission of submarines – ‘with emphasis on the ability of each [navy] to carry out their missions in the face of opposition by the other’. These missions were assumed to be the same for both navies: peacetime presence, sea control, and projection. Using the net assessment, Zumwalt testified that the US Navy was at the ‘nadir of its capabilities

59 Friedman, p. 370.
60 Zumwalt, *On Watch*, p. 462.
61 He said that FY75 was ‘the best naval budget of my four years, albeit still inadequate’. Ibid., (p. 463).
vis-à-vis’ Soviets and that ‘we stand now at our point of greatest weakness and in my estimate our greatest jeopardy’.64

Further, Zumwalt stated that the Navy was at an inflection point on the assessment curves with the 1975 budget. If Congress kept funding the modernization programme at the present pace, then some of these trends would be reversed within the next five years.65 However, he could not resist falling back on his probabilities model, and concluded with his own assessment that, with sufficient budget appropriations in the coming years, the confidence level would return to greater than 50 percent by the early 1980s.66

Apart from his political arguments and budgetary battles, Zumwalt aimed to change the Navy’s culture of long-range planning. Project SIXTY was the initiative in his first few months to provide a course of action for the rest of his time in office. He chose two rear admirals known for their intellectual firepower to lead the ambitious effort: Stansfield Turner and Worth Bagley. Project SIXTY was the blueprint for what to think and what to build in the coming years. Its primary purpose, according to later analysis, was to ‘re-optimize’ the Navy to ‘counter the Soviet threat’.67 The two most significant changes that transformed the threat since the late 1960s, according to the document, was the Soviet Union’s attainment of parity in strategic nuclear forces and the ‘emergence of a strong, worldwide deployed Soviet Navy’. To meet the new challenge, the US Navy must focus on four core capabilities – assured second strike (strategic deterrence), protection of sea lines of communication, power projection, and peacetime presence.68

Project SIXTY promoted programming and budget guidelines that would improve fleet capabilities – all with the Soviet Navy foremost in mind – and most especially Zumwalt’s vision of it. He sought a less costly force structure centered on sea control instead of power projection. His targets were the high-end investments in nuclear-powered ships and submarines pushed by Rickover. Zumwalt argued that the Navy was building too many of these ‘exquisite and expensive’ ships, thereby forcing

65 Ibid., p. 459.
68 Hattendorf, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, p. 4.
a more defensive orientation to protect them. His high-low mix was inspired, in part, by Gorshkov’s example:

   The innovative part of this program was the Low. In contrast with the Soviet Navy, which always has operated on the principle epitomized by a quotation hanging above Admiral Gorshkov’s desk that “better is the enemy of good enough,” the US Navy has traditionally insisted on traveling first class. There was more than enough High, more than enough Too High, already under construction or under contract when I began Project 60, and almost no Low at all.

Zumwalt aimed to add numbers to the fleet by designing less costly ships to meet all the Navy’s mission requirements. His proposals included a hydrofoil patrol boat, a patrol frigate, a surface effects ship, and a sea control ship. The emphasis on sea control platforms stemmed from Zumwalt’s core belief that the two superpower rivals were in a much different geopolitical position. The US demanded much more from its navy to protect and control vital sea lines than a land power-oriented Soviet Union did of its naval forces in a sea denial role. In addition, the growing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, coupled with the Nixon Doctrine, further demanded more from US conventional surface forces in terms of overseas presence.

Admiral Zumwalt emphasized that numbers mattered for sea control and presence missions. Ultimately, it came down to the balance between current force levels and future modernization. Zumwalt acknowledged that there were difficult choices and tradeoffs ahead, especially in the more budget-restricted era of the early 1970s in funding force structure and determining the ratio between sea control and power projection forces.

Zumwalt was especially passionate about the sea control ship concept. He envisioned multi-purpose, smaller (17,000 tons, 25-knot), conventional carriers that would operate in Mediterranean and the western Pacific in place of large carriers to keep the latter outside of Soviet cruise missile range in times of tension. There was no desire by his replacement, Admiral James L. Holloway III (a naval aviator), to carry out Zumwalt’s low-end ship plans once he retired, especially at the expense of more

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69 Friedman, p. 369.
70 Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 72.
71 Ibid., pp. 60-62; 304.
72 Hattendorf, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, p. 16.
attack carriers. It is worth noting, however, that the Soviet Navy embarked at the same time with a similar (albeit much larger) ship in the Kiev-class aviation cruisers that would carry VTOL aircraft (Yak-38 Forger strike fighters) and helicopters.

Naval experts consider this innovation a game-changing event. Other navies that did not have a strong carrier legacy (or lobby) or the enormous naval budgets of the US sought similar ‘sea control’ and ‘air-capable’ ship solutions, such as the Royal Navy’s Invincible-class light aircraft carrier to carry Harriers and ASW helicopters.

Zumwalt’s high-low legacy was mixed. He supported the big-ticket programmes – the ‘complex and expensive systems’ – that contributed to the Navy’s core capabilities and played a pivotal role for the remainder of the Cold War. He backed the Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarines and endorsed the Polaris/Poseidon replacement programme that produced the Trident missiles and Ohio-class SSBNs. He also supported the procurement of the power projection forces necessary to meet the ‘two-ocean challenge’ presented by the Soviet Navy, such as nuclear-powered carriers, F-14 Tomcat fighters, Spruance-class destroyers, and amphibious assault ships. Yet these big-ticket items could not be purchased in the desired replacement numbers by the mid-1970s due to inflation and shipbuilding costs, which rose to nearly four times what had originally been planned: ‘the Navy lost the purchasing power it had counted on’.

Project SIXTY proved more influential in its strategic and planning concepts than specific programmes. High-low also produced the versatile Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates as well as a host of other supporting weapons and sensors such as the Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile and ocean surveillance systems. The emphasis on cruise missiles, taking a page from Gorshkov’s playbook, was Zumwalt’s attempt to diminish the influence of the ‘carrier admirals’ and to shift the focus to surviving and prevailing in a battle with a Soviet surface fleet.

Ultimately, Admiral Zumwalt secured a larger share of the defence budget over the other services for his modernization programme. This outcome mainly

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74 Middleton, ‘Soviet Carriers Stirring Concern’.
75 Norman Polmar, interviewed by author, 22 February 2017.
76 Hattendorf, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, p. 17.
77 Baer, p. 410.
79 Baer, pp. 407-408; Friedman, p. 375.
reflected the increasing importance of the Navy under the Nixon Doctrine to counter Soviet global influence rather than a validation of his often counter-productive probabilities campaign. Zumwalt’s major impact as chief of naval operations was injecting the idea that the Navy’s sea control mission demanded greater attention and resources than the power projection mission organized around carrier battle groups. The debate over missions that drove budgets, shipbuilding plans, and strategy would continue through the 1970s and centered on the US view of a potential clash with the Soviet Navy at sea.

**Admiral Cassandra**

Elmo Zumwalt continued to speak out on the Soviet naval threat after he retired. Courting controversy to the end, one of his final interviews as chief of naval operations was a lengthy ‘candid conversation’ in *Playboy* magazine. Zumwalt told the interviewer that what had remained consistent throughout his naval career was his implacable belief in the danger posed by the Soviet Union. Moreover, he steadfastly contended that the public did not know the true nature of America’s ability to respond to Soviet aggression. Zumwalt concluded that the weaknesses of the Soviet system would eventually catch up with it and ‘eat away at its vitals’ but the process would take years and the West must maintain its military superiority, especially in sea power, to deter Soviet adventurism. Otherwise, détente would not be good policy.\(^{80}\)

Zumwalt relished his post-CNO role – dubbed ‘Admiral Cassandra’ by a conservative magazine – in publicizing the Soviet naval threat.\(^{81}\) He made his strongest statement in his autobiography, *On Watch: A Memoir*, published in 1976 during his failed run for a Senate seat from Virginia.\(^{82}\) The Soviet Navy was a dominant theme throughout the book, though he only briefly mentioned Gorshkov’s role in its transformation. Instead, Zumwalt had plenty of domestic adversaries in Washington to discuss as obstacles to his modernization plans. Zumwalt’s clash of personalities (and egos) was greatest with Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover and Dr. Henry Kissinger.\(^{83}\)


Zumwalt spent the remainder of his retirement years providing expert testimony and writing on national security issues. His ‘Cassandra’ reputation as an expert on the Soviet Navy and a critic of the US carrier-centric naval force continued into the Reagan era. The title of his 1981 article, ‘Naval Battles We Could Lose’, reflected his continued pessimism on the eve of the biggest American naval buildup of the Cold War. Zumwalt wrote that it was amazing that ‘the need for a strong US Navy’ was still up for debate. Yet he maintained that larger numbers of the wrong types of ships – what he termed a doctrine of ‘much more of the same’ – still left the US at a disadvantage. He described that the Navy’s critical role in the nuclear ballistic missile age had changed from ‘guardian of the moat’ to ‘geopolitical cavalry’, in which it countered Soviet naval power globally in low- to middle-level conflicts.

Zumwalt called for an end of the Navy’s reliance on the carrier battle group concept, which was increasingly vulnerable in a range of warfare scenarios against Soviet cruise missile-bearing platforms, such as Oscar-class submarines, Kirov-class cruisers, and land-based Backfire-B (Tu-22M) bombers. Instead, he called for a ‘distributed force’, in which supercarriers still played an important air superiority role, yet had its offensive power diffused among a larger number of diverse and geographically dispersed platforms.

Given these opinions, it is perhaps not surprising that Zumwalt a few years later joined other former defence officials, including Robert McNamara, in questioning the Navy’s plans for a 600-ship navy and the need for additional nuclear carriers to carry out an aggressive, forward deployed strategy of attacking Soviet naval bases at the outbreak of war. Once again, Zumwalt advocated for American naval power according to his own vision and using the most pessimistic terms, even as the US prepared to meet the Soviet naval threat with its greatest response to-date in the Cold War.

The Sailor’s View of the World

While Admiral Elmo Zumwalt occupied center stage as the dynamic and controversial leader of the US Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov emerged as a

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86 Ibid., p. 146.
dominant force in Cold War naval thought. Gorshkov aimed, through his writings, to shape the missions of the Soviet Navy as well as the perceptions of its power and relevance through its global employment. The ‘sailor’s view of the world’ for both Zumwalt and Gorshkov centered on their own navy’s support to their country’s geopolitical position as a land or sea power. More important, they focused on how they would do against the other’s navy in the ultimate test for sailors: a war at sea.

Admiral Gorshkov argued from the position of the weaker force, although it was difficult to tell this asymmetry from the media headlines. Instead of the public fearfulness from Zumwalt, Gorshkov used the language of communist propaganda to boast of Soviet accomplishments. Gorshkov never publicly nor explicitly expressed anxiety over the American naval threat, even if he personally harbored serious doubts about shortfalls in training and combat experience. Rather, Gorshkov’s statements conveyed the optimistic and defiant message that the Soviet Navy could hold its own against ‘imperialist’ aggression and an American naval onslaught.

For example, US coverage of Gorshkov’s Pravda article for Navy Day in 1972 featured his boasts of his fleet’s strength and ability, especially of its large number of submarines, to ‘reach any foe’ and detect and destroy the enemy’s ships. However, a closer reading of Gorshkov’s comments revealed that he was emphasizing the Soviet Navy’s ‘defensive might’ as the ‘impressive factor deterring any attempts at sudden aggression against the Soviet Union’. Gorshkov’s confidence stood in stark contrast to Zumwalt’s decidedly negative stance. As he retired, Zumwalt warned that the US had ‘lost control of the seas’ and ‘suggested American commanders consider keeping their forces out of hot spots whenever possible’.

Comparisons between Gorshkov and Zumwalt by the mid-1970s were inevitable. Indeed, their naval careers shared some significant parallels. Both were extremely young by promotion standards when they assumed their navy’s top leadership position. They owed their meteoric rise through the ranks to more powerful

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88 The ‘sailors view of the world’ was the working title from a draft section of Zumwalt’s autobiography. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr, ”Transcript of Zumwalt Tape 6, Sides A and B”, undated, EZC, Item 6230705001, p. 11.
patrons as well as some good fortune and timing. They were strategic thinkers on weighty naval matters and addressed the most pressing national security concerns of their day. And they undoubtedly left a lasting imprint upon their services. While Zumwalt had to attempt a revolution in four years, Gorshkov had decades to affect both evolutionary and revolutionary changes, including an additional decade after Zumwalt’s retirement at age 54.

A profile of Gorshkov in The Economist in 1973 observed that, ‘the number of great admirals is small. The number of them who have achieved historical fame not in the smoke of battle but in the bureaucratic squabbles of peacetime is smaller still. [One] is alive today. He is Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov … commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy’. Using this quote in a clear inference that Elmo Zumwalt was not on the list, a newspaper story speculated that ‘those words surely must make bitter reading’ for Zumwalt and that he must be ‘worried’ about Gorshkov’s growing navy.92

Admiral Zumwalt’s worries about the Soviet Navy were legion. Yet no one acknowledged Admiral Gorshkov’s achievements as an important naval leader and thinker more than Zumwalt himself. Indeed, Zumwalt had more to say about Gorshkov – much of it favorable – than any other American naval leader during the Cold War. The main topic of one of Zumwalt’s first post-retirement interviews was how much better off the Russians were thanks to Gorshkov, of whom he ‘spoke admiringly’ and declared was ‘the most effective naval leader in modern times’. Zumwalt credited Gorshkov with ‘transform[ing] the Soviet navy from a bunch of pitiful coastal boats under the army’s control to a first-class fighting force, challenging American Navy supremacy throughout the world.’ He also attributed this achievement to Gorshkov’s ‘freedom to implement the product “of good analytical work”’, without further elaborating on his use of this phrase.93

Gorshkov, for his part, remained silent on his views on his American counterpart. The two navy chiefs never met, even though the early 1970s were a period of increased interactions as the two governments engaged in detente and their navies negotiated the Incidents at Sea Agreement. Zumwalt made a direct offer of assistance – ‘from one sailor to another’ – to Gorshkov that he refused when a Hotel-

93 Wilson, ‘Soviet Navy Plans Better’.
class nuclear ballistic missile submarine caught fire off Newfoundland in February 1972. Nonetheless, the admirals assisted each other tremendously, as then recognized by strategist Colin Gray. Navies, like all armed forces, were ‘organizations in search of external enemies so as to overwhelm domestic enemies’. Notably, Gray wrote, ‘It is important to recognize that Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Zumwalt [...] are in vital functional alliance against domestic interests which argue for lower levels of defense expenditures and for a more benign interpretation of the forward naval deployment of the other side’.  

Thomas Wolfe also recognized this interdependence and produced a RAND report in 1972 on the impact of interactions and perceptions between the superpower navies. He outlined MccGwire’s reaction thesis that the Soviet Navy had been ‘optimizing’ itself against American naval power since 1962 by creating an ocean-going navy and taking its forces further out to sea to counter Polaris subs and carriers. In turn, Wolfe wrote, American perceptions of the Soviet naval threat radically altered with the introduction of long-range surface missiles and an increased global presence by the late 1960s, thereby setting the stage for the current debates over whether the US was overreacting to the Soviet naval challenge. The action-reaction cycle continued as Zumwalt set about optimizing the Navy in Project SIXTY to face the Soviet naval threat.

The Soviet Navy’s increased appearance on the global stage and interactions with the US Navy, by extending itself away from the USSR’s traditional defensive perimeter, also supported Soviet political interests. Wolfe cited Admiral Gorshkov’s articles as evidence that the ‘significance of sea power’ was receiving greater attention. Indeed, think tank analysts and admirals alike mined the articles as a rich source of insight into Soviet naval thinking.

Red Star Rising at Sea in 1974 was a compilation of Gorshkov articles previously published in Soviet and American professional literature. The US version featured commentary by mostly retired American admirals on each of the original Gorshkov articles. The admirals’ reactions to Admiral Gorshkov’s views revealed their own mindset during a particularly challenging time for the US Navy. They

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showed both empathy and antipathy for Gorshkov’s position as a fellow admiral and as their adversary. Admiral Arleigh Burke, America’s longest-serving chief of naval operations, grasped Gorshkov’s awkward position of presenting the Soviet Navy’s defensive wartime posture as the correct one ‘without intimating in any way that the Soviet Navy might have contributed much more to the defeat of their enemies had the Navy operated more at sea on the offensive and so perhaps prevented their enemies from advancing as far as they did’. Burke saw that it was Gorshkov’s current role to argue for a more expansive and ambitious role for a high-seas fleet to face the Soviet Union’s greatest foe in the present day.

Other commentaries showed an appreciation for a Soviet admiral having to justify the need for a more powerful navy in the face of intense inter-service rivalries and debates over missions. Indeed, if the series was a window into Gorshkov’s mind, it was also a mirror reflecting American naval leadership’s own insecurities and shortcomings in the 1970s Vietnam era. Strategist J. C. Wylie noted that Gorshkov unashamedly spoke in terms of Soviet national interests – something often ignored in US strategy and planning. ‘I wish that we, on our side of the Atlantic, had always been as hard-headed in our perception of our vital interests as they have been in theirs’, Wylie lamented. He concluded that American planners should base their judgments on ‘…what our own needs may be and of how our adversary is thinking, [so] we can set our own courses toward our own attainable ends. This, to me, is the principal lesson of these fascinating Gorshkov papers – the support and defense of vital interests. We have gotten a glimpse into a very important mind at work. We should profit by it’.

Yet could this ‘glimpse’ ever translate into true insight and a deeper understanding of the Soviet Navy? Others were skeptical. In a *Proceedings* essay that ran at the conclusion of Gorshkov series, historian K. Jack Bauer posed the question: ‘How much manpower and material will the US Navy need to meet the challenge posed by the Soviet Union’s increased and ever increasing maritime capability? To answer, our planners ought to have at least a clue as to Soviet intentions. But, as is

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98 Gorshkov, *Red Star Rising*, p. 97. This is the paradox as explained by Vigor’s ‘dual assertion’ observation in Vigor, ‘Admiral S. G. Gorshkov’s Views on Seapower’, (p. 53).
clear from the Gorshkov papers, Russians don’t think like we do – and we don’t seem to be able to think like they do’.  

Even if there was never a genuine understanding, former chief of naval operations from the mid-1960s, Admiral David L. McDonald, at least recognized Gorshkov’s language of navalism. US naval leaders routinely did the very same promotions before Congress or in the pages of magazines. McDonald wrote that, while ‘[Gorshkov’s] remarks seemed to me to be tinged with both admiration and envy’ for the success of Western navies, McDonald also confessed to ‘my envy of his navy's impressive progress and my chagrin and sadness at our country's complacency’. Gorshkov was an unabashed advocate for naval power that, according to McDonald, had no American parallel – clearly omitting the efforts of Admiral Zumwalt to modernize the US Navy since 1970. ‘No countryman of mine in recent years has been able to inculcate these universal truths for Americans with the vigor and singlemindedness of this tenacious Russian admiral,’ McDonald declared.  

In their interpretation of the articles, American admirals showed that they grasped the implications of the changing naval balance over the past decade and that Gorshkov would continue to push for an expanded role for the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. Both of these developments, in their view, demanded a stronger American response. Yet none of them appeared to truly appreciate the delicate balance that Gorshkov faced as head of the navy for the Soviet Union. Nor did they delve too deep into the question of why such a lengthy exposition by Gorshkov was even necessary at that time. Even a self-declared Soviet expert such as Zumwalt attributed a great deal of agency and independence to Gorshkov that may not have existed in the Soviet system. Ultimately, the admirals’ analyses were still through the lens of the American experience and what it all meant to the US Navy in terms of securing its own future. Perhaps not uncharitably, the book review of Red Star Rising at Sea in the Royal Navy-associated Naval Review remarked that ‘[t]he impression gained, in a continuous reading of both the series and the comments, is that if Admiral Gorshkov had not existed the US Navy would have had to invent him’.  

Of all the commentaries, Admiral Zumwalt’s essays had the most direct bearing on the current debates, given his role in raising the alarm over the US-Soviet

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101 Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, p. 121.
102 'Review of Red Star Rising at Sea Navies in War and Peace', Naval Review, 63.3 (1975), 291-293 (p. 292).
rivalry. In his usual candid manner, Zumwalt wrote that he was impressed by what Gorshkov had accomplished and by the ‘sophistication of the Soviet leadership’ to ‘adapt Western techniques to their own needs’. Zumwalt also drew parallels with Alfred Thayer Mahan – calling Gorshkov ‘a 20th century Russian Mahan’ – in order to place the Soviet admiral more in line with the Western canon of naval thought. Zumwalt called them both ‘advocates of seapower […] and] perceptive strategic thinkers who were able to appreciate new technology, and to discern its relevance to the changing art of naval warfare’.

In his desire to both praise Gorshkov and raise the alarm, Zumwalt read what he expected to find in the articles to match his own long-running threat narrative. For his part, Gorshkov clearly sought no comparisons with Mahan. Gorshkov called Mahan an ‘ideologue’ and ‘one of the greatest apologists for American imperialism’. Of greater significance, Zumwalt chose to emphasize the offensive nature of the Soviet Navy: ‘Throughout the series, Gorshkov repeats the theme that the strategy of today’s Soviet Navy must be an offensive, not a defensive strategy’. However, this conclusion was not explicitly supported by the text itself and reflected Zumwalt’s own biases. Even Stansfield Turner’s essay acknowledged that ‘the defensive orientation of the Soviet Navy is longstanding’.

Gorshkov’s writings and the American commentaries underscored another fundamental truth about the nature of the rivalry in the early 1970s. Both navies needed each other as mutual threats in order to grow and thrive in times of heightened uncertainty for national security in Colin Gray’s ‘vital functional alliance’. Indeed, as argued at the time, ‘[t]hrough symbiosis, the Soviet and American Navies each seek force structures pegged to that of the other. This includes qualitative improvements in naval capabilities’.

Zumwalt offered his final views in the 1980 article, ‘Gorshkov and His Navy’. His motivation to revisit the subject was the publication of The Sea Power of the State in English, which once more thrust the head of the Soviet Navy to the forefront of

103 Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, introduction.
105 Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, pp. 30, 40.
106 Ibid., pp. 140-41.
107 Ibid., p. 136.
naval thought. The article was part biography, part history lesson, and, as usual with Zumwalt, an opportunity to highlight the deficiencies of the US response. Moreover, he wanted to engage in the ongoing debate over Soviet naval development. He came down squarely on the side of the offensive nature of the Soviet Navy. He also noted that it would be a mistake to underestimate Gorshkov: ‘It is likely, however, that the future use of the Soviet Navy will depend more on the personal views of its most influential leader, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, than on any strategy used in a political debate over structure’.109

Zumwalt conceded that Gorshkov’s views on sea power were much more Marxist-Leninist than Mahanian.110 Yet Gorshkov was still a ‘strategic genius’, according to Zumwalt, because he harnessed his ‘broader strategic vision’ to provide the Soviet Union with two key ingredients as a great power: ‘superiority in central strategic nuclear systems and truly global sea power’. At the same time, he was able to check American naval power and use his navy ‘as a shield in order to win Western acquiescence in low-level aggression. In this regard, Soviet maritime forces have already made a mockery of President Carter’s Middle East doctrine’. Gorshkov had earlier frustrated the Nixon Doctrine and was on his way with rings of bases in Indian Ocean and Asia to further contribute to ‘Marxist imperialism’.111

**Turner**

Like Zumwalt, Stansfield Turner was an original thinker in the early 1970s in a position to start a ‘revolution’.112 He was a Rhodes Scholar and a surface warfare officer. The Navy’s top leaders had long recognized his bona fides as a uniformed intellectual. Turner was one of a handful of junior officers charged with giving Arleigh Burke ideas to ‘fix’ the Navy.113 Turner also made an impact on American naval thought on the Soviet Navy in the 1970s. Zumwalt used him to shake things up intellectually as the drafter of Project SIXTY that pushed the US Navy to think more strategically about missions vis-à-vis the Soviet Navy. As the president of the Naval War College, he injected more rigor in the curriculum and reorienting its thinking toward its Cold War rival as the Vietnam era drew down. In his final active duty tour,

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110 Ibid., pp. 496-498.
111 Ibid., pp. 509-510.
112 See Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, pp. 293-295.
he was the director of central intelligence from 1977 to 1979 (and as a civilian until 1981), where as head of the Central Intelligence Agency he continued to influence US views on the Soviet Navy.

**Stansfield Turner the Educator**

No other senior naval officer would have approached radical reforms of the Naval War College quite like Stansfield Turner. Zumwalt and Turner were not impressed with the academic rigor of their service’s war college. Zumwalt did not find his time there particularly challenging, while Oxford-educated Turner avoided it altogether and opted instead for Harvard Business School. Zumwalt dispatched Turner to Newport in mid-1972 to revise the curriculum as he saw fit.

Turner aimed to broaden the intellectual horizons of naval officers by the process of thinking through strategic problems beyond their narrow warfare specialties, instead of the ‘increasing reliance on civilians and on “think tanks” to do our thinking for us’. News coverage at the time announced that Turner’s drastic changes were ‘to teach future admirals how to cope with a Soviet Navy in an era of limited resources’ and to ‘counter overconfidence in … branches, such as naval aviation, that have not yet recognized either the expansion of Soviet sea power or the probability that the Navy will have to operate on the defensive more than in the past’.

The Soviet Navy, especially the submarine threat, had been part of the Naval War College’s curriculum since the early 1950s. The 1960s expansion to the Med brought further attention by lecturers and students, such as Soviet naval expert Robert Herrick, and guest speakers like Nicholas Shadrin. By Turner’s presidency, the Soviet naval challenge had become a matter of national security interest outside naval circles. The Strategy and Policy Department already had the Soviet strategic thinking on the syllabus by the early 1970s, including readings from Thomas Wolfe, Raymond Gartoff, and Robert Herrick. By 1975-1976, the strategy curriculum covered Soviet

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115 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, 'Convocation Address', *NWCR*, XXV.2 (1972), 72-80 (p. 3).


strategy and naval policy, the ‘Soviet naval view’, and the ‘Strategic Uses of Seapower: Growth of the Soviet Navy’. \footnote{118}

Turner further emphasized individual study through the establishment of an advanced research programme that allowed more attention to Soviet naval topics by students and outside scholars. By the late-1970s, the programme included numerous research projects on Soviet naval development, policy, strategy, and content analysis of Soviet writings. \footnote{119} In addition, the Center for Advanced Research opened in March 1975 and offered students and non-college academics the opportunity to pursue sponsored research, such as a study of Soviet naval vulnerabilities. The Center also held a symposium on the Soviet Navy in 1977. \footnote{120}

Thus, the war college under Turner served as an intellectual incubator for emerging experts on the Soviet Navy. Captain Robert Bathurst, a naval intelligence officer fluent in Russian, assumed the role as a thought leader similar to that of Robert Herrick in the 1960s. He was indebted to the atmosphere of ‘free intellectual inquiry’ fostered by Turner. ‘Such freedom …’, Bathurst wrote, ‘is a rare commodity, hardly to be taken for granted even in the universities, much less in the military. But under Admiral Turner, we had it’. \footnote{121}

Bathurst, like Herrick before him, took a contrarian view of much of Soviet naval analyses. Bathurst’s essay, ‘Patterns of Naval Analysis’ challenged the preconceptions applied thus far. The focus, he argued, should be on the function of navies; ‘the place to start … is not with comparisons of hardware but with goals’. \footnote{122} Yet understanding goals also meant comprehending Soviet writings. Admiral Gorshkov, previously known to a select few, grabbed headlines and attention from US admirals, including comparisons with Mahan. Gorshkov was not saying anything entirely new, Bathurst noted, yet most American analyses of Soviet military writings in the 1960s dismissed it all as propaganda and not a sign of Soviet intentions.


\footnotetext[120]{120} ‘Records of Director’, (1974-1979), NHC, RG 37, Subgroup 2 Records of Director, CAR, 1974-1979; Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, pp. 296-297.

\footnotetext[121]{121} Bathurst, Understanding, Acknowledgements.

According to Bathurst, the US Navy still struggled with the realization that, given the size and modernization of the Soviet Navy, perhaps Gorshkov was not striving to ‘be like us’ after all: ‘our perceptions had been shaken into a new awareness, although with surprising slowness’. Bathurst placed the blame primarily on the faulty thinking of American naval leaders, as exemplified by their commentaries on Gorshkov’s articles:

The trouble was that the Soviet Navy just did not make very much sense to the sons of Mahan, that is, until Admiral Gorshkov dotted the i’s and crossed the t’s. The conceptual problem is clearly exposed in [their] introductions to Admiral Gorshkov’s articles [...] When Admiral Gorshkov mentions “control of the sea,” it is interpreted that he means what we mean by “sea control”; when he writes of the “internal struggles,” it is assumed he means to build a build a “blue-water navy” free from army domination; and so on. Bathurst argued that the US misunderstood Soviet naval concepts due to mirror-imaging. Specifically, ‘the analytical preconceptions, with rare omissions, projected American experiences and attitudes onto the Soviets as if the Soviets had no imagination, no experience, and lived in an institutional and geographic environment almost like ours’. In his later work, Understanding the Soviet Navy, Bathurst continued to warn against the US tendency to see the Soviet Navy in ‘either/or’ emotional categories such as ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’, as navies clearly could be both and did not accurately capture Soviet reality.

The fault, Bathurst determined, was in the US refusal to read the signs and interpret Gorshkov’s words correctly. ‘We tended not to understand until 1975 the significance of Gorshkov’s statement, first made in 1967, that the navy should serve in defense of state interests’. ‘It is perhaps helpful to think of the Soviet Navy as a mass of signs about power relationships, some of which we will interpret correctly, some of which we will not understand, and many of which we will not perceive at all’.

The greatest thought leader at the Naval War College was Stansfield Turner himself. He not only ran the institution – he practiced what he preached. He continued to think and write on the Soviet Navy during his tenure. Turner turned his mind to the

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123 Ibid., p. 17.
124 Ibid., p. 18.
126 Bathurst, Understanding, p. iv.
127 Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
best way to counter the growing Soviet surface fleet and to demonstrate that the US was still the world’s foremost sea power. He engaged in scholarly forums and maintained a transatlantic orientation with an affinity for British academics. A ‘crystallization of ideas’ he had at the war college was when he concluded that the Navy, first and foremost, must be prepared to ‘dissuade Soviet adventurism, contain aggression, and exercise coercion in those areas where threats to our interest are most likely’. Thus, Turner focused his energy on promoting the missions of the US Navy as the best way to explain the strategic environment of the 1970s.128

**Turner, Gorshkov, and Naval Missions**

Stansfield Turner published ‘Missions of the US Navy’ in the spring 1974 edition of the *Naval War College Review* as his presidency drew to a close. It was the unveiling of a framework for naval thought that had been maturing since Project SIXTY in 1970. Elements of the four missions – strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and naval presence – had been incorporated into the Navy’s net assessments and posture statements. Turner continued to advocate through his writings for the missions as the ‘rationale’ for ‘formulating strategic plans, allocating resources, and developing supporting naval tactics’.129

Turner, like Zumwalt, further defined the Project SIXTY charter as ‘what [the Navy was] all about and why; the philosophy of it; the mission’.130 Like Zumwalt, Turner had also headed the Systems Analysis Division and thought about the Navy’s missions ‘in terms of output rather than input’. In Turner’s construct, a focus on output tied the Navy’s size and structure to national objectives so that the nation could better allocate its resources for what it wanted its navy to do.131 Like Gorshkov, Turner also argued that navies of great powers served a unique peacetime purpose as a diplomatic instrument and to protect vital national interests on the global ocean commons.

‘Missions of the US Navy’ aimed to redefine traditional naval missions and to translate them into a contemporary setting – what one author recently called ‘the Cold

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128 Mason, p. 607. Also see Stansfield Turner, Vice Admiral, US Navy, ‘The United States at a Strategic Crossroads’, *Proceedings*, 98.836 (1972), 18-25 (pp. 19, 21-22)
130 Mason, p. 373.
War Navy’s first attempt to address the inchoate state of sea power theory’.\textsuperscript{132} Turner put strategic deterrence in a unique category of its own as the most recent innovation. Both the US and Soviet navies maintained large numbers of ballistic missile submarines that could launch first- and second-strike nuclear attacks. These deterrent forces were part of the historic arms control talks that aimed for strategic parity. As such, the mission was an outlier because its forces were self-contained and devoted entirely to that mission. Turner declared that ‘there is very little overlap between strategic deterrence and other Navy mission areas at present’.\textsuperscript{133}

If strategic deterrence was the Navy’s newest and most narrow mission, sea control was the oldest and dated back to ancient times. Turner declared that, ‘the first and only mission of the earliest navies was Sea Control’.\textsuperscript{134} However, the mission also evolved over time. The traditional idea of ‘control of the sea’ or ‘command of the sea’ no longer held true, according to Turner, in the era of the submarine and airplane. He believed that ‘sea control’ was a more realistic descriptor and thus a better ‘sales pitch’. He later noted: ‘in the Mahanian concept, control of the seas meant you controlled it and the other guy didn't use it. That day was gone. I tried to say that sea control meant that you exercised control where and when you had to do it, but you didn't even aspire to do it everywhere and all the time’\textsuperscript{135}

Sea control was a demanding peacetime and wartime mission that used a multitude of active tactics – sortie control, chokepoint control, open area operations, and local engagement – as well as passive ones like deception and intimidation.\textsuperscript{136} Turner also acknowledged that there were two sides to control for any sea power – assertion and denial – depending on wartime objectives. However, he did not address the specific situation of the US and Soviet navies, as he did elsewhere in his *Red Star Rising at Sea* commentary.

According to Turner, ‘projection of power ashore’ evolved as a mission for naval forces in support of land operations in the 19th century and came into its own during World War II. Power projection encompassed amphibious assaults, naval bombardment, and tactical air projection (including interdiction and close air

\begin{itemize}
  \item Turner, ‘Missions of the U.S. Navy’, p. 6.
  \item Ibid., p. 4.
  \item Mason, p. 374. See also Turner, ‘Missions of the U.S. Navy’, p. 7.
  \item Turner, ‘Missions of the U.S. Navy’, p. 10.
\end{itemize}
support). Naval presence was also not a recent development, as ‘gunboat diplomacy’ was a traditional use of Western navies for both persuasion and coercion. Turner wrote that presence missions were either preventative (peacetime) or reactive (crisis response). Deployments were to influence, through visual comparisons of US-Soviet naval strength, the perceptions of the Soviet Union, nations allied with the Soviets, and non-aligned countries. Of these last two missions, the US Navy most clearly dominated the Soviet Navy in power projection capabilities as a carrier-based force, while the Soviets seriously challenged the US with its forward presence mission. Power projection also dominated US naval thinking, in Turner’s opinion, to the detriment of the other missions.

Turner’s subsequent writings on the importance of the presence mission placed him in the small group of scholars and strategists who emphasized naval diplomacy as a ‘new task’ for Cold War navies that was absent from the works of Mahan and Corbett. This group included James Cable, Edward Luttwak, and Ken Booth. It also included Gorshkov, who focused on the peacetime role of navies from a decidedly non-Western outlook. He declared that ‘it would be difficult to find an area on our planet where US leaders have not used their pet instrument of foreign policy – the Navy – against the progressive forces of the peoples of various countries’. He further declared that it was the prerogative of the Soviet Union to counter this imperialist powers threat for ‘peace-loving peoples’.

Turner noted that the theme that most permeated Gorshkov’s article on the importance of a navy was ‘its ability to be an adjunct to diplomacy in peacetime.’ In a 1973 speech, Turner had noted: ‘The Soviet Union’s naval building program, coupled with its radical change in deployment patterns over the past decade, the many statements by their CNO, Admiral Gorshkov, and their interest in obtaining basing and logistics support facilities in strategic locations, all point to new Soviet awareness of the persuasive power of military presence’.

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137 Ibid., p. 13.
138 Ibid.
140 Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, pp. 117-119.
141 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
Their contemporaneous publications on naval missions tied Turner and Gorshkov together in the minds of some reviewers. Some argued Turner was too simplistic, others found Gorshkov too convoluted to follow. A 1976 edition of the Naval Review contrasted the two approaches: ‘…the US Navy defined its tasks in a clear, crisp manner which offers a refreshing contrast to the turgid and elliptical prose of Admiral Gorshkov’. Nonetheless, the review credited both admirals with emphasizing the ‘novel’ areas of strategic deterrence and presence, as well as acknowledging Turner’s efforts to redefine sea control.  

Stansfield Turner did not find Gorshkov’s main message on navies difficult to understand. At the time of the articles’ publication, he was on his own mission to reinvigorate strategic thought at the Naval War College. Turner believed that there was a lesson for the US Navy in the way that Gorshkov framed the uses of modern naval power. ‘It appears to me that in contrast we have fallen into the trap of having to explain why we need a Navy in overly specific terms’, Turner wrote. ‘Perhaps we should study Gorshkov’s example. Quantitative systems analysis has carried over too far into strategic concepts. We have become too dependent upon scenarios and hypothetical campaign analyses to justify every force level….’ Thus, Turner’s thinking had also evolved from the reliance on scenarios to sell the Navy’s usefulness that he had touted only a few years before.

Turner found ‘instructive’ Gorshkov’s argument that ‘a Navy must chart its own course in light of its own intended employment and in its particular circumstances’ and stop imitating other navies. Turner had come to the same conclusion. He believed that ‘we should build our Navy around the areas of distinct advantage over the Soviet Navy, rather than try to copy the Soviets where they are ahead of us. Our advantages are in quiet submarines, sea-based air power, amphibious power, staying power through underway replenishment, and superior tactical experience’.

Nonetheless, Turner sought the connection between US naval missions and the Soviet naval threat, yet he found the parallels difficult to make. For his commentary on Gorshkov’s final article, he put the US and Soviet missions in a side-by-side

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143 ‘Technology and the Naval Art’, Naval Review, 64.4 (1976), 298-304 (p. 299).
144 Turner, ‘Missions of the U.S. Navy’.
146 Turner.
147 Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, p. 136.
148 Mason, p. 606.
comparison. According to Turner, Gorshkov vaguely described four missions of his own navy: strategic offence, strategic defence, support of ground operations, and naval presence. These missions did not neatly line up against the US ones, and neither list could be declared a universally or easily applied list to Cold War navies in general (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Deterrence</td>
<td>Yes—with added emphasis on Strategic Defense. As a by-product to their war fighting capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Control:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Denial to others</td>
<td>Yes-clearly in home waters, very probably in general interdiction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Asserting own use</td>
<td>Yes-under shore based air umbrella. Beyond that, dependent on what direction Kiev carrier employment proceeds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projection of Power Ashore:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Tactical Air</td>
<td>Unclear-Depends on evolving carrier capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Amphibious</td>
<td>Unclear-Depends on extent of build-up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Bombardment</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Presence</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Turner’s Comparison of US to Soviet Naval Missions

Strategic offence and defence missions roughly correlated with strategic deterrence (with some elements of sea denial). Gorshkov did not address power projection ashore, and he inferred support to ground operations in a sea denial campaign to cut US sea lines of communication. Only naval presence meant the same thing to both superpower navies. Of note, this discussion pre-dated Gorshkov’s ‘fleet against shore’ and ‘fleet against fleet’ mission construct that made its appearance in *The Sea Power of the State*.150

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Turner noted that Gorshkov’s discussion of missions was ‘too terse’ to really tell how the Soviet Navy intended to use the submarines and naval aviation that were the ‘backbone’ of his navy. Because of this vagueness, Turner wrote that Gorshkov’s article should only serve as a benchmark against which to compare other evidence – such as how the Kiev carriers were eventually employed. He even raised the question of the authoritativeness of the articles: ‘Even if this published view is an accurate portrayal of Gorshkov’s thinking, it may change, especially as Soviet naval capabilities evolve with time. […] It can encourage us to look for evidence that he was duping us or that things have changed’.

Turner authored a high-profile essay in which he once again compared US and Soviet naval missions. In the January 1977 issue of Foreign Affairs, Turner wrote that the decision on what kind of navy is needed should not be a ‘numbers game’ and answering the question ‘who’s ahead?’ Instead, there must be a mission-focused approach to assessing the naval balance of forces, because ‘only forces which oppose each other directly can be compared directly’, such as sea control and naval presence missions.

By that standard, the Soviets had been ‘cleverly’ applying presence missions to tip the balance on the ‘perception front’ of foreign policy in their favor. It was mainly in the sea control mission that the navies faced the chance of a direct confrontation at sea. In that regard, the US Navy remained ahead, but with serious caveats, according to Turner. ‘…Essentially, the capabilities of missiles have outstripped our ability to defend against them. […] [T]he US Navy can still successfully assert sea control; but in areas where the enemy can concentrate we must allocate a higher percentage of our total forces than before, almost always include an aircraft carrier, depend more and more on tactical initiative, and accept a higher risk’.

Admiral Turner published his ‘Naval Balance’ article during a time when the Soviet threat and the size of the US Navy were becoming increasingly politicized issues. The 1976 presidential campaign involved his old Naval Academy classmate,

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151 Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, p. 137.
153 Ibid., p. 344.
154 Ibid., p. 351.
Jimmy Carter. President Carter nominated Turner as the Director of Central Intelligence, and Turner achieved further notoriety as an innovative thinker on the US-Soviet naval competition. During his Senate confirmation hearings, Turner was asked whether the Soviet Union was basically defensive or offensive — were they acting unilaterally and imperialistically or in reaction to the US threat? Turner replied that it was likely a combination of the two. In addition, the Soviets — lacking economic power abroad — believed that ‘the existence of strong military forces can be translated into political advantage for them, and I would think this is the primary motive behind their very considerable efforts today, the great expense that they are accepting to build up their military power’.156

Conclusion

In their role of naval thinkers and communicators, Gorshkov, Zumwalt, and Turner had many audiences, both foreign and domestic. They had their admirers and critics of their intellectual efforts to make sense of the Cold War rivalry. American and Soviet admirals were oceans apart in their worldviews, yet they were in a ‘vital functional alliance’ as they explained the importance of the proper application of naval power. The dominant US perception in the 1970s was that the Soviet Navy was in the ascendency, encouraged by Admiral Gorshkov’s own words, while the US Navy was a beleaguered force – a view reinforced by Admiral Zumwalt’s public testimony.

Elmo Zumwalt both feared and admired what Gorshkov had achieved with the Soviet Navy. He sought to harness Soviet achievements to spur America into action with his dire predictions of possible defeat. Stansfield Turner took a less emotion-laden approach than Zumwalt. He treated the Soviet naval challenge as an intellectual problem to be analysed and answered using history and strategy as a guide. Gorshkov, for his part, communicated his ideas with a mixture of both pride and persecution. He acknowledged that great powers like the United States made use of their navies, but denied that these were valid missions worthy of emulation. He elevated Marx above Mahan in his own response to the American naval challenge. He used history to make

the sea power arguments that he could not make directly due to the constraints of the Soviet doctrine.

The cycle of influence between US and Soviet navies continued through the decade, yet the dynamics were changing by the late 1970s. By the 1980s, the naval debates in the US were moving beyond talk and into the realm of forceful response to the Soviet naval threat. Zumwalt and Turner joined the opposition to a more aggressive US naval strategy, while Gorshkov remained in charge of the Soviet Navy until 1986. Gorshkov’s most forceful arguments had all been made by 1976, and it became the US’s turn to counter with its own naval buildup.
CHAPTER 5 The Influence of Okean (1975-1980)

In these vast maneuvers, the Soviets set about evaluating for themselves, and no doubt, showing us, their newly developed worldwide naval capabilities. […] Everywhere, the Soviets were “at war.” It was mind-boggling - the greatest show of naval strength in world history.

- Former Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf II

The Okean global exercises of the 1970s signaled the completion of the Soviet Navy’s transformation from a coastal defence force to a blue water navy that resembled those in the West, yet clearly had different missions and motivations. The period 1975 to 1980 was the high-water mark in the rise of Soviet naval power to challenge the United States in terms of its global scope and its impact on American naval thought and policies. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov had several more messages to send before his retirement a decade later.

Two milestones in the US-Soviet rivalry were Okean 1975 and the publication of Gorshkov’s seminal work, The Sea Power of the State in 1976. All the naval developments that Gorshkov had been slowly working toward since 1956 finally came together. He capitalized on the moment, especially his ability to put on sophisticated and synchronized global exercises, to engage in naval diplomacy in the Third World, and to reach a large audience through his writings on the nature of sea power and the importance of navies. Those who studied the Soviet Navy took note of these significant events and debated their larger meaning. Wherever Gorshkov travelled and Soviet ships sailed, American curiosity and concern followed.

Okean broadcasted the Soviet Navy’s achievements to domestic and international audiences. For Kremlin leaders and the Russian people, it was a combination report card and marketing campaign intended to show tangible results of the naval expansion on Gorshkov’s watch. For those in the US, the global exercise came at a particularly low point in American naval development and self-confidence, and raised questions of the nature and severity of the Soviet naval threat. Gorshkov achieved two major aims in Okean that shaped American naval thought into the

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2 Baer, p. 411.
1980s. These were the demonstration of a command and control capability that supported a ‘battle of the first salvo’ concept, and the inclusion of merchant ships in scenarios that hinted at the real role of interdiction in Soviet naval strategy.

**Okean 1975’s Significance**

Admiral Gorshkov hosted Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko aboard his flagship in the Barents Sea in April 1975 for an impressive display of naval power. Together with other Kremlin dignitaries, the defence minister observed ‘missile, torpedo, and gunnery firings’ as part of the final phase of *Vesna* (‘Spring’). The global maneuvers involved more than 200 ships and submarines from the four fleets, which were forward deployed throughout the World Ocean and supported by long-range, land-based aircraft from Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, and Aden. From his Moscow headquarters and while embarked on his flagship, Gorshkov, codename SEAGULL, directed the activities of all these units.

The scene was a familiar one. Five years before, the Soviet Navy had demonstrated the results of its modernization programme in *Okean* (‘Ocean’). As in April 1970, the three-week, multi-ocean maneuvers in 1975 showed the Politburo and the Russian people the return on their investment – this time for the ninth five-year plan (1971-75) – and were likely intended to influence decisions on the next plan. This was also a period when détente as well as domestic and other economic priorities could potentially undercut future naval expenditures. It was therefore prudent for Red Fleet admirals to remind the land power-focused Kremlin of the navy’s unique contributions to protecting and promoting Soviet interests at home and abroad.

Admiral Gorshkov never missed an opportunity to drive home that message and to demonstrate that a tough naval policy could complement détente. He called on Peter the Great for support when he quoted the sea power tsar: ‘Any [ruler] with a land army has one hand but he who also has a fleet has two hands’.

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3 Office of Naval Intelligence, ‘Soviet Worldwide Naval Exercise [Director of Naval Intelligence Memo to Admiral Zumwalt with Okean 75 Information]’, 6 June 1975, EZC, Item 6230803011.
4 ‘All the Ships at Sea’, *Time*, 5 May 1975, p. 51.
Gorshkov’s speech to the 25th Party Congress in the spring of 1976 announced that the ‘most complex’ and ‘fruitful’ exercises such as Okean ‘… rightly became the measure of the Navy before the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, and all the people, against which the fleet’s readiness and military training are measured’. Exercises also allowed Soviet naval officers and crew, Gorshkov maintained, ‘to learn all the complexity and tension, the enormous scope and dynamism, and the multiplicity of forms and methods of modern armed combat at sea’.8 Naval analysts in the West recognized from his speech this important role of Okean in domestic lobbying. Bill Manthorpe later wrote that, ‘…the Okean exercises may reflect Admiral Gorshkov’s unusual understanding of those with whom he must work to assure the continued development of the Soviet Navy’.9

Admiral Gorshkov also intended the massive exercise to shape the perceptions of foreign audiences. ‘This was a sign to both the Western World and the Politburo’, according to Jane’s, ‘that here was a major, self-contained navy with excellent communications and friendly havens in foreign countries’.10 So the message was not missed, the TASS news agency formally announced the exercise on 10 April and its conclusion on 27 April with the statement that ‘the naval forces involved demonstrated high combat efficiency’.11

The American news media and military received the message as well as the intent. As Time noted, ‘far from screening the maneuvers, the Soviet navy took pains to advertise its muscle flexing. It passed routine naval orders over regularly monitored radio channels’. Time also quoted an officer who had monitored the Soviet fleet at sea: ‘What they've done in just ten years is absolutely fantastic. From almost nothing, they've built up a first-rate navy, and it’s an imposing threat’.12 Analysts from the Center for Naval Analyses later summarized the impact of the unprecedented Okean exercises: ‘… if statements by Western military leaders are any indication, both exercises have had important effects on Western perceptions of Soviet naval power’.13

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12 ‘All the Ships at Sea’.
Political leaders were also impressed. President Gerald Ford, in a speech to the Navy League at the conclusion of *Okean*, warned: ‘There is no doubt about it, the Soviet Union understands the importance of seapower. The Russians built up their Navy while we permitted ours to shrink, and they know how to show their flag’.14

Admiral Gorshkov’s far-flung task groups showed both domestic and global audiences the Soviet Navy’s ability to execute near-simultaneous attacks across the operational spectrum – including anti-shipping, anti-submarine, and anti-carrier missions – and under realistic conditions. Gorshkov proclaimed at the time that it was ‘a routine procedure for our ships to carry out combat exercises at remote distances from their permanent bases, in the cold and heat, in fog and in gales’.15 Above all, Gorshkov aimed to demonstrate that his navy was equal to – or superior to in some respects – the US Navy. Marshal Grechko had remarked to Gorshkov while watching *Okean* 1970 in the Barents Sea: ‘Maneuvers reveal where everyone stands – who is ahead and who lags behind’.16

Yet the signals sent by *Okean*, and other similar exercises, were mixed ones and resulted in ‘general assessments of poor handling, and unimaginative operational and tactical doctrine.’ The Royal Navy monitored *Okean* in its most ambitious shadowing and intelligence gathering operation (*Algy*) of the Cold War. One of the British frigate commanders was encouraged by what he witnessed during the maneuvers: ‘Although laden with impressive weapons and radars their drills, evolutions, exercises and reactions generally seemed slow and amateurish. Their method of fuelling astern on a short span at slow speed for hours on end must be a NATO submariner’s dream’. However, there were other signs that the West should not become too complacent over Soviet commanders’ lack of combat or shiphandling skills. In another instance, a British frigate (HMS *Danae*) engaged in a cat-and-mouse pursuit of a Soviet Kresta-class cruiser in the North Atlantic. During the high-speed chase ‘[…] ‘Danae’s captain was impressed with the handling of this ship, noting the ‘gusto’ and ‘panache’ of its manoeuvres in contrast to standard quality of most Soviet

naval handling. […] The high-speed chase demonstrated tactical imagination and the effective use of ruses by a resourceful Soviet commander.17

The parallels with Okean in 1970 were so obvious that Western observers ignored the Soviets’ own name change for their global exercise and henceforth called it Okean 1975 or Okean II. However, much had changed since 1970. To be sure, the exercise was another personal triumph for Gorshkov and a major milestone in his naval expansion plans. It was further vindication of his confidence that a blue water navy would strengthen the Soviet Union both militarily and politically. In addition, he had become more widely known and studied by Western naval analysts through his article series. The period between the global exercises firmly established Gorshkov’s reputation as both a naval leader and thinker without equal in the West. He had earned the respect (and even grudging envy) of his American counterparts, most especially from Elmo Zumwalt as the chief of naval operations.

Gorshkov kept a steady hand on his naval force that served the USSR well during the era – most notably in the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973 and the assertive Soviet naval response that resulted in the most tense superpower naval standoff since the Cuban Missile Crisis. After the first Okean in 1970, Admiral Zumwalt faced his own difficulties with a dwindling fleet size and mounting morale issues during his turbulent tenure as Richard Nixon’s chief of naval operations. Coming out of Vietnam, the US Navy, like the rest of the American military, was at its lowest ebb in terms of readiness, confidence, and overall direction. Zumwalt’s successor, Admiral James L. Holloway III, testified about his concerns over the US Navy’s ‘severely inhibited’ fleet operational readiness from the reduced numbers of days at sea, fewer exercises, and delayed maintenance from inflationary pressures.18

Against this backdrop of American unpreparedness, the Soviet assuredness displayed in Okean 1975 was striking. Perceptions once again played a major role in the rivalry. Quantity still had a quality all its own for Admiral Gorshkov, and his global maritime exercises dwarfed anything by NATO during the Cold War. Notably, Okean 1975 did not garner the same amount of media coverage nor generate the same

shock value as the first exercise in 1970. Yet for naval observers in the West, there were significant and troubling advances that grabbed their attention as they watched for new developments in Soviet strategy and tactics. Retired Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, said of the global maneuvers: ‘The United States has never previously faced a global threat to its sealane communications from such a mix of subsurface, surface and maritime naval forces. This is a strategic change of kind, not of degree’.19

The Soviet Navy’s new naval and aviation platforms were on display and showed the transition to a higher level of sophistication and armament with improved ASW capabilities.20 Okean 1970 had exhibited a host of new multi-purpose surface combatant classes, such as the Moskva helicopter carrier, the Kresta-I guided missile cruiser, and the Kanin guided missile destroyer, as well as the IL-38 May medium-range ASW patrol aircraft. In the interim years, the Kara-class guided missile cruiser appeared in 1973, considered by Western analysts to be one the world’s most modern warships – and certainly the most heavily armed with its array of anti-submarine weaponry and surface-to-air missiles. The Soviet Navy also debuted the Delta-class ballistic missile submarine, the Kresta-II cruiser, Krivak-class missile frigates, and the Ivan Rogov-class amphibious ship.

The most anticipated new ship was the Kiev-class VTOL carrier – the Soviet Navy’s largest combatant to-date. However, the Kiev was not operational until 1976 and played no role in the second Okean. Its imminent appearance signaled another incremental shift by the Russians – begun with the Moskva-class in the 1960s and further advanced with the Kuznetsov-class in the 1980s – to the larger deck carrier platforms for sea-based naval aviation long favored in Western navies, though publicly disparaged by Soviet political and military leaders. Behind the scenes, the move toward carriers had glacially progressed since Stalin first embraced the idea in the late 1930s and had never entirely gone away during the Khrushchev era.21 The Soviet Navy officially ignored the fighter (strike) and air cover mission of carriers and

20 For a primer on these new platforms written for the American public, see Norman Polmar, 'The Russian Bear Has Gone to Sea', Saturday Evening Post, March 1977, pp. 22-24.
21 Rear Admiral (Ret) Tom Brooks, interviewed by author, 17 July 2018.
instead placed ‘great hopes’ on them as platforms for the helicopter for anti-submarine warfare.\textsuperscript{22}

Thus, naval analysts expected that the doctrine and tactics displayed in 1975 would be soon be modified or even outdated as the impact of the new Kiev carriers was felt and the Soviet Navy adjusted to increased sea-based tactical air power and strengthened its strategic anti-submarine mission. A later example of the more complex maneuvers was a 1979 anti-submarine exercise in the Mediterranean where the two new carriers (the Kiev and Minsk) conducted joint operations to intercept simulated US and NATO submarines through barrier patrols.\textsuperscript{23} Yet, US intelligence continued to forecast the Soviet Navy’s ‘open ocean’ ASW detection and warfare capability in the 1970s as ‘low’.\textsuperscript{24}

The most fearsome new aircraft to make its appearance in Okean 1975 was the Tu-22M Backfire strike bomber that vastly improved on the Badger medium-range bombers of the 1960s. The supersonic bomber with an intercontinental range and armed with AS-4 cruise missiles caused great concern to the US Navy when it first appeared. Backfires eventually featured in planned saturation attacks against NATO naval formations. Indeed, it would difficult to overstate the impact of the threat from its anti-carrier mission that these land-based bombers posed in the Atlantic and Pacific. The Backfire squadron based in Crimea would soon put the entire Sixth Fleet at risk and, as noted by the senior Pentagon civilian leaders, would eventually threaten all American naval forces.\textsuperscript{25}

Because the same bombers with nuclear payloads in a strategic mission could also pose a threat to the continental United States, the US sought to limit the production (30 annually) and mission employment of the bombers through the framework of SALT negotiations.\textsuperscript{26} Yet for all its future menace, the Backfire quietly debuted in 1975. The New York Times noted: ‘Some of the Backfires participated in a limited way in the worldwide Okean naval exercise […] [b]ut the use, according to

\textsuperscript{22} Kuzin and Nikolskiy, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{24} Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare: Current Capabilities and Priorities [Intelligence Report]’, (September 1972), CASN, Record 0005512850, p. 7.
defense analysts, appeared primarily to train pilots rather than to develop techniques for supporting naval operations’.27

It was what the Soviet Navy did operationally with these advanced ships, subs, and aircraft that truly mattered. Major exercises were a window into their potential future employment and for comparison against declaratory policies. Okean 1975 was more sophisticated and less scripted than the 1970 version and exhibited a wider range of capabilities. Okean also demonstrated the ever-expanding maritime defence zones from Soviet shores. Soviet naval expert Robert Herrick identified these developments as part of the ‘blue belt of defence’ since the late 1960s that further expanded key zones of the North Atlantic and Pacific to prevent a NATO sea-based nuclear attack.28 Michael MccGwire further argued, not without controversy, that the Soviet Navy’s shift to forward deployment was a direct reaction to the US Navy’s carrier-based strike forces and part of their ‘general war-related’ tasks.29

The threat to the Soviet Union from carriers remained high throughout the Cold War and demanded a counterstrategy.30 The Central Intelligence Agency assessed in 1978 that ‘the Soviets continue to have great respect for the carrier’s importance in NATO military strategy. They regard it as the key element of the general purpose naval forces, as a reserve strategic nuclear force, and apparently as an integral part of amphibious landing forces’.31 By the late 1970s, Admiral Gorshkov had softened the Khrushchev-era rhetoric as the Soviet Navy made plans to build its own carriers, even as the proliferation of cruise missiles threatened aircraft carriers and their crews as never before. Gorshkov faced the dilemma whereby the capability of devastating strikes ‘against the shore’ posed by US carriers still out-ranged that of Soviet tactical missiles ‘against the fleet’ and some of his land-based naval aviation.32 His response, later confirmed by an authoritative Soviet naval history, was an anti-

32 Gorshkov, Sea Power, p. 171; 214.
carrier force built upon the ‘triad’ of cruise missile delivery systems of submarines, naval aircraft, and surface ships.\textsuperscript{33}

This triad had to be exercised and controlled across broad expanses of the open ocean to be truly effective. A CIA report from 1972 concluded that, ‘the new anti-carrier mission, although also defensive, required that the Soviet Navy actively seek out and attack naval forces on the high seas’.\textsuperscript{34} The NIE on the Soviet Navy in 1974 assessed: ‘We believe that coordinated strikes against Western carriers in [the northeaster Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, northwestern Pacific Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean] would at least be partially successful’.\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Okean} 1975 provided the best confirmation to-date of improved Soviet capabilities in this regard. As noted in \textit{Proceedings}:

> Traditionally, Soviet naval exercises have concentrated on a 1,500 nautical mile “defense perimeter” around the Soviet Union. In Okean-75, however, many units operated well beyond this perimeter. The expanded exercise area shows Soviet appreciation for the changing capabilities of the Western navies and planning for early attrition of hostile forces on the high seas before potentially hostile forces can reach the primary Soviet defense zone.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{Okean’s Impact on American Naval Thought}

\textit{Okean} 1975 had varied aims that ranged from the tactical to geopolitical levels, such as showing Soviet projection into strategic regions such as the Indian Ocean astride the world’s oil routes. Two aims in particular had great significance to Admiral Gorshkov and directly influenced American naval thought and strategy in the 1980s. These were: (1) the demonstration of command and control networks and the emergence of ocean surveillance in support of ‘first salvo’ attacks; and (2) the inclusion of merchant ships and the role of interdiction in Soviet strategy.

\textbf{The Battle of the First Salvo}

The Soviet Navy demonstrated that it was a global fleet during \textit{Okean} by its use of command and control networks using satellites and satellite relay to achieve

\begin{itemize}
\item Kuzin and Nikolskiy, p. 26.
\item Directorate of Intelligence, 'Soviet Capabilities to Counter US Aircraft Carriers [Intelligence Report]', (May 1972), CASN, Record 0005512849, p. 5.
\item CIA, 'NIE 11-15-74', p. 3.
\item Watson and Walton, p. 95.
\end{itemize}
near-real time communications and coordination. Okean also tested ocean surveillance capabilities from space for synchronized targeting of enemy forces. The Soviets launched two Cosmos satellites with orbital characteristics for ocean reconnaissance just before the exercise began. The US Navy noted that ‘in some phases of the multi-ocean exercise, naval bombers simultaneously flew simulated strike missions in both the North Atlantic and Western Pacific Oceans, with warships in the different oceans being attacked at the same moment’. Yet one analyst also detected an ‘apparent passivity of “enemy” forces’ in these scenarios – meaning targeted ships did not appear to be in a high state of combat readiness – that likely ensured the success of the ‘surprise’ missile strikes.

The common perception was that Admiral Gorshkov was acquiring the platforms and doctrine to coordinate widely dispersed strike forces in support of his ‘first salvo’ concept. Analysts paid significant attention to the ‘battle of the first salvo’ in the 1970s and 1980s. They speculated that Gorshkov’s problems from his fleet’s logistics deficiencies and lack of combat endurance – what Stansfield Turner termed ‘staying power’ – could be solved by the increased lethality and range of modern weapons that neutralized American naval advantages in a protracted conflict. The editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships stated: ‘I am not entirely satisfied that [the Soviet fleet] could fight anything more than a brief war […] At the beginning of a war, the fleet could be a difficult adversary. But the question must be asked: Are the ships being built for a long war? I think not’.

A Central Intelligence Agency report from 1976 determined that Soviet logistics were optimized to support peacetime operations. ‘The fleet logistic system would be largely ineffective, however, if the USSR were engaged in sustained combat

41 ‘All the Ships at Sea’; Watson and Walton, (pp. 95-96); USND, 3rd edn, pp. 23-24; Norman Polmar and Norman Friedman, ‘Their Mission and Tactics’, Proceedings, 108.956 (1982), 34-44 (pp. 37-38); Baer, p. 395.
42 Merry. See also Gorshkov, Red Star Rising, p. 137.
operations’ in a major war with NATO. A 1980 assessment on readiness found that ‘[the Soviet Navy is operationally postured to fight a short, intense war, and its potential for “first salvo” operations in waters near the Soviet Union has been maximized at the expense of its capabilities for sustained operations’. 

Recognition that Gorshkov was driven to the first salvo concept from a position of weakness and not from strength even appeared in the academic press. According to a 1978 article by a retired navy admiral, ‘[o]n balance, then, the logistics capability of the Soviet navy must be considered its weakest link. It is a “one-shot” navy at the moment, designed for a surprise, preemptive attack. The combat commander who can counter that pre-emptive surprise has gone a long way toward blunting the Soviet naval threat’. 

At the Center for Naval Analyses, Charles Petersen traced the origins of the first salvo debate within the Soviet Navy and the relevance of massed action naval tactics in the nuclear-missile era to the pages of Morskoi Sbornik in the early 1960s. According to Petersen, articles by Rear-Admiral K. Stalbo, one of the Soviet Navy’s leading thinkers and tacticians, were the ‘opening broadside’ in the debate. Striking power, Stalbo argued, came not from large numbers of concentrated platforms ‘firing again and again’, but rather from ‘a single powerful shot (moshchnoe razovoe vozdeijstvie) against the enemy ... with a relatively limited number of weapon platforms’. A research project at the Naval Postgraduate School on Gorshkov’s writings confirmed that surprise attack had been a recurring theme since 1963. ‘Admiral Gorshkov is an advocate of the initiative. He claims that the first moments in a modern battle at sea will go a long way to determining the final outcome of the conflict. He quotes Lenin concerning the importance of surprise. To Admiral Gorshkov, the battle for the first salvo is a necessary condition for ultimate victory’.

Gorshkov validated first salvo as an operational concept in the minds of Western audiences with his final ‘Navies in War and Peace’ article in 1973. In

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43 Directorate of Intelligence, 'Intelligence Report: Soviet Fleet Logistics: Capabilities and Limitations', (August 1976), CASN, Record 0005532898, p. 2.
47 Cramer, p. 152.
discussing ‘the problems of a modern navy’, he wrote: ‘… “the battle of the first salvo” is taking on a special meaning in naval battle under present-day conditions (conditions including the possible employment of combat means of colossal power). Delay in the employment of weapons in a naval battle or operation inevitably will be fraught with the most serious and even fatal consequences, regardless of where the fleet is located, at sea or in port’. Gorshkov further emphasized the importance of speed in naval art in *The Sea Power of the State*. He stressed the effectiveness of ‘dynamic, swift, decisive and increasingly productive combat clashes’ over prolonged and repeated engagements. He listed ‘speed’ and ‘time’ among the most important factors of conflict at sea.

In addition to Gorshkov’s writings, the Soviet response to real world crises added to US concerns. Admiral Zumwalt’s ‘worry that Gorshkov would adopt a surprise “shootout” strategy by surging his ships to forward stations on the eve of a conflict’, wrote one US naval historian, ‘… largely animated Zumwalt’s naval policy’. The surge of Soviet naval forces to the Mediterranean during the October 1973 war confirmed, to Zumwalt’s mind, that Gorshkov planned to pre-emptively strike American carriers in the Sixth Fleet.

The Soviet Navy’s simultaneous strikes during *Okean* further reinforced the belief that the real-world target of the salvo would be American carriers and that the concept was rapidly moving from theoretical discussion to tactical application. Indeed, the Navy debunked a news story that said the Soviet Navy had conducted a mock nuclear attack on the continental United States. Officials made it clear that the attacks were against simulated US carrier task forces. A 1978 *Proceedings* article on surprise in naval warfare repeatedly referenced ‘OKEAN-type attacks’ by nuclear and conventional missiles as the primary danger to surface forces. The proliferation of cruise missiles in the Soviet inventory for the remainder of the Cold War provided further compelling evidence of the threat from saturation attacks. According to a Russian history:

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51 Watson and Walton, p. 95.
From 1963-1970 up to 1991 the number of anti-ship cruise missiles in a salvo at one US carrier strike force (with one carrier in each carrier strike force) grew by almost double and reached 100 units, which in the opinion of many specialists was fully adequate for the destruction of it in a nuclear war or for the temporary knocking out of it with the use of non-nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{54}

However, it is worth noting that a 1977 report by naval experts on contract with the Department of Defense – the Welander report – injected a note of caution when looking for doctrinal evidence in Soviet writings on the complex issue of surprise. They warned that not every reference to surprise was an endorsement of the concept or an expression of the intention to preempt:

A close reading indicates that the Soviets consider surprise a two-edged sword that cuts both ways. Many of their historical allegories, particularly those written by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, can be read as straightforward object lessons for the troops to give purpose and meaning to the unremitting Soviet emphasis on readiness--to guard against being taken by surprise.\textsuperscript{55}

Analysts also suggested that the first salvo concept could be meant to impress a Soviet audience to secure a larger share of defence expenditures. Yet this view had to be balanced with the inescapable conclusion that naval technology gave the overwhelming advantage to whomever struck first, and the Soviet Navy had enthusiastically acquired the means to do so.\textsuperscript{56}

By the 1980s, the US Navy’s recognition that Soviet naval thought under Gorshkov placed a premium on surprise influenced the US response in the Maritime Strategy. Since the Soviets contemplated such an emboldened strategy, the Navy’s civilian and military leaders argued that the US needed forward deployed forces and an even bolder strategy to regain the initiative. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman testified before Congress in 1984 that ‘the transition to war is perhaps the most crucial of all [the Maritime Strategy’s phases]. How we position ourselves in the transitional phase, what Admiral Gorshkov calls the “battle for the first salvo” is critical’.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54} Kuzin and Nikolskiy, p. 28.
Naval professional literature in the US a decade after Okean noted that ‘battle of the first salvo’ had to be won to be an effective war-winning strategy: ‘If the Soviet preemptive strike is avoided or thwarted, the balance at sea swings decisively in favor of endurance, mobility, and flexibility—the virtues possessed by the [carrier battle group]. The object of NATO forces at sea during the first days of a war is to survive the enemy attacks’. However, Gorshkov’s true intentions and the potential use of the Soviet Navy as a ‘risk fleet’ – in the bold gambit of a lightning strike in the opening minutes of a war – conflicted with even stronger signals that it was primarily a sea denial, defence-oriented force. Thankfully the question of the Soviet adoption of ‘blitzkrieg’ warfare during the Cold War was never answered at sea with bolt-out-of-the-blue salvos of cruise missiles or on land – namely through the speed, surprise, and penetration of Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe overwhelming NATO through the Soviet equivalent ‘deep battle’ or ‘deep operations’.

Thus, there was a paradox in American naval thinking in the competing and often conflicting analyses of Soviet priorities. If Gorshkov was indeed focusing on a short war scenario – made even shorter by crippling pre-emptive strikes – and planned to devote the bulk of his forces to his pro-SSBN strategic mission and his anti-SSBN and anti-carrier missions, then an anti-shipping campaign was clearly a lower priority and perhaps not as great a threat as presented by the US Navy or envisioned by senior civilian leaders by the late 1970s. Indeed, Okean sowed further analytical confusion over the role of the Soviet Navy in the targeting of NATO sea lines of communication.

**The Interdiction Debate**

In early April 1975, Soviet merchant ships suddenly diverted course or left port mid-loading to join naval and hydrographic ships in the Barents Sea and the North Pacific, as well as off the Azores and in the Indian Ocean. They participated in what many Western analysts determined to be convoy exercises. Yet these global maneuvers in Okean obfuscated rather than clarified the importance of the Soviet anti-shipping mission and left American analysts wondering what all this activity truly meant. As noted in the Naval War College Review, ‘the Soviets probably assume

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that their high-visibility exercises will be observed by the West; hence, they can be expected to take some measures to avoid ‘giving away too much’ and may even look for ways to confuse Western observers’. As such, Admiral Gorshkov fueled debates over the role of interdiction at sea in Soviet naval policy for years to come.

Media reports in 1975 reflected this ambiguity and confusion. As Time magazine noted, ‘… whether Russian warships were practicing convoy escort or postulating the convoys as US fleets—or US tanker convoys […]’ would require much more analysis. The New York Times referenced Gorshkov’s signals in his article series and in the global exercise:

The presence of merchant ship convoys in the North Atlantic and east of Japan puzzled Defense Department analysts. Were the convoys supposed to be American or Soviet? The attacks on the convoys by ships and aircraft might argue that they were considered American and that the exercise was intended to perfect operations against allied maritime communications.

Some analysts point out that Soviet naval literature, especially the writings of the Commander in Chief, Adm. S.G. Gorshkov, recently has stressed the role the navy can play in carrying out Soviet overseas policy. Such a role could involve the movement of ground forces in a convoy.

“If the use of convoys signifies changes either way,” one analyst said, “it encourages the view that Admiral Gorshkov has made his point that the navy can deal with military-politico matters.” He added that there is “a need to rethink our ideas on the uses of the Soviet Navy, there’s clearly been a change.”

Behind the scenes, the significance of Okean and of Gorshkov’s writings as crucial pieces of evidence on the Soviet anti-shipping mission became a source of friction between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Eugene Sullivan, a senior analyst from the Naval Operations Branch of the CIA’s Office of Strategic Research – he was also a PhD and Navy veteran – later recalled that the CIA’s reporting on Soviet naval issues ‘stirred angry feelings’ in the US Navy. Yet according to Sullivan, his office was established in 1967 to do precisely that – i.e., to serve as a competitor to the military service intelligence organizations’

60 Daniel, p. 34.
61 ‘All the Ships at Sea’.
analyses of the Soviet armed forces and challenge assumptions. It is in this turf conscious environment, CIA reports on the likelihood of Soviet attacks on NATO merchant shipping further exacerbated the Navy’s already antagonistic stance.

It is worth noting that these analytic and bureaucratic battles were part of a larger shift in US defence policy in 1977. The need to more fully understand the Soviet views on interdiction suddenly became paramount with the election of Jimmy Carter. James Earl Carter Jr was the Democrat governor of Georgia, a US Naval Academy graduate, and part of Hyman Rickover’s early nuclear power officer cadre. Yet he was not the natural naval ally many presumed him to be. For example, his mentor Admiral Rickover was apparently unable to leverage the ties with Carter to get backing for more nuclear surface ships or to become an influential adviser and White House insider. Instead, Carter took the view of a more benign Soviet naval threat in general and of a less pivotal role for the US Navy in particular.

To be sure, given his background, Carter was a strong supporter of the Navy’s strategic mission for its nuclear ballistic missile submarines. He called them ‘our most important strategic element in the entire defense mechanism of our country’, during the 1976 presidential campaign. In a session with journalists, Carter acknowledged the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy into a blue water force, yet he also understood the rationale behind it. ‘It is basically a land-locked nation and to perform a certain function in naval control they require more ships than we do for coverage of the world’s seas. I don’t think we are in that vulnerable position now’. Carter’s perception of the essentially defensive and geopolitical nature of the Soviet Navy came up on the campaign trail. In October, he stated that the reason for the increase of the Soviet Union’s naval strength was ‘… in order to extend their influence throughout the world. But I don’t think it necessarily means a commitment toward

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63 Eugene Sullivan, interviewed by author, 14 September 2017.
belligerency … I am not overly fearful of the Soviets, and I don’t think that they are making their naval buildup with plans to start a war’.67

Once elected, what most concerned Carter was the sea denial threat to allied sea-lanes. His prescription was to bolster the US Navy’s sea control capabilities through smaller surface ships, more attack subs, and fewer strike carriers.68 The effects of Carter’s policies on the Navy’s shipbuilding plans were dramatic. The number of ships built in the next five years would be half in Carter’s first defence budget (70 vice 156) than what was planned by President Ford.69 The greatest blow was Carter’s continued opposition to the construction of another *Nimitz*-class nuclear carrier – at the cost of $2 billion – until his last year in office.70

President Carter and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, as well as the Office of Management and Budget and the newly established Congressional Budget Office, came down firmly on the side of sea control to determine future force structure – and a particularly narrow definition of it as applied to protecting Western sea lines of communication that did not involve forward strikes into Soviet waters.71 The Carter administration’s national security strategy, based on a reassessment of the Soviet threat, placed emphasis on countering Soviet ground forces in Central Europe. As a result, the Navy’s primary mission – apart from its strategic deterrence mission and much to its consternation – became protection of the Northern Atlantic sea lines of communication in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.72

Naval leaders and their congressional allies would spend the remainder of the Carter years trying to reverse – or significantly add other missions to – the primacy of convoy protection for the new Central Front.73 The contentious issue of the swing

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73 ‘Navy Battles to Retain Supremacy, but the Enemy Is President Carter', *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 6 April 1978, p. 3.
strategy, which called for the wartime shift of naval and air forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic theatre, further strained global naval forces, especially carriers. The Joint Chiefs broadly agreed that the solution was to build forces, not swing them, to avoid a repeat of the military overstretch of the Vietnam years.74

American naval thinking on the Soviet naval threat had entered a new and challenging phase. Giving the US Navy a primary mission to counter what was in all likelihood a secondary mission for the Soviet Navy introduced a host of strategic problems that had never before been faced during the rivalry. At best, the change was a potential corrective to the Navy’s carrier-centric orientation and further justified a high-low mix of ships as envisioned by Zumwalt that would bolster and diversify sea control capabilities without breaking defence budgets. At worst, it unnecessarily neutralized the superiority that the US Navy held over Soviet Navy since the beginning of the Cold War by unduly narrowing American strategic thinking and restricting the Navy’s ability to respond to the Soviet naval threat across a broad spectrum of missions.

Sea Plan 2000, under CNO Admiral James Holloway III’s leadership, was the Navy’s alternative strategic vision to preserve this superiority in the midst of this significant downgrade and to promote a forward deployed strategy.75 Notably, even Admirals Zumwalt and Turner at the height of the earlier debates over sea control did not downplay the vital importance of power projection and presence missions to the degree that was happening by 1977 and driven, by and large, by Carter’s sanguine perception of the Soviet naval threat and his antipathy toward the US Navy. The New York Times quoted Zumwalt, who said that he had read the guidance of the Navy’s new limited role, ‘… and it belongs in the funny papers’.76

Thus, it was imperative to study Soviet views on interdiction, given the major reorientation of the Navy’s role in Carter’s national security strategy. In early 1977, the Office of Strategic Research produced a two-page point paper on the subject – presumably for the incoming Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner. The paper concluded that ‘… there is little evidence to show that the Soviets

76 Wilson, ‘Pared Navy Shipbuilding’.
perceive disrupting of merchant shipping as an essential wartime objective’. 77 The paper further stated that Soviet priorities were anti-SSBN and anti-carrier operations to prevent nuclear strikes, while exercises showed disruption of shipping as ‘incidental’. Moreover, classified and open source writings also supported this viewpoint: ‘…Gorshkov’s writings seem to indicate that the interdiction of merchant shipping is an outdated concept in the era of nuclear weapons because the duration of the war will be short, and shipping can best be disrupted by destroying ports and the sources of shipping’. 78

The Office of Strategic Research greatly expanded on this argument in several versions of a top secret report in February and May 1978, ‘The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations’ [henceforth also called the ‘SLOC paper’]. Authored by naval analyst Jerry Sparks, the SLOC paper offered a detailed assessment based on projected Soviet intentions and capabilities, and stressed the former over the latter.79 The paper concluded that interdiction was a secondary mission for the Soviet Navy after the principal missions of protecting their own naval nuclear forces and destroying enemy naval nuclear forces.80 The paper restricted its analysis to ‘open ocean interdiction’ that targeted merchant ships carrying military or civilian cargo. This was the classic scenario of unrestricted submarine warfare used by the German navy in both world wars. However, according to the report, nothing published in Soviet writings showed that they would make another Battle of the Atlantic the centerpiece of their warfighting strategy. An important caveat was that intentions could change quickly and were situation-driven. In a protracted war, the Soviets would likely devote more resources to interdiction if they believed it would sway the outcome.81

Yet Admiral Gorshkov had been adamant that the enormous Soviet sacrifices in the Battle of Stalingrad, and not the failed German U-boat campaign in the

79 Unless otherwise noted, the May version will be cited.
81 Office of Strategic Research, 'The Role of Interdiction', p. 16.
Atlantic, had turned the tide in the Second World War. The internal debates in
classified writings and Gorshkov’s public writings, according to the SLOC paper,
showed that senior Soviet naval leaders understood the indecisiveness of such an
approach and the investment of time and resources required to make any substantial
impact. Admiral Gorshkov was especially critical of the diversion of resources for
interdiction at sea, and preferred to attack the source of shipping on land or use mine
warfare.\textsuperscript{82} He stated in \textit{Sea Power of the State} that interdiction is subsumed in the
‘overall system of naval operations against the shore’.\textsuperscript{83} Thus, interdiction at sea by
submarines was just one of the methods of stopping enemy convoys – and not the
most effective one, in Gorshkov’s view.

Both Soviet proponents and CIA analysts stressed that the Soviet Navy’s
interdiction operations entailed more than just targeting convoys. There were the
defensive operations that supported the traditional naval mission of protecting the Red
Army’s flanks in ‘close sea’ operations, such as intercepting enemy amphibious task
forces, as well as protecting Warsaw Pact shipping in the Baltic and North Seas as the
approaches to the Soviet homeland. The SLOC paper further noted that, while it may
be a wartime necessity, the Soviets did not devote a great deal of their naval exercises
to anti-convoy training. \textit{Okean} 1975 appeared to deviate from the norm in that
respect, but on the whole, the participation of merchant ships did nothing to alter the
place of open ocean interdiction in the Soviet Navy’s mission hierarchy.\textsuperscript{84}

The CIA report made no effort to hide the ongoing analytical dispute within
the intelligence community. It offered a side-by-side comparison in a table of the
competing interpretations of \textit{Okean} – that interdiction was either a high or a low
priority.\textsuperscript{85} Part of the confusion may have stemmed from the Soviet Navy also
exercising the aforementioned defensive missions to guard the approaches to Soviet
shores. The out of area operations in the Indian Ocean and west of Africa perhaps
simulated oil tankers targeted by diesel submarines, yet the real purpose proved more
difficult to interpret.\textsuperscript{86} Ultimately, \textit{Okean} likely demonstrated both offensive and
defensive interdiction operations in a range of scenarios that the Soviet Navy would
face in a war with NATO. As Bill Manthorpe later observed: ‘The multiplicity of

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., pp. 20-21; 31-32.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{84} See Appendix B, ‘Interpretations of Soviet Naval Exercises’, ibid., pp. 23-27.
\textsuperscript{85} This was essentially the CIA versus the Office of Naval Intelligence competing views. Ibid., p. B-4.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., pp. 24-25.
purposes for which the exercises are conducted is one of several factors which limit
the accuracy and completeness of Western observations and insights’.87

It is noteworthy that a single intelligence report by a mid-level civilian analyst
caused such a bureaucratic firestorm. Even more remarkable, the SLOC paper merely
amplified the views already found in a 1974 National Intelligence Estimate. The first-
ever intelligence community assessment of the Soviet Navy had earlier stated that
interdiction was not a priority mission in the anticipated short war scenario with the
West. In a longer war, the Soviet Navy would likely mount a larger-scale interdiction
campaign, but would encounter ‘major problems in doing so’.88

Reactions to the SLOC paper underscored the environment by the late 1970s
in which the Soviet naval threat was hotly debated and perceptions mattered because
of their larger implications for the US Navy’s future. Indeed, the June 1978
memorandum to the CIA from Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, Deputy Director of
Naval Intelligence, admitted as much. Shapiro wrote that assessment of the Soviet
Navy’s interdiction mission ‘… impacts heavily upon present and future US strategy
and force planning’.89

Notably, Shapiro’s memo came just a few months after the unveiling of
President Carter’s shipbuilding plan as part of his defence spending reductions. Big-
ticket items such as nuclear carriers were predictably on the chopping block, and such
sea control programmes that were spared – especially the FFG 7, Oliver Hazard
Perry-class frigate, which would play a key escort role in convoy protection –
presumably did not need new evidence that questioned their justification and the large
number needed.90 Above all else, the Navy’s view was that it needed to preserve and
grow fleet size. SLOC protection had historically been a good mission to justify larger
numbers of platforms – second only to the strategic mission of their carriers and
submarines.91

Shapiro’s specific complaints against the SLOC paper’s key judgments and its
‘analytical techniques’ included the charge that the CIA’s interpretation of Soviet

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89 Sumner Shapiro, Rear Admiral, US Navy, 'Intelligence Community Assessment of the Soviet Navy's
SLOC Interdiction Mission [Memorandum for the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for
National Foreign Assessment]', (23 June 1978), CASN, Record 0002073475.
90 ‘The Carter plan called for 26 FFG7s over the next five years. Wilson, 'Pared Navy Shipbuilding Plan
Unveiled; Hill Fight Expected'.
91 Discussion with Norman Polmar, 22 November 2017.
writings was incorrect. Unlike the CIA, naval intelligence did not find that the writings assigned ‘rigid priorities to their naval missions and that SLOC interdiction, regardless of scenario, is secondary’. Of greatest concern to him, Shapiro accused the CIA of making a ‘unilateral attempt … to resolve this complex and controversial issue’. Shapiro recommended a joint study on Soviet capabilities and intentions for SLOC interdiction in the form of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, in which the Navy ‘is prepared to assist fully in the development of such an interagency study’.

Admiral Stansfield Turner, as one of the Navy’s thought leaders, was uniquely qualified to referee this dispute between his Navy colleagues and his new CIA workforce. Turner got personally involved in the interdiction debate and called for the production of a secret version of SLOC paper to be shared with Secretary of the Navy William Graham Claytor, Jr and Under Secretary James Woolsey. Turner did not reflexively take the CIA’s side in the debate and directed specific revisions be made in the new version and challenged some of the CIA’s earlier assumptions. Not surprising given his previous writings, Admiral Turner was not satisfied with the CIA’s definition of Soviet naval missions. He had written in the January 1977 issue of Foreign Affairs that, ‘[t]here are fundamentally two threats that the presence of a naval force can imply: to do harm to a nation by projecting power directly onto its territory or to sever a nation's sea lines of communication through blockade or sea denial’. He found that the CIA had not sufficiently addressed the ‘possible Soviet sea control operations in the Norwegian Sea and of possible sea denial operations south of the G-I-UK gap’ in their list of Soviet wartime missions. He also charged that their study ‘attempts too much in the way of coming to a conclusion rather than explicating the problem’. The analysts responded that they were ‘now less categorical’ in the revised version and showed more variations in their assumptions in their predictive model of interdiction effectiveness.

The CIA released the secret version of the SLOC paper in April 1979. Admiral Turner, in his foreword, noted that he only partially agreed with its conclusions. He stated that both NATO and Warsaw Pact planners ‘basically expect a

92 Shapiro, 'Intelligence Community Assessment'.
93 Ibid.
94 Turner, 'Missions of the U.S. Navy'.
95 Turner, 'Naval Balance', p. 345.
short war. I therefore agree with the study that sea denial operations in the North Atlantic are not a high priority item for Soviet naval efforts in the initial stages of either a nuclear or conventional war ….' On the other hand, Turner believed that CIA analysts had come to an inaccurate conclusion about torpedo loads – thus siding with the Navy – and that ‘much more work remains to be done in this area’.  

The interdiction issue was far from settled. The revised SLOC paper continued to generate arguments between the intelligence agencies. The CIA’s response on the Navy review of the SLOC paper, documented in a lengthy 1979 memorandum, included ten pages on the Navy’s interpretation of the writings of Soviet admirals and generals. Civilian analysts maintained that the Navy had simply taken (or chosen) the wrong message from them. While the Navy cited the major writers that spoke authoritatively for naval policy, including Admirals Gorshkov, Stalbo, and V’yunenko, ‘… we disagree that their writings indicate that the Soviets plan on conducting a major at-sea interdiction campaign in a war with NATO’.  

Admiral Gorshkov wrote extensively on interdiction, the CIA argued, but he never placed it high on the list of naval missions and had a different focus for its employment. Instead, the memo offered the intriguing possibility that Gorshkov had been aware for years of NATO’s concern over the vulnerability of its shipping and ‘has sought to exploit that concern’ by playing up the mission generally without having to back it up with specific plans. Thus, Gorshkov could achieve an outsized impact and cost imposition with minimal resources that had been noted in the first edition of Guide to the Soviet Navy in 1970. Siegfried Breyer wrote that, ‘[t]he aim of the present-day Red Fleet is to reduce the offensive power of the Western Allies by forcing them to commit far greater forces to the defense of the sea lanes than the Soviet Union commits to their attack’. By 1976, Admiral Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations testified to Congress that ‘[o]ur dependence upon the SLOC is especially significant when one considers that a sea denial capability requires a much smaller investment than the sea control capability required to defend against it’.

99 Ibid., p. 11.
101 United States Congress, Fiscal Year 1977 Defense Budget : Hearings before the Task Force on National Security Programs of the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth
These back-and-forth criticisms illustrated how the US intelligence community struggled with the meaning of Admiral Gorshkov's writings in the 1970s in their classified reports, just as open source analysts and academics had debated them in conference papers and journal articles. It is also worth noting that the CIA had allies in their assessment of the Soviet Navy’s views on the SLOC mission. Other individuals and organizations looked at the question and came to similar conclusions. Barry Blechman at the Brookings Institution and Michael Klare in the pages of *Foreign Policy* also endorsed the view that interdiction was of lower importance and that the Soviet Navy did not have a ‘master plan’ to control the major sea lanes.\(^{102}\)

The Center for Naval Analyses, as part of their ‘literary intelligence’ effort on Soviet writings, also found that interdiction was a lower priority mission for the Soviet Navy than commonly believed.\(^{103}\) James McConnell had written as early as 1968 that the Soviet Navy’s anti-shipping mission had been appreciably downgraded since the early Cold War years. The large number of attack submarines (over 300) had the potential for *guerre de course*, but could not be spared from their primary missions.\(^{104}\) In addition, a major study by the Atlantic Council’s Working Group on Securing the Seas, chaired by Paul Nitze, concluded that there was little evidence in either Soviet writings or exercises to indicate planning for an extensive campaign against Allied SLOCs. Although anti-shipping attacks were likely ‘less urgent than some other missions, they would have the great advantage of tying down Western ASW forces and diverting them from posing a threat to the Soviet SSBN strategic reserve’.\(^{105}\)

The intelligence community resolved the interdiction debate in two ways, yet neither was a speedy solution that settled the matter during the Carter administration. First, the Navy’s call for a joint CIA-Navy study resulted in an Intelligence

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Interagency Memorandum in November 1981, more than four years after the controversial SLOC paper first appeared. The memorandum essentially supported the CIA position since early 1977, while ignoring the contentious torpedo capacity debate entirely. It concluded that, while the Soviet Navy possessed ‘significant anti-SLOC potential,’ ‘[w]e believe that it is not currently the intention of Soviet planners to conduct a large-scale interdiction campaign against sea lines of communication (SLOC) in a major war with NATO, although we believe they intend some interdiction’.106

The conclusion of the interdiction debate within the intelligence community came with the National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Navy (NIE 11-15-82/D). The 1982 NIE, drafted by Gene Sullivan, was also the final word on Soviet interdiction priorities.107 It concluded that the Soviet Navy would engage in ‘some interdiction’ of Western SLOCs, but that it was a ‘less urgent task than providing combat stability for their SSBNs and defeating the West’s nuclear-capable naval strike forces’.108 This translated into fewer resources devoted to the effort. According to the NIE, ‘[o]nly a few forces—primarily diesel submarines—would therefore be allocated to open-ocean SLOC interdiction from the outset of hostilities. The Soviets probably plan to use such units for attacks on shipping primarily to disperse and tie down NATO naval forces and to reduce the efficiency of NATO military shipping.’109

With this observation, the NIE confirmed that it was the potential threat of interdiction and the exploitation of NATO vulnerabilities – and not its likely full-scale execution as a priority mission – that gave Gorshkov his greatest advantage in both war and peace. This advantage was further amplified through his writings – in which he recalled Imperial Russian Navy’s successful coercion of its enemies by threatening their sea-lanes in peacetime – and sending reminder signals through exercises like Okean.110 Nonetheless, the US Navy still needed to address the ‘some interdiction’ problem and put it into its proper perspective.

107 Sullivan interview.
109 Ibid., p. 22.
110 See discussion of ‘OKEAN 75 and Sea Lines of Communication Interdiction’ in Naval Power in Soviet Policy, ed. by Murphy, pp. 227-29.
The US Navy’s response to the interdiction debate must be viewed through the lens of its Cold War history. World War II and its lessons for US logistical support to any future war in Europe became culturally ingrained in American naval thought. ‘Increasingly, Americans worried about the Soviet Navy as a sea denial force that could deprive the West of the free use of the sea, thereby creating political, economic, and military disaster. In short, Americans tended to view the new Soviet naval capabilities in terms of mirror-imaging and refighting World War II’.  

This perception had a direct impact on force structure and strategic planning. The Navy stressed the need for a defensive barrier to protect vital Western sea-lanes as justification for large numbers of destroyers, destroyer escort, and other sea control ships in defence budgets. Just as Gorshkov pursued forward deployment into the Mediterranean for defence against Polaris submarines in the early 1960s, the US Navy under Admiral Holloway (and later Hayward) advocated a forward strategy to defend Western shipping from Soviet subs to satisfy Carter’s Central Front prioritization. The Navy also cited its own interpretation of Gorshkov’s anticipated moves to push back against opponents (such as the Congressional Budget Office) of a larger power projection-oriented force with more attack carriers. In his 1977 response to its report on the Navy’s general purpose forces, Navy chief Admiral Holloway cited CBO’s supposed false assumption that … ‘the Soviets would conduct a one-dimensional (submarine) campaign against SLOC’s. Clearly, Admiral Gorshkov intends to use all his forces in a coordinated effort. This is the kind of campaign which the Soviets conduct in major exercises, the most recent of which (OKEAN 75) included both anti-carrier and anti-SLOC strikes by air, surface and subsurface forces’.  

Neither did the Navy’s views on interdiction change even as the Soviet Navy became a global blue water navy with a growing list of strategic missions. According to a historian of US naval strategy, ‘[t]he spectre of a powerful Soviet Navy leaving home waters […] and proceeding into the open oceans to disrupt the SLOCs grew to

111 Hattendorf, Evolution, p. 23.
near-crisis proportions from the late-1960s through the mid-1970s’. Another history of the Maritime Strategy noted:

The prevailing wisdom explained the continuing Soviet naval buildup in terms of threats to Western sea lines of communication. Soviet exercises such as OKEAN 1970 and OKEAN 1975 seemed to emphasize the correctness of the interpretation that the Soviets thought primarily in terms of naval presence and in cutting Western sea lines. From this, American naval officers drew the conclusion that if war with the Soviet Union came, it would bring with it a battle of the North Atlantic and Northwest Pacific sea-lanes.

Institutional and intellectual biases reinforced this ‘admirals like us’ view that had not kept pace with developments in Soviet naval thinking on interdiction and nor appreciated the variability of its place in their writings. Yet by the late 1970s, American naval officers were re-evaluating the priority of SLOC disruption in publications. The Evolving Soviet Navy stated that the anti-SLOC role was a secondary mission for the Soviet Navy and that ‘there is little if anything written by officers of the Soviet Navy to indicate that they intend to use their naval forces for SLOC interdiction’. Another publication noted that the Soviets thought the American fixation on sea lines of communication meant that the US was planning for ‘a decisive war to destroy the socialist camp’ against which the Soviet Union must prepare to defend its own sea-lanes better than it did during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Official publications were slower to fully adopt the revised view, yet began to soften the language and add more equivocation. The 1978 edition of Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, written by the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote that Gorshkov ‘recently said that: ‘… the disruption of the ocean line of communications, the special arteries feeding the military and economic potentials of those (the enemy) countries, has continued to be one of the most important of the Navy’s missions’. In the same volume, however, the Navy was more accurate when it wrote that ‘the


115 Hattendorf, Evolution, p. 29.

116 See section “‘Admirals Like Us’: The Soviet Union and SLOCs’ in Ford and Rosenberg, Admirals’ Advantage, pp. 77-78.


118 Bathurst, Understanding, pp. xiv, 134.

119 USND, 3rd edn, pp. 10-11.
relative importance of SLOC interdiction within the hierarchy of Soviet naval missions has fluctuated, depending on the current perceptions of the likely nature and length of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.\textsuperscript{120} By the 1985 and the 1991 volumes, SLOC interdiction is listed as fourth out of five main missions, or a ‘low-priority’ mission (respectively).\textsuperscript{121}

Figure 7. Cover story of September 1980 US Naval Institute Proceedings\textsuperscript{122}

Alarm over the Soviet naval threat to Western shipping continued for the last decade of the Cold War, such as the September 1980 Proceedings cover story (Figure 7) by an Oklahoma congressman on ‘Soviet Expansion and Control of the Sea-Lanes’. However, fears became more muted as the implications of a Soviet withholding strategy took hold in American naval thought.\textsuperscript{123}

Nonetheless, in a final twist to the debate narrative, several respected Soviet naval analysts, including James McConnell, thought that they detected another shift in Soviet policy – via new Soviet open source writings in the early 1980s – in favor of a protracted conventional war strategy that once again elevated the importance of logistics and of interdicting enemy sea lines.\textsuperscript{124} By then, however, the Maritime Strategy had given the US Navy its new direction and purpose while the SLOC debate, from the intelligence perspective, was a settled matter.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{121} Ford and Rosenberg, Admirals’ Advantage, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{123} Alexander MacLeod, ‘Admiral’s Warning: Soviet Navy Threatens Sea Lanes’, Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 1979, p. 3.
Conclusion

Naval experts in the West expected *Okean*-80, the next in the series of Soviet Navy’s global maneuvers held in the spring every five years, to occur in April 1980. Bill Manthorpe speculated on its potential impact in *Proceedings* in December 1979:

> As a report to the leadership—especially a leadership which has been extraordinarily generous with the navy and one which will probably be gone before the next Okean and by a commander in chief who himself may also be gone five years hence—*Okean*-80 has great significance as the concluding exercise of an era in Russian/Soviet naval history. For that reason alone, it will undoubtedly be larger in number of participating units and more worldwide in extent than any of its predecessors. Such an exercise would be designed to demonstrate clearly the new levels of blue-water strength and long-range capability which the current leadership has provided.

Manthorpe anticipated that the next *Okean* would showcase the new sea- and land-based air power capabilities provided by the *Kiev*-class carrier and the *Backfire* bomber. Improvements in open-ocean ASW capabilities would also feature prominently, he wrote, as well as confirmation of the place of the anti-SLOC mission in future plans. Manthorpe accurately forecast the changing of the old guard in the Kremlin within the next five years, especially the departure of Admiral Gorshkov at the end of 1985. However, all of Manthorpe’s other questions about the Soviet Navy’s current and future force employment and doctrine would remain unanswered. As *Proceedings* magazine went to press, the world suddenly changed.

*Okean* in 1975 would be the last of its kind. Another Soviet naval global exercise did not take place in the spring of 1980—nor in 1985, or thereafter. The Iranian Revolution that culminated in the US embassy hostage crisis in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the next month, were seismic events in world affairs. The region suddenly became a much more dangerous place with crises ashore. In April 1980, ‘54 US and Soviet warships [were] warily watching each other in the Indian Ocean’. It was an environment where many types of engagement were possible. The US and Soviet Union had recently squared off in the 1980 Winter Olympics, and a Russian IL-38 *May* antisubmarine aircraft out of Aden signaled its congratulations to the American ships in the Arabian Sea for the US hockey gold

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medal in the ‘Miracle on Ice’. However, given this close proximity of these forces, and the Soviet concentration on the land power campaign in Afghanistan, it is likely that the Soviet Union did not want the distraction and to appear provocative as a sea power with another global exercise like Okean.

The Soviet display of naval power in 1975, choreographed by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, was a microcosm of the larger rivalry and its impact was significant. For the USSR, it signaled Gorshkov’s continued success in his navy becoming an integral part of Russian identity as a modern sea power. Okean was not a ‘terminal point’, as Bruce Watson observed, ‘of the Soviet naval buildup for the last 20 years, but [an] indication of progress made thus far’. For the US, the exercise provided those naval thought leaders with something tangible to point to in the debates over the threats from surprise attack, the vulnerability of Western SLOCs, and a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In light of the dramatic changes that took place in the US Navy after 1980, Okean also marked an inflection point, after which the US responded to the Soviet naval threat on a scale that no one, including Gorshkov, could have anticipated.

127 Cooley.
128 Watson and Walton, p. 97.

The threat to the security of our country from the oceans loomed ever larger. Could the Soviet Union, faced with such a threat, agree with the age-old dominance of the seas and oceans of the Western maritime powers….? Of course not!

- Admiral Sergei Gorshkov¹

Admiral Gorshkov’s influence upon American naval thought peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In his role of architect of the Soviet Navy, many commentators in the West detected a grand design in his words and actions. For over a decade, the Okean global maneuvers, qualitative improvements in the Red Fleet, expansion of naval presence into the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, and his prolific writings indicated that Gorshkov was fulfilling his promise after the Cuban Missile Crisis to challenge American mastery of the seas. His reputation as a great naval leader and strategic thinker of the 20th century also further distorted perceptions of the Soviet naval threat in the US.

The publication of The Sea Power of the State, Gorshkov’s treatise on sea power for the nuclear submarine age, provided justification for a more balanced high-seas fleet for his domestic readership. The 1976 book envisioned the navy as an integral part of a greater Soviet maritime push into the World Ocean that would enhance its economic and political power in service to communist ideology. For external audiences, the book offered a presumed blueprint for Soviet state policy on sea power. Many took away the message that this future included domination of the oceans, even though Gorshkov himself decried the ‘imperialist’ pursuit of such a goal throughout history. On the purely naval side, his theoretical framework of ‘fleet versus shore’ and ‘fleet versus fleet’ as well as his discussion of command of the sea provided valuable insights into the current state of the navy chief’s thinking and the desired end-state for his navy from a skeptical Kremlin.

**Gorshkov’s Grand Design**

In 1978, a student at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London took a novel approach to ‘knowing the enemy’. The future setting for his essay was Admiral Gorshkov’s 70th birthday party in February 1980 aboard the cruiser Azov in the Black Sea.

Sea. The Father of the Modern Soviet Navy was surrounded by his fellow flag officers. As the vodka flowed, he gave a candid, ‘naval ears only’ speech that was vintage – and completely hypothetical – Gorshkov. The speech was both a history lesson and a pep talk on why the Soviet Union needed a navy worthy of its superpower status, while also recognizing everything they had thus far achieved in becoming a powerful ocean-going navy. Yet his words also revealed an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the Americans that still pervaded the Russian naval psyche.

The crux of Gorshkov’s imagined remarks was how his grand design resulted in ‘misconceptions’ in the West. Foremost was the mistaken belief that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the primary catalyst for the transformation. Instead, Gorshkov had pushed for submarine and ship construction to counter the Polaris and carrier threat as part of a forward deployed strategy long before the confrontation in the Caribbean. Expansion of the merchant and fishing fleets, he noted, was also part of the long-range plan to enhance Soviet sea power and thereby ‘offset imperialist influence’ around the globe. Gorshkov also looked forward to another Okean in a few months to show the Soviet Navy’s ‘outstanding operational ability’ so that their credibility could not be called into question. Finally, he confessed his frustration from fighting the Soviet establishment over ‘the relevance of a maritime strategy’. He stated: ‘We must persuade our comrades, whose dogmatic, entrenched and narrow views on sea power do them no credit, that a modern, well balanced and effective fleet remains an essential element in the prosecution of war….’

This exercise in red thinking illustrated the nature of threat perception – the analytical zeitgeist – by the late ‘70s. The causes and timing of Soviet naval developments was one area in which earlier misperceptions were slowly being addressed. The American media cultivated the idea, since at least 1968, that the Cuban Missile Crisis caused the Soviet Navy’s sudden appearance around the world. However, Michael MccGwire and a host of other experts had been debunking this idea since the early 1970s with some success. ‘Contrary to popular myth’, New York

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3 Ibid., pp. 113-114.
4 Ibid., pp. 118-120.
Times defence correspondent Drew Middleton wrote in 1975, ‘it was not the Soviet reverse in the Cuban missile crisis that stimulated Russian naval expansion….’

Admiral Gorshkov’s writings provided many Western observers with compelling evidence that there was a sophisticated intellectual framework behind the rapid naval development and expanding presence missions in the 1960s, and, in particular, that they could divine Gorshkov’s own motivations. He was not merely responding to events and reacting to the US Navy, but also taking pro-active steps to bolster the security and status of the Soviet Union. Yet thanks to the closed Soviet system, communist propaganda, and Gorshkov’s purposeful ambiguity in his writings, interpretations of his intentions continued to be hotly debated and easily manipulated. A key argument was whether Gorshkov’s writings were works of authority or advocacy – essentially reflecting a grand design that was already in progress (and doctrinally sanctioned) or one that he sought to implement by settling internal debates.

Not everyone claimed to see or understand Gorshkov’s plan. Defence analyst and academic Michael Klare wrote that, contrary to what many Western analysts and news headlines claimed, Gorshkov’s writings did not constitute a ‘master plan’ to dominate the oceans. Nonetheless, they signaled a serious political challenge at sea to Western ‘hegemony’ in the Third World. In a sign of similar confusion in British naval thinking on the Soviet Navy, an author in Naval Review confessed:

Even when I try to think like a Russian, I find it extremely difficult to establish a fully coherent reason for the shape and balance of the Russian Navy - to establish any grand design. Indeed I begin to feel that maybe there is no grand design - that the Russian Navy is, like other large organisations, subject to many different pressure groups, each of which presses to establish primacy for its own particular specialisation.

Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till also questioned the assumption of a master plan. ‘Perhaps on the contrary, the Soviet Navy is just rolling along in a directionless way with a bureaucratic and technological momentum of its own. Maybe the Russians do not know the exact purposes of their Navy any better than we do….’ These British experts conceded that this recognition of a navy that was just ‘happening’ did not

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7 Klare, pp. 92, 167.
impact the severity of the Soviet naval threat to Western interests, nor did it provide any insight into how to better understand it or correctly respond to it.9

Discussions of Admiral Gorshkov over the years invariably praised his leadership and foresight. Analysts often called him the ‘architect’ of the Cold War Soviet Navy – a term that cast him as the designer of a process or a strategy over which he had a significant degree of control.10 Yet the existence of a grand design was still in question until better defined as a matter of control, vision, or more correctly, a combination of the two. Indeed, Russian naval scholars later proved more clear-eyed about Gorshkov’s legacy and its consequences compared to their American counterparts.11 One provocative view declared that, ‘to call Gorshkov a “visionary” and confer on his actions a kind of mystical weight is probably not appropriate. He was simply the kind of man – undoubtedly smart, shrewd and cautious – that the USSR’s military-political leadership needed as Commander-in-Chief of the navy at the time’.12

Russians also remained skeptical as to how much control Gorshkov had over his naval force structure in a centrally planned Soviet economy that was driven by the military-industrial complex’s shipbuilding targets in the five year plans. There was also the matter of the firmly entrenched bias for land over naval forces in the Ministry of Defence that Gorshkov never fully overcame. Nor was he the dominant voice or driving force for his entire tenure as head of the Soviet Navy. According to an authoritative naval history from the post-Soviet era, Gorshkov only reached the height of his power in the 1970s before his influence waned and disappeared by the later 1980s:

‘Only at the end of the third period [Start of 1960’s – start of 1970’s] did the effect of Admiral of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov, which in the fourth period [Start of 1970’s – middle of 1980’s] dominated in spite of attempts at actions by the leadership in the form of [Minister of Defence] Marshal D. F. Ustinov, start to show up. The fifth period [Middle of the 1980’s to 1991] was characterized by the absence of

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9 Ranft and Till, p. 11.
12 Chernyavskii, p. 302.
Admiral Gorshkov’s patience, political acumen, and personal ties to key Kremlin figures played a large role in his success. His longevity in office convinced some American naval leaders and experts that he had a definite advantage in designing his naval force – especially over his rival, the chief of naval operations. A Naval War College Review article in 1977 noted of Gorshkov’s more than twenty years in command: ‘This extraordinarily long tour has yielded the Soviet Navy unique stability in the design and operation of its ships, weapons and planes. Western admirals are fortunate if the ships designed on their watch are operational under their immediate successors. Some ships launched and operated by Gorshkov have, by contrast, served a full 20-year term and now move into obsolescence’. However, to hold such a view, the writer had to overlook the years in which Nikita Khrushchev forced an unbalanced fleet of predominately submarines on Gorshkov, as well as false starts such as the Moskva-class carriers that were inadequately prepared to counter a growing Polaris/Poseidon threat. In other words, even if Admiral Gorshkov had the control or vision, it did not always work out to the Soviet Navy’s advantage over the West.

The perception of Gorshkov’s effortlessly operating within a compliant Soviet system and running rings around US in shipbuilding persisted at the highest levels, especially that multi-year building programmes meant that ‘he is running the store himself’. The Secretary of the Navy lamented in 1975:

The leader of the Soviet Navy has a much easier job [than his American counterparts]. First of all he doesn’t have the stop and go funding for his research and development programs. He can decide where his [Research & Development] money is going to be spent and embark on a major program to spend it. […] In shipbuilding, once he sets a course, he can stick to it without having to worry about cost overruns, cutbacks or what have you.

Other Western observers looking at the same period saw naval developments that were beyond Gorshkov’s control and clearly not part of any design. The Soviet

13 Kuzin and Nikolskiy, p. 17.
Navy was, regardless of Gorshkov’s remarks about a ‘balanced fleet’ and satisfaction with its progress, a force that was stretched thin operationally and still badly needed ships for all its missions in the mid-1970s. Michael MccGwire argued that the lack of political support for an increase of surface ships, in particular, in shipbuilding programmes acted as a ‘physical constraint’ on Soviet naval power.\textsuperscript{17} A 1979 article in the \textit{Naval War College Review}, citing MccGwire, came to the conclusion ‘[t]hat the Soviet Navy has, for the most part, failed in its effort to obtain a larger allocation of resources suggests its internal political weaknesses’.\textsuperscript{18}

Yet even this declaration proved premature as the West soon discovered that the Soviet Union, based on successful Gorshkov’s lobbying, was on the eve of launching what appeared to be its largest aircraft carrier to-date – approved at the 1976 party congress for the next five-year plan.\textsuperscript{19} There was a lag between the interpretations of changes in Soviet naval thinking and the secretive building programmes. Thus, Western perceptions of the threat could never quite keep pace with actual Soviet naval developments toward a balanced high-seas fleet. More recent assessments of the legacy of Admiral Gorshkov by experts paint yet another picture. They conclude that internally, Gorshkov got everything that he wanted from the Soviet system during his naval build-up after Khrushchev’s departure – including carriers, nuclear cruisers, more advanced submarines – without having to give up much in return, budget-wise. Thus, he was quite satisfied with the internal response to his grand design.\textsuperscript{20}

Such contradictory conclusions also stemmed from a lack of in-depth knowledge about how the Soviet Union made its naval policy and Gorshkov’s role in the decision making process. The debates over the authoritativeness of Gorshkov’s writings were illustrative of this uncertainty. There was also an element of domestic political messaging in the 1970s that American naval leaders needed to be more empowered by strategy and less constrained by budgets to respond to the growing threat. Views swung between Gorshkov as the total master of naval developments on the one hand, or that he could control very little of the Red Navy’s fate on the other. ‘One thing is for certain though – naval policy is not decided the way we do it in the

\textsuperscript{19} Kuzin and Nikolskiy, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{20} Discussion with Norman Polmar, 3 July 2018.
West’, remarked Geoffrey Till. ‘Gorshkov is not a Soviet Zumwalt. Individuals, even quite senior ones like Admiral Gorshkov, are not so important there as they are in the West. Soviet naval people operate in an area where independent analysis and thought is tightly constrained’. It is also worth noting that Zumwalt did not see himself as an American Gorshkov and frequently praised the Soviet navy chief for his accomplishments – even acknowledging him as the ‘most effective naval leader in modern times’.22

It proved important to differentiate between Gorshkov the man/leader/writer and the Soviet naval and political system in which he operated. Experts and laymen alike were often blinded by Gorshkov’s achievements and his writings to what was truly credible about the threat. Notably, a retired vice admiral, Gerald E. Miller, former commander of both the Second and Sixth Fleets, provided one of the more insightful assessments of Gorshkov as well as the biases and the inflation associated with threat perception. According to his 1978 evaluation, ‘Admiral Gorshkov is probably the outstanding naval officer in modern times. He has convinced his country of the value of seapower. […] The overall Soviet naval system, however, must be suspect’. Miller specifically meant the untested nature of the Soviet Navy’s combat proficiency and individual initiative.23 Miller concluded that the ‘Soviet naval threat cannot now be pictured as totally realistic, but neither can it be considered a figment of parochial imaginations.24 Miller’s observation echoed a famous quote about Russia variously attributed to Talleyrand, Metternich, Bismarck, and Churchill: ‘Russia is never as strong as she looks, nor as weak as she looks’.

The paeans to Gorshkov revealed an aspect to the American naval psyche by the mid-1970s coming out of the Vietnam War that reflected a low point of readiness and morale as well as fears for the future. The same sea service that produced fighting admirals such as Nimitz and Halsey in the earlier 20th century felt hobbled and disadvantaged to a rival that paled by comparison of its combat experience and its pantheon of wartime leaders. The Navy also acutely felt the void of a strategic thinker that could champion sea power with such authority.

24 Ibid., p. 56.
To be sure, there is no doubt of the mark Admiral Gorshkov left on his once coastal-bound navy as a result of his decades-long vision. He achieved an oceanic strategy that radically changed Soviet naval thinking and the course of Cold War history. However, his results would not survive his retirement in 1985 and the end of Soviet Union shortly thereafter. Whatever design there was proved ultimately flawed in terms of its expense (i.e., the impact on the struggling Soviet economy as a whole) and sustainability. Just as larger surface platforms appeared – such as the large deck Riga-class (later Kuznetsov-class) carrier and the Ivan Rogov-class amphibious ships that could further transform the Soviet Navy – world events and his opponents inside and outside the Soviet Navy overtook Gorshkov’s final plans. The definitive history in Russian noted that, '[i]n the ideological regard S. G. Gorshkov left behind only executors (extremely inconsistent) of his designs…. Gorshkov was not able to create the main thing – the mechanism for protecting the navy against political fluctuations'. A naval reserve officer foreshadowed this eventual outcome in his 1977 primer on Gorshkov’s book: ‘The admiral realizes that the importance of seapower and of a navy is not a constant either in Russian history or in the dialectical march of events. He fears that one day history may have no use for his splendid machine’.

Admiral Gorshkov was the Red Fleet’s chief advocate for decades as he tried to mitigate the ‘political fluctuations’ of an inherently hostile Soviet regime and to project an image of strength to the Americans. According to a CIA analysis at the end of the Gorshkov era, '[his] writings indicate that carving out a major role for the new Soviet Navy required constant efforts to shape the attitudes of the political leadership'. The US Navy labeled these promotion efforts ‘salesmanship’ and recognized its consequences:

The statement has been made that the Soviets are achieving a political and psychological impact with their maritime forces far out of proportion to their size and capabilities. This is believed due to often exaggerated descriptions of Soviet naval capabilities published in the West.

Not surprisingly, the same adjective-filled descriptions are trumpeted by the Soviet press and, probably of more significance, by the press of

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26 Kuzin and Nikolskiy, p. 29.
Naval intelligence assessed that Admiral Gorshkov took advantage of the situation by amplifying American threat inflation while minimizing his own weaknesses against a superior naval force to exert control over perceptions.

Gorshkov’s overarching goal was a balanced, high-seas fleet that ultimately included super carriers for power projection. To that end, he followed a discernable template based on three principles when marketing his strategic ideas at home and abroad. First, any philosophy on sea power must first be grounded in history. Gorshkov needed to build a case for Russia as a great maritime nation from quite modest origins – unlike Alfred Thayer Mahan’s embarrassment of riches with the history of the Royal Navy and British sea power that built a global empire. As a review of Gorshkov’s book noted, ‘[h]e gets little help from the Red Navy's history, because by and large it is a minefield of disasters. Even the most patient researcher cannot find the Russian equivalents of Trafalgar and Coral Sea, of Nimitz and Jacky Fisher, or de Grasse and von Hipper’.

While limited by his choices, Gorshkov used his historical cases – and examples of 18th century commanders such as Ushakov – to good effect in his argument for the unique course that the Soviet Union must chart as a sea power and one that was also consistent with Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet doctrine. He declared that, ‘[h]istory patently confirmed that without a strong fleet Russia could not take its place among the great powers’. These history lessons that puzzled most readers were actually key rhetorical devices that military authors such as Gorshkov never used ‘history for its own sake’. These past events were instead ‘direct analogues for the current situation’ and made arguments through latent content that would not overtly challenge Soviet doctrine or other errors in Kremlin thinking.

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32 Gorshkov, Sea Power, p. 66.
Second, Gorshkov’s emphasis on ‘naval art’ – the naval component of that particular Soviet fixation, operational art, that spanned operations at sea on tactical, operational, and strategic levels – meant that naval power must be firmly grounded in theory. Gorshkov also focused on putting Soviet naval developments and the USSR’s growth as a maritime nation into a larger framework of immutable military doctrine and nuclear war planning to carve out a greater strategic role for the navy. He feared any further downgrading of the Soviet Navy’s position and missions within the Soviet military hierarchy. Gorshkov made his case most strongly for the wartime missions of long-range strike operations against the enemy’s territory and amphibious operations – an area chronically neglected Soviet army strategists – in an umbrella concept he termed ‘fleet against shore’ in his later works.\footnote{Gorshkov, Sea Power, pp. 213-21.}

Finally, Gorshkov grasped the optics of sea power and that ideas are best illustrated with powerful images, such as the Okean exercises. Like many sea power advocates before him, he believed that navies were symbols of great power status and should be used as a policy instrument. An impressive Soviet warship in a foreign port did not raise the same alarms as Soviet tanks or missiles showing up in distant lands. Sailors also served as ‘ambassadors’ to the Third World in their port calls, according to Gorshkov: ‘Friendly visits by Soviet seamen offer the opportunity to the peoples of the countries visited to see for themselves the creativity of socialist principles in our country […] In our ships they see the achievements of Soviet science, technology and industry’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 252.} Moreover, navies with a transoceanic reach were an excellent, albeit tremendously expensive, way to coerce allies with gunboat diplomacy and confound adversaries through presence patrols. Gorshkov proved to be a master of both outcomes – most likely, by design.

**Reading The Sea Power of the State**

In his role of author, Admiral Gorshkov offered the ideological underpinning that perpetuated the notion of a grand design. Gorshkov’s presumed blueprint came with the publication of *The Sea Power of the State* in 1976. He was making the case for a unique path for Soviet sea power that did not mimic the American or Royal navies, past or present. ‘A fleet cannot be built by blindly copying its composition and organization from some blueprint, be this the blueprint of the fleet of the mightiest
state’, he wrote. The Sea Power of the State offered signs about the form that the unique blueprint was taking. Three overlapping spheres of the book’s influence were its immediate impact, interpretations of its content, and assumptions of its authoritativeness. Taken together, these explained the book’s contribution to the larger debate over the future of the Soviet Navy.

In the book, Gorshkov offered his vision of Russia’s maritime heritage and the Soviet Union’s destiny in which he defined the ‘sea power of the state’ as ‘the capacity of a particular country to use the military-economic possibilities of the ocean for its own purposes’. He took the most expansive view possible of what sea power encompasses, which included naval power and maritime components such as merchant and fishing, as well as scientific-technical fields such as oceanography. Moreover, he emphasized that sea power was an ‘inseparable union’ with the ocean environment. ‘World Ocean’ had become the phrase associated with Gorshkov’s contention that Russians must look beyond their own geographically restricted access via local seas to the open ocean expanses for their national well-being. The term also emphasized that the oceans were a global commons and commodity to be developed by all nations and not just resources to be exploited by ‘imperialist’ powers.

The Sea Power of the State appeared on Moscow bookstalls in early February 1976. The timing of a few weeks before the Communist Party’s 25th Congress strongly suggested an influence campaign directed at the Kremlin to justify a continued costly investment in the Soviet Navy. Gorshkov’s remarks to the party congress also trumpeted the success of the massive Okean exercise the previous year to further drive home his point. The timing proved compelling evidence to those who saw the book as an advocacy message about the strategic importance of the Soviet Navy meant to emphasize the need to keep funding a balanced fleet – i.e., for both ‘philosophic and budgetary’ purposes. The run of 60,000 copies from the official military publisher also signaled, according to a Naval War College analysis, a desire to reach a larger audience than the usual military readership. The hundreds of

36 Ibid., p. 59.
37 Ibid., p. ix.
39 Gorshkov, ‘Greeting’.  
copies that made their way to the West ‘indicate[d] the Soviet Government wants the book read and understood’.41

Admiral Gorshkov’s *magnum opus* joined a crowded market of titles by Soviet military luminaries, including Marshal Andrei Grechko’s *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* in 1974 and naval hero Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov’s *On Course to Victory*, published in 1975 for the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II. Grechko’s book declared that, ‘[t]he Navy has emerged from coastal waters and closed seas and mastered the expanses of the World Ocean. It has everything it needs for the simultaneous and prolonged conduct of combat operations on the oceans and seas’.42 Gorshkov clearly thought differently and responded with his own book to show that the Soviet Navy continued to be under-valued and under-resourced.

The intersection of history and politics also motivated Gorshkov to write with a view to the future for the ‘general reader’—specifically on ‘the importance of the oceans for the future development of our country and world civilization’. He later recalled that, ‘[s]erious attention had to be given to the popularization of our Navy, to increasing the prestige of naval service for the younger generations, to the heroic past, especially as the experience of the Great Patriotic War is now receding into the depths of history’.43

The war’s veterans were also fading away and the publication had added significance in its timing and perhaps Gorshkov’s sense of urgency, as one American reviewer put it, to ‘leave the decks clean’.44 Grechko, a grudging ally of Gorshkov’s global aspirations since 1967, died in April 1976 and his replacement as Minister of Defence, Marshal Dimitri Ustinov, was not initially a supporter of the ambitious plans for the next generation of Soviet carriers – i.e., to make them nuclear-powered with steam catapult technology.45

It was during this pivotal transition period that Gorshkov published his book. Because of this changing of the guard, Geoffrey Till noted that, ‘[q]uite a few analysts even saw the book as Gorshkov’s last will and testament and looked for puffs of smoke coming from the chimneys of Moscow’s main naval headquarters which would

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42 Quoted in Ranft and Till, p. 76.
43 Gorshkov, *Vo Flotskom Stroiu*, p. 197.
45 Kuzin and Nikolskiy, p. 156; Lovett, p. 246.
signify Gorshkov's going out to pasture’. Till’s analogy was perhaps an apt one, even if rumors of Gorshkov’s imminent retirement proved greatly exaggerated. A former US naval officer writing on the authority debate also complained of ‘… the penchant of many Western analysts to give the Admiral’s writings the finality of a papal bull, and thus deduce precisely the future course of the Soviet Navy….’

*The Sea Power of the State* was certainly Gorshkov’s own philosophy on sea power, although a number of experts at the time presumed the book to be the collective writing effort of a number of noted theoreticians. Later Russian military literature confirmed this suspicion by stating that ‘…some leading naval experts and scientists contribut[ed] to it’. Gorshkov credits, among others, Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo and Captain First Rank N. P. V’yunenko in the introduction and both likely ghostwrote a number of his articles over the years. Nor was it an entirely new work. The largest section on naval history – a third of its 300 pages in the later English translation – came almost directly from his earlier ‘Navies in War and Peace’ series in *Morskoi Sbornik*. German naval officer and historian Jürgen Rohwer cautioned readers in the US professional literature not to treat Gorshkov as a historian by focusing on his mistakes and falsehoods. Instead, they should carefully look to what he chose to say and the evidence he presented, because these examples are ‘presumably important clues to his own notions about politico-military matters and naval strategy. Possibly they can give us some insight into the change in the concepts that lie behind the most recent Soviet naval buildup’.

Gorshkov’s sea power thesis had three versions in the 1970s from which the US could gain insights. The original version debuted in his article series in 1972-73, when he first introduced the unique role of naval power in bolstering the Soviet Union’s national security, foreign policy, and economic development. Gorshkov further refined his thesis in *The Sea Power of the State*’s new sections, where he...

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50 Published in English in Gorshkov, *Red Star Rising*.
52 Ibid., p. 173.
introduced all the elements of sea power and expanded the concept into the commercial and scientific realms with pages of charts and maps to support his views. Gorshkov’s inclusion of the ocean environment (especially pollution) and the importance of maritime law, while hypocritical to Western readers, were undeniably forward-looking topics in a product of the rigid and repressive Soviet system. However, it was his discussion of the challenges of modern naval warfare and balancing fleets in the new section, ‘Problems in Naval Art’, and the window into Soviet intentions that were of the greatest interest in the West. The third and final version of his thesis came with the revised second edition of *The Sea Power of the State* in 1979.

Gorshkov surely realized that his book would eventually reach a wider American audience, yet he refused to talk about it with Captain Ronald Kurth, the US naval attaché in Moscow. Kurth – a naval aviator, fluent Russian speaker, and future president of the Naval War College (1987-90) – recalled: ‘He knew, I am quite sure, what discussion I would pursue: how can you develop your ambition for a naval presence on the world’s oceans and have a balanced fleet without tactical naval aviation, that is, aircraft carriers’. Thus, even though there was incremental movement toward ever-larger carriers, with more changes on the near horizon, Gorshkov was not prepared to openly acknowledge any shift in the Soviet position to adopting the American approach to aviation at sea. It was likely because the contentious decision was still being internally debated or was in the final approval stages, as analysts had already detected Gorshkov’s obliquely arguing for strike carriers. Thus, the subject remained a one-way channel of communication and the US Navy continued its speculation on the Soviet carrier question.

Admiral Gorshkov directed several key points toward American readers of his book. First, he wanted to underscore that the Soviet Union had a legitimate right to have an ocean-going navy as a major sea power. He again cited President Nixon’s 1970 comment that the USSR as a land power had different needs than the US – with the implication that any more navy than was deemed necessary in Western eyes must

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54 Kurth, p. 272.
be for aggressive purposes.\textsuperscript{56} Gorshkov was indignant over the lack of respect given to a Russian navy that was automatically accorded to other navies throughout history – especially to the American navy that, in his view, abused its power by fighting local wars of imperialism.\textsuperscript{57} Through his writings and actions such as the \textit{Okean} exercises, Gorshkov repeatedly sought recognition both home and abroad for Russian naval abilities, not just from the destructive capabilities of its weapons.

However, it was his second message that was of greater significance and garnered the most attention. More than once, Gorshkov warned Americans that the oceans that had once shielded their country for centuries were now the source of their greatest danger and their ‘weakest defensive link’.\textsuperscript{58} He reiterated the vulnerability of US territory to nuclear strikes from the sea if the US attacked the Soviet Union. ‘Today, all the apologists of imperialism are faced with the immutable truth that no ocean will protect an aggressor country from the strike of strategic nuclear missile forces launched from any area of the oceans or from another continent’.\textsuperscript{59} Yet even this threat was standard fare from his annual Navy Day messages in \textit{Pravda} aimed at ‘imperialists’ – that ‘his fleets can attack any point on the globe with nuclear missiles’ – since the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{60} The reminder was a key part of Gorshkov’s dual posture of proclaiming a defensive stance while also emphasizing the Soviet Navy’s strategic strike capabilities.

Gorshkov made the equally important – but less emphasized – point that the vast continental expanse that had thwarted earlier invasions of his motherland had vanished. The USSR also faced an existential risk in the Cold War: ‘no longer could Russia hide behind space’ thanks to the US nuclear triad.\textsuperscript{61} As such, the Soviet Navy needed to recapture strategic time and space by extending the traditional defensive perimeter several thousand miles out to sea. Gorshkov put it simply in \textit{The Sea Power of the State}: ‘Our country has built a modern fleet and sent it out into the ocean to support our state interests in order to reliably defend itself from attack from the vast ocean sectors’.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{56} Gorshkov, \textit{Sea Power}, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 234-44.
\textsuperscript{59} Gorshkov, \textit{Sea Power}, p. 271. See also p. 61, 162, and 246.
\textsuperscript{60} Associated Press, ‘Red Navy Commander’.
\textsuperscript{61} Lovett, p. 238; Gorshkov, \textit{Sea Power}, pp. x, 4.
An appreciation of the Soviet Union’s strategic dilemma and solution often went unacknowledged by most experts and the public. However, by 1980, even Elmo Zumwalt, who had often painted a one-sided picture of an offensive-minded Soviet Navy, conceded that Gorshkov had first embarked on a forward deployment strategy to expand his defensive perimeter to cope with nuclear weapons.\(^63\) Indeed, Zumwalt began to sound somewhat more like Michael MccGwire, whose views remained controversial and not widely accepted. By the mid-1970s, MccGwire was a scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington, where he continued to write in American naval publications on the central importance of forward deployment to meet the American naval threat as the cornerstone of Soviet strategy for nearly two decades.\(^64\)

The initial public reactions in the US to *The Sea Power of the State* focused on its more menacing passages and thus were alarmist and even conspiratorial in tone. The newspaper story, ‘Soviets Publish Blueprint for America's Destruction’, declared that Gorshkov had for the first time labeled the US as the ‘enemy’. Moreover, his new book contained ‘Russia's designs for emerging victorious in a war with “imperialism”’.\(^65\) The story highlighted Gorshkov’s conclusion that the creation of the blue water missile fleet was ‘an outstanding event which has shattered the illusions of the imperialist aggressors that they had no strong opponent in the sphere of naval warfare’ and was a historic event on par with the creation of atomic weapons.\(^66\) This early press report also took the American government’s lack of immediate comment as an ominous sign. ‘Pentagon officials, who have been stressing the growing strength of the Soviet navy in comparison to the decline of US seapower, have seemed almost conspiratory in their silence on Gorshkov's grand design for conquest and the effect it might have on the US naval shipbuilding program’.\(^67\)

While the Navy and other policy makers digested the implications of Gorshkov’s book, members of Congress reacted more forcefully. Defence hawks took the book as vindication for previous warnings on the threat. Bob Wilson, a Republican congressman on the House Armed Services Committee representing the

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\(^63\) Zumwalt, ‘Gorshkov and His Navy’, p. 504.

\(^64\) MccGwire, ‘Rationale’, pp. 161, 163. For the influence of MccGwire, see Booth, Daniel, Herman, and others.


\(^67\) Cooper.
Navy enclave of San Diego, entered the aforementioned article into the *Congressional Record* in September 1976. He remarked:

> Mr. Speaker, for years I have been alarmed by the increased buildup of the Soviet fleet and the concurrent decline in the number of ships in our own Navy. According to San Diego Union Military Affairs Editor Kip Cooper's article in the August 22 issue of the newspaper, my concern has not been without foundation.

I have said that the Russian increase in their navy went far beyond that necessary to protect her shores and her international trade, and indeed, portions of Russian naval chief Adm. Sergei Gorshkov's book, as quoted by Mr. Cooper, bear me out. I commend Mr. Cooper's article to all my colleagues as another hint of what the Soviet Union has in mind for the United States of America.68

Another media story that received wide coverage was the syndicated column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak that waded directly into the authority versus advocacy as well as the arms control debate. The duo wrote that Gorshkov as ‘architect’ had ‘… drafted a frightening blueprint that for the first time publicly projects Soviet naval power “to effectively utilize the world ocean in the interest of building Communism” in direct contradiction of détente. […] While contradicting official Kremlin policy, his grand strategy is viewed by officials here as an accurate mirror of Kremlin designs’.69

Evans and Novak further explained that the book was intended for internal consumption, thus intelligence experts were using the few copies available in the West to gain a ‘rare glimpse of inner Soviet strategy’. They also prematurely declared the analytical debate settled: the book was an authoritative work ‘spouting clandestine but official Soviet policy’ and not part of an ongoing debate about the role of the Soviet Navy. ‘The menace to the United States has now been made explicit’, they wrote. ‘Mix Gorshkov’s fearsome naval potion with the quixotic brew of détente and the result could be deadly for the West’.70

The column’s ominous interpretation caught the attention of Robert Taft Jr from Ohio. He proclaimed on the Senate floor in July 1976 that the rival Soviets had learned well from Mahan that ‘control of the sea is the sine qua non to control of

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69 Evans and Novak.
70 Ibid.
everything else’ and was the reason behind their naval buildup. Taft further listed the Soviet advantages over the US, especially in naval thought:

The Soviet Union, a land power by history and by nature, today seems to show a better understanding of the vital importance of seapower than does the United States, a country by nature a maritime nation. The Soviet Navy outnumbers ours; the Soviets are building ships faster than we are; many of the Soviet ships are individually often more capable than their American counterparts; and Soviet naval concepts are thoroughly up to date, where ours seem to reflect the thinking of 30 years ago. Now, thanks to Admiral Gorshkov, it is clear what the Soviets intend to do with their impressive naval capability. 71

While Gorshkov’s intentions were clear to those who sought to portray an offensive-minded adversary, the Soviet navy chief’s unprecedented move to publish his views on sea power did not immediately settle the matter. His book appeared at the height of the post-Vietnam debates over US weaknesses in the face of a growing Soviet threat and expansive moves around the globe that contradicted the gains made in détente and arms control. For many, the book provided validation of long-standing fears over the erosion of American naval supremacy and fueled the heated political debates over the need for a 600-ship navy to counter Gorshkov’s naval strategy. 72 Evans and Novak noted, ‘for the first time, that strategy emerges vividly with propaganda wraps stripped away, raising obvious implications for the current debate over US naval construction’. 73 Another columnist countered: ‘Admiral Gorshkov, of course, didn’t write his treaties to warn us of danger, nor to help [Chief of Naval Operations] Admiral Holloway get more ships from a stingy Congress’. 74 Nonetheless, Holloway’s testimony before Congress on the US Navy’s subsequent fiscal year budgets did, in fact, make extensive use of the views in Gorshkov’s book. 75

Even though The Sea Power of the State was a full-throated defence of sea power, Americans focused only on the big navy implications. Retired Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence in the late 1980s, recently noted:

Western naval circles immediately seized upon the wording [of all his writings] as threatening and saw an opportunity to use Gorshkov’s words to justify larger naval budgets. Whether or not they properly

72 Hattendorf, Evolution, p. 9.
75 See February 1977 posture statement excerpts reprinted in USND, 3rd edn, pp. 66-68.
understood his writings or the true context of his strategy or his words, the incendiary-sounding statements were there and portrayed a growing naval threat. They were regularly excerpted and used to justify larger navy budgets.\textsuperscript{76}

Of course, Brooks observed, Admiral Gorshkov also used the American naval threat and his own growing fame in the Western press to continue building his own blue water navy. ‘So, curiously, Gorshkov’s writings justified larger US naval expenditures while US Navy and other western writings […] helped him justify his budgets’.\textsuperscript{77} Like his showy \textit{Okean} exercise, American reactions were a report card to the Kremlin that their reluctant investment in the Soviet Navy was paying big dividends, according to Brooks.

The US Navy’s reaction, by that standard, likely did not disappoint Gorshkov. Admiral Holloway, with the support of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, testified that the current fleet of 480 ships needed expanding to 600 ships to maintain maritime superiority over Soviet Navy.\textsuperscript{78} However, the plan faced a number of critics wielding their own alternate studies and figures – including those by Les Aspin and the Congressional Research Service – who countered that the Soviet Navy’s shipbuilding programmes were stabilizing and that Gorshkov faced his own block obsolescence problem in coming years.\textsuperscript{79} Aspin, a long-time foe of increased naval spending and former Pentagon systems analyst, argued that defence intelligence estimates on Soviet shipbuilding had a track record of overestimations while, in fact, the Navy had classified studies that showed the adverse naval trends of recent years were being reversed. ‘We are being asked to spend billions on real ships to counter Russian ghost ships – a vast Red Fleet that sails only in the Pentagon’s filing cabinets,’ he charged.\textsuperscript{80}

As always, disputes over size and shape of general purpose forces centered on the need for additional nuclear-powered carriers and the US Navy’s own argument for a balanced fleet based on its sea control and power projection missions. Defence analyst Dov Zakheim authored the Congressional Budget Office study that proved

\textsuperscript{76} Brooks interview and Thomas A. Brooks, Rear Admiral, US Navy (Retired), ‘Gorshkov’s Writings and Senior US Navy Reactions: A Perspective’, (Supplement to interview, 16 June 2018).

\textsuperscript{77} Brooks, ‘The Impact of Gorshkov’s Writings’.


influential in establishing the Navy’s primary mission of convoy escorting – thereby torpedoing the initial proposal for a 600-ship navy. He also anticipated the coming debates over a more aggressive forward strategy in his report: ‘The fundamental issue is whether the United States wishes to buy naval forces designed to approach and attack the USSR or its allies in the face of heavy defenses, or whether we wish instead to concentrate effort on ensuring that we can keep the sealanes open against Soviet opposition’.

The US Navy’s future was also a presidential election-year issue in 1976. Republican challenger Ronald Reagan accused the Ford administration of neglect in the face of a Soviet naval buildup, thereby ‘… riding, and propelling, the general anxiousness about Soviet intentions prevalent today’ according to a press report. President Ford was so shaken by his April primary loss to Reagan in Texas that he soon amended his defence budget request for an additional 16 ships at $1.2 billion. A Pentagon spokesman acknowledged ‘…that the Soviet Naval threat has not changed since January when the Pentagon’s shipbuilding program was presented to Congress’.

Yet later in the year, reactions to Gorshkov’s ‘blueprint for destruction’ raised the issue once again. Because of the high stakes in the election year and the potential impact on force structure, senior naval leaders pointed to the book in their own messaging. Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf II was at the forefront of speaking about the importance of bolstering American sea power in a number of speeches and media coverage. He agreed with Gorshkov’s assertion that the oceanic buffer for the US had vanished and pointed to the Soviet submarine threat. Middendorf warned in a 1975 speech: ‘For the last 200 years the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have been the protective cloak for America … Today this protective cloak is infested with deadly spiders. This very day stealthy Soviet ballistic missile submarines – the “jaws” of Soviet seapower – are on patrol off both our coasts’.

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Middendorf preferred to use specific references and statistics to emphasize the Soviet naval threat. The clearest example was his dramatic use of Gorshkov’s book in his speeches. He called Gorshkov ‘one of the greatest military leaders of all time’ and noted that, ‘Like Mein Kampf, which spelled out Hitler’s intentions, when history of this age is written, Gorshkov’s Sea Power and the State may have been the most prophetic statement over the last part of the Twentieth century’. Middendorf’s exaggerated comparison to Mein Kampf was quoted in American newspapers for the rest of the year – with the implication that tragic consequences could result if these future intentions, like that of Hitler’s infamous book, were ignored.

World War II general and syndicated columnist Ira Eaker agreed with the parallel with Mein Kampf. He called Gorshkov’s book the Soviet plan for destruction of the West that ‘would be headlined in every newspaper in the United States were we not now completely preoccupied with politics’. While an emotional topic among some in Congress and media pundits, the American public was not yet swayed and the Navy quietly shelved most of its 600-ship rhetoric after the election during the less-permissive Carter years to come. As a contemporary history by a naval officer observed, ‘…the voting public did not yet sense that US sea power had sagged to a stage that might be most difficult to redress in the hazardous years ahead. Paradoxically, the Soviet naval commander-in-chief unwittingly was doing his best to alert Americans to that possibility.

It is worth noting that the limited availability of The Sea Power of the State outside the Soviet Union for the first few years contributed to the sensationalized and secretive nature of what was essentially an open source. This unavailability assured that – like Clausewitz and Mahan before him – Gorshkov as a strategist was often quoted, but seldom read. As with all of Gorshkov’s previous writings, there were the additional language barriers and analytical filters. A small number of experts, translators, and reporters selected what they deemed most relevant (or shocking) from

84 Jerome Burke, interviewed by author, 16 June 2017. Burke was a former speechwriter for Secretary Middendorf.
87 Ryan, p. 134.
the full text and shaped perceptions of the book’s content and conveyed Gorshkov’s message to the West.

The British scholarly journal *Survival* reprinted a highly condensed version of *The Sea Power of the State* in early 1977. The 4400-word excerpt initially ran in *The Sunday Times* of London as a ‘short but comprehensive presentation of Gorshkov’s views’. The abridged version made the book accessible to English-speaking readers and has been far more cited over the years than the primary source in Russian. \(^{89}\) It provided Gorshkov’s overarching thesis on modern naval power without all the Marxist references. However, it also diluted Gorshkov’s general views on sea power and removed his historical case studies. Instead, the excerpt emphasized the strategic tasks – conducting and countering nuclear strikes from the sea – of both superpower navies and the central role of submarines and aviation as the ‘chief weapons’. \(^{90}\) Thus, readers of the *Survival* article would think Gorshkov excessively focused on nuclear war in his naval thinking. They would not hear his other cogent arguments about the Soviet Navy’s political role in support of Soviet foreign policy goals, the problems of balancing fleets, and his views on modern navies in limited wars – the fleets in ‘local wars of imperialism’ and peacetime. \(^{91}\)

A more complete picture of the entire book was available within official channels. The US Navy and civilian agencies used government translations, such as one by the Office of Naval Intelligence, of *The Sea Power of the State* for their assessments. \(^{92}\) The book became invaluable reference material and essential professional reading for the US Navy. It was cited repeatedly in future versions of *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments* – the unclassified publication of the Navy’s official views on the Soviet Navy – as evidence of Gorshkov’s remarkable ‘salesmanship’. \(^{93}\) Soviet naval analysts added this unique resource to the multitude of other Soviet writings and other classified and unclassified intelligence in their research. They balanced it against the accuracy of what they observed elsewhere, such

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90 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
93 *USND*, 4th edn, p. 28.
as in exercises and naval building programmes, and noted what had changed since the Gorshkov articles.94

Among the many insights from *The Sea Power of the State*, the ones that commanded the greatest attention dealt with what Gorshkov had to say about strategy and wartime missions. What the US Navy found, not surprisingly, was little information on the current state of the Soviet Navy or its strategy in any detail. Instead, the book argued by historical analogies and touched on more general issues of concern such as the ‘battle of the first salvo’ and interdiction of sea lines of communication. Its inclusion of other concepts led to further questions and confusion among Western analysts. The theoretical framework of ‘fleet against shore’ and ‘fleet against fleet’ was the foremost example.

Gorshkov introduced the naval tasks of ‘fleet against shore’ and ‘fleet against fleet’ in his 1974 Navy Day remarks in *Pravda* and a 1975 article for *Soviet Military Review*.95 In *The Sea Power of the State*, Gorshkov surveyed naval history and declared that the correlation between the two tasks had been fluid and not always clear-cut. Naval operations that directly impacted the fate of land forces like amphibious operations during World War II were of greatest significance, while fleet actions at sea varied in their effect on ‘territorial’ tasks and impact on outcomes of wars. He cited the examples of England’s defeat of the Spanish Armada and the Napoleonic France’s loss at Aboukir Bay as the rare ones that altered the course of land invasions. There were also the anti-shipping campaigns, such as in World War I, that were not active operations against the shore, but independent actions that supported the more pivotal battles on land.96

Gorshkov used these historical references to underscore that the dynamics of naval warfare had changed in the Cold War missile era. The focus of navies had now pivoted from the sea to the shore: ‘… the fight of a fleet against the fleet of an enemy in the new conditions since nuclear weapons have appeared has become a secondary task as compared with the operations of a fleet against the shore’.97 The strategic mission of the ballistic submarine fleet against enemy shores and its military-economic targets could influence both the course and outcome of wars and thus

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97 Ibid., p. 221.
elevated their importance within the Soviet military hierarchy. While the unique strategic role of submarines was obvious to even the most land-locked Soviet marshal, the need for a balanced fleet with more surface forces to protect submarines required much more of Gorshkov’s ‘salesmanship’.

*The Sea Power of the State* provided valuable clues for American analysts on the employment of Soviet naval forces in nuclear and conventional wars. *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments* in 1978 cited Gorshkov’s book and announced that ‘battle against the shore’ was the ‘basic mission’ of the Soviet Navy in both an offensive and defensive sense. It listed Soviet naval missions, using American terms and prioritization, as: ‘(1) strategic offense, (2) maritime security of the Soviet Union, (3) interdiction of sea lines of communication, (4) support of the ground forces, and, in situations short of war, (5) the support of state policy’. Naval officer and scholar James J. Tritten – later Assistant Director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment and a Naval Postgraduate School professor – also made extensive use of the Gorshkov book’s treatment of fleet versus shore to build his case for the Soviet declaratory policy for the strategic employment of the Navy.

Yet mission lists did not easily translate into actual strategy or intentions. Gorshkov’s priorities was not as straightforward as may have seemed. According to his descriptions, nearly all naval operations fell under his system of ‘against the shore’ and the line between operations against the fleet and those against the shore proved difficult for outsiders to distinguish. Moreover, there was the issue of correctly interpreting the Soviet navy chief’s writings without mirror-imaging. David Kassing, director of the Center for Naval Analyses’ Institute of Naval Studies and future president of the think tank, cautioned when looking at fleet against fleet and fleet against shore:

> At first glance, these categories seem to coincide with Western concepts of sea control and projection of power ashore, but they do not. Nor do they match the Western definition of naval missions as either general purpose or strategic. Gorshkov’s two categories do not seem to coincide with any of the traditional Western, ways of defining naval missions.

98 Ibid., pp. x-xi, 223.
99 USND, 3rd edn, p. 7.
101 Kassing, p. 8. Also see Bruce W. Watson, Lieutenant Commander, US Navy, ‘Comments on Gorshkov’s “Sea Power of the State”’, *Proceedings*, 103.890 (1977), 41-47; William H. Thomson,
As such, Kassing echoed Stansfield Turner’s earlier frustration, with the vagueness of Gorshkov’s mission hierarchy and Turner’s inability to find precise matches to the US Navy’s four missions of strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and naval presence.102

Admiral Gorshkov purposefully eschewed the newly favored US terms of ‘sea control’ and ‘sea denial’ to discuss the supporting tasks of general purpose naval forces. Instead, he talked of the importance of gospodstvo na more – translated as ‘dominance at sea’ or ‘command of the sea’.103 Writing that ‘history does not know of a more ancient and harder concept’, Gorshkov noted that achieving or losing dominance at sea once determined the outcomes of wars. It had been the preoccupation of imperialist powers that sought command of the sea ‘as the sole aim of armed struggle at sea’ on the way to establishing world domination.104

His usual Marxist pejoratives aside, Admiral Gorshkov offered valuable insights into how Russians viewed the concept compared to Western strategic thinkers. His definition focused on means over ends, as ‘… a way of creating certain conditions enabling the forces and resources of the fleet to solve successfully particular tasks in specific areas of the theater in a defined period of time.’105 By emphasizing a more limited definition, Gorshkov was closer to Stansfield Turner’s concept of sea control than the Russian admiral would ever concede. Both strategists viewed command (or control) of the sea as not absolute possession, but its realistic use. Turner saw sea control as the way ‘… to temporarily exert air, submarine, and surface control in an area while moving ships into position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas forces’.106 Yet any reader looking for how the Soviet Navy would secure command of the sea was left disappointed. Gorshkov merely established its durability as a concept and its role in influencing the course (but not the outcome) of wars. For further insight into its operational implementation, analysts had to look to what the Soviets were building and how they were exercising their forces.

103 Gorshkov, Morskaya, pp. 372-380. The 1979 English translation used the term ‘dominance at sea’, while Soviet experts such as Herrick, MccGwire, McConnell, and Vigor, as cited in this discussion, used the more traditional ‘command of the sea’. Other reviewers erroneously substituted the term ‘sea control’ to better align with US terminology. See Kenney, ‘A Primer’, (p. 99).
104 Gorshkov, Sea Power, pp. 229, 231.
105 Ibid., p. 231.
If strategic strikes ashore supplanted the need for big fleet engagements, as Gorshkov claimed, and oceans would not be the primary battlefield in the future, then his lengthy discussion of command of the sea proved a curious and even contradictory addition. Experts in the West offered their theories as to why it was there, having already noted the topic appearing in recent articles in Soviet open source literature. There were the intellectual and personal explanations: to show that Soviet naval thought was distinctly different and less ambitious than Alfred Thayer Mahan’s ‘control of the sea’ and the British School’s (Philip Colomb and Julian Corbett) theories on command of the sea. Michael McGwire speculated that Gorshkov raised the topic in his writings to defend himself against internal criticisms that he was a supporter of Mahan’s ‘bourgeois’ and outdated views. He needed to remind readers of the more limited ‘Belli’ (a noted Soviet naval theorist of the Old School) concept of command of the sea from the 1930s.

Gorshkov in *The Sea Power of the State* argued that ‘command of the sea’ was not a foreign or useless concept to Russia – only that it needed updating for the new context of navies in the nuclear age. Robert Herrick later showed how command of the sea was periodically debated in Soviet naval theory, and both Herrick and Peter Vigor documented its reappearance in open source literature by the mid-1970s. It is worth noting that US intelligence had access to a classified *Voyennaya Mysl’* article by Gorshkov from early 1970 that showed this new direction of thinking beyond sea denial. Gorshkov admitted that in the postwar period ‘...we did not devote proper attention to working out problems of gaining supremacy of the seas, since it was considered that this category would not be characteristic of nuclear warfare’. Yet he realized the mistake as the Soviet Navy’s ‘probable enemy’ continued to work on the conduct of future war in this area – notably pre-dating by a number of months Zumwalt and Turner’s focus on sea control for the next four years with Project SIXTY. Therefore, ‘... we conclude that we must do additional work on this problem ... [and] to resolve this problem for nuclear and non-nuclear war and to work out

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practical recommendations for the fleets regarding ways and means of gaining supremacy of the seas in combat with a powerful naval antagonist’.110

The result of this reevaluation was apparent in The Sea Power of the State. Admiral Gorshkov wrote that allied navies would seek ‘favorable conditions’ for securing command of the sea at the outbreak of war. ‘The idea is to widen the sphere of dominance at sea to the depths of the oceans and the air space above them’.111 Thus, Gorshkov, using Western navies as a proxy, noted that modern gospodstvo na more was impossible without controlling the air as well and thus laid the intellectual groundwork for the next generation carriers in the late 1970s.

Moreover, the continued validity for command of the sea reinforced Gorshkov’s theme of a balanced fleet found throughout the book. His usual historical lesson was that Nazi Germany had not provided enough surface and air resources to protect their U-boats from Allied hunter-killer groups during the Battle of Atlantic. Because general purpose forces supported the ballistic submarine fleet – the tactical protecting the strategic – there needed to be peacetime investment in force structure that had not, to date, been adequately made in Gorshkov’s view. The Delta-class SSBNs began arriving and deploying in the 1970s without the full complement of ships, planes, and subs to defend this ‘insurance force’ against the Los Angeles-class attack submarines beginning to deploy in the mid-1970s. Major ASW platforms such as the new Kara and Kresta II cruisers and Krivak II destroyers could not arrive in significant numbers until the 1980s.112

Soviet naval thinking needed to keep pace with its own forces and alter its mission and building priorities accordingly. General purpose forces would need to engage American carrier groups approaching the defence zones in Eurasian waters, which was the Northern Flank scenario that eventually unfolded as part of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. Moreover, the Soviet Navy had the requirement to counter American sub hunters, especially the Orion P-3 anti-submarine patrol aircraft, in order protect their own subsurface forces.113 The post-Cold War history of the Soviet Navy revealed that the scientific research into the need for tactical aviation at sea – carriers with catapaults for fighter air cover – was complete by 1972, and

111 Gorshkov, Sea Power, p. 234.
113 Discussion with Tom Brooks and Norman Polmar, 18 June 2018.
Gorshkov had approved the new design in 1973. The conclusion was that ‘…without an air cover in conditions of the supremacy of the probable enemy anti-submarine air forces we will not be able to ensure not only combat stability but also the deployment of our submarines with ballistic missiles and the multipurpose submarines which are the main strike force of the Navy’.114

In the West, recognition of the emergence and elevated importance of the pro-SSBN mission lay at the heart of understanding Gorshkov’s rehabilitation of command of the sea and its ties to the survivability issue that preoccupied both Soviet and American navies in the later stage of the Cold War. James McConnell detected in The Sea Power of the State what was the most compelling and strategic reason for the Russian meaning of command of the sea in creating favorable operating conditions in a particular theatre. He believed that Gorshkov had the very specific case of command of the Norwegian Sea in mind. McConnell agreed with MccGwire in his assessment that it was likely the more limited range Yankee-class SSBNs that needed to transit through an area controlled by friendly forces if the Soviets attempted to run en masse the gauntlet of the West’s anti-submarine barrier into the North Atlantic. He concluded: ‘Command of the sea, then, is apparently focused primarily on the “breakout” of the Yankee after the onset of nuclear war […] to perform their missions, have to get out on the open ocean. Once there, they can find relative safety in dispersion’.115 Western open source literature at the time routinely reported that only a small number of Yankees (two or three) were on station at a time, so a surge would be necessary if war was imminent.116

There was also the likely additional option of protecting the Delta-class subs in safe havens or ‘bastions’ closer to their Northern Fleet base in the Arctic Ocean. This added dispersion would spread the risk among the strategic platforms, maintain the correlation of forces with the West, and complicate NATO’s anti-submarine warfare efforts. Yet the pro-SSBN requirement was also a ‘force-consuming task’ for which Gorshkov had to make the case for a balanced fleet with more surface and air components.117 Other articles from Voyennaya Mysl’ in 1970 and Morskoi Sbornik in

114 Kuzin and Nikolskiy, p. 154.
1977 mentioned the Norwegian Sea and Arctic Ocean as specific sea and air areas to command and provided further evidence of the accuracy of this view.\textsuperscript{118}

Overall, James McConnell found more evidence for the withholding strategy in Gorshkov’s book, with more direct references to SSBNs than in the earlier article series and historical analogies that supported the SSBN’s military-political role as an instrument for deterrence as a deferred second strike. Of further significance, McConnell noted that there was now a greater emphasis on the survivability of SSBNs that also supported the withholding of Deltas, yet also indicated that the same was true (or even more so) of the survivability of American boomers. Thus, McConnell speculated that the Soviet Navy’s anti-SSBN mission may have been downgraded and its naval resources re-allocated to the pro-SSBN mission.\textsuperscript{119}

A US intelligence community assessment in March 1976 determined that, ‘Soviet antisubmarine warfare forces do not now constitute a serious threat to Western SSBNs at sea. Soviet forces have major deficiencies in their ability to detect and track SSBNs’.\textsuperscript{120} Moreover, the Soviets would not likely develop the acoustic or non-acoustic means, or the wide area surveillance systems, to track US submarines for the next decade. Efforts to neutralize US SSBNs would be focused on tracking subs transiting from bases or through choke points before reaching the safety of the ocean depths. ‘According to Soviet writings’, the assessment noted, ‘a primary objective of Soviet ASW is to thwart an attack by Western SSBNs’. However, these were aspirations given all the capability limitations, and the Soviets themselves likely did not expect to execute successfully coordinated strikes.\textsuperscript{121}

The US Navy understandably highlighted the passages of \textit{The Sea Power of the State} that emphasized the targeting of SSBNs as a major Soviet objective during Congressional hearings in 1977 on the survivability of US strategic forces. Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Donald Harvey began his testimony with a prominent graphic of Gorshkov’s words from the book: ‘The employment of naval forces against the enemy’s seaborne strategic nuclear systems in order to blunt their attacks against ground targets to the maximum degree has become the most important

\textsuperscript{120} Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: Soviet Approaches to Defense against Ballistic Missile Submarines and Prospects for Success’, (March 1976), CREST, Record 0000261306, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p. 5.
effort of the navy’. Yet beyond Gorshkov’s prioritization of the anti-SSBN mission, naval intelligence could only speculate as to how it would be accomplished and it remained a mystery.

The SSBN’s natural survivability and the weaknesses of Soviet anti-submarine warfare greatly mitigated the danger, according to other testimony. Enhanced in-port security and an increase in at-sea patrol length of the new Trident (Ohio-class) submarines that kept them safe in the ocean depths further reduced the threat. In addition, the increased range of 4,000 nautical miles of the Trident I missile, scheduled to deploy in 1979, meant a ‘two-ocean ASW problem’ for an enemy and the option of returning more subs to port in the US. Notably, Admiral Harvey also referenced a key element of the potential Soviet withholding strategy that negated the need to surge their SSBNs, yet remained an unknown: ‘The score or more of Delta-class submarines they have now are theoretically capable of hitting US targets from alongside the pier’.

The question of the authoritativeness of The Sea Power of the State primarily interested experts in Soviet naval studies. Its publication resurrected the debates that had surrounded the Morskoi Shbornik series only a few years before. There were commentators who claimed that the new book revealed doctrine and that Gorshkov would not have overstepped his bounds as head of the navy and spoken out without authority. James McConnell led this school and based his conclusion on the presence of authenticators in the text known as ‘concrete expressions of doctrine’ and the use of phrases such as ‘unity of views’. Other analysts saw the publication as evidence of the ongoing internal debate over the Soviet naval strategy, and that Admiral Gorshkov still needed to argue for policy change within the Soviet establishment.

123 Brooks interview.
It is worth noting that the foremost proponent of the advocacy school, Michael MccGwire, had softened and altered his stance since the Gorshkov articles. He wanted to be sure the US Navy knew about it. MccGwire declared in both the Naval War College Review and Proceedings in 1980 that he detected a sea change happening in Soviet naval thought in more recent years along with an accompanying increase in shipbuilding of large surface combatants that included a new carrier.

‘Evidence that a fundamental shift in the theoretical basis of Soviet naval policy may be underway is provided by the reviews of the book Seapower of the State …’, he wrote. ‘During the decade the naval position has evolved from defensive advocacy, to a more rounded discussion of the importance of the ocean and of seapower in the broader sense, to challenging the primacy of the continental theaters of war’. 126 However, he warned, ‘[t]his does nor mean that all the ideas in the book have been fully accepted, but it does imply that the concept is now established in the mainstream of Soviet analytic discourse ….’ 127

Thus, MccGwire hesitated to declare that Gorshkov had won his battle for sea power in Soviet state policy that caused the increased allocation of resources, yet he took Gorshkov’s permission to publish the book as a sign that his advocacy was paying off and the results may soon be visible by the 1980s. MccGwire, along with other analysts, looked to the reception of Gorshkov’s book in the Soviet Union to determine its authority and acceptance. 128 A researcher at the Naval War College’s Center for Advanced Research, Renita Fry, studied the reaction of the Soviet press and military establishment reaction to the book. She discovered a contradictory picture that did not wholeheartedly endorse the book as an expression of doctrine and showed Gorshkov’s work was not universally accepted or entirely understood. Nor did she find that McConnell’s framework of doctrinal indicators and key words for determining the authority of the work in the reactions to his writings to be entirely convincing. 129

While such discussions appeared esoteric to non-experts, they tied directly to the broader perception that Admiral Gorshkov was revealing his master blueprint to dominate the oceans and to supplant American maritime supremacy. Renita Fry saw

127 MccGwire, 'Rationale', p. 177.
the grand design issue when she posed the question: ‘Is the West incorrect in assuming that Gorshkov is the architect of Soviet naval policy?’ She stated that the answer could be ‘yes’ if too much was invested in a single source such as The Sea Power of the State.130 Likewise, the Central Intelligence Agency did not put too much stock in its importance as a ‘charter’ for the Soviet Navy. Director Admiral Stansfield Turner referenced the book in a 1977 letter. He said that, ‘[my staff] tend to view Soviet military writers — even senior ones such as Gorshkov — primarily as historical interpreters and advocates, and not necessarily as authorities laying out firm blueprints for the future. Nonetheless […] much of what we see of the Soviet navy today has been foreshadowed somewhere in Gorshkov’s writings’.131

It was a testament to the significance of The Sea Power of the State that the US Naval Institute Press and Pergamon Press in the UK published identical English translations in 1979. These volumes became the most available and cited versions of Gorshkov’s work, and yet they were not the most recent version of his thesis. They were translations of the first edition, while a second edition of 60,000 copies with both major and minor changes appeared in August 1979 in the USSR. For example its audience changed from ‘primarily for the military reader’ to ‘for admirals, generals, and officers of the Soviet Army and Navy’. This version was only available through restricted government channels in December 1980 in a full translation that showed both the new text and the redactions from the original edition.132

The changes were highly revealing. Indeed, the second edition answered another of Renita Fry’s questions in the affirmative: ‘Was Gorshkov too generous in claiming doctrinal legitimacy?’133 The revised edition purged all references to ‘naval science’ to show that it did not exist independently of ‘military science’ as the term was purged from the strategic lexicon.134 Moreover, it contained a new 10-page section on ‘The Strategic Employment of the Navy’ that made clear that the Soviet Navy operated as a part of unified military strategy and did not operate as a special or independent arm that was more important than other service. Gorshkov wrote: ‘… it

130 Ibid., p. 36.
131 Stansfield Turner, ‘Letter to Mr. Frank E. Mckenzie’, (27 May 1977), CREST, Record CIA-RDP80M00165A002400030006-0.
133 Fry, p. 36.
should be remembered that today there is not and cannot be a sphere of warfare in which any one branch of the Armed Forces is the absolute sovereign'.

Ultimately, *The Sea Power of the State* was an example of Admiral Gorshkov’s insistence on writing about (or skirting up against) doctrinal matters for the Soviet Navy – its peacetime role, its strategic missions apart from other the combat arms, and its service to state policy – that were outside the more narrowly restricted bounds of naval science or art. He had some allies in this effort, but he also had strong opposition to his ambitions and was pushing the envelope on what he could do to openly lobby on the navy’s behalf. It was up to Western readers and analysts to account for this internal struggle and balancing act, and to arrive at the correct conclusions of what a naval leader, even as influential as Gorshkov, could or should be saying – for these had lasting implications for the future of the US-Soviet rivalry. The Soviet Navy’s deputy commander-in-chief, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov said of Gorshkov’s leadership style: ‘He knew how to report to the leadership, obtaining the necessary decisions. Unfortunately, S.G. Gorshkov was not disposed to sincere dialogue. He considered his view to be the sole correct one.’

While there is no doubt that his campaign for a more balanced fleet had gained serious traction by 1980, it was also clear from the second edition that Gorshkov had overreached in his own messaging. He had caused ‘uneasiness’ in the Soviet hierarchy over his ‘tendency to claim a greater degree of independence for naval theory and strategy than was acceptable’. That new Kremlin leaders had less deference for the famous admiral or his stature would become more apparent in his final years in office, especially in the post-Brezhnev era. ‘[Sea Power of the State] went beyond strategy and was part of Gorshkov’s continuing efforts to gain a greater, more independent voice for the navy by almost intentionally reducing the importance of the other Soviet services. When Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov became chief of the general staff in 1977, one of his first tasks was to restrain Gorshkov and remind him of the need for combined arms operations’.

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135 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, pp. 313-314.
136 As quoted in Chernyavskii, pp. 303-304.
The impact of *The Sea Power of the State* as a classic work of maritime strategy went beyond Gorshkov’s ‘salesmanship’ because of its influence on both Soviet and American naval thinking. It also arrived at an inflection point in the development of the superpower navies. Its origins and its reception in the US and the Soviet Union was a mirror held up to the anxieties of the age, as the leaders of both navies felt that they were not in control of the right forces or correct strategy due to political reasons beyond their control. Both sides were doing everything in their power to change those dynamics by a bigger share of defence budgets.

*The Sea Power of the State* solidified Admiral Gorshkov’s reputation as a dominant figure in Cold War naval thought, which was also notable for a Russian’s entry into the realm of maritime strategy dominated by Anglosphere thinkers. Indeed, it was a Russian communist admiral who ironically filled the void left by Mahan. The emotional reaction to Gorshkov’s book in American naval circles was instructive. Some bemoaned the lack of a strategic leader who could mount a similar intellectual challenge. A Marine Corps officer in a review of a collection of Mahan’s writings in 1979 pointedly asked:

> Who speaks to our generation? Who is the naval philosopher, historian, tactician, strategist, creative genius, coherent and clarion voice of sea power today? Gorshkov. Appalling! In his time Mahan was a one-man lobby. [...] Who sickens at the comparative diminution of our sea power? Who is the patriot willing to display the self-abnegation of Mahan and fight for our Navy now?139

There was a frustration that no preeminent strategist or naval leader – not even the colorful and controversial Elmo Zumwalt – had emerged in the US who could capture the popular imagination and provide a compelling, alternative narrative as Gorshkov had done for his own navy. Indeed, it was not that the US Navy did not produce strategic ideas or have access to thinkers who grasped the dynamics of the Cold War at sea and the broader maritime challenges. Those who worked on updating naval theory and missions for the nuclear age included Stansfield Turner and a small group of thinkers at the Naval War College on control theory, as well as the work of fleet and headquarters staffs who produced influential force planning studies such as Sea Plan 2000 in 1977-78.140

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To be sure, Gorshkov was not the first, nor the last, naval leader to recognize and define the emerging trends that shaped the US-Soviet rivalry. An example of earlier thinking dated back to 1966 – a full decade before Gorshkov’s book. As the Vietnam War was heating up, Vice Admiral John S. McCain Jr, called ‘Mr Seapower’, gave a speech called ‘The Total Wet War’ that looked at the global sea power competition and the power of fleets against the shore. He declared there were three key points about sea power:

First, we are involved in what I call a total “wet war” with the Soviet Union. This not only includes the naval aspects of the oceans but also the merchant marine, oceanography, and fishing industry.

Second, with any further expansion the Communists must move into those areas which are directly influenced by seapower.

And third, the most profound change in the history of warfare has been the extended inland reach from mobile bases at sea. With the addition in September 1964 of the 2,875-mile-range Polaris ballistic missile, no spot on earth is beyond range of attack from the seas.\footnote{John S. McCain, 'The Total Wet War', \textit{Vital Speeches of the Day}, 32.17 (1966), 514-518 (p. 514).}

In the final analysis, it was the unexpectedness and the novelty of a Soviet military figure being so seemingly forthcoming in how he intended to strike at the West that heightened the impact of Gorshkov’s writings and generated such interest in its content. Yet in typical Soviet fashion, \textit{The Sea Power of the State} concealed as much as it revealed. Gorshkov gave just enough away to persuade his Kremlin critics as he lobbied them and confound his American readers as he threatened them. It was nonetheless a remarkable achievement, according to the many reviews. A reviewer in the \textit{Naval War College Review} ruefully asked, ‘Who among us could fuse a discredited Slavic navy to the bankrupt philosophy of Marxism and produce a weapon that can help destroy Western civilization’?\footnote{Kenney, ‘A Primer’, pp. 103-104.}
CHAPTER 7 The American Response to Gorshkov (1980-1985)

Recently, there were four Soviet spy ships among our Second Fleet [Readiness Exercise forces] in the Caribbean. Their presence was publicly welcomed by [our strike fleet commander, who...] sent out his now usual message to the Soviet participants in the exercise. It could well serve as the maritime theme for US-Soviet relations in the decade ahead. That message read, “Admiral Gorshkov, eat your heart out.”

- Secretary of the Navy John Lehman

Admiral Sergei Gorshkov’s ambitious designs for his navy resulted in an even grander American response beginning in 1981. After years of debate over the maritime balance and the erosion of US naval power to its Cold War nadir, the new Reagan administration took immediate decisions to answer the Soviet naval challenge and to assure US maritime supremacy in the cause of confronting and defeating communism. Under the leadership of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and offensive-minded chiefs of naval operations, the US Navy responded with plans for 600-ship navy, a bold Maritime Strategy that directly confronted the Soviets based on a new understanding of their strategy, and a display of this new attitude through a series of large-scale exercises near Russian shores and around the globe.

The analytical debates in the 1970s over the interpretations of Gorshkov’s writings informed this dramatic response that played to American strengths and targeted Soviet weaknesses. Influences on this rethinking of the Soviet Navy included a diverse group of civilian experts and intelligence community analysts as well as highly influential individuals such as Director of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall. The major finding of a Soviet withholding strategy for its sub-launched ballistic missiles in response to US anti-submarine warfare superiority profoundly shaped the Maritime Strategy, as well as the major intelligence estimates and net assessments of the era. The US Navy’s recognition of the primacy of the pro-SSBN mission for Admiral Gorshkov came as the Soviet Navy also showed signs of transforming into a truly offensive force that would eventually include large-deck carriers. Both superpower navies continued to use the other’s words and actions to justify growing

their fleets. Yet as the 1980s rapidly turned into an arms race at sea, the rivalry just as quickly came to an end.

**The Influence of John Lehman**

The last decade of the US-Soviet rivalry reflected its inherently competitive and reactive nature throughout the Cold War as it transformed into a true arms race at sea. Without a Red Fleet numbering 289 major surface combatants and 370 submarines by 1980, there would have been no continued calls for a 600-ship navy. Without the radical changes to the Soviet Navy’s strategic thinking and to its global posture throughout the 1970s, coupled with provocative messaging directed at US Navy, there was no justification or appetite for a forward deployed strategy after the Vietnam War. And without the imaginative and determined leadership of Admiral Gorshkov, who for decades was a foil for his American adversaries, there was no rationale for the overwhelming response of civilian and naval leaders in the 1980s.

The missing component for the American answer to Gorshkov’s naval buildup was the political will backed by public opinion. The final response came quickly and with astonishing specificity thanks to the national security planning decisions during the 1980 presidential campaign and the electoral landslide victory taken as a mandate to fix a ‘hollow force’ military. The Republican Party platform that called for maritime superiority and naval rearmament became official US policy in Ronald Reagan’s new administration in early 1981. The platform declared that the neglect of the Carter years came ‘…while the Soviet Union pursued an aggressive shipbuilding program capable of giving them worldwide naval supremacy in the 1980s unless current trends are reversed immediately’.²

The US Navy was the main benefactor of the Reagan Doctrine’s ‘peace through strength’ buildup to arrest Soviet global influence and halt the spread of communism. However, the most ambitious peacetime naval expansion in American history did not unfold without a tremendous amount of debate and often warranted criticism that sharply contrasted the American approach to determining the size and role of navies with the Soviet one of secrecy and ambiguity. Critics in Congress and from previous administrations labeled the Navy’s plans unrealistic, dangerous, and ruinously expensive. The projected costs through fiscal year 1987 to add 146 ships

and 1917 aircraft were $96.2 billion and $71 billion respectively. Robert Komer, Carter’s undersecretary of defense for policy, opposed the Navy’s scheme on the grounds that it drew needed Army and Air Force budget resources away from the coalition defence of the European heartland to independent carrier strikes that ‘nibbl[ed] at its flanks’.4

Yet like the Soviet system, personalities and force of intellect mattered in changing strategic culture and overcoming bureaucratic inertia. A handful of individuals passionately believed that Gorshkov’s grand design for wresting American dominance of the oceans through an offensive strategy required an even grander American plan. As an op-ed in the New York Times by a senior naval officer noted, ‘new iron is useless without new ideas’.5 The blueprint for the 600-ship navy and the Maritime Strategy left no doubt as to its primary purpose and target: to recapture a clear edge in the naval race as a peacetime deterrent and to have the naval forces, if necessary, to destroy the Soviet Navy’s sea-based strategic and general purpose forces in war.

The architect of the response was Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, who worked in concert with Chiefs of Naval Operations Admirals Thomas B. Hayward (an aviator) and James D. Watkins (a submariner). The Naval War College’s Strategic Studies Group and the strategic concept planning staff in OpNav-603 further developed and operationalized the emerging concepts in the early 1980s.6 Lehman was an energetic, brash, and controversial leader who, not surprisingly, made a great number of allies and enemies for his efforts. He later recalled that the Pentagon staff became increasingly hostile to his constant use of the term ‘maritime superiority’ even as President Reagan continued to endorse it, and Lehman gladly reciprocated their enmity.7

John Lehman was no Navy outsider. While in office, Lehman was a naval flight officer for the A-6E Intruder attack aircraft in the Navy Reserves who counted

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7 Lehman, Command of the Seas, pp. 120-121; Wilson, 'In Policy Shift'. 
retired chiefs of naval operations Arleigh Burke and James Holloway among his many ‘sea daddies’ (mentors).\(^8\) He came from the business and defence policy worlds, as well as academia with studies at Cambridge and an Ivy League PhD in international relations. He was also a Republican political insider in Washington (Henry Kissinger was also a mentor) and one of the core group of defence hawks from the conservative Committee on the Present Danger who made up the majority of Reagan’s political appointees. The Committee’s policy statement in November 1976 stated: ‘the principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup’.\(^9\) Reagan’s national security strategy enshrined most of the Committee’s anti-communist hardliner language on countering the Soviet threat as part of America’s own unparalleled military buildup.

Of significance, John Lehman was also one of the principal shapers of the Navy’s new strategic thinking initiative, including work on Sea Plan 2000 in 1977-78 that was essentially an early draft of the Maritime Strategy. Unlike Admiral Gorshkov’s more oblique explanations in *The Sea Power of the State* of the need for a balanced fleet with more surface forces, the introduction to the American study explicitly stated that its purpose was to ‘explore the rationale for general purpose naval forces’.\(^10\) The study concluded that, in addition to peacetime stability maintenance and crisis response to deter Soviet adventurism, the US Navy had the requirement to maintain global strike capabilities in the event of war on the Central Front in Europe. Navy task groups on the offensive on its flanks would draw Soviet forces away from NATO sea lanes and relieve pressure by a second front in the Pacific. These contingencies called for American naval forces with sufficient numbers of carriers ‘to operate in forward areas and increase the risks for Soviet naval forces and capabilities’.\(^11\)

A more recent analysis of defence policy, seconded by Sea Plan’s main author at the Naval War College, Francis J. ‘Bing’ West, determined that the Navy’s biggest weakness in the 1970s was its strategic thinking.\(^12\) However, the timing and

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\(^8\) Lehman, *Oceans Ventured*, pp. xii-xiii.


\(^11\) Ibid., p. 107.

environment was not right for radical changes. Sea Plan 2000 was not implemented, according to John Lehman, because of the expected hostile reception in the Brown Pentagon, or fully embraced inside the Navy because of its budget- and programming-centered outlook at the time.\footnote{Lehman, \textit{Command of the Seas}, p. 129.} This new thinking was also a political liability that exacerbated the Navy’s problems without the executive branch clout and backing to mitigate it. Perceptions of navy leaders in search of a threat and an offensive plan to justify more nuclear carriers proved hard to avoid in the Carter years. Columnist Jack Anderson noted in March 1980 that ‘[m]uch of the [Navy’s] budget problem is self-induced, a result of the admirals’ obsession with an aggressive, “go-get-’em” strategy for carrying an all-out global conflict to the shores of the Soviet Union’.\footnote{Jack Anderson, ‘Not Shipshape’, \textit{Washington Post}, 16 March 1980, p. C7.}


Lehman shaped Ronald Reagan’s own thinking by convincing him of the necessity of maritime superiority to keep the oceans free from the Soviet Navy’s influence. Lehman firmly believed that Gorshkov was ‘another disciple of Mahan’s’ who pursued an ‘offensive blue-water strategy’.\footnote{Lehman, \textit{Oceans Ventured}, p. xxiii.} In a 1982 speech at the recommissioning ceremony for a battleship – the symbol of hyper-navalism of an earlier age – Reagan used Lehman’s words and ideas as support for his naval buildup. Indeed, the president offered the same argument made by Richard Nixon in 1970 that had upset Admiral Gorshkov in his writings: ‘… the Soviet Union is historically a land power […] it has created a powerful, blue-ocean navy that cannot be justified by any legitimate defense need. It is a navy built for offensive action, to cut the Free
World’s supply lines and render impossible the support, by sea, of Free World allies’. 19

The centerpiece of Lehman’s public relations campaign was his revival of the heated rhetoric on the Soviet naval threat. 20 To be sure, the message of Soviet aggression gained plausibility and a more receptive audience in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Nonetheless, Lehman’s advocacy required a clear and present naval danger. To that end, he adopted the narrative that Admiral Gorshkov himself long ago established in his famous quote featured in *Time* magazine in 1968: ‘sooner or later the United States will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the sea’. A *Los Angeles Times* article, ‘US Loses Sea Mastery to Russians’, in May 1981 featured that long-recycled quote and stated that ‘the moment that Gorshkov predicted has arrived’. The story cited Secretary Lehman’s announcement that ‘we have lost our maritime superiority’ due to budgetary neglect and that the US needed to regain the upper hand in a dramatic way. 21

Notably, the article employed all the usual sources of threat perception and served as a prime example of the state of American naval thought in the early Reagan era. As his evidence, the author pointed to the Soviet Navy’s current edge in cruise missiles and other technological advances that, according to naval intelligence, meant that the US ‘… can no longer depend on superior American technology to offset Soviet numbers’. Examples included construction of a super carrier (wrongly and widely assumed at the time to be nuclear-powered), as well as the titanium-hulled *Alfa*-class fast attack nuclear submarines, the powerful *Kirov*-class nuclear cruisers (called ‘pocket battleships’), and the just-launched 25,000-ton *Typhoon*-class ballistic missile submarine.

The reporter, Robert C. Toth, presented scholars at both ends of the spectrum on the nature of the Soviet Navy. He cited Michael McGwire’s view that the buildup was a ‘defensive reaction to what the Kremlin perceives as American naval threats’. At the Naval Postgraduate School, Jan Breemer predicted that five Soviet carrier groups by the end of the decade could tip the Soviet Navy’s goal from sea denial to great power maritime supremacy. Toth also cited the ‘striking parallels’ of the

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German naval challenge to Britain a century before from Oxford scholar Hedley Bull’s recent scholarship. However, Bull was no tiebreaker and determined the comparison also had important differences and that naval power at present was in an unprecedented state of equilibrium where no one state held the preponderance of power.\textsuperscript{22}

The article also quoted Gorshkov on his willingness to use naval diplomacy as an instrument of great power politics and to ‘achieve political goals without resorting to an armed struggle’. Most important, Toth noted the different strategies in the use of Soviet and American submarines. He wrote that, since the early 1970s, the Soviets deployed their ballistic missile submarines ‘… in sanctuaries close to home: the Barents and Norwegian Seas and the Sea of [Okhotsk] in the Pacific. Unlike US nuclear subs, they do not patrol far out to sea’.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, the May 1981 article demonstrated that the central significance of bastions in a withholding strategy had emerged from the secret pages of intelligence reports and specialist literature into the mainstream media for discussion. Just how significant operations in the far north were to US naval strategy would become apparent through the transformation of both American and Soviet naval exercises in the 1980s.

\textit{Ocean Venture ’81}

Navy Secretary John Lehman put bold actions behind his tough talk by taking a page out of Admiral Gorshkov’s playbook from 1970 with \textit{Okean}. On this point, Lehman and Gorshkov were in agreement. Blue water navies signal their capabilities and intentions doing what navies do best in peacetime: engaging in combat proficiency-building exercises at sea in support of national policy objectives. To that end, Lehman secured approval from President-elect Reagan to send a major force north seven months after the inauguration to demonstrate the navy’s unique role in the administration’s new forward strategy. The US Navy thus began a campaign of what Lehman termed ‘aggressive deterrence’ using hundreds of exercises over the coming years – some grandiose in their scope, scale, and audacity – and a high operations tempo that would not abate until the late 1980s. According to Lehman, it was all to

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. \textsuperscript{23} Ibid.}
drive home the same message to counter the ‘aggressive thinking’ of Soviet leaders, including Admiral Gorshkov: ‘Attack NATO, and you will lose’.  

For Lehman and other senior leaders, *Ocean Venture* from August to October 1981 was ‘a transformational strategic operation, not just as a training event’.  

According to earlier media reports, the annual NATO exercise in the Atlantic that normally featured a convoy protection scenario as its main phase would be much larger than any recent exercise, given the absence of *Okean* in 1980.  

*Ocean Venture* ’81 was the largest US maritime exercise since World War II, designed by commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Harry D. Train II, and the result of two years of planning. The allied participants of 120,000 personnel came from 14 nations and involved 250 ships and a thousand aircraft. The planned phases were actually a number of previously separate exercises compressed into a shorter timeframe across the pan-Atlantic region. These included amphibious landings in the Caribbean and Mediterranean, anti-submarine warfare operations in the Virginia Capes, combined task force maneuvers in the South Atlantic with Latin American countries, and an exercise to defend the Danish Straits in the Baltic. But everyone was in for a major surprise as the exercise unfolded – most of all Admiral Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy.  

*Ocean Venture* ’81 was a sharp break from previous years because of the forward phase in the Norwegian Sea. Two US carrier battle groups proceeded north of the GIUK (Greenland – Iceland – UK) gap in a move through the ASW barrier that for years had been off-limits by NATO policy as too provocative. The carrier operations in a war at sea scenario caught the Soviet Navy off guard because the American commander of the NATO Striking Fleet, Vice Admiral James ‘Ace’ Lyons, employed numerous cover and deception procedures, such as sending a smaller decoy force to the south and practicing radio silence to mask the carriers’ approach and actual location. The most provocative move in an already audacious gambit was the dispatch of fighter and attack aircraft for a flyby a thousand miles away just off Murmansk, the headquarters of the Northern Fleet. When the American aircraft

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25 Ibid., p. 70.  
encountered Tu-95 *Bear* bombers, according to Lehman, ‘without warning, they roared close by in formation as the refueling Russians stared in disbelief’.28

While the intended shock value of the sudden move into the High North was undeniable – John Lehman called it a ‘thunderclap’ for the Soviets – it was also an eye-opening training experience for the American participants. As Lehman wrote in his recent history, the Atlantic storms and the inhospitable environment in Arctic waters were brutal and dangerous for carrier operations. The Navy’s own coverage of the exercise noted that ‘[t]here were communication barriers, natural phenomena, supply problems and other obstacles to overcome’.29

What was not widely reported at the time was that Secretary Lehman was an eyewitness to the historic event and the Russian reaction. He was also a participant in *Ocean Venture*. In his naval reserve capacity he flew simulated strike missions over Norway (simulating an attack on the Kola Peninsula) with an A-6 *Intruder* squadron off the *Eisenhower*. He wrote that it was a frightening landing due to the icy conditions and low-visibility. He wryly noted: ‘I began to suspect that détente was not the only reason the fleet had not operated this far north’.30

While at sea, Secretary Lehman also communicated the new attitude to the carrier’s crew and the reason why they were becoming members of the Order of the Blue Nose for crossing the Arctic Circle. He told them that they were now all part of a larger strategic plan and sending an unmistakable message to the Soviets should they go to war with NATO: ‘we would kick their ass at sea, and from the sea’.31 Lehman considered this salty and direct language all part of his larger campaign of aggressive deterrence to close the chapter on the low morale and readiness of the 1970s Navy. He expected his bravado to be contagious throughout the Fleet and communicated by all commanding officers.

As for the Soviet Navy, their large-scale coordinated reaction to the Norwegian phase of *Ocean Venture* was as the US expected and provided valuable intelligence in the tactical and technical details of their response. Soviet reaction forces included the scrambling of shore-based *Bear* and *Badger* bombers and the dispatch of the *Moskva* ASW carrier, 18 surface ships, and a number of submarines.

29 Cabot, p. 20.
30 Lehman, *Oceans Ventured*, p. 82.
31 Ibid.
Indeed, it was an unexpected exercise of Admiral Gorshkov’s own defence of the homeland scenario in the northern maritime zone.

In Gorshkov’s official reaction, he referred to the new US aggressive posture in his next Navy Day broadcasts in July 1982. ‘The empire-building pretensions of the present US administration to supremacy on the seas and the practical steps aimed at increasing its naval might to an unprecedented peace-time level’, he warned, ‘as well as the operations of NATO squadrons in proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union, create a situation of increasing threat to our country’. Yet as always, Gorshkov turned the American naval threat to his own advantage as he reminded Soviet leaders and the Russian people that they needed to keep building a great high-seas fleet as ‘force capable a withstanding aggression from the seas’. He specifically pointed to the strategic role of both Soviet and US submarines to conduct nuclear strikes ashore and to the vital importance of a strategic reserve of Soviet SSBNs. He noted that, ‘…the ability of our navy to create the means of inevitable retaliation for such an attempt at aggression and to inflict blows on enemy naval forces and territories over immense distances, are all factors which have determined the growing role of the navy’.32

The appearance of US and allied forces in the Soviet Arctic domain was the unveiling of a key element of the Maritime Strategy and a strong geopolitical message to the world. John Lehman would testify the next spring on its results to gain congressional support for the 600-ship navy in the next budget. Ocean Venture ’81 was just the opening act in a long series of exercises, all designed to keep the US Navy proficient in operating in a range of scenarios and conditions around the globe, including the icy north. In particular, maneuvers near Soviet shores showed up the deficiencies of their ocean surveillance and early warning systems.

As chief of naval operations, Admiral Hayward got the opportunity to order exercises for what he had first envisioned in Project Sea Strike in 1977 when he was in command of the Pacific Fleet. Sea Strike outlined offensive war plans in support of general war with Soviet Union involving attacks on Soviet installations in Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok, and the Kuriles as well as the defence of the Aleutians.33 A new operational approach started in the Pacific in 1981-82, with US submarines operating in the Sea of Okhotsk and large-scale exercises in the Sea of Japan and off

33 Hattendorf, Evolution, pp. 18-19.
Alaska. In April-May 1983, the Pacific Fleet conducted a large exercise with three carrier battle groups in the northwest Pacific. As a later history explained, ‘[n]aval leaders wanted to reaffirm the fleet’s presence in the region and see how the Soviets reacted to it. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Admiral Sylvester R. Foley observed, “I’m sure we surprised the Soviets once again, sending them a message that our deployments are not going to be easily predicted”’.34

Indeed, there was always a strong, deliberate element of ‘perception management’ to the exercises and forward operations to show what the American navy could do and the Soviet navy could not. They also let the Soviet Navy know that the US knew how they would fight, and knew how to deal with it.35 The US Navy signaled the intention to surge forward with carriers and contest for control of the very waters that the Soviets planned to defend as SSBN bastions. As such, US commanders viewed their Soviet counterparts as vital exercise participants – as the prime audience and reactors to the scenarios. The Soviets routinely sent reconnaissance aircraft and intelligence collection ships to closely shadow the operations. As quoted in a 1983 interview during a large-scale Caribbean exercise: “I always count on Soviet participation – in fact, I welcome it,” said the 2nd Fleet commander, Vice Adm. James A. Lyons, with a grin, “We want to display a measure of proficiency that is unmistakably clear. The message we want them to take home with them is that (a Soviet attack) may be just too hard”’.36

Both Lehman and Lyons impressed upon the defence correspondent aboard the carrier USS Kennedy to observe the Caribbean exercise that the Navy’s increased operational tempo – what the story called a ‘war footing’ – was to send a strong deterrent signal to the Soviet Navy and to keep them off balance by its unpredictability. The news story then directly tied these actions to a response to Admiral Gorshkov:

As the two naval forces probe each others’ defenses and preen before the competition, a new dimension to gunboat diplomacy has emerged: constant tactical maneuvering to win what Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov has called “the struggle for the first salute. “There is a tremendous tactical advantage,” Lehman explained,

35 Mark Stout, ‘Notes from Submarine History Seminar’, (unpublished work, 11 April 2007). See also Cote, pp. 75-76.
“to the guy who gets word to shoot first.” And by next year, when both forces will be equipped with long-range cruise missiles, the premium on “shooting first” will be even more valuable. So the risks of potential confrontation are likely to grow…. 37

Yet with the US Navy’s avowed intention to be more assertive and unpredictable, including freedom of navigation exercises, came rising tensions with Soviets vessels and the very-real risk for collisions. Officials admitted that, ‘both Soviet and American ships and aircraft occasionally have engaged in deliberate harassment, which often brings them dangerously close….’ 38 The number of confrontations continued to climb throughout 1982-83. The protocols from the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement came into heavy use to address the deteriorating situation and the loss of the ‘hard-won civility on the high seas established under the agreement regime….’ In May 1982, Admiral Hayward sent a personal note to Admiral Gorshkov via treaty established channels after one particularly tense situation involving an American frigate and Soviet ships and aircraft near the Sea of Japan. 39

1984 saw another spike in exercise-induced tensions between the Cold War navies. In March, a Soviet Victor I nuclear attack submarine collided with the USS Kitty Hawk by surfacing under it at night and leaving a large piece of its propeller in the carrier’s hull. The incident occurred during intense Soviet monitoring of the battle group during an annual exercise with South Korea. Indeed, tensions were running high in general between the superpowers in the Pacific region and around the globe – the Soviet air force had mistakenly shot down a Korean civilian airliner in September 1983 in the Sea of Japan.

Both sides knew that these incidents needed resolving and confidence re-established at the annual INCSEA meeting in 1984, especially for the Soviets in the wake of the tragic shoot down. Notably, Vice Admiral Lyons was one of the delegates to the Moscow meeting. Lyons’ presence and his authority as a fleet commander, according to a recent history, helped to successfully diffuse the situation with his Soviet counterparts. Nonetheless, the Soviet representatives told the American delegation of their displeasure at the publicity surrounding the Victor/Kitty Hawk incident. The American practice of having a big media presence for major exercises

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
meant that the 25 reporters aboard the carrier filed detailed reports of the incident the next day, including speculation that it was the sub commander’s ‘poor seamanship’ that caused the accident. Another US naval officer stressed to a reporter that ‘the collision does not indicate carrier vulnerability’.40

Indeed, the high profile of these exercises and incidents did not always work in the Navy’s favor and embarrassment worked both ways. A few days later, the Kitty Hawk’s captain told the press, in a damning public admission, that the ‘escort ships protecting the aircraft carrier failed to detect a nuclear-powered Soviet submarine that rammed it in the Sea of Japan because they were too far away’.

As a result, John Lehman needed to do some public relations damage control of his own.

In an op-ed for the Washington Post, the navy secretary tried to cast the Kitty Hawk case in a positive light. He downplayed the significance of ‘things that go bump as sea’ as the price of being a forward deployed, operational navy. He declared the failure of the Victor detection a non-issue: the US had previously located and ‘killed’ the submarine more than 15 times earlier in the exercise. This was itself an incredible revelation of US capabilities to track Soviet submarines. Remarkably, Lehman also argued the value of Soviet submarine presence so close to US operating forces: ‘… the Soviets have provided very convenient services in helping us to train, and at no cost to the taxpayers’. He added for good measure that ‘… the Soviets’ attendance at these exercises and the configuration of their Navy indicate their ocean-going capabilities and intentions. No longer do we face the coastal or continental defense force of the past but an increasingly large and offensive modern navy’.

Lehman evidently feared the resurrected issue of carrier vulnerability just as he was trying to get more nuclear carriers budgeted for the 600-ship navy. He tried to change the conversation from the vulnerability of carriers to ‘the vulnerability of our supply ships’. He stated that interdiction was a primary Soviet wartime objective and raised the specter of another Battle of the Atlantic carried out by the Soviet fleet of 275 attack submarines.43 Thus, even though the Navy had long ago conceded that SLOC interdiction was not a top priority for Gorshkov (though still a possibility in a

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43 Ibid.
longer war scenario), Lehman played the ‘convoy card’ for the American public and Congress. For once, and for obvious reasons given the Kitty Hawk incident, he downplayed the real primary role he had envisioned for carriers in the Maritime Strategy, which was to engage in offensive attacks on the Soviet Union with carrier battle groups and put them at considerable risk.

Just as tensions reached their peak in the mid-1980s, with no sign of waning on the part of the US, the Soviet Navy changed its own operations tempo and exercise profile – primarily as a cost-cutting measure as speculated by experts in the media.\(^{44}\) The Soviets still conducted major exercises such as amphibious landings of naval infantry in the Baltic and showy ASW exercises in the Caribbean. But increasingly, the exercises were smaller in scope and nearer to home waters as the Soviet Navy returned to largely defensive focus of protecting Soviet territory. Most large-scale exercises focused on the ability to defend SSBNs in a response to the Maritime Strategy as well as the vulnerabilities revealed by the Walker spy ring that showed US effectiveness and confidence against noisier submarines. A 1985 story noted: ‘In contrast to the major 1975 worldwide Soviet naval maneuvers called Okean 75, when Soviet tactics emphasized projecting power into distant waters and cutting Western sea lanes, more recent maneuvers have focused on finding and destroying enemy submarines and protecting their own missile subs. . . .’\(^{45}\)

However, there were still periodic spikes in deployment patterns in support of state policy. For example, Soviet leaders used the Soviet Navy to send a strong signal of displeasure with the US decision to deploy Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear missiles to Western Europe in late 1983. In May 1984, the media reported that, ‘Adm. Sergei G. Gorshkov […] ordered Soviet missile-carrying submarines patrolling off our Atlantic coast to travel on the surface, where American television cameras could photograph them to prove to ordinary Americans that, indeed, new Soviet weapons were on station’ \(^{46}\). This increase in nuclear ballistic missile submarines – Delta-class subs joining the usual Yankees – off the US were ‘analogous response’ patrols in an unprecedented visible fashion. These redeployments continued for several years, but did not ultimately change American opinions – especially that of Ronald Reagan.


The Maritime Strategy: Ours Vs Theirs

The language and posture of the US Navy toward the Soviet Navy changed virtually overnight with the rapid policy decisions of the Reagan administration – most visibly with the global forward naval exercises that commenced in 1981. John Lehman recently explained the thinking behind the urgency: ‘We believed at the time that 90% of the deterrent power of this buildup could be achieved in the first year. This was done by publicly declaring and explaining the strategy, especially its naval component, and taking actions that left no doubt among friend and foe that it would be achieved’.47

Yet there were years of contentious debate over the correctness of this historic course of action, even though the US Navy was already implementing its principles and the Soviet Navy was reacting to them. A final version of the Maritime Strategy was not ready for publication until mid-1984. It took another presidential election and until December 1985, coinciding with Admiral Gorshkov’s long-anticipated retirement, for congressional hearings to formally determine that a 600-ship fleet was the ‘right navy’ and the minimum force structure needed to achieve maritime superiority over the Soviet Navy and to satisfy the goals of the Maritime Strategy. The force would include 15 carrier battle groups, 4 battleship surface action groups, 100 nuclear attack submarines, and an unspecified number of ballistic missile submarines.48

The US Navy unveiled the public version of the Maritime Strategy in a supplement to Proceedings in January 1986. The editor wrote that it was ‘… the nearest thing to a British “White Paper” – that is, an official statement of policy – that we are likely to encounter in the American political system’.49 In echoes of Admiral Gorshkov’s mea culpa additions to the second edition of The Sea Power of the State, the chief of naval operations stressed that his navy was part of a combined arms team

in support of the coalition war effort in the European heartland, and not embarking an irrelevant side show on its flanks. Admiral James Watkins wrote that, ‘the goal of the overall Maritime Strategy is to use maritime power, in combination with the efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to bring about war termination in favorable terms’.  

Admiral Watkins assured Congress in 1985 that the Maritime Strategy was intended, by design, to defeat Soviet naval strategy. The Navy had spent substantial time and energy to understand Gorshkov’s strategy, through a combination of ‘[Naval] War College studies with national intelligence estimates and all other intelligence gathering networks’. The conclusion drawn from all these sources was that at an outbreak of war, the Soviets would pursue the option of an extended bastion force and keep them in strategic reserve. This reserve of SSBNs withheld in the Arctic region from more distant patrol stations was variously termed ‘bastions’, ‘havens’, and ‘sanctuaries’, and they were presumably also under the polar ice caps.

The Soviets would ‘particularly like to be able to destroy our ballistic missile submarines, but lack the antisubmarine warfare capability to implement such a mission’, Watkins declared. This objective was tied to the Soviet preoccupation with correlation of forces with the West so important in the war termination phase. If they could not destroy US SSBNs, it was imperative to protect their own at all costs with many resources. Thus, interdicting sea lines of communication would be a secondary mission at the start of a war. ‘This view of the Soviet Navy’s role in overall Soviet strategy suggests that initially the bulk of Soviet naval forces will deploy in areas near the Soviet Union, with only a small fraction deployed forward’. The US Navy’s choice, Watkins wrote, was clear: ‘This is where the Soviet fleet will be, and this is where we must be prepared to fight’.

The Navy’s Norwegian and Barents Sea scenario and its plans to seize the initiative on the Northern Flank – and not remain in home waters or behind the passive barrier of the GIUK gap – was the most explicit and dramatic application of

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50 Barber Jr, p. 3.
53 Barber Jr, p. 7.
this new understanding of Gorshkov’s priorities. The scenario entailed an ‘aggressive forward movement of anti-submarine warfare forces’ to go after Soviet ballistic missile submarines of the Northern Fleet and to put up barriers at choke points; the movement by air of a Marine Corps expeditionary brigade to northern Norway; and the forward deployment of carrier battle groups to engage Soviet surface forces to ‘avoid losing the battle of the first salvo which is so important in Soviet doctrine’.

Watkins stressed that this did ‘not imply some immediate “Charge of the Light Brigade” attack on the Kola Peninsula or any other specific target’.54

Yet this scenario that took American carriers into their own havens in Norwegian fjords to conduct strikes against Soviet targets at sea and ashore – first introduced in the Ocean Safari ’85 exercise – was the most remembered and talked about aspect of the strategy because of the risk from Soviet naval aviation to US forces (especially from shore-based Backfire and Bear bombers) and the threat of nuclear escalation. It cemented the impression that the Navy was being rebuilt for just such a provocative campaign and as justification for 15 carriers.55 The scenario quickly became the central focus of the overall debate and for critics of John Lehman’s naval expansion plans. Congress was particularly uneasy about this element of the Maritime Strategy, and even admirals privately if not publicly voiced their own concerns and the feasibility of it ever happening. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia said in late 1982:

Lehman keeps talking about using carriers to more or less take the battle to the Soviets [close to the Soviet land mass]. I just think that is an unrealistic use of carriers based on my conversations with many Navy admirals. […] The last thing they want to do is bring those carriers into a confrontation within reach of Soviet air power based on land. That’s too big an asset.56

Fortunately the concept was never put to a wartime test. The Maritime Strategy, according to a recent history, ‘always remained something of a work in progress and never acquired a definitive final form’.57 The Navy declared that the strategy was the maritime component of Reagan’s National Security Strategy – and it

54 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
57 Ford and Rosenberg, Admirals’ Advantage, p. 94.
was informed by and coordinated with existing navy commander in chiefs’ theatre war plans – yet it was never incorporated into actual warfighting plans of the era.58

The forward maritime strategy continued to be exercised in the Norwegian Sea in the later 1980s by US and NATO forces. Its proponents maintained that the plan to use the inherent advantages of Norwegian coastal geography from which to offensively operate US strike carriers against Northern Fleet forces and bases was a sound and workable concept. For example, naval analyst Eric Grove determined that, ‘[t]he fiord option is such a good one because it exploits all the advantages of the defensive form of war’.59 Taking the early initiative in a crisis had the added bonus of tying up valuable Soviet sub and air assets from other potential surge uses such as attacking Western shipping in the Atlantic. However, Grove also acknowledged the risk of such a bold strategy from significant losses of one or more carriers by an effective Soviet response.60

Analytical Influences on the US Response

The debates over the Soviet naval threat in the 1970s, based in large part on interpretations of Admiral Gorshkov’s writings as well as Soviet exercises and shipbuilding programmes, foreshadowed the major elements of the Maritime Strategy. These included the pro-SSBN and anti-SSBN missions, the ‘battle for the first salvo’, control of the Norwegian Sea, and the lower priority for SLOC interdiction. A key element of the response was the targeting of Soviet weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The new strategy played directly to the long-standing Soviet fear of encirclement by US submarine and carrier forces that now included Tomahawk cruise missiles as it also directly attacked Gorshkov’s sanctuary strategy with conventional and potentially nuclear strikes. Indeed, Russian scholars later confirmed that ‘the utmost alarm among the naval leadership was stirred by US submarines’ being fitted with Tomahawk cruise missiles of strategic designation’.61 As critic Barry Posen also

59 Grove and Thompson, p. 28.
60 Ibid., pp. 29-31.
noted at the time, ‘Soviet concern for the long-term survival of the Northern Fleet SSBN force […] is the glue that holds the maritime strategy together’.62

The answers to the Maritime Strategy planners’ many questions had been featured in the Navy’s professional literature and unclassified reports for years. Indeed, the January-February 1981 Naval War College Review contained a piece by Jan Breemer on ‘Rethinking the Soviet Navy’ that included specific references on Gorshkov’s plan to protect the SSBNs in bastions with Soviet surface forces. As Breemer noted, this linkage was ‘quite prominent in current Western analyses’.63 To understand Soviet intentions, the strategy’s authors in the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) turned to the insights and works of ‘old hands’ in Soviet naval studies, such as Captain Bill Manthorpe in the Navy Net Assessment branch, Commander Kenneth McGruther at the Naval War College, and Bradford Dismukes at the Center for Naval Analyses.

McGruther laid out the evolution of Soviet naval thinking and Gorshkov’s intent to exert sea control in SSBN operating areas in 1978.64 He later became a vocal proponent of the view that, ‘if we are to defeat Soviet strategy we must understand how they think. Only then can we upset their plans’.65 In a presentation for a joint Naval War College-Center for Naval Analyses research effort in 1981, Dismukes similarly argued that, ‘If the US Navy is to carry out its primary functions in deterrence, escalation control, and war fighting, […] it must attack Soviet strategy as effectively as Soviet weapons’.66

Navy planners also consulted the influential work by Rear Admiral (Ret) Robert O. Welander of The BDM Corporation.67 Michael MccGwire called his report ‘… a most useful study and I have drawn freely on the conclusions’.68 The Welander report for Defense Nuclear Agency in September 1977 surveyed unclassified Soviet writings to understand the Soviet Navy’s doctrine for the employment of theatre nuclear capabilities. It drew extensively on Gorshkov’s writings, especially his article

62 Posen, p. 25.
63 Jan S. Breemer, ‘Rethinking the Soviet Navy’, NWCR, XXXIV.1 (1981), 4-12 (p. 5).
64 See Chapter 3 on ‘Missions’ in McGruther, The Evolving Soviet Navy.
67 Ibid., p. 70.
68 MccGwire, 'Naval Power', p. 166.
series and The Sea Power of the State, and was in general agreement with the contemporaneous work of McConnell and MccGwire.

Welander and his co-authors found that ‘Soviet naval writings […] reveal a deep-seated concern for the survivability of their own SSBN force’. They concluded that SSBNs would be kept in protected havens. Soviet literature also had a recurring theme of the need for a ‘breakout’ of the Soviet submarines through the anti-submarine barrier at the GIUK gap. In addition, the Soviets planned to put up their own barrier in this vital sea region for NATO forces flowing in the other direction – in other words, the maritime war at sea scenario exercised in Ocean Venture ‘81. The report determined that:

An Atlantic scenario […] would have the following characteristics at the outset of theatre war: a massive concentration of Soviet naval air, ASW surface, and ASW submarine forces in the G-I-UK gap to breach NATO anti-submarine defenses to permit the Soviet attack, cruise missile and, for the near term, ballistic missile submarines to stream into the Atlantic for offensive operations; concurrent operations by the same forces to prevent the entry into the Norwegian Sea of NATO ASW submarines; operations by Soviet cruise missile submarines and naval aviation to cover these forces from attack by NATO surface naval forces; hunter-killer operations in the Norwegian Sea against NATO ballistic missile and ASW submarines by Soviet ASW air, surface and submarine forces; and ASW protective operations by the same type of forces around an operating haven for their own DELTA SSBN force.

The Center for Naval Analyses

The pioneering work at the Center for Naval Analyses deserved much of the credit for bringing the Soviet views on sea-based strategic forces to the forefront of American naval thought, thereby shaping US threat perceptions and the strategic response. In particular, their experts provided the template for intelligence professionals to later ‘connect the dots’ of the SSBN withholding strategy with the other classified and unclassified sources on how Gorshkov intended to fight the US Navy. Together with similar analyses at the Central Intelligence Agency, by the late 1970s the Office of Naval Intelligence ‘was beginning to take the writings very seriously’.

69 Welander, p. 21.
70 Ibid., p. 33.
71 Brooks, ‘The Impact of Gorshkov’s Writings’.
However, the conclusions of these civilian analysts were not initially embraced or universally shared by the US Navy as sponsors or consumers of their work. For example, the Office of Naval Intelligence did not authorize the inclusion of James McConnell’s discussion of the withholding strategy in the 1979 book, *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, which he co-edited with Bradford Dismukes. According to Dismukes, it was because McConnell’s analysis did not agree with the US Navy’s position on the wartime force employment of the Soviet Navy. The concern was that Navy had given its imprimatur to the book’s publication through cooperation with the Navy-affiliated think tank. Otherwise, the Navy’s leadership was happy with the positive reception the book received and its contribution to scholarship on the subject.\(^7\) Overall, there was independence of thinking and permission to publish McConnell’s findings. He published a conference paper that included an abbreviated history of the withholding strategy in an edited volume in 1978.\(^3\)

Another problem was that the Soviet experts reviewing McConnell’s chapter for the Office of Naval Intelligence were not familiar with the methods of open source exploitation used by the Center for Naval Analyses. They believed that McConnell relied too much on what was essentially discussions of naval theory oriented to the future that were not reflective of current operations and strategy. ‘… [T]he reception that his conclusions received had sowed the seeds of caution and disbelief for officials in dealing with the work of CNA. However, in the long run, McConnell’s conclusions were born out by later evidence,’ concluded a later history.\(^4\)

These frictions between the Center for Naval Analyses and the Office of Naval Intelligence, among other factors, meant that the period of the think tank’s most direct influence on American naval thought essentially concluded by 1981. New sources of highly classified intelligence became more central to formulating assessments to which these analysts did not have access. The Navy still sought the center’s red teaming expertise on analysing the Soviet response to the proposed US anti-SSBN campaign – what was termed ‘strategic ASW’ – as they conducted war games on the newly emerging strategy in 1982-83. Bradford Dismukes regretted that

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the earlier and closer analytical relationship could not continue as he produced insightful reports on the implications of the new US strategy.\textsuperscript{75}

The Maritime Strategy and other assessments of Soviet strategy were a vindication for analysts such as McConnell, Dismukes, and Weinland in the Navy’s eventual decision to threaten an attack on Soviet strategy using the superior American anti-submarine capabilities. Indeed, all the early proponents of open source intelligence saw their efforts pay off in the subsequent changes to US strategic thinking and assessments on the Soviet Navy.

**The Office of Naval Intelligence**

The US Navy’s new understanding of Soviet intentions by the mid-1980s did not come easily and was itself a decade in the making. Then-Captain Thomas Brooks was one of principal briefers, along with Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, in 1981 in presentations to Navy senior leaders on the special intelligence that bolstered support for acceptance of the concept of withholding of SSBNs in protected bastions at the heart of the proposed maritime strategy. Looking back, Brooks determined that ‘…until the early 1980s, the senior leadership of the US Navy did not have an accurate picture of Soviet naval strategy and looked at Soviet naval strategy as mirror-imaging western naval thought’.\textsuperscript{76}

The intelligence briefings were for Admiral Hayward, then-Vice Chief of Naval Operations James Watkins (and his successor, Admiral William N. Small), Rear Admiral Kinnard McKee (Director of the Office of Naval Warfare), and the Fleet Commanders, among others. Brooks noted that the ‘level of disbelief was complete’ in their inability to understand and accept Gorshkov’s strictly defensive posture at war’s outbreak. This strategy went against the long-held assumption of an aggressive campaign by Soviet submarines in a replay of the Battle of the Atlantic that had dominated the Navy’s thinking since the earliest days of the Cold War. It also went against the ingrained tendencies of American naval officers to focus on capabilities, not intentions.

Brooks believed a radical change to thinking would never have been possible – i.e., the gamble on the correctness of the withholding strategy – on the strength of


\textsuperscript{76} Brooks, 'Gorshkov’s Writings'.
the open source writings and analysis of other evidence alone. Leadership was eventually swayed by the ‘special intelligence’ (signals intelligence, human intelligence and classified writings) in recent years that had produced a high volume of material and a compelling analytical picture of how Gorshkov would use his missile submarine force in war.\textsuperscript{77} The end result, as one recent history noted, was a tipping of the ‘intellectual center of gravity’ of the US Navy against their traditional views on the Soviet naval thinking.\textsuperscript{78}

A crucial source for the admirals’ newfound trust was only evident long after the end of the Cold War: ‘submarines [had] made a deep penetration of the Soviet Navy and of the Soviet military mindset’.\textsuperscript{79} In April 2007, the Naval Submarine League sponsored the history seminar, ‘How Submarine Intelligence Collection Made a Difference – Lessons from the Past’. The major theme of the Cold War veterans’ talk was how a small corps of submariners, intelligence officers, and analysts went about changing naval strategy in the early 1980s in ‘the most significant contribution made by Naval Intelligence since World War II’.\textsuperscript{80} Rear Admiral Brooks and other presenters spoke publicly for the first time about the role of US nuclear attack submarines as stealth intelligence collection platforms in independent forward operations.\textsuperscript{81}

The operational details and methods of trailing operations remained classified, except for the public acknowledgement of a 1972 operation in the South China Sea and a published account of Operation \textit{Evening Star} in 1978 when the USS \textit{Batfish} (SSN 681) shadowed a \textit{Yankee}-II SSBN on patrol in the North Atlantic for 50 days. The article’s author noted that ‘in the spring of 1978, the Carter Administration's detente with the Soviet Union was wearing thin, and one reason was concern over Soviet missile submarines cruising off both US coasts’.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{77} Brooks interview. Also Brooks, ‘The Impact of Gorshkov’s Writings’. See also Hattendorf, \textit{Evolution}, pp. 32-33; Ford and Rosenberg, ‘Naval Intelligence Underpinnings’, (p. 390).
\textsuperscript{78} Ford and Rosenberg, \textit{Admirals' Advantage}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{79} Stout.
\textsuperscript{80} Participants included Vice Admiral Roger Bacon, USN (Ret), former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare; Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret), former Director of Naval Intelligence; Mr. Richard Haver, former Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence; with Moderator Rear Admiral Thomas Evans, USN (Ret) former Commanding Officer, USS \textit{Batfish} (SSN 681) and former Deputy Commander (Submarines), Naval Sea Systems Command.
\textsuperscript{81} Stout.
Intelligence was changing the dynamics of operations and strategy for both navies and for their perceptions of their respective technological advantages or disadvantages. Aside from the intelligence value of these trailing operations to the US of identifying Soviet vulnerabilities in undersea warfare, there was SOSUS information that the Soviets gained from the John Walker spy ring that operated through the 1970s until mid-1985 that also altered the Soviet Navy’s actions.83 This espionage, according to Rear Admiral Shapiro, revealed ‘… the great acoustical advantage that US submarines enjoyed [over the Soviets, who then] embarked on a major effort to make their own submarines much quieter. […] Admiral Shapiro believes that knowledge of our ability to track their submarines anywhere in the world's oceans made the Soviets realize that their ballistic missile submarine force, which they counted on for reliable second-strike capability, was not invulnerable’.84

Naval intelligence personnel worked closely with operators – i.e., submarine warfare officers – to determine how the Navy could use the special intelligence to rewrite war plans to put the Soviet strategic reserve in bastions at risk. Another important factor in changing culture was the presence of influencers to sway opinions on the naval staff. Senior naval intelligence officers such as Captains Bill Cockell (who pursued Soviet studies at Columbia’s Russian Institute) and William Studeman also knew the value of the writings as a key to thinking more like Gorshkov. As Brooks noted of the writings, ‘without a solid grounding in Soviet Communist doctrine, military thought, and terminology, they simply were too arcane and hard to understand. Few in the US Navy (to include within ONI) had this sort of grounding’.85

Cockell and Studeman were executive assistants to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Hayward and Vice Chief Admiral Small (respectively). As a result of their influence, Admiral Small became the most vocal proponent of this new understanding of Soviet strategy. Once persuaded by the new intelligence, he set planners to mapping out an anti-SSBN strategy. By 1981-82, the Office of Naval Intelligence took an active and visible role in reevaluating the Soviet naval threat with new eyes and renewed purpose. Of all the voices of the era, Sumner Shapiro as director was the most vocal about the impact of Admiral Gorshkov on the rivalry and what he viewed

84 Allen.
85 Brooks, 'The Impact of Gorshkov’s Writings'. 
as a turning point for the Soviet Navy. Indeed, Shapiro relished the role of ‘salesman’ of an intelligence-based viewpoint, much as Gorshkov or Lehman embraced their roles as big navy spokesmen.86

As a Russian linguist and former naval attaché to Moscow in the 1960s, Shapiro closely followed and published on Soviet naval developments for years. He was well respected by the top admirals – he was a 1949 Naval Academy classmate and friend of Admiral Watkins – and was a powerful influence in shaping the threat perceptions both inside and outside the Navy. For the Navy, Shapiro established the Soviet Doctrine Division under senior analyst (and future Deputy Director) Richard J. ‘Rich’ Haver to exploit the sensitive intelligence sources and deepen understanding of Soviet thinking. John Lehman later credited this effort with providing senior decision makers ‘a steady stream of insights into Soviet naval doctrine and strategy, the Soviets’ means of fighting a war, their strengths and vulnerabilities, their perceptions of and prejudices against the United States, and their reactions to the increasingly aggressive American navy’.87

For the Fleet, Sumner Shapiro had a sobering message on the seriousness of the Soviet naval threat and what they could expect in the coming years. As such, he was educating a whole new generation of sailors who were children when Admiral Gorshkov embarked on his naval transformation in the 1960s. In a June 1981 interview for the official magazine for enlisted personnel, the Navy’s top intelligence officer spoke of the continued growth of the Soviet Navy and how the US stood in the way of its expanding global influence. Shapiro credited the revolutionary changes he had witnessed in his career to Gorshkov, who was ‘the greatest [Russian] naval shipbuilder since Peter the Great’. Shapiro noted that the Soviets possessed high quality hardware that could surpass US technology in some areas. They were also not afraid to exploit these new capabilities. ‘Admiral Gorshkov is clearly not content to leave his ships in port’, Shapiro said. ‘He sends them to sea and, with every new addition to the fleet, the Soviet naval defensive perimeter gets farther and farther out to sea’.88

While the Soviets still had their weaknesses, such as anti-submarine warfare and underway replenishment, they continued to grow their anti-ship missile arsenals

86 Ford and Rosenberg, Admirals’ Advantage, p. 128.
87 Lehman, Oceans Ventured, p. 42.
88 Sumner Shapiro, ‘Interview with Director, Naval Intelligence: Soviet Naval Threat Is Real’, All Hands, June 1981, pp. 2-7 (pp. 3, 5).
and to add an impressive array of larger and more versatile surface platforms, such as the Kirov cruisers, and ‘cutting edge’ submarines such as the Alfa’s, Typhoon’s, and the new Oscar-class cruise missile submarines. As such, the Soviet Navy was primed for more dramatic trends in the 1980s toward a truly balanced high-seas fleet, according to Shapiro, with enhancements for amphibious landings and logistics for long-range operations. Most important, he predicted a nuclear-powered conventional carrier by the end of the decade.\(^9\)

For Congress and the American public, Shapiro also framed Soviet progress in terms of Gorshkov’s successes as its commander-in-chief and architect. ‘He has savored that rare pleasure in history of planning and then seeing through to completion a massive and successful national undertaking,’ Shapiro wrote.\(^90\) In his February 1981 testimony, Shapiro drew on his knowledge of watching Admiral Gorshkov for the past quarter century. He pointed to the implications of a ‘well-balanced’ fleet using quotes from Gorshkov’s writings and to provide his own assessment of the changing situation. He had met the Soviet chief and was professionally impressed: ‘Somehow he has convinced the Soviet leadership that they need to put the resources, the scarce resources, of the Soviet Union into building a navy that gives them an offensive capability’.\(^91\)

Shapiro walked members of the House subcommittee on sea power in open and closed sessions through the newest additions to the Soviet order-of-battle, with great detail on the latest Typhoon and Oscar submarines, to underscore his point that Gorshkov was building a great offensive navy. He also drew a picture for Congress of how the Soviet Navy could be expected to change in the 1980s and that the US government could no longer ignore this threat as it had in the 1970s. His main message on Soviet naval advances made the press coverage, which stated that his remarks buttressed the new Reagan administration’s message of a ‘dramatic increase in Navy shipbuilding’ and Secretary Lehman’s call the day before for ‘unqualified naval superiority’.\(^92\)

In Sumner Shapiro’s remarks in the early 1980s, the director of naval intelligence looked beyond painting a threat for a bigger piece of the defence budget.

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\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 4, 7. This prediction was only partially fulfilled, with the laying of the keel for CVN Ulyanovsk in late 1988 that ceased with the fall of the Soviet Union.
\(^90\) USND, 4th edn, p. 79.
or convincing admirals of the withholding strategy. He was, in fact, going on the record as detecting another dramatic shift coming out of the 1970s. He wrote that were ‘clear and unmistakable signs that the Soviet Navy is changing its orientation and its mission’. Shapiro had forcefully argued that the Soviet Navy was primarily oriented toward a sea denial mission of interdicting Allied sea lines of communications in addition to their strategic defence tasks.

Shapiro considered 1980 to be a banner year in terms of naval construction, with strong evidence that a conventional takeoff and landing carrier was coming by the end of the decade. That evidence included intelligence on the construction of a catapult and arresting gear facility in the Black Sea region in 1977 long before laying of the keel of the Kuznetsov in 1982. He told Congress of this watershed moment: ‘We've seen a complete turnaround in the Soviet Navy, particularly in the last couple of years, a shift from a purely defensive force, one that was an extension of the land armies, if you will, to one that can project power, strike the enemy, the United States’.

Shapiro’s predecessor, Rear Admiral Donald Harvey, also testified to Congress in 1977 that he detected these trends and an evolution of Gorshkov’s thinking in *The Sea Power of the State*:

… [I]ncreasingly, after looking at his writings over a number of years, one senses two kinds of trends in his writings. He begins to sound more and more like a proponent for a conventional large navy and more in the western sense. He speaks of a balanced fleet. Underlying it all I was particularly struck in “Seapower of the State” by the emphasis on carrying the battle to the enemy. Perhaps the word I am searching for is “offensive,” which is implied through out the book much more so than had been see in his earlier writings.

However, Harvey was premature in presuming that Gorshkov equated ‘fleet against shore’ with power projection and was already transitioning to an offensive

93 USND, 4th edn, p. 81.
95 United States Congress, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2970 (H.R. 3519), pp. 3-4. See also Shapiro, ‘Interview with Director, Naval Intelligence: Soviet Naval Threat Is Real’, (pp. 3, 7).
strategy with the current state of his navy. Such a radical modification of thinking was not possible until the inclusion of large-deck carriers in the Soviet naval inventory. Gorshkov was foreshadowing desired changes to strategy and missions and laying the intellectual groundwork to take on power projection opponents inside his own service. As with all of Gorshkov’s major changes, these were incremental and gradual steps.

Indeed, the Soviet Navy’s post-Gorshkov future was still a matter of heated debate in their professional literature in 1981-82, as recognized by Soviet naval analysts.97 Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, Gorshkov’s long-time protégé and ghostwriter, was being taken to task for concentrating overly much on ‘combat at sea’ and operations independent of other services – and appeared to be overreaching just as Gorshkov had with his earlier book. It proved significant that one of the strongest critics was Chief of the Navy’s Main Staff, Admiral V. Chernavin, the submariner who would become Gorshkov’s successor in late 1985. These debates demonstrated that Soviet naval thought was itself in a state of reorientation if not disarray, as well as its leadership posturing for power in the waning years of the Brezhnev era. Thus, it was perhaps expecting too much of American naval thought to find clarity on the Soviet Navy if the Soviets themselves had not yet determined their future course.

Naval intelligence’s identification of these future offensive trends and the recognition of the existing primacy of strategic defence for the Soviet Navy certainly presented a mixed message in the early 1980s. Tom Brooks, Shapiro’s later successor as Director of Naval Intelligence, explained this dilemma for the Navy’s top admirals:

But even as they came to recognize the centrality of SSBN deployment and protection to Soviet naval strategy and force employment, they were confronted by significant evidence that the Soviet Navy was now going beyond that and were, in fact, building the high-seas navy that Gorshkov had promoted. Why else would they spend the immense sums of money required to build nuclear-powered battle cruisers and nuclear powered aircraft carriers.98

Yet this new emboldened Soviet Navy with global power projection from aircraft carriers never came to pass. After Admiral Gorshkov’s departure as the new Gorbachev era began – with lessening Cold War tensions and resource constraints under a defence doctrine of ‘reasonable sufficiency’ – the Soviet Navy was in fact on a slow path to its demise in the early 1990s.

98 Brooks, 'Gorshkov’s Writings'.

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Soviet Writings and the National Intelligence Assessment 11-15-82

The Office of Naval Intelligence was highly influential in shaping public opinion and strategy formulation on the Soviet Navy in the early 1980s. However, the final say and authoritative view of the intelligence community came with the National Intelligence Estimate 11-15-82/D. This classified estimate from November 1982, coinciding with the death of Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, was remarkable for its almost Soviet-style ‘unity of views’ and lack of dissenting opinions after years of infighting among the intelligence agencies, especially over the priority of interdiction of sea lines of communication in Soviet strategy.\(^9\) It resolved all of the major questions on the current status of the Soviet Navy and provided updates on the numerous major developments since the last comprehensive estimate in 1974.

A Cold War naval historian recently called the 1982 NIE ‘earth-shattering’.\(^{100}\) The estimate established a radical new baseline for thinking about the current threat, as well as projections on what the Soviet Navy would look like by the late 1980s and into the 1990s in its strategy and programmes. It injected clarity where there had been lingering ambiguities or doubts for years. The report was particularly noteworthy because its many findings on the wartime tasks of the Soviet Navy – its primary missions of strategic strike (pro-SSBN) and strategic defence (anti-SSBN and carriers) – aligned closely with the Northern Flank scenarios described in the earlier analyses (i.e., the Welander report) and in the future Maritime Strategy. As such, the estimate ushered in a new era of American naval thought as the classified blueprint for responding to Gorshkov’s wartime strategy. Above all, it validated the view of the Soviet reliance on protected SSBN bastions in Arctic waters for at least the next decade: ‘We expect that Typhoon and follow-on SSBNs would be deployed in wartime in much the same fashion as D-class SSBNs—primarily in “havens” close to Soviet territory’.\(^{101}\)

NIE 11-15-82 used key concepts earlier identified in Soviet writings by a number of experts. Although not an exhaustive list, Table 2 is a representative sample of the large body of open source work that had preceded the collective wisdom – or the ‘official truth’ as Bradford Dismukes recently termed it – of the entire US

\(^9\) Remaining citations will be from the reprint of NIE 11-15-82/D (‘Appendix I’) in Hattendorf, *Evolution*, pp. 128-129.
\(^{100}\) Remarks by Dr. David A. Rosenberg in Huckabey, 'Notes from Red Navy Revealed Panel Discussion'.
\(^{101}\) Hattendorf, 'Appendix I', p. 150.
### Table 2. Key findings and concepts in NIE 11-15-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NIE 11-15-82 Findings</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Open Source Analysis By:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Soviets regard strategic strike against enemy land targets as the primary naval mission. (120)</td>
<td>Fleet against the shore Strategic Strike</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some SSBNs, particularly the forward-deployed Ys, probably would participate in initial strikes against the continental United States. Many SSBNs, however, probably would be withheld for subsequent strikes or as a residual strategic force. (120)</td>
<td>Bastion defence Breakout Withholding strategy Strategic reserve</td>
<td>McConnell MccGwire Welander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviets have long been concerned with the vulnerability of their submarines to ASW forces. Soviet authors frequently cite the experience of the two World Wars to reject the notion that submarines can ensure their own survival through concealed operations. (120)</td>
<td>Survivability</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...since at least the 1960s, [Soviet authors] have discussed the need to use general purpose forces, including large surface combatants, to protect and support or provide “combat stability” to ballistic missile submarines. Such writings strongly imply that providing combat stability to SSBNs is an integral part of the strategic strike mission and the most important initial wartime task of a significant number of Northern and Pacific Fleet general purpose forces. (120-121)</td>
<td>Pro-SSBN Combat stability</td>
<td>Dismukes Herrick McGruther Welander Weinland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We believe that the Soviets plan to support and protect their SSBNs through an echeloned defense in-depth. (121)</td>
<td>Blue Belt of Defence</td>
<td>Herrick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of SSBN operating areas entails attempts to control all or large portions of the Kara, Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland seas as well as the seas of Japan and Okhotsk and the area off the Kamchatka Peninsula. (121)</td>
<td>Command of the sea</td>
<td>Herrick McConnell MccGwire Vigor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Navy’s most critical defensive task is the destruction of enemy SSBNs before they can launch their missiles. The Soviets probably recognize, however, that there is a wide gap between the importance of this task and the capability of their current forces to carry it out. Soviet writings acknowledge the enormous firepower present in even a single Western SSBN, and we believe they recognize the desirability of attacking such units during the conventional phase of hostilities. (124)</td>
<td>Strategic defence Anti-SSBN</td>
<td>McConnell McGruther Welander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We believe that the Soviets will continue to regard their SSBN force as vulnerable to enemy ASW forces through the 1990s. (149)</td>
<td>Survivability Strategic ASW</td>
<td>Dismukes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet ASUW doctrine is likely to continue its emphasis on “first salvo” attacks—tracking Western surface units during the prewar period of tensions and attacking the most important of them with maximum force at the outset of hostilities. (161)</td>
<td>Battle of the first salvo</td>
<td>CIA Petersen Welander</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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102 Ibid. The quotes (page numbers in parentheses) are compared with prior open source analyses.
intelligence system. The estimate was another validation of views that had their roots in research on Gorshkov’s and other Soviet writings, and further underscored how much these analyses foreshadowed what eventually played out in real world events as reflected in official assessments. The inherently defensive nature of the Soviet Navy – one that was still without carriers in the early 1980s – that Robert Herrick portrayed in the 1960s in *Soviet Naval Strategy* and the withholding strategy identified by James McConnell in the early 1970s became the central ideas that brought all the other streams of thinking and intelligence sources together. One of the CIA’s principal drafters of the estimate, Gene Sullivan, knew the value of open source writings and the impact of Gorshkov on Soviet naval developments. He wove their importance throughout the narrative and pointed to the traditional analytical triad for support of key judgments. ‘Our examination of Soviet naval writings, exercises, and construction trends allows us to estimate the Soviet Navy’s initial wartime tasks with a good deal of confidence. […] Since the 1960s, naval exercises and writings have consistently emphasized specific offensive and defensive tasks to be performed concurrently during the first stages of a war with NATO.’ Admiral Gorshkov made several appearances in the pivotal estimate. Of note, the only direct quote from an outside source was from *The Sea Power of the State*, to show the supreme importance of strikes against strategically important targets on the shore: ‘According to Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, SLBMs give navies, for the first time in history, the capability to directly affect “the course and even the outcome” of a war’.

The estimate also acknowledged Gorshkov’s success in establishing a balanced, high-seas fleet: ‘The substantial allocation of resources for [modernization and new weapons] programs indicates a continued, and probably growing, recognition by Soviet leaders of the value of naval forces in the attainment of wartime and peacetime goals’. It continued:

The most notable trend over the decade has been an evolution toward what Admiral Gorshkov calls a “balanced fleet”—that is, a navy capable of fighting at both the nuclear and conventional levels as well as protecting state interests in peacetime. As late as the mid-1970s, the

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103 Dismukes interview.
104 Hattendorf, ‘Appendix I’, p. 119. See also pp. 118, 119-121, 124, 126, 164-165, 177.
105 Ibid., p. 120. Source citation is Gorshkov, *Sea Power*, p. 221.
Soviet Navy could be described as a fleet with capabilities maximized for a short, intense war that rapidly escalates to the use of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{107}

From the vantage point of the early 1980s, the estimate speculated on the future of the post-Gorshkov navy, which would happen within the next decade. US intelligence also factored in the impact of the Soviet Union entering a period of political and economic uncertainty that would beyond any Soviet commander-in-chief’s control and that could ultimately determine the navy’s fate. Yet the international environment and a resurgent US Navy would likely require a ‘strong naval posture’ for the foreseeable future. As for Gorshkov’s replacement, his successor would not yet have the ‘high degree of authority’, and might want some shifts in emphasis in programmes and policies, but was not likely in the near-term to make major changes that affected the navy’s role or strategy. As the estimate also accurately foresaw, Gorshkov’s replacement could be submariner who did not share his vision for continued expansion of the blue water surface fleet.\textsuperscript{108}

As for the near-term, the estimate broadly agreed with recent assessments by the directors of naval intelligence of a major shift occurring under Gorshkov to become more like the US Navy using carrier task forces for power projection. ‘We believe […] that the most significant change in the Soviet Navy during the period of this Estimate will be the achievement for the first time of an ability to project power ashore effectively in distant areas in a limited war environment – that is, one that does not involve a confrontation between the USSR and NATO’.\textsuperscript{109} However, ambitions for American-style power projection, they wrote, would be somewhat checked by the Soviet limitations in building conventional large-deck carriers with sufficient speed and numbers, as indeed came to pass. The Soviet Navy launched one carrier, the Kuznetsov, in 1990 in its final years as an operational force.

Finally, the estimate’s authors assessed, with a fair degree of prescience, that three variables would determine the future course of Soviet naval developments, and by association the US-Soviet rivalry: ‘a major Soviet ASW breakthrough, a strategic arms reduction treaty, and a severe economic crisis that forces a cut in military spending’.\textsuperscript{110} The latter two changes came to pass in the Mikhail Gorbachev era, and

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 133.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., pp. 146, 148, 179.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p. 175.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 176.
were out of the navy’s control. A technological breakthrough in ASW – namely by nonacoustic sensors via aircraft or space – meant that submarines could be detected and tracked in the broad open ocean. It could profoundly affect Soviet wartime strategy and strike at the very heart of Cold War nuclear deterrence and the invulnerability of SSBNs.

The estimate assessed such a breakthrough as unlikely, although it had been a US concern throughout the 1970s. Yet it is worth noting that James McConnell in 1985 pieced together through elliptical references in open source literature, as he had with the withholding strategy a decade before, evidence that the Soviets had or was claiming to have a nonacoustic ASW technological breakthrough in mid-1982. The reference in Soviet literature was to an American announcement of breakthrough in the near future and attributed to John Lehman. McConnell explained: ‘The projection of an American “breakthrough” in ASW should be understood as a surrogate for a projected Soviet breakthrough; that is the typical Soviet practice. Moreover, it is unlikely that Washington would be granted a potential that Moscow does not at least share, since it is inadmissible to confess weakness’.112

Ultimately, a nonacoustic ASW breakthrough did not happen by the end of the Cold War. It was not for lack of trying by the Soviets since the early 1960s. A recent analysis explained that the Soviet research effort focused on a variety of detection systems and technologies, including ‘radar, infrared, gas analysis, laser, bioluminescent effects, and magnetometric effects’. Yet while there may have been some experimental successes, the fielding of an operational system proved extremely difficult. ‘While Soviet progress in advanced, nonacoustic detection was striking during the Cold War, most Western scientists and analysts believed such efforts could be successful only under ideal ocean and atmospheric conditions. The oceans are rarely “ideal” in this context’.113

The Influence of Andrew Marshall

An unrecognized and earlier influence on the US response to Gorshkov’s navy was that of Andrew Marshall, the director of the Office of Net Assessment from

111 Ibid., p. 177.
1973-2015. From his small, yet highly influential think tank inside the Pentagon, Marshall kept a keen eye out for technological trends and asymmetries in the long-term US-Soviet political-military competition that could be exploited to US advantage and incorporated into strategic planning. He sharpened his concept of competitive strategies in the mid-1970s with the help of Navy Commander James ‘Jim’ Roche as his assistant director.114 Roche, a surface warfare officer and recent PhD from Harvard Business School, found himself immediately ‘on the same frequency’ intellectually as Marshall. Together, they crafted assessments that borrowed from the business world of rival corporations that, in the national security context, meant identifying Soviet vulnerabilities to target and imposing costs for going up against superior US technology and operational advantages.115

As part of a strategic balance study for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 1976, Marshall looked at the maritime balance and found cause for concern, particularly with the Soviet lead in anti-ship guided missiles. He wrote: ‘The simultaneous decline of our own naval force levels and the rising capability of the Soviet Navy […] have clearly caused and are continuing to cause an adverse shift in the naval balance’.116 Yet, there were still clear advantages that the US Navy, using existing or enhanced capabilities, could leverage to limit Soviet options and tip the strategic balance back in America’s favor.

Rumsfeld wanted a different way at looking at the Navy – especially the surface fleet – as Gorshkov aimed to compete more seriously with the US. The defense secretary wanted to stop the old patterns that ‘are killing us now,’ as Marshall recalled.117 Rumsfeld ‘had requested a paper on the Navy – where should it be going, what was the real strategic long-term view’. At the same time Rumsfeld was publicly calling for a 600-ship navy, he was privately asking ‘…for ideas of how one should think about the Navy we ought to be building for the future’.118

Marshall and Roche coauthored a strategy paper in March 1976, ‘Thinking about the Navy’. The paper made a number of specific recommendations for future

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117 Marshall interview.
strategic planning and messaging. To begin, it recommended that, ‘the United States openly declare its intention to maintain a “blue water” navy able to dominate the world’s oceans’. It also recommended that, because the Soviet Navy was so dependent on its submarines, the US should focus on its clear advantages in the realm of submarine noise. That meant the increased quieting of American submarines and improved detection of Soviet ones, such as with acoustic undersea sensors. Budgetary priorities should also be given to enhancing weapons guidance technology and investing in underway replenishment, where the US Navy far excelled over the Soviet Navy. What the Marshall and Roche paper did not focus on was the number or tonnage of ships when thinking about navies as the usual benchmark. It was a novel, even revolutionary, way of seeing the rivalry with the Soviets as a true competition on every level. Marshall’s technological-based approach was the quieter challenge to the Soviet naval threat that contrasted with the showy confrontation on the high seas later pursued by John Lehman.

Rumsfeld was impressed with the navy paper’s recommendations. Building on its ideas, Marshall and Roche wrote a highly influential paper, ‘Strategy for Competing with the Soviets in the Military Sector of the Continuing Political-Military Competition’ in July 1976. These were early examples of concepts that developed into the second ‘offset strategy’ under Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The strategy used advanced technology such as stealth aircraft and precision-guided munitions as ‘force multipliers’ to offset Soviet advances in conventional forces and ballistic missiles. Brown, a physicist and former colleague of Andrew Marshall’s from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and RAND, was receptive to the ideas on competition in the strategy paper. Brown also came from the research and engineering side of the Defense Department, so the focus on technology ‘tickled his brain’, according to Roche. As defense secretary, Brown understood the implications immediately.

The special relationship between the Office of Net Assessment and Harold Brown, one that Marshall deemed the ‘biggest kind of payoff’ his office had in its existence, had implications for the American response to the Soviet naval

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119 As quoted in Krepinevich and Watts, p. 123.
120 Krepinevich and Watts, p. 124.
121 Roche interview.
challenge.\textsuperscript{122} Marshall’s overarching concern at the time was the erosion of US nuclear superiority – including the Soviet deployment of new 4000-mile range missiles on the \emph{Delta} SSBNs – and indications that the Soviets were looking at ways to prevent a US counterstrike after a Soviet first strike. A recent official history noted that, ‘[t]o deter that possibility, Marshall recommended devising a strategy that played on Soviet weaknesses and forced them to make difficult choices’.\textsuperscript{123}

The naval competition with the Soviets – especially with its technologically advanced nuclear submarines and costly ASW programmes – proved to be a good test case for Net Assessment’s competitive strategies approach. Andrew Marshall had recommended to Brown that he needed to pick a warfare area in which to compete with the Soviets, given the overall negative trend in the strategic nuclear balance vis-à-vis the USSR.\textsuperscript{124} All of these aforementioned concerns explained Marshall’s specific interest in holding what appeared to be the central tenant of Gorshkov’s withholding strategy at risk.

In 1977, Marshall authored with Jim Roche an ASW assessment for Brown that was ‘probably the most immediately effective assessment that we ever prepared…’\textsuperscript{125} Their thought process and conclusions are worth quoting at length:

By that time it had become very clear that the Soviets, because of their concern about the vulnerabilities of their ballistic missile submarines, had withdrawn them into bastions areas near the Soviet Union. Roche and I became convinced and had put together some good evidence that their whole plan during the early stages of the war was not only that these ballistic missile submarines were to be kept back near the Soviet Union, but that the rest of the Soviet navy was going to be destroyed in their defense, including all the submarines, and a good deal of the defense was going to be pushed out over the sea areas. We wrote this assessment, which put the whole picture together, and then made the point to Brown that these concerns that they had about our submarines coming after their SSBNs, even though they were in the bastions, had this beneficial effect, because most of the work that people were doing assumed that the attack submarines were going to come out into the North Atlantic, and we were going to have to convoy across, and therefore we had to devote all our efforts to putting up barriers [at the GIUK gap] so they couldn't get through. [...] So we made the point to

\textsuperscript{124} Marshall interview.
him that we should reinforce the Soviet concerns, that it was of such strategic advantage to us.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 32-33.}

Marshall and Roche concluded, like CIA analysts at the time, that the long-held operating assumption that Soviet attack submarines, as their primary mission, would be used for SLOC interdiction was incorrect.

According to Marshall, a key piece of evidence and his inspiration came from the work of recently retired Rear Admiral Robert O. Welander for a defence contractor in 1975. Welander determined from a study of recent exercises that Soviet naval forces would be used to protect the SSBN bastions in a ‘large defensive bubble in the region’ in an attempt to control large ocean areas.\footnote{Marshall and Roche interviews.} Welander knew of the significance of Soviet exercises from his time as the Joint Chiefs’ liaison to Nixon’s National Security Council.\footnote{Welander left the White House under a cloud after playing a key role the Moorer-Radford spy ring scandal in the early 1970s. Michael Getler, ‘Adm. Welander Denies Telling Yeoman to Spy: Denies He Gave Order’, \textit{Washington Post}, 22 February 1974, p. A1.} He provided a background brief to Kissinger in 1971 on the Soviet naval threat to share with President Nixon. He wrote that, ‘[t]he Soviets have been conducting increasingly larger and more complex fleet exercises which progressive move further south in the Norwegian Sea, and during OKEAN, there was a considerable presence in the North Sea for an extended period’.\footnote{Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Soviet Naval Threat in Baltic and North Seas’, (3 November 1971), CREST, Record LOC-HAK-18-1-33-4.} Notably, Welander’s next report in 1977 further pointed to the existence of the bastion concept based upon Soviet writings by Gorshkov and others.\footnote{Welander, ‘The Soviet Navy Declaratory Doctrine for Theater Nuclear Warfare’.} Influenced by those findings, Marshall’s office later sponsored additional research that looked at Soviet naval exercises, like \textit{Okean}, that confirmed that the defence envelope was extending outward with each exercise.\footnote{Marshall interview.}

The Office of Net Assessment’s ASW study and any implementation of its recommendations – beyond the earlier quote to ‘reinforce the Soviet concerns [for] strategic advantage’ – remain classified, although its reception by senior policymakers is now known. Brown and his deputy secretary, Charles W. Duncan, Jr, read the assessment in early 1978. At Marshall’s suggestion, Brown and his deputy agreed to meet with Admiral Holloway, chief of naval operations, and the vice chief, Admiral Robert L. J. Long, who Marshall knew well from their time together on the CNO’s
Executive Panel. Marshall presented his findings, ‘…and the Navy at that point was unclear as to how much they should prosecute this because US policy was ambiguous as to what they should do’. Nonetheless, Marshall viewed the eventual outcome as one of his office’s ‘principal contributions’ of the period because, ‘… it had a good effect on decisions that Brown made about our policy in the naval area toward the Soviets, particularly in the ASW area’.133

In the early 1980s, even bigger changes to confronting the Soviet threat came in the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Navy Secretary John Lehman. When asked a decade later, once the Cold War was over, if he agreed with Lehman’s ‘forward strategy to defeat the Soviet fleet’, Marshall replied:

I think the basic answer is yes, but it was not clear that you could close with the carriers in the way that he had proposed. In some ways the business of this naval strategy, which was enunciated under him, was already underway in a different way as a result of things the Navy was doing, which were reinforced by the assessment […] that Brown had acted on in the ASW world.134

Andrew Marshall and his navy collaborator, Jim Roche, in the Office of Net Assessment made significant contributions to rethinking and redefining the superpower naval competition in 1975-78. The ASW assessment was the product of many analytical streams coming together to create a compelling argument for targeting Admiral Gorshkov’s weaknesses and playing to American strengths. It was also a remarkable confluence of like-minded individuals that changed the dynamics of the rivalry in ways that will be more fully understood in the future. The episode also revealed that, while the US Navy was publicly and vocally out of sync with the Brown Pentagon in mission priorities with Sea Plan 2000 and clashed with the Carter administration over naval budgets, behind the scenes there was important progress in thinking about the Soviet naval problem to take control of the perception of who was truly ahead in the naval competition.

Conclusion

In 1985, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman commented: ‘I have the best job in the world. […] I’ll stay here 28 years, just enough to outlast Admiral

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134 Ibid.
Yet with his own sudden resignation in February 1987, Lehman was not around for much longer following Gorshkov’s unceremonious retirement in December 1985. He later wrote that ‘the Soviet Navy [had] lost its master architect, its most highly influential and articulate spokesman, and a strong advocate for a powerful, globally deployed, offensively oriented blue-water Soviet fleet with vital missions beyond support of ground forces’. Lehman also called Gorshkov ‘the most unrelenting and credible advocate for matching the United States and never accepting American naval superiority….’ As navy secretary, he had used Gorshkov’s challenge to its utmost advantage for his own advocacy for a forward deployed, 600-ship navy.

Controversy continued to follow John Lehman with his resignation. He remained a polarizing figure in Washington. Indeed, a number of top admirals, especially the new chief of naval operations, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, were glad to see him go, according to media reports. It was initially unclear what would become of Reagan’s maritime superiority programme without its chief promoter. However, the Maritime Strategy remained the Navy’s guiding concept until the end of the Cold War. Lehman saw that the US Navy nearly achieved the 600-ship mark: it reached a force level high in the 1980s of 594 ships in September 1987. He “got them enough resources to keep all the Navy fraternities happy,’ observed naval expert and policy supporter Norman Friedman in 1985, “But I worry that when he goes, it all falls apart”.

Admiral Gorshkov’s departure after nearly 30 years as navy commander coincided with seismic changes by the new Kremlin leadership in the era of glasnost. “[Gorbachev] tried to lower US and global perceptions of the Soviet threat through unilateral force reductions, an aggressive campaign of promoting a new Soviet “defensive” military doctrine, and a series of arms control propaganda and diplomatic initiatives’, recalled John Lehman. Yet, Soviet naval modernization (for the time being) continued apace from the momentum of the

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136 Lehman, Oceans Ventured, pp. 176, 203.
139 Keller.
shipbuilding programmes during the Gorshkov years and the US Navy still had to address the threat through deterrence and plans to defeat it. Nonetheless, it was a greatly diminished threat compared to just a few years before.

The *New York Times* remembered Admiral Gorshkov as ‘a forceful advocate of naval power as a wartime weapon and as an instrument of foreign policy in peacetime [who] wrote numerous articles and books on these themes in the 1960's and 1970's’. In typical Soviet fashion, the Soviet press said nothing of Gorshkov’s presumed forced retirement or his many accomplishments. The defence ministry newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, indirectly announced the change of command by referring to the 57-year-old Admiral Vladimir Chernavin as the navy’s commander-in-chief as he went overseas for an official visit.

Signs of a shift in Soviet naval policies were unmistakable by 1987. These changes brought the Soviet Union’s commitment to a blue water navy after Gorshkov into question and raised the additional question of the continued need for the aggressive US forward strategy. According to one news report of the American reaction of these ‘unexpected’ changes, the Soviet Navy had scaled back its out-of-area activities to focus on defensive operations closer to home waters. There were also cuts to construction programmes and a less ambitious carrier design change (ski jump flight deck) for the one under construction in the Black Sea. “The roughly 15% drop in out-of-area deployments (exercises) this year, which was the first sharp decline after decades of growth, came as quite a shock to everyone who watches these things,” one naval intelligence analyst said. “It implies the Soviets see bigger problems closer to home, and are focusing now less on the Third World than on their ‘first’ world”.

Both Gorshkov and Lehman were unparalleled advocates for the prestige and power of blue water navies in the last stage of the sea power rivalry. Both left behind much changed naval forces and strategies from their leadership decisions. By the 1980s the US Navy and the Soviet Navy were essentially oriented for a large naval war against the other. This long-term rationale for naval growth proved to be the

140 Lehman, *Oceans Ventured*, p. 204.
source of even greater uncertainty and the undoing of much progress as the rivalry quickly disappeared by the 1990s. In the case of the Soviet Navy’s fate, its new leaders had far greater concerns with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. By 1991-92, it was ceasing to function as the sea service of a great power.

For the US, the justification for the tremendous investment in a naval buildup – framed primarily in terms of the Soviet wartime threat and not peacetime requirements by John Lehman – vanished when it was the only superpower left. Even Lehman had to admit in his 1988 autobiography that, ‘[t]here was only one good reason to build a six-hundred-ship navy, and that was to restore our maritime superiority’. Remarkably, he began to write a few years later that since ‘the Western perception of the Soviet threat … has dissipated’ deep defence cuts were inevitable. He called for massive shift of a third of the US military’s existing force structure into the reserves. Lehman’s stated reason was that he did not want the Navy to disproportionately take cuts to keep extra and unnecessary land forces under arms.

John Lehman soon led the chorus of voices for a rapid draw down because he saw no use for much of the Navy that took years to build at his urging. During congressional testimony in March 1990, he called for half of the fleet to be put in reserve and to ‘stop operating as if we are at wartime tempo’. In yet another twist to the Cold War naval saga, as the US Navy searched for its primary purpose without its main rival in the 1990s, it embraced a strategy in ‘…From the Sea’ that echoed Gorshkov’s ideas of ‘fleet against shore’ a decade before. The US Navy shifted its focus from rival fleet engagements to power projection ashore with carriers and expeditionary warfare and to operating in the littorals.

In the last publication before his death in May 1988, Admiral Gorshkov wrote a foreword for The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development, and Employment, the most significant book for the Soviet Navy since The Sea Power of the State. It called, to little avail, for preserving Gorshkov’s legacy by emphasis on fast, high-tech submarines, further investment in carriers, and the missions of destroying US SSBNs and strategic strike against Western political and military targets. To counter the

144 Lehman, Command of the Seas, p. 116.
146 Quoted in Haynes, p. 42.
Maritime Strategy, it cited the mission of ‘destroying hostile naval forces to gain command of the sea around the Eurasian periphery’.  

The almost frenetic US response to the Soviet naval threat in the final decade of the Cold War was a study in contrast to the patient, incremental approach of Gorshkov. An obituary in the British press noted that, ‘Gorshkov could hardly have known, when he set out, that he would survive in office to see nine tenths of his strategic plan put into action. But there was nothing hasty or makeshift about its conception’. As Gorshkov’s grand design reached its culmination and rapid demise in the 1980s, the US chose highly visible and often politically contentious ways of responding to the threat – as shown by John Lehman and earlier admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Hyman Rickover – or the more subtle, yet still effective long-term approach of Andrew Marshall. Each had their views shaped to a large degree in their perceptions of Gorshkov. In the final analysis, Admiral Gorshkov, by his words and actions, ultimately had his own views shaped by the American navy with his 11th-hour embrace of carriers as an essential element of balanced modern navies.

If there was an obituary for the rivalry itself, it would reflect that on the American side of the equation towards the end, there was finally the resolution of the division between those who argued that the Soviet Navy posed an overarching offensive threat to US national security and maritime supremacy that demanded a vigorous response and those who saw the threat as a primarily (strategically) defensive one. Ultimately both sides triumphed. They had their views vindicated either in strategies and official assessments after years of uncertainty – such as the withholding strategy reflected in the Maritime Strategy – or the court of public and political opinion, in the case of the 600-ship navy and the largest peacetime naval buildup in US history. On the Soviet side, Admiral Gorshkov could claim a personal victory in that most of what he pursued to build a balanced, high-seas fleet in the face of tremendous obstacles. Yet the fate of the Soviet Navy was tied to the larger forces of history and the much bigger rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West even more than the American one.

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CONCLUSION

Admiral Gorshkov, who served five Soviet leaders, is believed to have been the driving force behind the Kremlin's decision to build a fleet of submarines and surface ships to rival that of the United States. [...] Many American military officers and analysts regarded Admiral Gorshkov as an important contributor to modern naval strategy.

- Gorshkov obituary, *New York Times*¹

The sea power rivalry was the dominant force in American naval thought during the Cold War as the US read and reacted to Soviet words and actions. The rivalry centered on the visions for their navies – especially that of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. It was US maritime supremacy, and the Soviet desire to counter it, that defined the era and spurred the competition. Ultimately, the rivalry was not a terribly targeted or balanced race. The blue water navies had different force structures for their different primary missions. The Soviets never truly challenged the US in aircraft carriers, and instead preferred greater numbers of submarines and heavily missile-armed surface ships.

The unparalleled undersea race fielded faster and quieter submarines and the resource intensive anti-submarine technologies to counter them. As such, the Soviet submarine threat was the one constant throughout the entire Cold War that preoccupied American naval thought and strategic planning. Yet, it is worth noting that Gorshkov’s navy was on the path to becoming more like the American fleet by the end of the Cold War, with the construction of carriers in recognition of the realities of modern naval warfare and the balanced forces needed to contest for command of the sea. Thus, the American navy, in return, exerted a tremendous influence on Admiral Gorshkov’s own naval thinking.

It was also a nuclear age rivalry, which added a far more ominous dimension to the threat as each navy had a strategic role in targeting the other’s homeland with nuclear strikes as well as providing wartime support with their general purpose forces. The navies also had vital presence missions in the ideological clash between the communist and free worlds in an era of violent peace. The rivalry’s sudden end was also unique, if anti-climactic, as the Americans ‘won’ without ever engaging the adversary. Unlike past rivalries, no large fleet engagements ever took place during the Cold War at sea and the world was a safer place for it. Nonetheless, there were plenty of high-seas confrontations that added to the tensions of the era. Without battles, the war of words

and the dueling strategic concepts and technologies became the true legacy of the period.

The expansion of the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov’s assertive leadership partly solved the US Navy’s strategic and political problems by providing it with a purpose in uncertain times. It was a visible threat that could be sold to politicians and to the public during budgetary battles. In the final analysis, both navies needed to portray their peer competitor as menacing as possible to secure their own futures when the bigger threats to their forces often came from domestic battles for budgets and their position within the armed forces’ hierarchies and defence strategies. This was as true for Gorshkov as it was for Zumwalt. Any misperceptions, whatever their cause, in the American case bolstered the Navy’s argument for a stronger response – the answer was usually more carriers – to an aggressive Soviet adversary. The incentive, therefore, was never to be too accurate or realistic in assessing the Soviet naval threat.

There was a tendency toward inflation of Soviet naval capabilities due to intelligence estimates, political expediencies, and media coverage. Moreover, commentators based their perceptions on mirror images of the Soviet Navy with Western sea power and its concepts and theories. As an example, the divergent approaches of the American and Soviet navies to the peacetime and wartime employment of nuclear ballistic missile submarines by the early 1970s proved significant in shaping US threat perceptions. Concern over SSBN invulnerability was a major driver of thinking. The Soviet Navy opted for smaller numbers of submarines on patrol at any one time while the US Navy operated from the assumption that their technologically superior sub force, regardless of their number at sea, did not require an extraordinary degree of caution or protection in either peace or war. Even the increasingly contentious national-level assessments of Soviet strike capabilities consistently agreed that America’s own submarines, in addition to their well-designed stealth and quietness properties, were safe and could fulfill first or second strike missions because ‘[Soviet] ASW forces will be unable to locate and destroy the US ballistic missile submarine force at sea’.2 Soviet naval literature, according to a CIA survey, also mirrored the general assessment that the anti-submarine warfare problem against US ballistic missile and attack submarines remained ‘unsolved’ by the early 1970s.3

2 Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines, pp. 174-75.
Thus, the US Navy was not driven by necessity like the Soviets to contemplate or implement a withholding strategy, nor could its top leaders and strategic thinkers fully understand a navy that would adopt such a conservative strategy – especially one that appeared to mimic US naval forces and operations on many levels except for this crucially important one. The ballistic missile submarine was the Soviet Union’s capital ship, whereas the carrier reigned supreme in the US, and both navies thought and fought on this basis. This fundamental difference in strategic culture was responsible for the US Navy’s lack of receptivity and openness to the idea of a Soviet withholding strategy in the early years of the debate. It also explained the tendency to engage in the ‘admirals like us’ approach to knowing the enemy.4

Mirror-imaging and inflation of the Soviet threat resulted in misreading or distorting Soviet intentions. Analysts recognized the consequences as it was happening, yet the problem still proved difficult to overcome. Robert Herrick was among the first to speak out on the issue and to offer an alternative perspective through an evidence-based view of the threat. This perception problem was further compounded by the US Navy’s focus for decades on fighting the last big naval war – through the lens of another Battle of the Atlantic with Soviet submarines breaking out into the North Atlantic in a massive interdiction campaign. As a result, for decades the US Navy applied the American mindset and solutions to understanding the Soviet Navy’s different political and strategic environment. Naval intelligence officer Robert Bathurst came closest to diagnosing the problem when he discussed the primary role of navies in conveying signals: ‘For Western navies, signs had to have a certain dimension to attract attention. We were reacting to big ships, big guns, and big kill ratios. We tended not to react to mere words, either.’5

Further compounding the problem of interpretation was that, for much of the late 1960s and 1970s, Admiral Gorshkov was the one sending all the signals of strength against a rival consistently portrayed as losing its operational edge as well as its confidence. His American counterpart, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, further amplified Gorshkov’s signals. John Lehman finally took those signals as navy secretary and turned them right back on the Soviet Navy – sending the biggest message possible with far-reaching consequences.

Before Lehman’s Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, there were lengthy debates over the correct course of action. Part of the dilemma was the interpretability of the

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4 Ford and Rosenberg, Admirals’ Advantage, p. 77. See also Hattendorf, Evolution, p. 23.
5 Bathurst, Understanding, pp. vii-viii.
evidence that challenged extant thinking on the Soviet Navy. As Bathurst noted, there
was a special power in numbers and in big, unambiguous signs that could spur major
political and budgetary decisions. Gorshkov knew the power of signs as well, which
was why the *Okean* global maneuvers in 1970 and 1975 were in a special class of their
own in terms of evidence and impact.

The American focus on the Soviet threat remained on the overarching issue of
the naval balance, which Stansfield Turner and many others repeatedly pointed out was
more than just a ‘numbers game’. Asking who was ahead was not as useful as asking
what was required of the navy by its nation, Turner warned.6 Such numbers-based
thinking culminated in the 600-ship navy, 15-carrier mantra of the 1980s. Moreover,
there were limits to looking strictly at capabilities and defining the nature of navies and
naval missions as offensive or defensive. The growing cruise missile inventory of
Soviet Navy could be used in defence mode – in zones around the Soviet homeland – as
well as attack US carrier forces in a ‘first salvo’. However, Gorshkov’s central need to
protect and preserve the Soviet Union from American SSBNs and carriers never
captured the headlines in US newspapers or the imaginations of naval planners.

What and how much the Soviets built still needed to be reconciled with what
they wrote and how they deployed and exercised. Moreover, these three areas needed to
be in general agreement to get to ‘ground truth’. Yet evidence from these latter two
categories were also subject to various interpretations due to their inherently ambiguous
nature. For example, the convoy scenarios of *Okean* in 1975 fueled the subsequent
SLOC interdiction debates. The Gorshkov writings of the 1970s spurred more debates
over interpretations – most notably over the existence of a withholding strategy and the
authoritativeness behind it all. These were all important questions as the expertise of
numerous analysts, such as James McConnell and Michael McGwire, moved
American naval thought toward a more accurate understanding of the Soviet Navy. The
most significant contribution of Soviet naval studies was to uncover the clues provided
by Admiral Gorshkov and then to present the correct context for which other sources of
intelligence could be sought and operating concepts confirmed – i.e., a closer reading of
Gorshkov told them where else to look for additional evidence through intelligence
sources.

The nature of the Soviet Navy proved to be the most important part of the
debates before the overwhelming response of the 1980s. There were two camps on the
threat at the height of the Cold War – those who argued that the Soviet Navy was

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primarily defensive in reaction to US naval power and those who saw it as becoming increasingly offensive and oriented toward projecting power against the US and the West. Both sides came armed with evidence from Soviet sources – especially those from Admiral Gorshkov’s and other open source writings. These differences of opinion proved contentious among analysts and organizations. Yet the existence of these multiple perspectives ultimately proved healthy for the debate. The American system for intellectual inquiry allowed for analysts such as Robert Herrick to question official positions. Both sides would later claim vindication in some aspect of later Soviet writings and actions as well as their own views finally accepted in US defence policies and strategy by the 1980s.

Sergei Gorshkov’s unique role was without precedent. His writings established a dialogue for the sea power rivalry that was truly remarkable, including the commentaries in Red Star Rising at Sea by American admirals responding to Gorshkov’s views. The Sea Power of the State further secured the Soviet’s place in strategic thinking on navies. The degree to which the US Navy, aided by the media and some in Congress, elevated, and at times distorted, Gorshkov’s reputation as a naval leader and strategist meant that understanding Gorshkov’s influence and his perceived ‘grand design’ called for separating myth or exaggeration from reality.

Was Admiral Gorshkov a great strategist? The answer is not so straightforward. Admiral Gorshkov as a naval strategist is a paradox: his impact on American and Western naval thought is at once considerable and negligible.7 Gorshkov ranks among the great naval leaders of the 20th century. He was a consummate planner and political operator. There is no denying that Gorshkov profoundly influenced not only the Soviet thinking on sea power, but he also impacted the course of the US Navy during the Cold War. Gorshkov’s ideas mattered and were carefully weighed by allies and adversaries alike.

Gorshkov’s strategic solutions such as the withholding strategy tailored to the constraints of his own navy – no large-deck carriers, noisy submarines, lack of strategic ASW – were innovative and likely the best (and perhaps only) option against a superior naval force. His strategy, by that measure, was a success. He also identified the need for joint operations and the growing importance of fleet against shore operations that eclipsed fleet engagements long before American thinkers addressed it in the 1990s. Yet Gorshkov’s strategic writings lacked the longevity or application of Mahan’s or Sir

7 This view of the author held firm for the rest of the research and writing phase – summarized initially in Huckabey, ‘The Paradox of Admiral Gorshkov’.
Julian Corbett’s works. Still, those essays that reflected on naval warfare in the nuclear submarine and missile age retain a freshness and relevancy that is absent or outdated in Mahan’s theories by comparison. There is also the not-so-inconsequential matter of his works being in support of the repressive and expansive Communist state and his use of a Marxist language full of propaganda and polemic that has thankfully passed from use that also limits their utility. His appeals to Russia’s sea power potential and its tenuous claims to naval greatness also proved ephemeral – and likely helped to push the Soviet state to collapse. Gorshkov’s ideas, in retrospect, reflected a very particular aspect of Cold War thinking that had fulfilled their strategic purpose.

As a result, Gorshkov is not considered a source for timeless or universal lessons on naval strategy, nor are his works widely read or discussed in the Western maritime nations that once followed his every word so closely in the heyday of Soviet naval studies. Even a recent revival of interest in a slim, edited volume of his writings, 21st Century Gorshkov, strains to make his ideas accessible and applicable to a new generation of naval professionals. A forthcoming Gorshkov biography by noted Soviet naval experts may hopefully provide the necessary historical context with the Soviet side of his contributions being more fully explored. Continued research will put Gorshkov’s legacy into clearer perspective than could be covered in this dissertation.

To be sure, Admiral Gorshkov’s impact on American naval thought went beyond his writings. His intellectual output must be considered as coming from a larger playbook of how to project rising sea and naval power – including signals sent by exercises, deployments, and engaging with adversaries on the high-seas in close operating environments – that shows Gorshkov’s real influence and results. Ultimately, it was his overall solution to the dilemma of a weaker navy challenging a stronger naval power, while at the same time building a maritime foundation and pursuing regional and global ambitions, that was truly instructive and remains worthy of deeper historical study. His strategic genius was in taking the most relevant parts of the American playbook on ocean-going navies and crafting a unique blueprint for the use of naval power in service to the Soviet state and to counter the US threat. That aspect involved as much salesmanship as strategy. His writings also served as a cautionary tale about the need to invest in balanced fleets to meet all naval missions – both offensive and defense – and that truly great navies cannot be developed without also supporting the other dimensions to sea power.

Admiral Gorshkov understood the limits of his authoritarian state’s tolerance for naval power and tested its boundaries. To that end, he learned how to finesse its lack of
maritime heritage, was politically adroit in growing and modernizing his forces, and promoted the words and images to at least appear to successfully challenge US maritime supremacy. He persisted in pounding the square peg of sea power into a vast land power-shaped round hole. His brand of strategic leadership and intellectual engagement tied the US in analytical and operational knots for decades of the Cold War. Pardoxically, Gorshkov’s plan eventually stimulated the communist hardliner antibodies in the US that resulted in an aggressive response, which in turn made many in the Soviet power circles in the later 1980s consider that a continued rivalry with US, on American terms (carriers) and against its superior technology, was a losing proposition.
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