

# Explaining the nature of opposition in Britain to the European community since 1973

By

James Noel Currid

**EXPLAINING THE NATURE OF OPPOSITION IN BRITAIN TO THE EUROPEAN  
COMMUNITY SINCE 1973**

**BY JAMES NOEL CURRID**

**SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PhD)**

**CARRIED OUT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD'S DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS**

**BOTH European Community (EC) membership and further European**

**FIRST SUBMITTED IN MARCH 1997**

**in forms of discourse utilized by political actors in Britain's "Europe debate".** Tony Blair's writings

**RESUBMITTED IN JULY 1998**

**"Europe debate"** are used to develop an "anti-EC" discourse typology. The types identified are "pragmatic"

**ACCEPTED IN 1998**

**object of discourse in the EC's material realm,** "ideological" discourse, whose object of discourse is the EC's pre-capitalist or pre-nationalist nature; and "nationalist"

**discourse. Four objects of "nationalist" discourse are identified:** transnational, Sovereign, Britain's world-role; France; and Germany. Corresponding types of "pro-EC" discourse are also

**identified. The thesis' hypothesis is that, since 1973, "anti-EC"** discourse in British politics has primarily been "nationalist" in content. In order to develop a theoretically and historically informed understanding of the socio-political context within which "anti-EC" discourse is utilized, the thesis draws upon a Marxian

**account of British historical development ("Marx-Anderson Thesis-**

**Second Studies of Britain"); Rawlsian theories of ideology;** histories of discourse, particularly those of Foucault; and largely post-Marxist theoretical approaches to understanding the existence,

**importance and political importance of ideologies, such as British** anti-EU nationalism, which no longer serve the interests of the economic elite in society ("A latent conception of ideology").

**Based on the hypothesis, the contents and themes of the discourse** analyzed in three case studies of Britain's post-1973 "Europe

**debate": the 1975 Referendum campaign, the 1986 French** constitutional debates on the Single European Act, and the 1988-9

**round of Commons debates on the "Maastricht Treaty". The analysis**

**EXPLAINING THE NATURE OF OPPOSITION IN BRITAIN TO THE EUROPEAN  
COMMUNITY SINCE 1973.**

y become "nationalist"? In tone, particularly  
in its references to Parliamentary Sovereignty as its object of  
**JAMES NOEL CURRID.**

**SUMMARY OF THESIS:**

This thesis examines the nature of British opposition since 1973 to both European Community (EC) membership and further European integration, by analysing the forms of discourse utilised by political actors in Britain's "Europe debate". Tom Nairn's writings on Britain's pre-entry "Europe debate" are used to develop an "anti-EC" discourse typology. The types identified are "pragmatic" discourse, whose object of discourse is the EC's material costs; "ideological" discourse, whose object of discourse is the EC's pro-capitalist or pro-socialist nature; and "nationalist" discourse. Four objects of "nationalist" discourse are identified: Parliamentary Sovereignty; Britain's world-role; France; and Germany. Corresponding types of "pro-EC" discourse are also identified. The thesis' hypothesis is that, since 1973, "anti-EC" discourse in British politics has primarily been "nationalist" in content. In order to develop a theoretically and historically informed understanding of the wider social context within which "anti-EC" discourse is utilised, the thesis draws upon: a Marxian account of British historical development ("Nairn-Anderson Theses-Informed Studies of Britain"); Marxian theories of ideology; theories of discourse, particularly those of Foucault; and largely non-Marxian theoretical approaches to understanding the existence, persistence and political importance of ideologies, such as British "anti-EC" nationalism, which no longer serve the interests of the hegemonic group in society ("the latent conception of ideology"). To test the hypothesis, the contents and themes of the discourse utilised in three case studies of Britain's post-1973 "Europe debate" are examined: the 1975 Referendum campaign; the 1986 House of Commons' debates on the Single European Act; and the 1992-3 House of Commons debates on the "Maastricht Treaty". The findings

from these case studies are valid, in that, over time, "anti-EC" discourse increasingly became "nationalist" in tone, particularly in its references to Parliamentary Sovereignty as its object of discourse.

## SUMMARY OF THESIS

## LIST OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	10
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	12
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.	16
1.1: What This Thesis Is About.	16
1.2: Distinctive Features.	17
1.3: The Concept of Nationalism.	21
1.4: The concept of Ideology.	23
1.5: The concept of Discourse.	25
1.6: Nettie's typology of "anti-EC" discourse: summary and development.	27
1.7: "Pro-EC" Discourse.	30
1.8: Deciding how case studies should be analysed.	32
1.9: Deciding which case studies should be analysed.	37
1.10: What the other Chapters cover.	39
Notes.	44
CHAPTER TWO: BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE WORLD UNTIL 1973.	42
2.1: What This Chapter covers.	42
2.2: The Logic of Priority.	43
2.3: The "exceptionalism" of Capitalism.	45
2.4: Hegemony.	51
2.5: The international dimension of Britain's historical development.	57
2.6: Britain, Europe and the World: 1945-73.	70
2.7: Conclusion.	82
Notes.	83

## **LIST OF CONTENTS.**

CHAPTER THREE: "ANTI-EC" "NATIONALIST" DISCOURSE: THEORY,	1
TITLE PAGE PGS.	1
Note. What this Chapter covers.	1
SUMMARY OF THESIS	2
Note. Summary.	2
LIST OF CONTENTS	4
Note. Introducing.	4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	10
Note. Basic Poularized.	10
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	12
Note. British theorists of ideology: their work and failings.	12
<b>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.</b>	16
1.1: What this Thesis is about.	16
1.2: Utilising Nairn.	17
1.3: The concept of Nationalism.	21
1.4: The concept of Ideology.	23
1.5: The concept of Discourse.	25
1.6: Nairn's typology of "anti-EC" discourse: summary and development.	27
1.7: "Pro-EC" Discourse.	30
1.8: Deciding how case studies should be analysed.	32
1.9: Deciding which case studies should be analysed.	37
1.10: What the other Chapters cover.	39
Note. The Logic of Culture.	41
Note. Summary outline of theoretical model.	41
<b>CHAPTER TWO: BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE WORLD UNTIL 1973.</b>	42
2.1: What this Chapter covers.	42
2.2: "The Logic of Priority".	43
2.3: The "Fractionation" of Capital.	45
2.4: Hegemony.	51
2.5: The international dimension of Britain's historical development.	55
2.6: Britain, Europe and the World, 1945-73.	62
2.7: Conclusion.	70
Notes	82
	83

CHAPTER THREE: "ANTI-EC" "NATIONALIST" DISCOURSE: THEORY, HISTORY, THEMES.	84
3.1: What this Chapter covers.	84
PART ONE: IDEOLOGY.	85
3.2: Karl Marx.	85
3.3: V.I. Lenin.	90
3.4: Antonio Gramsci.	92
3.5: Louis Althusser.	94
3.6: Nicos Poulantzas.	96
3.7: Ernesto Laclau.	98
3.8: Marxian theories of ideology: their uses and failings.	100
PART TWO: DISCOURSE.	106
3.9: Linguistic approaches to the Use of Language.	106
3.10: V.N. Voloshinov.	109
3.11: "Critical Discourse Analysis".	111
3.12: Michel Foucault.	115
3.13: Michel Pecheux.	119
3.14: Theories of language and discourse: their uses and failings.	122
PART THREE: THEORISING THE LATENT CONCEPTION OF IDEOLOGY.	127
3.15: Marxian contributions to understanding the latent conception of ideology.	127
3.16: Identity and Ideology.	131
3.17: The Logic of Culture.	133
3.18: Summary outline of theoretical model.	137
PART FOUR: DISCOURSE RELATING TO THE EC.	138
3.19: The Importance of Parliament.	138
3.20: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Conservative Party.	143
3.21: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Labour Party.	146
3.22: "National Internationalism".	149
3.23: France.	155
3.24: Germany.	158
3.25: "Anti-EC" "nationalist" discourse: final comments.	160
3.26: "Anti-EC" "Pragmatic" and "Ideological" Discourse.	161
3.27: "Pro-EC" Discourse.	162

<b>3.28: Conclusion.</b>	<b>166</b>
<b>PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.</b>	
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE WORLD, 1973-93.</b>	<b>167</b>
4.1: What this Chapter covers.	167
4.2: Developments at the international level, 1973-93.	169
4.3: The Conservative Party and the EC, 1973-93.	178
4.4: The Labour Party and the EC, 1973-93.	193
4.5: Conclusion.	201
Notes.	201
<b>CHAPTER FIVE: THE 1975 REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN.</b>	
<b>CHAPTER FIVE: THE 1975 REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN.</b>	<b>203</b>
5.1: What this Chapter covers.	203
<b>PART ONE: THE LABOUR PARTY.</b>	
5.2: The Labour Party Special Conference.	205
5.3: "Anti-EC" discourse at Labour's Special Conference.	206
5.4: "Pro-EC" discourse at Labour's Special Conference.	211
5.5: Peter Shore.	214
5.6: Tony Benn.	218
5.7: Barbara Castle.	221
5.8: Shirley Williams.	221
5.9: Roy Jenkins.	224
5.10: James Callaghan.	225
5.11: <b>Tribune.</b>	227
5.12: Labour Campaign for Britain in Europe.	229
<b>PART TWO: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY.</b>	
5.13: Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome.	230
5.14: Enoch Powell.	231
5.15: <b>The Spectator.</b>	233
5.16: Margaret Thatcher.	237
5.17: Eldon Griffiths.	239
5.18: Edward Heath.	242
<b>PART THREE: CROSS-PARTY ACTIVITY.</b>	
5.19: National Referendum Campaign.	246
5.20: Common Market Safeguards Campaign.	249
5.21: Get Britain Out Referendum Campaign.	250
5.22: Britain in Europe.	252

5.23: "H.M. Government".	254
<b>PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.</b>	<b>257</b>
5.24: The nature of opposition to, and support for, continued EC membership during the 1975 Referendum campaign.	257
5.25: Relating the discourse used in the case study to theories of discourse.	259
5.26: Relating the discourse used in the case study to non-discursive formations.	262
<b>CHAPTER FIVE: THE CASE STUDY</b>	
<b>CHAPTER SIX: HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES ON THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT/EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (AMENDMENT) BILL IN 1986.</b>	<b>266</b>
6.1: What this Chapter covers.	266
6.2: The SEA's contents.	266
6.3: The SEA's passage through Parliament.	267
6.4: Methodological issues.	268
<b>PART ONE: DEBATE ON THE SECOND READING OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (AMENDMENT) BILL.</b>	<b>270</b>
6.5: Second Reading: "anti-EC" speakers.	270
6.6: Second Reading: "pro-EC" speakers.	277
<b>PART TWO: THE COMMITTEE STAGE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (AMENDMENT) BILL.</b>	<b>281</b>
6.7: "Anti-EC" opposition to the Court of First Instance.	281
6.8: "Pro-EC" support for the Court of First Instance.	284
6.9: "Anti-EC" opposition to increased powers for the European Parliament.	285
6.10: "Pro-EC" support for increased powers for the European Parliament.	291
6.11: "Anti-EC" opposition to the EC's "internal market".	293
6.12: "Pro-EC" support for the EC's "internal market".	299
6.13: "Anti-EC" opposition to tax harmonisation.	301
6.14: "Pro-EC" support for tax harmonisation.	303
<b>PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.</b>	<b>303</b>
6.15: The nature of opposition to, and support for, the SEA during the 1986 House of Commons debates on the SEA.	303
6.16: Relating the discourse used in the case study to theories of discourse.	305

6.17: Relating the discourse used in the case study to non-discursive formations.	307
<b>CHAPTER SEVEN: HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES ON THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION- "THE MAASTRICHT TREATY"/EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (AMENDMENT) BILL- "THE MAASTRICHT BILL"- IN 1992-3.</b>	<b>309</b>
PART ONE: EXPLAINING CRISIS, 1973-93.	
7.1: What this Chapter covers.	309
7.2: The contents of the Maastricht Treaty.	310
7.3: The Process of Ratification in the United Kingdom.	312
7.4: Methodological Issues.	315
PART ONE: DEBATE ON THE SECOND READING OF THE MAASTRICHT BILL.	317
7.5: Second Reading: "anti-EC" speakers.	317
7.6: Second Reading: "pro-EC" speakers.	327
PART TWO: THE COMMITTEE STAGE OF THE MAASTRICHT BILL.	334
7.7: "Anti-EC" opposition to the Social Protocol.	334
7.8: "Pro-EC" discourse and the Social Protocol.	338
7.9: "Anti-EC" opposition to European Citizenship.	341
7.10: "Pro-EC" support for European Citizenship.	345
7.11: "Anti-EC" opposition to Subsidiarity.	348
7.12: "Pro-EC" support for Subsidiarity.	350
7.13: "Anti-EC" opposition to the ECB.	352
7.14: "Pro-EC" support for the ECB.	356
PART THREE: DEBATE ON THE THIRD READING OF THE MAASTRICHT BILL.	359
7.15: Third Reading: "anti-EC" speakers.	359
7.16: Third Reading: "pro-EC" speakers.	363
PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.	366
7.17: The nature of opposition to, and support for, the Maastricht Treaty during the 1992-3 House of Commons.	367
7.18: Relating the discourse used in the case study to theories of discourse.	368
7.19: Relating the discourse used in the case study to non-discursive formations.	372
<b>CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION.</b>	<b>375</b>

<b>8.1: What this Chapter covers.</b>	<b>375</b>
<b>PART ONE: A SUMMARY OF THE NATURE OF DISCOURSE USED IN THE CASE STUDIES.</b>	<b>375</b>
<b>8.2: The nature of "anti-EC" discourse used in the case studies.</b>	<b>375</b>
<b>8.3: The nature of "pro-EC" discourse used in the case studies.</b>	<b>377</b>
<b>8.4: Returning to the Hypothesis.</b>	<b>378</b>
<b>PART TWO: EXPLAINING CRISIS, 1973-93.</b>	<b>379</b>
<b>8.5: Applying theories of identity, ideology and crisis to the 1973-93 period.</b>	<b>379</b>
<b>8.6: The Conservative Party and the EC's challenge to its collective self-image, 1973-93.</b>	<b>388</b>
<b>8.7: The Labour Party and the EC's challenge to its collective self-image, 1973-93.</b>	<b>390</b>
<b>PART THREE: POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH.</b>	<b>393</b>
<b>8.8: Britain's "Europe debate": possible research issues.</b>	<b>393</b>
<b>8.9: Comparative Research: some possibilities.</b>	<b>396</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.</b>	<b>399</b>
ECA: European Council.	
EEBC: European Economic Community.	
EEG: European Economic Grouping.	
EME: European Monetary System.	
EFIS: European Free Trade Association.	
EMI: European Monetary Institute.	
EMU: European Monetary Union.	
EU: European Union.	
FBI: Federation of British Industry.	
FBB: Federation of Small Businesses.	
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.	
GEORGE: Get Britain Out Referendum Campaign.	
GDP: Green Domestic Product.	
GMI: General Municipal and Boilermakers.	
HOC: House of Commons.	

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

- AES: Alternative Economic Strategy.  
AUEW: Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers.  
BIE: Britain In Europe.  
BSA: British Social Attitudes.  
CAEF: Campaign Against Euro-Federalism.  
CAP: Common Agricultural Policy.  
CATOR: Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome.  
CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis.  
CFP: Common Fisheries Policy.  
CIB: Campaign for an Independent Britain.  
CBI: Confederation of British Industry.  
CFP: Common Fisheries Policy.  
CMSC: Common Market Safeguards Campaign.  
CPB (M-L): Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist).  
CPGB: Communist Party of Great Britain.  
EAEC: European Atomic Energy Community.  
EC: European Community.  
ECB: European Central Bank.  
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community.  
EEC: European Economic Community.  
EEPTU: Electricians Union.  
EFTA: European Free Trade Association.  
EPC: European Political Co-operation.  
EMS: European Monetary System.  
EMU: Economic and Monetary Union.  
ERM: Exchange Rate Mechanism.  
EU: European Union.  
FBI: Federation of British Industry.  
FSB: Federation of Small Businesses.  
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
GBORC: Get Britain Out Referendum Campaign.  
GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
GMB: General Municipal and Boilermakers.  
HC: House of Commons.

**IMF:** International Monetary Fund.  
**IoD:** Institute of Directors.  
**ISA:** Ideological State Apparatus. As can, I found, sometimes be a  
**KBO:** Keep Britain Out. ~~to do it for you.~~ Furthermore, I have  
**LCBIE:** Labour Campaign for Britain In Europe. ~~lot of toll, sweat,~~ a  
**NALGO:** National Association of Local Government Officers. ~~secret~~ I  
**NATISOB:** Nairn-Anderson Theses-Informed Studies of Britain.~~ed by the~~  
**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. ~~thesis writers-~~ past and  
**NEC:** National Executive Committee. ~~one of their fellows can do~~  
**NIC:** Newly Industrialised Countries.  
**NRC:** National Referendum Campaign. ~~and writing this thesis at~~  
**QMV:** Qualified Majority Voting. ~~and demanding experience. I feel~~  
**R&D:** Research and Development. ~~and I hope that anyone who reads~~  
**RSA:** Repressive State Apparatus. ~~seen something by the end of it.~~  
**SDP:** Social Democratic Party. ~~criticity for what is contained in this~~  
**SEA:** Single European Act. ~~we to think quite a few people for their~~  
**TGWU:** Transport and General Workers' Union. ~~intellectual odyssey in~~  
**TNCs:** Transnational Corporations. ~~the thesis would have undoubtedly~~  
**TUC:** Trades Union Congress. ~~bottom of my rather large pile of~~  
**UN:** United Nations.  
**US(A):** United States (of America). ~~my First Supervision, Professor~~  
**USSR:** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. ~~and encouragement were~~  
**VAT:** Value Added Tax. ~~for me completing this thesis. The fact of~~

~~Stephens' supervision, I must particularly thank him for ensuring that I produced a worthwhile piece of work within the four year time limit set by the University of Sheffield for submitting theses.~~

I must also thank my Second Supervisor, Dr. Steve Turton, for his help, not least as a source of second opinions on various parts of my thesis at different stages of it. His "Devil's Advocate" role in going through a full draft of my thesis in late 1996, I think, as a consequence, my thesis is a stronger piece of work since Steve set his, necessarily, critical eyes over it.

In addition, some other members of the University of Sheffield's Department of Politics deserve my thanks. I would like to thank Prof. Sarah Cook, the Department's Graduate Research Student

## **FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.**

Writing a thesis such as this can, I found, sometimes be a lonely business; no-one else can do it for you. Furthermore, I have come to the conclusion after over three years of toil, sweat, a wide range of human emotions and bouts of bad language- sorry, I meant good old-fashioned English words that were suppressed by the post-1066 "Norman Yoke"- that only fellow thesis writers- past and present- really understand what one of their fellows can go through.

Having said that, I have found writing this thesis an intellectually very stimulating and rewarding experience. I feel that I have learned a great deal, and I hope that anyone who reads it will feel that they have learned something by the end of it.

Although the final responsibility for what is contained in this thesis is all mine, I have to thank quite a few people for their help, since I began this particular intellectual odyssey in September 1993. Without them, this thesis would have undoubtedly remained buried at the bottom of my rather large piles of potentially good ideas.

First of all, I must thank my First Supervisor, Professor Stephen George, whose help, guidance, and encouragement were essential prerequisites for me completing this thesis. The facet of Stephen's supervision I must particularly thank him for is ensuring that I produced a worthwhile piece of work within the four year time limit set by the University of Sheffield for submitting theses.

I must also thank my Second Supervisor, Dr. Steve Ludlam, for his help, not least as a source of second opinions on various parts of my thesis at different stages of it. His "Devil's Advocate" role in going through a full draft of my thesis in late 1996. I think, as a consequence, my thesis is a stronger piece of work since Steve set his, necessarily, critical eyes over it.

In addition, some other members of the University of Sheffield's Department of Politics deserve my thanks. I would like to thank Mrs. Sarah Cooke, the Department's Graduate Research Student

Secretary for her help with the surprising amount of paper-work that has to be completed in order to eventually submit a thesis. I must thank both Professor Andrew Gamble and Dr. Mike Kenny for sparing me some of their spare time during the early stages of the thesis, when developing a theoretical framework for this thesis sometimes felt like the quest for the Holy Grail. I have also have grounds for thanking Mike and Doctor Martin Smith for chairing one each of the two Post-Graduate Research Seminars in 1994, where I first presented at length my musings on the task ahead of me. By forcing me to sit down and make me seriously think about my work, these Research Seminars, looking back, were crucial junctures in pushing my thesis forward towards the position I have now reached with it.

Still in Sheffield, but outside of the Department, I would like to thank the staffs of the University of Sheffield Library, Sheffield Hallam University Library and Sheffield City Central Library for their help over the last few years. I must particularly thank the staff who deal with Inter-Library Loans in the University of Sheffield Library for chasing up my requests for all sorts of written material, and managing to track most of them down.

Outside of Sheffield, I must give my very sincere thanks to the University of Aston's Library Services, who allowed me in the summer of 1995 to use their facilities. In particular, they allowed me access to their Harvester Press **Britain and Europe since 1945** microfiche collection, which I spent not far off two months going through with pencil and paper. Without it, however, I would have had great difficulties in locating the empirical material which is the centre-piece of my case-study on the 1975 Referendum campaign.

I must also thank the various "anti-EC/EU" organisations, particularly the Campaign for an Independent Britain, the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism and the Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign, for their help in sending me their literature and inviting me to their meetings. I learnt a lot from them; someday, someone should write their research thesis on them, particularly as I write this, it appears that history might be on their side.

I would also like to thank the following individuals for their

help with aspects of this thesis: Philippa Sherrington, for help in suggesting some Parliamentary "Europe debates" which might be worth looking at; Steve Austin, without whom I would have avoided reading the Maastricht Treaty; and Jo Britton, for her help in both furthering my understanding of theories of identity and for being a general intellectual antidote to potential carpet chewing by me.

Last, but very far from least, I thank my parents, Jim and Jill, who stumped up the cash to pay for my tuition fees, rent, bills and general spending since September 1993. Without their backing, both financial and emotional, I would have never have had the chance to write this thesis. I fully appreciate the opportunity they have given me and I hope that, one day, I can pay them back in kind. For all their I thank them from the bottom of my heart; and they are the two people I dedicate this thesis to.

Noel Currid,  
Sheffield,  
March 1997.

#### Addendum.

Being told after my viva that my thesis would be subject to referral was almost certainly the biggest set-back of my life so far.

I would like to thank all the people (you know who you are!) who helped to get me through the last twelve months or so.

I would like to thank Professor Gaffney, Professor Gamble and Professor George for their help; in particular, Professors George and Gamble for reading parts of the revised version of my thesis, especially those concerned with theories of discourse and ideology.

I also need to thank both Professor George and Sarah Cooke as well for ensuring that I was able to still have full access to the facilities of the University of Sheffield's Library.

Thanks as well to IO for your kind (and very true!) words of encouragement.

I would still like to dedicate this thesis to my parents. I

think if I wasn't for them, this thesis would have been thrown in the River Don ages ago!

1.1.1 What does this mean?

Noel Currid,

Sheffield,

June 1998.

This should be contrasted with the following from a written evidence submitted before the Select Committee on Environment, Health and Technology on 11th June 1998 by the Campaign Committee of the Sheffield Community Rail Trust over its proposed development in favour towards further European enlargement:

The implications which will be tested in this thesis is added to elsewhere in this document in the report of the think tank

where little attention however in British politics has been paid recently to this subject.

In this chapter the political and environmental implications will be found to show the importance of the link between the typical rural and semi-rural areas of European rail travel in Britain and the environment, as well as examining the contents of the other chapters on the rail system.

The implications will then be considered. This will be the focus of the House of Lords rail review, the role of the state and regulation, the role of the rail industry, the role of private investment and market forces and the role of rail in addressing climate change. The conclusions will be drawn in section 10.

This chapter will also look at general policies which can from time to time be adopted by the industry that the EU must be allowed to continue under its original package (1.1), or the environmental impact of enlargement, the social nature of European rail travel and finally, the joint bodies, such as the European Union and the International Transport and Trade Commission.

The final section will consider the implications for the environment and society of the "green" policies adopted by political actors in Europe, such as the "green" (1.4), including "green"

## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.**

### **1.1: What this Thesis is about.**

This thesis is concerned with understanding the nature of "anti-EC" politics in Britain since 1973. In this thesis "anti-EC" is defined as opposition to British membership of the European Community (EC) (1) and to British involvement in moves towards further European integration.

The hypothesis which will be tested in this thesis in order to increase understanding of the subject of the thesis is:

**The hypothesis that discourse employed by political actors in Britain in primarily since 1973 "anti-EC" discourse in British politics has been primarily "nationalist" in content.**

In the early 1970s Tom Nairn argued that Nationalism and the EC

In this Chapter the theoretical and methodological approaches that will be taken in order to adequately address both the hypothesis and the issue of the nature of "anti-EC" politics in Britain will be addressed, as well as outlining the contents of the other Chapters of the thesis.

This Introduction will begin by examining the works of the Marxian thinker Tom Nairn on Britain and the EC (1.2), for this lays the basis for much of the thesis' theoretical and empirical framework; and the reasons for utilising Nairn's works for understanding "anti-EC" politics in Britain.

This Chapter will then focus upon theoretical concerns which stem from the opening remarks made in this Chapter. That is, the need to define the concepts of **nationalism** (1.3); **ideology** (1.4), or the social nature of ideas; and **discourse** (1.5), the social nature of language. This discussion will focus, in particular, upon the relevance of Marxian theory in understanding these concepts, since other parts of the thesis' theoretical framework are drawn from Marxian theoretical perspectives.

The Chapter will then return to re-examining Nairn's work, and developing from that a typology of the themes employed by political actors in Britain's "Europe debate" (1.6), including "pro-EC"

discourse (1.7). That is, discourse employed by political actors who support British membership of the EC or British involvement in moves towards further European integration. This is followed by an examination of how this typology can be utilised to test the hypothesis (1.8); and how the case studies which will test the hypothesis are chosen (1.9). This Introduction will conclude with an outline of what will be discussed in the other Chapters of the thesis (1.10).

## 1.2: Utilising Nairn.

The hypothesis that "anti-EC" politics in Britain is primarily motivated by nationalism originates with the arguments found in two extended essays on Britain and the EC by the Marxian theorist Tom Nairn in the early 1970s. That is, **British Nationalism and the EEC** (1971) and **The Left Against Europe?** (1973).

During the period that Nairn was writing these extended essays, Edward Heath's Conservative Government was overseeing Britain's third, ultimately successful, attempt to join the EC. This attempt was opposed by the majority of Britain's Labour Party and wider labour movement, who campaigned against the "Tory Terms" of entry.

Nairn, who very much favoured of British entry (Thompson, W., 1992, pp.314-16), wanted to explain why, at that particular historical juncture, Britain was joining the EC, while most of the Labour Party opposed entry. After examining the use of language by Labour political actors opposed to EC entry during the 1960s and early 1970s, in fora such as Labour Party Conference debates and pro-Labour publications, Nairn argued that Labour's opposition to EC entry was primarily motivated by "nationalist" assumptions (Nairn, 1971, pp.9-10).

Consequently, Nairn offers a possible reason why there was such opposition to Britain's EC entry, and why there has been so much opposition since British entry in 1973 to staying in the EC or participating in further European integration. His argument that "anti-EC" politics in Britain is primarily based upon nationalist attitudes should be one that can be empirically tested. As will be

discussed in detail in Section 1.6, this appears to be the case, as Nairn's writings do suggest possible alternative reasons why "anti-EC" politics exists in Britain.

Apart from providing a hypothesis to account for the nature of "anti-EC" politics in Britain, there are two other good reasons to use Nairn's works as a basis for exploring the nature of British "anti-EC" politics.

First Nairn's works and arguments have set the parameters of investigation for much subsequent research about British "anti-EC" politics (Featherstone, 1981; 1982; Newman, M., 1983; Grahl and Teague, 1988; Tindale, 1992). These studies have generally endorsed Nairn's view that opposition inside the Labour Party towards British membership of the EC and further European integration is based primarily upon "nationalist" attitudes. Indeed, Featherstone (1981; 1982) has produced empirical evidence that, in the late 1970s, Labour MPs hostile to the EC held "nationalist" viewpoints similar to those Nairn expounds in his essays. This thesis can, therefore, be regarded as contributing to an academic debate on the nature of Britain's "anti-EC" politics, begun by Nairn, which also examines the empirical validity of his claims about British "anti-EC" politics.

The second reason for utilising Nairn's works stems from the emphasis placed by theorists of discourse upon the need to place discourse within a wider contemporary and historical context, so as to fully understand the reasons why and how particular forms of discourse occur and are utilised by social actors. As van Dijk (1997a, p.29) argues, "Discourse should...be studied as a constitutive part of its global, social and cultural contexts." Similarly, as will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.12, Foucault (1974, p.50) argues that "discursive formations" can only be understood in relation to "non-discursive formations", such as economic practices, institutions and political events." As Fairclough (1989, p.23) comments, "The whole is society, and language is one strand of the social..."

The point made by discourse theorists is that without a wider context to place discourse in, the analysis of discourse is flawed

either on the grounds of having a tendency to be ahistorical, or it abandons any links between social processes and language use, as Eagleton (1991, pp.203-20) argues is the case with "post-Marxist" theorists. Consequently, the issue that arises from the imperative to place the study of discourse within a wider context is whether Nairn's arguments can be placed within such a context; one that places discourse in a theoretically informed social and historical context.

Nairn's works and arguments can be placed in such a context. Both **British Nationalism and the EEC** and **The Left Against Europe?**, and the historical and theoretical perspectives which inform them, draw much of their intellectual debt from a series of writings from the mid-1960s, commonly known as "the Nairn-Anderson theses." Written by Nairn (1965; 1972) and Perry Anderson (1965) from an avowedly Marxian-Gramscian theoretical perspective (Forgacs, 1989, pp.75-7), the "theses" attempted "to develop a coherent historical account of British society" (Thompson, E.P., 1965, p.311) in order to understand why:

- (i) Britain had been in relative economic decline since the late Nineteenth Century;
- (ii) Britain's strength as a world power had declined during the Twentieth Century; and
- (iii) no British political actors had yet been able to halt or reverse the process of decline.

Since the early 1970s, both Nairn and Anderson have returned to, and expanded upon, the themes to be found in the original "theses" (Anderson, 1987; 1992; Nairn, 1979; 1981; 1988b; 1993). Furthermore, a number of other writers have since the 1960s used certain historical and theoretical perspectives contained in the "Nairn-Anderson theses" to inform their own work on various aspects of Britain's political, economic and social development (Barnett, 1982; Elliott, 1993; Gamble, 1988; 1990; Ingham, 1984; 1988; Leys, 1985; 1989; Longstreth, 1979; MacInnes, 1987; Newton and Porter, 1988; Overbeek, 1980; 1986; 1990). There can, therefore, be said to

be a substantial number of "Nairn-Anderson Theses-Influenced Studies Of Britain" (NATISOB). Consequently, there exists a body of work in NATISOB which can be used to develop a theoretically informed account of the wider historical context in which Britain's pre- and post-entry debates about the EC took place. Consequently, an account of Britain's historical development in this thesis is developed which draws heavily, but not exclusively, upon writings in the NATISOB tradition. Another important influence upon the wider historical account to be found in this thesis include writers who use Marxian-Gramscian concepts to inform their studies of international politics, as Nairn and Anderson used Gramsci as a means of understanding British politics (Gill, 1990; van der Pijl, 1984; 1991).

Both the original "theses" and NATISOB are far from being accepted as the most valid approach for understanding British historical development. Indeed, much of this criticism has originated from within the Marxian theoretical tradition (Thompson, E.P., 1965; Poulantzas, 1967; Johnson, 1976; Barratt Brown, 1988; Callinicos, 1989; Meiksins Wood, 1991). These criticisms might, it seem, raise doubts about the wisdom in turning to NATISOB in order to better understand the wider context in which Britain's "Europe debate" took place.

Whatever their fidelity to the canons of Marxian theory, the fact remains, however, that NATISOB and Marxian-Gramscian informed works on international politics do provide a theoretically informed account of Britain's historical development which provides a context with which to understand British "anti-EC" politics. Moreover, it is only by utilising such models and accounts of historical developments to inform theses and hypotheses is it possible to ascertain the extent to which these models and accounts of empirical reality have any validity in the first place.

With a Marxian theoretical approach being utilised in order to provide an account of British historical development to place the existence of British "anti-EC" politics and discourse in it, it would appear logical and consistent, if at all possible, to utilise

Marxian theory to define and understand other theoretical concepts employed in this thesis. That is, the concepts of nationalism, ideology and discourse.

In attempting to use Marxian theory in relation to these concepts, limits to the applicability and explanatory value of Marxian theory, suggesting that this thesis should employ other, non-Marxian, approaches, will be proposed in the next three Sections.

Marxian theorists are also aware in being unable to define the concept. Most well-known writers on nationalism,

### **1.3: The concept of Nationalism.**

Sabot-Nelson (1977) and Colletet (1983), have difficulty in doing so. Marxian theorists

Neither **British Nationalism and the EEC** nor **The Left Against Europe?** define "nationalism". Nor does Nairn define the concept in his other main theoretical discussion of nationalism (Nairn, 1981, Chapter 9). Nairn's inability to define nationalism appears, however, to be just one facet of a wider malaise within the Marxian theoretical tradition. As Nairn (1981, p.329) admits, "The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure."

The reasons why this is so are complex and a matter for much debate. Partly this failure of Marxian theory has resulted from its difficulties in analysing ideologies, such as nationalism, which cannot be easily categorised as serving a single economic class, exemplified by Marx's "incomprehension of much of the nature of the latter epoch in which he lived", most notably the rise of nationalist sentiments and movements throughout Europe (Anderson, 1976, p.114). It appears that the problems which Marxian theory has had in approaching ideologies such as nationalism have been further compounded by the Leninist belief that all forms of non-socialist consciousness held by the working class result from its narrow self-interest or material corruption (John Callaghan, 1987, pp.4-11); and the inability of Marxian theory to understand why social actors, whether individually or collectively, apparently need to feel a sense of national identity. Since the 1930s, the need for Marxian theory to embrace psychological theory to help understand the continued appeal of ideologies such as nationalism has often been made; most notably by those sympathising with Marxian theory,

such as Wilhelm Reich (1975) and members of the Frankfurt School, like Marx Horkheimer (Jay, M., 1973, pp.100-1). Consequently, it is appropriate to indicate here that non-Marxian models which attempt to theoretically explain the existence, persistence and political influence of nationalism will be examined to overcome this major gap in Marxian theory.

Despite the deficiencies in the Marxian theoretical approach to nationalism, Marxian theorists are not alone in being unable to define the concept. Most well-known writers on nationalism, including notable non-Marxians such as Seton-Watson (1977) and Gellner (1983), have preferred, in common with Marxian theorists such as Hobsbawm (1992), to describe aspects of nationalism, rather than define the concept.

In the absence of alternatives, the definition of nationalism used in this thesis is provided by Anthony Smith (1976, p.1), who defines it as:

"...an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, cohesion and individuality for a social group deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation."

Smith (1976, pp.1-2) also describes nationalism as both an ideology and a movement which aspires to "nationhood", defined by three basic ideals:

- (i) autonomy and self-government for the group in a sovereign state;
- (ii) solidarity and fraternity of a group in a recognised territory or home; and
- (iii) a distinct, unique culture and history peculiar to the group.

In Section 3.26 the extent that Nairn's analysis of British "anti-EC" nationalism, or the aspects he describes, conforms to Smith's general definition of nationalism, will be examined. With the weakness of Marxian theory to understand nationalism clearly demonstrated, the issue arises of how useful Marxian theory may be

in defining and understanding the concept of ideology.

Anti-American social theorists, approached ideology by laying the

#### **1.4: The concept of Ideology.**

In common with Anthony Smith, nationalism is regarded by many writers in both political and social studies as a form of ideology (Roberts, 1971, p.133; Abercrombie et al 1988, p.162). In order to understand the nature of "anti-EC" nationalism in Britain it would seem reasonable, therefore, to further theoretical understanding of this phenomenon by discussing the nature of ideology and to suggest that Marxian theories of ideology, although far from completely adequate for fully understanding the nature of British "anti-EC" nationalism, should be utilised in this thesis to understand the concept.

Valid objections can be made against trying to use any form of Marxian theoretical perspectives to understand the concept of ideology and, hence, of British "anti-EC" nationalism. To begin with, there appear to be many ways in which ideology can be defined. As McLellan (1995, p.1) notes, "Ideology is the most elusive concept in the whole of social science. For it asks about the bases and validity of our most fundamental ideas". Indeed, McLellan declares that ideology is a prime example of W.B. Gallie's idea of "an essentially contested concept...a concept about the very definition (and therefore application) of which there is much controversy". This lack of agreement within social studies over defining ideology is also noted by Eagleton (1991, pp.1-2), who gives "at random" a list of fifteen different definitions of the concept. It appears, therefore, that apart from being seen as concerned with the role of ideas within society, there is little consensus within social studies about what defines ideology.

Moreover, differences about approaching the concept of ideology can be seen as being further coloured by an individual's perceptions about society's fundamental normative coda. For instance, McLellan (1995, pp.7-8) declares that there are two basic views of ideology within social studies during the last two centuries. One view, originating with the views of the original

French "ideologues" and shared by Emile Durkheim and many Anglo-American social theorists, approaches ideology by laying its emphasis upon the consensual nature of society and truth, as well as upon the importance of being able to observe empirical reality. The other view, originating with Hegel and developed within the Marxian theoretical tradition, approaches the study of ideology by laying the emphasis upon whether ideology is true or false rather than empirical observation. Furthermore, rather than being held together by stable consensus, society is seen as a changing entity driven by conflicts.

With ideology evidently being a concept which is extremely difficult to define, and its study being so coloured by how consensual or conflictual one sees society as being, it may appear extremely problematic to try, at least initially, to use the Marxian theoretical tradition exclusively to understand ideology. Apart from the logical consistency in utilising Marxian theories of ideology in a thesis which already draws most of its theoretical approach from Marxian thought, there are two other valid reasons for arguing that the Marxian theoretical tradition should be utilised to try and understand the concept of ideology.

First, it is the Marxian theoretical tradition which has, historically, been the one that has been most concerned with the concept of ideology. For instance, Eagleton (1991, p.133) argues that "Most theories of ideology have arisen from within the materialist tradition of thought", of which Marxian theory has been the most important exponent; while McLellan (1995, p.31) states that "until comparatively recently, discussions of ideology were not prominent in non-Marxist social and political thought."

Second, the Marxian theoretical tradition is far from monolithic in its approach towards the concept of ideology. Consequently, the Marxian tradition reflects the differences and concerns about ideology to be found within non-Marxian social studies. To begin with, the concept of ideology within the Marxian theoretical tradition has been just as much an "essentially contested concept" as it has been within non-Marxian social studies. As Larrain (1983, p.1) comments, there is no single Marxian concept of ideology.

Moreover, Eagleton (1991, p.3) notes that within the Marxian theoretical tradition there is a split about approaching ideology which reflects an important division within non-Marxian approaches to the concept. That is, one approach is preoccupied with ideas of true and false cognition, and seeing ideology as illusion, distortion and mystification. The other approach, in contrast, is concerned more with the function of ideas within social life than whether they are true or false ideas. Consequently, in exploring Marxian approaches to ideology, not only is the theoretical tradition which has been most concerned with ideology being employed; it also means that issues about ideology which preoccupy non-Marxian social theorists, such as whether ideas within society should be seen primarily as forms of illusion or as having a social function, are also addressed within the Marxian theoretical tradition.

Consequently, in Chapter Three, Part One the concept of ideology, defined as the social nature of ideas will be discussed with reference to the theories of Marx himself, as well of those of his intellectual disciples, Lenin, Gramsci, Althusser, Poulantzas and Laclau, with special attention being given to demonstrating how their theoretical insights may be of relevance for analysing British "anti-EC" nationalism.

With a stronger case being made for utilising Marxian theory to understand the concept of ideology, the issue arises of how the Marxian perspectives of much of the thesis relate to the concept of discourse.

### **1.5: The concept of Discourse.**

Even with the development of a theoretically informed approach to the concept of ideology, the issues arise of how ideological themes appear, and influence human actions, within the language that humans use. To be more specific, one must attempt to develop a theory of discourse, defined as the social nature of language, in order to explain how ideologies can be identified within language; and how ideologies gain meaning in, and through, the use of

language.

As this thesis is attempting to use a broadly Marxian theoretical outlook in order to inform its findings, it is reasonable to declare that any theories of language which might be of relevance or use to this thesis should attempt to explain or investigate the nature of language by accepting its social and materialist essence. It has been suggested in the last two Sections that it might not be possible to develop a purely materialist theory of language. The Marxian theoretical tradition is, however, correct to emphasise that ideology is an important aspect of social existence, and, therefore, in the context of this thesis the social nature of language should be accepted. This particular assumption is shared by those theorists who describe their studies of language as "discourse analysis". For instance, for Fairclough (1989, p.20) discourse is "language as a form of social practice"; Eagleton (1991, p.195) defines the concept as the play of social power within language itself; and Macdonell (1986, p.12) argues that language only has meaning "in the concrete forms of different social and institutional practices".

Apart from emphasising that language has a social nature and context, there is no single agreed means of studying, or even defining, discourse. As van Dijk (1997a, p.1) observes, "the notion of discourse is essentially fuzzy." Furthermore, general use of the term is somewhat different from that used in social studies; outside of social studies, discourse generally refers to spoken language, or, more specifically, to a form of language use or public speeches (van Dijk, 1997a, p.1).

If analysis of the use of language in Britain's "Europe debate" is to advance beyond mere description of what has been said or written, it is necessary to examine various ways in which discourse could be analysed in a manner which is not theoretically inconsistent with the generally Marxian theoretical approach used so far in this thesis. That is, it is theory, which while not specifically Marxian in outlook, emphasises the social context within which language takes place, and how ideology is transmitted and acquires meaning within the use of language.

There appear to be strong grounds for taking such an approach. There are various theorists whose approaches to language and discourse are compatible with the overall theoretical approach of the thesis. For instance there is Ferdinand de Saussure's work **Course in General Linguistics** (1974), published in 1916, which is the basis for various forms of linguistics; "the father of...discourse analysis" (Eagleton, 1991, p.195) V.N. Voloshinov, and his 1930 work **Marxism and the Philosophy of Language** (1973); so-called "Critical Discourse Analysis" (CDA) (cf Fairclough, 1989; Wodak, 1989b; van Dijk, 1997b); the theoretical approach of Michel Foucault (1974; 1980a; 1980b; 1981; 1994); and that of Michel Pecheux (1982).

In Chapter Three, Part Two these theorists and theoretical approaches, and their applicability to the thesis will be discussed at length. It merely needs to be noted at this juncture in the thesis that a number of theories of language and discourse exist which are potentially compatible with the wider Marxian theoretical framework of the thesis.

With this extended survey of, and discussion about, the applicability of Marxian theory to the thesis completed, it is possible to return to Nairn's original arguments about the nature of "anti-EC" politics in Britain.

#### **1.6: Nairn's typology of "anti-EC" discourse: summary and development.**

In his works, Nairn identifies four different "nationalist" themes within the language employed by "anti-EC" political actors during the 1960s and early 1970s in expressing their opposition to Britain entering the EC. These are:

- (i) the need to defend British Parliamentary Sovereignty from the threat which the EC presented to it (Nairn, 1973, pp.50-2);
- (ii) "national internationalism", based upon a professed belief that EC membership would restrict Britain's world-role,

traditionally pursued outside the EC's geographical and institutional parameters (Nairn, 1973, pp.63-75);  
(iii) anti-French attitudes (Nairn, 1973, p.65); and  
(iv) anti-German attitudes (Nairn, 1973, p.72).

With these four forms of "anti-EC" nationalism identified by Nairn, a basis exists to develop a typology of "nationalist" discourse employed by "anti-EC" political actors. One could expect to identify within such "nationalist" discourse expressions of language based around the need to defend British Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC; expressions of "national internationalism", opposing the EC as a threat to Britain's "traditional" world-role; language expressing anti-French attitudes; and language expressing anti-German attitudes.

The hypothesis of the thesis stresses that it is testing the evidence to see whether "nationalist" discourse is the **primary** form of "anti-EC" discourse expressed by "anti-EC" British political actors. In order to prove the hypothesis, there must be other forms of "anti-EC" discourse to compare with "nationalist" discourse. Nairn's work can be used, however, as a basis for comparing the saliency of different forms of "anti-EC" discourse.

Nairn admits that he identified two other types of "anti-EC" themes, although he regards these very much as subsidiary themes. First, there are arguments employed by anti-entry political actors claiming that the material costs of joining the EC would outweigh the benefits. Second, there is a theme employed in labour movement debates that the EC membership would threaten the development of a socialist economic system in Britain (Nairn, 1971, p.22).

Utilising Nairn, two other types of "anti-EC" discourse can be identified and their employment by "anti-EC" political actors can be compared to that of "nationalist" themes.

First, there is discourse which emphasises the material costs of EC membership or further European integration will outweigh the material benefits. Such material costs can include adverse effects upon the material prosperity of individuals, industries, geographical areas or Britain as a whole. Such discourse will be

called "**pragmatic**", since referral to the language of cost-benefit analysis suggests that it would be possible to argue in a rational manner that the material benefits of EC membership or further European integration could outweigh the material costs.

Second, there is discourse which can be described as "**ideological**", which should not be confused with the theories of ideology, such as nationalism, discussed in Section 1.3 and Part One of Chapter Three. "Ideological" in this context is meant in the same way that Daniel Bell (1960) uses the term in **The End of Ideology**. That is, "ideological" discourse is language which is permeated by the concepts of "Left" versus "Right" or "Socialism" versus "Capitalism". In the context of "anti-EC" Labour Party politics which Nairn largely focuses upon, "ideological" discourse is that which emphasises the anti-socialist, pro-capitalist nature of an EC preventing the development of a socialist economic system in Britain.

Although, as the title of **The Left Against Europe?**, suggests, Nairn mostly concentrated upon the "anti-EC" attitudes of much of the Labour Party, he did not totally ignore "anti-EC" politics in and around the Conservative Party. Nairn argues that the opposition inside the Conservative Party to Britain's EC entry in the early 1970s used similar language to their equivalents in the Labour Party, such as appealing to the defence of British Parliamentary Sovereignty and "national internationalist" traditions from the EC (Nairn, 1971, pp.4-5).

This suggests that a typology of "anti-EC" discourse developed from Nairn's writings would reveal the utilisation of similar themes by both Labour and Conservative "anti-EC" political actors. It could be anticipated that the same type of "nationalist" and "pragmatic" themes would be used by both political actors from both Parties. The only significant difference in the content of Labour and Conservative "anti-EC" political actors would be their employment of "ideological" themes. That is, Conservative "anti-EC" political actors, instead of describing the EC as an anti-socialist, pro-capitalist organisation, like their Labour counterparts, would instead label it a pro-socialist,

anti-capitalist one.<sup>1</sup> certain historical junctures it has been considered whether Britain should join the EC; at others

In summary, by developing Nairn's categorisation of "anti-EC" language, three types of "anti-EC" discourse can be identified. First, "nationalist" discourse, based four themes of defending British Parliamentary Sovereignty; "national internationalism"; anti-French attitudes; and anti-German attitudes. Second, "pragmatic" discourse, emphasising the material costs of the EC. Third, "ideological" discourse, emphasising the pro-capitalist or pro-socialist nature of the EC, depending upon the political standpoint of the particular political actor.

### 1.7: "Pro-EC" Discourse.

All debates need at least two sides for there to be an argument, and Britain's "Europe debate" is no exception. However, two issues need to be addressed when considering "pro-EC" discourse in the context of this thesis. That is, whether "pro-EC" discourse should be examined; and if so, what typology of "pro-EC" discourse should be adopted.

Addressing the first issue, there are sound theoretical grounds for examining "pro-EC" discourse in this thesis. Linguistic theory since de Saussure (1974, p.121) has emphasised that particular systems of language are defined in relation to their opposites. Applying this insight to this thesis would suggest that "anti-EC" discourse can only be defined in relation to the existence of "pro-EC" discourse.

Furthermore, by examining the themes of "pro-EC" discourse it may be possible to increase understanding of "anti-EC" discourse on the grounds that they must share some common assumptions. As Laclau (1977, p.161) argues, conflict between antagonistic social actors at the level of discourse can only occur if there is a "common framework of meaning", since "this background of shared meanings...enables antagonistic discourses to establish their difference."

Furthermore, the nature and subject of Britain's "Europe debate"

are provisional. At certain historical junctures it has been concerned with whether Britain should join the EC; at others whether Britain should stay in the EC; and at others whether Britain should participate in moves towards further European integration. Consequently, British political actors' positions towards the EC are provisional and can change, either as a result of their own agency and volition, or as a consequence of changes in the EC's institutional structure, Britain's relationship with the EC or wider changes in the structure of "non-discursive practices" at either the domestic or international level. Consequently, the labels "anti-EC" and "pro-EC" are a large extent provisional, and can only be applied to discourse or political actors in the contexts of particular historical junctures. To study one form of discourse necessarily means having to study the other, particularly when Pecheux's (1982, p.113) argument that different discourses both coexist and overlap with each other is taken into account.

On the subject of how a typology of "pro-EC" discourse should be developed, on the grounds of consistency it would appear consistent to apply similar criteria to its study as one applies when scrutinising "anti-EC" discourse. In practical terms, this would mean developing a typology based around the assumption that "pro-EC" discourse would accentuate the positive features of the EC where "anti-EC" discourse dwells upon the negative ones.

In the spheres of "pragmatic" and "ideological" discourse, it is simple to define "pro-EC" discourse. Such "pragmatic" discourse is that which argues that the material benefits of EC membership and further European integration for Britain's economy and people outweigh the material costs.

"Ideological" discourse from "pro-EC" political actors would be based around, from the viewpoint of Labour political actors, the claim that the EC is a pro-socialist, anti-capitalist institution. The "ideological" discourse employed by "pro-EC" Conservatives would, in contrast, describe the EC as a pro-capitalist, anti-socialist institution.

If, as a general principle, a typology of "pro-EC" discourse can be developed as a mirror-image of "anti-EC" discourse, does this

principle extend to the development of a "pro-EC" discourse equivalent to the "nationalist" discourse utilised by "anti-EC" political actors.

It is possible to define a "pro-EC" equivalent to the "nationalist" discourse used by "anti-EC" political actors by utilising the theoretical insights of Foucault (1980, pp.131-3), who argues that every society has a "regime of truth" creating "a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements." The argument developed in this thesis is that the "regime of truth" within British society until recently was based upon assumptions that lend themselves more easily to the assumptions behind the use of "nationalist" discourse by "anti-EC" political actors than to any form of "pro-EC" discourse. From a perspective informed by Foucault, "pro-EC" political actors have a choice to accept this **regime of truth**, utilising a discourse imbued with the same "nationalist" themes as found in "anti-EC" discourse; not to address in any way the nationalist themes to be found in "anti-EC" discourse, and treat the subject as **taboo**; or to develop a discourse based upon a new regime of truth, which explicitly rejects the themes found in "anti-EC" nationalist discourse. The "pro-EC" response to the use of "nationalist" discourse by "anti-EC" political actors will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.26. Hence it will only be noted at this juncture in the thesis that "pro-EC" discourse which utilises the existing regime of truth will be defined as "**counter-nationalist**", and any that is drawing upon a new regime of truth will be defined as "**Euro-Federalist**".

With the development of both "anti-EC" and "pro-EC" typologies of discourse, it is possible to concentrate upon how these typologies will be utilised to test the thesis' hypothesis.

#### **1.8: Deciding how case studies should be analysed.**

The first criterion for deciding how the language used in the case

studies of Britain's "Europe debate" should be analysed is that they must have taken place in the public sphere and be on the public record. This is because Nairn utilises publicly available discourse to provide support his arguments in **British Nationalism and the EEC** and **The Left Against Europe?**

The second criterion is that the publicly available discourse analysed should be speeches, articles and other published material by political actors. This is not only because Nairn utilised such material. It also offers a good means of understanding the reasons why political actors took up their particular positions in the "Europe debate". In the case of speeches, as van Dijk (1992, pp.108-9) argues:

"such discourse, perhaps more than any other discourse, is 'for the record.' All speeches are recorded and published...speeches, therefore, are seldom spontaneous, and are usually carefully prepared, written statements read out loud."

Such arguments are even more applicable to published material such as journal, magazine and newspaper articles, pamphlets and leaflets. These types of written material are seldom spontaneous; are carefully prepared; and are meant to be read and consumed by a public audience.

With the type of material containing discourse to be analysed having being established, the issue arises of the sort of methodology by which such discourse should be analysed.

Temporarily putting aside the various theoretical approaches to discourse mentioned in Section 1.5 and to be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, Part Two, there appear to be two main approaches to analyse the language employed by political actors in a particular case study. The first way is by employing quantitative methods. That is, to count the number of times at a particular historical juncture use certain words, phrases or themes in their language. Wodak (1989, p.xvii) argues that using a

method that indicates "how much is said about" an object or subject defines "classical content-analysis". (pp.35-6, 36-7) From

However, by only using the quantitative methods of content analysis, the researcher provides no context, either social or historic, for the words, phrases or themes that he or she is counting and tabulating. In the context of this thesis, quantitative content analysis on its own would be unable to account for the saliency of, or shifts over time in, the prominence of the various forms of discourse employed by political actors in the three case studies examined in the thesis.

The second major approach to analysing political language utilise qualitative methods (Billig et al, 1988; O'Shea, 1984; Schwarz, 1984; 1986; Wright, 1984). However, much of the literature utilising this approach, while giving the use of political language a wider context, has its failings. Admittedly, it is very good at showing the rhetorical methods in political discourse (Edelman, 1964; 1971; Hirschman, 1991). Furthermore, writers on the subject are able to show the reader examples of discourse which backed up their central arguments. However, such methods of analysing political language are weak because:

- (i) they are unable or unwilling to establish criteria to measure the use of other themes o used in a speech or article;
- (ii) they do not give empirically testable indications to show if other themes were being utilised in the language used in the same arena, such as a journal or conference debate; and
- (iii) they give no guidance about how one can analyse the contents of two examples of language use taken at different times from each other.

Whatever their many other strong points, Nairn's writings on Labour's debates on EC entry contain prime examples of such failings in qualitative approaches to the use of political language. For instance, he quotes extracts from speeches by Tony Benn, Hugh Gaitskell, Clive Jenkins and John Stonehouse (Nairn, 1971, pp.10-11) from Labour's 1962 Annual Conference, and extracts

of speeches by Michael Foot, Clive Jenkins, Jack Jones and Peter Shore (Nairn, 1971, pp.22-4; Nairn, 1973, pp.58-9, 86-7) from Labour's 1971 Special Conference on EC entry. All declare their opposition to entry on various "nationalist" grounds. Yet Nairn does not indicate to the reader if any of these apparently "nationalist" speakers used "ideological" or "pragmatic" forms of "anti-EC" discourse in their speeches. Nor does he give any indication what other speakers, whether opposing or supporting EC entry, said, or how many of them said what. Nairn (1971, p.11) argues that in 1962, the Party Conference was "emotionally reunited in nationalistic fervour", but unless the whole debate is examined for the frequency that various forms of discourse were used by speakers, the only evidence available to support Nairn's assertions is a few anecdotes. As has been argued elsewhere (Currid, 1996, pp.10-16), examination of the entire 1962 debate on EC entry shows that speakers were both much more divided over entry, and the reasons for taking their particular stances, than Nairn indicates.

Moreover, Nairn shows that certain speakers used certain forms of "nationalist" language in both the 1962 and 1971 debates. Yet he does not show the extent to which the comparative saliency of the various forms of "nationalist" language use cited increased or fell. Nor was there any real indication given of changes in the frequency that nationalist, "pragmatic" or "ideological" themes were used in 1971 compared to 1962. In fact, the evidence suggests that between 1962 and 1971 there was an increased use of "pragmatic" discourse by speakers on both sides in Labour's "Europe debate" (Currid, 1996, pp.17-21).

This methodology adopted in this thesis to analyse the discourse employed by political actors in the case studies draws upon a combination of content analysis and the theoretical approach to discourse taken by Foucault.

Employing the principles of content analysis, each case study will focus upon particular media, whether individual speeches, debates, articles, pamphlets, paragraphs or sections of documents. After deciding which of these are "anti-EC" or "pro-EC" in

content, they would be examined for examples of the various forms of "nationalist", "pragmatic" or "ideological" discourse. These would then be counted and tabulated, so demonstrating the prominence and saliency of particular themes in the discourse employed by political actors in the case studies.

Moreover, the theoretical approach to analysing the language employed in the case studies is strengthened by the utilisation of some of Foucault's concepts of discourse. As discussed in greater detail in Section 3.12, four of the concepts Foucault utilises to understand discourse are **objects of discourse** (Foucault, 1994, p.44); **discursive formations** (Foucault, 1994, p.38); **systems of dispersion** (Foucault, 1994, p.37); and **statements** (Foucault, 1994, p.107). Foucault differentiates between the specific objects or subjects discourse refers to; the discursive formations defined when such an object is established as the focus for such discourse; the system of dispersion which reflects the hierarchy within a discursive formation; and the statements, which make up the discourse through having semiotic value with meaning to others.

Applying Foucault's four concepts to analysing the case studies, the objects of discourse are those objects which discourse can be built around, such as Parliamentary Sovereignty, Britain's world-role, France, Germany, the material costs of EC membership, or its perceived capitalist or socialist nature; discursive formations are the types of discourse, such as "national internationalist", "pragmatic", or "ideological", built around such objects, and provide a criteria by which statements can be categorised, counted and tabulated; the systems of dispersion show the sub-types of statements within a discursive formation, such as statements with "national internationalist" semiotic meanings referring in particular to, say, the Commonwealth, international free trade or the "Special Relationship" with the USA, which can themselves be identified, counted and tabulated; and statements are the individual words, phrases and themes to be found in speeches, articles or documents which have semiotic value, and be categorised, counted and

tabulated by discursive formation, according to the object of discourse they are referring to.

With the criteria established for analysing the discourse utilised in the case studies, it is possible to decide which historical junctures in Britain's post-1973 "Europe debate" should be analysed as case studies.

### **1.9: Deciding which case studies should be analysed.**

First, a "cut-off" point for the period to be examined should be established, if its commencement has been identified as Britain's EC entry in 1973. As the 1992 Treaty on European Union renamed the EC as the European Union (EU) in November 1993, it appears logical not to cover the period following the Treaty's final ratification in the Summer of 1993. Otherwise, the period analysed would be one where political discourse would have to be categorised as either "anti-EU" or "pro-EU".

Once the period to be examined ran from 1973 to 1993 had been established, it seemed appropriate that a case study should be made of a historical juncture from each of the three decades that Britain's EC membership covered. This would allow the measurement of changes in the emphasis and saliency of the various forms of discourse used in Britain's "Europe debate" over time, and test the robustness of the thesis' hypothesis at more than one historical juncture. Moreover, such historical junctures would be ones that were undoubtedly junctures that were crucial turning points in securing either Britain's continued EC membership or British participation in further moves towards European integration.

Moreover, as the thesis is designed to examine examples of "anti-EC" and "pro-EC" discourse emanating from both main parties, it would be appropriate to avoid making case studies from internal party disputes over the EC. Hence, Labour's disputes over Britain's continued EC membership in the 1970s and early 1980s and internal Conservative debates over the EC's future, interesting as

they were, would be inappropriate subjects for this particular thesis.

Furthermore, the historical junctures to be chosen as case studies also had to be ones where actors, on the whole, would not be obsessed with using one particular form of discourse, or even one sub-type of discourse, like "national internationalism", to the exclusion of all others. Consequently, the 1977-8 Parliamentary debates on direct elections to the European Assembly were not made the subject of a case study, since it could be strongly anticipated that the debate would revolve almost around the extent to which MPs thought direct elections would threaten British Parliamentary Sovereignty. It would be surprising if Parliamentary debates on the EC not containing some references to Parliamentary Sovereignty; but case studies in this thesis should be debates on issues that would encourage MPs to talk about more than just that.

Consequently, the three historical junctures, and the associated debates, in Britain's "Europe debate" between 1973 and 1993 which best fitted the criteria outlined for potentially fruitful case studies are:

- (i) the 1975 Referendum campaign about whether or not Britain should stay in the EC. Those political actors in this case study advocating a "No" vote, and hence British withdrawal from the EC, are defined as "anti-EC"; while those calling for a "Yes" votes are considered to be "pro-EC";
- (ii) the 1986 House of Commons debates on the Single European Act (SEA). Those MPs voting against the SEA are defined as "anti-EC", while those for the SEA are considered to be "pro-EC"; and
- (iii) the 1992-3 House of Commons debates concerning the Treaty on European Union, better known in British political debate as the "Maastricht Treaty". In these debates, defining which MPs are "anti-EC" and "pro-EC" is a difficult issue to resolve, as is differentiating the Maastricht Treaty from the Maastricht Bill. These methodological issues are fully explored in Section 7.4. At this stage of the thesis it just needs to be noted that the

starting point for defining "anti-EC" and "pro-EC" political actors in this case study is that those MPs opposed to the **Treaty as a whole**, and voted against the Maastricht **Bill** are treated as "anti-EC"; while MPs who did not vote against the Bill are considered to be "pro-EC".

With the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the thesis fully outlined, it is possible to outline the contents of the other Chapters.

#### **1.10: What the other Chapters cover.**

The Chapter structure of this thesis is based upon a combination of the Marxian argument that ideas and language can only be understood in their material, social context; and the arguments of various theorists of discourse that the use of language can only be understood as a facet of wider social processes. Consequently, those social processes which can be characterised either as the Marx's (1988d, pp.389-90) "base" or Foucault's (1994, p.162) "non-discursive formations" will be examined and discussed prior to examination of, respectively, the "superstructure" or "discursive practices". The other guiding principle over the structure of the thesis is that the Chapters are in historical order, in that Chapters Two and Three are largely concerned with the historical period up to Britain's EC entry in 1973, and Chapters Four to Seven concentrate upon the 1973-93 period.

With the broad structure of the thesis outlined, it is possible to briefly outline the contents of the various Chapters.

Chapter Two is concerned with discussing the non-discursive practices which provided the parameters for Britain's historical development up until Britain's EC entry in 1973. This account draws largely, but not exclusively, upon works in the vein of NATISOB. A number of theoretical concepts, such as hegemony and capital fractions, will be discussed in order that the theoretical underpinnings of NATISOB can be fully understood. Chapter Two is also designed to provide an account of Britain's historical

development which can be drawn upon to suggest the origins of the four aforementioned types of "anti-EC" nationalism, as well as to suggest why Britain joined the EC at the particular historical juncture that it did.

Chapter Three is concerned with providing a theoretically informed discussion to explain the origins, existence, persistence and political importance of British "anti-EC" nationalism. It not only examines the origins and development of this social phenomenon within British historical development, but also attempts to theoretically explain British "anti-EC" nationalism as an ideology; as a discourse; and the conditions allowing for its genesis, persistence and political importance. Chapter Three also discusses the nature of "pro-EC" discourse.

Chapter Four is a discussion of non-discursive practices, analysing British historical development using NATISOB, but this time for understanding the 1973-93 period. One reason for developing this account is to try and provide the means by which it is possible to anticipate and explain during this period shifts in the saliency of the various forms of aforementioned discourse.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven examine "discursive practices" during the 1973-94 period.

Chapter Six is the case study analysing the discourse used during the 1975 Referendum Campaign.

Chapter Six is the case study examining the discourse used during the 1986 House of Commons debates on the SEA.

Chapter Seven is the case study examining the discourse used during the 1992-3 House of Commons debates on the "Maastricht Treaty".

Chapter Eight, the Conclusion, begins by summarising the findings from the empirical case studies, and the validity of the thesis' hypothesis. There is then a discussion of how successful the theoretical model for explaining the existence, persistence and political importance of "nationalist" politics has been in accounting for the saliency of the discourse found in the case studies. The Conclusion ends with suggestions about various ways in which this thesis could inform and encourage new research,

including various outstanding issues concerning Britain's "Europe debate" which are not adequately addressed in this thesis.

### 2.1 *Theoretical Chapter* covers:

With the theoretical approach and perspectives of the thesis, and its empirical concerns, having been outlined, it is possible to begin examining the non-discursive formations influencing Britain's historical development, from the perspective of NATISOB, and its relationship to "anti-EC" politics in Britain. While pinpointing those periods and events which would contribute to the

**Note.** Some of the various forms of "anti-EC" nationalist sentiments in Britain discussed in Chapter Three.

(1) Sometimes, the EC has been referred to, not least by political actors in Britain's "Europe debate" as "the European Economic Community (EEC)", "European Communities" or "the Common Market". From 1967 until the provisions of the "Maastricht Treaty" turned it into the European Union, the EC was a widely used name for the merged EEC, European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) (Europa Publications, 1991, p.37). In this thesis, the term "EC" will be used except when quoting recorded discourse.

In addition, the validity of using NATISOB and the works of scholars such as Hearn (1979) and van der Valk (1984, 1991) to inform this thesis should be judged by the extent to which these works can be used to adequately explain the course of Britain's historical development and inform the thesis as a whole.

In analysing Britain's historical development the common approach to be found in NATISOB is to use Marxist theoretical concepts in order to understand the relative rise, then relative decline, of Britain's economic and political position in the world during the last three hundred years or so. At the same time, while a common feature of NATISOB is a conviction that "a generally Marxist model of Britain's condition is sufficient", this conviction is qualified by a belief that "it has to be a historical and specific model", where, Hearn (1979, pp.51-5) says, "over-explanation to avoided."

The four concepts discussed at length in different sections of this Chapter, are as follows:

First, the effects of the angle of priority on Britain's later development (2.2).

## CHAPTER TWO: BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE WORLD UNTIL 1973.

### 2.1: What this Chapter covers.

This Chapter focuses upon non-discursive formations, by providing an account of the historical development of British society within the capitalist world-system. This account is designed to explain why Britain felt compelled to join the EC in the early 1970s, while pinpointing those periods and events which would contribute to the existence of the various forms of "anti-EC" nationalist sentiments in Britain discussed in Chapter Three.

Chapter Two is divided into a number of Sections. Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 will provide a general account of British capitalism's historical development up to 1945, structured around four main theoretical concepts prominent both in NATISOB and in works which use Gramscian concepts to interpret historical developments in the capitalist world-system. As was argued in the Introduction, the validity of using NATISOB and the works of writers such as Gill (1990) and van der Pijl (1984; 1991) to inform this thesis should be judged by the extent to which these works can be used to adequately explain the course of Britain's historical development and inform the thesis as a whole.

In analysing Britain's historical development the common approach to be found in NATISOB is to use Marxian theoretical concepts in order to understand the relative rise, then relative decline, of Britain's economic and political position in the world during the last three hundred years or so. At the same time, while a common feature of NATISOB is a conviction that "a generally Marxist model of Britain's condition is sufficient", this conviction is qualified by a belief that "it has to be a historical and specific model", where, Nairn (1979, pp.52-3) says, "over-abstraction is avoided."

The four concepts discussed at length in different Sections of this Chapter, are as follows.

First, the effects of the **logic of priority** on Britain's later development (2.2). The concept of the "logic of priority" is

Second, the **fractionation** of capital (2.3).

Third, the use of the concept of **hegemony** to explain events in Britain (2.4).

Fourth, the need to take the effect of the international capitalist economy and state system into account fully if developments at the national level are to be explained fully. This account also draws upon the concept of hegemony, this time to explain events at the global level (2.5).

Section 2.6 will again largely focus upon the aforementioned concepts and the works of NATISOB and writers using Gramscian concepts to understand the capitalist world-system. These will be used to inform a discussion of the reasons, both at the domestic and international level, behind Britain's initial rejection of closer links with Western Europe in the post-1945 period, and its subsequent attempts in the 1960s and early 1970s to join the EC. It will be argued in this Chapter, and be further reiterated in Chapter Three, is that only by understanding the particular features of Britain's historical development, including the unique features of British and/or English national consciousness, can the existence and persistence of "anti-EC" nationalist discourse in Britain from 1973 onwards be understood.

## **2.2: The Logic of Priority.**

This account by discussing the concept of the logic of priority as it is the most distinctive theoretical concept found informing NATISOB, as it is the one concept outlined above which most jars with orthodox Marxian thinking on Britain's historical development. For instance, in **Capital** Marx (1988e, p.416) took Britain as his model for future attempts at capitalist industrialisation, and told his German readers "**De te fabula narratur!**" [The story is about you!]. In contrast to Marx, a strong theme in NATISOB is the argument that Britain's historical development, including its "model" of capitalist industrialisation is unique, and cannot be easily repeated by others. Furthermore, this cannot adequately be understood unless the concept of the "logic of priority" is

grasped. Nairn (1981, p.18) puts this point as follows:

"Actual repetition and imitation are scarcely ever possible whether politically, economically, socially or technologically, because the universe is already too much altered by the first cause one is copying."

Consequently, drawing upon NATISOB, one should expect major differences between Britain's historical development as a capitalist country, and those that came into existence after it. This phenomenon Nairn (1981, p.14) and Overbeek (1990, p.38) call the logic of priority.

The concrete manifestations of the logic of priority in Britain's historical development as a capitalist society are listed by Overbeek (1990, pp.38-9) as:

- (i) being the first country to have a bourgeois revolution;
- (ii) being the first country to have a capitalist ruling class;
- (iii) being the first country to industrialise;
- (iv) being the first country to have an industrial proletariat; and
- (v) being the country to create the modern world market.

Developing the concept of Britain enjoying the logic of priority, while not pre-empting arguments presented later on in this Chapter, it is possible at this stage to outline some reasons why Britain industrialising first had the unintended consequence of ensuring that other attempts at industrialisation did not follow the "British model" that Marx outlined in *Capital*.

For instance, Britain had a relatively long period of continuous capitalist development before industrialisation began. Consequently, industrialisation was a process which occurred over a relatively long period; much longer than any subsequent industrialising country had to build up its strength (Anderson, 1987, p.29). Industrialisation in Britain was a spontaneous, piecemeal and gradual process seen more as a means of making money rather than as a precondition for national economic survival; the latter being the view which was taken by Britain's future economic

rivals. Due to Britain benefiting from the logic of priority, the British state did not have a historically ingrained disposition to systematically promote or guide industrialisation (Anderson, 1987, p.37).

Another consequence of Britain enjoying the logic of priority in developing a capitalist economy and industrialising first was an attachment to the market, the untrammelled operation of which both at home and abroad guaranteed British capital large profits. Subsequent attempts at industrialising were informed by a belief that, left to itself, the market has a **cumulative**, rather than a **corrective**, effect on economic development. That is, without interference in the market, weaker industries and economies can neither survive nor develop. British capital rarely took this economic world-view as it benefited hugely due to the strength of itself and the coercive power of the British state (Anderson, 1987, p.72).

Those were two examples of how benefiting, initially at least, from the logic of priority, Britain's historical development has been unique. As will be argued throughout this Chapter, this logic is seen by NATISOB as having other marked effects, Overbeek (1990, p.39) comments, upon Britain's "class structure, the politico-institutional structure of the...state...and the prevailing ideological climate."

### 2.3: The Fractionation of Capital.

An important theme in NATISOB is that the idea of a monolithic, capitalist class, with unproblematic, commonly agreed interests and goals is a myth. NATISOB argue that capital as a whole has been, and is, sharply divided by divisions based on different types of capital. This process has been called the **fractionation** of capital (van der Pijl, 1984, pp.4-8; Poulantzas, 1976, p.77-85), and is drawn upon the original utilisation of the concept of class fractions in Marxian theory: Marx's (1988c, pp.79-81) The

## **Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte**, published in 1852.

There are two, overlapping, ways of looking at capital's fractionation. One is at a very general level. Overbeek (1990, pp.234) uses the work of fellow Dutchman Ries Bode to suggest that fractions of capital can be conceptually distinguished by five major criteria:

- (i) the functional-institutional forms of capital, such as commercial, landed, banking and industrial capital. This will be discussed further below;
- (ii) the use-value of production. That is, the means of production used to produce surplus-value and profit for the capitalist;
- (iii) the "productivity of conditions" in different branches of production. That is, whether the emphasis of capitalists is on producing absolute or relative surplus-value;
- (iv) the specific relation of capital towards the position of labour and the working class in both the work-place and society at large; and
- (v) the geographical orientation of different capitalists.

Out of these various possible fault-lines within the capitalist class, (i) and (v) will be most important for the purposes of this study.

In particular, a common theme in NATISOB is that divisions between productive capital and commercial capital are of crucial importance in attempting to understand the reasons behind Britain's relative economic decline. In arguing so, Anderson (1987, pp.21-5) claims that both Marx and Engels vaguely recognised that major divisions between the interests of commercial and productive capital existed in Victorian Britain, in addition to recognising the existence of frequent conflicts of interest between productive capital and commercial banking throughout the rest of Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Cohen, 1995).

The differences between productive and commercial capital are important, argues Overbeek (1990, pp.25-7), because both capital fractions as essential for the continuous reproduction of the

process of accumulating capital. Productive capital, which consists primarily of manufacturing and mining industries, however, is primarily interested in ensuring the continuity of production and the sale of its products as commodities.

In contrast, commercial capital, which primarily consists of banks, insurance companies and trading companies sees its interests as being primarily served by the free movement of capital and the convertibility of currencies. Consequently, commercial capital has a structural tendency to support liberal economic policies both at home and abroad, and, often to the irritation of productive capital, sees no particular reason to invest in the domestic economy.

Overbeek argues, however, that productive and commercial capital can themselves split, often on the lines suggested by Bode. Overbeek argues that some elements of commercial capital can have closer links with domestic productive industry than others; different banks orientate themselves towards different parts of the globe; and productive capital can be split, often between the differing interests of long-standing and newer industries.

NATISOB argue that in Britain the process of capital fractionation began much earlier than elsewhere. Capitalism in Britain began to emerge in the late Medieval period. The pressures of the Hundred Years War with France on the fortunes of the English feudal economy led to the peasantry revolting against feudalism, most notably in 1381. The disruption caused to the feudal system by such class conflict led to a divorce of the direct producers from the means of production in England at a much earlier stage than in the rest of Europe. Consequently, in the Fifteenth Century a capitalist system in English agriculture began to emerge, based upon wage labour and an orientation towards the market. Agricultural productivity markedly increased (Anderson, 1987, p.28).

NATISOB see the development of agricultural capitalism in Britain as being further aided by the "Wars of the Roses", which exhausted the strength of most of the feudal nobility to intervene

in the national political arena. Consequently the ruling Yorkist and Tudor dynasties were able to build up a relatively strong central state in England by the end of the Fifteenth Century, a process strengthened by the formal subordination of the Church to the Crown after 1536 (Gamble, 1990, p.44). In the relatively stable domestic political system of the Sixteenth Century agricultural capitalism was able to grow and prosper even further.

NATISOB argue that the Seventeenth Century saw this growth threatened by the existence of the Stuart dynasty, particularly in the form of Charles I, who wanted an Absolutist monarchy in England similar in form to those emerging throughout Europe in response to the decline of feudalism. Such an Absolutist regime would have introduced economic policies reminiscent of feudalism, and so interfere severely with the development of a fully capitalist society in Britain. The resulting tensions between the interests of the Crown and pro-capitalist sections of society led to political conflict in Britain between 1642 and 1688 (Anderson, 1965, pp.14-15). Politically, as discussed further in Section 2.4, the eventual result of the Civil Wars, Republic, Restoration and "Glorious Revolution" was to prevent the emergence of an Absolutist regime in Britain, and the shifting of the locus of the state's authority and policy-making powers from the Crown to Parliament (Gamble, 1990, pp.65-7). Economically, the two capitalist fractions to benefit from these upheavals were agricultural capital and merchant capital, based upon the City of London.

After 1688 Agricultural capital was able to oversee a full-scale "Agricultural Revolution" in the English countryside, based upon the large-scale spread of the enclosure of land and heavy investment in the most advanced agricultural methods available. By the mid-Eighteenth Century agricultural capital had established the most efficient and productive farming system in the world, effectively destroying the English peasantry in the process (Anderson, 1965, p.16; Anderson, 1987, p.28). The City had, in the meantime, established itself as the centre of world trade (Anderson, 1987, pp.32-3). Moreover, many merchants had abandoned their class fraction and invested in estates, while many landowners

had moved into colonial and trading adventures. This led to a permanent, if partial, interpenetration of the "moneyed" and "landed" interests in Eighteenth Century Britain (Anderson, 1965, p.16).

In the 1780s productive capital, based upon manufacturing and mining emerged in Britain, mainly as a consequence of the activities of agricultural and mercantile capital. The "Agricultural Revolution" provided both an economic surplus for investment in industry, and destroyed the peasantry as a class, therefore creating surplus labour for newly emerging industry in the towns. Meanwhile, the overseas expansion of mercantile capital, discussed in Section 2.5, provided sources of raw materials and markets for British goods (Anderson, 1965, p.17).

Consequently, the first British industrialists emerged into a socio-economic system which was basically capitalist in outlook. As a result, conflicts between productive capital and the existing capital fractions were of an **intra-class**, rather than of an **inter-class**, nature (Anderson, 1965, pp.18-19).

One argument found in NATISOB, however, is that from the late Eighteenth Century onwards, as industrial capitalism developed and technological innovation facilitated the emergence of new industrial sectors, six distinct fractions within British capital emerged, as well as the preexisting capital fraction based upon the City of London and agriculture. Each of these six newer capital fractions would have their own supporters within Britain's bourgeoisie, not least from various political actors. These six fractions are:

(i) **Liberal Bourgeoisie.** Based upon the first generation of industrial capitalists in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries, such as coal, textiles and shipbuilding, and the petit-bourgeoisie, such as the self-employed and shopkeepers. The Liberal Bourgeoisie tended to support liberal economic policies, such as free trade, while being rather hostile to both state intervention in the economy and to organised labour. In the latter case, this was due to the Liberal Bourgeoisie largely being made up

of labour-intensive industries dependent for their profits upon work-forces used to low wages and long hours;

(ii) **Social Imperialists**. This capital fraction emerged in the late Nineteenth Century as a result of increasing competition from overseas, with its support initially based around heavy industry, particularly arms manufacturers and other "metal-bashers" of the West Midlands. Social Imperialists tended to support protection of the Imperial economy and state aid for industry. In contrast to the Liberal Bourgeoisie, Social Imperialists were rather conciliatory towards organised labour and its demands, such as increased state welfare provision;

(iii) **Empire Free Traders** emerged as a distinct capital fraction in the late Nineteenth Century with considerable support amongst colonial capital, particularly in Asia, and from shipping firms. Empire Free Traders tended to be militant supporters of laissez-faire and the Empire;

(iv) **Atlantic Liberals** emerged after the post-1865 "boom" in railway building in North America and were initially supported by iron and steel firms benefiting from this "boom". Atlantic Liberals tended to be just as supportive of the Empire and laissez-faire as Empire Free Traders; in the long-run, however, they saw these goals as only being secured by Britain reaching some sort of agreement with the USA;

(v) **State Monopolists** emerged around and after World War One. This capital fraction was based upon the "new" industries developing at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, such as chemicals, electrical engineering, as well as iron and steel after 1914. Not only strongly supportive of protectionism, state intervention and deals with organised labour, State Monopolists also tended to be more pro-European in their outlook than the other capital fractions; and

(vi) **Corporate Liberals** emerged during the inter-war period, based around industries dependent upon mass production and mass consumption of their products, most notably cars. Like the Atlantic Liberals, Corporate Liberals tended to be pro-USA and pro-free trade, but they also supported domestic welfare programmes, state

economic intervention and compromises with organised labour.

Two comments can be made here. First, as will become clear in both this Chapter and later on in this thesis, as other Western capitalist economies developed, similar capital fractions, with their supporters within the wider national bourgeoisie, emerged in those countries.

Second, NATISOB maintain that, despite the emergence of various capital fractions in Britain from the late Eighteenth Century onwards, none would go on to gain the leadership or hegemony over British society from the "moneyed" and "landed" interests which existed in Britain before the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, argue NATISOB, this capital fraction, which from the late Nineteenth Century onwards concentrated its economic activities upon the City of London, continued to heavily influence, with rare interruptions, the economic priorities of both the British state and society as a whole. In achieving these aims, NATISOB highlight what they see as this capital fraction's strong structural links with that section of Britain's bourgeoisie who supplied the majority of the recruits for the majority of the posts available in the upper echelons of the civil service, judiciary, military and, since its formation, the Conservative Party. This process of achieving "hegemony" over British society, as found in NATISOB, is further discussed in the next Section.

#### **2.4: Hegemony.**

Discussing fractions of capital, however defined, would be of little consequence for this study if they did not affect events in British political history. Yet a recurring theme in NATISOB, as suggested at the end of the previous Section, is that struggles between different capital fractions, as well as between the capitalist class as a whole and the working class, need to be understood if the unique nature of Britain's historical development as a capitalist society is to be understood. To try and achieve this, NATISOB turn to Gramsci's concept of hegemony.

~~particular material interests in capitalist society (1).~~

Gramsci argues that, in the last instance, the ruling social groups in Western capitalist societies use coercion and force to prevent dominated, or **subaltern**, classes or social groups from seizing power. He argues, however, that the general, day-to-day rule of capital and its political representatives in "Western" societies functions through the actual consent of subaltern social groups to being ruled (Gramsci, 1986, p.238). Consequently, any attempt in the West by a subaltern social group to overthrow the dominant social group needs to gain leadership over society as a whole. Gramsci describes the process of acquiring leadership over society, and being recognised by the rest of society as leading them, as achieving hegemony.

Furthermore, Gramsci (1986, p.161) argues that the process of achieving hegemony over society is a process of constant struggle for the dominant social group. A dominant group needs to offer subaltern groups incentives and concessions to maintain their support and its position within society:

~~social group can strive to become a hegemonic one in society, with its aims open to all. Gramsci~~  
~~group aspiring to be hegemonic, it must be based on the universal interest of all social groups. This is because the~~  
~~equilibrium should be formed..."~~

In securing hegemony, Gramsci sees a social group having to go beyond its narrow, sectional "**economic-corporate**" interests to achieve hegemony, and must present its particular interests as being in the universal, **ethical-political**, interest of all social groups. At the same time, however, the dominant group has to protect fully its essential **economic** interests when compromising with subaltern groups (Gramsci, 1986, p.161):

~~the dominant group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity, and this is done by protecting its economic interests, while at the same time, the~~  
~~subaltern group can strive to become a hegemonic one in society, with its aims open to all. Gramsci~~  
~~group aspiring to be hegemonic, it must be based on the universal interest of all social groups. This is because the~~  
~~equilibrium should be formed..."~~

Consequently, Gramsci sees hegemony as ultimately defending

particular material interests in capitalist society (1). As Poulantzas (1976, p.16) argues, at a conceptual level, hegemony is not just achieved by a social group winning "the battle of ideas" in the ideological sphere of society; it is also achieved by dominating activities in the economic sphere and dominating the political sphere through control of the state apparatus.

Gramsci (1986, p.55) also discusses how subaltern social groups adapt to existing society. To begin with, whatever their level of group consciousness, "Subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of the dominant groups", whether this is in the economic, political or ideological sphere.

Faced with the dominant social group, Gramsci (1986, p.160) argues that subaltern groups have two strategic options. First, they can be an economic-corporate social group, attempting to pursue its collective interests and goals wholly within the existing social system. In pursuing this goal, a social group puts forward its narrow, sectional interests in the hope that the dominant social group takes account of these demands. Second, a social group can strive to become a hegemonic one in society, with its aims presented as an ethical-political challenge to the status quo. Gramsci (1986, p.182) says that the development of a social group aspiring to hegemony over society is "conceived of, and presented, as being the universal motor of a universal expansion...a development of all the national energies."

NATISOB see an alliance of agricultural and mercantile capital which emerged in the Seventeenth Century as creating a hegemonic **dominant bloc** (Anderson, 1965, pp.30-1) within British society. This bloc's hegemony was secured in the aftermath of the collapse of the Stuart dynasty in the 1688 "Glorious Revolution". Instead of establishing a parliamentary democracy with universal suffrage, the agricultural capitalists concentrated political powers in their hands by providing the personnel for the entire central state. The "aristocracy" provided army officers, civil servants and parliamentarians, and the City merchants were willing to accept this state of affairs (Nairn, 1981, pp.25-6; Gamble, 1990,

pp.65-7).  
In 1832 destroyed the possibility of the Liberal Bourgeoisie's original existence.

NATISOB argue that by the time of the "Industrial Revolution", Britain had been ruled for almost a century by a dominant bloc with total political, economic and ideological hegemony over Britain. In contrast, the Liberal Bourgeoisie, the first capital fraction to emerge from Britain's industrialisation, proved generally willing to pursue its interests at a purely economic-corporate level.

In NATISOB several reasons are put forward to explain the Liberal Bourgeoisie's outlook. First, as mentioned in Section 2.3, it owed much of its original existence to the existence of agricultural and mercantile capital. A second reason, closely connected to the first, is that the Liberal Bourgeoisie emerged into an already existing capitalist economic system. Third, the "Industrial Revolution" also created an industrial working class, which both industrialists and the dominant bloc feared would take their property from them. Combined with the threat of working class insurrection being supported by France between the 1790s and 1815, the Liberal Bourgeoisie felt a strong collective need to rally around the existing social status quo in Britain (Anderson, 1965, p.18). Moreover, as is discussed in Section 2.5, the Napoleonic Wars gave a strong boost to British industry, as did Britain's post-1815 global hegemony.

Despite this, NATISOB admit that the dominant bloc had to make various concessions to the Liberal Bourgeoisie to secure its hegemony in the early Nineteenth Century, such as passing the 1832 Reform Act to give industrialists the franchise; and repealing the Corn Laws in 1846, so ending the protection of British agriculture from cheaper, foreign imports (Anderson, 1965, pp.18-19). NATISOB argue, however, that these concessions to the Liberal Bourgeoisie did not result in the dominant bloc losing its hegemony over British society. Indeed, in certain ways, that hegemony had been reinforced. For example, in Parliamentary elections industrialists largely voted for landed aristocrats, and were quite willingly to leave the running of the state apparatus, and the formulation of state policy, to them (Anderson, 1965, p.19). Moreover, the refusal of industrialists to support the extension of the franchise to the

working class in 1832 destroyed the possibility of the Liberal Bourgeoisie mobilising the working class to challenge the dominant bloc's hegemony in a modernising "Second Revolution" (Anderson, 1987, pp.47-8).

NATISOB concede that a combination of the repeal of the Corn Laws and the agricultural depression of the 1870s severely undermined the traditional material base of the landowners' influence. By then the social intertwining of the "landed" and "moneyed" interests within the dominant bloc had led to the City of London becoming the economic linchpin underpinning the dominant bloc. Moreover, as a consequence of reforms to the state after 1815, a "City of London- Bank of England- Treasury nexus" emerged, (Ingham, 1984; Anderson, 1987, p.43), further strengthening the City's hegemonic influence over state economic policy. Furthermore, the Corn Laws' abolition had the effect of making Britain's future economic prosperity even more dependent upon the world economy, as Britain ceased to be self-sufficient in food. This was compatible with the international outlook of the dominant bloc, discussed in Section 2.5.

NATISOB also see a series of other factors encouraging the Liberal Bourgeoisie to accept the dominant bloc's hegemony. Both benefited from free trade and Britain's global hegemony, despite no intrinsic structural connection between the activities of the City and of British industry existing (Anderson, 1987, p.34). The Liberal Bourgeoisie were also encouraged to identify with the dominant bloc through institutions facilitating the possibility of industrialists becoming aristocratic "gentlemen". Through the process of reforming the Civil Service, reforming the universities and setting up "Public Schools" designed to educate the sons of the dominant bloc and Liberal Bourgeoisie alike, the existing dominant bloc was able to socialise the Liberal Bourgeoisie in the late Nineteenth Century into accepting its values (Anderson, 1965, pp.19-20). The only ideology which the Liberal Bourgeoisie now had distinct from those associated with the hegemonic dominant bloc was utilitarianism; a narrow, sectional economic-corporate ideology par excellence (Anderson, 1965, p.33).

NATISOB stress the importance of the logic of priority in accounting for the development of the British working class as this resulted in the working class being the first one ever. It had, therefore, to invent organisation, theory and values for itself. Since there was no already existing coherent socialist ideology that it could turn to for guidance, it embraced in turn Jacobinism, Owenism and Chartism (Anderson, 1987, p.49). Anderson (1965, pp.33-4) argues that Chartism's final defeat in 1848 inaugurated a period where, lacking either socialist theory or support from other classes, the working class retreated in on itself. This led to a class with a very high degree of economic-corporate consciousness, but a non-existent hegemonic one. NATISOB argue that if, as Gramsci suggests, subaltern groups are all subject to the activities of the dominant group in society, it should not be surprising that the British working class, outside of the immediate economic sphere of the work-place, had a world-view heavily coloured by the attitudes of the dominant bloc.

Rising living standards for the working class after the mid-Nineteenth Century moved much of it to support free trade, for the existence of cheaper food had been facilitated by the repeal of the Corn Laws, while an expanding world economy was allowing British industrial capital to increase wage levels (Anderson, 1965, p.25). Once Britain faced competition for its global hegemony, discussed in the next Section, the working class came to identify even more with the dominant bloc, since the latter were encouraging the identification of all social groups with it through the ideology of Imperialism. As Anderson (1965, p.23) comments:

"The major impact of imperialism was almost certainly on the character and ethos of the ruling bloc. But...general internalization of the prestations and motifs of Empire undoubtedly occurred...Probably at no period in peace-time history was English society so suffused with chauvinism and so gutted with rank."

Without anticipating much further the discussion in Chapter Three on the origins of British "anti-EC" nationalism, it is worth

noting that all the main emerging socialist groups in Britain, as well as the Liberals and Conservatives, were vociferously pro-Imperialist in their attitudes by the end of the Nineteenth Century (Anderson, 1965, p.24).

Despite of its strong economic-corporate world-view, Britain's organised working class towards the end of the Nineteenth Century did begin to seek independent representation in British political life. By the beginning of the Twentieth Century the trade union movement collectively felt that the Liberal Party, whose political outlook and electoral appeal was primarily based upon defending the interests of manufacturing capital, no longer adequately upheld the interests of British organised labour. These shifts in union attitudes led to the creation of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 and the formation of the modern Labour Party in 1906 (Anderson, 1987, p.51).

NATISOB argue that, while it became organisationally independent from the Liberal Party, the labour movement and its political representatives in the Labour Party embraced the ideological inheritance of Liberalism. Not only were the tenets of classical liberalism, such as a belief in the virtues of free trade, taken up by the Labour Party; the ideas of "New Liberalism", which believed that the nation-state should promote domestic social reform to reinforce the stability of capitalist society, were also enthusiastically taken up (Anderson, 1987, pp.51-2; Nairn, 1973, pp.69-71).

The Fabian Society, which played a crucial role in developing and popularising such ideas within the early Labour Party, is seen by NATISOB as having an important influence upon Labour's attitudes towards, on the one hand, the trade unions, and on the other, the British state. The argument is that the Fabians saw the Labour Party as playing the role of preventing conflict between the unions and the state, if possible; if it could not prevent such conflict, Labour should mediate between these two interests, with the aim of furthering social reform by the state while ensuring the unions' ultimate loyalties to it. The Fabians saw Labour's role in British society as not simply being the advocate of organised labour's

interests. Instead it should attempt, whenever possible, to unite the interests of the British nation-state and the British working class (Anderson, 1965, pp.36-7; Nairn, 1973, pp.52-5). In Chapter Three the ideological ramifications of the concepts of nation and class in Labour Party attitudes and discourse, particularly with reference to Britain's relationship with the EC, will be discussed in detail.

It is also worth saying that, just like British capital, the labour movement can be divided on certain issues by the existence of "fractionation" within its ranks(2). Just as with Britain's capital fractions, the divisions within British organised labour often stem from particular material interests within the structure of the British economy.

In certain cases, the formation of certain labour fractions mirror differences within British capital. For instance, some sections of the British labour movement whose origins lie in industries which the Liberal Bourgeoisie developed in the Nineteenth Century and prospered during Britain's undisputed hegemony of the international capitalist economy, such as shipbuilding and textiles, can be expected to favour world-wide free trade and domestic laissez-faire economics. In contrast, sections of the labour movement that emerged during the Twentieth Century from those industrial sectors associated with State Monopolists and Corporate Liberals, such as the chemical and car industries, would be more interested in developing trade links with Europe and supporting state intervention in the economy.(3)

Another potential source of labour fractionation in Britain could also be expected at certain historical junctures between those whose livelihoods depend upon the existence of the public sector and public spending, on the one hand, and those who depend on the mass production of consumer goods, on the other. The former fractions would tend to see high levels of taxation as helping to fund its economic sector, while the latter would see rising tax levels as reducing the levels of disposable income available within the economy to consume the goods they produce (Leys, 1989, p.138). Only through economic growth can such economic contradictions

between these two fractions of labour be easily resolved; if not, unions representing such labour fractions may come to support different policies on particular issues. This, in turn, could well lead to shifts in the policies put forward by the political party supposed to represent their interests; in the case of Britain, the Labour Party.(4)

Both the political and economic wings of the Labour

movement into the day-to-day running of the British state. The

In NATISOB, the beginning of the Twentieth Century, as the Labour Party was coming into existence, saw an abortive attempt by the Social Imperialist fraction of the bourgeoisie, personified by Joseph Chamberlain, to become a hegemonic force in British society. By 1900 economic competition from the main challengers to British global hegemony, the USA and Germany, was adversely affecting British heavy industry, particularly in the West Midlands. Consequently, a Social Imperialist programme emerged which envisaged the British economy being insulated from this competition through a system of tariffs favourable to the rest of the Empire. Despite being adopted by the Conservative Party from 1905, the Social Imperialist programme failed to gain sufficient support throughout British society, since it was perceived, in Gramscian terminology, as a narrow economic-corporate programme for the sole benefit of heavy industry. The City opposed it because it threatened to limit the scope of its worldwide operations; the economic interests of the Liberal Bourgeoisie, such as coal and textiles, were, overall, still benefiting from free trade; and the working class generally saw it as a recipe for dearer food. Moreover, the Social Imperialists themselves never envisaged implementing their programme through any vehicle but the existing political parties and the existing Edwardian state (Nairn, 1981, pp.45-6; Anderson, 1987, pp.43-4; Gamble, 1990, pp.162-4).

However, as Gamble (1996, p.21) argues, the Social Imperialist aim of domestic social, economic and state reforms being guaranteed by Britain being part of a wider economic, geographical and political association, was one which would appear again as British relative decline within the capitalist world-system would again become an issue.

In NATISOB it is argued that the domestic impact of the First World War and its aftermath upon the hegemony of the dominant bloc was to be more profound than the pre-1914 challenge of Social Imperialism. First, as part of the war effort, the dominant bloc needed to bring both the political and economic wings of the labour movement into the day-to-day running of the British state. The labour movement's generally enthusiastic support for the War, particularly amongst its leadership, had removed most doubts amongst the dominant bloc of the former's general loyalty to the state, despite many Empire Free Traders, such as Winston Churchill, having extreme doubts, demonstrated in his performance during the 1926 General (Overbeek, 1990, p.58). Indeed, the wartime need for extensive state intervention in the economy convinced the labour movement that it was possible for the British state to be peacefully converted into pursuing collectivist goals (Nairn, 1965, p.174; Overbeek, 1990, p.53). At the same time, the labour movement did not feel any need to embrace protectionism, which was still seen as equalling dearer food. The refusal of the 1929-31 Labour Government to embrace a Social Imperialist programme, as advocated by Oswald Mosley was proof of that (Overbeek, 1990, p.66).

World War One also saw the crystallisation of a State Monopolist fraction of productive capital, personified by Alfred Mond, later the Chairman of ICI. State Monopolists demanded a level of state intervention in the peacetime domestic economy similar to that carried out in World War One. The City was, however, determined in the 1920s to maintain the pursuit of liberal economic policies both at home and abroad. It generally succeeded, despite many sections of productive capital, including the State Monopolists, denouncing the deflationary consequences of such policies, particularly Sterling's return to the Gold Standard in 1925 (Gamble, 1990, p.135; Longstreth, 1979, p.166).

In contrast, NATISOB see the 1930s as a period when the dominant bloc's hegemony was seriously threatened by the collapse of the international trading system into full-scale national protectionism. This allowed a window of opportunity to appear, in

which the State Monopolists and the Social Imperialists were able to force the state to pursue policies more to their liking, such as Imperial Preference and state sponsorship of voluntary amalgamations of industrial firms, in a watered-down version of Joseph Chamberlain's vision (Anderson, 1987, 45-6; Gamble, 1990, p.168; Overbeek, 1990, p.68). Other fractions of capital, such as the Liberal Bourgeoisie, were forced to support the aims of the more protectionist fractions of British capital because there was simply no alternative to trading with the Empire in the 1930s (Overbeek, 1990, p.72). This was also accepted by the City, which turned towards becoming the centre of a Sterling Area, the longer-term importance of which will become clear in the next two Sections (Anderson, 1987, p.45; Longstreth, 1979, pp.171-2).

The protectionism of the 1930s also benefited the newly emerging Corporate Liberal fraction of British capital, whose fortunes were based upon production of mass consumer goods (Anderson, 1987, p.45). Depending upon large scale investment from US firms, such as Ford, and limited in influence by the relatively small market for such products in Britain during the 1930s, the political spokesmen for Corporate Liberalism, such as Harold Macmillan, had relatively little political influence upon the policies of the British state (Overbeek, 1990, p.64).

The possibility of the State Monopolists, personified in 1930s British politics by Neville Chamberlain, of achieving a successful hegemonic project in the long-run were scuppered by the failure to achieve an agreement with the main State Monopolist-dominated power in 1930s Europe, that is, Nazi Germany. There were close inter-firm links between the British State Monopolists and their German counterparts (Overbeek, 1990, p.69) and encouraged by the Economic Section of the Foreign Office (Overbeek, 1990, p.228), the economic base for the politics of "Appeasement" can be identified.(5)

As the 1930s progressed, however, other fractions of British capital increasingly saw the policy of "appeasement" as threatening the prosperity and security of the British Empire. The failure of Chamberlain to prevent Germany from invading most of Western Europe in 1940 led to the political initiative being seized by other

capital fractions, led by the Empire Free Traders personified by Churchill (Overbeek, 1990, p.70). The labour movement was again directly involved in the running of the war effort, and was to benefit greatly from the collectivist goals and legislation agreed to during World War Two (Nairn, 1965, pp.161-2; Anderson, 1965, p.28; Gamble, 1990, pp.100-1).

A clear argument in NATISOB is that both the degree of hegemony that the dominant bloc and the degree of influence that the various capital fractions had were dependent as much upon **external** factors as on **domestic** ones. It is the international dimension of Britain's historical development that will now be examined in detail.

## **2.5: The international dimension of Britain's historical development.**

Nairn (1979, p.52) argues that "all state-forms are the product of some specific historical balance between...internal factors and the external relations imposed by the world-system of capitalism". He goes on to argue (Nairn, 1979, p.53), though, that there is major error "in failing to see the United Kingdom's **exceptional** dependence on such external relations." In NATISOB the logic of priority, marking the entire historical development of British capitalist society, is exemplified in Britain's creation of the modern world economy and modern international state-system. NATISOB's understanding of Britain's position in the capitalist world-system is also informed by Gramsci's theory of hegemony (Gamble, 1990, pp.4-6; Overbeek, 1990, p.11). As discussed in the Introduction, other writers (Gill, 1990, pp.41-51 van der Pijl, 1984; 1991) argue that Gramsci's concept can be extended to the international level. A country can therefore be seen as attempting to achieve, or actually achieving, leadership at the level of the international state system and the international economy, and imposing its own "world-view" upon other nation-states and national economies. For instance, hegemonic economic powers tend to support free trade, for they can most easily take advantage of it (Overbeek, 1990, p.11). At the same time, just as at a national

level, this hegemony can be challenged by other countries, and be lost by a particular country, just as a social group can lose control at the national level. The argument to be found in NATISOB is that from the Sixteenth Century onwards, Britain attempted to achieve global hegemony and succeeded in this goal by creating the modern world market in the Nineteenth Century, before eventually losing that hegemony to the USA in the Twentieth Century. Furthermore, as Gamble (1990, p.43) argues, Britain's relative economic decline in the post-1945 period, which forms the backdrop to the "Europe debate" that this study is focused on, "can only be understood...in relation to the world economic system of which Britain is a part."

In attempting to understand Britain's relationship with the rest of the world, NATISOB begin with the Medieval period. In the Middle Ages the English feudal nobility saw themselves a European continental power, expressing this most forcibly through continual wars over territory with France (Gamble, 1990, p.47). Once England had been largely driven out of France by the mid-Fifteenth Century, however, Britain's physical separation from mainland Europe would facilitate the growth and expansion of British influence throughout the world (Gamble, 1990, p.48).

In NATISOB it is the discovery of the New World at the end of the Fifteenth Century, and the subsequent creation of a transatlantic economy by Portugal and Spain, which transformed the position of England in the world. No longer seriously interested in building a European empire, English foreign policy in the Sixteenth Century became increasingly oriented towards establishing a system of protected colonies and trade on the Spanish and Portuguese models. From the Sixteenth Century, then, English, and later British, capital became strongly oriented towards economic activity largely outside of Europe. Moreover, Britain's physical position meant that it was largely invulnerable from occupation by its European rivals: Holland, France, Portugal, Spain and the Papacy (Nairn, 1981, p.21; Gamble, 1990, p.47).

Furthermore, the argument in NATISOB is that it was this

overseas activity which helped to build up the economic and political influence of merchant capital, centred upon London, in Tudor and Stuart England. Through its wealth from trade, the City provided crucial funding for Parliament in the Civil War, and so inherited the full economic fruits of victory. Cromwell's Republic introduced the 1651 Navigation Act to create a monopoly for British shipping, and brought existing English colonies under Parliamentary control (Anderson, 1965, p.15; Gamble, 1990, p.48).

Following the 1688 "Glorious Revolution", which the City backed and which led to the creation of the Bank of England and the Stock Exchange (Anderson, 1987, p.32), Britain's unparalleled social stability allowed its landlord-dominated state to pursue a policy of large-scale expansion of British territorial and economic ambitions to the City's benefit. Indeed, every overseas conflict Britain engaged in during the Eighteenth Century was fought for commercial purposes, such as control of the world economy, control of new territory and control of the sea lanes. Moreover, eight of these wars were fought against, France, the target of England's Medieval ambitions (Gamble, 1990, p.48).<sup>(6)</sup>

In many ways, the War of the Spanish Succession at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century was the most important of these various conflicts for the fortunes of the City of London, since Holland, until then the main rival to British mercantile capital in international commerce, had its resources severely drained by the War. Consequently, Britain replaced Holland as the world's hegemonic naval and commercial power, although the Dutch compensated for this by becoming the principal international financial intermediaries of the Eighteenth Century (Anderson, 1987, pp.32-3).

For NATISOB, it is the Eighteenth Century which saw the establishment of a foreign policy, the basic essentials of which would be followed by successive governments well into the Twentieth Century. That is, British foreign policy should be supported by the worldwide presence of the Royal Navy, while a large-scale permanent military presence on the European continent should be avoided (Gamble, 1990, p.49). This strategy worked extremely well for

Britain in its various wars with France in the Eighteenth Century, as colonial conquests were made in North America, India and the Caribbean. Meanwhile, a general economic "boom" in the Atlantic area led to the City becoming the centre of international trade and the base for the most prosperous merchants in Europe. The only great reversal in Britain's drive towards global hegemony, leading to its eventual displacement as world hegemon, was the loss of the American colonies in 1783. Yet at the time this appeared to have little effect on Britain's drive towards world hegemony (Gamble, 1990, pp.49-50).

As was previously discussed in this Chapter, in NATISOB the domestic hegemony of the dominant bloc over the newly emerging industrial Liberal Bourgeoisie from the 1780s onwards was underpinned by the "shocks" to British society caused by the French Revolution and the subsequent period of Napoleonic expansion in Europe. As elsewhere in Europe, Britain's propertied feared that the propertyless would take the egalitarian ideology of the French Revolution to heart, and start a revolution in Britain. This led to the Liberal Bourgeoisie rallying around the dominant bloc, acquiring habits of subservience to the interests of the dominant bloc which it never really lost (Anderson, 1965, p.18). Moreover, Napoleon's establishment of a protectionist "Continental System" for French-dominated Europe unintentionally strengthened the position of the dominant bloc in Britain in two ways. First, the "Continental System" protected British industry from any potential competition from Europe, so allowing British industry to expand rapidly, without the Liberal Bourgeoisie feeling any need to demand state intervention, such as tariffs (Overbeek, 1990, p.39). Second, the "Continental System" ended the financial supremacy of Amsterdam, which was isolated from the wider world economy. By 1815 London had no rival as the centre of the world's financial system (Anderson, 1987, p.33).

Following the final defeat of France, Britain had assured its economic leadership in the fields, of trade, finance and industry, as well as being the leading power in the international state system. Consequently, to achieve this aim, after 1815 Britain

shifted the focus of its imperialism. The instrument of domination over other powers shifted from the pursuit of attaining exclusive colonies or trade routes, to the creation of a world economy based upon free trade (Gamble, 1990, p.50).

NATISOB argue that despite the Liberal Bourgeoisie being subordinate in British society to the hegemonic dominant bloc increasingly around the City of London, the primary material base for Britain's unchallenged domination of the world economy for most of the Nineteenth Century was its industrial superiority. Benefiting immensely from competing globally against **pre-capitalist** production methods (Anderson, 1987, p.72; Leys, 1989, p.42), the Liberal Bourgeoisie from this stage onwards had few doubts that its prosperity was largely due to free trade. Moreover, when considering its fortunes, the Liberal Bourgeoisie shared with mercantile capital a transnational perspective, which disposed it favourably towards free trade (Overbeek, 1990, p.38). Moreover, the abolition of the Corn Laws, strongly supported by the Liberal Bourgeoisie, was to tie Britain even closer to the world economy, since Britain after 1846 ceased to be self-sufficient even in food (Gamble, 1990, p.52). As mentioned in the previous Section, repealing the Corn Laws also had the effect of giving the working class a material interest, through low food prices, in supporting free trade. Free trade also allowed an expansion of the world economy, creating a sufficient capital surplus to facilitate substantial increases in wage levels. The cumulative rise in living standards, facilitated by free trade, created a strata of skilled workers, organised in trade unions, that had an economic-corporate outlook, strongly attached to piecemeal reform within the existing social system, and strongly deferential towards the symbols of the dominant bloc- Parliament, the Crown and Empire (Anderson, 1965, pp.23-4; Nairn, 1981, pp.39-40; Anderson, 1987, pp.49-50).

NATISOB argue that the City's position as the commercial linchpin of the global capitalist economy, demonstrated most forcibly by Sterling now being the internationally recognised currency underpinning the global free trade system, was supported

by the strength of British industry. At the same time, though, the City felt no need for its investments to be limited to funding the enterprises of the Liberal Bourgeoisie. From the mid-Nineteenth Century the City increasingly invested abroad, and in the process helped the creation of modern industrial economies that would eventually challenge Britain's hegemony. Furthermore, the disjuncture between the long-term interests of the City and British productive capital set in train Britain's relative economic decline (Anderson, 1987, p.34).

NATISOB identify the emergence of post-1871 Germany as an economic power as representing the first serious threat from continental Europe to British global hegemony since 1815. In contrast to the largely laissez-faire attitude of the British state towards the domestic economy, the Imperial German state believed that it had a duty to intervene directly in the national economy to ensure national economic prosperity and survival. Productive capital was seen as the means of ensuring this goal, while commercial capital's primary duty was to invest in German industry. To protect German industry from excessive competition in the domestic market, particularly from British goods, protectionist tariffs were essential. Furthermore, the German state saw direct territorial annexations as a means of gaining markets for goods and sources of raw materials (Anderson, 1987, pp.42-4; Gamble, 1990, p.60).

In pursuing such goals, post-1870 Germany was not that much different from other Western European powers in the four decades or so before World War One. All favoured the interests of productive capital over commercial capital, while state intervention and tariffs were seen as the best means to build up the domestic economy in the face of British domination of the world economy (Gamble, 1990, pp.53-4). All pursued the outright annexations of colonial territories to facilitate overseas economic expansion, rather than through Britain's preferred method of indirect economic subjugation; what Anderson (1965, p.22) calls, respectively, "military-industrial imperialism" and "diplomatic-industrial

imperialism". By 1914, most foreign investments by Western European countries were located in their overseas colonies, Eastern Europe, or Russia (van der Pijl, 1984, pp.44 and 47). Germany, though, was different as it was seen by the British as wanting to create a protectionist bloc which would include much of Eastern Europe and the Near East. Germany was also seen as building a navy strong enough to threaten the Royal Navy's supremacy (Gamble, 1990, p.234). Consequently Germany was perceived as a serious threat to two of the main pillars supporting the maintenance of British hegemony: free trade and naval supremacy (Gamble, 1990, p.60).

NATISOB realise that the USA was considered the other main threat to British global hegemony, particularly as its potential economic and military strength dwarfed that of both Britain and Germany. Unlike Germany, however, the USA was seen by many in the dominant bloc as less of a threat to the essential underpinnings of British hegemony. To begin with, the USA was more inclined towards pursuing its international goals through informal, "invisible", diplomatic-industrial imperialist means than the Germans (Nairn, 1973, pp.75-6).<sup>(7)</sup> Furthermore, the USA was more attached to free trade than the Germans were (Gamble, 1990, p.61). The Atlantic Liberals, the most pro-US British capital fraction in the pre-1914 period, could also cite the direct material interests that the USA had in maintaining a free trade system with Britain, in the form of the amount of British investment in the USA. For instance, in the 1902-10 period, 21% of new British investment went to the USA, compared to 5% for the whole of Europe (Overbeek, 1990, p.49).

NATISOB argue, though, that Britain's attitudes to the two main threats to its hegemony in the pre-1914 period were not fixed. Both Empire Free Traders and Social Imperialists remained suspicious of the USA, and the latters' most prominent spokesman, Joseph Chamberlain, even contemplated Britain allying itself with Germany (Gamble, 1990, p.235). As mentioned in the previous Section, however, the Social Imperialists' programme failed to attract the support of the City, and all three of these fractions rallied around the dominant bloc to support the war against Germany in 1914-18 (Gamble, 1990, pp.60-1).

NATISOB identify World War One as an important historical juncture in the process of bringing about the end of Britain's global hegemony. To fund its war effort, Britain became massively indebted to the USA (Anderson, 1987, p.45), further strengthening the Atlantic Liberals' conviction that cooperation with the USA was vital if a international free trade system was to survive.

The inter-war period, however, saw the USA return to a position of political isolationism towards Europe, and so failed to achieve the position of global hegemon. Consequently, investment by US capital in Europe, including, did occur during the inter-war period, but was on a limited scale compared to the post-1945 period (Overbeek, 1990, pp.78-80). Furthermore, continental European states were introducing increasingly protectionist measures, favouring State Monopoly capital (van der Pijl, 1984, p.77), as a response to the massive disruption of the post-1918 world economy resulting from the consequences of the War and the Bolshevik Revolution (van der Pijl, 1984, pp.49 and 55).

In the face of this massive disruption of the international free trade system which, NATISOB argue, underpinned its hegemony over British society since 1815, combined with pressure from Social Imperialists and State Monopolists for full-scale protection, the dominant bloc attempted in the 1920s to strengthen the City's position, which was weakening vis-a-vis New York. Sterling's 1975 return to the Gold Standard, suspended in 1914, was presented as a means of returning to free trade, on which Britain's prosperity and global hegemony had been built (Overbeek, 1990, pp.55 and 59). This attracted the support of the Liberal Bourgeoisie who, in true economic-corporate fashion, complained about the effects, but not the liberal assumptions, of this policy (Longstreth, 1979, p.166).

The 1929 Wall Street Crash, and subsequent World Depression, which led to a total breakdown of the global free trade system, reluctantly forced the British state to embrace the Social Imperialist strategy of Imperial Preference and move Sterling off the Gold Standard. The dominant bloc was forced to make concessions to protect its vital interests. The City adapted to the new international situation by becoming the centre of the Sterling

Area, which was to become the linchpin of the City's strategy for integrating itself into the post-1945 international economic system (Overbeek, 1990, p.80). British capital as a whole in the 1930s generally oriented itself towards the Empire for want of an external alternative; the share of capital exports which went to the Empire, excluding Canada, increased from 43% in 1930 to 50% by 1939. The weakness of the international economy as a whole in the inter-war period, and the City's weakness as a consequence, can be gauged by the fact that British capital exports as a whole in this period never exceeded 20% of their post-1913 level (Overbeek, 1990, p.63).

The dominant bloc's domestic hegemony was so adversely affected by the collapse of the international free trade system in the 1930s that the State Monopolists were able to pursue a strategy of allying Britain with Nazi Germany, the protectionist state **par excellence**. Only with the effective collapse of the possibility of Appeasement with Germany in 1940 were the Empire Free Traders, in alliance with Atlantic Liberals, Corporate Liberals and Social Imperialists, able to regain the initiative.

NATISOB argue that the British state fought World War Two to prevent Germany from dominating the Eurasian landmass, and hence threaten the existence of the Empire and the possibility of rebuilding an international free trade system. Britain succeeded in achieving this goal, but the price of the alliance with the USA which it had to enter in order to achieve victory was to bring about the definitive eclipse of Britain's global hegemony (Gamble, 1990, p.58).

## **2.6: Britain, Europe and the World, 1945-73.**

In this Section, the theoretical concepts and the account of Britain's historical development already discussed in this Chapter, are drawn upon in order to provide an account of Britain's relationship with Europe, particularly the EC, between 1945 and 1973.

Drawing upon NATISOB, it will be argued that the effects of the

loss of British hegemony to the USA were mitigated for the City by the creation of a US-sponsored international free trade system, which helped to re-establish the undisputed hegemony of the dominant bloc in the immediate post-war period. This was accompanied by the increasing influence of the Corporate Liberal fraction, whose rise was in the interests of the USA's strategy to secure global hegemony.

At the same time, though, the loss of British hegemony and its position in the USA's new global order for international capitalism, was to bring about a resumption of Britain's relative economic decline, which was perceived as being particularly acute from the early 1960s onwards.

As previously argued in this Chapter, the dominant bloc's hegemony over British society has always been dependent upon a favourable international situation. Consequently, the dominant bloc in the post-war period, if its domestic hegemony was to continue, would have to conceive of an external solution to relative economic decline. Such reasoning underpinned the attempts by British governments to push for EC membership from the early 1960s onwards, although other factors, discussed below, also affected Britain's relationship with the EC in this period.

NATISOB argue that the post-1945 strategy for global hegemony of the dominant fraction of US capital, whose activities were primarily centred upon the North Atlantic region, had a number of goals.

First, it was a strategy based upon encouraging international free trade. To encourage this, various international institutions were set up, including the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, based around the supremacy of the Dollar, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Gamble, 1990, p.107). Furthermore, the USA believed that an essential element of creating a free trade system would be the quickest possible dismantling of the protectionist system that Western European powers had erected around their national economies and colonial possessions (Gamble, 1988, p.5; Gamble, 1990, p.107).

A second goal of US capital's dominant fraction was that it saw a need to promote state intervention in domestic economies, and other collectivist measures. This was seen as an essential precondition for the creation of a global capital economy based upon synchronising increased mass production and increased mass consumption. To achieve this, it was not only recognised that harmonious relationships between capital and labour had to be encouraged; social welfare programmes for the benefit of the working class had to be introduced as a **quid pro quo** for the latter supporting higher productivity. This synthesis of international free trade, to benefit commercial capital, and domestic state economic and welfare programmes to benefit productive capital and labour, was in the eyes of US capital's dominant fraction, best served by governments dominated by Corporate Liberals (Overbeek, 1990, pp.84-7).

NATISOB argue that the 1945-51 Labour Government subscribed to many Corporate Liberal goals. It enacted legislation which brought into existence most of the welfare proposals outlined in William Beveridge's wartime proposals; it subscribed to the expansionist demand-management theories of Maynard Keynes to increase production and consumption; and it gave trade union leaders a say in the formulation of economic policy (Gamble, 1990, pp.102-3).

Moreover, the Labour Government, as befitted the labour movement's past, supported the USA's post-1945 efforts to create an international free trade system. In doing so it attempted to re-establish the traditional hegemony of the City over the parameters of the British state's economic policies. Britain, whatever policies its government had intended to pursue after 1945, was in extreme financial debt to the USA as a consequence of World War Two (Overbeek, 1990, p.89). In addition, the cost of Labour's welfare programme was such that in 1946 it was forced to secure a further loan from the USA. The 1946 Washington Loan Agreement made Britain even more dependent upon the USA, because if Britain wanted Sterling to play the role of "reserve" currency to the Dollar it would have to return to being a gold-convertible currency.

Furthermore, Britain's involvement in GATT, and hence free trade, would effectively end Imperial Preference (Gamble, 1974, pp.167-8; Overbeek, 1990, p.107).

NATISOB see the economic dependence of Britain, and other Western European countries, on the USA was strengthened by the substantial US investment into Western Europe from 1947 onwards under the aegis of the "Marshall Plan" (Overbeek, 1990, pp.91-2). This established in Europe, for the first time, industry based on mass consumer products. This, in turn, strengthened the position of Corporate Liberals within Britain, although not yet within the Conservative Party.

NATISOB argue that, even following their massive General Election defeat in 1945, the Empire Free Traders, led by Churchill, kept control of the policy direction of the Conservative Party. Although Churchill accepted the leadership of the USA over international capitalism as a whole, he thought that the "Special Relationship" still allowed Britain to pursue an independent foreign policy. Churchill saw Britain as a member of three "circles": the Atlantic; the Empire; and Europe, which was seen as the least important of the three (Gamble, 1974, pp.184-5; Overbeek, 1990, p.93). Of the various capital fractions which had influence within the Conservative Party, only the State Monopolists, such as R.A. Butler who was extremely influential in the leadership of the newly founded European Movement, were enthusiastic about closer ties with Western Europe. The Social Imperialists, such as Leo Amery, in contrast, were still oriented towards the Empire/Commonwealth, and were furious about the Labour Government's acceptance of GATT (Gamble, 1974, pp.165-6).

Although Corporate Liberals, such as Macmillan, were willing to see more British cooperation with Western Europe, as was demonstrated by their strong participation in the European League for Economic Cooperation (Overbeek, 1990, p.95), their practical influence was limited in the early 1950s by the influence of the Empire Free Traders, who through the figures of Churchill and Anthony Eden, dominated the Conservative Government between 1951 and 1957. The Empire Free Traders only supported British

involvement in European institutions which were inter-governmental, such as the Council of Europe, not supra-national, such as the ECSC, or those backed by the USA, such as NATO (Overbeek, 1990, p.96). Furthermore, the Corporate Liberals' support for closer British links with Western Europe was influenced considerably by intermittent US support for closer unity of Western European states under its hegemony (van der Pijl, 1984, pp.164-5).

The Empire Free Traders saw the "Special Relationship" as a means for Britain to preserve its position as a global power, through the vehicle of the Commonwealth. As said before, the Social Imperialists argued that this was not possible if GATT was diametrically opposed to Imperial Preference, but by the mid-1950s, the prevailing opinion inside the Conservative Party could not remain a global power without US cooperation (Gamble, 1974, pp.171-2).

The Empire Free Traders' illusions about the USA were shattered by the latter's response to the 1956 Suez adventure. The USA was able to halt the Franco-British invasion of Egypt through orchestrating financial pressure against Sterling; and US opposition also led the Corporate Liberals in both main parties, most notably Macmillan and Hugh Gaitskell, to denounce the operation. In the aftermath of the debacle, Macmillan became Prime Minister in January 1957; two months later the EC was formed.

Within five years of the Suez debacle, Britain, under Macmillan's leadership, had applied to join the EC. Drawing upon NATISOB and works in the field of international politics sharing a similar historical and theoretical outlook, a number of interconnected reasons for this apparently major shift in British foreign policy can be identified.

First, there was pressure from the USA for Britain to join the EC. In many ways, the EC was conceived as a State Monopolist project by the "Six" to create a regional economy which would end Western Europe's economic dependence upon the USA, just as US pressure was bringing about the dismantling of their overseas empires.

Western Europe's integration into the North Atlantic economy to attain global hegemony was the primary project of the fraction of US capital oriented towards the Atlantic economy, described by Schurmann (1974) as the **Internationalist** bloc. In contrast, there was a **Nationalist** bloc, a fraction of US capital whose activities are primarily focused upon the domestic economy, the Americas and the Pacific.(8) The Nationalists' influence on state policy tended to come to the fore in periods of Republican governments, as occurred during the Eisenhower Administration of the 1950s. Consequently, there were fewer official fears from the USA about the formation of the EC. Under the Democratic Kennedy Administration, though, the post-1945 project to achieve US global hegemony appeared to be in severe danger, particularly as the EC appeared in the early 1960s to be a vehicle for the diplomatic designs of the arch-State Monopolist, Charles de Gaulle. The solution, from the Internationalist perspective, appeared to be British membership of the EC, so ensuring that Western Europe would remain part of an integrated North Atlantic economy. Macmillan's application was enthusiastically supported by Washington, subject to the condition that the Commonwealth remained outside the EC's tariff walls (Overbeek, 1990, p.102), so allowing US capital to continue investing and exporting to the Commonwealth at the same levels as it had since the 1940s (Overbeek, 1990, p.105).

Second, British membership of the EC was seen by British-based large-scale productive capital, particularly those industries associated with the Corporate Liberal and State Monopolist sections of the bourgeoisie, as a way of prospering in the face of being located in a country which was starting to suffer from relative economic decline. To fully understand this point, various issues have to be addressed.

Although it enjoyed historically high levels of economic growth in the 1950s, Britain did not match the levels of economic growth experienced by the countries which would form the EC (Gamble, 1990, pp.14-16). There are main explanations for this. First, continental Western Europe had experienced a collective "Second Revolution" in the 1940s and 1950s, resulting from the effects of World War Two

and the collapse of their overseas empires (Anderson, 1987, pp.48 and 56). This meant that they could totally rebuild their economies on the lines which the US Internationalists had envisaged. High levels of economic growth and consumer demand were the consequence. In contrast Britain had not seen the influence of its traditional dominant bloc, based around the City, broken; indeed, its domestic influence grew as a consequence of the restoration of an international free trade system. Since Sterling was now a "reserve" currency to the Dollar within the Bretton Woods system, and since this was seen as an essential component of the free trade system that nearly everyone of importance in British society supported, the City was able to restore its hegemony over economic policy. In addition to being a "reserve" currency, Sterling was at the centre of its own Dollar-discriminating system. To maintain the credibility of this Sterling Area, and the illusion that Britain was still a global force, Sterling could not be devalued (Anderson, 1987, p.56; Overbeek, 1990, pp.92-3). Consequently, in order to keep Sterling "strong" in the eyes of the rest of the capitalist world, whenever a balance of payments deficit occurred, growth was sacrificed, leading to a "stop-go" cycle of economic growth in Britain (Gamble, 1990, p.112; Longstreth, 1979, p.175). The City's hegemony over the economic priorities of the British state was such that it (Nairn, 1979, p.52):

"...did not have to fight to impose its view upon the state; its assumptions and world-wide view were, by and large, taken for granted inside the general tableau of the British great-power mentality."

NATISOB argue that by the early 1960s the sacrificing of growth to keep Sterling "strong", when Britain's neighbours had no such qualms, was leading to Britain's relative economic decline. To maintain its long-term viability, Britain's State Monopolist and Corporate Liberal capital fractions saw British membership of the EC as the only way that they could take full advantage of the EC's greater level of demand for manufactured goods. As argued earlier, State Monopolists were long-standing supporters of closer economic

cooperation with Western Europe, while Corporate Liberals whose prosperity was based upon mass produced consumer goods, saw the EC as the fastest growing market for their particular merchandise. NATISOB see this combined pressure convincing the main collective voice of large scale British productive industry, the Federation of British Industry (FBI) to call in July 1961 for British membership of the EC as the best possible means to halt Britain's deteriorating economic performance (Overbeek, 1990, pp.100-1).

Third, NATISOB argue that Macmillan came to see the EC as the only viable external vehicle for halting Britain's relative economic decline which did not call into doubt the existence of the City. After the collapse of the Suez operation, Macmillan attempted to oversee a rapid process of decolonisation, combined with the creation of a true Commonwealth, which could support Britain as it economically modernised. Although decolonisation undermined the material base of the Empire Free Traders, it failed to facilitate the modernisation of the economy on the lines of France and Holland (Anderson, 1987, p.56; Overbeek, 1990, p.99).

Macmillan also tried to create a European Free Trade Area (EFTA) simultaneously to undermine the EC and provide an external means of improving Britain's economic performance. EFTA was implicitly abandoned on both counts by Macmillan almost as soon as it was formed in 1959. In 1961 the only external option left to halt relative economic decline, therefore, appeared to be the EC. Macmillan consequently made his application, with US backing, in the hope that it could be given a Corporate Liberal, rather than a State Monopolist, character. Macmillan's application was vetoed by de Gaulle in January 1963. The latter saw the former's attempt to make Britain a member of the EC as a US "trojan horse"; de Gaulle reasoned that Britain was putting the interests of the USA before those of the EC. His suspicions had been confirmed by the 1962 Nassau Agreement between Macmillan and Kennedy, which made Britain's nuclear weapons programme heavily dependent upon US technical knowledge. De Gaulle believed that if Britain was genuinely "European", it would have co-operated over nuclear weapons with France, instead of the USA (Anderson, 1987, p.57;

Overbeek, 1990, p.102). From the Commonwealth under ECAFE rules, the

After eventually deciding to oppose Macmillan's application to join the EC, Labour took office in 1964 on a programme calling for state sponsored regeneration of British productive capital outside of the EC (Nairn, 1971, p.11). From the beginning of Harold Wilson's premiership until November 1967, though, domestic economic growth was sacrificed in order to keep Sterling "strong" within the Bretton Woods exchange rate system. Unwilling or unable to seriously challenge the priorities of the City, Wilson, like Macmillan, came to the conclusion that the EC was the external vehicle which would halt Britain's relative economic decline. Consequently, in much the same way as Macmillan's Government had, during 1966-7 Wilson's Government attempted to get Britain into the EC, in much the same way as Macmillan's Government had. Similarly, in November 1967 de Gaulle rejected the application, barely a week after the eventual devaluation of Sterling which, if carried out much earlier in the life of the 1964-70 Labour Government, could have allowed Wilson's ambitious plans to halt Britain's relative economic decline to succeed (Nairn, 1971, p.11; Nairn, 1973, p.83; Anderson, 1987, pp.60-1).

~~in the early 1960s an integrated North Atlantic economy - including Western Europe - the Nixon~~

1970 saw the election of a Conservative Government led by an extremely enthusiastic Corporate Liberal supporter of EC entry, Edward Heath. As soon as he entered office Heath started negotiations to join the EC, and unlike the two previous British applications, this attempt succeeded.

Drawing upon NATISOB, particularly the works of Nairn (1971; 1973), a number of reasons can be put forward explaining why, apart from his strong enthusiasm to enter the EC, Heath's attempt to join the EC was successful, in contrast to those made by Macmillan and Wilson.

First, there was the effective termination of any possibility of Britain finding an alternative external vehicle which could help to halt its relative economic decline. British membership of EFTA had not noticeably alleviated Britain's relative economic decline during the 1960s. Although Britain was still allowed to obtain

relatively cheap food from the Commonwealth under GATT rules, the Commonwealth in general did not appear by 1970 as a means for aiding British economic regeneration.(9) Economically, the devaluation of Sterling in 1967 had effectively left the "Sterling Area" in ruins, and hence the possibility of Britain building a new economic organisation around the Commonwealth (Nairn, 1971, p.5).

Second, the early 1970s saw a major erosion of the USA's global hegemony, particularly over the world economy, and this had repercussions for Britain's place in the world economy. The cost of paying for the Vietnam War had caused major balance of payments problems for the US, and had consequently put the Dollar under great pressure on the world's currency exchanges (Gamble, 1988, p.9; van der Pijl, 1984, pp.241-3). Furthermore, despite the best efforts made by the Democratic Administrations of the 1960s, it was increasingly difficult for US productive capital to find sufficiently profitable investment opportunities in Europe, rather than in the USA itself or in the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) of Latin America and the Far East (van der Pijl, 1984, pp. 259-62). Consequently, by the early 1970s, US capital as a whole had less interest than in the early 1960s in an integrated North Atlantic economy embracing Western Europe. The Nixon Administration, more sympathetic to the interests of the Nationalist bloc, therefore decided in the Summer of 1971 to encourage the construction of a Nationalist alternative to the Internationalist project. This resulted in the suspension of the convertibility of the Dollar into gold; the introduction of import controls; and the introduction of floating exchange rates. These measures, in turn, resulted in the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, and the effective end of a "strong" Dollar considered as being in the "general" interest of international capitalism (van der Pijl, 1984, pp.254-8).

Nairn (1973, p.20) argues that this was to have a major impact upon the attitude of the City towards the EC. The City had always been somewhat wary of possible British membership of the EC, since it feared that EC regulations being imposed that would limit its ability to operate globally. Even with the collapse of the

"Sterling Area" in 1967 doubts remained since the fate of the City seemed to be tied to that of the Dollar. Not only did Sterling play the role of "reserve" currency to the Dollar; the City profited from the existence of the growth in the market for US government bonds outside the USA: the Euro-dollar market (Anderson, 1987, p.61). Many in the City feared that EC membership would curb such profitable activities.

In 1971, with the USA's abandonment of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, everything changed. The Dollar was no longer seen as underpinning the global capitalist economy, which appeared at that point to be moving towards a series of regional economic blocs. Consequently, the City's role in upholding the strength of Sterling as a "reserve" currency to the Dollar, and profiting from the Euro-dollar, seemed to be thrown into severe doubt. The City therefore quickly came to see the EC as an opportunity rather than a threat to its position; if the world economy was breaking up into regional blocs, the City's interests would be best served by Britain joining the EC, therefore allowing the City to dominate Western Europe's financial system (Nairn, 1973, pp.24-30).

Third, Heath was able to sign the Treaty of Rome since France had changed its attitude towards Britain; de Gaulle was dead, and had been replaced as President by a Corporate Liberal, Georges Pompidou (Overbeek, 1990, p.104). Pompidou saw Britain as a potential ally of France inside the EC, as Federal Germany's moves towards **Ostpolitik** within Eastern Europe appeared to foreshadow a German attempt to make the EC a diplomatic vehicle for Federal Germany rather than France (van der Pijl, 1984, pp.252-3). The French believed that Britain would not let this situation come about if it could.

Fourth, Heath was able to rally both British capital as a whole and the Conservative Party as a whole behind his project to join the EC. Of the six capital fractions outlined in Section 2.3, two, the State Monopolists and Corporate Liberals, were enthusiastic about joining the EC, and had been since the time of Macmillan's application to join. The Atlantic Liberals supported EC entry as a North Atlantic economy based upon a US-sponsored free trade system

no longer appeared to be a viable external alternative for Britain. For similar reasons, many Social Imperialists, whether capitalists and Conservative politicians, came to support EC entry, because the Empire no longer existed and the Commonwealth was not a viable vehicle. To a certain extent, EC entry can be seen as a political project in the tradition of Joseph Chamberlain, as Social Imperialists came to regard the EC as an external engagement for the British state which complements the domestic agenda of state, economic and social reform (Gamble, 1996, pp.21-2, 34).

Consequently, the Empire Free Traders and those Social Imperialists who rejected EC entry had, by the early 1970s, been reduced to small, if vocal, rumps (Nairn, 1971, pp.4-5). The only capital fraction left of any real consequence which was suspicious of joining the EC was the Liberal Bourgeoisie, since it feared that many of its members would be adversely affected by British membership. Moreover, the petit bourgeois element of this fraction, which was extremely active within the Conservative rank-and-file, had an articulate anti-entry spokesman in Enoch Powell (Nairn, 1971, pp.6-7). Such a crisis could have threatened Britain's

Nairn gives a number of reasons why Powell's "crusade" against entry failed. First, the Liberal Bourgeoisie still retained its economic-corporate mentality; when confronted by their social "superiors" from the pro-entry leadership, their ability to offer an alternative quickly receded (Nairn, 1971, pp.6-7; Nairn, 1973, p.37). Second, Heath was able to present entry as a "national achievement" after a decade of British failure and relative economic decline (Nairn, 1973, p.39). Third, EC entry was presented as just one facet of an overall modernisation strategy for the British economy, with the other two planks being laissez-faire economics and limits on trade union activity. As well as being proposals that would appeal to the traditional sentiments of the Liberal Bourgeoisie, Heath's programme was widely anticipated as being a recipe for extended class conflict in Britain. Consequently, the Conservatives felt a strong impulse towards uniting around all aspects of Heath's modernisation programme, including EC entry, and presenting a united front to their class

opponents (Nairn, 1973, p.40).

Finally, Heath would never have got the European Communities Bill through Parliament, considering the persistence of opposition to entry from many of his back-bench MPs, without the support of pro-entry Corporate Liberals inside the Labour Party, led by Roy Jenkins, and the Liberal Party (Nairn, 1973, pp.43-4).

## 2.7: Conclusion.

A couple of points can be made in concluding this Section. First, drawing upon the arguments made in NATISOB, it should be emphasised that Britain only joined the EC when all other external options which could possibly halt relative economic decline had either disappeared, such as the Empire, or seemed ineffectual, like the Commonwealth and EFTA. The EC in the early 1970s appeared to be the only available external option that Britain had which would allow it to halt relative economic decline without having to endure a painful and prolonged internal crisis (Nairn, 1971, p.5; Nairn, 1981, p.54). Such a crisis could have threatened Britain's long-standing political stability and even the continued hegemony of the dominant bloc over British society and its economic linchpin, the City, over state economic policy. When one considers how other external "shocks" had reduced the influence of the City while facilitating increased influence for other social groups and capital fractions, failure to join the EC in the early 1970s, would have led to:

"...a crisis of the ruling classes' hegemony... because the ruling class had failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested...the consent of the broad masses..." (Gramsci, 1986, p.210).

A second point, which Nairn (1981, p.54) emphatically emphasises, is that British entry was a goal which was to be achieved "too late". The collapse of the Bretton Woods system was followed by global economic recession, just as Britain joined the EC in 1973. Furthermore, Britain was entering an organisation

"falling into stalemate and self-doubt." Consequently, the EC was not to be the external instrument to halt Britain's relative economic decline, nor the **de facto** "Second Revolution" for the British economy. Not surprisingly, after 1973 those opposed to Britain joining the EC got a new lease of life, not least through their utilisation of "nationalist" discourse which had their origins at various stages in Britain's historical development as outlined in this Chapter. The origins of such "anti-EC" nationalism, and accounting for its persistence into the post-1973 period, will be discussed in Chapter Three.

mentioned are Karl Marx (3.2); V.I. Lenin (3.3); Antonio Gramsci

**Notes.** Louis Althusser (3.5); Michel Foucault (3.6) and Ernesto

(1) The question of whether British labour has been divided into fractions by differing material interests is an issue which NATISOB hardly discuss.

(2) The long-standing pro-European attitudes of Chemical Workers' Union are noted by Rosamond (1992, p.45).

(3) Ludlam's (1990) thesis is a study of these types of divisions within British trade unionism in the 1970s, over whether to prioritise exports or public spending.

(4) The "economics of Appeasement" are discussed in Newton (1990).

(5) The figure of eight Anglo-French wars between 1688 and 1815 is provided by Colley (1992, p.52).

(6) A discussion on the particular nature of US Imperialism is to be found in Stedman-Jones (1972).

(7) In this thesis, the use of Nationalist and Internationalist in the context of US politics should not be confused with the use of the phrases "nationalist" and "national internationalist" when discussing British politics.

(8) Furthermore, as Michael Newman (1983, p.205) observes, the political appeal in Britain of the Commonwealth had been eroded by the end of the 1960s as a result of most "New Commonwealth" members opposing official British attitudes towards the Rhodesian crisis and "New Commonwealth" immigration into Britain.

in order to develop a theoretical model of nationalism which draws upon both Marxist and non-Marxist theoretical tradition (3.18).

Part Four of the Chapter will be concerned with the objects of discourse for political actors in Britain's "Europe debate". The first four Sections are concerned with the four main "nationalist" aspects of "anti-EC" discourses identified by Hairs. That is, Parliamentary sovereignty (3.19), and its importance to many inside

## **CHAPTER THREE: "ANTI-EC" "NATIONALIST" DISCOURSE: THEORY, HISTORY, THEMES.**

historical archive which show perceptions of these objects of

### **3.1: What this Chapter covers.**

will be made in relation to them by "anti-EC" political actors.

This Chapter is about the discourse employed in Britain's "Europe debate", particularly the "nationalist" discourse used by "anti-EC" political actors.

Part One of the Chapter is a discussion of Marxian theoretical approaches to the concept of ideology. The Marxian theorists examined are Karl Marx (3.2); V.I. Lenin (3.3); Antonio Gramsci (3.4); Louis Althusser (3.5); Nicos Poulantzas (3.6); and Ernesto Laclau (3.7). In Section 3.8 there is a discussion about what theoretical insights they can offer in relation to understanding "anti-EC" nationalism in Britain, as well as the failings of these Marxian theories of ideology.

Part Two is about the theories of discourse. The theoretical relevance, or otherwise, of Ferdinand de Saussure and Linguistic approaches to language (3.9); V.N. Voloshinov (3.10); CDA (3.11); Michel Foucault (3.12); and Michel Pecheux to understanding the concept of discourse are examined, before the possible applications of these approaches to the thesis is outlined (3.14).

Part Three is concerned with theoretically explaining the existence, persistence and political importance of ideologies such as nationalism. After the contributions of Marxian theory to addressing this topic have been outlined (3.15), non-Marxian theoretical approaches to identity and ideology (3.16) and the logic of culture (Neumann and Walsh, 1991) (3.17) will be discussed, in order to develop a theoretical model of nationalism which draws upon both Marxian and non-Marxian theoretical approaches (3.18).

Part Four of the Chapter will be concerned with the objects of discourse for political actors in Britain's "Europe debate". The first four Sections are concerned with the four main "nationalist" objects of "anti-EC" discourse identified by Nairn. That is, Parliamentary Sovereignty (3.19), and its importance to many inside

the Conservative (3.20) and Labour Parties (3.21); Britain's world-role (3.22); France (3.23); and Germany (3.24). The historical archive which shape perceptions of these objects of discourse, and the type of statements which it can be anticipated will be made in relation to them by "anti-EC" political actors, will be discussed. This will be followed by noting the extent to which such discourse can be described as "nationalist" in relation to Anthony Smith's (1976) definition of nationalism (3.25).

Part Four will also include a discussion of the types of statements which "anti-EC" political actors can be anticipated to employ in their "ideological" and "pragmatic" discourse (3.26); and the discourse "pro-EC" political actors can be anticipated to employ (3.27).

However, the Chapter will begin by examining the Marxian theoretical tradition's approach to ideology, beginning with Marx.

## PART ONE: IDEOLOGY.

### 3.2: Karl Marx.

Divisions within the Marxian theoretical tradition towards approaching the concept of ideology can be said to stem from the works of Marx himself. As McCarney (1980, p.1) notes, Marx's view on ideology "gets no systematic attention in his own writings"; there is no single work by Marx on ideology to compare in scope with *Capital* on economics.

Lacking such an *mangum opus* by Marx on ideology, many scholars have instead turned to his 1859 **Preface to 'A Critique of Political Economy'** to explain his attitude towards ideology. This is widely seen as a crudely determinist elaboration by Marx of his concept of ideology. Marx (1988d, pp.389-90) is seen as presenting a model where the economic base of society determines what occurs in the rest of the social superstructure, with "a distinction...made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production...and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic- in short the ideological forms in which men become

conscious of the conflict". Furthermore, this economic determinism in the **Preface** is regarded as being further demonstrated by Marx's (1988d, p.389) statements that "With the change of the economic foundations the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed"; humans' ideas are a reflection of changes in the structure of the economic base, since "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but...their social being that determines their consciousness."

In fact, a number of approaches by Marx towards ideology exist, examples of which can be found throughout his works.

To begin with, argues Larrain (1983, p.1), most of Marx's writings on ideology treated the concept in a "negative" manner. That is, Marx saw ideology as a form of thought which distorted humans' consciousness of their actual material conditions, as it regarded itself as having no connection with material conditions in society (Marx, 1988b, p.164). This view of ideology corresponds to the tendency within wider social theory towards ideology, identified above by Eagleton (1991, p.3), which approaches ideology as a form of illusion, distortion or mystification. In Marx's early political writings, he concentrated upon criticising the "negative" ideological ramifications of the existence of religion and Hegel's conception of the state as "inversions", concealing the real character of material existence. Marx saw these "inversions" as turning the subjective into objective and vice-versa, so that "men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a **camera obscura**" (Marx, 1988b, p.164). Consequently, in Hegel's writings the "Idea" manifested itself in the empirical world in the form of the Prussian state bureaucracy, which Hegel claimed represented the "absolute universal", determining civil society. Marx argues that, in fact, the interests of the Prussian state bureaucracy are determined by civil society, particularly the interests of private property. Similarly, Marx (1988a, p.63) sees the idea of God as an "inversion", arguing that "man makes religion, religion does not make man". He sees religion expressing the contradictions and sufferings of the real world, compensating the mind for a deficient reality as "the opium of the people" (Marx, 1988a, p.64).

Marx, in critiquing religion and the Prussian state in such a manner, broke with his erstwhile intellectual colleagues, the Young Hegelians, who believed that their task was to liberate humans from their illusions in religion and the state by attacking those mistaken beliefs. While the Young Hegelians saw illusions in religion and the state as starting from consciousness, Marx saw such ideas as arising from real social conditions; only when the social conditions for believing in religion and the state disappeared would these erroneous ideas disappear; the ideological "weapon of criticism cannot...supplant the criticisms of weapons; material force must be overthrown by material force" (Marx, 1988a, p.69).

In his later writings on economics, Marx (1988e, p.435; McCarney, 1980, pp.22-3) describes the "Fetishism of Commodities" in capitalist society as a form of "negative" ideology. Marx argues that commodity fetishism is a process where humans conceive their social relations as if they were natural. Marx saw humans producing commodities, objects solely designed to be exchanged in the market place, and not coming into contact with each other until they exchange their products. Consequently, producers have no social relationships except when exchanging commodities, which come to stand for social relationships. Marx (1988e, p.436) argues that, under capitalism, humans' thinking about the social relations involved in their work is characterised by fetishism; "a definite social relation between men...assumes in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things."

Although Marx generally saw ideology as a "negative" concept, some of his writings suggested that it could be seen, in Larrain's (1983, p.4) terminology, in a "neutral" or a "positive" light. That is, ideology can be seen either as the totality of all forms of social consciousness or the political ideas of social classes.

Marx suggests on a number of occasions that certain sets of ideas or philosophies can be seen as articulating the world-view of a social class or group at certain historical junctures, and so "become material force as soon as it seizes the masses" (Marx, 1988a, p.69). For instance, Marx (1988b, pp.185-9) argues that the

increasing intellectual influence of utilitarianism in Britain, originating with the thought of Hobbes and Locke in the Seventeenth Century, represented and reflected the class interests of the rising bourgeoisie; while in France such ideas remained a mere type of philosophy. Marx (1988b, p.176) argues that history shows that all dominant classes or class fractions need to have an ideology to serve their interests:

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force in society is at the same time its ruling ideological force....The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas..."

While Marx saw non-proletarian classes having their own ideologies and ideologists, he generally avoided suggesting that the working class needed an ideology, as opposed to a scientific understanding of the social world which Marx was busily trying to develop. In the 1859 **Preface**, Marx (1988d, p.389; McLellan, 1995, p. 15) can be interpreted as saying that such "scientific socialism" is not an ideology, but a means of understanding "the material transformation of the conditions of production...with the precision of natural science." The **Preface** can also be read, however, as suggesting that the working class needs its own, "positive" form of ideology, for it is through "the ideological forms" that "men become conscious" of the class struggle (Larrain, 1983, p.47).

In addition to the "negative" and "positive" forms of ideology which Larrain identifies, John Thompson (1990, pp.40-4) argues that a third concept of ideology can be found in Marx's writings. This he calls the "latent conception of ideology", since although Marx was able to recognise and describe this ideological phenomenon, he was unable to theorise it fully.

The "latent conception of ideology", argues John Thompson (1990, p.41), is able to account for those ideological forms which can simply not be explained as either a total illusion, nor as the

articulated interests of a social class or group. Instead, "they are symbolic constructions which have some degree of autonomy and efficacy" from economic and class interests. Such ideologies, argues Thompson, "constitute symbols and slogans, customs and traditions which move people or hold them back, propel them or constrain them, in such a way that we cannot think of these symbolic constructions as solely determined by, and fully explicable in terms of, the economic conditions of production." Thompson sees such traditional symbols and values as not meekly disappearing in the face of widespread, constant change in the economy. Indeed, "they live on; they modify and transform themselves", so that traditional "social relations may be sustained, and social change arrested, by the prevalence or diffusion of symbolic constructions".

Thompson argues that Marx recognised the existence of such a **latent conception of ideology** at the empirical level, without being able to articulate the concept at the theoretical level. The empirical work cited by Thompson (1990, pp.42-3) pinpoints the best example of the latent concept occurring in Marx's works as being **The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte**. Marx describes the French political situation in 1848-51, with the country on the brink of revolution. He argues that an alliance of the urban proletariat and the rural peasantry should have been able to unite to overthrow the French state. In fact, as Marx ruefully describes, the revolutionary situation was terminated in favour of political reaction by Louis Bonaparte, nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, organising a **coup d'etat** in 1851 and proclaiming himself to be Emperor Napoleon III.

Marx (1988c, p.318) argues that the alliance of peasantry and proletariat never emerged because:

"Historic tradition gave rise to the belief of the French peasants that a man named Napoleon would bring all the glory back to them. And an individual turned up who gives himself out as the man because he bears the name of Napoleon... After a vagabondage of twenty years and after a series of grotesque adventures, the legend finds fulfilment and the man becomes Emperor of the

French. The fixed ideas of the nephew was realized, because it coincided with the fixed idea of the most numerous class of the French people."

Thompson argues that the **Eighteenth Brumaire** shows that Marx realised that social classes could be politically mobilised to support an ideology which did not represent their objective interests, but which instead arose from a "historic tradition" or a "fixed idea" "reactivated by the words and images of an imposter". In conclusion, argues Thompson (1990, p.44) Marx was able to recognise, but not theoretically articulate, the "latent theory of ideology" which informed his **Eighteenth Brumaire** which showed that:

"A tradition can hold and take hold of a people, can lead them to believe that the past is their future and that a master is their servant, and can thereby sustain a social order in which the vast majority of people are subjected to conditions of domination....the symbolic forms transmitted from the past are constitutive of everyday customs practices and beliefs, they cannot be disposed of like so many inert cadavers, since they play an active and fundamental role in people's lives."

### 3.3: V.I. Lenin.

After Marx's death, Marxian theorists increasingly saw ideology as a concept which could be regarded in a "positive" manner. That is, the working class was seen as needing a socialist ideology to represent its own interests. The "revisionist" Marxian theorist Eduard Bernstein was the first explicitly to articulate this viewpoint, declaring that no political programme, including the socialist one, could do without a "strong dose of ideology" (McLellan, 1995, p.22). It was with Lenin, however, that "The positive concept of ideology comes of age" (Larraín, 1983, p.63).

In his **What is to be Done?**, published in 1902, Lenin argues that "The working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism" (Lenin, 1988, p.109). He does not see this as guaranteeing the victory of socialism over capitalism because "bourgeois ideology is

far older in origin than socialist ideology,...is more developed, and...has at its disposal immeasurably more means of dissemination." Lenin (1988, p.109) sees bourgeois ideology as simply "the most widespread (and continuously and diversely revived)" ideology in capitalist society, whose grip over working class consciousness can only be overcome through by "an unswerving struggle" by socialists (Lenin, 1988, p.108).

Lenin (1988, p.98) argues, though, that the working class are unable to overcome their ideological subservience to the bourgeoisie on their own, since "The history of all countries shows that the working class exclusively by its own effort is able to develop only trade-union consciousness". Such "trade-union consciousness" corresponds to what Gramsci would call an "economic-corporate" outlook by a social group; one which adapts to the current social system rather than attempting to overthrow it by developing an "ethical-political" viewpoint. Lenin contrasts mere "trade-union" consciousness with "social democratic" consciousness, developed from the "scientific socialism" of Marxian theory which itself "arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia" (Lenin, 1988, p.98).

Lenin maintained, however, that despite being theoretically developed from a social group outside of the working class, socialism was the only ideology which truly served the interests of the working class. Indeed, for Lenin (1988, p.107), "the **only** choice is: either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a 'third' ideology'...in a society torn by class antagonisms....). Hence to belittle socialist ideology **in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree** means to strengthen bourgeois ideology."

In short, Lenin's conception of a socialist consciousness for the working class amalgamates the concepts of ideology, class consciousness and science (Larrain, 1983, p.68). When Lenin opposes bourgeois ideology on the grounds of being unscientific, it is because it is "bourgeois", not because it is "ideology". Ideology for Lenin is a sphere of class struggle, in which contradictory

class interests are manifested in different class ideologies which are in "ideological struggle" with each other. Lenin can therefore be said to have taken the "positive" view of ideology, originating in Marx's 1859 **Preface**, to its logical conclusion.

### **3.4: Antonio Gramsci.**

Like Lenin, Gramsci holds a "positive" view of ideology derived from Marx's 1859 **Preface**, arguing that "it is on the level of ideologies that men become conscious of conflicts in the world of economy" (Gramsci, 1986, p.162; p.365). Gramsci, however, holds a rather more sophisticated view of ideology than Lenin does.

For Gramsci (1986, p. 377), ideologies are embodied in collective and communal modes of living:

"To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is psychological; they 'organise' human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc."

Gramsci, echoing Marx's belief that an ideology "will become a material force as soon as it seizes the masses", argues that ideology has a material existence in the practical conduct of humans, providing the rules of practical conduct and moral behaviour similar to that provided by religion (Gramsci, 1986, p.326).

Gramsci argues that through developing an ideological world-view which is of practical relevance to humans' everyday actions and beliefs, it is possible for a social group to begin gaining hegemony over society. This gaining of hegemony, as previously discussed in Chapter Two, is also dependent upon gaining hegemony over the economic and political spheres of social existence. Furthermore, the development of ideological hegemony is, for Gramsci, dependent upon intellectuals supporting the would-be hegemonic social group. He divides ideologists into "traditional" and "organic" types. Gramsci's "traditional" ideologists can be seen as corresponding to those intellectuals, whom Marx saw as

distorting mass consciousness in a "negative" way. That is, Gramsci defines "traditional" intellectuals as those who present themselves "as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group"; who "think of themselves as 'independent', autonomous, endowed with a character of their own" (Gramsci, 1986, pp.7-8).

Gramsci contrasts these "traditional" intellectuals with "organic" intellectuals. The latter are created by, and articulate the interests of, a particular social group. "Organic" intellectuals give this social group "homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the political and social fields" (Gramsci, 1986, p.5).

Gramsci differs from Lenin, however, in arguing that "organic" intellectuals cannot bring socialist ideology and consciousness into the working class from the outside. His starting point is what he calls "common sense", the uncritical and largely unconscious way that people perceive the world. For Gramsci, all humans are "philosophers" to the extent that they have some outlook on the world, yet this may be in contradiction to their political consciousness. Consequently, Gramsci (1986, p.333) sees people having two theoretical consciences:

"..one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow workers in the practical transformation in the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed."

Gramsci sees that workers, trying to live their lives in capitalist society, have organised their experience through "common sense". Although the dominant ideology is constructed through "common sense", it is also the site for challenging and resisting the dominant ideology. Gramsci sees the task of Marxian theory as criticising "common sense" in order to develop the positive nucleus contained within it- "good sense" (Gramsci, 1986, p.328)- into a more coherent outlook. In contrast to Lenin, Gramsci (1986, p.331) emphasises that "it is not a question of introducing from scratch a scientific form of thought into everyone's life but of renovating

and making critical an already existing activity." For Gramsci (1986, p.427), therefore, ideology plays "an intermediate phase between philosophy and day-to-day existence."

Furthermore, Gramsci recognises, like Marx, the existence, at an empirical level, of the "latent conception of ideology". In creating an ideology based upon the "good sense" of the working class, Gramsci (1986, p.168) recognises that "mass ideological factors always lag behind mass economic phenomena" and at certain historical junctures, "the automatic thrust due to the economic factor is slowed down, obstructed or even momentarily broken by traditional elements"; as Marx recognised, but could not theoretically articulate, in France during the 1848-51 period.

### **3.5: Louis Althusser.**

Althusser (1971, p.136) describes the "base determines superstructure" model of ideology as "metaphorical i.e. it remains descriptive". Moreover, Althusser (1971, p.135) believes that the superstructure has "relative autonomy" from the base, with "reciprocal action", or effects, of the superstructure upon the economic base. Consequently, Althusser (1971, p.130) regards ideology, along with the "politico-legal" level of the superstructure, as not simply reflecting the economic base, but helping to guarantee "the existence of the necessity of the reproduction of the material conditions of production."

Althusser also redefines the nature of ideology, emphatically rejecting the "negative" conception of ideology within Marxian theory as illusion. For Althusser (1971, p.165), "Ideology has a material existence", as a real social relation exhibited in social practice. Through ideology, humans are formed, transformed and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence. Althusser (1971, p.127) argues that in all societies with a division of social labour, there is a need to renew the means of production if production is to be possible. For Althusser (1971, p.133), ideology is the means to achieve this goal, by equipping human agents with the necessary forms of consciousness

enabling them to carry out effectively the functions assigned to their allocated position in the division of social labour. For Althusser (1971, p.170), "there is no practice except by and in an ideology" and "there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects."

Althusser (1971, p.173) argues that "all ideology hails and interpellates concrete individuals as concrete individuals." He sees ideology as having a duplicate mirror-structure which catches individual human subjects in a quadruple system of interpellations. The four aspects to this system are (Althusser, 1971, p.181):

- "(1) the interpellation of 'individuals' as subjects;
- "(2) their subjection to their subject;
- "(3) the mutual recognition of subjects and subjects, the subjects' recognition of each other, and finally the subject's recognition of himself;
- "(4) the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition that the subjects recognise what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be alright...."

Althusser, therefore, sees ideology as a social cement, with his theory linking it to the practices of everyday life (McLellan, 1995, p.29). He also links ideology to an institutional context. Althusser (1971, p.143) sees some institutions in society, such as the government, administration, army, police, courts and prisons, "'functions by violence'- at least ultimately". These he calls "Repressive State Apparatuses" (RSA). Althusser (1971, p.146) agrees with Gramsci, however, that "no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony" over society through ideology. This hegemony is exercised through the "Ideological State Apparatuses" (ISA). Examples of ISAs mentioned by Althusser (1971, p.143) include religious institutions, educational institutions, the family, the legal system, the political parties and political system, trade unions, the media and cultural forms such as arts, literature and sports. Althusser (1971, pp.144-5) says that ISAs differ from RSAs since there are a plurality of ISAs; ISAs can be found in the private

domain, while RSAs belong entirely in the public domain; and ISAs function "by ideology", unlike RSAs functioning "by violence". Moreover, for Althusser (1971, pp.147, 185), ISAs can be a site of class struggle.

### **3.6: Nicos Poulantzas.**

Poulantzas (1976, pp.16-17) also extends Althusser's approach to ideology by arguing that the dominant ideology in society works by Poulantzas (1976, pp.139-40) suggests that the ideological region in capitalist societies is characterised by a specific autonomy from the political region. This separation of the ideological from the political region, argues Poulantzas (1976, pp.215-6), makes it possible for the dominant ideology to play an intensely political role, because it provides the ideological framework within which the dominant class or fraction can establish its political hegemony.

Furthermore, Poulantzas argues that ideology permeates the other levels of the capitalist social formation which itself is characterised by various regional sub-ensembles that correspond to different fields of social activity. In capitalist societies, says Poulantzas (1976, pp.210-15, 220-1), the dominant sub-ensemble tends to be the juridico-political region.

For Poulantzas (1976, pp.206-7), ideologies constitute a specific objective level of the social formation with their own reality and materiality, providing "a relatively coherent ensemble of representations, values and beliefs" (Poulantzas, 1976, p.206), whose function is to provide men with an "imaginary" relation to their real conditions of existence. Poulantzas sees ideology permeating every level of the social structure. Like Althusser, Poulantzas (1976, pp.206-7) sees the function of ideology as moulding agents' representations of their real relations so that they experience them in a way that is obvious but false. These representations are obvious to the extent that they include

elements of knowledge which enable humans to engage in political activities, but false in the sense that they hide the real contradictions in the agents. Poulantzas can, therefore, be seen as simultaneously embracing both a "negative" and "positive" concept of ideology.

Poulantzas (1976, pp.207-9) also echoes Althusser's approach to ideology in arguing that the dominant ideology in society works by inserting humans into the objective system of social relations in such a way that they "live" these relations in terms which are compatible with continued class domination. For Poulantzas (1976, p.213), "The 'cement' of ideology permeates every layer of the social structure, including economic and political practice", objectively imposing "imaginary" coherence upon society, which corresponds to the particular type of unity characteristic of its "structure of dominance". Consequently, the dominant ideology itself must have a certain unity and coherence so that it can express the unity of the social formation as a whole (Poulantzas, 1976, pp.211-13). Furthermore, Poulantzas (1976, p.223) argues that the influence of the dominant ideology is such that it strongly influences the way in which subordinate social groups resist oppression. For instance, in capitalist societies, subordinate social groups "spontaneously" live their revolt through notions such as "democracy", "equality" and "justice", drawn from the juridico-political region of the dominant ideology.

Like Gramsci, and unlike Lenin, Poulantzas (1976, pp.205-6) denies that any "pure" class ideologies exist in practice, arguing instead that the dominant ideology reflects the balance of class forces in society. It can, therefore, integrate ideological elements corresponding to, and associated with, other classes and class fractions. Similarly, the socialist ideology of the working class in capitalist society can be contaminated by ideological elements from the dominant class and petit bourgeoisie (Poulantzas, 1976, pp. 203, 210). Consequently, for Poulantzas (1976, p.202) ideologies cannot be "considered as if they were political number-plates worn by social classes on their backs." Moreover, Poulantzas (1976, p.203) maintains that there is "the possibility

of a whole series of dislocations between the dominant ideology and the politically hegemonic class or fraction."

### 3.7: Ernesto Laclau.

Laclau's theoretical approach towards ideology is strongly influenced by the works by Althusser and Poulantzas. However, he produces theoretical insights of his own, though, which go beyond those of Althusser and Poulantzas.

Laclau rejects Poulantzas' claim that an ideology can be analysed by breaking it down into elements associated with a particular class or class fraction (Laclau, 1977, pp.93-4), arguing instead that (Laclau, 1977, p.99):

"...ideological 'elements' taken in isolation have no necessary class connotation...this connotation is only the result of those elements in a concrete ideological discourse....the precondition for analysing the class nature of an ideology is to conduct the enquiry through that which constitutes the distinctive unity of an ideological discourse."

Laclau (1977, p.160) argues that nationalism in itself "has no class connotation" and only acquires it through "specific articulation with other ideological elements." Moreover, a class can only compete at the ideological level if all forces in struggle share a (Laclau, 1977, p.161) "common framework of meaning", for this is "this background of shared meanings that enables antagonistic discourses to establish their difference". Laclau (1977, p.161) illustrates this point thus:

"The political discourses of various classes... will consist of antagonistic articulation in which each class presents itself as the authentic representative...of 'the national interest'...."

Laclau (1977, p.161) argues that it is the existence of non-class contents within a discourse "which constitute the raw material on which class ideological practices operate."

Laclau (1977, p.102) uses Althusser's concept of ideological interpellations as another starting point in theoretically understanding ideology. He agrees with Althusser that all individuals in society have identities made up of a number of interpellations, including familial, religious and political ones. Laclau argues that such interpellations make up each individual's sense of "self", and all social actors, including political actors, experience the same process in order to define their ideological self-images.

Laclau (1977, pp.102-3) argues that, during periods of social stability, different interpellations coexist, despite containing contradictory values, within a relatively unified ideological discourse. Laclau argues that during these historical periods a social formation is able to reproduce social relations through traditional channels. The dominant bloc in a particular society formation succeeds in neutralising contradictions between the various ideological themes creating a general social consensus.

Laclau, though, also outlines a theoretical model for understanding a historical juncture which Althusser does not address at length. That is, periods of general ideological crisis. Laclau (1977, p.103) argues that an increasing lack of confidence in the "natural" or "automatic" reproduction of the social system is translated into the exacerbation of all the ideological contradictions neutralised during periods of stability. A dissolution of the unity of the dominant ideological discourse occurs, and since Laclau, echoing Althusser, argues that the function of ideology is to constitute individuals' identities and their sense of self, an ideological crisis within society is necessarily translated into an "identity crisis" for all social agents, including political actors.

As a society's ideological crisis unfolds, Laclau sees political actors attempting to resolve the crisis by reconstituting an ideological unity by denying all interpellations but one. All the logical implications of that particular interpellation are developed, transforming that interpellation into a principle for reconstructing the entire ideological domain.

Laclau (1977, p.161) draws upon Poulantzas to understand how the dominant class or social group maintains its ideological hegemony over society. He argues that "precisely because it is dominant", the dominant group's ideology interpellates members of both the dominant and dominated groups. The latters' subordination is partially achieved by the "absorption and neutralisation of those ideological contents through which resistance to...domination...is expressed." Laclau (1977, p.163) goes onto argue, however, that a dominant class may go too far in the absorption of the dominated classes' ideological discourse, so running:

"...the risk that a crisis may reduce its own neutralising capacity and that the dominated classes may impose their own articulating discourse within the State apparatus."

Laclau (1977, pp.166-7) approach to ideology is also distinctive in his recognition of the inability of Marxian theory to adequately explain the existence of **relatively continuous** popular traditions, such as national sentiments. He recognises that such traditions are crystallised in symbols and values which human subjects try to find their own identity. Laclau argues that popular traditions are not consistent, organised discourses, but are **elements** that only exist as part of a wider political discourse. As a result, the most divergent political actors can appeal to exactly the same ideological symbols. Laclau regards such popular traditions as mere elements, he sees them as residues of unique, irreducible historical experience, which cannot be modified at will, for they (Laclau, 1977, p.167) "constitute a more solid and durable structure of meanings than the social structure itself."

### **3.8: Marxian theories of ideology: their uses and failings.**

With the theories of Marx, Lenin, Gramsci, Althusser, Poulantzas and Laclau about ideology have been examined, it is possible to address the issue of which aspects of these theories will be of use to this study, and where, if possible, it will be more theoretically fruitful, to draw upon non-Marxian perspectives.

To begin with, there are a number of weaknesses in using Marxian theories of ideology in the specific context of this particular study. First, all six theorists are concerned with the place of ideology in attempting to further the dual interests of the working class and socialism. Hence, all six are concerned about the extent to which ideology is either a help or a hindrance to the pursuit of the connected causes of socialism and working class emancipation. The weakness of Marxian theory, as discussed in this section, is that it has little specifically to say about political situations or historical junctures where non-class factors have a strong salience. Britain's "Europe debate" has been one such situation, which for many, if not all, of its participants, has had little or nothing to do with their particular class interests, even if they perceive the existence of class interests. In short, theories of ideology designed to illuminate the course of class struggles may be found to be lacking clarity in a situation where any form of class struggle is hard to detect.

Second, Marxian theories of ideology may be seen as deficient in their explanations of the process by which events and changes at the economic level affect the attitudes and actions of political actors. Moreover, the Marxian theorists examined in this Section are unable to explain why political actors, both at an individual and collective level, feel a need to support particular ideological outlooks, especially those ideas which do not appear to serve their material interests. To maintain, as some Marxian theory does, that such ideological viewpoints are based on pure illusion, is to substitute mere moral condemnation for a social phenomenon which needs an adequate theoretical explanation. As Eagleton (1991, pp.15, 26) observes, all successful ideologies must have some resonance with the population to attract widespread support, even if their political opponents see them as mere illusion.

As can be seen, there is a need to develop a non-Marxian theoretical framework which can explain the existence of an ideological phenomenon such as nationalism. This does not mean, however, that Marxian theoretical perspectives on ideology have no insights that are worth utilising in trying to explain British

"anti-EC" nationalism. All but one of the six Marxian theorists examined in this Section have, in this respect, their uses.

First, Marx's **Preface** suggests that events in the economic sphere of social existence have their effects, in time, upon events in the ideological sphere. As was discussed in Chapter One, both Britain's domestic politics and its place within the international state system have, since at least the Seventeenth Century, been affected by economic developments at both the international and domestic level. There would therefore seem to be a valid case for supposing that these economic developments would also affect events at the ideological level in British politics.

Second, there is Marx's "latent conception of ideology". I would strongly argue that the "latent conception", despite of Marx's failure to explain it at a theoretical level, is the most important insight into the concept of ideology proposed by any of the Marxian theorists examined here. By examining British "anti-EC" nationalism in the "Europe debate" we are focusing upon an example of Marx's "latent concept". That is, British "anti-EC" nationalism can be examined as an ideological form which is not necessarily linked with class interests; it is, instead, an ideological form embedded into the national consciousness from a previous era of ideological hegemony, which still possesses a latent psychological appeal able to provoke strong reactions from political actors.

The one Marxian theorist examined here who has nothing to offer further theoretical understanding of ideology is Lenin. His crude model of ideology sees them as "pure" expressions of class interests. This approach may have been appropriate to Czarist Russia almost a century ago, where a simple class structure encouraged sharp class conflict, but has little explanatory value in trying to understand an ideological phenomenon in late Twentieth Century Britain which has little overt connection to any form of struggle between capital and labour.

Gramsci's concept of hegemony, including the struggle for ideological hegemony, has already been discussed in Chapter Two, and need only be noted here. An important facet of Gramsci's approach to ideology, with relevance to examining British "anti-EC"

nationalism, is his stress upon understanding a country's national historical and cultural experiences to understand a specific historical juncture. As mentioned earlier, Gramsci recognised the "latent conception of ideology" as Marx did, and a theoretical development of this would deepen the intellectual sophistication of both these Marxians' works.

Althusser has been criticised for developing a strongly determinist model of capitalist society where people are bearers of social roles rather than autonomous subjects; where ideology inescapably makes people into prisoners, leaving them no place for autonomous action or a reflexive understanding of the structure in which they are embedded; and where there is no possibility of them developing a consciousness able to do something about their situation (McLellan, 1995, pp.28-30). Despite these valid criticisms of Althusser's model of society and ideology, it does offer some insights to understand British "anti-EC" nationalism. For instance, one important type of ISAs for Althusser are political parties. One could, therefore, anticipate the British Conservative and Labour Parties being ideologically imbued with values which might encourage the expression of "anti-EC" nationalist sentiments. Furthermore, Althusser's account of how ideology plays its role in continually reproducing capitalist society, by ensuring that individuals are constantly being pressurised, through ISAs, into accepting their allocated roles in the capitalist system, may be of use. That is, unlike Althusser, it is possible to show how this reproduction of ideological values may be disrupted by disjunctions between the actual experiences of political actors, and the ideological positions they adhere to.

Such disjunctions are noted by Poulantzas, and accounting for them is theoretically bound up with developing a model of the latent conception of ideology. Poulantzas' also has two insights of value in approaching British "anti-EC" nationalism: first, that, in modern capitalist societies, the most important facet of the dominant bourgeois ideology are juridico-legal concepts; second, how imbued the thoughts and expressions of subordinate social groups are by the ideologies of the dominant social group.

Laclau's theoretical approach towards ideology has several aspects which have potential relevance in attempting to understand the various features of Britain's "Europe debate". He makes the valid point that political actors need to share common assumptions as a prerequisite for articulating their differences over, to use Laclau's example, the "national interest". Hence, in examining the language used by "anti-EC" and "pro-EC" political actors in addressing the issues of the EC and further European integration, it could be anticipated that the EC is presented as either helping or hindering a policy goal, which all participants in the debate express their agreement upon, such as maintaining Britain's international influence or the effective scope of its Parliamentary Sovereignty.

Another important feature of Laclau's theory of ideology, which has relevance to the theoretical understanding of Britain's "Europe debate", is his concept of ideological crisis. Although he does not discuss in detail about what causes an ideological crisis, Laclau offers possible theoretical understanding of its effects.

Laclau sees social and political stability, where the social formation is able to reproduce social relations through traditional channels, as guaranteeing a relatively unified ideological discourse. From a perspective informed by NATISOB, Britain in the 1950s can be seen as enjoying such a period of social and political stability, built upon Britain's relatively strong positions within the international economic and state systems, and accompanied by a relatively unified ideological discourse, based upon positive beliefs in Parliamentary Sovereignty, Britain's "world-role" and national superiority over France and Germany.

Using Laclau's ideas from a NATISOB perspective, however, from the early 1960s onwards Britain's relative decline within the international economic and state systems would enable the possible dissolution of the dominant ideological discourse in British society. Moreover, employing Laclau's theoretical insights, it is possible to anticipate that such a dissolution of, or crisis within, the dominant ideological discourse will precipitate an ideological crisis for all social and political actors within that

particular society.

Furthermore, using Laclau, it is possible to anticipate that British political actors will attempt to solve the ideological crisis through deny all interpellations but one; and developing that interpellation as a principle for reconstituting the entire ideological sphere of social existence. Using NATISOB and Nairn's typology of discourse within Britain's "Europe debate", it is possible to anticipate the use of particular forms of "anti" or "pro-EC" discourse by British political actors in attempting to resolve ideological crisis.

Laclau's theoretical approach to ideology is also notable in that, like Marx and Gramsci, he recognises the existence of popular national sentiments, or **residuals**, which political actors cannot ignore or manipulate at will. Consequently, Laclau recognises the existence of a latent conception of ideology. In common with Marx and Gramsci, though, Laclau is unable to articulate a theory to explain the political importance of residuals, as opposed to recognising their empirical reality.

Laclau's approach to ideology is distinctive from the other five Marxian theorists examined here, in that he uses the concept of discourse in relation to ideology. Laclau does not, however, adequately explain how the concepts of discourse and ideology are related to each other. Nor does he define discourse.

Such weaknesses in Laclau's approach to discourse should not distract attention from him being the only one of the six Marxian theorists of ideology examined here who uses the concept of ideology. It does mean, however, that other theorists should be examined if the concept of discourse is to be adequately understood and utilised in this thesis.

However, before examining the self-declared theorists of "discourse analysis", such as those utilising CDA, Foucault and Pecheux, it is necessary to examine possible ways of approaching the use of language in politics through the use of linguistic theory, beginning with Ferdinand de Saussure's **Course in General Linguistics**.

## PART TWO: DISCOURSE.

### 3.9: Linguistic Approaches to the Use of Language.

Ferdinand de Saussure can be said to be one of the most influential linguistic theoreticians of the Twentieth Century, as his **Course** was the seminal theoretical work for inspiring the structural linguistics approach to language use. Prior to de Saussure, linguistic theories about meaning in language had been based upon the assumption that words stood for preexisting ideas. Beyond this common assumption, there were two theoretical approaches: one seeing meanings coming from things "represented" in words; the other seeing meanings derived from universal ideas (Macdonell, 1986, p.9).

In the **Course**, Saussure broke with these theoretical assumptions of the previous two centuries; his approach to linguistics demonstrated that meanings not only vary in different languages, but also issue from a language, rather than preexisting it. To demonstrate that meanings do not exist prior to a system of a particular language, de Saussure (1974, p.116) cited the variety of human languages. Furthermore, he argued that languages are homogeneous; all people capable of speaking a language speak it the same way, with a common code or general system of sounds and meanings underneath a mass of spoken or written utterances.

Moreover, Saussure argues that this general system was made of relations; that the sounds, written images and meanings of any language exist in a system of relations with one another. He asserts that sounds, words and images come from the system of relations. Many of de Saussure's (1974, p.120) statements in the **Course** describe language as a system of negative relations, without positive terms. Within a language, possibilities of meaning are not determined by the positive, but are instead marked out by their negative relations to one another. Consequently in a system, possibilities for meaning are marked out, without any actual, definite meanings being pinned down.

At the same time, however, de Saussure (1974, pp.120-1)

recognises that if all possibilities of meaning are open and free-floating, communication cannot take place. He therefore asserts that "positive" terms, in the forms of signs, exist. Each sound is tied to the signs of a language. In the sign, open possibilities are pinned down and defined through oppositions with other signs. With that the **Course** replaces the initial concept of an open system with a closed structure of oppositions, and much subsequent theory about linguistics adopted this view of language (Macdonell, 1986, p.10). In taking the view that it is through difference or "binary oppositions" that meaning in language is signified, Saussure took a similar theoretical approach to that found within much psychology, and indeed, such "binary oppositions seem to be fundamental to all linguistic and symbolic systems and to the production of meaning itself" (Hall, 1992, p.279).

Before leaving de Saussure's **Course**, it is worth noting that he declared that "Language is a social fact" (Halliday, 1978, p.1). It would, therefore, appear to a **prima facie** case for supposing that linguistic theory can be an effective tool for examining the discourse, or language in a social context, used in the case studies of this thesis.

Discourse analysis has, however, rejected the belief that a single and general system lies behind all language use, while not rejecting all ideas of system (Macdonell, 1986, p.9). Subsequent linguistics theory took from de Saussure this assumption that language is unvarying, especially within a particular community. It also took from him the assumption that the study of language should be synchronic, not historical. That is, language should be studied as a static system, rather than one which is dynamic and changes over time (Fairclough, 1989. p.7). Whether a theoretical approach based on such assumptions will be of use in approaching case studies covering three separate decades, and where there could be disputes over the meaning of words- "sovereignty", for example- is doubtful.

Of course, to discuss modern linguistic theory on the assumption that it has just one approach to analysing language is incorrect. There are several methodologies which appear to have the potential

to analyse successfully the discourse used in the case studies examined in this thesis.

First, there is "sociolinguistics" (Labov, 1972; Coulmas, 1997). Such a methodology appears to be of great potential value as it can be defined as the study of "language in its social context." In practice, however, sociolinguistics is a theoretical approach which is strong in describing, in a positivist manner, what language was used; it does not explain, though, the reasons, in terms of how and why, behind the use of that particular language (Fairclough, 1989, pp.1, 8).

Second, there is the approach to linguistics called "pragmatics" (Wilson, 1990; Thomas, 1995). This is defined in Anglo-American linguistic theory as the study of "speech acts", with language being seen as a form of action. Such a theory of "pragmatics" does not, however, approach speech acts in a social context. Instead, speech acts are seen as "individual" actions, so down-playing the extent to which individual humans are caught up, constrained by, and derive their individual identities from social conventions and norms (Fairclough, 1989, p.9).

A third linguistic theory approach to analysing language is conversation analysis (Allen and Guy, 1974; Werth, 1981). Although conversation analysis does have the merit of examining "real" conversations, there are two main reasons why it is not an appropriate theoretical approach for the case studies in this thesis. First, those linguists who analyse conversations tend to resist making connections between the "micro" structures of conversation and the "macro" structures of wider society (Fairclough, 1989, pp.11-12). Second, without anticipating their content, in the case studies the language used by political actors could hardly be described as "conversations", if conversations are defined as interchanges of thoughts and words.

In conclusion, linguistic theory does not have the methodological means by which to analyse the language used in the case studies examined in this thesis. Instead it is necessary to draw upon theoretical insights from research methodologies which come under the collective title of "discourse analysis".

**3.10: V.N. Voloshinov.** (p.173-4) argues, Voloshinov's work allows a theoretical framework which avoids, on the one hand, seeing If Eagleton (1991, p.195) is correct, and Voloshinov's work is of sufficient theoretical importance for the latter to be dubbed "the father of discourse analysis", what makes **Marxism and the Philosophy of Language** such a seminal theoretical piece? If this issue can be adequately addressed, it would offer some criteria by which the theoretical validity of other works of discourse analysis, whether "Critical Discourse Analysis", or the works of Foucault and Pecheux, can be judged.

In writing **Language**, Voloshinov (1973, p.1) was attempting to conduct a Marxian study of language in a field where there was virtually no Marxian theoretical tradition (Voloshinov, 1973, p.1). Such theoretical pioneering work would alone make Voloshinov's theoretical efforts worthy of note. However, Voloshinov's work is also important as he is chiefly concerned in **Language** with the concept of the sign, and with the laws governing signs and their deployment within human society (Voloshinov, 1973, p.3). Furthermore, he stresses the importance of signs in connection to ideology. Indeed, Voloshinov (1973, p.9) declares that:

"Everything ideological possesses **meaning**: it represents, depicts, or stands for something lying outside itself...it is a sign. Without signs there is no ideology."

Voloshinov (1973, p.10) goes on to argue that a "world" of signs runs parallel to those of nature, technology and consumer goods. Moreover, "The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs" and "Everything ideological possesses semiotic value." Regarding himself to be working within the Marxian theoretical tradition, however, Voloshinov places much emphasis on the strongly materialist influences upon ideology, signs and language. He argues, for instance, that individual human "consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs" (Voloshinov, 1973, p.11); and that "The individual consciousness is a social-ideological fact" (Voloshinov, 1973,

As Eagleton (1991, pp.193-5) argues, Voloshinov's work allows a theoretical framework which avoids, on the one hand, seeing ideological concepts arising out of individual human consciousness, while, on the other hand, avoiding the Althusserian stance that ideological concepts can be reduced to social practices. By seeing ideology as a discursive, semiotic phenomenon, the materiality of ideology is emphasised, since signs are material entities, while preserving the sense that ideology is concerned with meaning.

Moreover, Voloshinov (1973, p.21) allows a place in his analysis for language as a site for wider social struggle to occur: "the forms of signs are conditioned above all by the social organisation of the participants involved and...the immediate conditions of their interaction. When these forms change, so does sign". Indeed, Voloshinov (1973, p.93) argues that "The organising centre of any utterance...is not within" the individual consciousness or psyche, "but outside- in the social milieu."

Voloshinov's work is also theoretically important for using what is called in discourse analysis the concept of "closure". "Closure" occurs when "certain forms of signification are silently excluded, and certain signifiers 'fixed' in a commanding position" (Eagleton, 1991, p.194). In the words of Voloshinov (1973, p.21):

"Every stage in the development of a society has its own special and restricted circle of items which alone have access to that society's attention....Only items within that circle will achieve sign formation and become objects in semiotic communication."

One major flaw with Voloshinov's theory, like those of other Marxian theorists examined in the previous section, is that he cannot articulate a latent theory of ideology. That is, ideologies, in the form of signs and discourse, which do not exist to serve the current functions or interests of a social class or class fraction, are dismissed by Voloshinov (1973, p.22) as being of little political importance or relevance:

"A sign that has been withdrawn from the pressures of social struggle...inevitably loses force, degenerating into allegory....The historical memory of mankind is full of such worn out ideological signs incapable of serving as arenas for the clash of live social accents."

Hence, in common with much other Marxian theory, there is a good case for accusing Voloshinov of being overly functionalist and reductionist in his attitude towards the persistence of long-standing ideological phenomena in capitalist societies. Despite this, there is a great deal of Voloshinov's theoretical approach which is of relevance and value to this thesis; and which is taken up by later "discourse analysts."

### **3.11: "Critical Discourse Analysis".**

CDA, also referred to by its practitioners as "critical linguistics" (Wodak, 1989a, p.xv) is a theoretical approach which has been embraced by many thinkers in the social studies field (Fairclough, 1989; Wodak, 1989b; van Dijk, 1997b), and has secured a strong intellectual hegemony over the contents of the academic journal **Discourse and Society** (Gastil, 1992). It will be argued that, while CDA has considerable merits as a methodological tool, it should not be the primary theoretical approach for analysing the case studies examined in this thesis. This conclusion stems from two crucial methodological flaws with CDA which will be discussed below. Having said that, many of the theoretical assumptions informing CDA should not be disputed as valid by anyone in social studies who is seriously interested in analysing discourse.

First, CDA emphasises that language is a form of social practice; that it is not external to society, but a part of it; that language is a social process; and that it is a socially conditioned process (Fairclough, 1989, p.22-3). CDA sees language as a communicative event; one where ideas, beliefs and emotions are communicated as one aspect of more complex social events (van Dijk, 1997a, p.2). Understanding the wider context in which language is used is extremely important for those using the theoretical

perspectives of CDA: suitable as the primary mode of discourse analysis for this thesis for two methodological reasons.

First, that "Discourse should preferably be studied as a constitutive part of its global, social and cultural contexts. Text and talk in many ways signal...their contextual relevance..." (van Dijk, 1997a, p.29).

"The whole is society, and language is one strand of the social...all linguistic phenomena are social, not all social phenomena are linguistic..." (Fairclough, 1989, p.23).

Second, CDA is interested in the functional aspects of language use. That is, who uses language; how language is used; why language is used; and when language is used (van Dijk, 1997a, p.2). CDA sees language as part of the social practice of humans:

"Both spoken and written discourse are forms of social practice in sociocultural contexts. Language users are engaged in discourse not merely as individual persons, but also as members of various groups, institutions or cultures. Through their discourse...language users may enact, confirm or challenge more comprehensive social and political structure and institutions." (van Dijk, 1997a, p.30).

Third, CDA recognises the importance of social cognition in order to understand discourse and language use. As van Dijk (1997a, p.31) comments, "Few ...aspects of discourse...can be properly understood and explained without having recourse to the minds of language users." In this context, Fairclough (1989, p.24) uses the phrase "members' resources" to describe what individuals "drawn upon when they produce and interpret texts- knowledge of languages, representations of the national and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions and so on." Such **members' resources** are cognitive, argues Fairclough, for they are in the heads of individuals, while having social origins, socially generated, dependent on social relations and socially transmitted. As van Dijk (1997a, p.31) comments, "cognition is the interface between discourse and society."

Despite having the aforementioned theoretical and methodological

merits, CDA is unsuitable as the primary means of discourse analysis for this thesis for two methodological reasons.

First, there are the motivations which underpin CDA, and those who employ its analytical methods.

Both Wodak (1989a) and van Dijk (1997a) clearly state what they think makes CDA unique as a means to analyse discourse. Wodak (1989a, p.xiv) argues that "the interests guiding...analysis...are aimed at uncovering injustice, inequality, taking sides with the powerless and suppressed." Amongst Wodak's (1989a, pp.xv-xii) list of the most important characteristics of CDA are:

- "(a) **Research interest:** Uncovering inequality and injustice.
- "(b) **Objects under investigation:** Language behaviour in situations of **social relevance**...is to be investigated....
- "(g) **Researchers are forced to take sides...**
- "(h) **Social...political practice is aimed at..."**

Similarly, van Dijk (1997a, p.22) argues that CDA involves analysts focusing on "relevant social **problems**...their work is more issue-oriented than theory-oriented." For van Dijk (1997a, pp.22-3), CDA is about allowing a "better understanding and critique of **social inequality**", in order "to be **agents of change**,...in solidarity with those who need such change most."

Britain's "Europe debate" is not, however, primarily concerned with social inequality and injustice, and that those political actors examined in the case studies are not part of the oppressed, but do have varying degrees of power and influence. This is particularly true in respect to Parliament, which van Dijk (1992) regards as a primary locus of power in Western capitalist societies. Hence, In this respect, CDA is not a suitable method of analysing the discourse examined in this thesis, even if its author wanted to show "solidarity" with any of those taking part in Britain's "Europe debates".

The second reason why CDA is unsuitable for analysing the case studies in this thesis is that a crucial element of this approach is incompatible with Foucault's approach to analysing discourse. As will be demonstrated further below, Foucault offers, overall, a

more theoretically fruitful approach to analysing discourse in this thesis than CDA does.

This incompatibility between the two approaches stems from the question of whether meaning in language is manifested in an overt or covert manner. Those who analyse language using the methodology of CDA emphasise the covert nature of meaning in language. For instance, Wodak (1989a, p.xiv) argues that those using CDA "want to uncover and demystify certain social processes...to make mechanisms of manipulation...and propaganda explicit and transparent." Similarly, van Dijk (1997a, p.22) argues that scholars using CDA can "actively participate...to uncover, demystify or otherwise challenge dominance with their discourse analyses."

In contrast to this approach, which seems to echo crude "Marxist-Leninist" rhetoric about the need to "expose" and "demystify" bourgeois ideology on behalf of a befuddled working class, Foucault emphasises the overt nature of meaning in language. Foucault (1994, p.25) rejects the argument, found in works of CDA, that:

"...all manifest discourse is secretly based on an 'already-said', and that this 'already-said' is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text that has already been written, but a 'never-said', an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a breath...It is supposed therefore that everything that is formulated in discourse was already articulated in the semi-silence that precedes it..."

Foucault (1994, p.25) summarises this approach to analysing discourse as "the interpretation of an 'already-said' that is at the same time a 'not-said'." In contrast to this approach, Foucault (1994, p.28) argues that discourse analysis should attempt to be a "project of a pure description of discourse events as the horizon for the search for the unities that form from within it."

With the main methodological difference between the theoretical approaches of CDA and Foucault to discourse analysis having been established, it is worth turning to examining Foucault's overall theoretical approach to analysing discourse.

### **3.12: Michel Foucault.**

An examination of Foucault's theorising about analysing discourse should begin with his concept of the "statement" for four reasons. First, Foucault sees statements as the precondition for the existence of discourse. Second, following Voloshinov, Foucault (1994, p.107) emphasises the semiotic nature of statements and of discourse, since "discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements". Third, echoing Voloshinov, Foucault (1994, p.100) argues that statements "must have a material existence". Fourth, again echoing Voloshinov's approach to language, Foucault (1994, p.101) regards statements as having a social context in time:

"....a statement must have a substance, a support, a place, and a date. And when these requisites change, it to changes identity."

Unlike Saussurian linguistics, Foucault sees language in the form of statements as developing over time. In common with Voloshinov, Foucault (1994, p.105) sees the statement or sign as being used by different social actors in different social and historical contexts:

"....the statement...enters various networks and fields of use, is subjected to transferences or modifications, is integrated into operations or strategies in which its identity is maintained or effaced....the statement circulates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the realisation of a desire, serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theory of appropriation or rivalry."

Foucault relates the existence of statements to the existence of discourse through the concepts of **systems of dispersion** and **discursive formations**. He begins this theoretical process by asking how a unity or relationship between statements can be identified (Foucault, 1994, pp.31-6). His solution is that any such unity should be based upon (Foucault, 1994, p.37):

...the idea of describing these dispersions [of statements] themselves; of discovering whether between these elements...an order in their successive appearance, correlations in their simultaneity, assignable positions in a common space, a reciprocal functioning, linked and hierachised transformations...it would describe **systems of dispersion.**"

From this starting point, Foucault (1994, p.38) declares that it is possible to identify a discursive formation, which occurs:

"Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements such a system of dispersion, wherever between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations)...."

With the concepts of systems of dispersion and discursive formations defined, it is possible to understand Foucault's (1994, p.117) definition of discourse as "a group of statements that belong to a single system of [discursive] formation." Moreover, Foucault (1994, p.117) emphasises the historical and social specificity of particular discourses:

"Discourse...is not an ideal, timeless form.... it is, from beginning to end, historical- a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself...."

In order to understand fully the methodology of Foucault's analysis of discourse, it is necessary to understand a number of his other theoretical concepts.

First, there is **discursive practice**, which is (Foucault, 1994, p.117):

"...a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function...."

There are also **objects of discourse**. Foucault (1994, p.44) argues that "discourse is characterised...by the way it forms objects that are highly dispersed." The existence of particular discourses and discursive formations can be established if one can identify a specific group of objects or subjects which discourse is referring to; "a discursive formation is defined (as far as its objects are concerned...) if one can establish such a group." Foucault (1994, p.45) emphasises that existing discursive formations make it difficult to create a new object, with new features, and may allow the object merely to emphasise its difference from other objects.

Connected to this difficulty for objects to be represented in a new, different manner, is Foucault's approach to understanding the concept of **closure**. Foucault (1994, p.64) comments that discourses "give rise to certain organisations of concepts, certain regrouping of objects...which form, according to their degree of coherence, rigour, and stability, themes or theories..." In addition, discursive practices are characterised by (Foucault, 1977, p.199):

"a delimitation of the field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts."

In short, the effect of **delimitation** is to make it virtually impossible to think certain ideas and concepts. Foucault (1981, p.52) mentions a number of ways in modern societies that "the production of discourse is at once, controlled, organised, and redistributed, by a certain number of procedures...to ward off its powers and dangers".

His list of ways in which discourse can be delimited includes the "most obvious and familiar...prohibition" or **taboo**, noting that in modern society politics, with sexuality, are "the regions where the grid is tightest..." (Foucault, 1981, p.52); commentary (Foucault, 1981, p.52); **societies of discourse** (Foucault, 1981, pp.62-3); and **doctrines**, which (Foucault, 1981, p.64) "bind individuals to certain types of enunciation and consequently

forbids them all others."

Connected to Foucault's concept of delimiting discourse in society is the concept of the **regime of truth** in every society (Foucault, 1980, p.131):

"that is, the types of discourse which it accepts...as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements...."

In this context, argues Foucault (1980, p.133), "'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution circulation and operation of statements."

Furthermore, Foucault (1994, p.92) argues that delimitation of discourse, and the hegemony of the regime of truth over the use of language, can be so pervasive within a society that an individual "author" cannot think outside this particular outlook. That is, the author has to accept the assumptions underlying discourse even if he or she disagrees with them:

"To describe a...statement does not consist in analysing the relation between the author and what he says (or wanted to say...); but in determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it."

Underlying the difficulties individuals may have in creating a new discursive formation is the existence of the **archive** in society. Foucault (1994, p.130) defines the archive as "the general system of the formation and transformation of statements", which "reveals the rules...that enables statements both to survive and to undergo regular modification." The existence of the archive makes its difficult for new statements, and hence discursive formations, to exist and prosper.

Despite all of this, Foucault does not rule out possible changes in the nature of a society's regime of truth. He emphasises the existence of **discontinuity**. Foucault (1981, p.67) argues that discourses should be seen as discontinuous practices, "which cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just

as well exclude or be unaware of each other. Furthermore, Foucault (1974, p.50) points to discontinuity in discourses when:

"...within the space of a few years a culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up until then and begins to think other things in a new way- probably...an erosion from outside, from a space which is, for thought, on the other side...."

For Foucault, a possible cause of such an "erosion from outside" are the existence of **non-discursive formations**, under the heading of which Foucault (1994, p.162) includes economic practices and processes; institutions; and political events. Foucault goes on to maintain that discourse analysis should try "to determine how the rules of formation...may be linked to non-discursive formations".

### 3.13: Michel Pecheux.

In **Language Semantics and Ideology** Pecheux (1982) draws heavily on the works of Althusser (1971) on ideology, most notably the latter's "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)" (Althusser, 1971, pp.127-86). Pecheux's approach can be regarded as applying Althusserian concepts to the study of discourse (Eagleton, 1991, p.195), and consequently can be seen as embodying similar theoretical strengths and weaknesses to Althusser's work.

For Pecheux, the existence of discourse is a consequence of the existence of ideology, transmitted via language throughout society by the agency of Ideological State Apparatuses. This is demonstrated in Pecheux's (1982, p.111) definition of "discursive formation", his key theoretical concept in understanding discourse:

"that...in a given ideological formation, i.e., from a given position in a given conjuncture determined by state of the class struggle, determines '**what can and should be said'** (**articulated in the form of a speech, a sermon, a report, a programme, etc....**'")

In a similarly orthodox Marxian theoretical framework, Pecheux (1982, p.58) declares that "every discursive process is inscribed in an ideological class relationship". Moreover, Pecheux (1982, p.185) declares that the setting up of discursive meanings is a consequence "of the class struggle in its various economic, political and ideological forms." It would appear, therefore, that Pecheux offers an extremely deterministic view of discourse, as a consequence of ideology as an effect of class struggle.

Pecheux's approach to discourse is, however, more theoretically sophisticated than that. To begin with, Pecheux (1982, p.59), echoing Althusser, argues that there is "relative autonomy of the linguistic system" in society. Expanding on his argument that such a "linguistic system" exists, Pecheux (1982, p.58) says that there is a difference between discourse and language. Systems of language are a common resource for everyone; but "it does not follow that...various people will hold the same **discourse**:...language thus appears to be the common **basis** of differentiated **discursive processes**...."

For Pecheux (1982, p.112), a "discursive process" is the means by which signs give a "discursive formation" coherence. It is a "system of relationships, paraphrases, symmetries, etc., which operate between linguistic elements -'signifiers' -in a given discursive formation." Like Voloshinov and Foucault, then, Pecheux emphasises the importance of signs in theorising about discourse.

Pecheux also stresses that more than one type of discourse exists. These types form part of an "interdiscourse", which Pecheux (1982, p.113) defines as the "'complex whole in dominance' of discursive formation."

Pecheux's (1982, p.112) approach is also notable for his argument that words cannot exist outside of discourse, since it is discourse which gives words their meanings: "words, expressions, propositions, etc., obtain their meaning from the discursive formation in which they are produced...." He recognises that the same word can have a different meaning in different contexts. Pecheux (1982, p.112) argues that this occurs because a word's meaning:

"...is constituted in each discursive formation, the in the relationship each word...enters with other words...of the same discursive formation. Correlatively, if...the **same** words...change their meanings as they pass from one discursive formation to another....words...which are **different literally** can, in a given discursive formation, 'have the same meaning...."

Moreover, echoing other Marxian theoretical perspectives, Pecheux (1982, p.111) regards the meanings to be found in language and discourses as products of specific historical and social processes:

"...the meaning of a word...does not exist 'in itself'...but is determined by the ideological positions brought into play in the socio-historical process in which words...are produced (i.e. reproduced)...words...change their meaning according to the positions held by those who use them, which signifies that they find their meaning...by reference to their ideological formations...in which those positions are inscribed..."

For Pecheux (1982, p.153), drawing upon Althusser, one consequence of this process is that certain words and phrases in particular situations can come to represent political antagonisms and struggles, and so can be fought over.

Pecheux also takes from Althusser the idea of individuals being interpellated into accepting the ruling ideologies of society. Pecheux (1982, p.112) sees this being achieved via the medium of discourse:

"...individuals are 'interpellated' as speaking-subjects (as subjects of **their** discourse) by the discursive formations which represent 'in language' the ideological formations that correspond to them."

Pecheux (1982, p.125) argues that most of the time individuals accept the hegemonic ideologies in society through the process of **forgetting**. Individuals are constituted by forgetting what

determines them (Pecheux, 1982, p.114); they are simply not conscious that the ideology they express support for has the function of perpetuating their own social subordination. However, Pecheux argues that individuals, as a consequence of class struggle, cease to forget. They can take part in a process of **disidentification** (Pecheux, 1982, p.158). This occurs when an individual ceases to identify with the ruling ideology, but offers nothing in its place. Pecheux (1982, p.157) also identifies **counter-identification**, when an individual consciously rejects the dominant ideology, denounces it, and opens up the possible creation of a **counter-discourse**. Like all of Pecheux's theoretical approach to ideology and discourse, though, his concepts of disidentification and counter-identification are all seen as a consequence of class struggle.

### **3.14: Theories of language and discourse: their uses and failings.**

With the various theories of language and discourse having been examined, it is possible to consider which aspects of these theoretical approaches will be of use to this thesis, and suggest certain theoretical issues which still have to be adequately addressed in this thesis.

This discussion has shown that various theoretical approaches to language which come under the umbrella of linguistic theory are inadequate for studying the use of language by British political actors in the "Europe debate". Although most modern linguistic theory, following the approach of de Saussure, recognises that language is a social act, it cannot adequately explain how this occurs.

With linguistic theories of language to explain the social nature of language in the context of the subject matter of the thesis being rejected, discourse analysis was examined.

The first theorist of discourse analysis whose work was examined was Voloshinov. His work is of value, in that he emphasises the social nature of language; individual words and phrases contain signs with semiotic values that only have meanings within a wider

social context. Moreover, Voloshinov emphasises the importance of closure in language use; when some words and phrases cannot be used, or even thought of, by society at large. These themes are also to be found in the writings of Foucault.

Voloshinov's work, however, is flawed in that it is too functionalist, seeing all language as ultimately serving the interests of particular classes or class fractions. Moreover, he cannot account for the persistence of language or discourses which do not serve the current interests of particular classes or class interests. Furthermore, Voloshinov does not see these persistent, latent, language forms having political influence or effects. Consequently, using Voloshinov's **Marxism and the Philosophy of Language** to understand the nature of discourse can only go so far.

The methodology of CDA was also examined. Much of the general approach of CDA to examining discourse is useful. In particular, the stress on the social nature of language; the functional aspects and nature of language use; and the need to understand the place of language in social cognition. Especially important in this respect is Fairclough's concept of members' resources, in which social processes, both past and present, inform an individual's view of the world and their use of language.

Leaving aside the ideological motivations behind many works informed by CDA, its main methodological flaw is that it is a theoretical approach which concentrates upon the supposedly covert meanings underlying the use of language. Apart from begging the question of why it is only those who use CDA and support its ideological outlook who can see, and interpret, these covert meanings, such an approach contradicts the approach of Foucault. He sees the meanings contained within discourse as being manifestly overt to those examining it. Since Foucault's theoretical approach to discourse is not only more sophisticated, but also of more relevance in understanding the subject of this thesis, than CDA, this thesis concurs with his arguments about the need to concentrate on the overt, often fairly obvious, meanings of the language used in Britain's "Europe debate".

Of the various theoretical approaches to language use and

discourse examined in this section, that of Foucault offers most potential understanding of the language used in Britain's "Europe debate". Like Voloshinov, he emphasises the importance of signs in language and their material nature. However, Foucault rejects the somewhat crude functionalism of Voloshinov's approach.

Echoing Voloshinov, Foucault emphasises that discourse is made up of sequences of signs, which have meanings for language users throughout society. Relating this to the subject matter of this thesis, it might be anticipated that certain phrases and words, such as "Parliamentary Sovereignty", "Britain's world-role", "the French" and "the Germans", would be used by political actors in the knowledge that such language use would have meaning for those whose support they are trying to gain. Foucault argues that discourse exists when a group of statements belongs to a single system of discourse formation; when language, with its semiotic values and meanings, has some regularity. If an object is regularly referred to in a certain fashion a discourse about it exists. It maybe that objects of discourse include Parliamentary Sovereignty, Britain's world-role, France and Germany and it could be anticipated that, in the case studies, certain forms of discourse will be focused upon them.

Moreover, using Foucault's methodological approach to discourse, it can be anticipated that any discursive formations in the case studies that are "anti-EC" in tone would make it very difficult to think, talk or write about the EC in a positive manner. Long-standing discourses, drawing upon the archive of Britain's historical experience, can be anticipated to give rise to a particular organising of themes used in British political life, which would be largely "anti-EC" in tone.

Furthermore, Foucault's concept of the delimitation of the field of discursive practices also has possible theoretical relevance. This is particularly true in the case of "pro-EC" political actors. For example, certain issues arising from Britain's relationship with the EC, such as its effect on the scope of British Parliamentary Sovereignty, might be considered taboo by "pro-EC" political actors. Consequently, they might not refer to the subject

of Parliamentary Sovereignty at all in their discourse. Similarly, MPs, who might be seen as an example of a society of discourse, might not want to refer to the possibility that the EC is limiting the scope of their *de jure* sovereignty over law-making in Britain. In addition, "pro-EC" political actors might want to avoid discussion that EC and further European integration threatens much the "doctrines" of the Conservative and Labour Parties, which, as will be discussed later, are based on the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty.

Another of Foucault's theoretical concepts which may be of use in understanding the language used in Britain's "Europe debate" is the regime of truth. There is a good cause to argue that, prior to the 1960s, Britain's regime of truth was built on attitudes which can be seen as "anti-EC". That is, Parliamentary Sovereignty, Britain's world-role and antipathy to France and Germany were ideological "givens" for virtually all British political actors; and for society in general. Since then this regime has been challenged by entry into the EC and further European integration. From this perspective, however, it is not evident that a new, "pro-EC" regime of truth has successfully emerged in Britain. Moreover, Foucault argues that, in general, to be heard in a debate a political actor has to embrace the norms of the regime of truth to be understood. Hence if the long-standing regime of truth can be regarded as "anti-EC", how easy will it be for "pro-EC" political actors to be heard in the "Europe debate" if they do not develop a "pro-EC" regime of truth? Consequently, the temptation for "pro-EC" political actors can be anticipated is to attempt to support "pro-EC" policies by clothing them in "anti-EC" garb.

Foucault's theoretical outlook does, however, offer a possible opening for overtly "pro-EC" discourse in his concept of discontinuity. He suggests that at certain stages in a society's development, society can begin to develop a discourse which allows it to look at an issue or object in a new way. Furthermore, such a discontinuity can be due to "erosion" caused by events outside of discourse, such as, say, a move towards further European integration changing overall attitudes in Britain to the EC. The

concept of discontinuity also allows different discourses to cross each other. For example, both "anti-EC" and "pro-EC" political actors could be expected to use a combination of "nationalist"- or "counter-nationalist"- "ideological" and "pragmatic" discourse. Foucault's approach also opens up the possibility of "anti-EC" or "pro-EC" political actors using unexpected types of discourse, normally embraced by their opponents.

Finally, Foucault's theoretical approach takes into account non-discursive formations, such as economic processes, institutions and political events. As Foucault argues, any analysis of discourse should be related to events occurring outside of the particular arenas where language is being used by political actors.

Despite all of this, there are certain flaws, or omissions, in Foucault's approach. He does not offer a means by which to anticipate how, when and why changes in discourse take place. That is, what is the process by which a discontinuity occurs? Nor does Foucault give an explanation of how themes in discourse come into exist and persist. The process by which ideological themes stay in humans' minds and hence get expressed in their language is left unsaid.

Pechoux's theoretical approach to discourse also has potential insights into the use of language in Britain's "Europe debate". First, there is his argument that a word or phrase can have a different meaning in a different discursive formation, and his related claim that a particular word or phrase, say, "sovereignty", can be the site of political struggle.

Second, there is Pechoux's application of Althusser's concept of interpellation, and his own related concepts of forgetting, disidentification and counter-identification. It can be argued that up until the 1960s the hegemonic discourse in British society stressed themes including the importance of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Britain's "world-role", anti-French and anti-German attitudes. All these consequently became major themes in "anti-EC" discourse. If that is the case, it would appear that "pro-EC" political actors, in order to gain popular support in Britain for the EC and further European integration, would have to attempt to

interpellate other British political actors and society at large by a discourse which rejected such themes. To begin with, using Pecheux's terminology, "pro-EC" political actors would have to attempt to construct a discourse which would lead to either disidentification with "anti-EC" nationalism; or an avowedly "pro-EC" counter-identification or counter-discourse, which could challenge the "nationalist" discourse employed by "anti-EC" political actors.

However, in embracing these theoretical insights of Pecheux, one needs to discard the class reductionist assumptions lying behind **Language, Semantics and Ideology**. That is, discourse and ideology cannot be reduced to mere forms, or consequences, of the class struggle. Pecheux's theoretical approach cannot account for the persistence and importance of ideologies or discourses which do not serve an immediate class function.

With various theoretical approaches to discourse having been examined, the next theoretical issue which needs to be addressed in this thesis is how to explain theoretically the process of how ideologies, such as nationalism, and the discourses in which they are expressed, come into existence, gain mass support, persist and limit the room for manoeuvre of political actors who wish to embrace policies with consequences that conflict with preexisting world-views.

In short, "pro-EC" political actors and their supporters within

**PART THREE: THEORISING THE LATENT CONCEPTION OF IDEOLOGY.**

**3.15: Marxian contributions to understanding the latent conception of ideology.**

Returning to Marxian theoretical approaches to ideology, it has been indicated earlier in the thesis that they contain important flaws and gaps. In particular, Marxian theorists from Marx onwards have been unable to theoretically explain the existence, persistence and political importance of ideological forms and discourses which do not, or no longer, represent the

material interests of particular classes or class fractions. This is an important flaw in Marxian theory when related to the account of British historical development and the continued existence of "anti-EC" attitudes in Britain following EC entry in 1973.

Chapter Two shows that by the early 1970s, any serious doubts within Britain's dominant bloc about the desirability of joining the EC had either disappeared or been silenced. However, the "Europe debate" in British political life or in society as a whole did not end at that point. Indeed, opposition to British membership of the EC and involvement in further European integration continued to exist, and be expressed, by both British political actors and the general public. For example, after examining the evidence from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey of British public opinion conducted in 1991, Geoffrey Evans (1995, p.136) suggests that "Pro-European politicians...still have a great deal of work to do before the British public embraces the European cause with open arms." Moreover, if all British political actors had enthusiastically embraced EC membership and further moves towards European integration from 1973 onwards, it is doubtful whether the 1975 Referendum about continuing Britain's EC membership, the Labour Party's policy in the early 1980s of advocating EC withdrawal and the tortuous progress of the Maastricht Bill through Parliament during 1992-3, would ever have occurred.

In short, "pro-EC" political actors and their supporters within the dominant bloc, whose views tend to predominate over state policies particularly economic ones, had great difficulty during the 1973-93 period in pursuing the policies towards the EC which they have wanted to. In order to explain why the "pro-EC" dominant bloc in Britain has been severely constrained in effectively pursuing its goals by the "anti-EC" actions and attitudes held by many domestic political actors and sections of the general public, it is necessary to develop a model explaining the importance of an ideology, such as nationalism, in a modern capitalist society. Consequently, a general theoretical model needs to be developed which can explain:

- with the latent conception of political representation. Gramsci's
- (i) why individuals embrace ideologies, such as nationalism, in order to acquire social identities; ~~extending the dominant bloc's~~
  - (ii) how ideas and ideologies continue to exist and affect human perceptions of the world when the original social situations which gave rise to those ideas and ideologies have changed, or even disappeared; and ~~or British historical development illustrating this~~
  - (iii) why and how the dominant group in society must take account of those ideas and ideologies which once justified or legitimised its rule over subordinate social groups, have persisted into the present, but no longer reflect its perceived interests. ~~economic decline. In the case again that Marx argues in his *Communist Manifesto*~~

~~With such a model it is possible to explain the existence, persistence and importance of "anti-EC" nationalism in Britain, both before and after 1973, in opposition to the generally "pro-EC" attitudes of the dominant bloc.~~

Such a model will also theoretically explain the latent conception of ideology recognised by Marx, Gramsci, Poulantzas and Laclau. That Marxian theory is unable to provide such a model, does not mean that Marxian theory cannot provide some theoretical insights which may contribute to and help inform the development of a model of the latent conception.

The first Marxian theorist who offers such insights is Marx himself. Apart from providing in his *Eighteenth Brumaire* an empirical description of a situation which a theoretical explanation of the latent conception would have been useful, Marx provides in the *Preface to 'A Critique of Political Economy'* a general principle in developing a model of the latent conception. That is, events and processes in the economic sphere of social existence do have effects upon events and processes in other spheres of social existence, including the political and ideological spheres.

Second, there is the contribution of Gramsci. In particular, he develops the idea of a society being affected by an **organic crisis**; a period when the dominant social group's hegemony comes under threat because subordinate social groups no longer identify either

with their traditional rulers or political representatives. Gramsci (1986, p.210) argues that such organic crises occur either because subordinate social groups are challenging the dominant bloc's hegemony over society, or "because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses..." as national

In the account of British historical development informing this thesis, a Gramscian organic crisis began in Britain during the early 1960s, because Britain's dominant bloc had "failed in some major undertaking": maintaining Britain's position as a major power with global influence, and averting British relative economic decline. In the same vein that Marx argues in his *Critique*, Gramsci argues that a crisis in the economic sphere will eventually lead to a crisis in the ideological sphere. as such a period of transition

Moreover, it can be suggested that another important aspect of Gramsci's concept of organic crisis in understanding the latent conception is his argument (Gramsci, 1986, p.210) that at the start of any organic crisis, the hegemonic social group keeps the initiative "since the various strata of the population are not all capable of orienting themselves equally swiftly...The traditional ruling class changes men **and programmes** [emphasis added] and, with greater speed than is achieved by the subordinate classes, reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp". Applying such theoretical insights of Gramsci to understanding the latent conception of ideology discussed this thesis, it is argued that the principle "programme" in the context of Britain's post-1960 organic crisis of relative economic decline and decreasing global influence was joining and integrating with, the EC. Furthermore, this "programme", it will be suggested, further compounded a national identity crisis for British society.

Third, there is the contribution of Poulantzas to developing a theoretical model accounting for the latent conception of ideology. Poulantzas (1976, p.203) sees the "possibility of a whole series of dislocations between the dominant ideology and the politically hegemonic class or fraction." It is an argument of this thesis that the support of Britain's dominant bloc for EC membership and

involvement in further European integration has led to such a "series of dislocations" between its goals and the dominant ideology in British politics.

Finally, there are Laclau's theoretical insights for aiding the development of an explanatory model of the latent conception of ideology. Apart from noting the existence of popular national sentiments, or residuals, which political actors cannot ignore or manipulate at will (Laclau, 1977, pp.166-7), Laclau also has a concept of ideological crisis. Laclau (1977, pp.102-3) argues that such crises are brought about by pressures upon the unity of the preexisting ideological discourse caused by political and social instability disrupting the automatic reproduction of that discourse. In the context of the account of British historical development presented in this thesis, such a period of ideological crisis was caused by Britain's relative decline within the capitalist world-system, at both the economic and state level, and the pursuit of a closer relationship with the EC after 1960, which conflicted with various residuals which informed the "nationalist" disposition and discourse of "anti-EC" political actors.

Having outlined various theoretical insights by Marxian theorists of ideology which may be of use in developing a model for understanding the latent conception of ideology, it should be once again emphasised that there are definite limits to the extent that Marxian theory can theoretically explain this social phenomenon. Consequently, it is necessary to utilise non-Marxian theoretical approaches to understand why an ideology, such as nationalism, which often cannot be categorised as serving the interests of a particular class or class fraction, exists, persists and can have such political importance.

### **3.16: Identity and Ideology.**

The importance of any ideology, such as nationalism, is dependent upon the degree to which individuals within a society collectively identify with it. The issue arises of what makes individuals

identify with others and with ideas.

By using the concept of identification, as used in psychology by theorists such as Sigmund Freud, George Herbert Mead and Erik Erickson, William Bloom (1990, pp.26-40) believes that it is possible to explain how an individual's identity can be used as a means of political socialisation and mobilisation.

Bloom begins by postulating that all humans have a deep need for psychological security, and that individuals achieve this best by attempting to internalise, and identify with, the attitudes, behaviour and habits of significant figures in their social environment, such as their parents or siblings. Bloom argues that, even at this stage, identity is a group process since any identification means at least two people, the identifier and the identified, being involved. Once an infant moves from this one-to-one relationship, identities are generalised. Moreover, even in the parent-child relationship, the parent's own identity is made up of generalised ideological and cultural identities belonging to the wider social environment.

Furthermore, Bloom argues that in order to maintain a high level of psychological security, all individuals have a need to enhance and protect the identifications that they have made. Bloom is therefore arguing that all people actively seek an identity which they will, if at all possible, to enhance and protect. Consequently, if they share the same set of environmental circumstances, a group of individuals will tend to internalise the same identity. Through this shared identity, individuals become collectively linked together in the same psychological syndrome. They will, therefore, act together to preserve, defend and enhance their common identity (Bloom, 1990, pp.23-6, 39).

In short, Bloom argues that identities are an essential means for individuals to achieve psychological security, which, in any society, can only be collectively achieved.

In attempting to apply these concepts to the analysis of politics Bloom argues that, at the level of national society, in order to ensure psychological security for the vast majority of individuals, there must be a widespread attachment to a feeling of

**national identity.** This he (Bloom, 1990, p.52) defines as a condition when:

...a mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols- have internalised the symbols of the nation- so that they may act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity."

Bloom (1990, p.39) also argues that, if a change in "historical circumstances" occurs, there can be a collective, generalised identity crisis for a society at a national level, just as there can be an identity crisis for an individual caused by an event challenging the foundations of his or her psychological security. This leads onto the subject of how such an identity crisis in a national society arises.

### **3.17: The Logic of Culture.**

Bloom (1990, pp.39-40) argues that when individuals or societies have to confront a change in the historical circumstances which brought about their current identity, they will have a behavioural imperative **either** to protect their already-held identity, **or** resynthesise a new identity. Whichever course of action they take, though, the criteria of success will be whether it brings a greater sense of psychological security to the individuals or society concerned. In the context of this study, the new sense of identity would be brought about by British society as a whole embracing the idea of Britain being an enthusiastic member of the EC.

As this has failed to come about, and public opinion survey evidence from the early 1990s suggests that there was still widespread opposition towards further European integration in Britain (Evans, 1995), the persistence of such "anti-EC" attitudes must be explained.

One way to achieve this is to use a concept employed by Neumann and Walsh (1991): **the logic of culture**. They contrast **the logic of raison d'etat** found in the "Realist" school of International

Relations theory, with the logic of culture. This is defined as the "logic" of "them and us", collective identity and group consciousness. It is a concept which can be readily used in conjunction with Bloom's theories about identification, ideology and national identity. Neumann and Walsh (1991, pp.2-3) go on to argue that in contrast to the logic of *raison d'etat*, which operates at the level of the sovereign state, the logic of culture operates at the societal level, and is common to all forms of human interaction.

To illustrate the differences between the logics of culture and *raison d'etat*, Neumann and Walsh (1991, pp.17-18) use their concepts to examine European attitudes towards Turkey since Medieval times. They argue that the fear of the "Other", namely the Muslim Turks, was possibly the major feature in determining the collective external policies of Christian Europe until at least the Renaissance period. Up to then, a widespread fear of the infidel "Other" amongst the general population of Christian Europe was reflected in the policies of their rulers towards the Turks. The logic of *raison d'etat*, argue Neumann and Walsh, can be said to have coincided with the logic of culture in Christian Europe.

Neumann and Walsh (1991, pp.6-7) argue, however, that after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, attitudes towards Turkey held by Europe's rulers began to change. Moves towards diplomatic recognition and alliances were made, yet a strong vein of hostility towards Turkey throughout Christian Europe still existed, which was championed by some European states, such as Imperial Russia (Neumann and Walsh, 1991, p.24). An eagerness by Europe's rulers to work with Turkey in the name of *raison d'etat* was therefore constrained by a long-standing fear of, and opposition to, Turkey amongst their subjects, a fear which had been originally nurtured by Europe's rulers. Consequently, Neumann and Walsh (1991, p.33) argue that, in this instance, the logic of *raison d'etat* was constrained for a long time by the logic of culture.

They distinguish, therefore, between the attitudes towards a nation's foreign affairs held by the foreign policy elite and those held by the mass of the population centred around national

identity.

This contrast between the logics of *raison d'etat* and culture is echoed by Stanley Hoffman (1966, p.867), who argues that there is a "national situation", which is made up of a country's internal features and its place in the world. Hoffman maintains, though, that there is no guarantee that everyone belonging to that nation will share the same perception of the national situation. The foreign policy-makers of the state believe in the "national interest", which Hoffman (1966, p.869) defines as "National situation X outlook of foreign policy-makers". Consequently, they will tend towards a view of the national situation based upon "objective" data, such as a country's domestic social structure and political system, as well as its external geography and formal commitments.

Hoffman (1966, pp.867-8) contrasts this with a view of the national situation heavily influenced by a popular **national consciousness**, which stresses a sense of national "cohesion and distinctiveness" setting the nation apart from other nations. Hence the national situation as perceived by a general population with a strong sense of national consciousness tends to stress common values, prejudices and opinions at the domestic level, while externally it focuses upon one's own traditions and assessments of others.

Hoffman therefore implicitly agrees with Neumann and Walsh that the nation state is constrained in conducting foreign policy by the attitudes of the general population and the informing its collective attitudes towards the national situation by a sense of national consciousness. Consequently, (Hoffman, 1966, p.868):

"Any statesman, whether he is a fervent patriot or not, must define the nation's foreign policy by taking that [national consciousness informed] situation into account ...The point is that even when the policy-maker tries to move 'beyond the nation-state' he can do it only by taking along the nation with its baggage of memories and problems...I do not want to suggest that the situation is a 'given' that dictates policy: but it sets complicated limits that affect freedom of choice." (emphasis added)

Bloom (1990, p.40) also utilises the concept of national identity in attempting to theoretically explain potential differences between the attitudes of the nation's political elite and the general population towards a country's foreign policy. Bloom argues that when faced with a challenge to their existing collective national identity by changes in the historical circumstances which brought into existence their current identity, individuals will respond collectively to the extent and degree of historical bonds within the group; their geographical propensity; the length of time passed together; the level of class, ethnic, religious or ritual bonds within the group; and the degree to which that particular identity is important to their general group identity. All these factors come under Neumann and Walsh's concept of the logic of culture. If such social bonds create a strong collective sense of national identity, Bloom (1990, p.55) argues, a **national identity dynamic** comes into existence, which he defines as "the potential for action which resides in a mass which shares the same national identification." The national identity dynamic is important for a nation state to exist, since it is the essential precondition for **nation building**, the "process whereby the inhabitants of a state's territory come to be **loyal** citizens of that state" (Bloom, 1990, p.55). Being able to appeal to the national identity dynamic in order to ensure a continual process of nation building is necessary if a social group is to legitimate and justify its continual hegemony over society.

Taking political advantage of the national identity dynamic is not the exclusive right of the state, government or hegemonic social group, argues Bloom (1990, pp.80-1), as "It is...in the very nature of domestic politics that there should be competition to trigger, manipulate and appropriate the national identity dynamic.". If opposition political actors or a subordinate social group can successfully manipulate symbols or images associated with national identity, they can wrest the national identity dynamic from those ruling society. The potential to mobilise support in such a situation is potentially limitless, argues Bloom (1990,

p.81), since "the mobilisation of mass national sentiment...is the widest possible mobilisation that is available within a state." Consequently, in order for a social group to secure its hegemony, it must take account of the national identity dynamic when formulating foreign policy. While it "may trigger, manipulate, appropriate" the dynamic, Bloom (1990, p.80) says that the hegemonic social group and the state which supports its might be compelled by the "logic" of culture contained within it that both might "be manipulated by...the national identity dynamic." One consequence of a social group having to take account of the national identity dynamic in order to secure its domestic hegemony, says Bloom (1990, p.91), is that "A government's foreign policy may...be dictated by internal domestic realities as much as by the actual nature of its international relations."

~~understanding the  
existence, persistence and political importance of "anti-RK"~~

**3.18: Summary outline of theoretical model.** ~~address the empirical~~  
~~nature of the discourse which can be expected to be utilised in~~  
In summary, the model for explaining the existence, persistence and political importance of nationalist ideology in a society, drawn from the ideas of Bloom, Hoffman and Neumann and Walsh, as well as the theoretical insights of Marx, Gramsci, Poulantzas and Laclau is as follows:

#### ~~3.19: The Importance of Facilitation~~

Individuals in a society embrace collective identities, such as a collective national identity, in order to achieve psychological security. An organic crisis in the political and/or economic spheres of society will threaten the hegemony of the dominant social group, as well as having repercussions in the ideological sphere, as society attempts to come to terms with the changing situation. This will lead to a collective identity crisis throughout a society that is suffering collective psychological insecurity; the choice is either to preserve its previous identity or to create a new one. The identity crisis is further exacerbated if the dominant social group tries to escape from organic crisis and its associated identity crisis by pursuing new programmes. To pursue a new goal according to the logic of *raison d'etat* in the

national interest must take account of the logic of culture to succeed, particularly if the general population embraces a long-standing sense of national consciousness, national identity or residuals to cope with its collective identity crisis. Such feelings can be mobilised as the national identity dynamic to threaten the hegemony of the dominant social group and its process of nation building. Consequently, in conducting foreign affairs, the dominant social group in its actions and discourse must constantly take account of the existence of a nationalist logic of culture in order to preserve the legitimacy of its hegemony over domestic society and prevent a series of disjunctions between its goals and the existing dominant ideology.

the political behaviour to the Test of Parliament (Taylor, 1975)

With the theoretical framework developed for understanding the existence, persistence and political importance of "anti-EC" nationalism in Britain, it is possible to address the empirical nature of the discourse which can be expected to be utilised in Britain's "Europe debate" in general, and this thesis' case studies in particular.

#### PART FOUR: DISCOURSE RELATING TO THE EC.

constitutional preoccupation with the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty has been a dominant feature of British political activity. Judge (1992) notes

##### 3.19: The Importance of Parliament.

"It may perhaps not be too presumptuous to suggest...that possibly the British have always been slightly obsessed with the sovereignty of their parliament." -John Taylor (1975, p.288).

Britain's Parliament first became an object of discourse within British political discourse during the Seventeenth Century, when the dominant bloc began to promote a "cult of parliament." From the perspectives of NATISOB, Crown and Parliament were the institutions which legitimised the seizure of power by the dominant bloc after 1688. The "Glorious Revolution" left Britain with just one constitution, based around the complete sovereignty of the "Crown-in-Parliament": the power of the Crown exercised through the monarch's ministers (Osmond, 1988, p.253). From this point onwards,

Parliament would be a vitally important ISA for the dominant bloc, and the juridico-legal ideology which informed so much subsequent constitutional discourse in Britain. In the Nineteenth century, Hence, Parliament was described as an institution which defended the traditional freedoms of the Protestant English against plots to destroy them schemed up by "unfree" Roman Catholic Europe. This pro-Protestant, anti-Catholic propaganda had widespread resonance throughout mainland Britain. Consequently, when Parliamentary reformers associated with the Liberal Bourgeoisie tried to reform Parliament in the early Nineteenth Century by extending the franchise, they found it hard to gain committed large-scale support, due to the deep attachment of Protestants of all regions and social backgrounds to the "cult of parliament" (Colley, 1994, p. 82).

When the dominant bloc did extend the franchise to the Liberal Bourgeoisie in the 1832 Reform Act it led to the creation of an object of discourse central to British "anti-EC" nationalist discourse: the doctrine of "Parliamentary Sovereignty".

Judge (1988, pp.441-44) differentiates between periods when the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty has been a behaviourist description of British political reality, and when it has been a normative prescription for British political activity. Judge sees advocacy of Parliamentary Sovereignty as a constant prescription in modern times as the dominant ideology in British constitutional theory since the mid-Nineteenth Century; but only during period between 1832 and 1867 was it a true description of reality. This constitutional interregnum period opened with the end of the monarch's right to choose government ministers in 1832, and closed with the establishment of "popular sovereignty" after the 1867 Reform Act was passed, precipitating the need to develop mass parties orientated towards fighting elections. Judge argues that, between these two dates, Parliamentary Sovereignty actually existed, with the Commons effectively constituting the focus of decision-making, with MPs' votes exercising effective control over government policies and ministerial tenures.

After 1867, however, many of Parliament's decision-making powers

slipped away to the Cabinet (Judge, 1993, p.154). Despite this, the concept of Parliamentary still dominated British constitutional discourse, with many MPs, belonging to the Westminster society of discourse, still behaving as though it actually existed. Furthermore, many of the "classical" observers of the constitutional process, such as John Stuart Mill and Walter Bagehot, regarded this exceptional period of "Parliamentary Sovereignty" as the norm, as did most subsequent constitutional commentators. For instance, A.V. Dicey in his 1885 **The Law of the Constitution** (1959, pp.39-40) argued that the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty meant that Parliament had "the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever" and that "no person or body is recognised by the law...as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of parliament."

Taylor regards such beliefs in Parliamentary Sovereignty as being the driving force behind opposition to British membership of the EC. This was despite the erosion of Parliament's powers over the years. For instance, he cites the proliferation in the number of Statutory Instruments, in the form of Regulations and Orders, which were rarely subject to Parliamentary control or scrutiny. Taylor (1975, pp.287-8) argues that compared to these, "the power which...the European Community exercise through...Regulations and Directives in Britain may well be compared to the biblical mote." Furthermore, Parliament had no control over the restrictions placed on the British nation-state by international treaties like GATT or NATO.

Taylor (1975, p.279) argues the reason for vehement opposition to the EC's threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty is that the EC is an institution from outside Britain which "can actually pass **legislation** binding on Britons..." Like other international treaties which Britain had signed, the Treaty of Rome fell within the Royal Prerogative, the constitutional device by which the government of the day- the "Queen-in-Parliament"- could sign an international treaty without Parliamentary authorisation. By itself, the Treaty of Rome had no influence whatsoever over the domestic legislative process (Valentine, 1962, p.180).

Writing at the time of Macmillan's abortive attempt to join the EC, Valentine (1962, pp.180-1) argued that the Treaty of Rome could, however, be incorporated into domestic law by an Act of Parliament; a Parliamentary Act could also make legal in Britain binding Regulations passed by the EC's Council of Ministers, so overruling any existing or future Acts of Parliament in Britain. In passing such legislation, it could, therefore, be argued that the legal supremacy of Britain's Parliament within the United Kingdom would be undermined by EC membership, with the supreme court in the British legal system no longer being the House of Lords, but the European Court of Justice (Valentine, 1962, pp.1823).

When Britain did join the EC, "anti-EC" political actors pointed to Section 2 of the 1972 European Communities Act, since: ~~Parliamentary Sovereignty will make statements where necessary~~ Section 2(1) of the Act gave effect to all provisions of EC law that have direct application or effect within all member states; Section 2(2) provided for the implementation of future EC obligations by secondary legislation; ~~Section 2(3)~~ Section 2(3) required all British courts to take judicial notice of decisions made in the European Court of Justice, where all decisions of EC law are to be referred to and decided upon; and Section 2(4) declared that "any enactment passed or to be passed, other than one contained in any part of this Act, shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions" (Judge, 1993, p.182). ~~the European Communities will represent the British Parliamentary Sovereignty/democracy~~

The result, from an "anti-EC" perspective, was that Section 2 undermined Dicey's belief that Parliament can by right, make or unmake any law, and that no person or institution can, by right, override Parliamentary legislation (Judge, 1993, p.183). As the institution of Parliament was, from the Seventeenth Century onwards, legitimising the dominant bloc's hegemony over British society and in defining the dominant bloc's concept of national identity, defending Parliamentary Sovereignty can be seen as a form of "anti-EC" nationalism, and an object of discourse for a discursive formation for British "anti-EC" political actors.

Furthermore, the system of dispersion developed around Parliamentary Sovereignty as an object of discourse within "anti-EC" discourse was further developed by "anti-EC" political actors utilising arguments which characterised the EC as a supra-national body with its own legal system and judiciary in the European Court of Justice; its own legislature in the European Assembly; and its own, unelected, **de facto** executive in the European Commission. Consequently, the EC could be portrayed by "anti-EC" political actors as an embryonic super-state, which, over time, all member states would be subordinate to within an EC-wide federal system of government.

Consequently, in the case studies, it can be anticipated that "anti-EC" political actors whose objects of discourse include Parliamentary Sovereignty will make statements whose semiotic values will include references to the following:

- (i) the threat that an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC represents to British Parliamentary Sovereignty/democracy;
- (ii) the threat that the EC represents to British national independence;
- (iii) the threat that the EC will lead to a EC-wide Federal system of government;
- (iv) the threat which the European Court of Justice will represent to British Parliamentary Sovereignty/democracy;
- (v) the threat which the European Commission will represent to British Parliamentary Sovereignty/democracy;
- (vi) the threat which the European Assembly or Parliament will represent to British Parliamentary Sovereignty/democracy;
- (vii) the EC will undermine Britain's veto over EC-wide law-making in the Council of Ministers; and
- (viii) the EC will undermine Britain's legal system and method of law-making.

As further European integration takes place, other statements within "anti-EC" discourse about other aspects of the EC can be anticipated to be made by "anti-EC" political actors.

Opposition to the EC on the grounds of preserving Parliamentary Sovereignty would not have had **that** much resonance with British political actors, if belief in Parliamentary Sovereignty did not play such a fundamental part in providing the ideological **raisons d'etre** of both the Conservative and Labour Parties.

### **3.20: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Conservative Party.**

The theoretical approach to national identity crises in this thesis makes it reasonable to expect that such a crisis will probably affect all political organisations whose **raisons d'etre** are based on the current definition of national identity. If a belief in the existence of Parliamentary Sovereignty is regarded by most of Britain's political actors as a central part of Britain's national identity, it would not be surprising if widespread political opposition to Britain being in the EC, and getting involved in further European integration, should occur. As Ashford (1992, p.119) comments, this is because the EC is perceived as a "threat...to the ideological self-images of the two main parties."

Furthermore, Ashford argues that the EC presents a particularly potent potential threat to the Conservative Party's collective ideological self-image. He sees power inside the party as being distributed pluralistically, since the Conservatives are an electorally orientated organisation; channels of communication must be kept open between the Conservative leadership and the rest of the party if it is to be electorally successful. At the same time, though, the leadership has to take account of the existence of an internal party "logic of culture. That is, the leadership has to bind the membership to it by appealing to particular unifying symbols which the Conservative Party as a whole believes in, and needs to believe in. Without this, the Party will suffer a collective identity crisis, and the legitimacy of the Party leadership will be put in jeopardy (Ashford, 1983, pp.396-7).

Ashford (1983, p.368) argues that anti-entry Conservatives believed that the party leadership, in supporting British membership of the EC, were abandoning three of these unifying

Conservative symbols: agriculture, the Commonwealth and national sovereignty. By the early 1970s, though, the leadership and pro-entry elements within the party had reduced their saliency and potency within the Conservatives' collective consciousness. Moreover, by 1973 pro-entry Conservatives had successfully linked the EC with several other symbols which unified the Conservative Party, such as anti-communism, Britain's world role, peace and prosperity (Ashford, 1983, p.371).

Ashford has also argued, however, that references by Conservative "anti-EC" political actors in their discourse to Parliamentary Sovereignty as an object of discourse have a potential to cause internal party divisions, because the Conservative leadership has in part maintained strong links with the rest of the Party and its wider support in the country by claiming to defend the nation's interest. "Anti-EC" Conservatives argue, though, that by joining and participating in the EC, the Conservative leadership undermined this aim, since integration justified in the name of Britain's "long-term" interests required some sacrifices of Britain's "short-term" interests, particularly a major reduction in the scope of effective Parliamentary Sovereignty and associated legislative powers which allow a Conservative government to argue that it is ruling Britain in the national interest (Ashford, 1992, p.120).

This potential source of identity crisis within the Conservative Party is further compounded by the association, in the archive that helps shape collective attitudes within the Conservative Party, of Parliamentary Sovereignty with a strong belief in free trade's benefits.

Judge argues that the establishment of Parliamentary Sovereignty as the hegemonic ideological concept in British constitutional theory in the Nineteenth Century coincided with the establishment of a British-created international free trade system. Consequently, the zenith of free trade in the mid-Nineteenth Century coincided with the high point in the practical application of the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Judge (1988, p.443) argues, that while Parliamentary Sovereignty has remained a hegemonic ideology in

Britain with declining significance for constitutional practice, "free trade transcended economic theory and became hegemonic state theory." As was discussed in Chapter Two, since 1815 the dominant bloc has continually supported the existence of the widest possible system of international free trade.

This ideological legacy of the Nineteenth Century has had a profound effect on attitudes towards the EC inside the Conservative Party, and, as the next Section shows, on Labour Party attitudes as well. Many Conservatives regarded Parliamentary Sovereignty and free trade as complementary, upholding Britain's liberal democracy, political freedoms and prosperity. Hence, preserving the independence of the British nation-state and an "open" world economy could be regarded as indivisible goals. Furthermore, the Conservative leadership's support for British membership of the EC and further European integration could be seen as creating a disjuncture between a state ideology corresponding to reality-Britain's support for free trade- and one existing as mere prescription- the existence of British Parliamentary Sovereignty. From the 1960s the Conservative leadership justified British involvement involvement with the EC as a means to increase free trade with other EC members (Judge, 1988, p.442). At the same time it acknowledged that some powers formally residing in Parliament have been removed from the national domain to the EC's various supra-national bodies in exchange for opening the EC's economies to more competition (Ashford, 1992, p.120). "Anti-EC" Conservatives argued that this not only eroded British Parliamentary Sovereignty, but also reduced Britain's opportunities to trade freely with the rest of the world economy. The extent to which the EC was compatible with the Conservatives' attitudes towards Parliamentary Sovereignty, free trade and the national interest lay at the heart of the Conservatives' post-1973 "Europe debate".

Another source of Conservative Party opposition to the EC on the grounds of defending the powers of Parliament is **Reflections on the Revolution in France** by Edmund Burke (1967), published in 1790. In opposing to the insistence of Revolutionary France that a nation's sovereignty resides in its people, Burke strongly supported the

example of the British Constitution, based on the supremacy of Parliament:

"...the Commons and the Lords; who in their several public capacities, can never be called to an account for their conduct;..." (Burke, 1967, p.27).

In defending Britain's Parliament, Burke also exhibited a strong antipathy towards federal states, which some "anti-EC" Conservatives argue, the EC will inevitably turn into. Burke (1967, p.193) scorns the plans of the French Revolutionaries to give France a federal system of government, in a manner which aspects of Margaret Thatcher's 1988 Bruges Speech appear to echo (Thatcher, 1988, p.4; George, 1993, p.18):

"It is boasted...that all local ideas should be sunk, and that the people should no longer be Gascons, Picards, Bretons, Normans; but Frenchmen, with one country, one heart, and one Assembly. But instead of being all Frenchmen; the greater likelihood is, that the inhabitants will shortly have no country. No man ever was attached by a sense of pride in...or real affection of square measurement."

From this examination of the archive and ideological doctrines from which "anti-EC" Conservative political actors can draw upon for statements that have Parliamentary Sovereignty as their object of discourse, it is possible to anticipate the utilisation of statements by Conservative Party political actors, and political actors closely associated with this ISA, which will include:

- (i) references to the threat that the EC represents to both British Parliamentary Sovereignty/democracy and to free trade; and
- (ii) references to the need to defend the British Constitution, in addition to Parliamentary Sovereignty/democracy, from the EC.

### **3.21: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Labour Party.**

"Anti-EC" nationalism found inside the Labour Party was also

heavily influenced by a belief in Parliamentary Sovereignty, which is a central element of the Party's traditional collective self-image. This self-image is based upon a belief in the doctrine of the "parliamentary road to socialism"; that is, through reforms passed into law through the legislative machinery of Westminster, British society can be pushed in a socialist direction. "Anti-EC" political actors within the Labour Party have argued that, as the EC is not only an institution of international capitalism but also places limits on British Parliamentary Sovereignty, it is a threat both to the Labour Party's goal of establishing a socialist Britain and the means of achieving it: unfettered Parliamentary Sovereignty (Ashford, 1992, p.120).

It is difficult to understand the importance of Parliamentary Sovereignty as an object of Labour Party discourse about the EC without first examining the attitudes of pre-Twentieth Century English Radicalism and organised labour. English Radicalism emerged during the Civil Wars of the Seventeenth Century. Its first organised expression, the Levellers, agreed with the ideologists of the newly emerging dominant bloc that the Protestant English were "freeborn" and Parliament was the main defender of those freedoms against the domestic and overseas forces of political absolutism. What the Levellers wanted, though, was the extension of the franchise to "the people" in order that their interests be properly represented. The dominant bloc did not agree with this, allowing Cromwell to crush the Levellers (Poulson, 1984, Chapter VI).

Except by expressing anti-French sentiments, as discussed in Section 3.23, the attitudes of English Radicalism were marginalised. With the onset of the Industrial Revolution, though, the newly forming industrial working class tried to find themselves a collective identity with which they could cope with the unprecedented change in their circumstances produced by industrialisation. In doing so, the working class took up the ideology of English Radicalism, and its belief that extending the franchise would allow the working class to improve their collective lot. This general acceptance of reforming the British state to achieve its goals would give the early working class economic-

corporate attitudes it would not lose. The Chartists saw radical reforms of the electoral system as the precondition for social reform, and their concept of social reform was based upon redistributing existing wealth to help the working class, rather than taking control of the nation's wealth at the point of production. They also accepted free trade, with the abolition of the protectionist Corn Laws being regarded as necessary to persuade agrarian-based economies to open up their markets to British manufactures (Semmel, 1970, pp.168-9). Hence the Chartists can be seen as the original articulators of the British working class's economic-corporate vision of using Parliament to promote social reform while supporting free trade to facilitate rising living standards. This world-view was supported by the "labour aristocracy" of the late Nineteenth Century, which made up the membership of the trade unions that brought the Labour Party into existence. As Hobsbawm (1976, p.274) argues, the "labour aristocracy" held liberal radical views which envisaged Parliament being used to pass social reforms to benefit them, while free trade would keep the prices of basic foodstuffs low.

Consequently, by the early years of the Twentieth Century, the organised working class had an economic-corporate world-view which saw Parliament as the instrument to better its collective lot. When the Labour Party was formed these tendencies were reinforced by the Fabians gaining intellectual hegemony over the Party. The Fabians were strict constitutionalists, believing the British state to be a fundamentally neutral institution, which could be used to implement reforms beneficial to the working class if the Labour Party could gain a majority in the Commons (Foote, 1986, pp.27-8). Consequently, from its beginnings, most of the Labour Party pinned its hopes of changing society on being elected to control the operations of the state (Osmond, 1988, p.264).

Nairn (1973, p.49) argues that the ideology which defines Labour's attitude is **labourism**, a belief that the organised working class, to achieve its goals, should be represented, through the Labour Party, within the institutions of the British nation-state. Labour is, therefore, both a **class** and a **national** party. Indeed,

labourism maintains that the fundamental interests of both the British **working class** and **nation** are fundamentally compatible. Nairn (1973, pp.50-2) argues that there are differences between Left and Social Democratic variants of labourism, with the Labour Left putting more stress than Social Democrats upon the importance of **class** rather than **nation**. Both tendencies are, however, loyal primarily to the British **nation** and its symbols, including Parliament, and symbolises the way in which the Labour Party embraces the ideology of both the dominant bloc and the subordinate working class. The Labour Party's attachment to the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty, says Nairn, has been strengthened by the association of Labour's wholehearted support for both world wars with progressive social legislation during, and after, these conflicts. The programme of the 1945-51 Labour Government, in particular, is seen as vindicating labourism's belief that Parliament can be used by the organised working class to introduce collectivist economic and welfare measures (Nairn, 1973, pp.71-3).

The preceding discussion of the Labour Party's historical archive and how it relates to Parliamentary Sovereignty suggests that statements made by Labour "anti-EC" political actors which have Parliamentary Sovereignty as their object of discourse might also refer, in addition to those already outlined, to:

- (i) the need for British Parliamentary Sovereignty to be protected from the EC as an essential prerequisite for social reform or socialism to occur in Britain; and
- (ii) the need for the Labour Party to protect British Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC in order to uphold its historical inheritance: the struggles for democracy made by English Radicalism and the early labour movement.

### **3.22: "National Internationalism".**

Nairn argues that very few "anti-EC" political actors in Britain admit to being, or like being called, nationalists and maintains

that (Nairn, 1973, p.63) "one of the most prominent features of Labour's defence of the nation against the Common Market was a strongly professed internationalism." He sees this as a nationalist "alibi", and describes such attitudes as "national internationalism". Hence, the object of discourse in this context is Britain's world-role outside of the geographical and institutional parameters of the EC, and the discursive formation which it is subject to is "national internationalism".

In "anti-EC" discourse, Nairn argues, Britain is presented as "outward-looking" and "internationalist" with "world-wide" commitments; in contrast, the EC is naturally "inward-looking" and "narrowly nationalist" or "regionalist". Why the EC should be such an organisation will be addressed in the next two Sections of this Chapter; in this Section, it will be the various "internationalist" alternatives to the EC that feature in "national internationalist" discourse that will be examined.

The origins of such attitudes can be traced back to the Sixteenth Century, which saw the effective end of serious attempts by the English state to territorially expand in mainland Europe. With the British capital and state becoming involved in the wider opening up of the non-European world to colonial trade and expansion, Britain's future destiny appeared to largely lie away from the European continent. After 1688, the fortunes of British trade, and of the City, came to rely so much upon Britain's extra-European external orientation that, as discussed in Chapter Two, Britain's dominant bloc always preferred external means to secure its domestic hegemony. Consequently, by the time of the debates on EC membership, there was a widespread belief throughout British society that Britain's natural orientation lay outside of Europe.

Apart from general appeals by "anti-EC" political actors for Britain to look to the world outside the EC, there were also appeals to uphold Britain's traditional policy of free trade from the "narrowly protectionist" EC. As has been discussed both in this Chapter and Chapter Two, there has always been strong support for free trade from the dominant bloc, subordinate social groups like

the Liberal Bourgeoisie and the working class, and from the two main political Parties.

"National internationalist" doctrine also presented the British Commonwealth as an arena outside of the EC where Britain could play a world-role. This raises the issue of why, when other members of the EC had held overseas empires, anyone in Britain should believe that the British Empire or Commonwealth were qualitatively different from these.

From the beginnings of its extra-European expansion in the Sixteenth Century until the defeat of Napoleonic France, Britain had rather successfully built a world-wide empire, which provided the raw material and markets for its thriving domestic economy. After 1815, however, Britain pursued a policy of encouraging global free trade, in order to exploit the comparative advantage British capital, particularly manufacturing, had over the rest of the world. Through free trade Britain established global hegemony with a largely "informal" empire (Semmel, 1970, p.8). Although the British were encouraged to regard the existing overseas possessions of the Empire, particularly India, as a source of national strength, their national vocation and even as a constituent element of their national identity (Marquand, 1995, p.188), there was, at the height of Britain's global hegemony, no economic imperative to seize more territory.

This era of "Free Trade Imperialism", as Semmel (1970) describes it, came to an end in the late Nineteenth Century, when other powers began to challenge British hegemony by building up their national industries and seizing overseas territory to provide their domestic industry with raw material and markets. As a consequence, Britain started to annex more territory, particularly in Africa, to secure resources and markets. This move to a more "formal" empire, was, as Semmel (1970, p.8) stresses, purely a response to external pressures; Britain's dominant bloc always preferred "informal" to "formal" means of protecting its overseas interests.

By the beginning of this century, the ideology of Imperialism, as a consequence of the move to a "formal" empire, had completely permeated every level of British social life. Reflecting the means

used to expand the Empire's territories, Imperial propaganda tended to be rather militaristic in character (MacKenzie, 1984, p.2). Such attitudes and imagery, as MacKenzie notes, permeated the educational system, the armed forces, the churches, forms of public entertainment like music halls and exhibitions, juvenile literature, publishers' lists, advertising, picture postcards and cigarette cards (MacKenzie, 1984, pp.2-3, 17), as well as being propagated by imperial propaganda societies such as the Imperial Institute (MacKenzie, 1984, pp.121-46), Royal Colonial Institute (MacKenzie, 1984, p.148) and the British Empire Union (MacKenzie, 1984, pp.156-7). The extent of Imperialism's hold at this time as an ideology on the British population can be gauged by the fact that both the Fabians (Foote, 1986, p.30) and the leader of the ostensibly Marxist Social Democratic Federation, Henry Hyndman (John Callaghan, 1990, p.16), were fervent imperialists.

With the increasing challenges from the USA and Germany to Britain's global hegemony, though, debate arose about how Britain should preserve its empire. As outlined in Chapter Two, Social Imperialists wanted to turn the Empire into a protectionist economic system, but failed either to persuade the dominant bloc or mobilise the working class to support them. Instead an ideology of Liberal Imperialism, which united Atlantic Liberals and Empire Free Traders against the Social Imperialists' vision, and indeed the Social Imperialist vision of Germany, triumphed. Liberal Imperialism cast Britain as upholding international free trade, cooperation and peace against "disruptive", "narrow" economic and political nationalisms, typified by the "formal" empires being pursued by the Western European powers. The Labour Party emerging at this time also supported Liberal Imperialism (Nairn, 1973, pp.69-70).

During the inter-war period Imperial propaganda shifted its emphasis: the severe disruption of international trade meant that the importance of the Empire to Britain's economic fortunes was increasingly stressed (MacKenzie, 1984, pp.107, 256). In addition, the concept of the trusteeship of colonies promoted by the League of Nations, was "based upon a vision of beneficial, idealistic

imperialism..." (MacKenzie, 1984, p.256). This had a major effect on Labour Party attitudes towards British imperialism; as Ronald Robinson has commented, many radicals, both inside and outside the Party, "ceased to decry the wickedness of the past and exalted a better empire to come" (Howe, 1989, p.132).

Even after World War Two, and the replacement of Britain's global hegemony by that of the USA, many political actors looked to the Commonwealth as a source of national strength. For instance, in the late 1950s, a survey (Finer et al, 1959, p.89) of professed attitudes of Conservative MPs found that 127 preferred Britain to have closer economic links with the Commonwealth compared to 104 who wanted Britain to have closer links with Western Europe. Moreover, throughout the British political spectrum after 1945, the Commonwealth was increasingly presented as an organisation consisting of a variety of cultures united in liberal constitutional advance (MacKenzie, 1984, p.257). Instead of being a national humiliation and a crisis of national identity, decolonisation was rationalised as Britain's "internationalist" duty; it was contrasted with the messy, bloody withdrawals by the other Western European powers from their colonies. Nowhere did Britain suffer the humiliation of an Algeria, Congo or Vietnam (Nairn, 1973, p.73).

Consequently, Britain's leadership of the multi-racial, world-wide Commonwealth was widely regarded by anti-entry political actors as incompatible with British membership of a six member Western European organisation with collective militaristic, Social Imperialist tendencies.

With its "internationalist" rhetoric, lack of a "formal" empire and support for free trade, "national internationalists" saw the USA as the post-1945 upholder of internationalism, and Britain should develop its "special relationship" further, despite the Internationalist capital fraction putting repeated pressure on Britain to forge close links with Western Europe to prevent it becoming the "narrow nationalist" region feared by "anti-EC" political actors. British "anti-EC" political actors tend to see GATT and NATO, organisations designed to bolster the USA's

post-1945 global hegemony, as much better vehicles than the EC for Britain to pursue its "internationalist" goals (Nairn, 1973, pp.66, 74).

"Anti-EC" Social Democrats inside the Labour Party tended to be amongst the most pro-US of "anti-EC" political actors. This is largely due to them seeing the foreign policies carried out by the "Internationalist" fraction of US capital throughout this century as the goals of the British Labour Party writ large. That is, the Internationalists, in their pursuit of US economic hegemony, have encouraged social reform and defence of free trade. For instance, after World War One the Labour Party, along with other European social democratic parties, warmly welcomed Woodrow Wilson's "Crusade for Democracy", which in reality was an abortive attempt by the USA to bring Western Europe capitalism, threatened by Bolshevism, under its hegemony (van der Pijl, 1984, p.60). Similarly, "anti-EC" Social Democrats believed that the Marshall Plan, another attempt to integrate fully Western Europe into the US-dominated Atlantic economy, was the USA benevolently funding the 1945-51 Labour Government's social reform programme.

In the 1960s the Kennedy Administration, while sponsoring Britain entry into the EC, was inaugurating the "Kennedy round" of GATT negotiations, which was meant to reduce EC tariff levels. A successful "Kennedy round" was seen by anti-entry Social Democrats like Douglas Jay as a viable alternative to Britain joining the EC; Nairn (1973, p.73) notes the similarities between the arguments of Jay's 1962 **The Truth About the Common Market** and US "Internationalist" Walter Lippman's fears, expressed the same year in **Western Unity and the Common Market**, that under de Gaulle's influence, the EC would become "a close, restrictive and exclusive society..."

The other main "internationalist" alternative to the EC which was put forward by anti-entry political actors was the argument that Britain should involve itself more in organisations and bodies, such as the UN and disarmament talks, promoting "internationalist" aims like disarmament and peace. The EC in

contrast, was widely associated, particularly on the Left with the Cold War; it was seen as economically underpinning NATO, with British entry heightening further East-West tensions (Newman, M., 1983, p.179).

To summarise: one could expect "anti-EC" political actors who made Britain's world-role outside the confines of the EC to make statements whose semiotic values were "national internationalist" in character. As well as general references to Britain's world role, such a discursive formation could be anticipated to have a system of dispersion, which would refer to:

- (i) Britain's traditional support for an "outward-looking" foreign policy designed to uphold an "open" world economy based upon free trade;
- (ii) Britain's links with the Commonwealth;
- (iii) Britain's "special relationship" with the "internationalist" USA, and support for "internationalist" institutions sponsored by the USA, such as NATO, GATT and the IMF;
- (iv) Britain's support for "internationalist" institutions, such as the UN, and causes, such as world peace and disarmament.
- (v) the EC as "narrowly nationalist" or "narrowly regionalist";
- (vi) the EC as inward-looking";
- (vii) economically protectionist; and
- (viii) potentially aggressive in its relations with the rest of the world.

### **3. 23: France.**

of the Eighteenth Century the colonial opposition to

the government was described by Edmund Burke as

"Every thing we had done is in the style of hostility to France, as a nation." -Edmund Burke (Newman, G., 1987, p.123).

Nairn argues that since "anti-EC" political actors claimed that the EC was a "narrowly nationalist" and "inward-looking" organisation, which an "internationalist" and "outward-looking" Britain should not be a member, this was due to the EC being

dominated by a "narrowly nationalist" France.

The existence of France as an object of discourse underlying the British, or more precisely English, sense of national identity, has a very long history. Fear of the French as part of English society's archive perhaps goes as far back as King John's reign (McGlynn, 1996). Rodney Hilton (1989, p.41) comments that, apart from wars with the Scots, in the medieval period "positive feelings of Englishness as we can find...mainly arose from...the predatory wars waged...in France in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and the inevitable counterraids by the French on the southern English coasts". Bloom (1990, pp.65-6) concurs that the effects of the Hundred Years War with France upon English society led to the emergence of the English national identity.

France has been as object of discourse for the British radical, conservative and liberal political traditions long before the EC existed. For two hundred years following the English Civil Wars, a sustained struggle took place between the dominant bloc and English Radicalism to mobilise the anti-French national identity dynamic to their political advantage. During the Civil Wars English Radical opinion, such as the Levellers, subscribed to a belief in the "Norman Yoke". That is, before 1066, the "free-born" Anglo-Saxons were free and equal citizens who governed themselves through representative institutions; it was the Norman tyranny that deprived the English of their liberties (Hill, 1965, p.57). Even as late as 1790s, the English Radical thinker Tom Paine in his **The Rights of Man** (Paine, 1989, p.19) was referring to the Norman conquest as the original source of all England's woes (Hill, 1965, p.99). For most of the Eighteenth Century the radical opposition to the government was described by itself and its enemies as "patriotic", leading Tory Samuel Johnson to call patriotism "the last refuge of the scoundrel" (Nairn, 1988b, p.171; Cunningham, 1989, p.60). Such "patriots" appealed to what Gerald Newman (1987, pp.74-7) calls "Folkish Gallophobia", which saw the aristocracy and government- the dominant bloc- as Francophile defilers of English liberty (Newman, G., 1987, p.78). Even in the 1840s, the Chartist movement had very patriotic and anti-French tendencies (Cunningham,

1989, p.69).

At the same time, though, the dominant bloc was able to manipulate the anti-French aspect of the national identity dynamic to mobilise the population in eight separate wars against France between 1688 and 1815. As well as gaining colonies and commercial opportunities from these conflicts, the aggression of the British was repeatedly diverted from challenging the dominant bloc's hegemony (Colley, 1994, pp.52-3).

The anti-French national identity dynamic was permanently appropriated by the dominant bloc during the wars with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France (Cunningham, 1989, p.65). Burke's polemic against the French Revolution can be regarded as being the first articulation of Conservative distrust of France (Burke, 1967), while Napoleon's creation of a protectionist "Continental System" engrained itself in the collective consciousness of British free traders and the working class. For instance, in June 1958 Macmillan publicly invoked collective memories of Napoleon's "Continental System" in declaring that the EC was a Continental blockade against Britain (Barker, 1971, p.158).

Even with improvements in Franco-British relations since the Napoleonic period, historical events could still be interpreted to deepen the anti-French archive within British society. For instance, World War Two is not generally referred to in British political discourse as an example of Franco-British cooperation, but as an instance of French untrustworthiness, in the form of sudden military collapse to, and subsequent collaboration with, Nazi Germany.

Furthermore, The protectionist tendencies of de Gaulle appeared to have revived fears about a protectionist, nationalist France during the British debates on EC entry. Even when Pompidou accepted British entry in 1971, it was seen as some anti-entrists as a "French Plot" (Nairn, 1973, p.65).

Another aspect of the EC connected to France, which can also explain British hostility towards both, is the EC's legal system, which undoubtedly limits Britain's formal Parliamentary

Sovereignty, being based upon French Administrative Law, as opposed to English Common Law (Valentine, 1962, p.183).

It can therefore be anticipated that "anti-EC" political actors who used France as an object of their discourse would make statements which contained semiotic values which refer to the following:

- (i) France dominates or heavily influences the operation of the EC as a means to dominate Britain as it has attempted to in the past;
- (ii) France has made, or will make, the EC into a protectionist, "narrowly nationalist" organisation;
- (iii) France will impose its own legal system, via the EC, onto Britain; strengthened by Germany's second attempt to supplant
- (iv) France's conception of democracy and the role of the state being alien to that of Britain;
- (v) the Norman conquest, and subsequent "Norman Yoke";
- (vi) Napoleon's attempts to dominate Europe and Britain; and
- (vii) France's defeat to, and collaboration under the Vichy regime with, Nazi Germany.

### **3.24: Germany.**

Germany was a member of the EC initially political actors utilised discourse which drew upon the negative. Compared to France, negative references to Germany as an object of discourse within British politics and society appeared relatively late. Throughout most of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, British public opinion was generally Germanophile (Robins, 1979, p.18). England's Parliamentary traditions were seen as originating from the democratic systems of self-government which the ancient Germanic tribes, including the Anglo-Saxons, had established in the Teutonic Forests. Furthermore, Protestant German states, most notably Prussia, had throughout the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, fought with Britain to prevent French hegemony over Europe (Wallace, 1991, pp.70, 77).

Attitudes began to change with Germany uniting under the hegemony of Prussia after 1870-1. The establishment of an

all-German protectionist system, the Zollverein, saw Germany breaking with free trade. Imperial Germany subsequently attempted to challenge Britain's hegemony by increasing its industrial strength, a series of colonial annexations and building up its navy. These events led to Germany gaining an image in the British national consciousness as a disruptive, aggressive, militaristic and "narrowly nationalist" power threatening global security and stability (Robins, 1979, p.18). In opposing Germany's system of Social Imperialism, the Liberal Imperialists of Britain's dominant bloc and Labour Party "internationalists" defined their collective self-image.

World War One led to British political discourse equating Germany with Prussian militarism. This negative attitude was further strengthened by Germany's second attempt to supplant British hegemony. In addition to World War Two strengthening the importance of Parliament, the Commonwealth and links with the USA to Britain's national consciousness, it strengthened perceptions of Germany within British political discourse as being fundamentally aggressive militarily, expansionist territorially and authoritarian politically, if not inherently prone to fascism (Robins, 1979, p.18; Wallace, 1991, p.72).

Consequently, as Germany was a member of the EC, anti-entry political actors utilised discourse which drew upon the negative perceptions of Germany which informed so many Britons' individual "members' resources" contained. This had already been attempted by the British left, including the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), in opposing German re-armament in the mid-1950s (Newman, 1983, pp.178-9). Through campaigning on this issue both the CPGB and Labour Left were able to win much more public support than normal (Robins, 1979, p.19).

Consequently, it can be anticipated that "anti-EC" political actors employing Germany as the object of their discourse will utilise statements whose semiotic values will draw upon, and refer to, the following themes:

- (i) Germany will dominate, or heavily influence, the operation of

the EC as a means to dominate Britain as it has attempted in the past; "Anti-EC" "Programme" and "Programme";

- (ii) Germany wants the EC to become a protectionist customs union, along the lines of the Prussian-dominated Zollverein in the Nineteenth Century, with Germany playing the role of Prussia;
- (iii) Germany will make the EC a politically authoritarian organisation, as befits its own political heritage;
- (v) references to World War One; and
- (vi) references to World War Two and the events leading up to it, such as the Munich Agreement, Hitler and the Nazis.

Consequently, an anti-EC discourse can be seen to be based alongside "nationalist" discourse.

### **3.25: "Anti-EC" "nationalist" discourse: final comments.**

Having outlined the historical origins of the "anti-EC" nationalist discourse which the case studies will be scrutinised for, it is possible to address the issue of whether this corresponds to Anthony Smith's (1976, pp.1-2) definition of nationalism.

As discussed earlier, Smith regards "nationalism" as an aspiring to "nationhood", which itself is defined by three ideals. The first of these, the autonomy and self-government for the group in a sovereign state, corresponds to the "anti-EC" goal of protecting Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC. This goal of "anti-EC" political actors may also be seen as achieving Smith's second criteria: the need for solidarity and fraternity of a group in a recognised territory or home.

However, all four objects of "nationalist" discourse, correspond to Smith's third criterion for "nationhood": a distinct, unique culture and history peculiar to the group. No other member of the EC can claim to possess a Parliamentary Sovereignty which gives the legislative assembly more constitutional importance than "the people" than Britain (Osmond, 1988, p.176). Neither has any had a history which has been more concerned with events outside Europe than Britain. Nor has any other EC member had similar historical experiences in dealing with France and Germany than Britain. "Anti-EC" "nationalist" discourse in Britain seems, therefore, to correspond with Smith's definition of nationalism.

expected to appear in the case studies, it is possible to examine

### 3.26: "Anti-EC" "Pragmatic" and "Ideological" Discourse.

in below:

This thesis' hypothesis is based upon the assumption that it can only be tested is that more than one form of discourse can be identified in the case studies. This is consistent with Foucault's (1981, p.67) concept of discourse as discontinuous practices "which cross one another" and Pecheux's (1982, p.113) concept of "inter-discourse" which regards the various discursive formations as a "complex whole". Those of "anti-EC" political actors. However, Consequently, in "anti-EC" discourse, statements with "pragmatic" and "ideological" semiotic values can be expected to be found alongside "nationalist" ones in the same case studies, or in speeches by the same political actors.

"Pragmatic" discourse by "anti-EC" political actors comprise of statements whose objects of discourse will be the material costs of EC membership. At the level of systems of dispersion, it should be able to identify, count and tabulate examples of statements referring to particular material costs of EC membership. For example: voices which emphasise the EC's role in increasing pauperity; improving living standards; creating a larger market (i) the imposition of VAT on the British economy; (ii) Britain paying more into the EC Budget than it is getting back; (iii) the effects of the Common Agricultural Policy upon food prices; and (iv) EC membership has led to higher unemployment.

The object of "ideological" discourse utilised by "anti-EC" political actors depends upon whether they are Labour or Conservative. If they are Labour, their statements can be expected to refer to the pro-capitalist, anti-socialist, anti-working class, anti-trade union nature of the EC. If the political actors are Conservative, their statements can be anticipated to denounce the EC as an anti-capitalist, anti-business, pro-socialist institution.

With the various forms of "anti-EC" discourse which can be

expected to appear in the case studies, it is possible to examine what discourse "pro-EC" political actors can be anticipated to employ.

"anti-EC" political actors appears more problematic when the

### 3.27: "Pro-EC" discourse.

anticipating the use of "nationalist" discourse, or the equivalent, by "pro-EC" political actors. As was suggested in Section 1.7, "pro-EC" discourse should be generally be regarded as being a mirror image of "anti-EC" discourse. That is, the objects of discourse for "pro-EC" political actors are similar to those of "anti-EC" political actors. However, the semiotic values of "pro-EC" statements, and the themes which are contained within "pro-EC" discursive formations should be largely the opposite of "anti-EC" ones.

Consequently, "pragmatic" discourse employed by "pro-EC" political actors would focus upon the material effects of EC membership and further European integration as its object of discourse, but statements and discursive formations would emphasise the material benefits, and not the costs, of the EC. Statements and discursive formations can be anticipated, therefore, to have semiotic values which emphasise the EC's role in increasing prosperity; improving living standards; creating a larger market for British goods; giving Britain a secure supply of food; and providing aid for Britain's regions. Such themes, amongst others, can be regarded as a system of dispersion within the overall discursive formation of "pragmatic" discourse, and can also be identified, counted and tabulated from the contents of statements made by "pro-EC" political actors.

On examining the "ideological" discourse used by "pro-EC" political actors, the criteria would be different according to whether the political actors could be categorised as Conservative or Labour. "Pro-EC" Conservative political actors can be expected to make statements which referred favourably to the EC as a pro-capitalist, anti-socialist institution, while "pro-EC" Labour political actors can be anticipated can be expected to portray the EC in their discourse as a pro-socialist, anti-capitalist institution which is of benefit to the British working class and

organised labour movement.

Analysing "pro-EC" political actor's discourse on the principle that such discourse is the exact opposite of that utilised by "anti-EC" political actors appears more problematical when the issue of analysing and anticipating the use of "nationalist" discourse, or its equivalent, by "pro-EC" political actors. The issue arises of whether it is at all possible to anticipate the use of any "pro-EC" equivalent to the "nationalist" discourse utilised by "anti-EC" political actors. In addressing this theoretical issue, it is necessary to draw upon theoretical concepts of Foucault and Pecheux. In particular, Foucault's concept of the regime of truth.

The four forms of discursive formation which make up the whole of "anti-EC" nationalist discourse in Britain draw upon a long-standing regime of truth which was essential for legitimising the dominant bloc's actions and policies. That is, the need to defend Parliamentary Sovereignty; the need to preserve Britain's world-role; suspicion of France; and suspicion of Germany all were forms of nationalist discourse which generally reflected the long-term interests of Britain's dominant bloc. That is, until the 1960s, when the British state began its attempts to join the EC, a policy which can be regarded as incompatible with untrammelled Parliamentary Sovereignty, a world-wide role for Britain and a suspicious attitude towards France and Germany. There would appear a need for a new regime of truth, which could legitimise British membership of the EC and further European integration.

Consequently, utilising Foucault's theoretical approach, the discourse employed by "pro-EC" political actors in addressing "nationalist" objects of discourse can take two forms.

First, it can be discourse which is subject to delimitation. Such discourse does not challenge the existing regime of truth, and enunciates statements with similar semiotic values to preexisting discursive formations in relation to existing objects of discourse.

The second form of discourse which could be used is informed in its statements by a new regime of truth, which openly challenges the assumptions of the preexisting regime of truth.

Employing Pecheux's theoretical approach, there are two theoretical concepts which can be utilised to categorise the discourse which "pro-EC" political actors use in addressing the "nationalist" objects of discourse which "anti-EC" discourse centres upon.

First, there is the process of forgetting, when political actors do not challenge, nor feel a need to challenge, the discourse employed by their opponents.

Second, there is counter-identification, when political actors utilise a counter-discourse to oppose the currently hegemonic discourse.

Drawing upon these theoretical approaches of Foucault and Pecheux, it can be anticipated that "pro-EC" discourse will demonstrate two methods to address those objects of discourse which "anti-EC" discourse addresses by means of "nationalist" discourse.

The first method, corresponding to Foucault's delimitation of discourse and Pecheux's process of forgetting, is what will be defined in this thesis as "**counter-nationalist**" discourse. That is, such discourse does not challenge the regime of truth which provides the "nationalist" assumptions which underlie "anti-EC" discourse, but accepts them. This does not necessarily mean that "pro-EC" political actors agree with the assumptions which inform their delimited discourse. Indeed, it may be that "pro-EC" political actors have begun a process, in Pecheux's phrase, of disidentification, where they cease to openly identify in their discourse with the "nationalist" themes employed by "anti-EC" political actors. However, it does mean that such "pro-EC" political actors are unable to successfully challenge the preexisting regime of truth and the "nationalist" discourse which "anti-EC" political actors derive from it.

Consequently, "counter-nationalist" arguments within "pro-EC" discourse can be expected to be made in the following ways:

- (i) Parliamentary Sovereignty is not threatened by British involvement in the EC. Indeed, the EC is a means by which Britain can increase its **effective** sovereignty;

- (ii) the EC does not limit Britain's world-role or ability to pursue its traditional "internationalist" goals, such as preserving peace and encouraging free trade. Indeed, the EC is a means to increase Britain's global influence and its ability to pursue its "internationalist" aims. Only if Britain does not participate in the EC will it become a "narrowly nationalist" or economically protectionist organisation, and Britain will lose any hope of once again becoming a truly influential power in the world. Moreover, if Britain fully participates in the EC, the possibility exists for Britain to potentially lead the EC;
- (iii) British participation in the EC prevents France dominating the EC and making it a "narrowly nationalist", protectionist organisation. British non-participation in the EC will ensure French hegemony over it; and
- (iv) British participation in the EC prevents Germany dominating the EC and making it a "narrowly nationalist", protectionist organisation. British non-participation in the EC will ensure German hegemony over it.

The second method of addressing "nationalist" objects of discourse in "pro-EC" discourse, corresponding to Foucault's idea that a new regime of truth needs to be established to challenge the existing one through discourse and Pecheux's concepts of counter-identification and counter-discourse, will be defined as "**Euro-Federalist**" discourse. Unlike "counter-nationalist" discourse "**Euro-Federalist**" discourse is based upon completely different assumptions about the EC than those informing the "nationalist" discourse employed by "anti-EC" political actors. In particular, "**Euro-Federalist**" discourse challenges:

- (i) the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty as an obsolete one, arguing instead that Britain's future lies in a Federal EC;
- (ii) the idea of Britain having an independent world-role outside of the geographical and institutional parameters of the EC; and
- (iii) anti-French and anti-German attitudes by emphasising that Britain's future is dependent upon cooperation with both France and

Germany within the structure of an emerging Federal EC.

### 3.28: Conclusion.

In this Chapter a theoretical model explaining the origins, importance and persistence of nationalism and national identity, and their relationship with organic crisis has been developed.

Furthermore, the historical origins and political importance of the four forms of "anti-EC" "nationalist" discourse in Britain have been identified. It is now possible to anticipate the types of "nationalist" discourse "anti-EC" political actors would use in the three post-1973 case studies examined in this thesis. It is necessary, however, in the next Chapter to examine the wider national and international contexts in which the case studies took place, and the non-discursive formations which took place during the 1973-93 period.

The development of the Thatcher-Ball alliance

12

in the international context,

the years 1973 and 1993 in which both

"new-right" and "new-left" took place

in Britain, and the organic crisis, within the

context of both the national and

internationalised party. From being

the main force behind the 1973 and root of the

1993 crises, the party moved onwards to

become the main force behind further

organic crisis in the late 1980s

and early 1990s, by promoting national

identity and a Eurosceptic critique of EC

membership, and in Britain's post-1993

crisis, by its continued promotion of events

such as the miners' strike, and the party

continued support of the Ulster Loyalists

## CHAPTER FOUR: BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE WORLD, 1973-1993.

### 4.1: What this Chapter covers.

This Chapter is concerned with the non-discursive formations, or the wider political context in Britain, the EC and the world in which the three case studies examined in this thesis took place. In order to achieve this aim, NATISOB and Gramscian analyses of the capitalist world-system will again be drawn upon. However, many of previously cited NATISOB do not address political events at the domestic and international level in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Consequently, the works of other writers have been drawn upon in order to develop a coherent account of the wider background to the case studies; an account which not only draws upon NATISOB to inform it, but is also able to take the account of British historical development within the capitalist world-system, begun in Chapter Two, right up to the passing of the Maastricht Bill into British law in 1993.

The Chapter will begin by examining the international context, both inside and outside the EC, between 1973 and 1993 in which both Britain's continuing organic crisis and "Europe debate" took place (4.2).

Section 4.3 is a discussion designed to explain, within the context of the changing course of events at both the national and international levels, why the Conservative Party, from being strongly supportive of EC membership in the 1970s and most of the 1980s, became increasingly prone from the late 1980s onwards to doubting the wisdom of supporting British involvement in further European integration. It will be suggested that the late 1980s onwards are a historical period when Britain's preexisting national identity crisis, caused by the dominant bloc's embrace of EC membership in the hope that it would help end Britain's post-1960 organic crisis, was further exacerbated by a combination of events which adversely affected the Conservative Party, as both the party of government and as the traditional party political supporters of

the dominant bloc's hegemony, much more than it did the Labour Party. It is suggested that these conjunctural events, including the consequences of the changing fortunes and structure of British capital over the post-1973 period; moves towards further European integration; changes within the wider capitalist world-system; and the emergence of increasingly varied perceptions within Britain's bourgeoisie about Britain's relationship with the EC affected Britain's place within the capitalist world-system. It is suggested that all these factors, combined with a continuing crisis of British national identity, both inside and outside the Conservative Party, increased divisions within the entire Conservative Party in the late 1980s and early 1990s over the future of Britain's relationship with the EC.

In Section 4.4 various reasons will be suggested to explain why, in the context of developments at the wider national and international levels, the Labour Party moved from being largely hostile towards the EC in the 1970s and early 1980s, towards generally being perceived as more "pro-EC" than the Conservatives by end of the 1980s and early 1990s.

There are a number of reasons why this Chapter is important for developing the rest of this thesis.

First, it will demonstrate the validity of the model of Britain's historical development, discussed in Chapter Two, in helping to understand developments during the 1973-93 period.

Second, it firmly puts the three case studies examined in Chapters Five, Six and Seven within a wider political context and the non-discursive formations which exist in that context.

Third, by demonstrating that Britain's organic crisis continued after joining the EC, it would suggest that a national identity crisis arising from Britain's EC membership and involvement in further European integration would occur. It could, therefore, be anticipated in the case studies examined in this thesis that "nationalist" discourse would be utilised by "anti-EC" political actors, thus demonstrating the existence of a national identity crisis affecting some of Britain's political actors in the process.

Fourth, by presenting an account of the national and international political situation in the 1973-93 period, it may be possible to anticipate the levels of, and the shifts in, the saliency of the various forms of discourse utilised by "anti-EC" political actors in the case studies; and the types of discourse employed by "pro-EC" political actors examined in the case studies.

Before this can be attempted, though, the wider political context in which Britain's 1973-93 "Europe debates" took place will be examined, not least at the international level.

#### **4.2: Developments at the international level, 1973-93.**

As was discussed in Chapter Two, the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system of fixed exchange rates was seen by many, including that of the collective opinion of the City of London which had been crucial in ensuring British entry to the EC, as the signal for a new global capitalist order to emerge. In particular, it was anticipated that the USA's global economic hegemony might be replaced by an international system based upon economically protectionist blocs, centred upon the USA, EC and Japan.

In fact, this situation did not occur, despite the existence of protectionist tendencies in all three of these economic regions. Instead, the post-1971 period saw the USA's continued hegemony over the world economy; what had changed was the economic underpinnings of that hegemony (Gamble and Payne, 1996).

The economic basis for US economic hegemony was the increasing domination of commercial capital, particularly financial capital, over the global capitalist system, reflected in shifts in the priorities of both the national and international economic policies pursued by Western governments and international institutions (Overbeek, 1986, p.17). At the level of ideas, this trend was demonstrated by the renewed intellectual confidence of liberal economic theories, such as monetarism, in the face of a crisis on confidence amongst "Keynesian" economists (Radice, 1984, p.137;

Overbeek, 1986, p.17). At the level of the firm, it was represented from the 1970s onwards by an increasing number of industrial corporations undertaking financial activities, such as credit, short-term deposits and foreign exchange deals (Overbeek, 1990, pp.200-1). With this increasing influence of commercial capital's priorities over those of productive capital, the emphasis of Western economic policy shifted towards the promotion of international free trade and free markets, rather than the promotion of national economic prosperity through direct state intervention in the national economy and the protection of nationally orientated productive capital from foreign competition. Direct state interventions in national economies were increasingly designed to attract investment from both domestic and foreign-owned TNCs to their national territories (Andreff, 1984, p.68; Gill, 1990, p.100).

Gill (1990, p.70) argues that in the post-Bretton Woods international financial system, the USA actually increased the structural basis for its global economic hegemony, as the international financial system was now based upon a pure Dollar standard, as opposed to the Gold Standard of the pre-1971 era, and the growing integration of the US and global money markets. The post-Bretton Woods global capitalist order still took a liberal form, favoured by the "Internationalist" bloc in the USA and backed by the institutions of global economic management, such as GATT, the IMF and the World Bank. Furthermore, the continued existence since the 1970s of a global system of trade, based upon liberal principles, led to further increases in the economic strength of TNCs. TNCs' increased power was demonstrated by the facts that from 1973 until the early 1980s, TNCs' profit and investment levels rose, while those of other firms in developed capitalist countries fell (Andreff, 1984, p.63); and in 1987 one-third of the 90 million workers employed in manufacturing in OECD countries were directly employed by TNCs (Gill, 1990, p.90).

With the rise of TNCs, and the increasing "internationalisation" of capital throughout the Western world, there emerged sections of the bourgeoisie in each Western country who saw their interests

being increasingly tied to the fortunes of the global economy. These members of the Western bourgeoisie, and the capital fractions that were associated with them, began sharing a similar world-view to their "comrades" abroad. That is, they wanted a stable world economic order where "inter-imperialist" conflict was minimised and liberal economic principles informed economic activity and state economic policy throughout the world. Both goals depended, however, on a hegemonic power to ensure global "stability"; and in the circumstances of the global struggle between capitalism and socialism, this meant the USA. Combined with possible support from sections of labour that could identify with the interests of transnational capital, Gill (1990, pp.37-8, 50) saw the post-Bretton Woods era as encouraging the emergence of a **transnational historic bloc.**(1)

For this to be a viable hegemonic project, however, a Gramscian "war of position" was constantly fought from the early 1970s onwards to undermine the position of those capital fractions, the wider bourgeoisie and associated labour-forces, which were strongly attached to the idea of economic activity, and the nation-state, being subordinated to the interests of "the national economy" (Gill, 1990, p.50). Moreover, there was also a need to secure the transnational historic bloc's hegemony at both the ideological and political level over both society and state policies.

The formation of the Trilateral Commission in 1972-3 was an attempt in the post-Bretton Woods era to bring together leading politicians, businesspeople, opinion-formers and policy-makers throughout North America, Western Europe and Japan in order to encourage Western unity based upon the promotion of free trade and, originally, Corporate Liberalism (Overbeek, 1990, p.170). For such unity to be re-established, though, the Nationalist tendencies of the Nixon Administration, which had led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, had to be neutered, and the Trilateralist world-view imprinted on US foreign policy. The Watergate scandal and its aftermath allowed Trilateralists to take up influential positions in the Administration of fellow Trilateralist Gerald

Ford. It was only with the removal of Henry Kissinger, who had antagonised other Western governments with his conduct of US foreign policy, and the election of Jimmy Carter, another Trilateral Commission member as US President, the hegemony of the Trilateralist world-view over US foreign policy in the mid-1970s was secured (van der Pijl, 1984, pp.273-5 ; Gill, 1990, pp.166, 222-3).

The Carter Administration initially attempted to promote Western unity by aligning the West along North-South issues, rather than East-West ones (van der Pijl, 1984, p.274) and through a coordinated programme of economic expansion led by Federal Germany and Japan (George, 1990, p.16). This strategy failed for a number of reasons. First, Helmut Schmidt, the German Chancellor and a firm believer in an Atlantic Partnership to promote Corporate Liberalism, was unimpressed by Carter's leadership, and feared that the USA would leave Western Europe defenceless in the event of a war between the West and the USSR. In 1979, to allay Schmidt's fears, the deployment of US Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe was agreed to in order to demonstrate that the USA was militarily committed to Western Europe (van der Pijl, 1984, p.276). Second, there was increasing pressure upon Carter within the USA to abandon Detente in order to pursue a renewed Cold War with the USSR. This pressure came from an alliance of elements from within the US military-industrial complex, represented by organisations such as the American Security Council (Gill, 1990, p.120); those sections of US capital most opposed to the Trilateralist goals of Atlantic Partnership and Corporate Liberalism, such as financiers, oil companies, rentiers and small businesses (van der Pijl, 1984, p.275); and pressure in both main US political parties for a more aggressive relationship with the USSR, a viewpoint best represented by the bipartisan Committee on the Present Danger (Overbeek, 1986, p.20). Third, oil price rises in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution, which constituted another foreign policy debacle for the USA, helped to plunge the world economy into recession and so undermine any possibility for a programme of coordinated reflation by the West (George, 1990, p.19).

The 1980 US Presidential Election saw Carter replaced by Ronald Reagan, who oversaw, in his first term of office, an aggressive US foreign policy towards the USSR and anti-US regimes and political movements in the Third World. This was combined with a more Nationalist attitude towards Western Europe, which partly reflected shifts in the centre of gravity within US capital from the Atlantic region towards the Pacific (Overbeek, 1990, p.182). Gill (1990, p.107) argues that the Reagan Administration in the early 1980s could be described not only as **Unilateralist** towards Western Europe, in that it appeared unconcerned about European reactions to US foreign policy, but also as Nationalist, for it tried, in an aggressive manner, to subordinate Western Europe's economy to the USA's own economic development.

The Reagan Administration's aim in the economic sphere was to restore the USA's undisputed hegemony over the global capitalist economy, particularly vis-a-vis Western Europe and Japan. On the one hand, this goal justified a sustained attempt to open up other Western European economies to penetration by US capital (Gill, 1990, p.107). On the other, the renewed Cold War legitimised a massive arms "boom" in the USA, bolstered by state-sponsored "military Keynesianism". At the centre of this programme was a tremendous financial stimulus to US Research and Development (R&D) in areas of new technology, such as computers, laser technology and robotics (George, 1990, p.28). This was seen as the technology of a new industrial revolution to underpin the creation of a transnational historic bloc throughout the West, attached to both the money-capital concept and freer international trade between capitalist economies, under the hegemony of the USA. The Reagan Administration's "military Keynesianism" also had a more immediate effect in the early 1980s of lifting the global capitalist economy out of recession (Gamble, 1988, p.111; Gill, 1990, p.102).

Meanwhile, the aggressive US foreign policy of Reagan's first term had a negative effect on Western European public opinion. The Reagan Administration's espousal of Cold War rhetoric; its apparent belief that nuclear war could be won or limited to Europe; its massive arms build-up, of which the deployment of Cruise and

Pershing missiles in Western Europe was the most apparent manifestation; its interventions in the Third World, as in Central America, Grenada and Lebanon; its unsuccessful attempt to use the 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland in order to push Western Europe into a full-scale trade war with the Eastern Bloc (George, 1990, p.28); and its general unwillingness to take account of Western European opinions opposed to its Cold War world-view, led to a widespread disillusionment throughout Western Europe with the USA's role in the world. This manifested itself in the appearance of a European peace movement which generally saw Western Europe taking a separate, **Europeanist**, course between the USA and USSR. While no government espousing Europeanist policies took office during this period, most Western European governments still believed in an Atlantic Partnership run along Trilateralist lines. The Reagan Administration's Unilateralist foreign policy was seen by them as provoking support for a Europeanist alternative to the Atlantic Alliance for the first time since the demise of de Gaulle at the end of the 1960s (Overbeek, 1986, pp.20-1).

During Reagan's second term in office, however, the Trilateralist tendencies within the Administration managed to gain hegemony over US foreign policy, which manifested itself in the USA's new enthusiasm for more joint Western coordination of international economic activity- so-called "management of interdependence" (Gill, 1990, pp.119-120) and a more conciliatory stance towards the USSR of Gorbachev.

By the mid-1980s, though, the Trilateral Commission had itself abandoned its championing of Corporate Liberal policies at the domestic level which it had promoted in the 1970s. Reflecting the increasing dominance of liberal economic doctrine over Western state policies, the rise of TNCs and the strengthening of the international position of financial capital, the Commission came to whole-heartedly embrace not only international free trade, but also the adoption of liberal economic policies at the national level throughout the Western capitalist world (Gill, 1990, pp.191-7).

Furthermore, by the mid-1980s the Trilateral Commission, which had been a consistent supporter of the EC as an essential element

in securing the continued existence of an international free trade system in the post-Bretton Woods era (Gill, 1990, p.177), saw the need for the EC to "relaunch" itself, through increasing its potential in the area of high technology R&D and by fully embracing liberal economics, "decreased state involvement and a return to more flexibility" (Gill, 1990, p.193). One does not have to embrace various conspiracy theories about the Trilateral Commission (Gill, 1990, pp.167-9)(2) to see that such proposals undoubtedly concurred with the EC's own proposals from the mid-1980s onwards to "relaunch" itself.

By the mid-1980s, in line with the thoughts emanating from the Trilateral Commission, Western Europe's hegemonic economic and political elites were increasingly concerned that the new technological revolution that Reagan's arms boom had done so much to encourage, would benefit the economies of the USA and Japan, rather than those of Western Europe. If a genuine Atlantic Partnership were to be built upon the economic strength of both the USA and the EC, the EC would have to find new ways to keep up technologically with the other two heartlands of global capitalism (George, 1990, p.25; Overbeek, 1990, p.209). These concerns resulted in the SEA, which had several driving forces behind its creation.

First, there were many amongst Western Europe's industrialists, organised through institutions like the European Round Table, who saw the creation of a genuine common market inside the EC as the essential basis for encouraging greater investment, particularly in the "new technologies" (George, 1990, p.22).

Second, there was the French state under Francois Mitterrand. French perspectives had been heavily influenced by the experience of Mitterrand's Socialist government in the early 1980s whose attempt during the 1981-3 period to unilaterally pursue an expansionist Keynesian economic programme in the midst of global recession had dismally failed. This experience convinced Mitterrand that France's economic development could not be unilaterally achieved. Furthermore, the subsequent recession also meant that

France was unable to exploit the advances it had made in areas of high technology R&D. Mitterrand believed that such advances could only be successfully exploited through EC-wide economic cooperation (George, 1989, p.15; George, 1990, p.23).

Third, Federal Germany saw the new technological revolution as having the potential to threaten its position as a leading industrial power, and leaving it as the producer of obsolete capital goods. Furthermore, the Germans saw EC-wide cooperation in new technology as essential if they were to exploit fully the advances made in those areas of technology (George, 1990, p.22; van der Pijl, 1991, p.31).

Fourth, the EC itself, particularly the European Commission, saw itself as an agent of economic deregulation (Milward, 1992, p.440).

The forces supporting greater EC-wide cooperation in the economic sphere, so that the EC as a whole could play a leading role in the increasing globalisation of capital, believed that the removal of inner-EC national barriers to trade were essential for EC-wide economic growth (Milward, 1992, p.441). At the same time, though, it was believed that removing these barriers could only be achieved through institutional changes which would reduce the ability of national governments to block moves reducing barriers to EC trade. Hence the changes to the EC's institutional framework in the EC contained in the SEA, including the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers on issues concerning the Single Market.

At the same time, the Commission's President, Jacques Delors, recognised that there would be losers as well as winners once the SEA goals were achieved. Consequently to reduce the potential for opposition to the "1992 project", Delors promoted a vision a "**Social Europe**" which would mitigate the effects of the Single Market. In offering this vision of the EC becoming both a free trade area and an arena for social reforms, Delors was putting forward a form of Corporate Liberalism, rather than unmitigated economic liberalism (Tindale, 1992, p.293).

The SEA and associated "1992 project" also had the effect of encouraging the revival of the idea of a Federal EC, based around

the assumption that a single market must lead to a single currency, issued by a single central bank, and hence the establishment of political union (Milward, 1992, p.441). The Federalist project was also boosted by Mitterrand's rhetorical support for it, as a means of attracting support from pro-Federalist EC members, such as Italy, for French plans to keep Federal Germany seeing its future as tied to Western Europe, and not Eastern Europe (George, 1989, p.15).

Federal Germany's dissatisfaction with US foreign and military policies in the 1980s, combined with its attempts to achieve closer links with Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany, and Gorbachev moving the USSR away from a confrontational stance with the West, all led to widespread German dissatisfaction by the late 1980s with its links with the rest of the West (van der Pijl, 1991, p.27). Consequently, Mitterrand conceived the "1992 project" as a means of lessening Germany's yearnings to re-orientate itself towards the USSR and Eastern Europe, whose markets by 1989 were 30% dominated by Federal German capital (van der Pijl, 1991, p.35). With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and German unification, French fears about Germany intensified, and the French saw the goal of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) contained within the Maastricht Treaty as a means to control the newly united Germany (Milward, 1992, p.443).

The plans for EMU in the Maastricht Treaty showed, however, how much liberal economic assumptions had come to inform so much Western economic policy-making assumptions by the late 1980s and early 1990s, since the plans contained in the Treaty for EMU and a European Central Bank (ECB) contained in the Treaty institutionalised the hegemony of the priorities of central bankers over the EC economies, and their independence from political control (Milward, 1992, p.442). As EMU could not take place without the participation of Germany, Maastricht also institutionalised the dominance of Germany within the EC. It was a Germany, however, that had no intention of cutting the EC economically off from the rest of the capitalist world-system, as it embraced the view of the German father of national political economy, Friedrich List, that strong economic powers achieved hegemony over other economies

through the extension of free trade rather than through protectionist measures (Gamble, 1990, pp.160-1). Moreover, German capital now wished to operate on a world-wide basis in the global capitalist market-place, and so had no reason by the early 1990s to make the EC a protectionist trading bloc (van der Pijl, 1991, pp.31, 35). The Trilateralists, whose views dominated the world-views of both the Bush (Gill, 1990, p.119-21) and Clinton Administrations(3), believed that the EC would be highly unlikely to embrace protectionism if Germany had a strong material interest in German participation in the development of a transnational historic bloc was encouraged. Consequently, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Washington made it clear that it considered the USA's relationship with Germany, rather than the "Special Relationship" with Britain that existed during the Reagan Administration, to be the most valuable one that the USA had with an individual Western European state (George and Sowemimo, 1996, p.254). As protectionist measures were being successfully resisted, there appeared to be no reason by the early 1990s why US and other non-EC capital investing in the EC should not benefit from the increasing internationalisation of the EC's economies which the SEA and Maastricht Treaty encouraged.

#### **4.3: The Conservative Party and the EC, 1973-93.**

As was seen in Chapter Two, it was the Conservative Party which was the primary political instrument by which Britain's dominant bloc, identified in NATISOB, managed to get Britain to enter the EC in 1973. Throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s, plenty of evidence existed to suggest that the Conservatives were still more enthusiastic about British membership of the EC and involvement in further European integration than the Labour Party. For instance, in April 1975 only eight Conservative MPs voted in the House of Commons against the "renegotiated" terms of EC membership (Ashford, 1983, p.314). In the late 1970s the Conservatives strongly supported direct elections to the European Parliament (Ashford, 1980, pp.115-6); and Margaret Thatcher described Britain's decision

in 1978 not to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) as "a sad day for Europe" (Tether, 1979, pp.22-3).

Once elected in 1979, the Thatcher Government saw Britain's EC membership as part of its strategy for reversing relative economic decline, in that Britain needed to fully embrace the increasing internationalisation of the post-Bretton Woods capitalist world-system. As the EC was seen by Thatcher and most of the Conservative Party as playing a vital part in this process, the question of whether Britain should stay in the EC was not an issue for her and it (Ashford, 1980, p.111). Thatcher's 1979-84 battles with the EC over Britain's contribution to the EC Budget were not a sign that the Thatcher Government was "anti-EC" in the early 1980s. Indeed, this episode can be seen as strengthening as Britain's commitment to the EC. Thatcher was able to argue that she was able to stand up for Britain's interests, while securing reforms from the EC which would benefit Britain, and so outmanoeuvred both "anti-EC" Conservatives and the Labour Party from making political capital from widespread antipathy in Britain towards the EC (George, 1989, p.23).

Furthermore, as the contents of Chapter Six demonstrate, the Thatcher Government was an enthusiastic supporter of the SEA, with only eight Conservative MPs voting against Second Reading of the Bill making the SEA part of British law (HC Debates 23 April 1986: cols.395-6). Consequently, it needs to be explained why, by the time of the 1992-3 Parliamentary debates on the Maastricht Bill, the Conservative Party was sharply divided in its attitudes towards Britain's relationship with the EC; differences so profound that it was perhaps surprising that the Maastricht Treaty did not divide the Conservative Party even more than it did (Baker et al, 1993; Baker et al, 1994).

This discussion of the underlying reasons for the splits inside the Conservative Party over the EC in the late 1980s and early 1990s will start by examining the effect that events at the level of the capitalist world-system had upon Conservative attitudes.

From 1979 Thatcher had seen Britain's position in the world as best being enhanced through supporting the USA's foreign policy, even when the Reagan Administration embraced Unilateralist and Nationalist tendencies with gusto upon the world stage (Gamble, 1990, p.213). In contrast to many in Western Europe, who often saw the Reagan Administration's conduct of US foreign policy as undermining Western unity in the face of the USSR, Thatcher saw Western unity behind the USA as the best means of achieving this. Consequently, she considered activities by Western European governments, who saw themselves as trying to revive the Atlantic Partnership concept, disapproved of by the USA, as the real cause of Western disunity (Overbeek, 1990, p.182). Hence, Thatcher either supported or did not publicly condemn the Reagan Administration over international issues as diverse as the USA's 1983 invasion of Grenada; its 1986 bombing of Libya; its attempts to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua; its policy of "positive engagement" with South Africa; its favouritism towards Israel in the Middle East; and its 1986 withdrawal from UNESCO. In contrast, the rest of the EC often refused to support the hard-line position of the Reagan Administration on these and other international issues (Gamble, 1988, p.112; George, 1990, pp.25-7, 29-33). Furthermore, the Thatcher Government, while supporting moves towards freer trade within the EC, also pressed for the EC to support moves towards wider free trade between the EC and the rest of the capitalist world-system through US-approved institutions, such as GATT (George, 1989, p.15; Overbeek, 1990, p.197).

Overbeek (1986, pp.18-19) describes the position that Thatcher took on foreign policy during the 1980s as "Churchillian", as it consciously echoed Churchill's belief that Britain could not hope to be influential in the post-1945 world without the backing of the USA. When the Bush Administration made a conscious "tilt" towards favouring a closer relationship with Germany, rather than Britain, when dealing with Western Europe, Thatcher's "Churchillian" world-view was seriously undermined. The collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the demise of the "Soviet threat", despite being a blow for Thatcher's shrill anti-communist

world-view, was another blow to the assumptions lying behind Thatcher's foreign policy; Western Europe no longer seemed to have any reason slavishly to follow US foreign policy, as Thatcher had advocated, as a great threat to the West's collective existence no longer existed.

Germany's re-unification in 1990, however, can be seen as the main body-blow to Thatcher's "Churchillian" world-view (Preston, 1994). Britain had fought two World Wars in the Twentieth Century to prevent German hegemony over Europe, and in 1945 had agreed to help divide Germany in order to prevent this happening again. German re-unification seemed to many in Britain as the first step towards Germany asserting its political strength within Europe equivalent to its economic power, and there was little Thatcher could do about it (George and Sowemimo, 1996, p.254). German re-unification seemed to symbolise a new era in European history. Faced with such a prospect, Thatcher appealed to the USA, as in her August 1990 Aspen speech (George and Sowemimo, 1996, pp.254-5), to pursue a Unilateralist rather than a Trilateralist foreign policy towards Europe in order to prevent German domination of it. At worst, Thatcher and her close political, intellectual and media allies could do little better than make stereotypical assertions about the German national character and references to Germany's Nazi past (e.g. Lawson, 1990).

These fears about German hegemony appeared to be further strengthened by Sterling's entry into the ERM, which took place almost simultaneously with German re-unification. In economic terms alone, ERM membership expose the weaknesses of the British economy, and undermine Thatcher's claims to have halted Britain's relative economic decline (Keeqan, 1996, p.2) and limit the ability of British governments in the monetary and fiscal policy fields, particularly the ability to set interest rate levels. More damagingly for Thatcherite prestige was that the ERM, being based upon the Deutschemark's strength, was an institutional expression of **de facto** German economic leadership of the EC; and Thatcher feared that the ERM would be a potential means by which Germany could make the EC into a regionalist trading bloc, which had been a

fear of many British political actors since James Callaghan exercised his choice in not allowing Sterling to join the ERM in 1978 (George, 1989, p.12). Moreover Thatcher feared that ERM would be a possible stepping-stone to EMU, which would make all the aforementioned features of the ERM permanent.

The fears of Thatcher and an increasing number of her Conservative colleagues about the EC's future direction during the late 1980s and early 1990s were not only caused by developments at the level of the capitalist world-system. Another major reason for mounting Conservative unease about the EC was due to it being increasingly seen by sections of Britain's bourgeoisie as a growing threat to the existence of the rule of capital in Britain.

In Chapter Two, drawing upon NATISOB, it was argued that much unease existed amongst British capitalists about the material effects EC membership would have upon them.

In the event, the effects of EC entry on British economic performance were mixed, even when one takes into account the 1973 oil price rise "shocks", which resulted in first, inflationary pressures, then deflationary measures, throughout the capitalist world-system, which led to world recession.

For some of Britain's capital fractions, the material benefits of EC membership outweighed the costs. The EC did not, for instance, place curbs upon the City of London's global activities. For Corporate Liberal and State Monopolist firms, such as GEC and ICI, EC membership either strengthened their positions in the EC market, or, as in the case of Corporate Liberal BL, the EC was an essential means of ensuring their continued existence as mass production firms in a recession (Overbeek, 1990, p.168).

As Anderson (1987, p.63) notes, however, "The Common Market lost its dynamism just as Britain joined it", and entry compounded the economic plight of many firms, particularly Liberal Bourgeois ones, who were simply not competitive enough to survive new, post-entry levels of competition (Overbeek, 1980, p.115). Consequently, for much of British capitalism, EC entry was not an external "magic objective force bestowing cure from above" (Nairn, 1981, p.396)

upon relative economic decline, but instead "bestowed, in conditions of gathering recession...modest opportunity for the financial sector and galloping de-industrialization up North".

British capital which did not gain from EC entry did not, however, revolt and make their feelings known to such an extent as to cause Conservative Party splits over the EC. The reason why opposition from British capital to the EC was so muted was a consequence of a strong fear that the Labour Left and militant organised labour was a threat to the very existence of British capital. Just as in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries (2.4), fears about the survival of capitalism in the 1970s and much of the 1980s was sufficient to neutralise resentment amongst the Liberal Bourgeoisie about the priorities of the dominant bloc. Furthermore, those priorities included EC membership.

The early 1970s were a period of intense class conflict in Britain, which were partly a consequence of the Heath Government's programme, outlined in Section 2.6, of which EC entry was one part and legal restrictions on the trade unions another. A consequence of the latter plank of Heath's programme was a number of spectacular union victories over his Government, the most notable being the 1974 miners' strike (Anderson, 1987, p.64). This prompted a series of events leading to Heath's electoral defeat and its replacement by a Labour Government committed to "re-negotiation" of the terms of Britain's EC membership, subject to ratification by referendum. Heath's programme also had the effect of increasing the strength of the Labour Left within the Party, and so Labour came to office in 1974 with an economic programme largely based upon the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES), which had originally been formulated in the 1960s by the CPGB (1968, pp.31-3). The AES, according to its advocates, could only be assured if a socialist Britain was freed from the restrictions placed upon it by the Treaty of Rome (Gamble, 1990, pp.174-8).

Hence, by the mid-1970s many sections of British capital saw the existence of capitalism in Britain threatened by a combination of an increasingly confident trade union movement and the existence of

a Labour Party elected on a programme which, if fully implemented, would lead to major restrictions on capital's freedoms, and leave the very survival of British capitalism in doubt (Leys, 1985, p.17).

Britain's "slide to the Left" was halted by the result of the June 1975 Referendum on Britain's EC membership, as the "No" campaign was largely presented as a left-wing crusade (Whitehead, 1986, p.138). Moreover, Harold Wilson immediately interpreted the vote to stay in the EC as signalling that he could get away with demoting the AES's most public advocate, Tony Benn, from the post of Industry Secretary, while persuading the TUC to introduce a pay-policy as part of a counter-inflationary programme. This led to the rapid abandonment of any serious attempt to implement AES-inspired elements of Labour's programme (Anderson, 1987, p.65; Gamble, 1988, p.90).

The experiences of the early 1970s and the continued denouncements by many in the Labour Party and the trade unions after the Referendum of the EC as a "capitalist club" or "conspiracy", preventing Labour Governments from implementing socialist economic policies, left long-standing scars upon the collective attitudes of British capital.<sup>(4)</sup> Even those capitalists, like many in the Liberal Bourgeoisie, who had gained little material benefit from EC membership, perceived it in the late 1970s and early 1980s as an institution which Britain had to stay in if the rule of capital in Britain was to survive. As the perceived powers of the trade unions and Labour Left increased during this period, the existence of British capital seemed to be in even greater danger. The Labour Party's policy of unconditional EC withdrawal, which lasted from the 1980 Labour Conference until the June 1983 General Election, was seen by nearly all of Britain's capitalists as an integral part of a frontal assault on their very existence. Only after the Labour Left was seen to be in headlong retreat inside the Party during the late 1980s; trade union militancy perceived to have been defeated in the 1984-5 miners' strike (Anderson, 1987, p.67); and Labour's move away from a policy of EC withdrawal in the aftermath of its 1983 General Election rout

confirmed, were British capital's collective attitudes to the EC even able to change.

From the mid-1980s, however, as Overbeek (1986, p.23) anticipated at the time, "The rule of capital no longer seems at stake, and more and more fractions of the ruling classes are growing dissatisfied with the price they are paying" on many issues, including Britain's relationship with the EC. A major aspect of that dissatisfaction towards the EC was brought about by many British capitalists, and increasing numbers of Conservatives, seeing the EC as becoming an anti-capitalist, rather than a pro-capitalist, institution. This perception largely resulted from 1988 onwards, with Jacques Delors articulating his vision of a "Social Europe". When the Labour Party and TUC embraced Delors' vision, Thatcher saw it as an attack on the policies her government had pursued since 1979, and a means to re-establish "socialism" in Britain. Denouncing the idea of a "Social Europe", and the rather limited proposals for equal employment rights within the EC contained in the Social Charter, as a return to the era of "Marx and the class struggle" (Stirling, 1991, pp.7-9), Thatcher was able to rally much of British capital behind her (Butt Philip, 1992, p.158).

Thatcher did not, however, rally a similar level of support from British capital for other aspects of her stance towards the EC during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These splits in capital are the third main reason for the deep splits in the Conservative Party during this period.

As previously mentioned, for much of their period of office, Thatcher and her supporters in Government saw the EC as an organisation which complemented the increasing internationalisation of capital. Furthermore, the EC was regarded by Thatcherites as a possible vehicle for exporting the assumptions behind their strategy for reversing Britain's relative economic decline. That is: 31 and 28.5% by their British and US-owned counterparts respectively (Overbeek, 1998, p.196). All this helped to secure the

(i) the practical application of liberal economics;

- (ii) the encouragement of commercial, rather than productive, capital; and
- (iii) the encouragement of the internationalisation of capital, so creating a domestic base of support for involvement in developing a transnational historic bloc committed to free trade and free markets.

Hence the Thatcher Government's domestic economic policies from 1979 onwards can be seen as a practical application of the implementation of these policy goals.

From the perspective provided by NATISOB, the Thatcher Government's espousal of internationalisation of the British economy as the solution to Britain's economic problems was based upon the assumption that the City's interests would continue to hold sway over the assumptions lying behind Britain's economic policy-making. In October 1979 all remaining exchange controls were abolished, which led to £35.4 billion being exported between 1979 and 1983 and British overseas assets increasing to £100 billion by the end of 1987 (Gamble, 1990, pp.194-5). By the end of 1979 interest rates had been increased to 17%, which along with the second oil price "shock", and Sterling being perceived as a "petro-currency", helped to increase the effective exchange rate by 12% in 1980 (Gamble, 1988, p.101). By the end of 1980 a wide-ranging programme of financial deregulation had taken place (Hutton, 1996, pp.62-6).

The subsequent increase in the possible scope of the City's activities made it an extremely attractive place for foreign capital to invest in, and speculate from. For instance, by 1985 70% of all assets and liabilities in the UK monetary sector were held in currencies other than Sterling; 75% of all bank deposits in Britain were held by overseas firms, governments and individuals (Anderson, 1987, p.69); and 27% of all international bank lending from Britain was conducted by Japanese-owned banks, compared to 21.4% and 20.5% by their British and US-owned counterparts respectively (Overbeek, 1990, p.196). All this helped to secure the City of London a position in the 1980s where it held global funds

of £1 trillion, three times the value of Britain's GDP (Anderson, 1987, p.64), while Britain became the leading country in the world for attracting foreign banking capital (Andreff, 1984, p.62).

While the Thatcher Government was pursuing policies which created boom conditions in the City, between 1979 and 1982 it oversaw the British economy's move into a deep slump, particularly in manufacturing. This led to Britain in 1983 becoming a net importer of manufactured goods for the first time ever (Gamble, 1990, p.194).

As Anderson (1987, p.64) observes, the Thatcher Government's policies led to the virtual detachment of the fortunes of the City of London from those of the domestic economy. Hence the many ways, compatible with Thatcherite economic principles, of cushioning the impact of de-industrialisation upon those parts of Britain which had spawned the Industrial Revolution was by encouraging the economic internationalisation of these areas through foreign investments. Foreign-owned TNCs were encouraged either to buy up those industrial concerns which had survived the slump, or to set up new plant in the areas worst affected by the slump (Nairn, 1981, p.388). This led to a situation by 1988 where 10% of the work-force was dependent upon the top 1,000 foreign-owned firms for their jobs (Rodgers et al, 1988, p.11). Such investment by foreign-owned TNCs helped to mitigate the effects of deindustrialisation resulting from many British-owned TNCs, who, to a large extent, had given up hoping that Britain's relative economic decline would be reversed. For instance, between 1979 and 1986 the forty largest British-owned manufacturing firms collectively increased their work-forces abroad by 125,000, while reducing them in Britain by 415,000 (MacInnes, 1987, p.80).

Apart from greatly increasing the internationalisation of the British economy, and further increasing the City of London's importance within the capitalist world-system, other consequences of the Thatcher Government's economic policies included shifts in the weight and interests of Britain's various capital fractions of the British bourgeoisie. In particular, the relative sizes and strengths of the Liberal Bourgeoisie and Atlantic Liberals

increased. In the case of the Liberal Bourgeoisie, there was an increase in the size of the petit-bourgeoisie, such as the self-employed, whose share of the work-force doubled in the 1980s (Hutton, 1996, p.107). Moreover, the Thatcher Government's deregulation of financial services at the start of the 1980s allowed the financial sector to increase lending to consumers between 1979 and 1990 by at least 15% per annum (Hutton, 1986, p.71). This, in turn, allowed an expansion of consumer credit, fuelling an increase in the size of those parts of the British economy providing consumer services, where growth in the 1980s averaged 6.4% per annum (Hutton, 1996, p.72).

The 1980s also saw an increase in the relative strength of the Atlantic Liberal fraction. This was a result of increased investments in the USA by firms such as the Hanson Trust (Overbeek, 1990, p.206). For instance, in 1987 alone, British-owned firms made bids in the USA worth \$30 billion (Rodgers et al, 1988, p.11). As the Liberal Bourgeoisie and Atlantic Liberals were two capital fractions that were quite sceptical about the economic merits of Britain being in the EC, as well as being on the forefront of funding the Conservative Party in the 1980s (Overbeek, 1990, p.206), Their fortunes from the late 1980s onwards can be regarded as an important factor in creating the external pressures which encouraged increasing Conservative Party divisions over the EC during this period.

By the time that the SEA had been signed by all EC governments in December 1985, the political atmosphere in Britain had changed considerably since the time of the Referendum campaign ten years before. The influence of Labour Left and the trade unions had been marginalised; the Labour Party was in the process of abandoning its opposition to EC membership and embracing the internationalisation of the British economy; and it appeared that "Thatcherism", consisting of the acceptance of **de facto** US hegemony over the international capitalist system, increasing internationalisation and adaptation to liberal economics, had triumphed in Britain, in the face of a divided and confused opposition from both within and

without the Conservative Party. Believing that the basis for sustained economic recovery in Britain been established, Thatcher wished to export Thatcherism to the rest of the EC, and she saw the SEA's goal of the single market as the means to achieve this (Kaiser, 1994, pp.385-6).

Initially, the City of London and the other main British capital fractions generally supported the goals of a single market in the EC, although their reasons varied. The City was pro-SEA because it saw it as one part of its attempts to maintain its role as the leading global financial centre, the October 1986 "Big Bang" of City deregulation being another (Overbeek, 1990, p.196). The Thatcher Government therefore put great efforts into securing a major deregulation of EC-wide financial services as part of "1992", so allowing the City access to the lucrative German market (Milward, 1992, p.441; George and Sowemimo, 1996, p.250).

For the Corporate Liberals and State Monopolists, in contrast, the single market was seen as encouraging further British links with the rest of the EC; a collective goal of theirs since the 1950s (Overbeek, 1980, p.110; Butt Philip, 1992, p.164). In contrast, the Atlantic Liberals and Liberal Bourgeoisie initially embraced the "1992 project" as it represented an extension of international free trade, which would further improve their international competitiveness.

Convinced of the economic benefits of a EC-wide single internal market, Thatcher and the overwhelming majority of the Conservative Party supported the SEA being passed into law in 1986, while being prepared to considerably reduce the scope of Britain's formal Parliamentary Sovereignty in the process by introducing QMV into the Council of Ministers, while increasing the legal powers of the European Commission, European Court of Justice and European Parliament (Milward, 1992, p.441). In doing this, Thatcher reduced the scope of British Parliamentary Sovereignty in order to facilitate the increasing internationalisation of capital within the EC.

Moves towards further European integration which followed the

SEA brought about splits within British capital that greatly contributed to splits within the Conservative Party over British involvement in further European integration. To begin with, there were differences over the connected issues of ERM and EMU. As already discussed, Thatcher was hostile to British membership of the ERM and participation in EMU for a number of reasons. In the late 1980s, however, there was much pressure from within the ranks of British capital for Britain to join the ERM, which she accepted in October 1990, and to participate in moves towards EMU. For instance, the CBI saw the ERM as a means of ensuring stable exchange rates, so allowing lower British interest rates (Overbeek, 1990, p.184); and much opinion in the City feared that, outside the ERM, Britain would have little say in the direction EMU might take, so leaving the City potentially marginalised within the EC during a major move towards even greater internationalisation of capital (George, 1989, pp.26, 29). It was the City's disapproval of Thatcher's opinions on EMU which caused her most political problems, and her vehement expressions of opposition to proposals for EMU expressed in the Commons after the October 1990 Rome Summit played a pivotal role in bringing about her replacement by John Major as Prime Minister and Conservative Party leader in the following month (George and Sowemimo, 1996, pp.255-6).

Prior to its April 1992 General Election victory, the Major Government appeared to offer a way of adjusting Britain's relationship with the EC, particularly Germany, in the light of the changed international circumstances of the early 1990s, that Thatcher's could not. As well as strongly supporting Sterling's membership of the ERM, Major declared that, in negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, he had secured the means for extending the single market, while allowing Britain "opt-outs" from both Stage Three of EMU and the Treaty's Social Protocol. The latter "opt-out" was partly designed to assuage fears amongst British capital about the material consequences of a "Social Europe", while securing the dominant bloc's project of supporting further European integration; as Nairn (1993, p.47) comments, "Maastricht Europe may now be seen as turning into...one more support for ongoing one-party hegemony".

By the time of the 1992-3 House of Commons debates on Maastricht, however, the Conservative Party was increasingly divided over the issue of Britain's relationship with the EC; splits further exacerbated by the June 1992 Danish referendum vote against Maastricht and Britain's September 1992 withdrawal from the ERM. Yet these splits within the Conservative Party echoed increasing differences between Britain's various capital fractions over Britain's future relationship with the EC.

Both the Liberal Bourgeoisie and the Atlantic Liberals tended towards the "anti-EC", anti-Maastricht, anti-ERM/EMU side of the divide amongst Britain's capitalists in the early 1990s.

Apart from fears about the consequences of a "Social Europe", the Liberal Bourgeoisie turned against the EC as a result of seeing it as contributing the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s. This recession was brought about by interest rate increases designed to reduce inflationary pressures in the British economy, resulting from the credit "boom" and large income tax cuts in the mid-1980s. The squeeze on consumer spending that followed severely hit many sectors of the Liberal Bourgeoisie which had prospered during the 1980s as a result of increases in consumer spending. The recession's effects were, however, lengthened and deepened by Britain's ERM membership. Entering the ERM at the level of 2.95 Deutschemarks, which hit manufacturing exports, the adverse effects of ERM on the British economy were compounded by increases in German interest rates to cope with the inflationary consequences of ERM. Consequently, to maintain Sterling's position within the ERM, British interest rates had to be kept higher than they would have been outside it, so continuing until Sterling's ERM withdrawal in September 1992. Since the ERM was widely seen as a precursor to EMU, many of those within the Liberal Bourgeoisie, dependent upon high levels of consumer spending within the domestic economy, began to associate the possibility of EMU with recession and German economic hegemony over the EC. Consequently, it was hardly surprising that, post-ERM, firms from the Liberal Bourgeoisie, such as Dixons and Scottish and Newcastle, funded opposition to EMU (Prest, 1996, p.3). Furthermore, "anti-EC" attitudes also increased

amongst the petit-bourgeois sections of Britain's Liberal Bourgeoisie during the early 1990s, as many of them were financially squeezed, and sometimes put out of business, by the recession which was deepened and lengthened by Britain's ERM membership. This is not mere supposition; public opinion surveys taken during the period of Britain's ERM membership suggested that opposition to European integration was strongest amongst Britain's self-employed and small businessmen (Evans, 1995, p.136).<sup>(5)</sup>

The Atlantic Liberals were becoming increasingly disillusioned with the EC by the time of the Maastricht debates. The Atlantic Liberals saw the Thatcherite economic policies that they had supported in the 1980s were coming under threat from the Maastricht Treaty, "Social Europe", ERM membership and possible German domination of the EC. Moreover, the Atlantic Liberals particularly feared that the EC could become a German-led protectionist bloc that could threaten their transatlantic economic activities. Consequently, it was not surprising that Atlantic Liberals, such as Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black, should have overseen an increasing amount of "anti-EC" discourse in the pages of their British-based publications, such as **The Sun**, **The Times**, **The Spectator** and **Sunday Telegraph** from 1988 onwards (Wallace, 1991, pp.72-3).

In contrast, the Corporate Liberals can be considered to be on the other side of British capital's divide over the EC. Since the dismal failure of their attempts to rally British capital against Thatcherism in the face of slump in 1980-1 (Radice, 1984, p.132) Corporate Liberals had favourably looked upon EC-wide economic cooperation as a means to reverse Britain's relative economic decline. This can be regarded as an updated version of the Social Imperialist programme advocated by Joseph Chamberlain at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, with domestic economic modernisation being facilitated by wholehearted British participation in further European integration (Gamble, 1996, p.21).

More specifically, Corporate Liberals favoured closer Western European cooperation, independent of US capital, in the field of military R&D, so that new technology could be developed to make the EC more of an economic equal in a renewed Atlantic Partnership with

the USA. In the 1980s attempts by Corporate Liberals to develop a British defence industry not subject to the aims of US capital were undermined by Thatcher, who saw them as anti-US schemes. Evidence for this include Thatcher's lack of support for Michael Heseltine's efforts to develop the Independent European Programme Group (Overbeek, 1986, pp.20-1); her scuppering of Heseltine's attempt to keep Westland Helicopters in the hands of European-oriented Corporate Liberals rather than be given over to US-oriented Atlantic Liberals (Overbeek, 1986, pp.13-15); and her cancellation of the RAF's order for the GEC-developed Nimrod in favour of Boeing's AWACS aeroplanes (Overbeek, 1990, pp.186-7). With Thatcher's removal, and moves towards further European integration in the early 1990s, Corporate Liberals regarded this historical juncture to be an ideal opportunity for making Britain's integration into the EC irreversible, and put great pressure upon Conservative MPs to accept this as fact.

Hence, a combination of differences between Britain's capital fractions over the EC; changes at the level of the capitalist world-system; fears that a "Social Europe", fronted by a French Socialist, would undermine the rule of capital in Britain; and moves towards further European integration which could be perceived as threatening Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty, its world-role, and the possibility of a German-dominated EC, contributed to splits within the Conservative Party over the EC which were quite apparent by the time of the Parliamentary debates over the Maastricht Bill in 1992-3, discussed in Chapter Seven.<sup>1792</sup> (p.219).

With the background to splits within the Conservative Party over the EC between 1973 and 1993 having been outlined, it is possible to turn to Labour Party attitudes to the EC during this period.

#### 4.4: The Labour Party and the EC, 1973-93.

The Labour Party's policies for promoting social reform for the benefit of its supporters, particularly within organised labour,

had since 1945 been built upon the premise that increased economic growth would allow for increased public expenditure (Rosamond, 1992, p.43). With the onset of Britain's organic crisis, and the renewal of relative economic decline in the 1960s, the existence of enough economic growth to sustain increased public expenditure was put in doubt, as the 1964-70 Wilson Government's performance demonstrated (Gamble, 1990, pp.171-4).

During the 1970s and early 1980s, as both the British and global economic situation were widely perceived as getting worse, the Labour Party as a whole saw the EC as an impediment to reversing relative economic decline and to achieving sustained economic growth at the national level. In a Labour Party context, the AES was widely regarded to be a programme designed to unite the Party and the wider trade union movement by allowing economic expansion to benefit the productive sectors of the British economy, while ensuring sufficient domestic economic growth to allow for increased state spending upon the public sector (Gamble, 1990, pp.174-81).

Consequently, the Labour Left and its supporters in the unions were united around the AES. In contrast, the Social Democratic wing of the Party was split over whether Britain should stay in the EC. The "pro-EC" Social Democrats, particularly after the Referendum, found it increasingly hard to argue that staying in the EC would ensure the economic growth which would lead to sufficient resources to pay for a Social Democratic programme of increased public spending. Unable to see how they could convince the rest of the Party, many "pro-EC" Social Democrats left to form the SDP in 1981 (Featherstone, 1988, pp.634; Tindale, 1992, p.279).

With declining support for "pro-EC" Social Democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the widespread perception within the labour movement that EC membership was compounding Britain's relative economic decline, the Labour Party voted to support EC withdrawal at both its 1980 and 1981 Conferences (Labour Party, 1980, pp.125-32; Labour Party, 1981, pp.236-44). At the 1983 General Election, it fought on a manifesto which pledged to withdraw Britain from the EC within five years (Labour Party, 1983, p.33).

A number of reasons can be suggested to explain why the Labour Party moved towards an enthusiastically "pro-EC" stance by the end of the 1980s. First, there was an increasing perception within the Labour Party that a national economic strategy which attempted to insulate the domestic economy from the process of internationalisation would not work (Radice, 1984, pp.113-4). The ignominious failure of Mitterrand's 1981-3 attempt to achieve this goal for the French economy was seen by many within Britain's Labour Party as a sombre warning to any socialist government which attempted to tackle the forces of global capital in the post-Bretton Woods era on its own (Hall, P., 1986; Machin and Wright, 1985). Consequently, during the 1983-7 period the official Labour line stressed the possibility of pursuing socialist economic policies based upon the need for Europe-wide reflation and growth, in which national governments would play the leading role in encouraging economic activity. By down-playing the possible role of the EC in a Europe-wide programme of economic recovery, the Labour leadership was able to move away from a position of supporting EC withdrawal, while not antagonising many in the Party and unions still attached to some form of AES (Featherstone, 1988, pp.64-5; Holland, 1982; Kinnock, 1984).

A second reason for changes in Labour Party attitudes towards the EC was the lack of enthusiasm exhibited by certain trade unions towards possible EC withdrawal. At the beginning of the 1980s unions, such as the Electricians (EEPTU) and Steel Workers (ISTC), whose memberships were often found in those sectors of the economy which depended upon exports to the EC, were in the forefront of labour movement opposition to Labour's withdrawal pledge (Rosamond, 1992, p.148). Withdrawal would mean EC tariffs being put upon these exports, with serious consequences for employment and union membership levels.

As the 1980s progressed, these unions were joined, by other, traditionally more "anti-EC" unions, such as the AEUW, GMB and MSF (Rosamond, 1992, pp.165, 168, 219, 222-3). During the 1980s, these unions realised that their members' livelihoods were becoming increasingly dependent upon the success of TNCs to sell their

products in the EC market (Rosamond, 1993, pp.427-8). Consequently, the growing internationalisation of capital, of which Britain's closer trading relationship with the EC was one facet, was creating a fraction of British labour in the 1980s which was an active participant in the creation of a transnational historic bloc within the post-Bretton Woods global capitalist system.

The shift in the British trade union movement towards a generally more "pro-EC" position was also encouraged by increasing contacts with other unions and national labour organisations within the EC. This encouraged British trade unions to recognise a need for EC-wide cooperation between labour organisations in order to achieve common goals (George and Rosamond, 1992, pp.178-9; Rosamond, 1993, p.433); and unions came to see the EC as a means to mitigate the effects of the Thatcher Government's policies, particularly increasing legal limits, upon their activities (Gaffney, 1991, p.225; Hodges and Woolcock, 1993, p.335).

In turning towards the EC, as opposed to Westminster, in the hope of mitigating the effects of the Thatcher Government's policies upon them, the unions were contributing towards increasing disillusion within the Labour Party during the 1980s towards the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Labour's disastrous performance at the 1983 General Election had considerably reduced the possibility of Labour gaining an overall majority in the House of Commons in the foreseeable future. If Labour, short of achieving a Commons majority was to have any influence at all upon political developments in Britain, it needed to consider other vehicles for achieving its goals. One of these vehicles was the EC.

As the 1980s progressed, other sources of pressure upon the Labour leadership to take up a more enthusiastic position towards the EC emerged. One of these was the experiences and shifting composition of Labour's MEPs. In the 1979 European Elections those Labour candidates who managed to get themselves elected were overwhelmingly "anti-EC" and supported British withdrawal. Working in the European Parliament with left-wing politicians from other parts of the EC, some Labour MEPs, most notably Barbara Castle (1982), began to see some merit in using the European Parliament as

a means of increasing European cooperation, and modified their outright opposition to the EC. In addition, Labour MEPs elected from the 1984 European Elections from the 1984 European Elections onwards tended to be more enthusiastic towards the EC than those elected in 1979 (George and Rosamond, 1992, p.178), leading to a situation by the 1990s when the evidence suggested that Labour MEPs were considerably more "pro-EC" than their Westminster counterparts (Baker et al, 1996b). Furthermore, Labour MEPs began to be elected to Westminster, and some saw their experience of working in the European Parliament as a positive one that could inform new ways of thinking and acting in British politics. Just as important in changing Labour attitudes towards the EC was the ability of Labour MEPs to get EC funds for the areas they represented (Gaffney, 1991, p.238; George and Rosamond, 1992, p.178).

The possibility of obtaining EC funding was another important factor in changing the attitudes of Labour-run local authorities towards the EC, which, as Labour councillors were elected to Parliament, influenced the attitudes of Labour MPs (Grahl and Teague, 1988, p.84). The Thatcher Government was regarded by many in areas with Labour-supporting local authorities as encouraging relative economic decline in the traditional Labour-supporting areas of the North and the inner cities, and compounding the decline by reducing regional aid levels for those areas. Furthermore, the Thatcher Government's emasculation of local authority powers to raise funds and intervene in their local economies, further increased resentment towards the "elected dictatorship" at Westminster. In contrast, Labour-run local authorities welcomed increases in the amount of regional aid given by the EC, through the agencies of the European Regional Development Fund and European Structural Funds (Grahl and Teague, 1988, pp.83-4). For instance, a doubling of Structural Funds in 1988 was welcomed by Labour local authorities, who also noticed the Thatcher Government's vehement opposition to the EC being able to increase its levels of regional aid (Tindale, 1992, p.296; Gamble, 1988, p.112). The perceived generosity of the EC's regional aid programmes compared to those provided by the Thatcher Government

was a crucial element during the 1980s in making more Labour MPs from traditional industrial areas, such as those in Scotland and Wales, support the principle of further European integration. It also appears that these changes reflected public opinion in Scotland and Wales by the early 1990s; Evans (1995, p.132) suggests that Scottish and Welsh public opinion by the early 1990s was much more supportive of further European integration than that found in the English provinces.

~~Morrell, 1985; Livingstone, 1990, p.232~~

Another factor pushing the Labour Party towards a more "pro-EC" stance in the 1980s was the emergence of a significant section of the Labour Left dropping its traditional "anti-EC" world-view. The emergence of a significant "pro-EC" section of the Labour Left was due to two main reasons. The first was a growing realisation, even before Labour's 1983 General Election defeat and the collapse of "the Mitterand experiment", that the idea of the AES limited to one country needed to be abandoned in the face of the growing internationalisation of capital. The "pro-EC" Labour Left instead embraced an "Alternative European Strategy", which would consist of a coordinated reflationalary programme throughout Western Europe to combat world recession. The edited collection by Stuart Holland (1983) **Out of Crisis** can be regarded as the intellectual catalyst for the emergence of a "Left Federalist" tendency (Rosamond, 1994, p.23) within the Labour Party with a distinct economic programme; a programme strongly championed by other members of the Labour Left such as Ken Coates (1985; 1986), Ken Livingstone (1990) and Frances Morrell (1985; 1987).

The emergence of a "pro-EC" Labour Left during the 1980s was also encouraged by the growth of the Europe-wide peace movement. This was seen as tangible evidence that the British Left could successfully cooperate with its European counterparts over particular issues. Furthermore, the "pro-EC" Labour Left argued that to call for British withdrawal from the EC would be folly when simultaneously attempting to cooperate with other Europeans in trying to remove US nuclear bases from Europe (Coates, 1986, p.30). For a distinguishing feature of the "pro-EC" Labour Left was that

it was consciously anti-US in their outlook, seeing a socialist Western Europe as an alternative to both the USA and USSR. Furthermore, the "pro-EC" Labour Left erroneously believed that the international capitalist economy was breaking up into three antagonistic trading blocs based upon the USA, Japan and the EC, which led to the argument that only by staying in the EC could the Labour Party advance the cause of socialism on an international scale, and end Britain's subordination to the USA (Coates, 1985; Morrell, 1985; Livingstone, 1990, p.237).

The promotion of a fiercely anti-US "Europeanist Road to Socialism" by the "pro-EC" Labour Left was not what the post-1983 General Election Labour leadership had in mind when they moved away from a policy of EC withdrawal. For a start, they generally believed in a form of Atlantic Partnership with the USA; although, as Chapter Six shows, many aspects of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy were attacked on the grounds that the USA was betraying its "internationalist" traditions and dividing the West in the process, leading to the EC becoming relatively more "internationalist" on foreign policy issues. The post-1983 Labour leadership had no intention, however, of swapping a belief, albeit strained, in the concept of an Atlantic Partnership for one based upon anti-US "Europeanism".

The Labour leadership also did not embrace the vision of the "pro-EC" Labour Left, for the project that Kinnock and his colleagues favoured was not one that would increase the Party's socialism, but one that would make Labour into a truly Social Democratic Party. This implied a traditional Corporate Liberal strategy, combining support for Atlantic Partnership, international free trade and a capitalist economy with some state intervention to promote the common good (Tindale, 1992, pp.282-5). The Labour Leadership believed that, in the post-Bretton Woods era, Social Democratic goals could only be achieved in Britain if they were simultaneously pursued at the EC level (Tindale, 1992, p.277).

A further shift in Labour Party attitudes occurred in the aftermath of its 1987 General Election defeat and the increased perception within the Labour Party that the SEA made programmes of

Keynesian economic expansion at the national level inside the EC virtually impossible to implement (George and Rosamond, 1992, pp.180-1). From 1987 another re-think occurred in Labour's attitudes to the EC. Jacques Delors' promotion of a "Social Europe" made it possible for the Labour leadership to enthusiastically embrace the EC without alienating anybody but the most hard-line "anti-EC" sections of the Party. Facing a Conservative leader intent on using her majority of 100 in the House of Commons to pass legislation in order to "abolish socialism" in Britain (Gamble, 1988, pp.221-2), the Labour leadership saw the EC as the only effective means available in the immediate future whereby any attempt could be made to rescue elements of the post-1945 Corporate Liberal consensus in Britain. Consequently, Delors' espousal of a "Social Europe", which would mitigate the effects of "1992" upon those regions, economic sectors and social groups adversely affected by the internal market's effects, was wholeheartedly embraced by most of the Labour Party and the trade unions following his speech to the 1988 TUC Congress, as a way of reviving some form of Corporate Liberalism in Britain (George and Rosamond, 1992, p.179; Rosamond, 1992, pp.425-7).

Furthermore, the Labour leadership recognised that, while the "1992" Single Market programme would appeal to those sections of the trade union movement whose members were highly dependent upon exporting to the rest of the EC for their livelihoods, the idea of a "Social Europe" appealed to those unions, particularly in the public sector, that had seen the public sector and public spending under continued attack from the Thatcher Government during the 1980s.

The Maastricht Treaty, with its strict "convergence criteria" for EMU, which some saw as "Euro-monetarism", and Britain's experience during 1990-2 of ERM membership was to lead to some in the Labour Party and the trade unions, such as the public sector union NALGO (Michie, 1993), to break with the generally "pro-EC" consensus within the Party which had emerged in the late 1980s.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Labour Party leadership

by the time of the Maastricht debates had developed a programme towards the EC which can be regarded as being very similar to a Social Imperialist programme. That is, support for further European integration was regarded by Labour's leadership as a vital component in enabling domestic social reform and modernisation of the economy and state institutions (Gamble, 1996, p.21).

However, Labour's leadership feared that if they publicly abandoned their attachment to the concept of British Parliamentary Sovereignty the issue of Britain's relationship with the EC could split the Labour Party in a similar manner during the Maastricht debates as the Conservatives had. Consequently, by emphasising the need for Labour to largely abstain in the debates unless the Social Protocol was incorporated into British law, the leadership minimised much of the potential divisions which the Bill might have had in wrecking the Party's public image as being generally united on the EC; divisions which had already been minimised by Labour not having to deal with the EC in office since 1979, and the need for Party unity in order to gain government office in the future.

#### **4.5: Conclusion.**

With an account of Britain's historical development having been extended to cover the 1973-93 period, and the effects that various non-discursive formations had on the two main Parties and their attitudes towards the EC, it is possible to again turn from non-discursive formations towards discursive practices, in the form of the three case studies of Britain's "Europe debate" which occurred during this period. In the next Chapter, the first of these, the 1975 Referendum campaign, will be examined.

#### **Notes.**

(1) Not to be confused with NATISOB's "dominant bloc", "historic bloc" is a term Gramsci (1986, p.418; Simon, 1985, p.86) uses, both for how a dominant social group gets other groups to accept its hegemony **and** for those social groups who collectively accept the dominant social group's hegemony. Britain's "dominant bloc" can be seen as having hegemony over a "historic bloc" since the

## Seventeenth Century.

(2) The discussion in this Chapter about the Trilateral Commission may appear to embrace "conspiracy theory". It does not, as the Trilateral Commission is not presented as the single cause for the myriad changes in the structure of the capitalist world-system since the early 1970s. Moreover, if this thesis had wanted to be considered a work of "conspiracy theory", it could have discussed and speculated at great length about the Bilderberg Group, which is sometimes credited, amongst much else, with being the driving force behind the EC's formation (Gill, 1990, pp.129-32). Examples of paranoia in British "anti-EC" circles about the Bilderberg Group include Tether (1979, p.2) and Atkinson and McWhirter (1995, pp.17-20). Ironically, one of those cited by the latter (Atkinson and McWhirter, 1995, p.18) as attending a 1993 Bilderberg meeting is Conrad Black, the "Euro-sceptic" owner of the **Telegraph** newspapers and **The Spectator** magazine...

(3) Leading members of the Clinton Administration who were once Trilateral Commission members included Warren Christopher and Richard Holbrooke (Sklar and Everdell, 1980, pp.101-3).

(4) As well as "nationalist" logics of culture existing, there can also exist "ideological"- as in the left-right/socialist-capitalist senses used in this thesis- logics of culture. The experiences of the 1970s and early 1980s inside both the Labour Party and trade unions can be regarded as having strengthened the already deep-seated "anti-socialist" logic of culture inside British capital, which affected its attitudes towards the EC.

(5) This increasing hostility of Britain's petit-bourgeoisie towards the EC/EU in the 1990s culminated in the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) calling for British withdrawal from the EU in 1995 (Martin, 1995).

Macmillan and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan would recommend that Britain should stay in the EC, and that a withdrawal would follow.

The Chapter is divided into four Parts. Part One contains Labour Party discourse, as Labour was the main political party most divided by the issue of Britain's EC membership. Part One will begin by examining the debate at Labour's Special Conference on the EC in April 1975 (5.2, 5.3, 5.4), followed by an examination of the discourses used in the speeches made during the session by various prominent "anti" and "pro" Labour ministers. These include speeches by "anti" Peter Shore (5.5), Tony Benn (5.6) and Barbara Castle (5.7); and speeches by "pro" Shirley Williams (5.8), Roy Jenkins (5.9) and James Callaghan (5.10). Part One ends by examining the contents of the "anti-EC" labour journal *Tricontinental* (5.11) and the publications of the "pro-EC" Labour Campaign for Britain in Europe (5.12) (5.12).

## **CHAPTER FIVE: THE 1975 REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN.**

### **5.1: What this Chapter covers.**

The manifesto which the Labour Party (1974, pp.6-7) won the February 1974 General Election had promised to "re-negotiate" the terms of Britain's EC membership. Furthermore, if the Government decided that the re-negotiations had been successful, Labour promised that a Referendum would follow to approve these "renegotiated" terms.

By March 1975, re-negotiations had virtually been completed, and a Cabinet majority agreed that these re-negotiations had been successful. The question of whether Britain should remain inside the EC or not would be submitted to the British people in a Referendum on June 5th 1975.

This Chapter will examine the discourse used to justify either an "anti-EC" or "No" vote or a "pro-EC", or "Yes", vote. As "It is difficult to define when the referendum campaign began" (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.160), early March 1975 will be taken as the starting point as it was then evident that the Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan would recommend that Britain should stay in the EC, and that a Referendum would follow.

The Chapter is divided into four Parts. Part One examines Labour Party discourse, as Labour was the main political party most divided by the issue of Britain's EC membership. Part One will begin by examining the debate at Labour's Special Conference on the EC in April 1975 (5.2, 5.3, 5.4), followed by an examination of the discourse used in the speeches made during the campaign by various prominent "anti" and "pro" Labour ministers. These include speeches by "antis" Peter Shore (5.5), Tony Benn (5.6) and Barbara Castle (5.7); and speeches by "pros" Shirley Williams (5.8), Roy Jenkins (5.9) and James Callaghan (5.10). Part One ends by examining the contents of the "anti-EC" Labour journal **Tribune** (5.11) and the publications of the "pro-EC" Labour Campaign for Britain in Europe (LCBIE) (5.12).

Part Two examines the discourse used by various Conservative political actors in the campaign. The "antis" examined are Conservatives Against the Treaty Of Rome (CATOR) (5.13), Enoch Powell (5.14)- who despite being an Ulster Unionist MP in 1975, was still regarded by many right-wing Conservatives as being "one of them" in all but party label- and **The Spectator** magazine (5.15). The "pro-EC" Conservatives examined are Margaret Thatcher (5.16), Eldon Griffiths (5.17) and Edward Heath (5.18).

Part Three looks at "anti" and "pro" EC cross-party organisations. The "antis" whose discourse is examined are the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) (5.19) and two of its affiliate organisations, the Common Market Safeguards Campaign (CMSC) (5.20) and the Get Britain Out Referendum Campaign (GBORC) (5.21). The "pro-EC" Britain In Europe (BIE) (5.22) is examined here; as is, mainly due to it being an important document which does not easily fit into any other Part of this Chapter, "H.M. Government's" pamphlet advocating Britain's continued EC membership (5.23).

Finally, Part Four summarises the evidence about the nature of the discourse employed by the "Yes" and "No" campaigns (5.24). This is followed by a discussion about how the theoretical approaches to discourse examined in Chapter Three, Section Two can be utilised to increase understanding of the discourse employed in the case study (5.25); and the relationship between non-discursive formations and the discourse used in the case studies (5.26).

Before examining the empirical evidence, the ostensibly unacceptable terms of Britain's EC membership, which apparently required extensive "re-negotiations" in 1974-5 to overcome, will be outlined. These were:

- (i) major changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP);
- (ii) new and fairer methods of financing the EC's Budget;
- (iii) rejection of the proposals for EMU;
- (iv) retention by Parliament of powers needed to pursue effective, regional, industrial and fiscal policies;
- (v) access to the British market for Commonwealth and developing countries; and

(vi) no harmonisation of VAT requiring taxation on necessities (Labour Party, 1974, p.6).

Consequently, one might expect a campaign centred around the results of re-negotiations of these terms to be primarily about the material costs of membership. This is because possible objects of "nationalist" discourse only appear in points (iv)- Parliament's control over domestic economic policy- and (v)- and commitments to help the Commonwealth and developing countries. Consequently, it should not be expected that "nationalist" discourse will be the primary form employed by "anti-EC" political actors during the campaign.

## PART ONE: THE LABOUR PARTY.

### 5.2: The Labour Party Special Conference.

On April 26th 1975, the Labour Party held a Special Conference in Islington to debate whether the terms for British membership renegotiated by the Wilson Government during 1974-5 were acceptable.

The end of Conference vote clearly showed that this was not the case, with delegates voting by 3.7 to 2 million to oppose continuing British membership of the EC (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.113).

However, of more importance to this thesis are the reasons given by speakers at the Conference for either supporting or opposing British membership of the EC.

If one takes the Conference debate as beginning with Harold Wilson explaining why he thought the renegotiated terms were acceptable, and finishing with Michael Foot, representing Labour's National Executive Committee, arguing against Britain's continued EC membership, 39 people spoke. 20 argued for a "No" vote in the Referendum, and 19 spoke for a "Yes" vote. This examination of the discourse employed at the Conference will start with those who called for British withdrawal from the EC.

### 5.3: "Anti-EC" discourse at Labour's Special Conference.

The reasons given for voting "No" by the twenty "anti-EC" speakers are shown in Table 5.1.

**Table 5.1: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" speakers at the 1975 Labour Party Special Conference debate in opposing continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
Reasons/alternatives	
EC is a pro-capitalist, anti-socialist/planning institution:	14
"National internationalist" duties and commitments:	14
Material costs of EC membership outweigh the material benefits:	13
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC:	9
Distrust of Germany:	3
Distrust of France:	1

There is no predominant object of discourse within "anti-EC" discourse as a whole. Three objects of discourse are cited by a majority of "anti-EC" speakers at the Conference, of which only one, Britain's world-role, is subject to a discursive formation whose statements have "nationalist" semiotic values.

An equal number of speakers make the EC's perceived anti-socialist nature their object of discourse:

"[the EC is]...a system based essentially on the capitalist system...and essentially on free enterprise." -Jack Jones (Labour Party, 1975, p.13).

"For me the Common Market is basically about capitalism." -Roy Hughes (Labour Party, 1975, p.15).

"In reality the Common Market is no more than a cog for big business, the multi-nationals and the capitalists." -Tony Saunois (Labour Party, 1975, p.20).

"We shall vote...to bring us out of this rich man's club in Europe and give us the opportunity to give effect to the socialist policies of this movement." -Bob Wright (Labour Party, 1975,

Jim Glazier, p.30). Party, 1973, pp.16-7), is the main exception to that no links opposition to EC membership becomes visible. As Table 5.2 demonstrates, there is a system of dispersion within "national internationalist" discourse which demonstrates that there is no agreement amongst "anti-EC" speakers about the primary external alternative to the EC once Britain withdraws.

**Table 5.2: Frequency of "national internationalist" reasons given for not staying in the EC, and suggested "national internationalist" alternatives to the EC cited at the 1975 Labour Party Special Conference.**

Reasons/alternative	Number of speakers supporting reason or alternative
International socialist/working class solidarity:	6
Links with the wider world are threatened/links with the wider world should be increased:	4
Commonwealth threatened/links with the Commonwealth should be increased:	3
An "open" world economy is threatened/international free trade should be encouraged:	2
EC is just one part of Europe/links with the rest of Western Europe should be increased:	2
The authority of the UN/disarmament bodies should be strengthened:	2
East-West relations could deteriorate/an easing of East-West tensions should be encouraged:	1
Third World economic development should be encouraged:	1

Few speakers express a preference for more than one "national internationalist" reason to oppose the EC, or possible alternatives to it. Bryan Stanley (Labour Party, 1975, p.11) is an exception:

"Norway and Sweden have advantageous trading arrangements without the disadvantages of EEC membership. Why should not Britain do the same? What about the rest of Western Europe?...Sweden, Norway, Austria....now what about the exciting possibility of a Socialist Portugal? "We would also wish to go on building on our links with Eastern Europe....Then there is the Commonwealth...spanning the gap between the rich and poor,...black and white....We want to develop an outward-looking attitude to the whole world."

Jim Slater (Labour Party, 1975, pp.36-7), is the other main exception, in that he links opposition to EC membership support with support for international free trade and the Commonwealth:

"It is our [the National Union of Seamen's] opinion that the extension of unrestricted trade with the whole world...in particular the Commonwealth, would be far more beneficial to our people and others than a system of trade administered by...Brussels.

"We have not had to ask twice in the past when we needed co-operation from New Zealand, Australia, Canada or any other members of the Commonwealth."

"...the majority of people in those countries [Australia and New Zealand] do not only consider themselves our friends but also members of the same family."

These speeches are, however, exceptions. Furthermore, the most popular "national internationalist" alternative to the EC is vague in the extreme. For example, statements referring to Britain relying upon international socialist or working class solidarity outside of the EC do not get beyond either pious hopes or abstract sloganising:

"We must...work for institutions at... international level which are truly socialist in character." -Lawrence Daly (Labour Party, 1975, p.14).

"Some other comrades...should remember that socialism without internationalism is nothing-but the internationalism of the working class and not the bogus internationalism of big business..." -Geoff Jones (Labour Party, 1975, p.29).

Similarly, speakers who make statements to Britain turning to the world outside the EC, can be extremely vague about the practicalities:

"We are internationalists. Our sights should not be just on Europe, they should be on the whole world." -Dan McGarvey (Labour Party, 1975, p.32).

Compared to the uncertainty in "anti-EC" discourse about alternatives to the EC, "anti-EC" speakers were, in their "pragmatic" discursive formation, easily able to list the material costs of EC membership to Britain, as Table 5.3. demonstrates.

*Fashioned to serve ourselves in this country*

**Table 5.3: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" speakers justifying withdrawal on grounds of the material costs of membership cited at the 1975 Labour Party Special Conference.**

Reasons	Number of speakers citing reason
High/rising food prices:	7
Adverse effects that EC's CAP has had, including its effects upon British agriculture:	6
Adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's balance of payments:	6
Adverse general effect that EC membership has had on British industry and manufacturing, including employment levels:	3
Britain has paid more into the EC Budget than it has been given back:	2
Imposition of VAT on Britain:	2
Adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's relatively depressed economic regions:	1

Compared with the number of "anti-EC" speakers making statements with socialist, "national internationalist" and "pragmatic" semiotic values in opposing EC membership, relatively few "anti-EC" speakers in the debate made statements referring to the need to defend British Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC. This does not mean that such statements were not made:

#### *Parliamentary Sovereignty*

*Concealed in the debate on the European Communities Bill*

"The issue of parliamentary sovereignty cannot be ducked by this country..." -Bryan Stanley (Labour Party, 1975, p.9).

"We want to ensure that our Parliament and our people maintain sole power in Britain over legislation and taxation....to retain our freedom we should fight to get out on 5th June." -Jack Jones (Labour Party, 1975, p.13).

"Representative democracy...we have in Britain is far from ideal, but it is infinitely superior to the sort of democracy possible in Europe." -Edwin Barlow (Labour Party, 1975, pp.16-17).

"...why should he [Harold Wilson]...be advocating that the British people their sovereignty and accept the Treaty of Rome as the

fundamental constitutional law of this country?  
The European Communities Act...fastened the  
Treaty of Rome around our necks." -Norah Pitt  
(Labour Party, 1975, p.34).

"I say that we do need to cling to democracy....  
the democratic institutions which we have  
fashioned to serve ourselves in this country....

"The Brussels Commission is not a democratic  
system....in this country if you do not like a  
Government you can kick them out and start with  
another....But in the Common Market...the

British people can vote for a Government to  
leave office, but they will still be left with  
the undemocratic authority of the institutions  
in Europe that are sustaining this." -Michael  
Foot (Labour Party, 1975, pp.41-2).

Some statements are made whose semiotic meanings only make sense  
in the context of a Labour Party debate. That is, statements which  
link the battle to defend Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC  
with earlier battles by the British labour movement and English  
Radicals to secure "the people's" rights. For instance, Eric Heffer  
(Labour Party, 1975, p.22) declares that:

"Our people...are affected because our  
forefathers fought for the right to organise,...  
to have free political parties, and to vote....  
If we hand it over to...Brussels we are  
undermining our own heritage."

Similarly, Michael Foot (Labour Party, 1975, p.42) invokes the  
origins of the trade unions and Parliamentary liberties, including  
the New Model Army's 1647 Putney debates, to defend Britain's  
Parliamentary Sovereignty.

Compared to the two other forms of "nationalist" discourse  
expressed in the debate, statements with semiotic meanings which  
are anti-French or anti-German are few. The only anti-French  
statement is made by Bob Wright (Labour Party, 1975, p.30):

"...we cannot support...creating a new vision of  
a Napoleonic adventure in Europe that would be  
based on that Community."

Apart from Jim Slater's aforementioned reference to the  
Commonwealth helping Britain in both world wars, there are two

other statements made in the debate with anti-German semiotic meanings. The first is made by Edwin Barlow (Labour Party, 1975, p.17):

Themes	Number of speakers
"...in the years ahead what happened to the empires of 1914-1918 could easily happen to Europe as a result of divisive tendencies."	10

Of Germany, no doubt.

However, the most anti-German statement of the debate came from Dan McGarvey (Labour Party, 1975, p.32), who declared that Germany wanted possession of nuclear weapons:

"I believe...that peace is not in our time if we remain in Europe....If we stay in Europe the Germans will want a finger on the nuclear trigger [sic] again. We could find ourselves blasted off the face of the earth."

#### 5.4: "Pro-EC" discourse at Labour's Special Conference.

Table 5.4 shows the reasons put forward by the nineteen "Yes" speakers for staying in the EC. Table 5.5 shows the system of dispersion in the "pro-EC" discursive formation which had Britain's world-role as its object of discourse.

**Table 5.4: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" speakers at the 1975 Labour Party Special Conference.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	16
EC membership does not impede, and can help, the development of a socialist economy in Britain:	14
Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:	12
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	3

As Table 5.5 shows, the majority of "pro-EC" speakers in the Conference debate maintain that if the Labour Party supported Britain staying in the EC, it would be participating in a practical

**Table 5.5: Frequency of "internationalist" themes in "pro-EC" speeches at the 1975 Special Conference justifying Britain's continued EC membership.**

Themes	Number of speakers citing theme
Most EC members have socialists in government, so co-operation with European socialists/trade unionists is possible:	10
Commonwealth wants Britain in the EC:	4
EC is an "internationalist" organisation; British membership will keep the EC "internationalist":	3
EC helps Britain help the Third World:	3
Withdrawal would internationally isolate Britain:	1
EC is expanding into Southern Europe to strengthen democracy there against fascist and militarist forces:	1
Britain must not break international agreements:	1
EC membership strengthens Britain's global influence:	1

application of internationalist socialist solidarity. They argue that, with six of the EC's member states having socialist or social democratic parties participating in national government, it would be practical international socialist solidarity for a Labour-governed Britain to stay in the EC and try to reform its institutions into vehicles to advance socialism's fortunes in Western Europe:

"I say 'Help us in Europe to build a positive Socialist Europe'. Our left wing says, 'No. We won't touch it. It's a rich man's club'.

Comrades, before we came to Westminster, it was a rich man's club. We fought and we won....

"...if our philosophy is worth anything, it is not just a British philosophy but a Socialist one. We must fight for it on a world level and the first place to win is in Europe." -John Mackintosh (Labour Party, 1975, p.20).

"By staying in Europe we have a great opportunity to build a socialist democracy....We need a concept at international level. Where better to start than Europe?" -Jim Boyack (Labour Party, 1975, p.30).

"It is right that we should strive to achieve a form of international socialism throughout the world. It is not contradictory that we should seek in European terms to achieve a European dimension for social democracy." -Dickson Mullan (Labour Party, 1975, p.32).

"I believe that our place is in Europe...We can

Table 5.6: "use Europe to promote our objectives throughout staying in the world." -David Ennals (Labour Party, 1975, p.38).

Related to this particular form of discourse is the theme, employed by some "pro-EC" speakers, that the EC's attitude towards the rest of the world is moving in an "internationalist" direction; a direction which socialists in Britain can strengthen by urging that Britain stays inside the EC. "Pro-EC" speakers argue that the EC's changing attitudes are a direct result of Britain, under a Labour Government, successfully attempting, partly through the re-negotiations, to modify and reform the EC's "narrowly nationalist" aspects:

Callaghan etc. creating

David Ennals

about effect

agreements, in

achieve this

"The Labour Government has already had a powerful impact on the Community and the workings of its institutions.

"The Community has changed, is changing and will go on changing." -Harold Wilson (Labour Party, 1975, p.5).

"...the EEC is not as much a rich man's club, a narrow restrictionist organisation, as it was before Britain played an active part as she has done under a Labour Government." -David Ennals (Labour Party, 1975, p.37).

Furthermore, some "pro-EC" speakers argue that the EC's "internationalist" and pro-socialist tendencies had led to the Commonwealth wanting Britain to stay in the EC:

and -ackett

the seasons

during the

this period

1975; 1975;

Labour's

Since referred

"I have been- I think I was born- and I remain a Commonwealth man..."

"...[therefore] I repeat my judgement...that it [the EC] is now...best for the Commonwealth..." -Harold Wilson (Labour Party, 1975, p.8).

"...all the Commonwealth, the old Commonwealth and the poor countries want us to stay in and help them from the inside." -Roy Jenkins (Labour Party, 1975, p.16).

Regardless of these "internationalist" statements "pro-EC" speakers do not ignore the material benefits of membership, although there is, as Table 5.6 shows, no predominant theme within the "pragmatic" discursive formation's system of dispersion.

**Table 5.6: Frequency of reasons cited in "pro-EC" speeches for staying in the EC on grounds of material benefits at the 1975 Labour Party Special Conference.**

Reasons	Number of speakers citing reason
EC increases British prosperity/improves living standards:	3
EC membership lowers prices, including those of food:	3
Economic disaster if Britain left EC:	3
CAP provides Britain with a secure supply of food:	2
EC aid benefits Britain, including depressed regions:	1

Some "pro-EC" speakers also make statements addressing the issue of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Those made by Roy Jenkins and James Callaghan are examined further on in this Chapter (5.9 and 5.10). David Basnett (Labour Party, 1975, p.15) argues that sovereignty is about effective control over a nation's affairs, and international agreements, infringing formal sovereignty, are sometimes needed to achieve this aim:

Reasons	"We must seek multi-governmental agencies to control world forces....We have created these agencies...UNO, ILO, the IMF and GATT. Each of these robs a nation of some of its sovereignty. The EEC is not different from these in kind."
---------	---

### **5.5: Peter Shore.**

Trade Secretary Peter Shore was "the best briefed and dedicated anti-marketeer" (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.115). To understand the reasons behind his opposition to British membership of the EC during the 1975 Referendum campaign, ten of his speeches during this period are examined (Shore, 1975a; 1975b; 1975c; 1975d; 1975e; 1975f; 1975g; 1975h; 1975i; 1975j) including one he gave at Labour's Special Conference (1975d). Table 5.7 shows how frequently Shore referred in those speeches to the "anti-EC" objects of discourse examined in this study.

As can be seen, the single most recurring discursive formation in Shore's speeches is the material costs to Britain of EC membership.

Table 5.8 shows the system of dispersion within Shore's "pragmatic" discourse, as indicated from his speeches.

**Table 5.7: Frequency of themes used by Peter Shore in his speeches during the 1975 Referendum Campaign in opposing continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
Material costs of EC membership outweigh the material benefits:	8
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC:	5
"National internationalist" duties and commitments:	4
EC is a pro-capitalist, anti-socialist/planning institution:	3
Distrust of Germany:	1
Distrust of France:	1

**Table 5.8: Frequency of reasons cited in Peter Shore's speeches justifying withdrawal on grounds of the material costs of membership.**

Reasons	Number of speeches citing reason
High/rising food prices	7
Adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's balance of payments:	4
Investment has shifted from Britain to EC since entry:	3
Britain has paid more into the EC Budget than it has been given back:	3
Adverse general effect that EC membership has had on British industry and manufacturing, including employment levels:	2
EC membership has led to increased unemployment:	2
Adverse effects that EC's CAP has had, including upon British agriculture:	1
Adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's relatively depressed economic regions:	1

Shore's speeches are, however, full of "nationalist" statements. To begin with, Shore expresses strong support for defending Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC:

"...our own cause [in the re-negotiations] was not helped by...the astonishing omission from the whole renegotiation process of the

fundamental question of the rights of our own Parliament and people against the authority of the institutions of Europe." (Shore, 1975a, pp.2-3)

"...all experience shows that self-government is better than other-government; that home rule is better than external rule; that elected government is better than non-elected government, even if the despots claim to be as benevolent as those who now man the Brussels Commission." (Shore, 1975c, p.2)

"...the European Communities Act...transfers powers from the British people and the British Parliament..." (Shore, 1975d, p.33)

"Last and most important of all, we should not have to accept the right of the Brussels Commission to make the laws and to levy taxes in our own land." (Shore, 1975i, p.2)

Shore also made several statements in his speeches which have "national internationalist" semiotic values. The system of dispersion making up this particular discursive formation is shown in Table 5.9.

**Table 5.9: Frequency of "national internationalist" reasons cited in Peter Shore's speeches during the Referendum campaign for not staying in the EC, and suggested "national internationalist" alternatives.**

Reasons/alternative	Number of speeches citing reason /alternative
Links with the wider world are threatened/links with the wider world should be increased:	4
Commonwealth threatened/links with the Commonwealth should be increased:	2
EC is just one part of Europe/links with the rest of Western Europe should be increased:	1
The authority of the UN/disarmament bodies should be increased:	1

As some speakers did at Labour's Special Conference, Shore tends to make unspecific references to restoring links with the wider world beyond Europe:

"Our future...depends on...our freedom to pursue international policies outside the narrow scope of Europe." (Shore, 1975a, p.4)

"...our involvement in the affairs of mankind... should not be limited by membership of an exclusive group of 200 million people in 8 countries in Europe. It must be with 3000 million people who inhabit the 6 continents of the world. These contacts are not helped but limited and reduced by membership of a regional bloc in Western Europe." (Shore, 1975c, p.2)

Shore's fears about Britain being made a member "of a regional bloc in Western Europe" appear to be fuelled by a fear that the EC is dominated by a Franco-German alliance. Only in one of his speeches does Shore (1975g, p.1) make such a statement, but its meaning is clear:

"...in reality we are dealing not with a Community, but with a group of nations, centred upon the Franco-German Alliance, each strongly pursuing its own national economic interest. "...There is no special relationship between Britain and the Common Market; in some of our member countries at least, no particular affection for our people or our country."

Shore's "nationalist" sentiments, however, go further. He is clearly proud of Britain's Parliamentary system:

"We have every reason for pride in our democratic institutions and in the way over the centuries [sic] we have conducted in freedom our own affairs." (Shore, 1975c, p.2)

Consequently, he perceives the removal of some of Parliament's formal powers to the EC as "a triumph for Europe and a disaster for Britain" (Shore, 1975a, p.2). Furthermore, Shore sees British membership as a source of national shame, which suggests something deeply amiss in the collective behaviour of the British people:

"The Common Market issue is at the heart of our national crisis...what is draining away is the self-confidence, the morale and the unity of our people.

"...The European or pro-Market "solution" to our crisis is for Britain to give up..."

"...there is a serious loss of nerves and confidence, above all in the high places of our

Table 5.10: "society." (Shore, 1975f, pp.1-2)

during the Referendum campaign

British

In Shore's view, the Referendum vote is a last chance to save the British nation from the collective crisis of confidence which even made it consider joining the EC. On the eve of the vote Shore (1975j, p.1) declared that:

general

British national independence and democracy

"The vote will be the judgement of the British people not only on the Common Market but even more upon themselves.

"If it is 'Yes' tomorrow....It will be the reluctant yes of a sullen and dispirited people, too frightened and confused to take their freedom by the hand.

"If it is 'no'....It will be a plain assertion that we are not finished as a country...we have faith in ourselves and our democracy; that we are determined to open a new chapter; that we are committed to put things right in our own country and in our own way..."

Table 5.11: Five speeches justifying EC membership

Reasons

Although Shore's speeches contain more with statements which can be regarded as examples of "pragmatic" discourse, rather than "nationalist" discourse, there appears a good case for arguing that it was only his position as Trade Secretary which compelled him to utilise more "pragmatic" than "nationalist" discourse in the first place.

positive effect that EC membership has had on Britain's relatively depressed economic position

### 5.6: Tony Benn.

Despite being mentioned in the previous section, Tony Benn

Tony Benn, Labour's Industry Secretary, was generally known as the populariser, in Labour Party debates on the EC in the early 1970s, of the idea of a Referendum on membership (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.115; Whitehead, 1986, p.137). To gain some indication of the discourse used by Benn during the Referendum campaign, five of his speeches are examined (Benn, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d, 1975e). The contents of these speeches are set out in Table 5.10.

As Table 5.10 shows, Benn makes statements in most of his speeches referring to the material costs of EC membership to Britain. These particular material costs are outlined in Table 5.11.

**Table 5.10: Frequency of themes used by Tony Benn in his speeches during the 1975 Referendum campaign in opposition to continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
<b>Material costs of EC membership outweigh the material benefits:</b>	4
<b>British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC:</b>	4
<b>EC is a pro-capitalist, anti-socialist/planning institution:</b>	3
<b>Distrust of Germany:</b>	2
<b>Distrust of France:</b>	1

**Table 5.11: Frequency of themes in Tony Benn's Referendum campaign speeches justifying withdrawal on grounds of the material costs of EC membership.**

Reasons	Number of speeches citing reason
<b>Adverse general effect that EC membership has had on on British industry and manufacturing, including employment levels:</b>	4
<b>High/rising food prices:</b>	3
<b>Adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's balance of payments:</b>	3
<b>EC membership had led to increased unemployment</b>	2
<b>Britain has paid more into the EC Budget than it has been given back:</b>	2
<b>Adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's relatively depressed economic regions:</b>	1

Despite being mentioned in the same number of speeches, Benn apparently sees defending Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC as a more important issue than the material costs of membership. For instance, in one speech Benn (1975a, p.1) declares that:

"The case against British membership...can be simply stated."

"1. The Common Market is a developing political federation...administered by a Commission that is neither elected by, nor answerable to, the people it has the power to govern.

"2. If the British people can be persuaded to continue for British membership...we shall by a single vote in a single day be throwing away both Britain's national independence and our

were not for... right to govern themselves democratically...  
address now "...there can be no doubt that we are  
when reform... campaigning to win a massive majority...for  
campaign would British withdrawal...national independence and  
parliamentary democracy."

Similarly, in another speech, Benn (1975b) argues that the EC represents a threat to the British people in three ways. The first two of these are the threat to living standards, through rising food prices, and rising unemployment. The third threat to the British people arises from the EC threatening Parliament and taking "away our vote as a way of making laws we need to protect us from the forces of power and money" (Benn, 1975b, pp.1-2). Benn (1975b, p.2) makes statements in this speech, not only referring to the struggles of English Radicals and the British labour movement to be represented in Parliament, but also Labour's involvement in supporting the two world wars:

"The whole of British democratic history is on trial this year. We cannot let a Commission we did not elect and cannot remove assume powers over our future that we have denied to Kings... Lords...and Big Business..."

"Labour must lead Britain now as it has so often before."

Benn also makes "nationalist" statement in a speech (Benn, 1975e, p.2) when he hints at a Franco-German "plot" to keep Britain in the EC, and utilises the place of 1930s "appeasement" within the archive of British history to condemn "pro-EC" political actors, as well as their supporters in the dominant bloc and mass media, who are their willing collaborators:

"We are losing jobs to German workers, paying through the nose for French food and being governed by a lot of Brussels bureaucrats..."

"Let us have an end of all this talk about Britain being finished. It is part of a systematic campaign to demoralise us so that we accept terms that this nation would not even accept after a defeat in war."

As in the case of Shore, it can be plausibly argued that, if it

was not for his position in the Cabinet, which forces him to address economic issues, and so to employ "pragmatic" discourse when referring to the EC, Benn's discourse in the Referendum campaign would have been far more "nationalist" than it was.

### 5.7: Barbara Castle.

Social Services Secretary Barbara Castle had been an implacable opponent of British membership of the EC since the early 1960s (Kitzinger, 1973, p.234). To understand the reasons why she opposed British entry in 1975, five of Castle's speeches (Castle, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d, 1975e) she gave during the Referendum Campaign have been examined, with the findings outlined in Table 5.12.

**Table 5.12: Frequency of themes used by Barbara Castle in her speeches during the 1975 Referendum Campaign in opposing continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
<b>Material costs of EC membership outweigh the material benefits:</b>	5
<b>British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC:</b>	2
<b>"National internationalist" duties and commitments:</b>	2
<b>Distrust of France:</b>	1
<b>Distrust of Germany:</b>	1

As can be seen, all of Castle's speeches are concerned with the material costs of membership, particularly rising food prices (Castle, 1975a, 1975b, 1975d, 1975e) and although some "nationalist" statements are made, they do not constitute a major discursive formation within Castle's overall discourse.

### 5.8: Shirley Williams.

Shirley Williams, the Prices and Consumer Protection Secretary, was one of the most prominent campaigners inside the Labour Party for continued British membership of the EC; indeed during the October

1974 General Election campaign, she had threatened to leave politics if Britain withdrew (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.35). The empirical material utilised to discover Williams' reasons for her stand come from seven speeches she gave during the Referendum campaign (Williams, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1975d, 1975e, 1975f, 1975g). The contents of these speeches are presented in Table 5.13.

**Table 5.13: Frequency of themes used in Shirley Williams' Referendum campaign speeches justifying continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
<b>Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:</b>	7
<b>Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:</b>	4
<b>EC membership does not impede, and can help, the development of a socialist economy in Britain:</b>	2

In all of her speeches, Williams concentrates upon the material benefits of membership, the system of dispersion of which is shown in Table 5.14. It would be fair to say that the evidence from her speeches demonstrates that Williams does not stress one particular material benefit of EC membership to the exclusion of others in her discourse. She also makes statements in the majority of her speeches referring to Britain's world-role and its "internationalist" duty to stay in the EC. The system of dispersion for this discursive formation are set out in Table 5.15.

There are two features of Williams' "internationalist" discourse worth noting.

First, her argument that British withdrawal from the EC would not be an "internationalist" act, but an isolationist one, betraying her "outward-looking" traditions and not impressing other members of the capitalist world-system:

"...we would offend and sadden the very countries that wish us well and respect British democracy- the Commonwealth, the USA, the members of the European Community." (Williams, 1975f, p.2)

"Britain, throughout her history, has been

**Table 5.14: Frequency of reasons cited in Shirley Williams' speeches for staying in the EC on the grounds of material benefits.**

Reasons	Number of speeches citing theme
"Perhaps we are frightened that the Community is a rich man's club, protecting only its members."	2
EC provides wider market/more trade for Britain:	2
EC aid benefits Britain, including depressed regions:	2
EC membership lowers prices, including those of food:	2
Economic disaster if Britain left EC:	2
EC increases British prosperity/improves living standards:	1
EC provides Britain with a secure supply of food:	1

**Table 5.15: Frequency of "internationalist" themes cited in Shirley Williams' speeches justifying Britain's continued EC membership.**

Themes	Number of speeches citing theme
Commonwealth wants Britain in the EC:	3
Withdrawal would isolate Britain internationally:	2
EC is an "internationalist" organisation; British membership will keep the EC "internationalist":	2
Most EC members have socialists in government, so co-operation with European socialists/trade unionists is possible:	2
Britain must not break international agreements:	1
EC membership strengthens Britain's global influence:	1
EC helps Britain help the Third World:	1

involved in the world. She has never been an isolationist country. I believe she would be untrue to her own traditions of internationalism and liberty if she sought to go it alone." (Williams, 1975g, p.1)

"Britain has a history which is woven into a history of Europe and indeed the world. If denied a greater influence and a greater concern ...she could become a crippled inward-looking country. We see Britain's future role being not only as a part of Western Europe, but as strengthening ties of understanding between the European Community and the Commonwealth...North America...and the rest of the world..." (Williams, 1975a, p.3)

Second, Williams affects understanding of the fears that the EC is "narrowly nationalist", while arguing that this is not the case:

"...a group of relatively rich West European nations determined to pull up the ladder and

turn its back on the world....Such a...stance  
stance would be quite unacceptable to me. But I  
am confident that the stance is an outward-  
looking one..." (Williams, 1975a, p.2)

"Perhaps we are frightened that the Community is  
a rich man's club, protecting only its members'  
interests and turning its back on the world."  
(Williams, 1975b, p.3)

### 5.9: Roy Jenkins.

James Callaghan began negotiations with a  
stance, suggesting that it would be especially difficult that the  
Home Secretary Roy Jenkins was another long-standing advocate of EC  
membership (Whitehead, 1986, p.64). Table 5.16 shows the contents  
of three of his speeches during the campaign (Jenkins, 1975a;  
1975b, 1975c).

**Table 5.16: Frequency of themes used in Roy Jenkins' Referendum  
speeches justifying continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	3
Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:	2
EC membership does not impede, and can help, the development of a socialist economy in Britain:	1
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	1

Like Williams, Jenkins (1975b, p.2) regards the EC as an "internationalist" organisation, a disposition which British membership secures:

"Since we joined...the Community has shown encouraging development in its progress from an originally rather defensive customs union towards a far more outward-looking force in the world."

Unlike Williams, Jenkins (1975a, p.15) addresses the issue of potential loss of sovereignty, suggesting that it cannot be preserved in an increasingly interdependent world:

"...I cannot regard the preservation of

All of Callaghan's speeches referred to sovereignty as the ark of the covenant of socialism.  
5.18 shows the Foreign Secretary's view of Britain's position in the world:  
"...I do not believe that it is either Socialist or realistic to think that you can cling to sovereignty in the world today."

### 5.10: James Callaghan.

Foreign Secretary James Callaghan began re-negotiations with a stance, suggesting that it would be extremely doubtful that they would be successful (Whitehead, 1986, pp.134-5). By the time of the Referendum campaign, however, Callaghan was a clear supporter of continued British membership, and in a number of speeches (James Callaghan, 1975a; 1975b; 1975c; 1975d; 1975e; 1975f) explained why this was so. The main themes in these speeches are shown in Table 5.17.

**Table 5.17: Frequency of themes used in James Callaghan's speeches justifying continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
EC helps Britain help the Third World:	6
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	4
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	4
EC membership does not impede, and can help, the development of a socialist economy in Britain:	3

**Table 5.18: Frequency of reasons cited in James Callaghan's speeches for staying in the EC on grounds of material benefits.**

Reason	Number of speeches citing reason
EC provides wider market/more trade for Britain:	3
EC membership reduces unemployment:	3
EC membership lowers prices, including those of food:	3
CAP provides Britain with a secure supply of food:	3
EC improves Britain's industrial performance:	1
EC increases British prosperity/improves living standards:	1
EC aid benefits Britain, including depressed regions:	1
EC membership encourages overseas investment in Britain:	1

All of Callaghan's speeches contain statements with semiotic values referring to the material benefits of EC membership. Table 5.18 shows the system of dispersion within Callaghan's "pragmatic" discourse. (James Callaghan, 1975a, p.26)

Callaghan also makes statements containing "internationalist" reasons for staying in the EC. This system of dispersion is shown in Table 5.19.

**Table 5.19: Frequency of "internationalist" themes cited in James Callaghan's speeches justifying Britain's continued membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches citing theme
EC is an "internationalist" organisation; British membership will keep the EC "internationalist":	4
Commonwealth wants Britain in the EC:	3
EC helps prevent war starting in Europe:	2
Britain inside the EC helps to strengthen the West	2
Most EC members have socialists in government, so co-operation with European socialists/trade unionists is possible:	2
EC helps Britain help the Third World:	2
Withdrawal will isolate Britain internationally:	1
EC is expanding into Southern Europe to strengthen democracy there against fascist and militarist forces:	1
EC membership strengthens Britain's global influence:	1

In his speeches Callaghan makes statements which argue that it is British membership, under a Labour government, which has shifted the EC towards a more "internationalist" role in the world:

"Our influence and our weight and the very facts themselves will continue to combine to ensure that the Community remains as responsive to Britain's needs and a changing world situation as she is now responsive to others." (James Callaghan, 1975a, p.26)

"Let me nail the suggestion that working with Europe means that we turn our back on the rest of the world. That is sheer unadulterated rubbish." (James Callaghan, 1975f, p.4)

Callaghan's discourse is also notable for tackling the issue of sovereignty. He argues that "anti-EC" political actors should:

"...put this sovereignty argument in perspective. Let us have a bit of common sense about it and not so much reading of fine print."  
(James Callaghan, 1975a, p.26)

He cites the Labour Government's recent nationalisations of the National Oil Corporation and British Leyland- the latter during the middle of the Referendum Campaign (James Callaghan, 1975a, p.26)- to argue that the EC has little **practical** sovereignty over the actions of British governments. Callaghan (1975f, p.3) goes as far as to claim that:

"The anti-marketeers have not been able to produce a single significant policy which the government has not been prevented from carrying out."

### 5.11: Tribune.

Since the 1960s **Tribune** had been a focal point inside the Labour Party for opposition to British membership of the EC (Newman M., 1983, p.213). In the 1975 Referendum campaign it ran a constant stream of "No" articles in its pages. From the March 7th to the June 6th editions 30 such articles have been outlined, giving reasons why Britain should withdraw from the EC. The contents of these articles are outlined in Table 5.20.

Examining this Table, it may appear that **Tribune's** coverage during the Referendum campaign mainly concentrated upon the material costs of membership, and that very little of the discourse in the paper can be described as "nationalist". While this statement is largely correct, there is a caveat. That is, the largest and most detailed article on the EC published in **Tribune** during this period: Michael Barratt Brown's (1975, pp.5-7) "The Socialist Alternative to the Common Market".

It might be expected that this article would present the socialist economic programme which **Tribune** would want a Labour government outside the EC to pursue. Much of it does just that, and Barratt Brown describes in detail what he sees as the economic

**Table 5.20: Frequency of themes used in articles in Tribune during the Referendum justifying British withdrawal from the EC.**

Themes	Number of articles using theme
<b>Material costs of EC membership outweigh the material benefits:</b>	23
<b>EC is a pro-capitalist, anti-socialist/planning institution:</b>	6
<b>British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC:</b>	5
<b>"National internationalist" duties and commitments:</b>	5
<b>Distrust of Germany:</b>	2
<b>Distrust of France:</b>	1

costs of British membership. Moreover, Barratt Brown (1975, p.6) warns the "anti-EC" Labour Left that, during the campaign, "To tail behind a purely nationalist and potentially anti-socialist line would be fatal."

This statement is followed by a section called "The Strengths of Britain's position", in which Barratt Brown might be expected to discuss how the British economy could survive outside the EC. In fact, it contains many examples of statements containing "nationalist" semiotic values.

First, Barratt Brown utilises Britain's historic archive in referring to World War Two:

"Appeals to the Dunkirk spirit have too often been invoked...to carry much conviction, but few would deny that the challenge of 'go it alone' combined with some real evidence of equality of sacrifice...would elicit a common response which no amount of encouragement to 'think European' could hope to do."

This is followed by a twelve point paean to Britain's "national strengths" (Barratt Brown, 1975, p.6):

"1...a long unbroken democratic tradition, in which the labour movement has played a central role and to which it is now the heir....  
 "3...we have no serious religious divisions.  
 "4...equal citizens rights are guaranteed to men and women of all colours....

PART TWO THE "11...the universal principle of these [social] services is unparalleled.

"12...the protection of the common law remains a crucial barrier to bureaucratic and authoritarian rule."

### 5.12: Labour Campaign for Britain in Europe.

LCBIE was affiliated to BIE (5.22), and was based around the long-standing Labour Committee for Europe (Newman, M., 1983, pp.214-15). The examples of LCBIE literature examined in this Section are a one-off tabloid, "Europe- Yes!" (LCBIE, 1975a), and the collective contents of six leaflets produced by the LCBIE (1975b; 1975c; 1975d; 1975e; 1975f; 1975g). The themes in the articles of "Europe- Yes!" are shown in Table 5.21, which appear primarily aimed at a Labour Party audience. In contrast, the evidence from the six LCBIE leaflets, shown in Table 5.22, points towards these being designed for a wider audience than Labour Party members.

Table 5.21: Frequency of themes cited in "Europe- Yes!" articles justifying British membership of the EC.

Themes	Number of articles using theme
EC membership does not impede, and can help, the development of a socialist economy in Britain:	3
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	2
Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:	1
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	1

Table 5.22: Frequency of themes contained in sections of LCBIE leaflets justifying continued British membership of the EC.

Themes	Number of sections containing theme
Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:	15
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	5
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	5
EC membership does not impede, and can help, the development of a socialist economy in Britain:	4

## PART TWO: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY.

### 5.13: Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome.

The minimal opposition inside the Conservative Party to continued membership of the EC was organised by CATOR. The reasons behind this opposition can be explained by examining CATOR's main published contribution to the "anti-EC" Referendum campaign, "Help Britain Out" (CATOR, 1975). The contents of this double sided leaflet are set out in Table 5.23.

**Table 5.23: Number of paragraphs in "Help Britain Out" containing themes justifying British withdrawal from the EC.**

Themes	Number of paragraphs containing theme
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC	6
"National internationalist" duties and commitments	3
Material costs of membership outweigh the material benefits	2
Distrust of Germany	1
EC is a pro-socialist, anti-capitalist institution:	1

The main object of discourse in "Help Britain Out" is Parliamentary Sovereignty:

**Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC.**

In all of the following extracts, CATOR's discourse is concerned with the loss of Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC.

**Sovereignty is being undermined by EC membership.**

"At present power is draining away from British parliaments and people." (CATOR, 1975, p.1)

"Over a widening area our laws are made for us without our significant participation and processes over which we have no real control."

"...a loyalty to the native land is to be extinguished and superseded by 'the Community'. Eyes must turn to Brussels, and hearts are supposed to follow." (CATOR, 1975, p.2)

CATOR also stress that Britain's past "national internationalist" commitments are being undermined by EC membership, and this world-role is linked in CATOR's discourse with the preservation of British Parliamentary Sovereignty:

**Table 5.23:** "...we kept our freedom to rule ourselves and be free during the 1970s at the heart of the Commonwealth and the English-speaking world." (CATOR, 1975, p.1)

Furthermore, CATOR make statements which combine references to preserving both free trade and Parliamentary Sovereignty. EFTA is mentioned as an arrangement within which Britain outside the EC could preserve its Parliamentary Sovereignty, while CATOR (1975, p.1) hark back in "Help Britain Out" to the times when:

benefits

Distrust of Europe

EC is a pro-nationalist  
"National interest"

"The arteries of our trade ran across the oceans of the world to places of our own choosing."

Moreover, CATOR (1975, p.2) describe the EC as "narrowly nationalist" when stating that "nearly all the world (including two thirds of Europe) is not in the Common Market!"

Identity.

#### 5.14: Enoch Powell.

Powell's speeches are full of statements with "nationalist"

The most prominent "anti-EC" Tory, although not officially a Conservative Party member, in 1975 was Enoch Powell. By examining seven speeches he gave during the Referendum campaign, the contents of which are shown in Table 5.24, it becomes possible to understand the reasons why Powell abandoned the Conservatives in 1974 because of their "pro-EC" stance. In particular, this Table demonstrates the importance that Powell attaches to the defence of Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty from the EC.

In all of Powell's speeches, the preservation of Parliamentary Sovereignty is presented as the most important reason for staying in the EC. To this object of discourse, all others are subordinate:

"...[the] cause is no other than the right to live under no laws but those made by our own representatives, to pay no taxes but those imposed by our own parliament and to be governed by none but that responsible to our own people." (Powell, 1975c, p.1)

"The choice now is none other than whether Parliament and the people of this country intend to continue to be a self-governing country at all...." (Powell, 1975g, p.4).

Furthermore, Powell's speeches are full of references to the "right to live under no laws but those made by our own representatives, to pay no taxes but those imposed by our own parliament and to be governed by none but that responsible to our own people".

**Table 5.23: Frequency of themes used in Enoch Powell's speeches during the 1975 Referendum campaign in opposing continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC	7
Material costs of membership outweigh the material benefits	3
Distrust of Germany	3
EC is a pro-socialist, anti-capitalist institution	3
"National internationalist" duties and commitments	1

In contrast, Powell (1975f, p.2) argues that the other EC members are not "parliamentary nations" because Parliamentary Sovereignty does not constitute an element of their national identity.

Even if his dwelling upon Parliamentary Sovereignty is excluded, Powell's speeches are full of statements with "nationalist" semiotic values. Like, CATOR, Powell (1975c, p.4) links Parliamentary Sovereignty to free trade:

"...being an ocean, world-wide trading nation... [Britain is] not at all the lonely isolated fortress of the pro-Marketeers' jaundiced imagination."

Powell also employs statements which have a semiotic meaning which suggests that the "anti-EC" Referendum campaign is akin to Britain's struggle during World War Two:

"I leave aside...the fact that this is a nation which within living memory has been prepared to risk more than its export markets for the sake of its liberties." (Powell, 1975c, p.3)  
 "We lived through this experience [of bribery and bullying of the British] in the 1930s; and now the same mistake is being made over Britain and the Common Market." (Powell, 1975e, p.1)

Furthermore, the discourse utilised in Powell's speeches share many of the assumptions which inform those of Peter Shore. That

is, Britain is a once great power which has suffered a collective crisis of national confidence in the last few decades:

"The sense of national dejection which has grown over Britain during the years since the War has deepened in the recent past into something not far from despair." (Powell, 1975f, p.1)

This lack of power has forced Britain to join the EC and abandon its Parliamentary Sovereignty:

"...it is a mark of decadence and defeat to argue for the merging of this in a new superstate...in order that we may be prevented from exercising our own constitutional freedom of choice in our way." (Powell, 1975b, p.3)

"The fact that...the United Kingdom could ever have gone through the motions of adhering to the EEC is the most striking symptom of this moral collapse....

"The very fact that we endure it...is an unfortunate sign of our national disease." (Powell, 1975f, pp.1 & 4)

For both Powell and Shore, the Referendum vote is a last chance for Britain to embrace national salvation outside the EC, rather than national oblivion inside it. For both men, the Referendum campaign is essentially a personal crusade to save Britain:

"The nation is deliberating...whether it will assent to that act of abnegation and thus.... render the moral collapse of Britain inevitable...."

"The electors of Britain hold in...their hands the only foreseeable means to the resurgence of Britain...[say] NO- No to renunciation...to dependency...to the years of degradation...the moment is to speak for Britain." (Powell, 1975f, pp.1, 4)

"To opt, at this moment, for being amalgamated as a minority into a new superstate is to commit the supreme crime in politics- to despair of one's own country and so deliberately deny it the hope and possibility of renewal." (Powell, 1975g, p.4)

### 5.15: The Spectator.

The main voice of opposition to EC membership within the pro-Conservative Party press in 1975 was **The Spectator**, although it was quite prepared to allow "anti-EC" Labour and other non-Conservative writers to use its pages during the campaign period. From the March 8th to the June 7th editions of the magazine, a total of 19 articles giving reasons why Britain should withdraw from the EC. Table 5.25 outlines the contents of these **Spectator** articles.

**Table 5.25: Frequency of themes used in articles in The Spectator during the Referendum campaign justifying British withdrawal from the EC.**

Themes	Number of articles using theme
"National internationalist" duties and commitments:	7
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC:	6
Material costs of EC membership outweigh the material benefits:	5
Distrust of Germany:	3
Distrust of France:	3
EC is a pro-socialist, anti-capitalist institution:	2

The Table's findings indicate that the most prominent discursive formations present within **The Spectator's** coverage of the EC during the Referendum are "nationalist" ones.

Furthermore, Table 5.25 shows that the most frequently expressed form of "nationalist" discourse in **The Spectator** are statements with "national internationalist" semiotic values:

"...we in Britain have more in common with other countries far away- USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand...India and Pakistan- than we have with our Community partners....With the first four we have a common legal tradition, a common language and common conceptions of democracy and liberty."

"The problems of inflation...energy...of

conflicts between...black, brown and white

people....all these can be solved only by the

combined efforts of countries far away as well

as in Europe." (Pickles, 1975, pp.279-80)  
"The future of a Greater Britain is surely not with this little Europe but in her traditional role as a shrewd, effective internationalist..." (Hewland, 1975, p.307)

"OUT- and into the world.

"it is impossible for us to achieve that recovery...away from the perspectives of the wider world." (**Spectator** Editorial, 1975b, p.675)

Almost as many statements in **The Spectator** have Parliamentary Sovereignty, and its defence from the EC, as their objects of discourse:

"...the British people...will be able to make up their mind whether to stay within an avowedly federalist organisation or not." (**Spectator** Editorial, 1975a, p.259)

"...questions asked by members of Parliament or letters from constituents to their members are a waste of time because the final decisions are no longer taken in this country." (Pickles, 1975, p.274)

"...we should restore Parliamentary democracy to the British people." (Jay, D., 1975, p.2)

Other objects of "nationalist" discourse in **The Spectator** are France and Germany. Indeed, it is not too fanciful to argue that there is a widespread fear of Western Europe as a whole expressed in various statements in the journal. If anything, Table 5.25 underestimates the level of hostility to the Continent in general, as well as the EC, expressed in the pages of **The Spectator**.

Purely anti-French and anti-German statements can be found in **The Spectator's** pages. For instance, Lionel Gelber (1975, p.570), a Canadian historian, argues that the EC is a potential anti-US "Third Force", under French control. Gelber, perhaps influenced by the existence of Francophone Quebec inside an English-speaking Canada, also claims that France and English-speaking countries have different concepts of democracy.

There is also an extremely anti-German article in **The Spectator** by Chris Jones (1975, p.404), who pulls no punches in attacking "Pan-Germanism":

makes Pickles' argument of not being "nationalist" in supporting the EC, which "...the fullest flowering...[of which was] the Third Reich, provides us...with the nearest economic analogy to the EEC".

After comparing the plans of Hitler's Economics Minister Walther Funk for European agricultural self-sufficiency with the CAP; noting certain resemblances between the European Commission and Pan-Germanic sympathiser Friedrich Newman's plan's for a Central European Economic Community run by experts; and commenting that the European Commission's first President, Professor Halstein, taught law in Germany during the Nazi period, Jones concludes that:

(Thatcher, 1975) "...a European Federation is what the EEC is all about. They ["pro-EC" political actors] are still pursuing their old, old dream- one which could again become our nightmare."

As indicated above, several statements are made in **The Spectator** characterising the majority of the original six EC member countries as being naturally disposed towards anti-democratic, authoritarian and aggressively nationalist policies:

"Our three main European partners- Italy, Germany and France- have respectively, a fascist, and a Nazi past and a police state heritage." (Pickles, 1975, p.279)

"No European power can display a record remotely comparable to ours in consistency or enlightenment; each- and especially the major powers- has had long and dark periods of revolution, dictatorship, instability and war hunger." (**Spectator** Editorial, 1975b, p.675)

"...the more tyrannical habits of the Latin countries- France, Italy and Belgium- will in the end stunt the growth of a genuinely outward looking, liberal Europe.

"It is this incompatibility of...the traditions, institutions and reflexes of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon worlds, rooted as they are in very different histories, which makes the vision of a supra-national Europe so unreal and indeed horrific to many perfectly sane people."

The widespread existence of such statements in **The Spectator**

makes Pickles' disclaimer of not being "nationalist" in opposing the EC, which can be seen as applying to the pages of the magazine as a whole, appear rather hollow:

"Nothing...said here remotely resembles any expression of chauvinism, jingoism, nationalism, or even the less desirable forms of patriotism."

### 5.16: Margaret Thatcher.

Elected Conservative leader barely a month before the Referendum campaign began, Margaret Thatcher made three speeches during the campaign supporting continued British membership of the EC (Thatcher, 1975a; 1975b; 1975c). The discursive formations of these speeches are shown in Table 5.26.

**Table 5.26: Frequency of themes used in Margaret Thatcher's speeches justifying continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:	3
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	3
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	2

Table 5.27 shows the system of dispersion within Thatcher's "pragmatic" discursive formation.

**Table 5.27: Frequency of reasons cited in Margaret Thatcher's speeches for staying in the EC on grounds of material benefits.**

Reasons	Number of speeches citing reason
CAP provides Britain with a secure supply of food:	3
EC aid benefits Britain, including depressed regions:	1
EC membership encourages overseas investment in Britain:	1
EC membership lowers prices, including those of food:	1

In all of her speeches Thatcher utilises statements with "internationalist" semiotic values. Table 5.28 shows the system of

dispersion for this "internationalist" discursive formation.

**Table 5.28: Frequency of "internationalist" themes cited in Margaret Thatcher's speeches justifying Britain's continued EC membership.** (Thatcher, 1975b, p.4)

Themes	Number of speeches citing theme
Withdrawal would isolate Britain internationally:	3
EC membership strengthens Britain global influence:	2
EC helps Britain help the Third World:	2
Commonwealth wants Britain in the EC:	1
EC helps prevent war starting in Europe:	1
EC is an "internationalist" organisation; British membership will keep the EC "internationalist":	1
EC is expanding into Southern Europe to strengthen democracy there against fascist and militarist forces:	1

Two observations can be made about Thatcher's "internationalist" discourse. First, she stresses that, in withdrawing from the EC, Britain would be taking an isolationist path, contrary to the natural disposition of the British people:

"As we look at our island history we see that our people have always have been at their best when they have been outward-looking." (Thatcher, 1975a, p.2)

"Over the past 200 years Britain has never been isolationist, and we must not be so now." (Thatcher, 1975a, p.3)

"...if we are true to our history, true to ourselves...we must ensure that an outward-looking Britain continues to exert her influence wherever it counts for most in the world." (Thatcher, 1975a, p.5)

"...neither the instincts nor the interests of this country are isolationist."

"...Traditionally we have always looked for our island livelihood and safety to being part of a larger grouping." (Thatcher, 1975c, p.2).

Thatcher also makes statements whose semiotic meanings are "counter-nationalist", presenting the EC as an appropriate vehicle for Britain to play the role of a great power:

"And, so it is...that the pursuit of this traditional outward-looking role has brought us

discursive form to exert our influence within the growing European Community of nations. That, in turn, has helped Europe to be outward-looking too." (Thatcher, 1975a, p.2)

"We can play a leading role in Europe..." (Thatcher, 1975b, p.4)

#### Themes

Thatcher also makes statements whose object of discourse is Parliamentary Sovereignty. In these, she contrasts pooling national sovereignty inside the EC to create greater **effective** sovereignty for Britain, with Parliamentary Sovereignty, which, compared to the period following her 1988 Bruges speech, Thatcher does not express much concern for:

Table 5.29: Frequency of reasons cited by Margaret Thatcher for staying in the EC on grounds of material benefits.

Reasons	Text
EC provides economic stability	"It is a myth that our membership of the Community will suffocate national tradition and culture." (Thatcher, 1975b, p.6)
EC membership	"The truth about sovereignty is that in the European Community each of the member states continues to enjoy all its individual traditions -constitutional, administrative, legal and cultural.
EC provides standards	"Naturally any international treaty or agreement ...involves some delegation of sovereignty in the judicial sense of the word.
EC improves economic situation	"...[the "anti-EC" campaigners'] prospectus ignores the fact that almost every major nation has been obliged by the pressures of the post-war world, to pool significant areas of sovereignty so as to create more effective political units." (Thatcher, 1975c, p.8)
EC increases aid benefit	
EC membership	
Brexit	
EC membership	

#### 5.17: Eldon Griffiths.

The Opposition Spokesman on Europe, Sir Eldon Griffiths was very much on the right of the Conservative Party. His reasons for supporting Britain's continued membership of the EC were expressed in 21 speeches during the Referendum campaign (Griffiths, 1975a; 1975b; 1975c; 1975d; 1975e; 1975f; 1975g; 1975h; 1975i; 1975j; 1975k; 1975l; 1975m; 1975n; 1975o; 1975p; 1975q; 1975r; 1975s; 1975t; 1975u). Their objects of discourse are shown in Table 5.29.

Like many other "pro-EC" political actors during the Referendum campaign, Griffiths' utilises much "pragmatic" discourse. Table 5.30 shows the system of dispersion within this

discursive formation, vulnerable to the threat posed by International communism, exacerbated by the Soviet Union. The importance of

**Table 5.29: Frequency of themes used in Eldon Griffiths' speeches justifying continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:	9
EC is a bulwark against socialism/communism:	9
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	8
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	2

**Table 5.30: Frequency of reasons cited in Eldon Griffiths' speeches for staying in the EC on grounds of material benefits.**

Reasons	Number of speeches citing reason
EC provides Britain with a secure supply of food:	5
EC membership reduces unemployment:	4
EC provides wider market/more trade for Britain:	2
EC increases British prosperity/improves living standards:	2
Economic disaster if Britain left EC:	2
EC improves Britain's industrial performance:	1
EC aid benefits Britain, including depressed regions:	1
EC membership encourages overseas investment in Britain:	1
EC membership lowers prices, including those of food:	1

Griffiths' discourse is distinctive, though, in the way that his discourse contains statements which bring together support for the EC with opposition to Conservative fears of socialism and communism. At the domestic level, Griffiths points out audiences that most of the British Left is opposed to Britain's EC membership, so (Griffiths, 1975e, p.1):

"...a No vote in the referendum would only serve to strengthen Labour's most extreme Left-wing."

Griffiths' (1975i, p.1) also invokes fear of Tony Benn, who "regards the Common Market as an impediment to his plans."

At the international level, Griffiths warns that withdrawal from the EC would leave Britain isolated from the rest of the West, and

would make it more vulnerable to the threat posed by international communism, orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The importance of these themes within Griffiths' overall use of "internationalist" discourse is shown in Table 5.31.

**Table 5.31: Frequency of "internationalist" themes cited in Eldon Griffiths' speeches justifying continued EC membership.**

Themes	Number of speeches citing theme
Withdrawal would isolate Britain internationally	5
Britain inside the EC strengthens the West:	4
EC is an "internationalist" organisation; British membership will keep the EC "internationalist":	2
Commonwealth wants Britain in the EC:	1
EC helps prevent war starting in Europe:	1
EC helps Britain help the Third World:	1

In Griffiths' speeches are full of statements whose semiotic values contain claims that a Britain outside the EC would be isolated within the capitalist world-system and be vulnerable to the threat posed by international communism:

"...the prospects of our democracy's survival are far greater in the context of a strong and prosperous Europe than they are in an isolated and impoverished Britain." (Griffiths, 1975b, p.1)

"...would it not be criminal folly for us, now, to desert our allies at the very moment when aggression and subversion once again are rampant?" (Griffiths, 1975g, p.2)

"Isolationism in Britain encourages isolationism in the United States." (Griffiths, 1975h, p.1)

Furthermore, "counter-nationalist" statements appear in Griffiths' "internationalist" discourse. For instance, he presents the EC as a vehicle for making Britain a great power again:

"Britain is good for Europe, just as Europe is for Britain." (Griffiths, 1975a, p.2)

"I believe that in Europe we can find a new role and new power for Britain, and as a British patriot, I urge you to vote with me for Britain to remain a member of the European Community."

*Table 5.31: "....in Europe, our country can once again can be a greater Britain and not a little England."*  
(Griffiths, 1975c, p.2)

#### *Themes*

Furthermore, Griffiths expresses fears, similar to those expressed by some "anti-EC" political actors, that Germany might attempt to dominate Europe. Griffiths (1975a, p.2) differs over the means to prevent this: Britain should stay in the EC. Otherwise, it was highly probable:

*"...that Europe will unite without us, perhaps under German leadership. We should then have on our doorstep an agglomeration of power...in which...liberal and democratic elements...could be swamped by the same dark forces that landed us in two world wars."*

Griffiths' object of discourse in two speeches is Sovereignty. In one of them, Griffiths (1975b, pp.1-2) argues that the real threat to Britain's laws and Parliament comes from the British Left and trade unionists disobeying the law. In the other speech, Griffiths (1975h, p.3) argues that effective sovereignty for Britain depends upon pooling it with the other members of the EC:

*"Sovereignty is the power of a country to act effectively in its own interests. And as part of a combined strength of nine countries, Britain's powers to take effective action is actually increased."*

#### **5.18: Edward Heath.**

Deposed as Conservative leader shortly before the Referendum campaign began, Edward Heath threw his support behind the campaign to uphold the one undoubted achievement of his premiership: making Britain an EC member. In 22 speeches Heath (1975a; 1975b; 1975c; 1975d; 1975e; 1975f; 1975g; 1975h; 1975i; 1975j; 1975k; 1975l; 1975m; 1975n; 1975o; 1975p; 1975q; 1975r; 1975s; 1975t; 1975u; 1975v) put various reasons forward why Britain should stay in the EC. The objects of discourse in these are shown in Table 5.32. In most of them Heath utilises "pragmatic" discourse, the system of dispersion in which is shown in Table 5.33.

**Table 5.32: Frequency of themes used in Edward Heath's speeches justifying continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches using theme
Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:	14
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	14
EC is a bulwark against socialism/communism:	7
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	4

**Table 5.33: Frequency of reasons cited in Edward Heath's speeches for staying in the EC on grounds of material benefits.**

Reasons	Number of speeches citing reason
EC membership reduces unemployment:	8
EC aid benefits Britain, including depressed regions:	4
Economic disaster if Britain left the EC:	4
EC increases British prosperity/improves living standards:	3
EC membership lowers prices, including those of food:	3
CAP provides Britain with a secure supply of food:	3
EC provides wider market/more trade for Britain:	2
EC improves Britain's industrial performance:	2
EC membership encourages overseas investment in Britain:	1

In just as many speeches, though, Heath makes "internationalist" statements. Table 5.34 shows the system of dispersion within this "internationalist" discursive formation.

**Table 5.34: Frequency of "internationalist" themes cited in Edward Heath's speeches justifying continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of speeches citing theme
EC helps prevent war starting in Europe	11
Withdrawal would isolate Britain internationally	8
EC is an "internationalist" organisation; British membership will keep the EC "internationalist"	4
EC membership strengthens Britain's global influence	4
EC is expanding into Southern Europe to strengthen democracy there against fascist and militarist forces:	3
Britain must not break international agreements:	3
Commonwealth wants Britain in the EC:	1
Britain in the EC strengthens the West:	1
EC helps Britain help the Third World:	1

In half of his speeches Heath makes statements which say that the EC prevents war happening again in Western Europe, as it brought France and Germany, the two main antagonists in the last two European civil wars, together (Heath, 1975e, pp.1-2; Heath, 1975i, pp.2-3). Heath (1975d, p.2) also makes a statement whose semiotic values invokes memories of the 1930s to castigate "anti-EC" political actors as "the voice of the 1930s when the bulk of the Labour Party...thought that Britain could insulate herself from events on the mainland of Europe."

Heath also attacks "anti-EC" political actors for their isolationism in supporting EC withdrawal:

"...to withdraw into a feeble isolation would be an act of madness." (Heath, 1975c, p.5)  
"Britain would...find itself slowly deserted by both Europe and America." (Heath, 1975t, p.2)

Moreover, Heath is the main "pro-EC" political actor examined in this particular case study to unapologetically and repeatedly make statements which contain "Euro-Federalist" semiotic values. He takes issue with the "anti-EC" campaign by attacking Parliamentary Sovereignty as an outdated, obsolete concept:

"The anti-marketeers are...living in a dream world when they talk about sovereignty. They see sovereignty in terms of the text-books rather than the real world.

"...national sovereignty...in plain English.... means the freedom of our nation to act effectively in our own national interests and in the individual interests of our people, And the reality is that we can act more effectively in all our interests if we work together and pool our sovereignty with others." (Heath, 1975c, p.4)

"They [anti-Marketeers] are so busy poring over over the dusty constitutional text-books looking up sovereignty that the real world is passing them by.

"The anti-marketeers want Britain to preserve her sovereignty and go it alone: but there is all the difference in the world between paper sovereignty and real sovereignty.

"If Britain were to go it alone, we would be....

"Free to say what we like- but too weak for

anyone to listen.

"This is the sovereignty and the freedom that the anti-marketeers dangle before you, but it is a sham sovereignty..." (Heath, 1975r, p.1)

Heath's attitude to the EC expressed in his speeches is, to a certain extent, a mirror image of that expressed by Shore and Powell. While the latter portray EC membership as a disaster for Britain, caused by a national decline which can only be overcome by a national revival outside the EC, Heath sees the EC, after years of national decline, as an opportunity to make Britain great once again. Consequently, Heath sees EC withdrawal as destroying that opportunity:

"Are we going to stay on the centre of the stage where we belong, or are we going to shuffle off into the dusty wings of history?" (Heath, 1975a, p.7)

"...since 1945 we in Britain have suffered a steady loss of faith in ourselves.

"But I believe profoundly that inside the Community we can recover our confidence as a nation." (Heath, 1975b, p.3)

"One of the sadder aspects of the campaign is the way the anti-marketeers are talking Britain down. They tell us that the British people are too weak to hold our own in the European Community.

"I reject totally this sort of defeatist talk... They may have lost faith and confidence in Britain and the British people. But I have not..."

"A vote for staying in Europe is a positive vote of confidence in Britain and the British people." (Heath, 1975h, p.1)

"A 'Yes' vote...will be a vote to end the years of retreat and begin the advance of Britain." (Heath, 1975i, p.4)

"I believe profoundly that the British people have the strength and enterprise to prosper in the Community....to bring about the renewal of our prosperity and our influence..." (Heath, 1975p, p.2)

Indeed, Heath's expressed belief that the British nation's destiny is in the EC can sometimes bring him to use language which most "anti-EC" political actors would find hard to emulate in terms

of "nationalist" sentiments (Heath, 1975u, p.2):

"Is the future of a great nation like Britain-a nation that has...been the greatest force for good in modern times; a nation, in the transition from Empire to Commonwealth, can claim credit for the greatest and most peaceful transfer of power the world has ever known; a nation that is home to a still great parliamentary democracy respected the world over as the Mother of Parliaments; a nation that twice this century has fought in Europe and in the process bled itself white in the cause of liberty and democracy for the peoples of Europe -is the future of this nation really to hinge on nothing more than the price of sliced bread?"

### PART THREE: CROSS-PARTY ACTIVITY.

#### 3.19: National Referendum Campaign.

The NRC was formed in January 1975, with the aim of being an umbrella organisation for all groups and individuals supporting a "No" vote in the forthcoming Referendum (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.99). Organisations affiliated to the NRC included CATOR, the CMSC and GBORC.

In addition to being important for bringing nearly all the most significant British "anti-EC" political actors together, however uneasily, in one umbrella organisation, the NRC is important for producing the most significant single piece of "anti-EC" literature during the campaign. **Why You Should Vote No** (NRC, 1975) was distributed to every household in the United Kingdom at the end of May 1975 (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.290). As such, it should have been the most important single piece of "anti-EC" literature most of the general public would have encountered during the course of the campaign.

In attempting to find the most important objects of discourse within **Why You Should Vote No**, the NRC document was broken down into its 48 paragraphs to examine how many of these paragraphs featured objects of "anti-EC" discourse. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 5.35.

**Table 5.35: Number of paragraphs of Why You Should Vote No using general "anti-EC" themes to oppose continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of paragraphs using theme
<b>Material costs of EC membership outweigh the material benefits:</b>	20
<b>British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC:</b>	12
<b>"National internationalist" duties and commitments:</b>	8
<b>Distrust of Germany:</b>	2
<b>Distrust of France:</b>	1

Most paragraphs of **Why You Should Vote No** have statements which refer to the material costs of EC membership to Britain. Table 5.36 shows this system of dispersion of this "pragmatic" discursive formation. It also shows that Britain can "enjoy... free and easy entry into the Common Market countries without the burden of being anti-French and anti-German, when referring to the practicalities of the European Parliament being able to pass laws in Britain by 1979."

**Table 5.36: Number of paragraphs in "Why You Should Vote No" citing a particular material cost of membership as a reason for withdrawal.**

Reason	Number of paragraphs citing reason
<b>High/rising food prices:</b>	9
<b>Adverse general effect that EC membership has had on Britain's balance of payments:</b>	5
<b>Adverse general effect that EC membership has had on British industry and manufacturing, including employment levels:</b>	4
<b>Adverse effects that the EC's CAP has had, including upon British agriculture:</b>	4
<b>Investment has shifted from Britain to EC since entry:</b>	2
<b>EC membership has led to increased unemployment:</b>	2
<b>Adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's relatively depressed economic regions:</b>	2
<b>EC wants Britain's North Sea oil:</b>	2
<b>Britain has paid more into the EC Budget than it has been given back:</b>	1

As Table 5.35 shows, however, the NRC pamphlet also contains many statements with "nationalist" semiotic values. The main object of this discourse was Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty, and the EC's threat to it:

5.20: Common Market  
An affiliate of the  
1973, p.235  
Independent  
called Remain  
published their  
Some of them  
with organisations  
fought. However  
British membership of the EC should be opposed.

"Already, under the Treaty of Rome, policies are being decided, rules made, laws enacted and taxes raised, not by our own Parliament, elected by the British people, but by the Common Market -often by the unelected Commission in Brussels. "...our right, as voters, to change policies and laws in Britain will steadily dwindle." (NRC, 1975, p.3)

"The real aim of the Market is...to become one single country in which Britain would be reduced to a mere province..."

Unless you want to be ruled more and more by a Continental Parliament in which Britain would be in a small minority, you should vote NO." (NRC, 1975, p.6)

Statements in **Why You Should Vote No** also link the defence of Parliamentary Sovereignty with the promotion of free trade. As an alternative to the EC, the NRC (1975, p.7) propose British membership of EFTA so that Britain can "enjoy...free or low-tariff entry into the Common Market countries without the burden of dear food or the loss of the British people's democratic rights."

The NRC (1975, p.6) also make statements whose semiotic values are anti-French and anti-German, when referring to the possibility of a European Parliament being able to pass laws binding upon Britain by 1978:

"This may be acceptable to some Continental countries. In recent times they may have been ruled by dictators, or defeated or occupied. They are more used to abandoning their political institutions than we are."

**Why You Should Vote No** (NRC, 1975, p.8) also contains some statements which can be classified as "national internationalist" discourse:

"Most anti-Marketeers rightly believe that we should remain members of NATO, the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, EFTA ...the Council of Europe...the UN and its agencies.

"In all these, we can work actively together as good internationalists, while preserving our own democratic rights."

**5.20: Common Market Safeguards Campaign.** An affiliate to the NRC, the CMSC was formed in 1969 (Kitzinger, 1973, p.235). During the Referendum campaign, its main publication, independent of the NRC's activities, was a tabloid publication called **Resistance News** (1975a; 1975b; 1975c). **Resistance News** was published three times during the period of the Referendum campaign.

Some of the articles contained in **Resistance News** were concerned with organisational matters about how the "No" campaign should be fought. However, other articles contained various reasons why British membership of the EC should be opposed.

Table 5.37 shows the number of articles in **Resistance News** containing such objects of discourse. The most frequently expressed reason being the material costs of EC membership. Table 5.38 shows the system of dispersion within this "pragmatic" discourse.

**Table 5.37: Number of articles in Resistance News using general "anti-EC" themes to oppose continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of articles using theme
Material costs of EC membership outweigh the material benefits:	11
British national independence and Parliamentary sovereignty/democracy are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC:	8
"National internationalist" duties and commitments:	5
Distrust of Germany:	2
EC is a pro-socialist, anti-capitalist institution:	2

**Table 5.38: Number of articles in Resistance News citing a particular material cost of membership as a reason for withdrawal.**

Reason	Number of articles citing reason
High/rising food prices:	3
Adverse effects that the EC's CAP has had, including upon British agriculture:	3
Adverse general effect that EC membership has had on Britain's balance of payments:	3
Imposition of VAT on Britain:	1
EC wants control over Britain's North Sea oil:	1

The objects of discourse featured in these six leaflets are shown

Table 5.37 shows "nationalist" statements were often made in **Resistance News**. For instance, several articles reporting statements by "anti-EC" political actors had Parliamentary Sovereignty as their object of discourse:

"Do we want self-government or not? That is what this Referendum is all about." -Neil Marten [NRC Chairman] (**Resistance News**, 1975a, p.1).

"So profoundly, so inherently, is Britain a parliamentary nation, that she could not alter this without ceasing to be herself." -Enoch Powell (**Resistance News**, 1975a, p.6).

"...the issue of the sovereignty of the people and Parliament has not been resolved and this is as far as I am concerned is the most fundamental issue of all." -David Stoddart [Labour Assistant Whip] (**Resistance News**, 1975b, p.1).

Statements in **Resistance News'** which have "national internationalist" semiotic value mostly refer to the existence of non-communist countries in Europe outside the EC. The members of EFTA, particularly those in Scandinavia, are quite prominently featured in **Resistance News** articles:

"Norway controls her own economic structure." (**Resistance News**, 1975a, p.4)

"Danish Poll favours following Britain out." (**Resistance News**, 1975b, p.1)

"Why Britain must rejoin EFTA." (**Resistance News**, 1975c, p.2)

### 5.21: Get Britain Out Referendum Campaign.

GBORC was the campaign against British membership of the EC set up by Get Britain Out, which was itself revived during early 1974 as the direct organisational successor to the anti-entry Keep Britain Out, originally formed in 1962 (Kitzinger, 1973, p.245; Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.98). During the Referendum Campaign, GBORC's main publication effort, separate from those coordinated by the NRC, was the production of six leaflets (GBORC 1975a; 1975b; 1975c; 1975d; 1975e; 1975f).

The objects of discourse featured in these six leaflets are shown

in Table 5.39. (GBORC, 1975d, p.1)

**Table 5.39: Number of GBORC leaflets using general "anti-EC" themes to oppose continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of leaflets using theme
Material costs of EC membership outweigh the material benefits:	6
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty are threatened by an undemocratic, bureaucratic EC:	5
"National internationalist" duties and commitments:	3
Distrust of France:	1
Distrust of Germany:	1

As can be seen from this Table, in all of these leaflets GBORC make statements referring to the material costs of EC membership. Furthermore, a majority of GBORC leaflets contain statements referring to the threat that continued EC membership poses to Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty:

"Did you vote for any of these men [the European Commission]? You have probably never heard of them. Yet these lucky thirteen have more power over your life than your MP. They run the European Commission...and their directives are now law in Britain, whatever the decision of the Parliament you elect." (GBORC, 1975b, p.2)

"VOTE NO TO BRUSSELS AND...BUREAUCRATIC FOREIGN RULE.

"It is the independence of Britain- it is the freedom of all of us- which is at stake..."  
(GBORC, 1975d, p.1)

Another feature of the discourse employed by GBORC in its leaflets is a populist, anti-Establishment, anti-dominant bloc, rhetoric (GBORC, 1975b, p.1):

"When all the Party leaders are agreed-  
When all the newspapers are agreed-  
You can be sure of one thing-  
**THEY ARE WRONG AGAIN.**"

Moreover, such rhetoric contains semiotic values which draw upon Britain's historical archive, and references to the build-up to

World War Two (GBORC, 1975d, p.1):  
to stay in an "internationalist" statement repeated in most paragraphs. It says "...Don't be fooled by the press bosses and the establishment politicians. They were wrong about Hitler and they're wrong again..."

### 5.22: Britain in Europe.

These messages:

The equivalent "pro-EC" organisation to the NRC was BIE. Like the NRC, BIE were allowed to send each household in Britain a pamphlet.

**Why You Should Vote Yes** (BIE, 1975) consisted of 45 paragraphs. Table 5.40 shows the objects of discourse contained within them.

The most cited object of discourse in BIE's pamphlet was Britain's world-role, and its "internationalist" duty to remain in the EC. Table 5.41 shows the system of dispersion within this "internationalist" discursive formation.

**Table 5.40: Number of paragraphs in Why You Should Vote Yes using general "pro-EC" themes to justify continued British membership of the EC.**

Themes	Number of paragraphs using theme
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	23
Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:	14
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	6
EC is a bulwark against socialism/communism:	1

**Table 5.41: Number of paragraphs in Why You Should Vote Yes citing "internationalist" themes to justify continued British membership of the EC.**

Theme	Number of paragraphs citing theme
Commonwealth wants Britain in the EC:	6
Withdrawal would internationally isolate Britain:	5
Britain inside the EC strengthens the West:	4
EC membership strengthens Britain's global influence:	3
EC is an "internationalist" organisation; British membership will keep the EC "internationalist":	2
EC helps prevent war starting in Europe:	1

BIE's pamphlet argues that Britain would be isolated if it

were withdrawn from the EC. The theme that the Commonwealth wants Britain to stay is an "internationalist" statement repeated in most paragraphs. Three of these paragraphs consist of statements from the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Prime Ministers supporting Britain's EC membership (BIE, 1975, pp.3-4). The other two statements in the pamphlet concerning the Commonwealth reinforce these messages:

"It [Britain's EC membership] makes good sense for the Commonwealth.  
...The old Commonwealth wants us to stay in....  
The new Commonwealth wants us to stay in. Not a single one of their 34 governments want us to leave." (BIE, 1975, p.3)

**Why You Should Vote Yes** also contains statements whose semiotic values stresses the general isolation Britain would experience within the capitalist world-system if it left the EC (BIE, 1975, p.3):

"Outside, we should be alone in a harsh, cold world, with none of our friends offering to revive old partnerships."

BIE (1975, p.7) make statements which can be regarded as "counter-nationalist" discourse, presenting the EC as a suitable vehicle for Britain to pursue its "internationalist" aims and to become a great power again:

"So do our duty to the world and our hope for the new greatness of Britain. We believe in Britain- in Britain in Europe."

**Why You Should Vote Yes** (1975, p.4) also contain statements which address Sovereignty, by claiming that:

"So much of the argument is a false one. It is not a matter of dry legal sovereignty. The real test is how we protect our own interests and exercise British influence in the world....

"If we came out....We would be clinging to the shadow of British sovereignty while its

substance lies out of the window."

### 5.23: "H.M. Government".

A second "pro-EC" pamphlet sent to every household was issued in the Government's name, and introduced by Harold Wilson. **Britain's New Deal in Europe** (H.M. Government, 1975) contains 11 distinct sections. Table 5.42 shows the objects of discourse they contained.

Table 5.42: Number of sections in Britain's New Deal in Europe citing general "pro-EC" themes to justify continued British membership of the EC.

Themes	Number of sections using theme
Material benefits of EC membership outweigh the material costs:	7
Staying in the EC is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	6
British sovereignty is not weakened by EC membership:	1

The opening section of **Britain's New Deal in Europe** is an introduction to the pamphlet by the Prime Minister. After referring to the re-negotiations, and to the "big and significant improvements on the previous terms", Wilson makes an "internationalist" statement to justify staying in the EC (H.M. Government, 1975, p.2):

"...these better terms can give Britain a New Deal in Europe. A Deal that will help us, help the Commonwealth, and help our partners in Europe."

After a section which discusses the Referendum, the leaflet refers to "**Our Partners in Europe**". After describing the material benefits of the EC as "one of the biggest concentrations of industrial and trading power in the world" and its "vast resources of skill, experience and inventiveness" (H.M. Government, 1975, p.5), **Britain's New Deal in Europe** lists "The aims of the Common Market." Two of these aims are concerned with the material benefits of the EC:

must be cooperation between states.

(ii) no imposed "To raise living standards and improve working conditions."

"To promote growth and boost world trade." and British Parliament"; moreover a national veto exists;

(iii) Two are "internationalist": right to repeal the Treaty of Accession; and

(iv) the House "To bring together the peoples of Europe...To help maintain peace and freedom."

The other aim brings both of these objects of "pro-EC" discourse together: this section concentrates on the material benefits of withdrawal, but also raises the broader aspiration (H.M. Government, 1975) "To help the poorer regions of Europe and the rest of the world."

After a two page map of the world demonstrating the EC's "world links" (H.M. Government, 1975, pp.6-7), the next three sections deal with the improvements re-negotiations had given Britain vis-a-vis the material benefits relating to food, the EC Budget and employment (H.M. Government, 1975, pp.8-9).

The seventh section is concerned with emphasising that "Commonwealth governments want Britain to stay in the Community". As well as quoting, like BIE's leaflet, the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, "Britain's New Deal in Europe" quotes Jamaica's UN Ambassador supporting the recently signed Lome Convention. This "internationalist" agreement, in which 22 Commonwealth countries get EC aid, is described as (H.M. Government, 1975, p.10):

"...a major move towards the establishment of a new international economic order and demonstrates the considerable scope which exists for the creation of a more just and equitable world."

The eighth section of the leaflet asks, "Will Parliament Lose its Power?" The four facts reasons given to deny that EC membership will lead to this are (H.M. Government, 1975, pp.1112):

(i) no country can control international forces today, so there

- must be cooperation between states; this is how we want it to be;
- (ii) no important policies can be decided by the EC without "the consent of a British Minister answerable to a British Government and British Parliament"; moreover a national veto exists;
  - (iii) Westminster retains the right to repeal the Treaty of Accession; and
  - (iv) the House of Commons voted in April 1975 to stay in the EC.

The ninth section asks, again rhetorically, "**If We Say 'No'.**" Most of this section concentrates on the material costs of withdrawal, but also raises the spectre of isolation (H.M. Government, 1975, p.13):

"Britain would no longer have any say in the future...development of the Common Market. Nor on its relations with the rest of the world—particularly on the help to be given to the poorer nations of the world.  
"We would just be outsiders looking in."

This is followed by a "**If We Say 'Yes'**" section, which concentrates upon the material benefits of EC membership, such as being in the world's most powerful trading bloc, secure food supplies and EC aid to Britain (H.M. Government, 1975, p.14). It also refers to the possibilities of the EC serving British interests and of its "outward-looking" nature:

"It is flexible. It is ready and able to adapt changing world conditions....

"The Market is aware of the need to help the poorer nations of the world outside Europe."

The final section declares "**And Now- the Time for YOU to Decide**". Amongst the hyperbole about the historical importance of the public's decision, it also assures the reader that if the vote is a "Yes", Britain can reform the EC even more, to make it amenable to Britain's "national interest" and "internationalist" aims (H.M. Government, 1975, p.15):

"If we stay inside we can play a full part in

helping it to develop the way we want it to develop. Already Britain's influence has produced changes for the better. The process can go on. The Common Market can be made better still."

## PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

### 5.24: The nature of opposition to, and support for, continued EC membership during the 1975 Referendum campaign.

Primarily "nationalist" discourse was employed by all the Conservative Party political actors examined in the 1975 Referendum campaign case study.

CATOR, Enoch Powell and **The Spectator** all primarily utilised "nationalist" discourse whose main object of discourse was British Parliamentary Sovereignty. **The Spectator** also contained many statements which were anti-Continental in their semiotic values, while Powell's utilised discourse whose main theme was that EC withdrawal was an opportunity for British national renewal.

Although none of the Labour Party political actors examined in this case study primarily utilised "nationalist" discourse in their speeches and published material, both Peter Shore and Tony Benn's speeches were characterised by the prominent saliency of Parliamentary Sovereignty as an object of discourse. Moreover, in common with Powell's Shore's speeches exhibited a belief that EC withdrawal would provide Britain with an opportunity for national renewal.

As previously discussed in this Chapter, there appears to be a good case for arguing that, if Shore and Benn were not Secretary of States for departments concerned with the economy, their discourse could have been characterised as primarily "nationalist" in its values.

Those "anti-EC" political actors whose objects of discourse are primarily "pragmatic" in nature include Barbara Castle, **Tribune** newspaper and the three cross-party organisations examined: NRC, CMSC and GBORC.

Expressions of primarily "ideological" opposition to the EC found in this Chapter were provided by "anti-EC" speakers at the Labour Party Special Conference, who stressed the anti-socialist features of the EC. However, it should be noted that such discourse was used in an inner-Party context; in a society of discourse where the doctrine of socialism is extremely important to Labour Party members. Hence, socialism *per se* was not important to a larger audience. To this particular audience, principally working class Labour supporters, the material costs or benefits of membership were a much more important issue. Hence the importance that Barbara Castle and the pages of **Tribune** attached to making the material costs of EC membership, such as rising food prices and the EC's adverse effects upon the economy, as their primary object of discourse.

When it is considered that in 1975 there was more opposition to continued EC membership inside the Labour than the Conservative Party, and that the cross-party organisations made material costs of EC membership their primary object of discourse, it must be concluded that the evidence from this case study suggests that, in 1975, the primary form of discourse employed by "anti-EC" political actors in the 1975 Referendum campaign was "pragmatic", rather than "nationalist" or "ideological". Consequently, the hypothesis of the thesis has not been proven in this case study.

However, when one considers that the Referendum was supposed to be about the "renegotiated" terms of EC membership, which as Section 5.1 shows, mainly lent themselves to the use of "pragmatic" discourse, the level of "nationalist" discourse employed in the Referendum campaign is surprisingly high.

In the 1975 Referendum campaign, the evidence from the case studies suggests that the discourse employed by "pro-EC" political actors was primarily "pragmatic" with its object of discourse being the material benefits of staying the EC.

The main form of "pro-EC" discourse which referred to the "nationalist" objects of "anti-EC" discourse was

"internationalist", which presented EC membership as Britain's "internationalist" duty and strengthening Britain's world-role. In other words, "counter-nationalist" discourse.

Most "pro-EC" political actors in their discourse either ignored the issue of Parliamentary Sovereignty altogether, or denied that EC membership affected Parliamentary Sovereignty in any way. Prominent in taking this viewpoint are the leaderships of both main parties, represented by James Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher. Furthermore, some "pro-EC" political actors, most notably Eldon Griffiths and Edward Heath, use "counter-nationalist" themes to justify their support for a "Yes" vote.

There was, however, utilisation of "Euro-Federalist" discourse by Roy Jenkins, the BIE's pamphlet and, most notably, Edward Heath, in claiming that British Parliamentary Sovereignty was obsolete. However, most "pro-EC" discourse which addressed Parliamentary Sovereignty as an object of discourse in the 1975 Referendum campaign can be characterised as "counter-nationalist".

#### **5.26: Relating the discourse used in the case study to theories of discourse.**

With the themes used by political actors during the 1975 Referendum having been outlined, it is possible to examine the extent to which the various theoretical approaches to discourse discussed in Part Two of Chapter Three can explain the discourse utilised by them.

The evidence from the case study suggests that the material costs of Britain's membership of the EC provided the main object of discourse for "anti-EC" political actors during the Referendum campaign. It appears that the non-discursive formations of the capitalist world-system in 1974-5 had the effect of encouraging "anti-EC" political actors, particularly within the Labour Party, to utilise "pragmatic" discourse; to make statements with semiotic meanings that emphasised the material costs of EC membership to Britain.

Furthermore, many "anti-EC" political actors within the Labour Party, particularly within the society of discourse of the Labour

Party Special Conference, focused "ideological" discourse upon the EC reflected a widespread view that the EC was an impediment to a Labour Government implementing economic policies inspired by the AES.

However, the evidence from the 1975 Referendum campaign does suggest that many "anti-EC" political actors, most notably those inside and around the Conservative Party, developed "nationalist" discursive formations around the objects of discourse of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Britain's world-role, France and Germany. A coherent regime of truth, around around the assumptions that Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty and world-role were threatened by an EC dominated by France or Germany or a combination of both, provided the cognitive framework for many of the statements made by "anti-EC" political actors during the 1975 Referendum campaign.

The semiotic potency of the historical archive that this regime of truth was based was not seriously challenged by the discourse employed by "pro-EC" political actors during the Referendum campaign. For example, the main attempt by the "pro-EC" political actors examined to utilise a "Euro-Federalist" discourse based around the object of discourse of Parliamentary Sovereignty, and its obsolescence, is by Edward Heath. Even in his case, support for EC membership is also justified through expressions of national pride and statements emphasising the importance of Britain's world-role: more "counter-nationalism" than "counter-discourse."

Most other "pro-EC" political actors do not mention Parliamentary Sovereignty as an object of their discourse at all, so treating it as a "taboo" issue; while Basnett, Callaghan and Thatcher deny that Parliamentary Sovereignty will be affected by continued membership of the EC. In other words, most "pro-EC" discourse on the subject of Parliamentary Sovereignty appears to be subject to closure, in Voloshinov's phrase; delimitation, in Foucault's; and forgetting in Pecheux's.

Other discourse employed by "pro-EC" political actors shows little attempt to articulate a new "Euro-Federalist" regime of truth to challenge or replace the assumptions of the existing one

readily utilised by "anti-EC" political actors making "nationalist" statements.

For example, both Thatcher and Williams make statements around the object of discourse of Britain's world-role. Such discourse portrays EC membership not as an end in itself, but as a means of strengthening Britain's world-role. In a similar manner, Harold Wilson, BIE and H.M. Government utilise discourse to support EC membership on the grounds that it will help the Commonwealth. Statements which make claims that Britain will be isolated within the capitalist world-system if it votes to withdraw from the EC would not appear to give the impression that EC membership should continue for its own sake, but for strengthening Britain's position in the world, and its world-role outside the EC.

Such use of "counter-nationalist" discourse goes even further in the case of Eldon Griffiths. He does not challenge the regime of truth employed by "anti-EC" political actors when he makes one of his objects of discourse Germany, and claims that Britain's EC withdrawal would encourage Germany to lead the rest of the EC in a "narrowly nationalist" manner.

In summary, it appears that apart from the partial exception of Heath, the regime of truth whose assumptions pervade so much of "anti-EC" discourse is so pervasive in setting the assumptions of debate over Parliamentary Sovereignty, Britain's place in the world, France and Germany, that "pro-EC" political actors are seemingly incapable of thinking about objects of discourse such as Britain's world-role in a different manner from "anti-EC" political actors. The historical archive that is drawn from Britain's history, and which informs many of the "nationalist" assumptions expressed in "anti-EC" discourse, appears to delimit the possibilities for "pro-EC" discourse.

Furthermore, utilising Pecheux's theoretical approach, the 1975 Referendum campaign shows little evidence that "pro-EC" political actors have disidentified in their discourse with the regime of truth that "anti-EC" discourse draws upon, let alone developed a counter-identification. If anything, "pro-EC" political actors can be categorised as having forgot about the regime of truth which set

the parameters of discourse on Parliamentary Sovereignty, Britain's place in the world, France and Germany.

However, despite being largely unwilling or unable to effectively challenge "anti-EC" discourse with its own regime of truth or counter-discourse, the "Yes" campaign did win the Referendum vote. In attempting to explain why this happened it is necessary to examine various non-discursive formations which, overall, helped the "Yes" campaign at that particular historic juncture.

"pro-EC" political actors, rather than their "anti-EC" counterparts. The appeal by many Labour Party "anti-EC" political

#### **5.26: Relating the discourse employed in the case study to non-discursive formations.**

The international situation was a vital prerequisite for neutrality in Britain not falling prey

The first type of non-discursive formations which favoured the semiotic effectiveness of "pro-EC", rather than "anti-EC" discourse was the international situation. The "No" campaign tended to use "national internationalist" discourse which referred, in a rather abstract way, to promoting international free trade or socialist solidarity outside the EC. In contrast, the "Yes" campaign was able to cite the EC as an existing "internationalist" organisation, which Britain was a member of. In particular, "pro-EC" political actors were able to cite the Lome Convention in their discourse as evidence that the EC was an "internationalist" organisation. Signed in 1975, the Convention gave all Commonwealth countries in Africa, the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Oceans to increase their levels of aid, trade and technical cooperation with the EC. Furthermore, economically developing members of the Commonwealth were given access to produce over 1.4 million tons of sugar to the EC, which was a substantial increase on the terms of their agreements with Britain before EC entry (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.39). It was such activities which gave credence to the claims made by "pro-EC" political actors, such as Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams, in their discourse that the EC would become a more "internationalist" organisation if Britain stayed in it.

The potential appeal of anti-French and anti-German discourse made by "anti-EC" political discourse was reduced, in the case of

the Labour Party, by the non-discursive formations which meant that West Germany had a Social Democrat Federal Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt. Furthermore, both Schmidt and the French President, Valerie Giscard d'Estaing were Corporal Liberal Atlanticists, who were not inclined to make the EC a "narrowly nationalist" organisation (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.31).

In relation to the utilisation of "ideological" and "pragmatic" discourse, various non-discursive formations favoured the discourse employed by "pro-EC" political actors, rather than their "anti-EC" counterparts. The espousal by many Labour Party "anti-EC" political actors of an economic policy based upon the AES helped to persuade most of British capital, and most Conservatives, that EC membership was a vital prerequisite for capitalism in Britain not falling prey to the plans of the Labour Left and the trade unions. Such fears were a central component of the "ideological" discourse employed by Eldon Griffiths during the Referendum campaign. At the same time, another non-discursive formation which complemented the use of "ideological" discourse by Labour "pro-EC" political actors was the participation, at the time of the Referendum, of left-of-centre political parties in governing six of the nine EC members. Hence, "pro-EC" political actors within the Labour Party could suggest that the EC was far from a "capitalist club" and, as James Callaghan mentioned, an institution which could not stop the current Labour Government from nationalising British Leyland and the National Oil Corporation. These various non-discursive formations also allowed the "anti-EC" Labour Left to be implicitly, or, in the case of Eldon Griffiths for one, explicitly portrayed by "pro-EC" political actors as wanting a form of socialism more akin to Communism, which the support for a "No" vote coming from the CPGB (Taylor, 1975, p.278) and other Marxist groups, such as the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) (CPB(ML), 1975), did not lessen.

However, the most influential non-discursive formations which helped the "Yes" campaign were the material consequences of EC membership, which were the objects of "pragmatic" discourse by both sides in the campaign. Probably the most important of all these was

food prices.

In 1974, high and rising food prices were widely seen as being the direct consequence of Britain joining the EC (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.46). If this particular non-discursive formation had continued into the Referendum campaign, "anti-EC" political actors may have been able to develop it into, to use Laclau's (1977, p.103) theoretical approach, an interpellation which could reconstruct the whole ideological domain, particularly if rising food prices were given a semiotic meaning that could associate them with the simultaneous abandonment of free trade and Parliamentary Sovereignty when Britain joined the EC.

From late 1974, however, world prices of grain and sugar rose above the EC price, allowing "pro-EC" political actors during the Referendum to associate the EC with low food prices, and preventing any attempts by "anti-EC" political actors to successfully link food prices with free trade and Parliamentary Sovereignty in their discourse. Moreover, by mid-1975 "pro-EC" political actors could also cite the EC as being a stable source of food for Britain, as opposed to being a protectionist organisation (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.40).

Similar non-discursive formations aiding the "Yes" campaign were the increasing economic problems, such as rising employment and inflation, throughout the capitalist world-system. Such economic processes made it very difficult for "anti-EC" political actors in their discourse to claim that Britain's economic problems were solely the fault of Britain being an EC member (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p.46).

To conclude, it can be argued that the various non-discursive formations at the particular historical juncture at which the 1975 Referendum campaign occurred favoured the utilisation of "pragmatic", "ideological" and "internationalist" discourse by "pro-EC" political actors to such an extent that they were largely able to avoid addressing the issue of how EC membership affected Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty without reducing their chances of achieving a decisive "Yes" vote.

However, if the international situation had been different; if Germany and France had leaders who were not as "internationalist" in their dispositions as Schmidt and Giscard; if food prices had been higher inside the EC than outside; and the "anti-EC" campaign could not have been so easily dismissed as a campaign dominated by the Labour Left; the chances are that the Referendum vote would have been much closer. Moreover, the unwillingness or inability of "pro-EC" political actors to develop a "Euro-Federalist" regime of truth with which to seriously challenge the assumptions underlying the "nationalist" discourse utilised by "anti-EC" political actors may have been cruelly exposed as the height of complacent folly.

Bill made through Parliament, and the Bill's impact on the European institutions. Part Two examines the methodological issues which arise when analysing the details of the debate about the Bill.

Part One of this Chapter will focus on the debate on the Second Reading of the Bill in the European Parliament. Part Two examines some of the debates on the Bill in the Council at the Committee stage of the Bill's passage. In addition, the debate concerning the proposals in the SEA for a European currency (6.7); a single market (6.11; 6.13); and the institution of the EEC will be looked at in detail.

Part Three of the Chapter will analyse the evolution of the discourse used by both sides in the debate on the Bill, and the discourses used by the EC institutions to analyse and to guide the discourse to non-disruptive formation.

#### 6.2: The SEA's content.

The SEA was signed by Germany on January 1985 by the Federal Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher. It consisted of 50 articles. Article 1 and article 2 of the SEA had the purpose of making concrete previous Treaty provisions and the status of the European Council (European Council, 1984, p. 21). Articles 4 to 27 dealt with monetary union, including the European Monetary System, 1986, and article 28 concerned the European Committee.

## **CHAPTER SIX: HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES ON THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT/EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (AMENDMENT) BILL IN 1986.**

### **6.1: What this Chapter covers.**

This Chapter is primarily concerned with examining the discourse used during the debates held in the House of Commons during 1986 about the contents of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, which incorporated the contents of the SEA into British law.

In the next Section (6.2) the contents of the SEA will be discussed. This will be followed by an outline of the progress the Bill made through Parliament during 1986 (6.3) and some of the methodological issues which arise from trying to examine the details of the debates (6.4).

Part One of this Chapter is concerned with the debate on the Second Reading of the Bill on April 23rd 1986 (6.5; 6.6). Part Two examines some of the debates which occurred during the Committee stage of the Bill's passage. In particular, debates concerning the proposals in the SEA for a Court of First Instance (6.7; 6.8); increased powers for the European Parliament (6.9; 6.10); a single market (6.11; 6.12); and tax harmonisation (6.13; 6.14) will be looked at in detail.

Part Three of the Chapter will discuss the nature of the discourse used by both sides of the side (6.15); relate the discourse used to theories of discourse (6.16); and relate the discourse to non-discursive formations.

### **6.2: The SEA's contents.**

The SEA was signed in Luxembourg in December 1985 by the twelve members of the EC and eventually came into force in July 1987. It consisted of 34 articles. Articles 1 to 3 outlined the SEA's purpose of making concrete progress towards European Unity and the status of the European Council (European Communities, 1986, p.3); Articles 4 to 29 dealt with amendments to the founding treaties (European Communities, 1986, pp.4-19); Article 30 provided for a

permanent secretariat to service European Political Cooperation (EPC) (European Communities, 1986, pp.19-22); while Articles 31 to 34 outlined the procedures necessary for the ratification of the SEA (European Communities, 1986, pp.22-3).

Three main themes informed the SEA. First, the need to complete the EC's internal market. In order to achieve this, the EC's role was strengthened by the SEA in a number of policy areas, such as economics and finance; the environment; social issues; and R&D.

Second, the SEA covered EPC. The European Commission was made an equal of EC foreign ministers in the area of EPC, with the European Parliament's views in this area being considered more.

Third, the SEA envisaged major institutional reforms for the EC. For instance, in the Council of Ministers unanimous voting would be restricted to decisions on EC membership applications and the general principles of new policies. Furthermore, a greater use of QMV would be provided for, particularly when considering issues related to completing the internal market. The Council of Ministers' ability to ignore the European Parliament was also reduced as the two were required to "co-operate" in the legislative process, allowing the Parliament a "Second Reading" of proposed legislation concerning the internal market. If the Parliament was to reject or amend a Council of Ministers' decision, only an unanimous agree of the Council could overturn the Parliament's decision. The SEA also created a Court of First Instance to reduce the workload of the Court of Justice (Europa Publications, 1991, pp.78-9).

### **6.3: The SEA's passage through Parliament.**

The Thatcher Government introduced the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, incorporating the Articles of the SEA to the House of Commons on March 27th 1986, where an unopposed First Reading was secured (HC Debates, 27 March 1986: col.1083). The Second Reading of the Bill took place on April 23rd, with the Government securing a majority of 159 (HC Debates, 23 April 1986: cols.316-97). On June 16th the Committee stage of the Bill began,

which continued, intermittently, during June (HC Debates, 16 June 1986: cols.812-82; HC Debates, 26 June 1986: cols.483-596; HC Debates, 27 June 1986: cols.597-664), until the Government proposed to "guillotine" the time allocated to debating the Bill (HC Debates, 27 June 1986: cols.666-70). After complaints from MPs opposed to the Bill (HC Debates, 30 June 1986: cols.705-9) a debate was held on the allocation of time for debating the Bill, followed by a vote supporting the Government (HC Debates, 1 July 1986: cols.931-82). On July 10th a truncated Committee stage and Third Reading took place, which ended with a Government majority of 106 in support of the Bill (HC Debates, 10 July 1986: cols.504-72). After further debates in the House of Lords (HL Debates, 31 July 1986: cols.1004-34, 1046-88; HL Debates, 8 October 1986: cols.246-95, 297-344; HL Debates, 17 October 1986: cols. 1035-92; HL Debates, 27 October 1986: col.509; HL Debates, 3 November 1986: cols.913-59), the Bill received Royal Assent on November 7th 1986 (HL Debates, 7 November 1986: col.1253).

#### **6.4: Methodological issues.**

In considering the methodological issues which arise when studying the debates in the Commons on the European Communities (Amendment) Bill possibly the most important is what constitutes in this context "anti-EC" and "pro-EC" political actors. The simple answer is those voting against the Bill are "anti-EC", and those supporting it are "pro-EC". While this is a good working definition to inform this Chapter a caveat arises. For instance, as will be shown later, some Labour MPs voting against the Bill are not entirely negative towards certain EC institutions and policies.

A second methodological issue concerns which debates about the Bill to look at, particularly as debate was curtailed by the aforementioned Government "guillotine". It would therefore seem most profitable to look at those debates **not** curtailed by lack of time, and where MPs were able to put at reasonable length their reasons for opposing or supporting the Bill, or amendments to it. Consequently, the debates looked at are the Second Reading and the

debates in Committee on amendments designed to delete from the Bill Articles of the SEA providing for the Court of First Instance; giving extra powers to the European Parliament; and effectively allowing EC members to opt-out of those measures introduced by the EC designed to create a genuine internal market. In addition, the debate on amendments deleting Articles providing for future EC-wide tax harmonisation is also looked at, despite being the particular debate in process when the "guillotine" was introduced.

The debates chosen were also considered worth examining as they can be anticipated to include "nationalist", "pragmatic" and "ideological" discourse. For instance, the Second Reading debate might be anticipated to contain statements giving "nationalist", "pragmatic" and "ideological" reasons for opposing or supporting the Bill. In contrast, "anti-EC" discourse in the debates on the Court of First Instance and the European Parliament can be expected to have statements referring to the "nationalist" object of discourse of Parliamentary Sovereignty. It could be expected the debate on the internal market to contain statements that are either "pragmatic", referring to the material costs or benefits of an internal market, or "ideological", with the SEA being presented, either favourably or unfavourably, as an extension of Thatcherite free market economics to the EC. Finally, the debate on tax harmonisation can be anticipated as being a debate dominated by "pragmatic" discourse centring upon whether such "harmonisation" would mean the scope and levels of VAT in Britain would begin to approach those on the Continent. In short, the discourse in the debates examined can be reasonably expected **not** to consist entirely of "nationalist statements about Parliamentary Sovereignty.

A third methodological issue is that, when examining what MPs said in the debates covered, it is necessary to differentiate between those making speeches and those making "interventions". What those MPs said when "intervening" are not considered in this Chapter. The main reason for this is that it is only in speeches are MPs able, at length, to explain "why" they oppose or support the Bill or a particular amendment to it. "Interventions" in these debates, even when they are not points of order concerning

Parliamentary "technicalities" are not able to achieve this.

It is also necessary to make two general points about the discourse and themes used in these debates.

First, despite this supposedly being a Bill about further British **integration** into the EC, rather than about British **membership**, some speakers, particularly those opposed to British membership, tend to use arguments and discourse which suggest that British membership, rather than the SEA itself, is **the central issue** of the debates.

Second, the SEA gave increased powers or influence to particular EC institutions, such as the European Parliament, or institutional arrangements, such as QMV, which "anti-EC" political actors see as undermining Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty. Consequently, "anti-EC" discourse in these debates will be examined not only for general attacks upon the EC/SEA undermining Parliamentary Sovereignty, but also for criticisms of **particular facets** of the EC which have achieved, or are attempting to achieve, this.

## PART ONE: DEBATE ON THE SECOND READING OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (AMENDMENT) BILL.

### 6.5: Second Reading: "anti-EC" speakers.

There were ten MPs in this debate who were to vote against the Bill. Their objects of discourse are shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on the Second Reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill in opposing the SEA/EC membership.

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
Material costs of EC membership/further European integration outweigh the material benefits:	10
"National internationalist" duties/commitments:	8
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the SEA:	5
The SEA will further strengthen the EC's pro-capitalist, anti-socialist/planning tendencies:	4

Table 6.1 shows that all "anti-EC" speakers made statements referring either or both to the existing material costs of EC membership to Britain or the further material costs which the introduction of the SEA would impose. Table 6.2 shows the system of dispersion within this "pragmatic" discourse.

**Table 6.2: Frequency of the material costs of the SEA/EC membership cited by "anti-EC" MPs during the debate on the Second Reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill.**

Costs	Number of speakers citing cost
The SEA will not stop the CAP continuing to have an adverse effect upon Britain and British agriculture:	6
The SEA will not mean that Britain will stop paying more into the EC's Budget than is given back to it:	5
The SEA will mean that there will be further impositions of VAT upon Britain:	5
The SEA will not lead to a reduction in unemployment levels caused by Britain's EC membership:	4
The SEA will cause further problems for British industry and manufacturing:	4
The SEA will not reduce the adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's balance of payments:	3
The SEA will not reduce the artificially high food prices Britain has had to pay for being in the EC:	1
The SEA will not reduce the adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's relatively depressed economic regions:	1
The SEA will not prevent further major shifts in investment from Britain to the EC:	1
The SEA will not reduce the adverse effects that the EC's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has had upon Britain's fishing industry:	1

Furthermore, Table 6.1 demonstrates that the majority of "anti-EC" speakers in this debate make statements belonging to a "national internationalist" discursive formation. Table 6.3 shows the system of dispersion within this "national internationalist" discursive formation.

Edward du Cann (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.333) is one example of an MP who makes "national internationalist" statements in the debate. In particular, he bemoans the loss of Britain's traditional world-role since joining the EC:

**Table 6.3: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited "national internationalist" reasons to oppose, or alternatives to, the SEA/EC during the debate on the Second Reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill.**

Reasons/alternatives	Number of speakers citing reason /alternative
The SEA will not help Britain help Third World economic development/Britain should pursue policies independent of the EC to promote Third World economic development:	3
The SEA will further loosen ties between Britain and the Commonwealth/Britain should increase its Commonwealth links:	2
The SEA will increase the EC's protectionist, anti-free trade tendencies/Britain should promote international free trade:	1
The SEA will further reduce Britain's links with the "wider world"/Britain should increase its links with the "wider world":	1

In signing the treaty of Rome we abandoned some flexibility in...matters of foreign policy and trade....we have now taken on board a new rigidity of discipline in foreign policy and trade matters which in the end...will serve this country less well than a more flexible position would have done."

Other speakers make statements claiming that EC membership means it impossible for Britain to carry out its traditional "internationalist" duties on behalf of the Third World and Commonwealth:

"It would be a serious mistake...for us to co-ordinate our external policies with a club of rich nations....That will not resolve the world's north-south problems. It would be much better to give greater prominence to using the Commonwealth in tackling these problems." -Eric Deakins (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.349).

"Those who care about the Third World should think about what this dumping [of EC food to the Soviet Union and Libya] is doing to the poorest countries in the world. It is depriving them of a decent price for their produce and spreading devastation, destruction and debt." -Teddy Taylor (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.369).

"...will the legislation that we are debating

tonight enable the Commission both to protect and promote the interests of African, Caribbean and Pacific cane sugar producing countries that export part of their produce to EEC member states?" -Norman Goodman (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.380).

From the Labour benches, however, other "internationalist" statements were made which differed considerably from traditional "anti-EC" discourse. The Second Reading debate took place barely a week after the USA had bombed Libya from air bases in Britain, an event which was disapproved of not only by many people in Britain, but also by most EC governments (Campbell, 1986, pp.341-5).

Consequently, several Labour speakers in the Second Reading debate attacked the Thatcher Government for its slavishness towards the Reagan Administration, which was pursuing policies that broke with the USA's previously "internationalist" outlook towards world affairs. In doing so, the Western Alliance had been split in two, with Britain isolated from its EC partners:

"A new and frightening split has developed between the traditional allies in Western Europe and the United States of America, with the Community incapable of persuading President Reagan of the consequences and dangers of his recklessness. A trade war with the United States is not far away either....

"It is not just on Libya that Her Majesty's Government depart from the European line. They vetoed the common line on South Africa....They ignored the united voice expressed among our partners about the Falkland Islands, where we stand alone. They ignored the unanimous advice offered on our supine withdrawal from UNESCO, and they show none of the genuine feeling of concern for American actions in central America that is shared by our European partners."

-George Robertson (HC Debates 23 April 1986: cols.326, 329).

"...in 33 categories the Americans are applying protectionism. I am not sure that this is consistent with the policies that the Community, in co-operation with the United States, would wish to see pursued." -Tom Clarke (HC Debates, 23 April 1986: col.370).

"How did the Government take account of partners' views...when they took the unilateral

decision to co-operate with the United States of America in that illegal air strike? From UNESCO it is clear that we did not take the European position....It is clear that in the bombing of Libya the Government did not take the European position but were a political figleaf of the United States. Let us hope that...in relation to central America...the Government will take the European view and not act as Reagan's poodle as they have done in other areas." -George Foulkes (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.385).

At the same time, however, accusations of being "nationalist" anti-Americans were denied by Labour MPs, who argued that the Reagan Administration's policies were a temporary deviation from the USA's "internationalist" traditions:

"The Labour Party is not anti-American, it never has been, and it is unlikely to be in the future." -George Robertson (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.330).

"Some hon. Members suggested...that anti-Americanism is evident on Opposition Benches.... It is not anti-American to take the view that I take. It certainly is not true today that America has the leadership it deserves... -Tom Clarke (HC Debates, 23 April 1986: col.371).  
"We are against some aspects of the foreign policy of President Reagan and the present US Administration, but that does not mean that we are anti-American, against the people of the United States." -George Foulkes (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.385).

As has been strongly hinted at in the previous set of quotes from the Debate, Labour speakers, particularly their front-bench spokesmen, George Robertson and George Foulkes, support British involvement in European foreign policy cooperation. Their opposition to the SEA in this instance seems rests to rest on the argument that it would be ineffectual means to achieve its end, as it would not rein in the Conservatives' extreme pro-Americanism. Consequently, in George Robertson's words (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.371), "the importance of European co-operation was being undermined" by the SEA.

Indeed, Tom Clarke (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.371) goes further in praising the "internationalism" of the EC:

"I think it is fair to say that the Community... now has a more progressive view on such matters as the Iran-Iraq war, South Africa and East-West relations in addition to the growing problem of central America."

Half of the "anti-EC" MPs speaking in this debate made statements whose object of discourse was British Parliamentary Sovereignty.

Table 6.4 shows the system of dispersion for this discursive formation.

**Table 6.4: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the SEA/EC that undermined British Parliamentary Sovereignty during the debate on the Second Reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill.**

Aspect	"Initially I was opposed to the European Community, but after a period as a Member of the European Parliament I recognised that advantages in working with members of the European Parliament's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	Number of speakers citing aspect
The SEA increases the European Parliament's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:		4
The SEA will lead to the EC becoming a Federal Union:		3
QMV in the Council of Ministers will reduce the British Parliament's powers:		3
The SEA increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:		1
The SEA increases the European Commission's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:		1

The majority of the statements made in this Second Reading debates by "anti-EC" speakers which referred to the SEA's threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty were very similar in semiotic values to those used by "anti-EC" political actors in the 1975 Referendum campaign:

"It is right that we in this House should be concerned about and interested in the constitutional proposals in front of us. We have very good reasons in practical terms to be most proud of our own constitution and the experience which we have evolved over the centuries."

"It is the duty of us all of us...to defend our constitution and all it stands for with all the strength we can possibly command.

"...this is not the time to agree any derogation

of our national sovereignty." - Edward du Cann (HC Debates 23 April 1986: cols.332-4).

"...we are seeing the beginning of a struggle between the Assembly [European Parliament] and the Council [of Ministers], with the Commission openly backing the Assembly in its desire to get more power away from the Council and, therefore, away from national Parliaments." -Eric Deakins (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.348)

Despite many "anti-EC" speakers in the debate making statements condemning the SEA as threatening Parliamentary Sovereignty, some Labour MPs made statements which showed that they were not negative in their attitudes towards particular EC institutions. For instance, former MEP Ann Clwyd (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.355) declares that:

"Initially I was opposed to the European Community, but after a period as a Member of the European Parliament I recognised that there are advantages in working with peoples of other nationalities from day to day....It had a positive effect on me and it changed my attitudes towards the European Community."

Furthermore, Clwyd asks whether:

"...the European Parliament might become more effective than the Westminster Parliament? I believe that in 20 years time the European Parliament will be more important than the House of Commons."

Another example of a Labour MP making less than hostile statements in this debate about particular EC institutions is Tom Clarke (HC Debates 23 April 1986: cols.369-70), who expresses a rather positive attitude towards the European Court of Justice:

"The European Courts offer, if perhaps not more experience, certainly fresh attitudes to many manners. They are not bogged down by commitments to the establishment and they can bear in mind the demands of the modern world."

Even George Foulkes (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.383) on the

Labour front-bench expresses qualified support for the European Parliament:

Benefits "...if the increased powers...proposed are at the expense of the non-elected Commission...we shall consider them sympathetically."

Foulkes, however, is not prepared to see British Parliamentary Sovereignty undermined by the SEA:

"If the proposals are to be implemented at the expense of sovereign Governments and sovereign Parliaments...we shall examine them more sceptically and be more concerned about them."

### 6.6: Second Reading: "pro-EC" speakers.

Nine MPs speaking in the Second Reading debate voted for the Bill. Table 6.5 outlines which objects of discourse they made statements about.

**Table 6.5: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on the Second Reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill in supporting the SEA/EC membership.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
Material benefits arising from the SEA/EC membership outweigh the material costs:	8
British sovereignty is not weakened by the SEA:	7
Involvement in further European integration is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	6
The SEA is a further bulwark against socialism/communism:	1

Most "pro-EC" MPs made statements referring to the SEA's material benefits. Table 6.6 shows the system of dispersion for this "pragmatic" discourse.

As in "anti-EC" MPs' references to the material consequences of the SEA, the "pragmatic" discourse utilised by "pro-EC" MPs is very similar to that employed during the 1975 Referendum campaign. The notable exceptions are more statements in the Second Reading debate referring to technological cooperation within the EC, and fewer

**Table 6.6: Frequency that the material benefits of the SEA/EC membership are cited by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on the Second Reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill.**

Benefits	Number of speakers citing benefit
SEA provides Britain with a larger market/more trade:	7
The SEA will allow Britain to co-operate more with EC members in the fields of R&D and technology:	6
The SEA will lead to lower unemployment:	5
The SEA will lead to more EC regional aid:	3
The SEA will improve Britain's industrial performance:	2
The SEA will increase British prosperity and living standards:	1
The SEA will lead to lower prices:	1
The EC guarantees Britain a secure food supply:	1
The SEA will lead to greater competition:	1

statements referring to the EC as a guarantor of a secure food supply for Britain.

It is the potential material benefits, particularly the creation of a genuine internal market for the EC that Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.318), proposing the Second Reading of the Bill, emphasises:

"Most important of all is the introduction of a commitment and timetable for completion of the common or internal market as one of the principal goals of the treaty..."

Most of the "pro-EC" speakers in the debate also make statements addressing the issue of whether the SEA will undermine British sovereignty. There are two ways that this issue is addressed.

First, "pro-EC" MPs make statements denying that the SEA will affect Britain's effective sovereignty and lead to a Federal EC:

"Henceforth, the [European] Parliament will have to give its agreement before these [new] accessions [to EC membership] can take place. This change does not diminish the role of national Parliaments. No new accession can take place without the consent of this Parliament and of every other national Parliament."

"We are not talking about the declaration or proclamation of a United States of Europe or

Table 6.7 shows reasons to support the Second Reading of the SEA Bill about vague political or legal goals.... "No doubt the House will hear a good deal... on the about the fearful constitutional fantasies that preoccupy them. Those are terrors for children; not for me." -Geoffrey Howe (HC Debates 23 April 1986: cols. 323, 325).

The SEA will influence international relations: "There is no question in our minds of European union, or movement towards European union, meaning ipso facto, the creation of a federalist state." -Geoffrey Rippon (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.350).

The SEA will influence Europe: "...[the claim that] an enhanced role for the European Parliament would mean a reduced role for other institutions....is a dangerous fallacy....life is not a zero sum game." -Lynda Chalker (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.390).

Second, an increased role for the European Parliament is presented as strengthening, not weakening, British Parliamentary Sovereignty:

"I favour the democratic system and would like Strasbourg and Westminster to exercise more control." -Michael Knowles (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.344).

"I cannot see how anybody who holds democracy dear to his heart can object to a proposal of this nature [increasing the European Parliament's powers]." -Lynda Chalker (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.373).

A majority of "pro-EC" MPs also make "internationalist" statements. Table 6.7 shows the system of dispersion in this discursive formation.

Four "pro-EC" MPs mentioned protecting the environment as an "internationalist" duty, perhaps showing a growth in environmental awareness in British politics and society during the 1980s. The other "internationalist" statements made, however, echo similar themes to those used in "pro-EC" discourse in the 1975 Referendum campaign. For instance, the opponents of the SEA are branded as isolationists:

"Some hon. members have put before us a will o' the wisp which has long gone- the idea of an independent Britain. We hear faint echoes of the 19th century in their speeches but that concept

**Table 6.7: Frequency that "pro-EC" MPs cited "internationalist" reasons to support the SEA/EC membership during the debate on the Second Reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill.**

Reasons	Number of speakers citing reason
The SEA will help Britain protect the environment:	4
If Britain does not support the SEA, it will be internationally isolated:	2
The SEA will allow Britain to increase its global influence:	2
Further European integration will lessen the chances of war starting in Europe:	2
The SEA will help Britain represent the interests of wider Europe in the EC more:	2
The SEA will allow Britain and the EC to help the Third World more:	1
The SEA will help Britain represent the interests of the Commonwealth in the EC more:	1
The EC is an "internationalist" organisation; British support for the SEA will strengthen the EC's "internationalist" outlook:	1

has gone. They cannot offer a future independent Britain." -Michael Knowles (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.342).

"Since when has the Labour Party become so obstinately isolationist that it cannot even support measures to improve the quality of life and the environment?" -Geoffrey Rippon (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.352).

It is also claimed that cooperation with the EC is a means to pursue Britain's traditional "internationalist" goals:

"...national goals can only be achieved in co-operation with our Community partners. The most fundamental of those goals has always been the preservation of peace and the enhancement of democracy. The Single European Act serves that fundamental objective." -Geoffrey Howe (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.326).

"...the EC...is...better than any alternative organisation which could conceivably be brought into existence to replace it...and incomparably better than a reversion to...nationalist power horse trading...which is what the enemies of the Community...apparently want." -Anthony Meyer (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.381).

Another echo of the "internationalist" discourse used in 1975 is

the use by "pro-EC" MPs of "counter-nationalist" statements arguing that the EC can be used as a vehicle to increase Britain's global influence:

"The events of the past week [the bombing of Libya] illustrate clearly...the need for us in Europe to be able to speak with one voice, and the enormous influence that we can have on events in other parts of the world if only we are prepared to get together and co-operate."

-John Butterfill (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.374).

"Pro-EC" MPs also make statements arguing that Britain has "internationalist" duties to the rest of the world, such as Western European countries outside the EC:

"...We must show that we as a country are concerned about...the other members of the European family....we should not forget our partners in EFTA, bearing in mind that one of our reasons for joining the Community was to protect EFTA's interests.

"...We should not allow Europe to be split in two with a widening gap between states that are members of the Community and those that are not." -Geoffrey Rippon (HC Debates 23 April 1986: col.354).

Before examining some of the debates at the Committee stage of the Bill, it is worth saying that the Second Reading saw the expression of quite a wide cross-section of opinions concerning the SEA and the EC. At the Committee stage, however, the debates are dominated by some of the most vociferous "anti" and "pro-EC" MPs. Consequently, these debates have a tendency to come across as heated discussions about whether Britain should stay in the EC, rather than serious discussions about various parts of the SEA.

## PART TWO: THE COMMITTEE STAGE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (AMENDMENT) BILL.

### 6.7: "Anti-EC" opposition to the Court of First Instance.

Three amendments were proposed which would have deleted from the Bill the Articles of the SEA which allow for the creation of a Court of First Instance, designed to mitigate a threefold increase in cases coming before the European Court of Justice over a ten year period (HC Debates, 16 June 1986: col.872).

Five MPs spoke in support of these amendments to the Bill. Table 6.8 shows the objects of their discourse.

**Table 6.8: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on amendments deleting SEA Articles allowing for a Court of First Instance.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the SEA:	5
Material costs of EC membership/further European integration outweigh the material benefits:	2
"National internationalist" duties/commitments:	1

Not surprisingly, it is the perceived threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty which animates most "anti-EC" discourse in this debate. Table 6.9 shows the system of dispersion in reference to this object of discourse.

**Table 6.9: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the EC that undermined British Parliamentary Sovereignty during the debate on amendments deleting SEA Articles allowing for a Court of First Instance.**

Aspects	Number of speakers citing aspect
The SEA increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	5
The SEA will further impose an alien system of law-making upon Britain:	3
The SEA will lead to the EC becoming a Federal Union:	1
The SEA increases the European Commission's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	1

All five "anti-EC" MPs made statements concerning the European Court of Justice's potential to undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty and Westminster's law-making powers:

"The European Court will decide what the Single European Act does. It will not be the Government, me or other members of Parliament. That will be decided by the European Court, which will interpret the new treaty." -Teddy Taylor (HC Debate 16 June 1986: col.831).

"...we have the monstrosity of the delegation by this provision of a form of legislation which is incompatible with the principles and spirit of our constitution...." -Enoch Powell (HC Debates 16 June 1986: cols.843-4).

"We are now setting up a second tier of courts to which the citizens of this land, and perhaps corporate bodies, will have first recourse, which are not under the aegis of the Crown... will not be subject to the statutes of the House or to its determination." -Nigel Spearing (HC Debates 16 June 1986: col.867).

These MPs also criticised the proposed

Several "anti-EC" MPs also criticised the proposed expansion of the Court of Justice because it would lead to a further extension of a continental system of law-making over its Anglo-Saxon equivalent, previously discussed in Section 3.7. The fear expressed by "anti-EC" MPs is that Continental judges, making up a majority in the Court of Justice, interpret the Treaty of Rome and the SEA in terms of general principles rather than through specificities and precedence. Consequently, argues Teddy Taylor (HC Debates 16 June 1986: cols.826, 830), the proposer of the amendments:

"The Minister will accept that the [EC] courts ...have extended their jurisdiction because... they do not take the same view of the law as do the British courts."

"...even the preamble which refers to a commitment to European union could affect decisions before the new court and before the old court."

Taylor's second quote touches on fears expressed by some "anti-EC" MPs that the European Court of Justice, with or without a extra Court of First Instance, is inherently a pro-Federalist institution. Eric Deakins (HC Debates 16 June 1986: col.855), in particular, sees behind these institutional reforms a cleverly hidden pro-Federalist agenda:

"The European Court will get rid of all the mundane cases which...are clogging up the works. If the top European Court gets rid of all those mundane cases will it not have much more time to deal with what it would regard as the important cases which because the court is federalist by nature, will advance the cause of European Union? More and more of the court's judgements and time spent pontificating on these matters and directing national Governments towards European union. At present, the court is being held back from doing that because it cannot push on to a subsidiary courts...minor cases..."

#### 6.8: "Pro-EC" support for the Court of First Instance.

Three MPs spoke in the debate who voted against the proposed amendments. One of them, Bill Cash, merely bemoaned the lack of useful information and knowledge in the public domain about the EC's institutions and legal system (HC Debate 16 April 1986: cols.863-4). Lynda Chalker (HC Debates 16 June 1986: col.879), speaking on behalf of the Government front-bench, defended the establishment of the Court of First Instance, presenting it as a:

"...sensible, clear-cut and eminently practical measure can ease the load on the European Court of Justice in a forthright and sensible way."

Both Chalker and John Butterfill, the other MP to speak in favour of the proposed Court, also down-played the constitutional importance of the measure, and denied that it was a potential threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty. Butterfill (HC Debates 16 June 1986: col.844) declared that:

"The dangers of some amazing new court with amazing new powers emerging have been grossly over-stressed because the court will not have new powers, It will not have any powers which are not possessed already by the European Court."

Chalker (HC Debates 16 June 1986: cols.874, 875) also denied that major constitutional issues were at stake:

Table 6.9: Commonest Party Line with regard to aspects of the EC during the debate on the powers of the

"Those substantial powers of the court can be changed only by treaty amendment and that would require the unanimous agreement of the member states and the consent of national Parliaments."

"...substantive changes of the Court's powers will have to go before national Parliaments.

There is nothing in the Single European Act or in the Bill that alters that in any way."

The SEA increases no reducing the powers of the European Parliament.

### 6.8: "Anti-EC" opposition to increased powers for the European Parliament.

Eight amendments were proposed to delete the Bill's Articles that increased the European Parliament's powers. Eleven MPs spoke in the debate to express support for these amendments. Table 6.10 shows the objects of their discourse.

Table 6.10: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on amendments deleting SEA Articles increasing the powers of the European Parliament.

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the SEA:	11
"National internationalist" duties/commitments:	4
Material costs of EC membership/further European integration outweigh the material benefits:	2
Distrust of France:	1
Distrust of Germany:	1

All the "anti-EC" MPs speaking in the debate made statements referring to the threat posed to British Parliamentary Sovereignty by the Articles of the SEA under discussion. Table 6.11 shows the system of dispersion for this discursive formation.

All the "anti-EC" speakers in this debate opposed the proposed increases in the powers of the European Parliament. There were, however, a number of distinct reasons expressed in their speeches for this opposition.

First, several MPs argue that an increase in the European Parliament's powers necessarily must lead to a decrease in the

**Table 6.11: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the EC that undermined British Parliamentary Sovereignty during the debate on amendments deleting SEA Articles increasing the powers of the European Parliament.**

Aspects	"This Bill takes powers away from both British people and this House and gives them to the European Assembly." -Tony Marlow (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.523)	Number of speakers citing aspect
The SEA increases the European Parliament's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:		11
The SEA will lead to the EC becoming a Federal Union:		3
The SEA increases the European Commission's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:		3
QMV in the Council of Ministers will reduce the British Parliament's powers:		2
The SEA increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:		1

powers formally residing in Westminster:

second, the proposal in the SEA that the European Parliament and Council of Ministers should be regarded by the British Parliament as seen in direct accountability result of the

The proposal is that the authority of the European Assembly should be greatly increased. In effect it follows that there must be an equivalent decrease in the authority of United Kingdom Ministers. It follows, too, that equally there must be a decrease in the authority of United Kingdom Parliaments from whom Ministers are selected and to whom hitherto they have been answered." -Edward du Cann (HC Debates 26 June 1986: cols.485-90).

"Whatever is arrogated to the Assembly by the legislation and the treaty is deducted from what is available to this Parliament and, thus, the people it represents.

"No unoccupied ground or unexplored territory can be colonised by the Assembly without a diminution in the control and powers of this House." -Enoch Powell (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.495).

"It will begin the long-term decline of this Parliament's sovereign powers."

"We care about parliamentary sovereignty. We understand it, and we don't want to see its powers eroded. We do not want to see this House being downgraded to the status of a county council." -Jonathan Aitken (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.523).

"We will have fewer powers in the Westminster Parliament....That is bad not because it is taking away powers from us as individuals, but because it is taking away the rights of the people of this country, exercised through us.... As powers leave us to go to that Assembly, we

should become something rather like a county council with limited delegated functions...."  
-Ron Leighton (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.525).

"This Bill takes powers away from both the British people and this House and gives them to the European Assembly." -Tony Marlow (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.527).

As in the Second Reading debate, Labour front-bencher George Foulkes (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.390) condemns any shift of sovereignty from Britain's Parliament to the European one:

"...we regard it as a significant transfer of power, from Westminster to Strasbourg, as well as Brussels."

Second, the proposal in the SEA that the European Parliament and Council of Ministers should "co-operate" in the legislative sphere is regarded by "anti-EC" speakers as another attack upon British Parliamentary Sovereignty. As British Ministers in the Council are seen as directly accountable to Parliament, their argument runs, the SEA reduces the power of these Ministers and their accountability to Parliament. "Anti-EC" MPs argue than the net result of "cooperation" is:

"...the power of the United Kingdom Government in the Council will be reduced....It will be difficult for any Government...to resist a united front of the Commission of the European Parliament and the rest of the Council." -George Foulkes (HC Debate 26 June 1986: col.493).

"It is only through the Council that this House can assert itself. It is only in the Council that the members of the Government who are answerable to the House can assert themselves."  
"...it is the Commission and the Assembly, jointly, which are given an accretion of power at the expense of this House- the Council and, therefore, at the expense of this House- the Council being the only element which can be directly influenced and ultimately controlled by the Parliament and people of the United Kingdom." -Enoch Powell (HC Debates 26 June 1986: cols.495-6).

Third, the SEA's expansion of the European Parliament's powers

is regarded by some MPs as a move towards a Federal EC:

"It is a great step towards the creation of a European super-state and of a European political union." -Edward du Cann (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.488).

"...we are against moving towards a united states of Europe. We are against the kind of union that is implicit and explicit in the Single European Act and the Bill that implements it." -George Foulkes (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.495).

"The only way that one could justify giving authority to anyone overseas...would be as part of a European system of government, which I completely reject. I do not want to see Britain as part of a federal Europe or any form of European union." -Eric Deakins (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.513).

A fourth element present in the "anti-EC" discourse used in this debate is the argument that, despite being an elected body, the European Parliament is not one with democratic legitimacy that can inspire genuine loyalty from the British people:

"...merely to be elected is not to be democratic, in the sense that we understand it. There is a certain relationship between electorate and elected body upon which the very nature of parliamentary sovereignty and our claim to be a representative body depends.

"Our Parliament implies a homogeneous electorate. It implies a single nation that elects the disparate Members who sit together in the House, it is the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Parliament that assembles in Strasbourg is an assembly of those who have been elected in different systems, to congregate together. They do not come together as the representatives of a single self-recognising community. The nature of that assembly is different in kind from the nature of this Parliament." -Enoch Powell (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.498).

"We all recognise ourselves as being members of a political unit. The proof of that is when there is an election. Sometimes we win elections and sometimes we lose. Losing is painful, but we do not question it."

"I wonder whether that loyalty and the

recognition of entity could conceivably be transferred to some great amorphous group of a dozen nations if an assembly or parliament not elected by us or removable by us were to carry out policies that we thought were damaging to us." -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.525).

Fifth, "anti-EC" MPs claim that the transfer of powers to the European Parliament is a betrayal of Britain's Parliamentary democratic past, Constitution and "the peoples'" struggles for the vote::

"'Parliament' is a word of magic in this country. We refer to 'parliamentary sovereignty'....Our history and political life would be unintelligible if Parliament were removed from that history. There is no other European nation at the heart of whose identity and history lies its parliamentary sovereignty." -Enoch Powell (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.497).

"Our present liberties and freedoms have been fought for and achieved by the struggles of our forefathers going back to Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Chartist, the Reform Bill and women's suffrage. We have inherited these rights and liberties as Members of this Parliament. We are the custodians of those rights and liberties. We are responsible for handing them onto future generations." -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 26 June 1986: cols.525-6).

"The heritage of our people and the power and influence of this nation's democracy are being cast on one side in three or four short parliamentary days." -Tony Marlow (HC Debates 26 June 1986: cols.527-8).

Sixth, two long-standing "anti-EC" Labour MPs use the theme of defending the constitutional position of the British Sovereign in order to attack the SEA's proposals for the European Parliament:

"The royal prerogative will be substantially affected by the new power given to the Assembly. ...Whatever one thinks of its exercise, perhaps the Minister can tell us if the Queen's consent has been notified to this diminution of an ancient right of the monarch and the Crown and the Queen in Parliament." -Eric Deakins (HC

Debates 26 June 1986: col.516).

"The power of the monarch and of the Crown is affected because legislation which comes direct from Brussels does not pass through the House and does not receive the Royal Assent. That means that the Crown is bypassed." -Nigel Spearing (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.519).

The utilisation of other types of "nationalist" discourse are to be found in the speeches of "anti-EC" MPs speaking in this particular debate.

For instance, Teddy Taylor (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.505) in an attack on the European Parliament's apparent inability to control spending on the CAP invokes a "national internationalist" appeal to help the Third World:

"When £150 million a week is spent on dumping, destroying and storing food, something is wrong. It must sicken poor Mr. Geldof, who sweated his guts out to raise £100 million, to find that the Common Market spends 50 per cent more every week on dumping and destroying food."

Ron Leighton (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.525) invokes memories of Britain's "internationalism" in turning the British Empire into the Commonwealth to attack the EC:

"This country gave sovereignty to all the ex-colonies of the British empire- it was then held to be a very progressive thing to do. Now we are being asked to give up our own."

Bill Walker (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.517), in contrast, attacks the Liberal Party's European and Scottish Affairs spokesman, Russell Johnston, for calling him a "narrow nationalist" in opposing devolution for Scotland, while opposing Britain's involvement in the EC through the use of similar language:

"There is nothing narrow and national about being a Scot or arguing that we should have a Scottish Assembly. Yet those of us who are opposed to an Assembly in Europe are accused by the hon. Gentleman of being narrow and national. I have never understood the differentiation between Europe and Scotland. The demand for a

Table 6.10  
Scottish Assembly seems to me to be fairly narrow and national."

Table 6.10  
Jonathan Aitken also accuses the EC of being "narrowly nationalist" in not allowing Turkey to join the EC or allowing it to acquire associated status. This Aitken blames upon a "southern alliance" of Greece, Portugal and Spain, who jointly oppose Turkish entry in order to defend their agricultural interests (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.524). A similar fear is expressed by Tony Marlow, who sees QMV as a vehicle for promoting the collective interests of an alliance of smaller EC members, including the "southern alliance":

"...ganging up, [and] who have always been in the forefront of federalism, because that is how they achieve influence and power. Those nations will gang up. What power will our ministers have then?"

Aitken (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.523) also expresses his suspicions of the Southern European members of the EC when he attacks Italy for having anti-democratic tendencies:

"...the political heirs of Cavour and Mazzini, who united a rabble of minor states...less than 150 years ago, when there was no real tradition of democratic assemblies of Parliament, do not feel...for the traditions of a Parliament that has governed our country since the days of [sic] Simon de Montford."

The one other "anti-EC" speaker in the debate who uses anti-Continental discourse is Edward du Cann (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.489), who comments that, compared to Britain with its Parliament, "Not every European nation has the same proud tradition of democracy."

#### **6.10: "Pro-EC" support for increased powers for the European Parliament.**

Four speakers in this debate voted against the proposed amendments.

Table 6.12 shows their objects of discourse.

**Table 6.12: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on amendments deleting SEA Articles increasing the powers of the European Parliament.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
<b>British sovereignty is not weakened by the SEA:</b>	4
<b>Material benefits arising from the SEA/EC membership outweigh the material costs:</b>	1
<b>Involvement in further European integration is Britain's "internationalist" duty:</b>	1

"Pro-EC" speakers in the debate put forward three reasons in their discourse why increased powers for the European Parliament do not represent a genuine threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty.

First, as the European Parliament is directly elected, it is necessarily democratic, and so is not a threat to Britain's Parliamentary democracy:

"I...express great sadness at the fact that my right hon. friend [Edward du Cann] should so lack confidence in this Parliament's ability to put its ideas across to the rest of the world that he fears that, by allowing ourselves to be drawn into the operations of the European Parliament, we will prejudice the rights and privileges of the House." -Anthony Meyer (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.499).

"It is directly and democratically elected." -Lynda Chalker (HC Debates June 26 1986: col.537).

Second, "pro-EC" MPs use "Euro-Federalist" discourse and argue that the British Parliamentary Sovereignty is an obsolete illusion:

"...the right hon. Member for South Down [Enoch Powell]...defends the shadow of the absolute sovereignty of this Parliament. I shall refer rather more to the substance of this Parliament's sovereignty." -Anthony Meyer (HC Debates June 26 1986: col.498).

"The hon. Gentleman [Tony Marlow] dreams about the so-called democracy of this Chamber, about

which we hear so much. It is nothing like so facts of  
marvellous as some suggest....It is unrealistic  
to refer ritualistically to sovereignty and its  
erosion." -Russell Johnston (HC Debates 26 June  
1986: col.507).

"Any treaty agreement in relation to that [NATO]  
is more ominous in terms of the surrender of  
power from this place as a sovereign Parliament  
when compared to the European Community..."

-Hugh Dykes (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.511).

#### Theme

Third, "pro-EC" speakers argue that the increase in the European Parliament's powers will lead to an EC which is able to influence international affairs much more effectively. Consequently, Britain will be able to gain a greater degree of effective sovereignty, even though this will mean a reduction in the scope of its formal sovereignty:

"If the Community becomes effective, it will exercise real power and influence in the world. This Parliament, as a constituent member of that Community, may, in theory, have surrendered some of its powers to a European Parliament, but will exercise its powers, slightly limited, on matters in which it can influence events."  
-Anthony Meyer (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.499).

#### Costs

"...we shall see that the Community can make the kind of progress that members of the public in all the member states want, because they know that is...the freedom that comes more and more from being a citizen of an individual member state, and the feeling that Europe can survive and prosper only by acting more and more closely together through its developing and sophisticated parliamentary mechanisms." -Hugh Dykes (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.512).

### 6.11: "Anti-EC" opposition to the EC's "internal market".

There was a debate about six amendments to the Bill, which were designed to delete those Articles in the SEA which refer to the EC's ability to impose EC-wide Rules, Regulations and Directives, ostensibly to help create a genuine single market. The amendments would give EC member states the right to exempt themselves from these measures.

Eleven MPs spoke in favour of these amendments. Their objects of discourse are outlined in Table 6.13.

**Table 6.13: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on amendments deleting SEA Articles which required EC member states to impose measures meant to facilitate the creation of a single EC internal market."**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
Nearly all the "anti-EC" speakers in the debate on amendments deleting SEA articles which required EC member states to impose measures meant to facilitate the creation of a single EC internal market:	
<b>Material costs of EC membership/further European integration outweigh the material benefits:</b>	8
<b>"National internationalist" duties/commitments:</b>	8
<b>British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the SEA:</b>	5
<b>Distrust of Germany:</b>	4
<b>The SEA will further strengthen the EC's pro-capitalist, anti-socialist/planning tendencies:</b>	3
<b>Distrust of France:</b>	2
<b>The SEA will strengthen the EC's pro-socialist, anti-capitalist nature:</b>	1

**Table 6.14: Frequency that the material costs of the SEA/EC membership are cited by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on amendments deleting SEA articles which require EC member states to impose measures meant to facilitate the creation of a single EC internal market.**

Costs	Number of speakers citing cost
<b>The SEA will not reduce the adverse effect that EC membership has on Britain's balance of payments:</b>	5
<b>The SEA will not lead to a reduction in unemployment levels caused by Britain's EC membership:</b>	5
<b>The SEA will create further problems for British industry and manufacturing:</b>	4
<b>The SEA will not mean that Britain will stop paying more into the EC's Budget than is given back to it:</b>	3
<b>The SEA will not stop the CAP continuing to have an adverse effect upon Britain and British agriculture:</b>	3
<b>The SEA will mean that there will be further impositions of VAT upon Britain:</b>	3
<b>The SEA will not reduce the adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's relatively depressed regions:</b>	3
<b>The SEA will not reduce the artificially high food prices Britain has had to pay for being in the EC:</b>	2
<b>The SEA will not prevent further major shifts of investment from Britain to the EC:</b>	1

As can be seen, most "anti-EC" speakers made statements referring to both the material costs that the SEA would, and the EC already had, on Britain. Table 6.14 shows the system of dispersion of this "pragmatic" discourse.

The same number of "anti-EC" MPs, though, make "national internationalist" statements. Table 6.15 shows the system of dispersion in this discursive formation.

Nearly all the "anti-EC" speakers in the debate making "national internationalist" themes presented the EC's internal market not as an extension of Britain's traditional pursuit of international free trade, but a rejection of it. The SEA was seen as further binding Britain to a regional protectionist trading bloc which had nothing to do with free trade, while undermining Britain's traditional trading links with countries outside of the EC:

"Sadly the Common Market is in danger of becoming a nasty, protectionist organisation, disrupting world trade and undermining GATT."  
-Teddy Taylor (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.553).

"I have a deep-rooted prejudice in favour of freedom of trade....Unfortunately the EEC has nothing to do with freedom of trade." -Enoch Powell (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.554).

"The EEC was essentially a protectionist device. It is not a free trade area....This new proposition does virtually nothing to take away the Community's protectionist nature." -Roger Moate (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.564).

"Why are we so interested in the internal market instead of the international market? The United Kingdom has always looked at the whole world as its trading area. It has not adopted a parochial attitude and looked only at one part of one continent...If we believe that free trade is so advantageous and beneficial, why do we not look to free trade on a world-wide basis instead of erecting barriers like the Common External Tariff between ourselves and, for example, New Zealand?" -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 27 June 1986: col.610).

The SEA's threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty was referred to by most "anti-EC" speakers in the debate. Table 6.16 shows the system of dispersion within this discursive formation.

**Table 6.15: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited "national internationalist" reasons to oppose, or alternatives to, the SEA/EC during the debate on amendment deleting SEA Articles which require EC member states to impose measures meant to facilitate the creation of a single EC internal market.**

Reasons/alternatives	Number of speakers citing reason /alternative
The SEA will increase the EC's protectionist, anti-free trade tendencies/Britain should promote international free trade:	7
The SEA will further loosen links between Britain and the Commonwealth/Britain should increase its Commonwealth links:	2
The SEA will not help Britain help Third World economic development/Britain should pursue policies independent of the EC to promote Third World economic development:	1
The SEA will further reduce Britain's links with the "wider world"/Britain should increase its links with the "wider world":	1
The SEA will further reduce Britain's links with the rest of Europe/Britain should increased its links with the rest of Europe:	1

**Table 6.16: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the EC that undermined British Parliamentary Sovereignty during the debate on amendments deleting SEA articles which required EC member states to impose measures meant to facilitate the creation of a single EC internal market.**

Aspects	Number of speakers citing aspect
QMV in the Council of Ministers will reduce the British Parliament's powers:	4
The SEA increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	1
The SEA increases the European Commission's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	1

QMV, presented in the SEA as a means of facilitating the breakdown of internal trading barriers inside the EC through reducing the scope for national vetoes in the Council of Ministers, is seen by several "anti-EC" MPs as a means to simultaneously undermine Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty and its free trade traditions:

"At a later stage we in the United Kingdom who largely believe in free trade could find ourselves facing a combination of Governments... who, together with the Assembly and the Commission, wish to be protectionist. Therefore, ...we could be outvoted and find our tariffs against the Commonwealth and the rest of the world raised without...being able to do anything about it." -Tony Marlow (HC Debates 26 June 1986 col.541).

"I suggest that, instead of having freer trade ...within the EEC, we will get a whole host of new nasty directives imposing things on the British people which they do not want and which Parliament does not want." -Teddy Taylor (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.553).

"I do not think it is worth paying the price of constitutional sacrifice that we are making for the contents of this bill." -Roger Moate (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.563).

"Why should we agree to the approximation of legislation? Will that not hamper, harass and restrict what the House of Commons can do?

Surely we should have freedom to decide what is best for this country?" -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 27 June 1986: col.615).

"Anti-EC" MPs also made statements referring to other "nationalist" objects of discourse. For example, Dennis Skinner (HC Debates 27 June 1986: col.634) declares that "the Common Market...is not all Europe", and argues that:

"...we have not even fed the Third World. I remember the debates when countless people said the Common Market, together with Britain, would be able to feed the impoverished millions in Africa and in central and south America..."

"We have had the appalling experience of seeing that this much vaunted Common Market cannot even deliver on an international humanitarian basis."

Ron Leighton (HC Debates 27 June 1986: cols.611, 612) in the course of his speech, makes a "national internationalist" statement **par excellence**:

"We are internationalists. I am pro-European, pro-American, pro-South American, pro-Asian and pro-African. Perhaps I should define what an internationalist means. The word 'inter' means

between therefore, the word means between ~~nations~~  
nations. It presupposes the existence of  
separate, different and distinct nations." ~~of~~  
"We believe in co-operating, not just with a ~~little~~  
~~little group~~ nations in one part of one ~~or many~~  
continent, whose citizens are of one race or  
colour....Our co-operation must be world-wide  
...[Russell Johnston's] internationalism...is  
circumscribed and parochial. He is obsessed by  
this little part of the world....He would cut us  
off from the rest of the world and the rest of  
the continent. That is the opposite of  
internationalism...."

discourses are outlined in Table 6.1.

Other "nationalist" statements expressed during this debate have a more anti-Continental, particularly anti-German, flavour. Tony Marlow (HC Debates 26 June 1986: col.541) refers to France and Germany in contemplating the spectre of QMV forcing Britain to embrace protectionist trading policies, when he comments that:

"Other Community countries may...because of their traditions...wish to have greater protection."

Enoch Powell (HC Debates 26 June 1986: cols.554, 555) also sees a German threat, both in terms of protectionist measures, and an ability to blackmail the rest of the EC through threatening to look East:

"There is a long tradition...in central Europe.  
There is a long tradition of a Zollverein."  
"...the Common Market has an open window to the  
East because the German motivation of German  
reunification and the ability of Germany to hold  
the Common Market to ransom from its earlier  
inception enforces that upon the rest of the  
members of the Community and makes an absurdity  
of their attempts at control."

The most vehement attack in the debate upon the precedents for European union comes, however, from self-confessed "pro-European" Ron Leighton (HC Debates 27 June 1986: col.612):

"This is not the first time that attempts have been made to unify Western Europe and to create an internal market. After all, we had the Holy

EC across the system of diverging "Pro-EC" significance of

Roman empire of Charlemagne. Napoleon had quite a good shot at doing it, but without great success. Perhaps we should remind ourselves of the Third Reich. Whatever else Adolf Hitler did, he had a good shot at unifying Europe. For many years it was unified."

#### 6.12: "Pro-EC" support for the EC's "internal market".

Five MPs spoke in this debate in favour of the proposed measures to facilitate a single EC-wide internal market. Their objects of discourse are outlined in Table 6.17.

**Table 6.17: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on amendments deleting SEA Articles which required EC member states to impose measures meant to facilitate the creation of a single EC internal market.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
addressing the question of sovereignty by attacking	
Material benefits arising from the SEA/EC membership outweigh the material costs:	5
Britain's sovereignty is not weakened by the SEA:	3
Involvement in further European integration is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	3
The SEA is a further bulwark against socialism/communism:	1

**Table 6.18: Frequency that the material benefits of the SEA/EC membership are cited by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on amendments deleting SEA Articles which required EC member states to impose measures meant to facilitate the creation of a single EC internal market.**

Benefits	Number of speakers citing benefit
SEA provides Britain with a larger market/more trade:	5
SEA will increase British prosperity/living standards:	2
SEA will lead to lower prices:	2
The SEA will allow Britain to co-operate more inside the EC in the fields of R&D and technology:	2
The SEA will improve Britain's industrial performance:	1
The SEA will increase British prosperity/living standards:	1
The SEA will lead to greater competition:	1

Not surprisingly, all the "pro-EC" MPs speaking in favour of the

EC stress the material benefits of the SEA. Table 6.18 shows the system of dispersion in this "pragmatic" discursive formation.

"Pro-EC" MPs in this debate make statements which down-play the significance of the constitutional issues arising from the SEA:

"Constitutionally the Bill is of minimal significance. The fundamental issue was settled long ago..." -Tom Normanton (HC Debates 27 June 1986: col.642).

"I do not deny the importance of a constitutional backstop when there is real opposition...but for all the ringing declarations from the few diehards here, there is no real opposition in the country to our continuing in the Community. People are interested in making the Community work better and improving its democracy." -Russell Johnston (HC Debates 27 June 1986: col.642).

Hugh Dykes (HC Debates 26 June 1986: cols.559, 560), in addressing the question of sovereignty by attacking Westminster's democratic effectiveness and comparing it unfavourably with proceedings in the EC, contributed to the debate a statement of "Euro-Federalist" discourse **par excellence**:

"Tonight, as always, when these issues are discussed...enthusiastic constitutional madness takes over....As our parliamentary colleagues get drawn into the semantic investigation of tiny words in clauses, they forget that they are complacent and over-reverent members of a Parliament which churns out a monumental amount of legislation every year. The legislation is ill-digested, unexamined, not properly examined. Through our tremendous rituals, usually on a three-line whip, hon. members vote on the legislation without having had a chance to examine it properly. There is a vast quantity of undigested and ill-digestible legislation. We have that reputation among all objective observers."

"The way in which the Community legislates is seen by more and more objective observers as a better way of legislating."

Some of the "pro-EC" MPs in this debate also make "national internationalist" statements in their speeches. Tom Normanton (HC

debates 27 June 1986: col.635), in contrast to Dennis Skinner, sees the EC as a means of helping Third World poverty: But two of those MP's new statements referring to the SEA's undermining of British Parliamentary democracy is that the intention is that the decision-taking mechanism in the Community improved to enable the Third World to feed itself." by tax harmonisation

Russell Johnston (HC Debates 27 June 1986: col.642), says that Britain must support the SEA because:

"...the Government are committed to honour an international agreement into which they have solemnly entered."

Jeremy Hanley (HC Debates 27 June 1986: col.646) makes a statement which can be regarded as "counter-nationalist". He justifies the SEA's economic effects on the grounds of enabling Britain to become a great power again:

"Perhaps hon. members [opposed to the SEA] would like us to lose our exports, which would mean... [Britain's] lost position and authority in the world."

#### 6.13: "Anti-EC" opposition to tax harmonisation.

One amendment debated in Committee would have deleted SEA Articles supporting EC-wide tax harmonisation. Table 6.19 shows the objects of discourse referred to by the seven MPs supporting the amendment.

Table 6.19: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on the amendment deleting SEA articles referring to EC-wide tax harmonisation.

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
<b>Material costs of EC membership/further European integration outweigh the material benefits:</b>	6
<b>British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the SEA:</b>	5

All but one "anti-EC" speaker emphasised the material costs of

tax harmonisation in the form of further impositions of VAT on Britain. What is noticeable, however, is that all but two of these MPs made statements referring to the SEA's undermining of British Parliamentary Sovereignty. The theme running through their speeches is that the legal right of Parliament to raise taxes is undermined by tax harmonisation:

opposition to the single market. Their extracts of discourses are shown in Table 6.10.

"Are the Government content that the freedom of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer to levy taxes as he wishes should be removed?....is the House content that the Commission, as opposed to the elected representatives of the British people, should decide tax levels in the United Kingdom?"

"The House of Commons will become impotent if we pass this legislation...we shall be relegated to the status of some sort of subordinate authority of lower grade, say, than a county council."

-Edward du Cann (HC Debates 27 June 1986: cols.660, 664).

"Perhaps if the newspapers were to have VAT imposed on them without the British Parliament having the final say in the matter, they might start to awaken and understand what is happening in the House and what has and will be done."

-Michael Foot (HC Debates 10 July 1986: col.510).

"...harmonisation of taxation...is necessary for the creation of political unity..." -Enoch Powell (HC Debates 10 July 1986: col.513).

"Many people fell very strongly about the primary financial role of this House. The long march of every man towards a democracy in which the people was free was due to the determination of this House to set its own rates of taxation. That is fundamental and it touches on the spirit of our people.

"This is the abnegation of a very important principle. It is extraordinary that the Government feel that they can edge us towards something which will contradict our history, interests and outlook." -Richard Shepherd (HC Debates 10 July 1986: col.513).

"If the proposal...were implemented, alien institutions outside this country, not elected by us, would decide upon the taxation of the British people. This house would give up its competence to vote supply, the historical source of its powers. In the past the House wrested these powers from the king in the name of parliamentary government. Are we to surrender

the 1986 House them now to those who would be unaccountable to the voters?" -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 10 July 1986: col.514).

#### 6.14: "Pro-EC" support for tax harmonisation.

When considering the evidence of these particular debates, a

Three MPs who were long-standing opponents of EC membership and Three MPs spoke in opposition to the amendment. Their objects of discourse are shown in Table 6.20.

**Table 6.20: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on the amendment deleting the SEA Article referring to EC-wide tax harmonisation.**

Theme	Number of speakers using theme
<b>Material benefits arising from the SEA/EC membership outweigh the material costs:</b>	3
<b>British sovereignty is not weakened by the SEA:</b>	2

All three speakers make statements emphasising that the measure is necessary if the SEA is to achieve its goal of a single internal market for the EC, and that it does not necessarily mean that Britain will be forced to impose VAT levels comparable to those on the Continent.

Moreover, two of the "pro-EC" speakers make statements denying that the measure will undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty:

"Under this article we have much more control because, for the first time, it is spelt out unequivocably that any change [in tax levels] must be unanimous. That is a great protection for the House and for any future Government." -John Butterfill (HC Debates 10 July 1986: col.510).

"...there is no diminution of sovereignty involved in the amendments to the treaty.

"...Nor are hon. Members' powers to oppose the imposition of VAT on some items in any way diminished." -Lynda Chalker (HC Debates 10 July 1986: col.516).

### PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

#### 6.15: The nature of opposition to, and support for, the SEA, during

the 1986 House of Commons debates on the SEA. When considering the evidence of these particular debates, a difference needs to be established between the discourse utilised by those MPs who were long-standing opponents of EC membership and further European integration, and that employed by the Labour front-bench and those in the Labour Party following its line on the SEA.

The discourse utilised by the hard-line "anti-EC" MPs was primarily "nationalist". They particularly emphasised the further threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty posed by the SEA. The main object of "nationalist" discourse for these "anti-EC" MPs was "national internationalist". That is, the proposed "single market" was a betrayal, not an extension, of Britain's traditional support for international free trade. Even this is linked in "anti-EC" statements to the EC's threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty.

The majority of Labour discourse concerning the SEA, particularly at the Second Reading stage, was rather more complex. Some Labour MPs made statements that were positive towards certain EC institutions, particularly the European Parliament.

Furthermore, many of the EC's foreign policy positions were praised in statements by ostensibly "anti-EC" Labour MPs as being more "internationalist" than those being pursued by the Thatcher Government and the Reagan Administration.

Any statements by Labour MPs in support of greater cooperation within the EC was tempered, however, by statements from Labour's front-bench expressing opposition to giving more of Parliament's powers to any of the EC's institutions, including the European Parliament. To that extent, "Official" Labour discourse in the SEA debates can be regarded as "nationalist".

However, since all ten MPs who spoke in the Second Reading debate made statements which were "pragmatic" in their semiotic values; since this debate gave a more representative sample of opinion in Parliament about the EC and SEA in 1986; since most Labour MPs would have followed their front-benches' stance towards the SEA; and since the number of Conservative MPs prepared to vote

against the SEA at any stage during the debates rarely reached double figures, compared to no Labour MPs voting in favour of the Bill; the conclusion that must be reached is that "anti-EC" discourse in the SEA debates was primarily "pragmatic" in its subject matter.

Except for some "Euro-Federalist" discourse arguing that Parliamentary Sovereignty was an outdated concept, which was employed by a couple of Conservative MPs and the Liberal spokesman, most "pro-EC" discourse denied that Parliamentary Sovereignty was threatened by the SEA. Increased powers for the European Parliament were partly justified on the grounds of strengthening the European Parliament's powers would strengthen Parliamentary democracy in Britain.

On the whole, though, "pro-EC" discourse consisted of statements emphasising the "pragmatic", material benefits of the "single market", with any institutional changes to the EC being justified on those grounds.

With the nature of discourse used in the 1986 SEA debates having been discovered, the application of theoretical approaches to discourse in understanding the types of discourse utilised needs to be addressed.

#### **6.16: Relating the discourse used in the case study to theories of discourse.**

In the 1986 SEA debates, the object of discourse for the most hard-line "anti-EC" MPs was Parliamentary Sovereignty and the threat to it from the EC and SEA.

However, the regime of truth which provided the framework for "anti-EC" political actors during the 1975 Referendum campaign was challenged during the 1986 SEA debates by some "anti-EC" MPs, particularly from the Labour side of the Commons. Discourse was utilised which challenged the assumptions of "anti-EC" political actors; assumptions which had been protected from serious

examination by the processes of closure, delimitation and taboo. For example, some Labour MPs made statements which were positive towards the European Parliament and European Court of Justice; EC institutions which provided for many "anti-EC" political actors objects of discourse around which they could articulate their opposition to EC membership or further European integration.

Furthermore, the policies of the Reagan Administration, which created the opportunity in the generally pro-US disposition of "anti-EC" political actors in Britain, led to several Labour MPs making statements which positively utilised the EC as an object of discourse in relation to the USA.

These discontinuities from the assumptions of the prevailing regime of truth amongst a few "anti-EC" MPs did not, however, provide a new regime of truth. If the MPs in the House of Commons are regarded as a society of truth, utilising discourse and making statements which generally strengthen the prevailing regime of truth, it should not be surprising that "anti-EC" MPs largely made statements in the SEA debates, particularly at Committee Stage, that have Parliamentary Sovereignty as their object of discourse. In addition, Labour's front-bench did not encourage in their discourse the development of a new regime of truth. In certain ways, it appears that a process of disidentification with the existing regime of truth may be occurring. This is tempered, however, by widespread scepticism amongst most Labour MPs about the material consequences of EC membership and the capitalist nature of its institutions.

Compared to the 1975 Referendum campaign, more "pro-EC" political actors make statements which can be categorised as belonging to a "Euro-Federalist" discursive formation. The utilisation of such "Euro-Federalist" discourse can be seen as a consequence of the discontinuities brought by the SEA's effect upon encouraging the project of a Federalist EC, as discussed in Section 4.2. However, those MPs who make such statements can be categorised as belonging to a "Euro-Federalist" discourse are either marginalised within the parameters of the British political system,

such as the Liberal Russell Johnston, or within their own Party, as in the case of the Conservatives Hugh Dykes and Anthony Meyer.

In general, "pro-EC" MPs in the SEA debates, when confronted with the issue of the EC's effect on Parliamentary Sovereignty, especially the SEA's effect upon it, ignored it completely in their discourse, in the manner of a taboo; denied that the SEA would have any effect; or claimed in a "counter-nationalist" manner that the SEA would increase Britain's effective sovereignty in its relations with the world outside of the EC. The failure of most "pro-EC" Conservative MPs to utilise "Euro-Federalist" discourse can be seen as a consequence of delimitation, with Party doctrines, and the societies of discourse they belonged to- Party and Parliament-inhibiting their use of such discourse.

Moreover, much of the discourse employed in the debates was either "pragmatic" or "ideological". Most "pro-Conservative" MPs had as their objects of discourse the material benefits to Britain of the SEA, through the creation of a wider EC market, and the spread of the virtues of free-market Thatcherite capitalism to the rest of the EC.

As "pro-EC" political actors did in 1975, "pro-EC" MPs in 1986 were largely able to avoid the issues posed by EC membership and further European integration to British Parliamentary Sovereignty, while achieving their policy goal. This is partly the consequence of non-discursive formations.

#### **6.17: Relating the discourse used in the case study to non-discursive formations.**

"Pro-EC" MPs were helped in their efforts to avoid the constitutional issues that the SEA raised, by various non-discursive formations.

First, the economic situation at the time helped "pro-EC" Conservatives. The SEA was presented as a means of extending free trade and free-market economics to the rest of the EC. Since Conservative supporters were, in general, materially benefiting from such economics at the time, it was very difficult for

"anti-EC" Conservative MPs to oppose, and mobilise widespread support against, what was presented as a "technical" measure to complete "the Common Market". Moreover, the SEA, like British entry in the early 1970s, could be presented as a "new project", with the attendant rhetorical claims about spreading the benefits of Thatcherite economics to the rest of the EC.

Another non-discursive formation which aided the passage of the SEA through the Commons was Labour's disposition towards the EC at this historical juncture. Officially, Labour was in principle, neither opposed to EC membership or to all forms of further European integration, as it had been just three years before; nor, at this juncture, could it enthusiastically support further European integration, as it would in three years time as a response to the vision of a "Social Europe".

Even if Labour had possessed a coherent position towards the SEA, it would have been unable to have done much to effect the passage of the Bill through the Commons, due to the existence of other non-discursive formations. These were the Government's ability to use Parliamentary methods to overcome opposition. First, with a overall majority in the Commons of around 140, there could never be a Parliamentary majority to vote down the SEA. Second, with an ability to successfully manipulate Parliamentary procedure, such as the guillotine on debating time which it used during the SEA, most people outside the somewhat closed society of discourse that is Westminster were unaware of the Bill's existence, let alone its contents.

As in 1975, a set of non-discursive formations frustrated opposition to the EC, while the Government, this time a Conservative one, was able to successfully deny that the EC represented any sort of threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty.

March 1976 debate 772-773, HC Debates 17 March 1976 (sections 7.17-7.20) and 7.26 accountability (Sections 7.15 and 7.17, HC Debates 24 March 1976 (sections 7.15-7.17)) are examined in detail.

Part Three of the Chapter examines the debate on the Third Reading of the Bill on 26 March 1976 (Sections 7.18 and 7.19, HC

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES ON THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION: "THE MAASTRICHT TREATY"/ EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (AMENDMENT) BILL: "THE MAASTRICHT BILL" IN 1992-3.**

### **7.1: What this Chapter covers.**

This Chapter is primarily concerned with examining the discourse used during the 1992-3 House of Commons debates about the contents of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, better known as the "Maastricht Bill" (Baker et al, 1994, p.37), which incorporated into British law most of the contents of the Treaty of European Union, better known as the "Maastricht Treaty" after the Dutch city where the Treaty was signed on February 7th 1992 (European Communities, 1992, p.2).

The Chapter begins with an outline of the Treaty's contents, and the "opt-outs" from certain provisions of it which the Major Government secured (7.2). This will be followed by a brief discussion of the progress that the Bill made through Parliament in 1992-3, and the events which helped make its progress so tortuously slow (7.3), before some methodological issues which arise from examining the details of the debates are discussed (7.4).

Part One of the Chapter is concerned with the Second Reading debate on the Bill, which took place on May 20th and 21st 1992 (Sections 7.5 and 7.6; HC Debates 20 May 1992: cols.261-470; HC Debates 21 May 1992: cols.509-600).

Part Two examines some of the debates which occurred during the Committee Stage. In particular, the debates concerning the Treaty's Social Protocol (Sections 7.7 and 7.8; HC Debates 20 January 1993: cols.402-69; HC Debates 27 January 1993: cols.1046-87); European Citizenship (Sections 7.9 and 7.10; HC Debates 1 February 1993: cols.27-116); Subsidiarity (Sections 7.10 and 7.11; HC Debates 8 March 1993: cols.720-59; HC Debates 11 March 1993: cols.1127-70); and ECB accountability (Sections 7.11 and 7.12; HC Debates 24 March 1993: cols.958-1060) are examined in detail.

Part Three of the Chapter examines the debate on the Third Reading of the Bill on May 20th 1993 (Sections 7.13 and 7.14; HC

Debates 20 May 1993: cols.381-471). ~~cont. of 381, with cumulative~~

Part Four discusses the nature of the discourse used in the debates to support and oppose the Maastricht Treaty (7.15); attempts to relate the discourse used in the case study to theories of discourse (7.16); and relate the discourse used in the case study to non-discursive formations (7.17).

(iii) the Treaty makes changes to the EC's institutional structure to give greater power to the European Parliament, including the

**7.2: The contents of the Maastricht Treaty.** As has been remarked (Michie, 1993, p.21), "The treaty is not set out for ease of reading." The Treaty on European Union's most significant features can be summarised as follows:

- (i) Article A of the Treaty transforms the EC into a "European Union", with the aim "of creating an ever closer union amongst the peoples of Europe" (European Communities, 1992, p.3);
- (ii) Title VI of Title II of the Treaty declares that the EC plans to create EMU, which will feature an "independent" ECB and a single currency, possibly by 1996 and by 1999 at the latest (European Communities, 1992, pp.7-13). The Treaty sets out a three-stage programme for the EC to achieve EMU. In Stage One, member states are obliged to join the ERM and abolish all exchange controls; Stage Two consists of setting up of a European Monetary Institute (EMI), which will play the key role in seeing that EC members are prepared for EMU; and Stage Three consists of full EMU, with the setting up of the ECB and the replacement of national currencies with a single European Currency Unit (ECU) (European Communities, 1992, pp.11-13). For member states to be ready to join EMU, a protocol to the Treaty sets out four "convergence criteria" which countries. These are: the national currency must have been in the "narrow band" of the ERM for at least two years before joining EMU; inflation over a period of four years may not be more than 1.5 per cent above the average for the three member states with the lowest inflation rates; average long-term interest rates must not be more than 2 per cent above the rates in the three member states with the lowest inflation rates; and the annual government expenditure

deficit must not exceed 3 per cent of GDP, with cumulative government debt not exceeding 60 per cent of GDP (European Communities, 1992, pp.50-1). Both Britain and Denmark secured "opt-outs" from Stage Three of EMU, meaning that if they met the convergence criteria they could, but did not have to, take part in EMU's final stage (European Communities, 1992, p.52);

(iii) the Treaty makes changes to the EC's institutional arrangements. For instance, Articles 138 and 158 of Title II of the Treaty give greater power to the European Parliament, including the right to legislate and approve appointments to the European Commission (European Communities, 1992, pp.18-19). Title II, Chapter 4 of the Treaty also establishes an advisory "Committee of the Regions" (European Communities, 1992, p.23-24). These changes are aimed to overcome the EC's "democratic deficit" by moving power away from the Commission (The European Communities, 1992, p.29);

(iv) Articles 126-130 of Title II of the Treaty gives the Council of Ministers, using QMV, greater powers in a number of policy areas, including education, consumer protection, public health, the creation of trans-EC networks in areas such as transport, and overseas development (European Communities, 1992, pp.14-18);

(v) Clause 3b of the Treaty makes legally biding the principle of Subsidiarity, that decisions inside the EC should be taken at the lowest possible level (European Communities, 1992, p.4);

(vi) Article 8 of Title II of the Treaty establishes "European Citizenship" alongside national citizenship, which would allow EC citizens to vote in municipal and EC elections throughout the EC (European Communities, 1992, pp.18-19, 22-3);

(vii) Article 130 of Title II of the Treaty creates a new Cohesion Fund for Eire, Greece, Portugal and Spain, intended to lift these economies more quickly to the performance levels achieved by the rest of the EC (European Communities, 1992, pp.15-16);

(viii) Titles V and VI of the Treaty provide for cooperation between member states, on an inter-governmental basis, in the fields of justice, home affairs, foreign and security policy (European Communities, 1992, pp.35-8);

(ix) the Treaty sets up a new framework, contained in the Social

Protocol, for Social Policy in fields such as health and safety, working conditions, equality between the sexes and information and consultation rights for employees. Britain was, again, however, able to secure an "opt-out" from the Social Protocol (European Communities, 1992, pp.53-4); and

(x) Article 0 of the Final Provisions of the Treaty reinforced the principle that EC membership is open to all European countries with a parliamentary democracy (European Communities, 1992, p.39).

### **7.3: The Process of Ratification in the United Kingdom.**

It must be noted, however, that there are a number of differences between the Maastricht Treaty and the Bill debated at Westminster in 1992-3. The Bill left out the sections of the Treaty covering foreign, security, defence, home affairs and justice policies, as these were matters for inter-governmental cooperation. These parts of the Treaty did not create legal rights or obligations, as they remained the Royal Prerogative's preserve, which meant that, legally, they were beyond Parliamentary scrutiny; as was the Social Protocol "opt-out". The Maastricht debates can, therefore, be regarded as a constitutional lesson, in that they demonstrated that Parliament is unable to amend international treaties a government sets before it, but merely able to accept or reject in their entirety those parts of a treaty which the government permits it to examine (Ludlam, 1994, p.30).

The First Reading of the Maastricht Bill, with the EMU and Social Protocol "opt-outs", took place on May 7th 1992 (HC Debates, 7 May 1992: col.162). The Second Reading debate took place on May 21st and 22nd, with the Government obtaining a majority of 244, a majority aided by the Labour front-bench calling for its MPs to abstain, since they declared that they could not vote for a Maastricht Bill without the Social Protocol's inclusion.

The smooth passage of the Maastricht Bill through the House was quickly destabilised, however, by the Danes narrowly voting against supporting the Maastricht Treaty in their June 2nd Referendum. This

led the Government to postpone further passage of the Maastricht Bill through the Commons, as 84 Conservative MPs supported an Early Day Motion (EDM) calling for a "Fresh Start" by the Major Government, which held the Presidency of the EC in the second half of 1992 (Baker et al, 1993, p.162).

Doubts that the French would fail to endorse the Maastricht Treaty in their September 20th Referendum, led to fevered speculation against certain currencies inside the ERM, including Sterling. On "Black Wednesday", September 16th 1992, British membership of the ERM was suspended, which in turn led 60 Conservative MPs to support another "Fresh Start" EDM, welcoming British withdrawal from the ERM (Baker et al, 1994, p.58). The Major Government, seeing the narrow 50.1 per cent in France supporting Maastricht (Hama, 1996, p.45), declared that the Maastricht Bill could not be ratified until Danish grievances were settled (George, 1993b, p.189).

Despite saying this, and after enduring a Conservative Conference that had been extremely "anti-EC" in tone, Major attempted to pass a "paving motion" through the Commons, to secure MPs' support for the Maastricht Bill to be examined at the Committee Stage. With the Labour Party treating this vote as one of "no confidence" in the Major Government, and many "Fresh Start" Conservative MPs seeing the "paving motion" vote as a means to scupper the Maastricht Bill for good, it took a combination of appeals to Party loyalty, ferocious "whipping", apparent promises by Government ministers that the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill would not be passed until a second Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty had taken place, and the support of all Liberal Democrat MPs but one, for the Government to secure a majority of three for its motion (HC Debates 4 November 1992: cols.283-385; Baker et al, 1993, pp.150-5).

Following the acceptance at the December 1992 European Council in Edinburgh of a number of further "opt-outs" for Denmark in order to secure a "Yes" vote in a second referendum on the Maastricht Treaty (Baker et al, 1994, pp.38-9), the Government got itself into further problems during the Committee Stage of the Bill. Labour put

forward amendments which would lead to Britain "opting in" to the Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty. In January 1993 the Government claimed that, if this occurred, neither the Bill nor the Treaty could be ratified, as the Social Protocol "opt-out" was subject to the Royal Prerogative (Baker et al, 1994, p.41). This encouraged anti-Maastricht Conservative MPs to continue their campaign; other amendments to other parts of the Bill would, it appeared, either delay or prevent entirely the Bill's ratification, and the Treaty's implementation. Eventually, in February 1993, the Government changed its line. It now argued that, as a consequence of the Social Protocol "opt-out" being subject to the Royal Prerogative, it did not matter how the Commons voted; it would not affect the Treaty's implementation. The Government's Parliamentary manoeuvring became even more desperate after it lost a vote concerning the Committee of the Regions (HC Debates 4 March 1993: col.485-555; HC Debates 8 March 1993: col.665-719). After that, the Government accepted further amendments to the Bill, rather than take amendments to votes, still arguing that the Treaty's content was not affected (Baker et al, 1994, p.41-2).

On April 22nd 1993 the Committee Stage of the Bill was completed after 163 hours of debate, and the defeat by 239 votes of an amendment that would include provision for a British referendum on the Treaty (HC Debates 22 April 1993: cols. 380-475). This was followed on May 5th by the Government accepting at the Report Stage of the Bill the inclusion of Labour's Amendment 27 (HC Debates 5 May 1993: cols.195-240), which deleted Britain's Social Protocol "opt-out", while ensuring that a vote on Amendment 27 would not be taken until the Bill was passed (Baker et al, 1994, p.42).

Following a "Yes" vote in the second Danish referendum on May 18th, the Third reading took place on May 20th, with the Government securing a majority of 180. Following heated debates in the House of Lords, the Maastricht Bill gained Royal Assent on July 20th 1993 (HC Debates 20 July 1993: col.323), but awaited ratification prior to a vote on the Social Protocol. This vote on July 22nd saw the Government defeated by 8 votes, forcing it to win a "no confidence" vote next day in order to push through the Bill, minus the Social

Protocol (HC Debates, 22 July 1993: cols.512-613; HC Debates, 23 July 1993: cols.627-725; Baker et al, 1994, pp.44-5).

The Maastricht Bill became law at the end of July 1993, after an unsuccessful attempt in the High Court to secure a judicial review, by Lord Rees-Mogg.

of the Labour leadership in introducing such documents and to

#### **7.4: Methodological Issues.**

With the content of the Maastricht Treaty, and the passage of the Maastricht Bill through Westminster, having been outlined, certain methodological issues arise from them.

There is the issue of how political actors are to be defined as "anti" and "pro-EC" in the Maastricht debates, especially considering that both the leaderships and most of the two main parties saw themselves as pro-Maastricht and "pro-EC". Where the Conservative and Labour leaderships differed was over whether or not the Social Protocol should be included into British law. It will be argued that "anti-EC" MPs can be defined in these circumstances as those who opposed the Maastricht Treaty becoming British law, **whether or not the Social Protocol was included in the Bill.** In contrast, "pro-EC" MPs are those who supported the Maastricht Treaty becoming British law, whether or not the Social Protocol was included in the Bill.

Another methodological issue is that, unlike the 1986 debates on the SEA, it is far from simple to define "anti" and "pro-EC" MPs just from their voting patterns in the Maastricht debate. Several factors make this so. First, Labour's official policy was to abstain on most votes if the Social Protocol was not included in the Bill.

Second, several MPs who from the statements contained in their speeches could be categorised as "anti-EC", such as Tony Benn, Bernard Jenkin and Iain Duncan-Smith in the Second Reading debate, failed to vote either way after debates.

Third, during the period of early 1993 when the Government insisted that inclusion of the Social Protocol in the Bill would wreck the Treaty as a whole, several "anti-EC" MPs voted for

amendments to the Bill that appear "pro-EC", in order to achieve this aim.

Fourth, Labour's front bench often introduced amendments to the Bill in the Committee Stage, while making clear from the outset that they did not intend to take them to a vote. The ostensible aim of the Labour leadership in introducing such amendments was to allow time for debate, while undoubtedly wanting to aggravate existing Conservative Party divisions over the Maastricht Treaty.

Fifth, some Conservative MPs, such as Rhodes Boyson, George Gardiner, Ivan Lawrence and Peter Tapsell, voted for Second Reading of the Bill in May 1992, but voted against the Bill at Third Reading.

After taking these factors into account, the case study will generally regard any MP who voted against the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill as being automatically classified as "anti-EC". A partial exception can be made for those MPs, mostly Conservative, who moved from supporting the Bill in the Second Reading debate, but voted against it at Third Reading. The combination of the first Danish Referendum result, British withdrawal from the ERM, and the subsequent "Fresh Start" EDMs were the events which collectively appear to have been a catalyst in pushing several Conservative MPs from a "pro-EC" to "anti-EC" stance after the Second Reading. Consequently, any MPs who supported the Bill at Second Reading, but opposed it at Third, should be classified as "anti-EC" during the Committee Stage debates on the Bill.

Another methodological issue concerns which debates should be examined. The Second and Third Reading debates are examined as they gave MPs the chance at reasonable length to argue why they either opposed or supported the Maastricht Treaty. As for the Committee Stage debates, the Social Protocol debate is examined as it is supposed to be the issue that divided the two main Parties' front-benches from each other. Furthermore, it appeared to be a debate that lent itself to the use of "ideological" and "pragmatic", rather than "nationalist", discourse. The debate on European Citizenship is examined as it would appear to be one where nationalist sentiments would predominate, as nation-states

traditionally decide the issue of who is to be a citizen.

The debate on Subsidiarity is examined as the Major Government presented it as an anti-centralising doctrine with force in EC law, which would protect the British state, and British Parliamentary Sovereignty, from being undermined by EC institutions. The debate on the ECB's democratic accountability is examined as this can be anticipated as lending itself equally to the use of "nationalist", "pragmatic" and "ideological" discourse by "anti-EC" MPs.

A final methodological point is that, as in the SEA debates, MPs "interventions" in the speeches of others have been ignored.

## PART TWO: DEBATE ON THE SECOND READING OF THE MAASTRICHT BILL.

### 7.5: Second Reading: "anti-EC" speakers.

There were 24 "anti-EC" speakers in the Second Reading debate. Table 7.1 shows the objects of discourse they made statements about.

**Table 7.1: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on the Second Reading of the Maastricht Bill in opposing the Maastricht Treaty.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the Maastricht Treaty:	22
Material costs of the Maastricht Treaty/further European integration outweigh the material benefits:	15
"National internationalist" duties and commitments:	9
The Maastricht Treaty will strengthen the EC's pro-capitalist, anti-socialist nature:	6
Distrust of France:	5
Distrust of Germany:	5
The Maastricht Treaty will strengthen the EC's pro-socialist, anti-capitalist nature:	2

Most "anti-EC" MPs make statements in their speeches about the threats which the EC in general, and the Maastricht Treaty in particular, pose to the existence of British Parliamentary Sovereignty. Table 7.2 shows the system of dispersion which makes

up this particular discursive formation.

**Table 7.2: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the Maastricht Treaty/EC that undermined British Parliamentary Sovereignty during the debate on the Second Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Aspect	Number of speakers citing aspect
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to the EC becoming a Federal Union:	12
The establishment of EMU/ECB/Single Currency will undermine the British Parliament's powers:	12
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	11
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Commission's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	11
Subsidiarity will not reduce the EC's centralising tendencies, which threaten to reduce the British Parliament's powers:	10
The Maastricht Treaty creates European Citizenship, so undermining the sovereignty of the British state:	3
The Maastricht Treaty does not reduce the scope for applying QMV in the Council of Ministers, which reduces the British Parliament's powers:	2
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Parliament's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	2

A majority of "anti-EC" MPs in the debate making statements whose semiotic values make reference to the threat which the EC represents to British Parliamentary Sovereignty, refer in particular to the Maastricht Treaty, and criticise it, for being a Federalist treaty:

"We have to face the fact that, almost from the start, our neighbours have wanted a federal union on the continent of Europe, and the British people have never wanted that."

"It means an extra tier of government which is superior to the present national tier of government, to which are transferred basic decision-making powers. Not a single federal state in the world today lacks those characteristics." -Peter Shore (HC Debates 20 May 1992: cols.283-4).

"The Bill is about the future government and

democracy of the United Kingdom. The gravitational pull in the treaty...would take us, indeed, drag us, into a federal Europe." -Bill Cash (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.312). "...I can assure the House that the projection is towards federalism and a united states of Europe. To pretend otherwise is to mislead the people of the United Kingdom." -John Taylor (HC Debates 20 May 1992: cols.327-8). "Maastricht was a brilliant tactical victory, but the forces of federalism...have yet to be banished." -Tony Marlow (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.345). "Although the word 'federation' has been dropped from the treaty, its imprint has been firmly left there..." -Trevor Skeet (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.423).

An equal number of "anti-EC" speakers make statements which declare that it is the process of EMU, and the creation of a single currency and ECB, which threatens to make British Parliamentary Sovereignty. That is, the ECB and EMU take away Parliament's main decision-making powers over deciding British economic policy, and so make Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty, in that respect as well, redundant:

"The whole concept of a single currency will bring about a powerful force for centralism..." -John Biffen (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.281). "If we want to build a federal Europe, of course we must have a single currency and a single central bank." -Peter Shore (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.283). "The economic and monetary union proposals entail a substantial shift of power over money and our fiscal and economic policy from democratically elected Government and Parliament to undemocratic Community institutions." -Denzil Davies (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.363). "It [EMU] reduces the House of Commons to a municipal body which can be rate-capped and fined." -Tony Benn (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.317). "I consider the Maastricht Treaty to be a poor deal for British democracy because it ends the sovereign right of the Westminster Parliament to tax and to spend." -Christopher Gill (HC Debates 20 May 1992: cols.414-15).

Almost as many "anti-EC" MPs speaking in this debate make statements which refer to two of the main existing institutions of the EC, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, as representing major threats to the existence of British Parliamentary Sovereignty, even though it appears that the Maastricht Treaty does not substantially increase the formal powers of either institution:

"The House has been asked to contemplate a European Commissioner sitting permanently at the Cabinet table dictating the policies of this country." -Peter Shore (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.286).

"Nor will I vote for another group of unelected, unaccountable individuals- the European Commissioners- to...take decisions that will affect my community." -Llew Smith (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.351).

"...law in the Community is not made by directly elected representatives. Laws are proposed and promoted by non-elected people...the members of the Commission." -Christopher Gill (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.417).

"The Court, through its judgements, cannot be considered neutral by any means: it is part of those key institutions that consider it their duty constantly to push forward the concept of the Community, ultimately at the expense of the nation state." -Iain Duncan-Smith (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.354).

"The court will be taking not merely legal and technical decisions, but political decisions about the areas where decision-making is legitimate at national level and those where it is legitimate at federal level. In those circumstances the European Court will have a massively enhanced status and will be involving itself in matters that should not involve the legal profession, but should be for democratically elected politicians to decide."

-Harry Barnes (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.426).

"Anti-EC" MPs speaking in this debate also make a number of statements which indicate that they do not believe that the inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty of the concept of Subsidiarity, which the Government regards as enabling the continued existence, and strengthening, of British Parliamentary Sovereignty will

achieve this aim: *House of Commons 29 May 1992: col.3151*.  
"...we need a federal, social and democratic  
Europe."

"It is used as a cloak to prevent people questioning too deeply the movement away from parliamentary sovereignty." -Denzil Davies (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.303).

"I believe that the principle of subsidiarity is a con trick. It is said that there will be devolution downwards of functions. Yes, that will happen. However, the critical fact is that the main functions will be transferred upwards." -Bill Cash (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.314).

"The court will put a European interpretation on it [Subsidiarity], and the European interpretation could be entirely different from that of the United Kingdom." -Trevor Skeet (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.424).

"It worries me that when I go to Europe and speak to people I know to be federalists, they can use the principle of subsidiarity to expand the activity of the European Community in the same way as those who do not wish them to be expanded can use it." -James Cran (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.444).

"Subsidiarity is mentioned in the treaty. Will it safeguard the rights for people? Under the treaty, nothing is guaranteed. Subsidiarity will apply where the EC does not already have priority and power." -Teddy Taylor (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.560).

It appears that "anti-EC" speakers have a strong attachment to Parliamentary Sovereignty, and nothing would loosen their attachment to it. However, some "anti-EC" MPs make statements which claim that the EC and the Maastricht **distort** the federalist ideal, rather than offer a federalist institution **per se**. This suggests that some "anti-EC" MPs would support a "genuine" federal and democratic EC. Most of the MPs who make such statements also make one which declare that they still believe in Parliamentary Sovereignty. They argue, however, that forced to make a choice, they would prefer to see a **genuine** federal system to that proposed in the Maastricht Treaty:

"...a fully democratic, federated, united states of Europe...would be a bit unwieldy, but it would not fall under any criticism on the ground that it was undemocratic." -Tony Benn (HC

internationalisation Debates 20 May 1992: col.315).

"We need a federal, social and democratic Europe."

"The antithesis of the European system which we are already in, but are moving deeper into, is democratic and federal. It is a Europe that will exist for all its people through the democratic institutions that will develop. That is the agenda that we should seek, and it shows the inadequacies of the measures before us." -Harry Barnes (HC Debates 20 May 1992: cols.427-8).

"...why do we oppose a federal Europe? It would be infinitely better than what we are creating under the Maastricht treaty. At least with a federal Europe some things would belong to us... our Parliament and our people." -Teddy Taylor (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.561).

In contrast, there is the "Left Federalist" Peter Hain, who, while also attacking the Maastricht Treaty as a distortion of the federalist ideal, also attacks the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty and promotes the European Parliament. In short, Hain (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.408) uses the sort of "Euro-Federalist" discourse one would not normally expect from an "anti-EC" political actor:

"Unlike many romanticists on both sides...who foresee a loss of sovereignty in increasing European political integration, I share the view of many continental socialists. They see the real issue as one of reclaiming some of the sovereignty that has been lost via the only feasible institution appropriate- the European Parliament."

All these speakers are, however, very much exceptions to the rule; most "anti-EC" MPs speaking in the Second Reading debate appear to be totally attached to the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty.

As Table 7.1 shows, the second most frequent statement made by "anti-EC" MPs were ones whose object of discourse were the material costs of EC membership for the British economy. The system of dispersion for this "pragmatic" discourse is shown in Table 7.3.

As shown in Table 7.1, just over one-third of "anti-EC" speakers in the Second Reading debate make statements with "national

"internationalist" semiotic values. Table 7.4 shows the system of dispersion for this "national internationalist" discursive formation.

All these speakers stress the need for a "wider Europe", incorporating the remaining members of EFTA and the ex-socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as opposed to the creation of a more closely integrated EC:

"...a happy and well-judged Europe is one that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals, in which Russia is one of the great historic nations." -John Biffen (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.281).  
"...entirely new approaches are needed if we are to get anything like the wider Europe that many of us wish to achieve." -Peter Shore (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.282).  
"I am in favour of a commonwealth of Europe...a Europe that is wider..." -Tony Benn (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.318).  
"We need a wider Europe..." -John Taylor (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.328)  
"I do not want impossible terms to prevent other countries from joining the Community. As a supporter of the European Free Trade Association, I look forward to the day when Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland join the Community." -Doug Hoyle (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.560).

Moreover, several "anti-EC" speakers accuse the EC of being "narrowly nationalist", since it is not allowing other European countries to join as soon as the latter want:

"Are we not aware of...creating a rich man's club of 12 countries, with millions of have-nots on its eastern borders?" -Roger Knapman (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.396).  
"We have a great historic opportunity to unite the whole of Europe....[but] We are turning our backs on central Europe...Russia and the ex-Soviet countries. Why on earth are we doing this?" -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.552).

This focus upon the rest of Europe allows "anti-EC" speakers to credibly claim that they are not, in the least, "anti-European":

**Table 7.3: Frequency of the material costs of the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership cited by "anti-EC" MPs during the debate on the Second Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Costs	"I do not regard myself as being very much in favour of the Maastricht Treaty." (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col. 315)	Number of speakers citing cost
The Maastricht Treaty will not lead to a reduction in unemployment levels in Britain:		7
The Maastricht Treaty will not increase the material well-being of Britain's relatively depressed economic regions:		6
The material costs to the British economy of pursuing the convergence criteria necessary for establishing EMU, and EMU's economic consequences, are too high:		6
The material costs to the British economy of ERM membership are too high:		5
The Maastricht Treaty will not stop the CAP continuing to have an adverse effect upon Britain and British agriculture:		4
The Maastricht Treaty will not stop Britain having to pay more into the EC's Budget than it is given back:		3
The Maastricht Treaty will cause further problems for British industry and manufacturing:		3
The Maastricht Treaty will not reduce the adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's balance of payments:		2
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to further impositions of VAT upon Britain:		1
The Maastricht Treaty will not reduce the adverse effects that the EC's CFP has had upon Britain's fishing industry:		1

**Table 7.4: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited "national internationalist" reasons to oppose, or alternatives to, the Maastricht Treaty/EC during the debate on the Second Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Reasons/alternatives	"Some anti-EC members could argue that... Britain had an 'internationalist' role outside of the EC." (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col. 315)	Number of speakers that citing reason /alternative
Britain should promote a "wider", as opposed, to "deeper" Europe, incorporating EFTA and Eastern European countries:		9
The Maastricht Treaty will help strengthen the EC's protectionist, anti-free trade tendencies/ Britain should promote international free trade:		1
The Maastricht Treaty will further reduce Britain's links with the wider world:		1

"This is not a debate between those who are anti-European and those who are pro-European."  
-Tony Benn (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.315).

"...I have been anxious to see the rebuilding of an international Europe on democratic lines."  
-Nigel Spearing (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.332).

"I do not regard myself as a Eurosceptic. I am very much in favour of Europe." -James Cran (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.442).

Several "anti-EC" MPs also make statements declaring that Europe, and the EC, must change as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the re-unification of Germany:

"I believe that they [European debates] have been fundamentally transformed by the catalytic events of recent years....the liberation of 400 million people in Eastern Europe." -John Biffen (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.280).

"...the whole architecture of Europe has changed during the last three or four years..."

"Most of the assumptions behind the launch towards a federal Europe...were entirely consistent with the Europe that had existed up to the end of the cold war, the liberation of eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union." -Peter Shore (HC Debates 20 May 1992: cols.282-3).

"The plain fact is that Europe has changed fundamentally since the Common Market was set up. Then it was cold war Europe...It is a wholly different Europe now." -Tony Benn (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.318).

"Most of the treaty is old hat. It is outdated; ...it was drawn up before the Berlin wall came down and before the collapse of communism in the east." -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 21 May 1992; col.551).

Some "anti-EC" speakers still made statements which argued that Britain had an "internationalist" role outside of Europe. The most prominent MP to argue this was Michael Spicer (HC Debates 21 May 1992; cols.569-70):

"Britain has strong national interests that are Atlantic as well as European and is, as a result, at the crossroads of much international trade." — Sir George Verdon

"We are at the centre of world trade...we are a high seas trading nation and we gain by being at the centre."

Furthermore, "anti-EC" speakers in the Second Reading debate made a number of statements whose objects of discourse were France and Germany. Four different themes can be identified in this context. First, Germany and France have fundamentally different world-views from that of Britain:

Fourth "Second Reading debate"

"Do we believe...that it is realistic to try and tie down the Gulliver that is Germany?" -Roger Knapman (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.396).

"Germany...is a central continental power, with interests to the east and the west. France has distinct national interests that are anti-American and protectionist." -Michael Spicer (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.569).

Second, France and Germany have different, alien systems of government and law to those of Britain:

"...a Europe of bankers and bureaucrats, a Europe shaped by that old Hegelian ideal of a universal class of expert civil servants whose loyalty and duties lie primarily with institutions. Of course, in their case, that means with the institutions of pre-war Germany ..." -Denzil Davies (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.300).

"...the difference between the tradition of common law that exists in this country and the tradition of Continental law- based...so fundamentally on the code Napoleon- means, essentially, that the European Court will...fall back on the preambles to treaties..." -Roger Knapman (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.355).

"Compared to the British Parliament, the French Assembly does not count a fig." -Michael Spicer (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.570).

Third, there are statements whose semiotic values are meant to remind MPs of Britain's past conflicts with France and Germany:

"Maastricht was the most effective defensive battle fought on the European mainland by a British leader since the Duke of Wellington at the lines of Torres Vedras."

"The heart of Bonaparte still beats in many breasts....The House should dedicate itself to the fight against Bonapartism. This should be the trumpet, the clarion call, the beginning of

a march to a second Waterloo." -Tony Marlow (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.394).

"The question is, is it a great victory, like Dunkirk, or is a damage limitation exercise?" -Roger Knapman (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.394).

Fourth "anti-EC" speakers cite the increase in support for neo-fascist groups on the Continent to suggest that the democratic stability of the EC is rather fragile:

"I do not take the roll call with any satisfaction, but there are the Front National in France, the republicans in Germany and the Lombard league in Italy. Those are not the heirs of the traditions of de Gasperi and Adenauer." -John Biffen (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.282).  
"...in Germany, France and Italy....right-wing fascist groups are already in the ascendent." -Roger Knapman (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.396).

### 7.6 Second Reading: "pro-EC" speakers.

In the Second Reading debate there were 57 "pro-EC" speakers. Table 7.5 shows the objects of discourse for their statements.

Table 7.5: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on the Second Reading of the Maastricht Bill in supporting the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership.

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
British sovereignty is not weakened by the Maastricht Treaty:	48
The material benefits arising from the Maastricht Treaty outweigh the material costs:	40
Involvement in further European integration is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	35
The Maastricht Treaty is a bulwark against socialism:	7
The Maastricht Treaty will strengthen the EC's socialist tendencies:	5
Anti-French sentiments:	5
Anti-German sentiments:	4

The object of discourse about which most "pro-EC" statements are made is Parliamentary Sovereignty. "Pro-EC" discourse, however,

does not present the EC as threatening British Parliamentary Sovereignty. Table 7.6 shows the system of dispersion for this "pro-EC" discursive formation.

*Interpretation of the concept*

**Table 7.6: Frequency of reasons given by "pro-EC" MPs why the Maastricht Treaty does not undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty in the Second Reading debate.**

Reasons	Number of speakers giving reason
Subsidiarity reduces the EC's centralising tendencies:	24
Parliamentary Sovereignty is increasingly becoming an outdated concept:	15
The Maastricht Treaty does not threaten Parliamentary Sovereignty:	13
The Maastricht Treaty reduces the powers of the European Commission:	10
The European Court of Justice is no longer a pro-Federalist institution:	4
The Maastricht Treaty reduces the power of the European Parliament:	2

The most frequently made statements by "pro-EC" speakers concerning the issue of why the EC is not a threat to Parliamentary Sovereignty refer to the existence of the concept of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty:

"We have secured a legally binding text on subsidiarity. That provides that any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the treaty." -John Major (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.126).

"...the concept of subsidiarity is one we should welcome. It is undeniable that it vests back on the ambit of national Government's authority that otherwise would have been the subject of creeping centralisation....Subsidiarity moves in the direction of redressing the deficit of democracy." -Andrew Hargreaves (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.433).

"...there is the principle of subsidiarity under which the interests of member states are paramount." -John Butterfill (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.558).

The Government's interpretation of Subsidiarity is that power

should generally be centred upon nation-states and national parliaments. Furthermore, as Douglas Hurd (HC Debates 21 May 1992: cols.514, 516) argues, the institutions of the EC accept this interpretation of the concept:

"There is no doubt that, during the past 35 years, the treaties on which the courts operated have set out an integrationist approach, and the court's decisions have reflected that....the thrust of the Maastricht treaty is different because of the test of subsidiarity and the rejection over a wide area of the centralising principles."

"The Commission is taking the concept of subsidiarity seriously."

In contrast, Opposition MPs tend to see Subsidiarity as a legal concept which legitimises the greater exercising of powers by regions and local authorities in Britain, especially in Scotland and Wales. The centralising of power in Britain in the hands of London under the Thatcher and Major Governments, argues Robert Wareing (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.379), means that "the Government have defied all the principles of subsidiarity in this country."

Such expressions of cynicism from the Opposition about the Government's advocacy of Subsidiarity for the EC are, perhaps, partly reflected in the widely expressed belief that the whole concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty is either obsolete or in disrepute. Most of the speakers making such "Euro-Federalist" statements come from the Opposition benches:

"I believe that throughout this decade and the next century the importance of the notion of the nation state will decline, although I do not argue that it will disappear." -Paddy Ashdown (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.292).

"What is so unique about Westminster...that all sovereignty resides there...? The sovereignty of this House...does not mean control of the Government; it means listening to what the Government say and then trooping through the Lobbies in the way that the whips direct. That is scarcely sovereignty."

"Sovereignty is the getting of proper control."

-Derek Enright (HC Debates 20 May 1992: cols.308-9).

"They [the Conservatives] dissemble over sovereignty and puff up their claims that the Westminster parliament controls matters it no longer controls." -Russell Johnston (HC Debates 21 May 1992: cols.536-7).

"I am not worried by losing sovereignty. The day of the nation state in Western Europe is finished and I am pleased that it is so..."

-Tony Banks (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.568).

"We are meeting today in this historic debate to confess that we now accept that sovereignty is a myth, that national independence is an illusion and that a love of parliamentary democracy is a fashionable excuse of those who so long for yesterday that they cannot face tomorrow."

-Brian Sedgemoore (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.571).

Similar "Euro-Federalist" statements that Parliamentary Sovereignty is an increasingly out-dated concept are, however, put forward by some Conservative MPs:

"Much has been said tonight about sovereign states. I do not believe that the sovereign state exists in the modern world; it has not existed for years." -Emma Nicholson (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.404).

"...I must tell my hon. Friends that they must come to terms with the decline of national sovereignty in a much smaller and mutually dependent world." -Peter Temple-Morris (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.577).

In a similar vein to many statements made by "pro-EC" political actors during the 1986 SEA debates and the 1975 Referendum campaign, the Government and many of its supporters in this debate argue that the Maastricht Treaty is not a threat to Parliamentary Sovereignty. Speaking about the possibility of Britain taking part in the Third Stage of EMU, John Major (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.265) declared that:

"...it will be for Parliament to determine the issue, and to do so in the way which Parliament most clearly demonstrates its sovereignty."

Other Conservative MPs made statements agreeing with their leader that the Maastricht Treaty did not threaten Parliamentary Sovereignty:

#### Benefits

No lasting union could ever be built on a desire to submerge individual and national characteristics or identity. That is extremely important, and nothing in the Maastricht Treaty threatens it." -Tim Rathbone (HC Debates, May 20 1992, col.320).

"It is an illusion that we would lose our sovereignty if we adopted a common currency." -Peter Hordern (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.331).

"We stand for the transfer of power away from the centre to the nation states. In delegating power to Europe, as we must do occasionally, we do not abdicate it, but delegate it. To pass the Bill is to...reinforce it with the authority of this ancient house." -Edward Garnier (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col. 378).

"I have every confidence in my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister continuing to maintain sovereignty." -Nicholas Hawkins (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.566).

#### debate on the second

Table 7.6 shows the material benefits of the Maastricht Treaty outlined by "pro-EC" speakers in the Second Reading debate.

Almost as many "pro-EC" MPs make statements stressing "internationalist" themes as "pragmatic" ones. Table 7.7 outlines the system of dispersion for this "internationalist" discursive formation.

Many "pro-EC" MPs, in common with many of their "anti-EC" counterparts, tend in this debate to make statements stressing that Britain should seek a "wider Europe", with Eastern European and EFTA countries encouraged to join the EC, as well as ensuring that the EC takes an "outward-looking" stances in its dealings with the rest of the world:

"It is the larger Europe...that will have the necessary strength." -David Howell (HC Debates 20 May 1992: cols.306-7).

"We need a Europe that is open; a Europe that is together; a Europe that can and should improve the world in many ways." -Derek Enright (HC

**Table 7.6: Frequency that the material benefits of the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership are cited by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on the Second Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Benefits	Number of speakers citing benefit
The Maastricht Treaty will provide Britain with a larger market/more trade:	15
The Social Protocol would aid the British economy:	10
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to more EC regional aid:	8
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to lower unemployment:	4
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to lower prices/price stability:	4
The Maastricht Treaty will improve Britain's industrial performance:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to greater competition:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to greater overseas investment in Britain:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will increase British prosperity and living standards:	1

**Table 7.7: Frequency that "pro-EC" MPs cited "internationalist" reasons to support the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership during the debate on the Second Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Reasons	Number of speakers citing reason
The Maastricht Treaty is a major step in creating a "wider, open" EC, including EFTA and Eastern European countries:	16
The Maastricht Treaty will enable Britain to shape/lead the EC:	12
Britain will be internationally isolated if it does not ratify the Maastricht Treaty:	10
The Maastricht Treaty helps to strengthen democracy in Europe:	8
The Maastricht Treaty will help Britain protect the environment:	6
The Maastricht Treaty will help Britain increase its global influence:	5
The Maastricht Treaty will reduce the threat of conflicts starting in Europe:	5
The Maastricht Treaty will help Britain represent Third World interests in the EC:	3
Britain cannot break international agreements:	1

Debates 20 May 1992: col.312).

"Through our history and our inclination we, as a nation, still have a strong instinct for

internationalism and we have a distinct contribution to make to ensure that our block-the European Community- does not become Fortress Europe but is outward-looking and that the world progresses in a cohesive manner as possible."

-Ray Whitney (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.349).

"The Maastricht Treaty...sets out the framework for a wider, more outward-looking Europe with a social conscience." -Gerald Kaufman (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.529).

"The Bill will put forward a vision of...an open Europe, a Europe that will grow wider..."

-Norman Lamont (HC Debates 21 May 1993: col.593).

In addition, some Conservative MPs make statements that Britain now had the opportunity to shape the EC it wanted. Furthermore, they also used the "counter-nationalist" theme that Britain could lead the EC:

"The question is...whether we have the confidence to exert our influence to build the Community we want to see. We have, we can, and we are building such a community. We can win those arguments. We are doing so." -John Major (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.267).

"More than any other time we are now in a position to shape the future of Europe and make it a free trade, outward-looking community of nations, and I have every confidence that we shall seize the chance." -Peter Hordern (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.332).

"During the next five years...the United Kingdom Government will probably be the most potent force in the argument over how the Community is to develop." -Giles Shaw (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.373).

"While the leadership of France and Germany suddenly look weaker, our Government are taking the lead in Europe." -Michael Colvin (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.432).

"We are now the masters. We are the one cohesive, experienced nation in Europe and we are in charge. That is a great opportunity for the shaping of Europe. The Treaty can mean what we make it mean..." -Nicholas Fairbairn (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.447).

Another feature of "pro-EC" discourse in the debate are the quite frequent expression of statements whose semiotic meanings are

anti-French and anti-German. Peter Hordern (HC Debates 20 May 1992: col.330) shows that "pro-EC" speakers could be just as vehemently anti-French in their use of discourse as "anti-EC" ones:

*Table 7.6: From the Social Thesis*  
"The French...coined the word 'communautaire', but that word means whatever is good for the French....They want a European state favourable to the French. The more centralised the state that they can obtain to that end, the better they will be pleased.

*British national democracy/seen the Maastricht Treaty material European Integration*  
"...The love of the French for Cartesian logic has led to a race of functionaries certain that they are always right; of such is Mr. Delors. In France, this takes the form of protectionism..."

"Pro-EC" speakers also make statements which utilise the "counter-nationalist" theme that the EC and the Maastricht Treaty are essential means for controlling Germany, and preventing it from following policies reminiscent of the pre-1945 period:

*All "anti-EU"*  
"...continuing the process...in the treaty and the co-operation with Germany and others on foreign and security policies...is the way to solve...the German problem." Douglas Hurd (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.518).

*British Parliament*  
"...in general Germany has played a sober and sensible role in the Community and the best way to ensure that it continues is for Britain to play an active role commensurate with our political strength in the Community. If Germany is ever likely to be a danger, an active British role is the best way to minimise it." -Gerald Kaufman (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.527).

*Table 7.7: From the Maastricht Treaty's own Parliament's*  
"It has been said that Germany wishes to dominate Europe....On the contrary, the thrust of German foreign policy has been to subsume its national identity and to gain a European one." John Butterfill (HC Debates 21 May 1992: col.557).

## PART TWO: THE COMMITTEE STAGE OF THE MAASTRICHT BILL.

### 7.7: "Anti-EC" opposition to the Social Protocol.

Labour's front-bench proposed six amendments to the Maastricht Bill, designed to delete Britain's Social Protocol "opt-out" (HC

Debates 20 January 1993: col.412). In this debate on the Social Protocol, seven MPs opposed to the whole Maastricht Treaty spoke. The main objects of their discourse are shown in Table 7.8.

**Table 7.8: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on the Social Protocol.**

Theme	Number of speakers using theme
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the Maastricht Treaty:	7
The material costs if the Maastricht Treaty/further European integration outweigh the material benefits:	5
The Maastricht Treaty will strengthen the EC's pro-socialist, anti-capitalist nature:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will strengthen the EC's pro-capitalist, anti-socialist nature:	2
Distrust of France:	1
Distrust of Germany:	1

All "anti-EC" speakers in this debate make statements which have British Parliamentary Sovereignty as their object of discourse. Table 7.9 shows the system of dispersion in this discursive formation.

**Table 7.9: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the Maastricht Treaty/EC that undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty during the debate on the Social Protocol.**

Aspect	Number of speakers citing aspect
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	6
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Commission's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	4
The Maastricht Treaty does not reduce the scope for applying QMV in the Council of Minister, which reduces the British Parliament's powers:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to the EC becoming a Federal Union:	1

The European Court of Justice is the institution which all but one speaker argues is the main threat to Parliamentary Sovereignty

in the debate on the Social Protocol. The argument made by "anti-EC" speakers is that the European Court, being an inherently Federalist institution, would see Britain's "opt-out" from the Social Protocol as an impediment to the creation of a Federal EC. Consequently, if any EC member state or individual was to go to the Court to reverse Britain's "opt-out", the "opt-out" would be overruled by the Court, and Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty would be further undermined. This argument is articulated at length by Iain Duncan-Smith (HC Debates 20 January 1993: cols.411, 414, 415):

"...the aspects of the treaty which are justiciable from the European Court's point of view will lead the court...to start introducing many of the elements in the social chapter from which we have opted out."

"It has become clear that the court sees...its task as to ensure that the interests of the Community as a whole go forward."

"...other nations will wish to...challenge us in the European Court....the European Court will...be called to make a judgement on a matter that is now supra-national, in an area where we as a Government have distinctly refused to take part. Yet suddenly the European Court will find against us in one area and then another."

"Anti-EC" speakers in the debate also make statements arguing that the Court could use its powers not only to make Britain's Social Protocol "opt-out" illegal, but in other areas as well:

"...it is impossible to imagine a situation in which, 11 member states having voted for a particular directive, the court will not rule against us if we continue to defy the directive." -Bernard Jenkin (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.422).

"We must remember that articles 2 and 3 of the treaty will add enormously to the legislation on which the European Court can rule as being relevant to the European Community." -Teddy Taylor (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.447).

"In our own domestic legislation, it would fill us with horror that the changing sentiments and instincts of the courts were our safeguard."

-John Biffen (HC Debates 27 January 1993:

The Court is, however, seen by "anti-EC" speakers as just one part of a wider institutional set-up, consolidated in the Maastricht Treaty, which will reverse Britain's Social Protocol "opt-out". The other parts of the EC institutional set-up which "anti-EC" speakers refer to in this context are the role of the European Commissioners and the existence of QMV in decision-making by the Council of Ministers:

"As qualified majority voting cut in, we should find ourselves in dispute with the other members of the Community." -Iain Duncan-Smith (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.415).

"When the Commission initiates legislation in the knowledge that it can get a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers and that the European Court will draw upon the objectives laid down in articles 2 and 3, one can be confident that we are going to find ourselves in a minority." -Bernard Jenkin (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.423).

"...I do not want our people stripped of their powers in favour of the Commission, with an international treaty and a court that will decide what is to be done." -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 27 January 1993: col.1079).

It is evident that in the debate on the Social Protocol, "anti-EC" MPs are more concerned about making statements about the threat posed to British Parliamentary Sovereignty by the EC than the material costs or the "ideological" content of the Social Protocol. Indeed, other forms of "nationalist" discourse appear in this debate. Two "anti-EC" MPs refer to the need for a "wider Europe", which the EC is not seen as addressing:

"They [Eastern European and EFTA countries] still have to be accommodated within the wider and looser Europe that the future beckons." -John Biffen (HC Debates 27 January 1993: col.1070).

"...the Maastricht treaty...does nothing for Eastern Europe." -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 21 January 1993: col.1075).

"Anti-EC" speakers even feel able to make statements referring

to the protectionist and bureaucratic traditions of France and Germany:

#### Benefits

"We must consider all 11 of the nations that are behind the social chapter- much of it was generated in France..." -Iain Duncan-Smith (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.415).

"If one is thinking in terms of continental countries, one may have to draw on Bismarck...to understand a tradition that is significantly different to our own." -John Biffen (HC Debates 27 January 1993: col.1069).

#### 7.8: "Pro-EC" discourse and the Social Protocol.

Twelve "pro-EC" MPs spoke in the Social Protocol debate. Table 7.10 shows the objects of their discourse.

**Table 7.10: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on the Social Protocol.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
The material benefits arising from the Maastricht Treaty outweigh the material costs:	12
The Maastricht Treaty will strengthen the EC's socialist tendencies:	6
British sovereignty is not weakened by the Maastricht Treaty:	5
Involvement in further European integration is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	5
The Maastricht Treaty is a bulwark against socialism:	2
Distrust of France:	1

Table 7.10 shows that the material benefits of the EC are an object of discourse for all twelve "pro-EC" MPs speaking in the debate. The system of dispersion for this "pragmatic" discursive formation is shown in Table 7.11.

There are, however, "pro-EC" speakers prepared to make statements referring to "nationalist" objects of discourse. Table 7.12 shows the system of dispersion for the discursive formation whose statements refer to Parliamentary Sovereignty.

Two Labour MPs deny that Britain signing up for the Social Protocol would undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty:

**Table 7.11: Frequency that the material benefits of the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership are cited by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on the Social Protocol.**

Benefits	Number of speakers citing benefit
The Maastricht Treaty will improve Britain's industrial performance:	9
The Social Protocol would aid the British economy:	8
The Maastricht Treaty will increase British prosperity and living standards:	6
The Maastricht Treaty will provide Britain with a larger market/more trade:	5
The Social Protocol "opt-out" aids the British economy:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to lower unemployment:	2
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to more EC regional aid:	2
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to greater overseas investment in Britain:	2
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to greater competition:	1

**Table 7.12: Frequency that "pro-EC" MPs give particular reasons why the Maastricht Treaty/EC does not undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty in the debate on the Social Protocol.**

Reasons	Number of speakers citing reason
The Maastricht Treaty does not threaten Parliamentary Sovereignty:	2
Subsidiarity will reduce the EC's centralising tendencies:	1
The European Court of Justice is no longer a pro-Federalist institution:	1
The Maastricht Treaty reduces the powers of the European Commission:	1

"I certainly do not agree with the second part [of Bowen Wells' intervention], in which he suggested that somehow decisions on such matters would be taken away from the jurisdiction of this house." -John Cunningham (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.406).

"We are not talking about an alien body trying to impose things on the United Kingdom....We are talking about Britain playing its full and effective role in the creation of a single market." -Geoff Hoon (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.460).

In contrast, "pro-EC" Conservatives, in rejecting the Social Protocol, argue that the "opt-out" is a means of preserving British Parliamentary Sovereignty. Stephen Milligan (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.430) argues that the "opt-out" is an integral part of achieving Subsidiarity within the EC:

"The treaty has established the principle of subsidiarity, which is that, wherever possible, issues should be decided at national level. One can put the case for social intervention and regulation on hours and wages, but that is a national decision. It is not appropriate for the Community to act in such matters."

Edward Garnier (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.468) presents the Social Protocol "opt-out" as a way of reducing the Commission's powers over Britain:

"...neither I nor my constituents want the Commission to interfere in domestic employment law or other matters set out in the protocol."

It is the Government Minister Tristan Garel-Jones who addresses the most salient object of "anti-EC" discourse in the debate; that the Social Protocol "opt-out" will be undermined by the pro-Federalist nature of the European Court of Justice. He argues that a combination of the Maastricht Treaty, its emphasis on Subsidiarity, and the Court's recognition that people in the EC, as shown in the 1992 Danish and French referendums on the Treaty, want a less centralised EC, mean that the Court is starting to abandon its traditionally pro-Federalist tendencies (HC Debates 27 January 1993: col.1059):

"The European Court has, perhaps, traditionally been a centralising institution, expanding the powers and scope of the Community...I contend, however, that there have recently been clear signs that the court is sensitive to the change in mood in the Community- even in advance of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty...  
"The Court is showing itself to be increasingly sensitive to states' rights, and is giving increasing weight to the national arrangements. It is even less inventive in its interpretation

of Community law, and is demonstrating a welcome willingness to give greater scope to exceptions and derogations."

Furthermore, Garel-Jones (HC Debates 27 January 1993: col.1061) presents the Court as an essential means for Britain to create the EC it would like to see:

"I believe that it is wrong to suggest that the Court is Britain's enemy; we need it, and we should not fear it....we look to the European Court to enforce, and make a reality of, the single market for which we in Britain have fought so hard."

"Pro-EC" speakers also make statements which utilise "internationalist" discourse. Opposition MPs argue that, by not accepting the Social Protocol, Britain is isolating itself inside the EC:

"...the isolation of the British Conservative Government in Europe on the issue is absolute. They should regard that not as a badge of honour but as a badge of shame for Britain." -John Cunningham (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.404).

"We must not be regarded for another decade as an offshore island which cannot determine whether or not we want to be part of Europe." -Daffyd Wigley (HC Debates 20 January 1993: col.429).

"I hope that...the Government will repent and end their foolish and damaging isolation on this important matter." -Joyce Quin (HC Debates 27 January 1993: col.1068).

### 7.9: "Anti-EC" opposition to European Citizenship.

Sixteen "probing" amendments were put forward by Labour's front-bench for the issue of European Citizenship to be debated in the Committee Stage of the Bill. Seven "anti-EC" MPs spoke in this debate. As Table 7.13 shows, their statements almost entirely concentrated upon the proposal's perceived threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty.

**Table 7.13: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on European Citizenship.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the Maastricht Treaty:	7
"National internationalist" duties/commitments:	1
Distrust of France:	1
Distrust of Germany:	1

Table 7.14 shows the system of dispersion in the discursive formation whose object of discourse is Parliamentary Sovereignty.

**Table 7.14: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the Maastricht Treaty/EC that undermined British Parliamentary Sovereignty in the debate on European Citizenship.**

Aspects	Number of speakers citing aspect
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to the EC becoming a Federal Union:	6
The Maastricht Treaty creates European Citizenship, so undermining the sovereignty of the British state:	6
The Maastricht Treaty undermines the Queen's position as head of the British state:	5
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Parliament's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	4
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	3

Most of the "anti-EC" speakers in the debate made statements arguing that the concept of European Citizenship undermined loyalties to the British state and its Parliament, so paving the way for a Federal EC. They claimed that while EC citizenship would give British subjects the right to vote in European and municipal elections in the rest of the EC, and the right to petition the European Parliament, it would also mean that British subjects would have, as yet unspecified, duties and obligations to the EC. As "anti-EC" speakers argued that an individual citizen can only have allegiance to one state, European Citizenship would mean that

British citizens would have **de facto** allegiance to the EC, inevitably undermining their allegiance to legislation passed at Westminster. "Anti-EC" speakers refer in despairing tones to the constitutional consequences of European Citizenship:

"...the citizens of the union will in effect have the rights and obligations normally associated with the citizens of a single state." -John Wilkinson (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.53).

"That European state will be superior to the existing nation states. It will have the power to decide and to enforce rights and duties." -Ivan Lawrence (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.78).

"...there certainly was a difference between citizenship of the European union, and the citizenship of member states- the latter would be subordinate to the former." -Bryan Gould (HC Debates 1 February 1993: cols.83-4).

"The Bill attempts to remove the sovereignty of the House, and our right to represent the people and defend their liberties as we have done for more than 1,000 years." -Nicholas Bonsor (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.93).

"That [Maastricht] means that United Kingdom citizenship must be of itself be subordinate. Therefore, my first duty to support the laws and maintain the structure will be to the union of Europe rather than to the United Kingdom."

-Richard Shepherd (HC Debates 1 February 1993: cols.108-9).

Another argument used by most "anti-EC" speakers in this debate is that the Queen would also acquire European Citizenship. As she, and her successors, would be citizens of the EC with duties, obligations and allegiance to the EC, the entire British constitution, with its doctrine of the legal supremacy of the "Queen-in-Parliament", would be undermined. While no speakers go as far as other "anti-EC" political actors in claiming that overthrowing the legal supremacy of the British monarch in the United Kingdom is an act of treason (Atkinson and McWhirter, 1995), their statements in the debate express manifest concern about the position of the monarch under the Maastricht Treaty:

"Is it seriously suggested that the British people would have wanted Her Majesty the Queen to be the subject of Mr. Delors, remembering his thoughts on the future of Europe?" -Ivan Lawrence (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.70).

"It is a remarkable thought that the Queen, the supreme citizen of our political entity, would owe allegiance to some higher, wider authority." -Bryan Gould (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.84).

"...if we sign the treaty, the rights and prerogatives of our monarch will be brought into question by some European authority...some time in the future." -Nicholas Bonsor (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.92).

"We have heard no analysis...of what citizenship means or how it affects the Queen in Parliament." -Richard Shepherd (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.106).

Furthermore, Parliamentary Sovereignty is also presented in "anti-EC" statements as being threatened by European Citizenship since the concept gives increased powers to both the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice:

"It is not we, members of this sovereign, imperial Parliament at Westminster, who will be consulted [about the rights of citizens], it will be the members of the European Parliament at Strasbourg." -John Wilkinson (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.58).

"Article 8d gives Euro-citizens the right to petition the European Parliament. What will happen if such a petition succeeds? Will it succeed over the decisions of the British Parliament? Is that an example of the European Parliament taking power over the Westminster Parliament?" -Ivan Lawrence (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.74).

"The European Court of Justice...has adopted, quite deliberately and self-consciously- this teleological approach. It interprets every legal question that is brought before it in order to further the cause of European union." -Bryan Gould (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.86).

"The duties to which we as citizens of the be subject....will be decided by a European Court determined to develop the European union...supersede and crush the independence of of the union's member states." -Nicholas Bonsor (HC Debates 1 February 1993: cols.90-1).

of the concept of European Citizenship. Three other forms of "nationalist" discourse feature in statements made in the debate. First, Bryan Gould (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.88) sees the concept of European Citizenship as a means to create an exclusive, "narrowly nationalist", European identity, which would help prevent the creation of a "wider Europe":

Involvement in Britain's "in and welcoming, Europe; instead, it is a centralised Europe, a European super-state. It is exclusive because it closes its doors to others..."

Second, Ivan Lawrence (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.71) creates the spectre of a "French plot", since EC citizens would be able to vote anywhere in the EC at European elections:

"What will stop sufficient French farmers... coming here...by virtue of their French citizenship...and thereby getting the MEP they want? Such an MEP might stand for policies which the Euro-farmer particularly wants but which the British farmer does not want." (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.71).

Third, Bryan Gould (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.86) invokes Germany's Nazi past to illustrate his fears about the possible clash of loyalties European Citizenship could bring:

"I fervently hope that we shall never reach the point where citizens of this country have to choose, as Germans did under the Nazi regime, between their preparedness to obey the law... the normal condition of citizenship- and their refusal to accept a legal system imposed upon them from outside."

#### **7.10: "Pro-EC" support for European Citizenship.**

Five "pro-EC" MPs spoke in the debate on European Citizenship. Table 7.15 shows the objects of discourse for their statements.

Most "pro-EC" speakers stressed the "internationalist" symbolism

of the concept of European Citizenship. Table 7.16 shows the system of dispersion which makes up this "internationalist" discursive formation.

**Table 7.15: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on European Citizenship.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
Involvement in further European integration is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	4
British sovereignty is not weakened by the Maastricht Treaty:	4

**Table 7.16: Frequency that "internationalist" themes are cited by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on European Citizenship.**

Themes	Number of speakers citing theme
The Maastricht Treaty will lessen the threat of conflicts starting in Europe:	4
The Maastricht Treaty will help Britain protect the environment:	1

European Citizenship is presented in "pro-EC" statements as a means of generally lessening international tension and preventing intra-EC conflicts, in particular:

"Viewed sensibly, it will be part of progress towards a better, more stable world- and the European Community has a part to play in that." -Tony Blair (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.33).

"...although it is currently nothing more than a symbol, it is an important token of membership of a multi-national, multilingual and multi-faceted community."

"...world war became the basis for forming a community in Europe. The prime purpose of its formation was to prevent that ever happening again." -John Fraser (HC Debates 1 February 1993: cols.60, 64).

"We need to find devices to prevent that [world war] from happening again." -Andrew Rowe (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.100).

"Pro-EC" statements also attempt to address the effect that

European Citizenship will have upon British Parliamentary Sovereignty. The themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate are shown in Table 7.17.

**Table 7.17: Frequency that "pro-EC" MPs gave particular reasons why the Maastricht/EC does not undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty in the debate on European Citizenship.**

Reasons	Number of speakers citing reason
<b>The Maastricht Treaty does not threaten Parliamentary Sovereignty:</b>	4
<b>Parliamentary Sovereignty is increasingly becoming an outdated concept:</b>	2

The main argument made in "pro-EC" statements is that European Citizenship is no threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty, as it **complements**, not **supplants**, British citizenship:

"Some of us feel that the advent of citizenship in Europe is not a loss of national identity... I do not at all regard it as a loss of national identity because I think that we shall gain something from it, and that that gain shall outweigh any theoretical loss."

"It does not mean that we scrap our nationality or citizenship, or even that we subordinate it. It means that running alongside our rights and obligations as British citizens will be a European citizenship." -Tony Blair (HC Debates 1 February 1993: cols.31-2).

"...I feel no sense of outrage at the idea that, together with being a national of the United Kingdom, I shall be a citizen of the European Union." -Kenneth Clarke (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.34).

Indeed, Charles Kennedy (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.46) of the Liberal Democrats cites the "national internationalist" cause of the Commonwealth to argue that an individual can hold more than one form of citizenship:

"...one can talk about Commonwealth citizenship....There can be a category or classification of citizenship which goes beyond the nation state."

The other argument employed in "pro-EC" statements concerning European Citizenship is the "Euro-Federalist" argument that British Parliamentary Sovereignty is an increasingly obsolete concept:

#### Aspect

"The article is...partly philosophical because it deals with citizenship and begins to redefine and consider the notion of the nation state freshly and more fully." -Charles Kennedy (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.50).  
"...the restrictions on individual citizenship and divisions between European countries have become archaic." -John Fraser (HC Debates 1 February 1993: col.60).

#### 7.11: "Anti-EC" opposition to Subsidiarity.

As was mentioned in Part One of this Chapter, opinions about Subsidiarity played an important part on both "pro" and "anti-EC" discourse during the Second Reading debate on the Maastricht Bill. At the Committee Stage, the Labour front-bench put forward a group of five "probing" amendments concerning Subsidiarity. Five "anti-EC" MPs spoke in this debate. Their objects of discourse are shown in Table 7.18.

**Table 7.18: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on Subsidiarity.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the Maastricht Treaty:	5
"National internationalist" duties/commitments:	1

The threat to Parliamentary Sovereignty posed by Subsidiarity clearly dominated "anti-EC" statements on the concept. Table 7.19 shows the system of dispersion making up this discursive formation.

Most "anti-EC" MPs make statements expressing their fear that Subsidiarity will be used by both the European Court of Justice and the European Commission to undermine Parliamentary Sovereignty:

"As the concept of subsidiarity is in the

**Table 7.19: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the Maastricht Treaty/EC that undermined British Parliamentary Sovereignty during the debate on Subsidiarity.**

Aspect	Number of speakers citing aspect
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	5
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Commission's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	5
Subsidiarity will not reduce the EC's centralising tendencies, which threaten to reduce the British Parliament's powers:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to the EC becoming a Federal Union:	2
The Maastricht Treaty does not reduce the scope for QMV in the Council of Ministers, which reduces the British Parliament's powers:	2
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Parliament's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	1
The establishment of EMU/ECB/Single Currency will undermine the British Parliament's powers:	1

treaty, it is potentially justiciable. The European Court of Justice must therefore be involved in determining what comes under the doctrine of subsidiarity."

"...the Commission will be deeply reluctant to give up the areas of decision making that are within its province or within the Community's province." -Norman Godman (HC Debates 8 March 1993: cols.737-8).

"...subsidiarity, far from confirming Parliament as the supreme legislative authority in the land, will instead make it ever more subsidiary to the institutions of Brussels." -Bernard Jenkin (HC Debates 8 March 1993: col.748).

"It is in the interests of the Commission, and of individual Commissioners, to exercise as much power as they can."

We know that, on the past record of the European Court of Justice, it will decide in favour of the Treaty's objectives." -Bill Walker (HC Debates 11 March 1993: cols.1137, 1140).

"Subsidiarity is a moral and philosophical notion that has been given no legal or constitutional application in the Maastricht Treaty. It means whatever the institutions of the Community wish it to mean." -Harry Barnes (HC Debates 11 March 1993: col.1167).

**Table 7.21: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs made reference to Subsidiarity**

Furthermore, "anti-EC" statements regard Subsidiarity itself as a potentially centralising concept, leading to a Federal state; for the idea of powers being exercised at appropriate levels inside the EC being an extremely vague concept:

Parliamentary Sovereignty:	"Far from being a purely decentralising concept ...subsidiarity can be used to widen Community powers; it therefore strengthens the centralising tendency of the Community."
Subsidiarity tendencies:	-Bernard Jenkin (HC Debates 8 March 1993: col.743).
The European Federalist in The Maastricht European Consensus:	"I submit that subsidiarity...instead of being purely a decentralising concept is...and can be used...will be used- to widen Community powers."
A majority of the pro-EC MPs:	-Bill Walker (HC Debates 11 March 1993: col.1128).

In conclusion, most "anti-EC" MPs in the debate would agree with Bill Walker (HC Debates 11 March 1993: col.1141) that "Subsidiarity is legal nonsense."

### 7.12: "Pro-EC" support for Subsidiarity.

Table 7.20 shows the objects of discourse which six "pro-EC" MPs made reference to in their statements.

**Table 7.20: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on Subsidiarity.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
British sovereignty is not weakened by the Maastricht Treaty:	5
Material benefits arising from the Maastricht Treaty outweigh the material costs:	3
Involvement in further European integration is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	2
Anti-German sentiments:	1

Nearly all addressed the issue of Subsidiarity and its effect on Parliamentary Sovereignty. Table 7.21 shows the system of dispersion for this discursive formation.

**Table 7.21: Frequency that "pro-EC" MPs give particular reasons why the Maastricht Treaty/EC does not undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty in the debate in Subsidiarity.**

Reasons	Number of speakers citing reason
The Maastricht Treaty does not threaten Parliamentary Sovereignty:	3
Parliamentary Sovereignty is becoming an increasingly outdated concept:	3
Subsidiarity will reduce the EC's centralising tendencies:	2
The European Court of Justice is no longer a pro-Federalist institution:	1
The Maastricht Treaty reduces the powers of the European Commission:	1

A majority of speakers made statements insisting that Subsidiarity would protect British Parliamentary Sovereignty:

"...the most powerful of all levels [in the EC] is that of the nation state." -David Wilshire (HC Debates 8 March 1993: col.737).

"Subsidiarity is about nation states taking decisions when it appropriate for them to do so." -John Butterfill (HC Debates 11 March 1993: col.1754).

Douglas Hurd (HC Debates 11 March 1993: cols.1158, 1162), on the Government front-bench, made the most forceful statement which argues that Subsidiarity was the best means of defending Parliamentary Sovereignty and reversing the centralising tendencies of EC institutions:

"I do not agree...that the result of Maastricht is to strengthen...the bank, the Court and Commission....I believe that it is the European Council, representing the Heads of State or Government, that will be the chief gainer of Maastricht."

"The Commission, in action and in words, has shown that it is conscious of the need to legislate by setting minimum requirements rather than resorting to heavy-handed harmonisation across the board."

"It is for national Parliaments and Governments to decide what policies they yield to the Community."

Hurd (HC Debates 11 March 1993: col.1163) also argued that Subsidiarity was the means by which Britain could fulfil its "internationalist" duty by building "an open, expanding, free-trading, decentralising Community":

"That can be built only on the basis of this treaty and on the principle of subsidiarity."

The same number of "pro-EC" speakers, however, made statements employing the "Euro-Federalist" argument that Parliamentary Sovereignty was not threatened by Subsidiarity, because Parliamentary Sovereignty was already becoming an outdated concept. Not surprisingly, MPs representing Scottish constituencies were in the forefront of making statements with such "Euro-Federalist" assumptions informing them:

"The reality is that some of these decisions are taken out of our hands anyway." -George Robertson (HC Debates 8 March 1993: col.726).

"The House has dismally failed to protect the rights of our people and it deserves to be eclipsed by more democratic and effective institutions in Strasbourg, Edinburgh and Cardiff." -John Home Robertson (HC Debates 8 March 1993: col.757).

### 7.13: "Anti-EC" opposition to the ECB.

At the Committee Stage, 44 amendments to the sections of the Maastricht Bill concerned with the ECB were put forward.

One of these amendments, giving the House of Commons an opportunity annually to debate the ECB's report to the European System of Central Banks, the Labour front-bench pressed to a vote, before abstaining (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.961) In the debate on ECB accountability seven "anti-MPs" spoke. Table 7.22 shows the objects of their discourse.

All speakers opposed the ECB on the grounds that they saw the material costs of both the single currency and the convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty to achieve a Single

**Table 7.22: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on ECB accountability.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
<b>Material costs of the Maastricht Treaty/further European integration outweigh the material benefits:</b>	7
<b>British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the Maastricht Treaty:</b>	7
<b>The Maastricht Treaty will strengthen the EC's pro-capitalist, anti-socialist nature:</b>	4
<b>Distrust of Germany:</b>	3
<b>Distrust of France:</b>	1

**Table 7.23: Frequency that the material costs of the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership are cited by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on ECB accountability.**

Costs	Number of speakers citing cost
<b>The Maastricht Treaty will not lead to a reduction in unemployment levels in Britain:</b>	6
<b>The Maastricht Treaty will not increase the well-being of Britain's relatively depressed economic regions:</b>	4
<b>The Maastricht Treaty will not stop the CAP continuing to have an adverse effect upon Britain and British agriculture:</b>	3
<b>The material costs to the British economy of pursuing the convergence criteria necessary for establishing EMU, and the economic consequences of EMU, are too high:</b>	3
<b>The Maastricht Treaty will not stop Britain having to pay more into the EC's Budget than it is given back:</b>	2
<b>The material costs to the British economy of ERM membership were too high:</b>	2
<b>The Maastricht Treaty will cause further problems for British industry and manufacturing:</b>	1
<b>The Maastricht Treaty will not reduce the adverse effect that EC membership has had on Britain's balance of payments:</b>	1
<b>The Maastricht Treaty will not prevent further major shifts in investment from Britain to the EC:</b>	1

Currency are too high. Table 7.23 shows the system of dispersion for this "pragmatic" discursive formation.

All "anti-EC" speakers also made statements which had as their object of discourse Parliamentary Sovereignty, and the ECB's threat to it. Table 7.24 shows the system of dispersion for this

discursive formation.

**Table 7.24: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership that undermined British Parliamentary Sovereignty in the debate on ECB accountability.**

Aspects	Number of speakers citing aspect
Treaty as a whole:	
The establishment of EMU/ECB/Single Currency will undermine the British Parliament's powers:	5
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	1
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Commission's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	1

According to statements made by "anti-EC" speakers, the main threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty contained in the plans for the ECB are the undemocratic consequences of EMU. These consequences include a single currency throughout the EC overseen by a single ECB which would be "independent", or, in "anti-EC" eyes, accountable to nobody but itself. Consequently, the ECB as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty is seen as taking control over the raising and spending of government expenditure, as well as the issuing of currency in Britain, out of the hands of Parliament and elected politicians, into the hands of unelected bankers. This is regarded as a massive blow to British Parliamentary Sovereignty:

"With the loss of ultimate parliamentary control over the central bank, the House will lose the rock on which it was founded and built: control over the money supply." -Peter Tapsell (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.970).

"I may be an idealist to believe in Parliament, but when I was elected I was told that the great thing about Parliament was that it controlled the purse and the sword. That was the great 17th century gain, but today we do not control the purse." -Tony Benn (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.989).

"..we will remove from the House and...the people of the United Kingdom, that essential element that gives them control over their destiny- money." -Christopher Gill (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.1001).

Anti-German statements are also quite prominent in "anti-EC" discourse in this debate. Peter Tapsell (HC Debates 24 March 1993: cols.980-1), echoing the article by Chris Jones in **The Spectator** during the 1975 Referendum campaign (5.15), makes a bitter attack on the intellectual origins of the ECB, EMU and the Maastricht Treaty as a whole:

"European monetary union was not dreamed up by M. Jean Monnet...; the idea was floated in July 1940 by Walther Funk...a drunken homosexual Nazi toady...In July 1940, just after the German panzer divisions had overrun Western Europe, Funk circulated a number of documents on monetary union..."

"...the wording of the Maastricht treaty in certain sections follows word for word the documents circulated inside the Reichsbank in 1940. The view, which Hitler strongly shared, was that Europe could not be held permanently subordinate to Germany by force of arms alone, that it was necessary to resort to economic and monetary forces to make the domination permanent."

Tapsell (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.978) also makes statements which draw upon the historical archive of Britain's wars with France:

"Prior to Napoleon's Berlin decree codifying the continental system, people were telling Pitt that he had lost independent control of the British currency."

Two other speakers also make statements with anti-German semiotic values:

"If the Germans were able to achieve their aspirations, it would preclude English people from achieving any of theirs." -Christopher Gill (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.1005).  
"It [the ECB] is above all a German institution." -Peter Shore (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.1038).

Indeed, Shore (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.1034) makes a

statement repeating his claim, made during the 1975 Referendum campaign (5.5), that the EC was not a community with which Britain could genuinely identify:

"We refer to the European Community, but I am not sure that it is a community in the same sense that...the United Kingdom is a community.. . "...it is no good pretending that there is the same degree of commitment and sense of genuine community and union between the countries of Europe as there is within each country." (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.1034).

#### 7.14: "Pro-EC" support for the ECB.

Five "pro-EC" MPs spoke in this debate. Table 7.25 shows the objects of discourse of their statements.

**Table 7.25: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on ECB accountability.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
The material benefits arising from the Maastricht Treaty outweigh the material costs:	5
British sovereignty is not weakened by the Maastricht Treaty:	4
Involvement in further European integration is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	3
The Maastricht Treaty is a bulwark against socialism:	1
Anti-German sentiments:	1

All five made statements citing the material benefits of EMU, the ECB and a single currency. Table 7.26 shows the system of dispersion of this "pragmatic" discursive formation.

Four of them also made statements whose object of discourse was Parliamentary Sovereignty. Table 7.27 shows the system of dispersion of this discursive formation.

Three of the "pro-EC" MPs make statements presenting the creation of an ECB as not a threat to Parliamentary Sovereignty. Stephen Dorrell (HC Debates, 24 March 1993: col.1044), on the Government front-bench, emphasises that Parliament would have the final say over whether Britain participated in Stage Three of EMU:

**Table 7.26: Frequency that the material benefits of the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership are cited by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on ECB accountability.**

Benefits	Number of speakers citing benefit
"...weaken accountability..."	
Moreover, both Smith and Conservative Peter	
The Maastricht Treaty will mean lower prices/price stability:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will provide Britain with a larger market/more trade:	1
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to lower unemployment:	1
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to more EC regional aid:	1
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to greater overseas investment in Britain:	1

**Table 7.27: Frequency that "pro-EC" MPs give particular reasons why the Maastricht Treaty/EC does not undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty in the debate on ECB accountability.**

Reasons	Number of speakers citing reason
"...influence over our own affairs than at the moment." - John Butterfield (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.992):	
The Maastricht Treaty does not threaten Parliamentary Sovereignty:	3
Subsidiarity will reduce the EC's centralising tendencies:	1
Parliamentary Sovereignty is becoming an increasingly outdated concept:	1
"The position in 1975- it remains the same now...was that no form of monetary union could be imposed on the country other than as a result of a treaty amendment, which would clearly require the consent not merely of the Government but of the House..."	

Furthermore (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.1044):

"...even when we are designing a monetary authority which is separate from the member states, we should seek to apply the principle of subsidiarity."

In putting forward the amendment requiring that the ECB's annual report should be presented to Parliament, Andrew Smith, for Labour's front-bench (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.961), stresses that it would:

"...provide the opportunity for a vote on it. That would give the House a form of accountability that is not available to it now. Therefore, it would strengthen rather than weaken accountability."

Moreover, both Smith and Conservative Peter Butterfill see the ECB as a means of enhancing Britain's **effective** sovereignty over currency matters, rather than diminishing it:

"...the choice facing us is not between influence through the pooling of sovereignty on the one hand and influence outside that pooling on the other; it is a choice between influence through the Community and precious little influence at all." -Andrew Smith (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.964).

"Indeed, if we were to move quickly to currency union, we should all gain a great deal more influence over our own affairs than we have at the moment." -John Butterfill (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.992).

Liberal Democrat Malcolm Bruce (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.1012), utilises "Euro-Federalist" discourse to welcome an independent ECB which would weaken Parliament's say over economic policy:

"Some of us believe that the sovereignty of the House is used not to liberate the citizens of this country but occasionally to enslave them."

Both Smith and Bruce criticise the Government for its "opt-out" from Stage Three of EMU and its reluctance to rejoin the ERM in the aftermath of "Black Wednesday". These criticisms are made not so much because of the potential economic benefits for Britain of the ERM or EMU, but on "internationalist" grounds; Britain is being marginalised Britain inside the EC, when it could be leading the EC in the sphere of financial policy:

"Let me make it clear that the Labour Party does not find it acceptable any prospect for closer European co-operation and integration that does not have Britain firmly in the first division."

Table 7.281 From -Andrew Smith (HC Debates 24 March 1993:  
on the Third col.964).

Maastricht Treaty  
Theresa  
"Britain could have secured a pivotal role, but  
the Government have effectively thrown that role  
away." -Malcolm Bruce (HC Debates 24 March 1993:  
col.1013).

Bruce (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.1015) also argues that the EC is an organisation where Britain can pursue "internationalist" policies, such as free trade:

"I do not accept that the EC is a closed community; it is an open, free trade community."

It is also the case that fervently "pro-EC" MP Giles Radice responds to the employment of anti-German statements by some "anti-EC" MPs during the debate on ECB accountability by utilising similar "counter-nationalist" discourse of his own. That is, Radice (HC Debates 24 March 1993: col.1015) argues that the establishment of "a European central bank...is the way to stop German domination" of the EC.

### PART THREE: DEBATE ON THE THIRD READING OF THE MAASTRICHT BILL.

#### 7.15: Third Reading: "anti-EC" speakers.

Twelve "anti-EC" MPs spoke in this debate. Table 7.28 shows the objects of discourse for their statements.

All twelve make statements referring to British Parliamentary Sovereignty. The system of dispersion for this discursive formation is shown in Table 7.29.

Table 7.29 shows that most "anti-EC" MPs express their opposition to the Maastricht Bill utilising statements with the same, or similar, semiotic values as used in the Second Reading debate.

What is different is a noticeable air of despondency and resignation to be found in "anti-EC" statements during the Third Reading debate. There is a sense that an era of history, that of British Parliamentary Sovereignty, is almost over, with the passing

**Table 7.28: Frequency of themes used by "anti-EC" MPs in the debate on the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill in opposing the Maastricht Treaty.**

Themes	Number of speakers using theme
British national independence and Parliamentary democracy/sovereignty will be further undermined by the Maastricht Treaty:	12
"National internationalist" duties/commitments:	7
Material costs of the Maastricht Treaty/further European integration outweigh the material benefits:	5
The Maastricht Treaty will strengthen the EC's pro-capitalist, anti-socialist nature:	3
Distrust of France:	2
Distrust of Germany:	2

**Table 7.29: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited particular aspects of the Maastricht Treaty/EC that undermined British Parliamentary Sovereignty during the debate on the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Aspects	Number of speakers citing aspect
The establishment of EMU/ECB/Single Currency will undermine the British Parliament's powers:	10
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to the EC becoming a Federal Union:	6
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Commission's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	6
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Court of Justice's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	4
The Maastricht Treaty creates European Citizenship, so undermining the sovereignty of the British state:	4
Subsidiarity does not reduce the EC's centralising tendencies, which threaten to reduce the British Parliament's powers:	2
The Maastricht Treaty increases the European Parliament's powers, so reducing the British Parliament's powers:	1
The Maastricht Treaty does not reduce the scope for applying QMV in the Council of Ministers, which reduces the British Parliament's powers:	1
The Maastricht Treaty undermines the Queen's position as head of the British state:	1

the Maastricht Bill into law. Despite David Winnick's brave assertion that "the fight for Britain to retain its national sovereignty will continue" (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.438), most

"anti-EC" MPs who spoke in the debate, do not sound so hopeful. A despairing, apocalyptic tone can be identified running deep through their speeches:

#### ~~Reasons for alternatives~~

~~Britain should "deepen" EC, in countries: The Maastricht Third world etc The Maastricht protectionists should promote The Maastricht links with the with the ECAs~~  
"When we vote tonight...the House will abandon that which makes it a focus of interest and attention for generations from the Chartists and the suffragettes until now." -Tony Benn (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.421).

~~Agenda: Nigel~~  
"It will not matter two hoots in five years' time how we elect Members to this Parliament, because we shall give away most of the powers that they have had...for centuries." -Michael Cartiss (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.437).

~~that "The nil Nigel Spearing regards the into the area~~  
"I fear for the future....as democratic power is slowly shifted from national Parliaments to Community institutions." -George Gardiner (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.441).

~~Agenda: Nigel~~  
"We are arrogating, binding, restricting and shackling future generations and Parliaments by seeking to extend our dominion into the future, thus robbing our successors of their freedom of choice." -Ron Leighton (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.450).

~~Agenda: Nigel~~  
"We shall become citizens of the European union ...and Parliament will be subject to the courts of the Community, as will the Crown. This could be the end of British parliamentary democracy as we know it." -Nigel Spearing (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.455).

#### ~~Internationalist~~

The majority of "anti-EC" speakers in the debate also made statements with "national internationalist" semiotic values. Table 7.30 shows the system of dispersion found in this discursive formation.

As in the Second Reading debate, most statements with "national internationalist" semiotic values refer to the need to develop a "wider" Europe than that currently provided by the EC, or will be provided by the Maastricht Treaty:

~~old agenda~~  
"...I suggested a Commonwealth of Europe, a looser arrangement where harmonisation is by consent." -Tony Benn (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.420).

"It is an exclusive treaty because it heightens the barriers and makes it more difficult for other countries to join; we need a looser

**Table 7.30: Frequency that "anti-EC" MPs cited "national internationalist" reasons to oppose, or alternatives to, the Maastricht Treaty/EC during the debate on the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Reasons/alternatives	Number of speakers citing reason /alternative
Britain should promote a "wider", as opposed to "deeper" EC, incorporating EFTA and Eastern European countries:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will not help Britain help Third World economic development:	1
The Maastricht Treaty will help strengthen the EC's protectionist, anti-free trade tendencies/ Britain should promote international free trade:	1
The Maastricht Treaty will further reduce Britain's links with the USA/Britain should increase its links with the USA:	1

Sister "pro-US" relationship." -Austin Mitchell (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.453).

Again, Michael Spicer (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.452) suggests that "The alternative is a free trade market looking outwards..."; Nigel Spearing (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.455), meanwhile, regards the Maastricht Treaty's extension of the EC's competence into the area of overseas development as a betrayal of Britain's "internationalist" traditions:

"...we shall have a single overseas development policy, not an aid policy but a development policy based on the mercantilist selfishness of the European Community."

Denzil Davies (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.429) also accuses the EC of being "narrowly nationalist" and anti-American in its policies towards ex-Yugoslavia, blaming this on one of Britain's old enemies:

"The events in Bosnia and the rift with the United States reveal that the French and those who have argued against NATO have already won the intellectual argument and will move quickly towards a common European defence and foreign policy..."

Nigel Spearing, in contrast, blames Germany for inflaming the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia by persuading the EC to diplomatically recognise Croatia in 1991 (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.455).

It is Tony Benn, however, makes a statement with semiotic values which draw upon the historical archive of English Radicalism and anti-French sentiments. That is, the "Norman Yoke". Seeing the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill as signalling the death-knell of British Parliamentary democracy, Benn comments that (HC Debates May 20 1993: col.421) "If we learned to live with William the Conqueror, we can learn to live with Jacques Delors."

#### **7.16: Third Reading: "pro-EC" speakers.**

Sixteen "pro-EC" MPs spoke in this debate. Table 7.31 shows the objects of discourse of their statements.

**Table 7.31: Frequency of themes used by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on the Third reading of the Maastricht Bill in supporting the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership.**

<b>Themes</b>	<b>Number of speakers using theme</b>
Involvement in further European integration is Britain's "internationalist" duty:	13
The material benefits arising from the Maastricht Treaty outweigh the material costs:	12
British sovereignty is not weakened by the Maastricht Treaty:	10
The Maastricht Treaty is a bulwark against socialism:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will strengthen the EC's socialist tendencies:	2
Anti-German sentiments:	2

Most of them make statements stressing "internationalist" reasons for supporting the Maastricht Treaty. Table 7.32 shows the system of dispersion within this "internationalist" discursive formation.

Like their "anti-EC" opponents in the Third Reading debate, and as in the Second Reading debate , "pro-EC" speakers make most statements with "internationalist" semiotic values about the need

**Table 7.32: Frequency that "pro-EC" MPs cited "internationalist" reasons to support the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership during the debate on the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Themes	Number of speakers citing theme
The Maastricht Treaty is a major step in creating a "wider, open" EC, including EFTA and Eastern European countries:	8
Britain will be internationally isolated if it does not ratify the Maastricht Treaty:	7
The Maastricht Treaty will lessen the threat of conflicts starting in Europe:	5
The Maastricht Treaty will enable Britain to shape/lead the EC:	5
The Maastricht Treaty will help Britain increase its global influence:	4
The Maastricht Treaty will help Britain protect the environment:	2

for the EC to build a "wider Europe" than currently exists:

"...the Community must continue to change and expand. We should work positively for the admission of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Austria to an expanded Community." -Jack Cunningham (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.402).  
 "The enlargement of the Community must be a high priority..." -Cranley Onslow (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.417).  
 "...we should seek with all possible speed a wider Europe..." -David Atkinson (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.444).  
 We seek a wider Europe, a different Europe, a free trading Europe." -Norman Lamont (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.467).

More statements are made in this debate, compared to the Second Reading one, arguing that if the Maastricht Treaty is not ratified, Britain faces international isolation. This argument is put forward by the front-benches of both main Parties:

"One of the lessons that we in Britain should have learned by now about developments in the Community is that to stand back, to remain apart and to join late inevitably leads to disadvantages for our country. We lose influence and we play no part in shaping events or institutions." -Jack Cunningham (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.398).

~~maintain that~~ "If we do not [ratify Maastricht], we shall effectively place ourselves at the margins of Europe's affairs, cut off, devoid of influence ..." -Norman Lamont (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.464).

Almost as many "pro-EC" MPs make statements referring to the material benefits of the Maastricht Treaty for Britain as "internationalist" statements. Table 7.33 shows the system of dispersion in this "pragmatic" discursive formation.

**Table 7.33: Frequency that the material benefits of the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership are cited by "pro-EC" MPs in the debate on the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Benefits	Number of speakers citing benefit
The Maastricht Treaty will lead to more EC regional aid:	4
The Social Protocol would help the British economy:	4
The Social Protocol "opt-out" aids the British economy:	3
The Maastricht Treaty will improve Britain's industrial performance:	1

**Table 7.34: Frequency that "pro-EC" MPs gave particular reasons why the Maastricht Treaty/EC membership does not undermine British Parliamentary Sovereignty in the debate on the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill.**

Reasons	Number of speakers citing reason
The Maastricht Treaty does not threaten Parliamentary Sovereignty:	5
Subsidiarity will reduce the EC centralising tendencies:	4
The Maastricht Treaty reduces the powers of the European Commission:	3
Parliamentary Sovereignty is becoming an increasingly outdated concept:	2

There are fewer "pro-EC" statements referring to British Parliamentary Sovereignty than in the Second Reading debate, but a majority of speakers still refer to it. The system of dispersion for this discursive formation is outlined in Table 7.34.

Half of the "pro-EC" MPs speaking in this debate continue to

maintain that the Maastricht Treaty does not threaten Parliamentary Sovereignty:

"The two big new areas of work under the Maastricht Treaty- foreign policy and...law and order and foreign policy- will be managed by national Governments accountable to national Parliaments." -Douglas Hurd (HC Debates 20 May 1993: cols.389-90).

"We do not want to join a federal Europe, and that is not the kind of Europe that the Maastricht treaty will create." -Norman Lamont (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.463).

Furthermore, the principle of Subsidiarity is still presented in statements as a means to prevent further moves towards Federalism, rather than complementing them:

"We must make subsidiarity a political procedure ...This House will have a pivotal role to play in ensuring that it is made a political procedure..." -David Howell (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.427).

"Subsidiarity...will ensure that power is not passed to the Commission, but remains the absolute right of the member state." -Peter Emery (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.448).

Another form of "counter-nationalist" discourse which appears in "pro-EC" statements in this debate is the argument that the EC and further European integration, in the form of the Maastricht Treaty, is needed to keep Germany under control:

"Our purpose in seeking to be at the heart of Europe is not to dominate Europe, as France and others have always feared that Germany would." -Peter Emery (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.418).

"...a Community in which Britain...did not sign the treaty is inconceivable. It would be a disaster...for democracy, human rights, and all for which we stood against Hitler in 1940."

-Andrew Bowden (HC Debates 20 May 1993: col.445).

#### PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

## **7.17: The nature of opposition to, and support for, the Maastricht Treaty during the 1992-3 House of Commons debates on the Maastricht Bill.**

Statements utilised by the opposition to the Maastricht Treaty, with or without the Social Protocol, were primarily "nationalist" in content. The primary theme in "anti-EC" discourse stressed the threat that the Maastricht Treaty posed to British Parliamentary Sovereignty; discourse which, if the findings of post-Maastricht surveys of Conservative and Labour MPs' attitudes to the EC/EU are broadly correct (Baker et al, 1996a; 1996b), reflects a widespread unease, particularly amongst Conservatives, about the limits European integration places upon the Westminster legislative process.

A small amount of "anti-EC" "Euro-Federalist" discourse was in evidence during the debates examined, but more traditional defences of Parliamentary Sovereignty predominated.

The other main "nationalist" theme in "anti-EC" discourse during debates on the Maastricht Bill was that the Maastricht Treaty was an impediment to the creation of a "wider, looser" European institutional set-up, in the aftermath of German re-unification, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the disintegration of the USSR. Furthermore, compared to the 1975 and 1986 case studies, there was a noticeable increase in the number of anti-French and anti-German statements made by "anti-EC" MPs during the Maastricht debates.

Compared to the degree of nationalist discourse expressed by "anti-EC" MPs during the Maastricht debates, they employ relatively little **ideological** and **pragmatic** discourse.

In contrast to the discourse used by "anti-EC" MPs, no one discursive formation predominated in the discourse employed by "pro-EC" MPs in the Maastricht debates. In attempting to counter the appeal of defending British Parliamentary Sovereignty, many more MPs than in 1986 made statements whose semiotic values contained the "Euro-Federalist" argument that Parliamentary

Sovereignty is an obsolete concept. The two main Parties' leaderships and those within their Parties sharing their attitudes towards the EC maintained that the Maastricht Treaty was no threat to British Parliamentary Sovereignty.

"Internationalist" discourse was also regularly employed by "pro-EC" MPs in the Maastricht debates. This often echoed "anti-EC" discourse, in that it employed the vision of a "wider, looser" Europe; "pro-EC" MPs differed from their "anti-EC" counterparts in insisting that the Maastricht Treaty was the **means**, not the **impediment**, to achieving this goal. Moreover, many "pro-EC" Conservative MPs, declared, in a "counter-nationalist" manner, that the Maastricht Treaty was the means by which Britain could lead the EC. The frequency that this claim was made markedly fell, however, after the Second Reading debate.

Furthermore, echoing the shifts of emphasis in "anti-EC" discourse since 1975 and 1986, there was a noticeable increase in the number of anti-French and anti-German statements made by "pro-EC" MPs during the Maastricht debates.

#### **7.18: Relating the discourse used in the case study to theories of discourse.**

Compared to the 1975 Referendum campaign and the 1986 SEA debates, the object of discourse which "anti-EC" political actors make most statements in the Maastricht debates examined in this Chapter is Parliamentary Sovereignty.

However, some "anti-EC" MPs in the Second Reading debate make statements that could be described as "Euro-Federalist" in terms of their semiotic values. Such "Euro-Federalist" statements are largely made by "anti-EC" MPs who express a preference for a genuinely Federal EC, as opposed to the one proposed in the Maastricht Treaty. Only Peter Hain makes a statement which expresses a preference for a Federal EC in comparison to both the EU proposed in the Maastricht Treaty and British Parliamentary Sovereignty. In any case, most "anti-EC" MPs continue to utilise "nationalist" discourse which draws upon the regime of truth which

informed the statements about Parliamentary Sovereignty made by "anti-EC" political actors in both 1975 and 1986.

Moreover, non-discursive formations, in the form of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and German re-unification, encouraged the development of new systems of dispersion within the "nationalist" discourse utilised by "anti-EC" political actors. Hence, a new system of dispersion of dispersion can be identified from statements referring to the need for a "looser, wider" EC in response to possible German hegemony over the existing members of the EC and a number of Eastern European countries, after rejecting socialism, expressing their willingness to join the EC. These particular non-discursive practices also had the effect of encouraging "anti-EC" MPs to draw upon the historical archive and their members resources in order to make statements which were anti-German in their semiotic values.

Furthermore, new systems of dispersion in the "pragmatic" and "ideological" discourse employed by "anti-EC" political actors were encouraged by the non-discursive practices of the ERM's effects upon the British economy; the spectre, for "anti-EC" Conservative MPs, of a "Social Europe" spearheaded by the Social Protocol; and, for Labour MPs, the convergence criteria for EMU justifying "Euro-monetarism".

"Pro-EC" MPs in the Maastricht debates were much more divided than "pro-EC" political actors in 1975 and 1986 in how they responded in their discourse to the utilisation of "nationalist" discourse by "anti-EC" MPs.

Most, on the Conservative side of the Commons, continued to use "counter-nationalist" discourse informed by "members' resources" which drew upon the "archive" underlying the "regime of truth" employed by virtually all "anti-EC" MPs utilising "nationalist" discourse. For instance, such "pro-EC" discourse, when referring to Parliamentary Sovereignty as their object of discourse, not only claimed that the Maastricht Treaty did not effect Parliamentary Sovereignty; some others made statements that the concept of Subsidiarity would prevent any more attempts by the EC to undermine

British Parliamentary Sovereignty. Such statements encouraged "anti-EC" MPs to argue with justification that the EC had in the past reduced the effective scope of Parliamentary Sovereignty, as well as claim that Subsidiarity was a meaningless concept in the first place.

Furthermore, much "pro-EC" Conservative discourse, particularly in the Second Reading debate, had as its object of discourse Britain's world role, and made statements claiming that Britain could lead the EC: a prime case of "counter-nationalist" discourse. Similarly, "pro-EC" discourse which portrayed Britain's role as encouraging the development of a "wider, looser" EC appeared to be little different from "national internationalist" discourse employed by "anti-EC" political actors, except that its enunciators did not vote against the Maastricht Bill.

Moreover, several statements were made by "pro-EC" MPs which presented the EC and the Maastricht Treaty as a means to prevent France or Germany from controlling the EC. As well as "pro-EC" MPs making statements that, apart from one that Eldon Griffiths made once in relation to Germany in 1975, no "pro-EC" political actors examined during the Referendum campaign and SEA debates made, these statements again illustrate the frequent employment by "pro-EC" MPs of "counter-nationalist" discourse in the Maastricht debates.

However, a large number of "pro-EC" Labour, Liberal Democrat and Nationalist MPs, and some Conservative ones, such as Kenneth Clarke, Emma Nicholson and Peter Temple-Morris, employed "Euro-Federalist" discourse in the Maastricht debates, particularly when the object of their discourse was Parliamentary Sovereignty. The statements they made generally dismissed Parliamentary Sovereignty as an obsolete concept with little relevance in the modern world. By utilising such "Euro-Federalist" discourse, those "pro-EC" MPs were opening up the possible development of a new "pro-EC" regime of discourse within British politics, which would facilitate, to use Laclau's phrase, a new unity of ideological discourse to justify and legitimise British involvement in further European integration. It would also offer a new archive and members resources for those "anti-EC" political actors, such as Peter Hain,

who wanted to oppose the EC and further European integration through different discourse from those whose discourse was delimited by the existing regime of truth.

However, the front-benches of both main Parties were more inclined in the Maastricht debates to utilise "counter-nationalist" discourse, rather than "Euro-Federalist" discourse, and so failed to give "Euro-Federalist" discourse much greater legitimacy within British political debate than had previously been accorded to it. This can be regarded as a consequence of both Conservative and Labour leaderships having their discourse subject to delimitation resulting from the doctrines of Parliamentary Sovereignty and, respectively, the Constitution and the Parliamentary Road to Socialism; being constrained by belonging to societies of discourse in the form of their Parties, as ISAs still guided in much of their approach to the EC by their existing regime of truth, and by Parliament. The two main Parties' leaderships may have, at the time of the Maastricht debates, largely begun to disidentify with the preexisting regime of truth informing the "nationalist" discourse employed by "anti-EC" MPs. By not utilising the counter-discourse of "Euro-Federalist" discourse, the Conservative and Labour leaderships were forced to employ discourse which shared the same assumptions as the discourse utilised by "anti-EC" MPs, at a historic juncture where non-discursive formations were causing an "erosion from the outside" (Foucault, 1974, p.50) to the assumption that "counter-nationalist" discourse could be utilised indefinitely to justify British involvement in further European integration.

Moreover, attempts by "pro-EC" MPs in the Maastricht debates to utilise "pragmatic" and "ideological" discourse, as "pro-EC" political actors had in 1975 and 1986 with such effect, were not aided by developments with non-discursive formations elsewhere. That is, "anti-EC" MPs in their discourse were able to cite the material costs to Britain of ERM membership, while "anti-EC" Conservative and Labour MPs could attack the Maastricht Treaty as containing, respectively, the Social Protocol and the EMU convergence criteria.

To summarise, utilising theories of discourse to analyse the

Maastricht debates, it can be suggested that by the end of the them, attempts by "pro-EC" MPs to utilise a combination of "counter-nationalist", "pragmatic" and "ideological" discourse to justify Britain's involvement in further European integration, was becoming increasingly untenable.

Such attempts were made increasingly difficult by various non-discursive formations which occurred during, or immediately before, the period when Maastricht debates occurred. These are examined in more detail in the next Section.

#### **7.19: Relating the discourse used in the case studies used in the case study to non-discursive formations.**

Various non-discursive formations at this historical juncture contributed to the Maastricht debates taking the form that they did, and so making the debates much more of a trauma for "pro-EC" political actors taking part in them than the 1975 Referendum campaign and 1986 SEA debates ever were.

At the political level, the Major Government emerged from the 1992 General Election with a majority of just 21, and increasing wariness within the Party towards further European integration; neither of these non-discursive formations existed when the SEA went through Parliament in 1986. In attempting to minimise potential opposition to the Maastricht Treaty, Major gained, to no avail, "opt-outs" from the Treaty's Social Protocol and the Third Stage of EMU. Furthermore, as the Major Government had rejected the Social Protocol, the most prominent manifestation of Delors' idea of a "Social Europe" in the Treaty, the "pro-EC" Labour leadership would not, or could not, back the passage of the Bill by voting for it. Otherwise, the Labour leadership could find the coalition it had forged inside the Party supporting the idea of the EC as a "Social Europe" might come under pressure.

In addition, non-discursive formations which occurred during the passage of the Bill undermined the confidence of "pro-EC" MPs in the Commons. The combination of the Danish rejection of Maastricht,

Sterling's withdrawal from the ERM and the wafer-thin vote in France in support of the Treaty, meant that by the Autumn of 1992, both an important part of the plans for achieving EMU and support for the Maastricht Treaty throughout the EC looked threadbare. By the time that the Committee Stage debates took place in early 1993, many "anti-EC" MPs in both main Parties felt that their struggle against further European integration

The early 1990s saw other non-discursive formations occurring whose cumulative effect was to favour to the use of discourse employed by "anti-EC" political actors in Britain. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the disintegration of the USSR and the re-unification of Germany all helped to make many feel that the post-1945 European order, of which the EC was one part, was over. Hence, the Maastricht Treaty could be presented in "anti-EC" discourse as a Treaty which had been overtaken by events, and had little relevance in a new era of international relations.

The early 1990s also saw an EC-wide recession, which was widely blamed on the high interest rates caused by national currencies trying to keep their value inside the ERM. Consequently, the EC was no longer automatically associated with economic prosperity, but material hardship.

Consequently, "pro-EC" MPs in the Maastricht debates were less prepared to promote the EC in their discourse as a source of material prosperity. Those "anti-EC" MPs, mostly on the Labour back-benches, who were opposed to the EC on "pragmatic" grounds, had plenty of readily available reasons for pursuing this line in their discourse.

With a Frenchman closely associated with the idea of a "Social Europe" and Germany, by reuniting, being seen as more assertive, the early 1990s was an ideal historic juncture for "anti-EC" political actors to use anti-French and anti-German discourse, with a reasonable chance of arousing long-standing collective distrust in Britain about both countries.

Instead of rejecting such "nationalist" discourse, some "pro-EC" MPs echoed it, by saying that the Maastricht Treaty was a means to control French and German ambitions. Similarly, with both "anti-

"EC" and "pro-EC" discourse in the Maastricht debates emphasising the need for a "wider, looser" EC, "pro-EC" MPs can be seen as implying that the present EC was a "narrowly nationalist" organisation.

More "pro-EC" MPs did, however, take up the "Euro-Federalist" argument that Parliamentary Sovereignty was an obsolete concept. This can be seen as a consequence of a non-discursive formation of the Federalist project throughout the EC, which was encouraged by moves towards further European integration during the late 1980s and early 1990s in the form of the SEA and Maastricht Treaty.

However, the majority of "pro-EC" MPs, including the Party leaderships, continued to claim that the Maastricht Treaty did not undermine Parliamentary Sovereignty, as "anti-EC" MPs claimed. By insisting that the concept of Subsidiarity was needed to prevent Parliamentary Sovereignty being further eroded, much "pro-EC" discourse was **de facto** legitimising the claims of "anti-EC" political actors in the past that the EC did erode British Parliamentary Sovereignty.

By mainly not directly addressing Parliamentary Sovereignty as an object of discourse in the past, such as in 1975 and 1986, the position of "pro-EC" political actors were put under greater pressure in 1992-3 than they should have been. By echoing the concerns of so much "anti-EC" discourse, however, it was perhaps not surprising that only through the extensive utilisation of non-discursive formations, in the form of extended threats, tactical retreats and Parliamentary manoeuvres, was a nominally "pro-EC" House of Commons able to get the Maastricht Bill passed into law.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION.**

### **8.1: What this Chapter covers.**

*British Parliamentary Case Studies*

This Conclusion brings together the empirical findings of the case studies analysed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven of this thesis with the theoretical model explaining the existence of British "anti-EC" nationalism developed in Chapter Three within the account of British historical development discussed in Chapters Two and Four.

In Part One of this Chapter, the findings of the case studies are briefly summarised, showing the extent to which the discourse utilised by "anti-EC" political actors in 1975, 1986 and 1992-3 was "nationalist" (8.2); the type of discourse employed by "pro-EC" political actors in these case studies (8.3); and whether the thesis' hypothesis is supported by the evidence from the case studies (8.4).

Part Two examines the theoretical model explaining the political importance of the latent conception of ideology outlined in Chapter Three, Part Four, and examine its validity in explaining the empirical findings of the case studies (8.5). The possible validity of theoretical explanations of the discourse used between 1973 and 1993 by the Conservative (8.6) and Labour Parties (8.7) will also be discussed.

Part Three of the Conclusion discusses various ways in which this thesis can be used as a starting point for further research. Ways are suggested about how this thesis can inform further research into both Britain's "Europe debate" (8.8) and politics in other countries (8.9).

### **PART ONE: A SUMMARY OF THE NATURE OF DISCOURSE USED IN THE CASE STUDIES.**

#### **8.2: The nature of "anti-EC" discourse used in the case studies.**

The evidence obtained from the three case studies suggests that,

between the 1970s and early 1990s "anti-EC" political actors in Britain increasingly utilised "nationalist" discourse. In particular, over the time period examined, statements which had British Parliamentary Sovereignty as their object of discourse formed the primary discursive formation within "anti-EC" discourse as a whole.

During the 1975 Referendum campaign, the evidence examined in Chapter Five suggests that the discourse employed by Labour and cross-party oriented political actors primarily focused upon the "pragmatic", material costs of EC membership. In contrast, the statements utilised by Conservative-oriented "anti-EC" political actors were primarily "nationalist" in their semiotic values. In particular, Parliamentary Sovereignty became their primary object of discourse. However, as most "anti-EC" political actors in the Referendum campaign were cross-party or Labour, it is fair to conclude that "anti-EC" discourse in 1975 consisted primarily of statements whose object of discourse was the material costs of EC membership to Britain.

In the 1986 House of Commons debate on the SEA, discussed in Chapter Six, the evidence examined from speeches of those who voted against the SEA becoming law is rather ambiguous. In discussing opposition to the EC in this case study, it is necessary to differentiate between opposition to the SEA expressed during the Second Reading debate (6.2) and that expressed during Committee Stage (Chapter Six, Part Two). The opposition at the Committee Stage to the SEA comes largely from long-standing opponents of EC membership, such as Michael Foot, Ron Leighton, Enoch Powell and Teddy Taylor. Their statements are primarily "nationalist" in their semiotic values; in particular referring to Parliamentary Sovereignty and international free trade as objects of discourse.

During the Second Reading debate, much more opposition to the SEA is expressed by Labour MPs, including their front-bench spokesmen, several of whom make statements concerning the EC which differ considerably from those expressed by most "anti-EC" MPs who

dominate debates at Committee Stage. In particular, several Labour MPs make favourable statements about certain EC institutions, particularly the European Parliament, and express their preference for some of the EC's positions on international issues, as opposed to those put forward by the USA and the Thatcher Government. The Labour Party as a whole was still not prepared, however, to make statements which supported greater EC cooperation that involved further infringements upon British Parliamentary Sovereignty.

However, most Labour "anti-EC" MPs who spoke in the Second Reading debate had the material costs of EC membership as their primary object of discourse. Consequently, as nearly all the MPs who voted against the SEA were Labour ones, it must be concluded that the nature of "anti-EC" discourse used in the SEA debates was primarily "pragmatic" in its semiotic values.

In the 1992-3 House of Commons debates about the Maastricht Treaty, examined in Chapter Seven, the primary object of discourse for "anti-EC" MPs opposing the Treaty and Bill was British Parliamentary Sovereignty. This was true for all the debates examined. The Maastricht debates also saw a noticeable increase in the use of anti-French and anti-German discourse compared to both the 1975 Referendum and 1986 SEA debates. In the Maastricht debates the main object of "national internationalist" discourse utilised by "anti-EC" MPs was the need for a "wider, looser" EC.

### **8.3: The nature of "pro-EC" discourse used in the case studies.**

The overall nature of "pro-EC" discourse which was used in the case studies examined can be summarised as follows.

In 1975, the primary object of "pro-EC" discourse was the material benefits for Britain of staying in the EC. The main object of discourse for "pro-EC" political actors who made statements addressing "anti-EC" objects of discourse was Britain's world-role. The "internationalist" discursive formations developed around this stressed that it was Britain's "internationalist" duty to

remain in the EC.

In the 1986 SEA debates, the primary object of "pro-EC" discourse was the material benefits of EC membership and further European integration in the form of the SEA. The main object of "counter-nationalist" discourse utilised by "pro-EC" MPs was Parliamentary Sovereignty. That is, the SEA would not threaten British Parliamentary Sovereignty. However, some "pro-EC" MPs employed "Euro-Federalist" discourse to argue that British Parliamentary Sovereignty was an obsolete concept.

#### PART TWO: EXPLAINING CRISIS, 1973-92

In the 1992-3 Maastricht debates no one discursive formation predominated in "pro-EC" discourse. The most noticeable shift in the semiotic values of statements made by "pro-EC" MPs was that a sizeable number of them, from all three main Parliamentary and the Nationalist parties, utilised "Euro-Federalist" discourse to argue that the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty was now obsolete. However, most "pro-EC" MPs, including the Conservative and Labour front-benches, continued to make statements which insisted that this particular move towards greater European integration did not threaten British Parliamentary Sovereignty.

In summary, the evidence suggests that, over a twenty year period, most "pro-EC" political actors were either unwilling or unable to develop a "Euro-Federalist" discourse to legitimise British participation in the EC, while rejecting the use of "nationalist" statements and the assumptions of the regime of truth which increasingly informed the employment of "anti-EC" discourse over this period.

#### 8.4: Returning to the Hypothesis.

With the evidence summarised, it is possible to return to the hypothesis of the thesis. That is:

since 1973, "anti-EC" discourse in British politics has been

**primarily "nationalist" in content.**

The evidence examined in this thesis suggests that, over time, "anti-EC" discourse became increasingly "nationalist" in tone, to the extent that, by the time of the Maastricht debates, it was primarily "nationalist" in tone. Hence, the evidence over time suggests that the hypothesis became increasingly valid; that the discourse utilised by "anti-EC" political actors became increasingly "nationalist" in tone.

## **PART TWO: EXPLAINING CRISIS, 1973-93.**

### **8.5: Applying theories of identity, ideology and crisis to the 1973-93 period.**

The applicability of the various theoretical approaches to discourse to the case studies, discussed in Chapter Three, Part Two, has already been discussed in detail in the final Parts of Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Consequently, the explanatory value and importance of the concepts of the regime of truth, the archive and member resources; closure or delimitation; forgetting, disidentification and counter-identification; and the relationship between discursive and non-discursive formations in understanding the discourse employed in the case studies should be already evident.

Moreover, as discourse is only the form within language use that ideologies appear, it is necessary to address wider theoretical issues concerning ideology. In particular, the need to develop a theoretical model explaining the "latent conception of ideology" (Thompson, J., 1990, pp.41-3); that is, the need to develop a theoretical model which explains the political importance of ideologies, which do not, or do not any longer, function as an ideology which legitimises the interests of a particular class or class fraction.

Consequently, this Section will examine the theoretical model developed in Chapter Two, Part Three which attempts to explain the

existence, persistence and political importance of "anti-EC" nationalism in Britain as a "latent conception of ideology" (Thompson, J., 1990, pp.41-3) and how it can be applied to increase understanding of the saliency and shifts, in the discourse utilised by political actors in Britain's 1973-93 "Europe debate" case studies.

The model, based upon theoretical concepts and insights from the works of Bloom (1990), Gramsci (1986), Hoffman (1966) Laclau (1977), Marx (1988d), Neumann and Walsh (1991) and Poulantzas (1976) can be summarised thus:

**Organic crisis** in the political and economic spheres of society threatens the dominant social group's hegemony and has repercussions in the ideological sphere as society attempts to cope with the newly changing situation. This can lead to a collective identity crisis, which can only be overcome by an identity either being newly created or being preserved. Collective identity crises are exacerbated if the dominant social group attempts to pursue a new programme to escape the organic crisis. It must, therefore, take account of the existing logic of culture/national consciousness/national identity/residuals to succeed. If it does not, the national identity dynamic might be used to mobilise the nation's population against the dominant social group and its new form of nation building. The dominant social group must, therefore, take account of the existence of a nationalist logic of culture if it is to preserve and legitimate its present hegemony over national society and prevent a series of disjunctions between its goals and the values of the existing dominant ideology.

First, in order to ascertain the strength of the explanatory model for understanding the 1973-93 period in Britain, the applicability of the concept of organic crisis for understanding this period will be considered. Gramsci (1986, p.210) sees organic crises occurring when either subordinate social groups challenge the dominant social group's hegemony over society, or the dominant social group has failed in some major political undertaking for

which it originally obtained the consent of subordinate social groups. He also argues that organic crises are often overcome by the dominant social group being able to promote new programmes in order to prevent subordinate social groups from using the opportunity presented by crisis to challenge its hegemony.

Applying these definitions to the post-1973 period in Britain, it would appear that, at various points in the 1970s and early 1980s, the trade unions appeared to be challenging the rule of Britain's dominant bloc. At no stage, however, even during the 1974 and 1984-5 miners' strikes and the 1978-9 "Winter of Discontent", was there a shift in the consciousness of the workers involved, let alone amongst the wider working class, from, using Gramsci's terminology, a rather narrow economic-corporate outlook towards an ethical-political one; the latter form of consciousness being essential for a sustained challenge to the dominant bloc's hegemony. For instance, even after the 1974 miners' strike, a time when most of Britain's capitalists thought that their very existence was at stake, the TUC was quite willing to sign up to a "Social Contract" in order to stabilise the political consequences of economic crisis; nor did the TUC conceive of it, or its affiliates, taking powers that would have led the unions to have a positive role in running the economy (Anderson, 1987, p.65). With the slump of the early 1980s seeing a reduction in both the levels of union membership and militancy, the potential threat posed by organised labour in Britain was largely neutralised, although it took the breaking of the 1984-5 miners' strike to secure the dominant bloc's hegemony vis-a-vis the unions.

The Labour Party, and particularly the Labour Left, were also seen during the same period as a possible threat to the dominant bloc's hegemony, and they could have possibly used dissatisfaction with Britain's relative economic decline. After the 1975 Referendum result, which showed that any claims by the Labour Left that they spoke on behalf of "the British nation" were somewhat premature, the Left became rather more preoccupied with internal party politics, rather than attempting to win over the mass of the British people to their programme.

This was despite the antipathy of most of the Labour Party towards the EC. The evidence from opinion poll data around the time of the 1979 General Election suggested that the EC, and Labour's support for its "radical reform" or withdrawal, was (Crewe, 1982, p.37) "the only example of an issue that might meet...visions of a radical electorate awaiting a radical Labour lead..." The failure of the Labour Left seriously to use the EC as an articulating principle (Laclau, 1977, p.103) to develop a potentially hegemonic programme during the late 1970s and early 1980s to overcome ideological and organic crisis- a period which contained mass industrial action against the Social Contract, an economic slump and inner-city riots- was possibly the major factor in the Labour Left's marginalisation and disintegration following Labour's 1983 General Election debacle, which they had anticipated would be their finest hour (John Callaghan, 1987, pp.vii-viii, 182-4, 210-1).

With the failure of the Labour Left and trade union movement to articulate a genuine challenge to the dominant bloc's hegemony in the 1973-93 period, was there an organic crisis in Britain during this time? There was, in that the dominant bloc, and through its generally unchallenged hegemony over policy-making assumptions of the British state, was widely seen by subordinate social groups as being unable to reverse either Britain's relative economic decline or increase its influence in the world. Perhaps only for relatively short periods around the time of the 1982 Falklands War and the 1987 General Election (Gamble, 1990, pp.186-90) were claims that Britain's relative decline in its global position were considered by the mass of the population as more than wishful thinking; and even the "Thatcher economic miracle" was seen as illusory when a period of severe economic recession followed. Enough people in Britain, however, had benefited from the consequences of the further internationalisation of the British economy and the expansion of consumer credit in the 1980s to support Thatcher's 1983 and 1987 re-elections. Indeed, enough feared something worse to ensure Major's narrow 1992 General Election victory.

Applying Gramsci's concept that the dominant social group is often able to overcome organic crises by promoting new programmes

to Britain since the 1970s, it is clear that these new "programmes" have largely consisted of a number of "external solutions" to Britain's problems. These have all proven in time to be illusory, but each had the advantage from the dominant bloc's view-point of not appearing to challenge its hegemony over British society. The Falklands War proved to be one such external solution (Barnett, 1982, p.17; Nairn, 1985) in the 1980s. Before that, the prospect of North Sea oil revenues was presented as the means by which Britain's relative economic decline could be halted. In fact, it was used as a means to strengthen the dominant bloc's hegemony and the City of London's economic prosperity. Consequently, North Sea oil contributed to Sterling's rise in value which compounded the effects of the 1979-82 slump on British industry while mitigating the material consequences by allowing the Thatcher Government to pay for increased claims for unemployment benefit; while, simultaneously, North Sea oil revenues for the Thatcher Government allowed it to reward its supporters through income tax cuts and so allowed them to increase capital exports (Hilton A., 1987, pp.166-7; Hutton, 1996, pp.62-3; Leys, 1989, pp.23-4; MacInnes, 1987, p.69).

Another "external solution" to Britain's relative decline presented to the British people by the dominant bloc and its political representatives within the wider bourgeoisie was the EC. Once Britain's EC membership was secured after the 1975 Referendum, it was not presented as an "external solution" to Britain's relative economic decline until the SEA was passed into law. Then further European integration was once again presented as a means by which Britain's economic success and diplomatic influence in the world could be secured. Consequently, "1992", ERM entry and the Maastricht Treaty- either with or without the Social Protocol- were all presented by "pro-EC" political actors, businesspeople and members of the media in terms of the positive effects they would have both for Britain's economy and its place in the world (e.g. Sanders and Edwards, 1994, pp.417, 436).

What actually occurred in the 1990s was that European integration in several ways further deepened Britain's organic

crisis. First, many in the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats and Nationalist Parties, came to see further European integration, and the espousal by the EC of the principle of Subsidiarity, as undermining the hegemony of a Conservative-run state which was seen as having done little for the parts of Britain they represented. Second, prospect of a "Social Europe" and the experience of ERM membership as a possible foretaste of life inside EMU led to many inside Britain's Atlantic Liberal and Liberal Bourgeoisie capital fractions becoming disillusioned with EC membership and possible further European integration. Differences between Britain's various capital fractions contributed to splits inside the Conservative Party over the EC. Third, European integration led to further losses in the scope of formal British Parliamentary Sovereignty, which threatened to undermine the ideological potency of an ISA which had been so important to the ideological *raisons d'etre* of two other important ISAs in British society: the Conservative and Labour Parties. Consequently, the dominant bloc began to see challenges to its hegemony over British society, which were being sustained by the possibility of further European integration.

As Britain's "organic crisis" continued throughout the 1973-1993 period, and was further aggravated by the consequences of further British involvement in moves towards greater European integration from the mid-1980s onwards, the extent that "pro-EC" political actors prevented their "anti-EC" counterparts from exploiting the potentially "anti-EC" residuals to be found within Britain's national identity dynamic should be examined.

The evidence examined in Chapter Five suggests that in the 1975 Referendum campaign, "pro-EC" political actors were successfully able to neutralise attempts by some "anti-EC" political actors to trigger, manipulate and appropriate the national identity dynamic in order to achieve a vote for EC withdrawal. This can be seen in how "pro-EC" political actors were able to neutralise the use of discourse by "anti-EC" political actors which referred to the four main "nationalist" objects of "anti-EC" discourse outlined in

### Chapter Three, Part Four.

First, "pro-EC" political actors usually ignored in their statements how EC membership would affect Parliamentary Sovereignty. When they did, however, "pro-EC" political actors insisted that Parliamentary Sovereignty was not threatened; there would be no dilution of Britain's veto, and no question of a Federal EC or EMU occurring in the future.

Second, "pro-EC" political actors neutralised the appeal of "national internationalist" discourse by insisting that the EC was "internationalist", as had been demonstrated by the recent signing of the Lome Agreement. Moreover, "pro-EC" political actors insisted that they would not want Britain to stay in the EC if the latter was **not** internationalist in its outlook. British membership would ensure that any "narrowly nationalist" tendencies within the EC would not prevail, since Britain's veto was safe. Furthermore, "pro-EC" political actors insisted that, if Britain was to vote for withdrawal, it would be isolating itself from the Commonwealth, EFTA and the USA, who all wanted Britain inside the EC to ensure that it remained an "internationalist" organisation; and the only countries that wanted Britain out were the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact.

Third, "pro-EC" political actors were able to neutralise the appeal by "anti-EC" political actors that France or Federal Germany would use the EC as a means to further their "narrowly nationalist" goals by pointing to the Atlantic Partnership orientation of both Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. Neither conducted foreign policies, "pro-EC" political actors argued, that could be described as "narrowly nationalist".

With other contingent factors, outlined in Chapter Five, Part Four, working in the favour of the "Yes" side in the Referendum, the inability of "anti-EC" political actors successfully to appropriate the national identity dynamic ensured their defeat in 1975.

In 1986, the ability of "anti-EC" political actors to stop the SEA was not helped by the way it was presented before Parliament,

with an extensive debate on the implications of the SEA being quillotined by the Thatcher Government; and the lack of media coverage of the debates, which minimised the level of public interest, and hence the ability of "anti-EC" political actors to mobilise the national identity dynamic in their favour. It is difficult to mobilise people around the defence of the nation if no-one knows anything about what they are supposed to be mobilising against. Apart from these impediments, probably the most difficult obstacle in the path of "anti-EC" political actors trying to mobilise the national identity dynamic against the SEA was Thatcher's support for it. Her struggle between 1979 and 1984 to get Britain's EC Budget contributions reduced gave her a reputation for putting "the national interest first" in the EC (George, 1989, p.23). Consequently, many, particularly within the Conservative Party, must have reasoned that if Thatcher supported the SEA, how can that be against the national interest? By presenting proposals in the SEA, such as QMV, as simply technical measures to ensure greater competition and freer trade inside the EC, the Government was able to neutralise attempts by "anti-EC" MPs successfully to appropriate the national identity dynamic in opposing the Treaty as a betrayal of Parliamentary Sovereignty and Britain's traditional promotion of international free trade.

In the 1992-3 Maastricht debates, however, the national identity dynamic was contested much more fiercely by "anti-EC" MPs, particularly after the results of the Danish and French referendums and of Britain's ERM withdrawal. Indeed, at times during the Maastricht Bill's tortuous passage through the Commons, it looked as if "anti-EC" MPs might appropriate the national identity dynamic to such an extent as to bring the Bill's passage to a halt, and possibly bring the Major Government down in the process. By examining the main forms of "anti-EC" discourse already outlined in this study, one factor that can be identified as helping "anti-EC" MPs in their attempts to gain hegemony over the national identity dynamic in the Maastricht debates was the way that many "pro-EC" MPs, including the front-benches of both main Parties, often used

discourse which gave greater legitimacy to the arguments used by those opposed to Maastricht.

First, if one looks at the discourse used by many "pro-EC" MPs in the Maastricht debate concerning the question of Parliamentary Sovereignty, they emphasise the importance of Subsidiarity in preventing the EC's centralist, proto-Federalist tendencies from further undermining British Parliamentary Sovereignty. Such "pro-EC" discourse legitimised "anti-EC" claims that the EC did have centralist, proto-Federalist tendencies; that Subsidiarity would not be used to reverse existing EC legislation; and that Subsidiarity was a notion vague enough to be supported by supporters of a Federal EC both inside and out of Britain.

Second, when examining the discourse used in the Maastricht debates, most "anti-EC" MPs utilising "national internationalist" discourse made statements arguing that Britain should pursue a policy of allowing EFTA and Eastern European countries into the EC as quickly as possible, so as the EC can be developed upon "looser, wider" principles. This argument could be found in statements made by many "pro-EC" MPs; except that "pro-EC" MPs maintained that only if the Maastricht Bill was passed could the EC become a "looser, wider" organisation.

Third, some "anti-EC" statements made in the Maastricht debate claimed either that Delors' goal of a "Social Europe" was designed to make the EC a protectionist, bureaucratic organisation under French domination, or that a re-united Germany was wanting to make the EC a "narrowly nationalist" and protectionist institution. Instead of trying to develop and utilise a discourse to challenge such "nationalist" discourse and the assumptions behind it, a fair number of "pro-EC" MPs competed for control of the national identity dynamic, arguing that many hostile statements about France and Germany made by "anti-EC" MPs were understandable. Furthermore, "anti-EC" fears about the future conduct of France and Germany were understandable, but only if the Maastricht Treaty was implemented would the threat of future French or German domination of the EC be lifted.

However, if the predominant themes in "pro-EC" discourse during

the Maastricht debates had been based upon a "Euro-Federalist" regime of truth, the consequences could have included divisions within the two main Parties to an even greater extent than did occur. Moreover, this could have led to splits in the two main Parties, so threatening to undermine the stability of the British political system. Furthermore, if the leaderships of either the Conservative or Labour Parties had utilised an avowedly "Euro-Federalist" discourse during the Maastricht debates, they would have risked not only deep internal divisions, but also losing much of their electoral support **and** much of the ideological **raisons d'etre**. For if a Parliamentary Party declares that Parliamentary Sovereignty is obsolete, how can they achieve their goals?

At the same time, with the use of discourse which is either conceding much of what "anti-EC" MPs claim to be true about the EC, or by using discourse which was almost indistinguishable from that used by "anti-EC" MPs, many "pro-EC" MPs during the Maastricht debates almost handed the national identity dynamic to "anti-EC" MPs by default. This demonstrates that, in a time of organic crisis, a crisis compounded by a national identity crisis brought about during a period of major historical change, the potential hegemony of a dominant bloc and its political representatives to hold onto the national identity to legitimise their hegemony is weak.

#### 8.6: The Conservative Party and the EC's challenge to its collective self-image, 1973-93.

"Parties come into existence, and constitute themselves as organisations, in order to influence the situation at moments which are historically vital to their class; but they are not always capable of adapting to new tasks and to new epochs, nor of evolving **pari passu** with the overall relations of force (and...relative position of their class) in the country in question, or in the international field."  
(Gramsci, 1986, p.211)

The national identity crisis caused to many of Britain's political actors by EC membership and further European integration since the

late 1980s had its most severe effects upon the collective consciousness of the Conservative Party. The model developed by Ashford (1983) in order to explain how power is distributed within the Party, and how the Conservative leadership must respect certain Conservative symbols in order to keep its hegemony over the Party as a whole, can be used in order to try and understand what caused Conservative splits over Britain's future relationship with the EC.

Ashford argues that there are certain Conservative symbols which exert a logic of culture, to use Neumann and Walsh's (1991) phrase, upon the Party. If these symbols are not respected by the leadership, the Party will suffer a collective identity crisis, and the leadership's legitimate claim to lead the Party will be put in jeopardy (Ashford, 1983, pp.396-7).

"Anti-EC" Conservatives in the 1960s and early 1970s claimed that the Party leadership, by supporting Britain's EC entry, were betraying the Conservative symbols of agriculture, Commonwealth and sovereignty. The leadership was able to neutralise the appeal of such arguments by "anti-EC" Conservatives to the Party, and successfully link British membership with other Conservative symbols, such as anti-Communism, Britain's world-role, peace and prosperity (Ashford, 1983, pp.368-71).

By the early 1990s and the Maastricht debates, how potent were all these Conservative symbols, and how well associated were they with the "anti-EC" Conservative cause?

Of the three symbols stressed by "anti-EC" Conservatives pre-entry, only sovereignty had much potency to a Conservative audience, and it was the crux of the "anti-EC" Conservative campaign against Maastricht. Of the four Conservative symbols Ashford highlighted as being associated with British entry, however, none could be easily monopolised by "pro-EC" Conservatives in the early 1990s.

First, the EC could no longer be presented as a bulwark against communism; instead the EC's "socialist" tendencies were increasingly emphasised in "anti-EC" Conservative discourse.

Second, instead of seeing the EC as helping to enhance Britain's world-role and preserving world peace, much Conservative opinion

now saw Britain pursuing such aims in the 1990s under the aegis of the Atlantic Alliance under the USA's hegemony. EC attitudes to the Gulf War and ex-Yugoslavia were seen by many Conservatives as evidence that Britain would have no world-role if it subordinated its foreign and security policies to those decided by the EC. Third, the EC was no longer seen by that many Conservatives as an area of prosperity, but one of low growth and high unemployment when compared to the USA and Far East. The effects of ERM membership on the British economy also undermined the link in the collective Conservative attitudes between the EC and prosperity.

Using Ashford's model to understand changing Conservative attitudes to the EC, it is not surprising that the Maastricht debate led to a major collective identity crisis for more and more Conservative MPs, since there was a major disjunction between Hoffman's (1966, pp.867-9) concepts of the national interest, as envisaged by Major and most Conservative MPs- that the interests of British capital and the state were best pursued by accepting the Maastricht Treaty- and the national consciousness, experienced by increasing numbers of Conservative MPs and supporters- that Britain's Parliamentary Sovereignty and world-role were threatened by further European integration. Consequently, the Maastricht debates led to both a crisis of collective identity amongst Conservatives, and a crisis for Major's legitimacy as leader, a legitimacy which was never really re-established.

#### **8.7: Labour and the EC's challenge to its collective self-image 1973-93.**

As with the Conservatives, the Labour Party has a certain logic of culture, or doctrine (Foucault, 1981, p.64), which the leadership must take account of in order to secure its hegemony over the Party. When one considers the "nationalist" doctrine inside the Labour Party towards the EC which Nairn (1971; 1973) identified in the 1960s and 1970s- based around the defence of British Parliamentary Sovereignty, "national internationalism" and hostility towards France and Germany- it might be asked how, and to

what extent, the Labour leadership of the late 1980s and early 1990s managed to neutralise the appeal of such attitudes to the Labour Party as a whole.

In addition, the Labour leadership in moving the Party towards a "pro-EC" position had to take account of the potentially "anti-EC" ideological raison d'etre of the British labour movement since the last century. That is, at the domestic level, social reforms to support the position of the working class should be pursued through the Westminster Parliament, while abroad, international free trade was pursued.

Only with the neutralisation of these long-standing labour movement attitudes were "pro-EC" political actors inside the Labour Party able to break the hegemony of their "anti-EC" opponents over these, when events put the "anti-EC" forces onto the defensive. Only when the Conservatives had secured two three-figure majorities in the House of Commons did the allure of British Parliamentary Sovereignty start to recede within the Labour Party; only when it appeared that the EC and its single market, in the face of perceived US and Japanese protectionism, was the only arena where Britain could seriously influence the breaking down of trade barriers, was the appeal of calls to promote global free trade outside the EC effectively broken; and only when the EC promised a "Social Europe", which appeared to hold out the hope for the reversal of Thatcherite welfare policies in Britain, did claims that the policies of the "capitalist club" of the EC were necessarily worse for Labour supporters than those emanating from Westminster sound extremely hollow. By presenting the EC as an institution which promoted free trade and social reform, while denying that it made British Parliamentary Sovereignty obsolete, the labour leadership was able, from the mid-1980s onwards, to gain hegemony over these three potent symbols in Labour's "Europe debate" from "anti-EC" political actors.

The appeal of the four forms of "nationalist" discourse which Nairn identifies as being used by Labour "anti-EC" political actors were similarly neutralised by the "pro-EC" Labour leadership as the 1980s progressed. The neutralisation of the potency of

Parliamentary Sovereignty has already been examined.

As was discussed earlier, in the 1980s the appeal to Labour audiences of "national internationalist" alternatives to the EC was greatly reduced by the USA's international behaviour. Indeed, many Labour Party members came to regard the EC's foreign policy positions as more "internationalist" than those of the Unilateralist-Nationalist Reagan Administration.

The potential for anti-French discourse to make an impact upon Labour's collective attitudes in the 1980s was reduced considerably by the existence of a Socialist President from May 1981, and French governments dominated by the Socialist Party during the 1981-86 and 1988-93 periods. Furthermore, the idea of a "Social Europe" was identified with a Frenchman.

As for anti-German discourse, it might be expected to have a large degree of resonance with a Labour audience after a Social Democrat-led government was replaced by a Christian Democrat-led one in 1983. In fact, this did not occur to any significant degree.

In trying to account for this, it would appear that Labour increasingly came to see the German "social market" economy, which both main German political parties supported, as being a great deal nearer to the Corporate Liberal economy that Labour's leadership wanted to see introduced to Britain, than to Thatcherism (Hodges and Woolcock, 1993, pp.334-5). Furthermore, Labour's leadership saw Germany's economic strength as an essential precondition for further European integration, an EC-wide economic recovery programme, EMU and the establishment of a genuine "Social Europe". Hence, most of the Labour Party saw nothing worth gaining through the utilisation of the sort of anti-German discourse that increasing numbers of British Conservatives were employing by the early 1990s.

In conclusion, it can be said that various non-discursive formations during the late 1980s and early 1990s, occurring both at the domestic level and throughout the capitalist world-system, helped to neutralise a large part of the potential appeal of "anti-EC" politics, expressed through "nationalist" discourse, within the Labour Party.

## PART THREE: POSSIBLE FURTHER RESEARCH.

### 8.8: Britain's "Europe debate": possible research issues.

In this thesis, it has been demonstrated that there is plenty of evidence supporting its hypothesis.

However, there are many related research issues which have not been addressed in this thesis. Furthermore, do the theoretical frameworks and perspectives which inform this thesis have valid applications elsewhere in the study of modern politics? In the next Part of this Conclusion, a number of possible ways that the contents of this thesis can be viewed as starting points for various types of future research in the politics field will be suggested. This discussion will begin by suggesting some research areas related to Britain's domestic debates on the EC/EU which could be pursued.

An obvious research area is the nature of discourse in Britain's "Europe debate" since the end of the Maastricht debates in the summer of 1993. Since then, Britain's relationship with the EU has, if anything, become more prominent in British politics than ever before. This suggests that a great amount of discourse exists which can be analysed for the saliency of various "nationalist", "pragmatic" and "ideological" statements within them.

Another area of possible research connected to Britain's "Europe debate" is examining what appears to be an increasing amount of "anti-EC" and "pro-EC" discourse emanating from British capital since the late 1980s. As suggested in Chapter Four, the issue of how Britain should approach issues such as the ERM, EMU and the "Social Dimension" of further European integration have caused splits, both within and between, different firms, industrial sectors and capital's national representative organisations, such as the CBI, FSB and IoD.

The existence of these public splits in British capital since the late 1980s have been accompanied by serious divisions within

its primary political representative, the Conservative Party over, the EC/EU. By examining the extent to which the discourse used by particular Conservative MPs resembles that used by particular elements within British capital, it might be possible to shed greater light upon what particular interests Conservative political actors, in however refracted a manner, represent.

A similar exercise might be possible in a third possible area of related research; that is, examining the attitudes of British organised labour since EC entry. As argued in Chapter Four, the unity of the British trade union movement since the late 1980s around the twin goals of a single market and a "Social Europe" appear to be challenged by the EMU convergence criteria, which can be seen as a threat to both public spending and the public sector. By examining trade union discourse on Britain and the EC/EU, and comparing it with what particular MPs say in the "Europe debate", it might be possible to say which MPs represent particular sections of the British trade union movement on this issue.

In examining the discourse used by Britain's capitalists and trade unions in Britain's "Europe debate", one could anticipate "pragmatic" discourse to predominate. After all, in looking at the material costs and benefits of the EC/EU to their firm, industrial sector or the British economy in general, capital and labour's representatives could be anticipated to examine the costs and benefits in a rational manner before making informed decisions. One should not, however, assume this to be a foregone conclusion. For example, Rupert Murdoch, one of the leading capitalists in Britain, if not a leading British capitalist, declared that he opposed EMU as "there will be an inevitable loss of economic sovereignty if Britain chooses to join." (Wallace, 1996, p.9.)

This quote by Murdoch raises a fourth possible area of future research connected to Britain's "Europe debate": the discourse employed by the press. The national press has not been examined in any depth in this thesis. Press coverage of the 1975 Referendum has been examined in a certain amount of depth before (Butler and

Kitzinger, 1976, pp.220-3), but apart from the CPGB's low circulation **Morning Star**, all the national daily and Sunday papers supported a "Yes" vote.

In the 1990s, though, many traditionally pro-Conservative papers have become more "Euro-sceptical" in both their coverage of, and outlook towards, the EC/EU. There seems to be a lot of research possibilities in discovering the forms of discourse employed by Britain's press since 1975 in its approach to Britain's relationship with the EC/EU, and some work on this areas has been carried out (Hardt-Mautner, 1995). One interesting line of research would be to compare "anti-EC" discourse in the broadsheets with that in the tabloids. One might anticipate that the latter to take a more populist, "nationalist" line in its discourse, while broadsheet articles would be expected to take a "pragmatic" tone.

A fifth area of possible related research would be examining the discourse used by cross-party pressure groups and "think-tanks" concerned with the EC/EU. Although both BIE and the NRC folded once the 1975 Referendum campaign ended, various cross-party organisations have continued to function. Indeed, it may be that more pressure groups, cross-party organisations and "think-tanks" concerned with the "Europe debate" now exist than at any point since the Referendum campaign; or even since the struggles over British entry in the early 1970s. On the "anti-EC" side, there are organisations such as the Campaign for an Independent Britain (CIB), the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism (CAEF), the Bruges Group and the European Foundation. "Pro-EC" pressure groups and "think-tanks" include the Action Centre on Europe (ACE), the European Movement and the Federal Trust.

A study of the contents of Bruges Group literature already exists (George, 1993a). There would appear to be plenty of primary resource material which researchers could examine to find out how often similar organisations use "nationalist", "pragmatic" and "ideological" discourse in their literature. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see if such enthusiastically "pro-EC" organisations such as ACE and the Federal Trust use more

"Euro-Federalist" or "counter-nationalist" discourse in their literature.

A sixth suggested area of research is to ask if it possible to develop a concept of British or English national identity which could be used by "pro-EC" political actors in order to make the British more enthusiastic about embracing the EC. In a sense this would be a research project into British history, to see if "pro-EC" political actors can break the near hegemony "anti-EC" political actors seem to currently have over Britain's national identity dynamic, which threatens to fatally undermine positive British involvement in the EU. Little need to be said about the potential enormity of such a project, and suggest a possible route for developing a comprehensive "Euro-Federalist" regime of truth, except that it would need to emphasise Britain's historically friendly links with the European mainland in the face of much anti-German bile (Wallace, 1991, 76-7). Such as the EC/EU, has so far dominated and informed (Rudd and Payne, 1996).

#### **8.9: Comparative Research: some possibilities.**

A valid criticism of this thesis is that it lacks a comparative dimension; Britain's "Europe debate" and the discourse used in it is not compared or contrasted with those which have taken place in other European countries, both inside and outside the EC/EU.

There have been some works on comparing British political actors' attitudes to the EC/EU with those held by their counterparts in the rest of Europe. These all seem to compare Britain's Labour Party with their equivalents elsewhere on the Continent. Apart from Featherstone (1982; 1988), most writers compare Labour to just one European counterpart, whether in Denmark (Henrik Haahr, 1992), France (Newman, M., 1983) or Norway (Geyer, 1993). Comparative studies of European centre-right parties and the British Conservative Party are unknown, it seems, and no-one seems to have examined in any depth the discourse used by political actors in "Europe debates" elsewhere.

Consequently, there seems to a potential research issue waiting

to be examined in-depth. That is, to what extent have the types of discourse used in Britain's "Europe debate" been replicated in the rest of Europe? In particular, has the discourse in these other debates been primarily couched in "nationalist", "pragmatic" or "ideological" terms? For instance, to what extent do "anti-EC" political actors elsewhere in Europe use discourse which appeals to the defence of their national parliamentary sovereignty; their "world-role" outside of the EC/EU; or anti-French or anti-German sentiments? Indeed, do "pro-EC" political actors use "counter-nationalist" themes in reply?

Another area of research which could be developed from aspects of this thesis starts by recognising that British participation in the EC/EU is just one part of a wider process of the economic "globalisation" of the capitalist world-system in the post-Bretton Woods era. A "globalisation" process, moreover, which the development of regional trading blocs, such as the EC/EU, has so far complemented, not undermined (Gamble and Payne, 1996).

This begs the question: if "nationalist" discourse is employed in British politics by those political actors opposed to EC membership or further European integration, to what extent are local forms of "nationalist" discourse used by political actors in other parts of the world opposed to the "globalisation" process?

Consequently, to what extent are or were forms of discourse, which can be seen as "nationalist" in their particular context, employed by, for example:

- (i) Canadian political actors opposed to the USA-Canada Free Trade Agreement?;
- (ii) Indian political actors opposed to the effect of GATT on local agriculture?;
- (iii) US political actors opposed to GATT and the North American Free Trade Agreement?;
- (iv) political actors in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR opposed to the opening up of their national economies to Western capital?; and
- (v) political actors in Third World countries opposed to

IMF-imposed "structural adjustment".

Any such research would, of course, need to be informed by comparing "nationalist" forms of "anti-globalisation" discourse with "pragmatic" and "ideological" ones. It would also be interesting to see if "pro-globalisation" discourse used its own local version of "counter-nationalism" in response.

Hopefully, this thesis can be seen not only as a useful contribution to understanding Britain's "Europe debate"; it may also prove to be a help in informing studies of other instances where the external perspectives of domestic economic and political elites come into potential conflicts with a preexisting national logic of culture.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY.**

**(a) Primary Material.**

\*Benn, Tony (1975a) *Speech at Sophie Hall, Cardiff June 4*  
Material preceded by a \* were found in the Harvester Press (1976)  
microfiche collection **Britain and Europe since 1945: 1975 Update**  
(Hassocks: Harvester Press).

Also consulted were all issues of **The Spectator** from March 8 to  
June 7, 1975 inclusive; all issues of **Tribune** from March 7 to June  
6, 1975 inclusive; and those sections of **Hansard (HC Debates)**  
referred to in the text.

\*Atkinson, Rodney and McWhirter, Norris (1995) **Treason at Maastricht: The Destruction of the Nation State** Second Revised and Expanded Edition (Newcaslte-upon-Tyne: Compuprint Publishing).

Barratt Brown, Michael (1975) "The socialist alternative to the Common Market" **Tribune** March 7, pp.5-7.

\*Benn, Tony (1975a) **Speech to Meeting of Executive of the NUR, Unity House, Euston Road, London April 8.**

\*Benn, Tony (1975b) **Speech to the Labour Common Market Safeguards Campaign, Central Hall, Westminster April 25.**

\*Benn, Tony (1975c) **Speech at Coventry Police Hall May 16.**

\*Benn, Tony (1975d) **Speech at Lunch held by the Association of Economic Representatives at the Dorchester Hotel, London May 23.**

\*Benn, Tony (1975e) **Speech at Wakefield Unity Hall May 28.**

BIE (1975) **Why Should You Vote Yes** (London: BIE).

\*Callaghan, James (1975a) **Speech to the Labour Party Special Conference April 26, op cit, pp.25-8.**

\*Callaghan, James (1975b) **Speech to the Annual Conference of NUM North Western Region, Cliffs Hotel, Blackpool May 15.**

\*Callaghan, James (1975c) **Speech to NUM Conference in Blackpool May 15.**

\*Callaghan, James (1975d) **Speech at Mountbatten Theatre, Southampton May 21.**

\*Callaghan, James (1975e) **Speech at meeting of Teeside Labour Party, Middlesborough Town Hall May 22.**

- \*Callaghan, James (1975f) **Speech at Sophia Hall, Cardiff** June 4.
- \*Castle, Barbara (1975a) **Speech at Tribune Rally, Manchester Free Trade Hall** April 11.
- \*Castle, Barbara (1975b) **Speech at Oxford Town Hall** May 2.
- \*Castle, Barbara (1975c) **Speech at Public Library, St James Street, Accrington** May 16.
- \*Castle, Barbara (1975d) **Speech at St George's Hall, Bradford** May 18.
- \*Castle, Barbara (1975e) **Speech at Islington Town Hall** May 22.
- Castle, Barbara (1982) "Let them throw us out" **New Statesman** 17 September, pp.10-11.
- \*CATOR (1975) **Help Britain Out** (Beaconsfield: CATOR).
- \*CMSC (1975a) **Resistance News** March 1975.
- \*CMSC (1975b) **Resistance News** April 1975.
- \*CMSC (1975c) **Resistance News** May 1975.
- Coates, Ken (1985) "A New Internationalism" **New Socialist** No.30, pp.36-8.
- Coates, Ken, ed., (1986) **Joint Action for Jobs: A New Internationalism** (Nottingham: New Socialist/Spokesman).
- CPB(M-L) (1975) **No to the Common Market, No to Capitalism, Lets Fight One State, Not Nine** (London: CPB(M-L)).
- CPGB (1968) **The British Road to Socialism** (London: CPGB).
- European Community (1986) **Single European Act** (London: HMSO).
- European Community (1992) **The Unseen Treaty: Treaty on European Union Maastricht 1992** (London: David Pollard Publishing).
- \*GBORC (1975a) "**YOUR FUTURE...**" (London: GBORC).
- \*GBORC (1975b) "**THE GREAT VANISHING TRICK**" (London: GBORC).
- \*GBORC (1975c) "**IN THE COMMON MARKET- OUT OF A JOB**" (London: GBORC).
- \*GBORC (1975d) "**YOU AND THE COMMON MARKET**" (London: GBORC).
- \*GBORC (1975e) "**NO- the 7 Ministers' Decision**" (London: GBORC).
- \*GBORC (1975f) "**SO YOU THINK FOOD IS DEAR?**" (London: GBORC).
- Gelber, Lionel (1975) "EEC versus the West?" **The Spectator** May 10th, pp.569-70.
- Griffiths, Eldon (1975a) **Speech to Bury St-Edmunds Under 23 Club** March 7.

- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975b) **Speech in Haverill, Suffolk** March 15.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975c) **Speech in York** March 21.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975d) **Speech to Conservative Party workers at Wickham Brook, Suffolk** April 11.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975e) **Speech** April 14.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975f) **Speech in Oxford** April 17.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975g) **Speech in Bury** April 25.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975h) **Speech to Newcastle Women's Association** April 29.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975i) **Speech at Leicester** May 6.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975j) **Speech to Rotary Clubs of Westminster in Royal Overseas Club** May 7.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975k) **Speech at Seminar on Europe in Lewisham** May 8.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975l) **Speech in Bury St-Edmunds** May 9.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975m) **Speech at University College, London** May 15.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975n) **Speech to businessmen's lunch in Birmingham** May 20.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975o) **Speech in Bristol** May 22.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975p) **Speech in Colchester** May 23.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975q) **Speech in Farnworth** May 29.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975r) **Speech in Chorley** May 30.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975s) **Speech in Bury St-Edmunds** June 2.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975t) **Speech to Businessmen's Luncheon at the Duke's Head, King's Lynn** June 3.
- \*Griffiths, Eldon (1975u) **Speech in Horsham** June 4.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975a) **Speech to Greater London Young Conservatives' Conference in Hastings** April 5.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975b) **Speech to Conservative Group for Europe Conference, Central Hall Westminster** April 19.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975c) **Speech at Chislehurst and Sidcup Grammar School** April 25.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975d) **Speech at Beaconsfield** April 28.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975e) **Speech at Newcastle** May 2.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975f) **Speech at Rally at Trafalgar Square** May 4.

- \*Heath, Edward (1975g) **Speech at Bexley-Sidcup Constituency Supper Club** May 5.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975h) **Speech in Leicester** May 12.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975i) **Speech in Richmond** May 15.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975j) **Speech in Dumfries** May 20.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975k) **Speech in Glasgow** May 21.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975l) **Speech in Edinburgh** May 22.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975m) **Speech in Lancaster** May 27.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975n) **Speech in Bolton** May 27.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975o) **Speech in Newcastle** May 28.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975p) **Speech in Catterick** May 29.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975q) **Speech at Pavilion Gardens, Buxton** May 30.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975r) **Speech in Exeter** May 30.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975s) **Speech at West Malling** May 31.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975t) **Speech at Leeds** June 1.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975u) **Speech at Westminster Central Hall** June 2.
- \*Heath, Edward (1975v) **Speech at Alma Road School, Sidcup** June 3.
- Hewland, Philip (1975) "Trading Follies" **The Spectator** March 15.
- H.M. Government (1975) **Britain's New Deal in Europe** (London: HMG).
- Holland, Stuart (1982) "New Strategy for Europe" **New Socialist** No.8, pp.7-13.
- Holland, Stuart (1983) **Out of Crisis: A Project for European Recovery** (Nottingham: Spokesman).
- Jay, Douglas (1975) "Back to EFTA" **The Spectator** June 7, pp.681-2.
- \*Jenkins, Roy (1975a) Speech to the Labour Party Special Conference April 26. **op cit.** p.16.
- \*Jenkins, Roy (1975b) **Speech to BIE rally in Edinburgh** May 14.
- \*Jenkins, Roy (1975c) **Speech to LCBIE meeting at Derby Guildhall** May 20.
- Jones, Chris (1975) "Bland as bananas" **The Spectator** April 5, p.404.
- Kinnock, Neil (1984) "New Deal for Europe" in James Curran, ed., **The Future of the Left** (Cambridge: Polity/New Socialist), pp.231-48.
- Labour Party (1974) **The Labour Manifesto 1974: Let Us Work**

- Together- Labour's Way Out of the Crisis** (London: Labour Party).
- Labour Party (1975) **Labour and the Common Market: Report of the special conference of the Labour Party Sobell Sports Centre Islington London April 26 1975** (London: Labour Party).
- Labour Party (1980) **Report of the Annual Conference and Special Conference of the Labour Party 1980** (London: Labour Party).
- Labour Party (1981) **Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party 1981** (London: Labour Party).
- Labour Party (1983) **The New Hope for Britain: Labour's General Election Manifesto 1983** (London: Labour Party).
- Lawson, Dominic (1990) "Saying the unsayable about the Germans" **The Spectator** 14 July, pp.8-10.
- \*LCBIE (1975a) **Europe-Yes!** (London: LCBIE).
- \*LCBIE (1975b) **"SAY 'YES' TO EUROPE"** (London: LCBIE).
- \*LCBIE (1975c) **"It makes sense to stick together"** (London: LCBIE).
- \*LCBIE (1975d) **"WE ARE BETTER OFF IN EUROPE"** (London: LCBIE).
- \*LCBIE (1975e) **"OUT OF EUROPE..."** (London: LCBIE).
- Livingstone, Ken (1990) **Livingstone's Labour: A Programme for the Nineties** (London: Unwin).
- Michie, Jonathan (1993) **Maastricht: Implications for Public Services** (Manchester: Nalgo).
- Morrell, Frances (1985) "AES: Alternative European Strategy" **New Socialist** No.31, pp.9-11.
- Morrell, Frances (1987) "Our future lies in Europe" **New Statesman** 6 March, pp.23-4.
- NRC (1975) **Why You Should Vote No** (London: NRC).
- Pickles, Wilfred (1975) "Your rights and the Common Market" **The Spectator** March 8, pp.273-80.
- \*Powell, Enoch (1975a) **Speech at Lunch arranged by PA Management Consultants for senior businessmen in North West Valley Lodge Hotel, Wilmslow, Cheshire** May 2.
- \*Powell, Enoch (1975b) **Speech at Bournemouth Town Hall** May 10.
- \*Powell, Enoch (1975c) **Speech at West Bromwich Town Hall** May 17.
- \*Powell, Enoch (1975d) **Speech to public meeting at Webster Theatre, Arbroath** May 30.
- \*Powell, Enoch (1975e) **Speech to public meeting at Winter Gardens,**

**Blackpool May 31.**

\*Powell, Enoch (1975f) **Speech to public meeting at Mecca Ballroom, Bullring, Birmingham June 2.**

\*Powell, Enoch (1975g) **Speech to public meeting at ABC Cinema, Sidcup, Kent June 4.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975a) **Speech to Tribune Rally on the Common Market at Westminster Central Hall April 10.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975b) **Speech at meeting organised by the NRC, Conway Hall, Red Lion Square April 12.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975c) **Speech at Labour Common Market Safeguards Campaign meeting, Westminster Central Hall April 25.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975d) **Speech at the Labour Party Special Conference April 26, op cit, p.33.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975e) **Speech at Labour Party Headquarters, Yeovil May 4.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975f) **Speech at St John's College York May 9.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975g) **Speech at Annual General Meeting of ASTMS in Bournemouth May 11.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975h) **Speech at Woolwich Town Hall May 14.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975i) **Speech at Swindon Town Hall June 2.**

\*Shore, Peter (1975j) **Speech at Bristol Corn Exchange June 4.**

**Spectator Editorial** (1975a) "Hesitation, evasion and reluctance", March 8, pp.257-9.

**Spectator Editorial** (1975b) "OUT- and into the World", June 7, p.675.

Tether, Gordon C. (1979) **The Great Common Market Fraud** (Bristol: Pentacle).

\*Thatcher, Margaret (1975a) **Speech to London University Conservative Association at the House of Commons March 7.**

\*Thatcher, Margaret (1975b) **Speech at opening of the Conservative Group for Europe's Campaign to keep Britain in the European Community at St Ermin's Hotel, London April 16.**

\*Thatcher, Margaret (1975c) **Speech at Christ Church School, Hendon May 19.**

Thatcher, Margaret (1988) **Britain and Europe: Text of the Speech delivered in Bruges by the Prime Minister on 20th September, 1988**

(London: Conservative Political Centre).

Vander Elst, Philip (1975) "Red Herring" **The Spectator** June 7, p.682.

\*Williams, Shirley (1975a) **Speech at Press Conference at House of Commons**, April 17.

\*Williams, Shirley (1975b) **Speech at LCBIE meeting, Caxton Hall** April 25.

\*Williams, Shirley (1975c) **Speech at LCBIE meeting, St Patrick's Church Hall, New York Road, Leeds** May 8.

\*Williams, Shirley (1975d) **Speech at Shire Hall, Hereford** May 22.

\*Williams, Shirley (1975e) **Speech at Press Conference at Charing Cross Hotel** May 24.

\*Williams, Shirley (1975f) **Speech at LCBIE meeting, Mountbatten Theatre, Southampton**, May 28.

\*Williams, Shirley (1975g) **Speech at Bragwyn Hall, Swansea** May 30.

#### **(b) Secondary Material.**

Abercrombie, Nicholas et al (1988) **The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology** Second Edition (London: Penguin).

Allen, Donald E. and Guy, Rebecca F. (1974) **Conversation Analysis: the sociology of talk** (The Hague: Mouton).

Althusser, Louis (1971) **Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays** translated by Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press).

Anderson, Perry, ed., (1965) **Towards Socialism** (Glasgow: Fontana).

Anderson, Perry (1965) "Origins of the Present Crisis" in Anderson, ed., **op cit** (originally published in **New Left Review** No.23 Jan/Feb 1964), pp.11-52.

Anderson, Perry (1976) **Considerations on Western Marxism** (London: NLB).

Anderson, Perry (1987) "The Figures of Descent" **New Left Review** No.161, pp.20-77.

Anderson, Perry (1992) **English Questions** (London: Verso).

Andreff, Vladimir (1984) "The international centralization of capital and the re-ordering of world capitalism" **Capital and Class** 22, pp.58-60.

- Ashford, Nigel (1980) "The European Community" in Zig Layton-Henry, ed., **Conservative Party Politics** (Basingstoke: Macmillan), pp.95-125.
- Ashford, Nigel (1983) **The Conservative Party and European Integration 1945-1975** PhD (Coventry).
- Ashford, Nigel (1992) "The Political Parties" in George, ed., **op cit**, pp.119-48.
- Baker, David et al (1993) "Whips or Scorpions? The Maastricht Vote and the Conservative Party" **Parliamentary Affairs** Vol.46, No.2, pp.147-62.
- Baker, David et al (1994) "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and European Ratification" **Parliamentary Affairs** Vol.47, No.1, pp.37-60.
- Baker, David et al (1996a) "The Blue Map of Europe: Conservative Parliamentarians and European Integration" in Colin Rallings et al, eds., **British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1995** (London: Frank Cass), pp.51-73.
- Baker, David et al (1996b) "Labour and Europe: A Survey of MPs and MEPs" **Political Quarterly** Vol.67, No.1, pp.353-71.
- Barker, Elizabeth (1971) **Britain in a divided Europe 1945-1970** (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson).
- Barnett, Anthony (1982) **Iron Britannia** (London: Allison and Busby).
- Barratt Brown, Michael (1988) "Away With All The Great Arches: Anderson's History of British Capitalism" **New Left Review** No.167, pp.22-51.
- Bell, Daniel (1960) **The End of Ideology** (New York: Collier).
- Billig, Michael et al (1988) **Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking** (London: Sage).
- Blackburn, Robin, ed., (1972) **Ideology in Social Science: Readings in Critical Social Theory** (Glasgow: Fontana).
- Bloom, William (1990) **Personal Identity, national identity and international relations** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Burke, Edmund [1790] (1967) **Reflections on the Revolution in France** Introduction by A.J. Grieve (London: Dent).
- Butler, David and Kitzinger, Uwe (1976) **The 1975 Referendum** (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

- Butt Philip, Alan (1992) "British Pressure Groups and the European Community" in George, ed., *op cit*, pp.149-71.
- Callaghan, John (1987) **The Far Left in British Politics** (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Callaghan, John (1990) **Socialism in Britain since 1884** (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Callinicos, Alex (1989) "Exception or Symptom? The British Crisis and the World System" **New Left Review** No.69, pp.97-106.
- Campbell, Duncan (1986) **The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain** (London: Paladin).
- Carfuny, Alan W. and Rosenthal, Glenda G., eds., (1993) **The State of the European Community Vol.2: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond** (Boulder: Lynne Rienner).
- Cohen, Anver (1995) "Divided Capitalism and Marx's Conception of Politics" **Political Studies** Vol.43, No.1, pp.92-104.
- Colley, Linda (1992) **Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837** (London: Pimlico).
- Coulmas, Florian, ed., (1997) **The Handbook of Sociolinguistics** (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Crewe, Ivor (1982) "The Labour Party and the Electorate" in Dennis Kavanagh, ed., **The Politics of the Labour Party** (London: Unwin), pp.9-49.
- Cunningham, Hugh (1989) "The language of patriotism" in Samuel, ed., *op cit*, pp.57-89.
- Currid, Noel (1996) **"The Left Against Europe?" Revisited: Labour Party Conferences' debates on the European Community October 1962 and July 1971** (Leicester: University of Leicester Centre for Federal Studies).
- Dicey, A.V. [1885] (1959) **An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution** 10th edition (London: Macmillan).
- Eagleton, Terry (1991) **Ideology: an Introduction** (London: Verso).
- Edelman, Murray (1964) **The Symbolic Uses of Politics** (Urbana: University of Illinois Press).
- Edelman, Murray (1971) **Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence** (Chicago: Markham Publishing).
- Elliot, Gregory (1993) **Labourism and the English Genius: The**

- Strange Death of Labour England?** (London: Verso).
- Europa Publications (1991) **The European Communities Encyclopedia and Directory 1992** (London: Europa Publications Ltd).
- Evans, Geoffrey (1995) "The State of the Union: attitudes towards Europe" in Roger Jowell et al, eds., **BSA: the 12th Report** (Aldershot: Gower), pp.119-40.
- Fairclough, Norman (1989) **Language and Power** (London: Longman).
- Featherstone, Kevin (1981) "Socialists and European Unity: The Attitudes of Labour MPs" **European Journal of Political Research** 9(4), pp.407-21.
- Featherstone, Kevin (1982) **Socialists and European Integration: A Comparison of the Attitudes held within the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, and the Belgian Socialist Parties** PhD (Manchester).
- Featherstone, Kevin (1988) **Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative History** (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Finer, S.E. et al (1961) **Backbench opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59** (Oxford: Pergamon).
- Foote, Geoffrey (1986) **The Labour Party's Political Thought: A History** (London: Croom Helm).
- Forgacs, David (1989) "Gramsci and Marxism in Britain" **New Left Review** No.176, pp.70-88.
- Foucault, Michel [1970] (1974) **The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences** (London: Tavistock).
- Foucault, Michel (1977) **Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: selected essays and interviews by Michel Foucault** edited by D.F. Bouchard (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Foucault, Michel (1980) "Truth and Power" in Colin Gordon, ed., **Power and Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977** (Hassocks: Harvester Press), pp.109-33.
- Foucault, Michel [1970](1981) "The Order of Discourse" in Robert Young, ed., **Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader** (Boston MA: Routledge), pp.48-78.
- Foucault, Michel [1969] (1994) **The Archaeology of Knowledge** translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge).

- Gaffney, John (1991) "Labour Party Attitudes and Policies Towards Europe" **Current Politics and Economics of Europe** 1 (3/4), pp.213-39.
- Gamble, Andrew (1974) **The Conservative Nation** (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Gamble, Andrew (1988) **The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism** (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Gamble, Andrew (1990) **Britain in Decline: Economic Policy, Political Strategy and the British State** Third Edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Gamble, Andrew (1996) "An Ideological Party" in Ludlam and Smith, eds., **op cit**, pp.19-36.
- Gamble, Andrew and Payne, Anthony, eds., (1996) **Regionalism and World Order** (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Gastil, John (1992) "Undemocratic discourse: a review of the theory and research on political discourse" **Discourse and Society** Vol.3 (4), pp.469-500.
- Gellner, Ernest (1983) **Nations and Nationalism** (Oxford: Blackwell).
- George, Stephen (1989) **Nationalism, Liberalism and the National Interest: Britain, France and the European Community** Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics No.67 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Department of Politics).
- George, Stephen (1990) **The European Community: A Structuralist Perspective** Sheffield Papers in International Studies No.5 (Sheffield: University of Sheffield Department of Politics).
- George, Stephen, ed., (1990) **Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment** (Oxford: Clarendon).
- George, Stephen (1993a) "The Bruges Group, The Conservative Party and the European Communities" in Tony Powell and Chris Llewelyn, eds., **Dissident Voices** (Swansea: University Centre for Development Studies and Department of Political Theory and Government), pp.15-27.
- George, Stephen (1993b) "The British Government and the Maastricht Agreements" in Carfuny and Rosenthal, eds., **op cit**, pp.177-92.
- George, Stephen and Rosamond, Ben (1992) "The European Community" in Martin J. Smith and Joanna Spear, eds., **The Changing Labour**

- Party**, (London: Routledge), pp.171-84.
- George, Stephen and Sowemimo, Matthew (1996) "Conservative Foreign Policy Towards the European Union" in Ludlam and Smith, eds., **op cit**, pp.244-63.
- Geyer, Robert (1993) "Socialism and the EC After Maastricht: From Classic to New-Model European Social Democracy" in Carfuny and Rosenthal, eds., **op cit**, pp.91-106.
- Gill, Stephen (1990) **American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Grahl, John and Teague, Paul (1988) "The Labour Party and the European Community" **Political Quarterly** Vol.59, No.1, pp.72-85.
- Gramsci, Antonio [1971] (1986) **Selections from Prison Notebooks** Edited and Translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
- Hall, Peter A. (1986) **Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France** (Cambridge: Polity).
- Hall, Stuart (1992) "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power" in Stuart Hall and Bram Greben, eds., **Formations of Modernity** (Cambridge: Polity/Open University), pp.275-331.
- Halliday, M.A.K. (1978) **Language as a social semiotic: The social interpretation of language and meaning** (London: Edward Arnold).
- Hama, Noriko (1996) **Disintegrating Europe: The Twilight of the European Construction** (London: Adamantine Press).
- Hardt-Mautner, Gerlinde (1995) "How does one become a good European?: the British press and European integration" **Discourse and Society** Vol.6 (2), pp.177-205.
- Henrik Haar, Jens (1992) "European Integration and the Left in Britain and Denmark" **Journal of Common Market Studies** Vol.30, No.1, pp.77-100.
- Hill, Christopher (1965) **Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century** (London: Secker and Warburg).
- Hilton, Anthony (1987) **City within a state** (London: Taurus).
- Hilton, Rodney (1989) "When were the English English?" in Samuel, ed., **op cit**, pp.39-43.

- Hirschman, Albert (1991) **The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy** (Cambridge MA: Bellman).
- Hobsbawm, Eric (1974) **Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour** (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson).
- Hobsbawm, Eric (1992) **Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Hodges, Michael and Woolcock, Stephen (1993) "Atlantic Capitalism versus Rhine Capitalism in the European Community" **West European Politics** Vol.16, No.3, pp.329-44.
- Hoffman, Stanley (1965) "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the case of Western Europe" **Daedalus** Vol.95, No.3, pp.862-915.
- Howe, Stephen (1983) "Labour Patriotism 1939-83" in Samuel, ed., **op cit**, pp.127-39.
- Hutton, Will (1996) **The State We're In** Revised Edition (London: Vintage).
- Ingham, Geoffrey (1984) **Capitalism Divided? The City and Industry in British Social Development** (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Ingham, Geoffrey (1988) "Commercial Capital and British Development: A Reply to Michael Barratt Brown" **New Left Review** No.172, pp.45-65.
- Jay, Martin (1973) **The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-50** (Boston: Little Brown).
- Johnson, Richard (1976) **Barrington Moore, Perry Anderson and English Social Development** (Birmingham: Centre for Cultural Studies).
- Judge, David (1988) "Incomplete sovereignty: the British House of Commons and the completion of the internal market in the European Community" **Parliamentary Affairs** Vol.41, No.4, pp.441-55.
- Judge, David (1993) **The Parliamentary State** (London: Sage).
- Keegan, William (1996) "All roads lead to devaluation, not to Maastricht" **Observer Business** 21 January, p.2.
- Kitzinger, Uwe (1973) **Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market** (London: Thames and Hudson).
- Labov, William (1972) **Sociolinguistic Patterns** (Philadelphia:

- University of Pennsylvania Press).
- Laclau, Ernesto (1977) **Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism- Fascism- Populism** (London: NLB).
- Larraín, Jorge (1983) **Marxism and Ideology** (London: Macmillan).
- Lenin, V.I. [1902] (1989) **What is to be done?** translated by Robert Service (London: Penguin).
- Leys, Colin (1985) "Thatcherism and British Manufacturing: a Question of Hegemony" **New Left Review** No.151, pp.5-25.
- Leys, Colin (1989) **Politics in Britain: From Labourism to Thatcherism** (London: Verso).
- Longstreth, Frank (1979) "The City, Industry and the State" in Colin Crouch, ed., **State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism** (London: Croom Helm), pp.157-90.
- Ludlam, Steve (1990) **Labourism and the disintegration of the post-war consensus: disunited trade union economic responses to public expenditure cuts, 1974-1979** PhD (Sheffield).
- Ludlam, Steve (1994) "Parliamentary or Executive Sovereignty? The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty" **Politics Review** Vol.3, No.4, pp.27-30.
- Ludlam, Steve and Smith, Martin J., eds., (1996) **Contemporary British Conservatism** (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Macdonell, Diane (1986) **Theories of Discourse: An Introduction** (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Machin, Howard and Wright, Vincent, eds., (1985) **Economic Policy-Making Under the Mitterrand Presidency 1981-1984** (London: Francis Pinter).
- MacInnes, John (1987) **Thatcherism at work: Industrial Relations and Economic Change** (Milton Keynes: Open University Press).
- Marquand, David (1995) "After Whig Imperialism? Can there be a new British identity?" **New Community** Vol.21, No.2, pp.183-93.
- Martin, Donald (1995) "Small Businesses turn against the 'European Union'" **Britain Summer**, p.5.
- Marx, Karl [1844] (1988a) "Towards a Critique of 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right'" in McLellan, ed., **op cit**, pp.63-74.
- Marx, Karl [1845] (1988b) "The German Ideology" in McLellan, ed., **op cit**, pp.159-91.

- Marx, Karl [1852] (1988c) "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" in McLellan, ed., **op cit**, pp.300-25.
- Marx, Karl [1859] (1988d) "Preface to 'A Critique of Political Economy'" in McLellan, ed., **op cit**, pp.388-92.
- Marx, Karl [1865-6], (1988e) "Capital, Volume One" in McLellan, ed., **op cit**, pp.415-88.
- McCarney, Joe (1980) **The Real World of Ideology** (Brighton: Harvester).
- McGlynn, Sean (1996) "British Nationalism and Europe: A Medieval Comparison" **Politics** Vol.16, No.3, pp.167-74.
- McLellan, David, ed., (1988) **Karl Marx: Selected Writings** (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- McLellan, David (1995) **Ideology** Second Edition (Buckingham: Open University Press).
- Meiksins Wood, Ellen (1991) **The Pristine Culture of Capitalism** (London: Verso).
- Milward, Alan S. (1992) **The European Rescue of the Nation-State** (London: Routledge).
- Nairn, Tom (1965) "The Nature of the Labour Party" in Anderson, ed., **op cit** (originally published in **New Left Review** No.27 Sept/Dec 1964), pp.159-217.
- Nairn, Tom (1971) "British Nationalism and the EEC" **New Left Review** No.69, pp.3-28.
- Nairn, Tom (1972) "The English Working Class" in Blackburn, ed., **op cit** (originally published in **New Left Review** No.24 March/April 1964), pp.187-206.
- Nairn, Tom (1973) **The Left Against Europe?** (originally published in **New Left Review** No.75 Sept/Oct 1972) (Harmondsworth: Pelican/New Left Review).
- Nairn, Tom (1979) "The Future of Britain's Crisis" **New Left Review** Nos.113-14, pp.43-69.
- Nairn, Tom (1981) **The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism** Second, expanded edition (London: Verso).
- Nairn, Tom (1985) "Britain's Living Legacy" in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, eds., **The Politics of Thatcherism**, (London: Lawrence and Wishart), pp.281-8.

- Nairn, Tom (1988a) **The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy** (London: Radius).
- Nairn, Tom (1988b) "The burial of popular sovereignty" **New Statesman** 11 March, pp.16-21.
- Nairn, Tom (1993) "The Sole Survivor" **New Left Review** No.200, pp.41-8.
- Neumann, Iver B. and Walsh, Jennifer (1991) **The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Security** Nupi Paper No.445 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute on International Affairs).
- Newman, Gerald (1987) **The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History 1740-1830** (New York: St Martin's Press).
- Newman, Michael (1983) **Socialism and European Unity: The Dilemma of the Left in Britain and France** (London: Junction).
- Newton, Scott (1990) "The economic background to appeasement and the search for Anglo-German detente before and during World War 2" **Lobster** 20, pp.25-33.
- Newton, Scott and Porter, Dilwyn (1988) **Modernisation Frustrated: The Politics of Industrial Decline in Britain since 1900** (London: Unwin Hyman).
- O'Shea, Alan (1984) "Trusting the People: How does Thatcherism Work?" in Schwarz, ed., **op cit**, pp.19-41.
- Osmond, John (1988) **Divided Kingdom** (London: Constable).
- Overbeek, Henk (1980) "Finance Capital and the Crisis in Britain" **Capital and Class** 11, pp.99-120.
- Overbeek, Henk (1986) "The Westland Affair: Collision over the future of British capitalism" **Capital and Class** 29, pp.12-26.
- Overbeek, Henk (1990) **Global capitalism and national decline: the Thatcher decade in perspective** (London: Unwin Hyman).
- Paine, Tom [1791-2] (1989) "The Rights of Man" in Tom Paine **Political Writings** Edited by Bruce Kuklick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.49-203.
- Pecheux, Michel (1982) **Language, Semantics and Ideology: Stating the Obvious** Translated by Harbans Naqpal (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Poulantzas, Nicos (1967) "Marxist Political Theory in Great Britain" **New Left Review** No.43, pp.57-64.

- Poulantzas, Nicos (1976) **Political Power and Social Classes** Edited and Translated by Timothy O'Hagan (London: NLB).
- Poulson, Charles (1984) **The English Rebels** (London: Journeyman).
- Prest, Michael (1996) "Campaign to block Emu launched" **Observer Business**, 3 March, p.3.
- Preston P.W. (1994) **Europe, Democracy and the Dissolution of Britain: An Essay on the Issue of Europe in UK Public Discourse** (Aldershot: Dartmouth).
- Radice, Hugo (1984) "The national economy: a Keynesian myth?" **Capital and Class** 16, pp.41-60.
- Reich, Wilhelm (1975) **The Mass Psychology of Fascism** (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Roberts, G.K. (1971) **A dictionary of political analysis** (London: Longman).
- Rodgers, Peter et al (1988) "Who owns Britain as the 'for sale' sign goes up?" **Guardian** 2 August, p.11.
- Rosamond, Ben (1992) **Beyond Nation State Socialism? British Trade Unionism and European Integration in the Thatcher Years 1979-1990** PhD (Sheffield).
- Rosamond, Ben (1993) "National Labour Organisations and European Integration: British Trade Unions and '1992'" **Political Studies** Vol.49, No.3, pp.42034.
- Rosamond, Ben (1994) "The Labour Party and European Integration" **Politics Review**, Vol.3, No.4, pp.21-3.
- Samuel, Raphael, ed., (1989) **Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, Volume 1: History and Politics** (London: Routledge).
- Sanders, David and Edwards, Geoffrey (1994) "Consensus and Diversity in Elite Opinion: the Views of the British Foreign Policy Elite in the Early 1990s" **Political Studies** Vol.42, No.3, pp.413-40.
- Saussure, Ferdinand de [1916] (1974) **Course in General Linguistics** edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye (London: Fontana).
- Schurmann, Franz (1974) **The Logic of World Power: an enquiry into the origins, currents and contradictions of world politics** (New York: Pantheon Books).

- Schwarz, Bill, ed., (1984) **Formations of Language and People** (London: Routledge).
- Schwarz, Bill (1986) "Conservatism, Nationalism and Imperialism" in James Donald and Stuart Hall, eds., **Politics and Ideology: A Reader** (Milton Keynes: Open University Press), pp.154-86.
- Semmel, Bernard (1970) **The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism 1750-1850** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Seton-Watson, Hugh (1977) **Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism** (London: Methuen).
- Sheridan, Alan (1994) **Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth** (London: Routledge).
- Simon, Roger (1985) **Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction** (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
- Sklar, Holly and Everdell, Ros (1980) "Who's who in the Trilateral Commission" in Holly Sklar, ed., **Trilateralism: the Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management** (Boston: South End Press), pp.90-123.
- Smart, Barry (1985) **Michel Foucault** (London: Tavistock).
- Smith, Anthony D., ed., (1976) **Nationalist Movements** (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Stedman Jones, Gareth (1972) "The History of US Imperialism" in Blackburn, ed., **op cit** (originally published in **New Left Review** No.60, March/April 1970), pp.205-37.
- Stirling, John (1991) "This great Europe of ours: trade unions and 1992" **Capital and Class** 45, pp.7-16.
- Taylor, John (1975) "British Membership of the European Communities: the Question of Parliamentary Sovereignty" **Government and Opposition** Vol.10, No.3, pp.278-93.
- Thomas, Jenny (1995) **Meeting in interaction: an introduction to pragmatics** (London: Longman).
- Thompson, E.P. (1965) "The Peculiarities of the English" in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, eds., **Socialist Register 1965** (London: Merlin), pp.311-62.
- Thompson, John B. (1990) **Ideology and Modern Culture** (Cambridge:

Polity).

Thompson, Willie (1992) "Tom Nairn and the Crisis of the British State" **Contemporary Record** Vol.6, No.2, pp.306-25.

Tindale, Stephen (1992) "Learning to love the Market: Labour and the European Community" **Political Quarterly** Vol.63, No.3, pp.275-300.

Valentine, D.G. (1962) "Community Law and English Law" **Journal of Common Market Studies** Vol.1, pp.180-6.

van der Pijl, Kees (1984) **The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class** (London: Verso).

van der Pijl, Kees (1991) **German Reunification and World Politics** Sheffield Paper in International Studies No.7 (Sheffield: University of Sheffield Department of Politics).

van Dijk, Teun A. (1992) "Discourse and the denial of racism" **Discourse and Society** Vol.3 (1), pp.87-118.

van Dijk, Teun A. (1997a) "The Study of Discourse" in van Dijk, ed., **op cit**, pp.1-34.

van Dijk, Teun A. (1997b) **Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Volume 1: Discourse as Structure and Process** (London: Sage).

Voloshinov, V.N. [1930] (1973) **Marxism and the Philosophy of Language** Translated by Ladislav Mateljkae and I.R. Titunik (New York: Seminar Press).

Wallace, William (1986) "What price interdependence? Sovereignty and interdependence in British politics" **International Affairs** Vol.62, No.3, pp.367-89.

Wallace, William (1991) "Foreign policy and national identity in the United Kingdom" **International Affairs** Vol.67, No.1, pp.65-80.

Wallace, William (1996) "Save us from the saviours of England" **Guardian** 30 December, p.9.

Werth, Paul, ed., (1981) **Conversation and discourse: structure and interpretation** (London: Croom Helm).

Whitehead, Philip (1986) **The Writing on the Wall: Britain in the Seventies** (London: Michael Joseph).

Wilson, John (1990) **Politically Speaking: The Pragmatic Analysis of**

**Political Language** (Oxford: Blackwell).

Wodak, Ruth (1989a) "Introduction" in Wodak, ed., **op cit.**, pp.xii-xx.

Wodak, Ruth (1989b) **Language, Power and Ideology: Studies In Political Discourse** (Amsterdam: John Benjamins).

Wright, Patrick (1984) "A Blue Plaque for the Labour Movement? Some political meanings of the 'National Past'" in Schwarz, ed., **op cit.**, pp.42-65.