Social protection and fragile states: An historical and ideational institutionalist analysis of agenda development in the World Bank

Sophia Mackinder
PhD
University of York
Social Policy and Social Work
July 2018
Abstract

Over the past three decades a new paradigm has emerged within international development that seeks to address the issues of fragility and conflict. This new paradigm for engagement brings the state and its ‘capacity’ into the centre of international interventions, and is built around notions of security, economic liberalisation, democratisation and the rule of law. Concurrent with this new approach a concern with poverty emerged, as demonstrated by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the subsequent Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Poverty within fragile and conflict-affected states is a particularly acute problem, as 60% of the world’s extreme poor are projected to be within fragile states by 2030. However, poverty-reduction mechanisms such as social protection suffer from a lack of ‘capacity’ in fragile states, undermining the efficacy of usual processes and policies that are used in non-fragile development contexts. This study therefore seeks to explore the extent to which social protection is considered within the fragile states agenda, to establish whether and how the building of coherent and sophisticated social protection systems is included within the broader ambition of ‘state-building’. Specifically, it looks at the development of – and the interaction between – the fragile states and social protection agendas in the World Bank, the leading and most influential development organisation.

The study therefore draws attention to the significance of the World Bank’s institutional architecture as the forum within which the ideas surrounding fragility and social protection develop. Drawing on 43 elite interviews with influential World Bank staffers and a complementary documentary analysis, it employs an historical and ideational institutionalist framework to capture the interplay between the institution, the ideas around fragility and social protection, and the interests of the actors involved in the discourse, to identify the constraining and facilitating influences within the Bank that shape the agendas and their interaction. It finds that not only is the social protection agenda stronger than the fragile states agenda within the Bank, but that the institutional architecture of the organisation has restricted the potential for the two agendas to interact, meaning that the issues around building coherent, sophisticated and effective social protection mechanisms in fragile and conflict-affected states have been neglected until relatively recently.
# List of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Contents</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0 Background to the study</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Empirical and theoretical contributions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Thesis structure</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Fragile states and social protection</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0 Introduction</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 The new paradigm</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Fragile states: a fuzzy concept</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 State-building as market-building</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Social protection in the fragile states literature</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Social protection in development discourse</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Social protection in fragile states</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Conclusion</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Historical and ideational institutionalism</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0 Introduction</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Hall &amp; Taylor’s new institutionalisms</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Historical institutionalism</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 Analytical concepts: time</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2 Analytical concepts: power-distribution</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 The limits of historical institutionalism</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Ideational institutionalism</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1 The analytical significance of ideas</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2 Typologies of ideas</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.3 Causal power and effect of ideas</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.4</td>
<td>Ideas and institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.5</td>
<td>Ideas and interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Institutionalism at a global level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 4: Methods**

| 4.0 | Introduction | 74 |
| 4.1 | Research questions | 75 |
| 4.2 | Research design | 77 |
| 4.3 | Data collection | 80 |
| 4.3.1 | Elite interviews | 80 |
| 4.3.2 | Documentary materials | 91 |
| 4.4 | Analysis | 94 |
| 4.5 | Post-analysis | 98 |
| 4.6 | Ethical considerations | 99 |
| 4.7 | Limitations | 100 |
| 4.8 | Chapter summary | 101 |

**Chapter 5: Introduction to the findings**

| 5.0 | Introduction | 103 |
| 5.1 | Introduction to the findings | 103 |
| 5.1.1 | Interviewees | 103 |
| 5.1.2 | Temporal framework | 105 |
| 5.2 | Background to the World Bank | 109 |
| 5.2.1 | The governance agenda until 1995 | 116 |
| 5.2.2 | The social protection agenda until 1995 | 117 |
| 5.3 | Chapter summary | 119 |


| 6.0 | Introduction | 120 |
| 6.1 | The fragile states agenda | 123 |
| 6.1.1 | The governance agenda | 124 |
| 6.1.2 | The development effectiveness agenda | 128 |
| 6.1.3 | Conflict as a research agenda | 130 |
Chapter 10: Discussion and conclusion 246
10.0 Introduction 246
10.1 Research questions revisited 246
  10.1.1 RQ1: How did the fragile states agenda develop over time in the World Bank? 246
  10.1.2 RQ2: How did the social protection agenda develop over time in the World Bank? 254
  10.1.3 RQ3: To what extent, and how, did the two agendas interact during their development? 258
  10.1.4 RQ4: To what extent, and how, did the institutional architecture of the World Bank facilitate or hinder the development of each agenda and the interaction between them? 261
10.2 Theoretical considerations 268
  10.2.1 The institution 269
  10.2.2 Ideas 271
  10.2.3 Interests 272
  10.2.4 Summary 273
10.3 Potential avenues for future research 274
10.4 Conclusion 276

Appendices 279
A Topic guide for fragility participants 280
B Topic guide for social protection participants 284
C Consent form 287
D Information sheet 289
E Ethics application 291
F Covering email 303
G Timeline for the fragility agenda 304
H Timeline for the social protection agenda 305
I Kim’s 2014 restructure 306

Abbreviations 307
Bibliography 310
List of Tables

1. Typologies of ideas 57
2. Interview participants 104
Acknowledgements

The first thing they tell you about doing a PhD is that it can be lonely and isolated. This was not my experience, due only to the incredible group of kind and supportive people that I have been lucky enough to be surrounded by over these four years (I appreciate that I have lapsed into bad grammar – sometimes sincerity requires you to break the rules…).

First and foremost I would like to thank Dr Chris Holden, my poor beleaguered supervisor, who has done an incredible job of treading that finest of lines between encouraging and supporting me whilst also inspiring and challenging me to go that extra mile. The supervisor-student relationship is so important, and I am constantly reminded of how lucky I am to have struck gold in that regard.

The Department of Social Policy and Social Work at the University of York has been the home of this thesis, and I couldn’t have hoped for a happier one. The list of people within the department who have made the experience enriching is too long to mention, which is indicative of the warmth and supportive nature of all who work here. Special mention goes out to Dr Kevin Farnsworth, Professor John Hudson, Dr Lisa O’Malley and Dr Caz Snell.

The data in this thesis is of a quality that, at the beginning of the process, would have been beyond my wildest dreams. This is due to the kindness of the 43 World Bank staff who have sacrificed time in their hectic work and travel schedules to speak to me. Without their willingness to support a lowly PhD student, this thesis would have looked very different.

Friendships old and new have been invaluable, and I am lucky to have friends that are always there to celebrate or commiserate as necessary throughout the whole process. Special mention goes to my fellow PhD crew, Darren Baxter, Kelly McDonald, Jed Meers, and Laura Bainbridge, who showed me through their successes how to write a PhD, and who kept me laughing through pub trips and poker nights.

Finally, family. Thank you to my cousins from all round the world (especially Will and Fiona) for their constant stream of support and encouragement. To Joe and Helen, for the steady stream of Sauvignon Blanc, Coca-Cola, cheese nibbles, roast dinners, and most importantly, love and laughter. To Annie and Isla, the joys of my life. And finally to my parents, whose love, support and advice is the only reason that I am able to do anything, let alone complete a thesis.
Declaration

Material from this thesis has been presented as papers at the following conferences:


I declare that this is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not been previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university. All sources are acknowledged as References.
1.0. Background to the study

Fragile states have become a key development issue since the 1990s, when a new era of international interventionism emerged in response to the wave of wars that followed the end of the Cold War. The release of international organisations such as the World Bank from the political stalemate of the Cold War yielded a new development paradigm that put the capacity of the state and its institutions at the centre of policy approaches and prescriptions. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 drew further attention to state capacity, as states perceived to be ‘failed’, ‘fragile’, ‘weak’ or ‘collapsed’ were highlighted as a threat to international security. Development approaches based on the idea of ‘state-building’ consequently evolved, which argued for technical policy prescriptions that focused on aspects of state capacity from a normative Western assumption of statehood.

The new paradigm of international interventions also saw a renewed attention to the issue of poverty. The economic transformation and subsequent crises in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s had created a rapid rise in poverty rates, and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were receiving extensive criticism for their role in the crises through their structural adjustment programmes, which had been based in the economic paradigm of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Rodrik, 1997; 2006). Development actors consequently focused more attention on social issues and sectors, elevating social development to one of the core issues within development strategies. A prominent poverty-reduction approach that emerged within this context was social protection, which has experienced a ‘quiet revolution’ (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009), overcoming previous perspectives that had viewed it merely as consumption and a waste of resources.

Prior to this revolution, social protection was traditionally a Western mechanism of poverty alleviation that consisted of a range of public institutions, rules, policies and programmes that protected the poorest in society from poverty and deprivation, predominantly through cash transfers (Barrientos & Hulme, 2005; Hanlon et al., 2010). This model of social protection was closely integrated with both the formal labour market
and the life cycle, and thus included work-related contingencies such as unemployment benefits, and life-cycle contingencies such as maternity and family allowances and pensions (Barrientos & Hulme, 2005). The ‘quiet revolution’ of social protection in the 1990s saw the concept filter into the developing world, where it emerged against the backdrop of numerous economic crises, the aftermath of structural adjustment and a global economy.

While there was consensus among development actors at this point that social protection was a useful tool for poverty alleviation, there was (and continues to be) strong debates over how social protection should be defined and employed in developing contexts. Various differences between northern and southern contexts, such as the much larger informal labour market seen in the latter, gave rise to technical debates such as affordability, targeting and priorities within policy design (Barrientos & Hulme, 2005). Other debates centred on ideological perspectives, contesting whether social protection was a global right or should be conceptualised through need, and the level of individual, familial and societal responsibility inherent within social protection provision (Munro, 2008). Key development agencies consequently have adopted different definitions; the UN’s Economic and Social Council bases its definition on the traditional Western model, defining it as ‘broadly understood as a set of public and private policies and programmes undertaken by societies in response to various contingencies in order to offset the absence or substantial reduction of income from work; provide assistance to families with children; and provide people with healthcare’ (UN, 2000). The International Labor Organization (ILO), which has led the way in championing the perspective of social protection as a global right, argues that social protection refers to ‘the integrated set of policies designed to ensure income security and support to all people across the life-cycle – paying particular attention to the poor and vulnerable’ (ILO, 2015: 1).

The World Bank has recently signed up to the ILO’s definition (see Chapter 9); however, its traditional model of social protection centred around ‘social risk management’ (SRM), which added macroeconomic stability and financial market development to the ‘traditional’ perspectives of social protection, building a model that consisted of public interventions that helped individuals, households and communities manage ‘risk’ (Holzmann & Jorgensen, 1999; see Chapter 6 for further discussion). Key ideological and technical differences exist within development discourse, therefore, and these have significant implications in terms of the policies and programmes that are developed on the
ground. However, as Barrientos and Hulme (2005) point out, there are key features of social protection in development contexts on which all parties agree; it focuses on poverty alleviation, addressing the causes of poverty as well as the symptoms, and acknowledges that these causes are found within the myriad social risks that the poor face. These risks not only create vulnerability through loss of assets, but also affect behavioural change that can be detrimental to welfare (Hanlon et al., 2010). Consequently social protection in recent times is perceived as investment rather than consumption, and seeks to develop the capacity of those in poverty to cope with, or ameliorate, social risk (Barrientos & Hulme, 2005).

There are ongoing debates about what development institutions constitute ‘social protection’, as it overlaps with a number of food security, human capital and livelihood interventions (Harvey et al., 2007). It is outside the remit of this thesis to offer a definition, as one of the empirical tasks is to trace the Bank’s definition and conceptualisation throughout the period under study. However, for clarity as to what is meant by social protection, the following definition, which reflects the concept as seen in most development organisations, is offered: ‘Social protection is all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of the poor, vulnerable and marginable groups’ (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004: i).

A subset of the academic literature on social protection that has emerged addresses the specific problems of developing social protection mechanisms in fragile and conflict-affected states. The desperate need for such mechanisms is apparent; the gap in the poverty level between those countries affected by major violence and those that have not has been climbing since the 1980s (World Bank, 2011a), and the share of the extreme poor living in conflict-affected situations is projected to rise to 60% by 2030 (World Bank, n.d.(c)). However, this subset highlights that the capacity issues raised in the literature and policy prescriptions for fragile states present a particular problem for social protection in these contexts; as the state is unable (or unwilling) to provide social protection through its own institutional architecture, the role is taken up by other actors, usually external, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This creates a vicious circle, however, as it undermines the state and prevents the opportunity for state capacity to develop, as the incentive to address the issue is taken away by the actions of the external actors. The
subsequent legacy of NGO delivery of social protection mechanisms can be a path-dependent parallel structure that leaves state institutions weak, ineffective and under-resourced (OECD, 2008a; Zivetz, 2006). Additionally, the literature highlights that social protection mechanisms can in fact support and help build the state-society relationship, which has emerged as a critical aspect of the state-building discourse, through providing tangible and positive outcomes that restore citizens’ faith in state providers (Macrae, 1995; Harvey et al., 2007), suggesting that an opportunity is lost through over-reliance on NGO service delivery.

This study therefore seeks to draw the policy approaches for fragile states, often conceptualised in terms of ‘state-building’, and the focus they bring on the capacity of state architecture, together with policy approaches to social protection, and the capacity problems they experience in fragile contexts. This places the actions and discourse of those leading the international interventions in the spotlight. Institutionalist theory in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated the explanatory power of a focus upon complex institutional arrangements that structure actors and their interactions in a way that influences policy outcomes (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Skocpol & Pierson, 2002); more recent theoretical advancements within this school have also highlighted the importance of ‘ideas’, and how they are conceived within and navigate complex institutional arrangements to become policy discourse and practice (Schmidt, 2010; 2011). Traditionally this theory was applied to the state and its institutions; in recent years, however, a nascent body of literature has applied it to multilateral institutions, in order to understand how ideas within development discourse are conceived, adopted and developed into development practice (Bøås & McNeill, 2004). This literature has highlighted the importance and significance of the institutional architecture of development organisations in understanding how concepts such as state fragility and social protection emerge and are translated into policy agendas. Consequently, the World Bank was chosen as the focus of this study, due to its leading role and extensive influence in both development discourse and policy. The thesis consequently situates the World Bank in the research agendas of fragility and social protection, and in doing so draws attention to the significance of its institutional architecture as the forum within which the ideas surrounding fragility and social protection develop. The consequent analytical framework therefore seeks to capture the interplay between the institution, the ideas around fragility and social protection and the interests of the actors involved in the discourse. This is in order to identify the constraining and facilitating influences within the
Bank that shape the conceptualisation of fragility and social protection development issues, and facilitate to what extent and how they interact.

1.1. Empirical and theoretical contributions

Drawing on 43 elite interviews with senior World Bank staff and a complementary documentary analysis, the thesis contributes to a nascent body of literature that applies an historical and ideational institutional analytical framework to multilateral organisations. The analysis traces the evolution of the fragile states and social protection agendas separately and the interaction between them, identifying aspects of the Bank’s institutional architecture that constrain or facilitate the development of the discourse and policy prescriptions. Consequently, it answers the following research questions:

1) How did the fragile states agenda develop over time in the World Bank?
2) How did the social protection agenda develop over time in the World Bank?
3) To what extent, and how, did these two agendas interact during their development?
4) To what extent, and how, did the institutional architecture of the World Bank facilitate or hinder the development of each agenda, and their interaction?

The study reveals that the social protection agenda is ‘stronger’ than the fragile states agenda within the Bank, despite the high profile of the latter in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks in the US in 2001, and the subsequent international interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, due to the social protection agenda’s ability to navigate the institutional constraints of the World Bank more effectively. It also finds that these same institutional constraints within the Bank restricted the ability of the two agendas to interact in a coherent manner, meaning that the problem of building coherent, sophisticated and effective social protection mechanisms in fragile and conflict-affected states has been neglected until relatively recently. Furthermore, it reveals that the limited interaction that has existed between the two agendas has been driven by the stronger social protection agenda, rather than the apparently broader fragility / state-building agenda, which has struggled to break out of a ‘siloh’ of a small group of advocates for a more sophisticated engagement with fragile states.
1.2. Thesis structure

Following this introduction, the thesis is organised into nine additional chapters.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on fragile states and social protection. The fragile states literature contains a vigorous debate on the concept of ‘fragile’ states, demonstrating how ‘state-building’ approaches are based on an ideal-typical form of Western statehood, which views fragile states in terms of what they lack. A more recent literature has emerged that highlights the importance of a political-economy approach that analyses the context in which any state-building interventions take place, and in doing so highlights the relative uselessness of technocratic approaches that neglect political-economy considerations. However, leading policy makers such as the Bank, which are driven by economic doctrine and an apolitical mandate, face criticism for their continued use of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that is based within a ‘neoliberal’ philosophy that conceptualises state-building in terms of a state’s ability to support global markets, which leads it to continue to embrace a technocratic approach to state-building. The chapter then reviews the fragile states policy literature from the perspective of social protection, finding that although there is a body of literature on ‘service delivery’, social protection is rarely if ever considered from this perspective. The broader literature on social protection within international development is then examined, as is the sub-set of literature that outlines the unique challenges that social protection initiatives face in fragile contexts, such as the lack of capacity and the ‘problem’ of external provision through NGOs.

Chapter 3 offers a review of the historical and ideational institutionalist scholarship that provides the analytical framework for this study. ‘Historical institutionalism’ provides analytical insights by situating an institutional analysis within the context of time, arguing that concepts and mechanisms such as temporal ordering and sequencing can introduce important considerations such as unintended consequences and long-term power asymmetries into the analysis. However, historical institutionalism has received criticism through its inability to explain change, due to its analytical focus on continuity and institutional constraints, and the lack of agency it grants to actors working within the institutional environment. Consequently, ‘ideational institutionalism’ is given a prominent place within the analysis to introduce the analytical relevance of ideas to the historical institutionalist framework, which provides agency to individuals and consequently provides theoretical perspectives on change in institutions. An overview of the nascent
body of literature that has applied historical and ideational institutionalist approaches to the study of multilateral institutions is offered at the end of the chapter.

Chapter 4 details the method used for this study. After establishing the aims of the thesis the research design is outlined in detail, providing an overview of the data collection processes for the elite interviews and documentary analysis. The analytical approach of a hybrid thematic analysis, which includes both deductive and inductive codes, is then justified and explained. An overview of the ethical considerations and approval process follows, and the chapter ends with a reflection on the limitations of the study.

Chapter 5 offers an introduction to the findings, which provides important background information pertinent to the analysis prior to the findings being presented. It commences with an overview of the interviewees who agreed to be named in the thesis, and their roles within the two agendas. It then goes on to justify and explain the temporal framework around which the findings are presented; namely an historical narrative framework whereby each chapter covers the tenure of one of the four World Bank presidents (James Wolfensohn, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Zoellick and Jim Yong Kim) during the time period under study. The chapter ends with a brief history of the World Bank, with additional focus on the two agendas under study, to ‘set the scene’ of the institutional context prior to the point where the findings chapters commence, at the beginning of Wolfensohn’s presidency in 1995.

Chapters 6 to 9 present the findings of the study. Each of these chapters are divided into three sections; the first covers the fragility agenda (with additional insights into the governance agenda, which was closely connected to the fragility agenda), the second addresses the social protection agenda, and the final section examines the interaction between the two and offers some initial analysis with reference to the research questions.

Chapter 6 covers the Wolfensohn presidency (1995–2005), which encompasses the period that the data points to as the moment when both the fragility and social protection agendas (re)emerged in the Bank, in the nascent stages of the new era of international interventionism. The chapter traces how considerations around conflict and fragility emerged in different pockets around the Bank, including a new research agenda on conflict, a unit in Africa that addressed demobilisation issues in post-conflict scenarios, and a new taskforce and ‘initiative’ named ‘Low Income Countries Under Stress’ that addressed the problems of a collection of low-income countries that were
underperforming. It also includes an overview of the ‘development effectiveness’ agenda, which was to present a significant stumbling block for the fragility agenda throughout the period under study, as it restricted financing to countries perceived to be suffering from poor governance. The chapter then goes on to detail the development of the first Social Protection department and strategy, mapping how the agenda navigated the opposition it experienced in the Bank to become accepted as an effective poverty-reduction mechanism. However, the social protection agenda at this time was only considered within middle-income development contexts, meaning there was little interaction with the fragility agenda.

Chapter 7 details the short tenure of Paul Wolfowitz (2005–2007). The Bank was embroiled in scandal during his presidency, due to accusations that Wolfowitz had violated ethics by awarding his companion a significant raise and a promotion. The different pockets of the fragility agenda coalesced during this period into one unit, called the Fragile States Unit, however it remained a small ‘policy shop’ with little political power in the Bank, demonstrating how the fragility agenda was having difficulty gaining a high profile during the 2000s. However, the high-profile international engagement with Afghanistan, and further conceptual and operational work that had been occurring outside of the Bank, demonstrated that the fragility agenda at this point was ‘lagging behind’ the wider discourse in the development community. The social protection agenda, on the other hand, was moving from strength to strength; in 2007, the social protection team turned towards low-income contexts for the first time, with the development of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia, laying the groundwork for the potential to consider fragile states within the social protection portfolio.

Chapter 8 covers the presidency of Robert Zoellick (2007–2012), who was considered a stabilising force in the aftermath of the perceived ‘chaos’ of the Wolfowitz presidency. Zoellick was a keen promoter of the fragile states agenda, and as such facilitated a key moment in the fragility narrative; the publication of a World Development Report (WDR), the Bank’s annual flagship publication, on fragility, conflict and violence (World Bank, 2011a). This helped the fragility agenda to break out of its small ‘silo’ in the Bank to become a Bank-wide issue, and a new department was created in Nairobi that afforded the agenda greater political clout. The social protection agenda had boomed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash, with a five-fold increase in lending disbursements occurring in the following years; while the majority of lending had gone to middle-income countries,
low-income countries were also coming forward with requests for social protection programmes. However, Bank internal evaluations criticised the agenda for its lack of engagement with fragile states, and argued that the social protection agenda should adopt a more ‘systems’ approach that echoed the discourse of the state-building agenda in terms of institutions building. The second social protection strategy, published in 2012, took these criticisms on board, promising an engagement with fragile states and a ‘systems’ approach moving forward; this generated the first comprehensive interaction between fragile states and social protection, and it is significant that it was driven by the stronger, more powerful social protection agenda rather than the fragility agenda.

Chapter 9 is the final findings chapter, and covers the Jim Yong Kim presidency from 2012 until the time of data collection in 2016/17. The fragile states agenda initially blossomed in the aftermath of the WDR, and a ‘hub’ dedicated to the agenda emerged, which took on a more hands-on approach operationally, and significantly, challenged the ‘development effectiveness’ agenda that had prevented fragile states from gaining access to lending through the previous two decades. However, it was significantly disrupted by a ‘restructure’ in 2014 by Jim Yong Kim, a period revealed by the data as a time of ‘chaos’, which saw several significant individuals leaving the Bank and setting the fragility agenda back. The data indicates some level of recovery since the restructure, but concerns arise that the fragile states agenda has ‘had its moment’ and is being overshadowed by newer development issues such as the refugee crisis. The social protection agenda on the other hand has continued to grow, to become the second largest department in terms of lending. There are initial signs that it is taking the move towards overcoming the problems of social protection in fragile contexts seriously, with more coherent work taking place between the two departments. The data suggests, however, that this is a critical moment in terms of social protection in fragile states.

Chapter 10 provides the discussion and conclusion of the thesis. The research questions are revisited, applying the historical and ideational institutionalist analytical framework to illustrate to what extent and how the agendas were influenced by the institutional architecture of the Bank. It finds that the social protection agenda was consistently stronger than the fragility agenda throughout the period under study, due to its proponents’ ability to navigate, and take advantage of, the institutional make-up of the Bank in a way that the proponents of the fragility agenda were unable to do. It also finds that there has been little interaction between the two agendas until relatively recently, due in part to the fragility
agenda’s inability to break out of a ‘silo’ of working, and the lack of incentive for the social protection agenda to engage in fragile contexts. The chapter then goes on to discuss the theoretical considerations of the thesis; seven facets of the Bank are identified as constraining factors in terms of the success of an idea (its ‘neoliberal’ institutionalism; its apolitical mandate; its lending mechanisms; its incentive structures; its technocratic quantitative philosophy; the bifurcation between knowledge production and operations; and the ‘siloed’ nature of working). The role of ideas is also discussed, in particular the influence upon them of powerful interests of donor countries such as the US, and the interests of the Bank in terms of its own future, and how these interests interplay with the institution to further constrain the options available in terms of the progression of an agenda. The chapter then concludes with possible avenues for future research that would build on this study.
Chapter 2

Fragile states and social protection

2.0. Introduction

Fragile states emerged onto the development policy agenda in the 1990s, in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the restructuring of the global economy towards the Western liberal paradigm. The concept was developed through the prism of a new ‘good governance’ agenda that emerged as the foundation of development practice throughout the 1990s, which focused on the institutional architecture and capacity of the state. However, the theoretical and conceptual analysis of state fragility and failure since their emergence has been muddied by a lack of clarity and consensus around the terms, due to the ‘complex, ill-defined and interdependent nature of the reality behind the labels’ (Brinkerhoff, 2014: 333). Much of the literature addresses the shortcomings of an approach that puts an ideal-type model of Western statehood at the centre of its analytical focus of contexts with complex governance structures that do not conform to the Weberian model of the state. Despite this wave of oppositional literature to the concept, it remains in good currency, and is central to the development agendas of institutions such as the World Bank.

This chapter begins by outlining the emergence of the new agenda and discourse around fragile states, tracing its development within the context of the neoliberal economic paradigm through to its promotion to a top global security and development concern in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Section 2.1). It then summarises the debates that surround the concept, demonstrating how ‘state-building’ approaches that have arisen in response to the perceived problems of fragile states are based on the ideal-typical form of Western statehood, which views fragile states in terms of what they lack from an institutional perspective (Section 2.2). A more recent literature has emerged highlighting the importance of political economy considerations within any policy approaches, and the relative uselessness of technocratic approaches that neglect political-economic considerations; however, a bifurcation in the literature is identified whereby policy makers such as the World Bank are driven by economic doctrine and an ‘apolitical’ mandate in terms of their policy prescriptions, as opposed to the academic literature which calls for more nuanced understandings of the socio-political issues and conflicts, rather than a
perspective of capitalist development. Section 2.3 examines this bifurcation and highlights gaps in the literature regarding the World Bank’s ‘neoliberal’ approach, both in terms of where the broader poverty and ‘welfare’ agenda sits within this approach, and how the World Bank itself has avoided scrutiny as to its own political economy which shapes this approach.

The chapter then turns to the concept of social protection. Section 2.4 reviews the fragile states literature from the perspective of social protection, revealing that social protection is rarely, if ever, mentioned in the broader agenda of fragile states. Social protection, however, as Section 2.5 outlines, has become a powerful agenda within development policy. Three different discourses surrounding social protection are identified in the literature, which underpin different policy approaches; the risk-based school, the rights-based school and the needs-based school. The World Bank firmly embeds its social protection approach in the risk-based school, and in doing so, has helped to institutionalise this perspective of social protection within most policy prescriptions in the developing world, although the ILO’s work has challenged this. However, most social protection prescriptions within development approaches assume a role for the state; a subset of literature has consequently arisen that addresses social protection in fragile states, where state capacity is limited. This is examined in Section 2.6, which identifies the unique social protection challenges in fragile states and how other, often external, actors step in to fill the gap left by the state to meet social protection needs in these contexts. This creates a vicious circle, whereby state governments are undermined further by these external actors, compromising the state-society relationship, while the incentive to create institutions that support stable and long-term social protection mechanisms that are managed by the state is diminished.

The chapter concludes by highlighting the lack of scholarship that links the agenda of fragile states and its policy prescription of ‘state-building’ with the agenda of social protection in developing contexts. These two sub-themes of the overarching development discipline coexist within international organisations such as the World Bank, but to what extent they consider and influence each other is not clear from the literature. It is from this starting point that the research questions for this thesis are formulated (Chapter 4).
2.1. The new paradigm

The end of the Cold War in 1989 heralded a shift in various global political spheres that thrust fragile states into the limelight within development policy. Termed prematurely as ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama, 2004a), the Western liberal democratic paradigm became unchallenged at this point. Against this context the US, in a largely benign security environment after the fall of the Berlin Wall, turned its national security lens towards fragile states as one of the key dangers for national and global security (Mazarr, 2014; Chandler, 2010). This concern was echoed globally by the proliferation of internal conflicts and instability that followed, as a new ‘wave’ of democratisation that followed the end of the Cold War sharply exposed the weak institutional architecture of many countries that had been supported throughout the Cold War by one or other of the two superpowers (von Engelhardt, 2018; Young, 2004). The case of Somalia was a particular concern, where the national state had completely collapsed; other wars such as those in Sierra Leone, Liberia and in former Yugoslavia contributed to the debate (Call, 2008). Seminal works by Helman and Ratner (1993) and Zartman (1995) situated the debate around fragile states as an academic issue, launching the concept and beginning a debate around the nature and validity of the concept that continues today (see Section 2.2).

Development organisations ‘jumped on the bandwagon’ (Call, 2008) at this point, embedding their formulation of the problem within an analysis of the state and its institutions. Structural adjustment, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’s previous policy approach to development, was under fire from all sides, as growth had not materialised as expected within developing contexts during the era of structural adjustment, and frequent and painful financial crises were occurring throughout Latin America and East Asia (Babb, 2005; Rodrik, 2006; see also Chapter 5). The failure of structural adjustment policies to encourage economic growth and to reduce poverty led development actors to revisit the role of the state within development strategies (Chandler, 2006; Rodrik, 2006; Pender, 2001). The focus of development actors therefore turned to the nature and capacity of state institutions and government policy environments to understand how they could support economic development (von Engelhardt, 2018). Fukuyama (2004b: 4), who broadly supports the economic doctrine of the Washington Consensus that underpinned structural adjustment, argued that ‘while states needed to be cut back in certain areas, they needed to be simultaneously strengthened in others’. He maintained that while the state-reduction agenda was promoted, the state-building agenda
which he argues is as of much importance as state-reduction – was neglected, due to a ‘conceptual failure to unpack the different dimensions of the state’ (p. 6). The ‘good governance’ agenda emerged, which at this stage was understood in terms of management that was transparent and accountable, and served the public good (World Bank, 1989). Those that had state institutions that were perceived to be weak – ‘fragile’ states – would inevitably come to be conceptualised as a development problem.

Previously prohibited by their charters and the intense political tensions within the Cold War environment, development institutions consequently turned their attention to the links between development and the quality of governance within developing countries (von Engelhardt, 2018; Call, 2008; Gore, 2000). Concepts such as institutions, the rule of law, the sequencing of reforms, and security became principle concerns within development strategies (Harrison, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004a; 2004b; Hameiri, 2007; Sabaratnam, 2011; Chandler, 2010). This new focus on institutions was not divorced from the economic principles of the Washington Consensus; rather, the neoliberal principles provided the foundation for the debate that arose concerning the nature of the state (Harrison, 2004; Hameiri, 2007). The idea of shrinking the state evolved into one of institutional development, in an ‘attempt to deepen and extend the relations of the free market’ (Harrison, 2004: 19) in accordance with the economic principles of neoliberalism.

The emergent agendas that were crystallising within development, security and academic agendas on fragile states were thrown into the global spotlight with the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, which situated fragile states as a global security threat (Rotberg, 2004; Menocal, 2001; Fukuyama, 2004a; 2004b; von Engelhardt, 2018), and promoted them to the top of foreign policy agendas (Blair, 2005; White House, 2006). From this arose a literature on fragile or failed states, which is examined in the following section, to gain further insight into how the new development approach with institutions at its core was applied analytically to the fragile states concept.

### 2.2. Fragile states: a fuzzy concept

As a consequence of this new prominent position within development, humanitarian, security and geo-political agendas, a vast literature has emerged since the 1990s that seeks
to address the ‘issue’ of fragile states\(^1\). However, the complexity of the issue, and the political environment in which it has emerged, has created a lack of clarity and theoretical conformity within the concept. A large body of literature, beginning with Helman and Ratner’s (1993) and Zartman’s (1995) seminal works in the early years, has attempted to categorise and define the concept (e.g. Rotberg, 2004; François & Sud, 2006; Zoellick, 2008; Stewart & Brown, 2009). These studies tend to look at various institutional indicators, or proxies such as GDP, trade openness, democratic principles and levels of well-being to ‘diagnose’ fragile statehood or its different categorisations, stressing that state failure is caused by institutional dysfunction or absence that means the functions and expectations of ‘statehood’ are not met (Gross, 1996; Zoellick, 2008). The ‘good governance’ approach came to frame the debate around state fragility in terms of the state and its institutions (von Engelhardt, 2018; Grimm et al., 2014).

A swathe of oppositional literature has, however, highlighted the problems with this approach. The first criticism is extended through the lack of empiricism within this theoretical argument; scholars such as Rotberg (2004) and Zartman (1995), for example, and the Fund for Peace (n.d.) tried to develop criteria that would explain and categorise the countries perceived to be failing, but none of these were able to critically capture the diversity of those countries, or were based on thorough empirical work (Call, 2008; Bøås, 2017). This is linked to two further criticisms; the first being that given the nature of the emergence of the concept, through security, humanitarian and economic considerations to name a few, the different perspectives through which the concept is approached yield very different ideas as to the maladies that the countries are experiencing. Brinkerhoff (2014) highlights how the fragility problem draws from several perspectives, from development economics, international relations and conflict studies, humanitarians, peacekeepers and the military. They all view the problem from a different approach, which focuses on a different aspect of the complex interplay of factors that are occurring within any given fragile context (Brinkerhoff, 2014). What all approaches have in common, however, is the desire to break down the problem into component parts, consequently promoting a ‘cookie-cutter’, one-size-fits-all approach to ‘state-building’ in these contexts, which almost

\(^1\) It is important to make a definitional note at this point; as this section (and following chapters) demonstrates, there is little clarity or consensus over the terms and concepts used over the phenomenon under scrutiny. Terminology has ranged over time and discipline to include terms such as ‘failed’, ‘fragile’, ‘collapsed’, ‘rogue’, ‘conflict-affected’, to name a few. For clarity, this thesis uses the term ‘fragile states’ as an umbrella term for the broader concept, but acknowledges that this is problematic conceptually (as described here) and not universally used. This thesis does not attempt to generate a definition as a) the literature demonstrates the difficulties around this and b) it is outside the remit of this study to do so.
unanimously prescribe ‘order and stability’ as the solution. For example, the Failed States Index (Fund for Peace, n.d.), argues that not only must state institutions be built, but that five aspects should be prioritised: the military, policy, civil service, leadership and justice. The prioritisation of these five demonstrates that the problem of failed states has not been approached indigenously; rather, it is framed in terms of performance issues that reflect the security and geo-political interests of the Western powers that have driven the debate (Call, 2008; Grimm et al., 2014, Mazarr, 2014). Western powers such as the US framed their policy approach around the issue of security and terrorism; development organisations, as seen in Section 2.1, framed theirs in terms of global capitalism and the ‘neoliberal’ paradigm. The contrasts and influences of these different Western interests are demonstrated by Mazarr (2014), who notes that prior to 9/11 failed states were a contentious issue within US political spheres, whereas afterwards they became a bipartisan issue; the right sought to address fragile states from the perspective of security, whereas the left were more concerned with humanitarian considerations.

This puts the role of the ‘state’ within ‘state-building’ policy prescriptions sharply into the spotlight, as these Western interests became inextricably tied to how the ‘state’ and its role was perceived within the policy discourse and prescriptions towards states perceived to be ‘fragile’. Specifically, as demonstrated by a significant body of literature, the state was considered within ‘state-building’ policies from the perspective of Western normative assumptions (Brinkerhoff, 2014; von Engelhardt, 2018; Call, 2007; Woodward, 2004; Hameiri, 2007; Jayasuriya & Hewison, 2004; Milliken & Krause, 2002). Explanations of state failure (e.g. Rotberg, 2004; François & Sud, 2006; Zoellick, 2008; Stewart & Brown, 2009) stress heavily that the ‘failure’ is caused by institutional dysfunction or absence that means the functions and expectations of ‘statehood’ are not met – Bøås (2017) highlights how such approaches defined failed states by what they lack, and that the mainstream approach to fragile states is embedded in ideas about ‘norm and deviation’, with the norm being an ‘ideal-typical’ form of Western statehood, that has its roots in social contract theories such as those of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the institutional theory of Max Weber (von Engelhardt, 2018). This results in a large and hugely varied collection of countries being bunched into an ‘othered’ category (Bilgin & Morton, 2002); as Call (2008: 1495) describes it, an ‘excessive aggregation of diverse states’ occurs, which ‘throws a monolithic cloak over disparate problems that require tailored solutions’. Categorising fragile states against a normative Western ideal-type consequently neglects
hugely important political economy considerations. The focus on security and stability, for example, neglects to consider that stable, strong states can be instruments of oppression and corruption (Call, 2008; Grimm et al., 2014; Risse, 2011a).

Risse (2011a; 2011b), in his critique of the good governance concept, challenges the normative assumption of statehood and its Western bias using Russia and the People’s Republic of China as examples; while these countries’ political and economic systems do not conform to the Western model of statehood, it is difficult to argue that they are not developed or are lacking in governance. Risse (2011b) consequently argues that ‘statehood’ should be viewed through the Westphalian conceptualisation, which promotes ‘sovereignty’ and disregards the political and economic stipulations that are championed by the West. Highlighting four dimensions of governance – territorial, sectoral (specific policy areas), social (specific population groups) or temporal – he argues that the vast majority of nation states fail to have full monopoly over all four dimensions at any one time, and as such can be considered ‘areas of limited statehood’. This makes a mockery, he claims, of the idea of sovereign nation states as espoused by international law and policy, as over 80% of the world’s population lives within one of these areas of limited statehood and ‘yet the world order today is largely based on the fiction that it is populated by fully consolidated states’ (Risse 2011b: 7). Furthermore, these countries cannot be accused of lacking in governance; Risse (2011b) goes on to highlight how governance need not necessarily be provided by the state, using the example of oil companies within insecure regions to prove his point; due to the increased security risk in fragile states, oil companies hire private security firms to protect their facilities, which in turn inadvertently protects the inhabitants of the surrounding regions. In this way private companies substitute, rather than complement, the state; other actors such as NGOs, criminal networks such as the Mafia, or clan or patron-based systems may be providing substitutive ‘informal’ governance.

The literature, therefore, has forcefully demonstrated that contextual political-economy considerations are important within state-building approaches, not least as the failure of any policies to effectively address the problem have demonstrated that an ideal-type Western state is unlikely to take root within a ‘fragile’ context without certain historical and cultural influences inherent within this ideal-type (Herbst, 2000; Paris & Sisk, 2009), or where colonialism has destroyed any traditional governance structures (Clapham, 2002). The new global geo-political formation has exacerbated this problem further, as the power
of the state as a territorial authority has been diminished (Evans, 1997; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Risse, 2011; von Engelhardt, 2018). A sub-set of literature, for example, has explored the concept of multi-level governance, which originated in the European integration literature and referred to the emerging trend of ‘re-allocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; 8), resulting in institutions becoming dis-embedded from the national context, and re-emerging within a sub-national or supra-national context (Deacon & Stubbs, 2007). Within the context of fragile states, this challenges the framing of state-building strategies that view interventions as temporary and finite, as the patron-client relationships that develop between the multiple international actors within the development arena and the domestic actors muddies the political landscape to the extent that external actors become ‘embedded’ within the domestic policy arena (Schneckener, 2011). This in turn undermines the idea of nation-state sovereignty as these external actors gain influence within the policy process, and in doing so create a situation whereby the withdrawal from the territory and the restoration of a sovereign nation-state is unlikely ever to happen, as ‘transnational governance’ networks are institutionalised (Schneckener, 2011).

The desire of the development community to break down state failure conceptually into institutional considerations, and to approach ‘state-building’ as a technical and apolitical exercise is consequently of little use (Bøås & Jennings, 2007; Call, 2008; Hagmann & Hoehne, 2008; Nuruzzaman, 2009; Schneckener, 2011). Not only are supra- or sub-national governance arrangements not considered, but issues such as democracy, representation, accountability and transparency are also neglected or relegated. There have been some attempts to move beyond the conceptualisation that views state-building as a purely technical exercise that focuses on capacity; there is a growing interest in both the practitioner and academic literature to examine state-society relations more critically and to scrutinise sub-concepts of governance issues such as legitimacy and accountability within a fragile states perspective (Bøås, 2017; Boege et al., 2009; Marc et al., 2013; OECD, 2010b). The formation of the g7+ in 2010, an informal forum of some of the ‘fragile state’ countries to promote their interests within the discourse, demonstrates the desire for a more pluralistic and nuanced understanding of fragile situations, and the need for Western interests to be counteracted by the societies under scrutiny (von Engelhardt, 2018). However, the plurality of continued competing interests and consequent myriad constructions of the idea of fragility continues to render the definition and policy
prescriptions of fragility as problematic, particularly against increasing evidence of the discrepancy between the ideal-type of statehood and the formations that are emerging in the developing world, and the continued erosion of the power of states’ authority (Evans, 1997; von Engelhardt, 2018) in the face of globalisation.

Despite these problems, however, and the increasing criticism from scholars, the concept of fragility and failure ‘remains in good currency’ (Brinkerhoff, 2014) within development discourse, and the focus on the state continues to play a central role within both the academic debate and policy prescriptions, as the ‘good governance’ agenda continues to frame the broader development agenda (World Bank, 2017). De Siquiera (2017) outlines how the acceptance of the label by the countries themselves, as demonstrated by the creation of the g7+ forum, has given the concept further power; Fisher (2014) demonstrates how countries have actively used the discourse around fragility to gain international support while also avoiding censure for perceived governance transgressions.

The institutionalist focus, therefore, not only continues to act as a rationale and a definitional tool for the fragile states agenda, but is also the main approach considered within the ‘solution’ literature that looks to statebuilding (Costantini, 2015). It is at this point that the role of development institutions such as the World Bank should be considered. There is a large body of literature that highlights the influence of the World Bank within fragile states, which demonstrates, for example, how the Bank helped to ‘invent’ the fragile states and good governance concepts (Nay, 2014; Harrison, 2004), to its ownership of the ‘evidence’ that supports the concept (de Siquiera, 2014), to the policy and legal framework within which the concept sits (von Engelhardt, 2018), and to its influence within the policy sphere at the national level (Harrison, 2004; Nay, 2014; von Engelhardt, 2018). However, the literature also notes that the policy literature emerging from institutions such as the World Bank maintains a particular perspective in terms of its institutional approach to fragile states, which is examined in the following section.

2.3. State-building as market-building

As seen in previous sections, there is a large body of literature that is critical of the concept of fragile states and the development approaches that the concept engenders. However, there is also a bifurcation within the literature that accepts the concept and uses it as the foundation for development approaches in states perceived to be ‘fragile’. Scholars such as
Hameiri (2007), Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu (2014) and Pugh et al. (2008) divide this literature into two categories. Both categories adopt an institutionalist perspective; however, there are important distinctions between their ideas of statehood within their institutionalist frameworks. The first, which Hameiri (2007) terms as ‘neo-Weberian institutionalist’ (NWI) approaches, begins with the socio-political context of the region to establish an institutionalist framework that promotes social stability, examining the links between state and society and the suitability of the institutional architecture to represent the relationship between them (e.g. Eyben & Ladbury, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2007; Menocal, 2011). For example, scholars such as Wesley (2008), Rotberg (2004) and Menocal (2011) argue that legitimacy is at the centre of state-society relations, and link it conceptually to state functionality. While a focus on the economy is prevalent, NWI approaches argue that the neoliberal doctrine of minimal state intervention into the economy cannot facilitate a state-society relationship, for example due to the opportunities for political elites to harness global capitalism to serve their own material and power interests (Menocal, 2011).

The second category, however – which is the category that incorporates the approach of institutions such as the World Bank – puts neoliberal economic principles front and centre, leading Hameiri (2007) to name it the ‘neoliberal institutionalist’ approach (NLI). Within this institutionalist model of ‘state-building’ within fragile states, the primacy of the economic paradigm means that the social and political spheres are shaped so as to facilitate market relations. This, neoliberal institutionalists argue, means that social and political forces should be harnessed in a way to provide the optimum functioning of markets (Hameiri, 2007). In practical terms, this means that the core of state-building functions is focused on the rehabilitation or construction of institutions concerned with the operation of the market (as theorised after the failures of structural adjustment), specifically property rights, fiscal and monetary reform and the rule of law. Ashley (1983) calls this *economism*, which ‘produces a perspective in which political practice is devoid of all independent capacities to reflect upon or to check economic processes … an apology for the worldwide hegemony of a deadly logic of economy in determining social and political outcomes’ (1983, cited in Pugh et al., 2008). Within this approach, therefore, social and political institutions are drastically relegated within the state-building framework. The social and political institutional requirements are considered only within the context of the market; specifically, their ability to support the successful extension of market forces (Hameiri, 2007; Pugh et al., 2008).
The focus on the market consequently divorces any socio-political issues or conflicts from capitalist development, within the context of state fragility. As Hameiri (2007) outlines: ‘[p]olitical conflict is viewed in relation to the capacity of state institutions to provide conditions hospitable for the integration in the global economy’. Market-led development and trade openness are considered the solution to the problems of conflict and fragility – the ‘strength’ of the state, in Fukuyama’s (2004b) terms, lies within the relevant market institutions. From this perspective, state-building can arguably be re-conceptualised as ‘market-building’.

The development of the state, therefore, takes on a form where institutions are purely functional, and their functions are viewed in technical and objective terms (Hameiri, 2007; Pugh et al., 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2014). Consequently they are ‘depoliticised’, and viewed only in terms of their ‘capacity’. As seen in Section 2.2, this focus on technical capacity is much criticised in the literature; for example, Jayasuriya and Hewison (2004) term it ‘antipolitics’ and argue that it is pursued because it provides justification for radical and intrusive intervention strategies. Hameiri (2007) argues that it is ‘state transformation’, in that its over-arching objective is to create states in the model of a Western liberal democracy.

This is not to say that political institutions do not feature prominently within this framework – in fact, a highly influential body of literature emerged from US political science circles over the past decade that emphatically emphasised the importance of political institutions in supporting effective market institutions, and the symbiotic link between the economic and political realms. Rodrik (2007), for example, demonstrated that a market economy is dependent on a wide-range of non-market institutions that provide regulatory, legitimising and stabilising functions. An important role of these non-market institutions is to provide incentives for different social groups to cooperate, rather than fight for resources, by making uncooperative strategies of market engagement unrewarding (e.g. through the rule of law and the judiciary). However, Rodrik (2007) forcefully argues that local context and knowledge are important considerations in the creation of these non-market institutions, and in doing so is one of the first to argue for a political-economy approach to state-building. Without local knowledge and context, he argues, non-market institutions, and by extension market institutions and growth, will fail to overcome social cleavages and potential elite capture. He therefore advocates a ‘meta-institution’ of participatory political institutions, namely democracy, as a mechanism to elicit and
aggregate local knowledge, and in doing so build market and non-market institutions that are complementary and appropriate for the political context of a country; in doing so, he links democracy directly with economic growth.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) in their seminal work *Why Nations Fail*, argue from a similar standpoint on the importance of the symbiotic relationship between political and economic institutions to ensure economic growth. Their fundamental argument also maintains that while economic institutions are crucial for determining whether a country is rich or poor, it is the political institutions that determine what the economic institutions are. They consequently make a distinction between countries that are supported by ‘extractive’ institutions and those that are supported by ‘inclusive’ institutions. Extractive economic institutions are structured in a manner that extracts resources from the mass population and draws them upwards to the elite; consequently these institutions fail to provide property rights or provide incentives for economic engagement for the vast majority of the population. Growth through these institutions is unsustainable, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, as growth requires innovation, which is inextricably linked with ‘creative destruction’, which replaces old economic mechanisms with new ones, and destabilises established power relations in the face of new innovations in the market. Extractive economic institutions are synergistically coupled with extractive political institutions, however, which concentrate power in the hands of a small elite and create incentives for this elite to develop the economic institutions in a way that furthers only their economic interests; the existence of these extractive political institutions renders creative destruction (which undermines the interests of the elites) impossible.

Inclusive economic and political institutions, however, provide the means for economic growth and prosperity. Inclusive economic institutions enforce property rights, create a level playing field and encourage investments in innovative new technologies and skills which are conducive for growth. These economic institutions are in turn supported by inclusive political institutions, which distribute political power widely and pluralistically and move control of the economic institutions away from the elite. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) therefore argue that the key to economic growth and the reduction of poverty is a transition from an ‘extractive’ to an ‘inclusive’ political and economic system; transitions such as those experienced by Western countries since the 17th century. As state institutions, whether inclusive or extractive, are often trapped within a cycle through path dependency that maintains the status quo, such a transformation is not simple. However,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that it is not impossible, if there are some pre-existing inclusive elements within the state architecture, or if there is a broad coalition that is able to take steps to break the vicious circle. The history of the country is key, however, as it provides the explanation as to why inclusive institutions emerged in some countries and not others – Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), like Rodrik (2007), therefore argue that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is likely to fail as institutional differences that have been created over time through ‘institutional drift’ (via path-dependent processes, see Chapter 3), are key to the critical junctures that are the catalyst for transition, and that socio-political context cannot be ignored within the transition process.

North et al. (2009) put the problem of violence at the centre of their theory of state transformation. They argue that for most of history, violence has been controlled by granting privileges and benefits to organisations or individuals who pose a violent threat in order to incentivise cooperation among them; the economy is manipulated, therefore, not only to serve the economic interests of the elites, but also to maintain stable relationships between powerful groups with violence potential. North et al. (2009) term these states as ‘limited access orders’ or ‘natural states’, as it is necessary to limit access for the masses to organisations and institutions, so that competition and opposition to the elite coalition are minimised. The internal logic of natural states, therefore, means that the political system manipulates economic privilege not only for elite economic gain, but to maintain political stability.

In contrast to natural states, ‘open access orders’ (similar to Acemoglu and Robinson’s ‘inclusive political institutions’) have been successful in pursuing and maintaining economic growth as they have controlled violence through a different logic, whereby a powerful, centralised military and police force are subservient to a political system, thus satisfying the Weberian definition of statehood that the state possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The control of violence is then managed through deterrence, i.e. the threat of punishment by the state. However, as the state has the potential to use violence illegitimately, the political system to which the military and police forces are subservient to must be constrained by a set of incentives and institutions that promote pluralistic governance systems, which provide power to elites only through the support of the masses. Such a system prevents the political system from manipulating the economic system to further the interests of elites. It also promotes impersonality into the economic and political mechanisms, which fundamentally changes the nature of competition, as it
provides rights to a large number of individuals to form organisations and engage in political and economic activities to further their own interests; equality, North et al. (2009) argue, is impossible without impersonality.

Therefore, in order for natural states to achieve ‘development’, they must make a ‘transition’ to open access orders. To do this, conditions must arise in a natural state that are consistent not only with the logic of limited access orders, but also where it is in the interests of elites to move towards impersonal intra-elite participation. North et al. (2009) therefore forward three ‘doorstep conditions’, whereby elite interests are supported by legal protection; the creation of organisations that are ‘perpetually lived’, i.e. that endure beyond the life of individual members to maintain impersonality within their membership; and consolidated political control of the military that removes the need for elites to maintain alliances with each other. If these conditions are met, then the likelihood of successful transition to open access order systems is more likely; without them, social cleavages are likely to open up and lapses into violence and insecurity are a distinct possibility.

This theory of institutional progress argues that many of the theoretical and practical approaches to fragile statehood have not considered the logic of natural states; it argues adding capital or institutions such as democracy, property rights or a mix of public goods to a society that is driven by natural state logic is not enough to ensure prosperity, security and economic growth. While accepting that natural states suffer from too much market intervention, inadequate property rights and incomplete markets, North et al. (2009) argue that development economics and political science implicitly adopts the Weberian assumption that the state has the monopoly of violence, and in doing so dismisses the problem of violence away. Instead, they maintain (similar to Rodrik [2007] and Acemoglu and Robinson [2012]) that there is an inherent link between markets and political institutions, and emphasise the importance of a much more closely integrated political economy approach. Unlike Rodrik (2007) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), however, they argue that the driving force behind elite capture in natural states is not solely an economic one, but also the need to constrain the threat of violence.

This influential body of literature, however, is still embedded firmly within the neoclassical economic doctrine; development and progress are still defined in terms of growth. This raises two key questions. The first question looks to the ideational
environment and institutional architecture of the World Bank. As seen previously, there is a large body of literature that demonstrates the influence of development institutions, and the Bank in particular, on the discourse and approaches towards fragile states and their perceived shortcomings (e.g. Harrison, 2004; von Engelhardt, 2008; Nay, 2014; de Siquira, 2014). However, this literature almost exclusively looks at the Bank holistically; it describes the Bank’s approach as a coherent strategy based on a certain economic paradigm. It demonstrates that the Bank views fragile states through the prism of good governance, where development objectives are perceived fairly restrictively through the focus of a neoliberal philosophy, that promote a focus on the capacity of institutions such as the rule of law, public sector management, financial management, and privatisation (Harrison, 2004; Santiso, 2001), and does so apolitically (Santiso, 2001; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). This literature, however, does not look at how these approaches have developed through the environment and architecture of the Bank; there is an analytical gap in the literature whereby there has been little focus on how the Bank’s own political-economic environment engenders, nurtures and facilitates ideas around development concepts\(^2\), in particular fragile states. As Nay (2014: 212) highlights, ‘they [development institutions] seek to shape ideas and concepts so that these better reflect their own preferences, objectives and ideological views. The circulation of concepts and knowledge is a selective and competitive process in which actors holding conflicting views, driven by diverging interests and with unequal resource capacities, strive to ensure the success of their personal perspectives in policy analysis’. Analysis that seeks to see how the ideas surrounding fragile states emerged within such a politically charged and influential institution, where competing interests interact, and that identifies the influences (and variable power of those influences) that shape these ideas, is an important contribution to the fragile states literature that is shaped so significantly by these ideas, and to understanding development processes more broadly.

A new political science approach emerged in the 1990s that looked at institutions as a variable within the policy process – an approach that was influential on the emergence of the state-building agenda – that demonstrated how institutions develop over time within a certain socio-economic and political context and become ‘institutionalised’ along certain path-dependent routes that influence their policies and approaches over time. While this approach has been used mainly to analyse institutions at the state level, it provides an

\(^2\) The few exceptions to this are explored in Chapter 3.
appropriate framework with which to explore development institutions themselves. This new framework and approach is examined further in Chapter 3.

The second question that arises from this literature asks where institutions of social protection and associated issues of human wellbeing sit within the context of this perceived ‘neoliberal’ approach to fragile states. It is to this question, and to the literature on social protection in fragile states, that this chapter now turns.

2.4. Social protection in the fragile states literature

As seen in Section 2.1, the fragile states agenda emerged through a plethora of differing perspectives and priorities, which have been influential in shaping the discourse, policies and practices within development approaches in fragile states. Development institutions such as the World Bank built their fragile states approach around concepts of ‘good governance’, which firmly embedded intervention strategies within the economic doctrine of the ‘neoliberal’ agenda; as outlined in Section 2.3, this has crystallised the state-building focus on institutions that support market functions, such as the rule of law, the civil service, and financial institutions.

Social protection\(^3\), then, is rarely mentioned within the fragile states literature. However, there are considerations of needs within the agenda, which have been explored through a sub-set of literature on service delivery – where, logically, social protection considerations would be included. The interest in service delivery arose with the increasing prominence of the concept of state legitimacy that began to emerge in the late 2000s (Batley & McLoughlin, 2010; McLoughlin, 2015; OECD 2010b). Scholarship at this point began to emphasise the point that the perceived ‘illegitimacy’ of governments in fragile contexts compromised the state-society relationship, which in turn compromised state capacity. (McLoughlin, 2015; Wolf, 2007). The nurturing and maintaining of legitimacy soon became a core priority in the state-building agenda of development institutions, together with security and economic development (OECD, 2010b); the World Bank’s President Robert Zoellick called for legitimacy considerations to become the ‘strategic centre of gravity’ for all interventions in fragile states (Zoellick, 2008: 7).

---

\(^3\) For a definition of social protection, see p. 3.
Service delivery as a state-building focus arose within this context, as it was portrayed as the manifestation of the social contract between state and society (Kaplan, 2008; Batley & McLoughlin, 2010; OECD, 2008a). This conceptual linkage was based on the premise that a state that provides basic services is indicating its willingness and capability to respond to the needs of its citizens (McLoughlin, 2015; Wolf, 2007; Engelbert, 2002; Whaites, 2008). This yielded a subset of academic literature that addresses service delivery in fragile states (Baird, 2010; Zivetz, 2006; Kaplan, 2008, Batley & McLoughlin, 2010). Literature from development institutions also picked up on the linkage between legitimacy and state provision; for example, the OECD situated it prominently within its suite of policy prescriptions and guidelines for engagement in fragile states (OECD 2008a; 2010b). The literature for the most part scrutinises the causal link between legitimacy and service delivery (Wolf, 2007; McLoughlin, 2015), or explores the tension within service delivery priorities between the short-term urgent need to provide basic services in fragile or conflict-affected situations and the imperative to prioritise state-building and the long-term capacity of the state to deliver services (Batley & McLoughlin, 2010; OECD, 2008a; Kaplan, 2008; Whaites, 2008). This second point is particularly pertinent to the state-building agenda; with state actors likely to be unable or unwilling to provide services in fragile states, other actors, particularly NGOs in a humanitarian capacity step in to provide the services. International organisations go further to bypass the state by frequently outsourcing aid activities to the NGOs in the field (Barakat, 2009; Carpenter et al., 2012). This not only does little to help the state build capacity and nurture the state-society relationship, it also compromises its ability to do so in the future. As Batley and McLoughlin (2010: 132) put it: ‘what is good for service delivery may not be good for state-building’.

This is pertinent to discussions for social protection in fragile states, and are revisited in Section 2.6. However, within these service delivery discussions, social protection is notable by its absence. Instead, the discussion focuses on service delivery in terms of healthcare (e.g. Palmer et al., 2006; Newbrander et al., 2011), education (e.g. Rose & Greeley, 2006; Kirk, 2007), and water and sanitation (e.g. Brinkerhoff et al., 2012). The OECD, in its policy guidelines on service delivery in fragile states, focuses on what it considers the four most key service sectors: justice and security, healthcare, education, and water / sanitation (OECD, 2008a). The omission of social protection raises questions therefore as to where social protection fits in within the state-building agenda, if it all; if it
is not considered within a service delivery capacity, where does it stand in terms of the economic principles of the development institutions’ philosophy of state-building? This question is particularly pertinent when the prominent position of social protection as an anti-poverty and development tool is considered, and the fact that its emergence as such coincided with the emergence of the fragile states agenda. The following section briefly outlines the emergence of the social protection agenda and the debates that surround it.

2.5. Social protection in development discourse

The rise of the concept of social protection within development discourse had its roots, similar to the fragile states concept, in the economic transformation and consequent crises in Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; 2009; Carpenter et al., 2012). The increasingly open nature of international markets through globalisation and structural adjustment programmes concentrated social and economic hazards on the most vulnerable in society (Rodrik 1997; 2006), creating a rapid rise in poverty rates, conflict and social unrest in some contexts (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; 2009). Against this backdrop, development actors turned to the concept of human development (Addison et al., 2015b), as macro-economic theory began to acknowledge the importance of human capital within models of economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1994), in order to revitalise poorly performing economies through the production of a skilled, healthy and educated population (Rebelo, 1991; Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994). New sources of data and evidence through emerging new empirical methods such as household surveys supported these developments in macro-economic theory, by providing insights into the impacts of structural adjustment and globalisation on households and communities (Addison et al., 2015b). In particular, they highlighted the barriers that the poor faced in investing in human capital, resulting in ‘poverty traps’ (Sachs et al., 2004; Carter & Barrett, 2006).

In the face of extensive criticisms of its adjustment approach, donor institutions such as the World Bank significantly shifted towards a focus on social sectors, elevating social development to one of its core issues within its development strategies (Vetterlein, 2007; Addison et al., 2015b). It is against this backdrop that a social protection agenda emerged. Safety net interventions had been quickly introduced in response to the economic crises in Latin America and Asia in the 1980s and early 1990s (de Britto, 2008; Sumarto et al.,
2008), but the 1990s saw the broader conceptual embracing of social protection as a poverty-reduction tool.

Since then, enthusiasm for social protection in development has boomed (Devereux & McGregor, 2014; de Haan, 2014; Devereux et al., 2015), with Barrientos and Hulme (2009) describing its adoption as a development tool as a ‘quiet revolution’ that has overcome perspectives that viewed social protection as consumption and a waste of scarce resources. Consequently, a large volume of literature on social protection has developed, much of it focusing on the design and impact of particular programmes or policies (McCord, 2008; de Britto, 2008). However, the concept itself remains a point of contention, with multiple different definitions and purposes applied to it across agencies and governments that adopt different pragmatic and ideological views (Devereux et al., 2015); as Gentilini and Omamo (2011: 329) put it, ‘from macroeconomic stabilizer to humanitarian responses, from risk management to promoting social justice’.

Munro (2008) identifies three discourses within the literature that underpin this conceptual heterogeneity; risk-based, rights-based and needs-based. The ‘risk-based’ perspective views social protection in a way that privileges economic considerations, and sees it as a tool to mitigate uninsurable risks and other market failures such as externalities, incomplete markets, imperfect competition and imperfect information (Barr, 1998). Implicit within this approach is the assumption that markets are unstable and have pervasive technical problems, and that some risks arising from this instability are uninsurable within the market. Social protection, therefore, is justified through utilitarian concerns, as it is needed to mitigate these risks; some authors insist that state intervention is necessary to ensure market efficiency (Barr, 1998). Much of this risk-based literature is concerned with poverty, though it defines this in terms of income and consumption.

The rights-based school views social protection not through charity, morality or economic terms, but in terms of legal obligations to binding human rights. Since the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights, there has been a legal argument that social and economic rights should be supported by the state, putting a legal obligation on governments to supply a minimal level of social and economic security. There are significant resource implications inherent within the rights-based perspective; there is a burden of duty to uphold rights, and social and economic rights are particularly resource-heavy (Munro, 2008). The rights-based school acknowledges the scarcity of resources, but insists that
governments and other duty bearers must take steps over time to fulfil these duties and allocate resources progressively, identifying rights violations and taking steps to rectify them.

The final school, the needs-based perspective, is the less theoretically driven of the three models; it arose in opposition to the dominant focus within the risk-based school and development economics more broadly on income growth. It adopts a humanitarian approach, often based on bio-medical assumptions, that certain requirements exist in order for a person’s welfare needs to be met, including health, nutrition, literacy, shelter, employment and security, building inherently on Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs. As well as a moral dimension, it links to the human development discourse that views social protection not as consumption but as investment, with high rates of social and economic return (Munro, 2008). It promotes a strong role for the state, but also emphasises the role of the market, families and communities in meeting basic needs.

These conceptual underpinnings have implications for the policies and programmes that are promoted. Development organisations involved in the social protection discourse have different perspectives; the World Bank’s approach in the 1990s, which was highly influential in shaping the discourse and programmatic approach to social protection in developing countries, was firmly based in the risk-based school. It based its first social protection strategy on a Social Risk Management (SRM) framework (World Bank, 2001). The approach, driven by the risk-based assumptions, called for a three-pronged approach: prevention (preventing the risk from occurring through macroeconomic policies, investment and environmental policies, for example), mitigation (helping reduce the impact of the risk before it occurs through pooling the risk), and coping (relieving the impact of the risk once it has occurred, through borrowing or public/private transfers).

Due to the World Bank’s influence, and to its leadership role in introducing social protection as a development concept (see Chapter 6), the SRM approach was hugely influential for the first decade of social protection in development discourse and practice. However, the risk-based approach has received significant criticism in the literature, not least for its perceived neglect of rights- and needs-based considerations (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004; Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; 2009). Instead, the academic literature favours the ILO’s approach, which is embedded in the rights-based perspective. Through this, three alternative dimensions of social protection are identified: protective measures
(to ensure relief from deprivation), preventive measures (to attempt to divert deprivation through mechanisms such as pensions and health insurance), and promotional measures (to improve the agency of the poor through the enhancement of real incomes, through mechanisms such as micro-finance programmes or school feeding) (ILO, 2012). Barrientos and Hulme (2009) make the crucial point that the focus on human rights moves social protection from a policy option to an obligation.

Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) added a fourth dimension to their conceptualisation of social protection, arguing that even the ILO’s approach focused too much on ‘economic’ protection rather than ‘social’ protection. The fourth dimension, transformative measures, looked to incorporate socially vulnerable groups who experience discrimination due to gender, ethnicity, sexuality or socio-economic status. These are vulnerabilities that cannot be protected by resources transfers; intervention strategies are needed that go beyond a focus on consumption, for example through legislative change, to regulate behaviour towards socially vulnerable groups.

These debates demonstrate how the conceptual underpinnings of social protection dictate the practical actions and approaches that have emerged. Munro (2008) identifies trends as the favoured conceptualisation within the development community shifts; the current trend has moved towards the rights-based approach of the ILO as seen above, as the programmatic literature has shifted to address human capital deficits (for example, through conditional cash transfers), and in doing so links poverty and vulnerability objectives (Devereux et al., 2015), by strengthening linkages to social services such as child protection. In 2011, the United Nations Systems Chief Executive Board for Coordination Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I) was launched, led by the ILO and the World Health Organization (WHO), from which emerged the universal ‘social protection floor’ concept that all countries are now encouraged to adopt (ILO, 2012). The SPF-I offers guidance on implementing social policies that guarantee income security and access to social services across the life-course, with a particular focus on groups deemed to be vulnerable (Devereux et al., 2015).

However, despite this perceived shift away from the risk-based discourse of the Bank to the rights-based discourse promoted by the ILO, the practical engagement with social protection at the technocratic level in countries is still driven by a certain perspective on poverty, promoted by the World Bank, that argues that poverty is rooted in the
circumstances and personal characteristics of individuals (Devereux & McGregor, 2014). Policies, then, still place individuals or households at the centre of their analytical focus, and as such yield programmes such as social assistance, which deliver transfers to those who are already poor, or social insurance, which identifies who is at risk and puts insurance mechanisms or safety nets in place. Devereux and McGregor (2014) argue that this ontological position reduces human behaviour into a model that maximises utility but constrains individuals, which does not acknowledge more complex explanations of poverty and how it is reproduced, and which ignores political considerations of social structures, institutions, and power structures.

Discussions around institutions have emerged more recently, coinciding with the social protection floor, as a consensus has developed between development organisations that there is a need for a move away from programmatic approaches to look at more systematic models of social protection (OECD, 2009; UNICEF, 2012; World Bank, 2012b). This links back to the role of the state, as is discussed in the fragile states literature; a discussion that, for the most part, is absent from the broader literature on social protection and development. As this section has demonstrated, the state is considered in terms of its role alongside other sources of social protection such as markets, families and communities, but not in terms of its strength, ability or political will to become an actor within social policy provision. A subset of literature has emerged, however, where the lack of state capacity and the myriad other complex problems in fragile states that create a challenging environment for social protection to be developed, is explored. It is to this literature that this chapter now turns.

2.6. Social protection in fragile states

The literature strongly emphasises the need for social protection in fragile states. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 highlighted how the poverty gap within those countries affected by major violence has been climbing over the past three decades (World Bank, 2011a), and the share of the extreme poor living in conflict-affected situations is projected to rise to 60% by 2030 (World Bank, n.d.(c)). One third of the world’s children who are not in school live in fragile states (UNESCO, 2011), as are one third of maternal deaths. Given that fragile states contain only one sixth of the world’s population, they contain a disproportionate number of the world’s social problems. A large
literature has consequently developed that examines the use and the potential of social protection in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

The literature generally argues that the objectives of social protection are essentially the same as within other development contexts (Harvey, 2009; Addison; 2015a; 2015b), namely the ambition to address long-term poverty and vulnerability. The socio-political context of fragility, however, dictates the need for adaptation and innovation in the instruments, financing and delivery capacity; it is to these issues that much of the literature turns. The focus on modalities and mechanisms that are appropriate for fragility is heavily scrutinised – although, as Carpenter et al. (2012) emphasise, data and evidence are problematic within fragile states, as the ability to collect data and track progress is severely lacking within fragile and conflict environments. Cash transfers and cash for work / public works is an increasingly used modality to address poverty and vulnerability from a ‘preventative’ perspective (see Deveraux & Sabates-Wheeler’s (2004) framework, Section 2.5), often with some level of conditionality attached; the literature however highlights its ‘promotive’ potential in reducing vulnerability, building asset bases and developing human capital (Garcia & Moore, 2012; Baird, 2011; Mattinen & Ogden, 2006; Schubert, 2008; McCord, 2008). Food aid, although of decreasing popularity in development approaches broadly, is still considered a key mechanism within fragile contexts (Margolies & Hoddinott, 2012; Levinsohn & McMillan, 2007) as a protective measure, due to its positive effect on consumption and welfare.

In addition to these more ‘traditional’ mechanisms within the social protection toolkit, there has been an increased scrutiny of the use of social funds and community-driven development (CDD) in fragile states, whereby state and sub-state levels of government are bypassed and money is provided to communities to ‘allow local stakeholders to determine investment decisions’ (World Bank, 2002d: vii). Social funds4 and community-driven development has increasingly been used by institutions like the World Bank as, in contexts where government capacity is lacking, they are ‘designed to place less stress on government line agencies by optimizing the use of community actors’ (Wong, 2012: iv). In addition to their protective and promotive qualities, they are also lauded due to their ‘transformative’ potential, due to their ability to build social cohesion (Barron, 2011; Carpenter et al. 2012).

4 Social funds are projects whereby local stakeholders determine investment decisions at the community level. For more details, please see OED (2002).
However, while there are studies that highlight the promotive, protective and transformative capabilities of such modalities, there are others from other contexts or perspectives that offer little evidence to support these claims about them (e.g. Manor, 2007; Crost et al., 2015). This links to discussions within the literature about the qualitative differences between social protection considerations within fragile states and those within other development contexts. The first is the broader range of demographics that constitute those who are considered vulnerable or socially excluded within these contexts; for example, demobbed combatants, displaced people and returnees, those disabled by conflict or landmines, widows and orphans, and those affected by HIV/AIDS (Longley et al., 2006; Carpenter et al., 2012). The role of social protection therefore needs to extend considerably beyond the economic sphere, to incorporate other complex and interrelated forms of risk. Several authors emphasise this point; for example, Darcy (2004) argues that any social protection agenda in these contexts must consider not only these fragility-related forms of insecurity and risk, but also align itself with the security agenda to provide protection from intimidation and coercion, as well as from economic risks.

Linked to these broader considerations of risk are the linkages between state, society and non-state actors (NSAs), which warrant – and receive – a large amount of attention in the literature. The lack of capacity in fragile states generates a focus on alternative actors; there are very few examples (the exception being Nepal) of government-owned, driven and financed social protection systems within fragile states (Holmes 2011; Carpenter et al. 2012), which by definition makes them unwilling or unable to deliver core functions such as social protection (DfID, 2005; Darcy, 2004; Carpenter et al., 2012). Various streams of literature emerge from this understanding; the first looks to stress the importance and potential of informal mechanisms of social protection. Scholars argue that, rather than viewing social protection in terms of a breakdown of capacity, it should be considered through the agency and resilience of individuals and communities that emerge within contexts of fragility and conflict (Kaplan, 2009), such as through clan leadership (de Coninck & Drani, 2009) or social welfare groups and religious bodies (Longley et al., 2006; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010).

Another sub-set of literature on non-state provision addresses the role of NGOs. The role of NGOs is complex, as their contribution can range from humanitarian relief, to implementation of social funds, the receipt of donor or government contracts, or conversely NGOs contracting out to private providers (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Deacon
Much of the literature focuses on the overlap and discrepancies between the humanitarian aspects of NGO provision and their role as quasi-state providers. The international response to needs and vulnerability in fragile states often falls back on humanitarian approaches, and NGOs are in a primary position to take on the role as the main social protection provider (Batley & McLoughlin, 2010; Harvey et al., 2007). The perceived positives around this are numerous; NGOs hold extensive expertise and experience as to how to intervene effectively and sensitively to the context. They are fleet-footed, enabling a quick response to catastrophic needs. They do not rely on tax revenues or the necessary complementary institutions to manage financial requirements (Harvey & Holmes, 2007; Harvey et al., 2007; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Such positives are what have resulted in the contracting-out by governments and by donor institutions to NGOs to undertake social protection interventions in fragile states.

However, the literature is also quick to draw attention to the short-comings of an approach that relies so heavily on NGOs; the short-term, project-based approach that NGOs employ are inadequate in tending to chronic needs (Harvey et al., 2007, Edwards & Hulme, 1996). The reach of such organisations is also limited, and there is a fierce debate about their cost-effectiveness; Grødeland (2010) goes as far to say that, given the extent of the subsidies provided to NGOs, their results are unimpressive. Furthermore, the plethora of agencies often resulted in a fragmented, incoherent strategic framework (Carpenter et al., 2012).

A literature arose in response that addressed the transition from humanitarian aid to long-term social protection and state-building objectives; beginning in the 1990s, it looked at this transition from a linear perspective, arguing that the natural progression of a fragile state was to transition gradually from humanitarian aid to long-term solutions as the effects of the political or physical disaster were negated through humanitarian efforts (Macrae, 1995). Critics argued, however, that the incongruity between the political, security and development objectives within the state-building agenda created a tension between the neutrality of the humanitarian actors (Harvey, 2009, Leader & Colenso, 2005). More recent attempts have attempted to view the ‘transition’ through technical, political or vulnerability frameworks that build themselves around the difference between aid and social protection (Dunn & Brewin, 2014), the principles of engagement (Harvey et al., 2007) or the concept of vulnerability (Longley et al., 2006).
However, the fundamental point surrounding the undermining of state and local governmental structures remains; the literature continues to make the point that such undermining is detrimental to the progress of state-building policies and the political contract between state and citizens (de Waal, 1998; Harvey et al., 2007; Carpenter et al., 2012; Barakat, 2009). There is a trade-off between service delivery and accountability when NGOs, or certain other donor mechanisms such as community-driven development (CDD) or social funds, are prioritised (Howell & Lind, 2008). The consequent legacy of substantial NGO delivery in service delivery is a path-dependent parallel structure to state delivery that leaves state institutions weak, ineffective and under-resourced (OECD; 2008a; Zivetz, 2006). The theme of the capacity and resilience of institutions that deliver social protection is a strong theme throughout the literature, which echoes that of the state-building agenda (Carpenter et al., 2012; World Bank, 2011a). Throughout the literature on state-building, there is an emphasis on the state-society relationship (see Section 2.3); within the social protection literature, there are repeated claims that social protection mechanisms can support and help build the state-society relationship, through providing tangible and positive outcomes that restore citizens’ faith in state providers (Macrae, 1995; Harvey et al., 2007; Beath et al., 2012; Kaplan, 2009). While there is no call in the literature to build welfare states in the Western model, there is a repeated insistence that the institutions that support social protection mechanisms must be addressed, in order for the government to take a leading role in their development, financial management and implementation, in order for the state-society relationship to be restored and to overcome the fragmented nature of international aid interventions.

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature on two prominent themes within development discourse currently; fragile states and social protection. The fragile states literature highlights how policies that address perceived state ‘failure’ have focused on institutions. While much of the academic literature has focused on the shortcomings of conceptualising ‘good governance’ and ‘state building’ from the perspective of the Western state model, the policy prescriptions of development organisations have continued to focus on institutions that support markets, in line with their over-arching mission to facilitate economic growth. However, literature that supports this pursuit of growth has more
recently highlighted the importance of political institutions that create and support the key economic institutions and processes, and that access to these institutions for the masses is a key component for stability, and in turn, growth. This literature therefore advocates an integrated political-economy approach to fragility and development, which draws a closer link between the political and economic institutions of state and the broader society.

This link between state and society is also seen in the other literature reviewed in this chapter, that of social protection. The development social protection literature argues that social protection can help support the state-society relationship. However, the current approaches to social protection usually involve a multiplicity of actors that undermine the state, not only compromising the relationship between state and society but also compromising the long-term sustainability of social protection mechanisms through a lack of capacity. This raises the question as to how fragile state policies and interventions consider social protection, either as a mechanism to support the state-society relationship or in terms of the requirement to build long-term, sustainable institutions that support social protection mechanisms. This in turn raises questions as to how the two agendas interact within large development organisations such as the World Bank, where ideas and agendas surrounding the two policy issues are often engendered and formulated. It is from this perspective that the research questions for this thesis are formulated, as seen in Chapter 4. The following chapter continues the theme of institutions, exploring the academic literature on institutionalism and in doing so developing an analytical framework from which to explore the development and interaction of the agendas of social protection and fragile states within the institutional architecture of the World Bank.
Chapter 3

Historical and ideational institutionalism

3.0. Introduction

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the past two decades have witnessed a rise in institutionalism. This emergence has been accompanied by a turn to institutionalism as an analytic approach, which has contributed to the development of fragile state theory and practice (North et al., 2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Despite its prominence at state-level scholarship, however, institutionalist approaches have rarely been applied at the global level, with scholars in this field preferring to adopt approaches such as organisational theory (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004) to study international organisations.

This chapter provides an overview of the scholarship on institutional theory. In doing so, it demonstrates that the institutional analytic toolkit provides a useful framework with which to study the development of ideas such as fragile states and social protection within global institutions such as the World Bank. However, the institutionalist scholarship has not presented as a unified body of thought. Various different analytical approaches have emerged from the institutionalist school, all of them emerging in response to the shortcomings of behavioural approaches of the 1960s and 1970s, but providing very different perspectives and definitions of institutions and their roles. Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three ‘new institutionalisms’; rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism. Rational choice has been particularly influential within economics, and provides much of the toolkit from which ‘neoliberal institutionalism’, as defined by Hameiri (2007), draws; however, both sociological and historical institutionalism provide approaches that demonstrate the short-comings of a framework that gives explanatory power only to the behaviour of ‘rational man’. Historical institutionalism has been enthusiastically adopted within the field of political science, particularly within the comparative school, due to the analytical insight it provides by placing processes and decisions within the context of time, arguing that concepts and mechanisms such as temporal ordering and sequencing can introduce important considerations such as unintended consequences and long-term power asymmetries into analysis (Pierson, 2004).
Historical institutionalism is therefore a suitable theory in which to ground this research, however, historical institutionalism is not without its critics, particularly with regard to its inability to explain change due to its analytic focus on constraint. Ideational institutionalism, which arose in response to this criticism, introduced the analytical relevance of ideas to the historical institutionalist framework, which provided agency to individuals and consequently provided theoretical perspectives on change within institutions. This chapter consequently examines both historical and ideational institutionalism in detail to build a suitable framework with which to explore the emergence of the fragile states and social protection agendas in the World Bank.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 explores two of Hall and Taylor’s (1996) ‘new institutionalisms’; rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalism is explored in some detail, as it demonstrates the assumptions on which the seminal institutionalist literature that has emerged in relation to fragile states discourse is based (North et al., 2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; see Chapter 2). Section 3.2 explores historical institutionalism in detail, tracing its emergence within political theory and summarising its key analytical concepts such as time and power-distribution. Section 3.3 outlines the analytical limits of historical institutionalism as identified in the literature, such as its lack of predictive power, its meso-level focus and, crucially, its inability to explain change. Ideational institutionalism, which arose in response to this final criticism, is explored in Section 3.4, including the analytical significance of ideas (Section 3.4.1), the various categorisations of ideas (Section 3.4.2), the causal power and effects of ideas (Section 3.4.3) and their relationships with institutions (Section 3.4.4) and interests (Section 3.4.5). Section 5 explores how institutionalist analysis has been used at the global level, and reviews the sparse scholarship that applies a historical-ideational institutionalist perspective to multilateral institutions like the World Bank.


This section traces the emergence of the new focus on institutions that arose in the 1980s and 1990s, which arose in response to the shortcomings of behaviouralist and pluralist theories. Specifically, it explores two out of the three ‘new institutionalisms’ identified by Hall and Taylor (1996): rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.
Rational choice institutionalism

Rational choice theory was a well-used paradigm that had emerged from the behaviouralist school during the middle of the 20th century. The sociological study of behaviour had looked at the empirical regularities regarding the properties and characteristics of the individual as an analytic unit, explaining political results as an aggregation of individual actions (Shepsle, 1989). Within this perspective, institutions were not analytically considered. Rational choice theory evolved from this approach, but rather than seeing the individual as a passive actor driven by sociological considerations, rational choice scholars granted the individual agency, creating a proactive rational person with the motivation to make decisions in a way that maximised his/her material actions (Shepsle, 1989; Hall & Taylor, 1996). So while institutions were still sidelined, with the aggregate actions of individuals considered the explanatory power behind political outcomes, the characteristics of the individual within the paradigms had dramatically shifted.

However, the focus on the individual proved to have analytical shortcomings. In economics, where rational choice theory was closely related to the dominant neoclassical paradigm of the time, questions began to be asked about why organisations existed; why did capitalists not rely on voluntary exchange mechanisms and the coordination of market forces (Moe, 1984)? Economic scholars turned to organisation theory to explain this, expanding theory on production processes and the cost of information within economic transactions. The authority and hierarchy structures that organisations and firms provided were found to be more efficient than market coordination, as they incorporated considerations about capital, land, labour and specialised knowledge necessary to correct information asymmetries (Moe, 1984). This was combined with more complex theorising on the theory of choice, so individual characteristics such as memory and information processing were considered. From this, the ‘new economics of organisation’ emerged (Moe, 1984; Hall & Taylor, 1996), which emphasised the importance of institutions to mediate property rights, rent-seeking, and transaction costs (Hall & Taylor, 1996). This new understanding within the economic discipline was the influential factor in applying institutional approaches to development considerations. The theory was taken up by international organisations and became the embedded economic assumptions that drove fragile state policy (North, 1990).
American scholars of political science drew on this developing theory to explain the emergence of a paradox within the Congressional system. Rational choice theory postulated that a rational actor, working to maximise their self-interest, would vote in such a way that achieving a majority vote in Congress would be impossible: ‘the multiple preference-orderings of legislators and multidimensional character of issues should lead to rapid ‘cycling’ from one bill to another as new majorities appear to overturn any bill that is passed’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 10). Scholars such as Riker (1980) and Shepsle (1989) drew from the ‘new economics of organisations’ and placed institutions into the analytical landscape in order to explain the Congressional paradox. Institutions were seen as a tool that provided a map of the political architecture, which rational actors must navigate in order to maximise their self-interest. Scholars such as North (1990) developed the theory further, looking beyond the motivations of the individual to the relationship between individuals. The significance of institutions consequently gained increasing importance, as they not only structured the options available to actors, but also provided information on their opponents’ and allies’ behaviour, information on the political rules and sensitivities, and provided the rules of the ‘game’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Rational choice institutionalists, therefore, presume that individual actors have a fixed set of preferences, as postulated by the theories of rational choice and neoclassical economics. They also agree with these earlier theories that grant these agency to behave in a way that maximises their interests and preferences. Where rational choice institutionalism develops the theory is by placing these actors within a ‘collective action’ setting; i.e. these actors are granted agency to behave in a way that looks beyond their own interests to a contextual setting that can influence the outcomes. Hall and Taylor (1996) term this the ‘calculus’ approach:

[Rational choice institutionalists] assume that individuals seek to maximize the attainment of a set of goals given by a specific preference function and, in doing so, behave strategically, which is to say that they canvass all possible options to select those conferring maximum benefit. In general, the actor’s goals or preferences are given exogenously to the institutional analysis. (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 7)

Within this approach, institutions provide actors with information and certainty – or uncertainty – about the behaviour of other actors. Furthermore, they provide information
on the penalties of certain strategies, and mechanisms for enforcement or agreement (Hall & Taylor, 1996).

In sum, the emergence of rational choice institutionalism within the economic disciplines had extensive influence on the shift to the state within development policy, as scholars began to understand the significance of institutions on economic efficiency (Shepsle & Weingast, 1987). Political scientists concurrently reoriented their focus away from the theories of generalisability or empirical individualism to acknowledge the importance of institutions on political outcomes; however, within this field, the theory of institutionalism was not confined to rational choice approaches. Other institutionalist approaches emerged, that not only provided an alternative perspective, but also undermined some of the assumptions inherent within rational choice institutionalism. The institutionalism at the opposite end of the spectrum was sociological institutionalism.

**Sociological institutionalism**

Sociological institutionalism acknowledges some of the conceptual underpinnings of rational choice, such as the game theoretic approaches and the self-interested motivations of actors. However, they highlight the need to look at the broader political and cultural landscape, and the influences they have on an actor’s objectives and consequent strategy (Dobbin, 1994; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Specifically, sociological institutionalists argue against the assumption of ‘inherent rationality’, maintaining that an actor is subject to myriad influences generated from the political and cultural context in which they operate (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Furthermore, these influences have been generated not only by the actors, but by the institutional set-up itself.

This approach requires a much broader definition of an institution than within rational choice institutionalism, as it views institutions as reflections of cultural configurations that provide the ‘frames or meaning’ that guide human action and interaction (Hall & Taylor, 1996), so both formal and informal rules and norms are considered within the approach. They claim that institutions and culture are mutually inclusive; institutions are not created in a vacuum, and as such are created within and consequently reflect cultural influences. Hall and Taylor (1996) term this the ‘cultural approach’ as an opposite to the ‘calculus approach’ of rational choice, within which institutions are seen as follows:
Institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action. The individual is seen as an entity deeply imbricated in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provides the filters for interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course is constructed. Not only do institutions provide strategically-useful information, they also affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of the actors (Hall & Taylor 1996: 8).

The sociological approach, therefore, presents a perspective that is highly problematic for fragile state approaches. It supports the theory that institutions cannot be considered in purely technical and objective terms – as with the criticism of fragile state interventions (see Chapter 2) – as not only are the actors within the political, social and economic spheres influenced by cultural influences, but so are the institutions themselves.

3.2. Historical institutionalism

Historical institutionalism similarly arose in response to the dominant theories of the 1960s and 1970s, maintaining that grand theory could not answer discrepancies between outcomes, and that quantitative micro-empirical analysis of variables provided only limited information (Steinmo, 1992; 2008). Consequently, scholars turned to other theories such as group theories and structural-functionalism for new analytical considerations (Carnoy, 1984; Block, 1987; Hall & Taylor, 1996). From group theorists they drew the idea that political struggle was the driving force behind politics, and from structural-functionalists the idea that the organisation and architecture of the political system had an influence over structuring outcomes.

Historical institutionalists sought to go beyond these theories, however, in order to answer several real-world empirical questions that were going unaddressed in political science at the time. In particular, they sought to discover why real-world outcomes varied so much cross-nationally (Steinmo et al., 1992); a question grand theory and technical quantitative approaches had failed to answer. To answer these questions, they turned attention away from independent variables to cross-national case studies (Evans et al., 1985). A seminal text in this regard was Peter Katzenstein’s Between Power and Plenty (1978), which sought to explain why there was a different response between East Asian countries in response to the oil price shocks of the 1970s. The historical institutionalists turned their
attention to the state, not as an arbiter of political struggles as represented within neo-Marxism, but as an influential autonomous actor, made up of complex institutional arrangements that structured the actors and their interactions in a way that influenced political behaviour and outcomes (Krasner, 1980; Steinmo et al., 1992; Evans et al., 1995).

The approach that emerged sat between the rational choice and sociological institutionalisms, drawing on both of Hall and Taylor’s (1996) ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ approaches to explain the relationship between individuals and institutions. They agreed with rational choice institutionalists that actors were self-interested, rational and strategic (rejecting the sociological perspective that actors are little more than ‘rule-followers’), but argued that the, context and the rules of institutions and the broader polity had an influence, not only on the strategies of the actors but also on their goals (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Steinmo et al., 1992; Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1996).

In order to explain why certain decisions and choices were made at a certain point, and how they were made, scholars turned to the contextual – or historical – record. The theory that emerged stipulated that ‘time matters’ (Pierson, 2000; 2004; Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). Historical institutionalists argued that a rational choice institutionalist approach is empty without consideration and understanding of the trajectory that the broader polity has taken, in order to explain a particular circumstance in which decisions are taken (Pierson, 2000; 2004). The acknowledgement of the importance of time considerations had myriad analytical consequences, including the significance of unintended consequences, the temporal gap between actions and consequences, and the inter-connected relationships between institutions and the impact they have on power distribution (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). From this emerged an analytical toolkit that contributed towards the development of theory surrounding temporal considerations.

### 3.2.1. Analytical concepts of historical institutionalism: the importance of time

Historical institutionalists therefore looked to understand how the progression of a polity has influenced the institutional architecture that structures that polity by exploring temporal considerations. They saw institutions as ‘enduring legacies of political struggles’ (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Thelen, 1999). Stephen Krasner (1984) emphasised the idea of institutional stability and ‘stickiness’. The theoretical implications of this ‘stickiness’ are
embedded within the conceptualisation of ‘path dependence’, which, led by the work of Paul Pierson, was a principle focus of historical institutionalist study in the late 1980s and 1990s. Path dependence in its broadest conceptualisation refers to the causal significance of preceding events within political or economic development (Pierson, 2000). It draws on the conceptual understanding of ‘increasing returns’, also known as ‘positive feedback’ or ‘self-reinforcing processes’. The idea of increasing returns first gained traction within economics, where anomalies within the ‘decreasing returns’ tradition were previously prevalent (Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2004). Increasing returns suggest that early decisions ‘lock in’ a path from which it becomes increasingly difficult to diverge. The famous example of this can be demonstrated from technology, specifically the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985).

This, therefore, highlights several of the principles inherent in the conceptualisation of path-dependent processes. First, historical processes are highly influenced by the early stages of the process (e.g., the decision to design the keyboard in the QWERTY model). Second, outcomes are unpredictable; as the effects are of such significance and are random, the eventual outcome cannot be known. Third, the path is inflexible; the further a process travels down the path predicated by early events, the more difficult it is to reverse the process, or shift to another path. Skocpol and Pierson (2002: 102) explain this as ‘political alternatives once quite plausible become irretrievably lost’. The final characteristic is that the ultimate outcome may, in fact, not be the most efficient or fit-for-purpose; mistakes or accidents in the early stages are not cancelled out, and in fact feedback into future decisions (Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2000; 2004).

The implications for political processes under path-dependent theory are numerous. Within a political setting, there are likely to be numerous options available to actors, so there is an extensive range of possible outcomes from an identical starting condition (Pierson, 2000; 2004). The events in the nascent stages of a political process are critical to the eventual outcome (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002), and however small these events may appear, their consequences can be very large (Pierson, 2000; 2004; Schwartz, 2004). Finally, and

---

5 The QWERTY keyboard has been found to be ergonomically unsatisfactory and inefficient, and yet it is used unanimously throughout the English-speaking world, as it has become embedded within the combined technological mindset of English-speaking cultures. The fact that it was established so soon after the idea of a keyboard was mooted culminated in QWERTY’s domination over other options, despite its relative inefficiency (David, 1985).
crucially, the sequence of events within the political process matters (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002; Hacker, 1998; Farrell & Newman, 2010).

In order to explain the importance of temporal sequencing, Paul Pierson (2004) uses the analogy of cooking, and the significance of the culinary equipment, the ingredients and the recipe. Talking to a hypothetical chef, he highlights the importance of the recipe – not only are the ingredients (or variables) and the equipment (the institutions) important, but the order in which they are used are an equally significant part of the cookery process. The theoretical framework provided by path-dependent analysis suggests the sequencing and temporal ordering is equally important in political life. The initial stages of a process are crucial; they dictate (as the QWERTY example demonstrates) the direction of processes that have the potential to become reinforcing. Other stages are equally significant; further decisions or consequences further down the line can be influential in dictating the future path of a process. History is therefore not seen as an independent chain of events, and historical institutionalists are dismissive of the idea of variable independence (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002; Steinmo, 2008); the interactive effects between variables over time frame the ontological and epistemological perspectives of historical institutionalism.

A famous example of historical institutionalist analysis that focuses on sequence and temporal order is Hall’s (1992) analysis of the movement from a Keynesian economic policy to a neoliberal model in the 1970s. Hall argues that three factors – the growing power of the financial markets, the waning strength of the unions and the degree of power and autonomy available to Margaret Thatcher – came together at a certain point in time in a way that provided Thatcher with the opportunity to generate a paradigm shift, where other political elites had failed to do so. This is conceptualised as a ‘conjuncture’ (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002), whereby distinct causal sequences meet and interact at particular moments in time. These conjunctures are the focus of historical institutionalists’ attention, as they look to establish and explore the factors and influences within a context to explain political outcomes.

The underlying theory of path-dependent processes, therefore, was organised around explaining institutional persistence and retrenchment, which stresses continuity over change (Arthur, 1994; Skocpol & Pierson, 2002; Pierson, 2004). To explain change, historical institutionalists looked to the initiation of feedback processes, termed as ‘critical junctures’ (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002; Pierson 2004; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). The idea
is that the constraints that surround embedded historical pathways are periodically loosened, to provide a brief moment of contingency and agency (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), or ‘brief phases of institutional flux’ (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). Within these phases, there are ‘permissive’ and ‘productive’ conditions; the permissive conditions changing the context in a way that releases the constraints on actors (providing possibilities for contingencies), and the productive conditions working with the permissive conditions to shape the initial outcomes (Soifer, 2012). The moment in history whereby Thatcher was able to introduce the neoliberal paradigm would be termed a critical juncture (Hall, 1992). Change, therefore, is conceptualised within the classical historical institutionalist approach as exogenous, an analytical explanation that would later come under extensive criticism (see Section 3.3).

3.2.2. Analytical concepts of historical institutionalism: power-distribution

A second significant feature of historical institutionalism is its emphasis on power distribution and asymmetries (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Moe, 2005). Historical institutionalists argue that the path-dependent nature of institutions means that they have a direct impact on power relations. Ellen Immergut has developed this idea of power distribution into a theory of veto points, looking into how institutional structures give certain people or interest groups more or less access to the decision-making process. Her seminal work on veto points looks at the lobbying efforts of medical associations in Switzerland, France and Sweden, and finds that there is variety within the political systems of those countries that provide the associations with differing levels of access to the policy process (Immergut, 1990). This is an example of the effect of institutional structure on power distribution; and when put within an historical context, the path-dependent nature of institutions means that power asymmetries can become embedded, and exacerbated, over time. Consequently, historical institutionalists pay attention to the way in which institutions distribute power across social groups (Immergut, 1990; Moe, 2005; Steinmo, 2008).

3.3. The limitations of historical institutionalism

Despite its rise in popularity in the political sciences, historical institutionalism has faced several criticisms. The first common criticism is that it is atheoretical. Its tendency to look
at ‘real-life’ (often rare) phenomena makes it vulnerable to accusations that it is not a useful source of prediction, and as such is an imperfect causal mechanism (Drezner, 2010; Farrell & Newman, 2010). The case-study approach often adopted by historical institutionalists exacerbates this problem, as the assumption is that such analysis suffers from the limitations of small-N study. The goal of social science, these scholars argue, is to generate theory, not to provide explanations for past events, and historical institutionalist case studies cannot do anything more than generate ‘theoretical ideas’ (Drezner, 2010).

Historical institutionalists have been quick to defend themselves against this criticism. For example, Steinmo (2008) and Skocpol and Pierson (2002) are quick to turn the tables, arguing that grand theories and micro-analysis of independent variables are limited in their causal predictions as, unlike the hard sciences, the interdependence of variables in political science are as significant as the variables themselves. So these ‘real-world puzzles’ focus the attention ‘back on the wood rather than the trees’ (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002: 14). Rueschemeyer (2003) argues persuasively that the temporal case study approach can actually do much more than generate theoretical ideas, as despite the appearance of a small-N study, the temporal dimension means that there are multiple observations over time; a single case does not mean a single observation. He goes on to argue that the temporal approach is able, unlike other theory-generating methods, to inject causality into correlation. The ontology and epistemology of historical institutionalism, therefore, does not seek predictive power, but explanatory power, which, in turn, may contribute to theory generation (Steinmo, 2008).

Other criticisms are more difficult to defend. A common critique is that historical institutionalism’s focus on meso-level institutions (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992) privileges middle-range processes over structural theories (Pontusson, 1995; Drezner, 2010). The focus on the process level means that the structural concerns of grand theories, the initial theories that historical institutionalism arose in reaction to, are lost. As Drezner (2010: 796) puts it, ‘excessive attention to one causal process can blind a researcher to the possibility that there are substitutable causal processes at work – and in the process, privilege middle-range theories over more ambitious paradigms’.

The middle-range approach has become the main concern of historical institutionalism, to the extent that some critics argue that historical institutionalists are actually not concerned with the state (Pontusson, 1995). The middle-range focus has not always had dominance;
in the early days of historical institutionalism a more macro-historical focus was used to look at phenomena such as varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001). But the current vogue of looking at certain sets of institutions means that other structural variables outside of the causal significance of institutional systems are neglected. Pontusson (1995), for example, argues that historical institutionalism assumes that the socioeconomic structures that made up the ‘superstructure’ of Marxist analysis are the same cross-nationally. However, he argues that there are several variables outside of the polity-focus of historical institutionalism (such as corporate organisation, or the relative size of the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors), that may have an effect on the political outcomes that historical institutionalists are trying to explain. Rothstein (1998) defends the analytical primacy institutions are given by arguing that institutions are ‘a product of human agency’, in that they have been intentionally created and designed, meaning that they deserve attention. Pontusson (1995) dismisses this point by pointing out that human agency is also influential in macro structural change, such as the different decisions taken by Sweden and Germany on the type of capitalism they adopted. He argues, therefore, that the structure-agency consideration is not satisfactory for focusing on institutions at the expense of other structures.

This is a convincing argument, and there is a particular need to address this shortcoming within analyses of global political economy (see Section 3.5). Pontusson (1995) suggests a break with the polity focus of historical institutionalism to resolve this analytical shortcoming, recommending a shift away from meso-level institutions to broader structures; for example, shifting the analytical focus from ‘capitalist states’ to ‘capitalism’. Other scholars, such as Bøås & Jennings (2007) address this problem by combining historical institutionalism with realist and neo-Gramscian theories in order to include macro-structures within their analysis. This is also explored further in Section 3.5.

Perhaps the most damning criticism that historical institutionalism has received is its inability to explain change. Classical historical institutionalists describe critical junctures as the dominant generator of change, namely that change is brought about by exogenous influences (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002; Pierson, 2004; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). The main body of historical institutionalism focuses more on stability and continuity, theorising around the embedded nature of institutions and the consequent volume of political resistance to institutional or procedural change (Katzenstein, 1978; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Krasner, 2004). This body of theory is extensive, closely conceptually linked with
path-dependent theory, focusing the debate on the constraining nature of institutions in such a way that the scholarship looks solely to the idea of stability and continuity, relying heavily on the definition of institutions that paints them as enduring and persistent (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Krasner, 2004).

This focus on institutions as enduring and stable has endured heavy criticism, not least because it compromised the idea of human agency (Steinmo, 2008). Scholars increasingly attempted to explain change in a way that did not rely on exogenous influences. Path-dependent theory came under scrutiny, specifically its focus on the power-distributional effects of institutional development and concepts such as the ‘first turn advantage’ (Drezner, 2010; Peters et al., 2005). Empirical exploration of these concepts highlighted in more detail the intricate complexities of institutional formation and growth, in particular the political conflict present at the time of institutional design. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) drew on existing empirical work that applied the concept of power-distribution to institutional genesis and design, to demonstrate that the very foundations of institutions are embedded within political conflicts and compromises, suggesting that the path-dependent ‘rules’ which embody the institutions are fraught with ambiguities and gaps which are vulnerable to alternative interpretations, exploitation and ideas. In sum, there is an element of dynamism within the very definition of institutions in historical institutionalism (Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).

Various scholars sought to use this dynamism to explain endogenous change within historical institutionalism. Dynamism as a concept had been present in historical institutionalism previously, as scholars sought to highlight how the influence and scope of institutions changed over time (Thelen, 1991; Dunlavy, 1992; Hattam, 1992). Thelen and Steinmo (1992) identified three ‘dynamic’ possibilities, such as: changes in the socioeconomic or political balance of power (e.g. the rise of the unions); exogenous change that does not cause the collapse of an institution but changes the objectives and strategies of those within it; political actors changing their strategies in response to changes in the institutional structure. This dynamism was presented in a way to support the approach’s focus on the macro level, as it acknowledged the myriad influences on institutions from the broader macrocontext. However, these conceptualisations of dynamism still had a heavy bias towards change being stimulated by exogenous forces.
In order to overcome this, scholars such as Streeck and Thelen (2005) drew on developments in Pierson’s (2004) theorising of the temporal dimension, in particular his work on slow-moving causal processes, and the realignment of the historical institutionalist debate along power-distributional concepts, to develop theories surrounding gradual institutional change. A typology of gradual institutional change emerged, with four key concepts: displacement, layering, drift and conversion. Displacement suggests that while there is a ‘dominant’ logic of institutions, it can be changed by environmental changes, either through ‘defection’ (when actors work to bring a secondary path to dominance), or ‘invasion’ (when actors ‘supplant’ existing paths with secondary ones) (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Actors who are ‘losers’ in the status quo can use displacement as a strategy to create new pathways (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), although power-distribution considerations need to be included within any analysis of distribution. Layering looks at the introduction of new stakeholders and actors who join an institutional framework, who can either add stability to the institutional framework if they adhere to the status quo, or can change it through the introduction of their own institutional networks; ‘differential growth’ can set path-altering dynamics in motion (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Drift argues that institutional stability is not a given; it requires maintenance by relevant actors. If this maintenance is not forthcoming, erosion or atrophy can cause institutional programmes to alter or decay (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). The final concept, conversion, looks to the redirection of existing rules to apply them in new situations that are different from their original specification. These rules are vulnerable to exploitation due to ambiguities created by political compromise at their genesis, unforeseen circumstances or changing environments (Streeck & Thelen, 2005).

These new concepts did slightly temper the criticisms towards historical institutionalism’s theoretical ability to explain change, and did much to challenge the conventional wisdom of institutional lock-in and path dependency. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) built on the theoretical base of gradual change to develop causal propositions to assist in locating institutional change by placing the concept of gradual institutional change back into a behavioural perspective, drawing the relationship between institutions and actors into analytical focus, and building on the conceptual understandings of the power-distributional effects of institutions.

However, despite these advances in explaining change within historical institutionalism, many critics were still unsatisfied that this constituted a robust theory (Pontusson, 1995;
Drezner, 2010). This typology presented patterns of institutional change; it did not offer an explanation or theory of institutional change (Steinmo, 2008); in fact, it provided no clear definition of what constitutes change (Roumpakis, 2011). Blyth (2010) argued that the gradual change approach did not actually source moments of endogenous change, as the distinction between endogenous and exogenous had been analytically dictated, rather than empirically. Change initiators such as drift and conversion were termed as endogenous because the actors are embedded within the institutional framework; however, their influences extended beyond that framework, so they could act as purveyor of exogenous influence. Conversely, shocks that are termed ‘exogenous’ (to use Blyth’s example) might, in fact, be viewed historically, in that ‘prior events empower agents within that context to make war’ (p. 98).

Furthermore, while the gradual change typology usefully specified moments of political conflict and strategy, it was unable to explain the complexity of political conflict or the substantive content of political choices that initiated path-dependent processes. Hay (2011) demonstrates the problem by highlighting the historical institutionalist explanation of institutional development, or critical junctures. Returning to Hall and Taylor’s (1996) rational choice institutionalist ‘logic of calculus’ (where decisions are driven through self-interest) and the sociological institutionalist ‘logic of appropriateness’ (where decisions are driven by normative cultural logics), Hay (2011) demonstrates the historical institutionalist blend of both these logics would suggest that actor behaviour is predictable, through examination of the context in which they act. Thus, even with the more sophisticated model of gradual institutional change, actor agency is sidelined, and theory surrounding the political struggle and conflict is absent from analyses, explained away as ‘exogenous’ (Lieberman, 2001; Peters et al., 2005; Blyth, 2010). The ‘power-distribution’ effect does not offer any theorisation on power, and analytically offers no additional insight into agents’ interests and strategies (Roumpakis, 2011).

Another criticism posed to historical institutionalism, and institutionalist approaches more broadly was its reductionist approach, closely conceptually linked with its focus on exogenous change. Seminal works such as Weir and Skocpol (1985), Immergut (1990) and Hall (1993) all fell back on the historical institutionalist habit of sourcing constraint; the interests and ideas of actors were dictated and hampered by the institutional context within which they featured (Campbell, 1998), and highlighted a reductionism within institutional theory which assumes away complexity (Lieberman, 2002). In order to address these
issues of change and reductionism, a subset of historical institutionalist scholarship turned to the role of ideas to explain the content of political struggle, from which ideational institutionalism arose.

### 3.4. Ideational institutionalism

To explore institutional and political change more effectively, scholars turned to ideas to fill the analytical gap within historical institutionalism. The discourse quickly turned to endorse the assertion that ‘ideas matter’ (Steinmo, 2008; Hay, 2011; Mehta, 2011). This is not to say that ideas were not previously prevalent in the social sciences, however, like institutions, ideas were relegated from theoretical consideration as the behaviouralist and structuralist modes of enquiry were in vogue (Béland & Cox, 2011b). However, as institutionalism gained ascendancy, and its shortcomings were increasingly interrogated, the analytical usefulness of ideational approaches was revisited, and institutionalist scholars turned to ideas to help develop more robust conceptualisations of, among other things, actor agency and institutional and political change (Hay, 2010; Schmidt, 2010; 2011).

The influence of ideas, these scholars maintained, is seen in day-to-day life. Mehta (2011) demonstrates how ideational influence is routinely accepted in everyday life, citing the shifting values and beliefs about science, religion and political paradigms as an example, and the progressive developments regarding former societal prejudices in the fields of race, gender and sexuality. She highlights that millions of dollars are spent on think tanks, their very purpose being to generate ideas, and to analyse their content and value. The very idea of democracy is based on the differing ideas of political actors – if all politicians were guided only by the institutional and societal context in which they exist (as the logics of calculus and culture would suggest), then there would be no differences between political parties and factions. A counter-argument to this, however, is the role of material interests, a significant consideration when arguing the causal power of ideas, as this section will demonstrate. A key consideration for historical institutionalists who sought to draw ideas into their frameworks in order to explain agency, is the relationship between ideas, institutions and interests.

Ideationalist scholars working within the historical institutionalist field sought to remedy three perceived analytical shortcomings within the institutionalist approach. First is the
focus on *equilibrium* (Blyth, 2010), a particular focus of rational choice institutionalism (Levi, 1997) but that is also prevalent within historical institutionalist approaches, for example in the conceptualisation of path-dependent processes that can only be disrupted by exogenous change. The second is the idea of *linear causation* (Blyth, 2010), in that causal processes within the historical institutionalist approach assume a linearity that is undermined by empirical examples; a surprising approach given that historical institutionalism arose from a desire to explain the divergence of political economies in similar settings (Katzenstein, 1978). The final analytical shortcoming is the reductionism of institutional approaches, which assumes away complexity by putting institutions as the main causal mechanism within analyses (Lieberman, 2002).

However, ideas have not been completely absent from historical institutionalist scholarship over the past decades. For example, Heclo’s (1974) concept of ‘social learning’ looked to an actor’s intellectual engagement with the context, their experience from previous policy and reactions to it, and their specialist expertise within the policy-making process, and in so doing touched on many of the principles of agency and expertise with which ideational institutionalists look to build an analytical toolkit. Similarly Hall (1993) tried to go beyond the organised structure of historical institutionalism with his concept of ‘policy paradigms’, looking beyond policy and policy instruments to understand the very nature of the problems actors are trying to address by drawing on sociological considerations and actor agency.

Margaret Weir was criticising the mainstream explanatory models within institutionalism as early as 1992, for their disregard of the influence of ideas. In her contribution to the seminal volume that defined ‘historical institutionalism’, *Structuring Politics* (Steinmo et al., 1992), she criticises the ‘value’ and ‘power’ explanatory models, saying that without consideration of deeply embedded cultural values, their analytical and theoretical potency is limited, because the ‘social and economic policies that bear on these values changes substantially over time’ (Weir, 1992). She emphasises the importance of ‘political framing’, namely the process whereby policy options are created and chosen.

However, scholars belonging to the neo-ideationalist school say that these early attempts at drawing ideas into the analytical framework are limited in their approach. To use Weir’s (1992) example, scholars such as Béland (2005) and Lieberman (2002) argue that she still draws too heavily on the path-dependent theory central to historical institutionalism
approaches; her emphasis continues the bias on the constraining nature of institutions, rather than focusing on the analytical significance of ideas. Heclo (1974) and Hall (1993) are vulnerable to similar accusations, as their models of ideational explanatory power both look to demonstrate the narrowing of policy options through retrenchment and self-reinforcing processes, rather than exploring the potential within ideas of the analytical perspective of fluidity and change; the power of ideas was dictated and hampered by the institutional context within which they featured.

The analytical ‘gap’ to which neo-ideational scholars objected so strongly, therefore, was not a lack of acknowledgement of ideational forces, more that these forces are exogenous to the explanatory framework (Lieberman, 2002). Ideas were not used to fill their own ‘gap’ in the analysis of outcomes, but their content was not considered – their presence was considered to have enough explanatory power to supply theoretical validity, meaning that they were relegated to the outskirts of the analysis, and their substantive contribution excluded from theoretical consideration.

### 3.4.1. The analytical significance of ideas

To explain the analytical importance of ideas, many scholars turned to Kingdon’s (1995) seminal work on agenda-setting theory. Within his model, Kingdon highlights the analytic distinction between agendas and their alternatives, demonstrating how both are the product of three interacting streams; the ‘problem’, ‘policy’ and ‘political’ streams. The ‘problem’ stream, by his definition, is how policy makers are influenced by their beliefs as to what are the most ‘pressing problems’ that require policy, by events that focus media and public attention on certain policy problems, and by historical influences such as the previous policies to which policy makers react. The ‘policy’ stream is where policy options and ideas are in a ‘primeval soup’, where myriad ideas are available, conjoining and influencing each other in different ways, guided by a policy paradigm that constitutes the structure of the intellectual debate around that policy. The final stream, the ‘political’ stream, is how a problem gains its place on the political agenda, receives political backing and, crucially, public support for action.

Different ideational scholars have drawn different conceptualisations of the importance of ideas from Kingdon’s model. Weir (1992), working on an earlier version of his model, uses Kingdon’s theory to highlight how ideas work within the generation of policy
solutions; while she argues that his model lacks sophistication due to its ahistorical approach, she shows how institutions over time create the context within which certain ideas about that context generate policy problems and solutions. Béland (2005), on the other hand, uses Kingdon’s model to show how the framing of policies has an impact on political outcomes, as it is a ‘strategic and deliberate’ attempt at generating both political and public support. Mehta (2011) demonstrates yet another ideational influence by using Kingdon’s model to theorise how ideas influence problem definitions – while closely conceptually linked with Weir’s, it differs in that the focus is on how ideas are causally significant through analysis of the power and resources of claimants, the venue and ownership of the problem.

The fact that Weir (1992), Béland (2005) and Mehta (2011) all find different applications of ideas within Kingdon’s theoretical model is telling; it highlights the wide variety of ideational types and influences within social and political phenomena. The conceptualisation of ‘ideas’ is complex, which may explain the initial reluctance of historical institutionalists to draw them into the analytical framework. In order to unpack the role of ideas within the policy-making process, and, crucially, to identify causal mechanisms to supply theoretical validity into a framework that incorporates ideational influences, an exploration of the variety of ideational concepts is required. It is the lack of a robust conceptualisation, Campbell (1998) argues, that has hampered the efforts of ideational scholars to draw ideas into the analytical framework thus far.

3.4.2. Typologies of ideas

Several scholars have attempted to generate typologies of ideas in an attempt to categorise their characteristics and their causal mechanisms. An analysis of the different attempts highlight that ideas as an analytical tool offer a vast array of conceptual complexity, as different scholars highlight different characteristics and analytical considerations.

A comparison of the typologies presented by Campbell (1998), Tannenwald (2005) and Mehta (2011) demonstrates this (Table 1). All the typologies are similar to the extent that they work within a spectrum of broad, generalisable ideas (categorised here as the ‘macro’ level), and ideas that look to a specific policy problem or solution (the ‘micro’ level).
Table 1: Typologies of ideas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro</strong></td>
<td><strong>Paradigms:</strong> Broad cognitive ideas, such as neoliberalism (cognitive)</td>
<td><strong>Causal beliefs:</strong> Cause-effect, or means-end relationships. Provide cognitive understandings of the world</td>
<td><strong>Public philosophies/zeitgeist:</strong> Widely shared assumptions such as Keynesianism, or the American focus on the individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ideologies:</strong> Systemic set of doctrines, e.g. fascism or Catholicism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meso</strong></td>
<td><strong>Frames:</strong> Symbols and concepts that help ‘sell’ effectively (normative)</td>
<td><strong>‘Normative’:</strong> Values and attitudes</td>
<td><strong>Problem definition:</strong> How problems are defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Public sentiment:</strong> Politically acceptable (normative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro</strong></td>
<td><strong>Programmatic:</strong> Specifically related to a policy problem (cognitive)</td>
<td><strong>Policy prescriptions:</strong> Specifically related to a policy problem</td>
<td><strong>Policy solutions:</strong> Specifically related to a policy problem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Drawn from Campbell (1998), Tannenwald (2005) and Mehta (2011).*

The ‘micro’ level ideas are similar across all typologies; they are specifically related to a policy problem, albeit with different names. Beyond the micro level, however, there is little consensus as to the categorisation. The ‘macro’ level categories range from the sociological perspective of societal norms to which essentially all participants subscribe (Tannenwald, 2005), to specific ideologies that pertain to particular political or social systems (Campbell, 1998; Mehta, 2011). The ‘meso’ level provides even more complexity; Campbell (1998) views the ideas within this category level as normative ‘tools’ that can be used (implicitly or explicitly) to present political or social issues successfully, whereas Tannenwald (2005) sees the meso level as a continuation of macro perspectives, but at a less general level; these ideas are subject to contestation by alternative ideas. Mehta (2011) uses the meso level to demonstrate that the micro level is not mutually exclusive from
other levels; ‘problem definition’ shows the socially constructed context within which micro level ideas are played out.

The reason for this conceptual complexity and lack of consensus is that there are several distinctions between ideas, in addition to the macro-micro spectrum, that different scholars try to acknowledge. For example, Cox (1986) makes a distinction between ‘shared’ and ‘contested’ ideas. Shared ideas are often the focus of constructivist approaches and drawn from sociological considerations, as they analyse how normative and cultural assumptions that arise from shared ideas create hegemonic ideas. Contested ideas are those shared by differing individuals and groups, and create the discourse, opportunities and conflict that many scholars argue is where change is generated.

Closely conceptually linked with Cox’s (1986) shared/contested distinction is Campbell’s (1998) cognitive/normative distinction, but Campbell embeds his distinction within institutional theories. He draws the idea of ‘cognitive’ ideas from organisational theory, arguing that actors cognitively navigate their way through institutional cues and routines in order to achieve their aims. ‘Normative’ ideas, however, he draws from historical institutionalist scholars such as Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1996), who claim that ideas are constrained by institutional forces. These institutional constraints are in the background of political thinking, and consequently taken for granted.

Ideas, then, can be categorised in myriad ways, including: by different stages of the policy process; by different levels of generalisability; by whom they are possessed; whether they are cognitively or normatively held; and whether or not they are subject to contestation. These complex considerations raise several questions as to how ideas can be incorporated within an analytic framework. From an institutional perspective, how do ideas interact with institutions, and what are their causal power in relation to institutions? Furthermore, from a material perspective, what weight should material interests be awarded within an ideational analysis? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to analyse the causal power of ideas in order to establish their analytical significance; when and how do ideas matter? Unsurprisingly, the causal effect and level of causal power of ideas is under debate, with little consensus.
3.4.3. The causal power and effect of ideas

Weir (1992) argued that interests had been favoured over ideas within the institutional literature due to the lack of analysis and theory regarding the causal effects of ideas. In order to address this shortcoming, scholars such as Tannenwald (2005) and Mehta (2011) have tried to unpick the question of the causal influence empirically, suggesting that the different types of ideas have varying causal influences and power ratios.

For ‘micro’ level ideas, variables such as policy viability, administrative viability and political viability (Hall, 1993) are considered significant, making the explicit point that policy viability is not enough to create a causal relationship; it also needs to be administratively simple and have political backing in order to have causal power (Hall, 1993; Kingdon, 1995). Mehta (2011) complements this by drawing in historical considerations to the causal model, highlighting that the reason why some ideas are chosen over others is not always visible in the short-term, as such a perspective obscures variables that are changeable over the longer period. In addition to these policy perspectives, there are also actor-led considerations; what levels of expertise are available, and what is the relationship between experts and governments?

Analysis of the causal effects of ‘meso’-level ideas has generated its own subset of literature (George et al., 2006; Kangas et al., 2014). This literature focuses on the one hand on the strategic use of normative scripts to ‘frame’ or ‘define’ problems, and on the other the use of non-cognitive assumptions that are implicit within the outcomes: ‘actors [are seen] less as strategic wielders of ideas, more as possessors of taken-for-granted assumptions that influence the types of policy solutions and definitions they favour’ (Mehta, 2011: 28). This returns to the interesting cognitive versus normative question; to what extent are actors aware of their manipulation of macro-level ideas, and if they are aware, do they employ them strategically in order to benefit the promotion of their meso-level ideas?

Meso-level ideas have also been operationalised in terms of power-distributional considerations, such as Immergut’s (1990) veto-points theory; Mehta (2011: 30) argues that the meso level is ‘a contested process among players with varying levels of power and persuasiveness’. This draws heavily on institutionalist theory; the causal power of ideas in this context is highly influenced by institutional considerations.
There is a vast literature that addresses macro-level ideational phenomena, of which the historical institutionalist literature plays a key role, due to the macro-focus of historical institutionalism. For example, Hall (1992) is one among many who explore the effects of the shift from Keynesianism economics to monetarism, demonstrating the myriad causal effects of macro ideas, such as who gets elected, which in turn affects legislation, can influence the outcomes of ‘policy definitions’ and can provide a ‘touchstone’ to which policy advocates can appeal to generate support for their policy (Mehta, 2011).

There are several understandings and considerations that can be drawn here from the literature on the causal effects of ideas. The first understanding is that ideational forces are not mutually exclusive; macro ideas such as ideology have an effect on meso and micro ideas such as framing strategies or policy solutions. This is a crucial consideration; ideas do not operate in a vacuum. Secondly, the causal power of ideas is very difficult to operationalise. Scholars have tried to measure their causal power by statistical associations, but are hampered by practical and operational problems, such as how to statistically quantify an idea, or how to ensure all other contributory variables are accommodated (Yee, 1996). Qualitative approaches which adopt a deductive strategy to establish causal mechanisms, while less contentious than statistical associations, are also not without flaws. Ideas are only one of many probable and partial causes (Yee, 1996; Lieberman, 2002), as within social science there are multiple (often indeterminate) causes; furthermore, not only are ideas influenced by other ideas, they are also influenced in both content and causal power by structural considerations such as material interests and institutions. This is explored further in the following sections.

### 3.4.4. Ideas and institutions

The debates surrounding the interplay and relationship between institutions and ideas are key. Due to the wide range of opinions as to how ideas (in their different iterations) should be handled, and the weight that they should be given relative to material considerations, there is little consensus as to how institutional approaches should incorporate ideational perspectives into their analytical toolkit.

Weiss and Carayannis (2001) provide a typology of ideational approaches that is useful to demonstrate the spectrum of opinions with regard to ideational relationships with institutions. At one end of the spectrum are what Weiss and Carayannis (2001) term
‘institutionalist’ approaches, which seek to embed ideas within institutionalist frameworks. At the opposite end are ‘constructivist’ approaches (Weiss and Carayannis, 2001), which argue that ideational concepts need to be dis-embedded from institutional considerations. This section explores these differing approaches in more detail.

At the ‘institutionalist’ end of the spectrum are scholars who remain wedded to the principles of institutionalist conceptualisations, but who use the toolkit provided by ideationalists to explain change and agency. For example, Goldstein and Keohane (1993) insert ideas into their rational choice institutionalist approach by suggesting that ideas can be used of as conceptual ‘road maps’ or focal points, which can be used at moments of upheaval to organise action and navigate changing preferences and definitions of interests.

This delicate insertion of ideas into a robustly institutional framework has received extensive criticism from ideational scholars from the constructivist school, who put weight on the substantive content of ideas and their causal influence. Blyth (1997) suggests that using ideas in such a way is ‘little more than an ad hoc attempt to account for theoretical problems in the main schools of institutional theory’ (p. 229), reducing ideas to theoretical tools that have little analytical merit of their own.

The social-constructivist school, at the opposite end of the spectrum of ideational scholarship, presents a variety of approaches as to how ideas and institutions should be treated within analyses, and provides much of the ideational scholarship available. Ideational approaches are well complemented by a social-constructivist philosophy due to the myriad cognitive and normative influences explored in Section 3.4.1. At the purest end of the social-constructivist school are scholars such as Hay (2011) and Schmidt (2010; 2011) who argue that ideational approaches should be separated from institutional concepts, as they argue that ideational scholarship goes beyond the fundamental presuppositions of the three institutionalist traditions.

Hay (2011), suggests that a fourth institutionalism is necessary, which he terms ‘constructivist institutionalism’. He maintains that the material interests that are the foundation of grand theories, and that are incorporated into institutional frameworks within considerations such as power-distribution concepts, are not objective facts, but are social, historical and political constructions. Arguing that rational and material arguments are insufficient in explaining post-formative change, he suggests that the intended and unintended consequences of political agency – which he terms ‘path-shaping logics’ (as
opposed to path-dependent logics) – need to be put centre stage within analyses. He claims that the motives of an actor cannot be explained by their background (as in the sociological institutionalist perspective) or by their material interests (as in the rational choice/historical institutionalist perspectives), and that the only conclusion is that they are socially constructed, and as such unable to be employed as proxies for material factors.

Schmidt (2010; 2011) similarly argues for a fourth institutionalism, terming her contribution as ‘discursive institutionalism’. She maintains that discourse is the principal explanatory factor in explaining how ideas gain traction within a political setting, defining discourse as an exchange of ideas, which is not only about what is said, but also about who said what to whom, when and why (2011: 56). Without this, Schmidt argues, it is impossible to see how collective action is created from ideas, so the ‘logic of communication’ is therefore crucial to explaining political change, as it acknowledges the ability of actors to think outside of the institutional setting within which they are placed. The empirical implication is that the analysis should be focused less on the institutional context and more on the communication between actors at the policy, political and public level.

While a convincing argument in explaining change, and highlighting the importance of actor interaction, there are several shortcomings to a purely constructivist approach. Schmidt (2011) herself acknowledges that power-distributional considerations are lacking, despite such considerations having a considerable impact on the logics of communication. Such approaches also have a tendency to neglect other considerations outside of ideational factors, in a manner similar to that of how rational choice institutionalist approaches are criticised for their short-sighted focus on the individual.

Other scholars, who situate themselves within the social constructivist school are less dismissive of institutional factors. Scholars such as Béland (2005) and Leiberman (2002) claim that the study of ideas is compatible with institutionalist concepts, and that analytical approaches should seek to create a model that acknowledges the impact of political institutions and path-dependent legacies (Weir, 1992), but also understands and incorporates the role of ideas, considering them to be integral explanatory elements (Leiberman, 2002). Béland (2005) demonstrates this point by analysing ‘framing’ techniques, which are by necessity embedded in broader ideological perspectives and historical processes, in order to make strategic and deliberate choices to generate public support. His overarching point is that ideological forces are significant within the social constructivist school.
an institutional context, as they are conceptually linked with the necessity of ‘framing’ for political and public approval. He demonstrates how ideational forces can both generate policy change or reinforce the existing institutional paths, and it is important to understand their content in order to discover why some issues gain ascendancy over others, and why public views become embedded or shift.

Lieberman (2002) similarly argues for ideational analysis to be inserted into existing institutional approaches. He argues that without embedding ideas within broader institutional frameworks, ideationalists can fall into the same traps as their institutionalist counterparts, and focus exclusively on regularity and stability, regarding change as exogenous. He argues convincingly that ideas need to be attached to frameworks of structure and power, as the interaction effects between ideas and institutions are the genesis of political change. He demonstrates that ideas must navigate the institutional architecture in order to become influential, and that the institutional architecture itself is in constant flux. In order to avoid the accusations of bias towards continuity and restraint that institutionalist approaches received, he suggests that political events should be situated within a variety of ‘ordered institutional and ideological patterns, each with its own origins and history and each with its own logic and pace’ (p. 701). Analytically speaking, he suggests an approach that strips a political order into its ‘component parts’ (p. 703), whether ideational or institutional, and analyse how they interact or influence each other. He argues that ‘an important advantage of this approach is that it can consider both institutions and ideas as building blocks of an explanation for political change, but it need not do so if the important motors of change in a given case fall on one side or other of the ideas-institution divide’ (p. 703).

The weight given to institutions within ideational analysis is therefore a contentious issue. The disagreement stems principally from different conceptualisations of material interests; whether, as the pure social constructivist school posits, they are actually socially, politically and historically driven constructs, or, as claimed by the rational choice, historical and some of the ideational institutionalist schools, they are fundamental building blocks with causal power by their own merit. The next section explores the relationship between ideas and interests in more detail.
3.4.5. Ideas and interests

Social constructivist ideationalists are highly critical of what they perceive to be the oversimplified conceptualisation of interests that are inherent within rational choice and historical institutionalist approaches. Despite attempts by both the historical institutionalists and rational-choice institutionalists to draw ideas into their analytical framework (Weir, 1992), social constructivists argue that they do not go far enough to analyse the significance and power of the ideas behind material interests.

Blyth (2010), for example, argues that rational choice theory neglects the ‘cognates’ of interest, for example the wants, beliefs and desires of actors. He maintains that these cognates are the building blocks of interests, and that interests are consequently a ‘cluster’ concept. Due to the inherent uncertainty in politics, the component parts of this cluster are unstable, making the interests that they constitute equally unstable. In order to use interests effectively with an analytical model, therefore, he argues that a rational perspective needs to be disregarded and the cluster examined in order to provide substantive content to these interests.

Hay (2011) reinforces this point within his ‘constructivist institutionalist’ model, arguing that the purpose of his approach is ‘to identify, detail and interrogate the extent to which established ideas become codified through institutional embedding and serve as cognitive filters through which actors interpret environmental signals and so conceive of their own interests’ (p. 68, italics not in the original). Schmidt (2010; 2011) similarly calls for a deconstruction of interests in order to explain change within the institutional context.

Scholars who put weight on the influence of material interests are quick to counter these arguments, however. Rational choice institutionalist scholars argue that the black-and-white conceptualisation of interests that social constructivists paint with regard to rational-choice theory is unfair, as interests are themselves interrogated within rational-choice models to provide a comprehensive model of interest (Bevir & Rhodes, 2001). Furthermore, rational-choice and historical-institutionalist models that use structurally derived interests within their analyses have proved effective in explaining political outcomes, providing empirical evidence that interests do have inherent explanatory power (Hall, 1992).

The relationship between interests and power distribution provides a powerful argument against adopting a strategy that perceives interests as socially constructed. The factors of
power and economic gains provide a strong *material* incentive which, within the institutional context, can be seen to support the structurally derived concept of interest within the rational-choice and historical-institutionalist literature. Tannenwald (2005) highlights that there are two models of theorising about human behaviour, those that emphasise instrumental rationality (the economic model) and those that emphasise value rationality (the sociological model), and it could be argued that there is a bias in the ideational literature against the former in the effort to discredit rational-choice principles. The level to which ideational influence is considered within the construction of interests is, therefore, an empirical question, and depends on the choice of the dependent variable. Tannenwald (2005) argues that ‘if the material factors are highly constraining, there is little room for the independent role of ideas. If not, the door is opened to ideational factors in shaping the perception of material conditions’ (p. 23). Pontusson (1995) stresses the importance of the analysis of interest formation, as it enables analysts to link the politics of institutional change to other structural influences such as capitalism. However, he warns strongly against substituting interests for ideas; they are not always conceptually related as there are certain material needs that must be met, and as such interests and ideas must be treated independently.

Bøås and McNeill (2004) are a convincing example where interests are afforded their own conceptual identity while acknowledging a social constructivist paradigm. They agree with Wendt (1999) who claims that the structure of a social system contains three elements: material conditions, interests and ideas. Cox’s (1986) distinction between shared and contested ideas has implications here; contested (collective) ideas are drawn from prevailing power structures and different understandings of social concepts such as justice or wealth-distribution, whereas shared (or inter-subjective) ideas are constant throughout a historical period, based on social relations. The latter, therefore, are independent of material considerations, whereas the former are influenced by material conditions. Their conclusion states that:

> Ideas can be used, knowingly or unknowingly, to promote interests or even more deep-seated worldviews. Where these run counter to the interests or worldviews of others, they may be imposed not through the direct use of power, but through the exercise of what Gramsci calls ‘hegemony’; through the adoption of shared ideas, and agreement concerning collective images (Bøås & McNeill, 2004: 6).
They are arguing here that while a socially constructed view of ideas is important, it does not go as far as conceptually overpowering the role of interests; they go as far to argue the conceptual opposite, namely that interests can be the driving force behind ideas.

Tannenwald (2005) provides a useful typology to conceptualise the different relationships between the material and the ideational that are prevalent within the literature. Her first category, the realist approach, argues that ideas are ontologically distinct and separate entities from ‘realist’ variables of power and interest. The rationalist approach suggests that ideas may shape some aspects of power and interests, and precisely which ones they do influence is a matter for empirical research. Her final category, the constructivist approach, argues that ideas and material factors are not distinct and separate entities, but mutually constitutive.

Approaches such as that provided by Bøås and McNeill (2004) argue convincingly that material interests and ideas need to be kept conceptually distinct, in order to ensure that other structural considerations such as hegemony and power-distribution effects are fully represented within the analyses. While acknowledging constructivist considerations, it is important to appreciate the value that material considerations can add to the analysis. This thesis will therefore adopt an approach that keeps interests and ideas conceptually distinct; the analytical approach that is employed for this research is outlined in further detail in Chapter 4.

3.5. Institutionalism at the global level

As this chapter has demonstrated, much of the scholarship that uses historical and ideational frameworks has been used for analysis at the state or sub-state level. However, there are a few examples of it being used for supranational analysis in recent years, particularly in the international relations discipline. This section explores this literature.

There is a relevant literature to this thesis within international relations approaches that employs historical institutionalism. Since the global financial crash in 2008, a new scholarship on ‘international market regulation’ has arisen in global political economy, that debunks the idea (seen in state-building) that international economic policies are unrelated to domestic regulatory policies (Woll & Artigas, 2007), an issue that international relations schools have been keen to address (Farrell & Newman, 2010). They interestingly argue
that much international relations and global political economy scholarship has been concerned with what they perceive to be apolitical ‘technical’ issues (Drezner, 2010); this school has consequently stipulated that international market regulation is an inherently political task with significant distributional effects. Several of these scholars, in strikingly familiar language, stress the importance of ‘technical capacity’ as a source of power, emphasising that these capacities are inherently political. For example, Mosley (2010) uses an historical institutionalist approach to argue that a set of global standards and codes to govern capital markets will have little success for low and middle-income countries, as ‘domestic political institutions, as well as interests, often will lead to the failure of governments to implement global codes and standards’ (p. 761). Bach and Newman (2010) compare international regulation in the pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries, demonstrating differences in agenda-setting power within the industries, and emphasising the ‘relative sequential development over time of domestic regulatory capacity in leading markets’ which has translated into transgovernmental cooperation (p. 665). They credit historical institutionalism with ‘offering clear expectations for the origins of and terms of influence within such cooperation’, further reinforcing the point that capacity is not only not apolitical, but it is the consequence of path-dependent processes and is consequently highly contextual. Furthermore, capacity itself is a political resource; it is a source of power and preference (Drezner, 2010).

This literature has echoed classical historical institutionalism in that its focus has looked to explain variations, this time in domestic and international financial regulation. The criticism that has emerged from this search for explanation is that rational choice institutionalism and neoliberal institutionalism – in which state-building is embedded (see Chapter 2) – is flawed due to its insistence on the premise of equilibrium (Drezner, 2010; Levi, 1997). Specifically, ‘the belief that once power, preferences, ideas and institutions are put into the theoretical blender, the result will be a stable regulatory outcome that possesses the properties of a Nash equilibrium’ (Drezner, 2010: 793). The assumption within this approach is that there is no incentive for any actor to deviate from the status quo in global economic policy. The application of historical institutionalism, specifically the concepts of path dependency and sequencing, to international political economy has done much to debunk this assumption; an important consideration within the political economy of the fragile states agenda.
Drezner (2010) raises important questions about historical institutionalism being applied at the global level, specifically due to the presence of ‘regime complexes’. These complexes, he argues, undermine path-dependence theory. To demonstrate this point, he uses the example of the role of labour standards in US trade policy; path-dependency would predict that there should not be a role, as although human rights and labour unions have lobbying power, they are less powerful than business industries within the policy process of trade policy. Despite this, labour standards have become a significant part of trade policy, which Hafner-Burton (2009) posits came from Congress; certain members of the legislative branch had the veto power to make the executive branch ‘rethink trade policy’ to include labour rights. The US, with its considerable economic and negotiating power on the global stage, was able to insist on these clauses within trade agreements, despite the protests from the developing world (Drezner, 2010).

With this summation, Drezner (2010) is arguing that historical institutionalism is as yet under-theorised when applied to a global perspective, as it lacks an explanation for how domestic bureaucratic politics affects actors on the global stage, ‘where regulatory questions begin to cross multiple issue areas’ (p. 791), and where ‘regime complexes’ of overlapping and non-hierarchical polities are in place. He highlights that historical institutionalists need to explore the effects of these ‘nested and overlapping regimes’ at the global level.

This is an important point, and needs to be considered within empirical approaches to international organisations. The power-distributional considerations of political discourse within these organisations are particularly significant due to these ‘nested’ regimes, and as such need to be empirically considered within any analyses. However, his point that historical institutionalism is not appropriate because of these nested complexes can be challenged, as the nature of politics means that there are myriad influences, direct or otherwise, that impact on the policy discourse and process, whether it be at the macro or micro level. What is important is to delimit the scope of the analysis in a way that acknowledges these external influences (in doing so, potentially highlighting areas for further research), while addressing the empirical problem; undertaking institutional analysis at this level can have its own merits.
Ideational institutionalism at the global level

The most significant example of how institutionalist approaches have been applied at the global level in a way that overcomes the equilibrium, power-distribution and ‘constraining’ nature of historical institutionalism is offered by Bøås and McNeill (2004), in their edited volume *Global Institutions and Development*. The authors within this volume conceptualise discourses within the global arena, such as poverty and governance, as ‘ideas’, and so use ideationalism to trace the development of the ideas’ power, and how they navigate the institutional make-up of the global political sphere to gain potency. They link the power of the global actors to their ‘framing’ abilities, showing how attention is drawn to specific issues, and determining how such an idea is viewed. They identify two political forces that drive the ideational process within such organisations, specifically neoliberal ideology and what they call the ‘economic-technocratic nexus’ (p. 2). Significantly, they argue strongly that a process of ‘depoliticisation’ occurs while operationalising ideas:

*In short, we suggest that ideas that challenge the conventional wisdom become distorted as a result of a series of related pressures: depoliticization and ‘economization’ which may be – but are not necessarily – linked to neoliberal ideology and the material interests of those countries with most power in the system*  
(Bøås and McNeill, 2004: 2)

In order to encapsulate the power-relationship dynamics within their framework, they reject the idea of a fully social-constructivist philosophy in favour of a theory that, while acknowledging the socially constructed nature of politics, also draws on realist and neo-Gramscian theories to place more emphasis on power and power relationships, and the relationship between power and ideas. In doing so, they situate themselves in the middle ground of the realist-constructivist debate. This places them in a good position to examine both the material factors that some argue have been diluted or abandoned within ideational approaches, and the discursive element of politics that can be a key source of agency and change.

Some authors within this volume have examined how ideas flow through the World Bank, which offers some interesting insights into the Bank from an ideational-institutionalist perspective. Sindzingre (2004), Wade (2004) and McNeill (2004) examine the evolution of the concepts of poverty, the environment, and social capital respectively, and identify
various influences on the promotion of ideas and their interaction with institutions. The Bank, they argue, has a remarkable capacity to absorb new ideas, but its implementation of these new ideas is very slow, due to the size of the organisation and the challenge that many of these new ideas pose to the incentive structures that are already in place (Sindzingre, 2004; Wade, 2004). Consequently, the impact of new ideas can only be traced over a long time-span (Sindzingre, 2004). The Bank is, however, often a leader in new ideas in the broader development discourse – it led the way in the promotion of new ideas around poverty, environment and social capital, although early adoption of the idea does not necessarily guarantee continued momentum (Wade, 2004; McNeill, 2004). The Bank is keen to promote the idea that its leadership in these new agendas is driven by new academic insights and evidence; however, the work of Sindzingre (2004), Wade (2004) and McNeill (2004) identify various internal and external factors that coerce the Bank into engagement.

The first is external critics; it was the external criticism of structural adjustment that motivated the Bank to drastically overhaul its development approaches in light of the impact on poverty (Sindzingre, 2004; see Chapter 5). Similarly, Wade (2004) demonstrates how a massive campaign by NGOs was instrumental to the Bank’s consideration of the environmental impacts of its development policies. However, the Bank is also acutely aware of US policies and how the Bank reflects them (Sindzingre, 2004; Wade, 2004). The narrative of the emergence of environmental considerations is deeply entwined with the US – the Bank’s initial engagement with the concept of the environment, for example, echoed an emerging interest in US policy-making spheres in the environment. Similarly, when the momentum in the US faded, so did the World Bank’s (Wade, 2004). However, other external critics are able to use this relationship and reliance on US favour for their advantage;

The NGOs admitted that they had no right to tell the governments of developing countries what to do. But they claimed every right to lobby the US government on what instructions should be given to the US executive director about how the Bank lending resources should be used (Wade, 2004: 82–83).

This is not to say that the governments of developing countries did not have an influence. Sindzingre (2004) identifies the outcomes of domestic policies in these countries as an influencer of ideas in the Bank, although these outcomes are framed by the Bank’s own
conceptual interrogations of the issues and the consequent operationalisation for measurement. Wade (2004) also argues that the recipient countries’ dissatisfaction with environment policies, which they saw as Western pressure to adopt policies at the expense of economic growth, was a factor in the Bank taking a step back from environment considerations after its initial enthusiasm. (It is worth noting, however, that this may have been a convenience to the Bank; there was little desire internally to continue promoting the agenda due to the US’s waning interest as mentioned previously, and to the implicit agreement with the developing countries that these policies impeded the Bank’s fundamental concern, economic growth. The recipient countries’ concerns consequently offered them a welcome opportunity to withdraw from the agenda.)

Another factor that the scholars identify is the role of the research department in the Bank. While the Bank continues first and foremost to be a ‘Bank’, with its operational priorities being lending, it has taken to positioning itself as a ‘knowledge’ Bank, producing an increasing amount of research which it perceives and promotes as a public good (Sindzingre, 2004). However, the context in which this research is developed is significant; the Bank is still heavily dominated by economists (there is an increasing number of political scientists and sociologists in its employ, although the extent of their power in terms of agenda promotion is questionable; see Chapter 5). Consequently, the evidence base that the Bank’s research develops is based on econometric ideals and cross-country regressions; its leadership role and power in terms of voice and power means that the research and datasets that it produces (often the only large datasets available) are influential in driving the broader development discourse. This power of its discourse can be a problem, however; as Wade (2004) points out, the NGO campaign against the Bank regarding its approach to the environment was not directed to any great extent at any other institutions, as the Bank was seen as the main actor, leader and, consequently, offender.

A paradox can be identified within Sindzingre’s (2004) analysis of the Bank’s research processes; on the one hand, she argues that the Bank has amnesia in terms of previous work, perhaps reflecting the internal conflict and power dynamics that institutionalise some ideas and not others. On the other hand, she argues that much of the research the Bank produces is self-referential, suggesting a certain inward-looking approach that is self-validating. This is not to say that the research always reflects the homogenous ‘party line’ approach that is often the external perception of the World Bank; disagreements exist. For example Easterly’s (2000) paper that structural adjustment had no effect on poverty
reduction, which is strongly antithetical to the Bank’s formal position. This calls into question the relative power of the different individuals that are promoting the different ideas within the Bank. Individuals are pointed to overwhelmingly as influential in the promotion or failure of ideas, in particular senior individuals; presidents, in particular McNamara and Wolfensohn, are considered influential in all three of the poverty, environmental and social capital agendas. Other key figures such as Joseph Stiglitz, as a Vice-President and Chief Economist, are also identified as being able to introduce some of his ideas into the Bank’s research portfolio (Sindzingre, 2004).

However, above these individuals, a dominating factor within the literature is the role of the Board, which Sindzingre (2004) identifies as highly influential to the elaboration of ideas. The Board is made up of 24 executive directors that represent the 184 member countries, with the proportion of the shares being divided according to each country’s economic weight. This of course grants further power to the US, which holds enough shares to veto any decision. The Board has to give its approval to all the different stages of operations, thus affording Western normative values a higher purchasing power than those in developing countries in terms of the Bank’s authorising environment. This broader contextual environment is crucial in terms of the ability for ideas to take root at both the research and policy level.

Sindzingre (2004) argues that the research department creates a bridge between the Board and the policy developments of the Bank; in principle, once the Board has approved an operation the staff have the agency to choose the design and technical aspects, but these are validated by the work of the research department, which in turn is validated by both the Bank’s higher organisational bodies (e.g. the Board) and its participation in the international research community through academic journals. However, McNeill (2004) identifies a bifurcation between the research department and the policy arena. Exploring the use of conceptual definitions within Bank discourse (a key concern for social scientists, and economists in particular), he highlights how a lack of conceptual clarity stands in the way of operational utility in terms of measuring any given concept. For a concept to gain traction in operational terms, therefore, the measurement needs to be effective and fruitful in terms of the Bank’s overarching incentive – the disbursement of loans. This is one factor that contributes to the slow integration of new ideas into the Bank’s portfolio as highlighted above (Sindzingre, 2004), but also shows how vulnerable concepts can be outside of the research domain, as highlighted by Wade’s (2004) example whereby the
environment agenda took time to gain traction, as the Bank’s leadership did not initially understand the complexities within the concept. When concepts such as this clash with other priorities – such as the overriding concern with growth – they are vulnerable to being whitewashed by competing incentives and ideas. It is only when it becomes ‘costly’ for the Bank not to adopt ideas (e.g. when US Congress held lending resources hostage unless environmental factors were considered) that these concepts gain or regain their power (Wade, 2004).

In summary, these studies of the World Bank identified various influences, including individuals, structural factors and both internal and external incentives, on the power of ideas. The extent to which these ideas in turn influence the Bank is still in question; McNeill (2004) argues that the social capital agenda, while influencing some modifications to the Bank’s economics ethos, did not impact the Bank’s technocratic approach in any way, which is fundamental to the nature of the institution. This suggests that there are limits to the extent of the Bank’s ability to change in response to new ideas, and that those changes there are may consist of ‘surface’ changes; McNeill (2004) goes as far to describe some new agendas as ‘Trojan Horses’, as the Bank’s broader contextual and structural considerations are solidly embedded through power-distribution and path-dependency, reflecting the resistance of the institution to change (see Section 3.2).

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of institutionalism which both provides more insight into the influence of the institutionalist approach in state-building practices, and which offers a theoretical and methodological approach that is suitable to study the development of discourses in the global political arena over time. It has identified several debates within institutionalist scholarship that are important to address within empirical analysis, specifically the agency-constraint debate, the realist-constructivist debate and the interests-ideational debate. How these are applied to this thesis is outlined in Chapter 4. The final section has drawn on the small literature that exists that applies this theoretical framework to the World Bank, outlining some key influences on the promotion of ideas and their interaction with the Bank’s institutional architecture. These will be revisited and discussed in light of this thesis’s findings in Chapter 10.
Chapter 4
Methods

4.0. Introduction

The primary aim of this study is to examine social protection in fragile states from the perspective of the Bank. Specifically, it aims to understand the relationship between these two different development agendas (social protection and fragile states) – both key agendas within the overarching discipline of ‘development’ – within the world’s most influential development institution. Further, this study seeks to establish how the institutional and ideational architecture of the Bank facilitates or hinders the relationship between them. By exploring the trajectory of each agenda through the Bank’s institutional architecture, with a particular focus on to what extent and how each agenda considers the other and the relationship between them, this thesis contributes to both the social protection and fragile states literatures, and provides insights into how different strands within the broader discourses of ‘development’ interact (either positively or negatively), and the impact this has on the Bank’s social protection strategies within fragile states.

To understand how the interrelatedness of the social protection and fragile states agendas has been facilitated or hindered by the Bank’s institutional architecture, the study examines the development of the agendas over time, so that the current state of social protection in fragile states as considered by the Bank can be better understood within its historical context (Pierson, 2004). This thesis consequently borrows from the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism has most commonly been applied to institutional systems at a country level; this thesis applies the framework to an international organisation, contributing to a nascent body of work in this area (e.g. Bøås & McNeill, 2004).

The theoretical framework used for this study borrows time-related concepts from historical institutionalism such as path-dependency and the notion that time is important to institutional considerations (Pierson, 2004), in order to trace a ‘detailed and holistic
analysis of sequences’ (Bennett & Elman, 2006)⁶. However, this study also seeks to capture change, in particular to study the role of the ideas surrounding social protection and fragile states, and their relationship with stakeholder interests and power distributions within the Bank’s institutional make-up. The ‘pure’ historical institutionalist model has been criticised as insufficient in explaining change (see Chapter 3). Consequently, this study follows the theoretical approach adopted by Bøås and McNeill (2004), described here as ‘ideational institutionalism’. This is similar to Schmidt’s (2010; 2011) ‘discursive institutionalism’, which seeks to capture the explanatory power of ideas and discourse. However, the approach used for this study stops short of her fully constructivist approach, in order to capture the realist assumption that the variables of power and interests are ontologically distinct from ideas (Tannenwald, 2005). As Bøås and McNeill (2004) explain:

If we accept the central premise that both ideas (shared and contested) and the distribution of power (ideational and material) matter, then we need to study the interplay between actors and structures in the various power games that take place in relation to these material and ideational struggles in multilateral institutions.

(Bøås & McNeill, 2004: 5).

The remainder of this chapter sets out the methods used to achieve the aims of this thesis. The following section sets out the research questions, followed by the methods used to generate a robust and valid dataset to answer the questions, adopting a qualitative approach that utilises elite interviews and documentary analysis.

4.1. Research questions

In order to meet the research aims of this study, a series of research questions were developed:

1) How did the fragile states agenda develop over time in the World Bank?
2) How did the social protection agenda develop over time in the World Bank?
3) To what extent, and how, did these two agendas interact during their development?

⁶ It should be noted that the consideration of time has methodological implications, particularly in the sampling strategy, which will be discussed in the following sections.
4) To what extent, and how, did the institutional architecture of the World Bank facilitate or hinder the development of each agenda, and their interaction?

These four questions build upon one another to provide insights into the approach to social protection in fragile states at the Bank. The first two questions look at the two agendas separately, to trace their development and in doing so to identify the ideas, interests and institutional forces that were influential on the development of each agenda. While the literature does to some extent trace the overarching approach of the Bank (and the development community more broadly) to both these concepts, there is little academic scrutiny of how the ideas came to fruition and developed within the Bank; these two questions therefore address these gaps in the literature and are formulated to make an original contribution to the scholarship on social protection and fragile states. The third question seeks to draw on the knowledge gained from answering the first two questions to establish whether, and how, each agenda considered the other throughout their development. The fourth question examines these findings in the terms of the World Bank’s institutional architecture.

Careful consideration was taken over the use of the word ‘agenda’. Other possibilities were considered, such as ‘discourse’ or ‘approach’. Discourse was rejected as it was felt that this was too restrictive; it would capture the theoretical and conceptual discussions around fragile states and social protection, but it would not capture important aspects of the development process such as the translation from theoretical and conceptual discourse into operational strategies. ‘Approach’ was similarly considered too restrictive as it was deemed to focus too much on what the World Bank does, as opposed to why it does what it does; it omits an analysis of the generation and development of ideas. ‘Agenda’ here is used in order to capture not only the discourse that surrounds each of the concepts, but also how the discourse is translated into operational work.

These four questions were collectively formulated to make an original contribution to existing literature, both by developing a new dataset and by providing an opportunity for theory development. The questions were kept ‘open’ in order to facilitate inductive enquiry (Gillham, 2000; see following sections for further details).
4.2. Research design

Institutionalist approaches have suffered accusations of a lack of methodological exposition (Lieberman, 2001). This study has therefore taken steps to ensure that it is not vulnerable to such accusations by developing a robust research design that seeks to maximise validity and reliability within the method selection, data collection and analysis processes. Several different methods were considered in order to establish their efficacy in addressing the research questions. The first consideration addressed the use of qualitative and quantitative methods. Quantitative methods were considered on the whole not to be suitable for this study, as the concepts under scrutiny could not meaningfully be reduced to numbers; qualitative data was deemed more appropriate due to the ‘how’ nature of the research questions and more able to capture the nuance and interpretations of meaning of the processes that drove the development of the two agendas (Given, 2008; Maxwell, 2009). Furthermore, early explorations of the potential for quantitative study demonstrated that the potential for securing good secondary data is problematic for fragile states or work associated with them, particularly for a time-sensitive study, as fragile states are rarely in a position to gather and publish national-level data (OECD, 2008; Carpenter et al., 2012). However, before quantitative approaches were rejected completely, the potential for a quantitative analysis of qualitative data through content analysis was explored. Content analysis is defined as ‘a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ (Berelson, 1952: 18). This method offered the potential to examine documentary data from the World Bank that had been published over time, to examine how the discourses around social protection and fragile states had evolved and analyse them quantitatively through content-analysis software. This offered the potential to utilise the large volume of documentary data that the Bank makes public.

This method, however, was problematic due to sampling issues. The total volume of documents that the Bank has produced over the time period was too large to analyse in its entirety. This could be mitigated by refining results through terms such as ‘social protection’ and ‘fragile states’. However, this was problematic as the name of the fragile states agenda has changed frequently over time (this is explained in further detail in Section 4.3 and in the Findings chapters); in order to ensure that all documents pertinent to fragile states were included a manual element to the sampling would be required, to

7 The time period chosen for study is discussed in Section 5.1.
establish the different terms used for the fragile states agenda. This undermined the usefulness of using content-analysis software as a tool to analyse a large volume of data. Furthermore, the documents published by the Bank have different weights and emphasis, rendering some more relevant for this study than others. For example, documents range from World Development Reports (WDRs), the Bank’s flagship annual publications that provide a ‘state of the world’ overview of a development issue, to think pieces written by certain members of staff that offer a particular point of view or perspective. While documents such as WDRs are useful in terms of the Bank’s approach and agenda regarding a certain topic, think pieces by staff are less relevant, and may run counter to the Bank’s approach and thereby skew the data. This could be mitigated by using a ‘series’ of documents that have equal weight and purpose. Consequently, the possibility of using Country Assistance Strategy documents (CASs) was considered. CASs are the most important country-level documents, and are developed in conjunction with a country government that sets out the level and type of assistance the Bank will provide to the country for a four-year period\(^8\). This method offered some potential, in that it offered some insight into how social protection was considered within fragile states over time on the ground. However, the method would not yield insights into how the ideas had developed, and why, and how they had moved within the institutional framework of the Bank; it could only offer insights into how the ideas were translated operationally. This offered limited value in terms of the research questions.

At the initial stages of the data collection, content analysis of the CAS documents was kept open as a possibility. Through this exploration of the potential of different research methods, however, it became clear that the ideal method for answering the research questions that looked to uncover ideational processes and development was interviews with those who had a first-hand perspective (see Section 4.3.1), from which details of the interaction between ideas, interests and institutions could be established through the triangulation of testimonies. There was reluctance at this stage of method development to embrace interviews as the primary data source, however, as the sampling criteria for those involved in the development of the two agendas dictated that the type of interview fell under the category of ‘elite’ interviews, which, as the literature forcefully suggests, often suffer from access problems (e.g. Lilleker, 2003; Odendahl & Shaw, 2002). The initial

---

\(^8\) CASs were introduced in 1990. Recently, they were renamed as ‘Country Partnership Framework’ (CPF) documents.
method, therefore, looked to a documentary analysis of key strategy documents, to establish how the strategy developed over time, complemented with the CAS content analysis, to identify how the strategies were being implemented in the field and how this changed over time. In addition, attempts would be made to source interviews where possible with past and present actors in the World Bank to give insights into ‘behind the scenes’ processes as to how ideas and strategies came about, and the debates and discourse that surrounded them. Interviews with World Bank staff would also be able to identify which documents were of particular relevance in terms of the development of the two agendas.

However, when interviews were sought (initially with junior members of the Bank, see Section 4.3.1), it became clear that many World Bank staff were receptive to participating in the research. Furthermore, the data that was being gathered through the initial interviews was of particularly high quality and pertinent to the research questions, as they were rendering highly valuable insights such as the role of certain key events in shaping the agendas, and themes pertinent to the ideational development (such as importance of the discourse around governance in shaping the fragile states agenda) that were not easily found within the documents (see Chapters 6 to 9). Consequently, the CAS content analysis was dropped from the analysis in preference for a broader interview strategy, and the time and resources were transferred to securing interviews.

The final approach was therefore qualitative in nature, which was the most appropriate to capture the influences – political and ideational – on policy and practice, rather than the outcomes of these policies and practices (Carmines & Zeller, 1979; Beamer, 2002; Richards, 1996). The approach was multi-method, complementing the elite interviews with the key personnel involved in the development of the ideas and the policies with the documentary analysis of key World Bank documents. This multi-method approach not only established a degree of triangulation and enhanced validity, but also enabled a mutually dependent relationship between the two sources of data; documents were able to assist in the sampling strategy for the interviews, and the interviews were able to establish which documents were particularly influential and significant, and therefore confirm their inclusion in the analysis (this was to prove particularly important, as interviews revealed that some documents that seemed initially to be important had not actually influenced the discourse in any way, and vice versa). The following sections examine the two methods separately, before summarising the benefits and limitations of the data collection strategy.
4.3. Data collection

4.3.1. Elite interviews

As seen above, interviews were considered to be the most effective and suitable method in terms of tracing the narrative of the development of the two agendas. As the sample of those most appropriate for interview are members of the global policy elite, ‘elite’ interviews were considered the most appropriate form of interview, which raised a certain set of benefits and challenges. Elite interviews are the most suitable method in terms of understanding the theoretical positions of policy makers, their beliefs and ideologies (Richards, 1996; Beamer, 2002), and can yield rich insights into ‘behind closed doors’ data (May, 2001). As Lilleker (2003: 213) puts it, ‘no one is able to offer the level of knowledge of an issue […] as one deeply involved within that area’. The ability of elite interviews to uncover the hidden elements of political and organisational processes that are not evident in other data sources rendered them most appropriate for this study (Tansey, 2007). While documents can offer a ‘roadmap’ as to the progression of policy and thinking in an institution, details such as the deliberations, negotiations and compromises that constitute the policy process are not captured. Tansey (2007) highlights this inherent weakness in a purely document-driven analysis of a political process, demonstrating how it can present a misleading account that presents only the ‘official’ version of events, implying consensus towards a final product. Furthermore, documents can provide an abundance of data that renders it difficult to critically assess the value of a document; speaking to authors and those involved in the broader process can help a researcher establish their significance (for further discussion see Section 4.3.2). This renders elite interviews a potent source of data with regard to political processes and the development of concepts (Tansey, 2007), and as such they were consequently considered the most suitable method to uncover information on the political sphere of the World Bank, in particular the institutional and political influences on ideas (Beamer, 2002).

There is little consensus or theoretical development as to what constitutes an ‘elite’ in the literature (Harvey, 2011; Richards, 1996; Mikecz, 2012; Leech, 2002). For this study, an ‘elite’ was considered as a current or former World Bank staff member, and fell into the category that Odendahl and Shaw (2002) call ‘professional elites’. However, within this sample there are different levels of ‘elite’; the actors who could exert influence in varying degrees and in various ways range from the presidential level of the Bank to junior
consultants and researchers. However, it does not necessarily follow that the most senior level within the elite sample has the most valuable testimony in terms of the progression of the two agendas; the potential for influence and different levels of the hierarchy, and the way that influence can be used, is in fact an important part of the analysis. In addition, the identification of those within the sample who were influential, at different levels of the elite spectrum, is crucial for sourcing the most relevant interviews. These considerations have implications for both sampling and access (see following sections).

The next sections look at the sampling, access and the interview process, bearing these implications in mind. The strategy for the interviews was built on the practical guidance from a growing literature on elite interviewing (e.g. Richards, 1996; Hertz & Imber, 1995; Lilleker, 2003; Beamer, 2002; Harvey, 2011) to develop sampling techniques, enhance the probability of gaining access, ensure validity and develop questioning strategies.

**Sampling**

The sampling strategy for elite interviews can be a significant issue in securing valid data (Richards, 1996; Lilleker, 2003; Beamer, 2002). For this study, the aim is not to make inferences about a larger population, as is the case with some qualitative interview strategies. This study looks to reconstruct a process or processes, and the discourse, debate and conceptual thinking that helped to drive these processes. As such, probability sampling was not considered appropriate, as taking a probability-driven approach could result in key actors in the debate being omitted from the sample (Tansey, 2007). A non-probability approach, specifically a purposive method, was considered most methodologically suitable to pursue the research goals of this study, as it seeks to access a certain set of actors that are most able to provide insights to the processes under investigation. However, as individuals pertinent to this study are a set of actors that is not easily identifiable and visible, compiling a list of the population poses problems for the purposive sampling strategy. From this standpoint, a snowball strategy to support and augment the initial purposive sample was deemed appropriate (Tansey, 2007). Furthermore, a snowball strategy has potential to overcome the access problems associated with elite interviewing (see following section).

To identify an initial purposive sample with which to start the snowball sample, it was important to gain a detailed knowledge of the field and the actors within it (Richard, 1996),
in order to establish the actors that are of particular relevance and influence. However, as Farquharson (2005) highlights in her work on policy networks, establishing key actors in a policy field can be a difficult task, as the environment is constantly in flux, through policy developments or changes in power dynamics. This problem is exacerbated when tracing policy developments over a long historical period. Consequently, a multistage approach was adopted to identify the key actors in the development of the policy ideas over time. The first stage looked to key documents that have been published by the Bank that were pertinent to the research questions.

At this stage, it became clear that the purposive sampling strategy for the fragile states agenda would be more complex than for the social protection agenda. This was due to the complexity in the fragile states agenda that resulted in a lack of a coherent ‘thread’ throughout the fragile states discourse – work on different aspects of the fragility concept arose in different parts of the Bank, with different terminology, with little conceptual linkage, particularly in the early stages (see the Findings chapters for a more detailed exposition of this). Unlike the social protection agenda, the fragile states agenda did not have a dedicated department from the beginning through which an analysis of the agenda could be traced. Consequently, it was much easier to identify the target population for social protection as the term ‘social protection’ was frequently included in their job title. It was also easier to identify key social protection documents – in particular the social protection strategy documents – and compile a list of their authors and contributors to create an initial purposive sample for the interviews.

The personnel working on the fragile states agenda, however, were much harder to identify. It was at this stage that the initial finding arose that identified that terms in the literature such as ‘fragile states’ and ‘state-building’ were not terms that were used widely in the Bank, and when they were used, it was with little consistency. There was no department or job title, particularly in the early stages, that aligned easily with the agenda. There was consequently no easily accessible source of all the tactical and strategic decision makers and implementers (Goldstein, 2002; Tansey, 2007). It was therefore necessary to turn to key documents regarding ‘fragile states’ and ‘fragility’, and to acknowledge this as a finding to explore in more detail within the interviews. The most significant document found in Google searches and searches of the Bank’s document library⁹ was the World Development Report 2011, on Fragility, Conflict and Violence (see Chapter 8).

Contributors to this report were included within the target population, together with the authors and contributors of other documents deemed to be key (e.g. the LICUS Taskforce Report, see Chapter 6). These documents were then also included within the documentary analysis (see Section 4.3.2).

This stage of the sampling strategy was complemented by website research, in order to gain a better grasp of the field. As more documents were uncovered, and a better understanding of the terminology surrounding fragile states over time was established, it was possible to trace a rudimentary path among the different iterations of the department(s) that looked at fragile states, such as the Lower Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) department (see Chapter 6) and the Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) team (see Chapter 9). The complexities of these iterations were uncovered in much more detail through the interviews, however this rudimentary understanding through exploration of documents and the Bank website was sufficient at this stage to develop a base purposive sample. It was bolstered by the use of professional networking sites such as LinkedIn to identify further potential participants that had similar job titles or interests as those identified through the documents.

Throughout this process, it was important to acknowledge that this was an historical study, and that consequently potential key participants may no longer be working at the Bank. In these cases, therefore, it was necessary to do further web-based research through Google searches and networking sites to identify the up-to-date contact details of those whose names were sourced through older documents, but who were no longer working at the Bank. This was an iterative process – sometimes it was not clear that they had left the Bank until an attempt at first contact had been made but the email was ‘bounced back’ by the World Bank server due to an unrecognised email address – and yielded mixed success. It was therefore necessary to concentrate more time and resources to sourcing these past Bank employees, through further Google searches or through the ‘snowball’ stages of sampling, e.g. sourcing their contact details through former colleagues or seeking an introduction to them from these former colleagues. This was relatively successful; this, together with the fact that several interviewees had worked at the Bank for the 22 years under study, meant that there was good coverage of the whole time period through the interviews.
The original purposive sample exercise yielded a list of 40 interviewees\textsuperscript{10} that became the first ‘initial set’ of potential participants for interview (Tansey, 2007). At this stage the interviews began, and the sampling process turned to one of a non-probability snowball sampling approach. At the end of every interview that was secured, the interviewee was asked to suggest other people whom they believed would have pertinent insights into the topics that had been discussed within the interview. In addition, the interview itself yielded insights into influential people, as actors were identified in the answers to the interview questions (see following section and Appendices A and B). Throughout this process judgements had to be made to ensure that the chain of referrals remained relevant to the research aim of the study (Tansey, 2007). The snowball process was also able to correct errors in the purposive sample; some respondents on the initial sample list self-identified as being inappropriate for the study based on the information sheet and covering email (see following section) (for example, if they were named on a large project report, but had been included as part of the project team through their expertise on a tangential area such as environment policies). In these cases, respondents would often recommend colleagues who would be more appropriate.

The snowball sampling continued throughout the whole interview data collection phase; after about 20 interviews had been undertaken, the names of the key actors began to emerge frequently, suggesting that the sample population list was reaching saturation. This reflected the small population under study, consisting of World Bank employees who had worked in some capacity on social protection or fragile states. Approximately 30 new names emerged as part of the snowball stage of recruitment.

This two-stage approach, consisting of a purposive sample generated from documentary analysis and web searches followed by a snowball sampling method, proved to be very successful in terms of response rate. The implied saturation of the field that emerged during the snowball stage provided confidence that the purposive sample list compiled by the strategy had identified the key actors. The number of nominations each actor received also provided insights into how influential they were in the process (Farquharson, 2005). Further benefits emerged from the strategy; during the first round of interviews, useful data was generated that identified key moments and decisions that were influential in the

\textsuperscript{10} It is important to note that the list of 40 was the ‘ideal’ list; not everyone on this list responded or agreed to an interview (see following section).
development of World Bank policy and implementation, which provided useful leads as to further potential informants who were involved in those moments and decisions.

However, this is not to say that the strategy is without limitations. As Farquharson (2005) highlighted, policy networks are not fixed; the in-flux nature of these debates and the time-limited nature of the fieldwork means that it cannot be guaranteed that people – or events and documents that provided the baseline of the purposive sample – of influence and significance have not been missed off the final population list. The muddied nature of the conceptual discussion of fragility in the Bank (as detailed earlier) further complicated this, as without a concrete strategy (such as that seen with regard to social protection) that addresses fragile states directly, identifying actors who were involved in what the literature base perceives as ‘state-building’ or within ‘fragile states’ work within the Bank setting was difficult, as the remit fell across different departments at different time periods (see Chapters 6 to 9). This exacerbated another limitation with the sampling strategy, namely that the reliance on a snowball strategy risks a bias in the sample that reflects the initial respondents’ own networks, friendships or interests (Beamer, 2002; Tansey, 2007). This study sought to minimise this limitation by broadening the documentary and internet searches that yielded the initial set of interviewees as much as possible to avoid generating a sample through snowballing that only reflected a particular ‘bubble’ of thought within the World Bank. Throughout the interviews, questions were also crafted to illicit information into ‘opposition’ views, e.g. while discussing contentious or controversial issues asking specifically who ‘opposed’ the view of the interviewee, in order to gain insights into further avenues of investigation that could minimise the bubble effect (Beamer, 2002). This has provided some confidence that these limitations have been overcome as much as possible; however, as with all purposive and snowball sampling strategies, this limitation must be considered when regarding the validity of this study.

Gaining access

The final population list of the purposive sample identified approximately 70 names. However, while the list was considered as robust as possible within the limitations outlined above, gaining access to those on the list was key to achieving the sample’s potential; as Goldstein (2002: 671) highlights, ‘picking a good sample is of little use if you cannot get your sample units to speak with you’. Gaining access is the key methodological problem

85
with elite interviewing (Hertz & Imber, 1995; Harvey, 2011), and is one of the biggest risks to an empirical project of this nature, as ‘elites are by their very nature difficult to infiltrate’ (Hertz & Imber, 1995: viii), and are ‘busy officials who are widely sought after’ (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002: 673). It was therefore necessary to build a comprehensive and systematic strategy in order to maximise the chance of success in gaining access (Ostrander, 2003; Goldstein, 2002), based on the techniques outlined in the body of literature. However, the body of literature in this field is limited, as there is a lack of studies that systematically address methods of gaining access to elites; nearly all the literature does little more than retell experiences from the field (e.g. Ostrander, 2003; Stephens, 2007). Despite this, some ‘best practice’ strategies can be gleaned from the literature, and were employed within this study (see following).

Access was sought through email contact. A template email was developed (Appendix F) that sought to be as detailed as possible (Richards, 1996) about the nature of the research and what was required from the interviewee. The email was sent from my University of York email address, and the institutional affiliation as a doctoral student was stressed, with reassurances that the research was not being financed by an external funding body, and that the work was associated with an institution that was reputationally strong (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). While working within the template, each email was tailored to each participant depending on their current situation, and their perceived relevance to the project (e.g. if they worked on a particular document that was pertinent to one of the two agendas under study). An Information Sheet (Appendix D) was attached to every email which included the University of York logo, and which gave further information about the research and the data, including information about anonymity and attribution, data storage and use, how results would be disseminated, and what the interview would entail.

The email was also tailored depending on the location of the potential interviewee. As the World Bank’s headquarters are based in Washington D.C., fieldwork was undertaken in the city for two weeks in October / November 2016. For potential interviewees who were based in the D.C. offices, or working at alternative locations in the D.C. area, the email was tailored to suggest a face-to-face meeting during the fieldwork period. For those not located in D.C., the choice of a telephone or video conference call (e.g. through software such as Skype) was offered. The initial email, and any follow-up emails, all emphasised my flexibility with regard to scheduling interviews, and emphasised a willingness to work around the interviewee’s schedule (Harvey, 2009; Mikecz, 2012).
Contact details were sought, as seen in the above section, from public documents or the World Bank’s webpages. From this, it was possible to establish the Bank’s email address format, which can be expressed as:

[initial][surname]@worldbank.org

From this it was possible to generate email addresses for any sampled interviewee who did not have publicly available contact details. For potential interviewees who no longer worked at the Bank, internet searches were made to establish their contact details (see previous section). For approximately eight people on the sample list, email addresses could not be found via internet searches, or through the subsequent snowballing strategy. Five of these potential interviewees, however, were found on LinkedIn, so a LinkedIn account was set up in order to contact them through the professional networking site.

The response rate for the initial round of emails was broadly successful, with approximately 60% of the potential interviewees responding after one email. The next stage of recruitment represented a strategy of being ‘politely persistent’ (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002: 673). Follow-up emails were sent every two weeks, for up to four attempts. If this proved unsuccessful, then enquiries would be made in interviews with their colleagues as to whether introductions could be made. The literature suggests that gatekeepers would be a problem (e.g. Dexter, 1970), however this did not pose a problem with this research.

The interview

In total, 46 interviews were secured, 15 face-to-face (12 in Washington D.C., three in the U.K.), and 32 over the phone or video conference. Traditional methodological advice suggests that face-to-face interviews are preferable to technology (e.g. Gillham, 2005). However, the international nature of the study, with the sampling list including potential interviewees in the US, Europe, Africa, Asia and Australia, meant that insisting on face-to-face interviews severely compromised the availability of data, and would bias the sample towards those working in the Washington D.C. office or former employees who now worked in the UK, as time and resources would restrict further access. It was therefore considered that the benefits of telephone and video conference interviews would outweigh the negatives with regard to this study. Furthermore, some of the benefits of face-to-face
interviews as outlined in the literature, such as the ethnographic context of an interviewee’s home or work place (Holt, 2010), or the need to make the interviewee feel at ease (Irvine, 2011), were less relevant to this study, due to the elite and professional nature of the interviewees who were unlikely to be intimidated by the interview format. Recent empirical research (e.g. Irvine, 2011; Irvine et al., 2013) suggests that telephone interviews are shorter, cover fewer topics than face-to-face interviews and require more direction by the interviewer. However, this was not the experience of this study; indeed, some of the longest and richest interviews were conducted over the telephone, reflecting the opinion of some researchers (e.g. Stephens, 2007; Chapple, 1999) that telephone interviews can be ‘just as good’ as face-to-face interviews.

There is less academic literature available on video conference software such as Skype, reflecting the relatively recent emergence of the technology. There is essentially no empirical research at the time of writing that analyses interviews through Skype or other software packages systematically (Deakin & Wakefield, 2013). However, the limited literature that there is argues that Skype brings together the benefits of a face-to-face interview, such as the visibility of nonverbal and social cues enabling rapport (Janghorban et al., 2014) and those of the telephone interview, such as the mitigation of geographical distance and the time and cost-saving positives (Hanna, 2012). Thus, it was considered an appropriate form of interview for this study; however, it should be noted that a couple of interviews conducted over video conferencing technology did suffer technical issues, particularly when the interviewee was situated in Africa, and where the internet connection was weak. The data was consequently compromised within these interviews.

The interviews took place in a variety of different locations. Face-to-face interviews occurred in a place convenient to the interviewee, which was usually in their office in the World Bank D.C. headquarters. Three of the D.C. interviews took place in alternative locations such as coffee shops or hotel lobbies; these were always in public places in order to secure researcher safety. On these occasions, ‘quiet’ locations were sought within the venues, in order to maximise the confidentiality of the proceedings and to ensure that background noise did not interfere with the recordings, and informal consent was secured from respondents in these cases regarding the potential for confidentiality and anonymity to be compromised. Telephone and video conference interviews took place in a secure room at the Research Centre for Social Sciences (ReCSS) at the University of York.
Before the interview, consent forms were sent to every interviewee (Appendix C). Distance interviewees were asked to read and return the consent form before the interview, whereas with face-to-face interviews, while the interviewees were sent the consent form prior to the interview to give them time to read it, they were asked to fill in the form at the commencement of the interview. The majority agreed to this, however a few (both distance and face-to-face) preferred to wait until the interview was completed to fill in the form, so that they could make a decision on the anonymity clause once they understood the line of questioning the interview would take (see following section for further information).

The consent form asked the respondent to indicate whether they agreed to their name and job title being used in the thesis and associated research outputs, or whether they preferred to remain anonymous. There were associated risks with anonymity, however; the information sheet explained that, due to the nature of the research within one organisation, complete anonymity could not be assured due to the small population size of the sample (although efforts would be made to ensure confidentiality as much as possible within these parameters). The limitations of anonymity were reiterated at the beginning of every interview, and interviewees were asked if they were happy to continue on that basis; all agreed to this and understood the limitations of anonymity within the Bank. For those that agreed to be ‘on the record’ (i.e. to be quoted with their name and job title), a discussion was had at the beginning of the interview where it was highlighted that if anything came up that was of a sensitive nature that they did not want attributed to them, to highlight this so that the record reflected their anonymity request, and assurances were made that this would be applied in the analysis and write-up. This was in order to uphold the highest ethical standards, and had the additional benefit of putting the interviewee at ease with regard to their own record.

The consent form also outlined that the interview would be recorded for transcription purposes, and that the recording would be kept secure and only used for the researcher’s reference. This again was discussed at the beginning of each interview to ensure that the interviewee, whether face-to-face or at distance, was happy for the interview to be recorded. All but one interviewee agreed to the recording; the interviewee that declined changed their mind about seven minutes in to the interview, once they realised that the line of questioning was not controversial, meaning that all but these seven minutes of data was captured on record. Ten of the interviewees asked for the transcript to be sent to them after the interview, while four asked to see the outputs (e.g. any quotes) before they were
published to ensure that their views had been represented accurately; this was agreed (see Section 4.5 for further details).

After the initial discussion surrounding the consent form, the substantive section of the interview commenced. The questioning took a form that optimised the opportunity to elicit the interviewee’s account of their experiences and perspective (Mikecz, 2012). Questioning took the form of a semi-structured interview; a semi-structured form was considered most appropriate because the use of open-ended questions supported the objective to elicit interviewees’ own accounts of their experiences and perspectives (Harvey, 2011; Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; Mikecz, 2012; Stephens, 2007), while the opportunity to prompt and probe their answers could provide further depth and insight into their ‘taken-for-granted’ norms (Stephens, 2007) within the World Bank setting. The flexible line of questioning also created the opportunity for interviewees to introduce issues, events and concepts that they considered important to the debate. The structured element of the interview insured that all topics could be covered within the time available (Harvey, 2011; Mikecz, 2012) and, as this was an historical study, to follow the chronology of the debate in accordance with the interviewee’s own experience (Atkinson, 2002). It also ensured that the conversation remained in-line with the research focus (Beamer, 2002). Two different topic guides were developed for actors who were involved in social protection at the Bank (Appendix B) and those who were involved in the fragile states agenda (Appendix A).

However, the structured element was kept very flexible for two reasons. The first was to reflect the individual experience of each interviewee. The different areas of expertise of the interviewees, the nature of their work during their time at the Bank, together with the timespan of their career at the institution (or, more specifically, the differing periods of time on which they were working in a position that was relevant to the research questions), meant that flexibility and preparation before the interview was necessary to ensure that the line of questioning was relevant to their experience and career timeline.

Post-interview dialogue

After each interview, an email was sent to the interviewee thanking them for their time and their contribution to the study. If the interviewee had not returned the Consent Form prior to the interview or in its immediate aftermath, the thank you email included the Consent
Form again and included a polite repeat request to fill in the form. This worked in the majority of cases; some filled in the form, others replied to the email giving consent (for example, if they were in the field and did not have access to a scanner, they would send an email giving consent based on the content of the form). In four cases, however, the Consent Form was never returned. Polite requests continued to be sent until the very last possible moment of the analysis; at this stage, when it was clear that the Consent Forms would not be returned, the transcripts of these three interviews were removed from the analysis, reducing the number of consented interviews to 43. For further details on the final interviewees, see Chapter 5.

After the interviews, transcription began. Overall, there were approximately 52 hours of interview material. Those who had requested the transcript of their interview then had their transcript sent to them at this point. For those who had requested to remain anonymous, or who had asked certain sections of their interview to be kept off record, the transcript was password-protected, with the password sent in a follow-up email. Those who had transcripts sent to them either did not respond or did not request any changes at this point.

Many of the interviewees had offered follow-up interviews if further clarification was required; it was hoped that this would be possible, but the large volume of initial interviews and the extensive amount of transcription meant that time was not available to conduct follow-up interviews.

4.3.2. Documentary materials

As seen in Section 4.3.1, a comprehensive search for documents to identify potential elite interviewees was undertaken at the early stages of the research process. During the interview period, the research process turned to documents in their own right as a potential source of data.

The World Bank is a major producer of documentary materials. As highlighted by Bloomfield and Vurdabakis (1994), textual documents provide an important insight into how organisations constitute ‘reality’, and the knowledge base associated with that reality. Documents highlight how organisations represent themselves and their ideas; they represent a construction of reality that has a ‘pervasive significance’ in terms of self-presentation (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004). They are not a transparent representation of
organisational reality, and cannot be treated as neutral evidence of what they report (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004). They are authored by individuals or groups from a particular perspective, working within an organisational authorising environment and socio-political context, for a specific purpose and audience (Flick, 2014; Mason, 2004). This makes them a ripe source of data for research that focuses on how ideas, processes and identities emerge, develop and become institutionalised (Rapley, 2011).

While there is a temptation to use documentary materials as secondary to oral data (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004; Hodder, 2012), the way they are used, the ideas they represent and what they are used to accomplish situates them as an equally important source of data in terms of how ideas and interests interact within an institution like the World Bank. Consequently, in addition to their utility in creating a purposive sample for the elite interviews, they were also used in this study to examine ‘snapshots’ of how ideas are presented at a particular point in time, and sources of factual information in terms of the World Bank’s agenda and strategy. Furthermore, they played an important part in triangulation, an important feature of research methodology (Denzin, 1978). While they are not transparent representations of reality, they can help corroborate and contextualise the recollections of the elite interviewees (Mason, 2004), introducing an important source of both external and internal validity (Macdonald, 2008).

In line with several historical and political researchers (e.g. Burnham et al., 2008), Lichtman and French’s (1978) categorisation of primary, secondary and tertiary documents was considered, and documents gathered accordingly. Primary documents refer to evidence that was involved in or produced during an event of interest; in this context these referred to strategy documents that indicated a new or evolved approach to an idea, or ‘state of the world’ pieces that outline the Bank’s interpretation of a particular idea or concept. Secondary documents refer to those relating to and generated shortly after the event; here this means documents such as operationalisation papers or policy documents. Tertiary documents include written resources that reconstruct events and ideas after their occurrence; this can refer to opinion pieces, conference papers and evaluation documents.

Consequently, the documents collated for this study included:

- World Development Reports

---

11 World Development Reports (WDRs) are an annual ‘state of the world’ piece published annually by the World Bank on a particular developmental issue. The Bank describes WDRs as follows: ‘Each report
Sampling

As seen in Section 4.3.1, a comprehensive documentary search was undertaken to create a purposive sample for the elite interviews. This search involved internet searches using terms such as ‘World Bank fragile states’, ‘World Bank state building’, ‘World Bank social protection’. Further to these general internet searches, the Documents and Reports Repository of the World Bank\textsuperscript{12} was explored, using the ‘topic’ search facility and a perusal of the categories of ‘governance’, ‘conflict and development’ and ‘social protection and labor’. This resulted in hundreds of documents – these were further filtered by Board reports and World Development Reports to get the ‘top line’ documents that are produced by influential members of the relevant departments.

Similar to developing the purposive sample for the elite interviews (see Section 4.3.1), sourcing documents for the fragile states agenda was more complex than for the social protection agenda, due to the lack of a coherent ‘thread’ through the fragile states discourse and the frequent name changes of the agenda. This made it harder to source relevant documents. Similar to the approach in the elite interviews, it was necessary to get a cursory understanding of the development of the labels associated with fragile states over time (e.g. the ‘LICUS’ agenda, see Chapter 6), through an exploration of the documents to be able to add additional search terms to the internet excavation of documents.

\textsuperscript{12} documents.worldbank.org

provides in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on a specific and important aspect of development – from agriculture, the role of the state, transition economies, and labor to infrastructure, health, the environment, and poverty. Through the quality and timeliness of the information it provides, the report has become a highly influential publication that is used by many multilateral and bilateral international organizations, national governments, scholars, civil society networks and groups, and other global thought leaders to support their decision-making processes. This corporate flagship undergoes extensive internal and external review and is one of the key outputs of the World Bank’s Development Economics unit’ (World Bank, n.d.(b): n.p.).
To help further this understanding and to ensure all relevant documents were included, once the interviews commenced the sampling of documents was included within the interview process; interviewees were asked to name any documents that were particularly relevant to the agenda, as well as other people to interview. Often, particular influential documents were named by interviewees unprompted. This helped not only to identify pertinent documents, but also helped to gauge the weight and influence of the sampled documents. Due to the nature of the Bank and the time period under review (see Section 5.1), most documents were publicly available on the World Bank website. On a few occasions, interviewees spoke of non-public documents; in the majority of cases they were happy to provide these documents for the study, and to allow them to be referenced.

About three quarters of the way through the interviews, the responses to the request for document recommendations were not yielding any new titles; at this stage it was assumed that the document ‘snowball’ had reached saturation, in terms of influential texts.

4.4. Analysis

After the data collection phase of the research, an analytical strategy was implemented to process the data. Unlike the ‘recipe book’ approaches of quantitative data (Yin, 2014), qualitative data does not have a strict format or widely accepted rules with regard to analysis. This is further complicated by the lack of methodological exposition in the historical / ideational institutionalist literature, resulting in little guidance within this analytical approach as to best practice. Consequently, several different analytical approaches were considered for this study.

Initially, an examination was undertaken of the historical institutionalist literature from a methodological perspective; while these studies are frequently criticised for a lack of reflection and exposition of research design and methodology (e.g. Immergut, 1998; Lieberman, 2001), this was done to gain an understanding of the analytical tools needed to apply the framework. Within this approach, institutions are the central explanatory variables, and the analytical approach that is overwhelmingly favoured in these studies is process tracing. Process tracing, in its basest form, seeks to go beyond identifying correlations to analyse the causal relationship, and the causal mechanisms within that relationship. However, closely related to the methods problem, process tracing is used as a broad-brush empirical tool, resulting in little insight into what process tracing is, and how
it should be used. Beach and Pedersen (2013) have gone some way to address this shortcoming, breaking down process tracing into three variants: theory testing, which develops a theory on causal mechanisms from the literature, then tests it using empirical material; theory building, which uses the empirical evidence as a starting point to infer the existence of a causal mechanism; and explaining-outcome process tracing, which seeks to establish an explanation for a puzzling outcome in a specific case. Each of these theories has methodological implications.

Ideational institutionalists have often adopted a process-tracing approach (e.g. Kern, 2011; Jacobs, 2011). However, process tracing was not suitable for this study for two reasons. The first addresses the aim of the study – unlike researchers like Kern (2011), this study does not seek to explain an outcome or to test a theory; rather, it seeks to understand the evolution of and the relationship between two concepts and ideas within the context of a global institutional environment. The second reason is that the process-tracing method looks at causal mechanisms in terms of events, and is less capable of explaining the ideational influence as well as the institutional influence, leaving it vulnerable to the criticism of ideational scholars that the content of the ideas can be neglected within the analysis (e.g. Schmidt, 2010; 2011).

After a process-tracing analytic approach was rejected, the literature most closely related to the analysis of interviews and documents was consulted (e.g. Hodder, 2012; Macdonald, 2008; Rapley, 2011; Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002; Gee, 2014). Much of this literature advocates an approach that looks at the language of the interviews and texts, such as the distinctive use of language and linguistic registers, or their intertextuality, or what is omitted from the text, in order to gain insight into the socio-political context in which they were produced, and to how institutional norms shape and express ideas (Macdonald, 2008). This was not considered useful for this study, as the very nature of the questioning within the elite interviews addressed these issues specifically; the content of the interviews purposefully addressed why a certain concept was expressed in a certain way at a certain time, with reference to the institutional authorising environment and political approach. It became clear, therefore, that an approach that relied on discursive or documentary analysis approaches would be insufficient.

In order to build a more appropriate analytical framework for this study, the logic of Lieberman (2001) offered the foundation of the analysis, specifically the idea that
ideational-institutionalist studies need to look beyond events to insert the ideational, and to embed ideas within the broad institutional counterpart, to examine how ideas navigate the institutional architecture. In order to achieve this, Lieberman suggests stripping the political order under scrutiny into its component parts; ideational and institutional. This empirical elucidation of the respective roles of ideas and institutions lends itself to a deductive thematic analysis.

Thematic analysis is a commonly used technique for encoding qualitative information (Boyatzis, 1998), which identifies themes that emerge as significant to the phenomenon under study (Daly et al., 1997; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Themes are identified through repeated detailed readings of the data (Rice & Ezzy, 1999) through which pattern recognition emerges, which become the categories for the coding process (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). These themes and their respondent codes can be inductive (i.e. generated from the raw data) or deductive (driven by theory or a priori research) (Boyatzis, 1998). Driven by the constructivist institutional data, the analytical framework included deductive codes (see Crabtree & Miller, 1999), using the components of ‘ideas’ and ‘institutions’ as the top-line thematic codes.

However, although this study acknowledges the socially constructed nature of ideas, and to some extent the socially constructed nature of interests espoused in the ideational literature (e.g. Hay, 2010; Schmidt, 2010; 2011), it stops short, like Bøås and McNeill (2004), of adopting a fully constructivist interpretation of interests. It considers the power-relationship dynamics of the global governance arena to be significant. In order to reflect the epistemological middle-ground of the realist-constructivist spectrum within which this study sits, a third deductive code of ‘interests’ was inserted into the deductive thematic framework, and afforded equal weight with ideas and institutions. There are various different levels of interests related to the power-relationship dynamics that may be at play within a global institution; interests at the level of individuals, at the country level (both donor and recipient), and the interests of the institution itself. The deductive code was split into sub-codes in order to be alert to these different levels of the power-relationship dynamics.

This created three categorical codes that captured the component parts of the theoretical framework. However, the theoretical framework and the research questions also put an emphasis on time, and the interaction of ideas with the institutional architecture and with
each other. Consequently, in addition to the three categorical codes of ideas, interests and institutions, two additional dynamic, process-oriented codes were added to the deductive framework that captured time and interactions.

This broke down the analysis into the constituent parts of ideas, institutions, interests (categorical codes), time and interactions (process-oriented codes), forming the basis of the deductive thematic framework. However, this did not address Schmidt’s (2010; 2011) consideration that the content of the ideas under scrutiny is important. In order to address this, it became clear that a deductive thematic approach needed to be complemented by an inductive thematic approach; as the content of ideas is data-driven, an inductive approach was required to interrogate them, in order to capture the qualitative significance of the phenomena (Boyatzis, 1998). The resulting framework therefore followed the approach of Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) that adopts a hybrid approach, incorporating the deductive technique as outlined by Crabtree and Miller (1999) and the inductive technique as seen in Boyatzis (1998). This allows the tenets of discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010; 2011) in terms of the substantive content of ideas to become integral to the analysis, while retaining the analytic integrity of the institutionalist framework.

To apply this framework, the interview and documentary data was uploaded into NVivo, a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) package. The social protection and fragile states data was loaded into two separate files, so they could be interrogated initially in isolation. The data was then ordered temporally, highlighting key events and periods of time significant to the development of the ideas around the two concepts. This placed time as an organisational framework within the data process (Yin, 2014) (for timelines of the two agendas, see Appendices G and H). At this stage, the first cycle of deductive codes from the historical and ideational institutionalist approach were applied, permitting the research questions to be addressed in a way that draws on the institutionalist literature and theory, whilst retaining the flow and content of the ‘story’ over time (see Dussuage-Laguna, 2012). This stage of the process also helped to increase familiarisation with the data, and ‘tested’ the deductive codes to determine its applicability to the raw data (Boyatzis, 1998; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Ideally, this is done by comparing the initial results of two coding processes done by separate people on the same segment of text, to ensure that the predefined codes are clear and sophisticated enough to capture the essence of the research questions and theoretical framework in a consistent manner, which is necessary to ensure reliability within the analysis (e.g. Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006). As this was an individual project, this was not possible. To compensate, samples of coded data were shown to the supervisor of this thesis to gain a second opinion. No modifications to the code template were considered necessary at this point.

The next ‘sweep’ of the data developed the code manual for the inductive stage of the analysis process. Within the broader categorical codes of ‘interests’, ‘ideas’ and ‘institution’ and the process-oriented code of ‘interaction’ and ‘time’, inductive codes were applied that sought to identify new themes in the text, that addressed the substantive content of the concepts under study. These codes were not ‘new’ codes – rather, they were expansions of the initial codes that identified the emerging themes within them (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Throughout the process, notes and annotations were made within the software to capture thoughts for further interrogation or comments that addressed analytical, conceptual and theoretical ideas or thoughts in reference to the research questions. These were recorded to aid with both the compilation of the final codebook, and the analysis and write-up of the findings (see Chapters 6 to 9).

Once the final codebook was established, including both deductive and inductive codes, the data was re-read and coded twice more. The first ‘sweep’ sought to apply the new codes consistently to the data, and to gain further familiarity with the data as the analytical and theoretical understanding of the emerging themes and the intensifying interrogation of the ideas and concepts under study developed. The final sweep was undertaken because after the previous sweep, it was felt that the increasing familiarity with the data was helping to ‘knit together’ the narrative in terms of the research questions and the theoretical concepts; a final sweep was considered to be beneficial in order to maximise the utility of this familiarity with the data. Once the final coding was complete, the comments, memos and codes formed the basis of the narrative of the findings chapters (Chapters 6 to 9) and the concluding discussion, to ensure that the findings were evidence-led and reported sensitively, and ensuring the integrity of the data was maintained (Yin, 2014; Mason, 2004).

4.5. Post-analysis

After the analysis had been completed, and the findings written up, the requests from some interviewees to see how their words had been used within the study was addressed. Emails were sent to four interviewees who had made this request. Two responded requesting
changes to their words, or for their contribution to be anonymised; these requests were incorporated into the text. Further follow-up emails were sent at this point for those who had still not provided their consent forms; one of the four who had not provided the consent form responded to this request. For the three that did not return the consent form, careful checks were undertaken to ensure that the data they had provided was completely removed from the findings.\textsuperscript{13}

\section*{4.6. Ethical considerations}

An application for ethical approval was submitted to the Social Policy and Social Work (SPSW) Departmental Ethics Committee at the University of York in 2016.

The dominant concern regarding ethics for this study was the potential for professional harm for the participants. There was the potential for sensitive topics to arise within the discussion, which could compromise a participant’s professional standing if their colleagues or their wider professional community were to learn of their discussion of the topics. To mitigate this, the Consent Form (Appendix C), which was sent to every interviewee prior to the interview and was discussed at the beginning of each interview, included two options for participants: a) ‘you may use my name and job title’, or b) ‘you may \textbf{not} use my name and job title, so that each participant had the option to have their identity disguised.

However, due to the nature of the study, the pool of potential elite interviewees was small; specifically World Bank staff who had worked in some way on social protection or fragile states. Consequently, this small number of potential respondents created significant limitations in the potential for anonymity for those who requested this. To mitigate this risk as much as possible, and to inform participants of the risk, the Information Sheet included a discussion of the potential risks and the steps that would be taken to ensure anonymity, such as the allocation of a pseudonym (e.g. Anon – 1; see Appendix D); this Information Sheet was included with every introductory email sent to a potential participant. The risk was also discussed at the beginning of each interview. To ensure that the potential

\textsuperscript{13} There were limitations to this removal; for example, if the respondent had recommended someone else for interview, or had pointed to a particular document of significance, these were not removed at this stage, as they had become a data source within their own right. Similarly, if one of these interviewees had pointed to a particular event, and information had been retrieved from other sources to corroborate the details and impact of that event, the event was included within the analysis.
participant understood the risk, two further statements were included on the Consent Form; ‘I understand that the World Bank will be named in the researcher’s doctoral thesis and associated research outputs’, and ‘I understand that even if I am allocated a pseudonym my absolute anonymity cannot be guaranteed’. This was in-line with the example ethical guidance provided by SPSW.

The Information Sheet also outlined the purpose of the research, how it was funded (i.e. through a Departmental Studentship), why the potential participant had been approached, and the assurance that participation was entirely voluntary and could be withdrawn at any time prior to the submission of the thesis. Ethical considerations also included the handling of the data. Data was collected and handled as prescribed by the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998, which was also included on the Information Sheet. In line with the Act, all data was kept on a secure server at the University of York, and consent forms and the data key (which included identifier codes) were kept locked in a filing cabinet. Further ethical considerations around researcher safety were identified and safety procedures were put in place; see Appendix F for more details. Ethical approval from SPSW’s ethical committee was granted in 2016.

4.7. Limitations

As with all research projects, there were several limitations within this study. The first pertains to the sampling of interviewees; due to the small number of people who fitted the sampling profile due to the focus on the World Bank and the narrative nature of the study, there are particular voices that were not heard. This could be because the purposive sample and the subsequent snowballing techniques could by their nature have excluded certain participants or bodies of participants that represent a different point of view; this was mitigated to some extent by trying to reach the top of the ‘hierarchy’ in terms of influence on the discourse, but as some participants declined to participate, or did not provide the necessary Consent Form, there is the potential for ‘gaps’ or missing perspectives within the findings.

The documentary analysis is similarly limited. While attempts to understand the relevance or influence of documents were undertaken, and analysis was driven by what the Bank itself considers to be influential documents or documents that drive its approach (e.g. WDRs or strategy documents), both the purposive and snowball sections of the sampling
process suffered from the possibility that crucial documents may have been omitted. As many documents were recommended by interviewees, and some staff members were sampled due to their contribution to certain documents, this could create a bias towards documents to which the interviewees contributed.

Another consideration is that all the data was generated from the Bank and its staff. As highlighted in the documentary and discourse analysis literature (see Section 4.3.2), data generated by an organisation is embedded within the organisational norms, and is expressed in a certain way that represents the ideals and perspectives of that organisation. This could have been mitigated by differing perspectives, such as those of other international organisations (e.g. the OECD, DfID, the ILO) or recipient governments or citizens of World Bank aid in fragile states, to view the concepts from alternative angles. Both resources and time meant that the collection of such data was not tenable; this is a possible avenue for further research (see Section 10.3). In the meantime, this study must be considered within the confines of this limitation.

The historical element of the study is another limitation. Ideally, a study of this nature would be longitudinal. However, as current interview data from the time period is not available, the study relied on the recollections of interviewees, which could be incomplete, or misremembered. There is also the possibility that interviewees would seek to ‘rewrite history’ in their favour (Lilleker, 2003). Other observations that were pertinent to the study were also requested to be kept ‘off the record’, as it might identify the participant or was particularly politically sensitive. This data had to be omitted from the analysis in order to maintain high ethical standards, meaning that the data was limited further.

4.8. Chapter summary

This chapter has outlined the approach taken within the research process, interrogating the epistemological and ontological position and theoretical framework in terms of the methodology used. The method utilised for the study, including the search, sampling and selection strategy for the elite interviews and documentary materials has been provided, and the analytical approach that was developed to interrogate the data, namely a hybrid thematic analysis, is explained. The ethical considerations pertinent to the study, and the limitations of the methodological approach have also been provided. In the following
chapter, information on the presentation of the findings, and descriptive background information pertinent to these findings, is presented.
Chapter 5

Introduction to the findings and a background to the World Bank

5.0. Introduction

Before an analytic account of the findings are presented, this chapter offers some important background information pertinent to the analysis, in order to provide further context for the study and some reader ‘aids’ to assist with the navigation of the findings. The chapter begins with details of those interviewees who were willing to be on record, and their job at the Bank. It then gives an outline of the temporal framework around which the analysis is structured. This temporal framework is explained and justified as the structure within which the findings chapters are presented. The chapter ends with a brief history of the World Bank, with additional focus on the two agendas under study, to ‘set the scene’ of the institutional context prior to when the analysis picks up the narrative, in 1995.

5.1. Introduction to the findings

5.1.1. Interviewees

As discussed in Chapter 4, the final number of consented interviews was 43. Twenty of these interviews were anonymised, where pseudonyms were allocated, specifically ‘Anon’ and a corresponding number (e.g. ‘Anon – 1). Those that remained on record were as follows (listed alphabetically by surname):
Table 2: Interview participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Job title14</th>
<th>Time at the Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naila Ahmed</td>
<td>Senior Social Development Specialist</td>
<td>2004 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saku Akmeemana</td>
<td>Senior Governance Specialist</td>
<td>2005 – 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anush Bezhanyan</td>
<td>Practice Manager, Social Protection</td>
<td>1999 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Brumby</td>
<td>Director, Public Service and Performance, Governance Global Practice</td>
<td>2006 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Nat Colletta</td>
<td>Founding Manager, Post Conflict Unit</td>
<td>1998 – 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Paul Collier</td>
<td>Director, Research Development Department</td>
<td>1998 – 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanta Devarajan</td>
<td>Acting World Bank Group Chief Economist and Senior Director, Development Economics</td>
<td>1991 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joel Hellman</td>
<td>Director, Center on Conflict, Security and Development</td>
<td>2000 – 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Robert Holzmann</td>
<td>Sector Director, Social Protection</td>
<td>1997 – 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steen Jorgensen</td>
<td>Practice Director, Social Protection and Jobs</td>
<td>1987 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Kamurase</td>
<td>Senior Social Protection Specialist</td>
<td>2005 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarwar Lateef</td>
<td>Numerous roles</td>
<td>1976 – ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Malloch-Brown</td>
<td>Vice-President for External Affairs</td>
<td>1994 – 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mark)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice Poole</td>
<td>Consultant, Public Sector Management &amp; Governance Sector</td>
<td>2009 – 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesca Recanatini</td>
<td>Senior Public Sector Specialist</td>
<td>1998 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigel Roberts</td>
<td>Director of the WDR 2011 / Country Director (Nepal, Ethiopia, West Bank &amp; Gaza)</td>
<td>1981 – 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anita Schwartz</td>
<td>Senior Social Protection Specialist</td>
<td>1994 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 It is difficult in the space available to provide comprehensive job titles, as many of these interviewees had various different job titles over their time at the Bank, and naming conventions within the Bank have varied over time. Furthermore, the role that current Bank staff held at the time of the interview may not have been the role within which they had most influence over the agendas under study. The job titles that have been listed here are consequently either: a) the one provided by the interviewee; b) the role that was considered most pertinent to the study; or c) the most recent role if the interviewee is still at the Bank.
Matthew Stephens  | Senior Social Development Specialist | ? –
Graham Teskey     | Senior Adviser, Governance Department | 2009 – 2012
Nick van Praag    | Communications on WDR 2011, Head of External Affairs (Europe) | 1990 – 2012
Nikolas Win Myint | Senior Social Development Specialist | 2009 –
Michael Woolcock  | Lead Social Scientist, Development Research Group | 1998 –
Xiaoqing Yu       | Director of Strategy and Operations, Human Development | 1996 –

This demonstrates the wide range of personnel who were identified through the purposive and snowballing sampling stages of the recruitment as being influential within the development of the two agendas. Some of these interviewees were particularly influential at certain stages of the discourse, and thus can be identified as ‘key actors’; for example Professor Nat Colletta, Sir Paul Collier, Shanta Devarajan and Lord Malloch-Brown for the introduction of a discourse around fragile states (Chapter 6), Robert Holzmann, Steen Jorgensen for the development of the social protection strategies (Chapter 6), and Joel Hellman for his work on a new department, strategy and policies for fragile states at the beginning of this decade (Chapter 9). Their roles and interests are explored in further detail in the following chapters.

5.1.2. Temporal framework

The following four chapters present the findings from the interview and documentary data. Several approaches to presenting the data were considered; thematically, conceptually and temporally. While each approach had its strengths and weaknesses, temporally was chosen as the data highlighted the importance of the gradual evolution of the concepts over time. The two dynamic, process-oriented codes (see Chapter 4) of analysis were also best expressed through a narrative presentation; a temporal approach provided the opportunity to examine to what extent and how the two agendas were linked throughout their development, rather than in conceptually or theoretically distinct siloes.

The findings are consequently presented in four chapters that represent four time periods; specifically, the tenures of the four World Bank presidents since 1995. Similarly, several
different approaches to a temporal scheme were considered, such as decades or half-decades, or different time periods of significance for each agenda (for example, the tenure of a particularly influential director of a department). The latter was problematic, as the two agendas progressed at different speeds and over different time periods, resulting in two different ‘categorisations’ of their timelines, making it difficult to examine how the two agendas were linked throughout their development. The timeline was linked to presidents’ tenures for two reasons; they broke down the 20 years under study into manageable ‘chunks’ that offered an opportunity to assess the two different agendas and their interaction over the longue durée. The presidents’ approaches to the different agendas were also identified by the data as often being influential in the agendas’ discursive development. For example, President James Wolfensohn (1995–2002) was, while unpopular during his presidency, considered in hindsight to be an effective president that had facilitated the rise of both the fragile states and the social protection agendas (Chapter 6). The current president however, Jim Yong Kim (2012–present), is almost universally unpopular and there is a strong sense from the data that he has done damage to some agendas, in particular the governance and political economy agenda (see Section 9.1). It was consequently considered that looking at how the different agendas developed and interacted with each other under the leadership of the different presidents was the most appropriate and effective way of presenting the development of the agendas over time.

The findings start with the tenure of President James Wolfensohn. Wolfensohn took over as president of the Bank in 1995 in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, when global institutions had been ‘released’ from the political stalemate of the Cold War (Orford, 1997; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). This thesis begins its detailed findings with Wolfensohn’s presidency, as this is the period identified by the data as when both agendas – social protection and fragile states – really emerged (see Section 5.2). This is particularly true of the fragile states agenda; previous to Wolfensohn’s presidency, countries that would fall under the category of ‘fragile’ were not considered within the Bank:

*The Bank [at this time] was an institution where frankly using the words conflict and development in the same sentence was a non-starter... using development and conflict in the same sentence was an oxymoron* [Interviewee: Nat Colletta].

*The World Bank didn’t have an approach to fragile states. The concept of fragile states wasn’t really there as I remember* [Interviewee: Paul Collier].

106
Wolfensohn’s presidency, therefore, is considered the critical moment when the agenda arrived at the Bank, and therefore is an appropriate place to commence the findings. This is not to say that some elements that would contribute to the fragile states agenda in the 1990s/2000s were not already being considered in the Bank; the governance agenda, for example, had been introduced in the late 1980s. Consequently, an overview of the work on the governance agenda up until Wolfensohn’s presidency is provided in the Background to the World Bank section below (Section 5.2.1). Similarly, social protection emerged as a concrete concept in the Bank during Wolfensohn’s tenure, but ‘pockets’ of work on social protection considerations had been seen in various contexts prior to his presidency. Again, an overview of this agenda is offered below (Section 5.2.2).

While much of the progression of the agendas and discourses were incremental, in line with the literature on ideas and institutions (see Chapter 3), there were certain ‘key events’ that occurred within the time period under study that were identified by the respondents as important moments in terms of the agenda. Appendices G and H show timelines for the fragile states agenda and the social protection agenda respectively with respect to these ‘key moments’, for reference whilst reading the Findings chapters.

Each chapter is divided into three sections. The first looks at the fragile states agenda. The evolution of the fragile states agenda was the most difficult to trace; unlike social protection, the agenda was not driven by one particular department or cohort of people (as discussed in Chapter 4). Rather, different facets of the fragile states concept emerged in different areas of the Bank, and gradually coalesced into the fragile states agenda over time. The name fragile states is indicative of this; the agenda was rarely referred to as the ‘fragile states’ agenda throughout the period in the bank, but has had different names that reflected the different emphases or conceptualisations over time. Consequently, the agenda has been passed between and within departments, with frequent changes, and those involved in its development have been drawn from different sectors and regions. Its development is closely correlated with the governance agenda (in terms of the ‘state-building’ aspect of the agenda), so this also needed to be examined and considered, as well as other certain temporal trends that proved to be influential, such as the political economy agenda.

---

15 This thesis has used the term ‘fragile states’ to refer to the whole agenda, to avoid confusion – details of the different naming conventions are outlined in the relevant chapters.
An example of this confluence of different trends is seen in Section 6.1, when the fragile states agenda was initiated. Various different sectors and actors started to address issues which would later be influential on the agenda, including: a) a new research profile on the impact of conflict on development, b) the emergence of the governance agenda and the consequent fiscal concern with development effectiveness, c) a concern over the poor development of Sub-Saharan countries that generated a new taskforce regarding ‘Lower Income Countries Under Stress’ (LICUS), and d) a Post-Conflict Unit stemming from the Social Development department that addressed the problem of demobilised soldiers. These different discourses and programmes were discrete projects that stemmed from different areas in the Bank, but all contributed to the nascent agenda that was to become ‘fragile states’.

The first section of each chapter, therefore, loosely named ‘fragile states’, aims to unpick the different discourses and events that were developing that contributed in some way to the agenda. Each fragile state section begins with an interrogation of the development of the governance agenda within the time period, before moving on more specifically to the fragile states agenda. The governance agenda at the World Bank has been extensively discussed in the literature (e.g. Harrison, 2004; Stein, 2008; Miller-Adams, 1999; Weaver, 2008); these findings complement that literature by adding a first-hand perspective of those who were involved at the time, and what influences they were working under, and tying the agenda with that of fragile states. After this scrutiny of the governance agenda, the events that drove the fragile states agenda within each period are explored.

The second section of each chapter addresses the social protection agenda. This is a much simpler agenda to trace, as a Social Protection Department was established in 1997, which was the principle actor in driving the agenda forward and still continues to this day. The final section of each chapter offers some preliminary analysis – it draws in the theoretical and conceptual considerations of the two agendas and examines to what extent and how the two agendas were considered together within each presidency. These findings are further explored in Chapter 10. This format of presentation within the temporal categories of each president also means that each agenda can be traced individually, if the reader prefers; for example, the reader can trace the fragile states temporal narrative by reading the first section of each chapter (Section 6.1, 7.1, 8.1 and 9.1), or the social protection narrative by reading the second section of each chapter (Section 6.2, 7.2, 8.2 and 9.2).
5.2. Background to the World Bank

The Bank is the most powerful and influential development institution in the world. It acts as a public, multilateral institution that channels funds to developing nations in support of their economic progress (Miller-Adams, 1999; Gavin & Rodrik, 1995). The World Bank group contains five interrelated agencies: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Agency (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)\textsuperscript{16}. Its charter outlines five establishing purposes:

- To assist in development and reconstruction
- To promote private foreign investment
- To promote long-term balanced international trade
- To lend for project development
- To conduct its operations with a regard for business conditions (Harrison, 2004: 11, adapted from Shihata, 1991).

The Bank’s\textsuperscript{17} mission is achieved through a government-oriented approach – its Articles of Agreement stipulate that it only lends to governments. It consequently maintains a strong ‘apolitical’ stance to development, in order to promote its legitimacy and to enable it to lend to all types of government regime (Miller-Adams, 1999; Harrison, 2004). Linked to this, it functions as a technocracy, employing development approaches that can be measured quantitatively and framing development as a technical issue, rather than a political one (Harrison, 2004). Its central office is situated in Washington D.C., where 85% of staff are situated (although attempts have been made at decentralisation, as demonstrated in following chapters), and maintains a centralised and hierarchical structure (Miller-Adams, 1999).

\textsuperscript{16} The IBRD and IDA share staff and management and are the lending arms of the Bank. Consequently, they are the focus of this (and most) academic study (see remainder of this section for more information). The IFC’s role is to encourage private business and foreign investment, and in doing so can issue loans for private sector projects without a government guarantee (unlike IBRD and IDA, who must loan to governments). MIGA also facilitates private capital flows to developing countries by offering guarantees to foreign investors against losses from noncommercial risks. ICSID is not financial, but acts as an international arbitration agency between foreign investors and states.

\textsuperscript{17} From here onwards the ‘World Bank’ or the ‘Bank’ refers to the IBRD / IDA branches of the World Bank Group.
Despite these fundamental characteristics of the Bank, however, much of the literature—and as the world’s leading development institution it is extensively studied—focuses on the Bank’s ability to adapt and change (Kapur et al., 1997; Harrison, 2004). As Caufield (1996) puts it:

*That the Bank... has survived more than half a century of dramatic global economic and political changes is due largely to its ability to redefine itself. Among the personas it has adopted are those of a capitalist tool, a friend of big government, an international mediator, a force for industrialisation, a voice for social justice, a hard-nosed financial institution, a coordinator of the global economy, a social services agency, and an advocate of private entrepreneurship.* (Caufield, 1996: 2).

This capacity to reinvent itself and respond to the changing economic and development environments has created a certain amount of turbulence and controversy, not least surrounding the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s (see below). The Bank has survived despite these controversies, due to its ability to adapt and, in particular, by situating itself within a ‘role of conveyor belt of ideas about development policy to the borrowing countries’ (Gavin & Rodrik, 1995: 331), the role that is under scrutiny in this thesis. The Bank has become the most significant external source of advice and policy ideas to government actors in developing countries, and ploughed these intellectual resources alongside its loans into much of the developing world (Harrison, 2004). In doing so, it has become part of their governance structures and become an influential actor in their economic and social development.

Through its reinventions, however, the Bank’s concern with the promotion of capitalism and its ‘growth obsession’ has remained constant: ‘economic growth, measured as a high rate of GDP, is the *sine qua non* for the Bank, today as it was 50 years ago’ (Harrison, 2004: 11). This can be traced back to its genesis, when the Bank was established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, alongside the IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now incorporated within the World Trade Organization [WTO]). Its initial aim was to help rebuild the war-torn countries of Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. The original unit of the Bank, set up for this purpose, was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Gavin and Rodrik (1995) argue that the Bank’s creation needed the greatest leap of imagination out of
the three Bretton Woods institutions; the monetary disorder between the two world wars had highlighted the value of international monetary cooperation (hence the IMF), as had the need for a mechanism that ensured governments were committed to open and non-discriminatory trade deals (the GATT), meaning the debates around these two institutions were around how they would achieve these aims, not what they should do. The Bank, however, as a multilateral institution that would encourage capital flows to areas in need of economic reconstruction ‘followed far less obviously from the conventional understanding of the 1940s about the role of government and the need for international cooperation’ (Gavin & Rodrik, 1995: 332).

The founders of the Bank (Harry Dexter White, together with John Maynard Keynes), desired to build a ‘truly international’ organisation, where member countries had a stake and were responsible for decision-making (Gavin & Rodrik, 1995). The economic and international environment was radically different at that point (Miller-Adams, 1999), and the approach adopted was one that addressed capital scarcity, through growth-oriented measures (Harrison, 2004), securing the Bank’s preconception with growth. From its genesis the Bank looked to balance budgets, so its development strategies included robust tax systems and monetary stabilisation policies (Gavin & Rodrik, 1995), and it developed the quantitative, technocratic methodology in order to secure its creditworthiness in international capital markets (Miller-Adams, 1999). The Bank's dependence on bond markets to secure finance was influential in the formulation of its ideological approach; ‘lending should be done in a way that would not jeopardize the Bank’s access to private capital markets’ (Gavin & Rodrik, 1995: 332), resulting in the adoption in the early days of projects that addressed infrastructure requirements (mainly power and transport) that could demonstrate its efficacy and reliability to the markets through discrete, bankable, measurable projects. From its earliest days, therefore, the Bank had established its growth-oriented, technocratic philosophy that included a conditionality element within its lending programmes (Gavin & Rodrik, 1995; Harrison, 2004; Miller-Adams, 1999).

The Bank turned its attention to development in the late 1950s (Gwin, 1994). Dwight Eisenhower was the US President at the time, and the Cold War was a constant political threat. Development aid was seen as a mechanism through which support could be secured against the Soviet expansion; however, US political actors believed that it would be more effective if it was dispersed through multilateral means rather than through foreign policy mechanisms. Consequently they pushed for the creation of a new unit within the Bank that
could provide more generous loans to poorer countries than those provided by the IBRD. This new unit, the International Development Association (IDA), was created in 1959.

There was some debate surrounding what sectors and initiatives should be covered by the new IDA arm of the Bank. Some argued (including the US) that lending should be extended to social programmes, whereas others (including some Bank economists) argued that this was outside the remit – eventually it was decided that IDA could lend to projects and sectors that did not produce revenue, such as sanitation, water supply and housing (Stein, 2008). The financial structure also was a subject of debate – unlike the IBRD, IDA loaned money at less than market rates, and consequently their funds needed to be replenished from each member state’s contribution every three years (Stein, 2008) – known as the ‘IDA rounds’. This replenishment is often controversial, as will be explored in the following chapters. It provided an opportunity for political machinations among member states; in particular, it gave the US (already considered hegemonic with regard to the Bank) the opportunity to impose conditions on the American allocation, and in doing so influence the agenda of the Bank (Wade, 2002)\textsuperscript{18}.

The make-up of the Bank up until the 1960s had mainly consisted of engineers and bankers, supporting the infrastructure project focus of the Bank. There were some economists, but they were mostly concerned with establishing the Bank’s creditworthiness (Stein, 2008). This changed in the 1960s, however, when economists became dominant within the Bank’s staff. The president from 1963-1968, George D. Woods, felt that economic knowledge was important for development (Stein, 2008), and recruited former IMF economist, Irving Friedman, a fiscal conservative, to the Bank. This was to be significant, as it was at this point that the Bank became synonymous with a certain set of ideas about what is important to development in poor countries (Gavin & Rodrik, 1995), and became to play an intellectual role as the conveyor of ideas. As Gavin and Rodrik (1995: 333) put it: ‘neither White nor Keynes foresaw that the Bank would play such an important intellectual role, and nothing in the Bank’s charter required that it would do so’.

It made this step in order to respond to the development environment that existed at the time – developing countries lacked technical expertise, and the move into social considerations (albeit as a side issue – only 4% of spending in the 1960s was on social

\textsuperscript{18} For example, during the replenishment negotiations for IDA 6 in 1979, the then president Robert McNamara was told by Members of Congress that the replenishment would be voted down unless he agreed to block all loans to Vietnam (Kapur et al., 1997). As the US has a proportion of over 15% of voting power (an 85% majority is required for a majority), the US has veto power over all decisions (Stein, 2008).
projects), and the need to maintain its creditworthiness, meant the Bank needed to ensure the quality of policy making that surrounded its projects (Gavin & Rodrik, 1995). These ideas had their foundations in Friedman’s fiscal conservatism; for example, the role of the private sector was increasingly stressed throughout the 1960s. Much of the development work at this point was done in India and Pakistan, as the need to build a bulwark against Chinese and Soviet influences continued; 86% of IDA loans between 1961 and 1968 were to these two countries (Stein, 2008).

The McNamara presidency (1968–1981) saw several changes within the Bank. Its creditworthiness now well established with Wall Street, it became more open to other approaches and influences. Its economist profile continued to steadily increase, and it became a significant contributor to the field of development economics, through its conservative fiscal stance. Gavin and Rodrik (1995: 333), however, point out that many of the ‘ideas’ that the Bank promoted and implemented did not have their origin within the Bank: ‘the Bank’s strength lies in its tremendous power to spread and popularize ideas that it latches on to. Once the Bank gets hold of an idea, its financial clout ensures that the idea will gain wide currency’.

A particular idea that took hold during McNamara’s presidency was the Bank’s first turn towards poverty. McNamara had served as Secretary of Defence in both the Johnson and Kennedy administrations, and had been influenced by their efforts to combat poverty within US domestic policy (Gavin and Rodrik, 1995; Stein, 2008). A search for policy strategies to create anti-poverty programmes was therefore undertaken, including an increased focus on health, nutrition and employment. A turn to both regional and rural development that focused on areas particularly impacted by poverty, and emphasised smallholder agriculture, was developed. In the late 1970s, the ILO encouraged the Bank to consider the possibility that employment generation and growth were not sufficient in guaranteeing basic needs, and that an approach specific to ‘basic needs’ should be developed. McNamara was responsive to this, and various evaluations were undertaken to consider the concept of basic need (Stein, 2008). However, the anti-poverty programmes such as rural development were having limited success, which, combined with strong opposition from the Bank economists to a basic-needs approach due to what they considered to be an unacceptable number of opportunity costs (Kapur et al., 1997), meant that McNamara’s portfolio of programmes was essentially dropped with his departure in
1981, as the Bank economists pushed for a shift in direction. This ushered in the era of structural adjustment.

Development experts in the early 1980s had begun to focus on economic policy reforms, including the benefits of a robust private sector, in their pursuit of growth (Miller-Adams, 1999). The poor performance of agendas such as rural development led Bank economists to agree enthusiastically to the policies of the IMF and the Washington Consensus at this point, shifting away from its previous Keynesian approach that promoted state-led models of economic intervention (Stein, 2008). This resulted in the promotion of conditions for receiving loans, underpinned by neoclassical economic theory, that cut government budgets, constrained budgetary growth, liberalised trade and privatised state assets to encourage efficiency, investment and growth (Stein, 2008). McNamara’s successor as president, A.W. Clausen, a former president of the Bank of America and appointed by Ronald Reagan, was an avid supporter of free markets and strongly promoted the new agenda, hiring influential economists to the Bank (such as Anne Kreuger, chief economist) to ensure the neoliberal hegemony within the Bank’s staff (Kapur et al., 1997). As Stein (2008: 37) outlines:

*Soon after her arrival, Kreuger systematically altered the nature of the Bank staff... Three years after her arrival, 80% of the staff of the Development Research Department had left, to be replaced by people with what were deemed the appropriate skills. Between 1983 and 1986 the Economics Department set up an “intelligence system” to identify staff with positions diverging from the established views and to reward loyal followers.*

Concurrent with the shift in ideology, a crippling debt crisis in developing countries occurred, emerging in Latin America but spreading quickly to Turkey, the Philippines and many African countries. As a result of a rapid expansion of credit in the 1970s, and the subsequent rise in interest rates and stagnation in demand in world markets, these countries had found themselves struggling with balance-of-payment problems. By the mid 1980s, debt service payments were exceeding the inflows of capital, as the large flow of private lending that had occurred during 1970s rapidly dried up, resulting in Mexico suspending creditor payments altogether (Tomann, 1988; Deacon, 2007). The crisis consequently increased the Bank’s influence and leverage over the developing countries in terms of policy. Arguments that the debt crisis had been triggered by statist development strategies
accelerated the Bank’s move away from project financing towards the IMF’s approach of ‘programme lending’ for implementation of economic reforms through structural adjustment and policy conditionalities. The Bank consequently deeply institutionalised the new economic ideology and adapted its mechanisms for lending accordingly. Poverty was all but forgotten, as the new theory argued that the poor would automatically gain through the adjustment process and subsequent economic growth.

However, towards the end of the 1980s it became clear that the structural adjustment policy packages were not working. Real per capita income and food production were declining, as was – crucially – private investment. Africa, for example, had built up huge levels of debt, but had little to show for it (Stein, 2008). Stinging criticisms of the structural adjustment approach, such as UNICEF’s report on Adjustment with a Human Face (Cornia et al., 1987) exerted pressure on the Bank to rethink its policy formulations. The Bank internalised this criticism, with reports such as a 1989 study of Africa (World Bank, 1989), highlighting the negative impacts of structural adjustment and offering new policy options (see Section 5.2.1 below). In addition, radical changes occurred throughout the globe that changed the discourse around development radically. The end of the Cold War saw the fall of the communist economic systems, and market economic reforms were adopted in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The 1990s therefore were a period of ‘profound change’ in terms of the international context for development (Orford, 1997; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). The end of the Cold War had also released international actors from the political stalemate in which they had found themselves throughout the conflict, and the perceived ‘liberal’ victory created a push for democracy, and a new focus on institutions that had its genesis in institutional economics (see Chapter 2).

Consequently, the beginning of the 1990s saw a shift away from structural adjustment, and an acknowledgement of its negative impacts, in terms of poverty and other new policy considerations such as the environment (Miller-Adams, 1999). The consequent approach of the Bank therefore saw a renewed interest in poverty alleviation. It situated poverty as its prime goal, and a flurry of policy papers were published that put poverty reduction at the centre of all development agendas (Deacon, 2007). New agendas emerged that demonstrated a broader consideration of social-political aspects of development, such as community-driven development, gender, the environment and, crucially, a revolutionised attitude to the role of the state, resulting in a nascent ‘governance’ agenda (see following section) (Harrison, 2004; Miller-Adams, 1999). The new approach also saw a shift from
‘policy’ conditionality to ‘process’ conditionality (Deacon, 2007), in that the Bank aimed to give the poor a louder voice in the formulation of anti-poverty strategies that were undertaken by governments. In 1999, a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) was launched by the Bank, which put emphasis on the importance of non-economic development objectives such as health, education and nutrition; a ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’ (PRSP) procedure was launched as part of this framework (Deacon, 2007). The PRSPs were policy documents that were, crucially, ‘country-owned’, in that they would be prepared by governments in consultation with civil society, and loans were conditional on their completion, in theory giving voice to those who had been impacted by structural adjustment and a clear signal by the Bank that it was no longer ‘imposing’ economic sanctions on developing countries (Gould, 2005). The extent to which the PRSP procedure signalled a shift away from the Bank imposition on national policies and to what extent the economic ethos of the Washington Consensus had been abandoned has been hotly debated (e.g. Gore, 2004; Stein, 2008; Vetterlein, 2013), but these machinations signalled a deliberate shift by the Bank to situate itself as a ‘poverty reduction’ institution in the 1990s, just as the fragile states and social protection agendas were emerging in development discourse.

5.2.1. The governance agenda until 1995

As seen above and in Chapter 2, the failure of structural adjustment called into question the role of institutions. The report on Africa mentioned above (World Bank, 1989) was the catalyst that brought the governance agenda into the limelight:

Basically one major event happened ... at that time there had been ten years of structural adjustment, and it didn’t seem to be working... A report on long-term sustainable development in Africa was produced and [it] followed the Bank’s tradition at that time, which was to have no mention of governance. So when they went out and discussed this report with African observers et cetera, everybody laughed at them and said you’re missing the big issue, that these countries are all corrupt, they’re all misgoverned, and people are abusing the system badly [Interviewee: Sarwar Lateef].

The report was consequently amended, and broke with the Bank’s tradition of avoiding political discussion, concluding that Africa’s development struggles were due to a ‘crisis of
governance’ (World Bank, 1989). What followed was a period of controversy in the Bank, as its General Counsel sought to clarify the Bank’s perspective with regard to its apolitical mandate. The resulting memorandum allowed some scope for policy, but strongly reinforced that the Bank *inter alia* could not get involved or interfere with political affairs, and could not be influenced by the ‘political character’ of a borrowing country; it also clarified that the pursuit of ‘good order’ *was* within the Bank’s mandate, and that securing a ‘system of rules and institutions’ in order to facilitate economic objectives was acceptable (Shihata, 1991). Consequently, the Policy, Research and External Affairs Vice Presidency established a task force, headed up by Sarwar Lateef, to ‘prepare a discussion paper on what the Bank might take on in its operational work beyond its traditional focus on public sector management’ (Lateef, 2016). The paper drew on North’s (1990) work on institutions that defined institutions as ‘the rules of the game’, and argued that without strong institutions governments would be unable to provide two key areas of public goods; the rules within which markets could work effectively, and the ability to correct market failures, without either of which development progress would be limited or retarded.

The Bank’s grasp of governance issues at this time were in nascent form; however, despite this introduction and a space created for governance work, no significant analytical work occurred in the Bank after the release of this report. Lateef (2016) points to criticisms that the concept suffered from a ‘flavour of the month syndrome’; ‘It did appear for a while that the Bank viewed governance for a while as the flavour of the month, and went about its daily business, having ticked off the governance box’ (Lateef, 2016: 10). The agenda, therefore, went dormant for several years, until it was revived again under Wolfensohn’s presidency (see Section 6.1.1).

5.2.2. The social protection agenda until 1995

The World Bank’s engagement with social protection began in the 1970s, when individuals within the Bank turned their attention to labour market considerations (World Bank, 2001; Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen). It was the economic crises in the 1980s mentioned above, however, that brought social protection into the spotlight, as the impacts of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) put the Bank in the firing line of extensive criticism, led by UNICEF, regarding the consequences of SAPs in terms of the social cost. It was this external criticism and pressure that drove the Bank to look more closely at the issue:
Similar to the critique of what the Bank did on the environment\textsuperscript{19}, it came from the outside ... some of the ‘adjustment with a human face’ books from UNICEF really put a spotlight on things. And you had the happy consequence of a few people inside the Bank who were also trying to work on it. So it was very similar to how environment grew inside the Bank [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen].

The Bank started to develop programmes to address the social impacts in the 1980s. The data points to two types of intervention that the Bank began work on at this time, in addition to the labour market programmes developed in the 1970s. The first was the ‘safety net’ approach, where basic cash or in-kind transfer programmes were instigated in Latin America to ease the worst effects of SAPs. Social funds, which would later grow into the community-driven development agenda, also emerged. The first of these was in Bolivia, where the Emergency Social Fund (ESF) sought to develop small labour-intensive projects to create employment opportunities (Newman et al., 1991). This helped to set the stage for the 1990 World Development Report (WDR) on poverty (World Bank, 1990). While the WDR defined poverty in income terms, and based most of its strategy on labour-intensive growth and human capital development (such as health and education), safety nets were promoted as a poverty-reduction tool. The Bank, however, was not wholly committed to the safety-net agenda despite this: one critic described this as a strategy of ‘two and a half legs’, with safety nets representing the ‘half leg’ – a poor relation of the other two approaches of labour-intensive growth and human capital development (Maxwell, 2000).

The early 1990s, however, saw a turning point in the Bank’s relationship with social protection that saw it ‘brought to the forefront of the Bank’s work’ (World Bank, 2001). The data identifies two influential developments that were the catalyst for this shift. The first was the continuing financial and policy-induced crises in Latin America, which compelled the Bank to rely more heavily on social funds to alleviate the impact (World Bank, 2001). The continuation of these crises meant that the outside pressure on the Bank to do more persisted. The second development that drew social protection into the spotlight was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition of Eastern European countries. These countries had in place extensive ‘cradle to grave’ social security schemes, which were unsustainable from the Bank’s perspective and contrary to the economic principles of the transitions. The Bank therefore sought to reduce expenditure by dismantling the social security systems and replacing them with targeted transfers (World Bank, 2001).

\textsuperscript{19} See Wade (2004) for an overview of the environment agenda in the Bank.
The Bank’s ‘first foray into pension policy’\textsuperscript{20} was also triggered by the Eastern European transitions (Interviewee: Anita Schwarz). Until this point pensions policy had been situated within the remit of other multilateral institutions, particularly the ILO. However, with the sudden influx of vulnerable elderly people as the result of the transitions, and the chaotic, ineffective pensions that were in place (e.g. pensions systems being hijacked to act as broader social security schemes for vulnerable people more generally [Interviewee: Anita Schwarz]), the Bank decided to do a ‘state of the world’ research piece to establish what was known about pension policies, and what worked. The decision to undertake the work was not uncontroversial, with pushback from the ILO being particularly acute over ‘turf’. However, the Bank considered the pension debate to be an economic problem and consequently within the Bank’s remit and essential for consideration, so brought in several pension specialists to examine the problem. The result was a ‘seminal study’ on \textit{Averting the Old Age Crisis} (World Bank, 1994). Social protection, therefore, was gradually emerging onto the agenda at the time of Wolfensohn’s arrival.

\textbf{5.3. Chapter summary}

This chapter has provided some descriptive background information on the World Bank prior to the study's findings being presented, and offered guidelines and reader aids for the following chapters. It begins by providing information on those interviewees who were happy for their words to be on record and ascribed to them, before justifying and explaining the temporal schema adopted for the presentation of the findings. It then gives a brief history of the Bank, drawing on literature and on some interview data, to ‘set the scene’ of the Bank’s genesis and evolution prior to when the main findings chapters pick up the narrative in 1995. In Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 it focuses on the governance agenda (as a precursor to the emergence of the fragile states agenda) and the social protection agenda respectively, to show to what extent and how the concepts had been considered prior to Wolfensohn’s presidency. The following chapters apply the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 4 to the data.

\textsuperscript{20} For a detailed overview of the Bank’s evolving approach to pension policy, see Orenstein (2008).
Chapter 6

6.0. Introduction

The data points decisively to the presidency of James Wolfensohn as the moment when both the fragility / conflict and the social protection agendas emerged at the Bank. As seen in the previous chapter, the ‘profound change’ of the international context for development had triggered a search for new approaches – not least a shift away from structural adjustment – in the 1990s at the Bank.

In the late 90s, in the wake of the post-Cold War conflicts, there were several political / intellectual currents that pushed the Bank to consider the business model to development, in particular in post-conflict or conflict-affected countries [Interviewee: Saku Akmeemana]21.

The data strongly suggests that Wolfensohn’s leadership was paramount in the development of these new intellectual currents, as in light of the new ‘era’ and in the shadow of the criticisms surrounding the Bank’s structural adjustment reforms, he brought about a period of reform in the Bank. For example, he undertook a large re-staffing exercise in an attempt to break the hegemony of the economist / engineer, technocratic approach of the Bank. The data is split over the wisdom of this re-staffing exercise; while some view it positively as a way to overhaul the economistic approach of the Bank and to create a space for new agendas and a political lens to be applied to development [e.g. Interviewees: Nat Colletta; Michele de Nevers], Paul Collier did not consider it to be wholly positive:

The Bank massively restaffed. To some extent disastrously. The big strategic staffing mistake in my view was to get out of infrastructure, which happened under Wolfensohn, around the year 1999/2000. There was a massive split from infrastructure to social, which was driven by two things. Wolfensohn recognised that the Bank didn’t have any friends. The left hated the Bank because it thought it was neoliberal, fascist, whatever. And the right hated the Bank because it thought it

---

21 Square brackets denote data (interview and documentary) that was included within the analysis in NVivo.
was a waste of money. And so there were campaigns to close the Bank, and Wolfensohn correctly recognised that we’ve got to have some friends somewhere. And he recognised that the opposition from the right was more fundamental than the opposition from the left [Interviewee: Paul Collier].

These intellectual currents gained traction under Wolfensohn, however, and he played a ‘genuine rhetorical leadership role’ [Interviewee: Michael Woolcock] in getting the Bank to rethink its development objectives and approaches, and in doing so, created space for several new agendas to emerge; including various discourses that would eventually converge into a ‘fragile states’ discourse, and a new role for social protection within development. He ‘opened up the Bank to the outside world’ [Interviewee: Nigel Roberts].

In addition to the enabling environment that Wolfensohn created through his leadership, several events occurred in the 1990s that helped drive the Bank in a new direction. Much of the documentary data from the time points to the influence of these various global events; for example, a request was put in to the Bank in 1994 for it to administer a multi-donor trust fund for a reconstruction project in the West Bank and Gaza. This meant that the Bank was put in a position where it was forced to consider conflict-affected and fragile situations, where previously it had taken great care to avoid them; no agenda on fragility or conflict had existed prior to the late 1990s. Similarly, it was also asked to take the lead, together with the EU, on the planning and coordination of international assistance for post-conflict recovery in Bosnia and Herzegovina [World Bank, 2004b; Kuroda, n.d.]. One report defines Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular as ‘breaking the mold’ [World Bank, 2004b: 4], and leading to further engagements with conflict-affected countries such as Rwanda, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. A particularly significant event in the fragile states agenda was the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1).

Section 6.1 looks at the emergence of the Bank’s attention to fragility and conflict. Interestingly, although this attention was a significant breakthrough and represented a huge shift in the Bank’s developmental approach, the agenda did not emerge in a coherent manner or due to one conscious decision to add fragility and conflict to the Bank’s portfolio. Instead, several intellectual currents emerged independently in different areas of the Bank that interviewees identified as important to the development of the agenda. The first was the renewed take-up of governance considerations in the aftermath of the failure
of structural adjustment. The framing of the governance agenda initially was in terms of ‘anti-corruption’, which was considered an influential factor within the negative impacts of the SAPs. The theoretical understanding of governance soon became a blurred – and to some extent contested – area, as the Bank grappled with the institutional aspects of development, as Section 6.1.1 outlines. While the broader governance debate did not explicitly address fragility and conflict at this point, it was to influence the fragility discourse, as this and following chapters demonstrate. Section 6.1.2 explores an agenda that was also to be very influential on the progress of fragile states, and one that was closely linked to governance – the ‘development effectiveness’ agenda. The idea of development effectiveness became a powerful one within the Bank. It argued that without effective policy regimes (i.e., good governance), then financial aid became inefficient – an idea that was problematic for fragile states, which by definition lacked the required effective policy regimes, thereby creating a bias against them within the Bank’s aid structures.

Sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 examine the new discourses and activity that developed with the emergence of conflict as a development consideration. Section 6.1.3 explores how conflict came to be included in the Bank’s research agenda, a shift initiated by Paul Collier, a British academic who had been studying the effects of conflict on development outcomes and who was brought to the Bank by Wolfensohn as Head of Research. Section 6.1.4 addresses a new initiative that arose in the field from the social development branch of the Bank, called the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU). The PCU began in Uganda when the issue of demobbed soldiers created budgetary problems for the Bank and the Ugandan government. Beginning from this fiscal perspective, the initiative quickly grew to address broader social problems in the aftermath of conflict, tapping into the new focus on the social that Wolfensohn had initiated and raising concerns and questions about how the Bank engaged in post-conflict contexts.

The final element of innovation that occurred during the Wolfensohn presidency with reference to fragile states arose from a concern among senior Bank staff regarding the development performance of a group of lower-income countries (LICs). Related to the governance agenda, and the new international preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, a taskforce was set up to look at countries that were categorised as ‘Lower Income Countries Under Stress’ (LICUS), that were lagging behind other countries in performance indicators. The taskforce, and the seminal report that arose from it, resulted
in the ‘LICUS initiative’ that targeted countries with ‘weak policies, institutions and governance’ [World Bank, 2002b]. This is considered by many as the institutional moment of shift towards fragile states in the Bank, and is explored in Section 6.1.5.

Section 6.1 therefore demonstrates that the fragile states agenda did not emerge as a fully formed ‘idea’ of addressing fragile states in the late 90s / early 00s – instead, the enabling environment that Wolfensohn had created led to a ‘confluence of events’ which all contributed to the nascent discourse around conflict and countries with weak institutional architecture. ‘Pockets’ of discourse and programmatic innovation occurred in different areas of the Bank that addressed different conceptual elements of fragility. Section 6.2, however, which looks at the rise of the social protection agenda under Wolfensohn’s presidency, reveals a very different origin story to that of fragile states. Social protection burst onto the scene through the creation of a department dedicated to social protection as part of Wolfensohn’s 1997 restructure. After initial difficulty getting buy-in from the Bank, the social protection agenda developed rapidly due in no small part to its ability to conform to the quantitative, technocratic ideology of the Bank.

Section 6.3 offers some preliminary analysis on the fragile states and social protection agendas, summarising and comparing how they emerged within the context of the Bank at the time, the extent of the interaction between them, and how the institutional architecture of the Bank facilitated or hindered the progress of their discourse and operational efficacy.

6.1. The fragile states agenda

This section looks at the five different initiatives and programmes identified by the interview and documentary data that contributed to the emergence of the ‘fragile states’ agenda (broadly defined) under the Wolfensohn presidency: the governance agenda (Section 6.1.1), the development effectiveness agenda (Section 6.1.2), the research agenda on conflict (Section 6.1.3), the Post-Conflict Unit (Section 6.1.4), and the LICUS initiative (Section 6.1.5).
6.1.1. The governance agenda

As seen in Section 5.2.1, a focus on governance had briefly flourished in the very early 1990s, but then had suffered from a ‘flavour of the month’ syndrome, and been dropped from development discourse for a few years. This changed in 1996, a year into Wolfensohn’s tenure, when he made a famous speech at the World Bank and IMF’s Annual Meetings on the ‘Cancer of Corruption’ (Wolfensohn, 1998). Wolfensohn was keen to pursue an aggressive anti-corruption narrative, but saw corruption not only as a failure of economic institutions, or even state institutions more broadly, but also of civil society and accountability institutions such as the media [Interviewee: Mark Nelson]. The 1996 speech, therefore, represented a turning point in the governance discursive development [Interviewees: Francesca Recanatini; Sarwar Lateef; Michael Woolcock; Mark Nelson; Anon – 7], as it generated a space for discussion around issues that previously had been deemed ‘too political’ for the Bank to approach:

*When President Wolfensohn used the ‘C’ word for the first time and sort of legitimised it as an issue that we should be talking about, then it became a topic around which a lot of other things then became at least a little bit more acceptable to talk about* [Interviewee: Michael Woolcock].

*It was with the corruption storyline that Wolfensohn brought, I think, it really allowed for the analysis of political issues, especially as it linked to issues around governance. That made it legitimate to talk about* [Interviewee: Anon – 7].

The new agenda was outlined in the Bank’s first anti-corruption strategy, published in 1997 [World Bank, 1997b]. However, while Wolfensohn had broken away from the Bank’s previous reticence to involve itself in such political areas and created a more permissible environment for discourse around the concept of governance, the theoretical and conceptual understanding of governance at this point was limited, having not evolved much further from its genesis in institutional economics (e.g. North, 1990). Indeed, Wolfensohn’s explicit focus on corruption, rather than governance, was a source of frustration for some, as identifying corruption as an issue, rather than as a manifestation or symptom of poor governance, seemed to some to set the agenda back:

*[Wolfensohn] identified corruption as the top issue. And of course, we had to live with the folly of that statement for some time, in the sense that corruption is a*
symptom, an outcome of bad governance, but it’s not the problem. The problem is somewhere else [Interviewee: Sarwar Lateef].

That was the first time the Bank formally acknowledged corruption, which of course is just a manifestation of poor institutions – something that actually matters for development [Interviewee: Anon – 7].

The concept of governance ‘gained deeper engagement with the theoretical literature’ [Interviewee: Anon – 9] over time, as different aspects of governance and institutions were explored, a strategy led in part by Joseph Stiglitz who was keen to understand the institutional application to development [Interviewee: Francesca Recanatini]. For example, a more expansive agenda emerged in the 1997 World Development Report (WDR), *The State in a Changing World* [World Bank, 1997a], which while rarely mentioning the word ‘governance’ itself, argues that the state should be a ‘facilitator’ of growth through the reinvigoration of public institutions, and an increase in participation and accountability. While the report sticks to a ‘classic’ good governance narrative that focuses principally on state capacity and public financial management, it also has a chapter (Chapter 9) that argues that the socio-political context of a country is important. This reflects a discourse that was being encouraged in Africa at the time by the then Regional Vice-President, Callisto Madavo:

*[There was] an initiative of trying to take politics seriously in our operational work [...] Callisto Madavo said as part of our development work we need to understand the context, and this is OK* [Interviewee: Anon – 9].

The governance agenda was developing therefore, taking on extra streams such as a ‘context matters’ element, which were filtering through to the discourse from regional operational and conceptual work. The increased importance of institutions can be seen through various key documents that emerged throughout the Wolfensohn presidency; for example, the 2002 WDR looked at institutions for markets [World Bank, 2002a], while the 2003 WDR [World Bank, 2003a] went further, applying an institutional lens to environmental and societal factors.\(^\text{22}\)

The 2004 WDR, *Making Services Work for Poor People* [World Bank, 2004a], which the data points to as being particularly significant in the governance discourse [Interviewees:

\(^{22}\text{For more on the evolution of the governance agenda at the Bank, as seen through the World Development Reports, see Lateef (2016).}^{22}\)
Francesca Recanatini; Anon – 7], was co-led by Shantayanan Devarajan, a key player at various points in the development of the fragile states agenda (see Sections 6.1.5 and 9.1.2). The report made governance its central issue, building an accountability framework for service delivery, and continuing the initiative commenced in the 2003 WDR to put citizens – rather than governments or the private sector – as the central development consideration:

One major [piece of research] that was fundamental was the WDR on service delivery for the poor. It was entirely about how you build the right sort of institutions, both economic and political institutions, to make sure that the poor who typically are not well served by normal institutions are then served. [Interviewee: Anon – 7].

The narrative around governance therefore was developing rapidly during Wolfensohn’s presidency, not least filtering through from the connections with the broader US political science networks [Interviewees: Anon – 9; Saku Akmeemana]. However, the narrative lacked one clear conceptualisation to underpin this development; instead, various streams within the narrative were emerging, including a ‘good governance’ narrative that looked at state capacity, an anti-corruption narrative, a ‘context matters’ narrative, and the promotion of accountability. This reflects a finding in the literature on governance which conceives it as a vague and elastic concept (Abrahamsen, 2000), for example:

How do we define governance? [...] part of the reason why the term has gained such power – and even seduction – is that it is extremely ‘promiscuous’; it involves itself in a wide range of political considerations (Harrison, 2004: 4).

The data suggests that the Bank’s institutional architecture was a facilitator of this elasticity, as being a ‘relatively soft and balkanised bureaucracy’ [Interviewee: Anon – 9], prone to siloed working [Interviewee: Anon – 13], it created a space for different – and sometimes mutually inconsistent – narratives to emerge under the same rubric of ‘governance’. As one interviewee describes:

There was a clear admission that [liberal democratic market economy templates] were not working, and both practitioners and the academic community were starting to wrestle with why. In this place it’s not that the broad institution was really grappling with it back then, but certainly people within the institution were part of the broader discussion out there, and it started to filter through. But people
didn’t have the lexicon, the discourse, [to articulate it] [Interviewee: Saku Akmeemana].

While the ‘soft bureaucracy’ hindered the development of a strong consistent narrative, the data also hints that this was to the Bank’s benefit, in that it was in the Bank’s interest to keep the concept and discourse ‘muddy’ in order to respond to all constituencies and priorities, whilst not decisively committing – a useful approach with such a politically sensitive topic [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed].

The quote above also highlights an important point with regard to the Bank’s siloed, ‘balkanised’ nature, in that at this point in time, despite Wolfensohn aggressively putting governance and corruption on the agenda, it had not been mainstreamed into the Bank’s core work. There was a coalition of people driving forward the agenda – including in the research department, and people of influence such as Joseph Stiglitz who had sway over Bank outputs such as the WDR – but this had not (yet) progressed from the conceptual level into the Bank’s operational work in any systematic fashion. (The data suggests this is due to a bifurcation between the ‘knowledge’ area of the bank and the operational departments – ‘the thinkers versus the doers’ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].) Any operational focus at this point seemed to be purely capacity development and administrative reform. That being said, the data infers that Wolfensohn’s leadership had provided a conducive environment for work on governance to flourish, and that his leadership had shifted the agenda considerably in the right direction:

I think the whole thing relies less on operational set-up than it does on leadership from the top. I think leadership is much more important. And we had that leadership from James Wolfensohn, we made remarkable progress and did a lot of what I think was strong work to make this case [Interviewee: Mark Nelson].

---

23 Data is marked ‘intentionally unattributed’ if a) the respondent has requested the quote to be unattributed, or b) a judgement has been taken to protect anonymity. Data that is unattributed does not indicate that the respondent has been named elsewhere; even if the respondent has requested anonymisation, data may still be unattributed in order to afford further protection for anonymity in quotes deemed particularly sensitive.

24 The data highlights a revolution in the approach to capacity development in this era, moving away from ‘supply-driven training’ that looked mainly at the skills of individuals and had not had positive outcomes, to an approach that adopted a country-driven exercise that built human and institutional capacity, organisational functionality and institutional reform [Interviewees: Mark Nelson; Michele de Nevers].
6.1.2. The development effectiveness agenda

One conceptual aspect of the governance agenda that did have massive operational impact, however – particularly for post-conflict or fragile states – was the development effectiveness agenda. This was an agenda that became extremely powerful, both within the Bank and in the development community more broadly. Interestingly, the development of the agenda is not mentioned in any of the interview data that address this period; it is only brought up in retrospect in interview discussions that refer to more recent developments that have occurred in the past five years (see Section 9.1.2). This section draws on some of this ‘more recent’ data, but is based mainly on documents of the period that are explicitly or implicitly signposted in the ‘more recent’ interview data. The below offers a summary, as there is a large literature on the development effectiveness agenda (e.g. McGillivray, 2006).

World Bank economists Craig Burnside and David Dollar undertook seminal work in 1997 and 2000 that argued empirically that, in its simplest terms, development aid was significantly more effective within better policy regimes. As the mission of the World Bank was (and continues to be) to reduce global poverty, their findings argued that to reduce aggregate global poverty a selectivity approach to aid disbursements was necessary; i.e., an approach that gave preference to countries that had systems in place that protected and utilised external resources effectively. Paul Collier, another important figure in the emergence of the fragile states agenda (see Sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.5) played a significant role in the development effectiveness agenda. Building on Burnside and Dollar’s (1997; 2000) empirical work and principle, Collier worked with Dollar to create an aid selectivity model, with several governance criteria, which was embraced by the Bank and adopted in part to form the basis of the World Bank’s longstanding resource allocation within its IDA system25.

It is changes to this resource allocation model that occurred around the turn of the millennium that were to have a significant impact on fragile states, specifically their access to development aid from the Bank. In 1998, at the time of the IDA12 negotiations, steps were taken to stress the good governance agenda; specifically a ‘governance discount’, meaning that if a country scored poorly on at least three of seven governance criteria, a ‘discount’ of one third was applied to the overall rating, in essence, a punitive financial

---

25 For a more detailed explanation of the World Bank’s IDA allocation system, see World Bank (n.d.(a)).
consequence for poor governance. IDA13 in 2002 built on this shift in the aftermath of the work done on development effectiveness by Burnside, Collier and Dollar. The governance criteria within the formula were subjected to a thorough review, and the ‘governance discount’ was replaced by a ‘governance factor’. This factor was calculated by dividing the average governance rating by 3.5, and multiplying it to the power of 1.5:

\[
\text{Governance factor} = \left(\frac{\text{average governance rating}}{3.5}\right)^{1.5}
\]

A country’s overall rating (known as its Country and Policy Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating) would be multiplied by this ‘governance factor’. Those that rated below the average rating of 3.5 in their average governance ratings would suffer a decrease in their overall rating – and consequently their IDA allocations – whereas those above 3.5 would receive a premium (IDA, 2002). (‘Fragile states’ would become to categorised as those with a CPIA score of 3.2 or below.)

The justification, as demonstrated, was that with limited finite resources, the aid flows available should be better spent where there was a greater return on investment for each dollar spent. In an effort to reduce aggregate global poverty, the empirical argument was – at least at the time – a strong one. The approach did not, however, consider poverty within each individual country. The consequence for ‘fragile’ states was clear: such an approach created ‘donor orphans’ (McGillivray, 2006) for those that rated poorly in governance criteria.

That governance score by definition – because the definition of fragile states was that they were at the bottom of the governance lists, it meant that they got less money than their poverty would have warranted... they got a penalty for being poorly governed. So what it meant was that the IDA allocation was systematically biased against fragile states by definition. It was created to do that [Interviewee: Joel Hellman, interviewee’s emphasis].

The IDA allocation developers did take small steps to redress this imbalance – during the same IDA13 replenishment they created ‘Post-conflict allocations’, that were special allocations that provided a little bit of money for a few years in the aftermath of conflict, before reverting to the fixed formula. These were minimal, however; for example, in 2002 there were special allocations to only four countries – the Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone – and all of these were due to revert to the fixed formula within a few years. The fundamental outcome of the allocation system was that countries
considered to be in post-conflict, or to have low institutional capacity, were severely hampered in their access to World Bank resources.

6.1.3. Conflict as a research agenda

In 1998, Paul Collier joined the Bank as the Director of the Development Research Group. The interview data forcefully points to this as a significant moment in the conflict and fragile states agenda:

*It is clear that Collier’s work changed the nature of the discussion on conflict and forced most to at least question or cast a wary eye on the prevailing discourse on grievance as the sole driver for civil wars* [Document: World Bank, 2004: 6].

*There’s an issue of individuals here, as usual. These issues are partly about the nature of the individual, and partly people who see opportunities and argue the case forceably. So particularly when Paul Collier was involved… he saw the need, he felt very strongly that a critical explanation for sustained poverty was conflict. Protected violence. And he did a lot of research at that point that found a link between organised violence and poverty. And he found a lot of sympathetic individuals in the Bank* [Interview: Nigel Roberts].

*This was a shift which put conflict work back in the Bank, after being absent for four decades* [Interviewee: Anon – 2].

Collier had been working since 1986 in academia on conflict issues, and done pioneering work in bringing economic theory to the subject. There was an increasing concern among some at the Bank – a concern that Collier shared – about recent development outcomes in Africa:

*I was brought in by Joe Stiglitz, and the reason Joe brought me in was because he said that I want the research department to work more in Africa, because that’s where the big issues are* [Interviewee: Paul Collier].

As well as his work on the development effectiveness agenda (see Section 6.1.2) and the LICUS agenda (see Section 6.1.5), which addressed various issues in Africa, he built a large research programme to study the economics of conflict and violence. In 2003, this work was published in an influential policy research paper, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*
(Collier et al., 2003). This paper among other things highlighted the ‘ripple’ effects of conflict, not only on neighbouring economies but on the international markets more broadly, and that the risks of conflict can be traced to country characteristics, including economic factors; natural resources such as diamonds, or large cohorts of unemployed youth would, for example, increase the risk. Such insights and emerging debates firmly established conflict as a development issue, rejecting the previous opinion of Bank economists that conflict was an exogenous shock, and not relevant from a development perspective.

On the intellectual side you had the work that Paul Collier did on the Conflict Trap [...] this was important because the post – Head of Research – was important intellectually. And Paul was certainly the first person in living memory to have held that post who had an interest in this [...] the confluence is important because had it only been the intellectual side, I’m not sure it would have had the same traction in the Bank. But because it coincided with a bunch of operational requests [e.g. in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Section 6.0] it started to get more traction [Interviewee: Anon – 2].

6.1.4. The Post-Conflict Unit (PCU)

Nat Colletta was a social scientist working in the Education and Training Centre in the East Africa projects in the early to mid-90s, working in Uganda, when he was called into a meeting with the Ugandan Minister of Finance and the Chief of Staff of the National Resistance Army:

The key substantive point, of how the Bank got involved in this [post-conflict work] – it had nothing to do with conflict. It was all about money. The Bank had done a Public Expenditure Review, a standard piece of analytical work at the World Bank, that it did and continues to do in countries. They look at a country’s budget, and they say, you know – where are they spending the money? So the key point here was that Uganda was spending 38% of their budget on security. And only a combined 6% on health and education. This is a key point, because the next thing was … if you want money from the World Bank, you need to change the public expenditure profile. You need to reverse this. You need to spend 6% on security and 38% on health and education! That was the message. And Uganda was broke, they
were up against the wall – the Bank could dictate what they had to do... it started in Uganda with a budgetary realignment... Nothing to do with security, nothing to do with combatants, nothing to do with conflict. Your whole argument was economics. And pretty much finance – not even economics [Interviewee: Nat Colletta].

The problem that Uganda faced was the large number of combatants that were on the army’s payroll, and the budgetary commitment that was required to demobilise and reintegrate the soldiers and their families. To address this, Colletta developed a profile of the army, looking at the social characteristics of the combatants. As agriculture was the principle sector that was available to these combatants for employment, Colletta argued that to solve the problem, combatants should not only be supported back into farming, but also with a small level of social protection, as there would be a nine-month ‘limbo’ between the planting of the crops and their harvest when the farmers would have no income. Consequently a ‘transitional safety net’ was developed, based on a basket-of-goods approach, which calculated the shelter, health and education needs of a family of five over a nine-month period. The mode of transfer was contentious; according to Colletta, the economists involved in the strategy were strongly against providing a money transfer, as they did not think the recipients were responsible. The delivery system was consequently heavily debated, but economic arguments such as the high transaction and storage costs of the different ‘basket’ elements, plus the potential of a monetary benefit to help stimulate local economies, resulted in an incremental monetised safety net.

The support in Uganda, therefore, had been driven by economic and financial concerns around budgetary realignment, but had developed into a programme that addressed social and psychological factors at a micro-level. It was realised that this approach could have benefits in other African states, and was soon being implemented in other countries throughout the continent such as Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, Eritrea and Ethiopia [Interviewee: Nat Colletta]. The unit was known at this point as The War to Peace Transition Team, but it only focused on demobilisation programmes – disarmament was not considered, as the Bank’s statute forbade any dealings with military arms, or indeed any dealings with the military itself.

26 Another element to the programme was a counselling programme, in part to appease the economists’ and donors’ concerns surrounding providing ex-combatants with cash, and to ‘close the social distance between the beneficiary and the provider’ and to support the beneficiaries in the transition [Interviewee: Nat Colletta].
Controversy was prevalent, however; Colletta’s interview details an extraordinary number of debates and contentions around the development of the new programme, as the Bank struggled to fit this new mode of intervention into its legal and operational frameworks. It was only with the support of high-level personnel such as Regional Vice-President of Africa, Kim Jaycox, and the Vice-President of External and UN Affairs, Mark Malloch-Brown, that Colletta’s work was protected from opposition from legal and middle-management teams. There were various broader concepts developing, however, that supported Colletta’s work; e.g. the timing in the wake of structural adjustment and the shift towards poverty alleviation supported his agenda:

*It worked very well with the whole shift in the Bank towards poverty alleviation, poverty reduction. All of these words were coming on stream at the same time. And they realised that in order to reduce poverty, you had to work and invest in communities. It wasn’t just the big infrastructure anymore. [It was] that shift towards poverty reduction, rather than just growth* [Interviewee: Nat Colletta].

There was also in the broader development literature a focus on the relationship and transition between humanitarian and development aid (e.g. Macrae et al., 1997); staff members such as Colletta were able to argue that the Bank could and should be operating in the ‘gap’ between the two, rather than waiting for peace to be articulated [World Bank, 2004b]. As the programme spread out to other countries in Africa, it developed from a less individual approach on the combatants to one that addressed communities:

*If you want to develop the economy to even absorb these guys in the long term, you need to develop economic opportunities [...] we need dual targeting – we need to target the combatants, and their transitions into the communities, and we need to target the communities as receptive vessels, for the economic opportunity* [Interviewee: Nat Colletta].

Until this point, the team had been a regional unit in Africa, however as global geopolitics changed, with wars in places like Bosnia, Cambodia and Timor, the demand for the team’s services grew. The controversy of the intervention grew even further, with more people (e.g. senior economists) showing opposition to the project, and it was only through the support of Mark Malloch-Brown, the Vice-President of External Affairs and the UN, that Colletta was able to proceed. Having come from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Malloch-Brown had an interest in humanitarian work from the perspective of
refugees, and he understood the contextual complexities in a way that the economists, who were vocal in their opposition to the programme, could not:

It was part of my internal affairs brief to deal with these guys [other international agencies concerned with humanitarian issues], and unlike on other issues when people found their way to my door there was a natural place to post them on to, and to try and connect them with, and then my job would stop in a way with just the marriage-brokering role; here there was no one on our side to walk them up the aisle with, so I sort of de facto got drawn into this because of my personal concern about the issue, and the lack of institutional capacity in the Bank to refer the UN on to on this [Interviewee: Mark Malloch-Brown].

Malloch-Brown saw Colletta as essentially the only person who was addressing these sorts of issues, in particular who was seeing humanitarian crises such as post-conflict environments and the impact of refugees as a development issue, rather than as a humanitarian issue. He took it upon himself therefore to protect Colletta in his work, against significant opposition in the Bank. Both Colletta and Malloch-Brown identify the nature of the Bank at the time – as heavily biased towards economics – as the driving force behind the opposition:

At that time these were all macroeconomists who had a textbook knowledge of the world. Based on modelling... but this is not as simple as putting everything into a model... life in these villages was much more complex than some theoretical model that assumes you have all the variables [Interviewee: Nat Colletta].

The resistance of the Bank I think had two parts. One they were concerned about its lack of Bankability – if you make a loan, where’s the income going to come from, where are you generating the economic return to service that loan, so it’s a classic Bank concern. A perfectly reasonable one. And second, for an institution that was in a way still more focused on national growth strategies, it just appeared a slightly marginal thing [Interviewee: Mark Malloch-Brown].

Under Malloch-Brown’s protection, Colletta created the unit now called the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) in 1997 in the Social Development part of the Bank, comprised mainly of ex-UN and NGO staff (World Bank, 2004b). There was contention about what funding mechanism would support the unit, however; the standard Bank processes for securing a loan took 12-18 months, which in these quasi-emergency situations was problematic. So
instead a trust fund called the ‘Post-Conflict Fund’ (PCF) was set up, as these grant-based mechanisms had started to emerge in the Bank, and bypassed the standard Bank processes for loans. As one interviewee, referring to the emergence of trust funds as a funding mechanism, explains:

_The Bank actually makes money every year. It’s a bank, we forget that. It charges interest. And it’s embarrassingly making money, last year it made a billion dollars somebody said, something like that. And they didn’t know what to do with it! They almost don’t even want to admit that they made that kind of money! So they tried to figure out ways of putting that money back into the system, but not necessarily as loans_ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].

The initial allocation into the PCF was $8 million. The fund was ‘designed to support the Bank’s engagement in countries where the Bank’s regular lending instruments cannot be used, and to jumpstart the Bank’s activity in post-conflict countries’ [Kuroda, n.d.: 4]. Shortly after, a paper set out the rationale and guidelines in a new framework [World Bank, 1997c]. The work evolved quickly, as the concept of post-conflict transitions quickly became muddied:

_For me it was about economic transition – it was about giving humanitarian agencies exit strategies, and giving affected communities a prospect of a long-term sustainable development strategy instead of humanitarian handouts. But almost immediately it became clear that the Bank was going to get drawn into interventions much earlier than that. There wasn’t going to be this nice sequential thing where the humanitarians did it first and then the PCU came in as sort of a link to transition to Bank IDA or IBRD borrowing […] people wanted the Bank in there immediately […] so very quickly it was clear that this PCU was not going to come in in a planned way, only when a crisis was ready for transition – people, knowing that the Bank had a big cheque book, governments once they learnt of the existence of the PCU, wanted it immediately they had some kind of set-back_ [Interviewee: Mark Malloch-Brown].

The work began to link with the work coming out of the research department at the time (see Section 6.1.3), formalising it further [Interviewees: Paul Collier; Nat Colletta]. In 1998, the evaluation department of the Bank (OED) examined the Bank’s involvement in conflict settings in the aftermath of the West Bank and Gaza and Bosnia and Herzegovina
engagements [World Bank, 1998]. It concluded that while the Bank did have a comparative advantage that would be beneficial in conflict environments, it raised a concern that the Bank had been ad hoc in its approach to post-conflict intervention. As 16% of the Bank’s lending was already tied up in post-conflict environments by this point [World Bank, 1998], it argued that a more considered and coherent approach to these environments should be considered. The Bank formally took note, and in 2001 it created an Operational Policy, OP 2.30, that provided a strategy framework and set parameters on the Bank’s work, and outlined its approach to conflict or, significantly, vulnerability to conflict. This started to shift the approach from one of post-conflict reconstruction to a sensitivity to conflict, and called for the Bank to be more nuanced in its approach to conflict environments more broadly [World Bank, 2004b]. The PCU was re-named the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit as a result of this. At around this time, Ian Bannon succeeded Nat Colletta as leader of the unit.

This period, then, saw a break from the Bank’s typical work on infrastructure projects at the state level towards ideas of demobilisation, social programmes and a focus on communities (World Bank, 2004b). The work of the PCU/CPR broadened into more social policies such as gender issues, education and health issues (World Bank, 2004b). The work had also drawn the Bank into early intervention and prevention considerations of conflict, and led it to formalise its strategy. However, the PCU never became a priority of the Bank. It remained a very small unit in the Social Development Department, with little overlap with the governance work, and at this stage, while the research and LICUS agenda were still emerging, it continued to approach conflict as ‘a symptom rather than a disease’ [Interviewee: Shanta Devarajan].

6.1.5. The Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Initiative

The LICUS Report

The work thus far on ‘fragile states’ in the Bank had been channelled through a conflict prism; the research department had been examining the link between conflict and development (see Section 6.1.3), and the PCU had taken a role in post-conflict reconstruction from a social development perspective (see Section 6.1.4). Shortly after the terror attacks in the US in September 2001, the Bank commenced work on a report that looked not at conflict, but on states with weak institutions and governance, not only those
in or recovering from conflict. Documents credit this new focus to the 9/11 attacks [World Bank, 2004b], but the interview data suggests that the attacks tapped into concerns that key staff members already had:

*The origins of the [LICUS] report were a conversation over coffee between myself and Shanta Devarajan* [Interviewee: Paul Collier].

Collier, head of the research department (see Sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3), and Shanta Devarajan, then one of the division chiefs in the research department (who later went on to become Chief Economist of the Africa region, then the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and is currently Acting Chief Economist of the World Bank), had shared concerns about these states (particularly in Africa) that were not showing signs of development:

*Around the time that Paul got here, we started saying wait a minute, there’s an underlying syndrome here, that gave rise to conflict that in turn led to having to deal with this post-conflict demobilisation and so on. There are some systematic patterns, or characteristics of these countries which meant we should perhaps think of them as a distinct group. It doesn’t sound that profound any more, but that was the insight that Paul and I had! But I would go into these meetings about low-income countries as a whole, when they would do these reports about these low-income countries... you would see that there were two distinct groups. It dawned on me [...] that we should take a slice through these and pull out these countries as the countries that we might want to devote some particular attention to* [Interviewee: Shanta Devarajan].

On the advice of Devarajan, Collier sold the idea to Joseph Stiglitz, who in turn ‘got the ear’ of Wolfensohn [Interviewee: Paul Collier]. He recruited Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a Nigerian Bank staffer who went on to be Managing Director in the Bank and Minister of Finance for Nigeria, who at that time was working in the MENA regional office. Collier and Okonjo-Iweala were appointed as heads of an internal commission in November 2001, and recruited a team of people who were sympathetic to the issue of the ‘distinctive’ group of states. There was considerable controversy surrounding what the commission would be called, with worries that terms such as ‘failed states’, the term being used in the literature at the time (e.g. Gros, 1996; Rotberg, 2002) were too politically insensitive to be used by the organisation; Wolfensohn in particular was nervous about the name [Interviewee: Paul
Collier]. The Bank categorised countries by income – high-income countries (HIC), middle-income countries (MIC), low-income countries (LIC) – so this new class was considered to be a subset of the low-income category that were ‘under stress’, hence LICUS. It is significant that at the time the Bank considered fragility to be a low-income phenomenon, as shall be seen in following sections and chapters.

The commission produced their seminal report in September 2002, entitled *World Bank Group Work in Low-Income Countries Under Stress: A Taskforce Report* [World Bank, 2002b], the publication of which many of the interviewees point to as the institutional ‘moment’ of shift within the World Bank. LICUS are defined in the report as countries with ‘weak policies, institutions and governance’ [*ibid*: iv], where aid is less effective due to the lack of capacity or inclination on the part of the governments to use finance effectively for poverty reduction. The incentives for a re-engagement in LICUS after many years looks to the ‘risks’ of disengagement, as the evidence shows that countries in general have little chance of autonomous recovery, and the implications for not engaging include an increase of severe deprivation among the population, a risk of ‘state failure’ and countries that are locked into poverty and economic decline. Interestingly, there is not a strong emphasis on the security element, despite this being the ‘hot topic’ in the aftermath of 9/11. There is a brief mention of ‘adverse externalities’ [*ibid*: 10] that can stunt economic growth and health outcomes in surrounding countries and the region more broadly, but the broader message of global security is not prominent.

The strategy for engagement in LICUS had two branches: a) to gain a substantial and sustained improvement in policies, institutions and governance, and b) to improve basic public services, i.e. health and education. The report then goes on to argue strongly on the one hand for a bespoke approach in the World Bank that addresses the unique set of problems that LICUS face: ‘rather than disengaging completely with LICUS, the development community should continue to engage with them, albeit differently than with the typical low-income country’ [*ibid*: iv], while claiming on the other hand that ‘the existing instruments are appropriate for LICUS’ [*ibid*: vii]. Specifically, it argues that of the two sets of instruments that are available to the Bank – knowledge and financial instruments – the emphasis should be on *knowledge* instruments. This underpins the whole report – that the Bank’s knowledge is more useful than money within these contexts. It is unsurprising (given the leading role of Paul Collier in both) that the report echoes the
development effectiveness agenda and the IDA formula approach (see Section 6.1.2), even arguing that some LICUS receive too much aid:

Excessive lending in LICUS worsens corruption, accumulates indebtedness, and makes it harder for aid to play the important role of reinforcing reform once it is already under way. It is notable that the countries in which aid has recently played a major role in reinforcing reform – Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda, and Vietnam – all started reform from a base of low aid, so that it was feasible for donors to increase aid substantially as reforms progressed [World Bank, 2002b: p. v].

The ‘re-engagement’ with LICUS by the World Bank was not, therefore, going to be in the form of financial support. Instead, it was to be streamlined policies based on knowledge-based instruments. The report argued for a ‘highly focused reform agenda […] consisting [of] two or three reforms that are important in economic terms and likely to result in rapid and substantial payoff’ [ibid.: p. v]. The focus on improving public services was considered problematic, as the usual method of increasing funding for government provision to help improve delivery would not work, due to the weak nature of the government structures and the danger of corruption, but despite this attempts to improve health and education were considered necessary in order to commit to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and alternative methods of supplementing provision through other channels that could eventually contribute to government capacity (such as through NGOs or Independent Service Authorities27) were proposed. The ‘highly focused’ agenda argued for only two or three priorities – ‘other objectives may be better put on hold until there is greater capacity to move forward on a broader front’ [ibid.: p. v], that supported knowledge and capacity-building, through diagnostic activities, support to critical private or public sector reform – although there should be an ‘atypical reliance on the private sector’ [p. 12] due to low government capacity – and a more coordinated use of partnerships with other development agencies. This promotion of partnerships displays what the Bank considered to be its comparative advantage within LICUS contexts; namely, its analytical and intellectual strength.

The final recommendation is one of more resources – not, as above, through loans or grants to the country, but in terms of an administrative budget and a Bank presence in the

27 Bold, Collier and Zeitlin (2009: 3) describe Independent Service Authorities as ‘a public agency outside the civil service, somewhat analogous to an Independent Revenue Authority and a central bank. It is an implementing agency for government policy in the delivery of basic services’. 
countries. In particular, incentives for Bank staff to want to work in these countries are recommended. It is this final recommendation that is remembered most frequently in the interview data, for example:

Nobody wanted to work on these places! It was career death! Going to some little place, you wouldn’t be able to generate much in the way of loan portfolio to take to the Board, so it was career death. Where would you make your career? Go and work on the China project [Interviewee: Paul Collier].

The report, therefore, did not argue for new instruments or institutional responses; instead it articulated an increased profile for these countries in the Bank’s portfolio that looked to increase policy and institutional strength, drawing on the ‘good governance’ agenda, through increased engagement, knowledge and capacity instruments such as diagnostic activities and selective ‘capacity-building’ support and changes to field presence.

The LICUS Initiative

In 2002, after the publication of the report, the Bank set up the LICUS initiative as a follow-up to the report’s findings. A unit in the Operational Policy and Country Support (OPCS) department was set up to coordinate the initiative, and Sarah Cliffe was recruited to lead the unit.

LICUS was in OPCS, and that location carries with it, certainly at the time carried with it, a large amount of institutional clout, because this was the department responsible for making most of the approval decisions. So it was felt that that location had advantages in showing that the agenda was taken very seriously [Interviewee: Anon – 2].

The unit was not therefore a sectoral department – it was a ‘policy shop’ that looked to coordinate the new operational policies put in place for these countries:

The fragile states unit was a small policy shop – if you think about the way the World Bank functions, it wasn’t an ‘operational unit’. It was in the policy-making part of the Bank, the OPCS. So it was a small shop that was designed to address policy questions [...] Sarah Cliffe’s job was to create an operations policy on
fragile states which had never existed before, which actually sort of says the Bank is going to look differently at these countries [Interviewee: Joel Hellman].

Much of the work, then, was advisory – advising and supporting country teams in developing and implementing their strategies in a way appropriate for these specific contexts. For the first two years the LICUS initiative had no form of funding; this changed in 2004, when the LICUS Trust Fund (LICUS TF) was established to ‘strengthen institutions, support early efforts at policy reform and build capacity for social service delivery in fragile states’ [World Bank, 2006b: 1]. The initial allocation was of $25 million, gained from the Bank’s surplus income (similar to the PCF, see Section 6.1.4). The money went on projects such as: ‘transition’ projects in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire which would inter alia ‘address gaps in basic public financial management’ [p. 9], youth employment pilots and national identification programme (i.e. identity documents); capacity reform for combating HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe; and communications capacity in Haiti [World Bank, 2006b].

6.2. The social protection agenda

As seen in Section 5.2.3, the social protection agenda at the Bank began in the 1970s with a focus on the labour market, and since that time occasional initiatives that employed social protection considerations had been developed in various countries. By the time Wolfensohn arrived in 1995, therefore, there were rapidly increasing pockets of work within the Bank that were looking at social protection issues [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen]. The work was sporadic, however; much of it was ‘hidden’ in the department(s) that covered health, education and social policy, which were undergoing rapid evolutions as to their respective remits, as reflected in their frequent name changes [Interviewees: Steen Jorgensen, Anita Schwarz]28. The work was dominated by social insurance and labour market programmes [Interviewee: Anon – 7], with lending and non-lending work on job placement and retraining programmes, technical and financial pension reform, conceptual work on labour, and child labour and disability [Interviewee: Anon – 7; World Bank, 2001]. Other pockets of work on basic cash transfers to the poor and social funds were also there, but with little strategic emphasis or conceptual interrogation [Interviewee:

28 Anita Schwarz recalls how the department changed names ‘a million times’, including Education and Social Policy, Human Resources, and Poverty and Social Policy.
The timing of Wolfensohn’s arrival, however, coincided with a profound change in thinking on poverty reduction, as the continued criticism of SAPs and the continuing financial and policy-induced crises in Latin America forcefully demonstrated that the Bank’s policy of growth and sound macroeconomic policies were not sufficient in terms of poverty reduction. The role of social protection was therefore increasing in the broader aid community, culminating in a UN-led world summit in Copenhagen in March 1995 that identified social policy and social protection as a ‘cornerstone of development’ (UN, 1995), though this viewed social development through a Western-centric developed model with ‘little discussion about informal and market-based solutions’ (McKinnon, 2004: 299; World Bank, 2001).

Wolfensohn and the Bank responded to these developments. The 1995-96 crisis in Mexico set the scene for further engagement, as the Bank implemented its first conditional cash transfer (CCT). Robert Holzmann credits the idea to the prime minister of Mexico and various ministerial department heads, in particular Santiago Levy, the then Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit in Mexico. He developed the integrated conditional modality that sought to invest in human capital by demanding that cash transfers were linked to the health, nutrition and education of children through school attendance and health centre visits. To accomplish this, sophisticated data was required:

_This integrated approach promised a lot but in order to achieve this Santiago Levy—a great development thinker—from the very beginning insisted on rigorous monitoring and evaluation. Something that uses scientific methods_ [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann].

Internally in the Bank, Wolfensohn created a social protection department as part of his large restructure in 1997. Through this restructure Wolfensohn created global sector boards, one of which was entitled the Human Development Network (HD), which consisted of Health, Education and Social Protection. As seen in Section 6.0, this indicated a significant shift in approach and personnel of the Bank, not least as it was the first time a Bank-wide network of public sector specialists was created [Interviewee: Anon – 19].

---

29 The other global sector boards, which created the five departments within the ‘knowledge’ sector of the Bank, were: Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure (FPSI); Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (ESSD); Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM); and Operational Core Services (OCS).
Similar to Section 6.1, Wolfensohn receives much of the credit for this:

*He was an engaging person and someone who believed in development, and the concept of human capital is a critical part of development – this was clear to him* [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann].

Holzmann was recruited to lead the new department. He was an academic economist from Germany, who was a specialist in pensions and who had previously worked at the IMF, predominantly on middle-income countries (MICs). This reflected the focus of social protection in the Bank at the time, dominated as it was by social insurance and labour markets, predominantly in middle income countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America, where social protection had traditionally developed and was well established [Interviewee: Anon – 7]. His arrival coincided with the East Asia crisis:

*I joined the Bank on 1st May 1997, then during that summer the Asia crisis broke loose. I was immediately engulfed in working in Asian countries – I became very mileage rich! I would fly out for a couple of days of negotiations then fly back again. And what became very clear, in Korea for example, was that everyone in the Asia crisis talked about social protection and social assistance, but no one knew anything about it. This gave me a handle to increase the team* [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann].

From the moment the department was created, therefore, demand was high for social protection work, and the department quickly expanded. Against this backdrop, Holzmann sought to develop a strategy to generate a more systematic and theoretical approach to poverty through a conceptual framework, as outlined in the following quote from a concept paper prior to the strategy:

*Currently, social protection is often a collection of measure that includes: (1) social assistance, (2) social investment and development funds, (3) labor market interventions, and (4) pensions and other insurance-type programs. The overall concept unifying these areas deal with improving or protecting human capital. Within each of the areas that Social Protection covers, there are, generally, a well-developed theory and operational practice. However, all too often we end up operating within the four cylinders and not looking at cross-cutting issues or we do not analyze the social protection system as a whole* [Holzmann & Jorgensen, 1999: 5].
Steen Jorgensen, who worked on the strategy with Holzmann, was his deputy within the department. Jorgensen had been at the Bank for ten years, working on human development issues, in particular on social emergency funds and social investment funds, within the community-driven development (CDD) agenda. The partnership was a profitable one, with the data pointing to the synergy between Holzmann – a newcomer to the Bank and an economist – and Jorgensen – a human development specialist with knowledge of the Bank – as driving the resulting conceptual framework [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen] (see below). Holzmann and Jorgensen saw social protection as a ‘three-part challenge’ [Holzmann & Jorgensen, 1999]; while they praised the opportunity of globalisation for ‘unprecedented social and economic development’, the financial crash had demonstrated that the outcomes of globalisation were highly variable, and had increased the gap between the poor and the rich. Thus the poor were more vulnerable to risk – and, significantly, less able to respond to it. The final part of the ‘three-part challenge’ was the decreasing scope of governments to be able to raise revenue and to develop national economic policies independent of the global economy.

Consequently, Holzmann and Jorgensen developed a conceptual framework that centred around ‘risk’. In doing so, they sought to develop a strategy that helped individuals, households and communities to be less exposed to risk, and to be better equipped to respond to it. The decreasing scope of governments meant that the framework sought to engage with instruments outside of state intervention, as well as supporting state programmes. Such an approach was politically sensitive within the Bank; Holzmann recalls how important it was to couch it in politically acceptable terms in order to gain traction within the Bank:

_I developed the name – Social Risk Management – before the strategy. I thought I had to move away from social protection, which sounds too protective, too inward-looking... ‘social’ is always a good word, even if it’s a ‘weasel’ word it’s important to be there. But protection – not so good. What sounds active? Of course – ‘management’. And risk was a given... I came up with it very simply in a presentation somewhere, where I said we will do Social Risk Management. But the concept followed... I had to make it more attractive_ [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann].
This is representative of the enduring mindset within the Bank (and the development community more broadly) of the idea of welfare as ‘handouts’; the terminology and the phrasing required political sensitivity in order to overcome this mindset. Holzmann recalls how he came up with the concept to reflect the name on a Sunday afternoon in 1999, within a couple hours (although it took longer to ‘finesse’). The conceptual framework of Social Risk Management (SRM) asserted that individuals, households and communities are exposed to myriad risks from different sources, and that poor people were particularly exposed, having fewer instruments and resources at their disposal to mitigate the risks. Consequently, they are forced to resort to expensive and inefficient risk-averse behaviours, such as taking children out of school, which compromise the generation of human capital. The framework therefore develops a matrix of ‘strategies’ to minimise risk (e.g. prevention, mitigation or coping) and ‘arrangements’ (informal, market-based or public). The framework thus incorporates the type or risk, the efficacy of the available instruments and the level of demand [World Bank, 2001]. Preventative instruments include ex-ante insurance mechanisms, including enhancing informal and market-based activities. Mitigating instruments include improving old age security, and providing unemployment benefits. Coping instruments mainly involve safety nets.

The concept, therefore, not only pulled together a framework that unified ‘the whole bunch of things we inherited that were human development-related but didn’t fit neatly in education’ [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen]. Significantly, however, it put the individual as the central focus of the framework, shifting the economic emphasis from the macro to the micro; ‘you are deliberately saying it starts with poor people’ [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen]. There was a certain level of support for the new approach:

*I remember a managing director at the time, she caught onto it immediately and said this is really revolutionary, you’re saying that you need to start with individuals and their coping mechanisms, then building on that* [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen].

More broadly, however, the concept and its importance for development was a hard sell outside of the Human Development Network [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann]. Its focus on the individual refuted the idea that economic growth is created only by good macroeconomic policies, which had been the steadfast approach of the Bank thus far; consequently many of the economists in the Bank – who had predominantly a
macroeconomic agenda — were unsettled by a turn away from a macro-institutional perspective. There was also a belief that risk was a ‘soft topic’, which also threatened macroeconomic theories [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann]. The ‘handout’ mentality still prevailed within the Bank and the development community [Interviewee: Anon – 7]. Several interviewees recalled the well-known fight between Holzmann and Martin Ravallion, the then Director of the Research Department at the Bank; Holzmann himself recalls an incident in a Chinese restaurant:

_I recall we were having an early evening drink when I presented him [Ravallion] with the strategy before it was written – it must have been 1998, and he said ‘Robert, don’t be silly, the poor are poor because they have no money, it’s nothing to do with risk!’ He changed his mind but it took some time_ [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann].

The controversy was eventually overcome, with influential people such as Ravallion buying into the concept. There are several reasons outlined in the data as to why it eventually got traction and was accepted; the first was the synergy between Holzmann and Jorgensen, as Jorgensen was able to bring the human development perspective that provided a foundation for the focus on the ‘individual’, whereas Holzmann was able to draw on his economics background and express the idea in terms that made them more acceptable to the Bank’s economists. An important element of this economistic approach was to build in a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) element into any policy outputs, as had been the approach in Mexico. During the development of the strategy there had been ‘back and forth’ between the central and country teams, supporting the evidence base from the ground [Interviewee: Anita Schwarz]; Holzmann insisted this evidence-based approach was built in from the very earliest stages. This was to be a significant factor regarding the success and expansion of social protection within the Bank (as seen in following chapters). However, at this stage it had an impact fragile states within the nascent social protection agenda, in that it excluded them from consideration within it:

_I said the softer the topic, the harder the analysis has to be... and this has a meaning with regards to how you deal with fragile states. What is it there, what are the kinds of things you can bring to the table, what do you not know? [...] I’m not sure that if you come to a new fragile state you would have all the answers, or even 50% of the answers to guide social policies [...] It is ‘phrase development’ rather
than hard empirical evidence [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann].

Fragile states aside, the ‘economist’ approach was able to push back against the ‘welfare dependency’ narrative, as the concept relied on budget efficiency and expressed the concept through the promotion of a variety of strategies that included the informal and private sectors, moving the dialogue away from state welfare:

'It didn’t seem as dangerous as it potentially was, because the political message was well packaged in standard neoclassical terms [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen].

In addition to being couched in economic terms with extensive monitoring and evaluation (M&E), the broader movement in the Bank to address the social aspect of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), and the situation of poverty as the overarching development goal of the Bank, facilitated the concept’s acceptance. Several interviewees point to Wolfensohn creating a ‘wave’ of discourse around poverty that echoed some of the key elements of the concept – for example, the Voices of the Poor initiative (Naraya et al., 2000) that aimed to establish the experience of poor people, was happening at the time. This focus, and the personnel shift weakened the strong economistic focus of the Bank; the increasing size of the department and influential people helped to raise the profile of the concept, and enabled an approach that started with poor people’s perspectives.

A final influential factor in the acceptance was its featuring within the World Development Report (WDR) 2000/1 on Attacking Poverty (World Bank, 2000). The development of the WDR was a tense time at the Bank – Stiglitz had just resigned as Chief Economist after being particularly outspoken about the Bank’s sister organisation, the IMF, and the Bank itself; one of the Directors of the WDR, Ravi Kanbur, was also to resign during the WDR’s development ‘due to what he saw as unreasonable pressure to tone down WDR sections on growth and economic redistribution’ (GPF, 2000). However, the WDR showed a different perspective on poverty than that of 1990 (see Section 5.2.3), which had defined poverty in income terms with the ‘two and a half legs’ of labour-intensive growth, human capital development and the ‘half leg’ of safety nets (GPF, 2000). The new WDR, by contrast, adopted a more multi-dimensional definition of poverty, with the triad of ‘opportunity, empowerment and security’, the latter of which promoted the ‘half leg’ to a ‘full leg’ of social security that included the typology of risks and prevention/mitigation/ coping strategies forwarded by the SRM concept. Holzmann cites this embrace of the SRM concept by the WDR team as significant:
When the WDR 2000/1 was written, five or six people were put in charge, and they looked around to see where they could borrow something that is useful. The lucky part is that the person in charge [of the WDR production] was open [to the SRM concept], so immediately gave it the OK: ‘that’s a good concept and thought through, I can make my life easy if I work my chapter around it’. So it was the coincidence of the timing as well as the personalities – I’ve come up with other ideas that didn’t find takers [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann].

The inclusion of the SRM concept in the WDR considerably raised the concept’s profile and the debates around the issue: ‘not many people read the sector strategies, whereas WDRs are read around the world’ [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann]. One criticism that the WDR faced (e.g. Maxwell, 2000) was an omission of the consideration of ‘rights’, however, which other agencies, notably UNICEF, had embraced and was actively promoting, arguing that a rights approach supported and extended what the WDR was trying to do by providing a basis in international law for a multidimensional approach to poverty reduction. This criticism is discussed extensively by interviewees, specifically the complication that ‘rights’ could not be talked about in the Bank at this time, as rights considerations were considered outside of the Bank’s remit. Jorgensen recalls how he and Holzmann actually commissioned a rights lawyer to establish how the SRM concept fitted with the human rights approach; however, as the Bank interpreted its mandate of only economic considerations as outside of the rights-based agenda, this exploration by Holzmann and Jorgensen did not gain traction. Holzmann during this period and the following years was to have extensive debates with the ILO over the inclusion of ‘rights’ within social protection considerations. His view was that not only did the rights-based approach not have an appropriate M&E focus, rendering it incompatible with SRM [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen], but the conditionality and targeting issue that undermined rights-based theories were a sticking point, and one that would in particular impact fragile states:

We had a marriage between the social heart – you want to do something – but also the economic brain – yes you want to do something but resources are finite, and you need to be aware that transfers create changes in behaviour, and you want to make the people self-sufficient, not hanging in the welfare trap all the time. So this is an important point to understand, the rigorous empirical work on it, and the south-south learning on conditional cash transfers – you only let people in the club
who did rigorous monitoring and evaluation [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann].

The final strategy was published shortly after the WDR, having passed smoothly through at Board level. It was enthusiastically embraced by those in the Social Protection department and the Human Development Network – outside of the network there was still significant scepticism [Interviewee: Anon – 16; Steen Jorgensen], but this faded away over time as the M&E element that had been built into the concept soon began to yield evidence to support the efficacy and efficiency of the approach [Interviewees: Anon – 16; Anon – 7]. However, the siloed working of the Bank in terms of regional differences created very different strategic directions within the strategy. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), for example, was a very strong focus of the strategy, due to the region being an early leader on safety nets, its pioneering work on conditional cash transfers (CCTs), the Bank’s already-strong presence there and its close fit with the MIC focus of the agenda at the time. Thus, the strategy advised for LAC to ‘build SRM into the dialogue’, with country papers to help identify gaps and reform risk management instruments [World Bank, 2001: xiii].

Europe and Central Asia (ECA) was another strong focus, also due to the Bank’s presence owing to the transition of former Soviet Union countries, and the large legacy issue of pensions [Interviewee: Xiaoqing Yu]. The strategy therefore advocated pushing ‘second generation reforms’ in ECA to better integrate social protection subsectors and ‘establish more community-based activities as a complement to public interventions’ [World Bank, 2001: xiii]. East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crash, were in the nascent stages of development for social protection schemes; the strategy consequently advised ‘helping clients to establish public safety nets, improving functioning and access to market-based arrangements and review and support informal safety net arrangements’ [ibid: xiii]. South Asia (SA), where the World Bank had not been active in terms of social protection [Interviewee: Xiaoqing Yu], was advised ‘to establish SRM as an important element of poverty reduction; focus on microfinance, microinsurance and pension reforms in terms of operations’ [World Bank, 2001: xiii].

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), however, consisting of predominantly LICs and fragile states, and problematic in terms of poverty outcomes (see Section 6.1.5), had a very different focus within the strategy, which advised the following:

Work with other human development sectors to mainstream work on orphans and AIDS/HIV management; other sectors to mainstream CDD. Integrate pensions and
As previously demonstrated, the prevailing belief in the Social Protection department at the time regarding Sub-Saharan Africa and other fragile states was that without strong institutional architecture, social protection initiatives that required broader integrated systems were not tenable. Smaller human development projects and bottom-up schemes through community-driven development were therefore promoted, with the main instrument being promoted as social funds\textsuperscript{30}. Social funds were prevalent in Africa at the time, and this continued in the aftermath of the strategy. The strategy did address social funds, and recommended rethinking them due to their increased profile and through the increasing prevalence of CDD. The department promised in the strategy to expand the menu of projects, to target vulnerability as well as poverty, to strengthen an institution that was there that aided the flow of services, and to explore possibilities for further marginalised groups such as women.

The strategy did acknowledge this variance in approach towards Africa, detailing how it presented ‘special challenges’ [World Bank, 2001: 40], with numerous and widespread risks, but maintained that the resources and instruments for SRM were limited. The consequent competition for resources often meant that other human development initiatives such as health and education were prioritised. Institutional capacity in Africa was specifically addressed:

\textit{The capacity to implement social protection instruments is so low (except when done in partnership with communities through social funds) that even when a social protection instrument would be the ideal solution, the costs of providing it would be prohibitively high} [World Bank, 2001: 40].

A final constraint to the Bank’s social protection work in Africa was the lack of buy-in from African leaders and governments. While the Bank and broader development community were coming around to the idea of social protection as an effective poverty-reduction tool, African governments remained sceptical and maintained the anti-‘hand out’ mentality [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed], believing that social protection was consumption.

\textsuperscript{30} See Section 2.6 or OED (2002) for a definition of social funds.
The strategy came out concurrently with the implementation of the LICUS Taskforce; consequently, the ‘under stress’ categorisation of LICs were not included in the strategy as the concept had not yet been formulated. The social protection team did, however, have input in the LICUS initiative:

_We did a lot of work on social funds [in fragile states for the LICUS report]. In fragile situations with very weak institutional capacity, social funds were able to deliver quick wins, show government action on requests important to communities, and at the same time build critical community infrastructure. In this regard, one of the findings of the Taskforce was that social funds could be a very useful tool, in such circumstances_ [Interviewee: Anon – 18].

While SRM therefore had little to no overlap with the LICUS agenda and its target countries, social funds did become a tool within the fragile states agenda. Unlike the emerging SRM agenda, however, social funds did not target families and stay with them over a period of time, to help them develop the skills and assets needed to get out of poverty. The focus on the ‘individual’ was therefore missing from the LICUS agenda.

Despite this coalition between the two teams for the LICUS report, there was little formal contact between the two teams after the initiative was implemented:

_If things came up, including programmes to be implemented or developed, they were invited to our programme reviews or we were invited to theirs. There was not a formal conversation, that hardly existed, this was more ‘what you’re doing is great, we’re doing this, help us out...’_ [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann].

The data suggests two reasons for this. The first was an impression that the LICUS team was protective of their work; ‘it’s our baby, we’ll call you when we need you’ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. The other reason echoes the sentiments seen in Section 6.1.1; that the departments were strongly independent during this period, despite Wolfensohn’s efforts to minimise this:

_There was no formalised relationship [with LICUS], no. But for this reason we had think pieces that emerged – the most famous is the WDR, but there were also smaller flagship reports. It was during these moments that you worked with others. You kind of brainstorm, think of things you would like to have, then you would go outside for consultation, come back with lots of comments, then you brought people_
The contact, therefore, appeared only to be at the conceptual level – the data does not outline whether, if or how this was translated to the operational level. On the whole, however, in the latter end of the Wolfensohn era any social protection programme or social fund in LICUS contexts would be implemented by other sectors such as agriculture. This is not to say, however, that the social protection team were not influential within LICUS contexts; countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone were the recipient of social fund initiatives, in which the department was involved [Interviewee: Anon – 18].

Outside of LICUS contexts, social protection was increasing in profile and priority. The data forcefully points to the economistic approach of M&E as fundamental to this; Holzmann’s leadership was also a factor:

'[It became] one of the best networks in the Bank because under Robert, the team had a Bank-wide reputation of being very client-oriented and client-driven. The ‘knowledge’ team really supported country engagement so that relationship was more dynamic – it wasn’t a ‘separate’ GP31 that just did research. So it was really well governed. Robert set up a sector board and the tone was very forward-looking, which if it hadn’t been done right at the beginning, it would have gone down a different path. So it had a continuing reputation of being very knowledge-focused. [Interviewee: Xiaoqing Yu].

6.3. Conclusion

It is clear that the Wolfensohn presidency was a period of profound change at the Bank, not only in response to the changes in global geopolitics, but also due to the enabling environment that Wolfensohn created through his leadership. This environment enabled new ideas – including some that challenged the World Bank’s orthodoxy as outlined in Chapter 5 – to take root. Both the fragile states and the social protection agendas were a result of this new approach – however, their respective origin stories are very different, and highlight different aspects of the institutional architecture of the Bank that help or hinder the success of new ideas.

31 This refers to ‘global practice’, a term adopted during Jim Yong Kim’s president to refer to sectoral departments (see Section 9.1.3).
The fragile states agenda, as demonstrated in Section 6.1, did not emerge as a unified, coherent focus on fragility – instead, the problem of fragility and conflict was considered in different ways in different pockets of the Bank. Governance emerged as a solution to the failure of structural adjustment, with the framing of ‘anti-corruption’ gaining particular power (Section 6.1.1). The development effectiveness policies arose in order to demonstrate efficiency in the Bank’s work against the backdrop of the Millennium Development Goals (Section 6.1.2). The conflict research agenda was implemented due to the recruitment of Paul Collier as Head of Research (Section 6.1.3). The Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) began initially as a budgetary concern over wasteful public spending, but in doing so demonstrated the social dimensions of conflict within the development perspective (Section 6.1.4). Finally, the LICUS initiative came about due to the realisation of some senior, influential staff that a cluster of lower-income countries were falling behind in their development objectives (Section 6.1.5).

A strong theme that emerges throughout Section 6.1 is the role of individuals. Wolfensohn himself, through encouraging innovation, created a space for ‘new’ ideas that would not have gained traction before, demonstrating the importance of leadership, particularly in an organisation as hierarchical as the Bank, in changing institutional pathways and approaches. Another highly significant individual that emerges from the data is Paul Collier. His appointment as Head of Research meant that conflict and Africa, as two of his main research interests, gained more prominence in terms of profile in the Bank. He was one of the main instigators (if not the main instigator) in the promotion of the development effectiveness agenda, the conflict research agenda, and the LICUS agenda, and had tangential links to the PCU initiative and the broader governance agenda as well. When asked within his interview as to how difficult it was to push these agendas, he responded:

*It wasn’t, it wasn’t. The Director of Research is a great position. A great position. I was high enough up that I was in charge of a big budget, I was very close to Joe Stiglitz, Joe was Senior Vice President directly liaising with Wolfensohn every week, and when Joe left my friend Nick Stern took over. Each of them was close to Wolfensohn. So it was easy actually. And I worked very closely with the Africa region, because that was my interest, so I had a lot of links with the operational part of the Bank. So it was easy, is the answer. It was institutionally easy. And it happened to be easy because of the people I was working with* [Interviewee: Paul Collier].
This demonstrates the importance of the hierarchy at the Bank – an influential position, with links to other influential people, can initiate new ideas into Bank discourse. Those who are lower down the hierarchy are less able to exert influence, unless they get the support and buy-in from more senior staff, as was the case with Nat Colletta, who was protected from those who were against his ideas for the PCU by a vice president, Mark Malloch-Brown, who in turn saw value in Colletta’s work due to his previous experience working at the UNHCR. The PCU initiative was also able to gain traction by linking to other, more powerful agendas that had been initiated by top management – the new anti-poverty rhetoric that Wolfensohn had established in the Bank in the aftermath of structural adjustment also created space for more social considerations such as the PCU.

The role of individuals is important in the introduction of new ideas, therefore. However, the role of individuals seems to become less important after their initiation – at this point the content of the ideas, and how they reflect Bank processes and ideology, appears to come into play. After all, Collier helped to set up the LICUS agenda, and did so easily, but it did not become a powerful agenda – it remained a very small initiative for many years, with fragile states remaining a low priority within the Bank’s broader portfolio. The PCU, on the other hand, demonstrates how a new idea, whatever its initial conceptualisation may be, evolves in response to the context in which it finds itself; the PCU began as a budgetary concern over public spending, but developed into a programme that addressed social and psychological factors at a micro-level due to the necessities of the context. Its operational work and development raised new questions that in turn posed challenges for the Bank; for example, the limitations of a ‘post-conflict’ approach that did not acknowledge a sensitivity to the nuances around conflict, security and development.

The content of ideas, therefore, are vulnerable to institutional factors, despite any power they have received through promotion by influential staff members. Governance, for example, struggled to gain operational traction during this period, despite it being heavily promoted by Wolfensohn and others in the aftermath of structural adjustment. This is because governance as a concept clashed not only with the quantitative, technocratic tradition of the Bank that has been in place since the Bank’s genesis (see Chapter 5), but also with its Articles of Agreement that stipulated a purely apolitical approach to development. So while there was extensive discussion about the concept of governance in pockets of the Bank, it was not able to break out of the ‘silo’ of those interested in it. Even within this silo, it did not achieve definitional clarity, due to the difficulties in reconciling
such a political concept with the Bank’s apolitical mandate, and the difficulty in operationalising it. This, conversely, actually aided the sophistication of the discussion of the concept, as its blurred boundaries created space for different narratives, agendas and conceptualisations to be forwarded, such as the ‘context matters’ narrative. The data suggests that this was a deliberate move by the Bank – by encouraging a lack of strong definition, and keeping the concept blurred, the Bank is able to respond to all constituencies and priorities, and keep the political sensitivity of the concept at bay, while also demonstrating that it is addressing the problem. So while the concept had little operational traction, it could be used politically by the Bank to demonstrate its engagement with the criticisms of the broader development community, without committing to a definitive approach. Ultimately, however, while this developed the theoretical understanding of governance and development, it did little to help with the perceived governance crisis in countries.

One place where the governance agenda did gain traction is within the fragile states agenda. This calls into question the interplay between the five different aspects of the fragile states agenda that are outlined in Section 6.1. A strong theme that emerges through the interview data is the ‘silod’ nature of the Bank, which creates pockets of work on an issue. This is demonstrated by the fact that the five different aspects of fragile states explored here had little overlap in terms of cross-departmental coordination and developed in general independently, despite, for example, Paul Collier’s influence across many of them. This ultimately means that gaining buy-in beyond the relevant silo is difficult. The only agenda that was operationally significant within these five appears to be the development effectiveness agenda, and its consequent impact on the IDA allocation formula that consequently impacted almost every agenda and regional priority within the Bank.

There was, however, some interplay between the five. The LICUS initiative is one place that the governance agenda gained traction, albeit in a truncated form that focused on capacity building within certain institutions. The development effectiveness agenda, conversely, appears to have set the fragile states agenda back – while on the one hand the LICUS, PCU and research agenda on conflict were taking steps to forward the discourse on conflict and fragility, the development effectiveness agenda was in effect handicapping it, by removing any possibility of significant funding – as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the lending mechanism is the principal tool of engagement within the Bank.
work was consequently purely knowledge and discourse-based at this point, with little operational clout. The PCU, however was able to draw on the work done in the research department on conflict to gain more buy-in from Bank staff. So there was an element of ‘borrowing’ of concepts and power structures across the agendas to help gain buy-in and to institutionalise the agendas, albeit in a small way that does not break out into the Bank’s mainstream.

Social protection, on the other hand, managed to gain a prominent profile within the Bank very quickly. It did this by adopting an approach that fitted well with the institutional orthodoxy. Monitoring and evaluation was built in from an early stage, so that the agenda was able to prove – quantitatively – that it was effective and addressing the anti-poverty goal of the Bank. The initial resistance to a concept that appeared to include ‘welfare handouts’ – an anathema to the neoclassical economic doctrine of the Bank – was overcome by embedding the concept within economic language, and promoting an approach that looked beyond state intervention. The SRM concept stressed the importance of fiscal sustainability, and focused on the ‘very poorest’; in doing so it distanced itself from the idea of welfare while at the same time aligning itself to the ‘dollar a day’ poverty approach adopted more broadly within the Bank. Reflecting on the fragile states agenda’s difficulty in becoming mainstreamed, a key contrasting point to consider with the success of the social protection agenda (specifically, the SRM concept) was its inclusion in the World Development Report on Poverty [World Bank, 2000]. The World Development Report team were looking for a new concept and were keen to borrow new ideas. Holzmann identifies this as an important moment for gaining Bank-wide support and becoming mainstreamed. Important reports such as WDRs, therefore, are influential in terms of enabling ideas to gain power and become institutionalised.

Social protection, therefore, was far more successful in becoming mainstream than the fragile states agenda during Wolfensohn’s presidency. The social protection agenda did evolve during the period – the initial focus of basic cash transfers to the poor gradually evolved into a more nuanced social assistance approach, and the ‘tool box’ that the social protection department employed consequently became more sophisticated, as it moved more towards the idea of a ‘productive’ safety net, rather than purely ‘protective’ (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). It was able to do this by having established itself as an effective and fiscally conservative initiative that adhered to the Bank’s long-term principles.
Social protection, however, did not address fragile states at this time – in fact, it took steps to avoid them, believing (in line with the development effectiveness agenda) that social protection initiatives were not effective unless robust policy regimes were in place to support the programmes. The interrelationship between fragile states and social protection at this point is practically non-existent, apart from two considerations. First, it is interesting to note the similarities between the PCU initiative and social protection. The PCU was initiated several years prior to the Social Protection department, and its approach has strong echoes of a social protection agenda; it sought to develop a ‘transitional safety net’ for demobbed soldiers in its earliest years. The interview data does not suggest that this influenced the social protection agenda initiated by Holzmann and Jorgensen – this could be an example of the ‘pockets’ of social protection initiative outlined in Section 6.2.2.

The other moment of linkage between the two agendas is that the social protection team did send a representative to the LICUS taskforce. This promoted the use of social funds as a tool that could be used within fragile contexts – and was enthusiastically embraced by the LICUS team. However, social funds did not fit within the broader ambitions of the social protection team that promoted the SRM concept – it was almost an ‘also ran’ tool that was kept specifically for fragile and conflict-affected contexts. In general, the social protection department and those that worked on fragility had little interaction during the Wolfensohn period.
Chapter 7

The Wolfowitz presidency (2005–2007)

7.0. Introduction

Paul Wolfowitz’s presidency was a short and embattled one. His tenure was overshadowed by a high-profile ethics controversy whereby he was accused of having violated his contract by awarding his companion, Shaha Ali Riza, a staff member at the Bank, a significant raise and a promotion. His actions precipitated widespread condemnation and outrage, not least among Bank staff, and a campaign to remove him was instigated. Wolfowitz fought to keep his role and was supported by the Bush administration, who viewed the campaign to remove him as criticism of its Iraq policy (Adams & Goldenberg, 2007). Wolfowitz, however, was unable to calm the controversy, and resigned in mid-2007.

Despite this short tenure and the disruption that it inflicted on the Bank, the fragile states and the social protection agendas continued to evolve over the two years. Section 7.1 outlines some key events and developments in the fragile states agenda. The governance agenda, despite its difficulties in getting operational traction (as outlined in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.3), was on the verge of a ‘revolution’, as the importance of politics within development was experiencing a renaissance. Wolfowitz himself adopted anti-corruption as his core issue, and pursued it aggressively in the Bank, which gave the governance agenda more of a profile (Section 7.1.1). The more specific fragile states agenda was crystallising within the LICUS initiative. The narrative was increasingly moving away from a ‘post-conflict’ conceptualisation to an engagement with the idea of ‘state-building’, reframing the discourse accordingly, as is explored in Section 7.1.2. Various evaluations of the Bank’s post-conflict and fragility work, however, noted significant shortcomings within the LICUS approach, not least a disconnect between this emerging discourse and the operations that were occurring in the field. This demonstrated not only that many of the challenges that the fragile states agenda experienced (as outlined in Section 6.1) were thwarting developmental progress in these contexts, but also that the Bank was struggling to find a coherent and effective approach to fragile states. One consequence of the criticisms of the evaluations was that the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR)
Unit (formerly the Post Conflict Unit) and the Low-Income Country Under Stress (LICUS) team were merged into one department, itself a contentious move that caused tensions between different ‘factions’ of the fragile states agenda.

Section 7.1.3 applies a different lens to the analysis; specifically it examines some external influences on the agenda, and the Bank’s response to them. It uses the opportunity of Wolfowitz’s short tenure to look outside the internal institutional architecture of the Bank to observe in more detail how the Bank responded to developments outside of its control. Two external influences are examined: the first looks at Afghanistan, and the concentration of global development attention that occurred there in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Bank re-engaged with Afghanistan directly after the attacks, and was presented with a steep learning curve in terms of how to engage with states in conflict or with little or no institutional governance structure. Tracing the Bank’s involvement in Afghanistan demonstrates how it was forced to evolve quickly from one of post-conflict reconstruction that focused on infrastructure to one more in line with the ‘state-building’ discourse that drew the Bank firmly into the politics of the situation. The Bank’s experience in Afghanistan were to be significant, not least because the acting Country Director of Afghanistan through the first six years of the Bank’s re-engagement would return to Washington D.C. to take over management of the LICUS group, bringing these new insights from Afghanistan with him.

The second part of Section 7.1.3 looks at the Bank’s relationship with other influential development agencies, in particular the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD-DAC), which was doing important work on state-building and fragile states at the time, having followed the Bank’s lead in engaging with these contexts. This puts the Bank’s work within the broader picture of development progress, and critiques the Bank’s leadership role within this context.

Section 7.2 looks at the social protection agenda during Wolfowitz’s presidency. As outlined in Section 6.2, the Social Protection department had gone from strength to strength since its initiation in 1997, and Wolfowitz did little to disrupt this progress despite his tumultuous tenure. The conceptual work around social protection continued to grow in sophistication. A notable event did occur during this period, however, which drew social

32 The war in Afghanistan and the Bank’s engagement with it was obviously not restricted to the Wolfowitz era between 2005 and 2007; it has been included here, in one place (rather than dividing it over several chapters), to summarise the Bank’s evolution in Afghanistan until this period.
protection closed to the fragile states agenda; namely, a social protection programme was established in Ethiopia. This was the first time the social protection department had extended their programmatic work to a lower income country; while not a fragile country, this was an important step in reconciling the two agendas.

7.1. The fragile states agenda

The following sections revisit two agendas pertinent to the fragile states agenda that were explored in Chapter 6; the governance agenda (Section 7.1.1), and the ‘fragile states’ agenda broadly defined, including the LICUS initiative (Section 7.1.2). It then draws in the findings regarding external influences happening in the broader development field which were to have an influence on the Bank (Section 7.1.3); specifically, the war in Afghanistan and the work being done by other external agencies.

7.1.1. The governance agenda

By the time Wolfowitz took office, the governance agenda was in the early stages of what some interviewees refer to as a ‘revolution’ or an ‘evolution’, as political matters started to become more acceptable to speak of in development considerations, and as the Bank broke away from its technocratic ideals under the relative freedom of the Wolfensohn presidency. Respondents are keen to emphasise that this was a very gradual, incremental evolution, with small influences over the time (e.g. one of these ‘influences’ occurred in January 2006, when the General Counsel concluded that the Bank was able to consider human rights dimensions in its development policies (World Bank, 2006a: see also Palacio, 2006)). This evolution was still in its early stages during the Wolfowitz era, with many factions of the Bank still uncomfortable with the new paradigm:

*The degree to which we were prepared to push the envelope in terms of the Articles of Association, and the interpretation of what interfering within the political affairs of a country means – that has undergone a radical revolution in the last ten years [...] but back then [2006] we were paranoid, or whatever you want to call it, about politics* [Interviewee: Anon – 13].
The governance agenda was also still facing a roadblock in terms of how it sat within the Bank’s lending priorities and structures. Interviewees frequently spoke of how the Bank’s traditional *modus operandi* of lending for projects struggled to enfold less ‘concrete’ ambitions; the phrase ‘the Bank is a bank!’ was often expressed, in reference to how the Bank’s business model relied on securing loans, which was problematic for governance ambitions:

*There was definitely tension between governance and anti-corruption on the one hand, and lending – and country buy-in for lending – on the other. Some countries were really interested in strengthening governance and improving the quality of their government institutions, but others were more interested in building infrastructure and getting lending for big projects that were more politically advantageous for them. So governments didn’t borrow heavily at all for policy change or for governance reforms. There were a few who did, but that was not the key narrative* [Interviewee: Mark Nelson].

Despite this, the governance agenda, at least at the conceptual level, was gaining momentum throughout the mid-2000s, reflecting a continued focus in North American political science academic circles (e.g. Grindle, 2004; North et al., 2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; see Chapter 2, Section 2.3):

*The whole questioning of the good governance agenda and the way we thought about political order, and economic order in developing countries, and how we externals act with those two things – I think there was an increasing questioning of ‘cookie cutter’ approaches to institutional reform* [Interviewee: Saku Akmeemana].

This growing understanding did, however, remain siloed among a small, invested community; the discourse was still having little traction in operational terms. Wolfowitz, however, came to the Bank with a concern about corruption, and he pursued an aggressive anti-corruption agenda [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. Within his short tenure, the first strategy for ‘Governance and Anti-Corruption’ (GAC) [World Bank, 2007a] was articulated. (The data does not address how this came about – the extent of Wolfowitz’s influence, or that of any other individuals, is not available.) This provided an opportunity for some of the ideas that had been circulating regarding governance to be encapsulated and publicised. Those involved in the production of the report, however, took care to tread sensitively:
In the [2007] strategy, the focus was we want to strengthen the existing system in a country. We don’t want to go in thinking or suggesting that this is the way to do things. We want to really support the country – and I’m deliberate in the choice of words – we want to support the country to strengthen the institutions that are present there, and that the country decides. I’m not saying government, I’m saying country, as the country has many different parts... [Interviewee: Francesca Recanatini].

However, the various different aspects of governance – its ‘promiscuity’ as described by Harrison (2004) – can be seen within the document. There is the ‘good governance’ agenda in terms of accountability (e.g. ‘helping build capable and accountable states – by working to strengthen both the public administration and non-executive state oversight institutions’ [World Bank, 2007a: 17]), a strong corruption theme (e.g. ‘reducing corruption in Bank-supervised projects is essential not only to the Bank’s mission to reduce poverty, but also its credibility in advising and supporting countries’ governance and anti-corruption efforts’ [ibid.: 24]), a public administration focus (e.g. ‘the Bank will continue deepening its work to improve public financial management related to both revenues and expenditures and strengthen civil service performance’ [ibid.: 18]), and also a strong theme of ‘context matters’ (e.g. ‘the evolving, complex and diverse nature of country circumstances makes it impossible and undesirable to rigidly classify countries in any way; no lists or rankings of countries is being considered’ [ibid.: 13]). So while a shift away from a narrow technocratic focus is clear, that shift had not resulted in a coherent message. Given that this could work in the Bank’s favour in such a contentious perspective, it could be reasonable to infer that this was deliberate.

As well as the continuing controversy as to whether the Bank should be involved in governance at all, there was also controversy surrounding approaches to corruption, specifically whether engagement should be undertaken when corruption is found:

So the agenda was much more controversial about where the push should be... if there is too much corruption in a country, should we stop engaging with them? Whereas there was another part of the Bank that thought we cannot make the people – the more vulnerable people in a country pay twice [Interviewee: Francesca Recanatini].
The final approach argued that the Bank would stay engaged even in highly corrupt contexts, but would find other ways to engage, and take extra measures to protect the Bank’s resources [World Bank, 2007a].

Many of the contexts that could be seen as problematic in this regard were fragile states. Fragility and post-conflict issues were not, however, really considered in this strategy, apart from within the context of engagement (the alternative methods of engagement included using instruments such as community-driven development and third-party delivery systems, which did not rely on central government). Fragility, then, did not have a large role in the governance agenda at the time:

_I look back and I say we should have actually pushed more for fragility. I think today, fragility is an incredibly important issue inside the Bank for our thinking and how we engage […] at the time I got the impression that it felt it was a regional problem, rather than a problem that applied to the whole world_ [Interviewee: Francesca Recanatini].

The GAC strategy was published in March 2007, in the middle of the Wolfowitz controversy. In May of that year it was announced that Wolfowitz would be leaving the Bank in June.

7.1.2. The LICUS and CPR departments

Two documents that were published in 2005, at the time when Wolfowitz joined the Bank, demonstrate the evolution of the LICUS discourse since its implementation in 2002: _Fragile States: Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies_ [World Bank, 2005a] and the _Low-Income Countries Under Stress Update_ [World Bank, 2005b]. The rhetoric in these documents had shifted considerably from the ‘aid effectiveness’ approach seen in the 2002 Taskforce Report [World Bank, 2002b], towards a lexicon that used concepts such as ‘state-building’ and ‘peace-building’ and their associated language. The remit of the LICUS initiative now sought to include building state-wide capacity and improvements in accountability; a much more expansive agenda than the ‘narrow-focus’ approach outlined in the 2002 report [World Bank, 2002b]:

_Statebuilding: To support more effective approaches to state-building, the Bank will focus on developing good practice country examples and, where appropriate,
operational guidance on leadership support, basic economic and administrative systems, prioritizing institution-building to core state functions; robust economic governance approaches; private sector development; and effective service delivery approaches [Document: World Bank, 2005b: vi].

The agenda also now stretched far beyond any concept of ‘post-conflict’ engagement – the reports look to actively promote peace and conflict prevention, embedding the Bank in all stages of conflict work. As well as adopting a ‘state-building’ lexicon, the Bank was also now referring to LICUS states as ‘fragile states’, reflecting the terminology that was being used within the broader development community (see Chapter 2). At some point (the data is not clear), the LICUS initiative actually changed its name to the ‘Fragile States Unit’ (FSU) [World Bank, 2006b]. In light of this new terminology, the reports outline a new fragility typology, categorising fragile countries as in ‘deterioration’, ‘prolonged political crisis or impasse’, ‘post-conflict or political transition’ and ‘gradual improvement’. The agenda looked to differentiate the needs and requirements between the different categories, in order to develop strategies that were appropriate for each context. The discourse, then, had moved away from conceiving of fragile states as a homogenous group, as was the approach seen in Section 6.1.5, but was still not absorbing ideas around the ‘context matters’ approach seen within the governance discourse, that would argue against typological approaches on the grounds that stressed the importance of political economy considerations within each context.

Despite the rapid evolution seen in the discourse, a report done by the internal Bank evaluation department (IEG) highlighted several shortcomings of the initiative [World Bank, 2006c]. It discovered several positives; for example, it said that the initiative had given the agenda prominence, and new analytical approaches had improved the Bank’s operational readiness with regard to these states [World Bank, 2006c: x]. It had also increased LICUS countries’ access to funding through the trust fund; interestingly, it also cast tentative doubt on the empirical evidence on the link between strong policies and aid effectiveness, drawing in new research that contradicted the IDA allocation model and suggested that potential for returns to LICUS through IDA mechanisms could, in fact, be very high.

However, the report strongly suggested that the initiative’s turn towards state-building was weak, and did not employ ‘political intelligence’ within LICUS contexts; the Bank had
done little to move away from the business models and instruments that they used for ‘business as usual’ contexts, meaning that *inter alia*, political understandings of country contexts had not been internalised, as was reflected in the struggles the governance agenda was undergoing (Section 7.1.1):

*The Bank has made one of its traditional weaknesses (capacity development and governance) a central part of its focus by adopting the more complex state-building objective. This new emphasis requires the Bank to identify its comparative advantage more effectively; improve performance, including through the development of innovative approaches; and identify partners who can complement its work to ensure the achievement of intended outcomes* [Document: World Bank, 2006c: xxv].

The sentence that followed this claim was indicative of the problem that the Bank faced:

*The choice of the term state building may itself be inappropriate, given its political and ideological connotations* [Document: World Bank, 2006: xxv].

The report, therefore, suggested that although the unit was speaking the rhetoric, it was not implementing coherent ‘state-building’ strategies, compromising its efficacy. A second evaluation, undertaken by the UK development agency the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 2008, corroborated this summation, saying that the Bank had fallen back on technical, functionalist approaches that did not look beyond the ‘capacity [of the state] to do and deliver things’ (ODI, 2008: 6).

The IEG report also demonstrated that most of the Bank’s progress had been in the immediate post-conflict period, where its approaches were best articulated; after the immediate ‘emergency’ resources and – crucially – funding tailed off, which was another factor that undermined the broader state-building objective. The IEG report summed up that consequently the LICUS group, despite its shift in rhetoric and consequent broader ambitions, had progressed little from 2002, in part due to the lack of internal support for its objectives. It demonstrated a distinct disconnect between the discourse surrounding the fragile states and the operational approach and capacity to achieve the objectives of that discourse. These objectives had been muddied further from the siloed work on conflict that was occurring in the Bank, as the Conflict-Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPR, formerly PCU) remained in the Social Development department, while LICUS remained in OPCS, while their remits overlapped as they both tried to broaden their scope.
The data is quiet as to what was occurring in the CPR during the Wolfowitz era, other than to suggest it was continuing its work to establish certain practices such as community-driven approaches, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, and bespoke health, gender and education approaches for conflict environments. Marc [2009] gives some insights into projects that occurred during this period, such as violence prevention activities and peace-building integrated into post-war reconstruction in Colombia and Rwanda, and research into the impact of homicide and drug-trafficking on growth and poverty reduction in Latin America. This hints therefore that the CPR agenda, similar to the LICUS agenda, had significantly broadened its scope from a pure post-conflict reconstruction prism to one that embraced crime, violence, and peace-making activities.

The data does refer, however, to the merging of the two departments at the end of the Wolfowitz tenure. There is some evidence that this was in response to the IEG evaluation (e.g. ODI, 2008), however the interview data suggests that this had been percolating for a while. The data suggests that this was a contentious development, e.g. ‘there was a time when there was some competition over where the function would lie’ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed], but does not go into details other than to say that there was disagreement as to whether the new unit should be in the Social Development department, where the CPR was situated, or in the operations department, where LICUS had developed [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. The move however did reflect the progress that both teams had made in terms of their conceptual understanding of the issues and the broadening of their remit:

The whole movement surrounding conflict had gone a long way to initiating a more vibrant debate in the Bank, but it got stuck rather on the post-conflict reconstruction side, where most of the consciousness of what you do after a conflict had ended, and had been firmly resolved – it was sort of a sequential concept [...] and we had this group dealing with conflict [and LICUS], and they sort of merged those two groups recognising that there were too many similarities to have two separate entities. So if you like, LICUS was a sort of broader concept which included countries that were not necessarily conflict-affected or post-conflict, but also included those that had low institutional capacity with high risk of conflict. And so it became clear over time that it was more helpful to bring those together [Interviewee: Anon – 2].
This merger is discussed further in Section 8.1.2.

7.1.3. External developments

As the previous section demonstrated, the LICUS agenda had evolved considerably since its initiation in 2002, at least in terms of discourse, and this discursive shift had been, unsurprisingly, influenced by external influences and discourses that were filtering through to the Bank. The data points to two particular global influences that impacted the fragile states agenda at this time, namely the war in Afghanistan and the adoption of the fragile states agenda by other agencies such as the OECD-DAC.

Afghanistan

The Bank’s engagement with Afghanistan strongly impacted its approach to conflict and fragility. Straight after the 9/11 terror attacks, the Bank was drawn into a re-engagement with Afghanistan, where it had not had a programme for over ten years. The nature of the Bank’s work in Afghanistan changed considerably from its initial engagement, as the ‘messy’ process of re-building the country threw up new challenges, and called into question many of the assumptions underpinning the Bank’s approaches to fragile states.

The initial engagement strategy was one of post-conflict reconstruction [World Bank, 2002c]. The nature of the work was traditional infrastructure, such as road repair and electricity provision. The programme was complicated, however, by the myriad other international and bilateral agencies that had surged into Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. To try to halt the confusion, a large conference in Tokyo in 2002 established a ‘steering group’ for the Afghanistan project, which consisted of the US, the EU, Saudia Arabia and Japan. The Bank was situated as part of the ‘implementation group’ of multilateral banks and the UK that were commissioned with implementing the directives of the steering group, setting up a loose framework of aid architecture (ICRAA, 2002) (the data notes the Afghanis themselves were not consulted). This meeting also initiated the mechanism for a multi-donor trust fund, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which the World Bank was nominated to administrate.
The Bank’s work, however, quickly moved from one focused on infrastructure to state capacity building and strengthening, in particular trying to strengthen the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. The Bank’s country team undertook extensive analytical work, including in local administration, to find the gaps, which was considered to be unusual in a post-conflict setting. The ‘circus’ of bilateral institutions continued, each fighting to gain control of quick impact projects, particularly in the policy areas of education and health. There were gaps within the reconstruction effort, however, that were not being addressed, such as higher education. The Bank moved to fill in those gaps. In healthcare, the lack of coordination was particularly problematic; supply was only available where the NGOs had chosen to go, and was consequently delivered haphazardly. The Bank, with the Afghan government, developed a publically funded health service that utilised delivery by non-state actors through a competitive award scheme out to franchise by NGOs. The Bank’s remit, therefore, was rapidly expanding into several areas of development.

The other flagship programme was a community-driven development (CDD) programme. CDD was becoming a favoured programme of the CPR unit in the Social Development department of the Bank. The programme in Afghanistan, however, appears to have grown organically; the Minister of Reconstruction and Rural Development, Hanif Atmar, together with Bank staffer Scott Guggenheim developed a scheme to give $50-60,000 block grants to villages, through a National Solidarity Programme. The scheme included a democratic element; a ballot was held in every village to administer the funds. The programme was hugely successful, and was indicative of a significant shift in focus for the Bank; it was not only thinking in terms of infrastructure and reconstruction, but also in concepts within the broader state-building agenda, such as accountability, legitimacy and the social compact.

Afghanistan, then, had moved the Bank far out of its comfort zone in terms of its engagement with fragile states. On the instrument side, the instruments available for post-conflict work were put into focus – Afghanistan had continued to be identified as an ongoing emergency in order to access the emergency reconstruction instruments available through IDA, which highlighted the limits of these short-term ‘sticky plaster’ systems in the IDA allocation system (see Section 6.1.2). By 2007 the Bank was also involved in various sectors such as justice, security and the military, which at the time of its initial engagement in 2002 would have been considered far beyond its apolitical mandate. This had occurred as the World Bank had moved into a prominent position in the
‘reconstruction’ effort, created by the proliferation of different actors; the move into the justice sector, for example, had been because the Italians, who had been put in charge of the justice sector by the steering committee, sought help from the Bank. The engagement with the military came through purely economic concerns, in terms of considerations surrounding how the army would be funded, and its financial sustainability.

In addition to these shifts in thinking around financing and the boundaries of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, insights from the field surrounding ‘state-building’ issues such as capacity and the social compact had emerged. The extensive analytical work done in Afghanistan had found that contrary to the assumption of ‘weak capacity’ in these contexts, there was extensive capacity at the sub-national level that could be developed. The work on CDD provided insights into the importance of the social compact, and related concepts such as legitimacy and accountability, echoing work that was emerging from the OECD-DAC at the time (e.g. OECD-DAC, 2007; see following section). The Bank’s engagement in Afghanistan, therefore, challenged its assumptions with regard to fragile states, creating a space where concepts such as security and politics became relevant to development; interviewees see the engagement as a ‘sea-change’ in how the Bank viewed post-conflict and fragile situations [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed].

**Fragile states work in other agencies**

There is a literature that addresses the work done in the broader development community and its work on fragile states (e.g. Baranyi & Desrosiers, 2012); this section explores how the World Bank interacted with this broader community during this period. One interviewee suggests that this new focus in the broader literature was triggered by the Bank’s move to address conflict at the end of the 90s (see Sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.4) [Interviewee: Nigel Roberts], and the 9/11 attacks. DfID in particular began to concentrate on fragile states, and the OECD-DAC set up a Learning and Advisory Group (LAG) on Difficult Partnerships, a forum where various development stakeholders came together to develop best practice, principles and suitable policies for engagement in fragile states. It was in this forum that the term ‘fragile states’ had its genesis, as the forum looked to challenge the normative assumptions around USAID’s categorisation of ‘failed’ states [Interviewee: Anon – 2]. The LAG graduated to become the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), not least because of the tension around the idea of
‘difficult’ partnerships; this graduation was occurring almost in parallel with the LICUS initiative’s transition to the Fragile States Unit (Section 7.1.2).

Throughout the early to mid-00s this forum in the OECD-DAC refined their approach to engagement in fragile states, similar to LICUS. In 2007, it published its *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* (OECD-DAC, 2007). This situated the broader development thinking as one of ‘state-building’, including accountability and legitimacy considerations, with a more nuanced understanding of fragility that looked beyond state capacity and state-society relations. The adding of ‘situations’ to the concept of fragility, rather than just ‘fragile states’, demonstrated a shift away from state-centric approaches, and a more nuanced understanding of sub-national politics with respect to development, seeding ideas around a spectrum of fragility, and different varieties of fragility, and challenging the idea of fragility as a lower-income issue. The forum went on to provide several policy guidelines in response to the shift in understanding (e.g. OECD-DAC, 2010; 2011).

The Bank had a top seat at this forum, with Sarah Cliffe co-chairing the meetings, which were frequently hosted at the Bank. The interaction and influence between the Bank and the forum draws mixed impressions from the interviewees, however. Some interviewees say that the development of the discourse and understanding around the fragile states in the Bank emerged in parallel with the work at the OECD-DAC; others, however felt that the Bank was lagging behind the broader discourse at this point, that the Bank adopted the lexicon of the new discourse, but not much more [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. The remit of ‘state-building’ also differed between the Bank and this broader discourse; a comparison of the Bank’s *Fragile States: Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies* [World Bank, 2005a] and the OECD-DAC’s *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* (OECD-DAC, 2007) demonstrates different conceptualisations of what ‘state-building’ means. The World Bank’s approach conceives of state-building as predominantly a capacity-building exercise, to create a state that is effective in service delivery, and that creates a strong environment for economic growth; this is reflected in country strategies, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Security is acknowledged briefly (in terms of state capacity), and a thin accountability element is included. The OECD-DAC’s conceptualisation, however, goes far further than pure capacity concerns, drawing in frameworks on legitimacy and human rights, for example.
7.2. The social protection agenda

By the time Wolfowitz came into the presidency, the Social Protection department was well established and growing from strength to strength, both in terms of personnel and volume of lending. The data identifies several shifts that gradually occurred during the later end of the Wolfensohn period and the Wolfowitz presidency. The first is the growth and development of the social assistance agenda. While Holzmann’s strategic direction had broken from the previous reliance on pensions and labour market instruments and introduced social assistance in the form of cash transfers to the poor, over time this social assistance toolkit had expanded to make the social assistance more ‘productive’; i.e. to provide social assistance interventions that built on human capital. Public works programmes in particular were beginning to play a more prominent role [Interviewees: Robert Holzmann; Xiaoqing Yu].

The second development over this period was a clearer relationship with other multilateral and bilateral institutions in the pursuit of social protection goals. UNICEF, for example, is perceived to have shifted from being one of the Bank’s main critics to becoming a supporter of the Bank’s social protection work:

UNICEF was the interesting partner on this, because they shifted from being one of our main critics outside the Bank to becoming a really good partner. They were still critical [...] but because we were at least worried about what poor people felt and where they started from... yes they would have liked us to move further, but it created partnerships with others [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen].

The ILO similarly began to work more closely with the Bank – while debates about targeting and conditionality continued, interviewees viewed the relationship as more productive by this point [Interviewees: Robert Holzmann; Steen Jorgensen]. Other institutions such as DfID and ODI in the UK took on the conceptual work initiated by the Bank [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen], and developed the risk approach to consider human rights considerations (e.g. Foresti et al., 2006).

The data suggests that Wolfowitz did not ‘interfere’ with the content of the social protection agenda, so his leadership had little influence on its development [Interviewee: Robert Holzmann]. There is a sense from the interviewees that his mode of premiership hampered the vibrant academic community that was fertile territory for innovation that had been the style of Wolfensohn’s leadership, as Wolfowitz was trying to run the bank like a
US state institution [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. This made it more difficult for new ideas to gain traction. However, in general the data has little to say about Wolfowitz’s influence on social protection.

One key event occurred during the Wolfowitz tenure; a ‘Productive Safety Net’ (PSNP) social protection programme was established in Ethiopia. Chronic poverty, driven by continuing droughts and famines in the country (Vasagar, 2005), had made Ethiopia one of the poorest countries in the world, triggering a massive humanitarian response. However, the limitations of an approach that sought to mitigate the crises after the events had become increasingly apparent. The Ethiopian government consequently sought to work with the Bank and other organisations working in the country to establish a way to transform the aid money coming in into a ‘more productive development-focused aid’ [Interviewee: Anon – 18]. From these discussions the PSNP was developed, which targeted districts that had been most severely impacted by the droughts. Within these areas, households that had been receiving aid over a certain amount of time were targeted. The instrument used was public works for those that were able to work, and cash transfers for those who were unable, such as the elderly or pregnant women. The public works element specifically targeted the root of the problem, namely the droughts:

What made the Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program fairly unique was that in its design, the public works aimed to address one of the root causes of the drought. They were designed to support the watershed management, with the ultimate result of replenishing the water tables and rebuilding the top soil in those areas, adapting an approach that had been used in China ... they also then worked with the villages to cordon off selected hillsides from animal grazing, so that the grasses and bushes could regrow. In addition to providing fodder for animals, it also helped to reduce flooding from the hillsides close to villages. It has been a long-term programme that has actually addressed one of the root problems that caused the famines. [Interviewee: Anon – 18].

This was a significant development, as a comprehensive, national-level programme had been introduced into Africa, where, until that point, the social protection approach of the Bank in this region had exclusively relied on social funds. The new initiative in Ethiopia was to ‘open the floodgates’ to social protection programmes being introduced throughout the region, as outlined in Chapter 8.
7.3. Conclusion

While Wolfowitz’s tenure was short, significant shifts within development thinking were occurring in the mid-00s – arguably the most important was the gradual introduction of a consideration of ‘politics’ within development strategies and the new insights from Afghanistan. A core facet of Bank ideology – its apolitical mandate – was being challenged, as the theoretical and conceptual work done on governance increasingly demonstrated that politics could not be removed from the ‘development equation’. Consequently, the governance agenda was experiencing a ‘revolution’, albeit one that was very gradual, with new insights added over time. The interviewees offer a couple of factors that help to add these insights – the first is the powerful anti-corruption narrative pursued by Wolfowitz, the second was the influence of North American political science circles that were embracing the concept more and more, and other agencies as seen in Section 7.1.3. This tentatively suggests that much of the Bank’s agenda on governance was emerging in response to external ideas, rather than being generated internally at this point. The consequence was that – in its discourse at least – the Bank was moving away from a technocratic, ‘one size fits all’ approach to development, and the apolitical mandate of the Bank, while it was not rejected by any means, was being gently reframed in light of the new understandings of development.

The agenda was still experiencing stumbling blocks, however. While the openness to governance considerations was stronger than it ever had been before, there was still no concrete definition emerging from the Bank, or a strong operational policy to accompany the shifts in rhetoric. A significant roadblock continued to be the lending priorities and structures of the Bank – recipient governments did not want to borrow money to improve governance (and policies could only accompany loans), preferring to borrow for infrastructure projects or human development activities; ‘good governance’ lending offered no political incentive for recipient governments. In fact, sometimes it did the opposite, as governments could often benefit from a lack of good governance, and the Bank’s new philosophy in the wake of structural adjustment tried to veer away from anything that could be perceived as conditionality – the Bank was taking care to ensure that its country strategies were led by the countries themselves (to what extent the Bank was achieving this, or attempting to achieve this beyond rhetoric, is debated; see Chapter 5, Section 5.2).

Despite these roadblocks, the governance agenda was strong enough at this point to
generate the first ever ‘Governance and Anti-Corruption’ (GAC) strategy. It offered a
‘muddied’ definition of governance, with several different framings of governance
emerging within the same document, as was seen in Chapter 6. At this point fragile states
were not the priority within this strategic approach – respondents report how the Bank had
grappled, in light of the anti-corruption agenda, with what to do with countries that were
perceived to suffer from corruption, which suggests some overlap with the fragile states
agenda. The conclusion was that the Bank would stay engaged, but not through financial
support – similar to the conclusion that the LICUS initiative had arrived at a few years
earlier. The Bank’s creditworthiness and fiscal concerns still overrode any opportunity to
engage with ‘problematic’ states, so the phenomenon of ‘aid orphans’ in these contexts
continued.

The LICUS – now known as the Fragile States Unit (FSU) – agenda had seen a big shift in
rhetoric; it had moved away from a ‘post-conflict’ approach to one of ‘state-building’,
which reflected many of the concepts and theories under scrutiny within the governance
discourse. The data does not reveal whether this echoing of the governance agenda is due
to the ideas travelling internally within the Bank from the governance team to the FSU
team, or whether those working on FSU were reacting to the same external influences that
were being exerted on those working within the governance agenda. The LICUS agenda
was suffering, however, similar to the governance agenda, from a disconnect between the
new discourse and lexicon that sought to gain a better understanding of the political
context of development, and the actual operational work taking place in the field. Internal
evaluations claimed that political intelligence was not being employed in fragile states
contexts, that ‘business as usual’ was the norm in terms of engagement. This again
demonstrates a bifurcation in the Bank between the ‘knowledge generation’ part of the
Bank and the operations in the field, that had a disruptive effect on the power of ideas to
gain traction on the ground. (It is useful to remember at this point that the FSU team did
not have any personnel in the field – it remained a ‘policy shop’ in the D.C. headquarters,
offering advice to country teams who implemented country strategies.) The ideas
surrounding fragile states were therefore facing three significant institutional obstacles:
this bifurcation between knowledge and operations; their poor fit with Bank lending
mechanisms and processes; and the difficulty in their operationalisation – the discourse
had provided ideas around what ‘good governance’ looked like, but as yet had not offered
solutions as to how to achieve it.
Social protection, however, was suffering no such roadblocks – the agenda continued to grow in terms of both the size of the team and the volume of lending. The conceptual understanding of social protection was evolving, in particular in the direction of social assistance and ‘productive’ welfare, away from the protective approach and basic cash transfers. These evolutions were also forging a stronger relationship with other multilateral institutions, as the social protection agenda was powerful in demonstrating the Bank’s commitment to ‘poor people’. While tensions still remained around the conditional versus unconditional / targeting versus universal debates, where the Bank remained firmly on the side of conditionality and targeting, the fact that the department was addressing poverty at a micro level, and embracing concepts such as productive welfare, helped forge a stronger relationship.

The relationship between the fragile states agenda and the social protection agenda was still at best weak. The FSU was still promoting social funds, but the social protection team were still situating the vast majority of their work (particular in terms of SRM) in middle income countries. The introduction of a productive safety net in Ethiopia, therefore, represents a big breakthrough in terms of the social protection agenda being applied to low-income contexts. Respondents suggest that this idea came from the Ethiopian government, rather than the Bank itself – again the Bank seems not to have been the active initiator of this development. Nonetheless, its willingness to work with – and lend to – Ethiopia on the PSNP lay the foundations of a bridge between social protection and fragile states.
Chapter 8

The Zoellick presidency (2007–2012)

8.0. Introduction

Robert Zoellick came to the presidency in the aftermath of the tumultuous Wolfowitz era. Respondents suggest that the Bank was in a ‘state of shock’ [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed] after the events that occurred around Wolfowitz, and that morale was desperately low. Zoellick was generally considered to have a stabilising effect, and to have ‘calmed the waters’; he did not aim to radically revolutionise the Bank in the way that Wolfensohn had (see Chapter 6) or that Kim would attempt to (see Chapter 9). Zoellick did, however, show a particular interest in fragile states. This interest would provide a boost to the agenda that would ‘change the game’ of the Bank’s approach to fragile states.

Section 8.1 details the changes to the fragile states agenda. Section 8.1.1 revisits the governance agenda in the aftermath of the publication of the first Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy. Its publication had triggered two new initiatives; the first was the creation of a Community of Practice (CoP) in the Bank that aimed to create linkages between those in the Bank who were interested in – and wanted to promote – the concepts of governance and political economy within the Bank. The second initiative was a trust fund that accompanied the new CoP, which provided funding specifically for projects that would help to mainstream the work on political economy being done in the field into the Bank’s portfolio.

Section 8.1.2 looks at the new Fragility and Conflict-Affected States Unit (FCAS), the new unit that had arisen from the merger of the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPR, formerly known as PCU) and the Fragile States Unit (FSU, formerly known as LICUS). The merger had created an interesting mix of personnel, providing a social development perspective from the former CPR staff, and the more traditional Bank institutional perspective from those previously in the FCU. The new unit was led by Alistair McKechnie, who was returning from his work in Afghanistan, bringing the operational learnings from the field into the mix. Shortly after Zoellick’s arrival, the agenda would receive a large boost in profile with the announcement that a World
Development Report (WDR) had been commissioned on Conflict, Security and Development. The production of the WDR would be a long and contentious one, which took three years from announcement to publication, and which forced the Bank to tackle the issues that it had faced with its engagement in fragile states head-on. The decision to dedicate a WDR on conflict, however, and its publication, was highly important – its significance cannot be overstated with regard to the profile of the fragile states agenda at the Bank. Section 8.1.3 traces the development of the WDR.

Section 8.2 outlines the social protection agenda under Zoellick. This would prove to be a critical period for the agenda. As seen in Sections 6.2 and 7.2, social protection had been developing and expanding rapidly over the years, and the department had recently engaged with a low-income country – Ethiopia – for the first time. However, shortly after Zoellick’s arrival the global financial crash occurred in 2008, which catapulted the Bank’s social protection work into the spotlight as it became a key tool in handling the fall-out of the crisis. Lending on social assistance increased five-fold in the following years. While the majority of this support went to middle-income countries (MICs), there was also an expansion of the work in low-income countries (LICs), accelerating the nascent emergence of social protection programmes in Africa. The second social protection strategy, published towards the end of Zoellick’s presidency, reflects these shifts and approach and outlines two significant developments in the strategy – it embraces not only LIC contexts within its consideration, but also looks to make a shift from an approach that develops discrete programmes within countries to one that creates coordinated systems of social protection in countries.

Section 8.3 addresses how the ideas have evolved during the Zoellick presidency. Several methods of idea progression are identified, including a ‘bottom-up’ approach that looks to form small coalitions around an idea in the field that can be adopted to circumnavigate a broader reluctance in the Bank to engage comprehensively with the idea. The power of documents is also evident, in particular the power of WDRs in raising the profile of an agenda or an idea, or as an arena for ideational struggles. Section 8.3 also examines how the two agendas of social protection and fragile states meet for the first time in a comprehensive way, as the social protection department turns its attention to fragile states contexts.
8.1. The fragile states agenda

The following section looks at the developments in discourse and initiatives that shifted the fragile states agenda. Section 8.1.1 examines the governance agenda in the aftermath of the first Governance and Anti-Corruption strategy. Section 8.1.2 looks at the new Fragility and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) Unit, which had arisen through the merger of the FSU and the CPR units. Section 8.1.3 traces the development of the World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development.

8.1.1. The governance agenda

As seen in Chapter 7, the governance agenda had risen in profile in the mid-00s; Wolfowitz had chased corruption as his core issue, and political science academic circles in North America had turned their attention more forcefully to the concept of governance, influencing the Bank. The first ever Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Strategy [World Bank, 2007a] had been published just as Wolfowitz left the Bank.

Two developments arose in the aftermath of the GAC Strategy in 2007. The first was a Governance and Political Economy (GPE) Community of Practice (CoP), which was established by Brian Levy, the then Head of the Governance and Anti-Corruption Secretariat and a prominent figure in the forwarding of the governance agenda. The CoP facilitated discussions around the ‘context matters’ elements of the GAC Strategy, at the same time as a similar body of work was emerging in the US political science academic circles (interviewees cite scholars such as Dani Rodrik (e.g. 2007), North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)) who argued that the role of political economy factors in development was powerful, and that their omission from considerations compromised the efficacy of development strategies (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). The CoP sought to bring together the people in the Bank who were interested in the new work on political economy, in order to devote more attention to the political economy dimensions in development. The CoP communicated through an internal intranet platform, occasionally releasing papers and frameworks (e.g. Fritz et al., 2009) that published and promoted the approaches, lessons and analytical tools that were being developed.

The CoP gained momentum for a period during the Zoellick presidency, generating interest not only within the ‘knowledge’ area of the Bank, but within regional teams where country
directors and managers were responsive to the ideas. However, while the ideas were filtering through to operational considerations, the reach went only so far:

Of course, what each of us means by taking political economy seriously might be different from one to the other, so let’s not decide we are going to define it one ‘right’ way [...] but that reaches its limit. It reaches its limit because someone says that’s very nice but what are we going to do next? And we don’t have an answer. [Interviewee: Anon – 9].

Concurrent with the genesis of the CoP, a multi-donor trust fund was set up in 2008 called the Governance Partnership Facility (GPF), with founding partners of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It had an initial budget of $40 million to mainstream the ongoing work on political economy. Initially managed by Brian Levy, then Verena Fritz, its strategy in terms of the trust fund was not to formalise a systematic approach, but to support champions of working differently:

Since the inception of the Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) Strategy in 2008, the Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) has played a vital role in the success of its implementation. Through the GPF, colleagues across the World Bank have been inspired in their efforts to experiment with innovative approaches to issues of governance, public management, service delivery, information and communications technology, extractives, among a host of thematic areas [Document: World Bank, 2016: ix].

So, as one interviewee put it:

But note – this is not system-wide change in the Bank. This is trying to champion and incubate ideas [Interviewee: Anon – 9].

The GPF did inspire a growth in interest in certain operational teams in political economic considerations – this is explored further in Section 9.1.1.

8.1.2. The Fragile and Conflict-Affected States Unit (FCAS)

As discussed in Section 7.1.2, the Fragile States Unit (formerly LICUS) in the operations department and the Conflict-Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit in the Social
Development department merged at the end of the Wolfowitz tenure/ the beginning of Zoellick’s to create the Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) Unit. Their trust funds (The LICUS TF and the PCF) were merged to create the ‘State- and Peace-Building Fund’ (SPF). Its initial contribution was for $100 million from IBRD’s administrative budget for three years (World Bank, 2009) The unit became a Director-level department, with Alistair McKechnie returning from the South Asia office to lead the unit. The merger created two distinct groups of staff in the unit; one that had formerly been in the CPR, who had links to the humanitarian agenda and the UN, and those from the FSU, who were more ‘conventional World Bank’, dealing with issues such as infrastructure, investment, and job creation. The data outlines how these group dynamics overcame the ‘silod’ nature of the Bank, in a way that thematic sectoral networks had tried to do but with little success.

The data, however, does not outline in detail the activities of the FCAS at this point – most of the attention about this period is diverted to what was happening in terms of the development of the WDR. There is evidence that the FCAS unit was closely involved in helping the progression of the WDR (see following section), but as to what approach the FCAS was taking during the years of its development, the data is quiet.


In 2008, Robert Zoellick and the Board decided that the Bank would release a World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Violence. Certain ambassadors for the fragile states agenda, including Sarah Cliffe (the former head of LICUS / FSU) and Nigel Roberts, the Country Director of West Bank and Gaza and then The Pacific, had been lobbying the economics department and other stakeholders for four or five years to undertake a WDR that looked at fragile states, with no success. This changed in 2008, in no small part to Zoellick’s support [Interviewee: Nigel Roberts].

The data points to various different reasons as to why the decision was made at this point. Global geopolitical factors played a part; the on-going high-profile conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the emergence of several new conflicts (such as in Chad and Yemen) were increasing the pressure on the international and development communities – and Board members at the Bank – to address the problem of ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states. In the internal Bank discourse, the data suggests that the time had come after years of incremental realisations and conceptual and theoretical evolutions concerning conflict and its
relationship with development. Furthermore, a sharper focus on fragile states was a good business decision for the Bank; fragile states were becoming a bigger problem, where as many non-fragile lower-income countries were graduating into middle-income states:

*The intellectual focus needs to be on countries that are now our business; and the innovation of our business now needs to be on fragility* [Interviewee: Anon – 17].

The state of the fragile states agenda in respect to the FCAS unit was also a factor; the data offers a continuum of dissatisfaction with the Bank approach taken thus far. At best, the LICUS / FCAS initiative ‘had come as far as that analytical model could take us’ [Interviewee: Anon – 2]. At worst, there was a view that the Bank was lagging behind the rest of the development community with respect to its engagement with these issues [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed; see Section 7.1.3].

The final – and perhaps most significant – catalyst was the support of Robert Zoellick. He was strongly invested in the fragile states agenda; the data hints that his interest came in part through his strong connection to the US establishment33 [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed; see also Watts, 2014]. The US policy establishment at the time was heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, and had realised that governance and institutional development was critical to sustain what they referred to as their ‘peace-building’ mission (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009). While the interest from the US came from an interest in how to complement security objectives, rather than a development-first perspective, it coincided with the development community’s interest in fragility, making it ‘a topic that was a tactic for the Bank’ [Interviewee: Nigel Roberts]. It also muddied the divide between security issues and development perspectives; while the data does not say so explicitly, it could be tentatively inferred that the overlap of the two agendas created a space for the Bank to address security issues – still an area of contention in the Bank.

*Residual factors are always key in taking advantage of a shift or a movement or opportunity in a particular direction* [Interviewee: Nigel Roberts].

The decision to undertake the WDR is seen unanimously in the interview data as a highly important moment in the fragile states agenda in the Bank. It was the first time that the World Bank had addressed any issue related to conflict, security, human rights or justice in

33 Robert Zoellick had been Deputy Secretary of State in the Bush administration from 2005–2006, amongst other roles.
a WDR; until this moment they had been considered too political to address from a development perspective.

*Having the World Bank release a major report on conflict urging inclusive political institutions and confidence building in fragile situations as something that concerns development actors – it’s not new, but it’s revolutionary* [Interviewee: Anon – 6].

There was controversy, however; not least from the rest of the development community. The Bank’s involvement in fragile states had always been contentious with regard to the UN, which had traditionally been the institution involved in peace-building and conflict work, as the following quote regarding the introduction of the PCU in 1997 outlines:

*Once [the PCF] had been set up, I was worried that we were going to end up robbing Peter to pay Paul, in the sense of taking money away from the UN work in this area [...] I wanted the Bank’s resource or strength deployed on the problem, but not if it was just going to be actually redirecting resources from the UN to the Bank, which is a little bit what sort of happened* [Interviewee: Mark Malloch-Brown].

The decision to undertake the WDR did little to decrease this tension:

*Doing a development report on conflict and security was extremely controversial, there was a lot of bad feeling, especially within the UN initially, as it felt that the Bank was stepping out of its mandate and into the UN’s mandate. That itself was a process that needed to be managed carefully – which took time* [Interviewee: Anon – 3].

In part due to the sensitivities around the issue, and also to the fact that this was a new topic for the Bank, the Bank was given two years, rather than the usual one, to produce the report. Sarah Cliffe was appointed as director of the report, and she brought in Nigel Roberts as co-director. The approach they adopted for the development of the report again ‘broke the mould’ [Interviewee: Anon – 3] in terms of WDR processes. First, they brought in a team of predominantly external people, in acknowledgement that the Bank did not have a monopoly of expertise on the issue. The team included experts from other institutions such as the UN, and from a pool of recent graduates. The team then undertook extensive country visits, in order to establish a robust evidence base:
Everyone accepted that the state of the evidence was less well developed than for most WDRs, and that there needed to be more preliminary work to make sure there was a really good basis for the findings [Interviewee: Nik Win Myint].

The country visits sought to gain the perspective of those working in the field and from the domestic governments in the countries. It looked particularly at countries that had graduated from fragility (e.g. Chile, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Mozambique) – a very small sample – to try to understand what had facilitated the transition and what lessons could be taken. The second revolutionary approach was to consult on the report from the very beginning of the research process:

The process that the WDR developed was new; there was a much larger consultative process than was normally the case. We always used to say that the traditional WDR model was to do all the work in a very closed team in Washington, and then right at the end for the last two months go out and consult with people. We did it in a really different way – we started consulting with people on the questions, not just the findings. We had this advisory panel very much pulling in a political and practitioner view. So that was new – previous WDRs had only really had an academic advisory discussion [Interviewee: Anon – 2].

The consultation approach from the early stages not only added months to the overall production of the WDR, but it also exposed what one interviewee described as ‘fissures in the Bank’ (as described below) [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. Not that there were not benefits; for example the high-profile Advisory Panel that had been gathered helped gain credibility for the work\(^{34}\), and getting buy-in and ownership from external stakeholders such as the UN community, national governments, the academic and NGO communities secured support for the research and helped soothe some of the tensions within the UN:

More than with other reports I think there was a need for doing consultations for ownership purposes [Interviewee: Anon – 3].

The interviewees all praised the consultation process in that it helped to strengthen the report, as reviewers attempted to shake the analytical models and ideas to find weaknesses, blind spots and issues that needed to be addressed more thoroughly were uncovered, and

\(^{34}\) Details of members of the Advisory Board are available on p. xx of the WDR [World Bank, 2011a].
areas where the evidence was weak were highlighted so the report did not overstep the evidence [Interviewees: Nik Win Myint; Nigel Roberts]. The consultation process did, however, create battles for the WDR team to fight:

_I remember that when the first concept note went out for peer review, the lengths and comments we got back was longer than the concept note itself_ [Interviewee: Nik Win Myint].

_The number of review meetings we went through, and hundreds of pages of comments, lots of meetings that were not necessarily at the beginning very comfortable with the links with politics, security and justice_ [Interviewee: Anon – 2].

A theme that runs throughout the contention demonstrates the struggle to break away from the Bank’s traditional economistic model; despite the conflict agenda that had embraced broader state-building objectives such as legitimacy and accountability, and a governance agenda that stressed the importance of context within interventions, the ‘mainstream’ Bank still baulked at the approach that drew on political science and the inclusion – and promotion – of concepts such as politics, security and justice. An example of this continued tension between the Bank’s traditional methods and the new approaches proposed by the WDR team was a pressure put on the team to develop and include a typology of conflicts:

_The Bank is very data driven, very econ driven, and the economists have a very specific way of approaching problems that for example sociologists and anthropologists don’t […] what I remember very clear is there was a big push to do a typology of the different types of conflict. And we did _not_ want to do that, because you get stuck in a box_ [Interviewee: Anon – 3].

The team pushed back on this request, and compromised by including a table of ‘stresses’ – political, external, internal etc, – in its place [World Bank, 2011a: 74]. But the debate demonstrates that, despite the progress achieved on concepts such as governance and the political economy of development, and the move away from a personnel structure that rested heavily on economics that was initiated by Wolfensohn (see Chapter 6), there remained a strong prevailing inclination within the Bank to fall back on economistic approaches.
A final problem with the consultation process that is not explicitly referred to in the data, but can perhaps be tentatively inferred, is that with such a wide consultation, and the consequent proliferation of ideas and opinions, that many relevant insights could not get traction. A few interviewees with conflict experience expressed frustration that their knowledge, ideas or experience gained little traction\(^{35}\). However, there are many other reasons why certain ideas may not have been taken up; for example the authorising environment within which the team was working (e.g. the discomfort of the Bank of being ‘too political’), or that the idea or argument was insufficiently supported by the evidence that the team had collated.

Analytical framework of the WDR 2011

The analytical framework that underpins the report was identified as another area of tension – perhaps unsurprisingly, given that it supplied the theoretical and conceptual frame of the whole report. The data reveals that the team looked at various different options (it does not reveal what the other options were), and that it took a while to get it right:

_We had quite a lot of trouble coming up with an analytical framework ... we had quite a lot of problems determining what that was going to be_ [Interviewee: Nick van Praag].

The message of the WDR, emblemised by the framework, was citizen security, justice and jobs. The framework consequently looked to restore confidence in the institutions that provide citizen security, justice and jobs, and transform them to prevent relapse into violent conflict. Doing so is a slow process, and the framework strongly emphasises that confidence-building and transformation is not a linear trajectory; the framework is therefore represented as a helix that acknowledges \textit{inter alia} the repeated cycles of violence. In comparing fragile and violent contexts with stable developing environments, the framework identifies four differences that provide the context for fragile engagement:

1) The need to restore confidence in collective action before wide institutional transformation is undertaken

\(^{35}\) Examples have not been included to protect interviewee anonymity.
2) The priority of transforming institutions that provide citizen security, justice and jobs
3) The role of regional and international action to contain ‘external stresses’
4) The consequent specialist nature of support that is required [World Bank, 2011a: 11].

The framework therefore calls on institutional development and good governance as central to the processes of confidence-building and transformation, but emphasises again the need to work differently in these contexts; specifically, that the goal needs to be more focused on institutions that create security, justice and jobs. The processes of confidence building and transformation in these institutions also are represented as a repeated spiral, feeding into the helix nature of the framework. This spiral demonstrates that there will be no ‘make or break’ moment; ‘we can’t find George Washington to lead them out of the wilderness’ [Interviewee: Phil Keefer]. Rather, there needs to be transitional moments over time so that successes build on successes, and fast, visible opportunities need to be seized in order to build confidence.

The perceived strengths and weaknesses of the WDR 2011

The report was summarised by the Bank as follows:

*The WDR 2011 calls for a paradigm shift in the development community’s work on FCS [fragile and conflict-affected situations]. The proposed paradigm is that violence and other challenges plaguing FCS cannot be resolved by short-term or partial solutions in the absence of institutions that provide people with security, justice, and jobs. This paradigm is based on the following findings: (a) organized violence takes many forms, is often recurrent, and can mutate over time; (b) successful transitions have involved the creation of “inclusive enough” coalitions and early and convincing “signalling” of intent through concrete and credible actions; (c) building capable and legitimate institutions to deliver citizen security, address injustice, and create employment is key to breaking these cycles of violence; and (d) responding to these priorities requires much greater partnership and discipline by external actors, as well as revised procedures to permit greater speed, allow for longer engagements, and better manage the inevitable risks*
inherent in assisting countries facing fragility, conflict, or violent crime [Document: World Bank, 2011b: iii].

As seen in the previous section, the fact that the WDR was even undertaken and agreed to by the Bank was considered a significant achievement, and a breakthrough in terms of the Bank’s acknowledgement of the fragile state and conflict issue. The WDR provided a compelling and forceful argument that fragility and violence are a significant constraint to the success of the Millennium Development Goals, and that inequality/poverty and violence are related; children are twice as likely to be undernourished if they are born into a fragile or conflict-affected environment, and three times as likely to be out of education [World Bank, 2011a: 63]. During the time period the report studied, a country experiencing conflict and fragility lagged behind in poverty reduction by 21% [World Bank, 2011a: 60]. Beyond this, however, the perceptions of the WDR within the Bank and externally of the content of the WDR were, perhaps inevitably, mixed36. This mixed picture emerges in the interview data; on the positive side, there was a fair level of satisfaction with the synthesis of knowledge and conceptualisations that emerged, for example:

> It essentially didn’t break a lot of new ground, but like any good WDR it kind of crystallised the developing conventional wisdom, and kind of put a cherry on top, and said OK now the international development community is going to seriously look at the emerging and academic policy work, and come up with a consolidated statement about how important this is; and that’s what the WDR did [Interviewee: Joel Hellman].

While the WDR did not break new ground, by synthesising the conventional wisdom empirically it provided a framing of the subject that has been described by commentators as ‘counter-cultural’ (e.g. Vernon, 2011; Watts, 2014); i.e. it went a considerable distance to break from the traditional economistic, technocratic approach of the Bank. The positioning of legitimacy as a central underpinning concept of the report for example, highlighting concepts such as perception and interpretation, puts a strong emphasis on political dimensions of development. Its conceptualisation of violence is also significant; it emphasises the need to not underestimate the impact of organised violence, and in doing so demonstrates the wide differentiation between types of violence, such as that of militias,

---

36 Nigel Roberts, co-director of the WDR 2011, wrote a paper in 2015 (not publicly available) that critiqued the WDR, which was kindly provided for this study.
ethnic rebels, gangs and criminal groups. In doing so, this breaks from a ‘state-level’ conceptualisation of fragility; it is a comprehensive shift away from the idea of a ‘post-conflict’ model of engagement, and puts context as the starting point of engagement. As Watts (2014: n.p.) puts it: ‘the Bank endorses, unlike its one-size-fits-all approach in promoting market efficiency, a “best-fit” approach that takes history and geography seriously’, demonstrating an emphasis on politics never before seen in a World Development Report.

Despite these positives, there are significant frustrations in the Bank (not least within the WDR team itself) with the content of the report, including a frustration with the limit of how far the embrace of politics and context was prepared to go. The frustrations stem frequently from the compromises that had to be made within the production and consultation processes. A significant omission from the report that several interviewees point to is any case material or indeed reference to the role of external actors – particularly to powerful countries that are on the Bank’s board – in the escalation of conflict. Interviewees report how certain emerging middle-income countries did not want their countries to be drawn into any evaluation of conflict in the regions in which they were involved, which went some way to prevent more comprehensive discussions of other relevant concepts such as Islamic extremism [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. Other powerful high-income countries similarly insisted on the removal of any hint of responsibility being attributed to them; from an economic perspective for example, there is no acknowledgement that ‘Cold War imperialism and globally imposed neoliberalism has created conditions for reactive violent politics’ (Watts, 2014: n.p.). There is also data that suggests how Robert Zoellicck personally intervened to ensure that the role of the US in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts was not scrutinised; in fact, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are barely mentioned at all within the report [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. This removes a hugely important macro level of political consideration, that of global and international politics, and important actors and factors are removed from the analysis; a significant omission in a discussion that places importance on context and legitimacy.

Roberts (2015) also demonstrates that Bank ideology prevented any critique of the Bank’s current definitions and measures of fragility – despite suggesting that the withholding of finance as stipulated by the IDA allocation system may not be as efficient as providing finance with oversight mechanisms, the report does not call for a revisit of the IDA
formula. Furthermore, the methodology of the whole report relies heavily on the traditional ‘econometric’ methods of the Bank, rather than seeking to adopt an approach more appropriate for exploring historical or ethnographical considerations such as the motivations behind violence; the method ‘does not excavate the deep and knotty relations between ideology, discourse and political economy’ (Watts, 2014: n.p.)

[This criticism] is a fair point – the bibliography and reference points of the 2011 World Development Report do feature a preponderance of the North American liberal economic and political thinking: congruent, as one would expect, with the Bank’s own political economy and intellectual authorizing environment [Roberts, 2015: 8].

Another criticism of the report is that while it looks to establish what factors enabled countries to ‘exit’ fragility, a common theme of the authoritarian nature of many of these exits (e.g. Rwanda, Vietnam, Uganda, Mozambique, South Korea and Ethiopia) goes unacknowledged. Roberts [2015] suggests that the exit strategy that the report promotes may therefore be more applicable to middle-income countries where authoritarian regimes have recently collapsed (e.g. Egypt).

The reflections on the report from the interview data reveal that despite the significant breakthrough in several aspects of development considerations (the emphasis on the politics of development, for example), that the Bank is still working within strict confines imposed not just by the Bank itself, but also by the international political environment in which it finds itself. The data supports the findings of Watts (2014) that the document is a ‘bundle of contradictions’ (Watts, 2014: n.p.) or ‘schizophrenic’ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed], in that it eschews traditional Bank concerns such as a focus on markets and growth development orthodoxy and replaces them with a strong emphasis on concepts traditionally alien to the Bank such as security, justice, citizenship rights and legitimacy; however it does this through methods that remain traditionally economistic, and embraces politics and context only as far as broader geopolitical influences will allow. The introduction of a political lens also is ‘softened’ by the language used, in that while more political concepts are addressed, the report does not develop a comprehensive engagement with the complexities involved in such issues; for example, it stresses the importance of inclusion and legitimacy, but does not attempt to balance it against the need for law and order.
This being said, the data also strongly suggests that the WDR was powerful on a rhetorical level, and represented a move to embrace the ‘fragile states’ agenda in a way that had previously only been peripheral within the Bank’s broader objectives; the overriding impression from the data is that while the document was flawed and fell short on some respects, its break from World Bank normative considerations – and the fact that it existed at all – cannot be underestimated in terms of influence.

*On the analysis, it’s light years ahead of where we were ten years ago*
[Interviewee: Saku Akmeemana].

**The impact of the WDR**

Despite the overwhelming belief that the WDR was influential, there are mixed messages that emerge from the data in terms of its impact on the day-to-day functioning of the Bank. Some interviewees are keen to stress that its impact was significant and that the learnings from the WDR filtered through to operational work:

*Even five years later it still is being used operationally, and in academia, for academic references, and it is still referenced to this day. You don’t see that... you rarely see that with WDRs, they usually have a very short shelf-life*
[Interviewee: Anon – 3].

This is corroborated to a good extent by others; many interviewees detailing the differing levels of influence between WDRs, with some being remembered as influential (e.g. the WDRs in 1997 and 2004), whereas others as less so (e.g. WDR 2002).

*That [2002] WDR – it’s not such a widely discussed WDR. You mustn’t forget that the Bank is a very non-monolithic institution in some ways. Things that are talked about in the governance practice can be quite distant from the things that get talked about in the economics practice. Somehow the 2002 – I mean we have the 1997 WDR on the state, and the upcoming one on governance and the law, so those are the two, and then the 2004 on social dimensions – that somehow got stuck in everybody’s mind. But the 2002 one... I’m not sure our practice would identify with it a great deal*
[Interviewee: Anon – 5].
Against this perspective, the data suggests that WDR 2011 did ‘stick in everybody’s mind’; it is referred to frequently. However, on the ground, the data is unclear as to what practical differences the WDR made. A new department and structure aside (see Section 8.1.2), some interviewees say that the status quo remained after the report’s publication:

*There was no new operational policy that was issued, it didn’t fundamentally change the way we operate* [Interviewee: Nik Win Myint].

[Did it change anything on the ground?] Not really! It does give lessons learnt, in terms of recommendations. Things like ensuring there’s consistency in teams, in engagement – those are the kinds of lessons that came out of it that I think have been taken on board, and you can see it reflected in our staffing policies and in the way we manage those policies. But other than that, from my own perspective I haven’t seen anything else [Interviewee: Naila Ahmed].

Context seems to be significant in terms of its impact; this latter quote is from a country operative in Afghanistan, where the high-profile nature of the intervention suggests it may not be representative of other countries, for example. Indeed, the data does demonstrate different experiences in different countries, dependant on factors that include (but are not limited to) country context, World Bank regional management, the priorities of the national government, and the individuals working within that context. The following quote demonstrates this relationship between the WDR as an effective document and the contexts in which it was useful:

What [the WDR] did was provide a reference guide for teams working in fragile states, and we could go back to our management and say we want to do this differently, and look, this is what it says in the WDR, and so we did that – I’m working on a community development project here in Myanmar, and one of the things that we did at the outset was to argue for a much longer life-cycle of the project than the normal three or four-year programme cycles, and this is now actually a nine-year programme. There was a lot of resistance initially, because that’s not how we usually do things, and we were able to say actually it’s very consistent with what is said in the WDR, it’s good practice in fragile environments and so on. So basically it provides a lot of good evidence for fragile environments, a sort of management-endorsed set of good principles that the country teams are
able to make use of, to make this case, but I do think it has remained a little bit up to the teams to make that case [Interviewee: Nik Win Myint].

The WDR seems to have become, therefore, a point of leverage that can be used by individuals who are more sympathetic to the importance of context and political theories as a tool to promote approaches that go beyond the traditional World Bank ways of working. The data identifies two different ways this leverage can be used; through appeal to management as described above, or through inclusion in the country strategy documents [Interviewee: Anon – 2] (which themselves need management sign-off). This is consistent with the different experiences felt in different countries regarding the impact of the WDR; it was not necessarily the WDR itself that facilitated change, but rather how Bank staff responded to it.

While there are differing experiences as to the impact of the WDR on operational work, there was an undeniable impact at the senior management and Board level of the Bank. The data suggests that this reception may have been helped by recent global events, in particular the Arab Spring, which occurred around the time of publication of the report. While the Arab Spring in one sense highlighted limitations to the WDR’s framework (e.g. its predictive power) [Interviewee: Nik Win Myint], it also helped demonstrate the relevance of the issues it addressed, and went some way to support the report’s findings.

The Arab Spring, which was happening just as the WDR was published, and that of course tended to increase its resonance, because this message of legitimate politics, security, justice and jobs of course is generally considered to be fairly fundamental to what drove the Arab Spring [Interviewee: Anon – 2].

The continuing problems in Afghanistan were also influential in providing resonance to the report:

The donors were eager to understand these issues, not because they were interesting ideas, but they were all directly investing: they all had stakes in Afghanistan, not only multilaterally through the World Bank but also through their own development agencies [Interviewee: Joel Hellman].

This, and a positive response from the development community, led the Board to request – again a first for a WDR, and one that subsequent WDRs have followed – for an operationalisation paper [World Bank, 2011b] to be produced based on the findings. The
paper listed six recommendations or commitments that the institution would undertake to improve its engagement in fragile states:

1) **Making country strategies more fragility-focused.** This recommendation called for an overhaul of the strategy documents that are undertaken for every Bank engagement. It requested that stresses that can lead to conflict and violence to be identified in the strategy; to assess any deficiencies in the institutions that deal with security, justice and jobs; to identify any opportunities to break the cycles of fragility; and to work within time periods (not necessarily the normal three-year cycle of each strategy) that facilitate the building of ‘inclusive-enough’ coalitions. The paper explicitly says that the inclusion of these policies will require a greater focus on the ‘political economy’ issues of the country.

2) **Strengthening partnerships on development, security and justice.** This recommendation argued that greater cooperation between the agencies that make up the larger aid architecture was necessary to make sure the comparative advantages and mandates of each agency did more to complement the overall aim as a whole.

3) **Increasing attention to jobs and private sector development.** This recommendation called for a more concentrated effort to remove the ‘bottle necks’ to private sector investment, and a focus on ‘quick win’ public and community-based employment, and infrastructure investments to nurture private sector response.

4) **Realigning results and risk management frameworks for FCS.** This recommendation acknowledged that the risk-averse nature of the Bank did not facilitate effective engagement in fragile states, and that the risk of non-engagement in these countries could have been larger than the risk to donor resources. It called for a rethink of the Bank’s definition of risk tolerance, risk management and expected results through new operational policies and guidance notes.

5) **Seeking less volatility in funding.** As the WDR advocated sustained, long-term engagement, this recommendation acknowledged that there were allocation problems with regard to fragile states. It committed to exploring alternatives; however, one of the alternatives it forwarded is to ‘maintain incentives through increased allocations for cases of better performance, while maintaining minimum
thresholds to ensure consistent support for core institutions and basic services’ [World Bank, 2011b: 6]. There was still apparently no appetite at this stage to take away the bias against fragile states in the IDA allocation system, as demonstrated by continued support for ‘incentives’. The document also called for the continued use of the State- and Peace-Building Fund (SPF) to continue as a significant income revenue.

6) **Striving for global excellence in FCS work.** The final recommendation, which perhaps signals the biggest change in approach, maintained that in order for the Bank to play a ‘genuine leadership role’ in FCS work, work streams needed to be consolidated (e.g. the different work streams on capacity building, violence and crime) to ensure a ‘coherent response’ to fragile and conflict-affected states.

This final recommendation triggered a significant operational shift in the Bank, namely the Fragile States Unit was reconfigured into a ‘hub’, situated in Nairobi, to address the principles outlined in the Operationalisation Paper. This is discussed further in Section 9.1.2.

8.2. **The social protection agenda**

Robert Zoellick arrived at the Bank at a critical moment for social protection. As demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the social protection portfolio had been gradually increasing and developing throughout the first half of the decade, particularly the social assistance portfolio, which had evolved from basic cash transfers into a more sophisticated toolkit that looked to build human development outcomes and provide productive safety nets. Shortly after Zoellick’s arrival, however, the 2008 financial crash occurred, causing extensive food, fuel and financial crises over much of the developing world. The effect on the economics of both middle-income countries (MICs) and low-income countries (LICs) was devastating, not least as 65 million people were pushed into poverty [IEG, 2011]. The demand for social protection consequently boomed, as the Bank and governments fought to contain the effects of the crisis.

The crisis had several consequences within the Bank’s social protection agenda. A positive was that the Bank was able – and did – respond to the crisis quickly, with social assistance lending increasing five-fold in the aftermath of the crisis (of the $11.5 billion that the Bank committed to support social safety nets over the decade from 2000-10, over half was
committed after 2009 in response to the crisis [World Bank, 2012b]). The vast majority of this new lending, however, went to IBRD (i.e. middle income) countries; 54% of the lending went to five MIC countries that had social protection and labor programmes already in place that were able to be rapidly scaled up [ibid.]. This is indicative that the majority of support at this period still continued to be towards MICs. However, the crisis did create an expansion of support to LICs also – Bank documents indicate that 15 new LIC countries sought Bank support in the aftermath of the crash, many in Africa [IEG, 2011].

However, this is not to say that African governments had remained entirely resistant to the idea of social protection until the crash hit – while the crisis was unfolding in 2008 the African Union, with the support of all member countries, had adopted a Social Policy Framework (SPF), which endeavoured to give a higher priority to social policies and social development:

*The SPF aims to provide an overarching policy structure to assist African Union Member States to strengthen and give increasing priority to their national social policies and hence promote human empowerment and development. The framework treats social development as subordinate to economic growth, but justifies social development as a goal in its own right. It acknowledges that while economic growth is a necessary condition of social development, it is not exclusively or sufficiently able to address the challenges posed by the multi-faced socio-economic and political forces that together generate the continent’s social development challenges* (African Union, 2008: 4).

Social protection was one of 18 key thematic issues within the framework, and the data identifies this as a key moment of shift in the mentality of African leaders regarding the social protection agenda, as the broader development community had sought to push-back against the ‘handout’ mentality of social protection that had been prevalent in the region [Interviewee: Anon – 7; World Bank, 2012b].

The Bank’s entire African social protection portfolio at the time of the African Union pledge and as the crisis was unfolding was social funds, plus the PSNP in Ethiopia [Interviewee: Anon – 18]. The Kenyan government however soon approached the Bank with an idea of a programme for orphans and vulnerable children; the number of orphans was high due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, so the government wanted to incentivise
extended families to take in orphaned relatives. A programme, initiated with DfID and UNICEF, was called Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC). It demonstrated definitive progress in Africa and LICs in their acceptance of social assistance; however, they were LICs with institutional capacity, such as Kenya and Ethiopia [Interviewee: Anon – 18].

Social assistance programmes were emerging in LICs, therefore, but only those that had institutional capacity to support it – fragile states were not considered at this point. Tanzania was next to come to the Bank keen to set up a social protection programme; specifically, to transform an existing social fund, the Tanzanian Social Action Fund (TASAF), into a national-level programme. The TASAF had undertaken innovative targeting work by talking to communities about their perspectives and understanding of poverty, and undertaking community mapping, comparing it with the Bank’s proxy means-testing that used data from household surveys. The research had found that community targeting was more accurate than the proxy means-testing and had dispersed TASAF funds accordingly; the government now wanted to scale-up the project to a national-level programme, but starting from a bottom-up perspective:

*The TASAF is a social fund that has evolved from providing basic infrastructure and services at the local level, working with the ministries of education, health, water, roads etc to then having a major focus on building the capacity of local government to provide these basic services and infrastructure. In this case the social fund itself basically became technical assistance to local-level government.* [Interviewee: Anon – 18].

Initiatives such as the Tanzanian example were therefore building the Bank’s knowledge and understanding of how to tackle the challenge of implementing social protection programmes in LICs, in particular ways to build capacity in order to support the programmes. As cash transfer programmes continued to spread across Africa, varying approaches and methods were applied depending on the country and political context, building on any systems (e.g. social funds) that were already in place [Interviewee: Anon – 18]. The new programmes all had some common features; all the new initiatives were country-led and personality driven – for example, there were contentious meetings in Tanzania when DfID wanted to channel the funds in a different direction. The country-led approach was therefore significant:
I think it’s important to understand something that is often missed in the literature, that each country has its own version of how they give money to the poor. So Ethiopia is seasonal public works, focusing on environmental public works, so building water catchment works and so on. In Brazil you have conditional cash transfers where the conditionalities are really weak, especially if you don’t send your kids to school – nothing much happens apart from social workers kindly ask you what’s going on. In Mexico it’s much more Draconian cash transfers where if you don’t send your kid to school, you won’t get the cash transfer the next month [Interviewee: Anon – 7].

Not only was country demand and the knowledge base of how to address country context increasing, but LICs were benefiting from South-South knowledge transfer. In the Tanzanian case, for example, the Bank had brought over the man who had been in charge of *Progressa Oportunidades* in Mexico on a supervision mission to advise on one technical aspect, who was later hired to scale-up the TASAF [Interviewee: Anon – 18]. The South-South learning angle, which had proved to be successful in Latin America, became a key tool within the spreading of successful cash transfer programmes throughout Africa. In 2010, a Community of Practice (CoP) on Cash Transfers in the Africa region was set up, to encourage peer-to-peer learning. It started with five countries that were undertaking cash transfer projects (including projects that were not financed by the Bank, and that were either unconditional or ‘soft’ conditional). The practitioners in the countries would come together to talk about their experience, what was working well and what was not, and the areas that they wanted to learn about in terms of global best practice [Interviewee: Anon – 18]. The CoP quickly grew to over 30 countries, and held meetings approximately every six weeks over digital forums and once a year met together in person. The impact has been significant:

*That’s something that’s been relatively low cost but I think something of huge impact. It enabled practitioners to learn from each other about global best practices, as well as to network with each other so that the exchange could continue one-to-one as desired by participants outside of the formal sessions. Overall, the participants have reported that it has been an incredibly helpful tool for them* [Interviewee: Anon – 18].
The social assistance portfolio was gradually spreading throughout Africa, therefore, dictated by an increase on the demand side, as the perceptions of social assistance and social protection more broadly began gradually to shift. The supply-side of social protection initiatives from the Bank, however, while making progress, still was problematic in terms of inter alia, how to address low capacity, and how to apply the tools the Bank already had for LIC contexts in a way that supported the poverty agenda.

The supply-side issues were a consideration with various developments that had been occurring through this period in the central departments of the Bank. In 2009, Arup Banerji had taken over from Robert Holzmann as Director of the Social Protection department. Banerji had joined the Bank in 1996, working in both operations and research, initially in former Soviet Union countries in transition, then in the Middle East and North Africa, where he wrote the regional report on governance and institutions [World Bank, 2003b]. He then worked on human development initiatives, writing on ageing and labour market issues, before becoming Global Director of the Social Protection department. Respondents point to the period after his arrival as one of evaluation and examination of how far the social protection agenda had come since its inception in the Bank. The gradual inclusion of LICs into the portfolio was under scrutiny; the portfolio at the time was 70% in MICs, with a particular bias towards Eastern Europe and pensions and social insurance [Interviewees: Steen Jorgensen; Anon – 7]. However, with strong evidence emerging from Latin America that cash transfers were a powerful tool, and from the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) that demonstrated the potential of work-based programmes, there began an internal examination within the Bank of what elements of social protection were the most powerful if the Bank was to address poverty as its prime objective:

*This was very much at the time a combination of the Bank committing to use our tools to really address poverty as the primary objective rather than only the broader set of development, and the set of evidence that was appearing. The question we had was will this work outside the middle-income, high-capacity contexts that this evidence came from [Interviewee: Anon – 7].*

This perspective was to become a key narrative within the second Social Protection Strategy [World Bank, 2012b], on which work began shortly after Banerji’s arrival as director (see below).
A report that was commissioned almost concurrently with the second strategy, and that was to be influential in the approach that the strategy was to take, was a report by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) at the Bank that evaluated the Bank’s work on social safety nets (SSNs) from 2000-2010 (IEG, 2011). The report outlined several major findings that critiqued the Bank’s engagement and implementation strategies. The first finding noted that while the focus on addressing chronic poverty and human development had been successful, the Bank had neglected the issue of how SSNs respond to shocks – this had been starkly demonstrated in the aftermath of the financial crash, where SSNs had struggled to adapt and expand to the additional demand, particularly in countries where SSNs were not well established. This was due in part to the fact that SSN project objectives had not been anchored in a longer-term outcome framework; the project-focus of the social protection agenda had resulted in a short-term approach that had used instruments that were not designed for crisis response. The report did acknowledge that in the latter half of the decade, the Bank had made steps in shifting away from the project-based approach to one that encouraged countries to build ‘systems’ that supported SSN programs, such as targeting and payment systems, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. However, longer-term objectives, such as whether conditionalities regarding education had improved learning outcomes, had not been measured:

Support for SSNs needs to be treated systemically and systematically, rather than as one-off interventions in response to crises or particular political exigencies


Several other findings addressed LICs. The report highlighted that ‘despite a recent increase in LIC engagement, SSNs remained a much less significant part of the development agenda in LICs than in MICs’ [IEG, 2011: xii]. Projects that included an SSN component made up 13% of projects in MICs; they made up only 6% in LICs. The findings put this down to several reasons; for example, demand from MICs was greater as they have a higher capacity to borrow and spend. Interestingly, the findings point to the supply-side as perpetuating the bias towards MICs in SSN lending, arguing that the Bank’s low level of engagement may have perpetuated LICs’ low level of attention to SSNs, as within Bank engagement processes, dialogue accompanies resources – without access to resources, there are few if any opportunities for dialogue that could promote and support
SSN engagement [IEG, 2011: 73]. The report goes on to emphasise that despite these demand- and supply-side problems, it is important to promote SSNs in LICs if the Bank’s poverty objectives are to be achieved [ibid.: 77], not least because the evidence from Ethiopia had proved them to be effective.

The report also highlighted that donor support in LICs is often fragmented (with regional differences):

In many LICs, donor-supported projects with SSN components are small scale, fragmented, and scattered throughout the country; they address various pockets of needs, yet lack the coverage and cohesiveness necessary to build SSN institutions over the longer term or to serve as a potential mechanism for addressing other shocks that might arise. Moreover, the reality of international geopolitics is that some countries receive a great deal more donor support, regardless of their economic need. These politically important LICs have greater potential for improving their SSNs; those LICs that receive less donor interest face tremendous challenges for developing SSNs [Document: IEG, 2011: 77].

The report argues that the Bank consequently plays an important coordination role, not least through its analytical work, to try and overcome these challenges. The report also references fragile states, echoing the interview data that the Bank has ‘actively’ supported SSNs in fragile and conflict-affected states, supporting 26 of the 33 countries that the Bank has considered to be fragile within the decade, outlining that 13% of the total SSN projects were in these contexts – significantly, however, the percentage of lending was much smaller, at only 2% (highlighting the impact of the IDA stipulations outlined in Section 6.1.2). While the support seems to be extensive, however, the projects took the form of social funds (42% of projects), which were used mainly to create short-term employment in response to urgent labor demand strategies (such as demobilisation approaches), or in-kind projects (also 42%), usually food, that were used as a ‘safety net of last resort’ (ibid.: 18).

When the report turns to political economy issues, the approaches in fragile states become particularly pertinent. The broader political economy perspective acknowledges the variance in attitudes regarding the concept of redistribution of resources to the poor within and between countries and regions, and highlights that SSNs are vulnerable to political manipulation (e.g. to make economic reforms more acceptable politically, or to win
support in elections) [ibid.: 63]. It goes on to highlight how social assistance programmes are particularly vulnerable in fragile states:

*The Bank must tread a fine line within the state-building agenda: on the one hand, state building is essential for the country’s prospects for economic development and poverty reduction; on the other hand, the Bank does not support political groups. The country cases indicate that the Bank is generally sensitive to this tension and seeks to support fragile states with SSNs that incorporate pro-poor elements that can be developed further over time, albeit often more loosely than in more stable countries* [Document: IEG, 2011: 65].

The report finds that the World Bank is in general reasonably aware in most countries of political economy considerations, and has used this knowledge in some cases to, for example, identify policy champions to take advantage of political openings for SSN advancement, and that its support for technical systems insulates the programmes from political patronage [ibid.: 68]. However, there is room for improvement.

Related to the political economy perspective is the Bank’s own engagement practices and the political economy of the institution. The report found that in LICs, the Bank should have engaged earlier, rather than waiting until the financial crisis occurred in 2008. There is evidence that throughout the decade, SSNs had been raised in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) – however, despite this inclusion, they had gained little traction when it came to implementation, as the widespread chronic poverty and the tight budgetary constraints meant that SSNs were lower down the ‘priority list’, not least of the governments themselves (often due to a lack of awareness and knowledge, supporting the interview data’s assertion of the importance of the Community of Practice). Often, it was down to Country Directors – who may or may not be strong proponents of the social protection agenda – to decide what role SSNs would play within the poverty and growth agendas [ibid: 68].

The Bank’s internal organisation was found to exacerbate the problem of supply-side provision discussed above. Not only is Bank dialogue enabled by budget processes and lending, limiting resources to LICs for institutional capacity building for SSNs, but a broader problem of the incentive structure of the Bank, which discourages cross-team working, also impacted work in LICs in particular. The report identified that the interconnected nature of SSN components within projects to other sectors meant that less than
half of the total SSN projects fell under the remit of the Social Protection Sector Board. Furthermore, different departments took on different roles within the implementation of projects – analytical work was often undertaken by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) department, whereas technical knowledge would be supplied by Social Protection department. While the intention of the organisational structure was to be able to draw expertise from different areas, collaboration was challenging as the budgetary arrangements, which meant that budgets were allocated by default to the sector within which the Team Leader was situated, meant there was little incentive to work across departments, not least as teams were required to secure the funding in order to pay staff wages. The competition for ‘turf’ therefore meant that units would locate the largest sources of demand and resources, removing the incentive to work in LICs and fragile states.

These findings on the lack of support to LICs, the need for a ‘systems’ approach and the importance and significance of political economy considerations both in countries and within the Bank led the report to recommend five key areas that needed strengthening within the social protection agenda of the Bank:

1) The Bank needs to engage consistently through stable times to help countries development SSNs that address poverty and that can respond to shocks

2) The continued emphasis on building systems and institutional capacity is needed

3) Stronger engagement is needed in LICs

4) Short and longer-term results frameworks for Bank SSN support need strengthening

5) There needs to be a continued effort to ensure cross-network coordination on SSNs

These findings and recommendations strongly reflected the opinions of those in the social protection department, but added empirical clout that enabled the social protection strategy to take more radical measures [World Bank, 2012b] (see following section).

The Second Social Protection Strategy: 2012-22

The strategy was released in 2011, shortly after the IEG [2011] report. The influence of the report is easily identified within the strategy – the four ‘elemental gaps’ identified in the
strategy (integration across programmes and functions, better access to social protection and labour (SPL) instruments, promotion of access to jobs and opportunities, and global knowledge) closely echo those identified in the IEG report, albeit within a broader remit that reflects the inclusion of jobs and alternative SPL instruments to social assistance.

The strategy places as its core focus the need to develop ‘systems’, as suggested by the IEG [2011] report. The interpretation of systems was ‘to move SPL from isolated interventions to a coherent connected portfolio of programmes’, specifically to ‘help countries to address the fragmentation, and duplication across programs, and to create financing, governance and solutions tailored to their own contexts’ [World Bank, 2012b: v]. The ‘systems’ idea was therefore very specific; it did not look to create a ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach, or one that is grounded in the rights-based literature. Rather, it is still firmly grounded in the development agenda and applies the economics of institutions, rather than the social-political compact, as its starting point [Interviewee: Anon – 7]. This ‘economics of institutions’ approach is apparent through, for example, the application of governance considerations such as the ‘rules of the game’, and ‘controls and accountability’ [World Bank, 2012b.: 21], and the close link drawn between SPL and the broader growth agenda [ibid.: xiv]. The strategy does stress however that such an approach, although it does not start with the rights-based agenda as its entry point, is consistent with the agenda [ibid.: 14–16] and situates the Bank as having an ‘important roles to play’ [ibid.: 16] in the operationalisation of the SPF and in knowledge-sharing. As one interviewee put it:

*If you google Bolsa Familia in Google Images, you will find an iconic picture of people holding up the yellow cards and grinning at the camera. This was the first time that the social compact has reached them. It’s the first time that the state has reached out and touched their lives* [Anon – 7].

The strategic direction for the Bank in terms of the systems approach looks to connect the small, unconnected regional schemes developed by the Bank and other actors over the previous strategic period into a harmonised system – and to make these systems more inclusive of the vulnerable – by making programmes work together as a ‘portfolio’ of complementary programmes:

*SPL systems are portfolios of coherent programs that can communicate with each other, share common administrative subsystems, and work together to respond to*

This requires three levels of engagement at the administrative (e.g. beneficiary identification systems and registries, targeting systems, monitoring and evaluation [M&E]), programme (better targeting, improved M&E in skills-building programmes) and the policy levels (e.g. outlining a medium-term vision to improve integration and coordination across programmes by building needed programmes, eliminating overlaps, ensuring sustainable financing) [ibid.: 18]. The systems-building agenda is therefore closely associated with – and influenced by – the capacity-building agenda. This is demonstrated by the conceptual framework of the strategy, and a comparison with the previous strategy. The conceptual framework has evolved from the Social Risk Management [SRM] approach in the 2001 strategy – although it has its foundations with the ideas of SRM – which conceptualised social protection in terms of risk. The new strategy builds on this to conceptualise social protection within a triad of resilience, equity and opportunity. ‘Resilience’ is closely related to the idea of risk, as it seeks to help the vulnerable through ‘insuring against the impact of drops in well-being from a range of shocks’ [ibid.: 1], and calls for instruments such as social insurance to deliver it. ‘Equity’ looks to ‘protect against destitution and promote equality of opportunity’ [ibid.: 1], which builds on the SRM approach and looks to apply the new toolkit of social assistance instruments to protect against catastrophic loss of capital. The inclusion of ‘opportunity’, however, both within the concept of ‘equity’ and as a concept in its own rights, shifts the core focus of the new framework. Defining opportunity as ‘promoting human capital in children and adults and ‘connecting’ men and women to more productive employment’ [ibid.: 1], the strategy shifts the discourse from one of basic need to one of productivity, and more firmly embeds the approach within the ‘growth’ agenda.

One of the key implications of this new conceptualisation, in terms of strategic direction, was to extend the social protection tools available to the poorest countries, as recommended by the IEG (2011). This move to include LICs more predominantly in the social protection portfolio is stressed forcefully by the strategy. It continues to acknowledge the particular challenges of LICs and fragile states (such as restricted fiscal space, limited institutional capacity and the proliferation of actors), as outlined in the first strategy [World Bank, 2001: 32], but also argues (in contrast to the first strategy) that evidence suggests that SPL programming has the potential to build fundamental institutions to protect the vulnerable. As one interviewee put it:
What Mexico had done, and Brazil and Colombia, was build a technocratic programme that was really founded on a lot of transparency, a lot of attention being paid to the details of functioning, and effective programming. Dedicated staff that went across political cycles. This is institution building. So one of the reasons social protection has been so successful is not because we had this lovely idea that giving money to the poor is a good thing to do, but because it’s backed up by these extremely complex institutional structures which have high levels of transparency, high levels of accountability, and professional management. [Interviewee: Anon – 7].

Social protection, therefore, had not only the potential to alleviate the chronic poverty crisis in the LICs and fragile states, but also to help create some institutional capacity where there was little or none. The evidence that had been collated from projects such as the Ethiopian PSNP had demonstrated that social assistance tools would work in reaching these poorest parts of the world. To apply these tools in these contexts, the strategy outlined three key areas of work for fragile states: labour-intensive programmes such as work programmes that could stabilise labour markets while supporting infrastructure investment; cash transfer programmes to help communities re-establish livelihoods and restore any lost assets; and fee waivers for government services such as education and healthcare to support human capital investment. The argument, therefore, was that social protection could support capacity-building efforts.

The engagement with LICs, therefore, was one of the most significant shifts in the Bank’s social protection agenda. Interview and documentary data points to this shift as enabled in part by the evolution and increased sophistication of the social assistance agenda; the first strategy had focused on social insurance and job creation as its principle instruments, with social assistance included in the form of basic safety nets and social funds for low-institutional contexts. As social assistance had evolved over the decade, however, to include *inter alia* conditionality, more sophisticated targeting and public works programmes, social protection shifted from being reliant on institutional capacity to being a key tool in *creating* institutional capacity, thus developing tools that could be appropriately applied to fragile state contexts:

*[Social safety nets] is where the evidence is thickest – it’s hard to find as convincing intellectual evidence in terms of the efficacy of social insurance*
programmes as compared to these targeted transfers to identified poor. And those are the best ways to build the story of institutions [Interviewee: Anon – 7].

The strategic focus in terms of fragile states was therefore centred on knowledge generation and transfer, and the collation of data and evidence to support application of the toolkit to fragile contexts more effectively:

If you want to build more inclusive institutions then you need formal institutions, and to build formal institutions that directly and overtly touch the lives of the citizens is partly what this social safety net revolution is trying to do [Interviewee: Anon – 7].

It is important to note, however, that the capacity / systems approaches had a particular formulation. The systems agenda was due to the narrative that what hampers the coverage of social protection is ‘fragmentation’, exacerbated by a proliferation of actors with different geographic and demographic focuses. How it is applied to the strategic direction, however, is very specific; it centres on the capacity of delivery of interventions, such as how to effectively target and implement programmes and to remove any overlaps or inefficiencies. While the strategy touches on more ‘upstream’ system considerations such as policy environment, it does not focus on placing social protection among broader ‘state-building’ considerations such as broader financial integration, inter-ministerial coordination or the coordination between labour, taxation and social protection [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].

8.3. Conclusion

The discourse around both fragile states and social protection underwent several significant developments during the Zoellick presidency. How the ideas and discourse evolved, however, and were translated into the Bank’s broader portfolio, continued to show very different routes for the different agendas. The governance agenda achieved a slight elevation in profile off the back of the first Governance and Anti-Corruption strategy. The publication of this document enabled senior members of staff to develop a Community of Practice (CoP), which could form a coalition of supporters of the agenda. Furthermore, the trust fund that accompanied the Community of Practice meant that operational work that supported the agenda could be undertaken. This shows a high level of agency in the
development of governance discourse and operations; senior supporters of the agenda realised that difficulties there were in getting governance considerations and ideas adopted in a comprehensive manner within the Bank portfolio, due to inter alia its political nature, the difficulty in reconciling it with Bank lending structures and the lack of measurability that was alien to the Bank’s economistic and quantitative approach to development. Consequently, they developed strategies to build coalitions through discourse (the CoP) and made funding available to those who were willing to engage with the agenda. In doing so, governance work could emerge in pockets in operational settings. This demonstrates a deliberate bottom-up approach to facilitating the Bank’s engagement with an idea.

The development of the fragile states agenda, however, demonstrates a very different story. The decision to undertake a World Development Report on conflict, security and development was a critical moment for its profile in the Bank. Critical moments in the progression of an idea in the Bank are often accompanied by a document, which can be used by staff members in several different ways to progress an idea; World Development Reports seem to have a particular power (as seen also in Chapter 6, when the SRM concept gained traction by its inclusion in the WDR on Poverty). The data identifies three particular influences that enabled the WDR 2011 to come about; external events, a reassessment of the Bank’s business model, and support from the highest levels of management. The WDR was able, unlike its predecessors, to provide a dialogue that was ‘counter-cultural’ to the Bank’s traditional ideology and approach, validated by empirical work. In discourse, at least, the WDR 2011 was able to make some impact despite its shift away from a technocratic, quantifiable approach to development.

This is not to say, however, that the WDR 2011 was able to navigate the Bank’s institutional architecture and traditional orthodoxy easily. The reflections of the respondents identify the pressure that remained to revert to economistic, quantifiable methods that are more comfortable for the Bank (e.g. the pressure to include a typology of conflicts). Furthermore, there was no appetite to challenge the Bank’s definitions or measures of fragility, or the IDA formula. The politics around the document seemed to have been a particularly difficult area to navigate, and ultimately the theory and concepts included in the report were weakened by the political considerations of powerful Bank member countries and senior staff, demonstrating a clash between ideas and interests that is played out within the confines of a potentially powerful document.
The data also suggests that there were myriad ideas about the perspectives of conflict and security that fought for supremacy within the WDR development process. Examples are not provided here in order to maintain interviewee confidentiality, but there appears to have been several different approaches that were forwarded throughout the consultation process. The data does not give insight into how the final ideas for inclusion were chosen, but it can be tentatively inferred that those ideas that did get traction did so not purely through merit, but also through the power level of their advocates, their ability to conform with the Bank’s authorising environment in terms of how far the ‘counter cultural’ narrative is able to reach, and whether the empirical work that the WDR had undertaken directly reflected the idea. This echoes Holzmann’s experience in Chapter 6, in getting support for his SRM concept; he recalled how many of his ideas did not get traction, but SRM did due to its timing and its support and approval from powerful individuals, enabling its inclusion in the 2000 WDR.

The power of an idea is not guaranteed with its inclusion in a powerful document, however. As seen in Chapter 6, not all WDRs are equally influential within the Bank. Furthermore, WDRs are not policy documents for the World Bank – rather, they are ‘state of the world’ overviews of a development concept or challenge that go beyond the Bank’s work. Being encapsulated in a WDR is only a first step, therefore. Respondents identify two very different ways that the WDR promoted the power of its ideas after its publication. First, its message was powerful enough (and, perhaps, due to the same forces that enabled its publication in the first place, such as the increase in civil wars and the need for change in the Bank’s business model) that the Board members requested an operationalisation paper, the first time this had happened for a WDR. This was a significant step; it meant resources and attention were dedicated into mainstreaming the work into the Bank’s portfolio for the first time (this is explored in further detail in the following chapter). In terms of changes to approaches in the field, there are varying opinions as to its effect. Some respondents say it did not change much; others, however, were able to use it as a tool in order to gain support from senior management for new ideas that corresponded with the approach taken in the WDR. This again shows a ‘bottom-up’ approach, similar to the developments in the governance agenda. While the ideas did not initiate Bank-wide change, once they were encapsulated in the WDR staff members could use them to initiate changes in approach at an operational level. This requires a certain amount of will and buy-in from staff, but generates ‘pockets’ of advocacy that could, in time, provide
evidence that supports the ideas, and be taken up by processes such as South-South learning to enable their spread.

Social protection also underwent significant shifts, through some similar avenues of idea progression seen in fragile states. The Community of Practice set up in Africa helped spread the idea of social protection throughout Africa, as did the South-South learning, boosting the demand-side of the agenda in LICs that had previously been a stumbling block. The Bank was keen to support this, demonstrating its new willingness to engage in LICs through social protection. This necessitated an approach that looked into considerations such as capacity building – the discourse at this point is beginning to adopt some of the concepts seen within the governance and fragile states agendas. Social protection also vastly expanded in the aftermath of the global financial crash, again demonstrating the power of external events.

However, alongside these familiar tools of idea progression, back in Washington D.C. there was a fair amount of internal reflection on the social protection approach. The internal evaluation document [IEG, 2011] appears to have been important, and one of the first times that the social protection agenda was obliged to consider ‘state-building’ considerations, as the evaluation itself frames it. The data does not indicate as to what extent those undertaking the IEG evaluation had been influenced by the governance / fragile state discourse, but many of the criticisms the evaluation forwards are framed very much in ‘state-building’ terms; it criticises the lack of engagement in fragile states, and argues that the social protection interventions should consider politics more seriously. Importantly, it also calls for a ‘systems’ approach, albeit with a specific framing of systems that focuses on technical aspects rather than political economy considerations (this is discussed in more detail in the following chapter). These criticisms are acknowledged in the second social protection strategy, which demonstrates a significant shift in approach, away from SRM to a more systematic, ‘capacity-building’ approach that turns towards fragile states considerations. This is one of the first concrete overlaps between the social protection and fragile states agendas. It is interesting that the engagement between the two is driven by the social protection department; fragile states and governance discourse has still not embraced social protection in any comprehensive way – social protection is not a priority, within the discourse at least. Rather, the social protection department decides to turn its attention to fragile states. This is discussed in further detail in the following chapter.
Chapter 9

The Kim presidency (2012 – present)

9.0. Introduction

Jim Yong Kim gained the presidency under the Obama administration in 2012, in a contentious campaign; it was the first time a US candidate had been seriously challenged. His opponent was Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a former Bank staffer from Nigeria, who had been influential in the launch of the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) initiative (see Section 6.1.5) (Rushe et al., 2012). Kim was a doctor and former president of Dartmouth College, and had worked for the WHO from 2004–2006 (Trotman, 2012). His expertise therefore was in public health, in a break from the usual nomination of financial experts for president.

Optimism was high in the Bank on his arrival, as he was speaking the ‘language’ of institutions, capacity and governance, and a focus on implementation, that many in the Bank felt was the right approach in order to improve the efficiency of Bank interventions. However, he addressed the problems with a reorganisation of the Bank in 2014, which would prove to be a contentious, controversial and impactful exercise. A large number of people – including those of importance within the fragile states agenda – lost their jobs or left the Bank. Morale dropped significantly, and the data suggests a deep level of dissatisfaction that continues to this day.

Section 9.1 revisits the fragile states agenda. Section 9.1.1 examines the governance agenda, which particularly suffered at the hand of Kim. As seen in Chapter 8, a new focus on political economy was reaching its peak at the end of the Zoellick presidency. A new strategy, community of practice (CoP) and trust fund was helping the agenda get traction in various ways, and a new strategy in 2012 addressed some of the criticisms that the governance agenda had faced. However, this progress was disrupted severely by the 2014 restructure. Section 9.1.1 examines this through a mini case study on an initiative that emerged in the governance sector on state-building. This highlights how far the governance agenda had come, but also demonstrates how it was devastated by the new approach forwarded by the 2014 restructure.
The fragile states agenda suffered similarly, as is outlined in Section 9.1.2. It gained serious momentum in the aftermath of the WDR 2011 and its consequent operationalisation paper, resulting in a new ‘hub’ in Nairobi that replaced the Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) unit, and was granted a bigger mandate and more resources. Senior staff members were able to use this momentum to challenge the bias in the IDA formula against fragile states, meaning these countries had access to finance mechanisms that had not been available before – a huge breakthrough. However, as with the governance agenda, the momentum stalled with the 2014 restructure.

Section 9.1.3 addresses the restructure and its impact on fragile states. It is included here as the data strongly suggests that its impact was much greater for the fragile states agenda than the social protection agenda (respondents from social protection rarely mention the restructure; if they do, it is in terms of budgetary inconvenience and line management processes). Section 9.1.4 looks at the fragile states agenda in the present day, outlining a current ‘crisis’ in the governance agenda, and looking at the fragile states profile, which, while it has recovered somewhat from the impact of the restructure, is struggling as newer developmental issues such as the refugee crisis compete for attention and resources.

Section 9.2 examines the social protection agenda in the aftermath of the second social protection strategy. The strategy appears to have been taken seriously, and a new direction is clearly evident within the social protection department that considers systems and that has made a concerted effort to confront the challenges of social protection within fragile states. This section examines how these new approaches have been framed, and considers the social protection agenda in the present day, as it now stands as one of the largest sectors in the Bank.

Section 9.3 revisits how the ideas moved through the Bank during Kim’s presidency, and pays particular attention to the 2014 restructure and how it affected the political power of each agenda. It demonstrates the strength of the social protection agenda compared to the fragility agenda, but how this ‘strength’ of the social protection agenda can possibly render it inflexible to more progressive realisations of social protection in fragile contexts.
9.1. The fragile states agenda

This section examines four different issues and elements that were pertinent to the fragile states agenda during Kim’s presidency. Section 9.1.1 looks at the governance agenda, and the ‘state-building’ toolkit that emerged, applying the governance concept to fragile states more critically. Section 9.1.2 looks at the developments of the fragile states agenda in the aftermath of the World Development Report 2011. Section 9.1.3 looks at the restructure, and its impact on the two agendas. Section 9.1.4 looks at the fragile states agenda in the present day.

9.1.1. The governance agenda

The new focus on politics and political economy was reaching its peak at around the time of Jim Yong Kim’s accession to the presidency. Interviewees refer to political economy at the time as being ‘the buzz thing’ or ‘the sexy new topic’, that had emerged relatively quickly in the aftermath of the CoP and the GPF. The fact that there was funding to do political economy work, a core group of influential people including senior management who had been promoting a political economy focus (e.g. Brian Levy, Deborah Wetzel and Zoellick himself), and incentives in place to adopt a political economy approach, combined with the fact that evaluations of governance approaches had thus far attracted comments that there was a lack of understanding and tailoring around political economy contexts, meant that politics was now placed front and centre within the governance work at the Bank.

However, as previously discussed in Section 8.1.1, the take-up operationally went only so far. Some interviewees hint that although the term itself gained prominence, it began to be used to refer to anything to do with parliament or government structures, rather than political economy itself [Interviewee: Anon – 1]. In other places, it was inserted into key policy documents such as country strategies, but only as a box-ticking exercise; a vague conceptualisation of political economy issues would be applied so that any operational influence was lost when it came to on-the-ground implementation [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. A level of pushback remained from those who still believed that it was not part of the Bank’s mandate or traditional strengths to undertake any political economy considerations [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. The consequence was that despite the ‘buzz’ around political economy, its influence could only be seen in
certain countries and certain sectors where Bank staff who were receptive to the message were situated.

The Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy was updated in 2012 [World Bank, 2012a]. It took steps to address various criticisms that it had received, particularly that while the focus on institutions was welcome, that it had not taken steps to understand how to develop effective institutions. Closely related to this, further criticisms in the overall strategy were that the politics of governance had not been addressed adequately, and that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to governance, that looked to implement aspects of developed countries such as property rights, markets and the rule of law were being imposed on developing countries with little consideration of the political context; capacity had been considered, but not broader political economy streams of governance. As the updated strategy itself admitted:

Despite the significant progress made over the last few years, it is clear that the Bank needs to do even better in understanding issues of governance, institutions for development effectiveness, and ways to tackle corruption and malfeasance. It is insufficient to stress economic governance alone. The Bank’s traditional strength – its economic and technical understanding – needs to be complemented by a step change in its grasp of the opportunity and constraints in governance, within the parameters of its mandate. The Bank then must apply this knowledge to the development and strengthening of country institutions [Document: World Bank, 2012a: 9].

The updated strategy, therefore, argued for a three-pronged focus that looked not only at capacity, but also at authority and legitimacy; authority meant looking to establish an effective government that could control the territory effectively and reach and protect all citizens, legitimacy to establish trust in the government. It maintained a ‘context matters’ component [World Bank, 2012a: 10], and re-argued that its point of focus should not only be with the executive branch of a country, but also with civil society, the private sector and non-executive institutions of accountability. The main message was to demonstrate that the Bank was moving from a ‘best practice’ approach to one of ‘good fit’ in terms of strengthening institutions:

[The Bank] needs to demonstrate that it can move quickly and respond with imagination, creativity, and flexibility in country contexts that are changing almost literally overnight, and where governance – and government – is in flux [...]. The
challenge is to make this the norm for all Bank operations [Document: World Bank, 2012a: 14].

Furthermore, the recent rise in profile of fragile states saw the governance agenda broadening to focus on fragile states more explicitly. However, the governance agenda was to suffer hugely in Kim’s 2014 restructure. To illustrate this, the remainder of this section looks at an initiative that emerged within the governance sector on ‘state-building’.

The State-Building Toolkit

From the latter end of the Zoellick presidency and into Jim Kim’s presidency, an interesting development in terms of the fragile states agenda emerged in a sub-set of the governance sector. Namely, a small group looked to create a ‘state-building’ toolkit for use by the operational teams. This toolkit was undertaken by Graham Teskey, an influential person in the Governance and Anti-Corruption Secretariat (who would take over the leadership of this secretariat from Brian Levy), who had come from DfID, which the data suggests was generally considered to be further ahead than the Bank in terms of its grasp on ‘state-building’. Teskey undertook the commission as he was concerned about the use of ‘state-building’ a vague concept, and the lack of concrete definition in the Bank:

All the literature that I read concluded that it was important to consider sequencing, prioritisation and trade-offs in FCS programming, but no one ever said – well, how does one do this. So I thought I would have a go [Interviewee: Graham Teskey].

This linked with the broader ambition of Deborah Wetzel, the Head of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) department, within which the governance work sat, to link with the new GAC strategy, and to link with the WDR 2011 and the new conflict hub (see Section 9.1.2) [Interviewee: Anon – 15]. The project was given a significant budget and an advisory group, and undertook external and internal research. A working paper published alongside the toolkit [Teskey et al., 2012] outlined that this internal research included a review of country strategies in 37 fragile states between 2000-10 that found that state-building was rarely considered within the strategy process. When it was, it was used sporadically and with little consistency, and with no comprehensive understanding of what ‘state-building’ meant:
Rather, it was used as a proxy for a range of concerns, from a very narrow perspective of state-building as service delivery through the state to a very broad understanding of state-building as a fundamental transformation in the political, economic, social and security spheres [Schnell, 2010, cited in Teskey et al., 2012: 7].

The Bank’s preoccupation with capacity, and consequent neglect of authority and legitimacy, was also clear, with legitimacy rarely discussed and authority never discussed [Teskey et al., 2012]. The toolkit, therefore, looked to provide practical help to operational staff to think through questions of sequencing and prioritisation of country portfolios, and to come up with some commonly agreed terms and definitions of what ‘state-building’ in these terms would look like, and to guide decision making.

The toolkit consequently developed was an excel-based ‘State-Building Assessment Tool’ (SBAT), which broke down ‘state-building’ objectives into three steps: Assessing the overall strategic context; assessing weaknesses and strengths in state domains by authority, capacity and legitimacy; and assessing weaknesses and strengths in key institutions by authority, capacity and legitimacy. The tool was well-received, and has had some impact in other development institutions such as AusAID [Interviewee: Graham Teskey]. However, the toolkit stalled after the development stage, and was not implemented at a country level beyond a few pilot studies; it was not taken up by the Bank.

The reasons why are telling. A fundamental reason was the siloed nature of the Bank, which as seen in previous sections was frequently problematic. One respondent described this siloed nature as follows:

When you think about the World Bank, you have to think of it as a three-headed octopus. You have knowledge creation / knowledge management pillar, you’ve got your operational country support pillar, that does technical development assistance work, and then you have your lending arm, that does the public financial management and other bits like IDA. And those three arms, in my opinion, do not talk to each other [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].

In this instance, the ‘knowledge creation’, academic silo of the Bank took on board the learnings of the tool, and were keen to promote it. However, to get it out of this ‘silo’ was a very difficult task. Interviewees outlined two potential channels to institutionalise operational applications such as this tool: to go up the hierarchy of the Bank to get strong
positive enforcement at the top level and have it enshrined in operational policy (a near impossible task for something as complex and political as state-building), or to gradually gain support and buy-in from sympathetic individuals in other siloes (e.g. country teams) that can demonstrate and promote its efficacy; a long drawn-out process that relies on sympathetic individuals in a market full of ‘new ideas’. There is little indication in the data that the fragile states team worked closely with those working on the tool, apart from in an advisory capacity; many respondents had not heard of it.

Closely related to this siloed nature of the Bank was that shortly after the development of the tool, all of the team who had worked on it left the Bank, for various reasons. The academic environment and incentive structure in the Bank meant that, without its creators to advocate for it (particularly Teskey, who had extensive influence), there was no incentive for others to promote, disseminate and create buy-in for the tool in the country teams [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. This finding is not limited to the toolkit; other respondents also addressed this issue when speaking of certain projects, as outlined by the following quotes:

A lot of times how much or how well received an analytical tool or any kind of analytical work is, will to an extent depend on how many people feel that they have an incentive to advocate for it in terms of what it does for their careers and their growth. And if they don’t think that makes any difference for them, even if it is the best piece of work that has come out of the Bank in 50 years, it will sit on a shelf.

That is the political economy of the World Bank’s internal dynamics [Interviewee: Anon – 8].

There’s a broader problem at the Bank, because of the very academic environment; work becomes associated with individuals. And if individuals leave, there’s a general issue around how you... the lack of institutional memory about things. But there’s a broader issue which is related to the Bank’s cultural norms that lacks incentive for people to work on initiatives that have been developed by other people [Interviewee: Anon – 14].

The restructure was a significant reason for the loss of the personnel working on the tool (Section 9.1.3). Not only were job losses a problem at this time, but more broadly the Bank was ‘thrown into chaos’ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed], meaning that the concern around job insecurity in the Bank meant that the toolkit was side-lined within the
‘chaos’ and momentum was lost. The toolkit, therefore, sunk without trace internally in the Bank; despite being one of the first ‘hits’ of a Google Search on the World Bank and state-building. Many people interviewed who currently work in fragile states or governance had not heard of the tool; those that had were surprised that it was available on the website [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed].

This reflects the broader story of governance under the restructure. As one respondent put it, ‘it put it [the governance agenda] back two years, as governance was missing in action’ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. The sector suffered initially from a leadership vacuum, then poor leadership resulting in rapid turnover, as the department increasingly lost direction [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. The progress that had been made in terms of political economy was a particular victim, and several respondents think this contributed to the lack of progression with the agenda:

*The things related to the softer things, accountability, legitimacy, they’ve not been done a lot. I think that’s partly why the governance agenda didn’t succeed, because they didn’t know what to do about these things. So they’ve been dropped from the discourse.* [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].

There is some cautious optimism that governance may become more effective as a sector in the future, due to the appointment of a new director. However, old problems remain:

*We’re struggling for a new lexicon, in this transitional moment. Everyone has rejected the old model, everyone knows we have to engage in some way with the state, but we’re kind of searching. I think there’s epistemological siloes where we’re often talking at cross purposes, or talking about the same thing with a different lexicon* [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].

This is explored further in Section 9.1.3.

9.1.2. The Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) Unit

As seen in Section 8.1.3, the fragile states agenda had been lifted into the spotlight with the publication of the WDR 2011 [World Bank, 2011a], and the Operationalisation Paper [World Bank, 2011b] that the Bank’s board had commissioned to address the challenges
and shortcomings that the WDR had identified. The first step taken in response to the Operationalisation Paper was a dramatic reconfiguration of the fragile states unit.

Consequently, a ‘hub’ was set up in Nairobi, named the Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) Unit, known colloquially as the Nairobi hub, replacing the FCAS. The name reflected some of the insights that had preceded and become crystallised in the WDR, namely the shift away from ‘post-conflict’ conceptualisations of engagement and to broaden the issue of fragility beyond a state-level context, acknowledging sub-national and local levels of fragility and the contextual dimensions of violence:

\[
\text{We've moved from states to situations in order to capture this whole broader phenomenon of sub-national conflict, and we've moved from fragility to fragility, conflict and violence to capture the changing nature of conflict; interpersonal violence, criminal violence, in addition to civil conflict... so I think that moving from FCAS to FCV has actually been an important shift, it reflects a shift in the underlying understanding of the concept} \quad \text{[Interviewee: Nik Win Myint].}
\]

The new unit was a headquarters-level department, and as such was the first time a headquarters unit had been situated outside of Washington D.C.. It had therefore moved away from being a ‘policy shop’ within the operational department of the Bank (OPCS, see Section 6.1.5), to a department in its own right, to reflect the Bank’s intention to break away from the usual mode of operations to one more tailored to fragile states. The hub was to strengthen operational capacity and knowledge transfer across the regions [World Bank, 2011b: vi], and within it would be a Chief Technical Specialist in FCV who would have a ‘considerable role in determining the Bank’s core competencies’ [World Bank, 2011b: vi]. The hub would also lead on the Bank’s partnerships with other agencies within fragile environments, and take a leading role in the research taking place in the Bank on conflict, violence and fragility.

Joel Hellman was recruited as director of the hub. He was a Bank governance specialist, with significant expertise in fragile situations, including work after the tsunami in Indonesia and in Afghanistan. The task the new unit faced was how to translate the recommendations and the ideas of the WDR into change within the Bank. Various approaches emerged; first, they continued the work that Sarah Cliffe had begun earlier in the LICUS initiative to create a policy framework that would enable the Bank to work differently – and more efficiently – in fragile states. Cliffe had laid the groundwork for this
through advocacy and policy recommendations, but had had limited power within the initiative to initiate substantive change, as seen in Sections 6.1.5 and 7.1.2. Within the extended power and reach of the new unit, Hellman and his team argued that the ‘nuts and bolts’ of operations, such as procurement, financial management, safeguards and environmental issues, needed to be radically different from the standard Bank practice in non-fragile contexts, with more flexibility and more ‘exceptionalism’ allowed to cater to specific contexts. Hellman created a team to address these Bank ‘core functions’ in fragile states (e.g. a procurement specialist, a financial management specialist etc.), all of whom had experience in conflict and fragile environments.

Complementary to this, the team sought to engage far more heavily with the country teams in fragile states than previous units had done, as had been specified in the operationalisation paper. This was the biggest move away from the ‘policy shop’ model into one of operational significance – the hub held a ‘reserve’ or ‘surge’ capacity to country teams that were severely under-resourced due to the Bank’s ongoing HR problems in fragile states, which the Bank had yet to address effectively, and the broader lack of resources available to these countries. The reserve capacity could be used either when there was an overall shortage in personnel, or where a situation had escalated suddenly due to a resurgence in violence, for example. It was also used when specialist expertise was needed, for example to undertake diagnostic work or needs assessments in fragile environments, when capacity was needed only for short periods. This new approach not only signalled the greatest shift away from the ‘policy shop’ model, it also strengthened the policy recommendation side of the hub, as the lines between the experience of those advising and those working on the ground were blurred. The hub still remained a ‘strategic unit’ however – it did (and does) not do projects.

The unit is just defining the strategy direction... but you have the majority of people who know about conflict are not in the FCV unit. They are in the social development unit, because that’s where the conflict work was before. So the FCV group is basically a mix of the governance group, the social development group, and a few people from the economic group and a few people from operations. But you should not measure the unit as saying ‘that’s what the Bank does on conflict and fragility’ – there are only 40 people [in FCV]. There are about 200 people that are conflict sensitivities specialists [in other sectors] [Interviewee: Anon – 17].
The team also had to continue with significant advocacy work and lobbying within the Bank, as despite the new profile afforded to the team by the WDR, the operationalisation paper and the support from the Presidency and the Board, it remained an area of controversy. The interview data from those working within the hub at the time demonstrates that there remained an uphill struggle to establish the work within fragile states as a core priority of the Bank, as many within the Bank still remained unconvinced that fragile states work was within the Bank’s remit or its competences. The traditional sentiment, that such work was not an effective use of resources, and that moving away from the traditional work on technical needs was a mistake, still prevailed.

There was particular push-back against the idea that special provisions, and a separate ‘rule book’, should be developed for fragile states. The data identifies that those who were most uneasy with this development were those who sat just below top-level management, for example Vice-Presidency offices, who had broader mandates with multiple countries. They were particularly uncomfortable with procedures that sat outside the Bank’s usual operating processes, as they were not able to reconcile – or justify – this exceptionalism within their remit. In Africa, for example, it was difficult to justify resources for a small conflict-affected country such as Guinea-Bissau, when there was still prevalent poverty in larger, more typical countries for Bank engagement such as Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa. In addition, other teams such as those focused on gender were also competing for the same resources. The objections that the team met were forceful, and hindered progress to some extent, resulting in the necessity for intense negotiation and lobbying [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed].

*IDA 17*

One particular area of advocacy and lobbying, that was to change fundamentally Bank engagement in fragile states, referred to the IDA allocation system. The bias against fragile states in the IDA fixed formula (as described in Section 6.1.2) went against what the hub was advocating in terms of getting more resources and doing more work in fragile environments. The formula had changed slightly through the IDA 14–16 rounds\(^{37}\), but with a continued focus on ‘rewarding’ good governance performance. By IDA 16, the Country Performance Rating (CPR) had an exponent of five, making it by far the most influential

---

\(^{37}\) See World Bank (2005c; 2008; 2011c).
component of the IDA allocation formula (World Bank, 2011c). This was not a concern solely of hub staff; Shanta Devarajan, then Chief Economist of the Africa region, had recently co-authored a paper which demonstrated the existence of a ‘fragility trap’ [Andriamihaja et al., 2011]. Devarajan had been bothered by the phenomenon of fragile states, particularly smaller states, missing out through the IDA formula, and undertook empirical work to examine the problem [Interviewee: Shanta Devarajan]. It showed that the performance of fragile states had not only been lagging behind other developing countries since the 1990s (when the aid effectiveness narrative rose to prominence), but also that the gap was widening; as governance conditionality restricted the money to the countries, the governance capability would worsen, resulting in even less money being available to these countries. This therefore established fragility as a persistent problem; an African state that was fragile in 2001 had a 95% probability that it was still fragile in 2009 [Andriamihaja et al., 2011].

Larger fragile states such as Afghanistan and South Sudan had also been subjected to the same rules, but ‘little fixes’ had been adopted in order to maintain strong monetary flows (see Section 7.1.3). For example, additions to the IDA criteria such as ‘peace-keeping missions’ in a state would ensure more money for a short period of time (five years); small ‘sticky plasters’ that meant money could be given to these larger countries with a bigger profile, outside of the main allocation formula.

Hellman, and other supporters within the Bank such as Devarajan, felt strongly that the IDA allocation formula needed revisiting in order to address these problems. However, the initial reaction when they brought this suggestion to the table was strong opposition, particularly from the IDA team who oversaw the IDA allocations and who maintained the relationship with donor countries. This team argued that the donors would object to the suggestion, as it not only went against aid effectiveness theory, but would also take money away from larger countries where poverty was prevalent, thus undermining the mission against global poverty:

The IDA team was essentially saying no way, this is never going to happen, and in fact if you do this it’ll be the end of your career. They were literally threatening me. We had some very very tense meetings [Interviewee: Joel Hellman].

The tension was with the IDA team – they were the ones from whom we got most resistance, because they don’t like any deviation from the formula. Because for
good reason, they prefer rules rather than discretion [Interviewee: Shanta Devarajan].

The resistance was not only from the IDA team, however – the continued resistance in the Bank to work in fragile states crystallised the objection, driven in part by the fact that it was hard to work in these places, and that more funding would require more work. Hellman, however, with support from influential people like Devarajan, persisted, and developed various empirical arguments that disputed the objections. In particular, he targeted the understanding that focusing on non-fragile states would decrease global aggregate poverty:

*It was a perfectly legitimate argument for a World Bank person to say, well 83% of the world’s poor are still in highly populated countries approaching middle income, so 83% of our portfolio should be in those countries* [Interviewee: Joel Hellman].

Hellman created models that demonstrated that while this might be the case now, future projections that considered future growth rates (which were high in middle income countries but low in fragile states) revealed that every year the proportion of global aggregate poverty grows in fragile states: by 2030, the minimum projection was that 40% of the world’s poor would be in these countries, with some estimates saying as much as 70% [Interviewee: Joel Hellman]. By not taking future growth rates into account, Hellman argued, the Bank would constantly be playing ‘catch-up’ to the changing demographic of global poverty.

Emerging from the ‘fragility trap’ findings, Hellman was also able to show that the principles behind the aid efficiency argument were flawed, and that in fact marginal returns of aid in fragile countries were extraordinarily high; suggesting that investment could help them break out of the fragility trap [Interviewee: Shanta Devarajan].

*This was very surprising to the donors [...] they had just always assumed that our projects were less impactful in fragile states because they were so difficult. What we were able to show was that actually over the last several years we were actually seeing better project performance than we were in the rest of the portfolio* [Interviewee: Joel Hellman].
The empirical approaches taken by people like Hellman and Devarajan, therefore, strongly questioned the assumptions and approach of the Bank with regard to funding in fragile states, and drew together more forcefully the intersection between the fragile states and the poverty agendas in the Bank. However, the internal political problem of the objection of the IDA team on the one hand, and the continuing opposition to work in fragile states from some sectors on the other, meant that their findings had little traction initially. In order to gain support for their argument, therefore, they sought to engage the donors, and to present their findings to them directly. Hellman and Devarajan consequently presented to several important donors, to demonstrate the new findings and their consequences for the assumptions under which these donors and the Bank more broadly were currently working. The response was very positive:

*The donors were saying “oh my god, this changes everything!”*. Because if the projects were just as effective, and the poverty is going to be there [in the future], then we should be giving them more money [Interviewee: Joel Hellman].

As more and more donors came on board and embraced the ideas Hellman was proposing, the opposition in the Bank fell away:

*In the end the IDA team became very strong supporters, because once they saw that there was donor support... again they weren’t bad people, they were realistic, they know it’s hard to run these regulations, there’s 60 countries in these negotiations, their job is to have their finger on the pulse of what’s going to flow and what’s not. But once they saw we built a coalition in favour of it, they became very supportive. In the end they were fabulous [Interviewee: Joel Hellman].*

During the IDA17 replenishment, therefore, the evidence provided by the FCV advocates made their way into the language of the official documentation:

*[IDA participants] stressed that, in the current landscape – where the FCS are home to a growing share of the world’s extreme poor – achieving the WBG goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity requires renewed efforts by IDA to enhance its strategic relevance and maximize its development impact in these challenging environments [Document: World Bank, 2014: 37].*
Participants welcomed the improved performance of the FCS portfolio and noted that it now stands on a par with that for non-FCS [Document: World Bank, 2014: 38].

Three alterations were consequently made to the IDA allocation system with regard to FCS. The first established an ‘exceptional allocation regime for countries facing “turn-around” situations’ [World Bank, 2014: 39], the second increased the minimum base allocation from SDR\textsuperscript{38} 3 million to SDR 4 million per year. The third, and perhaps significant, reduced the CPR exponent from five to four.

Many interviewees pointed to this shift in IDA17 when discussing the recent developments in the fragile states agenda, and all were unanimous in stressing the significance of the shift, for example:

*I think the bigger point, which is very important to highlight why this shift in IDA17 was so important, is since 2011 the global humanitarian crisis has just been blown out the water. It’s just ballooned. So the fiscal pressures on donors to respond to humanitarian crises was huge. Which means that there’s very little money left over for the grant-funded programmes like LICUS. That’s highly important, as it shows that the mainstream financing like IDA is critical* [Interviewee: Anon – 4].

Joel Hellman’s role in furthering the fragile states agenda was therefore extensive. Through his efforts to revolutionise the IDA approach to fragile states, he also generated more data and evidence that linked poverty to fragility and conflict, establishing an empirical base for programming that also greatly enhanced advocacy potential for lending. His argument that conflict was fundamental to any development considerations in fragile contexts began to trickle through into mainstream Bank processes such as country strategies, where previously they had not been considered a relevant factor [Interviewee: Anon – 4].

9.1.3. Jim Yong Kim’s 2014 restructure

The progress of both the governance and fragile states agendas was suddenly disrupted in 2014 by a Bank-wide restructure undertaken by President Kim. It was the first major

\textsuperscript{38} SDR stands for Special Drawing Rights, and is the IMF’s unit of account. At the time of writing, 1 SDR = 1.4 USD.
restructure seen in the Bank since Wolfensohn’s reforms in the 1990s (see Section 6.0), and it generated significant controversy and unrest in the Bank. The dissatisfaction in the Bank hit the media, and is referenced frequently in the interviews as a negative turning point in terms of both agendas. The media coverage suggests that Kim’s objective was to make the Bank more effective in tackling poverty by breaking down the siloes with the Bank – a situation clearly evident in this and previous chapters – which, he believed, discouraged the sharing of best practices and knowledge across regions and continents (Provost, 2014; Lowrey, 2014). The Financial Times conceptualised this as a shift to a ‘solutions bank’ rather than a ‘giant loan mill’ (Financial Times, 2014: n.p.), necessary due to the changing nature of development aid as the Bank lost its relevance in middle income countries:

[The Bank] is an institution that is increasingly shunned by the large emerging markets. Countries such as China are able to tap capital from the international markets just as cheaply – and far less bureaucratically – than World Bank loans (Financial Times, 2014: n.p.).

Kim therefore argued that the value of the Bank would not be in capital terms, but in the quality of its advice. Consequently, the restructure consisted of the creation of a ‘global matrix’ of departments; the six client-facing regional units with country offices remained, but had their budgets withdrawn and given to 14 new ‘global practices’ (GP) [Interviewee: Anon – 13]. These global practices were to bring technical expertise across the six regions under one roof, and each addressed a development consideration such as agriculture, education, energy and the environment. Governance and Social Protection were both situated as GPs. Across the regional units and the GPs a new form of department was created called ‘Cross-Cutting Solution Areas’ (CCSA), which were five small teams that focused on global issues considered to ‘cut across’ both countries and sectors. The Fragility, Conflict and Violence hub was recast as a CCSA, together with climate change, jobs, gender, and public-private partnership (see Appendix I).

The process of the restructure itself was highly controversial. Several protests occurred in the atrium of the Bank’s D.C. headquarters, as staff feared for the jobs; Kim was also seeking to cut $400 million from the Bank’s budget (Financial Times, 2014) [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. The Guardian reported that in October of 2014 staff were given notice that hundreds of jobs would be cut, while a $94,000 bonus was given to one
of the top officials in charge of many of the cuts (Provost, 2014). Allegations of a lack of transparency and ethics at the top of the Bank’s management circulated, as did rumours that Kim had taken 13 private jet trips in the past year (Financial Times, 2014). Media reports that morale plummeted is supported by the interview data, which focuses less on the ethics, but more on Kim’s background as a health specialist (as opposed to a development specialist), and his lack of management experience, pointing to him as someone with a fundamental lack of understanding of the Bank’s own political economy and expertise and lack of appreciation for institutional memory, and who undermined the progress the Bank had made in recent years to break from the technocratic approaches to development to a deeper understanding of political context and the complex, political process of development [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed].

At the top-tier level of management, several senior managers were fired (including, according to the New York Times (Lowrey, 2014), three highly regarded female executives, angering women within the organisation), and department heads were asked to reapply for their jobs. During the process yet more controversy arose around the new appointments, as none of those appointed to lead the new GPs were African or East Asian, despite these regions being critical to development considerations (Lowrey, 2014). When African governors of the Bank objected, Kim wrote a letter:

> I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate to you my personal commitment to diversify and specifically the inclusion of Africans among all ranks of staff at the World Bank Group [Kim, 2014, cited in Lowrey, 2014].

Shortly after this letter was sent, Joel Hellman was replaced during the appointment process for CCSA Heads of Department as head of the FCV group by Betty Bigombe, the State Minister for Water Resources in the Ugandan Cabinet, who had previously been a World Bank staffer in the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) and as a consultant to the Social Protection and Human Development unit. The interview data is forceful in presenting this as a negative development from the perspective of the fragile states agenda. It demonstrates a strong feeling that Hellman’s departure undermined the gains he had achieved in progressing the fragile states agenda in the aftermath of the WDR 2011, and that Kim had shifted the incentive structures of the Bank to such an extent that the ‘best and brightest’ who had led the evolution of the Bank’s move away from the technocratic
model were removed or forced out, significantly compromising the work of the Bank, both in terms of its work in fragile states, and its operations more broadly.

The dissatisfaction in the wake of the restructure in the interview data also reaches the new organisational model of GPs and CCSAs. There are wide variations in the focus of this dissatisfaction, however; for example, several interviewees believed the FCV’s categorisation as a CCSA weakened the department’s mandate, as CCSAs had less organisational power:

*The department was restructured and given a less powerful mandate* [Interviewee: Nigel Roberts].

*[The restructure] undermined the mandate [of FCV] I think because it became one of many cross-cutting themes in the Bank, instead of a sort of dedicated SWAT team. I don’t think [it has] really recovered since then* [Interviewee: Anon – 4].

Conversely, others are dissatisfied that Governance was not classed as a CCSA [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed], rather than as a GP, arguing that isolating it in a GP ‘silo’ meant that governance considerations are not taken into account in day-to-day programme management of every project:

*[Putting governance as a GP] was the death of governance. Governance is the ultimate cross-cutting solution area! It cuts across every GP, it cuts across every CCSA* [Interviewee: Anon – 14].

*The Bank put us in these different groups, but I think in my ideal we have governance specialists working within each of the other practices* [Interviewee: Francesca Recanatini].

Others, however, show relief that governance has not been ‘relegated’ to a CCSA, drawing attention to the fact that the CCSA themes match recent WDR subjects, perhaps suggesting that they are consequently considered less as core functions of the Bank, and rather are to address the issues that are currently in vogue:

*I think they didn’t make [governance] a cross-cutting solutions area because they think it’s a thing in itself! I don’t know what the fate of the CCSAs are, but I think it’s fair to say that precisely because they are cross-cutting they are going to be*
politically weaker within the organisational structure [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].

The new Governance department was the biggest GP that was created. It merged the previous Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) department with the former Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Secretariat, and with some people from the World Bank Institute\(^39\) that had worked on public-sector related issues and those who worked in financial management and procurement:

*Suddenly there was a big fence put around the scene and we were told we were governance. And the three professional streams are quite different, our orientation are somewhat different, and our points of interaction with core Bank programmes and projects is quite different* [Interviewee: Jim Brumby].

The general feeling across most respondents (though not all) is that this is problematic for the governance agenda – that the GP does not speak with one voice, and that consequently this undermines the governance agenda in terms of its political power [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. There was also an apparent crisis of leadership in the new GP, that meant that its core message was not only disjointed, but badly disseminated [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. Others suggest that the restructure fundamentally changed the governance strategy, so that ideas such as the importance of context and the inclusion of legitimacy and authority in the 2012 Strategy have been lost, so the focus is now one that mainly concerns itself with public financial management [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed].

The FCV hub also suffered in the aftermath of the restructure. Betty Bigombe did not last long as the head of the department, being replaced within the year. The interview data understandably (given the sensitivity around the subject) do not give many insights into why, other than to hint that she was not effective in the unit, and that the period of her leadership and the aftermath damaged the fragile states agenda even more; for example, her tenure resulted in a loss of faith from donors who consequently were less willing to contribute to the SPF (by this time the largest multi-donor trust fund) [Interviewees: data intentionally unattributed]. Her management also damaged the incentive for Bank staff to work in the unit, which was seen as ineffectual, so ‘good’ people were lost or difficult to

\(^{39}\) The World Bank Institute is the ‘learning arm’ of the Bank, which delivers courses and seminars, promotes knowledge networks and provides strategic advice (for further information see World Bank, n.d. (d)).
attract. Bigombe was replaced as leader of the unit in 2015 by Saroj Kumar Jha, who continues to lead the unit at the time of writing. Interview data suggests that confidence is gradually being restored under his leadership (see following section).

9.1.4. The agendas today

The effects of the 2014 restructure continue to ripple through the Bank’s work today, and its impact on both the governance agenda and the fragile states agenda appears to be profound. There is little suggestion that Kim’s aim in becoming a ‘knowledge bank’, and to break down the siloed working within the institution has been successful; in fact, the prevailing feeling seems to be that the restructure has done far more harm than good. There are various differing opinions as to what the problem ‘actually’ is, that contradict Kim’s idea of the problem; some argue that it is not cross-support processes that are needed, but increased networks and mobility [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. Others believe the restructure has not dealt with the underlying problem that the Bank faces, namely that it does not know how to cope with problems that need to be dealt with outside of lending [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed], so the demand-side of work on governance and fragility issues is not addressed. Consequently, the prevailing feeling is that the Bank’s culture of technocratic models and technocratic expertise – which were challenged by the political economy movement – have in fact been strengthened by Kim’s reforms, so the Bank is even less able to adjust to context; it has reverted to being a ‘loan machine’ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. There is some hope that the GP model will deliver in a minority of interviews, but the general mood in the data is pessimistic.

The governance agenda is perceived to have particularly suffered, and continues to do so. The confusion around leadership, the amalgamation of several different aspects considered to be ‘governance’ and the loss of several prominent intellectual voices (several interviewees suggest that Shanta Devarajan is the only leading intellectual on these issues that remains in the Bank) means that ‘the governance pillar has totally fragmented’ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed], and the governance GP has been colonised by macroeconomists, so that not only is there a lack of a strong voice coming from the GP, but that the voice that does emerge is one that looks mainly at public sector management:
It’s financial management, procurement... all those other things, legitimacy, accountability, those things related to the softer things, I don’t think they’ve been done a lot, and I think that’s partly why the governance agenda didn’t succeed... they’ve been kind of dropped from the discourse [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].

The political economy aspect is far weaker, then; this is in part due to the fact that the GPF came to an end during the restructure; perhaps because DfID was unwilling to put money into the fund while the ‘chaos’ was unfolding [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. However, there is some evidence that the movement on political economy did filter into the countries:

While the political economy practice doesn’t actively exist, and there isn’t a fund to keep it moving, it is being taken on at a more conceptual level in individual countries [Interviewee: Anon – 15].

Project teams are approaching the governance team asking for help in political economy analysis – the irony is acute that while the project was prominent there was little demand, but now money and resource are removed, the demand is ballooning [Interviewee: Anon – 13]. There is optimism that a political economy lens might return, however:

There’s a perception that the Bank has dropped the ball on political economy, and that’s partially because of the last few years through the restructure there hasn’t been a strong voice coming from the Bank and taking a leadership role in this space. I think that’s going to improve, particularly with the WDR 2017 [on Governance and the Law] which is a very competent synthesis of where we’re at [Interviewee: Anon – 13].

In terms of the fragile states agenda, the feeling among interviewees are mixed. There is a definite sense of positivity in the aftermath of the WDR 2011 and the Nairobi hub, and the conceptual shifts that events such as the Arab Spring has brought about. The fragile states agenda is now considered an ‘incredibly important issue’, far more than ten years ago [Interviewees: Francesca Recanatini; Anon – 4]. There is even optimism that fragility has survived the perceived ‘chaos’ of the restructure and the ‘relegation’ to CCSA status [Interviewee: Anon – 10; Anon – 13]:

230
The Bank has undergone a lot of reforms and transformations – now the dust is settling it’s clear that fragility has remained one of the core issues that the Bank sees as critical to achieve the twin goals.\textsuperscript{40} [Interviewee: Nik Win Myint].

The conceptual advances, such as thinking about fragility in terms of the resilience of institutions (in addition to the capacity of institutions) are clear, and the shifts in terminology to capture the changing nature of conflict, fragility and violence and to situate fragility within ‘situations’ rather than within ‘states’ demonstrate the recent progress [Interviewee: Nik Win Myint]. Several interviewees were keen to stress this shift, not least because it dramatically challenges the traditional view of considering fragility as a low-income country problem; it promotes the idea of several different forms of fragility, that are not linked only to weak institutions but to those that can be strong in capacity but weak in terms of legitimacy and cohesion [Interviewees: Anon – 17; Shanta Devarajan]. This does, however, raise technical problems for the Bank:

\textit{This has caused us to completely rethink the whole intervention methods, because these countries [fragile states or situations that are not classified as low-income] do not qualify for concessional aid, for concessional loans from the Bank. They are middle income, so they have to borrow at commercial rates. And so – it’s very tricky – again, this is another one of those sacrosanct principles that we have had a lot of trouble getting over} [Interviewee: Shanta Devarajan].

The Bank is also working closely with the UN on fragility, including on a large study on clarifying the role of development actors in preventing violent conflict, and is closely engaged with the g7+ and New Deal initiatives\textsuperscript{41}, so is actively seeking to develop positive partnerships, and to remain engaged with concepts coming out of these partnerships and initiatives such as the fragility spectrum. Interviewees are positive about the efforts of the new director of FCV, Saroj Kumar Jha, who is continually working to raise the profile of the agenda and to effect change in the field [Interviewees: Anon – 4; Anon – 13]; there is a hint of an effort by Jha to pull those who promote a more sophisticated political economy.

\textsuperscript{40} In 2013, Kim renewed the emphasis on poverty, committing the Bank to the ‘twin goals’ of eliminating extreme poverty by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity. For more information see World Bank (2015b).

\textsuperscript{41} The g7+, as mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, Section 2.6, is a voluntary association of countries deemed to be fragile or conflict-affected, which was established in 2010 to give a collective voice to these countries within development discourse. The \textit{New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States} is a set of principles created in 2011 by the g7+ to guide international engagement in fragile states. For more information see g7plus.org (n.d.).
understanding from the governance GP into FCV [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].

However, despite these efforts, the fragility agenda still faces internal and external problems. There is still no appetite to nail down a definition of state-building [Interviewee: Anon – 10], and there is frustration that a theory of change in fragile contexts is still lacking [Interviewee: Anon – 8]. The fact that FCV is so disconnected from the Governance GP crystallises this problem [Interviewees: Anon – 8: Sarwar Lateef], and provides more evidence to suggest that the ‘siloded’ problem of the Bank is yet to be solved.

*There is the issue that I worry about a little bit that you get a cohort of people who deal within the Bank in fragility issues, and everybody else doesn’t, right? If you work in fragility you see the same sorts of faces popping up again and again which is nice, but you know one of the key things that we and everybody – I mean this again is not new – but something we pushed against in the WDR was this idea of siloes. You don’t want the peace guys to be sitting in a silo talking to themselves – it’s about getting conflict sensitivity into our entire portfolio. And that’s where I worry about people dealing exclusively with fragility issues, and people basically saying ‘yeah, OK, that’s being done by somebody else’* [Interviewee: Nik Win Myint]

This frustration that the Bank still separates fragility from day-to-day operations is regularly seen within the interviews, and was a significant criticism from Nigel Roberts in his post-WDR report:

*Sadly, an approach that could have transformed government and donor strategies in VFEs [violent and fragile environments] has been left on the shelf. While efforts have been made to inculcate fragility analysis into Bank country strategy documents, the WDR’s analytical logic swims against a strong ‘apolitical’ Bank tide, and such approaches have remained essentially additive and marginal instead of dictating the logic of Bank interventions* [Roberts, 2015: 6].

There is some optimism that in recent months this is being revisited, and that there is a greater emphasis on asking country teams to do a fragility emphasis even in non-fragile contexts, consequently broadening the focus from fragility to include risk of fragility [Interviewees: Anon – 17; Nikolas Win Myint]. However, while this means that fragility analysis and considerations make their way much more frequently into country strategies
and other project documents, there remains the problem of how to operationalise the ideas – once they have appeared in project documents, momentum appears to stall [Interviewee: Anon – 17]. This is because, despite the rhetorical progress, the Bank still is unclear on how to apply the conceptual understanding:

*I think there’s a lot of content that hasn’t been completed by any means, I wouldn’t say that the Bank now that we’ve done the WDR has solved this issue and knows how to deal with it. I think that we’ve got more awareness where we as an institution fall short, how our incentives sometimes lead us in difficult directions, and there’s an ongoing effort to deal with that* [Interviewee: Nikolas Win Myint].

This operationalisation problem is not one specific to the fragile states team – interviewees regularly point to how operational work struggles to keep up with the rhetoric, and that influencing the Bank’s portfolio to follow the vision of the conceptual work is an on-going effort [e.g. Interviewee: Anon – 17]. Bank incentive structures such as these emerge frequently as a barrier to the success of fragility work. The Bank has not divorced its tendency for economistic output-related approaches; it still focuses on what can be measured, which undermines any rhetorical progress surrounding social cohesion, legitimacy and accountability [Interviewees: Anon – 17; Francesca Recanatini]. The Bank’s structure, how it makes decisions and focuses programmes, continues to problematic; the Bank continues to work with governments, working “with state structures and through state structures”, as the development effectiveness evidence suggests is the right thing to do; but the Bank has not solved the problem of how to proceed if those state structures are not capable or not neutral actors [Interviewee: Nik Win Myint].

*The Bank doesn’t really know what to do with these complicated places, it sorts of grabs hold of community-driven development as the way forward* [Interviewee: Nik van Praag].

Furthermore, the demand-side problem continues: ‘the people we deal with in governments might not be as interested as we would like’ [Interviewees: Anon – 10; Anon – 4].

Finally, interviewees bring up the subject of the refugee agenda. While there is optimism that the refugee agenda provides an ‘entry-point’ into working in fragile contexts [e.g. Interviewee: Shanta Devarajan], there is also a prominent concern that the ‘state-building’ agenda, and indeed the fragile states agenda, has been overshadowed by the emergence of the refugee focus:
There’s a kind of tiredness of four-five years of something, and then something else has to happen, and the whole international community has kind of – there’s been a push-back in terms of the broader state-building and fragile states agenda, because of the focus on a specific issue in the last year and a half. And that is refugees. The refugee crisis has really narrowed the outlook and the interest of the international community [on fragile states] [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].

9.2. The social protection agenda

Jim Kim arrived at the Bank within months of the publication of the new social protection strategy. The social protection agenda was at an all-time high:

There are no debates like that [between Robert Holzmann and Martin Ravallion] anymore. Social protection is front and centre [Interviewee: Anush Bezhanyan].

Social protection had grown into one of the largest poverty-reduction tools and departments in the Bank, which the data credits to the impact of the enormous wealth of evidence, sourced from the extensive M&E that had been included within all programmes as stipulated by Holzmann, that proved the efficacy of social protection initiatives. The direction of the social protection operational agenda, however, was to receive a significant overhaul in the aftermath of the strategy.

It is clear that the two areas highlighted in the strategy – the ‘systems’ agenda and the extension of the social protection portfolio to LICs and fragile states – have been central focuses in the years since the strategy. Interviewees are keen to stress that this shift in approach is not ‘replacing’ the previous approach, but building on it – that the new evidence that showed the impact of safety nets that had convinced the World Bank and donor governments facilitated the next ‘stage’ of social protection development:

There has been a change in the institutional understanding of why these programmes are important, outside of our practice GP, which wasn’t there before. Now there is an understanding that they’re part of an effective poverty-reduction strategy [Interviewee: Anon – 12].

Also critical to the agenda’s ability to progress is the slow on-going acceptance of recipient governments, again swayed by the body of evidence, that social protection offered more
than ‘welfare’ handouts, but that within the broader economic context social protection could be considered an investment in risk management, resilience and human capital [Interviewee: Xiaoqing Xu]. It should be stressed that this barrier has not been completely overcome at this stage – country context is important to assess how much ‘welfare’ is politically acceptable.

The systems agenda

The systems agenda rapidly became a priority within the social protection department:

*If you talk to social protection people now in the Bank, they will all talk to you about systems* [Interviewee: Xiaoqing Xu].

*We’re one of the few practices that actually has a global support group on systems* [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen].

There were several operational starting-points for systems; as seen in Section 8.2, the fragmentation of programmes seen in MICs was an initial justification for turning to systems. In addition, the growing influence of cash programmes, which require IDs, bank accounts, processes and information registries, also demanded the renewed focus [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. Extending social protection to fragile states also called for a systems approach, as the starting point for any intervention required links with humanitarian actors and programmes (see following section).

The framing of what is meant by ‘systems’, then, is varied within the data. On the one hand, several interviewees spoke to how the systems-building approached was core to the institution-building and state-building agenda, for example:

*Systems are a whole set of things. Institutions, systematic policy, different programmes that have to be harmonised – they need to be transparent, efficient, accountable.* [Interviewee: Xiaoqing Xu].

However, when talking in practical terms, the data reflected that narrower, technocratic formulation found in the strategy that focused more on the technical *tools* required to repair the ‘fragmentation’ of programmes (such as targeting systems) supported by sophisticated IT support, information and registries. The main operational effort seems therefore to focus on the ‘downstream’ delivery of systems, not the broader institutional
and governance considerations that link into the wider architecture of the state.

The data points to two reasons for this technocratic focus seen both in the strategy and in the operational work that has taken place since. The first is that such technical considerations are the ‘next step’, as that the following step, to be undertaken in the future, is to link to more ‘upstream’ considerations, such as establishing a coherence between social assistance, labour policy and markets, insurance and jobs. The second reason forwarded in the interviews is that there is little consideration of political economy within the social protection agenda. The data suggests that interviewees view their role as ‘building’ institutions and laying the groundwork for the state, in that by building social protection institutions the relationship between the state and citizens is strengthened. However, in general, political economy does not factor in the approaches on the ground, apart from a few ‘enlightened individuals’; the strength of the social protection team is that its intellectual agenda has been well structured and organised, but the predominance of labour and micro-economists – rather than political economists – within the team mean that any operational focus looks at the fine technical details such as surveys and data collection, generating and analysing data. The consequence of this make-up of the social protection team results in practical solutions such as targeting and fiscal sustainability, but neglects the institutional aspects such as the ‘rules of the game’ or the broader coordination with state architecture. Health and education are drawn as examples – their categorisation of a ‘systems’ approach centre institutional aspects as integral, such as how to centralise management, and how to provide financial incentives to facilities, drawing on governance aspects. This is partly because the health and education agendas were strongly influenced by the WDR 2004 on service delivery (World Bank, 2004a), which put accountability as its key theme. The technocratic framing of systems in social protection, however, does not address these issues:

*In social protection, a typical way to provide assistance is through a single programme, then to help your government design and manage it. That’s not the case in health and education – they’re multiprogramme* [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]42.

---

42 It should be noted that there are pockets of activity where political economy is considered. For example, in the Middle East a subsidy reform left people uncovered, so social protection specialists there are developing guidance that looks at social accountability and ‘institutional’ issues [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed].
The blame is not placed entirely on the social protection team by respondents. There is a sense that the Governance GP has been slow to support sectors, and have not developed enough understanding of sector-specific needs; the ‘generic’ governance knowledge is not perceived to be useful in these contexts. The culmination of the GPF, and the reduction of the concerted push about political economy from the centre of the Bank, with no one to champion the agenda (see Section 9.1.1) has exacerbated this, as social protection is perceived to be closely linked with governance:

**Social protection has the highest proportion of governance relevance in all sectors**

[Interviewee: Xiaoqing Xu]

This micro-focus and lack of institutional or macro considerations is also a dominant factor in the overarching approach of social protection, specifically, the continued rejection of the rights-based approach favoured by the ILO, and the focus on fiscal sustainability. The conflict with other UN agencies that promote a rights-based and universal approach does not fit with the ‘fiscal sustainability economic bias’ [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed] of those in the social protection unit.

Many interviewees are quick to defend this standpoint in relation to the rights-based approach of the UN agencies. They stress how the Bank has progressed from prescriptive policies that stick to economic principle to a process that is country-led and underpinned by ideas of ‘feasibility’ – the Bank is described as more ‘pragmatic’ in this regard [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. Universality is not accepted due to the belief that to reduce poverty – the overarching aim of the Bank – it is necessary to start with the poorest; it is argued that this generates a more progressive realisation of human rights, if the economic as well as the legal perspective is considered, as no one is ‘left behind’ [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen]. The necessity for pragmatism is further endorsed by the country-led approach, particularly in LICs and Africa, where the welfare mentality of social protection still prevails, and universal policies are unlikely to get political traction [Interviewee: Anon – 7]. There consequently needs to be more sensitivity than either approach allows, if any programmes are to be truly country-led. However, a theme also emerges with regard to the approach that was seen in Section 8.1.3 – that whatever approach is chosen must be acceptable to senior management in the Bank. The institutional and authorising environment of the Bank sets boundaries to which any approach must adhere, suggesting that the resistance to universalist approaches goes beyond the social
However, interviewees also stress that the relationship between the Bank and the rights-based UN agencies regarding this issue has dramatically transformed in positive ways since the Holzmann era:

*The ILO and the World Bank used to be on opposite ends of the social protection concept – now we’re working together. That itself is a big achievement*

[Interviewee: Anon – 7].

In June 2015, Jim Yong Kim publically signed up to a Universal Social Protection Platform, a rights-based platform developed by the ILO, which promoted a package of basic social protection services that all states were to sign on to [World Bank, 2015a]. In September 2016, the ILO and the World Bank launched the ‘Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection’ initiative, which ‘aims to make pensions, maternity, disability and child benefits, among others, available to all persons’ (social-protection.org, n.d.). Both of these initiatives employed universalist language, contrary to the Bank’s traditional approach, suggesting that the Bank was perhaps moving away from its focus on targeting towards lifecycle social protection and social security for all.

The data does to some extent support this, however, the focus on fiscal feasibility remains:

*We are reframing our approach in light of that commitment, while understanding that some countries don’t have the resources, so we are trying to have a progressive realisation of it* [Interviewee: Anon – 12].

The data is not clear what this progressive realisation entails (data collection was taking place as the Global Partnership was being launched). However, there was some criticism of the Bank (Development Pathways, 2016) when, eight days after the launch of the Global Partnership, Jim Yong Kim spoke to The Guardian to address stunting through malnourishment, threatening to ‘name and shame’ countries that failed to tackle it and strongly promoting conditional cash transfers – contrary to the ‘universalist’ language of the new initiatives – to tackle the problem:

*We’re going to say to every country in the world that has a problem with stunting, we’re ready to bring you the Peru formula. We’re willing to provide financing for these conditional cash transfers. Conditional cash transfers are great anyway.*
They help poor people. They stimulate the economy, they are a great thing to do. [Jim Yong Kim, 2016, cited in Boseley, 2016].

In summary, the data suggests that both the systems agenda and the rights-based agenda have not progressed from the traditional approaches of the Bank – a technocratic, downstream approach continues within the systems agenda, and a targeted, needs-based approach continues to form the basis of most social protection interventions from the Bank. The data does suggest that this might change in the future; to what extent, and how, is not clear.

**Low-income countries and fragile states**

The other initiative forwarded in the strategy was to extend social protection programmes to LICs and fragile states, which until this point had mainly used bottom-up social funds and humanitarian aid as their principle social protection tools (see Sections 6.2, 7.2 and 8.2). The new approach took off quickly and forcefully; despite the continued middle-income bias when Jim Yong Kim came to the presidency, by 2014 lending for social protection in LICs exceeded that provided to MICs, and within the past five years social protection became bigger than both health and education in Sub-Saharan Africa:

_Now everything we do is in Sub-Saharan Africa, as opposed to five years ago_  
[Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen].

In the aftermath of the strategy, work was done within the Bank on what the extension of social protection to Africa would mean, and how it could be delivered [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen; World Bank, 2012b; Monchuk, 2014]. While the systems agenda was strongly linked to the work in Africa, a different approach was necessary in many contexts, particularly those that were fragile, not least because the World Bank’s standards in terms of procurement safeguards and other anti-corruption processes made using the middle-income country (MIC) model unfit for purpose [Interviewee: data intentionally unattributed]. The subsequent agenda was therefore framed around extending ‘what exists’ already, whether that was humanitarian interventions or existing government systems. For example, in Ethiopia, the foundations had been laid by humanitarian schemes that had been harnessed to generate the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), whereas in Tanzania the social funds had built the initial institutional base. In Syria, however, only humanitarians
were able to get access, whereas in Yemen humanitarians had taken over the remnants of a social welfare fund.

The consequent close association with the humanitarian agenda meant that much of the Bank’s approach was built around trying to gain conceptual clarity regarding where humanitarians had the comparative advantage, where they were duplicating functions, and where they could serve as an additional source of support where government structures are not enough. Interestingly, the overarching sequential approach to social protection in fragile states appears to be a space where the unconditional coverage agenda can emerge:

*I think basically in most fragile settings you start with some work on safety nets, usually it’s around cash for work, or just straight cash. So it sort of fits in the safety nets or labour side of the social protection work. We don’t get into social insurance in the beginning – because there is no social insurance in the beginning, because there are no social insurance institutions. Unless there are some fragile states, like Zimbabwe, which have a huge overhang of civil service pensions which are basically draining the economy, so there are times when there are not a new state being created, where you’ve got some dismantling to do of old systems. But I think mainly that’s what ends up happening. So you’ve got a focus on short-term job creation, a focus on safety nets – they tend to be unconditional in the beginning and then you can move them towards trying to incentivise people to invest in human capital [Interviewee: Steen Jorgensen].*

The ‘unconditional’ approach at the beginning of engagement is one of the few places where this is seen within the World Bank’s agenda – however, the intent to move back towards ‘incentivisation’ and conditional cash transfers (CCTs) suggests that even within these contexts, unconditionality and universality are still not considered as long-term options.

The labour side of social protection has taken a significant prominence within LICs and fragile states, not least because of the prevailing welfare mentality that makes countries reluctant to embrace comprehensive social protection systems. Governments are consequently keen to adopt programmes that are linked to public works or other jobs programmes. The data therefore identifies the WDR 2013 on Jobs [World Bank, 2013] as particularly important in terms of social protection in LICs and fragile states, not least because it argued – contrary to usual Bank economic principles that insist that it should be
the private sector that provides jobs – that public works are important for social protection in fragile states. There was some pushback to the suggestion, but this was overcome by evidence that proved their efficacy [Interviewees: Anon – 7; Anon – 11]. One interviewee interestingly compared this evolution in thinking about public works to the structural adjustment process, providing insight into the perspective of the Bank and how its philosophy changes, adapts and evolves:

*Many write that the World Bank inputs a sort of institutional orthodoxy that a certain institution does this. That’s the IMF but it’s not the World Bank. The World Bank is one of those lovely places where you understand that development is an unsolved mystery, that you have to keep on trying new things [...] there’s a lot of debate, there’s a lot of discourse, there are simultaneously different things happening, there’s a lot of experimentation. And really what happens over time is that a set of views, usually based on evidence, comes to the fore, and then when the evidence goes against previous sets of theories, they are abandoned. That frankly was the story of the structural adjustment era. So the [attitude to public works] is something like that – it wasn’t that one day somebody work up and said from today we will not do this [Interviewee: Anon – 7].*

Short-term interventions are considered particularly important within the jobs agenda (Interviewee: Anon – 11), and there is on-going work taking place that looks to link them to two systems: the state provision of services (for example free healthcare and access to education) so beneficiaries are able to receive a range of services beyond cash handouts; and job markets, in order to build skills that can be translated into a more productive workforce that is appealing to the private sector.

A strong theme that runs throughout the interviews is this is a period of ‘experimentation’; as expressed in the above quote, development in general is considered an ‘unsolved mystery’ [Interviewee: Anon – 7], and in particular, this challenge of extending national-level systematic productive social protection to these new contexts is considered a particular puzzle where experimentation is necessary to address the gaps in data in these countries [Interviewees: Xiaqing Yu; Anon – 7; Anon – 11; Anon – 12]. However, this experimentation phase does, while still focusing on bottom-up approaches to institution building, show a glimmer of possibility to become a space where the technocratic approaches *could* be challenged, where terms such as ‘universal’ are more frequently seen
and links to more upstream considerations, which consider more than just the ‘micro-level’ systems agenda are considered.

_Social protection today_

The social protection agenda seems to have been revolutionised during the years of the Kim presidency, including an enormous shift in focus towards LICs and fragile states; in 2016 the social protection department delivered more IDA payments than any other sector, including energy (usually the largest sector). The agenda is currently still powerful, with extensive experimentation and evaluation being undertaken to continue building an evidence base on which to apply social protection to more challenging contexts. The micro-focus economistic approach is still prevalent, but with the new initiatives that the Bank has signed on to, together with this experimentation phase which opens a space for new approaches such as a rights-based approach, the next few years will be a key to establishing in which direction the agenda turns. There is still significant work to be done in linking to broader institutional and governance considerations – again, there are some hints in the data that this could be included in the next phase of development; whether it is remains to be seen.

9.3. Conclusion

The Kim presidency has been a tumultuous period in the Bank. Some agendas, in particular the governance agenda, have suffered under the new approach. As Kim joined the Bank it was at its peak, with political economy becoming very high profile, and concerted efforts being made to acknowledge it in operational work. It is worth noting at this point how significant this is, and how far the approach had shifted from the strong opposition in the 1990s that refused to countenance anything that could be considered political. Now, in the new governance strategy in 2012, it was necessary to address concerns that the governance approach was not considering political context enough, and was falling back on technocratic, capacity-building approaches. The progress, therefore, has been extensive in terms of applying a political science lens to development, with the idea emerging incrementally.

The concepts and ideas around governance remained vague, however, demonstrated by
examples such as governance and political economy being seen as a ‘tick box’ exercise, or used to refer to anything to do with political context or government institutions. The vague conceptualisation, which, as seen in previous chapters, contributed to the idea being accepted, remained problematic in terms of its implementation. Some respondents argue that this contributed to its ultimate demise, as the fact that the Bank does not know how to generate good governance, despite the increased acceptance of the discourse, became a fundamental problem in mainstreaming the work in the Bank, and was particularly vulnerable to disruptive events such as the restructure. The incentive structures of the Bank, in terms of making impact and being able to measure that impact quantitatively, remain problematic.

The restructure itself, and the fall-out for the governance sector in terms of poor leadership, again demonstrates the importance of strong leadership within the institution to allow ideas to flourish and gain support. The Washington D.C. department was most affected by the chaos; the data does not refer directly to what happened in the field in terms of the ‘bottom-up’ approach to operationalising these ideas as discussed in Section 8.1.1, but as the trust fund supporting the work came to a close, and the community of practice lost its momentum, it could be tentatively inferred that these pockets of activity in the field were affected, although the extent of this is not known. How agendas fare when they have transitioned from the central part of the Bank to the field, but then the agenda suffers in the centre, would be an interesting subject for future research.

The fragile states agenda suffered a similar trajectory. At the beginning of the Kim presidency it was on a high, in the aftermath of the WDR 2011 and the operationalisation paper. A headquarters-level department was created, and there was an open acknowledgement in the senior management of the Bank that it was necessary to find a bespoke way of working, outside of the Bank’s usual practices, to engage with these contexts. Joel Hellman was a strong and effective leader, and helped to maintain the department’s profile, which moved for the first time beyond a role of ‘policy shop’ to engaging more actively within fragile situations. Hellman’s key achievement was arguably the changes to the IDA formula – the power and profile of the fragile agenda, together with strong empirical evidence that critiqued the Bank’s business model, enabled a fundamental change in institutional practice to be brought about. This is another example of coalition-building to promote an idea, but this time from the top-down – reaching out to donor countries and generating their support was necessary to overcome Bank opposition to the
idea of removing the governance bias for fragile countries.

The restructure, however, demonstrates the vulnerability of this progress. For both the fragile states and governance agendas, the progress was fundamentally undermined by a lack of enabling environment coming from the leadership in the Bank. Although the Governance GP was the largest created, it merged several departments that muddied the ‘message’ of governance significantly, removing its political power within the Bank. A lack of interest from the top levels of management meant this situation was near impossible to rectify, particularly as department-level management was in turmoil. This led the governance agenda to resort back to technocratic, capacity-building considerations that were more in-line with the traditional orthodoxy of the Bank, but neglected ‘softer’ issues such as political economy, and legitimacy and accountability. The new FCV suffered similarly – the ineffective department-level leadership created a lack of confidence both within the Bank and from donors, hampering the message of the agenda. Both departments are struggling to get the agendas back on track; it is an interesting development that the few champions left of the political economy approach are migrating from the Governance GP to FCV; as ever, the fragility agenda seems to continue to be a space where the more sophisticated conceptualisations of governance are able to gain traction.

Social protection, on the other hand, seems to have been barely affected by the restructure in terms of the power of the agenda. The department has gone from strength to strength, building on the second strategy and extending the approach to consider both systems and fragile states. This provides a stark comparison of the two ideas; social protection, unlike the governance and fragility agendas, has become more institutionalised and embedded within the Bank’s work, and thus resistant to ‘shocks’ such as the restructure. The reasons for this have been outlined over the previous four chapters – in the simplest terms, the approach to social protection has been more in tune with the Bank’s traditional ideological and operational approach that resorts to technocracy and measures results quantitatively, and is consequently less reliant on leadership and coalitions, *inter alia*, to maintain its prominence. This narrows the potential of the agenda, however; as seen in Section 9.2, this framing of the new systems approach in fragile states has been driven by the technocratic dominance; ‘systems’ is used to mean technical tools that overcome the fragmentation of programmes, rather than to address governance and political economy issues within the social protection agenda, in particular its work in fragile states. The ideas of governance and political economy, therefore, have reached social protection in terms of discourse, but
not in terms of practice; to what extent this would have been different if the governance/political economy and fragile states agenda had remained strong is not known. This means that this is potentially a critical moment in the social protection agenda, in terms of its ideas; the discourse is receptive to broader institutional considerations that are vital in terms of social protection in fragile states, but whether this discourse will win out over the traditional approach of the social protection department remains to be seen. It will be interesting to see the medium- to long-term impact of the WDR 2017 on Governance and the Law (World Bank, 2017), to see how this impacts the social protection agenda in fragile states.
Chapter 10
Discussion and conclusion

10.0. Introduction

This study set out to answer the following four research questions:

1) How did the fragile states agenda develop over time in the World Bank?
2) How did the social protection agenda develop over time in the World Bank?
3) To what extent, and how, did these two agendas interact during their development?
4) To what extent, and how, did the institutional architecture of the World Bank facilitate or hinder the development of each agenda, and their interaction?

This chapter revisits the empirical contribution of the study as outlined in Chapters 6 to 9 to provide answers to these questions, and to link the findings of the study to the existing scholarship and theory. Section 10.1 answers the research questions, examining how the agendas developed, their interaction and how the institutional architecture of the Bank was instrumental in facilitating or hindering them. Section 10.2 draws out the theoretical contribution of the study, examining the role of ideas, interests and the institution and their interaction in the development of the fragility and social protection agendas in the context of the Bank. Based on the findings in this study, Section 10.3 offers potential avenues for future research, and Section 10.4 concludes the study.

10.1. Research questions revisited

The following sections draw on the empirical contribution of the study to address the research questions outlined in Section 4.1, applying the analytical framework of historical and ideational institutionalism discussed in Chapter 3.

10.1.1. RQ1: how did the fragile states agenda develop over time in the World Bank?

The data suggests that the ‘profound change’ of the international context for development (see Sections 2.1 and 6.0) created a critical juncture within the Bank’s approach to fragile
states in the 1990s, in that the constraints that surrounded the embedded historical pathways were loosened, providing a brief moment of contingency and agency (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). Alongside the failure of the structural adjustment approach and the criticism that followed, Wolfensohn’s leadership clearly was a facilitating influence in this critical juncture; the data ascribes to him a rhetorical leadership role in the rethinking of the Bank’s development objectives and approaches, thereby creating an enabling environment for new agendas. This suggests that leadership plays a crucial role within the exploitation of a critical juncture within global institutions; without the enabling environment, the data implies that the new ideas around governance, conflict and fragility would not have gained traction in this moment.

Individuals also played a part in the selection of ideas that gained traction in this crucial moment in the immediate aftermath of the critical juncture; Paul Collier, in an influential role in the Bank, was able to use his position to forward his previous research interests in Africa and conflict to introduce a conflict / fragility lens to the Bank. However, as is demonstrated throughout Chapters 6 and 7, the new ideas were not completely detached from previous approaches in the Bank; the data supports the literature that claims that the new focus on governance was developed through the economic principles of the Washington Consensus (Harrison, 2004; Hameiri, 2007). Consequently, the new ideas that emerged around governance and fragility are framed from the perspective of economic growth (e.g. Collier’s research agenda as seen in Section 6.1.3, which views the conflict issue as one that impacts economic growth, and the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) as seen in Section 6.1.4, where the initial engagement was driven by macroeconomic fiscal concerns). This supports Béland’s (2005) ideational theory that a policy problem is influenced by policy makers reacting to previous policies, and framed accordingly.

While the continued focus on growth continued, there are some interesting perspectives in terms of the ‘sequencing’ of ideational influences, that Pierson (2004) outlines in terms of the aftermath of critical junctures. As seen above and in the Findings chapters, the role of individuals at the ‘moment’ of critical junctures is important in introducing new ideas. However, at the point after its initial introduction, the fragility discourse became more muddled, and the early ideas forwarded in the aftermath of the critical juncture did not always become embedded. This was perhaps due to the lack of a single, coherent, institutional focus on conflict and fragility; instead, different pockets of work emerged in the aftermath of the critical juncture in different areas of the Bank, each responding to
different perceived policy problems. To take one of these ‘pockets’ as an example, the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) initially emerged around an idea about fiscal concern over the public expenditure profile in Uganda. This ‘idea’ however did not become institutionalised – the PCU agenda was quickly overcome by concerns around demobilisation and micro-level economic considerations. The idea, therefore, took a while to be institutionalised in terms of an answer to policy problems; and the policy problem that the final ‘idea’ addressed was different to the one initially posed. This challenges the ‘sequencing’ theory of Pierson (2004), that the initial ideas dictate the formation of future policies; exogenous influences (such as the interests of recipient countries) can perhaps also play a part here.

In terms of critical junctures and sequencing, the data does not support the assertion in the literature (see Chapter 2) that 9/11 acted as a catalyst for action on fragility within the Bank. The data suggests that the Bank was already addressing fragility and conflict; it had become involved in Bosnia & Herzegovina almost a decade before 9/11 occurred, and the PCU was developed four years prior to 9/11, as was the conflict research agenda. The LICUS agenda could have been in response to 9/11; however, those who initiated the LICUS initiative who participated in the research (Collier and Devajaran) did not mention 9/11; rather, they recall conversations they were already having about a certain group of countries in Africa that were falling behind in terms of development indicators (see Section 6.1.5). The terrorist attacks may have pressured the Bank to promote its engagement in conflict and fragility more publicly, but the data strongly suggests that it was not the catalyst that brought about the engagement.

In the 2000s, there was a mismatch between the profile of the ideas in terms of how the Bank was portraying itself; the literature is forceful in outlining how the Bank turned to governance and fragility issues during this period, but the data shows that ‘behind the scenes’ the situation was much more muddied. The Bank’s understanding of the governance concept gradually increased over time, but it constantly clashed with a) the lending priorities and modalities of the Bank, and b) the apolitical mandate of the Bank. Consequently, it was in the Bank’s interests not to develop a concrete definition with which to approach its operational strategy; rather, the discourse around governance embraced this confusion around the concept, so that it could be seen to be addressing governance, but was also embracing a number of different constituencies that had opposing ideas of how the governance concept should look. This creates an interesting interplay between ideas, interests and institutions; the institution’s lending and apolitical mandate
provides the framework in which the ideas must interact, but its interests mean that on the one hand, the Bank must *look* like it is addressing the issue of governance (in response to the criticisms of its previous policies), while on the other hand it must look like it is not interfering in the politics of countries. The Bank’s interests are best served, therefore, by keeping the concept vague and elastic, so that it appeals to as many constituencies as possible whilst also framing its engagement of the issue in terms of the policy problem that the critics of structural adjustment identified.

This meant that the operational impact of the new discourse was severely hampered – much of the new insights surrounding governance did not get beyond a small ‘silo’ of individuals who were promoting the agenda; many of the ideas that this small group was advocating have come from outside the Bank – some of the links between Bank staff and the broader US political science community were influential here. These ideas, however, developed as they were outside of the institutional constraints of the Bank, were not easily transferred into the Bank’s path-dependent processes; rather, the governance agenda in the Bank was considered operationally in narrow terms that did not go much further than capacity building, as outlined in Harrison (2004). This group of advocates within the Bank did get some traction, however, again through powerful individuals, which resulted in a community of practice (CoP) and a trust fund that addressed the idea of political economy, which could be used to promote the idea operationally. How the Bank staff used the CoP and the trust fund demonstrates an idea gaining power through bottom-up strategies; those in charge of the trust fund used it to ‘reward’ country teams that were taking on board the new insights around political economy and governance more broadly, by providing them with extra resources if they did so. The aim, therefore, was to build coalitions around an idea, which in turn would become advocates for the idea.

The fact that these ideas continued to clash with the lending priorities and the ‘apolitical’ mandate of the Bank, however, meant they were vulnerable to shocks. The literature on historical institutionalism often points to exogenous shocks; this agenda, however, was disrupted by an endogenous shock, specifically the 2014 Bank restructure. As the idea had not been able to become ‘institutionalised’, or translated into operational work in a comprehensive way, it was vulnerable to competing interests within the ‘marketplace’ of ideas, undermining any progress the ‘bottom-up’ approaches had achieved. This demonstrates how the ideas of governance and political economy considerations within
development on the whole were unsuccessful in navigating the path-dependent institutional architecture of the Bank.

The fragile states agenda, closely linked with the governance agenda (although rarely, perhaps surprisingly, considered by it), suffered similar problems. It emerged through several different streams or perspectives – the PCU, the LICUS taskforce, and the conflict research agenda, all of which framed the problem in terms of growth. These different portfolios gradually came together in the middle of the 2000s, to create the ‘Fragile States Unit’ (FSU); however, despite the ‘high profile’ nature of fragility in the development literature at the time, in the aftermath of 9/11, the work of the Fragile States Unit was not significant in terms of the broader portfolio of the Bank. It remained a small ‘policy shop’ in the operational unit, with little operational or institutional clout. A significant handicap was the development effectiveness agenda, which still remains a powerful idea around governance and fragility, meaning that lending – a significant source of power within the Bank’s incentive structures – was barely available to countries that were deemed fragile.

There is a strong sense in the data, therefore, that the Bank was lagging behind other institutions in its response to fragility as a development issue in the mid-2000s. The OECD was considered a prominent leader at this point, driving the broader development discourse around fragility to one of ‘state-building’, which looked beyond institutional capacity considerations to include ideas around accountability, legitimacy and state-society relations. The Bank was involved in these discussions, and took on these new external ideas conceptually (the data is not clear as to whether the political economy discussions in the ‘governance’ silo were also filtering through to the FSU at this point), however the Bank’s own internal evaluations highlighted that while the Bank was using the more sophisticated lexicon of the new state-building agenda, its operational approach was lagging significantly behind, constrained as it was by a bifurcation between the ‘knowledge’ and ‘operational’ areas of the Bank (see Section 7.1.2), the poor fit with the Bank’s lending mechanisms, and the problem that the governance agenda also suffered – the difficulty in operationalising complex political-economy problems.

However, while the fragility agenda was not achieving a high-profile status within the Bank, Afghanistan was. It is reasonable to infer here that powerful country interests, specifically those of the US, came into play at this point – while the institutional constraints were stopping fragile states on the whole from gaining much traction, the US’s
interests in terms of engagement with Afghanistan were able to overcome those institutional constraints, not least in terms of lending, whereby funds were made available to Afghanistan in a way that they were not to other fragile states. The Bank, therefore, became closely engaged with a high-profile fragile state; initially its engagement was framed in terms of macroeconomic concerns, however it was quickly drawn into sectors which would have been deemed too political in a less high-profile context, such as the judiciary, military and social concerns; initially the engagement with these sectors was due to macroeconomic issues, but the Bank also started to ‘pick up’ sectoral areas where there were gaps in coverage (see Section 7.1.3).

The data suggests that the insights the Bank received into fragile states in Afghanistan were translated back into the discourse and operational considerations back in Washington D.C., however, it does not offer details into what these insights were. The data turns at this point to the WDR – a critical point in terms of the fragile states agenda at the Bank. The data around this WDR and the WDR that was influential for the social protection agenda (see following section) demonstrate that documents, in particular WDRs, are very powerful in terms of ideas. The data is forceful in demonstrating that a WDR dedicated to conflict, violence and fragility significantly raised the profile of fragile states and situations. However, due to the importance of the document, it also becomes a focus of ideational struggle, with various ideas competing during the production process to gain a profile (as demonstrated in Section 6.2, inclusion in a WDR can significantly help an agenda progress).

The decision to create the WDR on fragility shows a significant interplay between ideas and interests. Individuals played an important part in the decision, particularly Zoellick; and tangentially, it can be inferred that this in turn is supported by the interests of powerful countries (e.g. through Zoellick’s links to the US political establishment, and due to the continuing engagement with Afghanistan). The power of individuals and certain country interests are able to overcome the institutional resistance to an agenda that is so far from the Bank’s traditional remit. This creates a situation whereby documents such as the WDR become a tool for access to power, that Bank staff members can use to promote their agenda.

The production of the WDR demonstrates the strong prevailing institutional preference for economistic methods and considerations, which baulks at political concepts such as
security, justice, legitimacy and accountability. While these issues are being considered in less high-profile documents, and in contexts such as Afghanistan where institutional ‘rules’ can be broken for strategically important contexts, the data suggests that the Bank-wide consultation processes hampered the production team’s ability to embrace these concepts as much as they would like. On the other hand, the WDR is also perceived as having overcome the Bank's institutional ‘stubbornness’ in order to promote a ‘counter-cultural’ (Vernon, 2011) approach. This suggests that there was compromise; the idea was not able to overcome the path-dependent approaches of the Bank, but it could go some way to challenge them; within the historical institutionalist frameworks, this could be evidence of some level of ‘displacement’ (see Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Section 3.3), based on ideational processes. Interests are highly significant at this point of the WDR, however; there was no compromise over any inclusion in the WDR that challenged powerful national interests, such as those of the US and other key donor countries (see Section 8.1.3).

The data also demonstrates how the WDR, after initially being a forum of access to power, became a tool after its publication for the promotion of the ideas within it. The WDR had enough ideational power (perhaps through those interests that had pushed for its creation) that the Board members called for an operationalisation paper. Furthermore, country teams were able to use it as a tool to gain support from senior management for new ideas that corresponded with the WDR’s key messages; this is another example of ‘bottom-up’ attempts to gain traction for ideas.

The WDR, therefore, is a key moment in the agenda of fragile states; while it does not represent a critical ‘juncture’ per se (it does not come at a moment of ‘institutional flux’, or radically change the agenda in a different direction), it is a critical ‘moment’, in that ideas around fragility are given a centre stage; the first time this has occurred, despite the perceived high-profile nature of fragility in the Bank seen in the literature. The power of key documents, the role they play as a proxy for powerful interests and providing access to these powerful interests, and as a focus of ideational struggle, is significant in the progression of ‘counter-cultural’ approaches that go against the ‘stickiness’ of the Bank’s traditional philosophy. The power of the document also creates an opportunity for a change in organisational structure, and sets the scene for further progress into challenging traditional institutional approaches.
The new Nairobi ‘hub’ that emerged in the aftermath of the WDR created a more high-profile advocacy and lobbying group, which granted more power to the ideas surrounding the Bank’s approaches to fragility. Furthermore, it had an operational role, meaning the bifurcation between the ‘knowledge’ area of the Bank and the operational activities were somewhat overcome. However, despite this increased profile and power, the hub still struggled to make significant operational change, both in terms of creating a bespoke way of working in fragile states that sat outside the Bank’s usual operating processes and the IDA allocation system. The latter was particularly pertinent; it was the continued ‘punishment’ of fragile states through the bias against them in the lending mechanisms that had hampered operational engagement with them.

The process, undertaken by Joel Hellman, to change the allocation system demonstrates a complicated struggle between ideas, interests and the institutional practices. The objections to a change in the IDA formula were strong, and expressed through the interests of the Bank in terms of the importance of abiding to a perceived ‘neutral’ formula that had the backing of the Board. Hellman was only able to overcome these objections by also expressing his idea in terms of the Bank’s interests – by demonstrating that the aid effectiveness theory would not serve the Bank’s interests in the long-term, using quantitative methods that abide with the Bank’s economistic preferences. While this was not enough to influence the Bank internally, taking these ideas ‘above’ the Bank's authorising environment, to the governments of powerful donor countries, enabled the idea to get political buy-in and to challenge the path-dependent idea of aid effectiveness. This is a significant achievement, and was another incremental step towards the institutionalisation of at least a Bank-wide ‘acceptance’ of the fragility agenda.

However, despite these high-profile successes of the agenda, such as the WDR and the changing of the IDA formula, the agenda is still not a robust one that has been embraced and firmly institutionalised by the Bank. The 2014 restructure created what is perceived by many to be a ‘relegation’ of the agenda in terms of its operational power and long-term viability. The restructure cannot be conceptualised easily with reference to the historical or ideational institutionalist literature; it is akin to an ‘exogenous shock’ in its effects, but it occurs endogenously. Again, there is a powerful role for individuals here, namely for Jim Yong Kim. Kim is perceived to have a lack of understanding in terms of the Bank’s institutional culture and development agenda, thereby disrupting the status quo of the Bank’s approaches. This conceptualisation can go only so far – the Bank continued with its
fundamental business of loans, and continues to function (apparently effectively in terms of its own agenda) to this day. However, ‘weak’ ideas and Bank approaches, such as those surrounding governance and fragility, were significantly negatively impacted by this ‘endogenous’ shock. The restructure, then, demonstrates not only the extensive power of individuals, particularly when they have the support of powerful countries, but also how any ideas that go against the traditional institutionally embedded philosophy of the Bank are, despite a perceived higher profile, vulnerable. The data suggests that the fragility agenda is currently managing to gain back some of the power it lost within the restructure process, though it is now being challenged by competing ideas and interests, particularly the refugee crisis, resulting in a struggle over resources and political clout. The governance agenda continues to struggle in terms of how it can fit in with the Bank’s processes; this is despite the most recent WDR (2017) being on Governance and the Law. This mismatch between the perceived high profile of the agendas in terms of the Bank’s outputs and how the broader development community perceives the agendas within the Bank, compared to the reality within the Bank’s internal structures whereby these agendas face a continual uphill struggle against the institutional architecture, echoes McNeill’s (2004) conceptualisation of these non-traditional agendas as ‘Trojan Horses’ – the Bank is limited, or unwilling, to change in response to these ideas, so that any new ideas that challenge the status quo, despite a high-profile perceived acceptance of them, consist of little more than surface changes.

10.1.2. RQ2: How did the social protection agenda develop over time in the World Bank?

The social protection agenda presents a very different – and arguably much more successful – route to acceptance within the Bank’s broad development portfolio. The data suggests the use of ‘evidence’ – particularly the Bank’s own use of evidence – has played a key role in it becoming a prominent poverty-reduction strategic tool within the Bank. The implementation of the agenda begins, like the fragility agenda, with the ‘critical juncture’ in the aftermath of structural adjustment, and the enabling environment that Wolfensohn provided. This is not to say that it was easily and instantly accepted as a poverty-reduction concept; again similar to the fragility agenda, it was a confluence of events occurring within and as part of the critical juncture that enabled its acceptance. First, it was able to
tap into the ‘broader’ idea of poverty reduction that the Bank was heavily promoting at the time; the idea of social protection was able to use the broader idea to frame its usefulness effectively. It was also, however, able to tap into the continued economistic preference of the Bank, through the synergy of two individuals, Robert Holzmann and Steen Jorgensen; the latter was able to provide a human development perspective that situated the individual as the policy focus, whereas the former was able to frame the concept in terms that corresponded with the macro-economic agenda. The importance of ‘acceptable’ language in terms of Bank culture is demonstrated by Holzmann’s careful choice of the name ‘Social Risk Management’. The central concept of ‘risk’ that the concept afforded is, as seen in Section 2.5, criticised in some of the literature due to its neglect of rights- and needs-based perspectives – there was an attempt to consider this during the development of the concept, however the Bank’s broader apolitical mandate and economistic philosophy meant that the narrower conceptualisation of purely risk was the only way it could gain broader acceptance and utility within Bank processes.

A World Development Report also plays an important part in the promotion of the idea, similar to the fragility agenda. However, the data suggests a different narrative for the SRM concept than that seen in the fragility agenda; whereas the WDR 2011 was a focus of ideational struggle, with different ideas competing to access the power dynamics that the WDR represented, the SRM concept was quickly adopted by the WDR 2000/1 production team that was looking for an appropriate concept that fitted its overall purpose. It can perhaps be inferred from this that the WDR 2000/1 production team was looking for an approach that fitted the narrative that the Bank was trying to create with regard to poverty (as opposed to the WDR 2011, which was developed in an environment where the ideas around fragility were far less powerful and empirically grounded), so the SRM concept, which had been developed within that poverty narrative that the Bank was creating, provided a useful framework within which the Bank could situate its approach comfortably, demonstrating a close interplay between a macro (poverty) idea and a meso (social protection) idea that was not apparent in the fragility agenda.

The inclusion and apparent acceptance of the SRM concept in the aftermath of the WDR 2000/1 meant that the concept and the broader social protection agenda became so powerful that it was able to influence the broader development agenda in its approach to

---

43 A caveat must be included here in that the production team of the WDR 2000/1 were not included in the interview sample, so this finding is not triangulated.
social protection throughout the 2000s, as seen in Section 2.5, with the Bank becoming a leading actor in the discourse and operationalisation of the idea (unlike in the fragility agenda, where the Bank was perceived to be lagging behind the broader discourse).

The narrative therefore demonstrates the importance of ‘sequencing’, as offered in the historical institutionalist framework (Pierson, 2004), in creating a sequence that was acceptable and effective. In particular, the insistence of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) by the Social Protection department from the earliest stages of the concept is an example of how early decisions affect the direction and success of an idea. The M&E approach was important to the increasing success of social protection in the Bank, as it demonstrated that, in the Bank’s terms of success, the social protection approach was effective. Again, the ability of the concept to conform to the Bank’s economistic philosophy is important here – it is possible to ‘measure’ success in quantitative terms, as opposed to concepts such as governance and fragility, the complexity of which makes it difficult to quantify.

The social protection agenda throughout the early 2000s, however, was defined almost solely in terms of middle-income countries (MICs). The agenda at this time considered a robust policy environment as a requirement for the success of programmes, therefore the over-arching social protection agenda, formulated in terms of national-level programmes, did not consider fragile states, or even low-income countries (LICs). It also did not consider its remit in terms of contributing to the building of a robust policy environment. From the demand perspective, LICs were also not keen to adopt social protection programmes, as there was a belief that they emblemed a ‘hand-out’ philosophy that they were keen to avoid. The Bank on the whole accepted their position – as it served the agenda’s interests not to engage in these environments, it can be inferred from the data that little effort was made to change the narrative at this point. Any social protection needs in these contexts were constantly considered through alternative concepts such as social funds, which bypassed national-level institutional systems in preference for bottom-up approaches. These social funds were often channelled through alternative sectors, such as the agriculture or social development departments (or even the PCU, as seen in Section 6.1.4).

The social protection agenda evolved incrementally throughout the 2000s, driven by the increasing body of evidence that programmes were yielding, and mechanisms such as social assistance (as opposed to ‘hand-outs’) were introduced through new ideas
introduced by staff and the evidence. In 2007 a key moment occurred, when the social protection agenda got involved in an LIC (namely Ethiopia) for the first time. This initiative appears at first to have been led by the country, rather than the Bank itself, supporting the historical institutionalist theory of exogenous change; there is evidence of a shift in attitude within Africa away from their perception of social protection as ‘handouts’ which led to this new development in Ethiopia. However, the data is not clear as to whether this shift in attitudes was enough to create change in the Bank – specifically, it is not clear as to why it was this instance that the Bank agreed to engage in programme development in a LIC. A pertinent question would be, for example, if an LIC country had approached the Bank at an earlier point, would the outcome have been the same? It is not possible therefore to categorise this as a ‘critical juncture’, as there is no evidence that this period provided a moment of institutional flux. However, it was an important moment in that it created an environment whereby the social protection department and agenda turned its attention to LICs more critically and analytically.

Shortly after the new engagement in Ethiopia the 2008 financial crisis occurred. The social protection agenda expanded exponentially in terms of lending, which is an important measure of success within Bank processes and culture. While the majority of the lending continued to flow into MICs, there was also an accelerated expansion of social protection within LICs. In terms of LICs, therefore, this could be perceived to be a critical juncture – the moment of opportunity created by the engagement with Ethiopia made it possible for the agenda to spread into LICs more expansively in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash. Furthermore, in doing so it increased the evidence base for social protection in LICs, which as seen previously, was an important catalyst for success within the concept of social protection.

The agenda by this point, therefore, was extremely robust, and expanding and evolving. The robustness of the agenda is demonstrated by its response to Kim’s 2014 restructure; unlike the data on the fragility and governance agendas, it appeared to have had little impact on the social protection agenda, perhaps demonstrating how well the agenda had become embedded within the institutional architecture of the Bank. However, the agenda was influenced significantly by internal evaluations, as demonstrated in Section 8.2. This supports Sindzingre’s (2004) argument that the Bank is ‘self-referential’ in its documents (see Section 3.5); also, it demonstrates how the social protection agenda responded to – and reinforced – the Bank’s interests through the use of evaluation. The influence of
evidence and internal evaluations is important when considering the success of the idea, and creates a cycle of reinforcement; using the Bank’s parameters of success and its conceptual interrogations of the issues as both a starting point and as a catalyst for change helps the idea navigate the Bank’s institutional constraints more effectively, and to progress the agenda in a way that conforms to the Bank’s interests, ensuring continued success.

The fact that the 2011 evaluation highlighted LICs and fragile states as a gap in the social protection agenda (perhaps driven by a concern about the Bank’s business model, as MICs were ‘graduating out’ of IDA processes, as seen in the fragility agenda) is therefore significant. It led the department to look more seriously towards LICs and fragile states and the challenges they represent in terms of social protection. Interestingly, the data shows no evidence that the fragile states agenda was influential in this, other than that the increasing high profile engendered by the 2011 WDR (which was being published concurrently with the evaluation) may have made it a more prominent concern Bank-wide. An overlap between the two agendas is therefore seen at this point, led by the social protection department rather than the fragile states unit. The agenda also turned towards the idea of ‘systems’ for social protection; it started to speak the language of the state-building agenda, although at this early stage of this discourse ‘systems’ are framed in terms of technical capacity, for example how to effectively target and implement programmes and remove overlaps and inefficiencies. The agenda seems to have developed to this moment organically, however – there is little suggestion in the data that it was a concerted effort in terms of the governance or fragility agendas to engage the social protection department in these conversations. This is discussed further in the following section, which discusses the overlap between the two agendas.

10.1.3. RQ3: To what extent, and how, did these two agendas interact during their development?

The data strongly suggests that there was little interaction between the social protection and fragile states agendas through most of the period under study. There is strong evidence that the fragile states / governance agenda struggled to gain traction outside of the ‘silo’ within which those who were interested in the agenda were situated. It suggests that these siloes are a path-dependent feature of the Bank, which creates this path-dependent status
through its incentive structures – there is little benefit for staff members to seek to work cross-departmentally, as ‘success’ on the whole is measured by the amount of financial disbursements each sector has made through lending, with no mechanism available to credit cross-departmental working.

There is evidence that those promoting the governance agenda in particular, and to some extent the fragile states agenda, were keen to break out of their siloes to gain more influence in broader Bank discourse, but that they were hampered in their efforts to do so through the apparent ‘weaknesses’ of the agenda in terms of the Bank’s interests and incentives. This is not to say, however, that social protection considerations are not visible within the discourse and operations within fragile states – the work of the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU), for example, took the form of safety-nets and ‘hand-outs’ (see Section 6.1.4), and the LICUS Taskforce and consequent Initiative (see Section 6.1.5) used social funds to meet urgent welfare needs in fragile states, and to deliver ‘quick wins’ that could be perceived to help build the state-society relationship. However, while social protection mechanisms were being used within the fragile states discourse, there appears to have been minimal ‘official’ engagement with the social protection agenda being established in the Social Protection department, which was looking at larger national-level programmes through the lens of the Social Risk Management (SRM) concept.

The little engagement there was between the two agendas took place within the context of document production, for example during the production of the LICUS Taskforce Report or WDRs. This demonstrates that documents, as well as being both an instrument of power in terms of ideas and a locus of ideational struggle, also represent a space for staff members promoting an agenda to escape from their siloes to interact with other agendas. However, the main ‘business as usual’ processes exist within the siloes. Indeed, there seems to have been little desire in the data on social protection to break out of the silo; the agenda appears to have been self-contained and worked within its own parameters (there may have been interaction with other sectors – the data does not address this). This does not mean that those working within the agenda were not striving to improve and evolve, but that they did so through their own evaluation mechanisms and insights from country contexts. During the 2000s the agenda was for the most part deliberately not considering

44 It is important to note at this point that there may have been more interaction at the country level, within the operational departments of the Bank. The data did not pick up how the agendas interacted at ‘ground level’ (see Limitations, Section 4.7), and this could have been a place where the two interacted. This is an area for future research (see Section 10.3).
LICUS / fragility contexts, as the SRM approach was conceptualised within an assumption of robust policy environments – without these environments, the concept is unlikely to be effective in terms of its own evaluation parameters.

This approach changed in 2011, when the social protection agenda and department explicitly turned its attention to LICs and fragile contexts. This is significant; it is the first time the agendas have overlapped comprehensively, and the move was led by the social protection agenda, not the fragile states agenda. The move was triggered in part by the internal evaluation (IEG, 2011). On the surface, it appears that this shift towards fragile states developed endogenously within the social protection agenda; the expansion of the portfolio into LICs, and the evidence that this expansion yielded (i.e. that social protection mechanisms were effective in these contexts) appears to have driven the social protection agenda to reconsider its previous lack of engagement in these countries. However, the timing of the shift in direction challenges this interpretation, as this shift was occurring at a similar moment to the production of the WDR 2011, when the fragile states discourse was enjoying a particularly high profile within the Bank. Therefore, while the social protection data points to the IEG evaluation and its own M&E mechanisms as the driving force behind the shift, it is unclear in the data whether the independent evaluation team (who were not interviewed for this study), for example, was influenced by the new high profile of the fragility agenda, or the implicit realisation visible in the fragile states data that a more prominent shift towards fragile states was in the Bank’s interests in terms of its business model.

There was a similar situation in the social protection agenda’s new approach to systems within social protection mechanisms. This systems agenda has echoes of the capacity-building elements of the ‘state-building’ and broader governance agendas, although there is little evidence of a consideration of the political economy aspects that were for a while popular within the governance agenda. The extent to which this was influenced by the governance agenda gaining more traction is not really clear; the social protection data suggests that this move was driven by a natural ‘next step’ in the agenda, that once individual programmes or suites of programmes had been well-established in country contexts, the next step to build on this progress was to consider how the programmes interacted to decrease fragmentation between programmes. However, there is the possibility (although unsupported by the data) that the discourse around the governance
agenda (despite its operational ‘weakness’) has influenced this shift; for example, the last World Development Report was on *Governance and the Law* (World Bank, 2017).

There is evidence that the FCV unit and the Social Protection department are now working together; for example, staff from both departments recently collaborated to produce *An Integrated Framework for Jobs in Fragile and Conflict Situations* (von der Goltz et al., 2016). The data suggests this is indicative of a closer working relationship between the two departments since the social protection team included fragility and conflict within its broader portfolio, and since the fragility unit gained a more high-profile position through the establishment of the Nairobi hub. However, this relationship is in its nascent stages, particularly in terms of the systems agenda – an area for future research is to establish to what extent and how this relationship evolves over the next decade.

10.1.4. RQ4: To what extent, and how, did the institutional architecture of the World Bank facilitate or hinder the development of each agenda and the interaction between them?

The data strongly reinforces the idea that individuals are a key factor within the institutional environment of the Bank in terms of facilitating the adoption of new ideas. Both the fragility and the social protection agendas were engendered within the enabling environment created by President Wolfensohn in the late 1990s. It is not possible here to establish to what extent Wolfensohn would have been able to create this environment were it not for the broader criticisms that the Bank was receiving in the aftermath of its structural adjustment policies; there is evidence that supports the literature (Chandler, 2006; Rodrik, 2006; Pender, 2001; von Engelhardt, 2018) that suggests that it was in the Bank’s political interests to ‘rethink’ its development approach due to these exogenous influences, which may have in turn given power to Wolfensohn to create an environment that was fertile for new ideas such as fragility and social protection. Either way, it is clear that leadership from the top of the organisation is important, particularly in the early stages of an idea (reinforcing Pierson’s (2004) theory of sequencing).

Other individuals are also highlighted within the data as important to the implementation and progression of an idea. High-level roles such as the Head of Research (Paul Collier, Martin Ravallion) and Chief Economist roles (Joseph Stiglitz, Shanta Devarajan) have some political clout within the institution, not least due to their close association with the
Presidency, which grants them power to introduce and support ideas into the Bank. Other high-level management roles such as Heads of Department (Robert Holzmann, Brian Levy, Joel Hellman) also have a certain level of power – they are in a good position to promote agendas outside of the ‘siloes’ of the Bank (an institutional feature discussed below), and also have access to the top-level of individuals such as the Heads of Research and Chief Economists. This is not to say that top-level management has unlimited power – Joseph Stiglitz, for example, famously left the Bank due to disagreements about his ideas and theories – but within the overarching authorising environment of the Bank, the support of key individuals are a significant factor in the success of an idea.

Ideas can gain traction, then, through access to powerful individuals, which demonstrates the Bank’s status as a hierarchical bureaucratic organisation, as highlighted by Sindzingre (2004). The data also points to two other potential sources of power for ideas; documents and donor countries (particularly countries that have the most voting power within the Board). The data demonstrates that individuals promoting new ideas can use documents such as WDRs, or to a lesser extent other high-profile documents such as reports (e.g. the LICUS Taskforce Report) or strategy documents (e.g. the Social Protection Strategies) to formalise ideas and gain prominence for them. The data demonstrates two different scenarios for endorsement through a WDR. The first is represented by the SRM concept’s inclusion in the 2000/1 WDR on Poverty, where the concept was developed in such a way that it represented and encapsulated the interests of the production team and the Bank more broadly in terms of a mechanism for poverty reduction, resulting in its adoption by the production team. The second is seen in the development process of the 2011 WDR on Fragility, Conflict and Violence, where the WDR represented a forum for ideational struggle, where ideas were competing for traction. The WDR team also gathered a large body of evidence (the use of evidence in the Bank is discussed below) and an Advisory Board which created the parameters within which the ideas were competing. However, while the WDR 2011 was perceived to have challenged the Bank’s institutional orthodoxy to the extent that it was considered ‘counter-cultural’, the data also shows that the document itself was constrained by the Bank’s interests and the interests of influential countries. The Bank’s interests constrained the document by requiring it to be framed in terms that chimed at least in part with its economistic culture, whereas powerful country interests prevented evidence that highlighted the contribution of powerful countries to the problems seen within fragile contexts from being included in the discourse. Both powerful
individuals and powerful documents, therefore, while they have some scope to ‘change the game’ of the institution, are still constrained by the broader interests of the Bank (e.g. its need to prove its efficacy through quantitative evidence) and the interests of powerful countries, particularly the US.

Appealing to the interests of these powerful countries is, therefore, another route for ideas to get traction, albeit a very difficult one to achieve. The example in the data of this method is the campaign by Joel Hellman, supported by Shanta Devarajan, to change the IDA mechanisms that prevented fragile states from gaining access to Bank lending. This idea was receiving extensive push-back from institutionalised ideas within the Bank on development effectiveness, which could only be overcome by empirical evidence that the development effectiveness theory was flawed, at least in the long-term. Once buy-in from donor countries had been achieved, this strong institutionalised idea was able to be challenged, but achieving this buy-in required a level of power to be able to access the donor countries directly.

The main channels for getting traction for a new idea were therefore through access to powerful individuals, documents or donor countries/Board members, although individuals and documents were in turn constrained to some extent by the interests of the Bank itself and the Board member countries. However, the take-up of an idea does not guarantee the institutionalisation and effective operationalisation of its content. The data highlights many constraints within the Bank that an idea or new concept faces even after its initial ‘acceptance’. The first is the Bank’s lending mechanisms, which place various different constraints on the adoption of an idea. As seen in Section 10.2.1, a sector’s power in terms of the Bank’s incentive structures is equated with its ability to lend, as levels of disbursement are the main parameter for success in the Bank. The governance and fragile states agendas both were hampered by this measure of success; in terms of governance, there are difficulties persuading countries to borrow to address governance issues, as in countries where governance is a problem there is a likelihood that the political elites in that country will have no incentive to address the governance issue, as they may be benefitting through existing governance structures (see North et al., 2009 and Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, as discussed in Section 2.3). Rather, countries are more likely to want to borrow in order to improve infrastructure, or to assist sectors such as agriculture or even social protection.
Lending mechanisms also damaged the fragile states agenda in terms of career incentives; as demonstrated in Section 6.1.5, for many years working on the fragility agenda was considered ‘career death’, as success is measured by loan disbursements and fragile states were limited in their access to them by the IDA disbursement formula. Fragile states were not only limited in their ability to secure funding, but also through the career incentives of the Bank that had been skewed by the IDA formula.

Lending mechanisms also reinforced the ‘siloed’ nature of the Bank’s knowledge area, as there was no incentive provided by the lending mechanisms to work cross-departmentally, as seen in Section 10.1.1. This hampered an idea’s ability to gain traction in other areas of the Bank, or to be considered in broader Bank processes. The restructure and the formation of Cross-Cutting Solution Areas (CCSAs) were intended in part to address this issue, but as seen in Section 9.1.3, their ability to do so in practice is hotly debated.

In addition to lending mechanisms, the governance and fragile states agendas faced other constraints. The technocratic quantitative philosophy of the Bank, engendered through a long history of a dominant economistic focus, makes complex political-economy phenomena difficult to express in terms that are acceptable to the Bank’s incentive structures and evidence mechanisms. This is linked to the issue of ‘time’ – complex political economy issues take a long time to become effective operationally, so consequently there are difficulties in ‘proving’ the efficacy of the approaches, which again conflicts with the Bank’s incentive structures and reliance on quantitative evidence.

This is in turn related to a bifurcation seen in the evidence between the high profile agenda seems to receive (and which is promoted by the Bank) and the realities of the agenda in terms of acceptance and operationalisation within the Bank’s structures. As seen in the governance agenda (and as can be inferred for the fragile states agenda), it was in the Bank’s interests to be seen to be tackling the issues of governance and fragility, however it was not in its interests to firmly define and conceptualisation the issues in a way that was operationally useful, as this could open it up to criticisms in terms of its apolitical mandate, and put it in opposition to other definitions and conceptualisations of a highly complex issue that could also open it up to criticism. The data strongly supports McNeill’s (2004) theory of ‘Trojan Horses’ (see Section 3.5), in that the ideas equate to no more than ‘surface’ changes, whereby the Bank ‘talks the talk’ but is reluctant to ‘walk the walk’.
A second bifurcation that challenges ideas after their initial acceptance is the disconnect between the knowledge and operational parts of the Bank. This is linked to the problem of the Trojan Horse – if an idea is not definitively conceptualised in a way that is useful for operations, it is difficult for that idea to gain any operational traction. Furthermore, the data suggests that the links between the knowledge and operational departments of the Bank appear to be weak, meaning that the transition from one to the other is truncated and time-consuming. Additionally, there are many ideas competing within the knowledge arena of the Bank to gain traction operationally, further weakening the links.

It is important to note that this study has not captured the relationship between the knowledge and operational arenas of the Bank effectively (see Limitations, Section 4.7). This data is reliant on the perspectives of those principally in the ‘knowledge’ area of the Bank; it would be a useful area for further study to explore how ideas travel and change between the two arenas, perhaps using policy process theories, to gain more insights into the relationship between the departments more effectively. However, this study does provide strong evidence that ideas that are difficult to operationalise effectively are perceived by those who generate the ideas to have difficulties in gaining traction in the country contexts.

It is clear, therefore, that ideas, even after their initial acceptance into the Bank’s discourse, face constraints through the Bank’s lending mechanisms, incentive structures, economistic philosophy and bifurcations between discourse and operations in terms of its broader acceptance and operationalisation. The data identifies another avenue through which ideas can be promoted within these constraints, however; namely, a bottom-up approach achieved through coalition building. The political economy community of practice achieved this (see Section 8.2) to some extent; the theory being that creating operations in the field that employ the concept (through the use of alternative funding mechanisms such as trust funds) can build an evidence base and coalitions around an idea, which in turn gives it power within the broader Bank incentive structures as outlined above. The approach got some traction through the political economy trust fund (the GPF), however, a bottom-up approach is vulnerable to other, more powerful influences – in this instance the endogenous shock of the 2014 restructure, which disrupted the agenda to the extent where the trust fund was closed and the discourse severely reduced. So while there are other mechanisms in place to grant power to an idea, they are vulnerable until the moment they have achieved broader institutionalisation and acceptance.
The social protection agenda did not for the most part come up against these constraints, after it had been initially accepted. This provides the opposite perspective – how an idea can become successful within the Bank’s institutional environment. As seen in Section 10.1.2, after initial hurdles in the SRM concept becoming accepted, the social protection agenda was much more successful in gaining traction within the Bank’s aid architecture and becoming institutionalised. It did not come across any of the obstacles identified as having hindered the governance or fragility agendas. This is despite the social protection agenda potentially being perceived as going against the institutionalised ‘macro’ idea of the Bank identified in the literature, loosely defined as ‘neoliberalism’ (e.g. Hameiri, 2007, see Sections 2.1 and 2.3). This was achieved by ‘framing’ the idea in its early stages in terms that conformed to the principles of the overarching ideology but concurrently taking advantage of other, new ‘macro’ ideas that were circulating such as the renewed focus on poverty. This enabled the agenda to be presented in a way that was both progressive but also acceptable to the authorising environment of the Bank. This supports both Béland’s (2005) ideational theory that argues that the framing of policies has an impact on political outcomes (as a ‘strategic and deliberate’ attempt to generate support), and of Mehta’s (2011) theory of macro ideas influencing problem definitions.

The role of individuals is important to the success of this framing (in this instance, Robert Holzmann), and in gaining the support of even more powerful individuals (e.g. Martin Ravallion) to create a powerful coalition around the idea that demonstrates it is acceptable within the Bank environment. The inclusion within a document (the 2000/1 WDR) helps it become accepted as an idea. However, the role of individuals seems to become of lesser importance after the initiation of the social protection agenda. Instead, the agenda evolved, expanded and became institutionalised principally through the use of monitoring and evaluation. Due to the quantifiable nature of the concept it was operationalised easily, which in turn created a body of evidence that, within the Bank’s measures of success, equates to power. New ideas within the overarching social protection agenda such as the expansion of social protection mechanisms (Section 7.2), the turn towards low-income countries (Section 7.2) and the inclusion of fragile states within the portfolio (Sections 8.2 and 9.2) gained traction through the same mechanisms.

The data suggests, therefore, that the social protection agenda was able to utilise the same institutional features that were problematic for the governance and fragility agenda to become institutionalised: lending mechanisms (by creating a product that it was easy to
package in a way that was appealing to countries), the quantitative philosophy (by framing the concept in a way that was easily measurable in terms of spending and outcomes, thereby proving its worth), the apolitical mandate (by creating a product that could be expressed in purely technocratic terms) and the bifurcation between knowledge and operations (by creating a product that was easy for country teams to promote and operationalise).

In terms of the interaction between the two agendas, the institutional environment of the World Bank seems to have hindered any coherent engagement for much of the period under study. This is identified in the data as the ‘siloed’ nature of the Bank, both in terms of the different siloes within the ‘knowledge’ area of the Bank, and the bifurcation between the ‘knowledge’ area and the operational departments in the field. It appears to have been less of a problem for the social protection department; the data demonstrates no desire or requirement for the agenda to ‘break out’ of the silo within which the social protection agenda sits within the knowledge area of the Bank, and the bifurcation between knowledge and operations seems not to have been a problem, as outlined in the previous paragraphs.

The ‘siloed’ nature of the Bank appears to have been a serious problem for the governance and fragility agendas, however. Both struggled to gain traction outside of a small group of people who were interested and invested in the ideas that the agendas encompassed. As seen in Section 10.1.1, this was due not only to the difficulty (and reluctance) to define and operationalise the concepts, but also due to the institutionalised lending mechanisms and incentive structures that discouraged cross-departmental working. It can perhaps be tentatively inferred from the data that gaining access to the power of influential documents such as WDRs can help an agenda break out from its silo and in doing so gain some interaction with other agendas; for example, the fragile states WDR coincided with the turn towards fragile states as a consideration within the social protection agenda. However, there is an overarching problem identified in the data that cross-departmental working is difficult in the Bank, which compromises the interaction of ideas within the Bank. Furthermore, within a competitive ideational market, it is in the interests of those promoting an agenda to concentrate on it solely rather than explore opportunities to
consider engagement with alternative ideas (as demonstrated by the failure of the State-Building Toolkit to gain traction, as seen in Section 9.1.1)\textsuperscript{45}. 

This siloed nature of the institution is acknowledged – as seen in Section 9.1.3, the restructure took steps to reconfigure the institution in a way that enabled interaction between departments (and consequently, ideas and agendas). The new structure (see Appendix I) created 14 Global Practices (GPs), which brought together the Bank’s technical staff on different themes such as Agriculture, Education, Governance and Social Protection, and the five CCSAs (of which Fragility, Conflict and Violence, otherwise known as the Nairobi Hub, is one), which focused on issues perceived by the Bank as cross-cutting development challenges that required ‘integration and collaboration’ across GPs; an explicit attempt to disrupt the perceived siloes within the Bank’s institutional architecture. Support for the attempt is mixed, however, as seen in Section 9.1.3, as some perceive CCSAs to have less power and status than the GPs, whereas some within the Governance GP think it should be a CCSA, as they believe that governance considerations should be present within all sectors.

As the new structure was a relatively new phenomenon at the time that data collection took place, it is a task for future research to establish to what extent the new structure has facilitated more engagement between departments within the knowledge area of the Bank. There are some positive early signs, as seen in Section 10.1.3. However, many of the old incentive structures (e.g. the lack of flexibility in terms of the lending mechanisms) remain, so whether the problem has been overcome by Kim’s actions remains in doubt. Certainly in terms of the period under study, the institutional architecture was a significant hindrance to the engagement of the fragility and social protection agendas.

10.2. Theoretical considerations

This section revisits the analytical framework as seen in Section 4.4. It analyses the three analytical considerations of institutions, ideas and interests and how they interact within the context of the Bank, highlighting the theoretical insights that this study has yielded.

\textsuperscript{45} Again, it is important to caveat this finding by reiterating that this study focused principally on the ‘knowledge’ area of the Bank; the interaction of ideas may be more prevalent at the country-level within Bank processes, this is an important area for future research.
10.2.1. The institution

There is a significant body of evidence within this study that supports the idea of ‘institutional stickiness’ that is forwarded by the historical institutionalist literature (see Section 3.2). Specifically, there are seven aspects of the Bank’s architecture that are identified in the study that create an environment for institutional stability. The first two represent macro-ideational perspectives that have become institutionalised; specifically its ‘neoliberal’ approach and its apolitical mandate. The remaining five constitute technical aspects of the Bank’s functionality; specifically, the Bank’s lending mechanisms, its incentive structures, the quantitative technocratic philosophy, the bifurcation between knowledge and operations, and ‘siloes’.

‘Neoliberal’ institutionalism: Both the fragility and social protection agendas emerged through a concern with growth, and were formulated through the prism of the ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ identified by Hameiri (2007).

Apolitical mandate: The apolitical mandate, as espoused in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, are a macro-ideational aspect of the Bank that has been institutionalised in line with the Bank’s interests to be seen as not interfering with the (democratic or otherwise) politics of any given country. As the governance and fragility agendas have demonstrated (see Sections 6.1, 7.1, 8.1 and 9.1), the mandate has been gently challenged over time, with some levels of reinterpretation being evident in the data; however, there is also the overarching sense that this reinterpretation has done little to make substantive changes in terms of the Bank’s ability to operationalise ideas that address political-economy issues. However, as the literature forcefully demonstrates (e.g. Hameiri, 2007), this is not to say that the Bank’s actions are not political in a broader sense; its dominant ‘neoliberal’ ideas make a number of assumptions that are inherently political, for example.

Lending mechanisms: Lending is closely related to power within the Bank. Parameters of success within the Bank’s organisational structure are measured in terms of volume of lending. Aid products (and the ideas surrounding them) that fit well with the lending mechanisms are therefore more likely to gain traction.

Incentive structures: Incentive structures are closely related to lending mechanisms, which play a part in creating the incentives. For a successful career in the Bank, it is perceived to be important to work on products or in country contexts that maximise the power of
lending mechanisms. Furthermore, the lending mechanisms create a disincentive to work cross-departmentally, which has implications for the power of ideas outside of ‘siloes’.

**Quantitative technocratic philosophy:** The Bank has a strong economistic culture, and promotes an evidence-based approach to development. As seen in Section 5.2, this has its origins in the Bank’s earliest years, when its dependence on bond markets to secure finance led it to lend in a way that could demonstrate its efficiency and fiscal sustainability. Ideas that cannot be easily quantified therefore struggle to provide an evidence-base, which weakens their power to gain traction.

**Bifurcation between knowledge and operations:** The bifurcation within and between Bank departments is closely linked with the previous three aspects of the institution, in that if there are difficulties in operationalising an idea or agenda (e.g. in terms of lending processes, the incentive structures or the quantitative approach), then an idea has difficulty gaining wider Bank support in country contexts. Traction within the knowledge sphere has some power, albeit ‘soft’ power, as discourse around an idea may be used politically by the Bank to demonstrate that it is responding to the concerns or criticisms of the wider development community. However, if it is unable to become institutionalised through translation into operational work, then the idea or agenda remains weak and vulnerable to shocks (both exogenous or endogenous).

**Siloes:** Similar to the bifurcation between knowledge and operations, the ‘silod’ working within the knowledge arena of the Bank is created in part by lending mechanisms and incentive structures. If an idea is a self-contained one (such as social protection), buy-in from the wider Bank community is less important; however, ideas such as those surrounding governance or fragility need broader acceptance in order to gain traction. Siloed working also is a significant constraint in the development of integrated development issues, such as social protection *within* a fragile context.

These seven aspects of the Bank’s institutional architecture seem to be permanent structures of the Bank, historically embedded based on early decisions (which supports Pierson’s 2004 theory of sequencing and path-dependency). The success of ideas is therefore constrained by their ability to navigate these structures. The social protection agenda was framed from its earliest stages in a manner that acknowledged these constraints, and was therefore able to work with them and manipulate them to its advantage (e.g. the quantitative philosophy complemented the monitoring and evaluation
aspect of the social protection agenda). On the other hand, the fragile states and governance concepts struggled to fit within these constraints, so while they seemed to become high profile issues at various moments, they struggle to gain wider institutionalisation beyond the ‘Trojan Horse’ (McNeill, 2004) status whereby they are used politically by the Bank, meaning they remain weak and vulnerable to shocks. This therefore supports Heclo’s (1974) and Hall’s (1993) models of explanatory power in terms of institutions, which demonstrate the narrowing of policy options through retrenchment and self-reinforcing processes.

10.2.2. Ideas

The previous section demonstrated that the Bank’s institutional architecture does form constraints on the ability of ideas to develop, and narrows the ideational options available within the organisation. However, the data also demonstrates that there are space for new ideas, but the content and the timing of the ideas are important. Furthermore, ideational forces are not mutually exclusive; as seen in the previous section, macro-ideational perspectives such as the Bank’s ‘neoliberal’ ideology become part of the constraining architecture of the Bank through which new ideas must navigate. The data also suggests that the renewed emergence of the poverty agenda, which as seen in Section 5.2 had taken a back seat during the structural adjustment era but reemerged as a powerful macro idea in its aftermath, played an important part in creating the ‘critical juncture’ in which the agendas of social protection and fragility were able to emerge. The ‘framing’ of these new ideas needed to appeal to these macro, cognitive ideas in order to gain success. The ‘content’ of ideas is therefore important – but this study suggests that the content of ideas is of less importance after their introduction into the discourse. At its initiation, the content of ideas is important in terms of the institutional constraints as described above, but also relates to the power-distribution within the organisation; ‘it is not only about what is said, but also about who said what to whom, where, when and why’ (Schmidt, 2011: 56). The agency of individuals and their links to powerful individuals and documents is therefore important at this initial stage, in order to gain prominence over other ideas that may be circulating. However, the social protection agenda suggests that after the initial acceptance of an idea that conforms to institutional constraints, the content of the idea and the individual agency around it become less important, as it becomes institutionalised and
therefore relies more on self-referential Bank mechanisms such as monitoring and evaluation, rather than the advocacy of individuals.

The fragility and governance agendas also suggest that the role of individuals is important in the initiation of an idea for similar reasons as the social protection agenda – however, the content of the ideas and the individuals that surround them continued to play an important role even after their initial ‘acceptance’, due to the softer, weaker power that these ‘Trojan Horse’ ideas were afforded. Their conflict with the institutional constraints (see previous section) support Hall’s (1993) and Kingdon’s (1995) theories that ideas need administrative simplicity and viability in order to become institutionalised; without these, the ideas were still able to gain power in terms of the political interests of the Bank, however. This demonstrates a complex relationship between ideas and the Bank’s interests. It is possible that these ‘Trojan Horse’ ideas can gain institutionalised power over a longer time period in order to legitimise Bank practice, and the empirical evidence within this study suggests that this might be possible in forthcoming years (see Chapter 9). This supports Mehta’s (2011) theory that it is only over the longue durée that the power of ideas is yielded. However, the change within this study (e.g. the turn towards fragile states in 2011) is not necessarily due to the content of the ideas themselves, but more to the changing macro political environment, for example when it became in the Bank’s interests to situate fragile states as a high profile development issue as they continued to become a bigger geopolitical problem.

10.2.3. Interests

Various interests have been highlighted in the data. Of particular influence were the interests of powerful donor countries – the Bank’s interests are often expressed in terms of response to these donor interests, as well as to criticisms from the broader development community and the evolving geopolitical environment. The Bank is vulnerable – its future is not guaranteed, and as seen in Section 6.1, it faced (and continues to face) opposition from both the right and left of the political spectrum; the right is ideologically averse to aid, and the left is opposed to the perceived ‘neoliberalism’ of the Bank. Furthermore, with an increasing amount of aid emerging from other sources (e.g. China), the Bank needs to justify its existence through other means, such as its facilitation of global knowledge and
inter-country learning. The Bank’s need to remain relevant contributes significantly to the constraints that ideas have to navigate.

The interests of individuals are not well captured by the data. Most individuals represent themselves as working in the interests of an idea or an agenda. This is a potential flaw within the method; speaking to individuals involved in the agenda is unlikely to yield insights into the self-constructed interests of these individuals as an incentive to agency. The ideas that these individuals promote are more likely to gain power through their own merit in terms of the Bank’s interests. However, career trajectories are an important ‘interest’ factor in the advancement of an idea within the Bank – as demonstrated in Section 6.1.5, when the fragility agenda suffered from a lack of staff wanting to work in fragile contexts, as it constituted ‘career death’ [Interviewee: Paul Collier]. This shows how interests are also vulnerable to the institutional constraints of lending mechanisms and incentive structures, which in turn concentrates the need for individuals to promote ideas that conform to the Bank’s interests. There are a proliferation of ideas circulating around an issue or in the Bank more broadly at one time, and therefore competition among staff to generate or promote ideas that are likely to gain traction through appealing to individuals or documents that hold power. Career interests therefore contribute significantly to the ‘incentive structures’ constraining the influence of ideas within the Bank.

10.2.4. Summary

It is clear therefore that the interaction between interests, ideas and the institution are significant in terms of the success of an idea or agenda. The Bank on the one hand provides a fertile environment for new ideas, as development is an ‘unsolved problem’ that requires new ideas and approaches in order to meet development objectives. However, the interests of individuals, the Bank itself and powerful countries interact to create a powerful constraining influence within the institution, which ideas must navigate. This study has uncovered a ‘successful’ story in terms of a new idea (i.e. social protection), and a second, more complex story where some level of success (i.e. discursive power) is undermined by its inability to navigate institutional constraints in such a way that guarantees institutionalisation (i.e. fragile states). Furthermore, this study has highlighted the

---

46 As the Bank places more emphasis on its role as a ‘knowledge’ Bank, it will be interesting to see what impact this has on the lending mechanisms and incentive structures of the organisation, identified in Section 10.2.1 as aspects of constraint. This is an interesting avenue for future research.
difficulty in integrating different ideas (and to some extent, sectors) within the Bank, due to sticky constraints that discourage discourse and collaboration across agendas. There is some evidence, however, that these constraints may be overcome in the near future.

A final point to note, however, and a significant contribution of this thesis, is that theoretically, the analysis has uncovered an important relationship between the institutional aspects of the Bank – both historical and ideational – and the contingency of the political context and personalities within the Bank. While the analytical framework has yielded important theoretical insights into these institutional factors, the analysis has demonstrated that there is always a contingent element which centres around personalities. It is important, therefore, for those conducting research in the areas of policy development and analysis to understand the interface between institutionalist factors and these contingent factors.

10.3. Potential avenues for future research

There are various avenues for future research that could complement or build on the findings of this study, several of which have been highlighted throughout this chapter. As seen in Section 4.3.1, the elite interview sampling method sought to establish contact with those who were influential in the initiation and development of the two agendas under study. It became clear throughout the data collection and analysis phases that there is a ‘knowledge’ area of the Bank in which the majority of those identified through the sampling strategy sit. It also became clear through the analysis phase that there is a bifurcation between this knowledge area and operations on the ground. This gives rise to both empirical and theoretical avenues for future research. First, studies that scrutinise the process by which the ideas translate from the ‘discourse’ sphere in the knowledge area of the Bank in Washington D.C. to engagement with and operationalisation by the country teams would be beneficial. Linked to this, studies that critically analyse to what extent the operationalisation process reflects the discourse in the knowledge area would also be beneficial. Finally, an important avenue of future research would establish to what extent – and how – the two agendas overcome the ‘silod’ working practices in the knowledge area of the Bank to interact on the ground.

A further avenue to complement this study would be to gain outside perspectives of the Bank’s engagement with the agendas, for example the perspectives of other international
development agencies or country representatives of developing countries who engage with the Bank. This study was exploratory in nature and investigated one particular case (the World Bank); the findings therefore cannot be applied with confidence to other development agencies. The perspectives of alternative agencies would triangulate how ideas pass between them within the broader development discourse, and also counter some of the bias that will be inherent in this study due to a sole Bank perspective. For example, an interesting study would interrogate the ILO’s perception of its engagement with the Bank over time in terms of the social protection agenda. It would also be beneficial to see how the Bank’s work in these areas is perceived by other agencies, and which ideas (and why) the Bank absorbs into its own discourse. It would also be interesting to do a comparison study in terms of the interaction between fragile states and social protection in other organisations, to establish whether the findings within this study apply to other development actors.

Engagement with country actors would offer an important dimension in terms of how recipient country interests are represented. They are conspicuous by their absence within this study – influential interests in the data stem from the Bank itself and from powerful donor countries, not the recipient countries themselves. Studies from the country perspective would offer insights into how the findings in this study conform to the country’s needs, and consider and reflect the country’s interests. It would also be a mechanism to identify challenges at the country level that are not considered within the Bank’s approach.

A final avenue for future research is to extend this study longitudinally. Chapter 9 suggests that this is a key moment for social protection in fragile states; at the time of data collection in 2016, the dust was beginning to settle after the perceived disruption of the 2014 restructure, the fragility agenda was regaining a higher profile after a perceived slump after the restructure, and social protection was turning its attention more holistically to fragile states and a systems agenda. A study that takes up where this study ends would be beneficial, to see how these new initiatives take root, and whether the institutional constraints of siloed working can be overcome by the restructure and the new way of working.
10.4. Conclusion

This study has addressed how social protection concerns in fragile and conflict-affected states are considered within the broader fragility and state-building agenda in the World Bank, by tracing the evolution of each agenda and the interaction between them. It has created new knowledge through a strong empirical contribution of primary data, through 42 interviews with senior World Bank staff who played a role within the Bank on the development of each agenda. Through the application of an historical and ideational institutional framework, and building on the existing scholarship on fragile and conflict-affected states and social protection, it has yielded new insights by demonstrating how the institutional architecture of an influential development agency shapes, constrains and frames both the policy issue and its response to it. Specifically, it has demonstrated how both agendas emerged through strong leadership at a moment of ‘institutional flux’ in the 1990s, which had created an enabling environment for new ideas within development. Both agendas were perceived to gain a high profile relatively quickly, however, after their initial acceptance the two agendas offer very different narratives in terms of becoming embedded within the Bank's portfolio. The social protection agenda was able to navigate the institutional constraints of the Bank relatively easily, and use them to its advantage, by framing the issue and the Bank’s response to it from its earliest conception in terms that were acceptable to the Bank’s authorising environment. The fragility agenda, however, after its initial perceived acceptance struggled to navigate the same institutional constraints due to the political environment of the Bank itself and the broader geopolitical arena, consequently remaining a weak, ‘Trojan Horse’ agenda and only gaining influence incrementally. The interaction between the two agendas was minimal for a considerable length of time, due to a lack of incentive on the part of the social protection agenda, and a lack of power to break out of its ‘silto’ on the part of the fragility agenda.

In presenting an analysis of the genesis and evolution of the two agendas through the use of an historical and ideational institutionalist framework, the study has also offered a theoretical contribution by offering insights into the institutional constraints and opportunities within the Bank. In doing so, the inter-relationship between ideas, interests and the institution have been mapped, demonstrating how the Bank’s institutional architecture, and the way ideas and interests shape and conform to it, plays an important
role in the framing of policy issues and policy responses. This is an important contribution, as the way the Bank frames development issues is highly influential within the broader development discourse (as discussed in Section 5.2), and therefore influences how international interventions play out in country contexts. Consequently, further potential avenues for study have been highlighted to support and build on this contribution, including studies that examine the future progress of the two agendas in light of the potential moment of ‘shift’ that the data identified as occurring during the data collection phase.
Appendices
Appendix A: Topic guide for fragility personnel

University of York

Research Study on Social Protection within State-Building
Semi-Structured Interview Guide
Fragility, Conflict and Violence practitioners

Welcome

- Introduction
- Reiterate the purpose of the research
- Invite interviewee to ask any questions that they may have
- Complete informed consent form
- Check how much time interviewee is prepared to spare

Phase 1: World Bank interventions

Q1. Would you mind giving me a brief overview of your current role? How long have you been in this role / at the Bank?

Q2. Would you be able to explain to me how it works internally within the World Bank gets involved in a fragile state? For example,
   - How is Bank involvement triggered?
   - Which departments / sectors / people take the lead?
   - What different sectors within the Bank are involved?
   - How is the FCV involved?

Q3. What are the main priorities of the Bank in fragile states, once conflict and security priorities are met?
   - What are the aims / objectives of Bank interventions when conflict is ended?
   - How are these priorities operationalised?
Check – are there any publically available documents you know of that help explain this?

**Phase 2: FCV unit**

Next set of questions is about the FCV unit:

Q4. Please could you expand a little bit more on what the role of the FCV is within the World Bank? What is it they do? Do you have an example?

Q5. When was the FCV ‘unit’ created?
   - Why was it created – what was the incentive?
   - Who / what were the initiators?
   - Did it ‘replace’ anything?

Q6. Has its role changed at all since its inception? If so, how and why?

Q7. Has the FCV’s approach to fragile states changed at all? If so, how and why?
   - Check if there are any documents to support this?

**Phase 3: Statebuilding**

The concept of ‘statebuilding’ is a dominant one in the academic literature about fragile states, and organisations as DfID and the OECD regularly include it in their discourse about fragile states.

Q8. Is it a concept used regularly in the World Bank with regard to fragile states?

*If NO:*

- Why do you think the Bank doesn’t really use the concept in its fragile state approaches?
The Bank produced a ‘Toolkit to Statebuilding’ in 2012 – is this used at all? Did this Toolkit have an impact in your work / the Bank as a whole?

Do you feel it is a theoretical discourse that occasionally makes it into documents, but in general is not operationalised and used?

If YES:

- What is the Bank’s current conceptualisation of statebuilding – what are the objectives and aims of statebuilding?
- How is statebuilding ‘used’ in the Bank – who are the sectors ‘in charge’ of statebuilding? E.g., there isn’t a ‘cross-cutting solution’ area section on the webpage for statebuilding (as there is for FCV) – so how is it used?
- How has this concept developed in the Bank since the period of structural adjustment?
  
  Probe: Trying to find out how the World Bank shifted from ‘rolling back the state’ to ‘building a state’.
- If not yet clear: How is statebuilding operationalised?

Phase 3: Social protection within state-building

As discussed, this thesis looks particularly at social protection in fragile states, and how social protection initiatives are integrated into interventions in fragile states at the Bank.

Q9. Can we return again to the internal workings of the Bank –does the work FCV work closely with the social protection sector?

Q10. Would you say that social protection is a high priority within the work in fragile states that the Bank does?

Q11. Many of the World Bank’s outputs on state-building have framed it in terms of ‘capacity’ building. What capacity exactly would you say is the focus of this approach? Social protection proponents have said that welfare ministries in fragile
states often lack capacity – is capacity-building of these ministries included in state-building strategies?

Q12. Has the role of social protection within state-building evolved over time? If so, at what point, and for what reasons?

**Interview close**

- Ask if the interviewee would like to clarify or expand on anything they have said
- Ask if there is anything else that they would like to cover / is important to note before the interview concludes?
- Ask the interviewee to nominate prospective interviewees and seek recommendations concerning approach / access
- Request documentary materials
- Thank interviewee for time and contribution
Appendix B: Topic guide for social protection personnel

University of York

Research Study on Social Protection within State-Building

Interview Guide

Social protection practitioners

Welcome

- Introduction
- Reiterate the purpose of the research
- Invite interviewee to ask any questions that they may have
- Complete informed consent form
- Check how much time interviewee is prepared to spare

Phase 1: Opening general questions

Q1. Would you mind giving me a brief overview of your current role? *Do you work in fragile states specifically?*

Q2. My research is looking at social protection approaches of the World Bank in fragile states. Please could you describe to me how social protection initiatives in fragile states come about – what are the internal processes to get them off the ground? Who are the main actors in driving social protection strategies?

Who ‘manages’ them?

Q3. How does your role relate to this strategy?
Q4. What would you say are the World Bank’s motivations for the provision of social protection in fragile states?

Q5. Who does the World Bank consider is responsible for providing social protection in fragile states?

Phase 2: Social protection within state-building

Q6. Social protection has recently been given a much bigger role within international interventions in developing countries – it has become increasingly prominent since the structural adjustment period. Would you be able to describe to me how this happened internally in the Bank?

For example, when was the ‘social protection’ department of the Bank set up, who set it up, and why?

How has the role of the department changes since its set up? Why?

How has the attitude of the Bank towards social protection changed? Why?

Documents?

Q7. How is social protection in fragile states handled with regard to ‘broader’ statebuilding objectives? For example, much of the literature and policy papers emerging from the Bank are couched in terms of ‘capacity’ and ‘institution’ building, particularly governance institutions such as the financial sector, civil service, judiciary and rule of law etc. Where does the social protection agenda fit into this?

Is social protection integrated into the ‘country strategy’?

How is this managed internally?

Is the social protection department involved in country strategy document generation?
Q8. How long has this been the case? Has the role of social protection in country strategies changed over time? If so, how and why?

Q9. ‘Capacity building’ is a dominant concept in the Bank’s approaches. Is this applied to social protection – if so, how?

**Interview close**

- Ask if the interviewee would like to clarify or expand on anything they have said
- Ask if there is anything else that they would like to cover / is important to note before the interview concludes?
- Ask the interviewee to nominate prospective interviewees and seek recommendations concerning approach / access
- Request documentary materials
- Thank interviewee for time and contribution
Appendix C: Consent Form

UNIVERSITY of YORK

Research Study on Social Protection within State-Building

Consent Form

Please tick the appropriate boxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I agree to take part in the research</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have been provided with an Information Sheet, and have had time to consider it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the research and have had these answered satisfactorily. I am confident I understand what the study involves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that my participation in the research is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that the researcher may have to speak to another person if I reveal that I or someone else are at risk of harm, or if I reveal any illegalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that the information I provide to the researcher will be treated in strict confidence according to the UK Data Protection Act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that the World Bank will be named in the researcher’s doctoral thesis and associated research outputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that the interview will be recorded, with all recordings and transcripts kept in secure locations until the submission of the thesis, at which point they will be destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that my words may be quoted in the researcher’s doctoral thesis and associated research outputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please choose one of the following options concerning how you would like your words to be quoted in the doctoral thesis and research outputs. Please note that if you select Option B you will be allocated a pseudonym.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A) You may use my name and job title</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) You may <strong>not</strong> use my name and job title</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that even if I am allocated a pseudonym my absolute</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
anonymity cannot be guaranteed

I understand that all research outputs that emerge from this study will be Open Access

Name: .............................................................................................................

Signature: ......................................................................................................

Date: ..............................................................................................................
Appendix D: Information Sheet

University of York

Research Study on Social Protection within State-Building Strategies
Information Sheet

You are being invited to take part in a research study being conducted by Sophie Mackinder, a Doctoral Researcher in the Department of Social Policy and Social Work at the University of York (UK). The study is dedicated to understanding how state building has emerged as a concept within the World Bank, and how social protection in fragile states is incorporated into broader state-building initiatives.

Who is funding the research?
The study is funded by the Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of York.

Why have I been approached?
You have been contacted because of your role at the World Bank, as the insights you can provide are particularly relevant to the research. Although documents have been collected as part of the research, a key objective is to hear first-hand accounts of how the state-building process has developed over the past two decades. As such, your participation is invaluable and I would be hugely grateful if you could spare the time to support the study.

What would taking part involve?
I would like to conduct a face-to-face, Skype or telephone interview with you at a time that is convenient to you. I will be in Washington D.C. from 31 October to 9 November, and would be pleased to meet you at any time in that is convenient to you during that period. Alternatively, we can arrange a Skype or telephone interview at a time convenient to you if you are not available whilst I am in Washington D.C.. It is anticipated that the interview will last approximately one hour.

Before the interview begins there will be a further opportunity to ask questions and raise concerns. If you are still happy to participate I will ask you to complete a consent form, a copy of which will be provided to you for your own records. With your permission, the interview will be recorded and later transcribed so that I have an accurate record of our conversation.

During the interview you will be asked questions about the transition in World Bank approaches from the structural adjustment era to the current intervention strategies based within the state-building concept, specifically with reference to fragile and conflict-affected states. I would like to get your views and experiences of what influences and constraints shaped the current model of state-building, how state-building as a concept was used at the World Bank, and to explore in particular how social protection is conceived of within the state-building approach.
What will happen after the interview?
After the interview, I will transcribe the discussion. If anything is unclear within the data, I may get in touch to seek clarification and to ensure I have recorded your views accurately. The data will then be analysed and used within my PhD thesis and any associated research outputs such as articles and conference papers.

There are two options on the Consent Form concerning how your words will be quoted within research outputs: A) you may use my name and my job title, or B) you may not use my name or my job title. If you select option B you will be allocated a pseudonym. However, due to the specific nature of this research situated in the World Bank, there is a situation in which a cascade of interview identification could potentially occur. For example, readers of research outputs may be able to identify you due to your association with Bank strategy or because of the distinctive insights you forward. As such, it is important to be aware that absolute anonymity cannot be guaranteed in relation to this study even if you request a pseudonym. I will discuss this with you before the interview commences to ensure that an approach is adopted that protects your anonymity as securely as possible.

How will my details be kept confidential?
The research has been approved by the Department of Social Policy and Social Work’s Ethics Committee at the University of York. All information that is collected during the study will be kept confidential in line with the Data Protection Act (1998). Audio recordings and written transcripts will be stored securely at the University of York and will only be accessible to myself and to my supervisor, Dr Chris Holden.

If you tell me that you or someone else is at risk of harm, or of any incident of illegality, then I will take advice from my supervisor and may have to tell someone about it. This would be discussed with you first.

Do I have to take part?
No. Participation is entirely voluntary. If you do decide to participate you are able to withdraw at any time without giving a reason, up to the submission point of the thesis.

Who can I contact for more information?
If you have any questions about the research please contact:

**Sophie Mackinder (Doctoral Researcher)**
Research Centre for Social Sciences
6 Innovation Close
University of York
Heslington
York
YO10 5ZF

Telephone: (+44)07876 364878
Email: sophie.mackinder@york.ac.uk

**Dr Chris Holden (Supervisor)**
Social Policy and Social Work
University of York
Heslington
York
YO10 5DD

Telephone: (+44)01904 321254
Email: chris.holden@york.ac.uk
Appendix E: Ethics application

SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL WORK
DEPARTMENTAL ETHICS COMMITTEE

APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL OF RESEARCH

This form must be used for all submissions for ethical approval to the Social Policy and Social Work Departmental Ethics Committee. Please complete all sections and sign the undertaking (electronically). If you are unable to insert an electronic signature, please send a signed hard copy of the whole application to Nicola Moody, Alcuin B Block Room 125, Centre for Housing Policy.

The Social Policy and Social Work Departmental Ethics Committee is intended to consider projects which students, supervisors or staff believe may raise some ethical issues but which do not need to be subject to external review or review by the University Ethics Committee.

Completed and sign this form and email it, with any necessary attachments, to spsw-ethics@york.ac.uk for consideration by the Departmental Ethics Committee Panel. The Committee will endeavour to make a decision within 10 working days. However, please note this isn’t guaranteed and applicants should give plenty of time for this process to be completed.

Checklist (click on the box to enter a cross)

☐ Have you decided that your project needs ethical approval and that it needs it from the Departmental Ethics Committee (not from external bodies or the University Ethics Committee)? (See “Does my project need ethical approval” on the VLE (under SPSW Staff Intranet/Research/Ethics) or contact Julie Rugg, DEC Chair, if you are not sure.

☐ Have you attached copies of all additional relevant material, such as research tools (questionnaires and topic guides), information sheets and consent forms?

☐ Have you (and, for students, your supervisor) signed the form?

☐ Have you provided Nicola Moody an electronic copy of the form and attachments?

Date of submission: ...........................................................................................................
1. Please provide details about the principal investigator (student or lead staff researcher). It is possible the ethics committee panel members may get in touch if they have queries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sophia Mackinder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If student, course</td>
<td>Doctor of Philosophy in Social Policy and Social Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If student, supervisor for this research</td>
<td>Dr Chris Holden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If staff, post</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Sophie.mackinder@york.ac.uk">Sophie.mackinder@york.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>07876364878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. For staff projects, please provide details for co-investigators (add more boxes if necessary).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation if not SPSW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. When does the project start??

Project commenced in October 2014. Interviews to commence in Autumn term 2016

4. For staff: List any SPSW DEC member who might have a conflict of interest so should not act as reviewers for the project, such as those consulted in the development of the project, or close colleagues. A list of members can be found on the VLE (under SPSW Staff Intranet/Research/Ethics).

5. What is the full title of the research project?

Provisional title: The role of social protection within state-building strategies: an empirical study

6. If the research is funded, who is the funder and does the funding source create any ethical concerns and/or actual or perceived conflicts of interest?
7. What are the aims and key methods of the research?

In the past two decades, global strategies of intervention in severely low income and post-conflict states – ‘fragile’ states – have shifted from a focus on structural adjustment (the rolling back of the state), to one of ‘state building’ (looking to improve the capacity of governance structures). While there is extensive literature on this new strategic approach, there is little empirical evidence as to how this shift in paradigm came about. Concurrently with this paradigm shift in global intervention in fragile states has been a shift in perspective regarding the value of social protection in low-income contexts. Considered a ‘luxury’ that fragile states couldn’t afford during the structural adjustment, the international community has revised this view to acknowledge that social protection is important to aid poverty reduction and to support economic growth.

These shifts in perspective of development interventions in fragile states and the role of social protection in fragile states present a paradox. For, while intervention strategies have moved away from a ‘minimal state’ approach, they still advocate a market-led state, with a strong state architecture to support market development and foreign direct investment; the shift from minimal state to strong, effective state is essentially a reframing of the neoliberal paradigm that has been the normative global political economy approach since the 1970s. Social protection, and social policy more broadly, goes against this neoliberal paradigm, as it argues against the hegemony of market forces. The paradox, therefore, is that there are two opposing ‘messages’ emerging from the global institutional community; one that supports a intervention strategy that supports market-led development, and one that advocates a poverty-reduction strategy that employs state intervention in social affairs.

This study seeks to explore this paradox through an inductive study into if and how these two approaches are reconciled within international organisations. It comprises two parts; the first looks at the influences that triggered the shift in development thinking from structural adjustment to statebuilding. The second explores the role of social protection within the development shift, exploring how the two concepts have interacted over time. The following research questions provide the framework for this inductive study, in a manner that makes an original contribution to the academic literature on both state-building and social protection in fragile states. The World Bank has been chosen as the empirical focus of the study, due to its prominence and influence in both the state-building and social protection discourses.

1) What were the institutional and ideational influences that resulted in the emergence of the ‘state-building’ developmental approach? 
What actors within the World Bank were involved? What role did they play? What were they looking to achieve, and why? Were there any conflicts and compromises within the Bank, or from external agencies, that altered the trajectory of the state-building paradigm?

2) To what extent is social protection considered within the state-building approach? 
How are social protection considerations in state-building country strategies? What is the relationship between social protection facilitators and ‘state-building’ actors within the Bank? Are the two objectives
To answer these questions, a two-phase research design will be adopted, incorporating documentary analysis and elite interviews. These two sources of evidence will complement each other extensively, and triangulate information concerning both the development of the state-building discourse and the relationship between state-building and social protection.

**Documentary analysis**

Two types of documents will be analysed in order to answer the research questions. The first body of documents will focus on state-building within the World Bank. Key documents will be selected for inclusion initially through structured document searches within the World Bank archives (using search terms such as ‘state-building’, ‘fragile states’ and ‘institutional capacity’, chosen through their significance within the study’s literature review), back to the year 1990 (a key period identified by the literature review, when the state-building paradigm began to emerge). A snowball sampling approach will then be employed through the reference lists of the key documents, in order to trace empirically the development of the state-building discourse over the past 2.5 decades.

The second body of documents will focus on the social protection strategy of the World Bank, to provide an empirical footprint of social protection strategy, in order to trace similarities and differences in approach compared to the state-building documents. The story of the emergence of the social protection discourse within international organisations has been studied extensively, both theoretically and empirically, so the tracing of the social protection strategy is not an original contribution, and as such is not a focus of this research. Rather, the analysis of the social protection documents seeks to trace the changes with regard to the development of the state-building discourse, to see if and how the two discourses interact, and whether changes to the attitudes to social protection are reflected in the state-building discourse. The documents used will be identified in a similar manner to the state-building documents – through structured searches and a snowball method through reference lists.

While the structured searches and snowball method should result in all pertinent documents being retrieved, those selected for interview will be asked during the interview process if they have any internal, non-published documents such as memos, notes, emails or previous drafts that are pertinent to the study. These will be stored securely (see section 21-24 for details).

**Elite interviews**

In order to triangulate and expand on the evidence presented in the documentary analysis, elite interviews will be sourced with World Bank staff. Specifically, two groups of Bank staffers will be approached:

1) staff working on the Bank’s social protection strategy: these will provide the perspective from those for whom social protection is a priority

2) those that work on state-building and interventions in fragile states: these will provide details of how the state-building discourse has evolved from the structural adjustment period,
and provide a perspective of social protection from a state-building perspective

For more details on elite interviews, please see following sections.

8. What kind of research participants will be involved in the research (as interviewees, focus group participants, survey respondents etc), and how many?

Research participants will be professional staffers of the Bank who work in the relevant departments, the vast majority of which will be situated in Washington D.C. Interviews will for the most part be secured over Skype or alternative digital means. There is a small possibility that an opportunity to travel to Washington D.C. for a week to do face-to-face interviews will arise. Fieldwork will not be taking place in volatile or dangerous locations. It is hoped that a minimum 10 interviews will be secured from each business line, meaning that that total number of interviews are likely to be about 20. However, if access does not restrict the study, snowball recruitment will be conducted until a saturation point is reached, i.e. to the point where new interviews are no longer contributing new data or understanding. However, given the restricted membership of the relevant subject groups and access issues, it is unlikely that 20 will be exceeded. As such, an estimate of 10-20 interviews is reasonable.

9. How will research participants will be identified, approached and recruited?

A two-stage approach to sampling will be adopted. The first is based in the documentary analysis, as the examination of the pertinent documents will reveal key policy actors, for example the authors of the key documents, their department heads and the commissioners of the documents. If the documents cite any relevant World Bank actors, they will also be included in the sample. During this first round of interviews, interviewees will be asked to nominate any other individuals within their networks who would be suitable to include in the study, which will provide the basis for the snowball sampling round of interviews. The names of people mentioned during interviews will be added to the list of prospective participants.

The contact details of potential participants will be identified via documentary materials, the Bank website and professional networks such as LinkedIn. They will be contacted in the first instance via email, followed up by a telephone call (if telephone numbers are publically available). The initial email will provide an overview of the project, and an Information Sheet and a Consent Form (attached).
10. How will informed consent to participate be elicited from participants? If different groups are involved in the study (e.g. parents, children, staff), please describe the consent procedures for each.

Potential research participants will be provided with clear information about what participating in the study will involve and will be given the opportunity to decide if they would like to participate in the study. The Information Sheet will provide the following details:

- The purpose of the research
- The funders of the research (i.e. the University of York)
- What will happen to the results and how they will be disseminated
- What their participation in the research will involve
- What the potential risks and benefits of their involvement might be
- How issues of anonymity and confidentiality will be managed

It will also make clear that there is no obligation to take part in the study, and that they are able to withdraw from the study until the submission date of the thesis. Participants will be asked before the interview commences whether they have read the information sheet – only when they have agreed to its conditions, and completed the Consent Form, will the interview commence.

Digital consent forms will be accepted due to the long-distance nature of the interviews. Digital consent can be provided either by a) a scanned signature on the form, or b) returning the consent form from an official email address. To ensure the validity of the consent, the participant will be asked to repeat verbally during the recorded interview that they have provided their consent, and understand that they are not obligated to take part and may withdraw at any time.

If a participant does decide to withdraw during their interview or after their interview is recorded, their data and evidence they provided will be destroyed, and removed from the study.

11. State any promise you will make to participants about how their data will be used, including in publications and dissemination, for example whether names, job titles, or direct quotations will be used, and state what protection of anonymity you are offering. Please attach any consent form or information sheet used.

(Note: For Research Council funded work, councils want anonymised data to be archived and made available to other researchers in addition to the research team)

Outputs

Participants will be informed in the Information Sheet that their words may be quoted in the final PhD thesis and any associated academic outputs such as articles or conference papers.
Anonymity

Research participants will be given two options regarding how their words will be quoted within research outputs (see Consent Form)

a) You may use my name and my job title within the thesis and any research outputs

b) You may NOT use my name or my job title within the thesis or any research outputs

If a participant selects option B, they will be allocated a pseudonym. However, due to the small number of policy actors within the Bank that are relevant to the study, external readers of the research outputs may be able to identify research participants through their responses and opinions, or through the necessary small sample size. As such, absolute anonymity cannot be absolutely guaranteed. Before the interview commences, this will be discussed with the participant. This is a ‘risk’ to the participant that is clearly stated in the Information Sheet.

Security

Participants will be informed via the Information Sheet that their data will be kept securely (see below), and that their anonymity will be protected. The only two people who will have access to their name and details (if anonymity has been requested) will be myself and my thesis supervisor, Dr Chris Holden.

12. (Students: You are required to provide participants with a written information sheet and to obtain a signed record of consent form from participants. Please attach them.). For staff: Please attach the information sheet and consent form. If you do not envisage providing an information sheet and/or obtaining a signed (or audio recorded) record of consent from participants, please justify and explain the measures to ensure personal data will be collected and processed fairly, citing applicable Data Protection grounds from Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act (and schedule 3 as relevant) if necessary.

13. Does the way you will handle research data conform to the Data Protection Act?

Yes

14. What will happen to research participants once you have recruited them to be involved in the research? (e.g. invited to an interview, given a questionnaire etc). Please attach any research instruments (eg topic guides, questionnaires).
Once research participants have been recruited a Skype interview will be arranged. The video interview will last approximately one hour and will be recorded with the participant’s permission. An audio recorder will also be used as back up to the video recording software (DVDVideoSoft). The interviews will be conducted in the ReCSS which has a private room containing recording equipment.

The interviews will be semi-structured. An interview guide (three attached) will be used, as an aide memoir, which will include a baseline of questions. Three different interview guides are used, one for each different set of participants, as the questions that social protection experts are asked, for example, will be different to those asked of state-building experts. The interviews will be tailored to each interviewee as appropriate and employed in a flexible manner.

15. If research participants are to receive any payments, reimbursement of expenses or other incentives for taking part in the research, please give details.

N/A – no payments, reimbursement, expenses or other incentives will be offered

16. If the research may involve ‘vulnerable people’ explain how you plan to deal with any specific ethical challenges. Please also provide details of the relevant DBS (formerly CRB) checks and/or ISA registration that have been undertaken.

N/A – the research does not involve ‘vulnerable people’
17. What will you do if in the course of the research information is disclosed to you that legally requires further action or where further action is advisable?

It is not expected that any information should be disclosed that legally requires further action. However, should this situation I will meet with my supervisor, Dr Chris Holden, before taking any advised action. My Consent Form states that I may have to inform someone else if the participant discloses the potential for harm to themselves or another.

18. Are there any potential risks for participants? How have they been eliminated or minimised?

As detailed in Section 11, due to the restricted sampling nature of the study, participants cannot be guaranteed absolute anonymity. In order to minimise the risk of anonymity breaches, the following strategies will be employed:

- pseudonyms will be employed where participants do not wish to be directly quoted
- anonymity concerns will be discussed before the interview commences. If the participant is concerned that a certain piece or pieces of evidence that they provide can easily identify them, extra steps can be put in place to provide anonymity, for example not using that evidence as a direct quote, or using it within the analysis only as a signpost to alternative pieces of evidence (e.g. using the evidence only to identify other important documents or interview participants).

There is minimal risk of emotional distress within the interviews, as the participants will be discussing topics that make up their day-to-day work life. However, if a participant shows distress, I will suggest suspending the interview.

19. Are there any potential benefits to participants?

There are no concrete benefits to the participants from taking part in the research. However, they will have the opportunity to share their specialist knowledge, to have their expertise utilised within academic study, and potentially help to inform their future policy development.

20. Are there any potential risks for the researcher(s) involved in the project? What steps will you take to eliminate or minimise them?

(Note: these risks could include personal safety, emotional distress, risk of accusation of harm or impropriety).

There are very few emotional or safety risks involved in the research, due to the low-risk nature of the interviews and the non-emotive nature of the study.

In the unlikely event that the opportunity to travel to Washington D.C. arises to undertake face-to-face interviews, a fieldwork programme will be produced and given to my supervisor to ensure that he
knows my whereabouts. The programme will include the names and details of the person being interviewed, and the address where the interview is taking place. In addition to this, I will text or call my supervisor before I go in for the interview, and ‘check in’ again with him once the interview is finished. The interview will be conducted in a ‘safe’ place such as within the World Bank offices. My mobile phone will be kept on (in silent mode) during the interview. Interviews will be abandoned immediately if any safety concerns arise. I will carry some ‘contingency’ cash in case unexpected costs (e.g. taxis) arise.

I will research accommodation options carefully to secure highly rated and safe accommodation. The accommodation will be close to the World Bank offices. Travel insurance will be secured.

Professional integrity
To protect the integrity of the study and to prevent the threat of ‘veto’, no opportunity for pre-publication scrutiny of outputs will be provided to research participants.

21. In most cases, as soon as possible during the research, and by the time research is completed, you should anonymise the data taken from your participants (data such as paper or electronic interview transcripts, notes of discussions, videos, sound recordings etc). You should do this by removing names, addresses and other identifiers, and replacing them with a number, code or pseudonym. You should prepare a key linking the code to the data from the person. (Further guidance is available from http://www.ico.org.uk/Global/~media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Practical_application/anonymisation_code.ashx). (Note: sound and video recordings in which people may be directly or indirectly identifiable are also covered by the Data Protection Act.)

If you do not intend to anonymise data in this way, please explain why. If you do, when will you make this separation? What will you do to protect personal data in the interim? How will you keep the key safe? How long will you keep the key?

The video and audio of recordings of all participant interviews will be transferred to the University of York server and placed in a password-protected file immediately after the interview is finished. Each audio recording will be allocated a code, that corresponds with a data key that links the code to the data of the participant. The data key will be kept separately in a locked filing cabinet, to which only I have access, within the ReCSS, together with the signed Consent Forms. Entry to ReCSS is restricted to key card holders. This process will be repeated when the transcripts of the interviews are completed, and if non-published documentary evidence is obtained.

The data key will be kept for 5 years following final submission of the thesis.

22. Where will participant contact details, anonymised data, consent forms and data keys be kept during the research, and in what form?
(Note: The best method for contact details is to use first name only, or code, in a phone, or paper diary, and to destroy details once fieldwork is complete. The best protection for anonymised data is to store electronic data in a single site only, on a UoY server in password protected form. If other sites are used, they should be password protected and backups should be encrypted. Commercial Dropboxes should be avoided for personal data because they are cloud-based. You can encrypt your equipment using an open source application TrueCrypt. Avoid laptops and data sticks. Please make a special note if data are likely to be stored (including on servers) or otherwise transferred outside the EU). Consent forms and data keys contain participant names and should be kept safe and separate from anonymised research data. The best protection is to store paper data in a locked filing cabinet eg in the main departmental office, and to store electronic data on a UoY server in password protected form).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anonymised electronic data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audio recordings and electronic transcripts will be stored on the UoY server. All data will be held in password-protected files. NO data will be held on hard drives or portable devices. All electronic data will be destroyed one year after the mark for the thesis has been finalised.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data transmission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronic transcripts will be emailed to participants after the interviews to provide them with the opportunity to edit. These will be encrypted using Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) technology as recommended by the UK Data Archive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper-based data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consent forms and the data key will be stored in a locked filing cabinet, for which I am the only key holder, in the ReCSS. The data will be destroyed via confidential waste one year after the final mark for the thesis has been finalised, as will the consent forms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Where will anonymised data, consent forms and data keys be kept after the research in what form and for how long? If there are plans to archive data, how and where will they be kept and will there be restrictions on access and use?

(Note: Students should keep their data for a year after their mark has been finalised. For Research Council funded work, councils usually want anonymised data to be archived and made available to other researchers in addition to the research team. Councils want consent forms kept for 10 years).

As detailed in section 22, Consent forms and the data will be kept for one year after the final mark for the thesis has been finalised. In the instance that I am no longer in a position to hold the hard copies, or no longer have access to the University of York servers, my supervisor will take over responsibility of these items. They will be destroyed after the requisite time has passed.

24. Who within the University will have responsibility for the anonymised data, consent forms and keys after the study? What will happen if the person responsible for the project leaves the University of York?

(Please make a special note if the data may be transferred outside the European Economic Area.)

I will be responsible for both electronic and paper data and confidential items when I leave the
University of York, and will make arrangements to take these with me when I leave the university.

If it is not possible to transfer these items by secure means or I do not have access to secure storage when I leave the university, then I will make arrangements for my supervisor to take responsibility for these items until they are due to be destroyed.

25. Will results will be made available to participants and the communities from which they are drawn, and if so, how?

All research outputs will be ‘Open Access, which means they will be freely available to everyone online, including research participants. This is clearly stated in the Information Sheet.

26. Are there any other specific ethical problems likely to arise with the proposed study? If so, what steps have you taken or will you take to address them?

N/A.

27. When does the project finish? Documents relating to this request for ethical approval will kept for 10 years after this end date.

Estimated to finish December 2017

Signature of Student/Principal Investigator:
…………………………………………………………………………………………

For Supervisor (for Students)
…………………………………………………………………………………………

I have checked this form carefully and I am satisfied that the project meets the required ethical standards.

Signature of Supervisor:
…………………………………………………………………………………………

Date of Completion:
…………………………………………………………………………………………...
Appendix F: Covering email

Dear [Name],

My name is Sophie Mackinder and I am a Doctoral Researcher at the University of York, UK. My doctoral thesis is dedicated to reconstructing and exploring the process in which social protection is integrated into development strategies in the World Bank, specifically with regard to fragile states.

I am contacting you as I understand that you are a member of the [FPV / Social Protection] Sector, and as such will have extensive insight into the processes involved with regard to social protection and fragile states. [In particular, I would love to speak to you about your work on XXXXXX].

I was wondering if you would be willing to spare an hour to speak to me? I will be in Washington D.C. for ten days from the week commencing 31 October; alternatively, we could speak via telephone or Skype at any time that is convenient to you. I appreciate that you are very busy, but your participation in the research would be invaluable and I would be extremely grateful if you could spare the time to support the study.

I have attached an Information Sheet which outlines the research and the interview process in more detail. If you have any questions, please let me know.

Many thanks and best wishes,

Sophie Mackinder
Appendix G: Timeline for the fragility agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Wolfensohn’s ‘Cancer of Corruption’ speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Paul Collier joins the Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>LICUS Taskforce established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>PCU established in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>‘Lower Income Countries Under Stress: A Taskforce Report’ is published, LICUS initiative established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>WDR on Conflict announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>First Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>WDR 2011 on Conflict, Fragility and Violence published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Kim’s restructure, several people of influence leave the Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix H: Timeline for the social protection agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Social Protection department created</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>SRM concept included in WDR 2000/1</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>IEG evaluation on safety nets published</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I: The 2014 Kim restructure

Cross-Cutting Solution Areas

- Climate Change
- Gender
- Public Private Partnerships
- Fragility, Conflict and Violence
- Jobs

Global Practices

- Agriculture
- Finance & Markets
- Poverty
- Urban, Rural & Social Development
- Education
- Governance
- Social Protection & Labor
- Water
- Energy & Extractives
- Health, Nutrition & Population
- Trade & Competitiveness
- Environment & Natural Resources
- Macroeconomics & Fiscal Management
- Transport & ICT
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Conditional cash transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community-driven development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoP</td>
<td>Community of Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country and Policy Institutional Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIID</td>
<td>Department for International Development, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Europe and Central Asia Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Emergency Social Fund (Bolivia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSD</td>
<td>Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Fragility and Conflict-Affected States Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict-Affected States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCV</td>
<td>Fragility, Conflict and Violence Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPSI</td>
<td>Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>Fragile States Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>Governance and Anti-Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>Global Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPE</td>
<td>Governance and Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPF</td>
<td>Governance Partnership Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>Human Development Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>High income country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICSID</td>
<td>International Centre for Settlement on Investment Disputes (World Bank Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (World Bank Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEG</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Group (formerly OED)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IFG  International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group)
ILO  International Labor Organization
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INCAF International Network on Conflict and Fragility
LAC  Latin America and the Caribbean Region
LAG  Learning and Advisory Group
LIC  Lower income country
LICUS Lower Income Countries Under Stress
LICUS TF Lower Income Countries Under Stress Trustfund
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MENA Middle East and North Africa Region
MIC Middle income country
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (World Bank Group)
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NLI Neo-liberal institutionalist
NWI Neo-Weberian institutionalist
OCS Operational Core Services
ODI Overseas Development Institute (UK)
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC OECD Development Assistance Committee
OED Operations Evaluation Department (now IEG)
OPCS Operational Policy and Country Support Department
OVC Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PCF Post-Conflict Fund
PCU Post-Conflict Unit
PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Department
PREM Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department
PSNP Productive Safety Net Program, Ethiopia
ReCSS Research Centre for Social Sciences, University of York
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Asia Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBAT</td>
<td>State-Building Assessment Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Special Drawing Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>State- and Peace-Building Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPL</td>
<td>Social Protection and Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPSW</td>
<td>Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRM</td>
<td>Social Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNs</td>
<td>Social safety nets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASAF</td>
<td>Tanzanian Social Action Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>The United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBG</td>
<td>The World Bank Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Fund for Peace (n.d.) Fragile States Index. Available at: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/ [accessed 13 January 2018].

g7plus.org (n.d.) New Deal Implementation. Available at: http://www.g7plus.org/node/1 [accessed 7 May 2018].


Grødeland, Å.B. (2010) ‘“They have achieved a lot because we have paid them to do a lot”: NGO and international donor perceptions of each other in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia’, *Global Society* 24(2): 171–199.


