Countering the Narrative on International Interventions: Paternalism as a Constant of British Interventionary Discourse and Practice from the 19th Century Onwards

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Abstract

Contemporary international relations scholars view Western interventionary practices as having undergone deep transformations since the nineteenth century, from colonial interventions, to humanitarian interventions, to contemporary interventions under the “responsibility to protect” paradigm. This thesis offers a counter-argument based on an in-depth comparative historical examination of the evolution of British interventionary practices from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. Grounded in the analysis of the interconnections between practices, representations, and discourses as embodied in British interventions from the colonial to the contemporary era, the thesis demonstrates that paternalism is a constant of British interventionism, regardless of the transformations in the ideological and normative frameworks governing the international system throughout that history.

The thesis does so by looking at the interventionary practice and discourse of Britain in the following four historical periods: nineteenth century Imperialism, the Mandate period, the Cold and Post-Cold War, and the Twenty-first century. In each period, specific cases of intervention addressed by the existing empirical literature are examined in depth, on the basis of a comprehensive definition of paternalism that takes into account the interconnections among discourse, representation, and practice. The objective of each empirical chapter is to identify the manner in which British paternalism manifests itself in each case and to present what is characteristic of British paternalism in each period. Then by comparing the manner in which British paternalism manifests itself across the historical periods examined the thesis demonstrates the factor of continuity in British interventionary practices from the 19th century onwards. Two further conclusions are made in the process. First, the paternalism deployed by Britain since the colonial era is grounded in a longer socio-ideological history of domestic paternalism within the English social order, which was first exported to England’s closest neighbors. Second, the current “responsibility to protect” paradigm supposedly based on a universalist humanitarianism manifests an alignment of international interventionism with the same form of paternalism that has characterized British interventionism since the colonial era.
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1 Introduction

Contemporary international relations scholars view Western interventionary practices as having undergone deep transformations since the nineteenth century, from colonial interventions, to humanitarian interventions, to contemporary interventions under the “responsibility to protect” paradigm. This thesis offers a counter-argument based on an in-depth comparative historical examination of the evolution of British interventionary practices from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. Grounded in the analysis of the interconnections among practices, representations, and discourses as embodied in British interventions from the colonial to the contemporary era, the thesis demonstrates that paternalism is a constant of British interventionism, regardless of the transformations in the ideological and normative frameworks governing the international system throughout that history.

1.1 Western Interventions: The State of the Art

Contemporary accounts on western interventionism display a tendency to focus on establishing change in the interventionary practice and discourse of western states and international organizations. This is particular to scholarly accounts on humanitarian intervention and R2P. Turning first to the humanitarian intervention literature, change is mostly defined in normative terms by both scholars who engage with the long history of such interventions (Finnemore, 2003; Bass, 2008; Barnett, 2011; Simms and Trim, 2011) and by those who address recent instances of intervention (Rasbotham and Woodhouse, 1996; Wheeler, 2000; J. Welsh, 2004; Newman, 2009; Weiss, 2012).

Accounts considering historical instances of humanitarian intervention attribute change to motives, justifications and state interests (Weiss, 2012). International norms as carriers of change occupy a central position in these accounts (Finnemore, 2003; Simms and Trim, 2011; Barnett, 2011). Another line of argument considers that change in interventionary practice pertains to the identity of the people who are afforded protection and to the means employed to do so. What is more, the expansion
of the concept of humanity is also said to have produced change in interventionary practice (Finnemore, 2003; Simms and Trim, 2011; Barnett, 2011). Scholars addressing recent instances of humanitarian intervention focus their analyses on the Cold-War and Post-Cold War periods. Common to these is the argument that interventionary practices have been subject to transformations due to normative and legal changes (Wheeler, 2000; Newman, 2009; Falk, 1996). The Cold War environment itself has also been acknowledged as a variable causing change (Newman, 2009) as have been the purpose, context, means and consent of interventions (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996).

That change best characterizes interventionary practice in the Post-Cold War Period is an argument also endorsed by accounts on R2P. These analyses focus on the Post-Cold War era and the 21st century, locating change in the R2P norm itself (Evans, 2008; Thakur and Weiss, 2009; Bellamy, 2015). In order to understand why change has been considered as an essential pattern it is important to see how these analyses explain interventionary practice and discourse. As will be exposed in detail in Chapter 2, explanations provided by scholars working on humanitarian intervention regarding the occurrence, expansion, transformation and legitimacy of such interventions center on norms, expanded notions of security and the global context.

The Constructivist influence in many of these writings is apparent from the overt focus on norms. Contemporary scholars also present justifications regarding interventionism. In these, one can identify a similarity to justifications offered by states. For example humanitarian interventions in the Post-Cold War era are justified through human rights (Wheeler, 2000; Finnemore, 2003). This thesis, then, responds to these contemporary accounts on humanitarian intervention, and R2P, which posit a radical change in interventionary practice and discourse in the Post-Cold War era. The argument advanced in this thesis is one of continuity, namely, that the interventionary practice and discourse of states has not undergone deep transformation, and is rather characterized by continuity as represented by a persistence of paternalism.
1.2 Paternalism as a Constant of British Interventionism

At the start of the research the leading hypothesis was that by focusing on a state’s history one could identify a pattern of paternalism. This hypothesis led to the formulation of the following core research question, with respect to Great Britain, a state with a long history of interventionism:

What are the constitutive features of British paternalism and how are they manifested and sustained through time in the discourse, practice and representation (legitimation) of Britain’s domestic and external interventionism?

The general research question was in turn broken down into these partial questions:

Q1. What are the specific characteristics of British Paternalism?

Q2. How does British external paternalism extend from internal paternalism?

OR What is the relationship between external and internal British paternalism?

Q3. What features of British paternalism remain constant and what features have changed in the UK’s military interventions from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century?

Q4. How is paternalism manifested in the practice, discourse and representation in a changing normative and global context?

Paternalism is a subject addressed in the literature on interventionism, by scholars holding a critical stance on humanitarian intervention, R2P and post-conflict reconstruction (Jackson, 1998; Bain, 2003; Cunliffe, 2010; Stefano, 2011; Weiss, 2012). However, their treatment of paternalism is limited to characterizing interventionary practice as paternalistic and occasionally offering a definition of the
concept. As a result there is a need to turn to the wider IR literature’s treatment of paternalism. Apparent is the fact that only a handful of works address paternalism in IR, leaving behind many unanswered questions (Hetherington, 1978; Barnett, 2011, 2017; Hobson, 2012). To date, paternalism has been employed to address humanitarianism (Barnett, 2011), British discursive and ideological construction in Africa during the inter-war period (Hetherington, 1978) and to lead investigations at the level of theory (Hobson, 2012).

The recently published edited volume *Paternalism beyond Borders*, embodying the most recent academic contribution on paternalism in IR addresses paternalism in humanitarian governance and informs on multiple issues such as: asylum policies, peacebuilding, gender and violence, FGM/C, humanitarian aid and sex trafficking (Barnett, 2017). Through these investigations current scholarship on paternalism in IR offers insights into its relevance and utility in addressing un-equal relations in practice and in theory, and establishes that paternalism, albeit subject to shifts, is still a reality characteristic of present times. Be it as it may, paternalism has yet to be examined vis-à-vis interventionism as a means to demonstrate continuity in states’ interventionary practice and discourse. Reference to a broader, cross-disciplinary literature is therefore necessary to develop a comprehensive and efficient definition of the core concept of this thesis.

As shown in Chapter 3, paternalism has been the subject of much investigation attracting the interest of scholars working in various disciplines such as medicine (including nursing and mental health), sociology, philosophy, anthropology, public health, social work, welfare economics, social policy, governance, management and industrial relations. What is more, paternalism has been equally employed to investigate inter-societal relations in the context of Imperialism/Colonialism. Here, the meaning of paternalism is captured by historical and post-colonial accounts. All these accounts reflect a lack of unanimity in grasping what paternalism entails, which reflects the complex nature of the concept’s signifier in empirical reality. This lack of unanimity can be traced to three factors.
The first speaks to the concept’s context specificity. The context in which paternalism manifests itself determines the particular characteristics attached to it and the form they take. Consequently, the context in which paternalism is studied determines whether it is characterized as coercive, less coercive or as not involving coercion. The second factor relates to the literature’s tendency to treat paternalism as either a practice, a discourse or a representation. This results in a fragmented understanding of paternalism. Finally variations in the literature’s understanding of paternalism are a result of treating it as a concept relating either to social or to inter-societal relations. However, the comparative analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 exemplifies similarities in the characteristics ascribed to the concept between contexts and between realms. Based on this literature I have adapted a conceptual framework to my specific object in order to capture practices, discourses and representations of a state’s interventionism.

1.3 Conceptual Framework

As I explain in detail in Chapter 3 I have developed a working definition of paternalism that is based on my analysis of the cross-disciplinary literature examining paternalism in social and inter-societal relations, and that serves my objective of testing and demonstrating continuity in British interventionism. Accordingly, this research adopts the following working definition according to which paternalism is a coherent system of practices, discourses and representations that legitimate the actions, and their objectives, of groups claiming to have an obligation towards those they view as inferior, incompetent, and in need of being protected as in a parent-child relationship.

The above exposes the following elements as characteristic of paternalism: benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, difference and incompetence. It also exemplifies my conceptualization of paternalism, which differs considerably from what is envisaged in the cross-disciplinary literature. My working definition acknowledges the complex interconnections among practice, discourse and
representation. In fact these are so co-constitutive and mutually supportive that they cannot be considered independently of one another. For example, discourses pre-exist or co-exist with practices. Also a paternalistic discourse constitutes a practice in itself manifesting representations and ideologies. A practice can also produce representations. What is more, paternalistic representations can involve representing other groups as incompetent and inferior which is considered as a practice itself.

This working definition also stresses that paternalistic practices, discourses and representations are unidirectional. Domestically it is the government or a minority of rich and powerful who are responsible for the majority being depicted as unable to act left to its own devices. Similarly, on the international level certain states are responsible for the protection of people inhabiting foreign territories due to their status as victims. Finally, my conceptualization of paternalism acknowledges the relationship between the social and the inter-societal manifestations of paternalism. This enables conceptualizing paternalism’s external manifestations as a co-extension of its internal manifestations. Having established a working definition for paternalism and identified the elements characterizing it, it is then an issue of laying down the methodology which allows to demonstrate continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse through paternalism.

### 1.4 Research Methodology

In line with the objective of this research, namely to establish continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse since the colonial period, I adhere to a comparative methodology. I focus on one particular state and I compare a number of historical periods. Within each period I examine specific cases of British interventionism. This allows me to counter arguments advanced in the dominant empirical literature regarding radical change in instances of interventionism, especially in the Post-Cold-War era. I chose Britain as a referent to investigate state interventionism for a number of reasons. Britain intervened extensively throughout history and across the globe in Western and non-Western states. Some examples of
British interventions in non-Western territories include the Sudan in 1898, Operation Sheepskin in Anguilla in 1969, Sierra Leone in 2000 and Libya in 2011. Britain also intervened in Western states such as Greece in 1821-27 and Germany in 1945-49. Britain is a country with a long history of interventionism. Additionally, Britain headed one of the largest Empires whose reach extended across the globe. She was a major actor internationally and still retains a considerable position.

The four historical periods examined in this thesis include the imperial nineteenth century, the Mandate period, the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, and the twenty-first century. The majority of cases explored in this thesis were selected because they were treated by the empirical literature of interest. By taking on the same cases I provide an alternative interpretation accounting for the manifestation of British paternalism. This, however, was not feasible for all the periods under analysis simply because the cases investigated by the empirical literature did not always consist of interventions undertaken by Britain. In view of this, I conducted an in-depth investigation based on secondary literature as well as Parliamentary debates, which led me to select the following case studies as especially relevant ones: the British intervention in the Sudan 1896-98 examined in Chapter 5, and the reconstruction of Germany 1945-49 and the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66 investigated in Chapter 7.

I now turn to the rationale behind the cases selected for each period subject to this thesis, starting with the nineteenth century. The intervention in Greece 1821-1827 by Britain, France and Russia, British rule in India during 1830-60 and the British intervention in the Sudan of 1896-98 are the three nineteenth century cases I analyze. The interventions in Greece 1821-1827 and in Syria-Lebanon 1860-61, and the Bulgarian atrocities of 1875-78, are instances presented by the literature as nineteenth century practices of humanitarian intervention. The decision to study the case of Greece rested on the fact that out of the three above instances it is only in Greece that Britain was involved in the intervention. Current interpretations of the intervention in Greece rest primordially on religion as the primary factor for humanitarian interventions in the nineteenth century. By taking the same case I aim to show that
religion is but one element amongst many present during the intervention, and that British paternalism manifested itself in the practice and discourse of Britain.

British rule in India during 1830-60 constitutes the second nineteenth century case I examine. The post-colonial literature employs this case to draw parallels between imperialism and more current events. I employ the case of India in order to show continuity in British paternalism and build on my counter-interpretation of nineteenth century British interventionism. Finally I explore the British intervention in the Sudan 1896-98. This case enables me to demonstrate how nineteenth century interventions did not predominantly focus on white, Christian people and that British paternalism of this period is not ultimately defined by the element of religion. This case is treated by historians studying imperialism and described as “one of the main military commitments to the Middle-East at the height of Empire” (Dighton, 2016). As regards the second historical period under analysis in this thesis, the Mandate period 1920-1948, I selected two cases examined by the post-conflict literature: the British mandate on Palestine (Class A) and Tanganyika (Class B).

Both were administered by the British government and each informs on the administration of a distinct class of territories reflecting the ideology prevalent at the time. At this point it is essential to note that the classification of mandated territories instituted by the Mandate System included Class C mandates such as Nauru and South West Africa. The decision not to include a territory of this class was based on the following consideration. These territories were administered in a manner reminiscent of nineteenth-century colonial rule, a topic addressed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The third period subject to analysis incorporates the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods. As regards the Cold War period the empirical literature examines three cases of interventionism initiated by non-western states, namely East Pakistan 1971, Cambodia 1978 and Uganda 1979 (Wheeler, 2000, pp. 140, 172; Ocran, 2002, p. 2; Chesterman, 2004, p. 149).

Given my focus on British interventionary practice and discourse I undertook a meticulous enquiry so as to identify cases for examination. This entailed looking at
numerous instances of British interventionism within but also outside the empire, focusing on secondary accounts in the wider literature and debates in Parliament regarding them. During the selection process I assessed thirteen instances of British interventionism, namely: the Greek civil war 1944-47, the Vietnam war 1955-75, the Korean war 1950-53, the Indonesian revolution of 1945-46, the Malayan emergency 1948-1960, the Anglo-Egyptian war 1951-52, the Mau Mau uprising 1952-56, the Oman war 1957-59, the Jordan crisis 1958 and 1970, the reconstruction of Germany 1945-1949, the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66, Biafra 1966-70, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman 1963-1976. During the period 1945-1989 Britain intervened within but also outside the Empire, focusing on small states and new nations and in territories she entertained treaties of friendship and/or defense agreements.

The assessment I carried out involved identifying in British practices, discourses and representations the defining elements characterizing paternalism discussed in Chapter 3. This in turn brought forward the two cases I have selected to investigate for the Cold War period: the reconstruction of Germany 1945-1949 and the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66. Aside from identifying all elements defining paternalism in the case of Germany, my decision to move forward with this case was further reinforced by its identification as an instance of post-conflict reconstruction by Knowles (2013), hence placing it within the scope of this thesis. Next my decision to include the case of the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation was driven by the fact that it combined different policies and objectives characterizing British interventionism during 1945-89. Malaysia was part of the British Empire until 1957 when she became an independent territory and subsequently joined the Commonwealth. This case is a good example of a trend in British military interventions of the time, highlighting how Britain rarely intervened alone.

Concerning the Post-Cold War period the following cases have been previously treated by the humanitarian intervention literature: Northern Iraq 1991, Somalia 1992, Bosnia 1992-95, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia 1990-1996, the US-led intervention in Haiti 1994, Rwanda 1994, Sierra Leone 1997-2000, Kosovo 1999 and the Australian-led intervention in East Timor 1999 (Finnemore, 2003; Wheeler, 2002;
Out of these, I chose to focus on the Kosovo intervention 1999. This decision was based on the following considerations. First, unlike the intervention in Sierra Leone led by the Britain in May and October 2000, the case of Kosovo took place in the 1990s, hence falling within the scope of the period I examine. Second, the Kosovo intervention stands out from other instances of interventionism involving Britain cited by the literature. The intervention was undertaken without explicit authorization from the UNSC.

What is more scholars point to Kosovo as a case demonstrating a newfound activism by the UNSC and a willingness to employ Chapter VII powers in the domestic matters of states (Chesterman, 2000; Finnemore, 2003; Wheeler, 2000; Weiss, 2012). Finally, for the fourth period focusing on the twenty-first century I chose to address the R2P intervention in Libya in 2011. This is because Libya is the case most often employed by the literature to stress R2P’s normative and precedential novelty. It is not the only instance of an R2P intervention, take for example the 2010 intervention in Cote D’Ivoire. At this point it is important to elaborate on the types of interventions examined in this research. Predominantly focus is directed to instances of military intervention and post-conflict reconstruction. However, with a view to demonstrate the underlying paternalism of military interventions, these need to be interpreted in the larger interventionist pattern of British foreign policy, as defined by the full set of discourses, representations and practices.

To identify British paternalism in the four historical periods examined I focus on particular practices, discourses and representations. The practices I investigate in the empirical chapters of this thesis (5, 6, 7 and 8) include specific laws and policies (native policy, education, land/agricultural policies), ways of governing (management of resources, infrastructure, and representation of natives in government), counseling and institutional practices towards populations abroad. I also look at British military practices such as training, the defence of territory and the use of force. The discourses I examine are those articulated by the British political elite which include public speeches, debates, correspondence between political officials and their envoys abroad,
and on Security Council decision-making processes and results. This sheds light on the manner in which British policy and practices become legitimized and the place of strategic and other interests in defining these practices.

In regards to representations, I look at the narratives of British elites who enacted the various policies abroad, with a specific focus on the nature of representations (how were the others represented). The above enables me to study paternalism in its unidirectionality. I focus on how this paternalism is enacted in particular practices, discourses and representations by the interveners instead of looking at how it is received by the subjects intervened upon. The decision to study paternalism in this manner does not result from conceptualizing the subjects of intervention as passive or as lacking agency. In fact as I discuss in Chapter 3, I conceptualize that coercion does not fully define a paternalistic practice since paternalism also operates on the level of legitimation of action of the agent and his/her status. The subjects of intervention are active participants who in some instances accept an intervention because they have previously internalized the paternalistic relationship as “normal”.

In terms of primary data this thesis looks at Parliamentary debates (Houses of Commons and Lords) extracted from the Hansard database and correspondence between British officials collected from the National Archives in Kew. These are particularly significant since they bring forth the discourses articulated by the British political elite and the ideologies underlying them. The secondary sources consulted include historical accounts, narratives and British newspaper articles. British newspapers (which also serve as primary data reflecting the elite’s views) are enlightening on public opinion and allow to draw parallels with the discourses expressed by the British political elite.

The primary data examined in this thesis are texts. In order to analyze these texts and identify British paternalistic representations, discourses, and practices in Britain’s internal and external interventions I employ critical discourse analysis (CDA) and practice theory. Both reflect the way I approach paternalism since they look at the interconnections among practices, discourses and representations. Due to the fact that
my material is not directly observable I indirectly reconstitute praxeographic elements reported in primary and secondary sources. Due to the nature of my material my methodology is more informed by CDA, which, as I explain in Chapter 3, I adapt to my specific objectives and objects.

I draw on my working definition of paternalism developed in Chapter 3 in order to compare instances of British interventionism within but also across the historical periods of interest. In light of employing Britain as a test case, there was a need to identify the particularities of British paternalism, which is accomplished in Chapter 4. British paternalism is anchored in a particular history. I therefore adopt a history specific approach taking into account paternalism’s context of emergence and development. Accordingly, Chapter 4 reconstitutes the social and intellectual history of British paternalism. It identifies the characteristics of English paternalism as manifested in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries by looking at the Poor Laws and the establishment and evolution of the welfare state in England. It also looks at the ways in which English paternalism manifests itself when exported to other countries, notably to Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

1.5 Thesis Structure

Having introduced the subject of this thesis, the research question and the conceptual and methodological foundations underlying it, what follows will present the structure of the thesis:

Chapter 2 engages with the literature on interventionism and examines accounts of scholars working in the areas of humanitarian intervention, R2P, post-conflict reconstruction and state-building and post-colonialism. The chapter assesses these accounts by looking at how they justify or explain interventionism (and whether paternalism is included in their analyses) and whether these analyses link current instances of interventionism to previous historical context, which can be revealed by how they address continuity and change. Additionally the chapter assesses academic engagement with paternalism in the wider IR literature.
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical and methodological aspects of the research. In a first instance it reviews conceptualizations of paternalism in the cross-disciplinary literature and then presents my working definition of paternalism and the main characteristics attached to it. While doing so the chapter also introduces my conceptualization of paternalism based on a complex inter-connection of practice, discourse and representation. Then, the chapter moves to elaborate on the comparative methodology adopted in this research informing on the case study selection, on the historical periods examined and the criteria referred to, to carry out comparisons between the cases employed in the historical periods considered.

Chapter 4 inscribes British paternalism in its social, political and intellectual history by examining its origins and evolution at the domestic level. It builds on the working definition of paternalism presented in Chapter 3 in order to identify the characteristics of British paternalism. The chapter first identifies the characteristics of English paternalism in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries focusing on the structure of English society, the Poor Laws and the Welfare State. It then turns to examine the ways in which English paternalism has manifested itself when exported to the outside world, and in the first instance to England’s closest neighbors, namely Wales, Scotland and Ireland.

Chapter 5 constitutes the first foreign intervention case-study focusing on nineteenth century British interventionary practice and discourse. It examines the Allied intervention in the Greek struggle for independence of 1821-27, British rule in India during 1830-60 and the British intervention in the Sudan in 1896-98. Within each case the chapter reveals how English paternalism, as examined in the previous chapter, finds an ideological, discursive, and practical continuity in Britain’s relations to foreign others. This chapter illuminates British diplomatic and military practices towards Western and non-Western territories and on policies relating to the administration and education of a colonial territory.

Chapter 6 proceeds to examine the Mandate period 1920-1948, during which “new” norms and concepts such as mandate, trust and development were codified in
international law. The cases investigated here include the British Mandate over Palestine (Class A mandate) and Tanganyika (Class B mandate). Here again the chapter identifies the ways in which British paternalism manifested itself in each case by looking at the practices, discourses and representations of the British political elite in the areas of administration, education, land and agriculture.

Chapter 7 considers the period that follows and examines British interventionary practice and discourse from 1945 to 1999. It demonstrates continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse by identifying British paternalism in the reconstruction of Germany 1945-49, the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation of 1963-66 and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The chapter informs on British practices relating to administration and education, the defence of a foreign territory and the defence of a persecuted population through diplomatic and military means.

Chapter 8 concludes the empirical investigation of this thesis. It engages with the R2P literature and examines the 2011 intervention in Libya. It investigates Britain’s involvement in Libya in relation to two lines of response: sanctions and military action. In doing so the chapter identifies British paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in the case of twenty-first century type of intervention. Equally important is the analysis of the paternalistic characteristics of the R2P norm itself.

Finally, Chapter 9 presents the argument of continuity advanced in this research. In a first instance the chapter presents what was previously identified in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 as characteristic of British paternalism. Then, a comparison is carried out looking at the manner in which British paternalism manifested itself across the four historical periods examined. The chapter also addresses how the thesis contributes to academic discussions on interventionism and presents the limitations it is subject to.

The three significant conclusions this thesis has generated are the following. First and foremost the thesis establishes paternalism as a constant characteristic in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse, hence countering current scholarly
interpretations stressing change in interventionism in the Post-Cold War era. Second, it shows that British paternalism as manifested in foreign interventions is grounded in a long social, political and ideological history of internal (domestic) paternalism that also gives British external paternalism its specific character as ontologically constitutive of British foreign interventions. Lastly, the thesis reveals that far from evolving into a more universal normative framework, recent interventionism as practiced under the R2P actually manifests an alignment of recent international norms with the same type of paternalism that has been practiced by the British political elite throughout the periods under examination.
Literature Review: Interventionism and Paternalism: Accounting for Continuity and Change in Interventionary Practices

There are two important lenses through which to address the issue of paternalism in Western interventionism: one is to examine how the literature justifies or explains interventionism (and whether paternalism is included in their analyses) and the other is inquire whether these analyses link contemporary interventionism to previous historical context, which can be revealed by how they address continuity and change. Approaches to explanation in the empirical literature on interventionism vary based on their object and theoretical framework. For instance, within the literature on humanitarian intervention explanations regarding interventionism and its expansion focus on norms (expanded notions of security) and the global context. The overt focus on norms, their expansion and influence on interventionism stems from a Constructivist influence within many of these writings.

Approaches to continuity and change also vary considerably. On the one hand, scholars working on humanitarian intervention posit that both the discourse and practice of Post-Cold war interventions have been altered considerably due to normative changes. The same line of argument is followed by the literature on R2P. On the other hand, Post-colonial scholarship argues for a continuity of both discourse and practice since nineteenth century colonialism. For example Mark Duffield observes that “the fragile state discourse reproduces key assumptions and rationales of colonial bureaucracy” (2009, p. 116).

Variations in the literature in explaining interventionism and the approach to continuity and change produce very different accounts of its history. The problem is when such accounts posit historical novelty and thus obscure the long-track record of Western states’ interventionism. To identify and clarify my own investigation of this area, I examine in this chapter accounts of scholars in the areas of humanitarian
intervention, R2P, post-conflict reconstruction and state-building and post-colonialism. In assessing these accounts, I am guided by two questions: How are interventionary practices explained and/or justified? and How are continuity and change accounted for? I propose an alternative approach to studying interventionism where paternalism figures prominently.

The merit of this approach is not explanatory but rather ontological. Paternalism is manifested in the discursive practices of Western states. Through a systematic exploration of the different literatures concerned with western interventionary practices I recognize the contributions of a number of scholars and, drawing on their work and insights, I propose to trace continuity and change in western states’ interventionary practice and discourse through paternalism. The value of employing paternalism is that its continuing existence in the interventionary practice and discourse of states sheds light on wider issues such as the structure and working of the international system and the manner in which legitimating strategies become successful.

This chapter is structured as follows: first, I examine literatures that either explain or justify interventionary practices and I assess whether the concept of paternalism figures in such accounts. Within these literatures I also explore how continuity and change in western states’ interventionary practice and discourse are grasped, which variables are accounted for and how they are followed through time. Second, I turn my attention to paternalism in the IR literature, exploring how the concept is understood and the manner in which it is studied. In doing so, I explain the role of paternalism in my research, and how it can be discerned in the discourse states have used to legitimate their interventionary practices from the nineteenth century to current events. What I seek to bring forth most of all is that paternalism is not just an unsavory legacy of the nineteenth century but a continuing reality of present times.
2.1 The Literature on Interventionism

Interventionism can be broadly defined as “governmental interference in economic affairs at home or in the political affairs of another country” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interventionism). Its broadness reflects the many areas, governmental tools and policies falling under the banner of interventionism. This research does not investigate all types of interventions that fall within this broad area. Rather, it concentrates on military interventions defined as “the blatant use of military force in another country” (Van Wingen and Tillerma, 1980, p. 292) and post-conflict reconstruction. In order to show their underlying paternalism in the case of military interventionism, one needs to interpret these types of interventions in the larger interventionist pattern of British foreign policy, as defined by the full set of discourses, representations and practices deployed by interventionary Britain. Consequently aside from looking at cases cited in the literature on humanitarian intervention and R2P I also engage with British colonial policy, post-conflict reconstruction and the administration of foreign territories during the inter-war period.

In reviewing the IR literature on interventionism in this section I will be looking at two types of narratives, justifications and explanations. Additionally I will be examining how continuity and change are accounted for by the literature. Turning first to the literature on humanitarian intervention, it is clear that the preoccupation with justifying interventionary practices stems from directing focus on issues such as the use of force, human rights, the legitimacy of interventions and the tension between state sovereignty, non-intervention and human rights. Giving a general sense of the necessity and context in which humanitarian interventions are deployed, Nicholas Wheeler argues that “humanitarian intervention becomes an issue when a government has turned the machinery of the state against its own people, or where the state has collapsed into lawlessness” (2000, p. 27). Humanitarian intervention is justified by means of a human rights rhetoric, where human rights are depicted as natural and universal rights for all people.
As Martha Finnemore argues, military interventions “are now supported by a dense web of international legal obligations to protect human rights” and she points to the cases in Somalia 1992, Cambodia 1992-93, and Yugoslavia 1991 as illustrations (2003, p. 21, 52; Wheeler, 2002, p. 1). The scale of atrocities and human suffering has also been utilized in attempts to justify humanitarian intervention (Hopkinson, 1996). Fernando Teson has argued that “government tyranny and situations of extreme anarchy result in injustice towards people...in such cases external interventions are morally permitted in order to end injustices” (2001, p. 3).

The obligation incurred by certain states or people to intervene also figures prominently in discourses justifying humanitarian intervention. Such an example is found in Teson’s work, where he claims that “serious violations of human rights generate obligations on others” (2001, p. 7). Conversely, other advocates of humanitarian intervention view such a practice as being based on a “right” to intervene. A good example is Bernard Kouchner, the advocate of “le droit d’ingérence” (the right of interference), for whom humanitarian action is more than just a duty or a moral obligation (Allen and Styan, 2000, p. 835).

Although Kouchner also employed the term “devoir d’ingérence” (the duty to intervene) the idea of “droit d’ingérence” is much more complicated and problematic. First, it totally disconnects humanitarian intervention from sentiments such as caring and concepts such as “common humanity”. There is a significant difference in saying that practices of humanitarian intervention are “a right” rather than “a duty”. Second, “right” brings forth the superiority and a degree of arrogance from the part of the West. It also points to a feeling of entitlement felt by powerful states. States do not have “a right” to intervene, as such a conception stands against the established principle of state sovereignty. In sum, these justifications are in most part based on moral and ethical considerations regarding distant strangers. Military intervention is seen as a necessary evil in the face of mass atrocities, which, it is said, the West and the UN cannot ignore.
Although humanitarian intervention is justified by scholars through the UN and multilateral operations, it still involves single state decision-making, a crucial point that is obscured by an overemphasis on the UN. Paternalism does occupy a place in discussions regarding humanitarian intervention, found in the literature holding a critical stance. While investigating the conditions under which it is morally permissible to bypass state sovereignty to defend human rights Paul Di Stefano looks at the concepts of non-intervention and self-determination. On this he asserts that “freedom gained through the paternalistic intervention of outsiders is an ephemeral imposition devoid of lasting intrinsic or instrumental value…an interventionist approach denies the possession of autonomous agency to those who are assisted” (2011, p. 538). Of value here is the characterization of interventionist practices as paternalistic.

In contrast, Michael Newman relates the international community to “a doctor that treats its patients” (2009, p. 111). Although he does not use the concept of paternalism, his analogy relates to a relationship among un-equals, where one has certain duties towards the (weaker) other. Paternalism also figures in the work of Thomas Weiss, who refers to the paternalism of intervening powers in the early twentieth century while discussing how the credibility of interveners is undermined. He argues that “the paternalism of intervening powers who were self-appointed custodians of morality and human conscience as well as the guarantors of international order and security partially undermined the credibility of interveners” (2012, p. 35). Weiss’s description does not give the impression that paternalism’s presence is a continual one. Even though paternalism is employed in the critical literature on humanitarian intervention, the absence of a definition points to a tendency to regard the concept as commonsensical and self-explanatory.

Let us now turn to the explanatory narratives provided by scholars working on humanitarian interventions informing on their transformation, expansion and legitimacy. The constraints imposed by international norms and rules are one way in which humanitarian intervention is explained. Wheeler, for example, examines the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in respect to how rules of the society of states
constrain or enable state action (2000, p. 21). Newman similarly explains interventions in the post-cold war era in relation to a transformation from the normative assumptions of the cold war period when intervention was contrary to state sovereignty and was illegal (2009, p. 38). Norms are also employed in accounts interrogating earlier practices of intervention. Finnemore explains patterns of military intervention by looking at how states construct rules about using force (2003, p. 1). Additionally, she examines the role of humanitarian norms and normative understandings of who is human in an attempt to inform on the interventionary conduct of states (2003, p. 11-15).

Expanded notions of security, with a particular focus on human security, are another focus for scholars who attempt to provide explanations for the occurrence of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000; Tirman, 2003). The adoption of such conceptions enabled explanation of the upsurge of humanitarian intervention practices in the Post-cold war era. Jennifer Welsh points to UNSC resolution 688 pertaining to the intervention in Iraq in 1991, and argues that for the first time “the Council had recognized that a state’s internal repression could have transboundary consequences that threatened international security” (2004, p. 33). In the same way Weiss uses the example of “Operation Restore Democracy” in Haiti where force was employed to remove one regime and install another (2007, p. 49). Having seen how scholarly accounts of humanitarian intervention justify and explain western state interventionary practices, I now turn to reflect on the way these accounts track continuity and change through time.

Change in the interventionary practices of western states or international organizations is determined by changes in norms and rules. This trend can be found in writings of a historical nature (Finnemore, 2003; Bass, 2008; Barnett, 2011; Simms and Trim, 2011) and in those dealing with recent instances of intervention (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996; Wheeler, 2000; Welsh, 2004; Weiss, 2007; Newman, 2009). What is common among scholars who cover the Cold-war and post-Cold War periods is the assumption that interventionary practices have changed because of a change in norms.
For Wheeler what has changed since the Cold war period are norms concerning the legality of humanitarian intervention and the use of force (2000, p. 285). In contrasting the two periods, Wheeler finds that in the post-cold war period the intervening states are western and their justifications focus on humanitarian arguments (p. 139). He illustrates this through the interventions in Cambodia 1978, Uganda 1979 and East Pakistan 1971 against the post-cold war cases of Northern Iraq 1991, Somalia 1992 and Kosovo 1999 (p. 3). In the same way, Newman situates change between the two periods in normative assumptions. He observes how the end of the Cold-War “led to major shifts in both the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention” (2009, p. 37). In his account, the Cold-War environment prohibited the practice of humanitarian intervention in two ways. First, this type of intervention conflicted with state sovereignty and second, “mutual rivalries, ideological conflicts and co-existence built on sovereignty and non-intervention” rendered humanitarian intervention unlikely (2009, p. 38).

For Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, change in the practice of humanitarian intervention is seen in terms of purpose, context, means, and consent (1996). Concurring with the above Richard Falk sees change in terms of the ascendancy of humanitarian norms in the Post-Cold War era and argues that “there has been a notable shift in interventionary diplomacy away from purely geopolitical interventionism in the direction of support for humanitarian claims to alleviate human suffering” (1996, p. 511). The aforementioned employ the cases of Somalia 1992, Liberia, northern Iraq 1991, former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor 1999, East Pakistan 1971, Cambodia 1978 and Uganda 1979 in order to track the expansion of humanitarian intervention from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War periods (see also Wheeler, 2000, pp. 140, 172; Ocran, 2002, p. 2; Chesterman, 2004, p. 149).

Norms are equally but not exclusively seen as variables to account for change in interventionary practices by scholars adopting a historical perspective. In interrogating the expansion of humanitarian intervention Weiss accords importance to the nature of conflict since the Post-Cold War period. For him the transformed nature of conflict is a parameter explaining the move towards military interventions with humanitarian
intents (2007, p. 29). Additionally he accords importance to motives, justifications and state interests to account for change since colonialism. He employs to these ends the nineteenth century cases of Greece (1827) and Syria (1860) (2007, p. 32), the Cold war cases of East Pakistan (1971), Cambodia (1978) and Uganda (1979) and the twentieth century cases of Somalia (1992), Sierra Leone and Haiti (p. 38,42,49).

The insistence on norms as a variable to account for change is also found in Finnemore’s work. In conforming to her Constructivist orientation she looks at the role of international norms, which enables her to problematize interest and their change over time (2003). She argues that “the pattern of intervention cannot be understood apart from the changing normative framework” (2003, p. 52). Finnemore observes that “although states have been intervening for humanitarian purposes for at least two centuries, whom they protect and how they intervene to do so have changed” (p. 3). She identifies this change to a change in identification. This argument is illustrated by the nineteenth century cases of Greece 1821-27, Syriam/Lebanon 1860-61, the Bulgarian agitation (1876-78) and Armenia 1894-1917 (p. 60), decolonization, and instances since 1945 such as Somalia 1992, Yugoslavia, Iraq 1991 and Cambodia (p. 52). She concludes that “states now entertain claims from non-white, non-Christian people who previously would not have registered on their consciousness” (2003, p. 3).

Through this Finnemore entertains the idea that the expansion of humanity between the nineteenth and twentieth century is a variable accounting for transformations in recent humanitarian intervention practices (2003, p. 66). Brendan Sims and David Trim are in agreement with Finnemore. For them change in humanitarian intervention is provoked by changing conceptions of whom or what should be protected over time. They also observe important shifts in “the types of people who were thought to deserve interventionist protection, in the rationale for protecting them and in the rhetoric used both at home and abroad to justify the use of force to protect foreign peoples” (2011, p. 387). These conclusions are drawn by looking as far back as the nineteenth century cases of Greece 1827 and Syria Lebanon 1860-61. Concerning the issue of what the international system ought to support and maintain, they observe shifts from
Continuity in the practice of humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, is argued for by Bass, who asserts that it is possible to identify a discourse of human rights back to Victorian Britain and cites the anti-slavery campaign in England and the mass uproar against Belgian colonial rule in the Congo as supportive cases (2008, p. 4). Finnemore also identifies the use of humanitarian justifications in the nineteenth century (2003). On the other hand, Weiss observes continuity in humanitarian intervention in terms of who leads decision-making. He asserts that “in spite of normative changes, globalization, technological and communication advances, an overwhelming continuity in the discussion of humanitarian intervention involves decision making by states” (2012, p. 28).

The next literature of interest to this thesis addresses non-military interventions, such as post-conflict reconstruction and state-building. In these accounts justifications vary depending on the focus of investigations. In fact, justifications provided in this literature can be better understood by dividing the subjects of investigation in two themes. The first focuses on the need to save failed states and the second on how best to deal with state failure. Works focusing on the need to save failed states tend to provide justifications based on security considerations, focusing on the type of states concerned. Failed or collapsed states are portrayed as posing security threats internationally or to a specific western state (Fearon and Laitin, 2004, p. 14).

According to Michael Ignatieff “intervening has also become an urgent state interest: to rebuild failed states so that they cease to be national security threats” (2002, p. 115). Stephen Krasner and Carlos Pascual envision the threat more broadly in terms of global security and offer an analogy whereby state weakness is seen as “constituting structural threats akin to dead leaves that accumulate in a forest… no one knows what spark will ignite them or when” (2005, p. 155). Safeguarding international peace and security is seen as the motive for the UN’s involvement in rescuing failed states (Helman and Ratner, 1993). Lastly, Stephen Krasner argues that the availability of
weapons of mass destruction and the presence of transnational terrorism in such states can threaten the security of more powerful states (2004, p. 86).

Security as a justification is discussed in all its dimensions: national and global. Justifications found in works looking at how best to deal with state failure are quite different from what has been presented above. Scholars interrogating the ways in which failed states can be dealt with examine practices of international administration of foreign territory (trusteeship, transitional administration, international territorial administration). Justifications presented rest on the idea that international administration enables the expansion of freedom. As Lene Søbjerg argues, “Trusteeship can be a constructive tool in the re-establishment of freedom, stability and peace in post-conflict societies” (2007, p. 475). Further she asserts that the ambition of Trusteeship is “to accelerate development of post-conflict societies…to enable the individuals to reach their highest self” (p. 480). At the core of justifications referring to freedom are those focusing on the agency of non-western states, pointing to the need for the West to act as a facilitator. Krasner, for instance, argues that “left on their own, collapsed and badly governed states will not fix themselves because they have limited administrative capacity” (2004, p. 86).

In reference to the usage of political Trusteeships, Perritt justifies it in terms of “governing for the benefit of the local population and for the purpose of preparing the trust territory for eventual self-rule” (2003, p. 398). Further, Simon Chesterman argues that state building enables “a people to be saved from themselves” (2004, p. 1). All in all justifications found in the post-conflict reconstruction/state-building literature can be seen as a mixture of security considerations and the need to save suffering strangers. Scholars focusing on the need to save failed states tend to point to security threats posed by such states. On the other hand, scholars working on international administration, on how best to deal with failed states, tend to look at suffering strangers and how to further freedom.

Justifying such practices on the basis that they further freedom or that the presence of Western states is a prerequisite because of a lack of agency on the part of non-western
states is inexorably paternalistic. Paternalism makes its appearance in works that critically interrogate the place of trusteeship like arrangements in the administration of foreign territories, re-surfacing in the late 1990s. Robert Jackson and William Bain identify trusteeship with paternalism. Jackson conceives of trusteeship in world politics as a form of paternalism “inconsistent in a world of sovereign states” (1998, abstract). Bain observes that trusteeship invokes “a paternal mode of conduct” (2003, p. 2).

However, these accounts differ on their definition of paternalism. Jackson defines paternalism as “taking at our own initiative responsibilities that lie outside our sphere of jurisdiction and operation in the desire to do some good or to reduce some evil in a foreign country by placing the people who live there under our control without the consent of the government” (1998, pp. 21–22). His definition also includes the practice of treating both governments and citizens of foreign countries as children (1998, p. 22). Bain employs Gerald Dworkin’s definition of paternalism whereby “interference with a person’s liberty of action is justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or the values of the person being coerced” (2003, p. 2). However different, both definitions incorporate certain elements such as doing good, the absence of consent and interference. What distinguishes these scholars from those employing paternalism in relation to humanitarian intervention is that their account of paternalism is detailed, providing definitional clarification.

Let us now turn to this literature’s approach to continuity and change. Here, scholars approach change in terms of the international environment. Robert Jackson, for instance, sees failed and weak states as challenges brought forth by the end of the Cold War. A change in norms is also observed with regards to an increase in the Security Council’s resolutions directed at massive human rights abuses in certain states (1998, p. 4). In contrast, Fearon and Laitin see change in interventionary practices as a result of changing motivations. In contrasting nineteenth century motivations and current motivations for intervention they argue that “intervention is no longer conducted in the name of national glory, profit, civilizing missions or based on fear of other states...
acquiring too much power…today major powers have faced significant and justified pressures for intervention on humanitarian grounds” (2004, p. 13).

Writings focusing on the international administration of foreign territories detect continuity at the level of practice. Parallels are drawn between current practices of foreign administration and the League of Nations Trusteeship system. Perritt argues that “recent interventions after the formal termination of the UN Trusteeship system exhibit continued viability of the political Trusteeship system” (2003, p. 398). Furthermore, Jackson illustrates such parallels by citing UN involvement in domestic conflicts such as in Northern Iraq 1991 and in Cambodia (1998, p. 10). Jackson makes a very interesting argument, namely that “failed states met with international responses earmarks of Trusteeship even if the language of Trusteeship is not employed” (1998, p. 10). The latter finds me agreeing and disagreeing at the same time. It is not only that current practices adopted by western states resemble past practices, but features of the legitimating discourse are also still very much alive. The cases examined here by scholars to point to a continued viability of Trusteeships are instances of foreign governance in Bosnia Herzegovina (1999), East Timor (1999) and Kosovo (1999) (Caplan, 2007, p. 231).

Next, focus is directed to accounts on the responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P or RtoP) or “protective interventionism” (Popovski, 2010, p. 205). The latter is presented as one of the most recent normative developments in the area of interventionism aiming to protect citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Since the R2P principle was introduced by ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) in 2001 policymakers and academics have focused on clarifying what it means and most importantly on operationalizing it.

The existence of failed or collapsed states is treated as a major threat to security on a national and individual level. According to the ICISS report, “failed states are quite likely to generate situations which the international community simply cannot ignore” (ICISS, 2001, p. 43). The R2P is justified by means of a “responsibility” discourse and
turns the discussion to collective rather than unilateral interventions. In his statement to the UN General Assembly Informative Interactive Dialogue on the 23rd of July in New York, Gareth Evans stated that “the issue is not the right of big states to do anything, but the responsibility of all states to protect their own people from atrocity crimes and to assist others to do so by all appropriate means” (Evans, 2009).

Further, interventionism is also justified in terms of “humanity”, resembling justifications put forward regarding humanitarian intervention. According to Evans “the case for R2P rests simply on our common humanity, the impossibility of ignoring the cries and pain and distress of our fellow human beings” (2008, p. 296). A number of criticisms have been articulated against the idea of R2P. For instance, Carlo Focarelli observes that “the very notion of responsibility is ambiguous, the R2P swings between power and obligation to intervene” (2008, p. 210). It has also been remarked that the R2P might be misused to justify unilateral intervention by powerful states claiming the role of the human protector (Orford, 2011b).

It is in the critical literature on the R2P that reference to paternalism is found. In critically engaging with Louise Arbour’s work on the R2P and her idea of a duty of care, Philip Cunliffe identifies that states are pushed in the realm of paternalism with domestic and international repercussions. In relation to this he argues that “the doctrine fosters the paternalism of strong states over weak states and of states over their people” (2010, p. 96). In the domestic realm he observes that “upholding a duty of care under the threat of external sanctions pushes representative governments into the realm of paternalism where states have responsibilities for their people rather than to their people” (2010, p. 81). Although Cunliffe identifies paternalism within the doctrine of R2P, his account of paternalism does not go further than that. For him the R2P is paternalistic because “it expands responsibilities without accountability” (2010, p. 93).

Additionally, academics working on the R2P do not engage with establishing continuity in interventionary practice and discourse. If they did it would contradict their main task, which concerns establishing the consolidation of the R2P as the new and emerging norm guiding intervention for human protection. On this Thakur and
Weiss argue that “the most dramatic development of our time – comparable to the Nuremberg trials and the 1948 Convention on Genocide in the immediate aftermath of World War II – relates to the responsibility to protect” (2009, p. 22). Change is here conceptualized in normative terms. The R2P is presented as that which effects change by envisioning sovereignty as responsibility and not sovereignty as a right.

I now turn to the post-colonial literature. Given that post-colonial accounts do not offer explanations or justifications regarding interventionism what follows will simply focus on post-colonialism’s approach to continuity and change. The Postcolonial literature addresses issues such as the impact of colonial practices on the production and representation of identities, the discursive practices of colonizers, questions of race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality and hybridity (Chowdhry and Nair, 2004, p. 2; Pilario, 2007, p. 52). Scholars in this tradition give special attention to discourse as a powerful material to draw parallels between historical periods. Argument as a variable accounting for continuity is observed in the volume *Empire, Development and Colonialism* edited by Vernon Hewitt and Mark Duffield. It is valuable in that parallels between arguments of the 1840s over “what is Empire for” and current debates about the need for humanitarian intervention by the West are identified (2009, p. 2). In his chapter Duffield illustrates how the fragile state discourse reproduces key assumptions and rationales of colonial bureaucracy, such as the Liberal practice of indirect rule or native administration (p. 116).

Lisa Smirl, a contributor to this volume, detects continuity in the material and spatial practices of the international community with previous Anglo-Indian colonial experiences (Smirl, 2009, p. 97). Similarly, Rob Skinner and Alan Lester point to a resemblance between contemporary humanitarian action and past imperial projects (2012, p. 729). A further example is the work of Asselin Charles, who observes continuity in colonial discourse from medieval times to today. He argues that “colonialist discourse today also assumes the guise of the literature of economic development in which the old Western dichotomy of barbarism and civilization is replaced by concepts such as development and underdevelopment” (1995, p. 151). The above analysis makes evident the importance of discourse in accounting for continuity
and change in interventionist practices. Additionally, it presents the many parallels in interventionary practice and discourse identified by this literature. Having reviewed the various approaches literatures associated with interventionary practices employ to explain, justify and track change and continuity, I now turn to an exploration of both the meaning and usage of paternalism in the existing empirical literatures.

2.2 Paternalism in IR

It is in the wider IR literature that paternalism is investigated in a more thorough manner. The significance of these works lies in their investigation of paternalism on various topics, illustrating its utility, significance and relevance. A major contribution of these works is that they introduce paternalism and provide a certain clarity in conceptualization which is otherwise lacking. However, only a handful of works deal with paternalism in IR, leaving behind many unanswered questions. To date, paternalism in states’ military interventions has not been the subject of scholarly enquiry. In majority, paternalism is investigated in relation to humanitarianism and humanitarian governance (Barnett, 2011, 2017).

The role of the state is often given less importance when compared to that of humanitarian organizations, NGOs, humanitarian workers, activists etc. Additionally, paternalism has also been studied on a theoretical level (Hobson, 2012). In reviewing current scholarship on paternalism I seek to identify the ways in which it is conceptualized and employed. In Empire of Humanity Barnett provides a refreshing take on the history of humanitarianism illustrating that it does indeed extend further back than what is claimed by the standard story where the Cold War is seen as signaling a transformation in humanitarianism. He identifies power as a constant of humanitarianism and argues that “politics, power and ethics have combined to alter the practice of Empire” (2011, p. 8).

Paternalism is seen as the best candidate to capture these changes and humanitarianism’s enduring tensions. He further elaborates on the usefulness of employing paternalism by drawing parallels between humanitarianism and
paternalism. Humanitarianism is seen as defined by a paradox of emancipation and domination resulting from its very nature. On this Barnett argues that “humanitarianism is partly paternalism – the belief that some people should act in ways that are intended to improve the welfare of those who might not be in a position to help themselves” (p. 12). He places emphasis on the issue of consent and adopts Gerald Dworkin’s definition of paternalism, which is widely adopted in the literature on interventionism (Bain, 2003; Barnett, 2011).

Further, Barnett uses paternalism to highlight two issues seen as integral to humanitarianism’s history. The first centers on “who is the human that demands our compassion? and the second on “how do we know what is best for another person?” (2011, p. 35). He comes to the conclusion that both questions relate to conceptions of superiority and inferiority. By employing these two questions as referent points, he observes changes occurring throughout the three distinct historical periods he investigates: Imperial Humanitarianism 18th–WWII; Neo-Humanitarianism WWII–end of Cold War; Liberal Humanitarianism end of Cold War–present (2011, p.9). He notes that between the periods of Imperial humanitarianism and Neo humanitarianism, “humanitarianism’s once explicit religious discourse was losing ground to the discourse of humanity and international community” (2011, p. 94). For an exploration of paternalism limited to explaining the expansion of an international ethics of care, these two lines of enquiry seem to suffice. Although Barnett’s history of humanitarianism accounts for the two camps (emergency and alchemical\(^1\)) constituting it, his account overwhelmingly focuses on relief aid. Consequently the role of the state is acknowledged only in so far as it has had any impact on humanitarian organizations.

Unlike Barnett, Hetherington (1978) provides a systematic analysis of British paternalism during the inter-war period. Additionally, her investigation centers on paternalism in relation to the roles (administration) of Britain in Africa and not on

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\(^1\) The emergency branch of humanitarianism concentrates on the immediate relief of individuals needing help, whilst the alchemical branch goes further, focusing on remedying the causes of suffering (Barnett, 2011, p. 10).
humanitarian relief. Hetherington’s work is valuable in providing insight on how to identify British paternalism. Her account of British paternalism during the inter-war period illustrates how paternalism was embodied in beliefs, assumptions and policies directly dependent and fueled by racist views, social evolutionary theories and Social Darwinism. She looks at how the new roles Britain acquired were influenced by various beliefs, which in turn enabled practices of administration. Inequality and distinctions of superiority-inferiority as markers of paternalism are clearly and explicitly identified in her work. On this she argues that “the paternalist doctrine of the inter-war period allowed claims to superiority from the part of Britain …which in turn lead to the claim to be able to promote desirable political, economic and social development in Africa” (p. 158). She presents only one aspect of British paternalism, pertaining to a very specific historical period. As a result she fails to account for British paternalism’s multifaceted and complex reality. British paternalism’s external dimension is accounted for while its domestic manifestation is excluded from her analysis.

Unlike the above, John M. Hobson’s book *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics* investigates paternalism in a distinctive way, at the level of theory. He draws analogies between past and present Eurocentric discourses and perceives paternalism as derivative of Eurocentrism. In this account paternalist Eurocentric discourse is followed through time via meta-narratives underpinning each international relations theory in terms of a) particulars of standard of civilization, b) degree of agency ascribed to East–West and c) position to imperialism (2012, p. 3). A feature of Eurocentric paternalism he observes as typical of all Eurocentric variants explored is their tendency to separate East from West, ridding the latter of all negative features and transposing them to the former (p. 9). Equating paternalism with Western imperialism is problematic since it precludes the identification of paternalism outside the West. Also the origins of paternalism do not begin with imperialism. Indeed it is possible to identify paternalism as far back as the sixteenth century when it was referred to as patriarchalism (Kleinig, 1983, p. 3).
Finally, I now turn to the recently published edited volume *Paternalism beyond Borders* (Barnett, 2017), embodying the most recent academic contribution on paternalism in IR. Its inter-disciplinary character enables the identification of paternalism in humanitarian governance on issues such as asylum policies, peacebuilding, gender and violence, FGM/C (female genital mutilation/cutting), humanitarian aid and sex trafficking. Its value is that it shows the relevance of paternalism in current affairs. The volume looks at paternalism analytically, normatively and at its historical institutional variations. The interest in paternalism stems from the duality between control and care characterizing it. Thus, it is seen as a useful tool through which to consider how power figures in relations of care. Also, the contributors to the volume fill an existing gap in understandings of paternalism in IR by demonstrating that there are different paternalisms. Richardson distinguishes between true and aggravated paternalism, Fassin between soft and hard, Hopgood between pure and pragmatic and Barnett between strong and weak.

Another important contribution of this volume lies in its conceptualization of power. It distances itself from the standard definition of power involving A getting B to do something that B would not otherwise do, moving to a conception of power where circumstances, institutions, and structures do not let an actor make decisions regarding his/her welfare. This manner of conceptualizing power leads Barnett to define paternalism as “the attempt by one actor to substitute his judgment for another’s on the grounds that it is in the latter’s best interests or welfare” (2017, p. 13). The value of this definition rests on it being more flexible than existing definitions of paternalism and that it does not include consent.

In unanimity the contributors to the above-mentioned volume see paternalism as relational and hierarchical. As such inequality and hierarchy are seen as constituted by pre-existing structures and authority relations distributing different roles with differential social capacities creating positions of inferiority/superiority. The contributors detect several structures and relations of inferiority/superiority such as: civilizational, class-based, epistemic, and related to a discourse of humanity. By and large it is argued that there has been a shift in paternalism from a strong to a weak
version described by Barnett as “paternalism light” (2017). Continuity and change in paternalism are identified through the following variables: acceptable means, duration, basis of confidence, character of accountability and scope. Despite acknowledging that not all features have shifted at the same time and pace the only element seen as exhibiting continuity is the scope of paternalism. The shift in paternalism is considered as resulting from the institutionalization of liberalism and rationalism. All in all this volume showcases the relevance of paternalism is discussions of current affairs and brings forth a number of interesting contributions as outlined above.

2.3 Beyond the State of the Art

Current scholarship on paternalism in IR sheds light on its relevance when investigating unequal relations both in practice and in theory. Further it establishes that paternalism is indeed a reality and that it did not end with Imperialism. However, this scholarship does not engage thoroughly with paternalism and military interventions. Although discussions on peacebuilding point to the existence of paternalism, and paternalism has been identified in discourses and practices, these usually focus on aid workers and NGOs. Paternalism’s utility in exploring the manner in which states legitimate their interventionary practice and discourse is left unexplored. This is a gap that my research aims to fill. This research will show that paternalism is in fact more inherent than just the legitimation, and that it is an ontological characteristic of British state interventionism.

Specifically, the thesis responds to contemporary accounts on humanitarian intervention and R2P, which posit a radical change in interventionary practice and discourse in the post-cold war era. I make use of justifications provided by the literature in order to illustrate that these contain paternalistic features. Unlike contemporary accounts on interventionism I do not seek to explain or justify the occurrence of states’ interventionary practice and discourse. Rather, I aim to establish continuity in interventionism by tracking the manifestation of paternalism historically. I will show in this thesis that paternalism is a constant feature of states’ interventionary...
practice, discourse and representation. Given that my aim is to establish continuity, my approach relates to post-colonialism and state-building and diverges considerably from humanitarian intervention, R2P.

I associate with the post-colonial approach first, because they focus on continuity between the contemporary period and the colonial period, and second, because of the importance accorded to discursive practices and to representations as a means of drawing parallels between historical practices. In the same manner I associate with scholars on international administration who identify parallels between previous and current practices of administration of foreign territory. My approach to continuity and change takes into account the importance of power as determining the representation that states make of themselves internationally and as structuring the legitimating discourse employed by the UK.

Moreover, I intend to use the R2P to illustrate a continuation in interventionary practice and discourse. Although the introduction of the R2P norm alters the narrative states employ to justify interventions, the R2P is itself extremely paternalistic, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 8. It retains the hierarchy and inequality defining military and non-military interventions. Accordingly I associate with critical writings on the R2P, which interpret the doctrine as a continuation of humanitarian intervention. However, scholars on humanitarian intervention point to norms as carriers of change in the interventionary practice and discourse of states, whereas I will argue that international norms have often served to mediate or naturalize paternalism, and that paternalism can in any case continue despite normative change, as that change mainly affects the way paternalist discourse and practice are justified and expressed.

In fact my analysis of empirical cases from the different periods will rather show that the changes in norms have gone in the direction of incorporating elements of paternalism characteristic of the paternalistic political culture of the interventionist states, the UK in my case. This focus on the interventionary practice and discourse of a particular state also differentiates my research from Barnett’s (2011). The fact that the state I examine happens to be a Western one, however, does not mean that I align
my conceptualization with that of Hobson (2012). My interest in Hobson’s work (2012) relates to the method in which analogies are drawn between past and present Eurocentric discourses, but I do not share his view of paternalism as a derivative of Eurocentrism because it precludes the existence of other forms of paternalism, particularly non-western. In order to proceed further in developing a holistic conception of the relations between paternalism and interventionism, the next chapter presents the theoretical and methodological frameworks of this research project.
3 Paternalism: Conceptual Framework and Methodology

Since this thesis aims to demonstrate continuity in state interventionary practice and discourse through paternalism the optimal methodology to deploy is a comparative analysis of the most relevant case-studies of the type used in the literature that argues for change in the pattern of interventionary practices. The comparison aims to demonstrate that paternalism is a constant, by showing that it manifests itself in all these cases, across different historical periods and global/international structures and norms. This chapter, then, will present the conceptual and methodological foundations of this thesis. First I will show how I developed a working definition of paternalism based on a critical assessment of its different conceptualizations in the cross-disciplinary literature.

Paternalism has been the subject of extensive research and has been of interest to scholars of various disciplines. However, there has been a lack of unanimity in understanding precisely what is meant by paternalism. Because of this, the existing literature offers a broad array of definitions of the concept of paternalism, none of which is satisfactory for the purposes of this thesis. The lack of agreement across disciplines about just what paternalism is reflects the complex nature of its reality. This has long been acknowledged by scholars who argue that “paternalism is a time-worn term that has had indefinite meaning in common usage” (Jackman, 1994, p. 10). Consequently the lack of conceptual clarity acts as an obstacle for future research on the topic and this is the first problem that this thesis needs to address.

The following review of the literature will specifically highlight three significant factors accounting for differences in understandings of paternalism. The first is context-specificity. The different contexts in which the concept is examined inevitably result in different determinants of what actually comprises paternalism.
A second major cause of definitional variation is the conceptualization of paternalism as either manifested in domestic social relations or inter-societal relations, both of which are in fact relevant to the phenomenon, and even interrelated. The third reason for the lack of a common understanding of paternalism is that it is conceived and treated as either a practice, a discourse, or a representation (ideology) instead of being approached as an integrated whole. This compartmentalization is the source of much of the confusion found in the literature.

The critical examination of this literature that takes into account all these complicating factors will lead me to formulate a working definition of paternalism that avoids the existing confusion and conceptual fragmentation, while also allowing me to deploy my empirical methodology. Once I have ascertained the main characteristics defining paternalism I will present the methodological principles guiding my research which centre on the comparative approach, the most appropriate methods through which paternalism will be studied in the context of British interventionism and the approach to data analysis I adopt in this thesis.

3.1 What is Paternalism? A Holistic Conceptualization

The literature focusing on paternalism as a form of social relations illuminates on its usage and conceptualization in a multitude of contexts such as medicine, nursing, mental health, philosophy, anthropology, social work, industry, management, welfare economics, social policy and governance, and sociology. As for paternalism’s manifestation in inter-societal relations, it is conceptualized in the context of Imperialism/Colonialism, whose meaning is captured by historical and post-colonial accounts. When paternalism is treated as a practice, the literature unanimously ascribes coercion as its defining characteristic. This applies to both realms in which paternalism manifests itself. However, the coerciveness of paternalism is identified in differing ways. Depending on the context in which paternalism is studied, it tends to be seen as coercive, less coercive or as not involving coercion. Conceptualizing paternalistic practice as necessarily involving coercion is problematic. Turning first to social
relations, this is best illustrated in the disciplines of philosophy, anthropology, in the medical setting (mental health), in public health and in social work. In philosophy, a paternalistic practice is coercive because it is carried out without the consent of the subject and involves an “interference with the liberty of action or autonomy of another person” (Dworkin, 1972; VanDeVeer, 1986, p. 12). Accordingly, laws requiring motorcyclists to wear safety helmets when operating their machines are classed as paternalistic (Dworkin, 1972, p. 65).

The same applies to anthropological research on corporate categories and groups, where paternalism is seen to “block or destroy the corporate autonomy” of its prospective beneficiaries (Goodell, 1985, p. 250). Alternatively, in social work, the interference applies “to intentions, actions, emotional states and the right to accurate information of another person” (Reamer, 1983, p. 260). Such differences are also apparent in medicine, public and mental health. In these contexts a paternalistic practice involves “the intentional overriding of one person’s known preferences or actions” (Lyerly and Rothman, 2004; Seo, Kim and Rhee, 2013) “the usurpation of decision making power by preventing people from doing what they have decided” (Buchanan, 2008, p. 15). Unlike in philosophy, in the medical setting and in social work a paternalistic practice also entails the withholding of information from the patient (Buchanan, 1978, p. 371; Reamer, 1983, p. 260). This difference is owed to the context in which paternalism manifests itself.

As a result, when philosophical accounts theorize doctor-patient relations it is acknowledged that “one can act paternalistically by telling people the truth, as when a doctor insists that a patient know the exact nature of her illness, contrary to her wishes” (Audi, 1999, p. 646). The coercive aspect of a paternalistic practice is also illustrated in inter-societal relations by both historical and post-colonial accounts. Turning first to historical accounts, Bernard Porter’s study on British imperialism identifies how the British did not consult the natives in the Empire. He notes that “for years India had been ruled as if she were to be ruled for ever, a ward whose majority was never contemplated” (1996, p. 188). Alternatively, Cain and Hopkins note that paternalism involved the imposition of forms of social order and the spirit of liberty such as existed
in Great Britain. The most illustrative is the case of India where improvement was “imposed by paternal rather than liberal means” (2002, p. 98). The latter conceptualization of a paternalistic practice as involving an imposition is also identified by the postcolonial literature. According to these accounts a paternalistic practice is coercive because it forces upon other people cultural practices or ideas foreign to them. For example, colonial powers relied on coercive religious conversion in order to bring spiritual welfare to colonial peoples. The latter were also inserted “into the economic infrastructure of colonialism which was to bring the material benefits of Western science” (Narayan, 1995, p. 134). The drawback of conceptualizing paternalistic practice as coercive is that it excludes the identification of a paternalistic practice when consent from the subject is given.

A review of the literature brings forth an alternative conceptualization based on a process of legitimation of authority and deference acknowledged in both social and inter-societal realms. In social relations this has been recorded in the industrial and management setting. Here, the coerciveness of a paternalistic practice is not easily identifiable. Coercion features in an implicit manner. Although paternalism functions as a strategy of labor control it develops as a form of personalization where the employer individuates relations with his/her employees and features a role transcending concern towards them (Padavic and Earnest, 1994, p. 392). This also applies to the context of paternalistic leadership at the individual level, where paternalism is identified as “the care, protection and guidance in both work and non-work domains” (Aycan, 2006, p. 446). That paternalistic practice is characterized by deference is also recognized in inter-societal relations in historical accounts.

This is consistent with arguments that “paternalistic practices were sometimes accepted by non-Europeans (Indians) because they fitted local norms of authority and government” (Johnson, 2003, p. 83). The principle on which these people operated assumed that those in authority should behave as “the mother and father of the people”

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2 This assistance takes the form of housing, mutual benefits, and pension funds, schools, stores and churches (Reid, 1985, p. 582).
A middle way of conceptualizing paternalism is to see it as more or less coercive. For example, in social relations in the context of welfare economics “the coerciveness of paternalism depends on whether it compels, induces or persuades” (Burrows, 1993, p. 562). This also applies to the context of social policy and welfare programs. Here, a paternalistic practice takes the form of supervision, such as the teaching of parenting skills or the giving of advice on training, or the act of compelling the poor to work where the objective is to change their behavior (Macgregor, 1999, p. 109).

Similarly in the area of governance, recorded by historical studies, a paternalistic practice is identified as one that rules, guides or helps other people (the rich vis-à-vis the poor) (Thornton, 1966, p. 13; Roberts, 1979, p. 4). By conceptualizing paternalistic practice in this manner it is also possible to identify paternalism as compelling another person and ruling (Thornton, 1966, p.13; Roberts, 1979, p.4; MacGregor, 1999, p.109). In the same manner, the discipline of sociology identifies paternalistic practice as “persuasion” (Jackman, 1994, p.4). Similarly in inter-societal relations seeing paternalism as more or less coercive enables the identification of a paternalistic practice as that of rendering a service and guidance (Johnson, 2002, p. 83; Narayan, 1995, p. 133; Baaz, 2008, p. 168). For instance, in the context of development aid, aid workers engage in “teaching the partner how to be independent and how to use their own resources” (Baaz, 2008, p. 168).

As a result, my conceptualization of paternalism as practice can be seen as incorporating both the idea that paternalism is based on a process of legitimation as involving deference and as operating on various levels of coercion. In my conceptualization, paternalism can operate without coercion because it also operates on the level of legitimation of the action of the agent and of his/her status. This understanding of coercion acknowledges that a country could accept an intervention on its territory by another country, because it has already internalized the paternalistic relationship as “normal”. As a result, the victim can be seen as enabling his/her own subjection to the powerful. However, by conceptualizing paternalism as a practice that can often be legitimated by the “victim”, I do not suppose that a paternalistic practice
is not coercive, but rather that coercion is not necessarily visible, since it is not needed once legitimacy is internalized by the subject being treated paternalistically.

As such paternalistic practice is that which involves caring, guidance, protection (Thorton, 1966, p. 13; Roberts, 1979, p. 4; MacGregor, 1999, p. 109; Aycan, 2006, p. 446), supervision, teaching, giving advice, helping (Thorton, 1966, p. 13; Roberts, 1979, p. 4; Narayan, 1995, p. 133; MacGregor, 1999, p. 109; Johnson, 2002, p. 83; Baaz, 2008, p. 168), compelling another person and ruling (Thorton, 1966, p. 13; Roberts, 1979, p. 4; MacGregor, 1999, p. 109) and persuading (Jackman, 1994, p. 4). What the analysis of the literature further reveals is that paternalistic practice needs a certain justification, visible in discourse. When conceptualized as a discourse, paternalism is attributed distinct characteristics. The literature unanimously characterizes paternalism in both social and inter-societal relations as benevolent. Here again some differences are observed when moving from one context to another. In addition, the literature also characterizes paternalistic discourse as containing the language of obligation, moral responsibility, and duty.

A paternalistic practice is seen as undertaken for the good of another person. This is the case in both social and inter-societal relations across contexts. In social relations, in the medical context, in nursing, mental health, public health, and philosophy practices are undertaken “for the own good of the person interfered with” (Kopelman, 2004, para. 1), to “benefit the other person” (Lyerly and Rothman, 2004; Seo, Kim and Rhee, 2013, p. 217) or with the purpose of doing some good (Cody, 2003). This benevolence is also articulated in a more specific manner where the purpose of the action is to promote the welfare of people (Reamer, 1983, p. 268) or the welfare, good, happiness, and needs of the person who is coerced (Dworkin, 1972, p. 65; Kleinig, 1983).

In social work a paternalistic discourse is characterized with benevolence because it is concerned with the welfare of people (Reamer, 1983, p. 268). Alternatively, in welfare economics and anthropology concerned with corporate categories and groups, a practice has to yield “a potential benefit to the paternalized individual in the sense of
a net welfare gain” (Burrows, 1993, p. 559), or “provide an economic benefit to the other person” (Goodell, 1985, p. 248). This recurring element can also be found in the context of governance in 19th century Britain articulated as: “for the benefit of the governed, there needed to be a widening and strengthening of the zones of paternal authority” (Thornton, 1966, p. 17). Such arguments were complemented by the following: “the government must be for the good of the people and not for what pleases them” (Thornton, 1966, p. 49).

Similarly in inter-societal relations benevolence is seen as characteristic of paternalistic discourse. However, the conceptualization of paternalism as discourse in historical and post-colonial accounts diverges on some points. In historical writings paternalistic discourse is characterized by benevolence where practices (legislations) are undertaken having in mind “the true interests of people in the Third World” (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 119). Similarly, for post-colonial scholarship paternalism functions on “a care discourse” where practices are undertaken for “the interest of, the good of, and the promotion of the welfare of other people” (Narayan, 1995, p. 134). However, in these writings caring takes the form of control and domination exercised by the privileged and powerful group (Narayan, 1995, p. 135).

The above unanimity is complemented by some differences. The first is visible in social relations in the medical context, in nursing, mental health, public health, and philosophy paternalistic practices have a dual purpose, benefitting and avoiding harm to another person (Dworkin, 1972; Buchanan, 1978; Kleinig, 1983; Cody, 2003; Kopelman, 2004; Lyerly and Rothman, 2004; Seo, Kim and Rhee, 2013). The second difference in the understanding of benevolence is visible in labor relations and sociology. Although benevolence is characteristic of paternalistic discourse, in labor relations taking the form of “a putative concern for the welfare of the working poor provided they are kept within bounds” (Padavic and Earnest, 1994, p. 395; Hay, 1998, p. 27), the objective, is the exploitation and domination of the workforce (Padavic and Earnest, 1994, p. 392; Wray, 1996, p. 702; Aycan, 2006, p. 455). Similarly in sociology, although a paternalistic discourse contains positive feelings for another group, benevolence is not seen as a defining characteristic of paternalism because of
the presence of conceptions of moral superiority prevailing in unequal relations (Jackman, 1994, p. 14). As a result, paternalism for Jackman is characterized by a mixture of positive feelings and discrimination vis-à-vis another group (1994, p. 11).

Further, scholarly engagement with paternalism brings to light an additional component of paternalistic discourse, namely moral duty and responsibility. In the context of governance from a historical perspective paternalistic discourse conveys the duties of the governing classes towards those of lower rank (Thornton, 1966, p. 48, 49; Roberts, 1979, p. 4; Lawes, 2000, p. 13). Likewise, in the medical setting doctors and personnel have a moral duty to interfere in order to determine whether the person is competent (Kopelman, 2004). Conversely, in the management and industrial context paternalistic discourse contains moral responsibilities of both employers and employees (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976, p. 418; Wray, 1996, p. 704). In the context of welfare programs, welfare users have a responsibility for themselves. In case they fail to act responsibly, the responsibility falls on the government (MacGregor, 1999, p. 109).

This is also the case in inter-societal relations. For historians such as Porter, this is visible in discourses during imperialism articulated as follows:

I conceive that by the acquisition of its colonial dominions the Nation has incurred a responsibility of the highest kind, which it is not at liberty to throw off. The authority of the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful instrument, under providence of maintaining peace and order in many extensive regions of the earth, and thereby assisting in diffusing amongst millions of the human race, the blessings of Christianity and civilization.

(Third Earl Grey, in Porter, 1996, p. 30)

According to the above paternalism conveys a responsibility on the part of the British towards the inhabitants of their colonies. Alternatively post-colonial writings see paternalism as a responsibility by looking at paternalism as a discourse of difference. As was the case in social relations, in this realm a paternalistic discourse incorporates strategies of differentiation. Here, the non-European is constructed as unreliable
whereas the European is constructed as reliable and trustworthy (Baaz, 2008, p. 167). Both historical and post-colonial accounts see a paternalist ideology as based on Eurocentric ideas about evolutionary development, according to the view that there are stages of development for all peoples (Porter, 1996, p. 167; Baaz, 2008, p. 167). What this connotes is that some have duties, obligations and responsibilities towards a specific segment of the population.

My conceptualization of paternalistic discourse takes into account all the common elements found within the literature. First, that a paternalistic discourse espouses benevolence. Second that it contains a language of responsibility, obligation and duty. The objective is then claimed to be to benefit another person in a broad sense, including the welfare of people. However, I take into account that paternalism also espouses a duality between control and care as acknowledged in the industrial setting and in sociology (Padavic and Earnest, 1994, p. 395; Jackman, 1994, p. 14; Hay, 1998, p. 27; Aycan, 2006, p. 455). Whereas for some paternalism constitutes a practice or a discourse, for others it is conceptualized as a representation of a social/economic order (ideology).

The literature agrees that a paternalistic representation is characterized by a hierarchy, inequality and a difference. What is more, the literature makes apparent two types of representations, one of an economic or social order and one of a paternal kind. In social relations, in the industrial and management context paternalism is seen as hierarchic and unequal because the organization of relations functions under a family sentiment (Padavic and Earnest, 1994, p. 399; Wray, 1996, p. 702). This relationship is based on certain duties ascribed to the superior (care, protection, guidance) and the subordinate (loyalty and deference) (Aycan, 2006, p. 446). It is in this context that paternalism as a representation of an economic order is observed. Hierarchy and inequality in the industrial and management context serve a certain objective, the organization of a productive unit (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976, p. 413).

The same applies to paternalism as a representation of a social order. Here inequality, difference and hierarchy function as a way in which healthcare is delivered
(Kopelman, 2004) or the way in which a certain harmony and order are established in society (Roberts, 1979, p.4; Lawes, 2000, p.9). Similarly, in sociology relations between unequal groups are seen as hierarchic and unequal, operating on the family model (Jackman, 1994, p. 10). However, in this context the relationship is determined by ascribing superior characteristics such as “prestige” and “privilege” to one group (dominant) over another (Jackman, 1994, p. 3). The family model as an organizing principle of healthcare delivery is acknowledged by a minority in the medical setting (Kopelman, 2004). However, what renders a representation/ideology paternalistic in the medical setting is difference. This involves differentiating the paternalist from the paternalized. Patients are represented as missing certain qualities that would allow them to take decisions.

Also found in mental health, nursing and social policy (welfare programs) is that patients or welfare users are described as incompetent. Patients are seen as incapable of rational decision-making and as a danger to themselves and others (Cody, 2003, p. 288; Buchanan, 2008, p. 17; Seo, Kim and Rhee, 2013, p. 218). Likewise in social policy users are seen as incompetent, as “lacking certain capacities” (Ben-Ishai, 2012, p. 151). What differentiates paternalism in these contexts is that in social policy society is seen as structured in the following manner: “a first world (global elite), a second world (middle class) and a third world (of poor and deviant)” (MacGregor, 1999, p. 109). A paternalistic representation involving hierarchy and inequality is also present in historical accounts on governance.

Both were characteristic of a paternalist view of nineteenth century society in England. Society was viewed as authoritarian, hierarchic, organic and pluralist (Roberts, 1979, p. 4; Lawes, 2000, p. 9). In this context, hierarchy was established through the acquisition of property, seen as the source of authority. Additionally it required dependence on the part of servants and agricultural laborers (Thorton, 1966, p. 62; Roberts, 1979, p. 4). Further, what is characteristic of this paternalistic representation is that it originated from a class of employers and country gentlemen (Hay, 1998, p. 45; Lawes, 2000, p. 4). As is the case in other contexts, paternalism functions on the family model. This is illustrated by the following: “paternal authorities know what is
good for those depending on them, just as a father knows what is good for his children” (Roberts, 1979, p. 53). Quite apart from the above, in the discipline of archaeology the characteristics ascribed to a paternalistic ideology are those of concern and help (Goodell, 1985, p. 252). This is due to archaeologists’ interest in studying the effects of state paternalism on groups within the state’s domain. Although I made a distinction between two types of representations, it is important to understand that this distinction is not clear-cut.

In all contexts, the family analogy, the father-child relationship is employed unanimously as a way to understand paternalistic practice but also a means by which this analogy, relationship helps justify paternalistic practices. It demonstrates the way in which authority is established in paternalistic relations. In inter-societal relations, a paternalistic representation is ascribed the same characteristics. However, in this context the representation is based on civilizational references based on Eurocentric ideas about evolutionary development (Porter, 1996, p. 167; Baaz, 2008, p. 167). As acknowledged by historical and post-colonial accounts, the representation of the other as inferior is corollary to their subjugation. The post-colonial literature makes apparent how the self is represented differently from the other and “people are situated at a different stage of development and enlightenment” (Baaz, 2008, p. 167). Additionally, racist stereotypes about the negative and inferior status of the other (Narayan, 1995, p. 133) are also seen as part of this process of representation.

According to these accounts this process of representation works in the following way in practice: “those who are seen as reliable tend to function as informal controllers and as sources of responsibility” (Baz, 2008, p. 167). In a similar way, historians view a representation as paternalistic when it asserts the superiority of one culture over the other (Johnson, 2002, p. 83). For example, during imperialism, non-Europeans were

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3 The ideological components of paternalism in this context bear similarities with contexts discussed above. As an ideology paternalism is based on a set of duties such as the obligation to “rule firmly and superintend” (Roberts, 1979, p. 6). In addition, this ideology entailed a responsibility from the part of the governing classes (Lawes, 2000, p. 4).
represented as children (Porter, 1996, p. 346). In addition, paternalism is seen as hierarchic and unequal in that people are not ascribed similar characteristics. For instance, non-Europeans were represented as inferior, signifying a lack in qualities of character (Porter, 1996, p. 46). The inequality, characteristic of paternalism, is seen in the form of superior knowledge on the part of Europeans articulated as “we in the West know better the needs of other cultures than the members of those cultures” (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 116). The following is a good illustration of a paternalistic representation and its ideological components in the context of colonialism:

The “master” arrogated to himself, with a good conscience, the right to define the ways to happiness and progress for the “slave” or the “pupil”; everyone, left and right, used the same standard or model (that is, France) and the same basic ideas about civilization and barbarism; the left, then and later, was not immune to ideas, encouraged by the anthropology of the time, about “inferior” civilizations and one single, inevitable form of human evolution (cited in Derrick, 2002, p. 55).

In my conceptualization of paternalism, I take into account these two interconnected manners of representation which, I argue, are decisive in the understandings of paternalism. Inequality, hierarchy and difference are seen as a product of a representation of social and economic order, and of the differential representation of the self and other. By using the common characteristics and elements I have extracted from the literature on paternalism I here develop my own working definition of paternalism:

**Paternalism is a coherent system of practices, discourses and representations that legitimate the actions, and their objectives, of groups claiming to have an**

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4 Historically, the British employed this father-child analogy to justify their rule and subsequently its relaxation during decolonization (Porter, 1996, p. 346). By depicting non-Europeans as children, the superior Europeans could claim that they were helping their children develop. As argued by paternalists during the 19th century ‘the object of parenthood was just this, to fit your children for an independent existence’ (Porter, 1996, p. 346).
obligation towards those they view as inferior, incompetent, and in need of being protected as in a parent-child relationship.

The above definition reflects my conceptualization of paternalism, which differs from what has been envisioned by the literature, in that the complex inter-relationship between practice, discourse and representation/ideology is acknowledged and the concept is defined accordingly. Representation, discourse and practice are so co-constitutive and mutually supportive that they cannot be studied independently of one another. For instance, the discourse of obligation pre-exists or coexists with the practice of protection. A paternalistic discourse is understood as a practice itself and as manifesting certain representations and ideologies. Further, a representation can take the following two forms, as representing other groups as incompetent and as representing the other group, speaking on their behalf. The former, representing other groups as incompetent, is also considered as a practice itself. A practice can also produce representations. For example it is often argued that racism as an ideology was the product of slavery as a practice.

The same is true for paternalism: a paternalistic practice, especially if it is viewed as successful, would produce the view that one is naturally predisposed to act as a “parent”. By defining paternalism in this manner I provide conceptual clarity in the understanding of the concept, which is not apparent in the literature on paternalism. I do this by acknowledging two important issues relating to the concept of paternalism. First, the complex inter-relationship between a paternalistic representation, discourse and practice, and second the relationship between the social and the inter-societal manifestations of paternalism. The latter enables conceptualizing paternalism’s external manifestation as a co-extension of its internal manifestation. This chapter will now explain how paternalism will be studied in the context of military interventions.

3.2 Methodological Principles: Comparative Analysis

While studying British paternalism in the context of British interventionism this thesis aims to answer the following:
What are the constitutive features of British paternalism and how are they manifested and sustained through time in the discourse, practice and representation (legitimation) of Britain’s domestic and external interventionism?

In an attempt to facilitate my investigation, I have developed the following questions to guide me through this methodological overview:

Q1. What are the specific characteristics of British Paternalism?

Q2. How does British external paternalism extend from internal paternalism?

OR What is the relationship between external and internal British paternalism?

Q3. What features of British paternalism remain constant and what features have changed in the UK’s military interventions from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century?

Q4. How is paternalism manifested in the practice, discourse and representation in a changing normative and global context?

This thesis hypothesizes that the characteristics I have identified above as defining paternalism are always present in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse, and that what changes is the way these are manifested or expressed in a changing normative and global context. More specifically, what changes is how incompetence is defined, and the basis of incompetence and obligation in the historical periods examined. It is also the manner in which distinctions are articulated between “the self” and “the other”, influenced by what is determined as being politically correct and acceptable, what is in line with the ideological setting of the time. For instance, one would not be disposed to employ the distinction civilized/uncivilized in the 21st century, or at least its use would be controversial to say the least.

To demonstrate continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse I compare different epochs. The periods under investigation and the cases chosen are those of pre-existing empirical research. This allows me to counter the arguments in
the dominant literature regarding change in the interventionary practice and discourse of states and intergovernmental organizations. Each period follows and counters a specific literature. Overall I engage with interventionary practices labeled as humanitarian intervention, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and post-conflict reconstruction. The historical period I address begins with the nineteenth century and culminates with current events. Following the literature I have divided this long period into four shorter ones: Nineteenth century Imperialism, the Mandate period, the Cold and Post-Cold War, and the Twenty-first century.

The number of cases I examine in each period is determined by the literature I engage with and the objective set. For some periods multiple cases are required to emphasize the manner in which paternalism manifests itself. These case studies will provide a holistic and in-depth understanding of each military intervention and will bring forth paternalistic representations, practices and discourses. The nineteenth century instances I address consist of the intervention in Greece 1821-1827 by Britain, France and Russia, British rule in India during 1830-60 and the British intervention in the Sudan of 1896-98. The second period dealing with the Mandate period 1920-1948 looks at the two cases examined by the post-conflict literature: the British mandate on Palestine (Class A) and Tanganyika (Class B). The third period encompasses the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods and addresses the reconstruction of Germany 1945-1949, the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66 and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Finally, the fourth period focusing on the twenty-first century will investigate the R2P intervention in Libya in 2011.

The conceptualization of paternalism provided in the first sections of this chapter will be used to operationalize my criteria for the comparison to be effectuated between the four historical periods. However, my focus on Britain as a case study calls for a need to establish the characteristics of British paternalism. These will be identified by focusing on an extended period in time, from the eighteenth century to the establishment of the welfare state in England. In essence I will be constructing the concept of British paternalism by reconstituting its social and intellectual history (Chapter 4). The comparison I will undertake will also account for variations in the
characteristics of British paternalism. To that end I will be focusing on changes occurring in the normative, ideological and global context.

Let us now turn to the data which will be employed to identify paternalism in each case study, and which will in turn be used to compare between cases and historical periods. In terms of practices I will look at specific laws and policies (native policy, education, land/agricultural policies), ways of governing (management of resources, infrastructure, and representation of natives in government), counseling and institutional practices towards populations abroad. Regarding discourses I will focus on public speeches made by political leaders, on any documentation such as correspondence between officials and their envoys abroad, and on Security Council decision-making processes and results. This will inform on the manner in which British policy and practices were legitimated and the place of strategic and other interests in defining these practices. In order to identify dominant British representations I examine the narratives of British elites who enacted the various policies abroad, with a specific focus on the nature of representations (how were the others represented).

There is a need for a degree of uniformity in the type of data employed. The data needs to be amenable to comparative analysis. Given that paternalism consists of an interconnection among practice, discourse and representation and is instituted by the political elite of a country vis-à-vis those lower on the ladder (nationally or internationally) I have employed primary as well as secondary data. Primary data is extracted from parliamentary debates, specifically from the Hansard database. Overall I analyzed approximately 300 debates and written question sessions. These debates reflect the discourse of political elites in Britain and the representational practices at play. Moreover I examined correspondence between British officials and policy documents available at the National Archives in Kew. The material consulted at Kew pertains to all cases analyzed apart from the most recent case of Libya. I examined and analyzed around 100 records. The secondary sources I have employed include historical accounts, narratives and British newspaper articles informing the British public on military interventions their country is involved in.
3.3 Studying Paternalism in Britain’s Interventionary Practice and Discourse

The identification of British paternalistic representations, discourses, and practices in Britain’s internal and external interventions are achieved through the dual employment of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and practice theory. Both are particularly informative on the way I approach paternalism since they look at the interconnections between practices, discourses and representations. CDA and practice theory do not provide a unified way of thinking about discourses or practices nor do they have a single strategy to study them empirically. Each is characterized by various approaches. Consequently, I refer to the literature that is most appropriate. Turning first to practice theory, all approaches share certain commitments enumerated by Bueger and Gadinger as “emphasizing process, practical knowledge, collectivity, materiality, and performativity” (2014, p. 11).

Practice theory focuses on the relations between ideas and practices, a point conveyed in conceptualizations of practices provided in the literature. Generally practice theorists view practices as “arrays of activity”. However they diverge on what constitutes an activity and what connects them (Schatzki, Karin and von Savigny, 2001, p. 11). Moreover practice theorists think of practices as “embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding” (p. 2). According to Reckwitz a practice is “a routinized type of behavior which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, “things” and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge” (2002, p. 249).

Practice theorists share the belief that a close link exists between knowledge and action. Additionally they also contend that practice is always linked to a collective (Bueger and Gadinger, 2014). Both of these premises are also reflected in my research. I focus on the practices carried out by individuals who belong to a collective, the political elite of Britain who constitute a distinct social class, and I conceptualize their
practices as linked to their discourses and representations. In recent years the field of IR witnessed a renewed interest in the theorizing of practices identified as “the practice turn”. Examples of practice theory driven research in IR include studies on NATO Russia diplomacy (Pouliot, 2010), private military companies (Leander, 2005), security communities (Adler, 2008), Somali piracy (Bueger, 2013), or Cold War and Post-Cold War strategic interaction between Washington and Moscow (Adler and Pouliot, 2011). Predominantly these look at contemporary international practices.

The practices I investigate constitute historical international practices that embody representations and knowledge. These include policies, laws, institutional practices, and practices of education, training, advising, governing and the behavior of British officers on the ground. For example in Chapter 4 I look at the institution of the Poor Laws and the establishment of workhouses. In Chapter 8 I look at the use of military force to help a persecuted population. I employ the elements I have previously identified as characteristic of paternalism as markers for its identification in practices (benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, difference, incompetence). A benevolent practice includes educational and administrative reforms such as teacher training, agricultural or administrative training. It is about giving people the tools to develop and learn and involves giving advice, help and guidance. Such practices are analyzed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In Tanganyika, a case explored in Chapter 6, the British in charge of administering the territory provided agricultural education to the natives, which involved teaching them how to grow new cash crops. In Germany (Chapter 7) the British were re-educating German teachers by providing them with training on new methods of teaching. Education Control Officers not only provided advice to German education authorities at Land Level but they were also supervising to see how they were progressing with education reforms.

Practices of administration display incompetence and protection. When administering foreign territories the local population rarely has a part to play. Responsibility for administration is given in a step-by-step process and natives usually occupy positions of little importance. Such practices also display protection. Practices of protection can amount to administering another country as is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Until the
people of Tanganyika were considered to have reached a level of development allowing them to govern on their own, Britain was tasked with the administration of the territory. In essence, Britain was protecting them from themselves. A practice is also protective when it involves sending an army to another country to save one part of the population as was the case in Greece discussed in Chapter 5. Such a policy is undertaken not to punish put to protect people in a life-threatening situation.

To reconstitute practices as they are directly observed, practice theorists use methods influenced by ethnographic research known as “praxeography”. Praxeography includes techniques such as observing, learning, talking about and reading practices (Bueger and Gadinger, 2014, p. 53). Unlike the majority of practice-theory-driven research I do not investigate practices that are directly observable. Instead I indirectly reconstitute praxeographic elements reported in primary and secondary sources. The texts I analyze in order to identify paternalistic practices are policy documents, written correspondence between British political elite and histories of interventions. I contribute to practice theory by using a historical reconstitution of practices. What I do is similar to what has been done, for example, in the social history of science. Due to the fact that my material is not directly observable my methodology needs to be informed more by CDA.

On the whole, CDA approaches to language “focus on discourse and on the relationship between discourse and other social elements such as power relations, ideologies, institutions and social identities” (Gee and Handford, 2012, p. 9). They assume that power relations are discursive, meaning that power is both transmitted and practiced via discourse (Flowerdew, 2007). The aim of CDA approaches is to increase awareness and bring to the fore strategies employed in “establishing, maintaining and reproducing asymmetrical relations of power as enacted by means of discourse” (Hidalgo Tenorio, 2011, p. 183). An additional aim of CDA is to provide explanations regarding power abuse by addressing how it is “enacted, reproduced or legitimated by the talk and text of dominant groups and institutions” (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 25).
This is of particular relevance to the subject of my research. Paternalism is intimately linked with power, and discourse is a way through which it is manifested. To demonstrate how my analysis will be carried forward I will now address the various ways the concept of discourse is defined in CDA and I will present the particular methods, tools and indicators I employed to carry out my textual analysis. All CDA approaches move beyond the narrow linguistic definition of discourse as “a passage of connected writing or speech” (Hall, 2001, p. 72). For some of these approaches discourse is conceived as “a communicative event, including conversational interaction and written texts as well as associated gestures, face work, typographical layout, images and any other semiotic or multi-media dimension of signification” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 25). Others see it as a semantic construction of specific aspects of reality that serve the interests of particular historical and social contexts (van Leeuwen, 2008).

What distinguishes CDA from other methods of textual analysis is the conceptualization of both written and spoken language as a form of social practice (Parker, 1990; Fairclough, 2003; Wodak and Weiss, 2003; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). It is influenced by Austin’s “speech acts”, for whom “the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action” (Austin, 1962, p. 6; Bourdieu, 2001, p. 18). Conceptualized in this manner it implies the existence of a dialectical relationship between a specific discursive event and the situation, institution, and social structure which framed it (van Dijk, 1997; Wodak & Meyer, 2009 p. 6). According to Van Dijk accomplishing discourse as social action requires that we “accomplish not only illocutionary acts such as assertions and promises but also locutionary or graphical acts of actual speech and writing, as well as propositional acts such as meaning something when we speak or write” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 10).

Following Van Dijk’s conceptualization of discourse, discourse should not only be studied “as form, meaning and mental process, but also as complex structures and hierarchies of interaction and social practice and their functions in context, society and culture” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 6). At this point it is worth noting that CDA goes beyond what I am looking at, increasingly focusing on interactions. In my cases I focus on
discourse as a manifestation rather than as an interactional practice. Instead of looking at discourse as an interactional phenomenon, I approach it as a unidirectional one. I am only looking at the speech of one actor instead of the interaction of various actors. Consequently I am not employing the whole of CDA methodology.

Ideology is a concept CDA approaches engage with extensively, focusing on its discursive construction and effects. For them discourses contain certain representations of agents and social events. For instance, Foucault sees discourse as a system of representation, as “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular time” (Hall, 2001, p. 72). Discourse is for Foucault an abstract form of knowledge, understood as cognition and emotion (Tenorio, 2011). CDA approaches based on socio-cognitive theory conceive of discourse “as structured forms of knowledge and text as the concrete oral utterance or written documents” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Ideology is understood as a systemic body of ideas organized from a particular point of view (Kress and Hodge, 1979).

In practice CDA analysis entails looking at choices of words and grammar in texts to uncover the underlying discourses and ideologies (Machin and Mayr, 2012). Additionally it requires to look at texts at various levels. In the analysis I carry out I focus on the linguistic form of texts and on the context in which these discourses are articulated. I focus on texts (written form) such as political discourses, parliamentary debates and statements to the media. These discourses fall in the genre of political discourse. The analytical categories and markers I employ are based on my working definition of paternalism developed above and on the concepts I have identified as distinctive of paternalism (benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, incompetence and difference). These concepts act as markers directing attention to specific issues and aspects characteristic of British paternalism. As my definition of paternalism indicates, these concepts can be understood within the framework of a parent-child relationship.
The above analysis demonstrated that paternalism’s first defining characteristic, benevolence, characterizes intent, the reasoning behind the enactment of certain practices or their justification. Consequently I identify benevolence or words espousing benevolence in texts by focusing on processes of legitimation and the manner in which they appear in texts. Conceptually benevolence is associated to a deep concern, caring and benefiting another person. Since benevolence entails intent it can be identified in text by looking at the semantic relationship between sentences and clauses (Fairclough, 2003). More specifically, causal semantic relations of purpose help identify the intent of certain actions. These are marked in text by connectors such as “so that”, “the purpose of this” and “in order to”. In the discourses I analyze benevolence also figures through the use of terms such as “for them”, “to benefit”, “in their interest” etc.

Moving on, the concepts of obligation and duty characteristic of paternalism are used to explain or justify paternalistic practices. Due to the fact that feelings of obligation/duty are directly linked to strategies of classification, to the representation of others and to issues of power and authority, it is important to be attentive to legitimating strategies employed in text to identify them. Fairclough lists four strategies of legitimation: authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation and mythopoesis (Fairclough, 2003). For the identification of obligation or other related words authorization and moral evaluation are most adequate. This is because the strategy of authorization legitimates by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law and of persons in whom some kind of institutional authority is vested. Additionally, moral evaluation as a strategy of legitimation makes use of value systems.

In the empirical chapters investigated I identify obligation/duty/responsibility as attached to Agreements and Treaties Britain was a party to. For example, in Malaysia the British sense of duty and responsibility emanated from the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. The way social actors are represented while legitimation occurs in text is crucial in identifying obligation. Accordingly I attend to the following classificatory strategies. The first refers to nomination/functionalization. The objective
here is to look at whether participants are nominated in terms of who they are, or functionalized in terms of what they do. The crucial point is to identify which actors are nominated and which are functionalized. The second classificatory strategy focuses on the use of pronoun and noun. By looking at this distinction in text I identify the “in-group” and the “out-group”. In addition, this allows me to identify obligation in text as a particular aspect of a specific class in society or of a specific group (political elite in Britain).

The concept of protection pertains to the nature of the acts carried out by the dominant group in a society and externally. In order to identify how acts of protection are articulated discursively I pay specific attention to speech-acts. I am also guided by the following questions: what is done, how is it done, by whom? Is it specific of a class in society? Is it specific to certain countries in the international system? An additional course I pursue to identify the concept of protection in discourse is to look at justifications offered. In a number of instances British politicians justify intervention in foreign countries on the basis of “protecting populations”.

The next two elements I employ for the identification of paternalism are markers of incompetence and difference. Although these two concepts are intimately related, each calls for the employment of varying strategies. The concept of difference underlies a specific social order and points to the existence of hierarchy. From representations of difference flow distinctions between “the self” and “the other” and representations of incompetence. Both concepts emanate from representations formed by the dominant group, the political elite in Britain in charge of policy-making at home and abroad. These representations are based on ideological considerations. There exist certain strategies that help extract such representations in texts. The particular representations I look for are representations of social actors, the ways in which these actors are discursively constructed in texts.

Difference between social actors can be identified in texts by looking at the semantic relations between clauses and sentences. Contrastive relations marked by conjunctions such as “but”, “instead of”, and sentence adverbials like “however” are particularly
useful in identifying difference (Fairclough, 2003). Also, metaphors and analogies are crucial linguistic strategies employed for representational purposes. During the British reconstruction of Germany 1945-1949 British politicians and officers on the ground made use of a number of analogies to differentiate themselves from the Germans. For example, Germans were represented as “cannibals” and the British as “missionaries”. Predication is another strategy I employ to identify difference. It requires being attentive to stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits (adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups), comparisons, similarities, rhetorical figures, allusions and evocations. In most of the cases analyzed the British represented the objects of their interventions as victims. These people were described as “defenseless”, “suffering”, “ignorant”.

This chapter presented the conceptual and methodological aspects of the thesis. It provided a working definition for paternalism accompanied by its constitutive characteristics by analyzing the conceptualizations of paternalism in the cross-disciplinary literature. Then, the chapter described the comparative methodology at the heart of the thesis stemming from the very objective I seek to accomplish. My objective is to demonstrate continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse through paternalism. In accordance with that, in the next chapter I reconstitute the social history of British paternalism concentrating on its internal and external manifestation. In the following four empirical chapters I identify how British paternalism manifests itself in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse by looking at Greece 1821-1827, British rule in India during 1830-60, the British intervention in the Sudan of 1896-98, the British mandate on Palestine (Class A) and Tanganyika (Class B) between 1920-1948, the reconstruction of Germany 1945-1949, the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66, the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the R2P intervention in Libya 2011. The comparative analysis demonstrating continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse will be performed in the conclusive chapter of this thesis.
4 Investigating the Origins of British Paternalism in English Society and Politics

In the preceding chapter, I have presented the theoretical and methodological underpinnings that will inform the present but also subsequent chapters. On the theoretical level, the analysis of differing understandings and definitions of the concept of paternalism resulted in me formulating the following working definition:

Paternalism is a coherent system of practices, discourses, and representations that legitimate the actions, and their objectives, of groups claiming to have an obligation towards those they view as inferior, incompetent, and in need of being protected as in a parent-child relationship.

The above brings forth the following constitutive elements as characteristic of paternalism: benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, and representations of incompetence and difference. Further, this definition showcases that paternalistic practices, discourses and representations are unidirectional, from classes in society at the highest on the ladder, or the government towards a specific segment of the population. Additionally, this definition provides a clear insight into my conceptualization of paternalism as a complex system of representations, practices, and discourses. Although these three components are interconnected, there is no particular order in which this connection operates. A practice or a set of practices influences and is influenced by discourses and representations. Consequently, practices can shape representations, discourses can be used to justify practices and/or representations and representations in turn can influence or direct practices.

The above definition provides a general understanding of paternalism, and acts as an entry point into the complex nature of its reality. Given that my research addresses paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse, there is a need to identify the particularities of this British paternalism. This cannot be accomplished without taking into account its specific context of emergence and development. In a
first instance I focus on England and, building on the above definition, I identify the characteristics of English paternalism as manifested in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The need to address paternalism in England stems from my identification of British paternalism as originating in English paternalism, which is in turn expressed towards other British nations. A coherent sketch of British paternalism can only emerge once its manifestation is identified in the core and then in core-periphery relations.

The importance of the interconnection between core and periphery in drawing a sketch of British paternalism rests in those in charge of policy-making. Those arguing for certain policies and in charge of drafting them into law are the same persons who argue for policy regarding nations of the periphery. In essence policy-makers of the center are in charge of both the center and the periphery. Although my investigation has as a starting-point the eighteen century, the origins of English paternalism go far back in history. David Roberts in *Paternalism in Early Victorian England* traces these origins to Medieval and Tudor England. For the governing classes of Tudor England the body politic was seen as “authoritarian, hierarchic and organic” and society was organized in terms of “degrees and ranks that ran from kings to villeins” (Roberts, 1979, p. 10).

During the Tudor period paternalism found a stronger and more coherent formulation through the establishment of the poor laws and the creation of a paternalist state (Roberts, 1979, p. 13-14). However, both Thompson (1978) and Roberts (1979) observe an erosion of paternalism during the eighteenth century. Roberts sees this erosion as resulting from seventeenth-century Englishmen who “destroyed the paternal state, diminished the role of the church, and undermined the intellectual framework of a hierarchic society” (1979, p. 15). For Thompson paternalism in the eighteenth century declined as a result of economic relations between landlords and laborers which saw the erosion of the benevolent aspect in those relations (1978, p. 144-145). Despite discontinuities in paternalism’s manifestation Roberts concludes that “from the late middle ages to the eighteenth century, the governing classes, predominantly landed, held the basic assumptions that define paternalism, but they did so in an unselfconscious and customary manner” (1979, p. 22).
The continuities in paternalism’s manifestation identified by Roberts in Medieval, Tudor and Victorian England demonstrate that despite contextual changes the essence of English paternalism persists throughout history. In order to identify the characteristics of British Paternalism this chapter will be structured as follows: the first section will focus on the eighteenth century and will bring forth the way in which domestic paternalism was expressed by looking at the structure of English society and at institutions and policies directed at “vulnerable groups” of society such as “the poor”. Similarly, the second and third sections will address English paternalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century respectively. At the very general level it can be seen as an investigation into the Poor Laws (Elizabethan Poor Law/ Poor Law Amendment Act 1834) and the development and evolution of the welfare state in England.

In the following section, a comparative analysis of English paternalism in the three periods under investigation will, by way of tracing constants in its formulation, provide a concrete image of English paternalism. The next section will address English paternalism in its external manifestation, henceforth discussed as British paternalism. This will involve looking at England’s relations with Ireland, Wales and Scotland. It is impossible to grasp British paternalism without taking into account the way in which it existed outside the domestic realm. In fact the interplay between domestic and external British paternalism is fascinating and informative. Looking at the way in which domestic policies, representations and discourse influenced the colonies or vice versa is of great significance in understanding the origins of and possible shifts in British paternalism.

4.1 English Paternalism in the Eighteenth Century

The eighteenth century is characterized by the literature as one where “traditional” paternalism thrived (Sherman, 2001), indicative of the presence of an older ideology

5 The phrase English paternalism will be employed when addressing paternalism in England in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, when I turn to the relations between England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland and the manifestation of paternalism in these relations in section 5 I will refer to British paternalism.
of paternalism. This older ideology was “one of a stable and hierarchical rural order, which while arguing that the poor were to remain in their place, offered them in return care and protection of the rich considered as the protectors of the poor” (Novak, 1988, p. 39). During this period, paternalism was seen as functioning under a “feudal system of personal, face to face relationships” (Scull, 1977). In opposition, Thompson in *Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture* notes the erosion of paternalism in the relations between the gentry and the laboring people in the eighteenth century (1974, p. 383).

This traditional or older ideology of paternalism seen as characteristic of 18th century English society coincides with my working definition of paternalism and the elements of benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, and representations of incompetence and difference identified in the previous chapter. However, in order to gain a complete picture of English paternalism in the eighteenth century it is crucial to look at the structure of society during this period, at representations of the lower classes of society (vulnerable groups) by those at the top of the ladder and at the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which since their inception in 1601 dictated the treatment of the poor.

### 4.1.1 English Society: Representations of Social Order

In order to provide a comprehensive image of English paternalism in this period it is crucial to focus in a first instance on the particular structure of English society. This involves engaging with issues such as class, religion, property, the landed aristocracy, particular inclusions and exclusions, and the hierarchical nature of that society. A review of the literature reveals that eighteenth century English society was hierarchical in nature (Viner, 1968, p. 31; Perkins, 1985; Black, 2001). As observed by Perkins, “men took their places in an accepted order of precedence” (Perkins, 1985). This also holds true for women of the period, who were understudied or discussed as members of a male-dominated society. Nineteenth century notions of class did not impact or define society in this period. Consequently, the different parts of society were differentiated in other ways.
As observed by Jeremy Black, “those with pretensions to social status wore wigs, while the poor wore their own hair”. In addition, social status was also visible in the seating arrangements in churches and the treatment of the dying and their corpses (Black, 2001, p. 95). The hierarchical nature of society has been described by Jacob Viner as “a continuous gradation stretching from the dizzy heights of royalty and nobility, down to the lowest depths of miserable and hungry and degraded creatures”. This gradation was described by theologians and poets of the period as “that admirable creation of God, the great chain of beings” (1968, p. 31). This is crucial in that it brings forth the important place of religion in English society during this period.

In fact, according to Perkins, religion provided the “nearest approach to overt class attitudes” (Perkins, 1985, p. 33). An example of the place of religion in society is the development of the evangelical movement whose practices will be developed in the following sections (Checkland, 1983). Further, status in eighteenth century England was based on property, on the amount and kind one owned (Perkins, 1985). It also determined who was eligible to sit in Parliament. According to the 1710 Act, a minimum landed income of 600 pounds per year was necessary to sit in Parliament (Thornton, 1966, p. 62). Hence, the hierarchical nature of eighteenth century English society was to a considerable degree determined by property. Landowners in this period acted as the state (Viner, 1968).

According to Perkins the landed aristocracy “held in its hands the strings of connection and dependency which held society together in a hierarchical manner” (Perkins, 1985, p. 37). Similarly, for Thompson English society was until the 1970s one of “gentry’s hegemony” (Thompson, 1978, p. 162). Aside from addressing the hierarchical nature of English society in this period, and its corollary, inequality, the above has also brought forth the minimal role of the state. In fact, as Kim Lawes argues, English society in this period was based on familial and community responsibility (Lawes, 2000, p. 1).
4.1.2 Representations of the ‘Poor’

According to what has been presented above, the make-up of English society consisted of “a minority of rich and powerful and a majority of poor and powerless individuals” (Perkins, 1985, p. 17). The manner in which the nobility labeled the lower part of society and differentiated itself from them is extremely valuable in order to grasp the paternalist nature of representational practices in England during this period. A review of the literature indicates that the “labels” ascribed to the poor and the ways in which they were represented were many. At a general level it is possible to describe these as practices of instilling differentiation between the higher classes and the lower classes.

Before looking at the various ways in which the poor were represented it is important to delineate what “poor” meant in eighteenth century England. According to Black, although the use of the term varied, it was more often than not employed to refer to those people who were on relief or dependent on charity (Black, 2001, p. 104). A review of the literature on representations of the poor reveals shifts occurring during the eighteenth century. Brundage observes the emergence of harsher attitudes towards the poor in the early part of the century. He makes an association between these harsher attitudes and the connection drawn by people such as Henry Fielding, novelist and London police magistrate, between paupers and criminals (Brundage, 2002).

Providing a more general description of the representational practices of the upper classes, Viner asserts that the lower classes did not usually form part of their vocabulary, but when they did “they were included in a qualified sense, in the denotation of the word the people” (1968, p. 29). The words “poor”, “the populace”, “the rabble”, “the mob”, the “scum” were used to describe those Viner terms “the excluded” (1968, p. 29). The poor people were seen by William Petty as “the vile and brutish part of mankind” (cited in Viner, 1968, p. 29). Further, eighteenth century English writers explained the growth of poverty as a result of their laziness and luxury (Marshall, 1969).

By the 1750s the term “laboring poor” appeared in usage and was used to describe two different groups. The one was “the mob” consisting of the majority of people and the
second, was “the people” referring to those who had a settled income (Black, 2001, p. 104). During the same period Hollen Lees observed that the poor, in the cultural productions of the middle classes most obvious in satirical prints, were “pushed from the center to the periphery of the community they inhabited” (1998, p. 93). These representations shifted during the last decade of the eighteenth century. At this point, the poor were “reduced to skeletal figures shunted to the sidelines of their society” (Lees, 1998, p. 94).

Coinciding with this, Jeremy Seabrook describes how at the end of the period “poverty or pauperism in its darker form began to be described as plague or contagion” (2013, p. 29). Additionally, the Citizen in 1757 in discussing the poor wrote “they are called the vulgar, the mob, the rabble and treated as if they were some inferior species, who are designed only for labor” (cited in Black, 2001, p. 105). Overall the negative traits accorded to the poor and the manner in which they were represented rendered them ignorant, worthless, evil, and incompetent and stripped them of any individuality. In opposition to those historians arguing for the rise of harsh attitudes towards the poor during the last decade of the period, Marshall (1969) records a new attitude and as a result a more lenient treatment of the poor since Gilbert’s Act of 1782 relating to the Poor Laws which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

4.1.3 The Poor Laws and Charity

The second step in the identification of English paternalism involves looking at the policies and institutions directed towards the poor. Perkins remarks that the Poor Law was the “most symbolic of all paternal protections” (1985, p. 185). As its name indicates the Poor Law targeted the poor and albeit with some minor alterations it was based on the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. As the above section illustrated, the Poor Law of the eighteenth century did not espouse benevolence from the higher classes of society, quite the contrary, the aim was deterrence (Slack, 1990). In fact, it was the

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6 Important to note that the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 was preceded by other Parliamentary enactments on the subject of poor relief. Be it as it may, it was only in 1601 that a mandatory system of poor relief, publicly financed was established both in England and Wales (Brundage, 2002).
representation of the aged and impotent paupers as a problem that led to the development of the workhouses (Brundage, 2002).

Very characteristic of the period in terms of society and the Poor Law is that its administration was in the control of parishes. Each had the power to decide the level and conditions of relief and to whom it would be given (Novak, 1988, p. 48). Additionally, there was a tendency to discriminate between the deserving and undeserving poor. Relief was given to the sick, elderly, young and women with children and was denied to the able-bodied (Black, 2001). However, this changed with the growing institutionalization of poor relief during this period. The “overseers of the poor” were, according to a provision of the Elizabethan Poor Law, to find them work (Black, 2001).

Although deterrence was by and large the objective behind the Poor Laws, when it came to the able-bodied poor the help accorded by the overseers in finding them work showcases a more benevolent aspect of the system. Reforms instituted during the eighteenth century, an example of which was the Workhouse Test Act of 1723, showcase a duality of benevolence and deterrence. On the one side the Act encouraged the founding of workhouses in parishes in order to offer work and accommodation to the poor (Black, 2001). On the other hand, the same Act sought to make unattractive the conditions that would provide relief. A special type of institutions accepted paupers, and those who refused to enter them were deprived of outdoor relief (Slack, 1990, p. 40).

An equally important change recorded during the second half of this period related to the transfer of authority from parish overseers to elected and appointed guardians of the poor (Brundage, 2002). A Board of Guardians was established, constituted by justices of the peace and men of property. This Board appointed “Acting Guardians” who would be responsible for the management of workhouses (Slack, 1990). The designation “guardians of the poor” is paternalistic in two ways. First it connotes that the poor must be protected and second not by anyone other than those of high rank in society. Gilbert’s Act of 1782 is the last reform established in this period. It is of
significance because according to some historians it signaled a more positive attitude towards the poor (Marshall, 1969; Slack, 1990). The Act altered the powers held by both churchwardens and overseers of the poor (Marshall, 1969). Further, as per the Act, the able-bodied poor were to be employed outside the workhouse. The latter were to only provide housing for the impotent (Williams, 2011).

Apart from the Poor Laws and associated policies, the lower classes of society were also at the center stage of charity initiatives. Williams observes that charity took the form of “bequests, benefactions and privately founded charities, face to face charity, the gifts of bread and beer at back gates at kitchen doors” (2001, p. 6). The charity school, an Anglican 18th century institution headed by country gentlemen, is a further example of charity initiatives. Here, the concern was the provision of education to the poor. Their education was seen as “good for the poor, good for the country, and good for the rich” (Viner, 1968, p. 32). However, a limit was set as to the depth of knowledge the children of the poor were to receive. It consisted of an elementary level of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Apart from being a benevolent gesture, it can also be characterized as leading to and sustaining dependency between the “giver” and the “recipient”. When these children would grow up they would be dependent on the children of the country gentlemen.

4.1.4 Justifying the Need for the Poor Laws and Poor Relief

Discourses being justifications for policies and actions, they are particularly revealing with respect to English paternalism. According to the literature, duty and responsibility are the most often cited justifications for the conduct of the few towards the many “poor” in the Eighteenth century. For instance Beatrice and Sidney Webb argued that “The English Poor Law at no time gave the destitute a personal ‘right’ to relief… what was enacted was not a right at all but an obligation… the obligation to relieve the impotent poor and to provide the able-bodied with the means of earning their livelihood by work…the amount of relief and the manner of relief were left to the discretion of the parish officers” (cited in King, 2000, p. 50).
Reverend Sherer’s argument in his work *Remarks on the Present State of the Poor* in 1796 is crucial in understanding the system of obligation and deference between the rich and the poor in this period. He argued that

mutual is the dependence of the rich and the poor upon each other, and mutual are their obligations. Their rights and duties are reciprocal. Whatever are the duties of the poor, are the rights of the rich; and whatever are the duties of the rich, are the rights of the poor. It is the duties of the poor, to behave to their superiors with reverence, to serve them with fidelity, and to obey them with clearfulness; these therefore are the rights due to the rich: in like manner, it is the duty of the rich to protect the poor, to reward their services, and to supply their wants; and these are the rights due to the poor. (cited in Sherman, 2001, p. 7)

The above depicts a paternalistic ideology, whereby the rich protect and tend to the poor. It also brings forth the idea of a mutual obligation between the haves and the have-nots, which engenders dependency for the poor. In response to the above, Sherman has argued that, “in paternalist apologetics” the system described by Sherer “was intended to imply that the poor’s inequality ensured their well-being” (2001, p. 7). The duties and obligations of the higher classes are also illustrated in Bailey’s argument: “To provide a comfortable subsistence for the poor is most certainly a duty highly obligatory upon every person in whom the traces of moral virtue are not quite obliterated, the performance of which is equally required by Policy and Religion” (quoted in Marshall, 1969, p. 19-20).

The above discourses displaying the duty and responsibility of particular groups in society bring forth the way in which paternalistic discourses were formulated in eighteenth century England and the crucial relevance of religion. Also these discourses were complemented by the idea that the aged and impotent paupers were unable to care for themselves (Brundage, 2002). Similar arguments were put forward by Edmund Burke in 1770 that “men required for their own sake and in their own best interest to be controlled” (Thornton, 2009, p. 76).
4.2 English Paternalism in the Nineteenth Century

The position of scholars on the manifestation of paternalism in nineteenth century England is mixed. Scholars like Novak argue the decline of paternalism and the appearance of laissez-faire. For others, like Sherman, “traditional” paternalism declined with the development of the New Poor Law of 1834 (Sherman, 2001, p.4). For her, paternalism during the nineteenth century underwent a shift from its traditional kind to one adapted to industrialization. For Lawes the shift in paternalism resulted from a shift in the locus of authority, from familial to state responsibility (2000). Even if paternalism’s form changed to a certain degree, its manifestation persisted from one period to the other because paternalism is ingrained in the social structure of a society and its institutions. In fact, the historian David Roberts supports that both the industrial and urban revolutions permitted the development of a social theory imbued with paternalism, representing “a social remedy for new frightening problems” (1979, p22).

4.2.1 The Structure of British Society: Representations of Social Order

A review of the literature on English paternalism and more generally on English society demonstrates that hierarchy, class distinctions, dependency, “the aristocratic ideal”, deference, charity and an increased role of the state were characteristic of English society in the nineteenth century. Some of these features persisted throughout the century, others were subject to shifts. Hierarchy is unanimously presented as the bedrock of nineteenth century society (Best, 1971; Roberts, 1979; Finlayson, 1994; Sherman, 2001). Sherman notes that paternalism refers to “the process of legitimation by tradition of the hierarchical nature of English society” (2001, p. 6). This demonstrates the centrality of the hierarchical nature of society to this period and its centrality to paternalism.

Some historians have argued that the emergence of class signalled a shift from the old vertical connections of dependency/patronage characteristic of the previous century and a shift from a hierarchical to a class-based society (Perkins, 1985; Hewitt, 2006).
For Scull (1977), the “traditional” relations between the rich and poor changed as a result of the emergence of the capitalist system. In spite of this, a sense of place of belonging and hierarchical conceptions still remained. Hierarchy in early nineteenth English society was deemed indispensable. The idea that “society was unequal and should remain so; the poor should be subordinate to the rich, for that was the relationship which a wise Almighty ordained” expressed by Burke in 1780, inspired, according to Finlayson, writers of the nineteenth century (cited in Finlayson, 1994, p. 51).

Similarly, Tories in Early Victorian England believed that the link between hierarchy and inequality would enable the establishment of order in English society (Roberts, 1979). The existence of hierarchy and conceptions about it during the early years of the period exhibit the continuance of ideas from one century to the next. Roberts identifies dependency as key to the paternalist hierarchical outlook of the Early Victorians (Roberts, 1979). Its value was acknowledged in J.S. Mill’s theory of dependency and protection:

The relation between rich and poor, according to this theory… should be only partly authoritative; it should be amiable, moral, and sentimental: affectionate tutelage on the one side, respectful and grateful deference on the other. The rich should be in loco parentis to the poor, guiding them and restraining them like children. Of spontaneous action on their part there should be no need. They should be called on for nothing but to do their day’s work, and to be moral and religious. Their morality and religion should be provided to them by their superiors, who should see them properly taught it, in return for labor and attachment, properly fed, clothed, housed, in return for labor, spiritually edified and innocently amused. (2004, p. 193)

The latter is highly instructive in that it clearly displays the authority and duties of the higher classes in English society. Apart from dependence and hierarchy, society in early Victorian England saw the re-emergence of “the aristocratic ideal” (Perkins, 1985; Lawes, 2000). This ideal was revived by Michael Thomas Sadler and a group
of Tories conveying a sense of social responsibility for the lower orders by the aristocracy (Lawes, 2000, p. 1-2). It was revived at a time when laissez-faire was gaining ground as the strategy for the ideal society. That the poor had a right to relief began to be contested by country gentlemen. It became increasingly prevalent that the poor should find work on their own and that it should not be the responsibility of employers (Novak, 1988; Lees, 1998).

A certain continuity can be observed between the early and mid-nineteenth century in terms of social order. According to Geoffrey Best (1971, p. 228), deference was characteristic of the middle part of the period resulting in a situation where “the great man helped the poor man, and the poor man loved the great”. In addition Bagehot also shared his ideas on the nature of deference in English society: “England is the kind of deferential country, in which the numerous unwiser part wishes to be ruled by the less numerous wiser part. The numerical majority…is ready, is eager to delegate its power of choosing its rulers to a certain select minority. It abdicates in favor of its elite and consents to obey whoever the elite may confide in” (Bagehot in Best, 1971, p. 237).

Religion and the church were, during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, a significant aspect of English society seen by paternalists as a means to achieve a better society (Roberts, 1979). For example, Samuel Coleridge argued for the moral regeneration of the individual and saw the Church of England as the head of a paternalist society (Roberts, 1958, p. 324). Accordingly, the primary educator of the poor for those such as Coleridge was the Church of England, not state aided schools (Roberts, 1958, p. 327). This was acknowledged by the clergy of the Church of England, who viewed themselves as “shepherds enjoined by God to protect both the eternal and the temporal welfare of their flocks” (Roberts, 1979, p. 150).

Charity was a central part of English society throughout the nineteenth century, intimately related to religion. It was the domain of the bourgeoisie and their response to the issue of poverty (Novak, 1988). Middle-class Englishmen focused on the morality of the working-class, guided by the belief that personalized charity was a form of character-building (Goodland, 2001, p. 594). The effect of charity initiatives
was that they established a continuity in the relations between the haves and the have-nots. In respect to Christian charity, Cruikshank observes that “it encouraged the dependence of the poor upon the rich…it ritualized the class order, inspired awe and deference in the helped and arrogance in the helper” (1999, p. 48). This is interesting not only because it showcases the central place of charity, mostly dominated by the rich, but it also illustrates once more how dependency was a crucial aspect of society in this period.

The emergence of class is an additional characteristic of this period. By the end of the century the organization of schools, work, housing, welfare, culture and recreation combined to compartmentalize English society along class lines (Harris, 1994). A two-class system formed: on the one side was a property-owning ruling class and on the other was a property-less working class (Harris, 1994, p. 6). The role of the state in relation to poor relief is also quite characteristic of this century. There is something interesting to be said about the idea of the government in the period, which also touches upon paternalism.

The notion of paternal government was a concept that emerged in the early Victorian period prior to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (Lawes, 2000). Proponents of paternalism like Robert Southey and Samuel Coleridge demanded that the state have an active and protective role (Lawes, 2000). Following this attitude the Morning Post wrote in 1848: “Direct and protect are the two great offices of a rational and well principled government” (Roberts, 1979, p. 198). Although authority began to shift from the parish to the state, the notion of protecting those in need remained. What changed was the locus of that authority.

4.2.2 Representing the Lower Classes: Writers, Social Theorists, Political Figures

The situation of the poor was explained in distinct ways in this period. For early Victorian Poor Law theorists poverty was an inevitable condition owing to the dependency of people on waged labor. As such it was not perceived as constituting a
social problem (Harris, 1994). In contrast, the Charity Organization Society classed poverty as a problem of “character”. It resulted from the “improvident habits and driftlessness” of the poor (Novak, 1988, p. 97). For the members of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws appointed in 1832, poverty was not inevitable, quite the opposite, it was a voluntary condition which could be reversed (Englander, 1998).

Pauperism on the other hand, was from early on labeled as “a social problem” (Roberts, 1979, p. 74). It occupied center stage in discussions on the alleviation of poverty. Not all poor people were classified as paupers. Paupers were those belonging to the group of dependent poor who received poor relief as they could not support themselves (Harris, 1994; Lees, 1998). The early nineteenth century saw the beginning of practices and discourses of exclusion targeting paupers. Hollen-Lees observes that both practices and writers of the period identified paupers as a separate, inferior group and that it was a feeling of hatred towards them that influenced the establishment of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act (Lees, 1998, p. 233). One of the problems encountered when discussing the place of the poor, lower classes in general is that the differentiation between “pauperism” and “the poor” was not always clear-cut.

Poverty was seen as the product of natural laws, whereas pauperism was due to individual human will (Harris, 1994, p. 238). Poor Law reformers, more specifically the Commissioners appointed to review the Poor Laws, aimed to render this distinction more evident. Their conception of poverty moved beyond the all-encompassing concept of laboring poor and included the two concepts of “dependency” and “non-dependency” (Englander, 1998, p. 6). Despite their efforts the New Poor Law did not manage to draw a clear distinction between the poor and the pauper. In fact, the “stigma” of pauperism, which was meant to differentiate the pauper from the poor, had the perverse effect of stigmatizing the entire body of the poor (Himmelfarb, 1985).

In addressing how the lower classes were represented in this period, it is crucial to address how differently “the poor” were represented in different parts of England. It is in London that “the poor” were represented in the more distinct manner. London’s poor were seen as constituting a class apart, ultimately seen as a race apart
(Himmelfarb, 1985). Given that English society in the nineteenth century was one headed by aristocratic men, being poor was seen as a problem but being a poor mother was even worse. Local guardians questioned the capacity of poor mothers to bring up their children competently. In their eyes institutions could do a better job (Thane, 1978).

4.2.3 The Poor Laws Amendment Act 1834

The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (New Poor Law) was the result of calls for reform due to the inadequacies of the Elizabethan Poor Law. Prior to its formulation, minor reforms such as the Parish Vestry Act of 1818 and the Select Vestry Act of 1819 were enacted. Both Acts reiterated that the protection of the poor was a responsibility vested onto the parish. One of their objectives was to decrease the influence of magistrates and overseers and increase that of important landholders. It was based on the belief that “the responsibility of distributing and managing parish funds was a duty of care which should fall to men of substance and education” (Lawes, 2000, p. 72).

Steadily, the role of the state in relieving the poor was extended during the century. Laws enacted by Parliament were seen as necessary means to protect certain sections of the population. Shaftesbury argued in 1840 that laws “should assume the proper function of protecting the poor” (Finlayson, 1994, p. 89-90). A number of protective legislations in the mid nineteenth century ascribe a role to the state, which was “not to enable, but to restrict; not to encourage, but to curtail” (Finlayson, 1994, p. 90). In essence the state exercised this role on behalf of people seen as “vulnerable” and thus could practice neither mutual aid, nor self-help (Finlayson, 1994). This reveals that although the 1834 Act was seen as the ultimate expression of laissez-faire (Novak, 1988), paternalism was still part of the system. Although the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 retained certain features of its predecessor, it was distinguished by its two core principles of less eligibility and the workhouse test (Goodland, 2001).

The first principle dictated that the pauper should at no point be in the same position or condition as the lower class of independent laborer (Himmelfarb, 1985). The second
tested the real need of a pauper by making relief only accessible through a workhouse (Goodland, 2001). Consequently, only those in real need of relief would choose to enter and endure the workhouses. The Poor Law amendment Act of 1834 has generally been described as an Act of discipline and deterrence rather than relief (Poynter, 1969; Brundage, 2002). This characterization coincides with the treatment of the able-bodied poor. The deterrent and disciplinary aspect of the Poor Laws was embodied in the institution of the workhouse, seen as a place of terror and discipline (Novak, 1988). Its main purpose was to make paupers feel like “unwelcomed guests” (Goodland, 2001, p. 592). The conditions within workhouses that paupers were faced with as well as the loss of personal freedom and the sense of shame and failure operated as a psychological deterrent (Brundage, 2002).

The need for the strict and deterring aspect of the Poor Law was seen as necessary to be maintained. The Goshen Minute of 1869, a minute of the Poor Law Board, reiterated that workhouses should maintain their deterrent character arguing that “a strict poor law would deal with the undeserving poor in such a way as to jolt them into the ranks of the deserving poor” (Finlayson, 1994, p. 92). This displayed harshness, an antithesis to benevolence seen as a feature of paternalistic practice, does not necessarily indicate that benevolence was absent from the institution of the Poor Laws. In fact, benevolence was characteristic of practices under the Poor Law directed to the non-able-bodied (Finlayson, 1994).

At a general level, the Victorian period can be seen as a period in which protective legislation was increasingly promoted by both paternalists and philanthropists. Some examples are the regulation of hours and conditions in the workplaces, and the regulation and supervision of lunatic asylums (Finlayson, 1994). In many respects it was a period characterized by an increased interventionist stance by the state embodied in numerous acts of legislation in social and economic life (Novak, 1988). In addressing the Poor Laws, it is important to include the place of charity, which was overwhelmingly the response of the bourgeoisie to the problem of poverty. Their practices were characterized by benevolence. An example of this was the giving of school meals to “necessitous children” by charities (Briggs, 1961, p. 224).
4.2.4 Justifying Practices Around the New Poor Law

According to the literature, duty, protection, and the responsibility of the higher classes but also of the government were at the heart of discourses of the time. The motive was either the call for protection of the lower classes or a “mission” to alter them. As Thane remarks, helping the destitute was an unavoidable obligation of Poor Law administrators (Thane, 1978). A characteristic of the paternalism of this period is the idea that the Poor Law provided support for poor people who were unable to support themselves (Spicker, 2002, p. 24).

Discourses of protection extended to the laboring poor. Michael Thomas Sadler, a Tory Member of Parliament, argued on several occasions for the need to put in place protective policies for the laboring poor. In his attempt to push for action in order to provide better benefits for this class he urged members of the House “to assume its noblest character, that of the protector of the poor, and, seeking that the suggestions of humanity, and the dictates of policy have long been disregarded, let the law once more interpose its sacred shield, and protect the defenseless and the wretched from the miseries they have too long endured” (cited in Lawes, 2000, p. 148).

The above is a powerful statement illustrating the sense of duty and obligation of those in positions of power and the way in which protection was justified by representing the object of intervention as wretched and defenseless. This coincides with Roberts’ observation that for paternalists of Early Victorian England “the simple call for the protection, as a father would protect a child, of the weak, helpless, poor and ill was a criterion for government intervention in early Victorian England” (Roberts, 1979, p. 190). Paternalists such as Coleridge shared the above views regarding the responsibilities of the government and its role in looking out for the needs of the people (Lawes, 2000). Similarly, the poet William Wordsworth wrote in the 1830s that the state should act “in loco parentis to the poor” (cited in Finlayson, 1994, p. 89).

Departing from discourses which espoused the familial notion of protection and the duties of the government were those which focused on reforming or altering the laboring poor based on representations of “the self” as the ultimate objective for that
reformation. For example, J. Roebuck, a radical MP, stated his objective in 1868 as being “to make the working man as … civilized a creature as I could make him”; “I wanted to make the working man like me” (cited in Goodland, 2001, p. 591). There is a certain mark of duty and obligation emanating from this. A crucial aspect of the above pointed out by Goodland is the civilizing mission aspect of it which caught the interest and attention of the middle-class of that period (Goodland, 2001).

4.3 English Paternalism in the Twentieth Century

The emergence of the welfare state and discourses of collectivism accompanying it influenced the structure of society, perceptions of “the self” and “the other” and policies towards certain and all classes in England. A continuing element observed between the twentieth century and the one preceding it was the problem of poverty and the exploration of adequate solutions to manage or alleviate it. With the turn of the century surfaced conceptions of organic corporate identity and common citizenship in political thought. For Harris (1994), these conceptions and the shift from individualism to collectivism weakened the class model as it had existed in the nineteenth century.

Be it as it may, this does not imply that inequality ceased to be a characteristic feature of twentieth century English society or that the nature of this society radically changed. It is rather the case that paternalism evolved rather than disappeared. Paternalism was increasingly seen as characteristic of the government after the establishment of the Welfare State. However, this changed when Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979. Her objective as described to the Times in January 1984 was for her government to be seen as that “which decisively broke with the debilitating consensus of a paternalistic government and a dependent people, which rejected the notion that the State is all powerful and the citizen is merely its beneficiary; which shattered the illusion that Government could somehow substitute for individual performance” (cited in Lowe, 1999, p. 3). Although, the welfare state underwent increasing reforms in the later part of the twentieth century under the governments of Margaret Thatcher, John
Major and Tony Blair, some continuities are still observed at a societal and policy level.

### 4.3.1 The Structure of English Society

A review of the literature indicates that English society up until the mid-twentieth century was hierarchic, un-equal, influenced by universalist principles and saw a further extension in the role of the government. Features characteristic of the previous century are observed, which are according to Stevenson (1984, p. 17) a result of the persistence of both Victorian and Edwardian assumptions and habits in the minds of certain classes. English society during the 1940s and 1950s reflected an older order. Marr (2008, pp. 46–47) describes this society as one that was hierarchical, ascribed to rituals and was “run by cliques and groups of friends who first met at public schools and Oxbridge”.

The role and power of the landed aristocracy as witnessed in the nineteenth century was declining. This was also accompanied by a shift in the interests of the upper class from land to business (Marwick, 1991). Class was a constitutive feature of society during this period that served to organize it in a hierarchical fashion. Despite the softening of class distinctions (Marwick, 1991; Marr, 2009) it was nevertheless the basis of differentiation between the different groups in society. During the first decade of the century, classes in society were differentiated by their clothing, the way they spoke, the conditions and hours of work and the educational system they had access to (Thompson, 1992). In a similar fashion class differentiation during 1945-50 was determined by the way one spoke, one’s place of residence and one’s choice of entertainment (Marr, 2008, p. 43).

A number of scholars identify the softening or blurring of overt class distinctions, especially between middle and working class since the 1920s (Marwick, 1991; Thompson, 1992; Harris, 1994). It is seen as a direct result of the emergence of conceptions of collectivism and common citizenship (Harris, 1994; Marwick, 1991). These conceptions moved in the opposite direction from the individualism of
Victorian England (Brundage, 2002). Be it as it may, that class was and is deeply anchored, at the core of English society, is undeniable. Lynne Banks, a novelist, expressed in 1976 the centrality of class saying that “class is deeply embedded in our national sub-conscious it is poisoning every aspect of our lives. Not just industrial relations and politics” (cited in Marwick, 2003, p. 166).

Poverty was another important aspect characterizing society in this period. It was an issue of considerable concern, which after the establishment of the Welfare State was believed to belong to the past. However, during the 1960s occurred what many commentators have described as “the re-discovery” of poverty (Banting, 1979; Lowe, 1999; Spicker, 2002). It was during that decade that both poverty and inequality took once more their place as defining elements of society (Banting, 1979). The Universalist principles at the basis of the welfare state were challenged to a considerable degree by policies targeting particular classes. Selective targeting was observed in the 1950s, prior to the re-discovery of poverty, directing expenditure to the most impoverished classes (Whiteside, 1996, p. 84).

A further characteristic of twentieth century society was the further expansion of the role of the government. The first decade of the century saw its area of responsibility broaden by legislation enacted on education, children’s rights and working hours (Finlayson, 1994). A distinctive aspect of the government’s role in relation to social welfare was that it applied to “all” citizens (Briggs, 1961, p. 224; Sleeman, 1973). Again here the influence of Universalist principles is observed. The public accepted that collective improvement could only result through government initiatives and that it was the government that had a responsibility “to promote and protect the well-being of its citizens” (Noble, 2009, p. 7). The welfare state resulted in establishing a “universal right to welfare” under the responsibility of the state (Taylor and Lansley, 1992, p. 154).

However, when one looks at English society in the last quarter or so of the twentieth century, some differences can be observed. The first relates to the shift from Universalism back to Individualism characterizing English society in the 1980s and
According to the literature, individualism, independence, competitiveness and self-reliance were encouraged as values to be embraced by society (Abercrombie and Warde, 2000, p. 436). The second pertains to the role of the state. From 1979 onwards the objective of politicians, exemplified by Mrs. Thatcher was to “roll back” the state (Lowe, 1999, p. 317; Fraser, 2017, p. 269). What this meant was that the state’s purview in terms of providing welfare was to be restricted. Voluntary organizations and the family were encouraged to be more involved as providers for the poor.

According to the Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher “the welfare state has displaced the role of the family as main providers of welfare” (Glennerster, 2000, p. 196). The role of the state was further re-conceptualized during the late 1990s by the New Labour government of Tony Blair. For him the state was envisaged as “an enabling force” (Blair, 1998, p. 4). These conceptualizations led to an intensive system of welfare characterized by increased targeting (Marwick, 2003). Aside from these shifts, continuities are also observed when we turn to the issue of poverty and the unequal character of society. There was a significant rise in poverty during 1979-87 which persevered until the end of the twentieth century (Abercrombie and Warde, 2000; Powell, 2000). What differentiates the periods 1979-87 and 1987-2000 is the extent to which politicians strove to reduce poverty and alleviate it. Unlike his predecessors, Blair’s top priority was poverty reduction (Powell, 2000, p. 55).

English society continued to be characterized by inequality which intensified as a result of policies initiated in the 1980s (Mack and Lansley, 1985). Scholars also point to the market as responsible for creating further inequalities (Lowe, 1999; Marwick, 2003) On this, Marwick notes that “inequalities in income and living conditions between well-off and badly off were intensifying” (2003, p. 382). Decreased taxation for the wealthy was an additional contributing factor. Aside from this, this period also witnessed geographical inequalities. Unemployment levels were higher in the North of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and lower in the South (Reitan, 2002, p. 71). It is crucial to note at this point that from 1997 onwards the government was increasingly promoting equality of opportunity and social inclusion (Lister, 1998). Although class distinctions continued to be less rigid than they were in previous
centuries, class remained a characteristic of English society. However, immigration, affluence and individualism did have an impact on its meaning (Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, 2017, p. 298).

4.3.2 Redefining the Subjects of Compassion in the Welfare State

The negative representations of the lower classes identified at the end of the nineteenth century were still visible during the first decade of the twentieth century. The poor were labeled as “diseased” and “contagious”, seen as in desperate need of social engineering or even elimination (Novak, 1988, p. 106). They were also viewed and treated as “defective members” of British society (Lees, 1998, p. 311). Co-existing was a very different manner of representing the poor, based on an opposite understanding of poverty. It focused on statistics and economics seeing poverty as a result of a lack of income. This view of poverty was at the core of insurance schemes introduced in 1909, which in 1948 became the welfare state (Lees, 1998, p. 311).

Consequently, a shift in representations but also labels ascribed to the poor saw the establishment of the welfare state. After 1930, “pauperism” was no longer in use (Lees, 1998). Poverty came to be defined through a Liberal definition acknowledging that it resulted from numerous factors such as personal misfortune, low wages, large families, etc. Banting identifies this with the conceptions enshrined in the Beveridge Report of 1942 and recommendations contained therein (1979, p. 83). From 1945 onwards, distinctions previously made between “respectable” and “rough” working classes gave way to representations of a more homogenous class (Marwick, 2003, p. 25).

Just like in the previous century women were subject to increased discrimination both in the Edwardian period and during the years before the establishment of the Welfare State. For example until 1914, unmarried women were differentiated as belonging either to the group entitled as “the innocent” or to that of “the depraved” (Thane, 1978, p. 46). The Beveridge Report of 1942 touched upon another level of discrimination. It
emphasized the role of women as mothers and wives and not as workers. Their status was as dependents of their husbands (Novak 1988 p. 152; Lowe, 1999).

In order to forge a holistic understanding of the ways in which the poor were represented, it is imperative to turn to the second half of the twentieth century. A review of the literature makes apparent certain shifts that occurred during this period relating to the definitions employed to characterize and measure poverty. From the 1950s onwards poverty was defined in relative rather than absolute terms which resulted in more people being defined as poor (Jones and Lowe, 2002; Fraser, 2017). Its measurement was undertaken in two distinct manners. The first, relied on accounting for those who received supplementary benefit (Piachaud, 1987, p. 11). The second method employed by the EU and the British government’s series *Households Below Average Income*, measures poverty by accounting for those whose income is below 50% of the average income (Abercrombie and Warde, 2000, p. 124).

Poverty was no longer seen as due to a combination of factors. According to the literature victim blaming became common in the 1970s-90s (Mack and Lansley, 1985; Jones and Novak, 1999). In fact, as Mack and Lansley note the poor “came to be blamed not just for their own problems, but also for the nation’s” (1985, p. 4). This gave way to harsher attitudes towards the poor, resembling those found in the first decade of the twentieth century. Welfare claimants in the 1980s and 1990s were labelled as “scroungers”. Numerous policy initiatives were undertaken in order to deal with those who were taking advantage of the welfare benefits system (Jones, 2000). Abercrombie and Ward (2000, p. 438) note that during those two decades more often than not political speeches and the media referred to welfare claimants as “scroungers” who were “draining the resources of taxpayers”.

Those who previously fell in the category of “able-bodied” or “undeserving” poor, were subject to negative representations not only from the political elite but from the wider public. For example in 1983, a Tory voter stated “people are tired of featherbedding for those too lazy or inadequate to fend for themselves” (cited in Samuel, 1992, p. 16). What becomes apparent is a return to views regarding “the
“deserving” and “undeserving” poor. The latter is supported by McKay and Rowlingson who note that the Blair government’s focus on children and pensioners “draws on traditional views about ‘the deserving’ poor” (2008, p. 69). A further illustration of this, is the concept of the “underclass” or the “socially excluded” which Turner traces back to the nineteenth concept of “undeserving poor” (Turner, 2014). Both concepts referred to a group in society characterized as “unskilled, unpowerful and often unwaged or low-waged” (Turner, 2014, p. 430).

4.3.3 The Welfare State

Up until 1945 the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 continued to determine poor relief dealing with those at the very bottom of society. The first forty years of the twentieth century are crucial in understanding the establishment of the Welfare state under the Labor Government 1945-50. In terms of providing relief, The Unemployment Workman Act 1904 relieved the “deserving” unemployed who temporarily had no work (Novak, 1988, p 109). The protective role of the state becomes evident through the Children’s Act of 1908, substituting family with state care for neglected or delinquent children (Thane, 1978).

In order to identify paternalism in light of the development of the welfare state portrayed as antithetical to the notion of paternalism there is a need to go back to 1942 and address the Beveridge report. The latter has been widely seen as the basis upon which the Welfare System was established (Novak, 1988). For Marsland the report “encouraged widespread reliance on the central state, ever-expanding state intervention, bureaucratic control of people’s lives and massively increased public expenditure” (Marsland, 1992, p. 146). But more importantly, he described the welfare state as established by the Beveridge Report as paternalist and Universalist (1992, p. 146). This proposes that paternalism is not antithetical to Universalist principles and that it eventually finds an expression in the welfare state and in its various branches (social security, housing, personal social services, health, and education).
Rather than aid be provided by the rich to the poor, Beveridge’s system of social insurance relied on a system of mutual aid such as the contributory insurance of the prewar period (Lowe, 1999). Each citizen contributed to this system in order to be able to benefit from it at a later date. In practice, the welfare state and two of its central policies, the National Insurance Act of 1946 and the National Assistance Act of 1948 (Thornton, 2009), did not fully ascribe to the Universalist vision of the time. Although the National Insurance Act was presented as applying to all citizens in society, it did promote inequality rather than equality.

Those people who were unable to contribute their share to the scheme had to have recourse to the supplementary Act of National Assistance and undergo means-tests. In Noble’s (2009, p. 2) view this supplementary Act came forth as a replacement to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. Like its predecessor the means-test benefit scheme applied to that portion of the population below the poverty line like women (separated, divorced, widowed), the elderly, the unemployed and the sick and disabled (Lowe, 1999). Another continuity observed between the National Assistance Act and its predecessor is the treatment of the poor. Paupers were still seen with suspicion and treated badly (Brundage, 2002).

This is also true for other aspects of the Welfare state. Some conformed more than others to Universalist philosophy. A case in point is the National Health Service (NHS), seen as that adhering most to that philosophy. Conversely, housing policies in practicing selectivity distanced themselves from that principle. Housing Acts and council housing subsidized by the state focused on the working classes (Marwick, 2003). According to Marwick drug control in the mid-twentieth century was based on “the most liberal paternalistic principles”. By registering, drug users, identified as being mostly middle-aged and elderly citizens, received their dose through the NHS (Marwick, 2003, p. 114).

The Universalist philosophy upon which the welfare state was established came under increasing scrutiny after 1979. The Thatcher 1979-90, Major 1990-97 and Blair 1997-2007 governments sought to remedy key problems that resulted from the Welfare State
of 1945: dependency, the increased involvement of the state and rising levels of public expenditure. It is important to note that especially during the Thatcher years, social security reforms were driven predominantly by a need to reduce costs (Reitan, 2002, p. 17). Dependence on welfare benefits was tackled through a variety of reforms. For example, in 1982 sickness and unemployment benefits were based on price inflation rather than wages, resulting in lower benefits for recipients (Reitan, 2002, p. 31). What is more, the 1982 Social Security Act made benefits taxable (Fraser, 2017, p. 288). The latter severely impacted all welfare recipients resulting in more not less poverty.

In majority these steps were undertaken to deal with the group previously identified as the “undeserving” poor. A further example to showcase this, is the Social Security Act of 1986. One of its provisions was that those applying for unemployment benefit had to show willingness and availability to work (Marwick, 2003, pp. 298–99). The welfare to work scheme established in 1997 to tackle dependency also showcased the principle of conditionality. Various means were employed to incite people to work rather than rely on benefits (Fraser, 2017, p. 295). Powell notes that Blair’s government, “continued with similar policy goals to the previous Conservative government, particularly in relation to the focus on moving people from welfare to work” (Powell, 2008, pp. 53–54). At times the New Labour government coerced and at others helped people to go back to work.

While positive assistance was to be given to people who decided to move from benefits to work, financial penalties were to be initiated towards those who did not termed the “workshy” (Powell, 2000, p. 45). The conditionality principle, a feature of policy reforms after 1979 was a means through which personal responsibility would be inculcated into those claiming welfare benefits. In the 1980s personal responsibility was encouraged by the government through the sale of council houses (Reitan, 2002). Moving on, the use of means-tested benefits persisted during the second half of this period. There were two types of means-tested benefits. The one applied to all citizens when their income fell below an agreed level. In 1948 it was known as National Assistance. It was then renamed Supplementary Benefit and subsequently became known as Income Support. As already identified above it was usually the poor who
had recourse to this type of benefit, despite being available “to all”. The second included a variety of means-tested benefits like for example free school meals, rent rebates which sought to aid the most needy (Jones and Lowe, 2002, p. 42).

Following 1986, the government simplified Income Support by introducing two benefit rates, one for the over-25s and the other for the under-25s. Also families, the elderly and disabled received additional premiums (Lowe, 1999, p. 323). According to Glennerster through the 1986 Social Security Act “more help went to the elderly, children and the long-term sick” (2000, p. 171). Families with children received increasing support through the Family Credit later renamed The Working Families Tax Credit under Blair (Powell, 2000). Overall, it could be argued that reforms instigated on the poorer section of society were disciplinary but also at times ingrained with a small dose of benevolence. This is particularly true of the 1980s. The government distanced itself from universalism in order to reduce costs but also to “target aid where it was most needed” (Marwick, 2003, p. 240). It is towards those identified as most in need that benevolence is identified. Protection in the second half of the twentieth century involved pushing the poor, especially the “undeserving” to better themselves to become responsible and active citizens.

4.3.4 Justifying the Welfare state

Most explanations and justifications for the development of the welfare state and its objectives do signal the decline of paternalism. As referred to above, collectivism was the ethos characteristic of the period. According to the literature, the welfare state and the role of the government was seen as dedicated to positively promote the welfare of all its citizens (Sleeman, 1973; Whiteside, 1996). These ideas were reflected in the argument of a historian of British social policy during World War II who saw that “it was increasingly regarded as a proper function or even obligation of government to ward off distress and strain not only among the poor but among all classes of society” (Briggs, 1961, p. 224).
Although the concept of obligation is employed here, it is not restricted to a particular target group but rather is presented as all-inclusive. The position of the Conservatives was similar to that of the historian of British social policy quoted above. In their 1949 pamphlet *The Right Road for Britain* they argued that “the social services are no longer even in theory a form of poor relief. They are a cooperative system of mutual aid and self-help provided by the whole nation and designed to give to all the basic minimum of security, of housing, of opportunity, of employment and of living standards below which our duty to one forbids us to permit any one to fall” (Briggs, 1961, p. 227).

Despite this, more current positions reflect the dependence ensued from the Welfare State and the conception that “for many of the poor and vulnerable, state action may represent the only possibility of substantial progress” (Banting, 1979). Although Banting was referring to the 1970s, it is a conception that also holds true for most of the twentieth century. State responsibility stemming from an inability of certain citizens to look after themselves was also an argument voiced during the 1960s during the period of the re-discovery of poverty. In arguing for the abolition of the Rent Act, the Ministry of Housing argued that “[w]e just cannot have these poor wretched creatures kicked into the streets”; “we have to reintroduce control” (Banting, 1979, p. 30).

The 1980s and 90s exhibit similar justifications pertaining to some of the poor and especially to those seen as unable to take care of themselves. This was conveyed in Thatcher’s speech in 1981 to the Conservative Women’s Conference in London according to which “the state must look after some children in care and those old people who cannot look after themselves” (Finlayson, 1994, p. 362). What is more, discourses espousing the protection of the vulnerable were voiced by key ministers and Parliamentarians. In 1982 Norman Fowler, the Secretary of State for Social Services argued at the Conservative Party Conference “‘I did not come into politics to ignore the needs of the sick and handicapped. I came into politics to do something about their position, not by words, but by deeds’” (quoted in Wilding, 1983, p. 5). Similarly during a Commons debate in February 1981 Mr. Jenkin, the Secretary of State for Social Services stated “what we must do, and are doing, is to ensure that
those in the greatest need are helped and protected as far as we are able” (HC Deb 3 February 1981, c170).

Moreover, responsibility and duty resurfaced in political discourses in a dominant way. However, these did not speak of the duties and responsibilities of the state towards all its citizens, but rather of mutual duties and responsibilities. Stress was especially applied on the concept of individual/personal responsibility. As Thatcher put it in “we are all responsible for our own actions…intervention by the state must never become so great that it effectively removes personal responsibility” (Finlayson, 1994, p. 358 quoted in). On the matter of duties and responsibilities Blair argued that ‘the modern notion of citizenship gives rights but demands obligations, shows respect but wants it back, grants opportunity but insists on responsibility’ (quoted in Dwyer, 2008, p. 199).

4.4 Constants and Variations in English Paternalism

The previous sections have shown how paternalism manifested itself in eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century England. Throughout these centuries, its manifestation was influenced or even challenged by the emergence of industrialism, differing conceptions of class, of the poor, shifts in the structure of society, new policies, wars, famines, etc. Consequently, there is a need to further interrogate how developments within each century influenced English paternalism. To these ends, this section will focus on the structure of English society, on policies enacted and on the prevailing discourses in all periods under investigation. This comparison will allow the identification of possible transformations to some of the concept’s elements and will culminate in the identification of the constant features defining English paternalism in the domestic sphere. The possibility that paternalism is still part of the twentieth and even of the twenty-first century is supported by scholarly descriptions of the nature of both English society and culture. According to Holme paternalism’s persistence results from “a combination of constitution and culture, which have
created a system of government of the people, and, at its best, for the people but never by the people; rather by those who know best” (Holme, 1992, p. 404).

4.4.1 The Structure of English Society: Representations of Social Order and the Population

The previous chapter addressing various conceptual understandings of paternalism concluded that hierarchy and inequality were at the very core of the concept. Both elements were present in all three periods examined in this chapter as central aspects of English society. Throughout the centuries societies undergo certain alterations due to external factors, but inevitably certain aspects live on. In line with this, Lawes observes a continuity in the structure of English society between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Nineteenth-century social policy, the author argues, stemmed from “eighteenth century ideas about hierarchical responsibility, deference, and reciprocal obligation” (Lawes, 2000, p. 1).

What differentiated these two periods was the shift occurring in the nineteenth century from landed to middle-class rule and the rise of individualist philosophy. In turn, the twentieth century diverged from both previous periods in two significant ways. First with the rise of Universalism which saw the development of the welfare state and then with the rise of Individualism in the second half of the century promoting a string of policy reforms. Second, this century was characterized by an erosion in overt class distinctions (Whiteside, 1996). Despite these changes, hierarchy and inequality featured as core elements of these societies. In the eighteenth century it was religion and property that organized society in a hierarchical manner. In the nineteenth it was overt class distinctions and religion, and finally during the twentieth century society was hierarchical and unequal because of class, poverty and market inequalities.

Another constant element observed between the three periods under analysis refers to practices of representation towards the lower classes in English society. The poor were represented in harsher or more lenient ways, with poverty being understood as a social problem. There were of course variations regarding explanations offered in regards to
poverty. As indicated by Himmelfarb, poverty in twentieth-century England “is most decidedly not the same thing as it was in the age of Smith, Malthus, Cobbet and Dickens” (Himmelfarb, 1985, p. 533). During the eighteenth century the poor were depicted as “ignorant, worthless, evil and incompetent” and the system of poor relief was based on distinctions between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor (Viner, 1968, p. 29; Black, 2001; Sherman, 2001, Brundage, 2002).

In a similar fashion, nineteenth-century representations also put an accent on the character of the poor, seen as the root of the problem. Conversely, during this period poverty was seen as inevitable. During the early twentieth century perceptions of the poor echoed previous pessimistic tendencies. They were portrayed as constituting a disease and as defective members of society. Although these perceptions gradually withered, they resurfaced in the 1980s and 90s. Once again the poor were seen as responsible for their misfortunes (Mack and Lansley, 1985, p. 4). What is more welfare claimants were described as “scroungers” (Abercrombie and Warde, 2000, p. 438). What makes this highly significant in discussions regarding English paternalism is that such representations of the poor sustained the unequal character of society which gave impetus to discourses of protection and accentuated the duty and responsibility felt by the higher classes and the state.

4.4.2 The Poor Law, the New Poor Law and the Welfare State

In terms of practices directed towards the poor, the eighteenth and nineteenth century share much in common. The objective of practices under the Elizabethan Poor Law and the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 was to deter and discipline the pauper (undeserving poor). This was particularly reflective of the institution of the workhouses (Pointer, 1969; Slack, 1990, p. 40). The nature of these practices can be understood within the framework of controlling as a means to instill order. This is supported by the framing of poverty as a social problem. Benevolence appeared characteristic of Poor Law practices involving the deserving poor and acts of charity by individuals belonging to the higher orders of society. Benevolence also describes practices established within the framework of the Welfare State system. The difference
between the Welfare State period and the previous ones is that help was provided to people irrespective of whether they needed it or not. As characterized by Sleeman (1973, p. 1), the twentieth century featured “an excessive care for the needs of all”.

The discontinuity brought forward by the establishment of the welfare state, between state protection for some and state protection for all, marked a radical break from previous periods. The extension of universal state-protection has been explained as being the result of the two World Wars witnessed in the twentieth century (Whiteside, 1996). Nevertheless, it is possible to identify practices of selective targeting within the welfare state as it is to identify practices intent on control. A good example of the latter are policies on drug control (Marwick, 2003, p. 114). In fact from the 1980s onwards there was an increase in the targeting of welfare benefits. The underlying objectives were to “roll back” the state, give help to those most in need and inculcate personal responsibility in people. The reforms carried out during the later part of this period where disciplinary in character and thus similar to the treatment of the “undeserving” poor during the nineteenth century. What is more, practices towards children and the elderly were characterized by benevolence.

4.4.3 Justifications / Discourses

As the previous sections have demonstrated, representations of the poor and explanations as to the origins of poverty served as a powerful tool for the justification of a number of policies under the Elizabethan Poor Laws, the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 and the Welfare State. Constant in discourses appearing in the periods examined were the concepts of duty and responsibility. What changed was the agent who was to carry the duty and responsibility towards the poor. Throughout the eighteenth century the higher classes (landed aristocracy) and parishes were responsible for poor relief. With the turn of the century, this duty and responsibility gradually became the concern of the state. Although its role expanded considerably, poor relief remained a local affair.
The duty/responsibility to protect the poor was justified by the view that they were unable to protect themselves. The family analogy but also civilizational references inhabited discourses of the time. In fact the family analogy was also apparent in the period preceding it. With the coming of the welfare state, discourses exemplified a duty and responsibility universal in character, not attached to any particular group/class in society. Coexisting with this was a discourse of rights and responsibilities regarding welfare claimants visible throughout the second half of the twentieth century (Dwyer, 2008). In practice, however, the welfare state did not fully abide by the Universalist principles that influenced its establishment. For example, the Ministry of Housing in arguing for the abolition of the Rent Act made the following plea “We just cannot have these poor wretched creatures kicked into the streets”; “we have to reintroduce control” (Banting, 1979, p. 30). What is more, discourses of protection appeared in the 1980s towards those seen as vulnerable (Wilding, 1983).

In accordance with the above, certain features appear which have lived through the centuries, characteristic of English paternalism. These are: inequality, difference, a sense of duty and responsibility and practices of protection and control and benevolence. Distinguishing between Thatcher’s government and those that came before it, Holme (1992, p. 405) puts emphasis on benevolence as a core characteristic of paternalism in England. He argues that “during Mrs. Thatcher’s period of government, much of the benevolence which makes paternalism tolerable, and which indeed might be argued to be its only justification, was stripped away, leaving the bare bones of an authoritarianism without kindness exposed to view”. Although in some respects this is true, the analysis carried above showed that help was provided to those seen as vulnerable and in need. In saying this I acknowledge that poverty and inequality rose increasingly during her time and government and made the poor, poorer. I am not arguing that paternalism was as strong as it was in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. However, saying that it was completely obliterated is also untrue.
4.5 Towards a Formulation of British Paternalism

At the outset, this chapter clarified that British Paternalism, the subject of this research project, originated with English Paternalism. Its British variant results from the extension of English paternalism from the core to the periphery. The intimate relationship between domestic and external spheres has been catalogued by a number of academics. Lawes for example noticed a shift during 1815-1833 from foreign to domestic issues, accompanied by a willingness to reform (2000). Both policy-makers and men of affairs shifted their attention back to England. For men of affairs this shift resulted from perceiving the subjects in the periphery as not grateful enough for all they had given them (Botsford, 1924, p. 289).

Further, the emergence of a new philanthropic spirit in the mid-eighteenth century in the domestic and international spheres was, according to Botsford, due to “England’s awakened responsibility for the moral and religious welfare of its world empire” (Botsford, 1924, preface). These instances show that the domestic and international arenas influence each other in multifarious ways. The same also applies to British paternalism. Several avenues are available to examine how British paternalism developed and to identify its defining characteristics. One is to look at how English paternalism manifested itself in England’s relations with its first colonies in the US and Australia. Another avenue, is to look at the relations between England and its closest neighbors (Ireland, Scotland and Wales). Their close proximity to England and the very complex relations between England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales are aspects that have informed my decision to pursue this avenue, rather than study England’s relations with its first colonies.

The nature of England’s relations with these three neighbouring nations has been characterized by Hechter as instances of “internal colonialism” (Hechter, 1975). Colonial experiences elsewhere were highly influenced by English practices, discourses and representations at work in Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Although conquered in the twelfth century, these territories were politically incorporated at different times in history. Through the Laws in Wales Act in 1536 and in 1543 Wales
was integrated politically with England. For Scotland this happened in 1707 through the Act of Union, which saw the establishment of the United Kingdom. Finally Ireland was incorporated in 1801 (Hechter, 1975).

Union with each territory was accompanied by policies of control and the imposition of English culture and institutions. For example in Wales, English land law, courts judges and the Church of England were imposed after the Union. Both Ireland and Scotland ceased to have their respective Parliaments after the Union. In contrast to Wales and Ireland, Scotland after the Union of 1707 retained its legal system and saw the institutions of church and education unaffected (Raftery, Mcdermid and Jones, 2007). The manner in which the three territories were administered after the Union follows the pattern identified in the previous sections. According to Cannadine both England and Britain were hierarchical societies. Wales, Scotland and Ireland were administered by social leaders connected with Westminster and Whitehall. As in England, it was those at the top of the hierarchy who had the power over the rest of the population (Cannadine, 2002, p. 11).

It is crucial to highlight that incorporation through the Union did in no way signify equality between the territories. In the British Isles practices of differentiation were based on a clear distinction between Anglo-Saxons and Celts. The former embodied “the best” where as the latter stood for “the rest” (O’Connor, 2006, p. xii). Prior to the nineteenth century, England was differentiated from the periphery through its superior institutions (Horsman, 1976). The nineteenth century saw the emergence of practices of differentiation based on conceptions of race (Hechter, 1975; Horsman, 1976). Horsman notes that English thought in the nineteenth century was based on conceptions of an Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy (1976, p. 387). Whether it was through institutions or race, these practices of differentiation sustained the hierarchical relations between core and periphery.

Accompanying practices of control and practices of differentiation was a discourse of benevolence. Hechter observes how the Unions were considered as “beneficial” since the “backward Celts were granted membership in one of Europe’s most advanced
societies” (1975, p. 68). All this is consistent with academic conceptualizations of paternalism in intra-societal relations addressed in Chapter 3. The previous sections focused on showing the manner in which English paternalism manifested itself in England in the space of three centuries in the area of poor relief. In order to provide an adequate comparison and a sketch of British paternalism, it is important to continue investigating the area of poor relief.

Having provided a general description of the relations between England and each of Scotland, Ireland and Wales, the remainder of this section will focus exclusively on the relation between England and Ireland in the nineteenth century as regards poor relief. Out of the three sets of relations, that between England and Ireland is the most relevant and illuminating. Ireland, unlike Scotland or Wales, did not, prior to the nineteenth century, have any legal provisions for poor relief. As such, it stands as a good candidate to explore how English paternalism was exported by English political elites to Ireland. These political elites in their encounters with the periphery exported a paternalistic ethos they possessed which was, in turn, informed by the external sphere back to England.

4.5.1 The Practices, Discourses and Representations of English Officials and the Irish Poor Law of 1838

A review of the literature on English practices, representations and discourses pertaining to the Irish Poor Law establishes the prevalence of the concepts of hierarchy/inequality, obligation/duty, control/protection, and benevolence. Although Ireland was incorporated with England in 1801, inequality and hierarchy is a core characteristic of their relationship. For Edward Said England’s relation with Ireland is typical of an imperial relation. Despite geographical proximity he argues that “the one relationship that does not change is the hierarchical one between the metropole and overseas generally, between European-Western-white-Christian-males and those peoples who geographically and morally inhabit the realm beyond Europe” (Said, 1994, p. 127).
The hierarchical and un-equal relationship between the two was also present in English representations of the poor in Ireland. For example English travelers drew a clear distinction between the state of the poor in England and those in Ireland. The state of the poor in Ireland was seen as a consequence of the backward state of the country and of people’s character. Crossman (2013, p. 12) argues that the poor in Ireland were “represented almost as a different race, closer to savages than to civilized people”. Hence in the English mind the Irish were seen as representing “the other” rather than “the self”. Differentiation between the English and the Irish was effectuated in the nineteenth century through class and race and resulted in the superiority of the former and the inferiority of the latter.

However, not all English officials shared the view that saw English and Irish as essentially distinct and opposite. Lengel (2002, p. 10) argues that before 1846 English middle-class perceptions of the Irish were not based on a racial differentiation. Instead their perception was shaped by the belief that all had the ability to improve. This view was also shared by the Whigs. However, although the Irish were in this case seen as having the ability to improve, it was considered that this could only be accomplished after “generations of tutorship under English law and the English middle-class” (Lengel, 2002, p. 10). In essence England was to act as the teacher and guide Ireland into becoming better. What unites these distinct perceptions of the Irish is that both saw England, her laws and institutions as constituting “the” remedy.

Feelings of English duty and responsibility did result from practices of differentiation between the English and Irish. Even when the Irish were not seen as the complete opposite of the English, they were still seen as unable to develop left to their own devices. Thomas Sadler was a strong proponent for the establishment of a Poor Law in Ireland. In discussing the poor Irish he argued in Parliament that “the poor creatures who take refuge here I do not blame. Absenteeism has deprived them of bread, and its consequences driven them forth from their country; on the contrary, I would receive and relieve them till a better system is established in their own country” (Lowe, 2000, p. 130). Although this relates to Irish immigration to England it is still instructive in that it displays a degree of benevolence as an integral part of paternalism.
The objective of the Poor Laws as discussed by George Nicholls, one of the three Commissioners in charge of administering the operation of the Poor Law Amendment Act 1934 in England and later sent to Ireland to judge whether the Act was suitable to Ireland, also displays a degree of benevolence. For him the Poor Law in England and Ireland had as an objective to “relieve the community from the demoralization as well as from the danger consequent on the prevalence of extensive and unmitigated destitution” (1856, p. v). Further, the policies and practices attached to the Poor Law in Ireland display, as was the case in England, elements of control, deterrence and benevolence. The presence of these elements results from the fact that the Irish Poor Law was based on the English model of 1834.

That the two were increasingly similar in their application was inevitable. However, as Gray notes, the objective in Ireland was not to reform the pauper but rather focused on the absentee landlord who was seen as responsible for the “economic backwardness of Ireland” (2012, p. 25). Nevertheless the workhouse system guided by the eligibility principle was established in Ireland and stayed in Irish popular memory as a symbol of suffering and degradation (Gray, 2012). The structure of Irish workhouses was the same as those in England and Wales, designed by the same architect, who incorporated the principles of discipline and classification in the very structure of the workhouses (Gray, 2012). Another commonality observed was the distinction made among the poor subject to relief. Like in England, the distinction between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor was employed (Crossman, 2013).

Benevolence, as was the case in nineteenth century England, was accorded to the deserving poor, whereas the undeserving were subject to punishment and deterrence (Crossman, 2013). Discourses supporting the establishment of a Poor Law in Ireland bring forth another aspect of the relationship between the English and Irish. The exportation of the English Poor Law was seen as a method of teaching the Irish poor. In trying to get support in Parliament Sadler stated: “let them be taught again to entertain feelings of respect and affection towards their superiors” (quoted in Lowe, 2000, p. 149). According to this, the deferential relationship between rich and poor needed to be reinstated in Ireland as it had been in England. In addition to this, the
need for the Poor Laws was justified as a way to deal with absentee landlords. Sadler argued that these classes “had duties to perform as strictly and righteously due, as those it exacts from poverty” (cited in Lowe, 2000, p. 136).

Control and supervision was also characteristic of the administration of the Poor Laws in Ireland. Primary responsibility rested with the English Poor Law Commission. The resident Commissioner in Dublin had a team of assistant commissioners from England and Ireland. It was only in 1847 that an Irish Commission for the Poor Laws was established (Crossman, 2013). This reflects the perception that the Irish needed to be taught, they needed to learn how to administer the Poor Laws by those who knew best and once they were deemed ready they would be given a degree of responsibility.

4.6 Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to identify the characteristics underlying British paternalism, to be employed as markers for its identification in the following chapters. This was accomplished by taking into account paternalism’s specific context of emergence and development in England and its exportation to Ireland, Wales and Scotland. Since British Paternalism originates in English paternalism, the chapter first moved to the identification of the latter. This was accomplished by investigating the structure of English society, its institutions and policies directed at “vulnerable groups” of society such as “the poor”, “women”, and “the lunatic” in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After identifying how English paternalism expressed itself in each period in the practices, discourses and representations of English officials, a comparative analysis was initiated.

The comparative analysis exposed certain variations in the structure of English society, in policies put in place to deal with the lower classes, and in practices of representation vis-à-vis the poor. For example hierarchy and inequality were central aspects of eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century English society. That did not mean that the different groups in society were differentiated in the same way. In the eighteenth century hierarchy and inequality were determined by religion and property
whereas in the nineteenth century distinctions were based on class and religion. Although English society in the twentieth century followed the Universalist philosophy of the time distinctions between Englishmen were made based on class, poverty and market inequalities.

Aside from exposing variations, the comparative analysis identified the elements characteristic of English paternalism by drawing on the features found present in all three periods under analysis. These are: hierarchy/inequality, difference, a sense of duty and responsibility and practices of protection and control and benevolence. Paternalism’s persistence throughout these three centuries reflects Holmes’ (1992, p. 404) argument that it results from “a combination of constitution and culture”. The idea that superiority engenders duty towards the less fortunate, who are in need of protection and sometimes require control, is a hallmark of English paternalism.

Having provided a description of English paternalism the chapter moved to address the relations between England and the periphery in the nineteenth century by focusing on Ireland. This section investigated how English paternalism was exported to Ireland by looking at practices, discourses and representations on poor relief. A correlation between paternalism at home and abroad was expected given that those arguing for certain policies and in charge of drafting them into law at home, are also the ones in charge policy formulation in the periphery. This analysis conducted brings forth some important observations and conclusions concerning British paternalism in line with what was presented in Chapter 3.

When exported from the core to the periphery, paternalism retains its core characteristics. English practices, discourses and representations on Irish poverty display hierarchy/inequality, protection/control, benevolence and obligation/duty. Although the same characteristics define practices, discourses and representations within but also outside England, the meaning ascribed to them was subject to a degree of variation. At the same time, however, it is possible to discern a difference between domestic and external practices, discourses and representations. In the domestic sphere hierarchy was based on class differentiation and religion. In contrast the hierarchical
relation between England and Ireland was based on class and race. The superiority of the English was highlighted against the inferiority of the Irish in multiple ways.

Differentiation was also visible in explanations procured regarding the causes of poverty in England and Ireland. In Ireland poverty resulted from a character flaw in the Irish and from the backward state of the country. Duty and responsibility were visible in both realms. In English society it was a feeling shared by the higher class towards the poor laborers. In Ireland, it was English officials who had a duty and responsibility towards the lesser Irish. In both cases practices of differentiation and the hierarchy and inequality defining their relationship resulted in feelings of duty from the “superior” group to the “inferior” group. Practices of protection and control in England and Ireland bring forward similarities. First and foremost the English established their system of compulsory poor relief in Ireland. The workhouses in both countries functioned as a place of terror for the pauper who entered them. Given that English institutions were seen as superior, they were exported to Ireland in the hope to benefit the Irish poor. Unlike practices established domestically, those instilled in Ireland had as an object to teach and guide the Irish so that they could reach a higher state of development. Although the Irish were represented as “the other”, the English believed that if provided with the right English guidance and help they could improve.

This chapter, then, has identified the following as defining characteristics of British paternalism: hierarchy/inequality, difference, a sense of duty and responsibility and practices of protection and control and benevolence. Each characteristic informs on the ideologies prevalent in England, the structure of its society, its policies and its history. The next chapter will identify the manifestation of this British paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in the nineteenth century in Greece 1821-27, the Sudan 1896-98 and India 1830-1860. It will employ the characteristics identified in this chapter as markers for the identification of paternalism.
5 British External Paternalism in the Nineteenth Century: Greece, India and the Sudan

In this chapter I examine three cases of British interventionism which will reveal how English paternalism, as examined in the previous chapter, finds an ideological, discursive, and practical continuity in Britain’s relations to foreign others. The first is the Allied intervention in the Greek struggle for independence 1821-27. The case of Greece has been widely employed in the literature to demonstrate the origins of humanitarian intervention. Current interpretations rest primordially on religion as the primary factor for humanitarian interventions in the nineteenth century. By taking the same case I aim to show that religion is but one element amongst many present during the intervention and that British paternalism manifested itself in the practice and discourse of Britain.

The second case I examine is British rule in India during 1830-60. It is a case found in post-colonial literature, used to draw parallels between imperialism and more current events. I employ the case of India in order to show continuity in British paternalism and build on my counter-interpretation of nineteenth century British interventionism. The third case I explore is the British intervention in the Sudan 1896-98 that enables me to show that nineteenth century interventions did not predominantly focus on white, Christian people and that British paternalism of this period is not ultimately defined by the element of religion. The identification of British paternalism in the above cases will involve the analysis of texts, focusing on the dominant discourses, representations and practices. I am most interested in the practices, discourses and representations of the British elite, politicians and officers on the ground. Within each case I look for the elements I have previously identified as characteristic of paternalism (benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, difference and incompetence).
5.1 British Paternalism During the Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-27

The cases of Greece 1821-27, Syria-Lebanon 1860-61 and the Bulgarian agitation 1876-78 are presented by the humanitarian intervention literature as instances of nineteenth century practices of humanitarian intervention. Since Britain was not involved in Syria-Lebanon I only focus on the case of Greece and how it has been interpreted in the literature. On the whole, interpretation centers on the religious aspect of the struggle, Christianity being presented as the driver of the intervention. Bass for instance argues that British identification with the Greeks resulted in the creation of a “Pan-Christian solidarity” (2008, p. 6). The intervention is also seen as the result of the various accounts revealing the massacres taking place in Greece (Bass, 2008; Simms and Trim, 2011). Alternative motives for intervention such as Britain’s national interest have also been addressed by some (Finnemore, 2003; Simms and Trim, 2011).

In Simm and Trim (2011) Britain’s strategic considerations are addressed in presenting the Realist case for intervention. Finnemore (2003) acknowledges the existence of geostrategic factors while at the same time calling for the preponderance of humanitarian considerations presented as the catalyst of the intervention. At odds with most interpretations, scholars such as Chesterman argue that the intervention in Greece does not constitute a historical precedent for practices of humanitarian intervention (Chesterman, 2000; Rodogno, 2012). Despite this, the European intervention in Greece is labelled as the first instance of HI recorded in the nineteenth century by the majority of scholars in this literature (Frank and Rodley, 1973; Wheeler, 2000; Ocran, 2002; Finnemore, 2003; Bass, 2008; Simms and Trim, 2011; Weiss, 2012).

Seen in this light, scholars use this case to argue for radical change in interventionary practice and discourse in the Post-Cold war era in terms of who is intervened upon, stressing normative changes that have occurred. In the analysis that follows I provide my counter-interpretation of the case of Greece by focusing on the period covering the
beginning of the insurrection in 1821 until the decisive battle of Navarino in 1827 when Britain, France and Russia intervened. What scholars on humanitarian intervention fail to acknowledge is the existence of paternalism; the complex interconnection between practices, representations and discourses embedded in interventions.

Before I begin identifying British paternalism in the case of Greece some background information is essential. Greece was under Ottoman rule since 1453. The first insurrectional movement of the Greek struggle for independence began in March 1821 in the Peloponnese (Finlay, 1877). The Greeks rose against their Ottoman oppressors and sought to become independent. The uprising was inspired by the French Revolution of 1789 and the enlightenment principles accompanying it. A few months after the start of the insurrection approximately 20,000 Muslims were killed, an event scarcely noticed in Europe (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015). In 1822 the people of Chios stood up to the Turks. The massacre of the Greeks which resulted was one of the most documented events during the struggle (Schwartzberg, 1988; Rodogno, 2012).

The plight of the Greeks was strongly supported by fellow Greeks living in Europe and the Philhellene movement consisting of Europeans who wanted to help the Greeks in their struggle. Greek Committees were established in various European countries including Germany, Switzerland, France and England (Penn, 1938). To deal with the insurrection of his subjects, in 1824 the Sultan sought the aid of Mohammed Ali of Egypt. In return for his aid in providing a navy and an army the Sultan allowed him to acquire the Morea (Abbott, 1916). The Pasha’s son Ibrahim was the one leading the Egyptian conquering mission in the Morea that began in February 1825. By December Ibrahim Pasha managed to quash most of the resistance.

Rumors of an upcoming “barbarization project” led by Ibrahim travelled fast in Europe (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015). The provisional government of Greece asked Britain for protection. However, Britain turned down the request, maintaining her position of neutrality (Cowles, 1990). In 1826 the St Petersburg Protocol was drafted and signed by France, Britain and Russia offering mediation to both sides. The Porte rejected the
offer of mediation (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015). On July 6th 1827 the three powers (France, Britain and Russia) signed the Treaty for the Pacification of Greece in London⁷. In accordance with the Treaty they imposed an armistice upon the Greeks and the Turks, obeyed only by the Greeks (Abbott, 1917). The treaty also provided for mediation between the two parties and the possibility for Greece to become “a dependency of Turkey” (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015, p. 116).

The Turks rejected the provisions of the treaty and continued diffusing violence. Finally the fight for independence culminated with the battle of Navarino. On October 20, 1827 the fleets of Britain, Russia and France combined their forces and under the command of admiral Codrington defeated the Egyptian and Turkish fleets (Cowles, 1990). Britain maintained a position of neutrality during the first five years of the Greek struggle for independence and was concerned with limiting Russia’s potential of going on a full-scale war with the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, as the following will show, British paternalism manifested itself in the discourses, practices and representations of the British political elite and of the British public.

Let us now address how each paternalistic element manifested itself in the case of Greece, starting with benevolence. Benevolence is a characteristic visible in both practices and discourses relating to Greece. In discourses benevolence is discernible in the justifications brought forth by the British political elite stressing the importance of an intervention on behalf of the Greeks. The perceived need for Britain to intervene in the Greek struggle was justified in terms of benefiting the Greeks. There are instances where benevolence is clearly articulated in British discourse. For instance, the Times wrote in 1824 “the struggle must succeed and must lead to an improvement not only of Greece but of Asia” (The Times, July 21st, 1824). In a similar line the newspaper read in 1826 “England and France are equally animated by the desire to see Greece released from bondage” (The Times, February 15, 1826).

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⁷ The Treaty of London was signed by Britain, France and Russia and referred to the pacification of Greece. It specified the steps to be taken by the signatory powers in order to effectuate the pacification of Greece. The signatory powers agreed to interpose themselves between the Greeks and the Turks.
British public opinion and correspondence between British political elites and officers demonstrate how British action was perceived as mandatory in order to benefit Greece. In 1834 in a House of Commons debate Sir R. H. Inglis (MP for Dundalk) in presenting a petition from White Rothing in Essex on behalf of the Greeks stated “in perfect consistency with this rule of Conduct, government had used, and would continue to use, not only with Turkey, but with Austria, and every other state, every legitimate means in their power to obtain for the Greeks, not merely protection and security, but the revival and independence of their nation” (HC Deb 19 May 1826, c1272). Similarly in a dispatch addressed to the Greek leader, Prince Mavrocordato on September 10th 1827, General Edward Codrington the British Commander in chief in the Mediterranean writes that “England can have no other object than the welfare of Greece” (Bourchier, 2012, p. 452).

Discourses relating to the treaty for the pacification of Greece of 6th July 1827 further prove the existence of benevolence. On the matter Mr. Brownlow (MP for Armagh) was of the opinion that “it was conceived in a good spirit – it emanated as a love of independence” (HC Deb 31 January 1828, c72). Most revealing as to the existence of benevolence are discourses articulated by a great number of British Philhellenes and members of the London Greek Committee, established in 1823. Its members included Stanhope, Jeremy Bentham, Lord Byron, Bowring and Blaquiere. For instance, Stanhope the Commissioner of the London Greek Committee, argued in 1823 that “the object of the committee is to give freedom and knowledge to Greece” (St. Clair, 1972, p. 162). Articulated in this manner, freedom and knowledge are seen as the goal to be attained for the benefit of Greece. It was not only a matter of aiding the Greeks in their struggle of independence, it was also about supporting the regeneration of Greece and the transmission of knowledge from England (St Clair, 1972). Stanhope was among those British Philhellenes who were strongly convinced of this.

Adding to this, the president of Magdalene College at Oxford, Martin Routh, argued in 1823 that “as a philanthropist, therefore, I feel myself disposed to assist the cause of suffering humanity in a country distant indeed, yet particularly interesting on many accounts; and as Christian, I wish to heal the wounds inflicted by the rage and cruelty
of infidels” (cited in Bass, 2008, p. 81). This can be seen as a depiction of the sense of duty and obligation felt by the British due to religion. However, this also informs on the manner in which Christianity also indicated benevolence, the giving and helping of our fellows. It is not an issue of the Greeks being Christian but of “us” the British and what this entails.

Practices undertaken during the revolt also exhibit benevolence. These refer to actions carried out by the London Greek Committee and British Philhellenes such as fund-raising and writing pamphlets. Additionally, a number of them including Lord Byron joined the fight on the side of the Greeks to assist them (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015). The London Greek Committee also helped the Greek government obtain a loan since the money raised from fund-raising initiatives was barely sufficient (Zegger, 1970). All these practices were in nature benevolent, providing help and assistance in all these different ways. Although they were not carried out by the British government, they are both relevant and important because members of the London Greek Committee included Members of Parliament such as Sir Francis Burdett and John Hobhouse as well as many others constituting the British elite (Zegger, 1970). For its part, the British government provided help through diplomatic means. With its allies, the government drafted treaties to end the conflict and offered mediation to both parties engaged in the conflict.

Let us now consider the second element defining British paternalism, obligation/duty, linked to representations of “the other”. The analysis of British discourses brings forward the ways in which this sense of British duty and obligation towards the Greek population developed. The first is captured through the tendency to omit atrocities committed by the Greeks and over-exaggerate those committed by the Turks, evident in British correspondence and in newspapers covering the event. For example the 1821 massacre of Muslims did not evoke much in Europe whereas the massacre of Greeks in Chios in 1822 was widely discussed, analyzed and labelled as “barbaric”. Such practices of differentiation showcase a British identification with the Greeks and a dissociation with the Turks. In turn these practices gave life to feelings of duty and obligation on the part of the British towards the Greeks.
In discourses the Greeks were represented as similar to the British through a common religion and civilization, creating the in-group. Consequently, the Greeks were seen as “the self”, the European, and not as “the other”. In contrast, the Turks were depicted as barbarians and constituted the “out-group”, the “other”. What follows will show how the tendency of Philhellenes\(^8\) to represent the Greeks as “the basis of our civilization” accentuated this identification. Secondly, British obligation and duty was given life through strategies of legitimation evident on a number of occasions in the texts analyzed. Through these, the character of Britain and the British individuals involved comes to the forefront. Britain comes forth as superior and bound to lending a hand to a fellow Christian and civilized people.

As mentioned above, British identification with the Greeks rested in the first instance on the manner in which Greeks and Turks were represented in discourse. As far as the Turks are concerned, the majority of texts accord them the most negative characteristics also visible in the description of their actions. For instance, in a dispatch to the British ambassador in Constantinople Lord Strangford in 1821, Foreign Secretary Castlereagh on the subject of the Porte’s reprisals against the Greek subjects wrote that “the sultan’s government perseveres in its endeavors to strike terror into the minds of its Greek subjects” (Prousis, 2011, p. 171). In another dispatch between the two, Strangford gave an account from the Morea, Epirus and Cyclades in 1821. He stated that “the slaughter of the Greeks both before and after the battle was prodigious, and several baskets of ears and tongues have been exhibited at the Porte” (FO 78/98).

A year later, in Parliament, Wilberforce the Leader of the Christian Evangelicals in the House of Commons described the Turks “as enemies of Christianity and freedom” (cited in Rodogno, 2012, p. 70). Coupling that, the Turks were characterized as “the most weak, contemptible, vie-stained tyrants that ever polluted the earth on which they trod, vilifying and degrading the fairest part of the creation” (Rodogno, 2012, p. 75). Continuing the list of negative traits, the Turks were also described as a cruel,

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\(^8\) The Philhellenes were British and other Europeans who supported the Greek cause. They wished to publicize the Greek cause and raise money. They helped the Greeks economically, militarily (joined as volunteers).
aggressive, barbarian race posing an active threat to Western civilization (St. Clair, 1972). In stark contrast, the Greeks were assigned the most positive traits and identified with the British through religion and civilization. Discourses articulated by Philhellenes are particularly illuminating in these respects. This is because calls to action were justified on the basis of the ancient Greek civilization. The main themes of Philhellenic discourses on Greece are well encapsulated by the following (1822):

Greece… that land, the fostering nurse of civilization, where the spirit of antiquity still seems to linger amidst its olive groves, its myrtle bowers, and the precious relics of its splendid edifices, where both sacred and profane history unite forming the most interesting associations; where Socrates taught the lessons of his incomparable ethics, and a still greater than Socrates disclosed the mysteries of the unknown God to those that sat in darkness. (quoted in St. Clair, 1972, p. 58)

Identified in such a manner, Greece was seen as encapsulating “civilization”, the European. Philhellenes were comprised among others of poets and writers. The nature of the identification of the British with the Greeks is further demonstrated in Percy Shelley’s poem “Hellas” written in 1821. In the preface he writes

We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have their root in Greece…The Modern Greek is the descendant of those glorious beings whom the imagination almost refuses to figure to itself as belonging to our king, and he inherits much of their sensibility, their rapidity of conception, their enthusiasm, and their courage. (quoted in St Clair, 1972, p. 54)

This can be seen as a strong vehicle pushing for British action on behalf of Greece by the public. In a similar manner, Jeremy Bentham, a member of the London Greek Committee, described the Greeks as “the first enlightened nation” (cited in Bass, 2008, p. 78). Further, Edward Blaquiere explained his reasoning for helping the Greeks by saying he was “enthusiastically favored to Grecian freedom, not less from a sense of religion than of gratitude to their ancestors” (Blaquiere, 1825, p. 117). Such propositions are also evident in newspaper coverage of the events. The Times wrote
Further, in a public meeting held in 1823 at the Crown and Anchor Tavern covered by the Times and attended by a number of MPs, Lord Milton, a member of the London Greek Committee, spoke of the nature of the Greeks. Some in England presented the events taking place in Greece as a contest between two barbarous nations. In response, Lord Milton defended the Greeks arguing that “if the Greeks were barbarians who was it that had made them so?” (The Times, May 16, 1823). Not only were the Greeks assigned the most positive of traits in the texts analyzed but there is evidence pointing to the fact that Greece was seen as “the self”. In the same meeting, John Sydney Taylor argued that “If Englishmen were pursued like wild beasts, they would turn on their hunters with no very calculating rage” (The Times, May 16, 1823). It can be assumed from this that both being Europeans and civilized, Britons and Greeks when faced with the same situation would act in a similar manner.

The processes of legitimation conducted by the British are equally significant in furthering their sense of duty and obligation towards their “fellow” Greeks. For instance, in 1826 the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Stratford Canning, in a dispatch to the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, described the ongoing situation in Greece as follows: “Sir, the situation in Greece appears to become more critical everyday…It would seem, in short, that without a miracle the Greek insurrection cannot be much longer maintained” (FO 78/142). Further, in 1827 the Times read “Our assistance is required by the descendants of those whose glorious literature has formed our taste” (The Times, 29 November 1827). What is apparent from the above is that Britain represented itself as the only one able to secure the Greeks and as such had an obligation to do so. At the same time, these also bring to light how the need for protection was justified. This is complemented by statements
of Philhellenes such as “All are looking forward to Lord Byron’s arrival, as they would to the coming of a Messiah” (Bass, 2008, p. 105).

British obligation and duty also emanated from British representations of civilized conduct and permissibility. This is clear in a dispatch to Count Lieven, the Russian General and ambassador to London, in 1827 where Canning stated that “a contest so ferocious, leading to excess piracy and plunder, so intolerable to civilized Europe, justifies extra-ordinary intervention, and renders lawful any expedients short of positive hostility” (quoted in Marriott, 1918, p. 218). This is also the case pertaining to Britain’s position vis-à-vis the alleged barbarization project against the Greeks. In the instructions given to the Duke of Wellington who represented England at the St Petersburg conference in 1826, Secretary Canning shared Britain’s position on the alleged plan of depopulation. He stated that “supposing the fact true, it may surely be questioned whether a warfare of such a nature can be tolerated by Christian nations” (FO 881/165).

Religion and most importantly Christianity could not be absent from the justifications offered for British action. On the whole, Christianity was seen as entailing certain duties towards the Greeks. For example, in the Times, Lord Bentinck argued that “he felt it to be the duty of every man who has any regard for freedom, for religion, for humanity to use his best endeavors in favor of the cause of civil and religious liberty” (The Times May 16 1823). Some years later, the Times wrote “what England can do with such perfect ease and safety she is, we think, in policy and honor, bound to do on this occasion so important to the whole of Christendom” (The Times, 13 May 1826). Further, Blaquiere, a Philhellene, and former British naval officer talked about the duties dictated by religion and Christian charity (The Times, June 19, 1827).

Legitimation through religion largely emanated from the Philhellene movement in Britain. But Christianity was also a justification articulated in Parliament. Wilberforce, the leader of the Christian Evangelicals in the House of Commons, in demanding

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9 The official agent of the London Greek Committee.
10 The Duke of Wellington was sent to St Petersburg to consolidate relations of alliance between the two countries and arrange a joint intervention in the affairs of Greece.
military intervention in response to events in Chios exclaimed “it was rather a disgrace that the great European powers had not already driven back a nation of barbarians, the ancient and inveterate enemies of Christianity and freedom, into Asia” (cited in Bass, 2008, p. 69). Protection, a further element defining paternalism, was also present in Britain’s practices and discourses enacted during the Greek struggle for independence. Protection describes on the one hand the nature of practices undertaken by paternalists and on the other calls for the need of protection.

The identification of protection is particularly interesting because it can be seen as an antithesis to the manner in which obligation and duty are articulated and represented. In order for the need of protection to be justified, British texts tend to represent the Greeks as different to the British. In some cases this entails representing the Greeks as incompetent. However, what has previously been presented as the engine of the sense of obligation and duty fits well to illustrate protection. In the same manner, representations of difference and incompetence helped justify further the need for protection. This shows the extent to which the elements constituting paternalism are interdependent. The British government was, after 1825, taking actions that can be seen protective in nature.

Two sets of practices describe the involvement of the British government during the Greek war of independence. The first consisted of diplomatic efforts like drafting treaties and offering to mediate between the two parties. Britain along with France and Russia signed the St Petersburg Protocol in 1826 and the London Treaty in 1827. Both were attempts to resolve the conflict by offering mediation. If these efforts succeeded, the Greeks would no longer be in danger from the rumored “barbarization project” of the Turks. It is in this sense that these diplomatic efforts contained protection. The second set were a mixture of forceful and non-forceful actions. When in 1827 the Porte rejected the armistice British vessels were tasked with preventing Turkish and Egyptians assistance (men, weapons, vessels) from reaching Greece (Bass, 2008).

Force was employed by the Allied navy against the Turkish and Egyptian fleet during the battle of Navarino on October 20, 1827. The physical protection of the Greeks was
the end result of these efforts. In conformity with my arguments presented in Chapter 3, coercion need not be a defining feature of paternalistic practices. In the case of Greece, Britain did not intervene by force against their wishes. As the Protocol relative to the affairs of Greece signed at St. Petersburg on April 4th 1826\(^\text{11}\) stated, “His Britannic Majesty having been requested by the Greeks to interpose his good offices, in order to obtain their reconciliation with the Ottoman Porte” (HC Deb 31 January 1828, c87). Through a mixture of diplomatic and military efforts Britain and her allies protected the Greeks and provided them the opportunity of gaining independence.

In discourse the need for protection was articulated in a number of ways. First, it was justified through the vivid accounts of the atrocities committed by the Turks. In relation to the alleged extermination project against the Greeks, Augustus Granville Stapleton, the private secretary of George Canning, referring to Ibrahim Pasha wrote he was laboring to blot out of existence a whole Christian people, and to establish a new Barbary State on the shore of the Mediterranean. Mr. Canning held this to be a casus belli, giving all nations a right to interfere by force, and accordingly he consented to the Greek treaty, which admitted of a forcible interference, if necessary to prevent the consummation of the atrocious design. (1866, cited in Rodogno, 2012, p. 89)

Further, in a dispatch to Lord Strangford, Castlereagh stated on the subject of the Porte’s reprisals against the Greek subjects that “the sultan’s government perseveres in its endeavors to strike terror into the minds of its Greek subjects” (Prousis, 2011, p. 171). Similarly, Sir R. H. Inglis in a Commons Sitting read the following petition from White Roothing in Essex on behalf of the Greeks: “That the petitioners beg to recommend to the compassionate regard of the House the deplorable condition of our fellow Christians, the Greeks, now suffering under the merciless rage of the Mahomedan tyranny” (HC Deb 19 May 1826, c.1274).

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\(^{11}\) Through this Protocol England was empowered to offer to the Porte a settlement of the Greek Question. It contains the steps to be taken and the offer to be presented to the Porte.
Following the same justification, Mr. Brownlow in the Commons in 1828 asked “was it not plain that the object of the horrible warfare carried on there was the extinction of the Greek nation in that devoted land?” (HC Deb 31 January 1828, c72). On another occasion a similar case was made in the House of Commons. Wilberforce stated that “he knew of no case in which the power of a mighty country like England could be more nobly, more generously, or more justifiably exerted than in rescuing the Greeks from bondage and destruction” (Bass, 2008, p. 69).

Further, in a correspondence to the Tsar on the 28th October 1821 Castlereagh argued

Ought the Turkish yoke to be forever riveted upon the necks of their suffering and Christian subjects; and shall the descendants of those, in admiration of whom we have been educated, be doomed in this fine country to drag out, for all time to come, the miserable existence to which circumstances have reduced them? (Schwartzberg, 1988, p. 146)

This is also evident in newspaper coverage. In response to the massacre in Chios the Times wrote that the Greeks were subject to “immediate and total annihilation…we know not that any tragedy on record ever produced in this country a movement of deeper horror than this recital of the atrocities” (cited in Bass, 2008, p. 69). The above demonstrates that protection was justified in terms of necessity, in terms of Christianity. Necessity was articulated in a manner that gave no choice to the British but to move to the immediate protection of the Greeks. Christianity was employed, here again as a manner to identify the Greeks as “the self”.

The last component of British paternalism I will now address is based on dominant representations of incompetence and difference which sets a defining line between the paternalists and the subjects of their intervention. Here, the latter are identified not only as different but also as being incompetent to act left to their own devices. This is clearly contained in British texts relating to the Greek struggle. The preceding sections have demonstrated and stressed how the Greeks were represented as the “self”, which drove discourses of duty and obligation. However, representations of difference were also very much alive in the case of Greece.
For example, General Gordon, a Philhellene and a British army officer, stated that

whatever national or individual wrong the Greeks may have endured, it is
impossible to justify such ferocity of their vengeance, or to deny that a
comparison instituted between them and the Ottoman generals, Mehmet
Aboul-abad, Omer Vironi, and the Kehaya Bey would give to the latter the
palm of humanity. Humanity, however, is a word quite out of place when
applied either to them or to their opponents. (quoted in Finlay, 1877, p. 192)

What is evident here is that the Greeks were portrayed as similar to the Turks, as
ferocious and barbarian-like. Adding to this observation, a British Philhellene
cautions that some were of the opinion that the “Greeks themselves are barbarians
and far surpass the Turks in atrocities” (cited in Bass, 2008, p. 64).

Similarly, W.H. Humphreys, a Philhellene, described the modern Greeks in his journal as “debased, degraded, to the lowest pit of barbarism” (cited in Rodogno, 2012, p. 66). In Britain, this discourse of Greek barbarism existed alongside the one praising Greek civilization and culture. The Tories in particular insisted on moral equivalence between the Greeks and the Turks (Bass, 2008). Greeks were depicted as barbarians as a result of the atrocities committed during the first years of the insurrection. Although the discourse of Greek barbarism was acknowledged and supported by various people including Philhellenes, some of whom were in Greece and witnessed the violence and cruelty, it was the discourse praising Greece and civilization which succeeded in bringing forth an intervention on behalf of the Greeks.

The Philhellenes put tremendous effort to counter the moral equality argument. Even when they acknowledged the cruelty and barbarity with which the Greeks conducted themselves, they nevertheless excused it, attributing it to years spent under Turkish influence and hardship. Additionally, Greek excess, unlike Turkish conduct, was excused and seen as overwhelmingly exaggerated. In relation to Greece’s violent conduct in Tripolizza in 1821, Blaquiere argued “when all the concomitant circumstances which led to the excesses at Tripolizza are made known, they will appear mild, when compared to those committed by the best disciplined and most
civilized troops of Europe in many circumstances during the last fifty years” (Bass, 2008, p. 65). It is particularly interesting that the violence and cruelty committed by the Greeks was paralleled with the conduct of other Europeans rather than the Turks.

Finally, on a number of occasions the Greeks were described as “unfortunate” in British correspondence. In a dispatch to Castlereagh on the 26th of June 1821 Strangford argued in response to the massacre of Aivalis’ Greek inhabitants that “I thought that it would be highly proper to make some efforts on behalf of these unfortunate people” (Prousis, 2011, p. 196). Further, the Greeks were seen as weak. In his book, Bass shows that for the Liberals of the time if military or diplomatic force was to be used, it should be on the side of the weak, not on the side of tyrannical empires (Bass, 2008). As we will see the case of Greece shares common elements but also some differences with the case of India.

5.2 British Paternalism in British India 1830-60

Various aspects of nineteenth century British India have captured the attention of post-colonial scholarship and of scholars addressing humanitarian interventions. Their interpretation of the case and the objective for which it is studied differ considerably. One of the preoccupations of post-colonial scholarship is the making of connexions between past and present discursive practices. As argued by Charles (1995, p. 152) “the new world order may well be a new version of the old, and the new discourse, a new rendition of the old”. Nineteenth century India is one of the most cited cases employed to demonstrate parallels with current interventionary discourses and practices (Orford, 2003; Chowdhry and Nair, 2004; Duara, 2004; Sheldon, 2009). Scholars refer to certain aspects of British India or certain important developments during the nineteenth century. Sheldon (2009) investigates the case of famines in India from mid-nineteenth century onwards in the context of colonial development theory.

Further, the period 1830-50, characterised by extensive reforms, has been studied by the literature in order to enlighten on present interventionary discourse and practice. Among those reforms particular attention is given to educational reforms (Orford,
By looking at educational reforms, Orford (2003, p. 133) shows that “the pedagogical imperative” in force then continues to shape interventionary discourse today and how heroic narrative constructing images of “the self” and “the other” are still relevant, taking as an example the current case of Australian intervention in East Timor in 1999. The period following the Indian mutiny in 1858 and the subsequent changes which have taken place in the administration of India have caught the interest of the literature because they were seen as presenting a renewed sense of British superiority (Duffield and Hewitt, 2009). Lastly, the post-colonial literature treats India as the case where the colonizing mission flourished and which flagrantly displays the binary opposites which accompanied it (Duara, 2003).

The case of India is also discussed outside post-colonial scholarship. Finnemore (2003) sees India as an example of colonial humanitarianism whose mission was to civilize. It is for her an empirical instance of infantilization in practice. In Barnett’s study of the history and expansion of humanitarianism, the 1837 famine in northern India is explored in an attempt to address colonialism and compassion. For him paternalism denotes “the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person whose liberty is being violated” (2011, p. 34).

Paternalism serves two objectives in his study, to identify “who is the human that demands our compassion” and “how do we know what is best for another person” (2011, p. 36). Barnett argues that the 1837 Indian famine and the response of British authorities exemplify “how feelings of obligation to distant strangers in the colonial context could produce tragic forms of paternalism” (2011, p. 62). The British authorities dealt with the famine by establishing works of public utility. According to Barnett the British

were taking the unprecedented step of protecting the population, accepting a new humanitarian responsibility consistent with a general reluctance to adopt open-ended responsibilities and...limit the endlessly rising costs of direct Imperial intervention even inside its own colonies (2011, p. 64).
Despite British efforts, the situation of the people did not improve. Given that Barnett explores the 1837 Indian famine and illustrates certain aspects of paternalism, I am looking at another aspect, education. This is because practices and discourses on education are more representative of the ideology of the time. By focusing on Parliamentary debates and on the practices and discourses of the British colonial authorities I show how the elements I have identified as constituting paternalism manifested themselves. My conceptualization of paternalism differs from Barnett’s, as it is more inclusive and allows for the identification of practices where coercion is absent.

Since the choice of case studies is based on pre-existing literature, my focus will centre on British India during the period 1830-60. I pay special attention to educational reforms and to events after the mutiny of 1858 dealing with administrative reforms. This allows me to further develop my counter-interpretation to what has been offered by the humanitarian intervention literature, which argues for the determining impact of religion in 19th century interventions and its focus on rescuing Christians. The case of India is enlightening in many respects. First, as argued by historians working on India, it is in that country that the notion of civilizing mission developed and spread to the rest of the British Empire. Second, it is employed by the post-colonial literature, which echoes many of the arguments I seek to bring forth. Namely, that the past is in the present.

I now move to provide a background of the case. When compared to other British colonial possessions, India constituted an anomaly in that it was the East India Company (EIC) and not the British government that governed it. Britain officially established her rule over India on 28 June 1858. In 1833 the charter of the Company was extended to another twenty years. At that moment the Company lost its commercial side and retained its sovereign status. From 1830 to 1850 India underwent far-reaching reforms, her land and tax systems, civil laws, administration and education were, as historian Bernard Porter observes, “moulded in a new more English image” (1996, p. 33). In 1857-58 the Government of India was faced with a mutiny at Meerut near Delhi, over a question of religious principle (Porter, 1996). Pursuant to
this, the administration of India was transferred from the East India Company to the Crown (Bose, 1916).

The following analysis will pay close attention to discourses advanced by prominent figures who were involved in Indian affairs, particularly in the area of education, such as Thomas Babington Macaulay and Sir Charles Trevelyan. In proceeding to the analysis it is important to be aware of the different positions surrounding debates on education during the 1830s. The two main positions consisted of the Anglicists and the Orientals. The Anglicists wished to reform and develop India on an English model, including educating the natives in the English language, whereas the Orientals pushed for a more local approach, keeping the language and customs of the natives. An additional point concerns the propagation of the Christian religion to India. The government of India and the British government did not wish to interfere in the religious convictions of the people of India. The propagation of the Christian religion was, after 1831, left to missionaries.

Let us now consider how benevolence manifested itself in British discourses and practices in India during the period under examination. Policies relating to education, the judiciary and the general administration of India clearly display benevolence. In the sphere of education English was established as the medium of instruction. As far as higher education was concerned three Universities were established (Bombay, Calcutta and Madras) in 1857 (Jarayam, 2004). Additionally, the 1830s saw a remarkable advancement in infrastructure through the construction of roads, railways and the establishment of telegrams and electric grids (Sheldon, 2009). The perceived need for British action and interference in these areas was justified as being for the benefit and general welfare of the native population of India.

For instance, on the debate regarding the language to be used to educate the natives, Thomas Babington Macaulay, a legal member of the governor general’s council,¹²

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¹² Macaulay was one of the most important figures involved extensively in the educational reforms in India. In 1834 he took up the post of legal member of the governor-general’s council. He along with Charles Trevelyan are seen as those who were carrying the missionary impulse into every area of society.
argued that “the English tongue is that which would be the most useful to our native subjects” (Minute on education 1835). Similarly Charles Trevelyan believed that English education would result in “a decided change for the better in the character of the people” (cited in Singh, 1996, p. 125). Such justifications are also observed in discourses relating to the entire education system in the late 1850s. During a debate in the House of Lords on 19 February, Earl Granville, the Lord President of the Council stated that “every thinking man in the present day was of opinion, our real object in our government in India must be the benefit of the people governed, and that therefore we must do our best to elevate them in the scale of social and moral being” (HL Deb 19 February 1858, c1729).

Benevolence can also be observed as the justification brought forth regarding reforms in the judicial system. In 1833 the Law Commission was charged with remedying anomalies in the law of India. For Wolryche Whitmore, the MP for Wolverhampton it was mandatory to improve the law in India and the Commission’s efforts “would have the effect of encouraging the settlement of Europeans, which circumstances would prove the greatest blessing to that country” (HC Deb 10 July 1833, c502). As regards the administration of India by the East India Company, it was described on benevolent terms by some in Parliament. During the same debate Macaulay stated “I see a government anxiously bent on the public good. Even in its errors I recognize a paternal feeling towards the great people committed to its charge…I see evils but I see the government actively employed in the work of remedying those evils” (HC Deb 10 July 1833, c522).

Benevolence is also observed as the justification provided by British discourses in debates on the future administration of India, following the mutiny which terminated in 1858. Debates focused on the transfer of the administration of India from the East India Company to the Crown. On the issue, T. Baring (MP for Huntingdon) argued in the House of Commons in 1858 that “the great object of the Government and of the House ought to be to promote the welfare of our Indian fellow-subjects” (HC Deb 12 February 1858, c1293). Similarly, Viscount Palmerston, elected thrice as Prime Minister of England, stated “I believe that a great benefit to India, and through India
to the British nation, will result there from” (HC Deb 12 February 1858, c1291). In a later debate, Viscount Palmerston similarly stated “I am persuaded that a change from the authority of the East India Company to that of the Crown would have a most salutary and powerful effect upon the native mind of India” (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2040). Espousing the welfare of the Hindoo people was claimed to be a sentiment shared by the British public in the late 1850s. As conveyed by Sir Erskine Perry, a British Liberal Politician who served as a judge in India “what they desired was, to see the people of India prosperous, happy, and improving under our rule” (HC 12 February 1858, c1311).

The analysis of British discourses also reveals the varied ways in which British obligation and duty towards the Hindoos developed and flourished. At a general level, obligation and duty were due to the mere possession of India by the British. As articulated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir George Cornwall Lewis) “we have incurred certain obligations towards the people of India which we are bound to fulfil” (HC Deb 12 February 1858, c1331). That was also the position held by A. Mills during a debate in April on the future government of India by the Crown. He argued “it is the duty of the Imperial government to legislate for the home government of India” (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2028). Further, Macaulay believed that “the British government had a responsibility to the Indian population” (cited in Bearce, 1961, p. 177).

This is also the case in the argument brought forth by Lord Brougham, a member of the House of Lords, regarding problems encountered with the administration of justice and police in India. It was, he argued, “the imperative duty of the government, the Parliament, and the country, to apply all the resources of their talent, knowledge and wisdom” (HL Deb 11 March 1853, c17). Further, The Governor General of India, Lord Bentinck, in 1834 maintained that “British rule is committed to ending the vices, the oppression, the despotism, the barbarous and often cruel customs that had been the growth of ages” (cited in Brown, 2008, p. 38).

Obligation and duty can also be seen as due to Britain’s superiority in a number of areas. This is intimately connected to what I have already presented above. In the area
of education, obligation and duty were not only as seen as due to Britain’s superiority, but also to the role taken by the British as “educators”. Of course this can be interpreted as a natural consequence of representations of superiority. Obligation and duty as owed to the role taken by the British as educators is clear in Macaulay’s argument regarding the issue of education proceeding in the English language. According to him we have to educate a people who cannot at present be educated by means of their mother tongue. We must teach them some foreign language. The claims of our own language it is hardly necessary to recapitulate. It stands pre-eminent even among the languages of the West (Minute on education, 1835).

Superior knowledge and culture was another factor attached to British superiority. According to Trevelyan who was an advocate of the Anglicist position, promoting English education for the natives “the past history of the world authorizes us to believe that the movement, English education, taking place in India, if properly directed…will end in bringing a decided change for the better in the character of the people” (cited in Singh, 1996, p. 124-125).

Years later, these convictions were still very much alive. In a despatch sent to India in 1853 by the Board of Control in charge of overseeing the East India Company it was stated that “it was a public duty and a public advantage that the people of India should receive Western education” (HL Deb 19 February 1858, c1726). In the same year, Lord Glenelg (Charles Grant) who had previously served as president of the Board of Control and as secretary of state for war and the colonies was of the opinion that “it was not only the duty but the mission of this country to India, to communicate to the natives of India the best education which it was in their power to give them” (HL Deb 11 March 1853, c25). Similarly, in 1858 Earl Granville asserted in a debate in the Commons “it was the duty, as it was the privilege, of the British government to improve the education of the swarming population who were subject to this country in India” (HL Deb 19 February 1858, c1725). He further argued that “every thinking man in the present day was of opinion that our real object in our government of India must
be to benefit the people governed, and that therefore we must do our best to elevate them in the scale of social and moral being” (HL Deb 19 February 1858, c1729).

The following quote from Jacob’s the Brigadier General displays in full force Britain’s perceived superiority and moral force as it existed throughout the period under investigation:

We hold India, then by being in reality, as in reputation a superior race to the Asiatic; and if this natural superiority did not exist, we should not, and could not, retain the country for one week. If, then we really are a morally superior race, governed by a higher motives, and possessing higher attributes that the Asiatics, the more the native Indians are able to understand us, and the more we improve their capacity for so understanding, the firmer will become our power. Away, then, with the assumption of equality; and let us accept our true position of a dominant race. So placed, let us establish our rule by setting them a high example, by making them feel the value of truth and honesty, and by raising their moral and intellectual powers. (cited in Hutchins, 1967, p. 26)

The role of educator taken on by the British concurs with a greater aim, that of civilizing and developing the Hindoo population. Responsibility and duty here can be understood as owing to these larger goals. Here again the superiority of Britain is brought forth as bestowing certain duties upon Britain towards the Hindoos. For example, on the subject of reforming the laws of India Macaulay stated that “our freedom and high civilization render this improvement, desirable as it must always be” (HC Deb July 10 1833, c531). In a debate in the Commons in 1858 on the issue of transferring Indian affairs from the East India Company to the Crown, Viscount Palmerston argued that

power has been entrusted to us for other and better purposes; and without pointing to anything particular, I think it is the duty of this nation to use it in such a manner as to promote, as far as they can, the instruction, the enlightenment, and the civilization of those great populations which are now subject to our rule.
Attached to this was his conviction that “we have a great duty to fulfil in India” (HC Deb 12 February 1858, c1292).

What I have presented so far shows that British discourses conveyed that British responsibility and duty were due to Britain’s possession (EIC) or prospective possession of India (Crown), to the role of the British as educators, which stemmed from the superiority of their country. Adding to this is the place of religion as conferring certain duties and obligations. For example, on the question of why India was given to the British, Daniel Wilson the evangelical bishop of Calcutta asserted that “it was so that we may be put upon our probation – that it may be seen whether we will communicate to India and the world the immense blessings of God which have been committed to our trust” (quoted in Brown, 2008, p. 196). According to Lord Glenelg “we were called upon by all that we owed to God, as well as man, and at any hazard, to exercise that duty” (HL Deb 11 March 1853, c25). Similarly Mr Blackett (MP for Newcastle upon Thyme) in a debate in the House of Commons argued that “nothing was more important for Christian rulers than to provide the blessings of education for the people” (HC Deb 24 June 1853, c765). Religion played its part in promoting Britain’s duty and responsibility. The place of Christianity was decisive in discourses of missionaries who after 1813 proceeded to do their work in India in full force. At a general level, the British government espoused neutrality on matters of religion and culture.

Let us now turn our attention to another element defining paternalism, protection. Locating the element of protection in British paternalism involves paying close attention to the interconnections which exist between this and other elements constituting it. What fuels calls to protection in this as in the previous case examined, are British representations of the Indians. The mere representation of the Hindoos as incompetent and as the complete opposite of the British, grounds acts of protection on the part of the British. The element of protection in the case of British rule in India (EIC and Crown) is intriguing because it does not connote protection from physical danger but it can be understood as protecting the Hindoos from themselves. Civilizational references are very common in British discourses on protection. What
is more, the nature of the practices undertaken during the period examined of British rule in India also concur with this observation. The policies in question relate to the system of higher education and to the administration of the country. From 1835 onwards the system of higher education in India followed a Western system of education and learning. Arabic and Sanscrit were replaced by English as the language of instruction (Jayaram, 2004, p. 86).

Additionally, as mentioned previously, in 1857 three universities were established in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras modelled on the University of London (Jayaram, 2004). In the area of administration following the mutiny the British put in place what Thompson and Garratt (1935, p. 476) describe as “a paternal system”. European ideas guided governing practices and knowledge, and information was provided by District Officers who were predominantly British. As far as educational policies are concerned, British authorities transplanted Western education and British thought and civilization in India. Such line of action was necessary since it was believed that the Hindoo did not know what was best for him.

On the subject, Macaulay argued in his Minute on Education in 1835 that “it would be bad enough to consult their intellectual taste at the expense of their intellectual health. But we are consulting neither. We are withholding from them the learning which is palatable to them” (Macaulay’s minute 1835). This shows that protection was interpreted as a call for civilizing and developing the Hindoos. The objective of civilizing through language was clearly articulated by Macaulay. He argued that “the language of Western Europe civilized Russia. I cannot doubt that they will do for the Hindoo what they have done for the Tartar” (Macaulay’s minute 1835). The latter brings forth a number of points. First, it concurs with what I have suggested that protection equalled civilizing the natives. Second, this quote also brings forth the interplay between representation and protection. Before Russia became civilized she was considered in Macaulay’s words as “being in a state as barbarous as that in which our ancestors were before the Crusades gradually emerged” (Macaulay’s minute 1835).
India was at that moment represented as being in Russia’s state before it was civilized. Therefore, with the guidance of Britain, India could reach a higher level of civilization. This idea of protecting through civilizing was also accompanied by the idea of protection as supervision. This idea was visible in the policy pursued by the EIC as regards the administration of justice. As explained by Mr Mangles who served as an MP and Chairman of the EIC after 1857,

the Indian government (East India Company) had gone about the principle of selecting the best Natives to hold those offices to administer justice in the first instance, employing English judges to oversee them in the performance of their duties. That was the only way in which the people of India could be educated into a fitness for self-government. (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2058).

This shows that this guiding and superintending was of essence because the Hindoos, as it was claimed, could not govern themselves. In the aftermath of the mutiny British parliamentarians called for the need to protect the Hindoos. During a debate on the issue of transferring the administration to the Crown Lord Harry Vane (MP for Durham Southern) argued in 1858 that “India was still overrun by hordes of a licentious soldiery, and complete tranquillity could not be expected for many months, it was absolutely necessary there should be a vigorous government to administer affairs in that country” (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2019). Imminence required that a decision be taken so that the people could be protected.

The last paternalistic element I now turn to is difference and incompetence, intimately tied to practices of representation. The manner in which the Hindoos were represented in British discourse fuelled calls to protection and framed at the same time the feelings of obligation and duty on the part of the British towards the Native population. British representations of the Hindoos prove to be an important medium through which British paternalism operated and flourished. Generally, the British represented the Hindoos as different. As such they were seen as representing “the other”. The Hindoos were seen as different in terms of culture, language, religion, their character and their intelligence. Regarding the Hindoo religion and the customs associated with it, Bearce
remarks that the reformers of the 1830s viewed India as “the land of superstition and despotism” (Bearce, 1961, p. 158). This is also reflected in Bentinck’s view of India as “a country cursed from one end to the other by the vice, the ignorance, the oppression, the despotism, the barbarous and cruel customs” (cited in Bearce 1961, p. 162). One such custom was the sati, whose abolition was celebrated as “the abolition of a barbarous custom” (HC Deb 04 June 1830, c1356).

The character of the Hindoos was also seen as different when compared to the British. In explaining the problems encountered by the EIC in the administration of justice in India, Mangles asserted that “the greater part of the defects which existed arose from the inherent difficulties of our position, from the character and habits of the people with whom we had to deal and from the utter impossibility of making the natives instruments of good government all at once” (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2058). Further, the Indian race was according to Macaulay “a race debased by three thousand years of despotism and priestcraft” (cited in Vohra, 2001, p. 68). The Hindoos were also seen as different because of their language. According to Macaulay “the dialects spoken among the natives of this part of India contain neither literary nor scientific information, and moreover are poor and rude” (Macaulay’s minute 1835).

A proposal was made in Parliament in 1853 that admissions to the civil service in India should be effectuated by examinations. This was to apply to both natives and Europeans. At the moment the proposal was brought forth natives were not admitted in the civil service. On that Macaulay argued that “I do not blame those who do not admit them, for it is my belief that there is not in India a young Native whom it would be a kindness to the Native population to place, at the present moment, in your civil service”. However he argued that “as soon as any young Native of distinguished parts should, by the cultivation of English literature, have enabled himself to be victorious in competition over European candidates, he would, in the most honourable manner, by conquest, as a matter of right, and not as a mere eleemosynary donation, obtain access to the service” (HC Deb 24 June 1853, cc757-758). This shows that natives were differentiated from the British and Europeans in general on the basis of not having sufficient command of the English language and knowledge.
What accentuated further this differentiation and the representation of the Hindoos as the other were British perceptions of masculinity. Trevelyans spoke confidently in 1838 of the time when Indians would “grow to a man’s estate” (cited in Hutchins, 1967, p. 76). This concurs with Macaulay’s caricature of the Bengali as “soft, devious, servile, indolent and effeminate” (cited in Duara, 2004, p. 80). What is more, the Hindoos were represented as child-like. Prof Horace Wilson was an English Orientalist who resided many years in India and was employed in various departments of the civil government. In his article in the Times in 1840 argued that “a common characteristic of men of learning and of the Hindus especially, was a simplicity truly childish and a total unacquaintance with the business and manners of life…where this feature was lost, it was chiefly by those who had been long familiar with Europeans” (The Times, 25 June).

The above corresponds with observations made by current literature, that the colonized people of India took in the eyes of their British guardians the role of adopted children in the family of the British Empire (Blue, Bunton and Croizier, 2002). This manner of representing the Hindoos resulted in them being seen as incompetent. For instance, on the subject of the government of India Bill, Mr Blackett did not think that the opinions of the Natives could assist them towards the conclusion as to what the government of India should be (HC Deb 24 June 1853, c765). Further in a Commons debate on the future government of India in 1858 Sir Francis Baring stated that “we could not let India govern itself” (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2030). Echoing the above, Mill argued in 1852 that “I do not think you could make a native Governor General, but I think natives might in time be appointed to many of the highest administrative offices” (1990, p. 65).

Of crucial importance is the fact that not all Hindoos were seen as “the other”. British texts are illuminating in this respect in that they show evidence of a double sense of identification. The educated classes were seen as closer to the “self”, as allies of Britain. This identification was owed to the fact that this segment of the population was educated on British standards. Similarly, Macaulay argued that “in India, English is the language spoken by the ruling class. It is spoken by the higher class of natives.
at the seats of government” (Minute on education, 1835). As a result of such identification these educated classes were seen and spoken of in a different light in relation to the rest of the Native population. For example, Macaulay argued regarding appointments to the civil service that “we ought if possible to take such measures that this service may consist entirely of picked men, of superior men, taken from the flower of the youth of India” (HC Deb 24 June 1853, c749).

5.3 British Paternalism During the Anglo-Egyptian Intervention in the Sudan 1896-98

The British intervention in the Sudan which took place in 1896-1898 constitutes the third case I address to provide a holistic representation of the manner in which British paternalism manifested itself in the nineteenth century. Despite not constituting part of empirical investigations of the interventionist literature, the case of the Sudan helps to consolidate my argument regarding British paternalism to a considerable extent. It also aids me in countering contemporary interpretations of nineteenth century interventions based on religion (Christianity). As the following analysis will reveal, paternalism manifested itself in the Sudan in similar but also in distinct ways to the case of Greece and India. Before presenting the ways in which British paternalism was manifested in the Anglo-Egyptian intervention in the Sudan some background information is necessary.

The history and the relations between Egypt, the Sudan and Britain are of a complex nature. Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1882 when it was occupied by British forces during the Anglo-Egyptian war (Neillands, 1996). The Sudan was an Egyptian possession since the early nineteenth century. Following a revolution by the Madhists in the Sudan against their Egyptian administration, Egypt abandoned the Sudan in 1884-5. A decade later, the British and Egyptians got involved in the Sudan. This was undertaken through three expeditions: the Dongola expedition in 1896, the Berber and Atbara expedition in 1897, and the battle of Omdurman in 1898 (Neillands, 1996). The British expedition in the Sudan can be understood as a battle against the
“Dervishes” in the territory whose name was given to them by the British to Mahdi’s followers (Neillands, 1996). Although the scope of this chapter does not extend to the aftermath of the British expedition, it suffices to say that it culminated with the establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium over the Sudan in 1899 (Daly, 2003).

Let us first turn our attention to the way benevolence appeared in British discourses and representations of the Sudan. In the discourses analyzed, British benevolence is evident not only in debates in the House of Commons but also in British correspondence. On the subject of moving forward in the Sudan Mr. Henry Seton-Karr (MP for St Helens until 1906) argued in 1896 that

> it was the best for Egypt and for the Soudan, was absolutely necessary for the security of the country.....it would lead to the Soudan provinces, and even the Equatorial provinces, at some time being thrown open to civilization, the present tyranny of the Madhi being put an end to, and the security and prosperity of Egypt finally secured. (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1537)

What is remarkable about the case of the Sudan, as clearly illustrated by the above, is that justifications for British involvement rested as much on the benefits and interests that would be afforded to both Egypt and the Sudan. Indeed, the interests of Egypt and the benefit it would acquire by Britain moving into the Sudan were overwhelming the justifications offered. In a debate in 1896 in the House of Commons, Mr. John Morley (MP for Montrose Burghs) stated that “It had been decided that it would be for both the present and the permanent interest of Egypt that an advance should be made up the valley of the Nile” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1489). Similarly, the Secretary of state for the colonies Mr. Chamberlain argued that “the present policy of the government is confined to the immediate needs of Egypt” (HC Debate 20 March 1896, c1512).

Justifications found in British discourse concerning British involvement in the Sudan also took a more a general direction. This is clearly illustrated in Mr. Labouchere’s (MP for Northampton ) statement in the House of Commons in 1896 where he argued that “we ought to smash the Madhi, or that the Madhi ought, in the interests of the
world, to be smashed” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1513). Further, the military expedition into the Sudan was to allow Egypt to re-conquer parts of it. On this, the Lord of the Treasury argued that “we do not think that it is a loss, but a gain, to civilization that Egyptian influence should be extended southwards in the way we propose” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, 1489). In terms of practices the British assisted the Egyptians militarily in various ways. Help was provided in terms of troops. British soldiers were after 1897 fighting with the Egyptian army. Additionally, gunboats were produced in Britain for the Egyptian government (The Times, 17 March 1896).

Obligation and duty figured in an equally intriguing way in British justifications. Here again, the British displayed a double sense of duty and obligation. On the one hand, they conceived that they had an obligation towards Egypt to assist her in gaining back the Sudan, due in part to their occupation of Egypt and the duties and obligations thereby conferred to them. On the subject of moving into the Sudan Mr. J. Morley argued in the Commons that “I say that no possibility of fulfilling our duty to the people who are actually within our frontier exists so long as Dervish power continually threatens the peaceable industry of those people by the sudden raids and incursions” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1507).

Britain’s role in Egypt as conferring certain duties and obligations was clearly articulated by Mr. Ronald Munro-Fergusson (MP for Leith District of Burghs) who in a Commons debate in February 1897 argued that “we are trustees” referring to Egypt (HC Deb 5 February 1897, c1496). Similarly, Mr. Pierpont (MP for Warrington) stated that “England being in a position of a foster-mother to Egypt, would be very wrong, indeed, not to take every possible means to maintain the safety of the country she had taken in charge” (HC Deb 5 February 1897, c1510).

On the other hand, Britain seemed to feel it a duty to assist the Sudanese. As the MP for Forest of Dean, Sir Charles Dilke stated “it was our duty to restore” what he labelled “civilization” to the whole of the territory inhabited by these tribes (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1549). This illustrates that duty and obligation towards the Sudanese was justified in terms of Britain being the carrier of civilization, which in itself carried certain duties and obligations. Additionally, the concept of responsibility figures prominently in British justifications regarding the Sudan. As the Chancellor of the
Exchequer argued in the Commons in 1897 “these responsibilities are not nearly so
great or so special as our responsibility for the inhabitants of the Soudan” (HC Deb 5
February 1897, cc1448). He also argued that “here is a case in which we may fulfil
that responsibility which undoubtedly rests upon us” (Hansard, HC, Deb 5 February
1897, c1449). This double sense of duty, obligation and responsibility can be clearly
inferred by the following quote. In 1897, the Times published from their correspondent
in Cairo that: “in the interests of trade, civilization and humanity England’s help will
be given until Dervish tyranny throughout the Sudan has been superseded by a good
government” (The Times 3 Nov 1897). The objective here was to help the Egyptians
on the one hand and bring civilization to the Sudan on the other.

Moving on to the element of protection, it is visible in the case of the Sudan towards
both the Sudanese and the Egyptians. In regards to Egypt practices undertaken were
of a military nature. Having previously been reformed according to British guidelines,
the Egyptian military was during the Sudan expedition led by a British Commander
known as Sirdar (Dighton, 2016). The three expeditions in the Sudan (Dongola 1896,
Berber and Atbara 1897 and Omdurman 1898) showcase the actions undertaken by
the British on the side of the Egyptians. From 1897 onwards British military personnel
joined the Egyptian army composed of Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers and took part
in battles fought against the Dervishes in the Sudan. The British were fighting
alongside the Egyptians to protect their territory from the Dervishes. As far as the
Sudanese are concerned, it was the outcome of these actions which were to protect the
Sudanese, in terms of bringing to them the benefits of civilization.

This point is illustrated by discourses relating to the aftermath of the Dongola
expedition of 1896. For example, Lord Cromer, the Consul-General in Egypt stated
“a large territory has been redeemed from barbarism and again placed under civilizing
influence” (The Times, October 24, 1896). Further, calls to protection were justified
by citing atrocities committed by the Dervishes and the nature of their administration.
The Dervishes were described as looting the inhabitants on the Blue Nile (FO
407/147). Making the case stronger, the Times argued for the need to “liberate these
enslaved populations” (The Times, May 26, 1896). Similarly, the MP for Southport
and Under-Secretary of State for foreign affairs, Mr. George Curzon stated in the Commons that “we should endeavor to rescue the poor people of Khartoum” (HC Deb 5 February 1897, c1474). Further, Mr. Seton-Karr in making his case for British involvement in the Sudan argued that “with this policy the present tyranny of the Madhi will be put to an end” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1537).

Finally, let us address the last elements comprising paternalism, difference and incompetence. British representations of the Egyptians labeled them as similar-but-different. By nature the Egyptians were seen as the “other”. However, they were represented as similar because of British influence since the occupation. Whatever was positive about Egypt was because of Britain. The otherness describing the Egyptians can be observed in terms of the capabilities and capacities ascribed to the Egyptians. On the subject of Dongola, Colonel Blundell (MP for Ince) argued that “Egypt if she stood alone, could not possibly forego the opportunity that presented itself of reconquering that lost province of Dongola” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1531).

This position was also held by a number of military advisers in the government who held that Egyptian forces would need to be materially supported by English troops in the event of extensive operations since they could not be relied upon (HC Deb 3 July 1896, c730). The latter does not only provide the grounds on which differentiation was constructed on the part of Britain but equally informs on the need for Britain to “assist”. In parallel, the Dervishes were described as a “savage foe” by Francis Grenfell, the General Officer commanding the force in Egypt in light of the battle of Omdurman (The London Gazette, Sep 30, 1898). Additionally they were described as “a mongrel and despicable people” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, cc1517).

Further, the Times in April 9th 1896 read “The Sudanese were it was said always aggressive and threatening”. Similarly, Mr. Courtney who had previously served as under-secretary and Financial Secretary for the Treasury and was at the time MP for Bodmin, stated that “the inhabitants of the Sudan were fierce, strong warlike and above all fanatical people” (The Times, April 9, 1896). These were complemented by the representation of Dervishes as “wicked” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1547). It is in
these ways that the British represented the Sudanese and more particularly the Dervishes as inferior. The Sudanese were inferior because of their peculiar character and temperament. British discourses put an accent on this by also differentiating between the Egyptians and Sudanese. For example the Times wrote “the Sudanese are less intelligent than the Egyptians, they are clumsy and slower at learning their drill” (The Times, May 11, 1896).

Apart from being seen as inferior to the British and Egyptians, the Sudanese also figured in British representations as victims. In 1896 the Times wrote “The unfortunate inhabitants of the Sudan groan under an oppression as cruel as that of the Turk” (The Times, May 11, 1896). The Sudan itself was also described as a territory “fraught with melancholy and tragic association” by Mr. John Morley (MP for Montrose Burghs) in the House of Commons (HC Deb, 20 March 1896, c1478). By being depicted as victims the Sudanese were in turn seen as incompetent. They could not rise up to the Khalifa or protect themselves. All in all, the British seemed to identify more with the Egyptians than the Sudanese. Seen on a gradient, the Egyptians tilted more towards “the self” than the Sudanese who were clearly portrayed as “the other”.

5.4 British Paternalism in the Nineteenth Century

Having presented the ways in which the core elements defining paternalism figured in the cases of Greece, India and the Sudan, I now move to a comparison of these three cases. I first provide a visual representation of British paternalism in each case showing the interconnections between the four elements constituting British paternalism. Then, by drawing on the commonalities and differences observed in the cases I bring forth the manner in which paternalism manifested itself in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in the nineteenth century. Before proceeding with the comparison, a general observation is in order. Although each historical period under investigation has some identifying elements due to culture, society and the context in which Britain intervened, each case has its peculiarities. Nineteenth century British interventions are no exception to this.
Figure 1 British Paternalism as manifested during the Greek War of Independence 1821-27

Figure 2 British Paternalism in India 1830-60.
The above diagrams illustrate that all four components of paternalism were identified in the three cases considered. Also apparent are commonalities and differences across the three cases in terms of how paternalism manifested itself. Let us first turn to the similarities. Common to all cases are justifications espousing benevolence, negative representations of the subjects intervened upon, references to civilization and representations of British superiority. Starting with benevolence, the British interventions in Greece, India and the Sudan were all justified as being for the benefit of each population respectively. The wording used is similar but not identical. The intervention in Greece was justified as having for an object “the welfare of Greeks” and their independence. The Anglo-Egyptian intervention in the Sudan was justified as being “the best” for both Egypt (security) and the Sudan (end of tyranny; civilization).

In India interference by the EIC was justified on the grounds of “benefiting the people of India” and as being “for the good of the people”. British rule (Crown) was justified as having a positive effect on the natives. A parallel can be drawn with what was observed in Chapter 4. The benevolence characterizing relations between the upper classes and lower classes in England is also characteristic of Britain’s relations with the peoples of the territories investigated in this chapter. The second commonality observed relates to negative representations of the subjects intervened upon. The
Greeks were described as “barbarians”, the Sudanese as “fanatical people” with a peculiar character and the Hindoos as “a race debased by many years of despotism”. As a result the British perceived the Greeks, Sudanese and Hindoos as different from “us”. Through these practices of differentiation the subjects of intervention constituted “the other”. In both India and the Sudan these representations constituted the source for British obligation and duty. In all three cases they were part of justifications of protection.

Further, British representations established the Greeks, Hindoos, Egyptians and Sudanese as incompetent. The Greeks and Sudanese were seen as victims whereas the Hindoos and Egyptians had limited capabilities. Either way, the representation of the subjects of intervention as incompetent fueled discourses of protection. This is consistent with representations of the poor in England, observed in Chapter 4. A corollary of these representations is the perceived superiority of Britain, present in all cases. British superiority in the case of Greece and the Sudan was based on its military capabilities. In India, however, the British were superior to the Hindoos by way of their culture, language, race and knowledge. Finally, in all cases the concept of civilization was mobilized. In Greece it functioned as a means to identify with the Greeks whereas in India and the Sudan it constituted partially or exclusively the objective to be attained.

Commonalities were observed in only two of the cases investigated pertaining to paternalism’s manifestation. For instance, a pattern of discourse was evident in Sudan and Greece. Both populations were described as “unfortunate” in discourses calling for British intervention. In the case of the Sudan the Times read “The unfortunate inhabitants of the Sudan groan under an oppression as cruel as that of the Turk” (The Times, May 11, 1896). In the case of Greece, Strangford argued that “it would be highly proper to make some efforts on behalf of these unfortunate people” (FO 78/99). Equally interesting is that the discourse on the Sudan refers to the Turks, i.e. to those who oppressed the Greek victims.
Moreover, in both India and the Sudan (in relation to Egypt), obligation and duty manifested in a comparable manner, based on Britain’s perceived role. In both, British influence was established, in India through the EIC and in Egypt as a result of occupation. In relation to Egypt, Britain was seen as a “trustee” or “foster-mother”. In India Parliamentarians represented the role of a British man as that of “educator”. Lastly there is a common element shared between Greece and India, the place of religion and Christianity. In both it served as a way to boost feelings of British obligation and duty. The British spoke of what it meant to be Christian and the duties that resulted therefrom.

The differences observed between the three cases are equally enlightening. Taking up the issue of religion once more, it was only in the case of Greece that Christianity was the means through which the British positively identified with the Greeks. It is this bond and that of the civilization they were perceived to share which resulted in British conceptions of duty and obligation towards them. However, religion was only one of the ways in which obligation and duty developed. My interpretation counters pre-existing ones, which see religion as the primary motive for the intervention in Greece. The case of the Sudan helps downplay the religious component of nineteenth century interventionism. Here, the British did not cite Christian duties, discourses were not informed by religion. As discussed above, obligation and duty during the Anglo-Egyptian intervention in the Sudan focused on civilization and on Britain’s perceived role in Egypt.

Another point of differentiation relates to the peculiarities of the intervention in the Sudan. Here, paternalism manifested itself on two fronts. It operated both on the side of Egypt and of the Sudan. Further, the three cases are distinguished by British practices of representation locating “the self” and “the other”. It is particularly useful to grasp these practices of representation as operating along a spectrum. In the British mind the inhabitants of the Sudan and India constituted “the other” because of their radically different character, customs and culture. In contrast the Egyptians were seen as closer to “the self”, resulting from Britain’s occupation of Egypt in the early 1880s. The Greeks were also seen as closer to representations of “the self”. However in this
case it was because they were Christian and also referred to as the first enlightened nation.

Despite the fact that both Greeks and Egyptians were represented as the self, protection was justified in terms of incompetence and difference. A more precise way to see these representations is as “the self but not quite”. This is also consistent with binary oppositions such as strong/weak, saviour/victim. The subject of intervention is identified with in certain cases in order to foster feelings of obligation and duty. However the paternalist’s need to protect will almost certainly rely on representations of difference and incompetence. These in turn sustain the hierarchic and un-equal relations between the paternalist and the paternalized. As we saw in Chapter 4 the representation of the poor in England maintained the un-equal character of society. Lastly, British representations of natives in India touches upon a very core element of paternalism, the family analogy. The Hindoos were seen as “child-like” and as the antithesis to masculinity. Although the Egyptians were not represented in this manner, Britain was seen as Egypt’s foster-mother. This coincides with what was presented in Chapter 4 with regards to internal paternalism vis-à-vis the poor.

A further point of differentiation refers to practices of protection. In the three cases investigated the British acted in various ways, pursuing distinct policies, all of which were protective in nature. In each case protection meant something different. During the Greek insurrection, British naval forces fought against the Turkish and Egyptian fleets. The British navy was also charged with blocking access to ammunition and forces from reaching Greece. The objective here was to ensure the physical protection of the Greek population. During the Anglo-Egyptian intervention in the Sudan force was employed against the Dervishes in the Sudan. The Egyptian army was led by a British commander and included British officers.

The British were protecting the territorial integrity of Egypt and the inhabitants of the Sudan by defeating the Dervishes. In contrast, in India practices of protection did not include a military aspect. By administering the territory, by ruling over the inhabitants and controlling the means of education and appointments to the civil service, the
British were protecting the Hindoos from themselves, just like the upper classes in England were protecting the poor from themselves. In India it was about offering protection through civilization.

Despite the differences observed among these three cases, paternalism did manifest itself in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse during the 19th century. The empirical chapters that follow will establish a similar degree of continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 we see how paternalism’s characteristics are manifested across historical eras, and that what changes is the context, the justifications and the language employed. The following chapter will turn attention to the Mandate period and address how paternalism manifested itself in two British Mandates, Palestine and Tanganyika.
6 British Paternalism During the Mandate Period

In contrast to current interpretations of nineteenth century practices of humanitarian intervention, the previous chapter demonstrated that religion was not the primary motive of interventions, but rather that it was one of numerous elements present in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse. With the same objective in mind, this chapter will focus on the Mandate period (1920-1948). From the outset, the Mandate period seems to differ in significant ways from nineteenth century imperialism. This is due to the codification in international law of new norms and concepts such as mandate, trust and development.

Further, the Mandate System introduced and established the idea that self-government would become a reality for certain ex-colonial people. The Mandate System also added a new class of territories with a different standing in international law. Indeed, until 1919 there were only two types of British dependent territories: colonies and protectorates (Chidzero, 1961). In order to attain the objective set for this chapter I will first address the relevant sections of the Covenant of the League of Nations (CLN) dealing with the establishment of the Mandate System. This will enable me to extrapolate the main themes and concepts crucial in understanding the political climate and mindset of the period under examination. Then, I will engage with current interpretations of the period and the Mandate System by the post-conflict reconstruction literature.

Following this I move to the analysis of two British Mandated territories, Palestine, a “Class A” mandate, and Tanganyika, a “Class B” mandate. In the case of Palestine I focus on specific areas subject to British interventionism (administration, education, land and agriculture, and the mandate and Balfour declaration). Within each area, I identify the four elements I have established in Chapters 3 and 4 as defining paternalism. Similarly in my examination of Tanganyika I look at the following areas of British interventionism: administration, education, land and agriculture, and I
identify in each how paternalism manifested itself. Finally, I compare the two case studies while at the same time making reference to British interventionism beyond the Mandate system, focusing on Britain’s relationship with its colonies in Africa.

6.1 The Mandate System of the League of Nations

The Mandate System was established through the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. At the time of its inception, it was perceived as an innovation in international law. Its framers saw the system as a means to improve upon colonialism, and as “a step toward the amelioration of the excesses of European colonial policies” (Dumbuya, 1995, p. 2; Sluglett, 2014). The establishment of the Mandate System is of crucial importance because it incorporated “new” concepts and norms in international law guiding state practice. The concepts “mandate” and “trust” are such examples. Also significant is the Mandate System’s objective. It acknowledged that former Turkish and German territories would, once developed, attain self-government. In order to fully grasp what the Mandate system sought to accomplish and the ideas guiding it, this section looks at the Covenant of the League of Nations (CLN) and the articles relating to the Mandate System. The first step in delineating the meaning of the concept mandate is to focus on Article 22 of the CLN, which reads as follows:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the state which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such people form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant… The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who…can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. (CLN, emphasis added).
The three sentences in bold I have emphasized above embody the main themes of the Mandate System in terms of representation, objectives and underlying ideology. The first sentence in bold establishes that the people subject to a mandate are not yet able to stand by themselves. Such representations link the subjects of a mandate with a certain vulnerability and incapacity (mental and material). The second sentence in bold informs on the twin objectives of the mandate, namely the well-being and development of the people. These objectives were to form a “sacred trust of civilization”. These two sentences are complementary in that the representation of the people as unable to stand by themselves necessitates the formation of a trust of civilization whereby they would be developed and looked after.

The third sentence in bold is important because it establishes who is seen as the best candidate for this trust. In keeping with the dichotomy civilized/uncivilized apparent in the first two, the candidates most suited to take on the trusts were “civilized” (advanced) nations. Their resources, experiences and geographical proximity, it was thought, rendered advanced states able to prepare mandated territories for self-government (Chowdhuri, 1955). Article 22 of the Covenant brings forth the following concepts: civilization, trust, inability/incapacity, development and hierarchy. The above clearly defines the concept of mandate, which was seen as the act of protecting and developing peoples who are not able to do so on their own. The underlying belief was that only with the help, guidance and tutelage of advanced nations would the less advanced nations be able to achieve the goal of self-government.

Although Article 22 described uniformly the people subject to the Mandate System, it also established a classificatory mechanism in order to distinguish between the territories to be mandated. These territories were divided into three classes. “Class A” mandates consisted of former Turkish colonies: Iraq, Syria including Lebanon, and Palestine including Transjordan. “Class B” mandates incorporated former German colonies of Central Africa: Togoland, Cameroon, Tanganyika and Rwanda-Burundi. Lastly, “Class C” mandates included the territories of South West Africa and the Pacific islands (Chesterman, 2004, p. 14). This classification was based on European definitions and understandings of development (Dumbuya, 1995; Callahan, 2008).
line with this, a territory’s developmental level was among the chief elements defining the nature of the mandate for each territory of every class.

As stated in Article 22(3) of the Covenant “the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic condition and other similar circumstances” (in Nele, 2005 annex). In order to fully grasp the basis of the classification undertaken by the League of Nations and the importance of civilization and development in that regard there is a need to turn to paragraphs 4-6 of the Covenant. According to paragraph 4 “certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice”. In contrast to this, paragraph 5 states that “other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory” (in Nele, 2005 annex). Lastly, paragraph 6 states that “there are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which…can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory” (in Nele, 2005 annex).

According to this, Class A mandates received administrative advice, Class B mandates necessitated administration and Class C mandates were to be administered as integral portions of the Mandatory’s territory. The level and degree of a Mandatory’s involvement was directly related to each territory’s perceived stage of development. The notion of development contained in the Covenant was intimately tied to that of civilization and to the ability or inability of a territory to exercise self-government. In essence the classification of territories in three classes was based on “perceived differences in development and levels of civilization” (Crawford, 2002, p. 262). The use of the term “stages” to connote the level of a territory’s development suggests a linear view of development, a unique way of attaining development along a continuum.
The literature on interventionism that takes account of the significance of the Mandate System is that which deals with state-building and post-conflict reconstruction, particularly with the peculiarities of foreign administration of territories. The focus of these writings rests on the aims, viability and relevance of foreign administration in a post-colonial world. Another, or rather inter-connected, preoccupation is to find ways in which to deal with failed states. The Mandate system of the League of Nations along with its successor the Trusteeship System of the United Nations are analyzed with a view to demonstrate continuity in current practices of territorial administration (Jackson, 1998; Stahn, 2001; Bain, 2003; Chesterman, 2004; Caplan, 2007). In showing continuity, these scholars question the argument that practices of transitional administration in the post-cold war era in countries like Kosovo, East-Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Eastern Slavonia are fundamentally new. In fact they argue that the continuity observed points to a resurrected practice of Trusteeship (Bain, 2003; Chesterman, 2004; Wilde, 2008).

Going back in time, Jackson and Bain trace the origins of transitional administration and of the concept of trusteeship to eighteenth century British India (1998; 2003; Matz, 2005). As observed by Jackson, “Britain held the responsibility of the civil condition of British India until it could stand on her own feet and become a full and equal member of the family of nations” (1998, p. 9). In examining the Mandate System, scholars focus on the three classes of mandates (Crawford, 2002; Chesterman, 2004; Matz, 2005). The mandates conferred upon Britain (Palestine, Iraq, Togoland, British Cameroon, Rwanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, South West Africa and Pacific islands (Nauru) along with those conferred upon the other Allied powers are interpreted in a general sense as cases embodying the idea of “trusteeship”.

Jackson clearly shows the place of Trusteeship in the Mandate System by referring to Article 22 of the CLN. Accordingly he argues that “tutelage of such peoples was entrusted to certain advanced nations and exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations” (1998, p. 9). As briefly discussed above, this idea of Trusteeship is traced back to the earlier colonial context (Wilde, 2008) where a
territory’s level of development was the determining criterion for the need of foreign administration.

This is seen as equally true for the Mandate system where the language of “development” and “civilization” constitute the cornerstones of the system (Crawford, 2002; Wilde, 2008). What binds scholars working on the subject of foreign administration of territory are these concepts of “trusteeship” and “trust”. Apart from establishing that the concept of trusteeship describes current foreign administrations and displays a parallel with previous such practices, scholars such as Jackson and Bain further interrogate the concept and its relationship with paternalism. In doing so, they bring to the forefront the manner in which both the mandate and trusteeship systems display paternalistic elements (Jackson, 1998; Crawford, 2002; Bain, 2003; Nele, 2005).

The relationship between Trusteeship/Mandate System and paternalism is discussed in terms of ideology. For Bain “the idea of Trusteeship presupposes the belief that the interests of such people (non-European) the moral and material conditions of their happiness must be represented on their behalf” (2003, p. 11). Similarly, for Jackson “Trusteeship involves paternalism on an international scale…treating governments and citizens of foreign territories as children”. Additionally he argues that paternalism presupposes “taking at our own initiative responsibilities that lie outside our sphere of jurisdiction and operation in the desire to do some good…placing people who live there under our control and care without the consent of the government” (1998, p. 12). Both scholars in their analyses clearly demonstrate some paternalistic elements ingrained in the Mandate System and the Covenant in terms of assumptions, the hierarchy and inequality presupposed and the feeling of responsibility towards the people inhabiting the territories under mandate.

Coercion is identified by both Jackson and Bain (1998, 2003) as characteristic of Trusteeship’s paternalistic tendencies. For Jackson Trusteeship involves coercion in that the people of a foreign country are placed “under our control without the consent of the government” (1998, p. 21). Similarly Bain identifies Trusteeship as involving
the loss of liberty of those placed under a trust (2003). In my conceptualization of paternalism coercion need not be defining of paternalistic practices because in certain cases authority is legitimated by the objects of intervention (government and public opinion). However, in both cases addressed in this chapter there were no governments and public opinion consulted, or if there was the consultation was not taken into account. Consequently I agree with Bain and Jackson regarding coercion. Although Bain and Jackson describe Trusteeship as paternalistic, their investigation does not extend to individual mandatories but rather is confined to the general principles of the League of Nations’ Mandate System.

6.2 British Paternalism and the Mandate over Palestine

The presence of Britain in Palestine pre-dates the bestowment of the territory upon Britain by the League of Nations in the early 1920s. Britain occupied Palestine during World War I thereby ending the 700 year-old Muslim rule. In order to gain a good grasp of British Policy in Palestine and the main articles of the Mandate it is crucial to go back to the year 1917 when the Balfour declaration was first issued (Shepherd, 1999). In issuing the declaration, Balfour, the then British Foreign Secretary, stated that

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. (From Arthur James Balfour to the Leader of the British Jewish Community, Lord Rothschild, November 2nd, 1917\textsuperscript{13})

\textsuperscript{13} The Balfour Declaration
The significance of this declaration cannot be stressed enough, as it was an issue most frequently debated in Parliament especially during the 1920s. Further, its significance is due to the incorporation of the declaration of 1917 into the Mandate for Palestine, which came into operation on September 29th 1923 (El-Eini, 2006). In terms of population Palestine was inhabited by a majority of Arab Muslims and Christians and a minority of Arab and non-Arab Jews\textsuperscript{14}. The relations between the Arab and non-Arab communities, especially between the Arab Muslims and Jews (non-Arab) were far from amiable. Revolts were commonplace. In 1929 Arab Muslims revolted for want of protection against Jewish land buyers and Jewish immigration from Europe (El-Eini, 2006).

The British administration strove to fulfil the obligations under the mandate in the areas of administration, education, land, agriculture and immigration. Despite British efforts, the situation in Palestine could not be settled as the British had hoped in 1917. Consequently numerous commissions were established and sent to Palestine to gather information for the formulation of policies. Examples include the Shaw Commission (1929-1936) and the Peel Commission of 1936, which recommended the partition of Palestine (Fieldhouse, 2006). British policy in the territory was guided exclusively by the Mandate for Palestine (hereafter referred to as MFP) document distinct from the CLN examined above. The MFP included provisions so as to comply with the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Article 2 of the MFP is a good starting point in bringing forth the cornerstone of British policy. According to Article 2:

\begin{quote}
The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion. (MFP)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} The British referred to Arabs and Jews, two categories constructed on the basis of race, hence leaving out Arab Jews. For this reason, in what follows I make distinctions when referring to a specific community in Palestine.
According to this, the establishment of a National Home for the Jews was one of the main duties of the Mandatory complemented by that of safeguarding the rights of the non-Jewish community (Arab Muslims and Christians). The main objective, as stated above, was the development of self-governing institutions. Consequently, the British viewed that they had in Palestine a double obligation and duty. Apart from being dictated by the Mandate as to their obligations, the British through their representation of the people in Palestine enhanced those feelings of obligation and duty. Arguments delivered in Parliament on the issue of the National Home for the Jews attest to that. For the most part, there was a tendency to refer to the greatness of the Jewish nation and race.

As expressed by Balfour in the House of Lords

their position and their history, their connection with world religion and world politics, is absolutely unique. There is no parallel to it, there is nothing approaching to a parallel to it, in any other branch of human history…do not forget what part they have played in the intellectual, the artistic, the philosophic and scientific development of the world (HL Deb 21 June 1922 vol 50, c1017).

Such arguments focusing on Jewish greatness tended to approach the Jews closer to British conceptions of “the self” and enhance the need to protect and help them. Although the Arab Muslims were represented at times positively and at times negatively they were never seen as inhabiting the realm of “the self”. Neither did they fit into representations of the “other”. As Mr Morrison stated in the Commons “when we are dealing with the Arabs we are not dealing with a backward, primitive people, such as there are in the equatorial parts of Africa” (HC Deb 24 November 1938, c2007). The Arabs and especially the Arab Muslims inhabited a middle space between British representations of “the self” and “the other”.

150
Despite the fact that there were many pro-Zionists in Britain not everyone celebrated the development of a National Home for the Jews. Opponents of the policy stressed the inequalities produced by one of the articles of the mandate which demanded the establishment of a Zionist Executive that would be involved in the administration of the country (HL Deb 21 June 1922, c994-1023). There was also an element of “benevolence” in discourses relating to the acquisition of the mandate by Great Britain and her role in Palestine. In his Speech of June 3rd 1921 Sir Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner of Palestine, spoke of the British government as “the trustee under the mandate for the happiness of the people of Palestine” (FO 371/6374).

In like fashion, Mr. Ormsby-Gore the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State stated in the Commons that “it is the object of the British government and of the British administration in Palestine to promote the harmony and development of all races and creeds in Palestine” (HC Deb 02 July 1923, c15). According to this Britain was to administer Palestine for the interest and future of its people. In conjunction with such opinions, the mandate and more specifically the National Home policy was justified on moral grounds and British interests were not seen as influencing British policy. It is true that Palestine was of strategic interest for Britain until the end of the war. However, after that Britain claimed to be administrating the country for the benefit of its inhabitants. This is consistent with Lord Lamington’s statement in the Lords:

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we as a country have absolutely no interest in Palestine, nor indeed in Syria. We have no commercial interests there except Thomas Cook & Son’s tourist agency…Palestine is not essential from a strategic point of view…we are now undertaking a distinct burden of government on behalf of the Jews, and not on behalf of British interests. (HL Deb 29 June 1920, c1014)
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The following sections will investigate the areas of British involvement in Palestine dictated by the Mandate and the general objective of the national home policy. As the

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15 Lord Sydenham (Baron Sydenham of Combe) stated in the Lords ‘I sympathize entirely with the wishes of the Jews to have a National Home but I say that this National Home must not be given if it cannot be given without entailing gross injustices upon other people’ (HL Deb 21 June 1922, c1021).

16 Similarly a British official in the administration stated that ‘Palestine was for most of us an emotion rather than a reality’ (cited in Segev, 2001, p. 4).
following sections will show Article 2 of the Mandate for Palestine guided policies on immigration, land and the administration of the territory. Apart from these areas, British involvement in education will also be investigated.

British policy in the area of immigration was encapsulated by Article 6 of the Mandate (MFP), which was to comply with the objective of the National Home policy. According to Article 6 “The administration of Palestine...shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions” (MFP). In carrying this responsibility forward, the British developed a system through which they would control the number of immigrants entering the territory with the advisory opinion of the Jewish Agency (Shepherd, 1999). The main lines of British policy on immigration were issued in the 1922 Churchill White Paper. According to the White Paper, the number of immigrants allowed in Palestine depended on the “economic absorptive capacity” of the territory (Fieldhouse, 2006, p. 155). Throughout the mandate a large number of Ordinances on immigration were issued because of Arab Muslim contestation.

Further, at certain critical moments during the mandate immigration was suspended or even restricted either because of rioting or because the economic absorptive capacity of the territory had reached its limit. Apart from developing a system to regulate immigration the British also issued the 1924 Palestinian Citizenship Order in Council whose goal was to facilitate Jewish settlement in Palestine by enabling Jewish immigrants to acquire Palestinian citizenship (Report on Palestinian Administration 1923 – hereafter RPA). The policies adopted on immigration display a certain level of protection towards the Jews and the Arabs (Arab Christians and Muslims). First, the large flow of European Jews in the territory was a move towards enabling the further development of Jews in Palestine. Protection is here understood in terms of providing a place to thrive. Second, the control of immigration through the principle of economic absorptive capacity protected both Jewish settlers and the three Arab communities by ensuring that the level of unemployment did not surpass immigration numbers.

The large flow of European Jews was justified through the Balfour Declaration and through representations identifying them as close to “the self”. European Jews were
seen as in need of help and emphasis was put on the hardships they had endured. This is visible in Colonel Wedgwood’s statement in the Commons where he argued that

when we remember the conditions under which the Jews have lived for centuries in Poland, Russia and Rumania, where they have been deprived of any chance of economic freedom, and we have a chance of establishing these people under the British flag upon a freehold where they can become producers for themselves and real pioneer settlers on the land; when we have this chance of providing a refuge and freedom, I think we ought to seize the opportunity.

(HC Deb 30 April 1929, c1476)

The need of protecting European Jews gained more ground with Hitler’s rise to power in the 1930s. For example Ramsey MacDonald argued in 1938 that “the tragedy of a people who have no country has never been so deep as it is this week. The sympathy of our own countrymen, their anxiety to do everything they can to help the persecuted Jews has never been so firm as it is today” (HC Deb 24 November 1938, c1989). In 1933, the British administration in Palestine granted a number of administrative concessions – 3,000 immigration certificates (1933 RPA). The latter policy was in nature protective. Through these certificates the British trustee was ensuring the physical protection of persecuted German Jews in Germany.

With respect to British policies on administration, these had as an objective to develop self-government as stated by Article 2 of the MFP. As regards the general administration of the territory, the British pronounced their role as “Trustees of the Holy Land” (HC Deb 02 July 1923, c15). That Britain was the trustee of Palestine was visible in the manner in which Britain administered the territory since its occupation in 1917. First through the 1920 Order in Council, the British set up a civil administration (Shepherd, 1999). A year later, the High Commissioner Churchill established an advisory council of twenty members consisting of 10 British members, 4 Arab Muslims, 3 Arab Christians and 3 Jews (Segev, 2001). Despite the absence of legislative power, the establishment of the advisory council ensured the representation of all communities of Palestine.
Two points are worth noting. First the British constituted the majority in the council, due perhaps to their position of “trustee”. Second, the seats allocated in the council did not reflect the fact that in majority the population were Arab Muslims. What is more, the Jews were given an advisory role in government headed by the Jewish Agency as dictated by the Mandate, whereas the Palestinian Arabs (Muslim and Christian) were given no such representation (Shepherd, 1999). In 1922, the Palestine Order in Council was issued, setting up a government for the territory. It defined the powers of the High Commissioner, giving him absolute power in administration (RPA 1922). The High Commissioner was accompanied by the Executive Council constituted of British Officials (Shepherd, 1999). Moreover, the 1922 Order in Council made provisions for the establishment of a Legislative Council.

However, with two failed attempts at constituting a Legislative Council due to Arab discontent with the Balfour Declaration, the High Commissioner continued to hold full legislative powers and worked in consultation with the Advisory Council which by 1928 consisted only of official members (Statement of Policy by United Kingdom, 1930). The development of self-governing institutions in Palestine should have been a straightforward matter since the territory belonged to Class A mandates. However, due to the animosity between the two communities constant delays were taking place. This explains to some degree the holding of full legislative powers by the High Commissioner. Although the administration did not succeed in the advancement of representative institutions at the national level it did make certain moves at the local level. In exercising their role as trustees the British were holding power until it was safe to hand it over to the two communities.

Generally, there was a certain preference for the Jews (European or not) in Palestine, visible in their employment in government. Although in the 1920s the Arabs constituted 40% of men employed in the senior civil service, none occupied a post higher than that of assistant head of central departments or district officers (Fieldhouse, 2006). This is revealing in terms of representation. A mixture of positive

17 The British administration formulated a proposal for the establishment of an Arab Agency in 1923, which was rejected by the Arabs (El-Eini, 2006).
and negative traits were attached to the Arabs (Arab Muslims). For instance, Lord Snell (MP for Woolwich East) argued in a Lords debate “we must remember that whilst they are a lovable, generous and chivalrous people they were associated with methods which do not belong to the modern world” (HL Deb 27 June 1934, c177).

On the prospective partition of Palestine, an issue linked with the administration of the territory, Captain Cazalet in defending partition stated in the Commons that

> We have in Palestine, rightly or wrongly, two different forms of civilization, side by side. On the side of the Jews we have a civilized nation which is modern and up to date, while on the side of the Arabs…we have a civilization which resembles more the sixteenth than the twentieth century (HC Deb 24 November 1938, c2076).

It becomes apparent how in the British mind the Jews and specifically the European Jews were seen as closer to “the self” and the Arab Muslims as closer to “the other”. What demarcated the European Jews and the British from the Arab Muslims was their perceived level of development (“civilization”).

Let us now turn to the area of education. Although education was voluntary in Palestine, the British administration undertook initiatives to develop the education system. As early as 1922 the total number of elementary schools established amounted to 265 (1922 RPA). The two largest systems of schools were those organized by the government employing Arabic as the language of instruction and those organized by the Zionist Executive in which pupils were taught in Hebrew (1926 RPA). The government was principally responsible for supporting Arab Muslim education. The British were not involved in matters of Jewish education, as the Jews were seen as able to provide educational services for themselves. This view is reflected in Colonel Wedgwood’s statement in the Commons that “the business of the Government is to look after the Arabs, and the Jews can look after themselves” (HC Deb 30 April 1929, c1479).
Such views resulted from British distinctions on the respective level of civilization and ability of the Arab Muslims and Jews. As stated by Colonel Wedgwood in the Commons “The Jews are of course in Palestine, the higher civilization” (HC Deb 30 April 1929, c1479). As a result of such representations the Arabs were seen as needing the most help, guidance and development. A central issue in education was the language of instruction. According to the British the English language was key. For the likes of Mr Ormsby Gore this would be done gradually, as he argued in a House of Commons debate: “we hope to introduce and encourage the teaching of English gradually, but not where it is contrary to strong local sentiment. If people want Arabic, to force English upon them would be most undesirable” (HC Deb 21 November 1927, c1396). The English language was seen as paramount for the improvement and development of the people of Palestine as was the case in India discussed in Chapter 5. There is, however, a distinctive difference between the two cases. In India the natives were not consulted since they were seen as unable to know what is good for them. This demonstrates a point made above regarding the representation of Arab Muslims as somewhere between “the self” and “the other”.

When the issue was raised in the House of Commons Colonel Wedgwood asked “Why can we not teach them the only language in which they will ever be able to become self-governing? ...Teach people to think in English, to think about justice, to think about freedom. That is the foundation of any possible real civilization of the native races in our Empire” (HC Deb 30 April 1929, c1485). This shows how in the British mind, the English language functioned as a marker of civilization and that its introduction as a language of instruction would in the long term benefit the Arabs since it would get them closer to achieving self-government. Since 1924, English was principally taught in Higher elementary and Secondary schools in Government schools and in Private Muslim schools. English as the principal medium was only employed in the Evelyne de Rothschild’s school and in the schools of the Alliance Israélite (1924 RPA).

Policies on land and agriculture, too, were guided by the National Home Policy and the goal of developing Palestine so as to attain self-government. As per Article 6 of
the Mandate, the British had to ensure the close settlement of Jews on the land (MFP). To a large degree the British were involved in the agricultural training and education of existing and future farmers and cultivators. They were teaching farmers how to grow on the land and which crops should be given priority. To that end the Government’s Agricultural Development department put in place a program to introduce high value crops and techniques for improved seeds. Additionally, the development of cash crops such as tobacco was encouraged through the 1925 Tobacco Ordinance, as well as the cultivation of dates. These were seen as most beneficial economically for the country. In terms of education, officers from the department provided advice to farmers and distributed seeds (El-Eini, 2006).

According to the 1932 Report on the administration of the territory the objective of improving farming methods was that “the fellah [farmer in Arabic] may become as nearly self-supporting as possible” (1932 RPA). However, these practices were not only geared towards the Arab Muslim population of Palestine. As stated in the 1925 Report on the Administration of Palestine “the Department of Agriculture advises Jewish colonizing agencies on land development, farming methods, control of animal and pest disease and agricultural education” (1925 RPA). Further, agricultural education was extended to schools through school gardens in order to prepare future cultivators under the supervision of government instructors (RPA 1932). In order to provide efficient agricultural education in government schools, the administration trained government teachers in agricultural matters (RPA 1930).

Although all sections of the population received training, education and advice, the increased ability of the European Jews was emphasised in Parliament on a number of occasions. In a Commons Debate Malcolm MacDonald argued that “since 1922 more than 250,000 Jews have entered Palestine and settled there. Their achievement has been remarkable. They have turned sand dunes into orange groves” (HC Deb 24 November 1938, c1989). British policy in agriculture demonstrates how protection was in the case of Palestine equated with development. Education was of course the task of British personnel who trained and advised the people because they did not possess such knowledge. This was also the case for the Jewish section of the
population who although they were seen as the “higher civilization” still needed supervision. There is also a certain hidden benevolence in these practices. The British were teaching the people of Palestine how to become better producers and introduced the crops they believed would be most advantageous to them in the long run.

Apart from agricultural education, the British also had to deal with issues relating to the large flow of European Jews and their settlement on the land. It is crucial to note that the land question was one of the most disputed issues during the mandate. To remedy problems caused by the large flow of Jews from Europe, numerous ordinances were issued to facilitate Jewish settlement and protect the Arab population inhabiting the land. As regards the facilitation of Jewish settlement, the British administration issued the 1920 Ordinance. The Ordinance removed discrimination resulting from the Ottoman legislation, hence giving the opportunity to all people to acquire land and register it in their name (RPA 1923). Further, the 1924 Palestinian Citizenship Order in Council facilitated the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship (RPA 1923).

For the Arab population a system was put in place to deal with displaced Arabs as a consequence of Jewish settlement. The Arabs were placed on the Register for displaced Arabs and land to re-settle was provided. Also, tenants were in the 1920s protected against eviction through the establishment of Land Transfer Ordinances, allowing them to retain maintenance land to support themselves (Shepherd, 1999). Further through the 1929 Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, cultivators were protected from distress following changes in land ownership (RPA 1929). The above demonstrates that policies on land were of a protective character and were directed towards both the Arab and Jewish communities. Their objective was to protect and enable development especially in economic terms.
The above diagram illustrates how British paternalism manifested itself in Palestine. Benevolence was observed in both British discourse and practice. In conjunction with the mandate (MFP) principles, the British justified their administration as being for the benefit of the whole population. This was particularly so as regards the Balfour Declaration which was a much contested issue by the Arab Muslim population. Steps taken towards the agricultural education of both Jews and Arabs contained a certain degree of benevolence. The British were teaching both communities how to grow on the land and which crops to prioritize. The MFP and British discourses brought forth a double sense in which obligation and duty in Palestine developed. British obligation towards each community differed significantly.

Visible in all sectors analysed was a positive identification with the Jews and more so with the European Jews, and a negative identification with the Arab Muslims. Seen on a continuum the Jews were seen as closer to “the self” whereas the Arab Muslims as closer to “the other”. At certain moments the Jews were even treated as collaborators rather than subjects of development. The case of Palestine bears close resemblance with the case of Greece and the Sudan discussed in Chapter 5. The Jews in Palestine and the Greeks display how paternalism develops vis-à-vis “the self”. On the other hand the Arab Muslims and the Sudanese bring forth how paternalism manifests itself
towards “the other”. British obligation and duty is most apparent in the manner in which the British administered the territory by holding full legislative powers. This shows how the role of trustee was put in practice.

Policies relative to education, agriculture and land further demonstrate how protection in Palestine signified development for self-government. British administrators were teaching, guiding and supervising both Jews and Arab Muslims until they were able to manage their own affairs. The extent of these practices was even more pronounced in the case of Arab Muslims. The presence of difference/incompetence has been referred to while demonstrating how other paternalistic elements were manifested. Throughout the mandate there was a visible preference for the Jews and especially for the immigrants who arrived from Europe. What differentiated the Jews from the Arab Muslims was their perceived level of civilization and ability for development. As we will shortly see, the British Mandate over Tanganyika (Class B) shares similarities with the case of Palestine.

6.3 British Paternalism and the Mandate over Tanganyika

Tanganyika was a multi-racial territory inhabited by Africans, Asians and Europeans (Chidzero, 1961; Dumbuya, 1995) occupied by Britain during World War I. Soon after the war ended Britain became the Mandatory power for this Class B territory, formerly an ex-German colony. Prior to the ratification of the Mandate in 1922 the British established a provisional civil administration in 1917. It was headed by Horace Byatt who served as first Governor of Tanganyika until 1925 when Sir Donald Cameron took over (Chidzero, 1961). Tanganyika under Sir Horace Byatt witnessed extensive reconstruction efforts in all areas as a consequence of the war. In terms of administration the British set up a Legislative Council in 1926 constituted by British official members and unofficial members.

Additionally, the institution of Native Authorities was established. These policies were undertaken in the framework of the system of native administration (indirect rule) established by Cameron, the Second Secretary General of Tanganyika in 1926, a
model of administration employed by the British in their colonies. The idea was that Africans were to be administered through their indigenous institutions (Listowel, 1968). Under the system of native administration the British pursued a number of measures to develop the natives in the areas of education, land/agriculture and governing institutions. Further, the Mandate for Tanganyika (MFT) obliged the British to deal with the issues of slavery, forced labor, control of arms affecting Class B mandates in particular.

In 1922, through the Involuntary Servitude Ordinance slavery came to an end in Tanganyika (Listowel, 1968). What guided policy-making in Tanganyika throughout most of the mandate was the concept of the “paramountcy of native interests”, which put the interests of the native community first (Chidzero, 1961). Another important development during the Mandate was the prospect for closer Union of the East African territories. A number of British officials wanted to unite the territories of Uganda (protectorate), Kenya (colony) and Tanganyika (mandate) in economic and administrative terms. Although this issue dominated British debates during the 1930s, it never materialized due to strong opposition by British Parliamentarians.

Let us now address British discourse and practice in the administration of Tanganyika. The first step taken by the British in Tanganyika was the establishment of a civil administration through the 1920 Order in Council. The latter established Sir Horace Byatt as the Governor of Tanganyika and established an Executive Council headed by British officials to assist him (Listowel, 1968). Under this Order the Governor was given full powers to legislate. At a local level, the British granted certain powers to recognized chiefs through the Native Authority Ordinances established from 1921-23 (1921 RTT). Although the chiefs acquired certain powers these were limited and controlled by District Officers. Until Cameron’s arrival as Governor in 1925, Byatt retained full powers of legislation.

These initial steps in administration showcase how the British practiced their position as “trustee”. The limited participation of natives in local administration and the control

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18 Report for the Tanganyika Territory formulated by the British government.
exercised by District Officers displays a certain level of protection. The British saw the natives as not able to administer themselves, needing to be taught how to do so; it was Britain’s duty bestowed upon her. The idea of trust was ingrained in the Mandate and articulated repeatedly in Parliamentary debates. As argued by the Duke of Devonshire in the Commons, “His Majesty’s Government regard themselves as exercising a trust, on behalf of the African population” (cited in Dougherty, 1966, p. 207). This observation is consistent with Edward Said’s analysis of the Occident’s representation of the Orient. Said (1995) argues that knowledge is intimately tied with domination and authority. In what I have presented authority results from the knowledge that the British have or perceive to have of the Africans. By representing them through various stereotypes, the Africans are seen as the complete opposite of Europeans (British).

The second wave of administrative development took place with Cameron’s arrival and the establishment of indirect rule. This policy stemmed from Lord Lugard’s administration in Northern Nigeria using traditional institutions in local government (Whitehead, 1981). In establishing indirect rule in Tanganyika, Cameron believed that “the people would derive material as well as moral advantage from it” (1939, p. 90). As such, the policy was seen as benefiting the natives. Cameron made changes to the administration of the territory by setting up a Legislative Council in 1926. This move put a stop to the full powers of legislation previously enjoyed by the Governor. The Council was constituted by thirteen official members: six members of the Executive Council and seven high-ranking officials. Additionally, the Council comprised a maximum of ten unofficial members. In 1926, there were five European and two Asian members (Listowel, 1968). Composed in such manner, the Council gave full powers to British Officials and excluded the Africans. Also the allocation of five seats to Europeans demonstrates how Europeans were seen as British collaborators in Tanganyika. The first African unofficial member was appointed in the 1940s. Cameron’s justification regarding the exclusion of Africans from the Council is representative of British opinion on the matter. He argued that “the native community cannot be directly represented because for the present natives cannot be found with
sufficient command of the English language to take part in debates of the Council; indeed to understand what is being said” (cited in Dumbuya 1995, p. 135).

This policy of exclusion informs on British perceptions of the Africans. The natives were seen as “the other”. They were described as primitive, backward and uncivilized (Madden and Drawin, 1994) which in turn denied them any ability and capacity. As we have seen before in the cases of India and Palestine, in the British mind the English language constituted the path to civilization and progress. It acted as a demarcating line between the African and the British. In policies of administration discussed so far, the British either held ultimate power or official majority. On this point, Lord Milner argued in the House of Commons that “the only justification for keeping official majority in any colony is that we are convinced that we are better judges, for the time being, of the interests of the native population than they are themselves” (cited in Taylor, 1963, p. 41).

This reiterates the observations made above regarding the place of the native in the British mind and the practice of British duty as trustee. Additionally, the British believed that they knew what was in the best interest of the natives and acted accordingly. In conjunction with the establishment of the Legislative Council, Cameron issued the 1926 Native Ordinance which amplified pre-existing provisions. The major change was that District Officers were to supervise the chiefs rather than command them. Justifications offered regarding the need for these Officers resonate with what has been presented above. Cameron (1939, p. 77) argued that

in the UK and the Dominions the people are literate and educated and have through the course of many generations imbibed the precepts of law and order which must regulate the conduct of a civilized people; they can readily learn, through the newspapers and otherwise, the day to day acts and regulations of the government which affect their lives. This is not so in Tanganyika or in the protectorate of Nigeria. Other means must therefore be found for communicating with primitive and ignorant people.
This illustrates how the natives were represented as direct opposites of the British. The British were educated and literate whereas the natives were primitive and ignorant.

As the above has shown, the nature of British administration was of a protective nature and justified as being in the native’s best interests. So far, the manner in which the British administered Tanganyika has brought forth how feelings of duty towards the natives were the result of their role as “trustee” and the negative representation of the natives. The perception of Tanganyika as part of the British Empire, indistinguishable from British colonies and protectorates also fuelled obligation and duty. In Parliament, Tanganyikan affairs were discussed under the headings of colonial development and colonial policies. For instance, during a Commons debate in 1925, Mr. Amery argued that “Tanganyika has now been permanently incorporated in the British Empire. It is a delusion that it is any less British than any other colony” (Dougherty, 1966, p. 204).

Although this shows how British obligation towards the natives was strengthened, it also provides an insight into British motives and interests in Tanganyika. British interests and motives as regards the territory were made obvious by calls for a closer political union among Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. Through this union the British would be able to permanently secure Tanganyika within the British Empire (Chidzero, 1961). British discourse and practice relating to education is equally enlightening. According to article 3 of the MFT “the Mandatory…shall undertake to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants” (cited in Chidzero, 1961, p. 259). This responsibility extended to education, land, labour and agriculture.

The British were extensively involved in the education of natives. This was especially so after 1925, when the success of indirect rule was attributed to the education accorded to chiefs (Listowel, 1968). Advances in education were visible before 1925. As early as 1919 steps had been taken to reopen government schools and training for teachers. The plan envisioned, written in the RTT (1920), was to “open elementary

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19 Also Mr. Somerville, MP for Windsor stated that ‘Tanganyika is a mandated territory which is part of the British Empire and will remain so’ (HC Deb 18 April 1929, c450).
schools in all District Headquarters and larger villages”. Progress was slow due to financial shortages which also resulted in cutting back on provisions for European staff. An interesting element of education policy in Tanganyika relates to who was seen as best suited to oversee the education of natives. According to the 1921 RTT “so far as the education of natives is concerned, the position of the European is that of legislator and guide”. In line with this, Europeans framed the syllabus, were responsible for the direction of studies and effectuated inspections. In turn, native teachers applied the principles put in place by Europeans (RTT 1921).

During World War I, schools in Tanganyika were shut down and teachers took employment in other sectors. To overcome the consequences of the War on the education system in the territory, the British administration undertook a number of initiatives. One such initiative was the training of old teachers in Dar-es-Salaam. This was seen as necessary because old teachers had either forgotten their previous training or did not possess knowledge of the English language. Education in the early 1920s was structured in the following way: First, pupils underwent a three-year elementary course taught in Swahili. Apart from learning reading, writing, simple arithmetic, geography and hygiene, students also acquired knowledge in husbandry through plantations attached to government schools. Second, those who were successful went on to receive primary education for an additional three years in Dar-es-Salam, a school supervised by a European headmaster and in which English was the language of instruction (RTT 1921).

The above illustrates the protective character of practices in the area of education. Europeans were tasked with supervising both the education system and native teachers. The natives required guidance and training because they were seen as backward. These observations coincide with what was discussed in the area of administration. This also holds true for education after Cameron’s arrival, despite changes owed to the introduction of indirect rule, which emphasized the importance of educated chiefs. Although open to all residents of Tanganyika, the education system focused particularly on educating the sons of chiefs and sultans (Kaniki, 1980). A major development in this domain was the establishment of the Tabora School in 1925
for the elite (Listowel, 1968). Most natives received education through boarding schools. The education received by students in these two systems differed considerably and resulted in education for leaders and education for the masses. Education for the masses concentrated on teaching natives various trades.

Further differentiation between the communities of Tanganyika operated through distinctions in the education syllabuses of Europeans, Africans and Asians. European schools were literary and employed the English language. In contrast African schools were vocational and taught in the vernacular (Kaniki, 1979). The segregation instilled among the three races and particularly among the Africans and Asians was seen by the British as maintaining divide and rule. It ensured that a common cause for political ends would not develop (Coulson, 1982). Despite this segregation, the education system established by the British formed part of their development policy, carrying forward their duty as mandatories. The ideas guiding the education system established by the British in Tanganyika are summarised in the Report of the Commission for Closer Union (RCU 1928-29). The Report stated that “the general object of education should be to raise the average standard of intelligence of the whole community” (Report of Sir Samuel Wilson 1829-1830).

As was the case in the early 1920s, education or its regulation was seen as a task not to be wholly entrusted to natives. As stated in the 1928 RCU “only from the non-natives can the native peoples obtain the education which will enable them to advance to higher levels of civilization and turn to advantage the natural resources of land” (Report of Sir Samuel Wilson 1829-1830). As discussed above, education in Tanganyika was of a protective nature, involving the training and guiding of native teachers, and the instruction of English at certain levels. It has already been observed how English was perceived as a sign of development and civilization, employed as an argument for the exclusion of Africans in the Legislative Council. By teaching the natives English the British saw themselves as developing their mental abilities and bringing them one step closer to attaining a higher level of civilization.
British education policy in Tanganyika also reveals a degree of benevolence. British policy was guided by the belief that educating the natives in the way they did was for their long-term benefit. It is important to reiterate at this point that education in Tanganyika focused mostly on educating present but also future chiefs. The education of the masses was not the first priority of British administration. The explanation for this rests on British conceptions of the African. The Director of Agriculture in Tanganyika stated in 1925 that “only 5% of all African students have sufficient intelligence to profit from academic instruction” (cited in Kaniki, 1980, p. 272). As a result of the depression in the 1930s a number of radical changes were instilled which included the expansion of elementary education, the reduction of post-elementary levels of education and the reduction of English courses (Kaniki, 1980).

Let us now look at British policy on land and agriculture, also based on Article 3 of the MFT. British officers engaged in the agricultural education of native farmers. They taught them how to cultivate new cash crops and how best to improve existing ones (Listowel, 1968). For example in 1920 the British distributed a large amount of seeds to encourage the cultivation of cotton by the natives (RTT 1920). In the early 1920s agricultural education was seen as paramount. As stated in the 1921 RTT “great importance is attached to agricultural instruction, with a view to stimulating production by the native” (RTT 1921). British officers were also teaching the natives less wasteful methods of husbandry. The importance attached to agricultural education continued throughout the mandate.

The objective of the British in the area of agriculture was, as Cameron stated, “to induce the native to become a producer directly or indirectly, that is to produce or to assist in producing something more than the crop of local foodstuffs for himself and his family” (cited in Coulson, 1982, p. 43). This on its own points to the fact that development (economic, educational) was one of the main objectives of British administration. The teaching and guiding provided by British officials to the natives would enable them to become successful farmers and growers. Apart from training cultivators and farmers, the British administration established agricultural education in schools, as seen above, to prepare future farmers and cultivators. During WWII
British agricultural policy regulated the cultivation of crops, giving priority to sisal and rubber seen as strategically significant for the British war effort. Cotton, once promoted to the natives for cultivation, lost its significance in the 1940s. In order to stop the production of cotton the administration decreased the price of cotton and increased the price of rice and groundnut (Coulson, 1982). Accordingly, British Agricultural policy in Tanganyika during the 1940s was geared towards supporting the war effort by controlling the cultivation of crops.

Moving on to land appropriation in Tanganyika, it is worth noting that on the whole it was based on the policy of “paramountcy of native interests”. As a result transfers of land from natives to non-natives were not permitted except with the sanction from the Governor (RTT 1921). In line with the policy of paramountcy the British administration established the 1923 Land Ordinance according to which

the whole of the lands of the Territory, whether occupied or unoccupied…are hereby declared to be public land…under the control and subject to the disposition of the Governor, and shall be held and administered for the use and common benefit, direct or indirect of the natives of the territory, and no title to the occupation of and use of any such lands shall be valid without the consent of the Governor (cited in Taylor, 1963, p. 57).

This bears similarities with the need to hold the majority in the Legislative Council discussed above. The British administration held power in their own hands because of their duty as Mandatories and also because the Africans were not seen as being ready yet for any power. Additionally, the words employed in the land ordinance exhibit benevolence. The land was to be administered for the benefit of the natives. The latter was interpreted very generally by the British. Indeed land alienation to non-natives was justified in such a manner. According to Cameron:

There are certain agricultural processes which European enterprise and capital can undertake but which are beyond the capacity of the African tribesmen and will be beyond their capacity for a long time to come. If land is available and European enterprise and capital desire to undertake those processes, then in
my view, it is directly contrary to the interests of the country as a whole for the
government to refuse to admit that enterprise and capital and attempt to hold
the land under a dead-head. (Chidzero, 1961, p. 226)

The argument he presented to the Legislative Council bore great similarity, as
Cameron argued that “non-native settlement should be encouraged wherever the
climate is suitable and adequate areas are available without depriving the native
population of sufficient land for its own use, provided always the transport facilities
are available to evacuate the produce” (cited in Taylor, 1963, p. 60). During his time
as Governor of Tanganyika 2,013,097 acres of agricultural land were alienated.

Figure 5 Interconnections of elements defining British paternalism in Tanganyika

The above diagram illustrates how British paternalism manifested itself during
Britain’s administration of Tanganyika. In all areas investigated, the elements defining
British paternalism (benevolence, obligation/duty, protection and
difference/incompetence) have now been identified. Benevolence was present in
discourses relating to administration, education, land and agriculture. The holding of
legislative power, of official majority in the Legislative Council and the control of
land by the British were all justified as being for the benefit of the natives. As far as
obligation and duty are concerned they emanated from obligations ingrained in the
Mandate for Tanganyika. These feelings were also enhanced by British
representations of the African native as “the other”, seen as uncivilized, ignorant,
primitive and backward. For some British Parliamentarians obligation and duty resulted from the perception that Tanganyika was incorporated in the British Empire.

The element of protection in the case of Tanganyika manifested itself in the practice and discourse of the British. In discourse, protection was tied to the political, economic and educational development of the natives. The British were protecting the natives from themselves and their intervention would eventually lead to a more developed civilization. In pursuing their role as “trustee” the British believed that eventually the natives would acquire the skills and knowledge for responsible government. On the ground, British personnel and Europeans were involved in the training and education of natives. In addition they supervised and controlled the system of education. The same applied to administration where natives had limited participation in government.

Lastly the element of difference and incompetence manifested itself in British representational practices. In general, the natives were seen as capable of progress but at a very slow pace and only with the guidance afforded by British officials. The incapacity of natives was based on the fact that they had limited or no knowledge of the English language. This being said, not all natives were seen as capable of progress. The British focused on developing a class of elites who would have the ability to practice self-government at some point in the future. In the mind of the British the natives were demarcated from “the self” on the basis of civilization and progress.

The analysis I have undertaken also informs on British interests in Tanganyika. Consistent with British colonial policies and mindset, Tanganyika benefited the metropole economically via exports while benefiting the natives at the same time. This was most pronounced during the 1940s. Plans for the establishment of an East African Federation were in part based on British interest. Its successful establishment would lead to Britain further consolidating her Empire. The case of British administration in Tanganyika also offers some wider conclusions as regards British policy in Africa during the mandate period, which will be further discussed in the following section. Suffice it to say for the moment that Britain conceived that they were exercising a trust on behalf of all Africans.
6.4 Comparing Events: British Paternalism during the Mandate Period

So far, I have demonstrated how each element defining paternalism manifested itself in the case of Palestine and Tanganyika. To identify the particularities of British paternalism during the Mandate period I now move to a comparison of these two cases. The comparison will focus on drawing commonalities and differences in paternalism’s manifestation in British practices, discourses and representations. It will be accompanied by certain observations relating to British colonial policy. This will allow to draw more definite conclusions regarding British paternalism during the Mandate period.

![Figure 6: British representations of communities residing in Palestine and Tanganyika seen on a continuum of “the self” and “the other”.

The above is a visual illustration of British representations of the peoples of each mandated territory. In both territories certain communities were identified as “the other”. In Palestine the people belonging to this group were the Arab Muslims and in Tanganyika the native Africans. Their identification as “the other” was based on the concepts of civilization, capability, backwardness and development. Although differentiation was based on the same concepts, the Arab Muslims as citizens of a Class A Mandate were naturally seen as less backward, uncivilized and incapable than the natives of Tanganyika. It is more accurate to describe the representation of Arab Muslims as inhabiting a space between “the self” and “the other”. This renders the spectrum self-other even more nuanced from what was observed in Chapter 5. In
contrast, the Jews, and especially European Jews residing in Palestine, were seen by
the British as being closer to “the self” owing to religion and civilization.

That European Jews were seen as closer to conceptions of “the self” did not signify
that they were represented in equal terms to the British. A more precise way of
interpreting this is that European Jews were seen as “the self but not quite”. This was
also the case for the Greeks addressed in Chapter 5. The European Jews were seen as
the higher civilization in Palestine but there was also attached to them a certain
vulnerability, they were seen as objects of suffering. These observations point to the
fact that “otherness” was a crucial component of British administration in both
Palestine and Tanganyika. British conceptions of “otherness” were more pronounced
towards the Arab Muslims in Palestine and the natives of Tanganyika. These were
visible in discourses and practices in British administration, agricultural reforms, land
alienation and education.

An example of practices demonstrating “otherness” is the exclusion of Arab Muslims
from key government positions in Palestine and the exclusion of natives in Tanganyika
from the legislative council. These practices also inform on perceptions of incapacity
and inability, a direct result of representing these communities as backward and
uncivilized. The perception of “otherness” was crucial in the exercise of Britain’s role
as trustee of both territories. The concept of “otherness” was also applicable to British
dealings outside the Mandate System. During the Mandate period (1919-1948) Britain
was not actively involved in military interventions, it was mainly preoccupied with its
African and Asian colonies. The way in which the British represented the Africans in
Tanganyika was akin to the way in which all natives were represented in the African
colonies. Of special importance is the fact that when discussing Africans in Parliament
the British very rarely differentiated between territories. An African was an African,
s/he was not a Tanganyikan, a Nigerian, a Kenyan, or a Rhodesian – they were all
uncivilized and backward people.

Within British discourses, obligation/duty, benevolence, difference/incompetence and
protection were identified. In both mandates obligation/duty manifested itself in
similar ways. First, it emanated directly from the League of Nations and the acquisition of the mandates. Second, it was enhanced by the perception that Britain’s role was to act as “trustee” of both territories. By representing Arab Muslims as close to “the other” and Africans as “the other” the British felt it their duty to develop and civilize them. It is also true that a positive representation of the Jews in terms of religion and history bred feelings of obligation and duty as did the focus on their hardships. In fact much of what was done in Palestine had as an epicentre the policy of a Jewish National Home. What differentiates Palestine from Tanganyika in terms of obligation and duty is that the latter was at certain points during the mandate seen as forming part of the British Empire – a direct result of its status as a Class B Mandate.

Development towards self-government, the object of the mandate system coincided with British colonial policy of the period. At the time there was an awakening of the idea that at some point colonial people would be capable of self-government and that British policy should in some respects prepare for that eventuality. Both concepts of trustee and development are visible in British discourses discussing colonial policy. This is exemplified in the Kenya White Paper of 1923 according to which:

In the administration of Kenya His Majesty’s Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population…But there can be no room for doubt that it is the mission of Great Britain to work continuously for the training and education of the Africans towards a higher intellectual, moral and economic level than that which they had reached when the Crown assumed the responsibility for the administration of this territory (cited in Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa 1930).

The above reiterates the crucial points of administration in both Palestine and Tanganyika, the concept of trustee and the British mission to educate. Although this is more pronounced in Tanganyika, the case of Palestine also displays moves towards development despite being focused on providing governing institutions. The relation
between mandate and colonial policy also figured in Cameron’s statement of 1939, where he argued that

the terms of the mandate in the case of Tanganyika did not trouble or preoccupy my mind in any way; the principles embodied in that document were in complete accord with which I had become so accustomed in the administration of Nigeria – the ordinary and recognised principles of British colonial administration. (quoted in Chidzero, 1961, p. 2)

Another point of convergence between the two mandates was the tendency to justify British administration and policies in education, agriculture, land, representation in government as being for the benefit of the communities. This was equally seen as guiding colonial policy. According to the speech of Baron Passfield on 23 June 1930 “the government of every colony equally with the government of a mandated territory is under an express obligation to promote the welfare and advancement in civilization of its native population” (Madden and Drawin, 1994, p. 25). In terms of practices undertaken and policies initiated both cases display protection. Some practices were geared towards protection from harm and others were carried out as protection of the people from themselves, protection as development.

In comparing the two cases, protection as development was more pronounced in Tanganyika, as Palestine was a country seen on “the threshold of modern development” (HC Deb 17 July 1929, c489). The stronger emphasis on development in Tanganyika is a corollary of the classification of these territories by the CLN, which classified Palestine as a “Class A” mandate and Tanganyika as a “Class B” mandate. Accordingly, Britain was to provide administrative advice in Palestine in contrast to being responsible for the administration of the territory in Tanganyika (CLN). Despite this, in both mandates British administrators held full legislative powers. In Palestine this was the case throughout the mandate, whereas in Tanganyika this lasted until the establishment of a Legislative Council in 1926. The latter did not give legislative powers to Africans, decisions at the national level were left to the British Europeans and Asians.
In Palestine, the High Commissioner held full legislative powers because of the animosity of the two communities, which rendered difficult the task of British administration. Practices geared towards protecting the natives from themselves are visible in both mandates as regards Arab Muslims and native Africans. In Palestine, Arab Muslims occupied minor posts in the senior civil service as opposed to Christian Arabs and Jews. In Tanganyika, native Africans were excluded from the Legislative Council until the 1940s. Further, Natives authorities and the Ordinances established in Tanganyika gave some powers to chiefs but entailed an increased amount of supervision from District Officers. These practices reflect to a large extent British representations of incapacity and inability. Additionally, they exemplify how Britain exercised its role as “trustee”. In Tanganyika, the idea of trusteeship was more pronounced, as the Africans were seen as not able to administer themselves yet and as needing guidance and training. As a corollary, the system of indirect rule was employed in order to first teach Africans responsible government through their own institutions.

Further, in both mandates the British took steps in the development of the territories by focusing on education, agriculture and the construction of infrastructure. The focus is here again on Arab Muslims and on Africans. In education, the British focused on bringing the levels of literacy up, on teaching via the English language at certain higher levels and on teaching better methods of cultivation. In the case of Tanganyika, a certain level of control is also visible in the practices undertaken by the British. This was particularly so in agriculture. The British administration controlled the crops to be cultivated by increasing or decreasing their price. Agricultural instruction was also accorded to Jews in Palestine. Practices undertaken towards the Jews in Palestine were also of a protective nature. As demanded by the Balfour Declaration, a large flow of European Jews were allowed to settle in the territory and restrictions to the possession of land were abolished in order to allow these immigrants to develop in Palestine.

The practices and policies undertaken with the goal of development in these two mandates and particularly in Tanganyika bear close resemblance with those found in British colonies. Limited representation in government was also the case in most
British colonies in East and Central Africa where no African could be found above the level of minor clerk (Brown and Louis, 1999, p. 235). As regards representation of natives and the constitution of a Legislative Council there is a resemblance between Tanganyika and India in the late nineteenth century. It first began with government officials in the majority and gradually elected official and un-official members (Brown and Louis, 1999, p. 236). Additionally, indirect rule, which was the model of administration adopted, was widely employed in British colonies and protectorates albeit with some modifications from territory to territory. As argued by Cameron in regards to indirect rule “the principle is not a new one – that of administering a more primitive people through their own indigenous institutions” (Cameron, 1939, p. 79).

Direct rule practiced in some territories bore a resemblance to the arrangement in Palestine.

The way in which the British practiced Trusteeship in the mandates was already illustrated above by holding majority or by restricting the representation of certain communities. In fact, the mandate principles guiding British policy in Palestine and Tanganyika shared many aspects with British colonial policy. The concept of trusteeship can be seen as a blueprint for thinking and acting towards the natives, particularly in Africa. The convergence between mandate policy and colonial policy is very well illustrated through British discourses. In his Memorandum dated 23rd of July 1923, the Duke of Devonshire spelled out Britain’s general policy. He stated that “as in the Uganda protectorate, so in the Kenya colony the principle of trusteeship for the natives, no less than in the mandated territory of Tanganyika is unassailable. This paramount duty of trusteeship will continue as in the past, to be carried out under the secretary of state for the colonies by the Agents of the Imperial government” (Madden and Drawin, 1994, p. 21).

The findings of my examination of British paternalism in Palestine and Tanganyika are similar to what Hetherington (1978) observed in *British Paternalism and Africa: 1920-1940*. She too notes the prevalence of British paternalism in this period and the centrality of Britain’s superiority and her role as “a development agency” (1978, p. 90). An equally important issue that merits some consideration is the place
of interests in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse. As was the case during the colonial era, there is no doubt that there were interests in the mandate period. Britain’s occupation of Palestine during WWI was guided by strategic considerations. It provided a “foothold in the region” and its proximity to Egypt allowed Britain to ensure a better protection of its possessions (Shepherd, 1999, p. 7).

Tanganyika’s relevance lay in its proximity to Uganda (British protectorate) and Kenya (British colony). Mandates and colonies also carried an economic significance through trade and exports to the metropole. Be it as it may, the consistent presence of British paternalism during both the colonial era and mandate period reveals something interesting regarding paternalism’s role in the production of British interventionism. During the colonial era Britain had a very considerable amount of power allowing her to act as she pleased. A discourse was not needed to justify its practices. Nevertheless a whole discourse developed.

The same is true of the mandate period. Britain was among the winners of WWI and international law gave her legitimacy. The Mandate system established that certain advanced nations were to act as trustees of less advanced nations. And yet, this chapter has demonstrated the development of a specific discourse accompanied by a certain way of doing things. Interests do not explain differences in the way British interventions are conducted. They cannot account for differences in representations or in the way that practices developed. Paternalism on the other hand makes that possible. Paternalism can be best characterised as a feature of British interventionary practice and discourse, one that gradually becomes embedded in the very fabric of the international system. The Mandate System itself was based on a paternalist ideology. The next chapter will establish a similar degree of continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse focusing on the period covering the Cold-War and Post-Cold War.
This chapter looks at British interventionary practice and discourse from 1945 to 1999. Contemporary literature tends to divide this period into two: “the Cold War” and “Post-Cold War” periods. These two periods are differentiated by their structural characteristics. The Cold War Period was defined by bipolarity, deterrence and a limited role for the UN in international affairs. In contrast the Post-Cold War up until 1999 was characterized by unipolarity and UN activism in international affairs. By differentiating the two periods in terms of the structure of the international system arguments of novelty in relation to military interventions are able to develop. The Post-Cold War period is presented as enabling interventions on humanitarian grounds (Newman, 2009). As presented in the literature review in chapter 2 empirical studies on humanitarian intervention argue that the Cold War has brought along far-reaching changes to the practice and discourse of humanitarian intervention. The changing variables identified are norms regarding the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000; Newman, 2009; Weiss, 2012; Abiew, 1999), the international environment, expanded notions of security (Weiss, 2012), the purpose and justifications of interventions (Falk, 1996; Wheeler, 2000; Newman, 2009; Welsh, 2004) and the definition of who counts as human (Finnemore, 2003; Simms and Trim, 2011).

Unlike current empirical investigations on military interventions I am interested in investigating and identifying paternalist continuity in the practice and discourse of British interventions in this period. As such I do not endorse the constructed categories of Cold War and Post-Cold War periods and instead treat them as one period. In doing this, however, I fully acknowledge the occurrence of change in the context in which interventions occur. As such this chapter takes account of the context in terms of normative and legal developments and gives special attention to Britain’s overall foreign policy. It is not expected that British paternalism will be as pronounced in Britain’s interventionary discourse and practice during the entirety of the period under investigation as it was during the Mandate period for example.
This could be a direct result of the influence on the context in which British interventions took place. The period 1945-89 can be characterised as a peculiar period in structural terms. The world was divided in two camps and the objective was to accumulate as much military capability as possible as a way to deter the other side. Britain was focusing on maintaining international order, on sustaining its military influence around the world and on ensuring its security. Be it at it may, Barnett (2011) has amply documented in his work *Empire of Humanity*, that Britain was a strong force in the area of humanitarian aid. Its discourse and practice along with that of British humanitarian organizations was characterised by paternalism. Indeed, it is possible to identify British paternalism in the area of humanitarian aid towards Germany, Rhodesia, Vietnam and Nigeria in Parliamentary debates and newspapers where British citizens wrote letters to newspapers calling for the need to send aid.

The case studies I employ to expose continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse are: the reconstruction of Germany 1945-49, the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66 and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The case of Germany was chosen for three main reasons. First, according to secondary literature it is seen as a case of post-conflict reconstruction (Knowles, 2013), which places it within the scope of my research. Second, it lends itself to comparisons with the Mandate cases investigated in the previous period because of the involvement of the concept of development. Third, it enables me to show the form of British paternalism towards a Western European country during this period. As Europe was a central part of Britain’s foreign policy it is interesting to see the manner in which paternalism exhibited itself. Just like the case of Greece analyzed in Chapter 5, Germany could potentially bring forth differences in representational and identification practices when intervention is undertaken in a European country. The case of Greece brought forward how the British represented the Greeks as “the self but not quite”.

The case of the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation was selected because it combines different policies and objectives characterizing the period. Malaysia was first a colony until 1957 when it was granted its independence and joined the Commonwealth. British policies and actions are also relevant in terms of the Anglo-American link and
the fight to contain communism in South East Asia. In addition the Malaysian-
Indonesian confrontation is an example of a trend in British military interventions
highlighting how Britain rarely intervened alone. Due to economic strains Britain
tended to seek help from Allies. Lastly, the intervention in Kosovo 1998-99 was
chosen because it is one of the examples of humanitarian intervention cited by the
empirical literature in order to stress not continuity but change in Western states’
terventionary practice and discourse.

This chapter will be structured as follows:

The first section will provide an overview of the period by focusing specifically on the
context. This will involve looking at the development of new norms and concepts and
at the overall structure of the international system by focusing on the UN Declaration
of Human Rights, on the UN Charter and on the Cold War. Through this overview I
will show normative change as well as continuity between this period and the one
preceding it. The following section will shift attention from the general to the
particular by looking specifically at British foreign policy between the years 1945 and
1999. This will help bring forward the main tenants guiding British policy-makers in
decisions taken relating, but not exclusively, to military interventions.

Next, I will concentrate on the British occupation and reconstruction of Germany
(1945-49) so as to present the manner in which paternalism expressed itself in British
practices and discourses. To that end this section will focus on British administration,
democratization and education efforts. With the same objective in mind the following
section will analyse the case of the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66. The
focus here will be on Britain’s overall policy and on its response to Indonesia’s
Confrontation policy against Malaysia. The last case to be analysed will be that of the
NATO intervention in Kosovo 1999. This section will concentrate on the three main
practices defining both the international and British response towards Slobodan
Milosevic: the condemnation of atrocities, the threat of the use of force and the use of
force in the form of air-strikes. Next I will carry out a comparative analysis of the three
cases addressed in this chapter in order to show similarities but also differences in terms of British paternalism’s manifestation.

### 7.1 1945-1999: The Normative and Geopolitical Context

The period 1945-1999 witnessed important developments in a number of areas of international politics. These developments touched upon perceptions of “us” and “them”, relations among states, the conduct of war and values. Throughout these years the UN and NATO were established, the UN declaration of human rights and the Genocide Convention were adopted, decolonization progressed, the Cold War dynamics of alliances, deterrence and bipolarity set in, and issues of sovereignty vs. human rights became prominent. These had varying degrees of influence on the way in which British paternalism expressed itself. Before moving to an analysis of three instances of British intervention carried out in the period under investigation it is imperative to take a closer look at the context in which these took place.

#### 7.1.1 New Concepts and Norms?

The new concepts and norms featuring in the period under examination are best explored by looking at the UN Declaration of Human Rights (DHR), the Genocide Convention and the UN Charter. In one way or another they all have one commonality: averting harm and promoting equality. Normatively, this period saw a move towards universalizing humanity and the promotion of human rights, starting with the UN DHR of 1948, which put an accent on the rights and freedoms all human beings were allowed to enjoy. A look at some of its articles is quite instructive to bring forward the significance of such a development. According to Article 1, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. Continuing, Article 2 states that “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (UN DHR, emphasis added)

The words I have emphasized above constitute a far-reaching change from what was observed during the Mandate period in Chapter 6. The terms “reason” and “conscience” break the barriers previously employed to differentiate among peoples. It reinforces the idea that all peoples have rights and freedoms, which was lacking thirty or so years prior to this declaration. It highlights that brotherhood and equality are attributes that should characterize relations among people. The influence of human rights during this period can be seen from the very beginning by taking a look at the dismantling of Empires. According to Finnemore (2003, p. 67-71) decolonization brought about a shift in the understanding of who is human and as a result humanity became universalized.

This, however, does not mean that previous conceptions of “trust” and guidance disappeared overnight. British decolonization can be seen as a mixture of the old and new. On the one hand the preponderance of human rights and their value were given paramount importance. In discussing decolonization in Africa in a Commons debate in 1959 Mr Benn argued “we cannot be uncommitted when it comes to freedom in Africa. In the world in which we live this is the greatest change of all – human dignity and human rights are now just as indivisible as peace” (cited in Porter and Stockwell, 1989, p. 52). On the other hand, however, Darwin and Porter’s analysis (1984; 2004) of British decolonization demonstrates the persistence of the father and child analogy. Human rights continued to play a significant part throughout the period reaching their peak in the 1990s particularly in relation to the use of force by states.

Another great development in this period was the establishment of the UN Charter, which came into force in October 1945. The main purpose of the UN according to Article 1 was

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. (UN Charter)

In relation to the use of force, Article 2(4) stated “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN Charter). Both the UN DHR and the UN Charter bring to the fore ideas of unity, acceptance, freedom and peace. They can be seen as a response to the devastating repercussions of World War II. Peace, stability and security were taken as the concepts to be guiding the future of the world.

7.1.2 The Cold War

It is impossible to provide an overview of the context during 1945-1999 without discussing the Cold War. Its characteristics (bipolarity, deterrence, state primacy, geostrategic considerations) came to dominate the international system and define it for a little over forty years (Greenwood, 2000). Its main protagonists were the United States and the Soviet Union. However, its repercussions were felt on a worldwide scale. Not a continent was left undisturbed. Countries were either allying themselves with the two superpowers or became non-aligned. Either way they were implicated in the East-West struggle. The Cold War was as much about territorial supremacy as it was about spheres of influence (Hopkins, Kandiah and Gillian, 2003). Generally this has been described as an international struggle between rival ideologies: capitalism and communism (Hopkins, Kandiah and Gillian, 2003).

Allies of the two superpowers were more often than not involved in conflicts around the world by committing troops, weapons, bases and so on. Examples of such conflicts were the Vietnam and Korea wars. The process of decolonization was influenced to a considerable degree by the conflict. For example Britain was highly concerned and did all it could to ensure that countries on the brink of independence were following democratic principles so that they would be strong enough to stand against Communist
influence. Further, the Cold War also had dramatic implications on the powers of the UN Security Council in terms of enforcing peace and stability. The powers of veto held by each of the two superpowers made action against aggression of one state by another impossible to implement.

Despite the dimensions it took, the Cold War was mainly fought between the US and the Soviet Union. As far as British Foreign Policy is concerned the ideological struggle against communism was not alone in influencing it. According to Hopkins, Kandiah and Gillian (2003) the Cold War did not cause a change in the minds of British policy-makers regarding the international status of their country. For a considerable part of this period, British policy-makers held the belief that Britain still had influence as well as an important role to play. The following section will continue this discussion more thoroughly by looking at Britain’s foreign policy from 1945 to 1989.

7.2 Britain’s Foreign Policy

Winston Churchill’s conception of three circles, devised in 1951, is a good illustration of the main preoccupations underlying Britain’s foreign policy from 1945 to 1989. According to this, Britain was seen as occupying an important position between the three circles comprising the Atlantic, Europe and the Commonwealth. Frankel (1975, p. 157) interpreted this three-circle conception as “pronouncedly egocentric, the effect of which can be likened to that of geographical projections focusing upon one’s country: by the sheer method of representation the country becomes the centre of the earth”. Indeed this reflects the basis upon which Britain’s foreign policy was guided for most of this period. According to Hopkins, Kandiah and Gillian (2003) the Cold War did not produce a change in the UK’s view of its position in the world, until 1956 that is. Similarly McCourt (2014) notes that British foreign policy makers behaved as if Britain was still a great power.

A central aspect of Britain’s foreign policy during this period is its intimate link with defence policy. Among Britain’s priorities were the defence of its position, its influence and its world role. As such Britain entertained a non-isolationist stance, put
a stress on the importance of its bases world-wide and was obsessed with acquiring nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter the Soviet Union. The formation of alliances was a crucial aspect of its foreign policy, the most important of which was its relations with the US. Lord Carrington’s (Minister without Portfolio) statement in a Commons debate in 1963 is a good illustration of the main tenets of Britain’s foreign policy objectives from the end of WWII to 1989:

The first, of course—and it is paramount—is to prevent war. The second—and hereafter I name them in no particular order of priority—is to protect British interests. The third is to assist our friends and Allies in the Commonwealth and outside should trouble arise. The fourth is to play our part in the containment of Communism all over the world. These are sizeable aims and they entail heavy commitments for us. (HL Deb 19 November 1963, c233)

In drawing a continuing line between WWII and its aftermath Marr argues that “the world after the war was still a world of war” and goes on stating that “from Greece to Korea and Malaya; from Kenya to the Falklands, Ireland to Iraq, Britain would always be fighting somewhere. The most serious enemy became Communism” (2008, Prologue). The spread of Communism was seen as posing a threat to Western societies and to civilization (Hopkins, Kandiah and Gillian, 2003). Consequently Britain entertained interest in small states and new nations. It was also extensively involved in its colonies on the road to independence. According to Woodhouse (1961, p. 168) Britain’s interest in small states and new nations was partly motivated by moral obligations and he goes as far as to say that these moral obligations could be considered as humanitarian. Britain’s main objective was not to leave a vacuum that would give Communism an opportunity to take over.

Changes to British foreign policy can be observed after 1989. According to Gaskarth, Porter and Edmunds (2014, p. 2) the end of the Cold War signalled an end to “existential calculations” connected to the national interest in foreign-policy-making. They also observe that a different conceptualization of the national interest occurred featuring in foreign policy speeches linking national interests to global interests.
underlying the fact of interconnectedness. 1989 signalled an end to the way in which the international system was structured during the previous 45 years. A review of the literature reveals that the most pronounced changes in this area occurred after 1997 with the rise of Tony Blair and New Labour to power. Britain’s foreign policy from that point on could be described through three components: an ethical dimension, Europe, and efforts to become the bridge between the US and the EU (Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011).

The ethical dimension was articulated by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in 1997. He argued that Britain “must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves”, further adding that human rights were to be “at the heart of our foreign policy” (cited in Daddow and Gaskarth, 2014, p. 4). Although this differentiates the main tenants guiding Britain’s foreign policy between 1945-1989 and 1989-1999 its involvement in wars does not. Its soldiers were sent to Iraq in 1998, to East Timor and Kosovo in 1999, and to Sierra Leone in 2000 (Williams, 2005). These were described as enforcement operations, and had human rights and democracy as their main objectives.

7.3 The British Occupation and Reconstruction of Germany 1945-49

7.3.1 Background

The occupation and reconstruction of Germany by the Allied Powers began with the signing of the Potsdam Agreement on August 2, 1945. This Agreement laid the foundations for the treatment of Germany in the initial control period in the four zones of occupation (US, GB, FR, and Russia). According to Jarausch’s analysis of Allied reconstruction efforts, the Potsdam Agreement defined the goals of occupation as follows: “while the German people needed to atone for the “dreadful crimes” they had committed, they were at the same time to receive an opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis” (Jarausch,
Reconstruction in Germany was based on four main principles: denazification, demobilization, de-industrialization and democratization (Marshall, 1989). These principles underscored the primary motive of the occupation and reconstruction of Germany by Britain, which was to ensure that Germany would not be able to threaten either Britain or her allies in the future. British policy was then primarily driven by security concerns (Turner 1989).

As per the directive of the Potsdam Agreement the beginning of occupation in the British zone saw the establishment of a military government under Sir Bernard Montgomery, who acted as military governor (Knowles, 2013). Democratization in the area of administration and institutional development moved at a fast pace in the British zone and elections at the local level took place in 1946. During the same year British and US military governors signed an agreement relating to the formation of a bi-zone, economic unit of their respective zones. In the following year, elections at Land level took place, and negotiations between the British and Americans resulted in their zones being unified.

In 1948 the London Programme was put in motion with the twin objectives of bringing the economic revival and the political reconstruction of the Western zones of Germany. Following these developments the Soviet Union responded with the Berlin blockade, which lasted from 1948 to 1949, and the Berlin Airlift. It involved blocking Western access to Berlin (Shlaim, 1983). Finally in 1949 two independent states were formed in Germany. One included the French, US and British zones, and the other the Soviet zone (Knowles, 2013). This signaled an end to British occupation as practiced during the previous 4 years (Watt, 1965).

7.3.2 Administering and Democratizing the British Zone in Germany

Policies pursued in the British zone on democratization followed the 1945 Potsdam Agreement (hereafter PA), whose directives were “to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany” (PA). As for its administration the PA
stated that “the administration in Germany should be directed towards the
decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility”.
Local self-government was to be restored as soon as possible. The process of
democratization headed by the Administration and Local Government division of the
Control Commission for Germany involved building democratic institutions, adjusting
the electoral system, decentralizing the machinery of administration and governance,
and politically re-educating the Germans towards a democratic way of thinking
(Ebsworth, 1960; Marshall, 1989). The primary threat towards the attainment of
objectives set was Nazism. Hence, its eradication was the first step towards the road
to democracy.

The second step involved altering/influencing the German mind so as to think in a
democratic way. On the whole British opinion towards Germany and Germans was
more often negative than positive. This was particularly true during WWII. In the eyes
of the majority of British politicians and the public the problem they were faced with
in Germany was one to do with Germans’ national character. Such conceptions were
due in most part to Lord Vansittart who served as Permanent Under-Secretary at the
British Foreign Office and as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government during
1938-1941. He authored numerous anti-German pamphlets, articles, books and letters
to newspapers (Goldman, 1979). For Vansittart the character of Germans was a danger
in itself due to a flaw in the German national character (Marshall, 1989). During war-
time planning discussions on the treatment of post-war Germany Lord Vansittart
remarked that “the Germans are the most ghastly fact in history…they have committed
cruelties hitherto undreamed by man. It is the old story, the logical climax of a people
whose soul has not been civilized” (HL Deb 7 December 1943, c117).

Polls carried out in 1943 indicated that these ideas reached all sections of British
society. Forty three percent of those questioned hated or had no sympathy for the
Germans (Goldman, 1979). In spite of this, Vansittart’s views were contested by
people in policy-making circles, clergymen and pacifists. Additionally British opinion
was influenced greatly by stereotypes established in the two World Wars (Watt, 1965).
However, Michail (2011, p. 3) observes that with time came a softening of attitudes
towards Germans. According to him “the image of misery and desolation emanating from Germany gradually softened the attitude of the British public, which saw itself as morally superior to the vengeful German”.

The nature of practices undertaken in the realm of democratization display a mixture of control and cooperation. This observation rightly describes the situation on the ground. It is, however, important to clarify that on the whole London held a harsher position towards the treatment of Germans than that of the people responsible on the ground working on behalf of the British government. Practices concerning democratization involved interference, supervision and working in partnership. However, partnership did not connote equal standing. How can two parties be considered of equal standing when one is constantly supervising and overseeing every step taken? British officers were working with their German counterparts and through individuated relationships managed to convey British influence.

This is first visible in practices undertaken to build democracy from the bottom-up giving the Germans political responsibility and power in a step-by-step process. This approach was a way to control the transfer of political responsibility to Germans and enable them gradually to familiarize themselves with a democratic society (Foschepoth, 1986, p. 402). An example of this is related to denazification practices in the political realm. The British military government was wholly responsible for vetting Germans who were to be given positions of responsibility. When in 1946 the Germans took over this vetting process British officers maintained the power and right to make final decisions regarding appointments, and especially those relating to high-level positions (Ebsworth, 1960).

Similarly in the area of local government the British re-worked the Local Government Act (Deutsche Gemeindeordnung) in place since 1936 and issued it under a Government Ordinance in 1946. The officers of the Control Commission for Germany were tasked with helping German authorities get acquainted with the new reforms introduced, which they did until 1949 (Ebsworth, 1960). Hence, the interference of the British in local government did not end when democratic local government elections
took place in autumn 1946. British involvement at Land level followed the pattern described. In December 1946, Ordinance no. 57 gave the Länder constitutional rights but did not include federal or central powers (Jürgensen, 1983). Since December 1946 the right of self-government was passed to the Germans (Marshall, 1989). However, limits were placed on the extent of self-government, limits of power. The Germans were allowed to develop their own initiative although all draft constitutions were to be reviewed and approved by the British. The Legislative powers of the Länder were limited to regional subjects. Finance, economic control and justice were areas worked out by a German administration, whose responsibility remained with the British until a central government formed.

Interestingly, Ebsworth (1960, p. 132) described this practice as “a kind of extension of the trusteeship principle” and argued that “it worked quite well”. Indeed the concept of trusteeship does describe well the nature of practices in the British zone. What distinguishes the case of reconstruction in Germany from the Mandate cases of Palestine and Tanganyika analyzed in the previous chapter is the lack of references relating to civilization and backwardness. The British in this case saw themselves as the guardians of Europe more generally. It was about keeping Europe safe by keeping the Germans on a leash. In a way the British were protecting the Germans from themselves. This fits well with the British view of a problematic German national character. Through such views the Germans were identified more often than not as “the other”.

With the guidance, supervision and sometimes control on the part of the British this “other” could eventually come closer to the self. Democracy was key to remedying the faults of the Germans. Although Britain was to help Germany in its reconstruction, sentiment or empathy was not a feeling generally shared in Britain. In fact harshness and anger for what the Germans had done was at the back of everyone’s mind. An example of this is Bevin’s statement in the House of Commons where he argued that

It must not be forgotten that crimes were committed and millions of Germans were implicated in those crimes, and Nuremberg by no means wipes the slate
clean. We must behave like decent and sensible human beings and not like Nazis, but I appeal to the country not to allow itself to begin indulging in sloppy sentiment. It will not do the Germans any good, and it will only result in misleading them. (HC Deb 22 October 1946, c1518).

Not everyone followed Bevin’s position. Some Parliamentarians displayed a more lenient attitude towards the Germans. A good example of this position is Nigel Birch’s statement in a Commons debate in October 1946 where he argued that

My last point is a plea for mercy. There was a time when mercy was a virtue which people valued. That time now seems to have gone. I cannot help feeling that we have drunk up some pollution from the blood of the Nazis. People so often say that the Germans would have done worse. Of course they would—a thousand times worse. Cannibals eat missionaries, but that is no reason why missionaries should eat cannibals. How often do we hear statements made, particularly by the Lord President of the Council, starting, "We do not love the Germans." It is difficult to love one's enemies, but it would be much more hopeful if someone began by saying, "We are trying not to hate the Germans" (HC Deb 22 October 1946, c1487).

What comes out from this but also from Bevin’s statement is the way in which the British were seen as complete opposites to the Germans. Birch presented the difference between an Englishman and a German through a powerful analogy ascribing negative characteristics to the Germans and positive characteristics to the English. He called on the British to be true to who they are, meaning that they should be merciful towards the Germans. In Bevin’s statement the British were different to the Germans based on the fact that they were human beings. This resulted in complete dissociation with the Germans and represented the British as superior to them. Equally important is that both statements did not distinguish between a German and a Nazi, they were seen as one and the same, they were all bad.

The British government felt they had a responsibility, a duty in Germany. In certain respects this was fueled by a sense of superiority. Britain emerged from WWII as a
victorious ally and believed to be part of the leading nations. A certain asymmetry existed between Germany and Britain. Germany was experiencing “zero hour” whereas Britain was not only great but also felt great (Lee, 2001). British superiority was also fueled by British democratic institutions. According to a Preamble to a key British Policy document “Our democracy, the strongest in the world, is the result of our character and our country. It flourishes best in British soil, but we export it and carefully tended, it blossoms in different lands” (cited in Welch, 1989, p. 6).

The sense of duty and responsibility was not confined to Germany but extended to Europe as a whole. In a debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons Mr Zilliacus (Gateshead) argued that “In Europe we have a special responsibility under the Atlantic Charter and under the Teheran and Potsdam Agreements” (HC Deb 23 October 1946, c1713). Britain saw itself as responsible for ensuring peace, stability and security in Europe. The way in which the sense of duty and superiority mixed is clearly illustrated by Bevin’s statement in the Commons when he shared his belief that “We are in Germany partly to clear up the mess which Hitler caused, and the Germans would be very much worse off if we were not there” (HC Deb 22 October 1946, c1487).

As for Communism during the first years of German reconstruction, it was not the threat it later came to be. This does not mean that the British were not starting to be suspicious about the Soviet Union’s intentions. Although opinion on this in the empirical literature is mixed it would be unwise to rule out that the prospect of Communist influence in Europe was not worrying Britain. For Turner, Labor’s post war foreign policy was influenced by a suspicion of communism. Indeed, he argues that “by 1946 the principal post-war threat was felt to be the Soviet Union” (Turner, 1989, p. 21). The possibility of communism spreading to the British zone became real with the merger of the Social Democratic party with the German Communist party forming the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the Soviet Zone in February 1946. Concurring, Lee (2011) identifies a level of hostility towards the Soviet Union even before the end of the war by figures such as Attlee and Bevin. Communism as a threat became quite pronounced during the Berlin blockade.
7.3.3 Re-education in the British Zone: The School System and the Political Re-education of the Media

A good starting point for understanding British policy on re-education is to follow Christopher Knowles’ characterization of British occupation in Germany as a “benevolent occupation”. According to him “positive effect was more likely when they created the conditions for the German people to act for themselves, rather than imposing solutions by force or decree” (2013, p. 84). This is also true for practices in administration and democratization. Control, informality, cooperation, supervision and guidance are characteristic of policies pursued by the military government and the Education Branch of the Control Commission for Germany (British element) (hereafter EBCCG) during 1945-1949. Re-education instead of punishment was the outcome of war planning discussions (1942-43) in Britain, which came to characterize post-war policy towards Germany. Re-education was an umbrella word devised to include a multitude of sectors and areas such as the school system (primary, secondary education and universities), its structure, the training of German teachers, the political re-education of the German public and the re-education of prisoners of war. The EBCCG included a number of sections responsible for universities, schools, teacher training, youth, textbooks etc. (Murray, 1978).

British policy-makers presented education/re-education as the bedrock of their policy in Germany. It was seen as the path through which a democratic Germany would arise. Re-education was meant to alter the German mind or as Lord Nathan put it in a Lords Debate the “purge of minds” (HL Deb 23 Oct 1945, c431). Interestingly, the chosen terminology was not liked by a majority working in the Education Branch (Robert Birley, Herbert Walker, Heinz Koeppler20) in Germany and by some in the Foreign Office. In a note to the Foreign Office dated 18 August 1948, Walker, the Deputy Director of the Education Branch, wrote “We detest the word re-education as much as the Germans do. This is an Education Branch not a “Reeducation Branch” (cited in Jürgensen, 1983, p. 226). Robert Birley, the educational adviser to the Education

20 Koeppler was the Director of Wilton Park, the Anglo-German study centre.
Branch also shared this strong dislike towards the concept of re-education (Birley 1978).

At the core of the distinction education/re-education lie conceptions about the Germans and the methods to be applied in order to establish democracy in Germany. Sigrid Fretloh-Thomas (1998) presents Vansittart as a strong defender of re-education and distinguishes his approach from people like Birley, Walker, Victor Gollancz and Koeppler. Due to his insistence on the problematic German character, re-education for Vansittart was not impossible but it would take a very long time and needed to be based on tight control (Fretloh-Thomas, 1998). In contrast, those adhering to the concept of education did not focus on German stereotypes. They acknowledged German culture and the possibility of a change of outlook (Hearnden, 1978, p. 43).

From the outset, the occupation and reconstruction of Germany was seen as a new experiment for Britain, something never attempted before. The British Zone Review spoke of Germany as “Britain’s greatest test” given that she was going “to administer a very highly cultured and very highly organized European country” (cited in Fretloh-Thomas, 1998). Although Britain had a long history of administering colonial possessions, never before did she have to reconstruct a European country let alone educate it. What becomes apparent from the start is that the administration and reconstruction of Germany was distinguished from all past British endeavors from the mere fact that Germany was a highly cultured and organized European country.

It becomes somewhat difficult to forge a link between British educational reconstruction in Germany and colonial policies in this period. British colonial policy in Africa did not have a clear strategy regarding education in the colonies until the 1925 White Paper on Education Policy in British Tropical Africa made its appearance (Whitehead, 1989). In fact it is only after WWII that serious considerations were given to the issue of education. Education was seen as the way through which Africans would be taught to take responsibility for running their own affairs. Although

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21 This example serves well as an illustration of a point made earlier in respect to administration and the difference of views between London and those engaged in Germany on the ground.
22 It was a fortnightly review of the activities pursued by the Military Government and the ECCG.
Germany and African colonies were very different there is a common element found in discourses. In a Paper entitled *Education Policy in Africa 1947* the following was written “Above all in education the role of HM Government, and of the Colonial Administrators, was to help the African people to help themselves” (Whitehead, 1989, p. 281). In a way this bears resemblance with the policies pursued in re-educating Germany discussed below.

During the first months of occupation the military government followed the directives provided by the PA concerning education according to which “German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas” (cited in Birley, 1978, p. 46). Security considerations were at the base of this. According to Squadron-Leader’s argument in the Commons: “The educational system of Germany must be handled so as to provide that a Hitler or a Kaiser cannot rise again, and it may be that the lives of people in this country may come to depend on that” (HC Deb 03 April 1947, c2294).

In accordance with the Potsdam Directives during the initial phase of occupation the Education Branch practiced tight control in relation to denazification. It involved screening books and school text-books and choosing the right kind of educators once all known Nazi supporters were removed (Ebsworth, 1960; Watt, 1965; Becker, 1978). Although control rightly describes the objective of British policies in the domain of education, it was done through collaborating with German educationists that had lived through the denazification process and German education authorities. In order to assess new books to be published and used in schools a Textbook Committee was set up which included German educationists and British advisers. This Committee was charged with receiving books to be published and sending back comments if they spotted any sign of nationalist sentiment (Birley, 1978, p. 55). In a sense it was about re-building the school system not only in structural terms (buildings) but in its entirety (books, teachers, methods of teaching).

During this period of practical educational reconstruction the cooperation and collaboration between German educationists and British officers was of great
importance. In his article “British Education Policy after 1945 and the Problem of re-
educating Germany” Jurgensen puts an accent on the collaboration between these two 
parties. He argues that “the building-up of an absolutely natural and trustful 
cooperation between those of the two nations concerned with education created an 
atmosphere of confidence” (1983, p. 235). The special place of this relationship for 
the re-education of Germany was re-emphasized in 1947 in an article in the Times 
which wrote “the most hopeful sign for the future is the excellent relationships formed 
between British education officers and the German teachers and educational officials” 
(The Times, 4 February 1947).

A change occurred towards the end of 1946 relating to the responsibility of education 
in the British zone. The British military government, which held the control and 
responsibility for German education in its zone, handed over this control and 
responsibility to the Länder governments through Ordinance No. 57 (Welch, 1989). 
Reflecting on this a year later the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (John Hynd), 
a Minister in charge of the Control Commission, argued in the House of Commons 
that “There may be mistakes, and it may be a slow process. Handing over the 
responsibility to Germans has led to a certain amount of inefficiency, but they 
cannot learn to administer unless they have the opportunity of doing so” (HC Deb 03 April 
1947, c2300). The Germans were given a chance to learn by doing it themselves.

However, they were never left on their own. In fact, according to Birley, the 
educational adviser to the Education Branch, despite this transfer of control and 
responsibility, the military government “retained a role of general supervision and the 
giving of advice and assistance” (Birley, 1950, p. 32). Supervision and the giving of 
advice and assistance related to German educationists, educational institutions and the 
German education authorities in carrying out reforms in Education. Staff from the 
Education Branch positioned at Land Level were, according to Ebsworth who was 
involved in the Administration and Local Government Division of the Control 
Commission for Germany, “most in touch with German officials and educational 
institutions” and occupied “the best position to influence and assist” (1960, p. 164).
According to a Memorandum listing their duties after the issuing of Directive No. 57, Education control officers were “to advise teachers and others about suitable reading in connection to their special interests” among other things and were expected to hold an approach towards Germans combining “courtesy and firmness”. Above all the Memorandum encouraged ECOs to convey a level of sincerity when giving advice to Germans (FO 1050/1177). Consequently British policy after Ordinance 57 was more about influencing through personal contact rather than forcing methods of re-education on them (Welch, 1989). It was also about conveying advice in a manner that exemplified a genuine concern to help.

By influencing German educational authorities, educationists and the German public, the British could ensure that the necessary educational reforms were put in place and carried out by Germans for Germans. Universities were seen as those most in need of reforms. As a result, a University Commission was formed under the orders of the Military Governor in 1948 in order to review the situation in Universities and propose recommendations. The Commission was composed by twelve members, ten of whom were German and represented Universities, the Education Ministry, the Catholic and Protestant Church and the Trade Unions. The non-German members consisted of Lord Linsday of Birker (Master of Balliol College, Oxford) and Professor von Salis of Zurich (FO 1050/1057).

In order to help in bringing their recommendations to fruition, Birley argued during a meeting held in his office in December 1948 that the University Commission’s report had to be disseminated as widely as possible in order “to influence German public opinion in the greatest possible extent” (FO 1050/1057). To these ends he wrote to representatives of Denmark, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Holland urging them to disseminate the Report in their respective countries. He argued that “there are many serious minded Germans who are anxious to see reforms take place in German Universities”. The dissemination of the Report in neighboring countries would, according to Birley, “lighten their task by giving them confidence. This will help them to make a valuable contribution to the future of German Education” (FO 1050/1057).
This also brings forth how the British helped, and above all supported those like-minded Germans who wanted to see a better Germany.

The British model was not imposed but attempts at influencing via British values and institutions did take place. In describing the main lines pursued in education after Ordinance No. 57 Birley stated that

As a piece of deliberate policy the members of the Branch have been deployed as widely as possible in order that they might influence German education by personal contacts with individuals. Their main task has been to get to know those persons, teachers and officials who have it in them to create a new and healthy education in Germany, to help and encourage them, and to put them in touch with the world outside their own country (Birley, 1950, p. 42).

According to this the Education Branch pursued an informal approach in dealing with the education and the re-education of German educationists. Birley believed that what was needed was to help German educationists “develop a sense of personal responsibility for the affairs of the state” (1978, p. 54). Coupled with the identification of cultural isolation of not being in touch with the rest of the world British policy focused on exchange programs between British and German educationists. This is where attempts at influencing via British values can be observed. For example, German teachers were encouraged to travel abroad and especially to Britain in order to learn about different manners of educating (Birley, 1978). Teacher training students were taking part in exchanges between British and German students (FO 1050/1032). There were also courses offered in the British zone to teachers so that they could learn techniques in order to teach their subject accompanied of course by British teachers (Birley, 1978).

In addition, English Weeks were taking place until 1948 in Land Niedersachsen. These courses lasted from 1 to 5 days and involved the presentation of the British way of life (FO 1050/1021). A parallel can be observed with policies and conduct discussed above in the area of administration. German teachers were not the only ones whose horizons the British wished to expand. Cultural isolation was a general trend in Germany.
Consequently British attempts at influencing via British values and the British way of life extended to school children, universities and source material for teaching. School children in Germany were encouraged to correspond with school children in Britain in an attempt to re-connect them to the outside world (FO 371/64386). As far as Universities were concerned, a scheme was endorsed during the end of 1946. Learned journals were sent from Britain to Universities and Technical colleges. This scheme was based on Birley’s conviction that “we have a special responsibility to restore their intellectual links with English thought and scholarship” (FO 371/64386).

Policies pursued by the Education Branch during and after the period they held responsibility for education in Germany were based on the SHAFF Educational Manual issued in 1945 to guide British educational staff. According to the manual

No attempt should be made to force on German educational institutions any principles of education or methods of teaching which are not desired by and indeed do not emanate from the Germans themselves. The long-term aim is to establish in German education the former standard of respect for objective facts and to extend this standard to fields in which it did not formerly operate. Also to foster in German education interest in the ideas of popular democracy, freedom of opinion, the press, religion. (cited in Balfour, 1987, pp. 27–28)

The main line of the Manual was that education in Germany was to be carried out by Germans for Germans. The policies described earlier were in line with directions included in the above manual. Given that the British were occupiers they had to tread lightly. Germany was not a British colonial possession, it was a European country. Even when the British had the chance to make changes in education in Germany during the first months of occupation, they didn’t. On this Balfour argued that “any change which the British might have tried to make would have met with tooth-and-nail opposition from almost all the non-Nazi members of the teaching profession” (1987, p. 28). This coincides with Helmut Becker’s observation that the British were
engaged in “a very cautious educational and cultural policy” (1978, p. 269). In doing so the British encouraged the restoration of the old order which German educationists wanted.

Although British policy in Germany followed the SHAEFF manual and a stress was put on influencing rather than imposing British values and institutions, Englishmen and women involved in Germany’s educational reconstruction strongly believed in the superiority of the English system and its ability to help the Germans in their endeavors to build a better and stronger educational system. In her article entitled “Problems in German Education—Secondary Schools” published in Die Welt, Miss E. Davies, a member of the Education Branch, stated that “those of us who came to work in Germany and have studied her great tradition of learning and her arts believe, however, that in our own educational system there are elements of universal value which if sympathetically considered by German educationists can help them to lay the foundations of democracy in Germany” (FO 1050/1192). Apart from the beneficial effect that elements of the British educational system would bring to Germany if adopted, Davies’ argument also brings forward a positive representation of Germany residing in her older traditions.

From what has been described, the policies pursued in education were not so much of a protective nature as such. It could be said that British education officers were helping the Germans help themselves by acquiring a supervisory role. German educationists were under training and their trainers tried to guide them towards the “right” path. This applied to German education authorities as well. Education Control Officers not only provided advice to German education authorities at Land Level but were also supervising to see how they were progressing with education reforms. British officers were laying the ground so that Germans could proceed to re-educate themselves. This point coincides with Viola Klein’s observations relating to youth education in Germany. She argues that “the victors were to provide the means to assist this process of self-education…give the Germans the mental tools and leave it to them to finish the job” (1947, p. 81). At this level it is possible to see a certain degree of benevolence in these practices which constitutes one dimension of paternalism.
The sense of duty and responsibility towards this group of Germans who worked for a better future for Germany is well expressed by Birley in an Address he gave at Chatham House in 1949 stating that “there are men and women there who are trying to create a better tradition and that they still need our help. To leave them now would be to leave them too soon” (Birley, 1950, p. 43). What becomes apparent from this and from what I have presented above is a somewhat positive representation, an identification not with all Germans but with those people (teachers, officials) who worked for the establishment of education in the British zone. In accounting for her work in the Education Branch, Davies writes “It was recognized that there were two Germanies and one would be prepared, indeed eager, to work with us for the benefit of the children of Germany” (1978, p. 95). This type of thinking worked in a way to bring these Germans closer to “the self” and further away from being seen as “the other”.

In contrast to the education and re-education of German teachers and reforms in the educational system, the Public Relations and Information Services Control (PR/ISC branch) of the Control Commission was directly intervening in order to change the German public’s thinking by controlling British-sponsored media and newspapers. The work undertaken by this branch concerned the political re-education of Germans. Instead of influencing through personal contact or guiding and supervising as was the case with the re-education of teaching staff, the ISC was involved in the manipulation of British-sponsored media. The objective was the projection of British values and the British way of life and not the re-establishment of German culture.

According to a Foreign Office paper circulated in May 1945 “the media were to re-educate the German public so that they may unconsciously become more accessible to the ideas and standards for which Britain stands” (Welch, 1989, p. 225). During the first months of occupation the content of newspapers was guided by Directives issued to British officers. According to the Directive of May 12, 1945 “common responsibility for Nazi Crimes” was to dominate the way in which information was presented (cited in Balfour, 1987, p. 32). In accordance with the directive Germans were presented with the horrors committed in Belsen and Dachau. Next, the Directive
of June 8 called for a clear distinction between active and passive guilt where the latter would be “atoned for by hard work, restitution and a change of heart” (quoted in Balfour, 1987, p. 32). According to Balfour the ISC attempted to produce “a Germany which was a free and a responsible society” by disseminating information regarding Nazi war crimes and cruelties, up-to-date reports relating to the Nuremberg trials and presenting the consequences of their war in other countries (Balfour, 1987, p. 30).

Welch’s detailed study on British re-education policy provides some valuable information regarding the policy pursued by the ISC branch of the Control Commission. According to Welch the ISC employed both collective responsibility and collective guilt to achieve its aims in an interchangeable fashion. To demonstrate this he cites Major Alec Bishop’s (head of PR/ISC in 1945) decision “to emphasize German war guilt as long as it was considered psychologically desirable” (1989, p. 221). Both Welch and Balfour recognize that the desire to keep a clear distinction between collective responsibility and collective guilt was not met in practice.

It is important to note that the policy pursued by the ISC and that relating to the re-education of German educationists was in accordance with the SHAEFF educational technical manual which called for re-education to be undertaken by Germans for Germans. After the initial period of occupation, the ISC allowed papers to be run by Germans instead of British officers by retaining control over what was published. Germans were given a license to publish and had strict guidelines to adhere to in relation to content (Balfour, 1987, p. 30).
7.3.4 Summary

Figure 7. Interconnections of elements defining British Paternalism in Germany

The above diagram provides an illustration of how British paternalism was part of discourses and practices during Germany’s reconstruction. Benevolence was expressed in the manner in which policies were executed. Although originally the British government had a certain preference for punishing the Germans, that was not the policy followed on the ground. Cooperation was the way in which reconstruction efforts proceeded. Especially in the area of education, it was a process of personal relations. In discourses, benevolence was not as clearly articulated as in other cases analyzed. Here it took on a more general expression. It was for the good of Europe as a whole. Obligation, duty and responsibility were in a first instance a result of the Potsdam Agreement. The British government felt obligated to act and proceed with the reconstruction of Germany because it signed the Agreement. Second, it related very much to democracy and Britain’s values, its own track record with democracy.

Third, those feelings were also fueled by the need to protect Europe and ensure its security and order within the region. As one of the victors of WWII and its position in the world, this task, it was felt, fell on Britain. The element of protection also makes itself visible here albeit being more about helping and supervising. Helping and supervising was also accompanied by control. Certain measures put in place were
primarily about controlling the Germans. In terms of representation, for the most part the Germans were depicted as “the other”. Primarily this rested on the conviction that what was wrong with the Germans was a result of a fault in their national character. However, as pointed out before proximity with the Germans did soften this belief. Additionally, with time but also with depictions of the massive suffering of Germans after the war there seems to have been a softening of attitudes. Nevertheless, the articulation of British superiority was a constant throughout efforts to reconstruct Germany.

7.4 The Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation: 1963-66

The previous section concentrated on an instance of British interventionism towards a European country during the first few years after the end of WWII. This section will focus on the 1960s. During the 1960s Britain was engaged on multiple fronts. Decolonization was still underway and it was now the turn of Britain’s African colonies to gain independence. In addition Britain’s attention was also on Far East Asia, where its colonies were also on the road to achieving independence. It was a matter of reconciling decolonization with British influence and geostrategic advantage. Britain attempted to keep her bases in Far East Asia so as to ensure order and security and stand against Communism in that region. Further, Britain during the 1960s also attempted to join the EEC twice (1963, 1967) but was blocked by France. With all this in mind this section will proceed with the investigation of a sphere of older influence. Unlike Germany, Malaysia was, prior to its independence in 1957, a British colony.

7.4.1 Background

The roots of Indonesia’s Confrontation policy against Malaysia lay in the formation of the Malaysian Federation, which was to comprise Malaya, the Crown colony of Singapore and the Borneo territories of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo (Tuck, 2013). Both Indonesia and the Philippines voiced opposition towards its formation and
their demands for seeking further the opinion of the peoples of North Borneo delayed the establishment of the Federation from August to September 1963. The British position for the need of the Federation rested on attaining two objectives. The first related to the need to contain communism. The percentage of Chinese in Singapore, Borneo and Sarawak was significant. Establishing the Federation, it was thought, would make it possible to ensure that the Chinese would remain a minority in population and in political representation (Kahin, 1964). The second involved securing peace and stability in the region.

The confrontation was a low-intensity guerilla war (Jones, 2001) primarily focusing on the borders between Indonesian Borneo, Sarawak and Sabah. During the confrontation, which lasted from April 1963 to August 1966, Indonesia employed various diplomatic and military pressures against Malaysia (Subritzky, 2000). The military side of confrontation involved cross-border raids, terrorism, insurgency and subversion (Tuck, 2013). Britain and its Commonwealth partners New Zealand and Australia went to aid in defending Malaysia. The main political actors in the Confrontation were Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Subandrio, its President Achmed Sukarno and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Tunku Rahman. The military side of Indonesia’s Confrontation began in April 1963 and slowly escalated. In January 1964 mediation attempts took place between the parties involved led by Robert Kennedy as US special presidential envoy, which concluded in a cease-fire (Llewelyn, 2006).

The cease-fire was meant to allow a UN mission to enquire whether the people of both Sabah and Sarawak wished to be part of the Malaysian Federation. The enquiry concluded that the people wished to be part of it (Gregorian, 1991). Regrettably the cease-fire was broken by Indonesia in the following months. The peak of the escalation was said to be between August and September 1964 when Indonesia attempted both seaborne and airborne landings on mainland Malaysia (Gregorian, 1991). In 1965 Singapore took the decision to secede from the Federation following political tensions (Tuck, 2013). Shortly thereafter, Indonesia experienced a coup d’état led by a group of leftist military officers (Llewelyn, 2006). In April 1966 the Malik-Razak meeting began between Indonesia and Malaysia facilitated by Japan (Llewelyn, 2006). The
crisis officially came to an end with the signature of the peace treaty in Bangkok on 11 August 1966 through which Indonesia recognized Malaysia as a legitimate state (Subritzky, 2000).

7.4.2 British Responses to Indonesia’s Confrontation 1963-65

Britain’s policy vis-à-vis the military aspect of Confrontation against Indonesia, which lasted from April 1963 to early 1966, was both defensive and offensive. Although Britain undertook an offensive line of policy with cross-border raids in mid-to-late 1964 its overall policy and stance were considered defensive. In line with a defensive posture, British personnel were helping the Malaysian military to counter the Indonesian threat in various ways at the borders of Sarawak and Sabah in North Borneo. British troops had the following tasks: defend the border, identify and defeat Indonesian incursions, and reassure the local population (Tuck, 2013). British aid in the defence of Malaysia also included the reinforcement of troops stationed in other areas usually occurring after an escalation in Confrontation tactics and frequency coming from Indonesia. In essence British personnel were to counter and not instigate any attacks. According to Mathew Jones’s (2001) analysis of the Confrontation the policy of British policy-makers consisted of standing up to “the bully”.

Additionally British personnel were involved in leaflet dropping in the Borneo jungle in 1965. As described by Mr Haley, Secretary of State for Defence, in response to a question in the House of Commons, “From time to time the security forces in Eastern Malaysia assist the civil authorities by distributing leaflets as part of a joint campaign to warn the local population against Indonesian infiltration tactics” (HC Deb 12 May 1965, c70W). This brings forward another aspect of the campaign which involved winning the “Hearts and Minds” of the native population in Borneo, part of Major General Walker’s strategy in that territory as commander of the security forces. His strategy also included working closely with civil and police powers and intelligence gathering (Gregorian, 1991). The nature of British policies is well summarized by Mr Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, who in response to a question about the sort of military action requested by the Malaysian government in
December 1963 stated that “British forces were being made available to support in combating Indonesian intervention in Sarawak, and Sabah” (HC Deb 05 December 1963, cc1335).

During the summer of 1964 following Indonesian attempts to reach mainland Malaysia by sea and air Britain shifted to a more proactive policy against aggressions committed by the Indonesian military (Llewelyn, 2006). This policy was offensive in nature and involved cross-border raids into Indonesian Borneo. In response to military pressure by Indonesia on the frontier in Borneo the Cabinet in Britain took the decision to sanction counter-battery fire against Indonesian gun and mortar positions. Hot pursuit across the border was also practiced up to a distance of 3,000 yards which itself became extended gradually to 10,000 in the span of a few months. These cross-border raids were codenamed CLARET. They were deniable cross-border operations in the jungle under the command of General Walker and targeted Indonesian bases (Tuck, 2004).

In nature these practices can be seen as encapsulating the concept of protection. It was about pushing the enemy away and defending a territory against aggression. It was a collaborative effort of the governments of Malaysia, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Throughout, the actions described above demonstrate that Britain was essentially protecting the territorial integrity of Malaysia. It concerned the physical protection of the people and of the territory. It was not about protecting them from themselves but rather from a very real threat, Indonesia. It could be argued that these defensive practices in Malaysia displayed benevolence. The military was lending a hand to its Commonwealth partner and worked alongside it. These remarks and observations also apply to the offensive part of operations sanctioned by the British Cabinet. Defense and self-defense was the main objective, which reflects the majority of actions undertaken by the British military and its partners.

Urgency was a feeling conveyed consistently by the media, the British government and Parliamentarians. Newspaper articles covering the Confrontation delivered this urgency, the need to do something quite strongly by describing all aggressive and non-
aggressive acts undertaken by the Indonesian regular and irregular armies. For instance the Guardian wrote in May 8, 1964 that “Sukarno’s saboteurs and terrorists in Singapore and Borneo are doing their best – although not a very good – to intimidate the local population” (The Guardian, May 8 1964). In September 13th 1964 the Observer published an article which read “more British troops, ships and weapons have been rushed to Malaysia to counter guerilla raids which have now spread from Borneo to mainland Malaysia.” (The Observer, 13 September 1964). The imminence of another attack or the escalation of the situation was also called for by newspapers covering unfolding events in Malaysia. Some were even describing the situation as a war. During the Confrontation, headlines in British newspapers read “Border-line war”; “Our War in Asia” (The Guardian 1964; The Observer 1964).

The need for British involvement in the defence of Malaysia and the need for further reinforcement of the troops were justified in a number of ways in Parliament. The most recurring were the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Treaty of 1957 and Malaysia’s position as a Commonwealth member. There was agreement in the House among all parties that Britain had to defend Malaysia from Indonesia. Britain portrayed itself as the protector of Commonwealth “partners” and especially newly formed states like Malaysia. Obligation was the most common term employed to characterize the need for British involvement. In responding to a question regarding why British men are sent abroad the Prime Minister stated that “We have an obligation to Malaysia and we have a more unwritten obligation to members of the Commonwealth who ask for our help” (HC Deb 17 June 1964, c1321). In conjunction with these justifications it is possible to observe in British discourses regarding British military support in Malaysia reference to Britain’s role in sustaining international order and peace in South East Asia. In a Lords Debate Lord Carrington stated that “The Queen’s speech also tells us that the Government will continue their efforts to provide peace and stability in South East Asia” (HL Deb 14 November 1963, c129).

Within British discourses differentiation is also apparent. The manner in which Malaysia and Indonesia were represented set them apart from Britain and also accentuated the need to take a part in Malaysia’s defence. Both were represented as
different to the British conception of “the self” but did not occupy the same space on the continuum where “the self” and “the other” reside. On the one side Malaysia was seen as vulnerable and fragile and consequently as needing and indeed seeking help. The Guardian stressed in May 8th 1964 that “not a single deliberately aggressive action has Malaysia offered against Indonesia so far” (The Guardian May 8th 1964, p). The terms employed to describe what was happening and the insistence on identifying Malaysia as victim and Indonesia as aggressor is an example of how this was accomplished. Newspaper articles and arguments in Parliamentary Debates stressed how Malaysia was being aggressed by Indonesia by giving details of specific instances.

Although the act of asking for help from the Malaysian Government was necessary for any British involvement as per the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement, it nevertheless figured in discourse as a manner to accentuate Britain’s role and further accentuate Malaysia’s representation as a victim. A good example of this is Mr. Bottomley’s response to a question relating to Indonesian aggression where he stated that “Malaysia and Singapore are exposed to Indonesian aggression and seek our assistance to meet that aggression” (HC Deb 02 November 1965, cc135-36 W). In addition Malaysia was seen as unable to deal with her situation on her own. Writing to Macmillan, Selkirk (14 June 1963) voiced that “The Malayans themselves have discovered the complete inadequacy of their own defence without British support. To let them down now would be to change their whole relationship with the UK and quite probably, allow in forms of government which are wholly alien to the present leaders in Malaya” (cited in Jones, 2001, p149). Coinciding with this line of reasoning the Guardian wrote a year later about the Malaysian army that it “is new, inexperienced and still limited to eight battalions” (The Guardian 8th May 1964).

On the other side, Indonesia was identified as the aggressor and Sukarno its president as the evil in this affair. Since 1963 Sukarno was seen as displaying an antagonistic attitude against the formation of Malaysia (HL Deb 14 November 1963, c135). This is not only clear in British discourses but also in newspaper articles covering the Confrontation. Sukarno was discussed in the most negative of terms by Britain. As
Jones notes in his work on the Confrontation “the British were developing a personal fixation with the bellicose Indonesian President” (2001, p. 172). The media described him as “a vain and ambitious man” and argued that “his aggressive tactics are indefensible” (The Observer, 13th September 1964). More generally the media made sure to clarify in all instances where negotiations were taking place that their failure was a result of President Sukarno not agreeing to terms and put stress on his aggressive attitude. For instance in January 1964 the Times wrote that Indonesia “was unwilling to stop supporting guerilla raids into North Borneo” (The Times, January 11, 1964).

The representation of Malaysia as the victim and Indonesia as the aggressor was further intensified by comparisons between the two. Some comparisons focused on the type of government each possessed. For instance, Mr. David Mitchell (MP for Basingstoke) argued in a Commons debate on Defence that “The contest between Malaysia and Indonesia presents the classic example in history of the giant dictatorship and the small democracy” (HC Deb 23 November 1964, c958). Others made a point to bring forward a positive image of Indonesia in terms of its general character and its stance during the Confrontation. In a Commons debate on July 19 1965 Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe described Malaysia as “a newly independent country…with no aggressive intentions” and as a country which did “nothing wrong” (HC Deb 19 July 1965, c1183). Malaysia was also differentiated from Indonesia as an “example of human welfare and racial cooperation” (HC Deb 17 June 1964, c1290). Through these representations it is possible to discern how Malaysia and Indonesia did not inhabit the same position on the continuum of “the self” and “the other”. By differentiating Malaysia from Indonesia in more positive terms based on democracy and character, it could be argued that Malaysia was seen as closer to “the self”.

Further, a look at British justifications in discourses on Malaysia’s defence also reveals their benevolent character. On the whole British Parliamentarians agreed that it was an issue of helping Malaysia. Mr Denis Healey argued that what they were doing in Malaysia constituted “a human responsibility” (HC Deb 17 June 1964, c1290). On similar lines Mr Paget in defending the help given to Malaysia in a Commons debate said that “our interests are altruistic” (HC Deb 04 March 1965, c1654). In 1965 the
idea of fighting for Malaysia was still voiced in parliamentary debates. Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe argued in a Foreign Affairs debate that “we are fighting a battle for the freedom of Malaysia” (HC Deb 19 July 1965, c1183). Taking these arguments together helps bring forward how for many but not all British engagement in the Confrontation, the addition of troops and the aid in military defence were undertaken in order for Malaysia to gain its territorial integrity and be free.

In discussing the benevolent element identified in British discourse during the Confrontation it is equally important to have a look at the overall context in which this British military intervention took place. In congruence with the majority of Britain’s military interventions during this period the national interest and strategic considerations played a part. It is quite impossible to find a case in which Britain intervened and had no interests whatsoever. It is only logical given the context in which these interventions were taking place. The case of Malaysia is no exception. Britain’s interest in the Confrontation in Malaysia was partly motivated by her base in Singapore. Wider political and military interests were at stake. Fundamental was the prevalent Whitehall assumption that Britain was, and should remain, a global power. A significant British military presence in Southeast Asia was one means of consolidating this idea of partnership with the Americans. By contributing to the containment of communism in the region, Britain was able to present its bona fides to the United States as a dependable senior ally in the Western alliance (Subritzky, 2000, p. 12).
7.4.3 Summary

An overview of discourses and practices relating to Indonesia’s policy of Confrontation against Malaysia brings to the surface all elements I have identified in previous chapters as core characteristics of British paternalism. Benevolence can first be seen in the type of practices undertaken by the British military sent to Malaysia. Their benevolence rests in that they were carried out for the defence of the territory against aggression. Discourses voiced in Parliament focused on concepts such as freedom, altruism, helping etc. According to this the policy of the British government and its military personnel was fighting for Malaysia for the future of a young country. The British military sent to Malaysia was working tirelessly for the defence of Malaysia’s territorial integrity. Duty was not a term employed in discourses pertaining to Malaysia, however, obligation was. This feeling of obligation was seen as due to the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Treaty of 1957 and to the Commonwealth link binding the two countries. Both were overwhelmingly employed in order to call for protective action on behalf of Malaysia.

Protection is also visible in both practices and discourses during the Confrontation. Britain was supporting its Commonwealth ally by providing troops when necessary for the defence of its borders (patrolling, fighting incursions). In this case protection referred to the physical protection of the territory using force in self-defence.
Concurring with this, discourses equalled protection with defence. It was not about developing the country but rather about defending it from physical danger. The last element, which refers to difference/incompetence, was also present. There were two ways the British practiced differentiation. The first involved differentiating between the British and the Malaysian government and the other between the Malaysians and Indonesians.

The Malaysians were seen as “the other” because they were seeking aid and as such were seen unable to deal with the developing situation on their own. Their military capabilities more than their mental capabilities were the reason for this conception. The second was a differentiation between the Malaysians and Indonesians where the former were “the victim” and the latter “the aggressor”. Representations putting an accent on the democratic government of Malaysia did move it further from conceptions of “the other” and closer to “the self”. All these manners of differentiation can be seen as pushing for action by Britain but also as reinforcing the feeling of obligation towards them.

7.5 The Kosovo Intervention of 1999: Operation Allied Force

The case of the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation analysed above permitted to demonstrate the persistence of British paternalism during the 1960s. The following two decades were characterised by a relative decline in hostilities between the East and the West. Appeasement defined the relations between the US and the USSR. During the 1970s Britain finally managed to join the EEC and completed its withdrawal East of Suez. This section will move my investigation from the 1960s to the Post-Cold War era.

7.5.1 Interpretation by the Empirical Literature

The NATO-led Kosovo intervention is part of a number of Post-Cold war cases cited in the empirical literature looking at humanitarian interventions. Among the examples cited Kosovo is seen as standing out from the rest. This is because it was undertaken
without explicit UNSC authorization for humanitarian ends and because the chosen method of intervention was bombing. As such it is employed by many scholars in order to investigate questions of legitimacy and legality when it comes to humanitarian interventions. Investigations focusing on the legitimacy of this intervention base themselves on certain principles that define legitimate interventions such as proportionality, necessity, use of force as last resort and a positive humanitarian outcome. Basing his analysis on these determinants Wheeler concludes that Kosovo is not a good model of humanitarian intervention (2000).

However, he also notes that “the international reaction to the Kosovo case marks a watershed in the society of states and that we should expect to see it exhibiting a new solidarity in response to any future cases where states intervene to end atrocities without UNSC authorization” (Wheeler 2000, p. 297). Coming from a legal perspective, Teson argues that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was justified (Tesón, 2003). Equally, Farer sees the Kosovo intervention as ethically and legally premised on massive violations of human rights (2003). A majority of scholars accept that the Kosovo intervention fulfilled requirements of “just cause” but failed to fulfil the other requirements (Morris, 2004). Aside from looking at the legality and legitimacy of the Kosovo intervention, scholars employ it to bring forth how interventions in the 1990s are different from previous ones conducted.

In a first instance Kosovo is seen as demonstrating a new activism on behalf of the UN Security Council in employing its Chapter VII powers into issues that used to be considered as matters internal to a state (Chesterman, 2000; Finnemore, 2003; Wheeler, 2000; Weiss, 2012). It demonstrates how internal matters became labelled as “threats to international peace and security”. In a second instance Kosovo is seen as an example where justifications for the use of force contained humanitarian elements whether being about human rights or to avert crimes against humanity (Finnemore, 2003; Roberts, 1999; Wheeler 2004; Weiss, 2012). Despite this, scholars such as Roberts and Mayall (1999; 2000) also argue that Kosovo was not purely justified on humanitarian considerations. For Mayall it consisted of a mixture of humanity and credibility (2000). In a third instance, Kosovo is portrayed as an example
to showcase a shift in who is protected. According to Finnemore post-1945 interventions are directed towards non-whites, non-Christians and non-Europeans moving away from religiously motivated interventions (2003). As such her argument is based on the idea that the humanity worth protecting has expanded due to normative changes.

7.5.2 Background

The story of Kosovo had its roots in the dissolution of Yugoslavia and events there were influenced by the incidents in Bosnia in the early 1990s and the Dayton agreement. The territory is constituted by a majority Albanian population (90%) and a minority of Serbs, Romani, Bosniaks, Turks and others. Both Kosovo Albanians and Serb authorities claimed exclusive rights to the territory. Kosovo Albanians called for independence whereas Serb authorities wanted Kosovo to be constitutionally part of Serbia (Calic, 2000). The situation in Kosovo deteriorated on 28 February 1998 when Serb security forces led by Slobodan Milosevic took violent action against the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) (Morris, 2004). Civilian casualties and displacements of population resulted from these clashes. In response, on March 31, 1998 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1160 under Chapter VII, which condemned the actions of the security forces and those of the KLA, a paramilitary underground force (Morris, 2004). Milosevic justified the actions undertaken by the Serb Security forces against the KLA as a response against terrorism.

During the summer of 1998 Serb forces instigated another wave of attacks on Kosovo Albanians. In September NATO threatened air strikes in an attempt to put a halt to human rights abuses and push for negotiations (Morris, 2004). Additionally, on 23 September the UNSC adopted resolution 1199 according to which hostilities should cease, and urged both Yugoslav authorities and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to improve the humanitarian situation (Morris, 2004). These resolutions were accompanied by diplomatic efforts to put an end to the fighting. Negotiations culminated with the October 15-18, 1998 Holbrooke Agreement with Milosevic, which called for the withdrawal of Serbian security forces, the deployment of OSCE
monitors, and NATO aerial verification (Roberts, 1999). However, the slaughter of Kosovo Albanians by Serb security forces in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999 ended the Holbrook Agreement (Roberts, 1999). NATO’s threat of force since September 1998 became a reality on 24 March 1999, marking the beginning of the 11-week NATO bombing campaign against the FRY, entitled Operation Allied Force (Roberts, 1999). The NATO bombing campaign ended with the 10 June 1999 settlement (Roberts, 1999).

7.5.3 Condemning Actions in Kosovo - Milosevic and the KLA

The condemnation of violence in Kosovo can be seen as part of a set of actions taken by the UNSC urged by The Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia23 of which Britain was a member. The UNSC condemned the situation in Kosovo on 31 March 1998 through Resolution 1160. The resolution imposed an arms embargo and condemned “the excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians” and “terrorist acts by the KLA” (UN SC 1160). In practice, the condemnation of violence and the sanctions imposed can be seen as protective in nature. The main objective was to put a stop to the fighting between the Serb Security forces and the KLA in order to prevent further civilian casualties through diplomatic means. Indeed, the resolution also called for the withdrawal of special police units and a stop to actions taken by Serb security forces that affected civilians. Other sanctions imposed upon Belgrade included a ban on visas for senior members of authorities in Belgrade and a freeze on credits for investment by the Serbian government.

Prior to the UNSC’s condemnation of actions in Kosovo, acts committed in the territory were the subject of debates in the Houses of Parliament in Britain. Both the British government and members of Parliament unanimously condemned the atrocities committed against the civilian population. From the start the Kosovo Albanians were identified as the main target of violence and hence the group needing protection. Both the Serb security forces and the KLA were seen as the culprits. This was conveyed by

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23 An informal group consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Russia.
Robin Cook the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in his statement in the House of Lords on March 10th 1998 arguing that “Belgrade cannot claim that such extra-judicial killings are a purely internal matter. The international community has a legitimate right and a duty to condemn such gross violations of human rights”. In relation to KLA actions he stated that “We strongly condemn the use of violence for political objectives, including the terrorism of the self-styled Kosovo Liberation Army. But terrorism cannot be used as the pretext for indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population” (HL Deb 10 March 1998, c128). Apart from identifying the two parties at fault for the suffering incurred by civilians this statement also brought forward that human rights were threatened. Additionally, it stressed that the actions of the Serb Security Forces were an international concern and not merely an internal matter.

All MPs present in the debate of March 10th unanimously condemned the violence in Kosovo and backed diplomatic efforts undertaken by Britain and the Contact Group, the EU and the UN. The condemnation of both parties resulted in representing them as the complete opposite to “the self”. The Serb government was seen as violating human rights, a sacred principle of European states. Despite this, discourses in the Commons did leave a window open for the possibility that the FRY could in the future be part of Europe and its democratic nations. The plight of the Kosovo Albanians was contained in discourses regarding the condemnation of atrocities. They were discussed in terms of victimhood and referred consistently to their suffering. Statistics were the most employed method in Parliament, in the press but also in official speeches by the British government to convey the extent of the problem and the need to act. For example Cook argued in the Lords on March 10th that “The security operations around Dreniza in the past week appear to have left at least 80 people dead…Of the 51 corpses released yesterday by the Serb police, less than half are believed to have been men of military age. The local press report that 12 were children, 13 were women and 4 were elderly men” (HL Deb 10 March 1998, c128).
7.5.4 The Threat of Using Force

From May onwards the Serb security forces continued their violent and repressive operations, which escalated during the summer of 1998. Responding to a KLA offensive the Serb Security Forces intensified their attacks on ethnic Albanians. In view of this the UNSC passed resolution 1199 on September 23rd 1998. With this resolution the UNSC drew attention to the gravity of the situation, to civilian casualties, to the many displaced persons and refugees. The UNSC also stated that it was “Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe” (UNSC Resolution 1199). The next day NATO warned of air strikes if the Serb security forces did not put an end to the fighting. As the situation deteriorated further NATO approved an activation order on October 13, 1998, which permitted preparations for a limited bombing campaign (Hodge, 2006). On the 24th of October of the same year the International Contact Group comprising Britain among others secured UNSC Resolution 1203 under Chapter VII, “determining that there was a threat to regional peace and security and that there was an imminent humanitarian catastrophe” (cited in Keohane, 2000, p. 79).

The need to take action in the form of threatening with the use of force was voiced in British Parliamentary debates consistently at various times since the fighting first intensified in February 1998. Within these debates it is possible to observe how the Kosovar Albanians were identified as victims. One way this was done was by focusing on their current but also previous oppression. A good example of this is Baroness Ludford’s statement in a House of Lords debate on October 12th where she argued that “the sad fact is that all this comes against a background of a decade of human rights violations against the ethnic Albanian population who make up the 90% of Kosovo’s population” (HL Deb 12 October 1998, c753). Similarly, The Lord Bishop of Hereford argued that “The story of Kosovo is a story of nearly 10 years of sustained and systematic bullying of the 90 per cent Albanian population by the 10 per cent. Serb population, with that policy orchestrated from Belgrade” (HL Deb 12 October 1998, c759).
The representation of Kosovo Albanians as victims and as suffering greatly was also displayed in discourses through the use of statistics. The numbers of people killed and displaced were cited in debates frequently. As Baroness Symons of Verham Dean stated in the same October debate “The excessive actions of the security forces in Kosovo and their acts of wanton destruction of people's homes and livelihood have forced 300,000 people—more than 15 per cent of the population—to flee their homes” (HL Deb 12 October 1998, c774). This does not only bring forward an image of the Kosovo Albanians as suffering, as victims but also conveys the sheer level of atrocities and the need to do something to protect them or act on their behalf. Further, justifications offered in favour of threatening force focused on Milosevic and the Serb security forces. The behaviour of the Serbian security forces was seen as “intolerable”, pushing for the need to threaten force. “Ethnic cleansing” was the term used to characterise what Milosevic and the Serb security forces were doing. As Baroness Ludford stated in a Lords debate “President Milosevic is engaged not only in brutal repression of his own citizens but also in indiscriminate violence amounting to ethnic cleansing” (HL Deb 12 October 1998, c753).

Although military action was not on the table quite yet, Parliamentarians voiced the need for it and especially for the use of ground troops, which they framed as “a humanitarian necessity” on the grounds of human rights violations and in terms of saving lives. If an intervention took place it would be for the people. As Cook argued on October 19th “If we are obliged to take action we shall do so on behalf of the people of Kosovo and in particular to ensure that they can have democratically elected politicians” (HC Deb 19 October 1998, c963). Additionally the use of force was justified by a need to protect the Kosovar Albanians from Milosevic who was seen as “a national and an international menace”. On that The Earl of Carlisle argued in a Lords debate that “his hands and those of his henchmen are dripping with blood. He has to be deterred from the use of force. I would welcome the use of airstrikes, followed by the use of ground forces, to protect the people of Kosovo” (HL Deb 12 October 1998, c768). In view of the situation unfolding in Kosovo parliamentarians argued that both the UK and the international community could not just stand and
watch. Such stance was accentuated by framing the situation in Kosovo as “increasingly dangerous”, “extremely dangerous” and as a “matter of deepening concern”.

7.5.5 The Use of Force: Operation Allied Force

The use of force materialised in Kosovo on 24 March 1999 when NATO conducted an air-strike campaign against the Serb Security forces, which lasted for eleven weeks. During that time NATO flew around 40,000 sorties. It was a tactical campaign against the Serb forces responsible for killings and expulsion of citizens (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000). As stated by George Robertson’s briefing of March 25th the objective was “to avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe by disrupting the violent attacks currently being carried out by the Yugoslav security forces against the Kosovar Albanians and to limit their ability to conduct such repression in the future” (The Guardian, 25 March, 1999). Support for the use of force in Kosovo and for the use of ground troops was voiced by British Parliamentarians and by the British government since the summer of 1998. The continuing violence against civilians and the breakdown of diplomatic talks pushed the decision for NATO air strikes. The Rambouillet Peace Conference reached a deadlock when the Serbian government refused to sign the peace agreement (Schnabel and Thakur, 2000). NATO air strikes were employed as a way to bring Milosevic back to the negotiations so as to bring a solution to the situation and protect the ethnic Albanian population (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000).

Debates in Parliament on the use of force focused on the legality and legitimacy of such a course of action. Those in favour justified the use of force through concepts such as humanity and human rights. It was also done by putting an accent on the level of humanitarian tragedy, on the devastation caused to people and property and on the duty of certain states to act in such circumstances. Cook’s statement in the House of Commons a day after the air-strike campaign began is a good example of the way in which British discourse for action was constructed. In explaining why air strikes took place Cook argued that
The solid basis for that unity is our common revulsion at the violent repression that we witness in Kosovo. Since March last year, well over 400,000 people in Kosovo have at some point been driven from their homes. That is about a fifth of the total population. In Britain, the equivalent would be over 10 million people. We have seen villages shelled, crops burned and farm animals slaughtered—not for any legitimate military purpose, but as acts of ethnic hatred. (HC Deb 25 March 1999, c536)

Here again the use of statistics is apparent in order to convey the tragedy of the Kosovar Albanians. Through this they are depicted as incurring immense suffering, being victims of a relentless oppression and the victims of violence unable to protect themselves in any way.

The incident in the village in Racak in January 1999 where 45 people were killed was also part of the many incidents that took place since 1998 documented in justifications offered for the use of force in Kosovo. Parliamentarians in justifying the air-strikes made a reference to television shots of the situation on the ground. For example.

Michael Howard (Folkestone and Hythe) argued in a Commons debate that “There can be no doubt that what we have seen in Kosovo is a humanitarian crisis. Who can forget the television pictures of massacres, such as that at Racak?” (HC Deb 25 March 1999, c542). In conjunction with this came a discourse focusing on duty, morality and the protection of the Kosovar Albanians. In the same debate Mr Livingstone said: “It is the duty of the nations that have the military power to protect individual communities from systematic genocide by evil regimes. Milosevic is not a democrat” (HC Deb 25 March 1999, c573). The Serb security forces and Milosevic in particular were depicted in the most negative terms, seen as primarily responsible for the tragic turn of events in Kosovo. Milosevic was described as a ruthless oppressor, as someone who chooses violence over dialogue. George Robertson, the UK Defence Secretary, writing in the News of the World drew similarities between Milosevic and Hitler. He described Milosevic as “the butcher of Belgrade” (BBC, 28 March 1999).
Indeed news coverage of the atrocities committed in Kosovo can be seen as accentuating the need to act, the need to protect the civilian population. In relation to the Racak massacre the Guardian published an article on January 17th 1999 entitled “The village that died when the butchers came at dawn” (The Guardian, 17 January 1999). Aside from constituting part of justifications for action by Parliamentarians and the British government, the media can also be seen as one way through which British public support for the operation was gained. The Guardian published an article on June 1st 1999 showcasing British public support. According to the article British support for military action against Serbia was 54% in favour (BBC, 28 March 1999). In discussing British poll results regarding British and NATO action over Kosovo it is important to highlight that different polls display different percentages. Despite this in all published polls the percentage of those in favour always surpassed those against military action in Kosovo.

Tony Blair’s well-documented Chicago Speech delivered in April 1999 is another good illustration to show the way in which the use of force was justified in the case of Kosovo. According to the empirical literature this speech is seen as heralding “a doctrine of the international community”. For Blair the humanitarian war in Kosovo was “a just war based not on any territorial ambitions but on values”: “We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand” (Tony Blair 24/4/1999). In a certain way the feeling of duty and responsibility was fuelled by values, by the need to uphold human rights. Indeed upholding human rights came to be seen as a mark of civility.
7.5.6 Summary

The above diagram serves to illustrate how paternalism manifested itself in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse during the NATO Kosovo intervention. It also aids in illuminating the interconnections between the four elements constituting British paternalism during the different phases of the conflict covered. Benevolence is identifiable in the diplomatic and military measures deployed since March 1998. The condemnation of atrocities, the threat of use of force against the FRY and the NATO air-strike campaign were justified as undertaken on the behalf of the Kosovo Albanians and for their protection.

The element of obligation and duty is discernible in a number of ways. First, it can be seen as emanating from Britain’s position as a NATO member, a member of the UNSC, a member of the Contact Group and from holding the EU presidency from January to June 1998. Additionally the feelings of obligation, duty and responsibility can be seen as arising from vivid representations of the appalling situation in Kosovo, which was an issue of human rights violations. Human rights were seen as values of immense importance characterising the conduct of democratic states. Because Milosevic and the Serb security forces were violating the human rights of the citizens, they were depicted as “the other”, as “the threat” to these cherished values. Duty and
responsibility was framed in discourses as that of the international community that Britain was a part of.

Protection in Kosovo was seen in terms of physical protection but also in terms of protecting values. The threat of use of force and the air strikes were represented as protective actions in an attempt to stop killings but also displacements of the population. Discourses on protection were fuelled in majority by representing the Kosovar Albanians as victims and as unable to respond to what is being done to them. Also calls to protection were justified by labelling the situation as “ethnic cleansing” and portraying Milosevic as ruthless, evil and an oppressor. Difference and incompetence were also an important part of the intervention in Kosovo. What is visible in British discourses are three separate sets of representation. The first relates to the Kosovar Albanian population, which was represented as the victim and as unable to react. The second relates to the KLA who were seen as terrorists and as part of the problem in Kosovo. What is crucial to point out is that although the KLA were represented as “the other” because of terrorism they were not as negatively represented as Milosevic and the Serb security forces. In fact attention focused predominantly on Milosevic and the Serb Security Forces. The group most differentiated from the self was Milosevic and the Serb security forces because they were violating human rights, values increasingly cherished by the international community as a whole.
7.6 Comparing Events: British Paternalism in Germany, Malaysia and Kosovo

7.6.1 Representations

The above figure provides a good illustration of the ways in which the British represented the countries and their people subject to intervention discussed in this chapter. In all three cases subject to a British intervention some parties and in some cases all parties were represented as constituting “the other”. During the reconstruction of Germany the British representation of the Germans as the other was based on a problem identified at the level of their character (aggressiveness). This otherness identified in Germans was also due to an inability on the part of the British to distinguish between being a Nazi and being a German. However with time, perceptions of Germans shifted towards a more lenient and even positive attitude due in most part to the suffering they were submitted to after the war. News of famine and devastation in Germany appealed to a portion of the British public.

For these reasons the Germans are placed somewhere in the middle of the self-other continuum. The fact that Germany was part of Europe geographically and culturally and was seen as key to Europe’s problems (economically) could explain why they have secured a place on the continuum which is somewhat closer to conceptions of “the self” than of “the other”. It is important to highlight that British personnel on the ground identified positively with those Germans actively involved in the
reconstruction of their country. In contrast, the interventions in Malaysia 1963-66 and Kosovo 1999 bring forward another pattern of representation. In both, Britain intervened on behalf of one party as a response against the aggression of another. Practices of representation in these cases bring forward the existence of levels or types of otherness. In the case of Malaysia the British represented both the Malaysians and Indonesians as “the other”, as complete opposites to representations of the self.

However, this otherness was based on contrasting grounds. Malaysia was depicted as “the other” because of its status as a victim and its inability to cope with the situation at hand. Its territorial integrity and freedom were threatened. Conversely, Indonesia was represented as the other because it was “the aggressor” in this particular situation. The British represented Indonesia in this manner by focusing almost exclusively on one man, President Sukarno, and his character. Although both Malaysia and Indonesia represented “the other”, the British also identified with Malaysians through democracy. As a result Malaysians are placed on the continuum between Germany and Indonesia.

This pattern of a two-type otherness is also present in the case of Kosovo. The otherness of the Kosovar Albanians was premised on their depiction as victims by focusing on the level of tragedy and their suffering. The Serb Security Forces and the Serbian Government were represented as the other by being identified as the aggressive party. An additional similarity is the fixation of the British on one man, Slobodan Milosevic. Just like president Sukarno of Indonesia he was seen as evil, as a bully. The same pattern of identification observed towards Malaysians also applied to Kosovar Albanians. Their identification as victims ascribed a vulnerability to the Kosovo Albanians and called upon the British to protect them because they could not do it themselves. At the same time, however, the British also identified with them. In British eyes the Kosovo Albanians constituted a different kind of “other”. For this reason they are placed below the Malaysians and between the Germans and Serbs.

What these cases have in common is that differentiation was based in part on character. The idea of multiple types of others complements well the idea of varying degrees of
conceptions of the self, brought forward in previous chapters. One can be seen as the self but not quite just as one can be seen as the other – a victim or an aggressor. As such, although both are identified as constituting the other, the one identified as the aggressor is the one seen as the complete opposite from the self. In all cases the way in which those subject to intervention were represented helped to intensify and justify the need for Britain to get involved, the policies pursued and also justified its presence.

7.6.2 Discourses

British discourses relating to the three cases reveal the presence of obligation/duty, protection, benevolence and difference/incompetence. In all three cases feelings of obligation and duty developed in relation to Britain’s perceived role on the international scene. Both in Germany and Malaysia Britain felt it had a duty and an obligation to maintain peace, security and democratic principles as well as containing communism. In Kosovo Britain’s role related to upholding values such as human rights. Feelings of obligation and duty were also connected to Agreements and Treaties Britain was a party to. In Germany and Malaysia Britain was bound by previous Agreements. Its involvement in the former was based on the Potsdam Agreement and in the latter on the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. Conversely in Kosovo duty and obligation featured in relation to Britain as a NATO member, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its EU presidency term during part of the Kosovo incident.

The cases of Germany and Malaysia both display a trend in British interventions in the years 1945-1989. During this period, Britain primarily intervened in places where treaties or agreements were put in place (treaties of friendship; defence agreements). The manner of presenting or representing a situation, especially its gravity, was another way obligation and duty become visible in discourse. In Germany obligation and duty was fuelled by presenting the devastation and the food crisis taking place in the British zone. In Malaysia British policy-makers and the media consistently called for urgency in dealing with the Confrontation, which was presented as escalating or on the brink of doing so. Similar to Malaysia, in Kosovo obligation and duty were
further accentuated by media coverage of the devastation putting an accent on human suffering and citing the number of dead and displaced.

Within discourses relating to each case it is possible to observe benevolence. Despite being articulated in distinct ways it constituted part of justifications for the policies pursued. In justifying the need for threatening and using force policy-makers argued that they were doing so on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians and in response to human rights violations. Contrasting this, in discourses vis-à-vis the reconstruction of Germany and British involvement in Malaysia justifications took a more general approach. It was about securing peace and stability in a region (Europe, South-East Asia). Although justifications on the issue of sending troops to Malaysia focused in majority on more general considerations, concepts such as freedom and altruism did figure in some arguments articulated in Parliament. All three cases display similarities relating to the way in which the need for protection was justified. Despite the fact that protection meant something else in each case as will be discussed in the following section thoroughly the way it was articulated in discourse displays a convergence.

Representing Malaysia and the Kosovar Albanians as “the other” pushed for calls to action, calls to protection. In both cases this translated into seeing them “as victims” of aggression unable to stand up to the bully on their own. What differentiated discourses of protection in the two cases was that discourses towards Malaysia focused on the protection or rather defence of a territory where as in Kosovo discourses focused on the suffering population. In the case of Germany, their representation as “the other” was employed not to justify protection in terms of physical protection but translated into protection from themselves. It was about re-education and providing them with personal responsibility. Britain was to help Germans enable them to develop on more acceptable lines (on democratic lines).

7.6.3 Practices

The objective of British policy and the nature of practices undertaken in all three cases can be described by the concept of protection. The meaning of protection and the type
of policies pursued in Germany, Malaysia and Kosovo were quite different. Convergence can be observed in the cases of Malaysia and Kosovo on the grounds that both were subject to military involvement and protection signified territorial or physical protection. It is important to note that although Germany was also subject to a military intervention, the period examined in this chapter addresses the reconstruction efforts after the war. Hence, in the case of Germany protection tended to connote development. In essence in Malaysia and Kosovo more pronounced was protection from harm whereas in Germany it involved protection from themselves.

The interventions in Malaysia and Kosovo share some points. The first is the military aspect of intervention and second the protective nature of practices undertaken. Other than these the cases are quite distinct from one another. For one, protection in Malaysia connoted the defence of its territory against aggression. This involved sending troops on the ground and naval ships in the area. Second, it concerned the territory more than the people. This of course could be owed to the fact that the situation in Malaysia was one of confrontation and not a full out war. It was a mixture of diplomatic and military measures. British troops patrolled borders, fought off incursions around the border in North Borneo and committed cross border operations during part of the episode. Effectively Britain was aiding in the defence of Malaysia.

Conversely in the case of Kosovo Britain’s policy focused on the protection of people (Kosovar Albanians). They were protecting Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing and those who as a result had to flee. They were attempting to avert a growing humanitarian crisis. Britain was not acting alone in Kosovo, it took part in larger NATO operations. Practices in Kosovo involved diplomatic and military measures. First Britain condemned the practices of both parties committing violence (the KLA and the Serb Security Forces). Second, as violence against the Kosovo Albanians continued Britain along with its NATO allies threatened Slobodan Milosevic with the use of force which the finally employed in the form of air-strikes. These air-strikes targeted the base of operations of the Serb Security forces in an attempt to push Milosevic to negotiate a solution to the situation unfolding.
The case of Germany as referred to above sets itself quite apart from the other two under analysis. In this case it was about developing Germany. It was about rebuilding it entirely in all areas after the devastation resulting from World War Two. It was about protecting the Germans from themselves. Reconstruction in Germany was undertaken in areas such as industry, economy, education, administration. Policies pursued can be understood as protection through development. In the British zone of Germany British personnel were controlling, supervising and giving back power to Germans in a step-by-step process. The policy of control was also accompanied by cooperation between British personnel and Germans. The British never voiced the intention of being “a trustee” for Germany.

All of the above reveals how paternalism existed in all three cases under examination. In revealing its existence the chapter has also demonstrated that British paternalism manifested itself differently in Germany, Malaysia and Kosovo. In part this is due to the specificities of each case and in part due to the context in which they took place. Despite differences, paternalism does make its appearance in all three, which helps to question arguments of historical novelty regarding interventions of the 1990s. In demonstrating the existence of British paternalism during this period the Chapter does not strive to make a causal correlation between British policy and paternalism. British involvement in Germany’s reconstruction, its support for Malaysia’s defence and military intervention in Kosovo did not take place because of British paternalism. In all three cases interests had a role to play in decisions to get involved. In Germany interests revolved around future national and economic interests once Germany would land on its feet. In Malaysia its interests were geostrategic in nature but also referred to peace and security. Finally in Kosovo the national interest was reconceptualised and defined in global terms.

The analysis conducted in this chapter brings forward some important conclusions. The first is that paternalism and all its constitutive elements were a part of Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse during this period. British paternalism was not the cause for interventions and the existence of interests in all three interventions does in no way downplay its existence. Second the chapter has demonstrated that what is
worth fighting for changes (territorial integrity, independence of a nation, human rights, democracy). That is a reality. This has been amply illustrated throughout this chapter. The language employed changes, the means also change (depending on the case). Third, arguments advanced by the empirical literature on humanitarian intervention can be seriously questioned by the existence of British paternalism in all cases analysed. For example, the concept of a common humanity and the argument that the definition of who is human has changed can be put into question. Paternalism as was shown in Chapter 3 relates to unequal relations and is based on making distinctions between “us” and “them”. The fact that the same states intervene in faraway places or nearby and that paternalism is identified in their discourse and practice does not signal a radical change but elements of continuity.
8 British Paternalism in the Twenty-First Century: The Responsibility to Protect and the 2011 NATO-led Intervention Libya

In this chapter I will engage with the literature on the Responsibility to Protect (referred to as R2P or RtoP) with the objective of identifying paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in the twenty-first century. Doing so will enable me to fulfil the second objective of my research, which entails demonstrating continuity in British interventionism from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century.

According to the R2P literature, interventions following the adoption of the R2P principle by the UN General Assembly in 2005 are different when compared to those of the 1990s. This difference is accounted for in normative terms. The R2P is presented as a radically different and new alternative to the humanitarian intervention doctrine, and praised for solving the tension between intervention and sovereignty (Evans, 2008; Bellamy, 2015; Thakur, 2016a). Instead of viewing R2P as an alternative to humanitarian intervention and as heralding a new era for intervention and human protection I will show that it is continuity and not change that best characterises the move from humanitarian intervention to R2P. I will demonstrate that interventionary practice and discourse in this period contains paternalistic elements but also that R2P itself is paternalistic.

Since its adoption by the UN General Assembly in 2005, the R2P has been referred to in 25 resolutions pertaining to cases involving the protection of people from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing (ICRtoP). In addressing the R2P’s normative development, its implementation, its novelty but also its problems the empirical literature has focused on Darfur 2006 (Evans, 2008), Libya 2011 (Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Serrano, 2011; Bellamy and Williams, 2012; Bellamy, 2013; Paris, 2014; Ziegler, 2016a), Kenya 2007 (Luck, 2010), Cote D’Ivoire 2010 (Evans, 2008; Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Serrano, 2011; Evans, Thakur and Pape,
Amongst these Libya is the case employed by the literature to illustrate the R2P’s normative and precedential novelty. There are a few prominent cases of military interventions framed through the R2P and undertaken without the consent of the host state’s government. Libya constitutes such an example. Given that I stand to illustrate that the R2P does not constitute a radical change in a state’s interventionary practice and discourse I will take the case employed by scholars engaging with the R2P.

Further, the case of Libya fulfills another of my requirements, which is that there should be British involvement. In fact Britain was, along with France, very actively involved in pushing for the need of establishing a no-fly zone in Libya, and in the framing of both UNSC resolutions (1970; 1973) that informed the UN’s reaction. Resolution 1970 called for coercive measures short of intervention against the Gaddafi regime such as travel bans, and the freezing of assets (S/RES/1970). Resolution 1973 went one step further, calling for the establishment of a no fly zone and the use of “all necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya (S/RES/1973). Third, because the R2P developed as a result of failings and tensions that occurred during the Kosovo intervention, a case analyzed in the preceding chapter, Libya lends itself as a very good candidate to evaluate change and continuity in interventionary practice and discourse between the 1990s and the 21st century.

I will begin my investigation by first presenting the conceptual tenets of the R2P by focusing on primary documents such as the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and on the 2005 Outcome Document of the World Summit, establishing the international community’s acceptance of R2P. Doing so will enable me to interrogate some of its central principles pertaining to conceptions of sovereignty and the evolution from a right to a responsibility. This will also allow me to show in a first instance that conceptually R2P is itself paternalistic. Additionally, drawing on the critical literature I will interrogate propositions of normative and conceptual novelty advanced by proponents of R2P, which will be tested through my empirical case.
Then, I will move on to the empirical part of the chapter which will attempt not only to identify paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in Libya but also follow on, on the argument that R2P itself is paternalistic. First, I will present current academic interpretations of the NATO Libyan intervention and situate myself in opposition to those arguing that the case is an example of R2P’s precedential novelty. Second, I will provide a background to the case by situating Libya within the wider Arab Spring movement, describing the beginning of hostilities and outlining the UN’s response to Colonel Gaddafi’s violence against the Libyan people. Following this my analysis of the case will centre on the UN’s initial response to Gaddafi’s repression and on the subsequent military intervention undertaken by the UN and NATO. By looking at the initial UN response guided by resolution 1970 and the subsequent military response guided by resolution 1973 while focusing on Britain’s practice and discourse I will identify the intervention’s paternalistic character.

8.1 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): New Norm, New Language?

The concept of the R2P appeared in a 2001 report prepared by an international Commission (ICISS) sponsored by the Canadian government entitled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (Axworthy, 2012). Then in 2005 the R2P was adopted by the UN General Assembly and its members during a World Summit of Heads of State. From that time onwards scholars and policymakers have presented the R2P as a new normative development in dealing with mass atrocities (Thakur and Weiss, 2009; Orford, 2011a; Bellamy, 2015). Many have argued that in introducing the R2P concept ICISS reconciled intervention with sovereignty, thereby ending a decade-long debate on humanitarian interventions (Alex J Bellamy, 2009; Popovski, 2010). Debates on humanitarian intervention during the 1990s were about whether or not there was a right to intervene in other countries for human rights purposes. The issue of what should be done with suffering strangers and the restrictions imposed on intervention due to state sovereignty were addressed from a legal, ethical and political standpoint.
Humanitarian interventions during the 1990s brought to the fore problems and tensions in need of being addressed in cases where interventions took place and in those where there was no response. In particular, Kosovo and Rwanda are often cited by the literature and policy-makers, albeit for different reasons, as the two most problematic cases of humanitarian intervention (Popovski, 2010; Orford, 2011a; Axworthy, 2012; Burke-White, 2012; Thakur, 2016b). In Rwanda the international community’s response was too little and in Kosovo NATO’s actions were debated as to their legality and/or legitimacy since there was no prior Security Council approval (Jennifer M Welsh, 2016). A year after NATO’s Kosovo intervention Secretary General Kofi Annan, in presenting his annual report to the UN General Assembly in 2000, posed the following question: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” (2000 report).

As a response to this plea, the ICISS presented their report, which brought forward a reconceptualization of humanitarian intervention. Within the report its contributors made their objective clear when they stated “We want no more Rwandas, and we believe that the adoption of the proposals in our report is the best way of ensuring that” (ICISS). Ramesh Thakur, one of the authors of the report writing over a decade after its publication, remarked that “R2P was the ICISS answer to reconciling the neuralgic rejection of humanitarian intervention by the Global South with the determination of the North to end atrocities” (2016b, p. 417). It is possible to identify three main contributions of the R2P as enunciated in the ICISS report and adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005.

The first refers to the introduction of new language to talk about humanitarian intervention. ICISS rejected the term “humanitarian intervention” and instead referred to “intervention” or “military intervention” (ICISS). As envisioned by the Commission, the R2P was not about “a right to intervene by one state on the territory of another state” but rather about “a responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001, p. 11). This “responsibility to protect” entails that “sovereign states have a responsibility to
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (ICISS, p. viii).

As a result attention is drawn away from the intervening states to “where it should be most concentrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance” (ICISS, p. 15). Through this move, Hopgood argued, the idea of civilian protection was incorporated as an expectation (2014, p. 183). In addition, for him the idea of sovereignty as responsibility was revolutionary since it established that “the international community had a duty to step in when states failed” (2014, p. 186). Despite giving primary responsibility to the state for the protection of its population, in the end the international community still figures as the savior of victims of atrocity crimes. What is problematic with this re-characterization is that it does not place a legally binding obligation on states to intervene or as Cunliffe notes “there is no identifiable agent formally obligated to act or intervene in a particular situation” (2010, p. 84). Another issue with this formulation is that in the event that the international community will respond militarily then it will usually be the same powerful states who carry out the intervention because as Moses puts it “there are no higher powers” to ensure accountability by states (Moses, 2013, p. 130).

The second contribution of the R2P is that it provided a re-characterization of the concept of sovereignty. Instead of conceptualizing “sovereignty as control” ICISS re-introduced the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility” (ICISS, p. 12) drawing from the work of Francis Deng on Internally Displaced People (Deng, 1996). Sovereignty as responsibility entails three assumptions. First, each state is responsible for protecting the safety of its people. Second, each state is responsible to its own citizens and to the international community. Finally, “the agents of state are accountable for their acts of commission or omission” (ICISS, p. 13). The ability of a state to protect its population judges whether that state can retain fully its sovereign powers (Axworthy, 2012). What this does is to emphasize that sovereignty entails duties and responsibilities. The fact that states are accountable for their actions is a shift from previous guarantees of absolute state immunity (Ziegler, 2016b). It means that sovereignty is not absolute.
Among critics of this reconceptualization of sovereignty, Cunliffe argues that it “pushes states in the realm of paternalism” (2010, p. 81). Because states at the national level are held accountable to the international community states end up having “responsibilities for their people rather than to their people” (2010, p. 81).

The third contribution of the R2P is that prevention is seen as its number one priority. The ICISS report clarifies that the R2P should be understood as encompassing three components: “the responsibility to react, to prevent and to re-build” (ICISS, p. 17). Military intervention is seen as the last resort, a policy to be pursued when all other measures have failed. Apart from narrowing the scope of the R2P to four crimes, namely “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (Outcome Document, par. 138), the Outcome Document of the World Summit where the General Assembly and its member states adopted the principle, incorporates the shift in language from humanitarian intervention to responsibility to protect, the reconceptualization of sovereignty as responsibility and the primacy of prevention.

According to Welsh, the Outcome Document clarifies certain aspects of the R2P further. For example, she argues that “while the R2P directs attention to the plight of individuals suffering from egregious forms of violence and persecution, it does so in a way that respects and strengthens state sovereignty” (2016, p. 5). In contrast, others have criticized how the R2P is understood in the Outcome Document. Many have argued that in an attempt to secure its adoption, the UN General Assembly has sacrificed the concept’s novelty under ICISS (Popovski, 2010; Burke-White, 2011). For example Popovski points to the fact that the concept only applies to previously recognized international crimes (2010). Additionally the Outcome Document does not include the ICISS’s call of restraint towards the P5 in using their veto power. For all the advancements that the concept is seen to make this is quite problematic when military intervention is contemplated. Ultimately the decision to intervene or not resides in the same five powerful countries.

Within the Outcome document, two paragraphs (138 and 139) refer to the R2P. The first relates to the responsibilities of states in terms of protection and prevention and
to the international community’s efforts to help states. The second details the responsibilities of the international community to protect populations collectively through non-coercive and coercive means if necessary. After 2005 the main challenge was to translate the concept of the R2P from words to deeds. In 2009 the Secretary General’s Report “Implementing the R2P” provided a framework for implementing the principle, identifying to those ends a three-pillar strategy. Pillar One addressed the protection responsibilities of the state, Pillar Two the issue of international assistance and capacity building and Pillar Three the timely and decisive response by the international community (p. 7-9).

A major issue highlighted by academics since 2005 has been the contestation of the R2P by many states. The post-2005 revolt against the R2P was according to Bellamy “in large part due to a continued association between humanitarian intervention and the R2P” (Focarelli, 2008; Alex J Bellamy, 2009, p. 111). Russia, China, Algeria, the Philippines and Brazil began questioning the commitment they had made in 2005 (Bellamy, 2009). Algeria made the case that differentiating between humanitarian intervention and the R2P was difficult. Members of the Non-Aligned Movement opposed the R2P because it could be seen as a medium through which great powers could impose their interests and values on weaker states (Focarelli, 2008). Ziegler, writing in 2016, gives a more up-to-date view on this issue by following R2P in practice and argues that contestation by the non-western world still exists despite calls that R2P is an emerging norm (2016a).

The main issue of contestation centred on seeing the R2P as a way of legalizing humanitarian intervention or, as Bellamy put it, “governments saw R2P as a Trojan horse for legitimizing unilateral intervention” (2008, p. 617). In reviewing the for and against positions of member states in the General Assembly and the Security Council Focarelli concluded that “humanitarian intervention implementing the R2P is not only feared as imperialistic by several weak states, but it also fails to find unconditional support even amongst the most powerful states” (2008, p. 209). Bellamy’s solution to remedy the continued association between the two concepts was to propose a need to develop the idea of an R2P continuum, which would encompass a variety of measures.
(2009). However, as will be shown later in the chapter there are issues with the implementation of the R2P acknowledged by both its proponents and critics (Evans, 2016; Ziegler, 2016a). When the concept is translated from words to deeds, especially in relation to military intervention, it is possible to observe continued contestation focusing on the concept’s ability for abuse by powerful states, issues of selectivity, etc (Ziegler, 2016a).

All in all the R2P concept is presented as novel in that it re-conceptualizes humanitarian intervention as R2P by bringing forth a different understanding of sovereignty, guarding against abuse, introducing a multiplicity of methods and tools in dealing with atrocity crimes and directing attention to those in need. Despite the introduction of the R2P and its endorsement by the UN General Assembly and its inclusion in numerous Security Council resolutions, the term humanitarian intervention is still widely employed in the literature (Chesterman, 2011; Kuperman, 2013; Paris, 2014). Does this reflect an enduring continuity between the two concepts? Has the R2P not remedied the issues it was meant to? Are weaker states less likely to be intervened upon?

### 8.2 The R2P: From Words to Deeds

Since the adoption of R2P by the UN General Assembly in 2005, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect has catalogued 62 instances when the R2P has been referred to in Security Council Resolutions (GCforR2P). Examples include resolutions pertaining to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi 2006, South Sudan 2011, Yemen, 2011, Cote D’Ivoire 2011, Libya 2011, Mali 2012, Somalia 2013, 2016, Syria 2014. Prevention was seen as a primary objective of R2P as conceptualized by ICISS and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005. The literature has identified the case of Kenya in 2008 as an example of preventive diplomacy under R2P (Luck, 2010; Bellamy, 2015; Sharma, 2016). However, due to the fact that Pillar III interventions are the most controversial aspect of R2P, academic scholarship has paid particular
attention to Cote D’Ivoire 2011\textsuperscript{24}, Libya 2011 and Syria since 2011. Academic engagement with these three cases revolves around addressing R2P’s normative development, its implementation, tensions and issues of R2P in action or inaction.

Both the cases of Libya and Cote D’Ivoire have been described as the only instances of military action authorized by the UNSC (Evans, Thakur and Pape, 2013; Paris, 2014) and as indicating R2P’s normative development (Serrano, 2011, Bellamy and Williams, 2011). For Serrano, the UNSC’s swift response to both cases displayed a shift in actions undertaken by the Council in regards to mass atrocities (2011). For Bellamy and Williams these two cases were indicative of “a new politics of protection” (2011, p. 826). Despite both cases being examples of coercive force under R2P, Libya is that which has been most extensively studied and debated. The overt scholarly focus on Libya rests on a number of factors. First, Libya has brought forth most issues and tensions when military action is undertaken under R2P (Dunne and Gelber, 2014; Thakur, 2016b). Second, it has attracted attention because of its consequences on the norm itself and on responses or rather the lack thereof, to atrocity crimes following it, such as in Syria.

One of the topics surrounding academic engagement with the intervention in Libya revolves around whether it should be interpreted as signalling a model for implementing R2P or an exception. Opinions regarding this have been somewhat mixed. At the time of the intervention in Libya, R2P proponents Thakur and Evans described it as “a textbook case for coercive military intervention” indicating the manner in which intervention regarding mass atrocities should work (Evans, Thakur, Pape, 2013, p. 205). In opposition, Richard Falk argued against viewing Libya as a precedent and cautioned that “its repetition should be avoided” (2011, para. 6). Since then, the debate on this issue has resulted in a unanimous agreement between proponents and critics, establishing Libya as an exception rather than a model for intervention (Bellamy, 2011; Hehir, 2013; Thakur, Evans, Pape, 2013; Engelbrekt, Mohlin and Wagnsson, 2014).

\textsuperscript{24} Post-election violence in 2010 resulted in a civil war (Charles Hunt, 2016).
For those addressing R2P’s normative development, both resolutions (1970 and 1973) passed by the Security Council on Libya are of major significance, particularly UNSC resolution 1973 which has been described as “the first of its kind” (Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Paris, 2014; Doyle, 2015). Resolution 1973 authorised UN member states to “take all necessary measures” in order to protect civilians and to enforce the no-fly zone established in Libya (S/RES/1973). In reviewing R2P’s normative development 10 years on, Bellamy refers to resolution 1970/1973 on Libya and resolution 1975 on Cote D’Ivoire as “landmark resolutions” embodying change and bringing about “a politics of protection” (2015, p. 165).

A number of scholars pointed to the fact that resolution 1973 marked the first time that the UNSC approved using force for human protection against the will of a government (Bellamy, 2011; Williams, 2011). Bellamy and Williams argued that despite “the use of all necessary means” being authorized by the UNSC in respect to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Cote D’Ivoire not long before Libya, those cases involved Blue Helmet operations which take place with the consent of respective governments (Bellamy and Williams, 2012). Consequently, resolution 1973 exemplified that the Council entered into new political terrain (Bellamy and Williams, 2012). This contention has not remained unchallenged by critics.

Without downplaying the normative significance of the R2P concept in general, Chesterman assessed the legal significance of the resolution. By citing the cases of Somalia 1992 and Srebrenica 1993 where the Council authorized “the use of all necessary means” so as to provide conditions for humanitarian relief and the setting up of safe havens, he concludes that resolution 1973 was not legally significant (2011, p. 279). Further, Hehir cites the case of Southern Rhodesia of 1965 in an attempt to downplay the precedent value of the resolution by its proponents, while at the same time guarding against exaggeration (2013a). Aside from its normative significance the resolution has also been subject to criticism regarding the wording used. Falk warned that the phrase “use of all necessary means” in Libya is vague enough as to allow “room for manoeuvring by Western states” (2011). Falk makes a valid point; however,
this is an issue which applies to most military interventions authorized by the UNSC throughout the years, and constitutes part of the standard wording employed.

The influence of the R2P in relation to decision-making and UN’s response on Libya has also been the subject of academic discussion. For some, the R2P played an important role in bringing about the Council’s decision to authorize the use of force. For Serrano the R2P was “a key ingredient” in bringing about a decisive and timely response (Serrano, 2011, p. 93). While emphasizing that UN officials framed the response in Libya in R2P terms from the very beginning, Bellamy and Williams follow scholars who acknowledge that a number of other factors such as regional consensus and Gaddafi’s international standing also influenced UN decision-making (2012; Dunne and Gelber, 2014). For others like Hehir, however, R2P’s influence was minimal in bringing about a coercive response. He points to the fact that in both resolutions the term R2P figures once and that presidential speeches by David Cameron and Barak Obama on Libya made no mention of R2P (2016).

Further, the interventions in Libya and Cote D’Ivoire and the lack of response in Syria have called for a crucial re-assessment of the R2P and its Third Pillar. Academics have presented the problems resulting from these cases and the tensions exhibited by Libya specifically and its repercussions for the future of R2P. Issues of implementation have been acknowledged by both proponents and critics of the concept (Serrano, 2011; Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Doyle, 2015; Welsh, 2016; Thakur, 2016). Serrano (2011) and Bellamy and Williams (2011) identify both Cote D’Ivoire and Libya as cases demonstrating the need for more implementation in regards to R2P. In relation to Libya, Doyle (2015) lists the lack of clarity in invoking Pillar III and the lack of clear guidelines in managing the intervention as problems exposed by the case. Evans (2015, p. 16) has characterised Libya and Syria as constituting a “mid-life” crisis for R2P.

Critical appraisals of Libya identify tensions and issues characteristic of Pillar III responses. While addressing the operation and aftermath of the intervention, Paris introduces what he terms “the structural problems” of “preventive humanitarian
intervention” (2014). He identifies 4 structural problems: “the mixed motive problem, counterfactual problem, conspicuous harm problem and inconsistency problem” (2014, p. 570). In fact, the inconsistency problem has also been identified by Hehir (Hehir, 2013a), Hopgood (2014) and Holmes (2014) referring to the inconsistency in international responses to atrocity crimes. Both Hopgood and Holmes illustrate this through the cases of Darfur 2003 and Sri Lanka 2009 where the UN did not intervene under R2P (2014, 2014). Through the examination of these cases Hopgood concludes that “we must not expect an intervention where vital stakes or conflicting interests are at stake” (2014, p. 181).

This is in line with fears expressed by UN member states regarding the abuse of the norm by powerful states. Ziegler has presented the BRICS’s (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) resistance to R2P as rooted in the recognition that Western powers have frequently been inconsistent in promoting R2P norms (2016b). The latter is also relevant to another problem that has resulted from the intervention in Libya, which relates to the mandate being extended beyond the protection of civilians to include regime change. Soon after the intervention scholars acknowledged that the extension of the mandate brought forth questions relating to the relationship between regime change and the R2P (Serrano, 2011; Williams and Bellamy, 2011; Falk, 2011). Indeed, it has been argued that it has had an impact on the UN’s response in Syria 2011 and on the R2P more generally (Kuperman, 2013; Paris, 2014; Welsh, 2016).

In reviewing how contemporary academic and non-academic scholarship interprets the case of Libya, it is important to acknowledge those contributing an interpretation which distinguishes them from the conventional narrative of events adhered to by most. Kuperman’s article “A model humanitarian intervention?: Reassessing NATO’s Libyan Campaign” constitutes such an example. He questions whether Gaddafi targeted unarmed civilians, whether NATO’s primary goal was to protect civilians and finally he addresses how the situation would have unfolded had NATO not intervened (2013). Another more recent example is Fabrice Arfi’s book entitled *Avec les compliments du guide*, exploring the French story behind the intervention, focusing on
the relationship between the then French president Nicolas Sarkozy and Gaddafi (2017).

All in all, the above has shown that the most problematic and highly criticised aspect of the R2P, by UN member states and academics, is Pillar III and coercive force\(^\text{25}\). Critical appraisals of the case of Libya reveal important issues with the R2P in practice such as inconsistency, mixed motives, double standards. These have led UN member states to be wary of R2P’s Pillar III, seen as a way through which powerful states can exert their influence and use the concept as they see fit. In commenting on the apprehension of some UN members to the R2P, Doyle states that “the only response is to acknowledge that the world remains un-equal, and that R2P cannot itself correct that” (2015, p. 140). His argument reinforces my own in arguing for the existence of continuity in interventionary practice and discourse.

Indeed the international system remains hierarchical and unequal. In saying this, however, it is crucial to point to the recent increasing influence of the BRICS in the UNSC and on responses to mass atrocities. My interpretation of the case of Libya follows those critical of the R2P such as Paris, Kuperman, Hehir, Cunliffe and Falk. In fact Paris, in presenting the structural problems of R2P points to the fact that they pertain to tensions in the “strategic logic” of preventive humanitarian interventions (2014, p. 570). As such this could help draw a continuing line between military interventions since the nineteenth century. Additionally, my objective in this chapter could be seen as building on criticisms that identify a certain relationship between R2P and paternalism (Cunliffe, 2010, 2016, 2017; Falk, 2011).

In response to the “triumphant spirit” evident in Western elite circles at the time of the intervention in Libya, Falk argued that “there is a heavy dose of implicit paternalism, condescension, and passé consciousness present if the West is to be identified as the best hope for the future because it managed to pull off this Libyan intervention” (2011). His observation gives particular weight to the argument I advance in this

\(^{25}\) Also termed ‘preventive humanitarian intervention’ (Paris, 2014); humanitarian intervention; military intervention.
chapter consistent with that of my research project. By engaging with the case of Libya I aim to identify paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in the twenty-first century.

The concept itself and criticisms levelled against it when implemented suggest that paternalism will be present in the case of Libya and reflect not a new but rather an older way of talking about intervention and of responding to it. As far as the concept itself is concerned the terms protection and responsibility have been previously identified in Chapter 3 as constituting two characteristic elements of my conceptualization of paternalism. The remaining part of this chapter will primarily engage with Libya and, when needed, reference will be made to other R2P cases.

8.2.1 Background to the Intervention

During February 2011 anti-government demonstrations took place in Libya influenced by the Arab Spring movement, which originated in Tunisia in 2010, and spread to Egypt, Bahrain and Syria (Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Paris, 2014). The objective of demonstrators in Libya was to call for democratic elections and a new government, thus ending Gaddafi’s forty-year rule (Garland, 2012). The peaceful demonstrations which began on 15 February in the city of Benghazi quickly spread to other cities around the country. Two days later the Gaddafi government responded to these demonstrations through the use of force but also by blocking communications (Engelbrekt, Mohlin and Wagnsson, 2014). From that point onwards the situation turned into a violent conflict between Gaddafi’s security forces and the Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC also referred to as NTC or TNC), an armed opposition group formed on February 27th based in Benghazi and composed of civilians, teachers, students and professional soldiers who defected from the government’s army and wished to see Gaddafi removed from power (Garland, 2012).

The demonstrations in Benghazi and in other cities all around Libya and Gaddafi’s efforts to forcefully suppress them since February 17th attracted the attention of various international actors. Most states and regional organizations condemned Gaddafi’s
actions against civilians. On February 22 the UNSC issued a statement condemning the violence and use of force and urging the Libyan government “to meet its responsibility to protect its population” (SC/10180). Similarly, on February 25 the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution relating to the human rights situation in Libya, acknowledging the deaths of hundreds of civilians, condemning “the recent gross and systematic human rights violations committed in Libya” and requesting that the government meet “its responsibility to protect its population” (A/HRC/RES/S-15/1). The regime’s actions were also condemned by regional organizations such as the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the EU.

On the 26th of February the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1970 condemning the “widespread and systematic attacks in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” against civilians, noting that they “may amount to crimes against humanity” (S/RES/1970). The resolution made use of R2P language by “re-calling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population” (S/RES/1970). Through this resolution the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and called on member states to effectuate an arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset freeze of people associated with the Gaddafi regime (S/RES/1970). The conflict between Gaddafi’s forces and the rebel opposition continued.

Gaddafi had managed to regain control of parts of the country the rebels had acquired and in mid-March he moved towards the city of Benghazi in order to put an end to the rebellion (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). In his first report, the ICC’s prosecutor presented estimates of 500-700 deaths for February alone and a total of more than a thousand since the beginning of violence (Report ICC). On March 1st the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 140,000 people had fled Libya since the beginning of hostilities (UNHCR 1 March 2011). From a reluctance to interfere keeping a cautious stance towards events in Libya, the UK and France led calls for a no fly-zone during March and with Lebanon drafted a resolution submitted for review to the UNSC.
It is crucial to point out at this point that both governments previously entertained good economic relations with Gaddafi. In fact, Britain had in 2009 sold 21.7 million pounds worth in defence equipment to the Gaddafi regime (Davidson, 2013). Their draft resolution was approached with considerable caution by the US and opposed by Germany (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). Regional organizations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Conferences and the African Union voiced support for the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya (Hehir, 2013b; Tocci, 2016). On March 9 the leader of the NTC Mustafa Abdul Jalil called for a need to establish a no-fly zone so as to prevent further casualties (Garland, 2012). On March 17th the UNSC passed resolution 1973, which restated “the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population” and demanded an immediate ceasefire (S/RES/1973).

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the resolution permitted member states to use “all necessary measures” to protect civilians and civilian populated areas and to enforce the no-fly zone policy (S/RES/1973). While resolution 1970 was passed unanimously, resolution 1973 passed with ten votes in favour and five abstentions from Russia, India, Germany, China and Brazil, who favoured a peaceful resolution of the conflict (SC/10200). During discussions that took place following the vote, representatives of countries that supported the resolution based their position on two points. The first stressed that Gaddafi did not abide by resolution 1970 and the second pointed to upcoming violence on civilians as Gaddafi’s forces moved to recapture territories held by the opposition. Representatives agreed that the protection of civilians was the only objective (SC/10200).

The day after the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, Gaddafi called for a cease-fire. In reality, however, the fighting never stopped in Mistrata and Adjabiya and Gaddafi’s forces were approaching Benghazi (Garland, 2012). On 19 March the military intervention in Libya began by a coalition of countries in an effort to implement the mandate of UNSCR 1973 (Garland, 2012). On 25 March NATO took over the command of the military intervention under the codename Operation Unified Protector. Its task remained to enforce the no-fly-zone and protect the civilian
population using “all necessary means”. The operation targeted pro-regime forces, their military installations and air defence systems. In relation to the R2P continuum the military intervention fell under Pillar III (coercive responses).

During the conflict in Libya, the face of the opposition, the NTC, formed an interim government on March 23. It was recognised as the legitimate authority and representative of the Libyan people by a number of countries such as France, the US, the UK and Qatar (Tocci, 2016) and support to the Council was given by Italy, Portugal, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the EU (Garland, 2012). Aside granting recognition to the NTC, states also aided the rebels in various ways. As reported by the Washington Post in April 2011 the US and its allies (France, UK, Italy) sent assistance and military advisers to the opposition (Washington Post April 20). Finally the conflict came to an end in October when Muammar Gaddafi was killed and the NTC took power (Hehir, 2013).

8.2.2 Responding to Libya: Britain’s Interventionary Practice and Discourse, R2P and Paternalism

Having provided a background to NATO’s involvement in Libya, this section will look at the intervention focusing specifically on Britain’s involvement in terms of discourse and practice. How did British politicians, parliamentarians and the media frame the intervention in Libya? How did the British public react to events unfolding in Libya and to the use of force? What practices did Britain along with other UN members undertake? What was the professed intent behind the freezing of assets, travel bans and the military campaign? What classificatory mechanisms were at play? What was Britain’s role and how was she represented through British discourse? These questions provide a gateway to the identification of paternalism in Britain’s involvement in the NATO intervention in Libya despite arguments of normative novelty articulated by politicians and academics in light of the use of R2P terminology.

Let us first address the nature of practices initiated in Libya. In reviewing the nature of practices in Libya it becomes apparent that paternalism existed but it was not as
pronounced as in other cases examined. It is in British discourses and representations that paternalism manifests itself most evidently. In the case of Libya, British practices were not about protecting the people from themselves, nor about teaching them the British way of life and culture or pointing them towards the right path in terms of cultural, economic, governmental development. British practices in Libya fell in two categories: military and diplomatic. In regards to the military aspect of the policy pursuant to UNSCR 1973, Britain contributed through ELLAMY. The latter was the codename given to the British military effort engaged in both air and sea operations.

The military campaign undertaken by a coalition of states, led by Britain, France and the US focused on striking military targets. The Royal Air Force (RAF) was involved in strike attacks against Gaddafi’s security forces and key Libyan installations (RAF). Specifically, RAF Tornado GR4s were used to strike tanks, armoured vehicles and ammunition bunkers (MOD 28 March). Sea operations included the deployment of frigates such as HMS Cumberland and HMS Westminster and the launching of Tomahawk missiles from a submarine (Telegraph 19 March 2011). The objective of these operations was the protection of the population. Indeed, the air attack on March 19 prevented Gaddafi’s forces from entering Benghazi and hence ensured the physical safety of the Libyan people in Benghazi.

In the diplomatic sphere Britain undertook a number of initiatives towards the NTC, the opposition to Gaddafi’s reign. It is here that the paternalistic nature of practices becomes more visible. Britain through its diplomatic missions to Libya and to the NTC was providing help, which took two forms, one related to material and the other to practical assistance. Material assistance involved the supply of non-lethal equipment to the rebels such as telecommunication equipment and body armour. The British procured the civilian police force with body armour, police uniforms, high visibility vests and t-shirts, and communication equipment. According to Mr Hague this material help was going to enable “the NTC develop responsible security forces and to protect civilians” (HC Deb June 7 2011, c32).
Practical support was offered through diplomatic missions constituted by diplomats and military advisers by a number of countries including Britain. In April, a British military liaison team was sent to Libya. British military officers provided the rebels with help and advice on how to set up a command and control structure (Kuperman, 2013). It was about enabling them to better themselves in terms of organization, in order to be in a better position against Gaddafi’s security forces. That the rebels needed all the help they could get was acknowledged a number of times in parliamentary discussions. They were seen as disorganized. Although Britain did not send ground troops or train the rebels in order to ameliorate their fighting skills, they did offer help and advice. Britain was indirectly involved in the rebels’ fight against Gaddafi.

Further Britain was part of a multinational coalition of experts sent to Benghazi in order to carry out a stabilization assessment for the immediate post-Gaddafi Libya. According to Hague “this support has been requested by the NTC and will help them ensure that they administer territory under their control to international standards and to protect the aspirations of the Libyan people” (FCO 13 May). The military campaign undertaken by the coalition of states and the diplomatic missions sent to make contact with the NTC and provide assistance fall into my conceptual framework defining a paternalistic practice. As I have argued in Chapter 3, a paternalistic practice may or may not involve coercion. A country may accept an intervention in its territory by another country, because it has already internalized the paternalistic relationship as normal.

In the case of Libya, the intervention was undertaken without the consent of the Gaddafi regime. As a result, the intervention is characterised by coercion, seen by the majority working on paternalism as defining a paternalistic practice. However, the intervention in Libya also demonstrates that it was subject to a legitimation of authority. The international community argued that the Gaddafi regime had lost all legitimacy. From March onwards, many states accepted the NTC as a legitimate authority representing the wishes of the Libyan people. Although the NTC was not acting as the government of Libya, its position as the representative of the people is relevant in this discussion. The NTC sought the UN’s help. It called on the
international community to “fulfil its responsibility to protect without any direct military intervention on Libyan soil” (cited in Garland, p. 121). According to this, the NTC recognised that it needed help by the international community, accepting the paternalistic relationship as normal.

British discourses and representations are more revelatory as to paternalism’s manifestation in Libya. Benevolence, one of paternalism’s defining components, can be identified by looking at the way in which intent was justified in discourse. The freezing of assets of the Gaddafi regime and anyone associated with it as well as travel bans imposed as a result of resolution 1970 were justified as being for the benefit of the Libyan people. In his statement to the House of Commons on February 28 the Prime Minister stated that “we should be clear that for the future of Libya and its people, Colonel Gaddafi’s regime must end and he must leave. To that end, we are taking every possible step to isolate the Gaddafi regime, to deprive it of money, to shrink its power and to ensure that anyone responsible for abuses in Libya will be held to account” (HC Deb 28 February 2011, c24).

Similarly, Hague, speaking to the BBC on February 27, said that “of course it is time for Colonel Gaddafi to go, that is the best hope for Libya” (BBC). A month later, Hague reiterated his argument stressing that Gaddafi had to be removed because “the Libyan people must be able to have a more representative government and determine their own future” (MOD 18 March). Further, justifications regarding resolution 1973 voiced in Parliament are equally interesting, demonstrating that the invocation of the R2P principle in the Libyan case did not remove the need to justify interventionary practices. The need to gain legitimacy for military intervention remained.

In a Commons debate dealing with resolution 1973, Edward Miliband, MP for Doncaster North and Leader of the Labour Party from 2010 to 2015, enumerated the tests to be satisfied to ensure the legitimacy of an intervention under R2P: right intentions, last resort and proportionality. In regards to the test of right intentions he argued that “our intentions are right: we are acting to protect the Libyan people, to save lives, and to prevent the Gaddafi regime from committing serious crimes against
humanity” (HC Debate 21 March 2011, c716). This is an example of a more general trend observed in British discourses on Libya, justifying the intervention as undertaken for the Libyan people and more specifically for their protection.

During the course of the same debate David Cameron made explicit that the military action which commenced on March 19 “was about protecting civilians, protecting life, and giving the Libyan people a chance to determine their own future” (HC Debate 21 March 2011, c704). Likewise, the Ministry of Defense Dr Fox speaking on Sky News about the coalition activity in Libya stated that “The UN Resolution is very clear that what we are about is protecting the civilian population. It was very clear that the regime was going to attack Benghazi, a city of a million people. We are protecting them from that particular fate” (MOD 28 March).

The intent of protecting the people of Libya was also articulated in parliamentary debates and beyond on the issue of contingency planning in the form of a no-fly-zone preceding resolution 1973. Speaking to the BBC on this issue, UK Defence Secretary Fox argued that “if it were to be carried out it would be for the protection of the civilian population, yes” (MOD 10 March). Reiterating this argument, Cameron stated during a Commons debate that “I am very clear that a no-fly zone is something that we should consider, because it may help to stop atrocities being committed against people who want a more democratic future” (HC Deb 14 March 2011, c32).

Looking back on the decision to implement a no-fly zone in Libya Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws expressed the logic behind her decision saying that “I supported the creation of the no-fly zone in Libya, feeling that it was absolutely for the right reasons: we have to step in to prevent the killing of innocent civilians” (HL Deb April 1 2011, c1472). Apart from establishing the benevolent intent of practices by invoking the protection of the population and the prevention of harm, the above also brings forth something very interesting pertaining to practices of representation and identification. The Libyan people were depicted as victims seen as unable to swiftly respond to what was being done to them by the Gaddafi regime. Such representations enabled and fuelled calls to action.

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This point is further accentuated in Cameron’s argument urging for the need to continue pushing for the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya. In making his case in the House of Commons he asserted that “Every day, Gaddafi is brutalising his own people. Time is of the essence and there should be no let-up in the pressure we put on this regime” (HC Deb 14 March 2011, c27). Further, the Libyans were described as “defenceless”, as “being under threat” and were presented as “suffering” (HC Deb 21 March 2011, c715; HL Deb 1 April 2011 c1454; HC Deb 5 April 2011, c921).

The imperative to act, the need to take swift action to protect the Libyan people was established by arguments of demonstrable need. This rested on a negative representation of both the Libyan people and of the Gaddafi regime and his security forces. A good example of this is Lord Stirrup’s statement to the Lords where he argued that ‘those civilians need protection because they are under threat from Gaddafi’ (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1454). While the military intervention was underway Mr Mitchell stated that ‘As I speak, the people of Libya continue to suffer at the hands of Gaddafi’s troops. In Misrata, fighting continues. Although accurate information is hard to obtain, there are reports that up to 200 deaths have occurred in the past week and that hundreds more people have been injured’ (HC Deb 5 April 2011, c921). Although both the Libyan people and Gaddafi’s regime were represented in British eyes in a negative manner, distinctions were made. The Libyans were negatively represented because of what they were going through, they were seen as the victims of the regime. The Gaddafi regime and his security forces were seen as constituting the number one threat to the people of Libya. As a result, the British and the international community had to intervene.

There is something interesting and peculiar in the way in which British discourses justified action in Libya. As demonstrated above, the need for contingency planning in the form of a no-fly zone, the sanctions imposed and military action were intended to protect and benefit the Libyan people. However, discourses also bring to light how actions pursued in Libya were based on a dual objective. Actions were justified as being for the benefit of the Libyan people and for the benefit of Britain and Europe. This was clearly articulated in Cameron’s response to those parliamentarians
questioning the need for contingency planning during a debate on February 28. He stated that “what we want—I would argue it is in our interest and in that of the whole world, including the Libyan people—is the swift removal of Colonel Gaddafi from his position” (HC Deb 28 February 2011, c34).

A month later he expanded on this by asking “do we want a situation where a failed pariah state festers on Europe’s southern border, potentially threatening our security, pushing people across the Mediterranean and creating a more dangerous and uncertain world for Britain and for our allies as well for the people of Libya?” (HC Deb 14 March 2011, c27). This duality of intent was also present in discourses pertaining to military action in Libya. In his interview on BBC Radio 5 on March 20 Hague explained the logic behind the intervention stating that “First of all people were being slaughtered by the Gaddafi regime, they were appealing for help, the Arab League unanimously appealed for a resolution and a no fly zone and it’s in our national interests to do so because, a Libya wholly dominated by a Gaddafi regime that had become a pariah state could be a source of extremism and terrorism on the southern boundaries of Europe for some time to come” (FCO 20 March). Accordingly, concerns regarding British and European interests centred on terrorism and immigration.

What becomes visible from this is that justifications for action in Libya were presented as a win-win situation. By intervening Britain and the international community would avert mass atrocity crimes and at the same time guarantee their common national interests. The presence of a dual intent in British discourse does not in itself indicate paternalism’s absence. It does however call for a need to interrogate this further. Why is it that at a time when the international community embraces the R2P establishing paternalism normatively, Britain at least domestically justifies the intervention through a win-win strategy? The manner in which British domestic justifications were articulated in regards to Libya needs to be seen in a wider perspective relating to Britain’s past interventionary practices.

A look at British discourses exemplifies a link between Iraq and the uneasiness voiced in Parliament towards involvement in Libya. Parliamentarians first voiced concerns
about Britain’s role in leading contingency planning calling for the establishment of a no-fly zone. During a Commons debate on March 14 the Prime Minister attempted to ease those concerns by distinguishing between Libya and past experiences. He argued that “what we are seeing in Libya is different. It is an uprising of a people against a leader, and it is quite different. No one is talking about invasions, boots on the ground and the rest of it” (HC Deb 14 March 2011, c30).

During the same debate Cameron responded to concerns voiced by a member regarding the possibility of being drawn into another war of attrition in the Middle East with the following:

Let me try to reassure my hon. Friend, and through him people who are concerned about this matter. There is no intention to get involved in another war or to see an invasion or massive amounts of ground troops. That is not what is being looked at. What is being looked at is how we can tighten the pressure on an unacceptable, illegitimate regime to give that country some chance of peaceful transition. We would let down ourselves and the Libyan people if we did nothing and said that it was all too difficult. (HC Deb 14 March 2011, c37)

The tendency to draw a line of differentiation between Iraq and Libya in order to ease opposition in Parliament can be observed during debates that took place while the military intervention was underway. Here Cameron stated that Libya “is different from Iraq. This is not going into a country and knocking over its Government, and then owning and being responsible for everything that happens subsequently. This is about protecting people and giving the Libyan people a chance to shape their own destiny” (HC Deb 21 March 2011 c710). Equally, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen said “we are clear that Libya is in no sense a repeat of Iraq. Our role in Libya is primarily the protection of civilians” (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1148).

Additionally it could be argued that the need to justify intervention in Libya as being for the dual benefit of the Libyan people, Britain and Europe stems from the fact that R2P does not suffice to rally support domestically. This could be seen as a result of
public fatigue and a decreased willingness by Parliamentarians to support further British military interventions. On this Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con) argued that “After two interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the British public have not the slightest appetite for getting involved militarily in a third Muslim country” (HC Debate 7 March 2011, c654). Similarly David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab) remarked that “there seems to be in the House and certainly in the country at large—and I believe it is the right attitude to take—no appetite for military intervention in Libya” (HC Deb 7 March 2011, c653). While Britain was debating action in Libya, British troops were still stationed in Afghanistan and although most British forces withdrew from Iraq in 2009, the British Navy had just completed the task of training local troops.

Despite opposition to British involvement in Libya in the domestic realm, public fatigue and the shadow left by Iraq and Afghanistan, the British government’s policy on Libya was backed by Parliament and by the British public. On 2 March MPs voted in favour of employing force in order to enforce UNSCR 1973 and in favour of British involvement in the operations. The vote was 557 in favour and 13 against (FCO 22 March). According to an opinion poll of the Financial Times/Harris conducted between March and April 37% of those asked supported the intervention, 36% were against and 28% remained neutral (Clements, 2013). Although this opinion poll does not reflect an overwhelming majority supporting military intervention, on the whole opinion polls conducted during the Libya campaign reflect these results. The difference between those for and those against was minimal. In Britain the intervention has been broadly supported, though it has also provoked strong opposition from a minority including former MP George Galloway and MPs Jeremy Corbyn and Caroline Lucas (Garland, 2012, p. 28).

In assessing the existence of British paternalism in the R2P case that is Libya, it is informative to look at justifications offered in British discourse revealing British obligation/duty/responsibility. This involves looking at strategies of classification and the ways in which the self and the other are represented. How does the framing of the case in R2P terms impact or not the identification of this element present in all
previous cases of British interventionary practice and discourse analysed? What has changed? To begin with, both terms, duty and responsibility, figure in British discourse as a result of invoking the R2P principle in the case of Libya. What this means is that the British sense of duty and responsibility towards the Libyan people stemmed in part from the presence of the principle itself.

This point is illustrated by arguments conveyed in a Lords debate in April on Libya. Baroness Falkner of Margravine stated that

> now, in Libya, we have put into practice the principle that every individual state has the responsibility to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Where a state falls down on this responsibility, the rest of us will move to afford that protection within the framework of the United Nations, and it is right that we should do so. (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1451)

Following the same line of argument Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws declared that

> the principle is simple. It is that we have a responsibility to protect our citizens from killing and ethnic cleansing, but we also have a responsibility to others. If a country is unwilling or unable to do so, or if the Government of a country are in fact the perpetrator of the violence, the international community has a duty to launch a military intervention (emphasis added, HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1472).

The fact that Libya was seen as a case where R2P was applicable brought in discussions of international and British responsibility and duty. Additionally, Baroness Kennedy of the Shaw’s explanation of the principle brings forth another interesting point. The last part of her argument highlighted in bold is not explicitly stated in the 2005 Outcome document relating to the R2P. It can be seen as a way through which to justify the need for military intervention by by-passing the theoretical premises of the principle. Within this phrase paternalistic elements are present.
This can be further demonstrated by looking at parliamentary debates dealing with resolution 1973 and the military intervention in Libya. For instance in discussing resolution 1973 Miliband stated that “the resolution is about our responsibility to protect the Libyan people – no more no less” (HC Deb 21 March 2011, c718-22). In presenting his position in this debate he stated that “a debate is often conducted about rights to intervene, but this debate is about not rights but responsibilities” (HC Deb 21 March 2011, c716). In line with this, Malcolm Bruce (Gordon) (LD) voiced that “it is important to explain clearly not only to the British people but to the wider international public that the responsibility to protect means just that. It does not involve a right or a permission; it is actually a duty to engage in a situation such as this” (HC Deb 5 April 2011, c936). Through these, emphasis was put on the fact that Libya was to be discussed in terms of a responsibility and not a right. What becomes visible here is how the invocation of the R2P imposes the language of responsibility and duty, it permits a certain narrative to develop which, as the following will demonstrate, is imbued with an older British paternalistic attitude.

Aside from discussing British responsibility through the R2P principle directly, Parliamentarians also spoke of a collective responsibility and global duty. A good illustration of this is the argument put forth by Lord Howell of Guilford, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, regarding the enforcement of the no-fly zone and aerial bombardments. For him these actions showed as he said that “we are doing our full bit, and more than our bit, in carrying out a global duty” (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1444). For Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister, Libya evoked not a global duty but a collective responsibility. In his speech at Chapultepec in Mexico City he contrasted Iraq with Libya arguing that “the action being taken in Libya today is right. It would be a terrible tragedy if the mistakes of Iraq led to a retreat from the principle of liberal interventionism, from the principle that we have a collective responsibility to support freedom and protect human rights around the world” (FCO 29 March).

This brings forward a link between British feelings of responsibility and duty and representations of a British role in the world. Aside from that, the use of the principle
Liberal interventionism is quite interesting at a time when a new principle, the R2P is that which is seen to apply to Libya. Why? Well, simply because the R2P theoretically was developed in an attempt to move away from concepts and principles which gave primacy to Western states and created a dichotomy between the Liberal West and Illiberal other which needs help. Oddly enough, although Cameron discussed Libya as an R2P case and along with Sarkozy pushed for both UNSC resolutions to be adopted, on September 5 during a Commons debate he characterized the intervention as a “practical, liberal, Conservative intervention” adding that “it is a way of thinking” (HC Deb 5 September 2011, c35).

This link is also made visible in a Lords debate in April by Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws, who, supporting action in Libya, argued that “there are times when we have to act. If human rights have any meaning at all, we have a duty to safeguard the humanity of people around the world” (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1472). While putting an accent on democracy as a basis for a British moral obligation Hague voiced that “Britain has a moral obligation to assist those who seek the democratic privileges that we enjoy in this country” (The Telegraph 18 March, 2011). Accordingly Britain, along with the other members of the international community, was seen as the guarantor, the protector of human rights, democracy and of the people and therefore had no choice but to take decisive action in Libya.

Britain’s role as the protector of people and as espousing a sense of duty and responsibility was also seen as a result of Gaddafi’s actions. It could be said that Gaddafi’s actions fueled the British sense of duty. According to Ms Harman “Gaddafi’s attacks on, and threats to, his own people, and particularly his threat to show no mercy to Benghazi, imposed a clear duty to prevent the slaughter of innocent people, and we support that action” (HC Deb 5 April 2011, c928). A similar argument was made by Baroness Falkner of Margravine. In supporting the government’s plan to propose the establishment of a no-fly zone she stated that “we know from the barbarous nature of his regime that we may well have to intervene on the responsibility to protect to take those minimal measures implied in a no-fly zone” (HL Deb 28 February 2011, c842). Again the idea of having no choice but to act resurfaces here.
Given that Britain presented herself in this role she could not remain a bystander. It is important to again highlight the power of representational practices. As I discussed earlier, the need to take action and British duty were based on representing Gaddafi as “the threat”.

Britain’s role as guarantor and protector of people’s rights, freedom and democracy did not end with Libya. In fact it is possible to observe how it was seen as applicable to the wider context of the Arab Spring. In respect to the situation in the Middle East and North Africa Cameron argued that “what is happening in the wider Middle East is one of those once-in-a-generation opportunities—a moment when history turns a page. The next page may not be written, and it falls to us to seize this chance to fashion a better future for the region, to build a better relationship between our peoples, and to make a new start” (HC Deb 28 February 2011, c26). Likewise, Hague argued that “it is vital for the people of these countries and the rest of the world that the international community play a coherent and ambitious role in supporting their aspirations. The British government are deeply committed to that endeavor” (HC Deb 7 March 2011, c645).

Most revelatory as to Britain’s role as facilitator for democracy is Lord Soley’s statement in the Lords where he argued that

> we should look at this as a process where our role is to encourage and promote, without being embarrassed about it, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. These are not just western concepts. Many societies throughout history and around the world have shown these attributes; they might not have used the same words or the same structures, but that is what they have done. There is bound to be a natural desire for freedom in people, and we need to stand up and speak for it. (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1478)

According to this, Britain becomes the spokesperson for all those people who wish to turn to democracy. Since they have had it for a long time this in a sense gives them a certain know-how and the ability to play a role in assisting the people of this region to attain their goal.
Despite the fact that the British believed they had a role to play in the wider Middle East and North Africa in respect to democracy and freedom they only intervened militarily in Libya. Human rights violations were also taking place in other countries in the region. However, Britain did not follow the same line of action as it did in Libya. Was it a lack of ability or willingness which precluded responses such as the one in Libya to extend to other countries in the region? The government’s official position regarding inaction outside Libya was expressed by the Prime Minister in various debates in both Houses of Parliament in the following way: “the fact that you cannot do the right thing everywhere does not mean that you should not do the right thing somewhere” (HC Deb 18 March 2011, c619). A variation of this was also articulated in discussions relating to the situation in Syria. Hague argued that “we will always do what we can to protect people’s freedom of expression, but of course we are not universally able to do so in every country of the world” (HC Deb 07 June 2011, c38).

Action in Libya and inaction elsewhere in the region was justified in Britain by differentiating Libya from other cases in the region. For example Cameron made the case that “what is happening in Libya is different. The situation is that of a people rising up against their leaders and wanting a more democratic future, and then us watching as, potentially, those people are destroyed by that dictator” (HC Deb 18 March 2011, c619). Coinciding with this, Hague argued that

The United Kingdom believes that the people of all these countries must be able to determine their own futures. That is why in all of them we argue for reform not repression, and why in Libya, supported by the full authority of the United Nations, we have acted to save many lives threatened by one of the most repressive regimes of them all. This will continue to be our approach as change continues to gather pace in the Middle East. (HC Deb 24 March 2011, c1115)

Accordingly, Libya was in a sense unique owed to the extent of Gaddafi’s repression and that action there was backed by the UN.
Moving on, unlike other countries experiencing the Arab Spring, in Libya Britain and the international community invoked the R2P. The latter, I argue, enabled the development of a narrative displaying an older British paternalistic attitude. This becomes evident when we look at British discourses on Libya focusing on Britain’s ability, its history and military capacity to intervene which can be seen as the basis upon which feelings of duty and responsibility vis-à-vis Libya originated. Essentially it requires looking at how the need for British involvement in Libya was justified.

In responding to his constituents’ questions regarding the need for British involvement in Libya Dan Jarvis (MP (Lab) for Barnsley Central) stated

> It is because we have no real choice. This country has a long history of standing up for justice and the rule of law, of standing up for the protection of the vulnerable and of standing up for the men, women and children whose own Governments have persecuted and abandoned them. Our country and our people should not walk by on the other side of the street, ignoring the weak, the lost, the unprotected and the dispossessed. Walking on by is not an option because we know that the right thing to do is to stand up for others when we can and when it is legally and morally the right thing to do. (HC Deb 5 April 2011, c939)

This brings forth how the British represented their role in Libya, which related to a British way of doing things reflected through history. In this narrative the Libyan people embody the group identified by Jarvis as “the weak, the lost and the unprotected”.

By representing the Libyan people in this manner the British had a duty and responsibility to react, to help them as they could not do it on their own. This is in line with a third element I ascribe to paternalism, difference/incompetence. Additionally, duty and responsibility are seen in terms not of Britain’s role but in terms of what it means to be British. For example, Malcolm Bruce (Gordon) (LD) argued that “the UK has taken quite a leading role on Libya, but I think I could be forgiven for saying that
this is not a hugely British responsibility—other than the fact that we are the kind of people we are” (HC Deb 5 April 2011, c937).

British involvement in Libya was also expressed in terms of a British and Western ability. Soon after resolution 1970 was passed by the UN, Cameron called for the need to prepare contingency plans arguing that “it is the job of leaders in the western world in particular to prepare for all eventualities and all the things that might happen, particularly if Colonel Gaddafi unleashes more things on his own people” (HC Deb 2 March 2011, c292). This not only brings forth a sense of responsibility to lead preparations in the event of an escalation in Libya but also a sense of superiority and know-how.

This Western or even British ability to meet the challenges brought about by the situation in Libya is further reflected in Cameron’s explanation regarding the need for Britain to be part of the group of countries implementing SCR 1973:

> We have one of the finest armed services in the world. We are one of the world’s leading military powers, and we also have huge strength in diplomacy, soft power and development. We should not play a disproportionate part, but I think that we should play a proportionate part alongside allies such as France, America and the Arab world. (HC Deb 18 March 2011, c629)

The existence of representational practices in British discourses on Libya has already been referred to above. I showed how identifying negatively with the Libyan people enabled a British sense of duty and responsibility to come forth. It equally reinforced calls to action. The British felt that they had to swoop in and save, protect the people because they were represented as suffering, as victims. Alongside these negative representations, British discourses also included positive representations of the Libyan people. The British identified with them because they were fighting back and because they were fighting for democracy.

This point is reflected in Ann Clwyd’s (MP (Lab) for Cynon Valley) argument vis-a-vis the sanctions imposed on the Gaddafi regime. During a Commons debate on
February 28 she said “I think that we all wish to record our tremendous admiration for
the courage and tenacity of the Libyan people—men, women and children—who are
fighting the dictator with their bare hands” (HC Deb 28 February 2011, c35). Comparably Cameron argued “We should support and say how much we admire those brave people who are standing up in their own country asking for greater freedoms
and greater democracy—for things that we take for granted in our own country” (HC
Deb 2 March 2011, c297).

With this admiration comes a positive identification. The British identified with the
Libyan people because they were fighting for a democratic future. This by no means
meant that they represented them as “the self”. If this were the case there wouldn’t be
a need to intervene on their behalf. Hence, on the continuum of “the self” and “the
other”, the Libyan people occupied a position that saw them moving closer to “the
self” and distanced from “the other”. The mixture of positive and negative
representations of the Libyan people is reflected in Cameron’s statement in the
Commons. While praising them for their efforts he argued “they took the initiative,
although we were able to help them” (HC Deb 5 September 2011, c45). Underlying
this is the idea that it was a British push that eventually enabled them to stand a chance.

Up until now I have demonstrated that there is a basis to the argument that the
invocation of R2P in Libya enabled an older British paternalistic attitude to resurface.
The British pointed to their role as protectors of the people of Libya and the guarantors
of human rights and democracy as a result of a certain British ability and historical
precedent. Additionally practices of representation whereby “the self” is differentiated
from “the other” enabled the articulation of a narrative in which the Libyans were
victims, the Gaddafi regime “the threat” to be abolished and Britain the saviour.

Is this specific to Britain, or is it possible to observe this in the practice and discourse
of other countries involved in the multilateral military intervention in Libya? A look
at French parliamentary debates on resolution 1973 (22 March) and on the
prolongation of the ongoing military intervention (12 July 2011) reveals parallels with
what has been observed in relation to British discourse. While discussing Libya as an
R2P case, French parliamentarians expressed an older French paternalistic attitude. As expected, protection and responsibility appeared prominently in French discourse, a result of applying the R2P principle on Libya. More generally, French discourse lines up with that of the British.

In terms of intent, the French justified the military intervention as being for the protection and defense of the Libyan people. This is reflected in PM Francois Fillon’s statement to the Assemblée Nationale on March 22: “Il s’agit de protéger la population libyenne tout en excluant explicitement l’envoi d’une force d’occupation au sol” (“It is about protecting the Libyan people, while excluding the possibility of sending an occupying force on the ground”; Assemblée Nationale, 22 March). Although French and British discourses share similarities in terms of the way paternalism is expressed, they are also differentiated by the way in which the concept of responsibility is discussed. This is why I have termed what is being expressed in French discourse as French paternalism.

In the case of France, the feeling of responsibility attached to France’s past, to its historical record. A vivid example of this is the argument brought forward by Jean-Marc Ayrault, representing the leftist parties in the March 22 debate in the Assemblée Nationale:

Nous sommes le pays de la liberté. Nous pensions avoir tout écrit. D’autres peuples renouvellent dans leur langue, aven leur alphabet, ce formidable élan qui nous inspire depuis 1789. Il était de notre responsabilité qu’il ne s’arrête pas aux portes de Benghazi, pour que les peuples arabes puissent écrire chacun leur histoire. Notre fierté est de les accompagner, sans les précéder, ni les abandonner. (“We are the country of liberty. We thought we had written everything. Other people in other countries are renewing in their language, and alphabet, this fantastic momentum that has inspired us since 1789. It was our responsibility that it did not stop at the gates of Benghazi, so that the Arab people could each write their own history. Our pride is to accompany them, without preceding, nor abandoning them”; Assemblée Nationale 22 March).
According to this, France had a responsibility towards the Libyan people because she represents freedom and liberty. Consequently, her role was to facilitate, to help those who sought to attain it. Underneath this is the belief that France has the know-how required and was willing to share it with other peoples. Further, discourses reveal that responsibility in France was equated with a French “honor”. Just like in the case of Britain, the feeling of responsibility and duty refers to “who we are” (British, French) and the role that each one prescribes for themselves, or is prescribed by historical precedent.

8.2.3 Conclusion

This chapter engaged with the literature relating to the R2P principle with two objectives in mind. The first was to identify the way in which paternalism manifested itself in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in the twenty first century by taking the case of the 2011 intervention in Libya. The second was to reveal continuity between Libya and past British interventionary practice and discourse. In light of these two objectives, the chapter first addressed the conceptual underpinnings of the R2P principle presenting the main concepts defining it: protection and responsibility. Next, it shifted attention to R2P in practice, engaging with existing empirical investigations of the Libyan 2011 intervention. Finally, the case of Libya was analysed and paternalism’s defining elements were presented. Britain’s involvement was analysed in relation to the two lines of response: sanctions and military action.

There are a number of significant observations and conclusions to be drawn from what has been presented in this chapter. The first relates to the R2P concept itself. At its core the concept is paternalistic. This has been pointed out by Philip Cunliffe. In relation to state responsibility, he contends that the R2P results in states having “responsibilities for their people rather than to their people” (2010, p. 81; 2016, p. 233). The R2P enables a national and an international form of paternalism to develop. I argue that the international responsibility to protect conceptually presupposes and rests on hierarchy and inequality in the international system. It divides the world in
two. On the one side are those who protect and on the other side those who are being protected.

Even though the R2P as adopted by the UNGA does not explicitly mention which states are more prone to intervention it still creates a taxonomy. No one expects that the R2P will in the foreseeable future be applied to a Western state. This has been suggested by the invocation and application of the R2P exclusively for the following countries: Cote D’Ivoire, Libya, the DRC, Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka and Syria. Additionally, authority is vested in the UNSC and its five permanent members who have the final say as to whether a military intervention will be undertaken. This places them in a position of power. Although this is not new as it predates the formulation of the R2P, it is still important.

Equally significant observations can be made when the R2P is put into practice. The case of Libya demonstrates that the hierarchy and inequality on which the concept is built transfers from theory to practice. It is the constant presence of paternalism in the practice and discourse of Western states that perpetuates the hierarchy and inequality of the international system. Some are protectors whereas others are protected. Some have responsibilities because of their status as protectors of values and human kind.

This brings forward another important conclusion relating to the R2P and paternalism. The case of Libya has illustrated how the invocation of the R2P enabled the development of a paternalistic narrative. The R2P functions as a platform allowing paternalism to flourish. This does not only apply to Britain. A review conducted of parliamentary debates in France has shown the existence of an older French paternalistic attitude in relation to the intervention in Libya. Consequently, by framing the intervention in R2P terms it enables a single country or even the international community to sustain a narrative where some are the protectors of the vulnerable people inhabiting the earth. For example, British discourses on Libya show that the British discussed responsibility and obligation in terms of a whole “international community”. However they also saw responsibility and obligation in individualistic
terms emphasizing Britain’s ability and the role it has played through history as a protector of the vulnerable.

That the R2P serves as a platform, or enables paternalism to express itself once a case of atrocity crimes is seen to fall under its purview, has been demonstrated by taking into account the wider context in which the case of Libya took place. Although Britain represented itself as being the protector of human rights and freedom in the Middle East and North Africa, parliamentarians did not express themselves in the same way as they did on Libya. The terms responsibility/duty, protection do not appear in discussions relating to the Arab Spring. The British government and parliamentarians did voice concern about the situation in Syria and did take steps in order to secure a UNSC resolution in order to apply sanctions. Despite this activism, British discourse and representations on Syria did not resemble those expressed on Libya.

The argument advanced in this chapter according to which the R2P is not new but rather a repackaging of something old, also holds true for the practices involved. I acknowledge that Libya is but one example of the R2P in practice, as I acknowledge that it is the only case featuring the use of force under Pillar III. Policies pursued in Libya, namely the no-fly zone, and the use of air power to protect civilians are by no means new methods for ensuring this protection. In fact these same measures were employed by Britain and NATO in 1999 in Kosovo.

The case of Libya also revealed the simultaneous existence of paternalistic justifications and national interest considerations. That British Parliamentarians justified the intervention as benefiting their national interests and the Libyan people does not undermine my argument. As discussed above, a broader contextualization shows that invoking the national interest alongside moral arguments was indispensable to acquire the backing of the British Parliament because Iraq was not such a distant memory. Weariness and fatigue necessitated such a line of argument.

All in all, this chapter challenges the argument put forth by scholars according to which the R2P signals a new normative development guiding the international community’s approach to human protection and atrocity crimes. The identification of
paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in Libya reveals the existence of an older British paternalist attitude. Consequently, I argue that the R2P is not new, but can be seen as repackaging the principle of humanitarian intervention into a more politically acceptable alternative, while still embodying older ideas and attitudes.
9 Conclusion

The aim of this research has been to counter the existing literature on interventionism and demonstrate continuity in the interventionary practice and discourse of states through paternalism, taking Britain as a test case. To achieve this objective, I developed a holistic working definition of paternalism following a critical and multidisciplinary assessment of the gaps and limitations of existing conceptualizations and empirical examinations of this phenomenon (Chapter 3). As per the comparative methodology of this research, I then deployed my conceptual framework to first identify the particularities of British paternalism by reconstructing the socio-ideological history of English domestic paternalism from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, and showing its first deployment toward England’s closest neighbours (Chapter 4).

The characteristics defining British paternalism identified in Chapter 4 were then employed to detect it in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in four distinctive historical periods, each of which showcased several key case-studies mirroring those used in the literature this thesis aims to challenge (Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8). Within each of these empirical chapters, continuity in British paternalism has been systematically exposed. What remains is to demonstrate continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse throughout the historical periods examined in this thesis. This will be accomplished in the following section. Following this, the chapter will summarize the main contributions and implications of this research, and critically consider some of its limitations while suggesting avenues for future research.

9.1 General Conclusions: Demonstrating the Continuity of British Paternalism from the Eighteenth Century Onwards

Each individual case of British interventionism has its own peculiarities as was demonstrated in this thesis. The same holds true for the historical periods examined.
Yet, what follows will present the elements of continuity and change I have previously identified throughout the empirical Chapters 5-8. Common to all three cases investigated during the nineteenth century (Greece 1821-27, India 1830-60, the Sudan 1896-98) were justifications espousing benevolence, negative representations of the subjects intervened upon, references to civilization and representations of British superiority. British practices of intervention were justified as undertaken to benefit the population of each territory, notwithstanding differences in wording. All subjects intervened upon were represented in a negative manner, differentiated from British perceptions of “the self”, and identified as constituting “the other”. British obligation and duty towards India and the Sudan were based on such negative representations, as were justifications of protection relating to all three territories. Additionally in both obligation and duty were manifested through Britain’s perceived role. In relation to Egypt, Britain was a trustee and in India she held the role of educator. British superiority was articulated in terms of military capabilities (Greece and the Sudan) and by way of culture, language, race and knowledge (India).

As pertains to practices of representation, while Britain identified with Greece and Egypt, placing them closer to conceptions of “the self”, protection in both cases was justified on the lines of incompetence and difference. Further, although Britain pursued distinct policies and acted in various ways in the three cases investigated, all were protective in nature. In Greece the British intervened militarily to ensure the physical protection of the population. In a similar manner, the British protected the territorial integrity of Egypt and the inhabitants of the Sudan by defeating the Dervishes. During the Mandate period British administration and policies in education, agriculture and land were justified in both mandates (Palestine and Tanganyika) as being for the benefit of each respective community. Obligation and duty manifested themselves in similar ways in Palestine and Tanganyika. They emanated from the League of Nations and Britain’s acquisition of the mandates and were further accentuated by Britain’s perceived role as “trustee”.

Practices of representation also fostered feelings of obligations and duty. Just like nineteenth century interventions, both positive and negative identification with the
subjects of intervention resulted in feelings of obligation and duty. As regards practices and policies pursued by the British administration in Palestine and Tanganyika they exemplified protection. Protection took two forms, protection from harm and protection from one’s self (protection as development). Protection as development was most pronounced in Tanganyika stemming from its classification as a Class B mandate by the League of Nations, a classification based upon a territory’s stage of development. Moreover practices of representation in the two mandates exemplified more nuances on the self-other spectrum. While the Jews (especially European Jews) in Palestine occupied a position more closely associated with conceptions of “the self”, the African natives of Tanganyika were represented as “the other” based on conceptions of civilization. Placed between British conceptions of “the self” and “the other” was the Arab Muslim community of Palestine. British interventionary practices, discourses and representations in both mandates shared aspects with British colonial policy in Africa.

Similarly to what has been presented so far, in the third historical period (1945-1999) examined, all elements defining British paternalism manifested themselves. Benevolence was present in all three cases (German reconstruction, Malaysian confrontation and Kosovo) in justifications offered for the different policies pursued. Obligation and duty was based on Britain’s perceived international role. In Germany and Malaysia this role pertained to the maintenance of peace and security, democratic principles and the containment of communism. In Kosovo Britain’s role related to upholding such values as human rights. Obligation and duty also resulted from Agreements and Treaties Britain was a party to (Germany and Malaysia). In the case of Kosovo obligation and duty were fueled by Britain’s membership in NATO.

Further, the inhabitants of the territories and parties to conflicts were differentiated from the British and represented as “the other”. The Germans were represented as “the other” as a result of their character (aggressiveness) and also because of the unwillingness on the part of the British to distinguish between a German and a Nazi. In contrast, in Malaysia and Kosovo British representations evidenced various levels of otherness. On the one hand Malaysians and Kosovar Albanians were represented as
“the other” because of their status as victims. On the other hand Indonesia and the Serb Security forces constituted “the other” because they embodied the threat. This was also the case with justifications calling for the need of protection, in which the subjects of intervention figured as “the other”. The policies and practices initiated by Britain in the three cases can be classified as protective. In Kosovo and Malaysia protection meant territorial or physical protection. In the case of Germany, protection translated into development and ultimately involved protecting the Germans from themselves. The British were to rebuild the country entirely by focusing on its industry, economy, administration and education.

The last historical period studied looked at the most current type of interventionism associated with the R2P concept and examined the intervention in Libya. Here benevolence was incorporated in justifications regarding the application of sanctions on the Gaddafi regime and on the issue of military action. The need to apply sanctions on the Gaddafi regime was justified as being for the benefit of the Libyan population, since ultimately they were hoped to push Gaddafi out. The intervention was also justified on the grounds of protecting the Libyan population.

British duty and responsibility manifested itself in multiple ways. First its presence resulted from the invocation of the R2P principle. Duty and responsibility were articulated in wider terms referring to the international community as a whole. Also Britain’s ability and its role, viewed historically, as the protector of vulnerable people and communities also fueled obligation and duty. Further, the Libyan people were represented in both a negative and positive way. They were represented as victims, unable to defend themselves. However, the British also identified with the Libyan people because they were fighting for democracy. As for the practices undertaken in Libya, they fell into two categories: military and diplomatic. The military campaign (air and sea) conducted by a coalition of states, led by Britain, the US and France had as their objective the protection of the civilian population. On the diplomatic side, Britain provided material and practical help to the NTC, thereby enabling the rebels to better themselves in order to be in a better position against Gaddafi.
The above makes apparent the similarities pertaining to each element characteristic of paternalism. Across the periods examined the various practices and policies pursued by Britain were justified as being for the benefit of the subject of intervention. Obligation/duty/responsibility were based on considerations regarding Britain’s role, its superiority and practices of differentiation that resulted in representing the subject of intervention as “the other”. Britain’s role as educator persisted, featuring in India, Tanganyika, Palestine and Germany. What is more, in certain cases obligation/duty/responsibility ensued from positively identifying with the people in whose territory Britain intervened. This was the case with the Greeks and Egyptians in the nineteenth century and with European Jews during the Mandate period. Protection, the third element defining paternalism, was present in both British practices and discourses. The need for protection was justified by representations of otherness. The Greeks, Indians, Sudanese, the Arab and non-Arab communities in Palestine, Tanganyikans, Germans, Malaysians, Kosov Albanians and Libyans were all seen as being different to the British, thus constituting the other. This reflects something particular of British paternalism, the paternalist’s need to protect will almost certainly rely on representations of difference and incompetence.

Indeed these groups were systematically depicted as incompetent. Incompetence took various forms ranging from their intellectual, military, cultural abilities and capabilities to their status as victims. For example, the Greeks, the Sudanese, the Kosovar Albanians and the Libyans were all depicted as victims suffering at the hands of oppressors and unable to defend themselves. In terms of practices, all were protective in nature. A parallel can be made regarding practices in education in India, Germany, Palestine and Tanganyika. Protection here referred to enabling cultural and intellectual development. The English language and English institutions and culture were seen as key.

Finally, the British established a demarcation between themselves and the inhabitants of territories in which they intervened. In British eyes these people were represented as “the other”. It is important to note at this point that practices of differentiation did not result in the rigid distinction between self and other. As the previous chapters have
demonstrated differentiation was quite nuanced including such categories – as I have defined them – as “the self but not quite”. Additionally on the self-other continuum certain peoples were placed closer to “the self” or closer to “the other” or at different other points in between.

Let us now consider the issue of change across the historical periods studied. Accounting for change period by period allows to identify the presence of a pattern or an evolution in paternalism. It involves looking at change in the manifestation of paternalism in conjunction with changes taking place in the context, norms and language. Let us first look at the colonial and mandate period. Although conceptions about the superiority of certain races over others persisted some changes did take place. During the mandate period race but also the stage of a territory’s development were at the basis of practices of differentiation. The binary civilized/uncivilized, present during the nineteenth century, was accompanied by that of advanced/non-advanced. The two periods are also differentiated by the manifestation of obligation/duty. During the mandate period religion no longer fostered feelings of obligation and duty. This is also applicable to the historical periods that followed.

Moreover practices of protection underwent a shift. During the colonial period protection signified physical protection as was the case in Greece and the Sudan and protection from one’s self as was the case in India. In contrast, in the Mandate period practices of protection focused exclusively on protecting the Arab and non-Arab communities in Palestine and the Tanganyikans from themselves. Focus was directed on developing these communities (economically, politically and intellectually) so that they could at a certain point be able to exercise self-government. In presenting these changes it is important to note that on most aspects the colonial period and the mandate period shared many similarities. The introduction of the Mandate System in 1919 did not radically alter British practice, ideology and discourse but rather established in international law policies and language previously in use. For example the concept of trust and development informed the practices, discourses and representations of the EIC and the British Crown in India 1830-60.
More radical changes are observed when moving from the Mandate period to that of 1945-1999. The first relates to obligation/duty and Britain’s perceived role. During the Mandate period feelings of obligation and duty resulted from Britain’s role as “trustee” vis-à-vis Palestine and Tanganyika. In contrast during 1945-1999 Britain’s role changed. Both in Germany and Malaysia Britain felt it had a duty and an obligation to maintain peace, security and democratic principles as well as contain communism. In Kosovo Britain’s role related to upholding values such as human rights. These changes were in line with normative developments (UN Declaration of Human Rights, Genocide Convention), Britain’s foreign policy, the Cold War and the absence of war. Benevolence also manifested itself in distinct ways. Justifications shifted from the particular to the general and back to the particular. For example in both mandates, Britain justified the policies pursued as being for the benefit of the population. In contrast from 1945-1989 policies pursued in Germany and Malaysia were justified through a more general approach. Finally after 1989 the British once again justified their policies as being for the benefit of the subjects of intervention (Kosovar Albanians).

The basis upon which differentiation was constructed also changed. It was no longer about civilization and race but rather about character. For instance the Germans were represented as “the other” because of their aggressiveness. “Otherness” also resulted from representing certain peoples as “victims”, as was the case in Malaysia and Kosovo. Finally, the objective of British policy and practices during 1945-1999 varied as was the case during the nineteenth century. Protection referred to physical protection, the protection of territory and the protection from one’s self. Lastly, change is also identified when moving from 1945-99 to the twenty first century. The most significant change identified relates to the manifestation of obligation, duty and responsibility. In the case of Libya, duty and responsibility figured in the discourses of the British political elite as a result of invoking the R2P principle. In saying this it is also important to note that Britain’s perception of its role vis-à-vis human rights, and democracy also underpinned their discourse of duty and responsibility as did their allusion to historical precedents.
On the whole this comparison has demonstrated the argument of continuity regarding British interventionism advanced in this research. Despite changes occurring in the context in which interventions are undertaken, normative developments and changes in language and justifications, the elements constituting paternalism are consistently present across the historical periods investigated. As shown above, it is the definition of incompetence that changes, the basis of incompetence, the basis of obligation. It is also the manner in which distinctions are articulated that change due to what is seen as commonly accepted and politically correct at the time. Moreover what is viewed as worth fighting for is equally subject to change (independence of a nation, economic, political and intellectual development, civilization, territorial integrity, human rights, humanity, democracy or security). This stands in opposition to the literature on humanitarian intervention and R2P, which argues that interventions since the end of the Cold War have undergone significant change due to changes in the international normative landscape.

9.2 Thesis Contributions

All in all this research brings forth three important conclusions. The first relates to continuity and change in British interventionism. This thesis has demonstrated the continuity of British paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse, thus countering current interpretations in the literature stressing change in interventionism in the Post-Cold War era. Second, the thesis identified the grounding of British external paternalism in a long social, political, and ideological history of internal English paternalism. Finally it has brought forth the alignment of recent international norms (R2P) with the same type of paternalism that has been practiced by British elites over the period considered.

This thesis thereby contributes in a number of ways to academic discussions on interventionism. The approach adopted here to account for continuity and change in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse carries an ontological significance. As was demonstrated paternalism manifests itself in Britain’s discursive practices and as
such sheds light on the nature of interventionist practice and ideology. The literature on interventionism focuses on international organizations and rarely looks at state interventionary practice and discourse. In contrast by focusing on the interventionary practice and discourse of states through the prism of paternalism, this thesis contributes by highlighting important aspects of state interventionism.

The first refers to practices of representation underlying Britain’s interventionism. This research has shown that the self is constantly differentiated from the subjects of intervention. The self-other spectrum displays nuances, going beyond the binary self-other. Even when the British political elite identify with the people inhabiting territories subject to intervention, ultimately discourses justifying the need for protection rest on representing these people as “the other”. This shows that interventionist behavior has not altered due to the expansion of humanity, as argued by scholars working on humanitarian intervention. Rather, as I have argued interventionism is based on conceptions of superiority and inferiority. On the one side is the group who protects and on the other those who are protected. The humans who are in need of protection are represented as different to those affording that protection. The increased number of interventions in the Post-Cold War era, then should not be viewed as a result of expanding conceptions of humanity, because the very paternalistic nature of such interventions falsifies this view.

The second aspect of state interventionism highlighted in this thesis is the relationship between the domestic and international realms in which states operate. I located British paternalism within a longer history accounting for its manifestation in England and its exportation to foreign countries. To date the relationship between these two realms has not attracted enough scholarly attention. As was shown in Chapter 4, practices, discourses and representations at work in England were systematically reproduced and exported in the periphery. When exported outside, notably in Ireland, English paternalism retained its constitutive features (hierarchy/inequality, duty/obligation, practices of protection and control and benevolence).
Such parallels were also observed in the international cases and throughout the historical periods examined in this research. Hierarchy and inequality were central aspects of eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century English society, as its people were differentiated through religion, class, and property. The same pattern of hierarchy and inequality were also characteristic of Britain’s relations with the subjects of her interventions examined in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. The representation of the poor in England sustained the un-equal character of society. In the same way the representation of the Greeks, Indians, Sudanese, the Arab and non-Arab communities in Palestine, Tanganyikans, Germans, Malaysians, Kosovo Albanians and Libyans as “the other” sustained hierarchic and un-equal relations between the protector and the protected, the savior and the victim, the educator and the educated.

It is important to note that the conclusions drawn from examining the domestic and external manifestation of British paternalism cannot be generalized to other countries. This is because it cannot be presumed that all states manifest the same kind of paternalism. However, the importance and value of examining the domestic and external realm that given states operate in has been efficiently brought forth, thereby highlighting the importance of taking it into account when addressing other potential examples. Further, by establishing continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse the thesis makes the wider role of state paternalism distinctively visible. Chapter 8 on Libya has demonstrated that progressively paternalism has become embedded within international norms on interventionism. The R2P, presented by the literature as the most recent normative development guiding interventionism, is itself paternalistic. Conceptually, the R2P presupposes and rests on hierarchy and inequality in the international system. It divides the world in two. On the one side are those who protect and on the other side are those who are being protected. Therefore when the R2P was invoked in Libya, it mediated the deployment of a prior paternalistic narrative and practice, not just in Britain but also in France.
9.3 Limitations

Let us now address the methodological limitations of this research. The first relates to the selection of cases examined. Given that Britain intervened extensively throughout history and across the globe, I could have looked at other cases of British interventionism. However, case-study selection was dictated by the existing empirical literature that my research aimed to conclusively critique. This methodological choice allowed me to counter the arguments in the dominant literature regarding change in the interventionary practice and discourse of states and intergovernmental organizations. A similar rationale applied to the historical periods investigated.

The second limitation pertains to data collection and my focus on texts. In terms of primary data I examined correspondence between British officials and policy documents available at the National Archives in Kew pertaining to all cases investigated, except the most recent case of Libya. I was bound by the official nature of these texts, as not everything was included in them. Additionally, a substantial amount was unavailable, either destroyed or missing. I also analyzed debates in the British Parliament, which included more information. In these debates Parliamentarians spoke more freely. Sensitive information pertaining to Britain’s foreign policy or strategizing were not, however, disclosed. The secondary sources I consulted included British newspapers, historical accounts and analyses. By looking at British newspapers I could further shed lights on British public opinion and identify parallels with the discourse of the British political elite.

Historical accounts and analyses enabled me to acquire background information regarding each case examined. Methodologically this approach allowed for an all-encompassing and thorough investigation and understanding of the practice, discourse and representation of the British political elite in each historical period. I looked at the British political elite because they are those who make policy in Britain. Instead of focusing on texts, I could have conducted interviews with people constituting this political elite. This would have allowed me to acquire information directly from the actors involved in decisions pertaining to Britain’s interventionism. However, due to
the historical and comparative nature of the research this would not have been possible throughout, and hence not efficient argumentatively.

The next limitation speaks to the approach followed. Instead of pursuing an ethnographic approach I chose to provide historical depth. The historical approach I adopted was the most suited to the objective set for this research, being to demonstrate continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse since the earliest periods covered in the existing literature. It allowed me to examine Britain’s social history and trace Britain’s foreign policy to its domestic policy, and identify what is characteristic of British paternalism by going as far back as eighteenth century English society. Had I employed an ethnographic approach I would have been able to gain firsthand knowledge from British policy-makers and observe them in their environment at a time when Britain was involved in interventionism. However, this would have been impossible for the older cases examined. Equally, an ethnographic approach would not have been entirely fruitful in the most recent case examined (Libya) as it took place seven years ago, and comparing ethnographic information would not have been possible across the periods examined.

The next limitation, already referred to above, applies to the generalizability of my findings. I investigated western state interventionism, focusing on one particular state. It cannot be presumed that paternalism as manifested in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse is either similar or distinct to the paternalism of other states. Hence, it is not possible to offer general conclusions. Instead of adopting a historical specific approach to study paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse, I could have compared Britain to other Western states or non-Western states such as China. This approach would have allowed me to identify what is specific to British paternalism and to other national paternalisms. However, this was not in line with the objective of this research. To effectively examine a state’s interventionary practice it is mandatory to put this practice in its historical, social and ideological context.
At this point, it is important to reiterate the conclusions I drew regarding R2P in Chapter 8. In this last empirical chapter I identified how international law became aligned with a very old state practice. Conceptually, the R2P revealed itself to be paternalistic. Equally in practice it acted as a platform enabling the development of a paternalistic narrative in Britain but also in France. Consequently, in future work it would be worth expanding this particular thread to look at other national paternalisms. France could prove to be an excellent candidate for this task. Non-western state paternalism could also be explored in view of the growing significance and influence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) on the UNSC and on responses to atrocity crimes. Paternalism is not a concept reserved to Western states. Another possible avenue for future work is to examine how paternalism has affected other areas of international policy. Due to the fact that paternalism by nature develops in the context of un-equal relations it can be employed to examine policies relating to international development and democracy promotion in certain countries – two areas that are especially central to contemporary political and academic concerns.
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