A Study of the Transfer, Reception and Implementation of
Community Policing within
Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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To complete this doctorate, I have committed a great deal of my spare time over the past seven years to research; it has been a long journey, but one that has been a challenging and rewarding experience. It would not have been possible to complete the thesis though without the guidance and support I have received from both Mr. Stuart Lister and Professor Adam Crawford at Leeds University and I would like to thank them both for that and their patience and encouragement throughout.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the transfer, reception and implementation of community policing in Abu Dhabi between 2000 and 2016. It was undertaken during a period of extensive organisational reform, which was informed by a process of policy transfer, primarily from the United Kingdom.

These reforms were driven by regional insecurity and increasing awareness that more needed to be done to improve police and community relations to prepare for anticipated future risks and threats to the security of the state. The reform programme included the introduction of a community policing model. This was encouraged by an elite network of international actors and Abu Dhabi Police officers, who embarked on extensive policy transfer processes to select good practice to be adopted and implemented locally.

This study aims to understand more fully why the community policing policy transfer was taking place, what policies were being transferred, the mechanisms through which policy was being transferred, what facilitated or constrained the process, and the outcomes of any adaptations made to the model that resulted from its implementation.

This thesis illustrates the argument that, in practice, the transfer of community policing from one context to another as a type of package that can be copied rarely occurs. Through processes of policy transfer, as part of a package of reforms, policy design mutates by purposefully adopting or amending aspects of ‘the’ policy, and by implementation.

In Abu Dhabi, this resulted in a centralised structure with specialised community police teams undertaking a social welfare role, with minimal use of police powers. This translation, rather than transfer of policy, resulted in a bespoke model of community policing designed to support local citizens, but simultaneously acknowledging the need to engage with the wider expatriate population to share community information in order to prevent crime and maintain security.
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List of Abbreviations

ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers
HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary
MoI Ministry of Interior of the United Arab Emirates
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NPIA National Police Improvement Agency
NRPP National Reassurance Policing Programme
PCSO Police Community Support Officer
SPSS Statistical Package for Social Science
UK United Kingdom
UAE United Arab Emirates
US United States
**Introduction**

The reader is invited on a journey of exploration, not so much in a Rolls-Royce through the lush pastures of certainty, but rather a bumpy ride through some unchartered ground towards the foothills of police affairs, before trying to ascend to levels where perspectives for the future might reveal themselves. (Alderson, 1979, p.2)

This quotation is part of the introduction to Alderson’s book ‘Policing Freedom’ and very much describes the journey that this thesis takes, exploring the transfer, reception and implementation of community policing policy primarily from Britain\(^1\) into a different context of policing and culture in Abu Dhabi, over the period from 2000 to 2016. In one form or another, community policing has been around in the UK\(^2\) for many decades (arguably centuries) and the concept has been replicated as good practice in other countries with varying degrees of success. This thesis illustrates the argument that, in practice, the transfer of community policing from one context to another as a type of package that can be copied rarely occurs. Through processes of policy transfer, as part of a package of reforms, policy design mutates by purposefully adopting or amending aspects of ‘the’ policy, and by implementation.

The influence of the British in spreading policing concepts and administrative models to other countries is not a recent phenomenon. Examples of colonial policing over centuries (Dunstall and Godfrey, 2005), often delivered through military institutions, illustrate that

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\(^1\) The terms ‘Britain’ and British’ are used in this thesis to refer to policing applied in England and Wales only.

\(^2\) References to the ‘UK’ are used in this thesis to refer to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
the British had a foothold in many countries to promulgate the maintenance of law and order (Arnold, 1986) including the states that now form the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Rabi, 2006; Neild, 2016).

In Abu Dhabi, prior to 1957 and the forming of the first formal police, the informal structure of the legal system originally created a watchman style of policing (Wilson, 1968; Reynolds, 1998) aimed at maintaining order and keeping the peace in tribal communities. This approach continued until the early 1970s, soon after the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was formed, and by decree, the first penal code\(^3\) was published, with other orders contained in federal law for the police to undertake an enforcement role.\(^4\) This transformed policing in Abu Dhabi and other state forces to adopt a more legalistic style with strict enforcement practices. This occurred in the context of extensive development of the state and population growth in Abu Dhabi, with workers arriving from many countries bringing with them their own cultures, traditions, behavioural norms and expectations, but contributing to a fear among local citizens about future crime and risks to security.

The more recent policing reform since 2000, examined in this study, aimed to change this approach again by implementing what could be described as a community-focused style of policing where community engagement and problem-solving would take more prominence than strict enforcement practices (Goldstein, 1990). This change was encouraged by an elite network of international actors concerned about an increase in regional insecurity in the Middle East and the ability of local governments to respond

\(^3\) Penal code revised edition contained within Federal Law No. (3) 1987
\(^4\) Article 4 of the Ministry of Interior Regulation No. 8, 1971
effectively to it (Brogden and Nijhar, 2005). Abu Dhabi remained free of any similar
problems and consequently, it was well placed in the region to lead on developing
community policing as an example to others. The aim was to operationalise the concept
in a way that would increase trust between the police and the community so that
information could be shared about crime and security (Reiner, 2010). However,
community policing is widely seen as a ‘notoriously slippery concept’ that has different
meanings in different policing environments (Tilley, 2008, p.377) and would likely
require adaptation when operationalised in the context of Abu Dhabi.

History has shown that the motivation factors for implementing community policing have
invariably been related to government and the police responding retrospectively to serious
problems of urban crime and disorder or other issues aimed at improving police
legitimacy (Jones and Newburn, 2007). But this study of Abu Dhabi was undertaken in a
country where there had been no recent history of serious disorder and where crime was
reported to be very low. Many studies into community policing highlight both its
organisational benefits and operational weaknesses as a solution to contemporary
policing problems. In most cases, it is still seen as a silver bullet to solve problems, but
there is still a question as to whether it works or not. As Innes (2006b, p.98) says ‘knowing
what works does not mean that it will always work’. The research literature has long
illustrated that the implementation of community policing is often challenging (Fielding,
1995).

To understand the extent of success or failure of transferring community policing to Abu
Dhabi, Evans (2009, p.246) suggests that ‘the proof of policy transfer lies in its
implementation [and] it is at this level where data should be examined to establish the
extent to which policy transfer has taken place’. This is central to the unfolding of policy to practice, where there is a real risk that the frontline police could contribute to implementation failure (Irving et al., 1989). Therefore, the translation of sets of policy ideas into a different political and social context raise important theoretical and empirical questions. Building on the existing literature, this study aims to develop further knowledge and understanding of the community policing philosophy and the experience of policy transfer from one country to another. The main sources of literature about community policing are extensive and span over three decades (Bayley, 1988; Goldstein, 1990; Mastrofski, 1993; Rosenbaum, 1994; Skogan, 2004; Brogden and Nijhar, 2005; Tilley, 2008; Reiner, 2010). Additionally, these texts are supported by other policy instruments such as government White Papers, Home Office practice advice (ACPO, 2006) and thematic reviews of policing (Flanagan, 2007; HMIC, 1999, 2016).

For policy transfer, the available literature is relatively limited, but widening the scope of the research beyond ‘criminal justice’ helps to develop a broader understanding of the concept (Bennett, 1991; Jones and Newburn, 2007; Evans, 2009; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2010). It was Dolowitz and Marsh who developed a framework for policy transfer and this has been adapted for use as a guide to analysing data obtained as part of this study. The processes of policy transfer, from initial policy design, through decision making to implementation, are also complex to analyse where policy is constantly mutating over time and space (Benson and Jordon, 2012; Hudson and Kim, 2014). But it is common for countries to embark on the process to learn from each other and share good practice. Copying policy to implant it in another country is, however, rare and this study illustrates some of the reasons why that is the case. What is more common is a process of policy translation, in which the adaptation of ideas takes place in the context of the requirements
of local culture and traditions of both society and of organisations such as Abu Dhabi Police. Consequently, this thesis adds to the existing knowledge about both the concepts of community policing and policy transfer, as it has developed in Abu Dhabi.

Little has been written about policing in Abu Dhabi and there are very few published articles, historical reports and policy instruments that one can turn to for information and guidance about the policy decisions made and implemented in practice. There was, for example, an over-arching strategic plan which simply stated that Abu Dhabi Police will respond to the changing demographics of the Emirate by implementing a community policing model. However, there are no written documents that detail what that model is, why it was selected or how it was to be implemented; in turn, there is little data available about the outcomes of the model when operationalised. This was, therefore, an important subject to research because the implementation programme was ongoing and research findings may not only add to the knowledge base of ‘community policing’ and ‘policy transfer’, but also assist with future organisational decisions. This sets the scene for this study with an intention to collect data in a systematic way to increase knowledge about community policing, the method of policy transfer and approaches to its implementation. The study posits the following research questions:

1. What were the reasons for the transfer of the community policing policy?

2. What precisely was the community policing policy (and the ideas that inform it) being transferred to Abu Dhabi and from where?

3. What are the mechanisms through which this policy was being transferred and implemented?

4. What facilitated or constrained the policy transfer process?
5. What are the outcomes of adaptations and modifications made to the community policing policy ideas that result from its implementation in Abu Dhabi?

The answers to these questions inform the findings of this study, presented in themes, firstly in relation to the challenges associated with large-scale organisational reform and implementing a change in policing style that for various reasons was limited to specialist teams. Then to broaden the understanding of the subjects of community policing and policy transfer and finally, the context of policing development in Abu Dhabi, all of which interface to illustrate a centralised structure and a priority for social welfare policing. This process has not been without some resistance to change from within the police organisation, a problem that has been experienced in other countries too (Goldstein, 1990), but Abu Dhabi Police has implemented strategies to address this issue. The outcome is a transfer of community policing policy, founded on appropriate selection of ideas, management decisions about aims and roles, and implementation of policy instruments such as police volunteers that have ensured that the philosophy has the best chance of success to be spread throughout the organisation and to the public.

**Originality**

A great deal has been written about community policing and certainly there is, over the last 30 years or so, extensive experience both in Britain, and the US, in terms of its implementation. However, community policing is a very new concept for countries in the Middle East and Abu Dhabi leads the way for others in the region by embarking on the adoption of international ideas through policy transfer processes. Until now the empirical questions, such as what policy was being implemented and why, have not been previously explored and analysed. Indeed, community policing has only existed as a policing concept...
in Abu Dhabi for a few years and the future of what it will look like as a model for the country and wider for the UAE remains unclear.

This study aims to discuss the answers to these questions and in so doing, generates new knowledge about both concepts of community policing and policy transfer. Additionally, the method of data collection is original, in that having access to senior officers and other staff within the police organisation, including those responsible for implementation on the frontline, is restricted in most cases only to those who are employed by the local police. The restrictions are tight and due to security clearances, it is unlikely, for the foreseeable future, that anyone outside of the organisation would be able to undertake this type of research with access to participants within the police organisation, which makes this study quite unique at this time.

**About the author**

As a former senior police officer of West Yorkshire Police, in the five years prior to my retirement in 2009 I was engaged in several strategic projects related to neighbourhood (community) policing. At the time, this work was driven by a new government-supported initiative to establish new community police teams in all neighbourhoods throughout Britain. The responsibilities for my role also included project management to develop an extended policing family. This work included membership of Chief Officer and National Police Improvement Agency thematic groups developing the roles and powers of volunteers (including community safety accreditation schemes), special constables and Police Community Support Officers. With over 30 years of experience of policing generally, I am dedicated to the idea of spreading good practice that drives forward a local policing agenda to improve police and community relations, reduce crime and maintain
security. By the end of 2009, I was selected by Abu Dhabi Police to work with them as an expert to provide similar support and advice to the implementation of a new initiative for community policing, directly supporting the advancement of the organisation’s strategy and strategic projects.

I continued in this role throughout the course of this research up to the end of 2016, based at the central community police department in Abu Dhabi, before transferring to a position in police headquarters as a more general consultant for strategy and organisational development. In the first two years of my work in Abu Dhabi, it was apparent that there was limited understanding of what the model of community policing was to be in the future, what elements of approach would be suitable for implementation in the context of local culture, and where policy ideas would be best drawn from. Moreover, the processes of policy transfer, assessment and analysis were not known or understood. Consequently, I was determined to undertake this research to build knowledge and potential solutions to challenges associated with implementing a new policing style in a large organisation. The advantage of my position, being immersed in Abu Dhabi Police as an employee, was that it allowed for unprecedented access to senior police officers (policy makers) who were my working colleagues throughout and with whom I had developed a trusting relationship. This facilitated access, not just to them, but to other operational community police teams working on the frontline. This created an opportunity for me to collect primary data to develop greater knowledge to contribute to the performance improvement of the organisation. Ultimately, this has also assisted me more recently in my new role developing large projects that aim to further spread the philosophy of community policing throughout the whole organisation.
Structure of the thesis

This thesis contains seven principal chapters that address the research questions posed in this introduction. To begin, Chapter 1 discusses the chronology of Abu Dhabi policing, examining its historical origins and tracing its development to its present-day manifestation. Abu Dhabi Police as an organisation has drawn from strong historical influences to establish its role in providing a broad range of services for the public. It is apparent in this review that as much importance has been given to the social service function of policing as to the prevention of crime and maintaining internal state security.

Chapter 2 explores the concept of community policing and how it has been recently applied in Britain. In so doing, it considers the motivations for developing community policing and how and why it became the primary model of choice in Abu Dhabi. Although it is widely accepted that when community policing is implemented in its various forms it can become an individual philosophy for all police employees, there are major challenges with operationalising the model, and implementation failure has been a significant legacy in the history of community policing. Despite this, the concept has, over the last three decades, become a policy idea with global reach, something that this chapter explores regarding its attractiveness as a solution for contemporary problems of order and security.

Chapter 3 reviews the literature of what can be generally referred to as the concept of policy transfer. It aims to develop an overview of this field of research to critically assess and understand the conceptual tools that can be used to analyse the transfer of community policing policy to Abu Dhabi. The literature is informative in that it defines what policy transfer means and considers what the motivation factors might be for developing new
policy ideas and what the processes are for how policy transfer effectively occurs. Several lessons have also been learned in the literature, including those from two specific criminal justice case studies of ‘zero tolerance policing’ and ‘three strikes’, which highlight issues associated with the transfer of slogans, labels and symbols. This leads to a better understanding of what might be ultimately perceived through analysis as levels of success or failure of the policy transfer processes.

Chapter 4 explains the research design strategy and the methods chosen to collect data for this study. It begins by discussing the reasons for the chosen strategy, which draws out the gap between policy and practice through phases of design and implementation. Relevant research methods are considered, leading to the choices made as to why some methods were excluded from the research and why others were selected. This includes a discussion that supports the strategy chosen to implement a mixed method approach by combining data obtained by different methodological approaches.

Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters that present the analysis of the empirical data collected during the study. The structure for the discussion in this (first) chapter, develops an initial assessment of the answers to seven key issues derived from a policy transfer framework developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (2010) to understand: what motivated actors to be engaged in the policy transfer; who was involved in the transfer; what policy was transferred and from where; what were the degrees of transfer; what constrained or facilitated the process; how was policy transfer demonstrated; and finally, what initial assessment can be made as to how the translation of policy led to success from an organisational perspective and the mechanisms applied to ensure that risks of failure were minimised or avoided.
Chapter 6 is the second chapter that analyses the empirical data collected during the study with a focus on the implementation of community policing within Abu Dhabi. In so doing, it develops its arguments by drawing not only on interviews with senior Abu Dhabi police officers, but also the results of a survey of frontline community police personnel. This mixed method of analysis follows the approach described by Brannan (2005) and Johnson et al. (2007) exploring whether the quantitative data corroborates the results of the qualitative analysis, whether it provides an opportunity to elaborate on the findings, or whether the qualitative and quantitative results might differ or contradict each other. For the study of policy transfer in the field of community policing, this approach provides evidence for developing greater knowledge of the impact on the organisation, on experience, and on the attitudes at all levels, from senior management to frontline police. This also supports the assertion that ‘the proof of policy transfer lies in its implementation [and] it is at this level where data should be examined to establish the extent to which policy transfer has taken place’ (Evans, 2009, p.246).

Finally, Chapter 7 presents the main findings of the research in four themes that interface together, concerning: the challenges of organisational reform; policy transfer and the notion of translating ideas from outside the country into a new context; operationalising community policing to build community trust and maintain security; and finally, implementing a new policing style in the context of policing development in Abu Dhabi. This chapter also highlights the limitations of the study but at the same time emphasises the strengths of the contributions made. In the remaining sections, after considerations are given for further research in the field of criminal justice and policy transfer, a short discussion of the future vision for community policing in Abu Dhabi is presented. This
leads to a final series of factors to consider how the organisation might continue to advance the model, but at the same time highlighting the challenges for the journey ahead.
Chapter 1: A Chronology of Abu Dhabi Policing

This chapter discusses policing in Abu Dhabi, examining its historical origins and tracing its development to its present-day manifestation. Going back centuries, there were features of culture and traditions in society that established an informal approach to policing and the administration of justice that have become interwoven with more recent formalised policy. As Newburn (2008, p.13) has emphasised: ‘we cannot possibly understand contemporary arrangements – whether they be policing or any other area of modern life – without reflecting on how it came to be the way we find it now’.

In present-day Abu Dhabi, the military structure from which the police were established remains dominant, resulting in a force that is a hierarchical, centralised organisation, run on military lines, focused on the protection of the state. It is highly bureaucratic at a strategic level and has limited devolved responsibility and decision-making processes for those working on the frontline of policing. These issues provide a context for effective policy transfer processes and the implementation of community policing. There are different views as to whether militarism creates a barrier to change (Da Silva, 1999) and this is discussed later in this chapter in the context of organisational culture. Nevertheless, it is argued that key elements of community policing, such as community engagement and problem-solving, were established long before the first police recruits marched in the desert sand, and that this, in time, acted as a facilitator of change in policing style.

The literature reviewed on policing and criminal justice locally and the transition from informal policing arrangements to a formal police organisation, is restricted to that available in English texts. The approach is underlined by evidence of the important
historical links between the UK and Abu Dhabi, but it is acknowledged that this limits the analysis. That said, this lens of documentary sources, as a partial insight into history, is sufficiently informative to illustrate early examples of policing development and of policy transfer.

The results of the analysis of policing themes in Abu Dhabi are discussed over three chronological eras. The first part discusses the various facets of culture and traditions applied to informal policing arrangements prior to 1957. Factors that included the various formal and informal military structures for maintaining order and security demonstrated the desire to preserve local power and control, which has persisted. Ultimately, an informal criminal justice system to deal with crime, suspects and a growing number of community problems, along with inadequate means by which to resolve them, steered the Ruler of Abu Dhabi to request the British government’s assistance in forming the first formal police force. It is argued that these factors of culture and tradition have remained dominant and have contributed to moulding the first formal policing style, and the subsequent decision, made decades later, to implement a community policing concept.

Part two discusses policing during the 1957 to 1999 period, from the establishment of the first formal paramilitary police in Abu Dhabi to phases of extensive growth in police organisational structure and personnel, to the expansion of public services. Charting this period of development demonstrates the change made from a policing model based on familial ties and relations to one governed by bureaucratic and administrative government. Operating as a paramilitary police force, the initial priorities were crime control and internal state security, which created the legacy of the formal policing function in Abu Dhabi. This period included the first evidence that policy transfer was to
become popular as a method of developing new approaches to organisational development.

Part three discusses the period 2000 to 2016, which is characterised by a quest for a new professionalism and a renewed international search for new policy ideas. Additional data available for this period relating to the political, social, environmental, and key risks associated with crime and security contextualise the challenges faced by the police at that time and inform the recently revised approach to policing style. The important elements of culture and tradition gained more prominence in this era, when a new focus on the organisation to become community-oriented and the foundations for the implementation of a community policing concept were established. The concluding part of this chapter summarises the relevant issues and arguments raised in this introduction and informs the remaining structure of this thesis.

1.1 Historical foundations of policing in Abu Dhabi (prior to 1957)

Prior to the introduction of any formal police organisation in Abu Dhabi, there were two distinct elements for the structure of policing arrangements: the regional formal military institutions and informal local paramilitary forces, and the application of local culture and religious traditions to criminal justice and problem-solving. These two elements created the framework for the maintenance of law and order and, it is argued, influenced how the police role was later formalised.

The internal and external military institutions that existed in Abu Dhabi and neighbouring countries, and their direct responsibility for maintenance of law and order, are of specific historical importance. It was not uncommon for the military to carry out a domestic law
enforcement role where the local government (Rulers) set a priority of protecting themselves, especially when there was a fear of violence being perpetrated against them (National Archives, 1968; Bayley, 2006). In support of this, the British had a long involvement in the Gulf region going back centuries, as part of the growth in international trade associated in the main with the business activities of the East India Company. The area that is now the UAE, along with other neighbouring countries, became part of a British protectorate, with guaranteed security in return for control of foreign affairs and commercial interests (Parliament, 2013). By carrying out a set of exclusive treaties with the Gulf states, the British aimed to stamp out piracy and criminality against shipping, guarding international trade routes (Dunstall and Godfrey, 2005; Rabi, 2006). As international trade continued to grow, the British signed a Maritime Truce in 1835 establishing the Trucial system that ‘cast Britain in the roles of protector, mediator, arbiter, and guarantor of settlements’ (Onley, 2009, p.7). Consequently, the British army enhanced its presence during the 1830s by increasing operational personnel in the area.

The British did not intend to become involved in the internal administration of the Gulf states and made no attempt to alter the laws or the rulers’ informal methods of applying criminal justice (Rabi, 2006). However, they did intervene in disputes between Rulers when they related to frontiers. The Buraimi affair, beginning in October 1949, was an example of such an intervention into what would become a long-standing territorial dispute (Priestland, 1987). At a time when extensive oil exploration was taking place in

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5 The East India Company, also called English East India Company, was formed for the exploitation of trade with East and Southeast Asia and India, incorporated by royal charter on December 31, 1600. The company became involved in politics and acted as an agent of British imperialism in India and elsewhere from the early 17th century to the middle of the 19th century.

6 The Gulf states are Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
the area, Saudi Arabia made claim to land that included the Buraimi oasis and surrounding villages (Zahlan, 1998; Morton, 2013). The British, representing the rulers of Abu Dhabi, defended the claim, aiming to resolve the dispute in what would be known as the Anglo-Saudi discussions. With slow progress towards a resolution by 1955, British forces were finally deployed in the area in support of local armed forces, to successfully recapture the region (Davidson, 2011). The dispute was finally resolved some years later at international arbitration in favour of Abu Dhabi (Morton, 2015). The significance of protecting the Buraimi region is that it was, and still remains, the home of the Ruling family in Abu Dhabi, who no doubt appreciated the continuing British protection of their tribes, power and land. This military action was taken during the post-war period even though, by then, the priorities and attitudes towards the Gulf states were beginning to change due to the collapse of the British government in India and other fiscal pressures (Smith, 2013). Nevertheless, the continued presence of the British maintaining an active and visible force to deal with serious crime and maintain order and security for over 150 years, with the full support of local tribes and their ruling Sheikh, formed the foundation of close relations with the UAE that would endure (Nixon, 2006; Neild, 2016).

In addition to the colonial armies, the local Rulers applied an informal police and local law enforcement regime using their own (paramilitary) ‘Matarzi System’ (Kibble and Al Shaali, 2000, p.294). Within the context of the role of the army, the police operated in a more militaristic fashion, responding to regional threats of violence that existed at the time. The Matarzi (or Mutarzeyah) were a selected team of men who operated under the command of the Ruler to protect the tribe, maintain security and enforce justice. However, they wore no uniform and had no administrative or organisational structure. The Matarzi were hand-picked from the community and were said to be strong loyal men, well known
in the area, often related to the Ruler and experienced in the use of firearms (Handhel, 2005). They had ‘all the characteristics of security men’ merged with those of military soldiers in implementing the laws (Al Shamsi, 2000, p.84), keeping an eye on the population as a type of watchman style of policing (Wilson, 1968). This approach to recruitment created two apparent opportunities for the Matarzi to carry out policing functions: firstly, the ruling family was assured of them being loyal to it in undertaking a protective role and securing state borders, and secondly, their familiarity in communities from where they were drawn meant that they were representative of the citizens they served. Consequently, such citizens might be more likely to consent to their role and cooperate with them in combatting crime and security problems. This also reflected an idea being developed in the context of policing in Britain in the 1820s (see Chapter 2). It was one that became explicit in the new principles of policing in London at the time (Reith, 1952) and more recently in considering police legitimacy and policing by consent (Reiner, 2010). The opportunity emphasised here relates to the importance of a connection between the public and the police (Matarzi) in order to cooperate in crime fighting (Kinsey et al., 1986).

The role of the Matarzi was wide and varied, having the priority of achieving internal security, including the protection of national borders, settling trade disputes and driving back invaders. They monitored market trade by supervising the movement of goods throughout the area, maintaining secure supply routes and protecting citizens from being exploited. They were also the tax collectors at the time when this was the only source of revenue for the tribal Rulers. In turn, this allowed for investment in basic facilities for citizens, overall a role generally not too dissimilar to that of the British police constable in the early 17th-century (Rawlings, 2011). To maintain a loyal and trusted security
regime, the area of command for the British army was restricted and it was not allowed to operate within the ‘Ruler’s place unless in an emergency’ (Kibble and Al Shaali, 2000, p.293). This differentiated the role of the Matarzi from the army in maintaining responsibility for local operations and protecting their Rulers, and as discussed below, this structure and governance for maintaining localised policing continues to the present day.

The structure of the regional armies and the local Matarzi lasted for over a century; however, as oil exploration began in the early 1950s, the need grew for new, more local armed forces. Their establishment was encouraged and supported by the British government in the early 1950s and this first local army, commanded by senior British army officers, was known as the Trucial Oman Scouts (Schmidt, 1971).7 This was significant in timing as in the following years, as the scouts took over full military control of the Trucial States, now the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the first police force was established in Abu Dhabi (Kibble and Al Shaali, 2000). It seems that in the light of the discovery of oil, the British were determined to expand the internal security infrastructure of these states and this took place not just in Abu Dhabi and bordering states, but in the surrounding Gulf countries (Strobl, 2011). This was early evidence of the British influence not just in military terms but later in policing too, which had a continued role and influence in the development of police administrative procedures and policing policy.

Local culture and traditions also have significant importance for Emiratis.8 Emsley (2007, ___________

7 Previously known as the ‘Trucial Oman Levies’, they were said to consist of a mixture of mature men from Aden and Jordan, continually supported and commanded by senior officers from the British Army until 1971 at the time of forming the Federation of the United Arab Emirates.
8 ‘Emirati’ is a term used that represents the indigenous local citizens of all the seven states that now form the United Arab Emirates.
p.131) states: ‘[culture] is seen primarily as a product – or even producer – of social practice’. It influences social policies, for example, those relating to conduct like smoking (shisha) in residential areas, eating and drinking during the month of Ramadan, and displays of affection, all of which, when breached, are taken up as policing issues within an Islamic society like that of Abu Dhabi (Price, 1999). Culture is also defined to include the ‘ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a particular people or society’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016), or the ‘collective mental programming of people in an environment’ (Hofstede, 2001, p.43). Al Ameri (2014), an Emirati social commentator, describes the impact of culture in Abu Dhabi in that:

it is where the old engages with the new and things just seem to flow naturally in that exchange. It is that bit of history that we see in each other every day. Culture to me was a trip to the old [market] with my father. It may not be as fancy to look at as the new museums … but it taught me to take pride in all that surrounded me.

This illustrates an important point when considering the transition from informal policing arrangements to a new formal organisation and its role in society. It contextualises the significance of including old traditions within more recent policing developments that helped to create a police force that was legitimate and operated with public consent. Emiratis take pride in their heritage and there were advantages to developing contemporary arrangements, including policing, if the links to culture could be maintained in some way.

Abu Dhabi is also an Islamic country determined to preserve its historical foundations. It is claimed that the application of Islamic principles maintains peace in society and affects

9 There are six Islamic principles, which are: the protection of life, protection of the family,
the everyday way of life, work and family decisions, as well as community safety priorities (Lippman et al., 1988). The application of policing in Abu Dhabi was and remains governed by Sharia law and enforcement of the UAE penal code\textsuperscript{10}. Extracted from Islamic foundations, it places an obligation on citizens to comply with laws, rules and regulations. Islamic criminal law is concerned with four issues: public safety (including protection of physical and mental well-being), the family (for example, punishing sexual activity outside of marriage), property (e.g. theft) and protecting the state and religion (Lippman et al., 1988). The effect in simple terms is that if a crime was committed, the offender was punished, and the victim compensated through informal means. Judicial decisions were often made by the leader of the tribe (the ruling Sheikh) (Kostiner, 2000), a process that to a limited extent continues today. Having evolved over centuries, this approach to law and order has had a strong influence on policing and judicial systems and has been a significant factor in influencing later approaches to policing.

Complementary to issues of culture are traditions, which are defined as the transmission of customs or beliefs from generation to generation (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016). In Abu Dhabi, this idea can be applied to traditional decision-making and problem-solving processes. This process operated within an environment in which family or neighbour disputes, including all types of crime, were resolved by applying Islamic principles. To help solve community problems, for example, it was a tradition for the Ruler to select other trusted citizens to deal with such matters as a social welfare function in society. At

\footnotesize{protection of education, protection of religion, protection of property and the protection of human dignity.}

an informal level, this method of applying a form of social support has long been practised in Abu Dhabi through the institution of the *Majlis*¹¹ (Salem, 2009). Sitting together with leaders in the *Majlis* was, and still is, a major part of the Arabian Bedouin tradition. In practice, the ruling Sheikh held discussions in the *Majlis* with fellow tribesmen, at which any individual could put forward their disputes or suggestions for consideration and ultimate resolution (Rabi, 2006). This might include, if necessary, punishment or compensation if, for example, the case involved a crime (Al Shamsi, 2000). This traditional approach to conflict resolution and decision-making was a demonstration of the informal judicial powers of the Ruler. However, over time, the increasing amount of work involved in this process made it problematic. The following account, relating to the experience of the Ruler in Abu Dhabi and his response, indicates the motivation to establish a new police force and constitutes an early example of an intention for policy transfer to take place:

At the end of December [1956] there was a clash [between two men] over a woman, which led to the wounding of a man. [The Ruler] sent some followers in two cars to bring the injured man and his assailants to appear before him in Abu Dhabi. [When congratulated by the British Political Agent for his actions, the Ruler commented that] he was finding it increasingly hard to undertake such tasks without a proper police force. He wants Her Majesty’s Government to help him form a force commanded by a British Officer which would be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Abu Dhabi. (Trip, 1957, p.306)¹²

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¹¹ The *Majlis* is one of the cornerstones of Emirati civilisation. For decades, friends, neighbours and families would gather in a *Majlis* during sunset. Meaning ‘a place of sitting’ in Arabic, the term is used to describe both a formal legislative assembly and a place for social gathering. Traditionally, it was one of the major facets of government and social life in the Gulf countries.

¹² J.P. Trip was a political agent, employed by the British government to maintain personal contact and good relations with local Rulers in the Trucial States. The role was to monitor progress, gather intelligence and protect British interests in the area (Onley, 2009). This included monitoring the
In practice, any victim (being a local citizen) who suffered a breach of their rights and freedoms could take their case directly to the Ruler’s Majlis for resolution, and this traditional method of securing a remedy is reported to be still quite common (Kibble, and Al Shaali, 2000). As discussed in the next chapter, this local application of tradition (holding council in the Majlis) and traditional methods of communication align, in principle, to key elements of a community policing concept relating to community engagement, problem-solving and community participation. The continued use of the Majlis by Emiratis and their Rulers, generally demonstrated that the cultural foundations for developing a community focused policing style was established long before the first police force was formed in Abu Dhabi. It is this approach to the preservation of ideas, social behaviour, infrastructure and family ties that was valued so much, and this, it is argued, became a fundamental element of how the recent style of community policing in Abu Dhabi was designed.

In summary, several factors led to the establishment of the first police force in Abu Dhabi, emanating from a historical experience that later influenced the formal police structure, role and responsibilities. These strong influences of culture and traditions permeated through the functions of the security forces, both regional and local, with continued support of the British motivating regional development. As discussed below, the strongest element of influence on the first police came from these military foundations and from the guidance of the British, who were at the forefront of modernisation and the development of contemporary programmes, including policing.
1.2 Establishment of the first formal police (1957-1999)

In a period of intense state building with new government departments, increased economic activity, new military institutions, and the volatility of territorial disputes, the first police force in Abu Dhabi was established in 1957. This development was encouraged and supported by the British state in order to preserve its interest and influence in the Persian Gulf and to maintain peace and stability (Smith, 2007); Britain’s primary motivation at the time was to secure new commercial interests related to oil exploration (Rabi, 2006). The first literary record of the existence of the new police occurs in correspondence between Abu Dhabi and London in a letter reporting that:

> the police force recently organised [in Abu Dhabi, has] thirty men recruited and rigged-out in khaki shirts and slacks, with orange head-clothes ... The policemen have been drilling for three to four hours every morning, to the amazement of the local populace, [and] … the Ruler has engaged two former [British] members of the Trucial Oman Scouts [to carry out the training]. (Trip, 1957, p.425)

The continued involvement of the British operating as a colonial force brought with it all the administrative processes and structures for the police to instigate a modernisation process in the region. However, there was little separation between the military and Abu Dhabi Police, each having been formed as part of the wider military organisation (Strobl, 2011). It was clear that this was, from the very beginning, a process of militarisation of the local police, with a limited role in society for community protection, acting primarily as an extension of the army (Kibble and Al Shaali, 2000). This blurred line between the military and the police was not unique and has been generally cited as a complex problem, as Cole (1999, p.89) explains:

> the complexity of protectorate policing …. lies mainly in the lack of a clear distinction between policing and military action. Most of the colonial senior
police officers … were recruited directly from the imperial armies, and [most] police forces in these protectorates were para-military units … In fact, in many of the pacified territories, police and military duties were interchangeable.

This raises the question of whether militaristic organisations could become a barrier to future police reforms, or whether, over time, any such challenges could be minimised or eliminated. The extent to which there is a military emphasis on policing can vary between countries (Brogden and Nijhar, 2005). Nevertheless, the militaristic style of the police creates confusion between the functions of military action and of policing powers and authority. This is not just a historical problem but one that currently exists in many advanced countries where there is evidence of increasing militarisation in policing (Newburn, 2008). This is part of the ‘controversy over policing [where] such militarisation … [creates] a deeper and more fundamental change in … society’ (Newburn and Reiner, 2007, p.943).

The issue illustrates what Hills (2014, p.765) describes as the ‘elusive meaning of policeness’ and how the organisation may be recognised as the police by its appearance or behavioural traits. This was illustrated by Hills and her experience in Somalia that, when visiting police stations, it was often challenging to distinguish the police from the complainants, as both groups wore the same clothes. In addition, during the early afternoon, it was also customary for the police commanders and other officers to chew narcotic khat, and consequently, they fell asleep under the tables and on the floor in their offices. Nevertheless, recognition of the police is not always achieved by the wearing of a distinctive uniform or by exhibiting disciplined behaviour. It might be attributed more to role priorities for maintaining security where policeness ‘acts as a lens through which law, policy and practice are refracted’ (Holdaway, 2013, p.710). However, there are
clearly advantages and disadvantages to the police force being militaristic. On the one hand, such organisations appear to be efficient when dealing with serious issues, such as state security. But at the same time, they create a gap between the police and the public, contributing to the blurring effect of the role in society, the legal framework and working methods (Weiss, 2011). Northern Ireland, as an example, has gone through a transformation of the police organisation from a centralised and bureaucratic paramilitary structure, to one based on the principles of decentralised community policing (Brogden and Nijhar, 2005). The new approach was far removed from the traditional policing style in Northern Ireland. It highlighted a failure of the core of militaristic policing practices in being able to change from a hierarchical, top-down, centralised armed force run on military lines and focused on the protection of the state, to one that was locally accountable and allowed officers to exercise local discretion. Similar issues of the problems of military structures and transformation to community policing approaches in other countries are discussed by Brogden and Nijhar, for example, in the European Union, Uganda, and Central and South America. But they acknowledge that in some cases, ‘traditional para-military policing … may not be an obstacle to local community policing in the long term’ (Brogden and Nijhar, 2005, p.120). Experiences of trial and error throughout implementation, as in the Netherlands, may be required to achieve success.

There is a distinction between the military (securing external borders and against threats made at the state) and a militaristic police force with a top-down hierarchical structure. The police, notwithstanding the fact that they can have a militaristic model, are ‘organisations within law enforcement bodies … with the statutory powers and legitimate status of the police’ (Rantatalo, 2012, p.51). In Abu Dhabi, the distinction between the military and the police followed some years later within the establishment of the statutory
powers of the police, but initially, without those powers, the role of the new police remained unclear. By the end of 1957, the number of recruits to the new police had grown to 120. Although they had reached ‘a passable standard of drill and turn out, the Ruler still [declined] to disclose how he [intended to] employ them’ (Trip, 1957, p.446). Another letter to London around the same time demonstrated this lack of clarity when after the report of a triple murder, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi attempted to catch the suspects with the assistance of the Trucial Oman Scouts, not the police, illustrating that there was still confusion between the roles of the two organisations. This was highlighted during the first decade after 1957 when the police delivered a narrow range of services at a time when police resources were limited, with no effective structure, and a lack of general education amongst its recruits. Nevertheless, establishing the police was an essential step taken by the Ruler towards the protection of national assets, including a response to combat crime such as ‘gun-running’ and security of oil revenues stored in the desert sand ‘rather than kept in the bank’ (Trip, 1957, p.332). The police were still very similar in their roles and responsibilities to the Matarzi, and in the absence of any other regulation, it seemed natural for them to default to this approach.

After the appointment of Sheikh Zayed in 1966 as the new Ruler of Abu Dhabi, there was renewed coercive pressure from the British for progress in developing all government entities including the police and security forces. To assist policing throughout the Trucial States, senior British police and military officers were appointed as commandants of all police forces. They were supported by a small team of British Special Branch officers, based in Dubai, who provided intelligence and information to maintain security against

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13 In August 1966, Sheikh Zayed, with the assistance of the British, became Ruler of Abu Dhabi, with a mandate to develop the Emirate as quickly as possible.
persisting threats, which included ongoing concerns about the security of the Buraimi oasis. Their combined roles provided a direct link between the local rulers and political agents, ensuring a coordinated approach to policing development while retaining British influence over policy (National Archives, 1967).

This action was pre-emptive of an announcement in 1968 that, for domestic reasons, the British government intended to withdraw all armed forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971, as part of a process of decolonisation (Sato, 2009; Davidson, 2011; Smith, 2016). This decision followed other challenges faced in the Gulf, including the Suez crisis of 1956, seen as a turning point for ‘Britain’s imperial destiny in the Middle East’ (Smith, 2007, p.1). Following the announcement, the Rulers of the Trucial States agreed to support each other in the event of any future foreign aggression, and the first joint military force for external defence was formed (Smith, 2013). Up to the end of 1971, extensive negotiations were coordinated by the British between the Rulers of the protectorates to negotiate the formation of a new federation. Ultimately, only the Trucial States would reach agreement to do so, with the others, including Bahrain, intent on remaining independent of that arrangement (National Archives, 1971).

As oil revenues increased, the extensive development of the infrastructure of Abu Dhabi took place, with the building of new houses, schools, hospitals, roads and government buildings, including foreign embassies (Zahlan, 1998). Construction was facilitated by mass immigration of workers, primarily from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, during the 1970s. This development was not without associated concerns from police commanders about possible security threats, resulting in a heightened security presence at key locations such as banks (National Archives, 1976). But for political reasons, to ensure that the
infrastructure plans of the states progressed, this approach to immigration took primacy over security considerations. It set aside the longer-term dangers associated with the growth in population comprised of foreign workers, most of whom arrived without official identification papers (Kostiner, 2000). Illegal immigration was also difficult to prevent throughout the Trucial States due to the indented nature of the coast, which could not be efficiently patrolled by any force (National Archives, 1968).

Consequently, during this period, the role of the police was extended primarily to guarding banks, palaces, markets and boats arriving into port, again taking over many of the responsibilities previously carried out by the Matarzi. They also dealt with wanted people, usually connected with trade disputes, and brought them before the ruling Sheikh to resolve their complaints as a continuation of his informal judicial role within the tradition of the Majlis. This was a period when a similar change in police development was taking place in many other countries in what Bayley (2006, p.10) describes as ‘the ascension of democracy and political development … [and] a component of social stability’. To some extent, separation of policing from the military was part of the transformation to a more democratic society, but it also required extensive training, especially where recruits were transferred from a quasi-military, top-down style to a new collegial style (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988).

Other than the apparent influence of the British, it appears that there was evidence of a period of more local and regional policy transfer taking place, and continued evidence of the benefits of good practice learned by Abu Dhabi from elsewhere, as an aid to rapid growth and advancement in policing. This was illustrated in the late 1960s with the beginning of the professionalisation of the police, which included development of the
organisation’s structure and new specialised departments. Abu Dhabi collaborated with Jordan for the supply of several experienced officers to work in Abu Dhabi. These Jordanian officers had worked alongside the British army and brought their own military approach to policing (Kibble and Al Shaali, 2010). Training became a key part of police professional development, and the partnership with Jordan allowed for several senior police officers to travel to that country to receive instruction at the police college. This later stimulated the development, in 1969, of a new police officer training college in Abu Dhabi. This college was a government initiative that centralised the control of training and became a key mechanism of standardising common objectives for policing (Jones et al., 1994), one that still exists today. It appears, however, from its structure and priorities that Abu Dhabi Police remained dominant as a militaristic organisation focused on internal state security, with no apparent elements of a community orientation or social policing in a society where strong culture and traditions might have been expected to have had an influence.

The Federation of the UAE was formed on 2nd December 1971, coinciding with the British forces’ departure at a time that would be ‘the genesis of international concern for the region’ (Zahlan, 1998, p.3). On the previous day, taking advantage of the British withdrawal, Iranian armed forces seized a group of islands (the largest of which was Abu Musa) from Abu Dhabi, raising another territorial dispute that has persisted to this day. It illustrates that the UAE, as a whole, remains vulnerable to foreign aggression (Davidson, 2011). However, although choosing not to become involved in this dispute (Neild, 2016), ‘Britain’s role was to remain far from inactive’, retaining broad links to the Gulf states that were ‘both practical and personal’ (Rabi, 2006, p. 361). Large numbers of British nationals remained, employed as civil servants and wielding significant
influence on the development of key government projects, including policing (Sato, 2009; Onley, 2009; Smith, 2013).

Soon, a new criminal justice system was formulated. The UAE Constitution gave responsibility for criminal justice jointly to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) for courts, and for policing alone, to the Ministry of Interior (MoI). This formed the structure of governance of the police that was government led, one which had remained the same at the time of this study. The right to act as a judge in the Majlis as a form of legal process had, to some extent, been retained, with the UAE constitution recognising these traditional powers, and in theory, retaining the Ruler’s primacy over the modern courts.

This has been recently illustrated in Dubai, when the Ruler intervened in a case of reckless driving and ‘ordered the young [Emirati] men to perform community service … to clean the city’s streets for a month’ (The National, 2017). All Emirates have Courts of First Instance and Courts of Appeal, either Federal or local, in addition to the Sharia Courts, and the primary source of legislation is drawn from Sharia law (MoJ, 2008). The Sharia legal principles extended the police role from traditional law enforcement to the protection of morals and social behaviour and respecting human values and freedoms, ensuring all citizens lived a quiet and peaceful life. This aspect of tradition underpinned

14 The MoI is similar to the UK Home Office, having been formed in 1971 at the time of the Federation, it is one of the most important federal establishments in the UAE due to its leading and effective role that contributes to enhancing security and stability. The Ministry was given several duties and responsibilities, the most important of these being to protect state security, create, organize and supervise police and security forces, conduct all affairs related to naturalization and residency, regulate traffic, provide protection and security of establishments and property.

15 Article 3 states that ‘The member Emirates shall exercise sovereignty over their own territories and territorial waters in all matters not within the jurisdiction of the Union’ as assigned in this Constitution and Article 41 where ‘Every person shall have the right to submit complaints to the competent authorities (which may include the ruling Sheikh(s)), including the judicial authorities, concerning the abuse or infringement of the rights and freedoms’ United Arab Emirates Constitution of 1971.
what later became a strong social welfare role for the police (see Chapter 5).

Within the structure of the MoI, the police were categorised into three groups: the Dubai Police, which remained autonomous from the rest; police forces in the other six Emirates including Abu Dhabi; and, at a Ministry level, the coastguard, police aviation, civil defence and finance. Notwithstanding that the MoI had responsibility for police forces throughout the UAE, the chief of police in each state was locally appointed by the ruling Sheikhs, and consequently, in addition to their accountability to the Ministry, each chief was accountable to the Sheikhs, directly creating a tripartite arrangement for governance.

This arrangement is one that Cole (1999, pp.97-99) also characterises as typical of military police organisations where, firstly, heads of government retain powers to appoint chiefs of police and ‘have them under their direct command’; secondly, the proximity of the police to government control creates less accountability (for example, to the public); and thirdly, there is a focus primarily on internal security, with the result ‘that tasks such as community policing are underdeveloped’. This is in contrast to the governance of the police in most western democracies, where there is a separation of powers, accompanied by attempts to create mechanisms of accountability of the police to locally elected representatives and citizens, with limited direct control from government (Jones, 2008).

The MoI created the first regulations beginning in 1971 and the police were given responsibility for the security and stability of the Emirate and maintaining the ‘souls, honors and properties of its people’ and for ‘the prevention of crimes and chasing culprits, using all capabilities and scientific capacities’.16 However, the defining point for the

16 Article 4 of the Ministry of Interior Regulation No. 8, 1971
police came with a Police and Security Decree of 1972 when they were described as a disciplined entity with special uniform [distinct from the armed forces] and special military training.\textsuperscript{17} Notwithstanding the differentiation from the military via a special uniform, the reference to a disciplined entity and military training indicated how the Rulers and policymakers saw their police at that time as primarily an extension of the army. This approach to law and policing in history is informative for understanding, for example, the priorities that the Ruler’s saw as most important at the time, and that ‘the police [were becoming] arguably the central public service in a [modernising] state’ (Jones et al., 1994, p.1).

The description of the police, including the term military, seems to have been perceived as a problem at some point, leading to a revision of the legislation four years later in the new federal law when reference to a disciplined entity was changed to a disciplined \textit{civil} entity\textsuperscript{18}. This created a greater demarcation between the military and the police, however, the focus on militarisation was compounded in the revised law in 1976 that defined the responsibilities for the police as the protection of public security, crime prevention, prosecution and control, undertaking interrogations and investigations within the limits of the law, protecting lives, possessions and funds, and finally, enforcing the laws assigned to them.\textsuperscript{19} In considering these responsibilities and the specific words used of protection, control, interrogations, enforcing and prosecution, the police were, it seemed, regarded as a persistent militaristic organisation. However, the wording of the law does not necessarily lead to a clear understanding of the police, as ‘the real policy is likely to

\textsuperscript{17} Police and Public Security Decree 1972
\textsuperscript{18} Clause (a), Article 3, Federal Law No. 12 1976
\textsuperscript{19} Article 9 Federal Law No. 12 1976
be inherent in behaviour’ (Jones et al., 1994, p.7). This would require research into understanding the full extent of what, why and how policing policy was being influenced and applied on the ground.

During the following years, other changes in the organisation were reported. These mainly relate to structure and the expansion of police departments and associated staff, reflecting what one might find in any large police organisation in other developed countries. With other disciplines and services, the police also gained responsibility for the ambulance service, civil defence (fire and rescue service), prisons, vehicle licensing and immigration, creating a whole multi-service organisation that employed more than 34,000 people by 1999. The police were still focused on providing services for the public as a government-led organisation that was imposed on society without the need for public involvement or cooperation. As discussed in the following chapter, the implementation of a community policing philosophy creates an alternative approach and aims to form a policing model that engages with the public and encourages them to participate with the police to solve problems (Goldstein, 1990; Tilley, 2008). Because the police had not undertaken this role initially, there was always the danger that it could be filled by others, such as private policing organisations, and there was evidence of this in Abu Dhabi.

During this period of police development, private security companies providing a form of private policing in Abu Dhabi, carrying out what can be typically described as a community safety function, rapidly grew. These included policing activities associated with crime prevention, guard duties, and the maintenance of safety and security in

\footnote{Information relating to the private security policing in Abu Dhabi was obtained by personal visits and meetings with the Director of the Private Security Business Department (PSBD).}
neighbourhoods, a common private security role, as described, for example, by Prenzler (2010). In Abu Dhabi, private security companies provide protective services\textsuperscript{21} for what is described as the mass private property sector (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Stenning & Shearing, 2015) and this includes gated residential neighbourhoods, labour camp housing complexes, shopping malls and other major buildings, in the main, to the exclusion of the local police.

There are concerns that the increase in privatisation of policing services in this way may have serious social consequences, such as the segregation of communities and social exclusion of marginalised groups (Jones 2007; van Steden and Sarre, 2007). Notwithstanding that private security employees are seen to be a key partner for the police in the prevention and detection of crime (Stenning, 2000), this partnership does not work if the two entities are detached from each other, or if there is no coordination or sharing of information and appears to be the case in Abu Dhabi. The answer for this problem, in part, is the regulation of private security companies, but this did not take place until after 2003. Irrespective of whether there was regulation or not, security company employees in Abu Dhabi had direct contact with communities and opportunities to form community relationships based on trust. Through this, the public regularly shared information and reported community problems direct to security companies for them to solve, irrespective of the presence of the formal police.

In summary, there was confusion for the public and some officials in differentiating

\textsuperscript{21} The role of private security employees included security at gated communities, labour camps and shopping malls, carrying out guard duties, regulating access, patrols in uniform on foot and in vehicles, collecting community information, dealing with neighbour disputes, enforcing community rules, monitoring of unoccupied premises and dealing with minor disorder.
between the military and the police, other than the special uniform they wore (Kibble and Al Shaali, 2000). Significantly, this military style of policing does little to encourage sound community and police relations built on trust. Moreover, it can be argued that militarism is a barrier to ‘professionalism, external accountability and community policing’ (Da Silva, 1999, p.121). The militaristic approach implies that the responsibility for crime prevention is the sole duty of the police, whereas community policing widens this approach to include partners and the public (Tilley, 2008). This created a real challenge for organisational change. During this period, the culture and traditions of society and how they influenced the approach to policing appear to have had little impact; but as discussed below, they became more relevant as the police in Abu Dhabi embarked on a programme of further modernisation and change in policing style.

1.3 Strategic development of Abu Dhabi policing (2000-2016)

This section focusses on the 2000 to 2016 period, when the professional development of the police included a new strategy to restructure the organisation and implement community policing in Abu Dhabi. The beginning of this process took place in 2000, following many years of destabilisation in the Gulf region (Zahlan, 1998) (discussed below). The approach to strategic change for policing is contextualised by examining four themes relating to the local political framework and how it applied to policy-making processes, demographic factors related to population growth, the natural geographic footprint that determined the structure of the police organisation and the risks linked to crime and security.

These themes, when brought together, comprise a resurgence of the informal policing

22 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
culture and traditions into a formal policing style. This was done in the context of the new Abu Dhabi, a rapidly developing country with substantial growth in population, infrastructure and community problems. The determination to maintain the culture and traditions in the context of modern reforms was restated by Sheikh Zayed, who made a significant speech relating to this issue in December 2003. His speech created what can be construed as the main influence and motivation for renewed policy transfer from Britain and elsewhere (to Abu Dhabi), creating opportunities and a stimulus for change, but at the same time, protecting social traditions. He stated:

While, though, we emphasise that the protection of our national heritage, our traditions and our culture are of the utmost importance, we also reaffirm that we shall continue to absorb and to acquire anything of modern developments in the technical, economic and cultural sphere that may come from elsewhere, [if] it is of use to us … Engage in interaction with the world around you. Take from it what is useful to you and to your country and leave aside those things that are harmful to your society, your traditions and your values. (Al Nahyan, 2003)

This speech was made at a critical point in the planned modernisation of the police. It was clear that this statement encouraged authorities to look beyond its own state boundary to seek out good practice and policy ideas, yet at the same time ensured that these agents of policy transfer (see Chapter 3) were selective in their choice to ensure that new laws, practice and procedures were adopted and adapted in the interests of Abu Dhabi, and in accordance with Islamic principles. This approach supports the idea emphasised by Hills (2009, p.301) that, in practice, there is no transnational policecraft that can be applied anywhere without adaption due to ‘political … power … [or other] deeper reason’. The subsequent process of policy learning needed to be coordinated, so a department for strategy and performance improvement was established to set the strategic plans for the
police, monitor the development of new ideas and coordinate the process at a senior management level. However, the creation of policy documents or other formal guidance was limited and contributed to the initial confusion as to what a new style of policing meant for the organisation. However, the new strategic framework of 2003 meant that several areas for development were agreed and these mirrored similar British police forces. These included, for example, sectors for policing operations, human resources and central operations, and in changing the way in which frontline policing was to be delivered through a community policing style.

Following the first implementation phase of the new strategy, in the context of this research, one of the most important achievements reported within the organisation was the successful creation of the community police department as a central entity to promote policy transfer and implementation. The department was directly responsible under the new strategy (Abu Dhabi Police, 2016), with a broad mandate to improve public confidence in the police organisation and to implement a community policing model that was perceived to be the approach to achieve it. After a period of trials with new teams, the number of community police operational personnel dedicated to community police roles was increased and placed in all of the main police stations, working together to support the operational policing priorities in Abu Dhabi, including the maintenance of internal state security.

Internal security, especially for the ruling family, was perceived as high risk and, as such, the Matarzi were still operating, albeit in a more specialist capacity. Their new role was to provide personal protection and undertake guard duties at palaces and other similar buildings, not dissimilar to the royal protection teams of the Metropolitan Police in
London. Most other functions and responsibilities of the Matarzi, however, had been absorbed into other public and private sector entities. The police, for example, took over the traditional (Matarzi) role of patrolling public spaces out of uniform to maintain public obedience to the law and to prevent crime. Police officers undertaking this task were locally known as the crime prevention patrol teams. It could be argued that keeping an eye on citizens and visitors was an essential part of maintaining security, but at the same time, invisible policing, as a legacy of the Matarzi, did not contribute to a force that was engaging with the public to build trust and confidence with them.

Several other new strategic decisions were being made by the police regarding structure and role, and the local political framework defined how policy was made locally. Abu Dhabi is the leading power and largest emirate of the constitutional federation of seven states that form the UAE (Zahlan, 1998): (see map at Appendix A). The UAE has its own single government supporting state Rulers with the Presidency Headquarters and Cabinet of Government based in Abu Dhabi, where several strategic development programmes for the Emirates were centrally managed (Urban Planning Council, 2011). The Executive Council is the local administrative authority and it managed the progress of government projects for over 20 entities, including the police (Rugh, 2007), and importantly, where fiscal decisions were made in support of national development plans.

The other federal authorities stipulated in the Constitution comprise the Supreme Council of the Federation, the President and Vice President of the Federation, the Cabinet of the

23 The Abu Dhabi Plan 2030 is an urban structure framework plan and is focused on the continued growth of Abu Dhabi to achieve its vision of becoming a global capital city (UPC 2011). The plan details specific areas for development including the environment, land use and transportation. Several other islands are being developed in this way and create opportunities for further growth in residential populations, business and leisure.
Federation, the Federal National Council and the Federal Judiciary (Davidson, 2013). This demonstrates an extensive structure for federalism; however, there is no federal police. Each state continues to maintain its own local police organisation. This approach maintained the traditional view of holding local security arrangements under local control, in the same way that the *Matari* had been utilised in the past. In practice, due to the level of government control, many policy decisions had to be approved at a ministry level or by the Executive Council, which created a significant amount of bureaucracy at the top and a challenge for policymakers to advance ideas for approval. In practice, most policy decisions were made informally by pragmatic and charismatic leaders lower down in the police organisation. This was where less bureaucracy existed, and there was room for flexibility for those who were charged with the implementation of organisational change programmes. This was an advantage for the police in advancing projects quickly, but at the same time, it created challenges for governance, allowing, for example, for fractures in support structures among some senior officers (see Chapter 5).

Demographic issues were also significant, with continued growth seen in the diverse population throughout the country. The first records of the total population of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi were created in 1962, when 13,000 people were counted. Of this total, approximately 5,300 were recorded as living on the island of the capital city (Al Fahim, 2007). Since then, from a basic infrastructure with highways formed out of sand, the city has grown to become the major metropolis that it is today. The population has equally continued to grow rapidly since the 1960s, with records showing an increase to 2.4 million by 2013 (SCAD, 2016). The population of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, particularly Abu Dhabi City, is now extremely diverse. Overall, it is estimated that no more than 20 per cent of the residents are Emirati or hold UAE nationality. The majority of the indigenous
population (up to 90 per cent) are Sunni Muslims, including the ruling family, with the remaining being Shia Muslims, broadly representing world average demographic data.\textsuperscript{24} Abu Dhabi, since the early 1970s, has also recorded over 40 per cent of its citizens being under 15 years of age (National Archives, 1976), and this has been reflected more recently in census data (Kostiner, 2000). It was said that from a policing perspective, this raised concerns about how to engage with young people, to support them through childhood, education, access to employment and the transition to adulthood and family life, to ensure the continued safety and security of the state in the future.\textsuperscript{25}

The remainder of the expatriate population comprises mainly labourers, largely from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; workers and their families from the United States (US), Europe and Australia, who generally work with large companies or are consultants employed by the Abu Dhabi Government; and those from the Philippines, Thailand and other parts of the Far East, who work in various support roles. Policing such a range of nationalities, most of whom do not speak the national language of Arabic, is a major challenge. Although English is widely spoken and is well integrated into the working practices of the country, both in the public and private sectors, there are still a considerable number of residents whose linguistic skills are restricted to their home language. This is evident too for the police, who speak Arabic mostly, especially among those who are in the lower ranks and who are engaged with the public directly. For the police, this was a significant challenge for the approach of community engagement and to avail of opportunities to share information and solve problems.

\textsuperscript{24} Population data are estimated by the Pew Research Center reporting on the future of the Muslim population considering projections from 2010 to 2030: www.pewforum.org/

\textsuperscript{25} Comments were made during conversations with senior officers of the Community Police Department in Abu Dhabi during the period of this study.
In addition, the expatriate population has formed mostly a transient group. The law restricted permanent residency only to local Arabs or, in some very limited cases, to others who obtained property ownership. All other foreign expatriate residents remained in the country with a valid working visa. As work came to an end, the visa was cancelled, and foreigners had a limited number of days to leave. Therefore, it followed that only an estimated 20 per cent of the total population had permanent residency rights. When most of the major construction work was expected to have finished, it was anticipated that a large percentage of the expatriate population would return to their country of origin. For community policing, this created a unique set of challenges to deal with communities with different needs and expectations, taking into consideration the extent of the public’s interest in becoming involved in community issues and long-term programmes of change, when most people were unlikely to see the results.

The geographic factors relating to the environment determined the recent structure of the police organisation and demonstrated the diversity of the policing styles required in each area. Abu Dhabi Emirate is divided into four distinct areas. The first is Abu Dhabi city, the capital of the UAE, which is mainly located on an island, the largest in the area on the coast of the Gulf of Arabia. This is the most densely populated area, with people from over 200 countries living, working and visiting the city, as recorded by the Statistics Centre in Abu Dhabi (SCAD, 2016). It is an area with a mix of high rise buildings and urban residential estates, and is typical of other capital cities in the world regarding its diversity and attraction for business and tourism.

The second main area is Al Ain, the home of the ruling family, which also has a large city
but one that is much more traditional and residential than Abu Dhabi, and the population has a greater balance between local and expatriates. The largest of all the areas is the Western Region (the Empty Quarter) where most of the onshore oil industry, nuclear power stations and other key infrastructure facilities are located. The small towns and villages in the west are predominantly populated by local citizens, and this is where the traditional institution of the *Majlis*, for example, remains strongest and local family leaders have a strong influence in how their area is governed and policed. The last is known as the ‘External Area’, which again comprises mostly local Emirati residents but has some major infrastructural developments, including those on Yas Island, the location of the Abu Dhabi Formula One circuit and other tourist attractions.

These four areas formed the structure of the police. Each is described as a directorate and each has several large comprehensive police stations that provide a full range of services for the public. This structure creates various styles associated with policing an emirate that ranges from two major cities to numerous rural communities. This is an important consideration when analysing a change in policing style and whether the approach to community policing, for example, might have been applied differently when operationalised in different areas. Nevertheless, the apparent dominance of Abu Dhabi in geography and economic power and the fact that it has held the presidency of the UAE since 1971, meant that it was the leading state in the federal government. For such matters as policing, for example, other states looked to Abu Dhabi for leadership, ideas, policy and guidance, finance and resources. This was particularly relevant for this research, where Abu Dhabi had more recently been involved in a process of transferring community policing policy to other states and the impact of this is discussed briefly in the concluding chapter of this thesis when considering the future of policing locally.
In relation to crime and security, a positive aspect of society throughout Abu Dhabi was a very low crime rate, but there were underlying security issues that could manifest themselves into national problems. Detailed crime data are restricted information within the police organisation; however, there is a limited amount of open source data contained in reports produced by the media and other agencies, such as the United States (US) Embassy Regional Security Office, other embassy officials and citizens. The US Embassy, as an example, provided travel advice to its citizens in relation to crime risks, stating that, ‘most travellers to [Abu Dhabi] are not affected by crime. Violent crimes and crimes against property are rare and where petty theft does occur, it is often, within the large expatriate workforce’ (US Embassy, 2016). Street crime was rarely seen and evidence of social decay, such as graffiti and broken windows, was almost non-existent. In context, almost half of the crime cases reported to the police related to financial debt due to insufficient funds to clear bank cheques; however, these cases were often resolved as civil disputes (Bond, 2012).

No regular national survey has been undertaken to assess public perceptions of crime in the same context to which it has been done, for example, in Britain. However, limited data were collected and published in 2014 by YouGov on behalf of a national newspaper, considering the views of the public throughout all the seven states of the UAE (The National, 2014). Data were collected from a small sample of 1,000 people from a total UAE population of over eight million. The results cannot be verified, and consequently, care should be taken in interpreting responses from participants. Important points from the survey highlight that most residents in Abu Dhabi believed that crime over the preceding three years had risen. Participants in other states also saw Abu Dhabi as the
main area in the UAE where crime was rising but, at the same time, residents in Abu Dhabi felt safer than those in other states. Although residents feared that theft was the main problem, they were becoming more security-conscious due to increasing crime generally. In relation to their views of the police, most participants were satisfied that they were doing a good job, and although police visibility was regarded as being good, there was a general view that an increase in patrols in local neighbourhoods was required.

Although Abu Dhabi had no history of serious urban disorder, externally to the area regional security threats remained high on the agenda (Anderson et al., 2009). There had been growing tensions during the previous decades, with political protests spanning the region. Additionally, the World Trade Center terrorist attack in New York in 2001 (Kamrava, 2011; Rosenberg, 2012), the Iraq war of 2003 and the years that followed profoundly affected security in the Middle East, with persisting widespread protests (Bansahel and Byman, 2004; Lynch, 2012). There were two failed terrorist plots in the UAE in 2005 and 2007; though not in Abu Dhabi, they underscored the continuing threats to all the states (Ulrichsen, 2017). Beginning in 2010, many young people, suffering widespread unemployment and frustrated with their leaders and authoritarian rule, took to the streets in several countries demanding political change in what became known as the Arab Spring (Noueihied and Warren, 2012). With the use of communications technology, such as the internet and social media, people were able to spread information, ideas and opinions to others, a factor that was a catalyst for continued disorder (Lynch, 2012). It was a period that emphasised the sectarianism of division between Sunni and Shia Arab societies, and though the reasons for violence were complex, religion was ‘perhaps the most visible of the cleavages that exist[ed]’ at the time (Turner, 2015, p.288).
Bahrain suffered the most, experiencing religious tension and instability between the majority Shia population, ‘who were profoundly dissatisfied with their second-class citizenship’ experienced under the rule of the Sunni-minority government (Berti and Guzansky, 2014, p.36). Serious disorder would last for several years, with ongoing violence that resulted in fatalities for both citizens and the police (Zahlan, 1998; Kostiner, 2000; Bahrain Independent Commission Inquiry, 2011). As part of the wider UAE response, Abu Dhabi supported Bahrain to control the protests by sending military personnel and police officers to the country in an attempt to prevent similar disorder erupting within home UAE states (Davidson, 2011). But there was criticism generally of heavy-handed tactics being deployed, with the UK government encouraging peaceful negotiations rather than repression as a solution to the problems (Parliament, 2013). Serious conflicts continued spreading violence in other countries (Young et al., 2014) including Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen, where Abu Dhabi and the other emirates of the UAE were also engaged in military operations to support efforts to return the region to a state of peace (Davidson, 2011; Emirates 24/7, 2015).

Although the uprising spread rapidly throughout the region, the Gulf countries of the UAE and Qatar remained largely unaffected (Matthiesen, 2013). But the growing risks to regional stability ‘revealed a sense of unease among officials in Abu Dhabi’, resulting in a tightening of government security policy (Ulrichsen, 2017, p.184). A strong stance was taken against anyone who showed affiliation to foreign terrorist groups that were deemed to threaten state security, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Efforts were made to eradicate the problem with extensive investigations leading to convictions in court (BBC, 2014; Rasheed, 2016; Ulrichsen, 2017). In addition, hundreds of foreign non-Muslim mercenaries were recruited, trained and accommodated in military barracks in Abu
Dhabi, ready to respond to demonstrations should they occur (Davidson, 2013). Concurrently, to counterbalance this action in 2011, the UAE Federal government implemented fiscal measures to appease its citizens in all states (Berti and Guzansky, 2014). Salaries and allowances for nationals working in government, military and the police were increased by up to 100 per cent. Similar action was taken by other states in the Gulf region as they attempted to relieve the financial pressures that could contribute to further anger among citizens (Gelvin, 2012). The outcome of this action has left the ruling families in the UAE, at least for the time being, in a sound position, preserving their power and authority with the support and consent of the citizens. However, the lack of economic diversification beyond oil revenues brings into question whether this type of political strategy can be sustained. States like Abu Dhabi have to prepare for alternative answers to future challenges (Matthiesen, 2013) and changing policing styles: to engage more closely with the public to improve police and community relations becomes more relevant.

From an international perspective, it was thought locally within the media that there was also a known threat from criminal groups residing in Abu Dhabi who originated in other countries. Although the true extent of this was difficult to assess, this threat stretched beyond Abu Dhabi to other emirates such as Dubai, and many cases were reported in the media, such as the arrest of a drug smuggling ring that indicated the problem was real (Barakat, 2015). What was known was the emergence of a trend widely recognised in recent years, that of the growth in organised criminal groups. In addition to drugs smuggling, such groups were typically involved in several different crimes, including bank theft, vehicle theft, cable theft, prostitution, violation of intellectual property rights and money laundering, as experienced in Dubai (Mathiason, 2010). Although the true
extent was unknown, organised crime was also present in Abu Dhabi and it was increasing. Some evidence of this was found with an increase seen in cash seizures at ports and borders in Abu Dhabi, which included a case involving the illegal transportation of gold originating from Africa into the UAE using oil tankers (WAM, 2011).

With increased flows of international cargo and the enhanced infrastructural development in the UAE, the new Khalifa deep port, located halfway between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, increased the risks of serious crime, including, for example, the smuggling of counterfeit goods and foreign currency (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011; Gulf News, 2016). Clearly, the UAE remains a key trade route as it was during the era of the Trucial States, and that brought risks of crime with it. As mentioned above, with most of the population being expatriates from other countries, there was a large flow of people in and out of the country on residency and work visas. This also created the potential for human trafficking problems and other associated crimes, including fraud, assault, and other violence (US Department of State, 2017). For the police, there was a challenge in how best to create a relationship with the public where they could share information and intelligence to prevent crime, maintain a society where people felt safe. Zhao et al. (2002) suggest that the best chance of success in this regard, is where an organisation provides high visibility policing, combined with implementing problem-solving techniques that engages the public.

Abu Dhabi has a unique amalgamation of traditional and modern political and social systems, which aimed to guarantee continued national stability and to be influential in combating localised levels of instability in the region and neighbouring countries. There was no history of terrorism, major disorder or public demonstrations in Abu Dhabi and
no overt political complaints about government. Nevertheless, key issues of crime and security in context created an appreciation of why certain priorities for strategic development might have been created and formed some of the drivers for a change in policing style.

In summary, the police in Abu Dhabi, although maintaining a militaristic approach to its structure and style, can be described as having an eye on the future, being keen to develop good practice by transferring policy ideas from other countries, but simultaneously, maintaining its strong history of culture and its religious traditions. State security is clearly an essential part of the responsibilities of the military, but also it is necessary for the police and society to play their part in cooperating with each other as a response to the public’s concerns or fears. The national crime survey data in Abu Dhabi has evidenced a potential level of fear of rising crime from the public’s perspective but the extent of this is unclear. However, the views and concerns of the police policymakers who were interviewed as part of this research inform this issue further (see Chapter 5). As Crawford (2007, p.899) emphasises: ‘fear reduction may be as important as crime reduction for perceptions of security, if not more so’.

1.4 Conclusion

Throughout this brief and selective analysis of policing history in Abu Dhabi and the surrounding states that now form the UAE, questions are raised as to what the rationale for policing reform was and why it was deemed necessary to change the policing style. Previously, the dominant and persistent issues faced by the Rulers had been the maintenance of internal security and international trade over centuries and this created a response to security risks that were controlled by use of force, and the tribal military institutions, both formal and informal, were the primary means of achieving that
(Shoshan, 2016). With minimal local resources to maintain security, it was the British who initially took the lead in providing protective services, and the army and its commanders had a significant influence in the area, with the support of local Rulers, in looking after all interests. Yet there was a clear demarcation between the army and the local Matarzi that ensured the Rulers retained local control of security in their own area and with people whom they trusted. This structure of crime control, it is argued, has had a continuing influence on the structure of the police in each state. The period up to 1957 also highlights how Abu Dhabi was, for many decades, open to new ideas from elsewhere, and this early evidence of policy transfer experience, specifically from the British, also set the foundations for further development of the states, including all components of government.

For policing, on the one hand, the history of culture and Islamic traditions in Abu Dhabi relating to the informal approach to criminal justice worked well for many centuries and was accepted by the community. This approach created an apparent opportunity for the successful implementation of the new police and later for a community policing style. But at the same time, the implementation of a community policing model in the context of an organisation that operated in a militaristic fashion appears to have created challenges for this approach. The principles of community policing, as discussed in the next chapter, address, inter alia, the issues of devolved responsibility and decision-making from the bottom up, elements that are less common in hierarchical militaristic organisations. Equally, where existing police policy has, for example, left the day-to-day policing of the mass private property sector to security companies, elements of a community policing model, such as community engagement, become more challenging to achieve in the traditional local policing role. This raises the issue of how policing policy
transferred from another country might require adaptation to be implemented locally, and is one of the questions raised as part of this study.

In any event, the challenges for the implementation of community policing were not important in the first few decades of the development of the police, which focused on creating the foundations of structures and services provided for emergency response policing. This period initially amounted to a divergence from the traditional approach in Abu Dhabi of engaging with communities to solve problems, a process that remained informal for some time and was managed by the Rulers probably until the formation of the UAE in 1971 and the drafting of the Constitution. The Constitution was primarily based around a strong emphasis on federalism, yet for policing, the control of crime and security remained a local issue with chiefs of police being appointed locally, and no apparent support for federal law enforcement organisations. This was the legacy of the approach demonstrated by the Matarzi, which maintained local control of policing, and this practice continues to this day.

The preceding discussion suggests that the conditions present in the Abu Dhabi policing system lent themselves to community-oriented policing. The traditional values, culture and resources were available to achieve it, even in the context of regional security concerns and local territorial disputes that have persisted. To reach that goal, however, an understanding of what community policing meant as a philosophy and in practice was required. The next chapter reviews and discusses the literature to develop that understanding and specifically how the police have connected with and engaged with their citizenry at a local level through community engagement and problem-solving approaches, both of which are associated with the informal traditional methods of
policing in Abu Dhabi. Chapter 3 follows with a study of policy transfer and the process by which ideas are learned and translated from one country (or one place) to another.
Chapter 2: Community Policing

This chapter explores the concept of community policing and how it has been recently applied in Britain. In so doing, it considers the motivations for developing community policing and how and why it has, in the context of this research, become the primary model of choice in Abu Dhabi. Although community policing is a common term, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that it is difficult to define; it is often referred to as a nebulous, yet persistent, notion, and a ‘notoriously slippery concept’, which has different meanings in different policing environments (Tilley, 2008, p.377). Nevertheless, it now seems that not only is community policing an international ‘household idea’ (Goldstein, 1994, p.viii), but it is widely accepted that when implemented in its various forms, it can become an individual philosophy for all police employees, and as an outcome, it can improve public confidence in the police (Flanagan, 2007, Tilley, 2008; Kappeler and Gaines, 2015). However, there are major challenges with operationalising the idea and implementation failure has been a significant legacy of the history of community policing and this is discussed further in this chapter. Despite this, the concept has, over the last three decades, become a policy idea with global reach, something that this chapter explores regarding its attractiveness as a solution for contemporary problems of order and security.

A great deal has been written about community policing, mainly in the US and UK, and consequently, the sources of research material are extensive. This review concentrates mainly on the British experience, but draws, where relevant, from the US literature to support the later discussion on Abu Dhabi Police. The chapter is organised into five parts.
The first provides a historical perspective to identify the importance of building effective police and community relations, an element that, it is suggested, is central to successful community policing. The discussion is separated into two periods, firstly 1829 to 1959, charting the history from the establishment of the new police force in London when, it is argued, the genesis of the community policing vision was formed, the principles of which remain relevant and are frequently invoked today. The second period, 1959 to 1992, was, for many reasons, a time when police and community relations broke down, which contextualises the more recent approach to changes in policing style.

Part two discusses a selection of recent policies that tells the story about how community policing has developed in Britain over the last 30 years. It emphasises the need for the police to cooperate closer with the public, but it is a policing model that has not always had the support of all police forces. This discussion emphasises the idea that community policing is often reasserted as a political response to serious problems of order and security and to enhance the legitimacy of the police organisation (Jones and Newburn, 2007). The study of policy also emphasises the complexity of establishing solutions to problems and that new approaches to policing are not always as successful in building community relations as policymakers would believe.

Part three discusses various descriptions of community policing. It seeks to understand what the concept means in the British context, since its development in the late 1970s. This includes a discussion as to how this approach ultimately aimed to rebuild community relations in the period up to 2016, and in doing so, attempts to provide specificity to the various components of community policing. To expand on the theory in developing community policing ideas, other analogous policing models ranging from ‘problem-
oriented policing’ and ‘intelligence-led policing’ to the most recent approach to ‘reassurance policing’ and ‘neighbourhood policing’ in Britain are also analysed. In doing so, this section informs a definition of the British model of community policing to bring the reader up to date with the most recent incarnation of this evolving concept.

Part four considers the challenges of implementing community policing and acknowledges too that there is criticism of whether the concept is as successful in practice as many commentators would suggest (Gordon, 1984). For this review, the discussion focuses on two main themes, relating to firstly the organisation’s culture, and secondly, the competing priorities between a proactive, problem-solving approach and the challenges associated with demand and response policing. What is clear is that these challenges are critical to success, and although not easily solved, action can be taken to mitigate the effects they have. In part five, the conclusion brings together the key issues discussed, considering why, notwithstanding its complexity as an approach, community policing has become attractive as a policy discourse for many other countries beyond Britain.

2.1 Charting the history of police and community relations

This first section provides a selective account of the history of the police during two periods in Britain that give an insight to the foundations of a community policing philosophy and the development of police and community relations. Historical analysis is important for understanding how approaches to community policing have been influenced by the experiences of the past (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003) through cultural changes (Garland, 2001), political motivation (Reiner, 2010) and economic factors (Neocleous, 2000). The analysis of the construction of community relations at high levels
of police legitimacy and of their later corrosion are charted in periods broadly following the approach set out by Reiner (2010, p.67). First, 1829 to 1959 was a period when, ‘the modern state and particularly the [new] police took over substantial responsibility for crime control and order maintenance’ (Clarke, 1987, p.388). It was a period of significant challenge for the police in the control of crime and disorder, internal corruption and conflicting levels of public acceptance of the police between the upper, middle and working classes. This resulted in what has been described as the ebb and flow of relations with the public that would at least end for the time being, in the 1950s, on a perceived higher note of success (Gordon, 1984). It is argued that understanding the reasons for this later success informs the key elements of a more recent community policing philosophy.

This is followed by the 1959 to 1992 period, when over three decades police and community relations became eroded due to the shift to professionalisation and the priority given to response policing to meet increasing demand and growing levels of crime. The erosion was further affected by internal police corruption and multiple occurrences of serious urban riots, all of which brought into question the extent of police legitimacy. In summary, it is argued, that in this era of new crime challenges and of continued urban disorder, the Peelian principles of policing from the nineteenth century became possibly more relevant than they were at the point of their conception.

2.1.1 Building police and community relations

Consideration of the first period begins by acknowledging the work of Colquhoun and Chadwick who, in the late 1700s, developed ideas for crime control and crime prevention that would later influence the creation of a new police force (Garland, 2001). Sir Robert Peel established the first police force in London via the Metropolitan Police Act 1829,
and most historians give a great deal of credit to him, in a period of public hostility and intense social conflict, for the introduction of new legislation and other reforms, including drafting nine principles for guiding the new force (Miller, 1979, Emsley, 2007; Newburn, 2008; HMIC, 2016). Although largely rhetorical, and indeed, there is some doubt cast as to whether Peel formulated them, or used the actual words commonly cited, the ‘Peelian’ principles are, nevertheless, commonly attributed to him (Kappeler and Gaines, 2015) and two, discussed below, are most relevant to this study of community policing.

In 1829, there was an expectation that the old traditions of society, where the public was directly involved in self-policing, would continue, but simultaneously, there was a need to overcome the previous inadequacies of informal and traditional methods of dealing with crime and disorder (Gatrell, 1981). This approach supported what has been described by Miller (1979, p.15) as an ‘extension of the state into the lives of ordinary citizens’. The Peelian principles contain elements emphasising this point in that the police should represent their local communities:

To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence. (Reith, 1952, p.154)

Secondly, the principles advocated proactive policing, emphasising what Chadwick, in 1829, had identified as the primary task for the new police being ‘the prevention of crime’ (Critchley, 1978, p.52). In a more recent context, these principles look familiar as part of a community-oriented organisation achieved through high visibility patrols on regular beats (Oliver, 1998; Adams et al., 2002; Gill et al., 2014). However, as Garland (2001,
p.30) explains, for various reasons, this was initially a ‘path not taken’. In practice, the new police did not represent the local population due in the main to initial recruitment from cities outside of London, which contributed to distancing the police from local citizens (Richardson, 1974). In addition, the retention of overt links to the military, demonstrated by the governments’ appointment of a Lieutenant Colonel from the army as one of its first two commissioners (originally known as justices), along with many other recruits who had military backgrounds, also contributed to the gap (Emsley, 2012). But this approach appeared to be deliberate, as the commissioners sought to distance themselves from upper and middle-class communities, avoiding the corrupting cosy relationships of their predecessors.

The new police, although tolerated by some, were initially viewed with some suspicion and controversy in what was deemed to be the exercise of a class-controlled rule of law against the working class (Storch, 1976; Clarke, 1987; Miller, 1979). They were perceived as an intrusion on civil liberties and likened to the French gendarmerie, consisting, it was said, ‘of spies and informers’ (Stead, 1984, p.516). This resistance to the police was compounded in that they were described by the media as a military body employed in civilian clothes and a political force controlled by the government (Emsley, 2009). An early trusting relationship between the police and the public was either absent or was going to be challenging to develop. However, to combat this initial negative image, the new police later distinguished themselves from the gendarmerie, avoiding the ‘sensitivity to liberty and hostility to all things French’ (Emsley, 2007, p.133). They were uniformed, non-political, non-military, mostly unarmed and would operate on a basis of public consent, and in principle, this approach undertook ‘efforts to accredit the new police with legitimacy’ (Mawby, 2000, p.107). If there was any process of policy transfer
taking place at the time from France to Britain, this appears to be early evidence of policy divergence.

It would be much later before the police became less open to political and military influence (Hassel et al., 2003). In time, the police took over from the military as the legitimate force in the control of crime and disorder, including riot control (Brogden et al., 1988; Waddington and Wright, 2008). By the 1850s, the successes in crime control were widely reported, not just in London, but in other parts of the country too where there was a steady increase in public confidence (Gatrell, 1981). Crime control, by arresting and prosecuting offenders, became the primary role of the police, whereas crime prevention seemed destined to remain simply part of the original principles, which ‘may not be or ever have been realised in practice [during this period]’ (Reiner, 2010, p.47). What emerged was a view that the police had become ‘imposers of urban discipline’, patrolling locations where the working class frequented, such as public houses and sports stadiums. Thus, community relations ‘between the police and the working class were [consequently] a good bit worse than the conventional wisdom [had] held them to be’ (Storch, 1976, p.502). No matter how the new police were viewed, they ultimately operated in communities to maintain order, keep the peace and enforce the new social order in society. This was the beginning of a new form of policing that would, over many decades, have a chequered history of success and failure of police legitimacy and community relations, and, later, of efforts to implement community policing too (Tyler, 2013).

The distancing of the police from the public continued; and by the end of the nineteenth century, the police uniform with ‘high buttoned tunic and distinctive helmet looked far
more distinct from civilians and far more military than the original police officer of 1829’ (Emsley 2012, p.49). The 1800s were also a period of community urbanisation and demobilisation, but simultaneously, there were concerns about the conditions that the labouring poor were experiencing and ‘there were many years of working-class deprivation and discontent ahead’ (Miller, 1979, p.21). There was a form of social change and urban expansion taking place, not just with the advancing role of the police, but including new labour laws and the legalisation of trade unions. It was a period of little access to transport and communication media, with most families living and working in the same areas for generations. This enabled the similarly immobile police to develop and maintain close community relations with them. However, the late 1800s was, nevertheless, a period of failed high-profile investigations and perceived police violence in quelling demonstrations that damaged community relations too (Miller 1979).

By the mid-1900s, the idea of the neighbourhood became an essential part of maintaining a ‘stable community’ (Beach, 1995, p.8). Notwithstanding the reported success of the police and improving community relations, the early 1900s were not without instances of serious urban disorder, with political violence occurring in the form of labour riots and the general strike in 1926. Nevertheless, in this period, crime generally remained low or was in decline (Wood, 2006). Regarding established and effective police and community relations, it was why this time saw the creation of the traditional iconic image of the ‘bobby on the beat’, patrolling on foot or on a bicycle in communities, that historians refer to as the golden age of policing (Miller, 1979; Clarke, 1987; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Emsley, 2009; Reiner, 2010). Local police officers, it was said, were familiar in their neighbourhood, and in turn, they knew most of the citizens on their beat (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003). The style of policing was primarily based on high-visibility
uniformed patrols maintaining law and order. It was a level of visible policing that generally attained high levels of public support, albeit there were still tensions between the police and the working class that were fuelled by the strict enforcement of the law. However, not all had the same positive view of this period. As Loader and Mulcahy (2003, p.viii) argue, episodes of continuing police malpractice and other scandals contributed to a steady decline in public confidence after 1945, and during this period, the police were transformed from a ‘sacred into a profane social institution’. Gordon (1984) also casts doubt on whether the golden age ever existed, pointing to the evidence that opposition to the police, often involving violence, remained persistent throughout this period.

Nevertheless, the backdrop to the rising legitimacy of the police up to the 1950s included a level of acceptance by the public that the police were more likely to arrest and prosecute offenders than deal with them informally. This acted as a deterrent to the control and prevention of crime (Gatrell, 1981; Emsley, 2012). It was a compliance-based approach to policing that was much less about community cooperation and participation than public approval of police actions, reflecting the Peelian principles (Tyler, 2013). But this did not last. There was ‘increasing concern about the effectiveness of the police’ (Jones et al., 1994, p.219) and over the following decade, crime began to rise significantly (Garland 2001), which seemed to end the ‘rosy portrait’ of the police being ‘lionized by the broad spectrum of opinion’ (Reiner, 2010, pp.68-69). This period was consequently followed by an erosion in community relations, at a time when the police had become even more focused on crime control (Clarke, 1987).
2.1.2 The erosion of police and community relations

From 1959, communities were changing based on major transformations of economic, social, cultural and political factors (Garland, 2001). Working class families were enjoying an improved welfare system, higher salaries, new cars, new homes and better working conditions, and they were becoming the new affluent workers (Goldthorpe et al., 1968). The change, as described by Garland, was that the public was now able to form ‘communities of choice’ as opposed to ‘communities of fate’, resulting in less community bonding and face-to-face interaction between families that had previously been the norm (Garland, 2001, p.89). The new opportunities of mobility and technology, and of the pressures of rising crime, increased public demand, and political influence motivated the police to change too. However, maintaining a community-focused style of policing that had been successful in the 1950s was to become a significant challenge. As Reiner (2010, p.78) illustrates:

> From a position of almost complete invisibility as a political issue, after 1959 policing became a babble of scandalous revelation, controversy, and competing agendas for reform. The tacit contract between police and public, so delicately drawn between the 1850s and 1950s began to fray glaringly.

As motor vehicles became more readily available for the police in the 1960s, with the aim of improving patrolling and effectiveness in response to growing demands for service, the police increasingly withdrew to mobile patrols, leaving very few officers patrolling communities on foot as they had done before (Mackenzie and Henry, 2009). It was a new quest for professionalism in a period of growing bureaucracy and standardisation that was acting on the police, resulting in a more traditional model that saw the rise of ‘unit beat policing’ with police cars patrolled geographic areas in towns and cities (Neyroud, 2007,
p.127). This change coincided with other new technologies, such as the telephone and advanced police radio and command and control systems, which reduced the need for the public to have face-to-face contact with the police in times of need (Rowe, 2014).

Maintaining a close relationship with the public became more problematic due to the requirement for improved response times to emergency calls, a rise in demand for services and increased levels of reported crime and disorder (Waddington, 1993; Neyroud, 2007). Answering the growing number of 999 calls significantly hindered the ability of the police to maintain close interaction with the public and they were no longer able to ask how things were and what problems the public might be concerned about (Skogan, 2004). It was a period of de-localisation of policing and was more about ‘getting there and getting out’ and ignoring the root causes of the problems they attended (Goldstein, 1990, p.20). A priority of maintaining the continuity of patrols in cars meant that the police lost ownership of community problems as they passed them on to others to deal with as part of a new administrative rationalisation. They were becoming disengaged from communities as there was a shift in policing operations from a proactive to a more reactive incident-driven style that was harming the police image (Gordon, 1984; Neyroud, 2007). This approach represented a divergence from a community policing concept where officers develop and maintain local ownership of their area, and was to have a significant impact on police and community relations and the extent to which policing by consent was taking place. The less the police were participating with the community, the less they would understand their needs, and the more frustrated and hostile the public became with them (Banton, 1964; Miller 1979; Fielding, 1995).

As demand grew, it was acknowledged that the police needed to look outside the
organisation to the public for their cooperation and that greater engagement with the community was needed to rebuild trust and confidence to help solve the problems of crime (Alderson, 1979; Schaffer, 1980; Friedmann, 1989). John Alderson (1979, p.38), the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall in 1979, argued that a traditional, and militaristic policing style evident in London, was no longer adequate and that ‘a newer philosophy of policing [was] required in which policing is not only seen as a matter of controlling the bad but also includes activating the good’. However, a move away from crime fighting and response-policing styles did not initially receive broad support from other chief constables due to a lack of management buy-in and a perceived shift away from the traditional role of the police (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Williamson, 2005). In addition, the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police argued at the time that the community policing approach should not stand in the way of reactive policing as both complemented each other as components of a total policing model (Gordon, 1984). Nevertheless, Alderson was highly influential at the time and he continued to establish a community policing approach in his own police area (Gordon, 1984; Tilley, 2008). He set out a new order for his officers, stating that:

community policing describes a style of day-to-day policing in residential areas in which the public and other social agencies take part by helping to prevent crime, and particularly juvenile delinquency, through social as opposed to legal action. (Alderson, 1979, p.239)

Alderson was acting in response to what was a reactive policing policy that he argued had gone too far. Acknowledging that responding purely as a demand-led service focused on crime fighting meant that there was less of a connection between the police and the community (Kinsey et al., 1986). Alderson’s work was the beginning of a revival of interest in a community-focused style that emphasised the importance of partnership
working within the concept of resolving community problems. He instructed that his community police officers would be in the first tier of policing, supported by others in traditional roles, such as emergency response and crime investigation, in effect, reversing the traditional police structure. However, it would not be until the late 1980s that Alderson’s vision would become the orthodoxy of other police areas (Reiner, 2010). His vision was still only the foundation of what would develop into the wider role of community policing in Britain over the following 30 years.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the growing pressure to improve police accountability in calculative terms was beginning to result in government policy being redrafted, where ‘important decisions about policing were [being] taken by central bodies’ (Jones, et al., 1994, p.222). Serious disorder throughout the country became the catalyst for change, with government and senior police leaders emphasising that crime control could not be achieved by state agencies alone (Garland, 2001). This was stressed in a Home Office report (1993, p.iii), which stated that:

> It is now widely recognised that crime cannot be prevented by an exclusive reliance on the police and other criminal justice agencies, the bodies to which the community has traditionally delegated responsibility. Rather, it depends on coordinated action by a wide range of agencies.

It was a time when there was a desire to re-engage with the public and to reconsider ‘the principles and practices [of the police] which are historic and traditional and to venture forth with commitment of their own’ (Alderson, 1979, p.2). An increased emphasis on a new orthodoxy of a community policing style (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994), it was thought, could be implemented to reconstruct the relationship with the public and end what Lea and Young (1984) describe as the vicious cycle of alienation.
In summary, this concise review of policing history points to several factors that, it is argued, have become important recently in the development of community policing in Britain. This applies both in relation to formulating the concepts and towards the process of operationalising the model. The historical experience indicates that public acceptance of the legitimacy of the police appears to be achieved through visibility, accessibility and familiarity, with a police focus not just on crime control but helping the public too, establishing a foundation of a social welfare role for the police (Punch and Naylor, 1973). The next section advances this discussion to consider the main drivers for change in policing style in Britain that resulted in a renewed focus on community policing as a solution to problems of maintaining order and security.

2.2 Government policy as a driver of change in policing style

This section discusses the selective elements of government policy relating to the British model of community policing with a chronological analysis from the 1970s to 2016, during a period of concerns about invasive policing. It tells the story of how neighbourhood policing came into being, emphasising the need for the police to be closer to the public. A variety of contemporary problems, including rising crime and a series of crisis events, created an imperative to explore solutions based around communities, and this has, in recent years, become a driver of change (Hughes, 2006). The most notable impact of reenergising community policing in Britain relates to the aftermath of riots and other serious crime between 1970 and 2001 (Mackenzie and Henry, 2009). These crisis events were, in part, a symptom of a weakening in community cohesion, a rise in the fear of crime and an erosion in police and community relations. These issues have put successive governments under pressure, and in turn, highlight that more recently ‘the
current second generation version of [neighbourhood policing] is a wholly political construct’ (Innes, 2005, p.158). This discussion illustrates the complexity of operationalising policy ideas, and supports the assertion that community policing is generally implemented as a political response to serious problems of order and security or to improve levels of legitimacy of the police organisation (Jones and Newburn, 2007). Ultimately, policymakers benefit from understanding these types of issues so that they can, in turn, seek out policy solutions either locally or internationally.

There were other reasons for the disorder connected with the marginalisation of young black men, but prior to the riots the police had lost the consent of the community to operate in their neighbourhoods in some parts of Britain (Scarman, 1982; Gordon 1984; Innes 2004). The erosion in community relations was also connected with the age of those involved in the disorder (Trojanowicz, 1989), highlighting criminality amongst young people in gangs, and community policing might not have been the answer to the problem, whereas harder crime fighting strategies may have been more appropriate (Innes and Innes, 2011b). During the 1970s and 1980s, street crime was high, and the saturation of police patrols and thousands of occurrences of youth being stopped and searched ultimately contributed to multiple serious riots (Scarman, 1982). This raised the question as to whether this was a sign that community policing was failing. Policing tactics that included stop and search, use of force, and the deployment of personnel armed with personal protective equipment such as side handled batons and US-style handcuffs was also a sign of a ‘trend towards the militarisation of the police into a repressive force, and the polarization of opposition in some areas, notably inner city areas with large black populations’ (Clarke, 1987, p.384). Nevertheless, the crisis incidents of the 1970s were at least ‘important in raising the status of community policing [again] as a possible means.
of improving community relations’ (Mackenzie and Henry, 2009, p.10).

After the London riots in 1981, the subsequent Scarman report highlighted the importance of community engagement, consultation, accountability and efforts to develop and rebuild police and community relations (Scarman, 1982). The report was a major driver for change in Britain that would guide police leaders advocating a return to a proactive community policing style (Tilley, 2008). Scarman encouraged the development of a relationship between the police and the public of mutual trust and goodwill rooted at a local level, suggesting remedies that had been proselytised previously by Alderson (Clarke, 1987). Several recommendations were made, including; 1) ‘that home beat officers should have a vital role to develop community relations’; 2) officers ‘policing on foot should do so on a regular basis and should be familiar to the communities they served’ and 3) that there should be, as a form of accountability for policing, a ‘statutory framework for consultation between the police and local communities with the establishment of local consultative committees’ (Scarman, 1982, pp.90-97).

Simultaneously, in encouraging a more direct line of police accountability to local communities (Home Office Circular 54/1982), the government required chief constables to explore ways to connect the police with the public and advise them about policing needs and of crime reduction. It was a time when chief constables were considering how to implement the law impartially and to promote the principle of policing by consent. Finding a way to overcome the view that a police officer was associated with the community’s weaknesses, troubles and failings, was a concern and it was natural to assume there would be tensions between the public and the police unless this perception could be changed (Schaffer, 1980).
Scarman’s police consultative committees were originally enacted under section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. It directed that arrangements be made in each police area ‘for obtaining the views of the people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area and for obtaining their cooperation with the police in preventing crime in the area’ (Zander, 1985, p.145). Section 106 was later repealed by the Police Act 1996 due, in the main, to a lack of clarity as to what specific form the consultation arrangements should take and who should participate (Jones et al., 1994). To solve the problem, this issue was later transferred to the responsibility of local government and wider partnership structures, such as those created in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Nevertheless, over the following decade, instances of serious rioting continued in a period when crime doubled (Garland, 2001). Despite Scarman, control and accountability of the police became more centralised, driven by political interests and not local communities. The miners’ strike in 1984 was evidence of this and police tactics at the time did little to help the quest to build community relations in those communities affected. It was a period of perceived crisis of the welfare state that macro-level changes to social and economic policies that were deemed necessary (Garland, 2001). The miners’ strike ended in March 1985, but other unrelated disorder continued throughout the country and ‘attention was again focused on policing and the poor relations between the police and the black community generally’ (Cantle, 2005, p.44).

The next key development was the murder of Stephen Lawrence in London, which triggered a new government-sponsored enquiry into police action (Macpherson, 1999). The enquiry found, inter alia, that the recommendations of the 1982 Scarman report had
largely been ignored and the need to build effective community relations and restore confidence in the police was again emphasised. The report recommended that the police, to be more sensitive of the communities they served, should recruit from all ethnic backgrounds, reflecting one of the Peelian principles discussed above. The erosion of community cohesion was a problem not just in London but in other parts of the country too, where, for example, in Bradford, Ouseley (2001, p.1) notes the following:

[there were] growing divisions among its population along race, ethnic, religious and social class lines – and now finds itself in a grip of fear. Few people talking openly about problems, either within their own communities or across different cultural communities.

In the same year that Stephen Lawrence was murdered, a new Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) thematic report was published, *Keeping the Peace: Policing Disorder* (HMIC, 1999). It stated inter alia that the police should ‘take a stronger and more active role in dealing with low level disorder and anti-social behaviour’. The report also strongly recommend that the police should adopt a problem-solving style, working with the community and building on partnership work. Implementation of any new style of policing was, however, subsequently slow and by 2001 there was a recurrence of serious riots. Heightened tensions between communities exposed the continued failure of approaches to community policing and a general fracture in society, where issues of ‘segregation [and] social cohesion’ were brought to the fore, causing political concern (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005, p.408). It was a time of a ‘pervasive sense of failure’ that would again raise questions about the ability of the police to control crime (Garland, 2001, p.62; Cantle, 2001).

These persisting problems led to two significant pieces of work from the Home Office
and the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA). The work informed new government policy that would broaden the agenda for policing from narrow crime control to anti-social behaviour and other community-based priorities. The first was the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) and the second was a community cohesion project being undertaken by the NPIA. Firstly, the NRPP aimed to improve the public perception of crime and disorder, and feelings of safety through high visibility patrols that would be accessible and familiar, increasing public engagement and the sharing of community intelligence (Povey, 2001; Crawford et al., 2003). Although crime was falling towards the end of the 1990s (Simmons, 2002; Crawford, 2007), among the public, fear of crime was high (Innes, 2004; Walker et al., 2006), an issue that became known as the reassurance gap (ACPO, 2001). There was an assumption that if crime was low or decreasing, the public would be reassured that the police were doing their job, whereas, if fear of crime was too high, then public confidence in the police was likely to be low (Millie and Herrington, 2005). Fear of crime was not a new problem, but over time it had developed into a mission statement on its own as a self-standing policy and included a broader agenda about confidence in policing (Hale, 1996; Innes, 2004). The second project managed by the NPIA on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) aimed to improve community cohesion and took into consideration several government and independent reports (Scarman, 1981; Povey, 2001; Home Office, 2004a, 2005b, 2006)26 recommending inter alia, changes to policing approaches in the aftermath of the riots. The focus of this project had three elements, community engagement, problem-solving and partnership working, and dedicated teams working at a neighbourhood level.

26 There were a number of other Home Office reports referred to by the project team in their research including: Home Office (2005) National Policing Plan 2005-2008 (no longer available);
In time, the two projects merged drawing together the aims of each one, and a new model for ‘neighbourhood policing’ was developed (ACPO, 2006). Research into the effectiveness of the new neighbourhood policing concept was undertaken between 2003 and 2005 at several pilot sites (Tuffin et al., 2006, p.ix). But the approach was not without criticism. For example, Fitzgerald et al. (2002, p.132) observe that in their view neighbourhood or reassurance policing may well be community policing under a new name rather than a new approach, and ‘it is difficult to justify devoting limited police resources to policing activity that serves only to give people the impression they are safer from crime’. There were indications too in British police forces that varying approaches to community policing had been implemented with analogous concepts, described as safer neighbourhoods, township policing, geographic policing and micro-best policing (Millie and Herrington, 2005). This illustrates the complexity in operationalising community policing because there are many variations in approaches (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994). As Innes (2006b, p.96) points out, there is a great deal of flexibility for the local adaptation of community policing, even at a city level, that allows for such variation. Nevertheless, the new approach to neighbourhood policing was to have a clear crime focus compared to community policing being simply focused on reassurance alone (Dalgleish and Myhill, 2004). The new model had a focus on reassurance and building confidence in policing, but also crime reduction, hence, the need for a link to an intelligence-led policing model (see below).

The positive outcome from the pilots on the effects of reducing fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, feelings of safety, and improved public confidence in the police contributed to the new Home Office Strategic Plan (2004-2008). The plan set out the
government’s ambition for further investment in the concept and for the rollout of neighbourhood policing throughout the country, supporting the new policing style flagged in the White Paper, ‘Building Communities, Beating Crime’ (Home Office, 2004b, p.7), stating that, by 2008:

we [the government] want every community to benefit from the level and style of neighbourhood policing that they need … providing a visible, reassuring presence, preventing and detecting crime and developing a constructive and lasting engagement with members of their community.

In addition, the critical event of the London terrorist bombings in 2005 was to add to the important role of neighbourhood policing being integrated into the UK national counter terrorism strategy. This integration included a focus on achieving the prevention of terrorism through maintaining close relations with the public to obtain their trust and confidence, and to get them to share information with authorities, especially with suspicions about potential terrorist planning (Innes, 2006a; Neyroud, 2007). This gave an impression that the revised approach to neighbourhood policing was expected to achieve a great deal and was presented to the public, through government policy, as a panacea for policing in a troubled society. It was presented as a solution to problems related to police effectiveness and legitimacy (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Newburn, 2008; Tyler, 2013), something that it may never become (Friedmann, 1989; Garland, 2001). Neighbourhood policing was a new form of policing, a new way for police officers to see their role in society, and a fundamental change in the organisation’s culture, even if it was a form of ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004).

Following the initial launch of neighbourhood policing teams, increasing fiscal pressures raised an emphasis on value for money, efficiency and effectiveness, evidence-based
methods of policing and more preventative work (Maguire and John, 2006; Neyroud, 2011). By 2010, with fewer resources, the police focused on what most increased public satisfaction (Innes, 2011b). This, in turn, meant that the officers and staff involved in community policing, from senior levels to the frontline rank and file, had to be committed to it, if it were to have any chance of success. In addition, there was more generally a constant pressure on the police organisation to provide sufficient resources to carry out the role of neighbourhood policing. Innes (2004) asserts that the approach is limited if carried out in isolation. As Crawford et al. (2003, p.41, emphasis in original) emphasise: ‘to reassure residents and make a difference in terms of visibility, accessibility and familiarity, relatively substantial increases in patrol presence may be needed’. Spending on neighbourhood policing, however, was unlikely to return to pre-2010 levels because of a change in government policy and austerity measures (Greenhalgh and Gibbs, 2014). This was a significant issue and created a risk of returning to the fire-fighting-type response services of the 1970s (Longstaff et al., 2015).

In summary, this review of policy development, including government enquiries and thematic reports over three decades, illustrates that potential solutions to a breakdown in police and community relations, and growing crime and security problems, are not always easily translated into positive outcomes by implementation of community policing. Continued problems of urban riots and serious crime have persisted irrespective of policy, which raises the question posited by Skogan (2004) as to whether community policing can work in practice. As Skogan (2004, p.181) states: ‘community policing might still be needed for its symbolic value in providing conditions for policing by consent, but that does not mean it is most sensibly the organizing principle for all policing’. How the elements of the community policing model have developed over the last few decades are
complex, but the next section aims to analyse this complexity. It builds upon the discussion in this and the previous section to establish the aims and mechanisms that contribute to define the most recent approach of ‘neighbourhood policing’ in Britain.

2.3 Community policing in England and Wales

This section charts the development of the model of community policing applied in Britain and illustrates how it has become a melting pot of various policing ideas and concepts under a rubric that creates a conceptual challenge (Alderson, 1979; Brogden and Nijhar, 2005; Tilley, 2008). This discussion takes into consideration associated, but by no means identical, models of policing including ‘problem-oriented policing’, ‘intelligence-led policing’ and ‘reassurance policing’, all of which have become absorbed into the most recent ‘neighbourhood policing’ approach in Britain (Bayley 1994b; Skogan and Hartnett, 1998; Goldstein, 1990; Skogan, 2004; Tilley, 2008; ACPO, 2016, Higgins, 2017). The discussion is divided into two parts, the first considering more fully what community policing aims to achieve and the second identifying the mechanisms and programmes through which it is operationalised. This discussion leads to the construction of a detailed definition of the most recent approach to community policing in Britain, which is included at the conclusion of this section. Although a definition can never be beyond contestation because of the complexity of the subject, formulating one advises operational policing practice (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Skogan, 2009). This informs the aims of this research too, underpinning the analysis of policy transfer to Abu Dhabi.

The origins of the term ‘community policing’ lie in the US during Goldstein’s seminal work on problem-solving in the 1970s (Goldstein, 1979), at which point various methodologies and programmes, such as Neighbourhood Watch, were established to
support implementation of the concept (Gordon, 1984). The aims of community policing have, however, continued to evolve over the last three decades and the following discussion sets out the current landscape.

2.3.1 The aims of community policing

In response to the erosion in police and community relations since 1959, there was a new debate about how the failings of the police reflected in urban riots and rising crime could be resolved (Jones et al., 1994). The change that took place was to ensure the police could support the traditional approach to social order to solve the problems of crime, fear of crime, anti-social behaviour, environmental issues, and other matters which affect the quality of life (Tilley, 2008). A community policing style was to become an approach that aimed to do this by postulating a broader vision of policing. The aim was to engage with the public on the basis that the ‘mandate of crime prevention should mean more than the traditional techniques of patrol and detection’ (Reiner, 2010, p.142). This included a re-examination of the service role of the police that had been successful in the past, where the police were not just the enforcers of law and order but also willing to help communities too (Alderson, 1979).

It was well-known then, as it is today, that when the public called for assistance this was not always related to a crime problem and that the police, consequently, often ‘play[ed] a social welfare role’, one that was vividly described as a ‘secret social service’ (Punch, 1979, p.102). The ‘secret’ element relates to the fact that this type of work rarely appears in police crime statistics, so remains hidden from scrutiny; in turn, however, this contributes to confusion about the role and aims of the police, and the balance between force and service (Banton, 1964). In addition, fear of crime was becoming a policy
problem that had gradually built up over the last 20 years and administrative tools like the Crime Survey of England and Wales fed into this issue (Innes, 2004; Ferraro, 1995; Jansson, 2006; Walker et al., 2006). Consequently, fear of crime gained ‘a new salience’ that would find its way into the key aims of community and reassurance policing (Garland, 2001, p.10).

Several studies have been carried out to understand the aims of community policing in a broader context examining the concept in comparison with traditional policing narratives. This type of comparison was originally presented by Sparrow (1988) and has been widely used and adapted as an informative tool (Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Kappeler and Gaines, 2015). The extract of the comparison repeated here (see Table 1) includes the addition of terminology that highlights the more recent landscape of neighbourhood policing. This demonstrates, for example, aims related to improving quality of life (2, 8) to solve problems of crime and disorder (3, 4, 5, 6), and to establish effective community relations that improve the legitimacy of the police organisation (1, 7, 9, 10, 11). Although useful for making such a comparison, the distinction is not as straightforward as it might appear, giving an impression that policing must be one or the other, traditional or community oriented. In practice, there is much more of an integration of the two. As Fielding (1995) points out, the collecting of community information, for example, can be used to inform harder-edged ‘traditional policing’ work. Nevertheless, the most significant difference between the concepts is the transition from a reactive style of traditional policing to proactive and preventative community policing.

Where research in the 1980s sought to some extent to differentiate between the traditional styles of policing with one that is community focused, others might assert that community
policing still has a traditional policing role to play, for example, in the arrest and prosecution of offenders, and in the response to emergency calls from the public (Goldstein, 1990; Kappeler and Baines, 2015). This was illustrated by Innes (1999, p.398), who states: ‘the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the English approach to policing has been held to reside in the veiled nature of the available coercion, it was an iron fist in a velvet glove’. If this is considered in the context of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing, ‘hard’ being the use of paramilitary tactics to achieve crime control and law enforcement (Hopkins-Burke, 2004), and ‘soft’ being social control exerted by the police as a ‘visible presence of authority, persuasion, negotiation and community interaction’ (Innes 2005, p.157), then the distinction is difficult to achieve because in many cases, both forms of policing act concurrently.

The apparent distinctions made in Table 1 are, therefore, less clear in terms of priorities for the prevention or detection of crime and responding to incidents. In summary, the aims of community policing in Britain are based around a new broad approach, and not just about returning to the Peelian principles of crime prevention at the forefront of the mandate for policing. As Newburn (2008, p.346) states: ‘the weight of crime prevention thinking was moving … to engagement with the community’. This would include a priority to involve actively the public in crime control (reduction of crime and fear of crime), to combat anti-social behaviour and to support improvements to quality of life issues (ACPO, 2006; Kappeler and Gaines, 2015). There would also be the aims of allowing the public to be consulted to help set policing priorities, to undertake problem-solving and partnership working and to share information and intelligence, as well as for the police to be locally accountable (Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Tilley, 2008).
### Table 1 – Comparison of traditional policing and community policing approaches
(Adapted from the original source: Sparrow, 1988, pp.8-9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Traditional Policing</th>
<th>Community Policing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Who are the police?</td>
<td>A government agency principally responsible for law enforcement</td>
<td>Police are the public and the public are the police [Peel, 1829 – legitimacy and policing by consent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  What is the relationship of the police to other public service departments?</td>
<td>Priorities often conflict</td>
<td>The police are one department among many responsible for improving the quality of life [partnership working]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  How is police efficiency measured?</td>
<td>By detection and arrest rates</td>
<td>By the absence of crime and disorder [crime prevention]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  What are the highest priorities?</td>
<td>Crimes that are high value (e.g., bank robberies) and those involving violence</td>
<td>Whatever problems disturb the community most [community priorities]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  What specifically do police deal with?</td>
<td>Incidents [Response policing]</td>
<td>Citizens’ problems and concerns [proactive policing]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  What determines the effectiveness of police?</td>
<td>Response times</td>
<td>Public cooperation [community engagement]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  What view do police take of service calls?</td>
<td>Deal with them only if there is no real police work to do</td>
<td>Vital function and great opportunity [community relations]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  What is police professionalism</td>
<td>Swift/effective response to serious crime</td>
<td>Keeping close to the community [building community trust]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 What kind of intelligence is most important?</td>
<td>Crime intelligence (study of crimes and series of activities crime)</td>
<td>Criminal intelligence (information about individuals and groups [intelligence-led policing]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 What is the essential nature of police accountability?</td>
<td>Highly centralised; governed by rules, regulations and policy directives; accountable to the law</td>
<td>Emphasis on local accountability to community needs [A focus on improving public confidence in the police]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These wider aims contribute to what was thought to be the policy solution that would foster police legitimacy (Tyler, 2013), and this created a broader mandate for the role of the police beyond that of the traditional and narrow control of crime (Mawby, 2000; Kappeler and Gaines, 2015). It is argued that an expanding role and multiple aims feed into the extent to which community policing is a nebulous construct, and consequently, creates implementation challenges of how to measure outcomes.

### 2.3.2 Key mechanisms of community policing

This subsection aims to define community policing and many academics have approached this challenge by describing the various mechanisms within the model. These are commonly comprised of three constitutive components underlined by decentralisation of authority and responsibility to lower levels in the organisation, which enhances the operational discretion of community police officers (Brogden and Nijhar, 2005; Tilley, 2008; Skogan, 2009). Each component is discussed and analysed in the context of the theory that underpins each one: community engagement and problem-solving as part of a problem-oriented policing model; information management as part of intelligence-led policing and a national intelligence model; and visible, accessible and familiar police as part of a reassurance policing programme where reassurance and safety may be achieved when a citizen sees a police officer on patrol or nearby (Bahn, 1974; Povey, 2001). This section concludes with a discussion that describes the most recent approach to neighbourhood policing in Britain.

Understanding how to deal with problems of controlling crime and disorder and ‘efforts to reconfigure the delivery of policing’ (Innes, 2004, p.152) have in some way generated the programme known as problem-oriented policing as a security discourse. This concept,
simply referred to as ‘problem-solving’, was founded by Goldstein in the US in 1979. It aims to widen the focus of the police from crime and disorder to deal with its underlying causes, and ‘encouraging the police to rethink about their purpose’, with a recommendation for the whole police organisation to be problem-oriented (Goldstein, 1979, p.236). It is a way in which, as Brogden and Nijhar (2005, p.23) describe it, the police can address the ‘distinctive policing problems that conventional police organizations and responses have not traditionally addressed’. Goldstein argues that problem-oriented policing is an effective use of resources and is a model that complements the traditional work of the police, which includes providing an emergency response to incidents and the arrest and prosecution of offenders. The measure of success for problem-oriented policing is the rise or fall in the number of problems; however, it does not necessarily require a sustained close relationship with the public in contrast to a community policing philosophy.

Problem-oriented policing is commonly operationalised by applying a model (known as SARA), which consists of scanning or information-gathering to identify community concerns, analysis of information collected to identify the problem, such as when, where, how and why the problem is occurring and who is involved, the response or action taken to address the problems and their causes, and assessing or evaluating the impact of the chosen response and the outcomes achieved (Goldstein, 1990). This problem-oriented approach creates significant challenges for the police and its partners at the point of implementation, as discussed in part four below. Nevertheless, it is not an approach that is exclusive to community policing, but a core element of it. Both community policing and problem-oriented policing acknowledge the importance of problem-solving, and it is not a matter of choosing one concept or the other; the concepts are ‘entirely
complementary’ and should be ‘one and the other’, drawn together in a single policing approach (Sparrow, 2016, p.18).

Problem-oriented policing and community policing rely heavily on effective community engagement. This is also an essential element and can be divided into two main functions, consultation and participation. Community engagement describes ‘how [the police] strike up a relationship with the community so that [they] can enlist their aid, focus on the problems that turn out to be important, and figure out a way [for the police] to be accountable, legitimate and innovative’ (Stone and Travis, 2013, p.21). Legitimacy in this context means that policing should be carried out with the consent of the public in order to build trust and confidence with all citizens. Innovation is to be achieved by investment in policies through the allocation of funding and resources and the spreading of good practice through the direction of staff based on informed analysis of data and provision of equipment and training.

Secondly, use of information points to intelligence-led policing approaches. In 2000, intelligence-led policing was being piloted in Britain and included development of the national intelligence model, which Tilley (2008, p.383) describes as a ‘practical notion of how better to deliver police work’. Intelligence-led policing was established as an outcome of a government White Paper published by the Audit Commission in 1993 and was introduced to ‘prescribe a proactive approach to targeting the criminal not the crime’ (Tilley, 2008, p.375). Community policing and problem-solving rely heavily on data, without which little effective analysis can take place to develop appropriate response options. Intelligence-led policing, can, on face value, support this because of its similar approach, relying heavily on information technology and analysis of intelligence to find
solutions within the narrow focus of solving and preventing crime (Maguire, 2000; Tilley, 2008). This means that it tends to concentrate on serious crime and disorder to the detriment of the community’s views about policing priorities. It was suggested by Tilley (2008), however, that intelligence-led policing could have a greater impact than problem-oriented policing or community policing because it sat better within the traditional model of crime fighting. However, his assertion is based on a narrow role for the police of controlling crime and excludes the public safety role they have too (Reiner, 2010). It is this point that Maguire and John (2006) raise as a risk, contrary to Tilley’s view, that the ‘predominance of intelligence-led policing appears already to be under challenge from reassurance and neighbourhood policing’. This also included a doubt as to whether intelligence-led policing was a suitable process where much of the government literature focused on anti-social behaviour and ‘responses to community fears and perceptions, rather than analysis of objective crime data’ (Maguire and John, 2006, p.67, emphasis in original).

Nevertheless, the national intelligence model was fully implemented throughout Britain and is a business process tool that aims to support an intelligence-led approach to policing. It provides guidance on assessment and analysis of intelligence, evaluation of risks and threats, and prioritising the police response. However, it is also uncertain as to how the process should be applied. To provide clarity, the Home Office National Centre for Policing Excellence published a description of what it aimed to achieve, in that:

The intention behind it is to provide [a focus for] operational policing and to achieve a disproportionately greater impact from the resources applied to any problem. It is dependent on a clear framework of analysis of information and intelligence allowing a problem-solving approach to law enforcement and crime prevention techniques. The expected outcomes are
improved community safety, reduced crime and the control of criminality and disorder leading to greater public reassurance and confidence. (Home Office, 2005a, p.6)

This extract raises several queries as to whether the intelligence model aimed to reduce crime alone, to reduce public demand for policing services, to seek to free up police time, or to solve problems, or that it attempted to fulfil all of these. A review by HMIC in 2001 found that the answers were unclear, with variations between police forces and a lack of understanding of what it meant. Some forces focused totally on crime and those committing offences, some focused on demand and so on, but there was no one clear application of the process highlighting implementation problems (Maguire and John, 2006).

Thirdly, the mechanism by which community policing aims to be visible, accessible and familiar in neighbourhoods is best understood as one of the components of what has been labelled ‘reassurance policing’ (Hough, 2004). Reassurance policing is achieved by the application of three components: ‘high visibility patrols performed by officers who are known to the local public, the targeting of ‘signal crimes’ and ‘signal disorders’ and ‘informal social control performed by communities’ (Innes, 2004, p.151). Although it has been suggested that reassurance is an outcome of community policing in this context, rather than a mechanism (Povey, 2001), Innes states ‘it is far more profitable to think of reassurance as a … policing strategy, designed to improve the public’s sense of security’ (Innes, 2004, p.158). It is part of the strategy of community policing that aims to improve public confidence in the police, reduce crime and fear of crime, improve information gathering and reduce anti-social behaviour, thereby enhancing security (Millie and Herrington, 2005). The problem with reassurance policing, however, is that its focus on
people’s anxieties and fears means there is a risk of withdrawing the police from communities that are most affected by crime. Fear of crime affects wealthy communities as much as poor areas; consequently, stretching limited police resources to all areas potentially reduces effectiveness.

Early ideas for what would deliver enhanced security by way of high visibility patrols were drawn from the history of policing in Britain but also in the US in the form of a community-oriented policing model. It has developed over several years since 1979 but was formalised in 1994 within legislation when the Community Oriented Policing Services Agency was established within the US Department of Justice (COPS, 1994). The model undertook to develop a closer working relationship between the police and the public and included a decentralising of policing services to local areas, and implementing regular foot patrols, not dissimilar to the vision of Alderson (1979). The idea of a return to foot patrols was emphasised as important for building community relations, notwithstanding that several studies in the US had criticised the effectiveness of them in the control of crime (Kelling et al., 1974; Police Foundation 1981; Trojanowicz, 1982). Visible foot patrols were still seen, together with other strategies related to community engagement, as critical to improving police efficiency and effectiveness (Kelling et al., 1974). It had previously been stated that visibility would be best achieved in the form of a uniformed police officer to build community relations and reassure the public about their safety (Bahn, 1974). This idea was reaffirmed more recently by Povey (2001, p.168), who state that, when asked what will improve confidence in the police, ‘the public tend to express their needs simply [and request] a visible presence [and] a familiar face’.

In Britain, reassurance policing coheres with the Peelian principles ‘in response to a
public need for mechanisms that would assist in securing the insecure’ (Neocleous, 2000, p.59). Forming those relations, however, could not be achieved to the same extent as in the ‘golden era’ of the 1950s (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003). As Tilley (2008, p.377) highlights, ‘difficulties arise in relation to the term community itself’. As opposed to a community being identified previously by its location, it might now be described as a ‘collection of people with a common interest’ (Evans, 1994, p.106). Acknowledging that communities are not necessarily based on territory, the police are better able to focus their attention where the community is diverse regarding their interests, faith or ethnicity (Mastrofski, 1988; Kelling and Moore, 1988; Innes, 2006b). It should also be noted that as much as people are part of a community, there are reasons why people withdraw from their community, whether physically or psychologically, due to such factors as high levels of crime or troubled neighbourhoods (Skogan, 2004).

Engaging with communities through high visibility patrols can be a positive aspect of the philosophy to overcome the problem ‘where the police have become detached from the policed’ (Innes, 2005, p.160) However, tensions can grow if the police are too close to the community and patrols in some areas may increase insecurities (Loader, 2006). Generally, there is an accepted level of consent in society that allows the police service to operate (Held, 1989). However, the very nature of policing means that not all the public will consent all the time, so any police action can have a positive or negative impact on society (Gordon, 1984; Kennison, 2000; Skogan, 2009; Reiner, 2010). Improving public confidence in policing is said to be achieved where the action of the police operates closely within the expectations and values of the public (Morgan, 1990). Making the judgement, therefore, as to how close to operate with the public is a challenge, nevertheless, the recent approach to neighbourhood policing in Britain aimed for all
neighbourhoods to have dedicated community police teams.

2.3.3 Neighbourhood policing

The new British approach to community policing was established between 2003 and 2006 and was labelled ‘neighbourhood policing’. The model involves a focus on neighbourhoods, and operationally, is distinguished by dedicated teams of officers carrying out patrols in their local area. In addition, the teams work as part of an extended policing family, the idea being that community policing as a concept is delivered not just by police officers, but by other resources that include wider community volunteers (Crawford, 2008). This reaffirms Banton’s recognition that ‘the police are only one among many agencies of social control’ (Banton, 1964, p.1). Police officers, as part of the new policy, work in communities together with Police Community Support Officers (PCSO)27, Council Wardens, Community Volunteers and other similar private sector organisations, in effect, acting as ‘facilitators in a third-party policing network’ (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2005, p.23). However, as Crawford and Lister (2004, p.viii) highlight, these ‘different providers of reassurance policing’ create a lack of clarity of their role that can leave the public unsure about the legitimacy that could be expected of them. This point was reaffirmed by Jones and Newburn (2006), who state that an increase in visible patrols from both the public and private sectors may have an unintended consequence of leading to confusion. Nevertheless, it emphasises the ‘active engagement of the population … that has gradually produced a new collective experience of crime, and a new set of possibilities for crime control’ (Garland, 2001, p.147).

27 References to a PCSO in this thesis relates to the role developed in England and Wales.
Neighbourhood policing needs an organisational environment in which it can survive and demonstrate operational effectiveness by achieving its aims, many of which are challenging. Nevertheless, neighbourhood policing ‘can and does significantly increase partner and community confidence in the police’ (Flanagan, 2007, p.20), and where the police have sustained cooperation of the public there can be a decline in levels of social disorder (Skogan, 2004). However, not all agree, with some suggesting ‘that evidence for its impact on communities are mixed and the interpretation of that evidence is fraught with danger’ (Somerville, 2009, p.265). Brogden and Nijhar (2005), for example, have argued that community policing has been harmful to some communities, mainly because the police do not consider local culture during implementation.

New neighbourhood policing teams have different priorities, and different policing skills are applied, from investigation to engagement. This aims to be an all-encompassing approach on the basis that ‘[neighbourhood policing] needs to be understood not as a stand-alone philosophy, but as a component of a full spectrum total policing model’ (Innes, 2005, p.158, emphasis in original). This means that there is a mix of a reassurance strategy, community cohesion strategy, crime control strategy, intelligence-led strategy and a problem-solving strategy, which, for a total policing model, ‘is significant in that it recognizes the multi-dimensional nature of policing’ (Innes, 2004, p.167). There is a question, though, as to whether these approaches can, in fact, coexist at the same time (Tilley, 2008). The model is expansive, with multiple aims, mechanisms and practices to deliver it. Nevertheless, neighbourhood policing in Britain has become, as Garland (2001, p.124) has previously described, as ‘an all-pervasive rhetoric and is used to describe any and every policing practice’.
In summary, this discussion has emphasised the importance of police visibility, accessibility and familiarity with the communities they serve in order to attain high levels of trust and confidence. Listening to the concerns of the public, responding to their needs and not limiting this purely to crime control results in the police potentially having higher levels of legitimacy in society (Tyler, 2013). Community policing has a variety of meanings but for the purposes of this research, the studies discussed above (Goldstein, 1990; Bayley, 1994; Povey, 2001; Brogden and Nijhar, 2005; Crawford and Lister, 2006; Tilley, 2008; Skogan, 2009; Reiner, 2010; Kappeler and Gaines, 2015) provide a comprehensive landscape of the most common elements that define the British model promulgated by ACPO (2006).

### 2.3.4 Summarising the British neighbourhood policing model

The concept of neighbourhood policing in Britain has been described in ten principles (ACPO, 2006), which are summarised as follows. Neighbourhood policing aims to be a philosophy and a strategy for the whole police organisation, where the idea is integrated across the whole police service (Flanagan, 2007; Tilley, 2008). The role is described as having two main components: a strategy to work with partners and the public together to solve problems of crime and disorder, and improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings of security (Kappeler and Gaines, 2015). They achieve this with a high degree of organisational decentralisation [with local accountability] (Oliver, 1998; Tilley, 2008; Skogan, 2009). The neighbourhood policing teams operate as part of an extended policing family in locally based, dedicated, flexible, familiar, adaptive and responsive neighbourhood teams (Crawford and Lister, 2006). They carry out high visibility patrols on foot, or by other means, undertaking proactive (crime prevention) policing tasks (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Skogan, 2006; Crawford and Lister, 2006; Povey, 2001;
Innes, 2011a; van Steden et al., 2014). Their deployment is driven by intelligence-led policing decisions as an output of using the national intelligence model business process (Innes, 2005; Maguire and John, 2006; Tilley, 2008). Finally, neighbourhood policing is subject to rigorous performance management, including clear performance monitoring against a local plan and commitments made to neighbourhoods (ACPO, 2006).

In this construct, neighbourhood (community) policing remains attractive as an approach for solving contemporary policing problems and restoring positive relations with the public (Brogden, 1999). The fluidity of the approach, as a container concept, has its advantages; as communities are diverse and have diverse problems, then so too the police should be adaptable and have flexibility to respond to local needs and priorities (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988; Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994; McLaughlin, 1994; Alderson, 1998). The plasticity of the model also demonstrates variations when implemented in other countries. A soft approach to local policing in the Netherlands (Chatwin, 2003) or the military and non-military structures throughout Europe, federal policing in the US and national police forces working alongside local police forces as a form of proximity policing, as in Spain and France, are all examples of this (Journes, 1993; Mackenzie and Henry, 2009). All these countries operate a community policing style, and to some extent, the ‘police get caught between conflicting philosophies’ (Schaffer, 1980, p.13).

Consequently, community policing, or whatever label it is given, seems to thrive on expectations of what it aims to achieve for communities in contrast to the policing of communities (Tilley, 2008; Kappeler and Gaines, 2015). This does not mean that the concept is an automatic success, notwithstanding that it ‘plays pleasant mood music of peace and goodwill that’s hard to resist’ there are challenges with implementation (Reiner, 2010, p.156). Yet it has, as van Steden et al. (2014, p.144) states, become ‘one
of the most appreciated police strategies of the past three decades’. It appears from recent evidence, for example, that high visibility patrols can reduce fear of crime (Flanagan, 2007), but the benefits in terms of crime reduction remain questionable (Sadd and Grinc, 1994). In Britain, there have been different approaches to neighbourhood policing at a local level, but this enforces the idea that ‘it should be delivered differently in different areas to be flexible and responsive to local needs and resources’ (Longstaff et al., 2015, p.32). However, although often exported abroad, the models of community policing raise problematic questions about how appropriate the transfer is in the context of relations between countries, and for some, the British approach may not be the most appropriate one (Ellison and Pino, 2012). Nevertheless, it has developed an attractive image of policing, especially in London, where others might look for ideas, and this is evident in this study of Abu Dhabi Police. Implementation of the philosophy, however, has not been without its challenges and the next section examines those that are relevant to this study.

2.4 Challenges and implications of implementation

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, implementation failure has been a significant legacy of the history of community policing; research has shown that there are multiple reasons for this, some linked to the concept, environmental factors relating to the nature of communities and other organisational issues (Irving et al., 1989; Rosenbaum, 1994; Brogden and Nijhar, 2005; Innes, 2005; Mastrofski et al., 2007; Garland, 2001). In addition, there has been criticism of the reported success for community policing, where it has been argued that the approach can only be applied to some people and not to others because the ‘sub-cultures of some communities [of criminals] are such … that inevitably the police will come into conflict with them’ (Gordon, 1984, p.56). This reaffirms that community policing might only exist alongside other approaches to crime control. But
even then, within the model, the quest to engage with communities to extract information and intelligence might be a form of surveillance and control of communities that enables the police ‘to wield a frightening mixture of repressive powers, on the one hand, and programmes of social intervention, on the other … in their efforts to control and contain the political struggles of the black and working-class communities’ (Bridges, 1982, p.184). Community policing, therefore, is not a silver bullet for solving all problems, but consideration might be given as to how far it can go to penetrate communities with their consent and motivate the public’s assistance in crime control (Gordon, 1984).

Trojanowicz (1982, p.258) was one of the early researchers to acknowledge the problems and confirms that there are, ‘many obstacles and challenges … for community policing to become a viable catalyst for changing public policy’. Community policing is something that on paper might create a positive ambition to achieve an informal mode of social control (Carr, 2003), but in practice, it is a complex process to implement. This complexity is often attributed to the interpretation or variations of the philosophy or, simply and unsurprisingly, to the conceptual fuzziness of what community policing means to those charged with its implementation. In Britain, for example, as discussed in this chapter, the approach is expansive; it has wide-ranging aims and multiple mechanisms and practices. This type of issue is illustrated by Bayley (1988, p.225), in that:

Despite the benefits claimed for community policing, problematic implementation of it has been very uneven. Although widely, almost universally, said to be important, it means different things to different people – public relations campaigns, shop fronts, and mini-police stations, re-scaled patrol beats … neighborhood watch, [and] foot patrols. Community policing on the ground often seems less a program than a set
of aspirations wrapped in a slogan.

There are also challenges of setting community-focused priorities where other aims, such as crime control, tend to direct resources to what are considered issues of greater importance (Flanagan, 2007). Being community-focused means that a process of consultation with the public becomes more important. This has taken many forms, including public satisfaction surveys, personal interviews, neighbourhood watch schemes, use of race relations officers and community consultative committees (Bennett, 1994). More recently, this has been extended to crime and disorder reduction partnerships, established in Britain under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Mackenzie and Henry, 2009). There have been problems relating to community participation, especially for consultative committees, where political representatives did not always support them or where existing structures were forced into new formal mechanisms. This created complexity in a large number of scheduled meetings that invariably were just ‘talking shops’ and merely symbolic of their wider purpose (Jones et al., 1994, p.240). In addition, the meetings sometimes attracted members of the community who spoke the loudest, or minority protestors who did not represent the wider population, leaving out those who needed access to consultation the most (Skogan, 2009), for example, black marginalised men (Scarman, 1982; Gordon, 1984). However, it is argued that where the police can judge the views of the public, they are more likely to apply their ‘discretion, conciliation, consultation and negotiation’ in the right way (Weatheritt, 1987, p.5). Therefore, the importance of community engagement and understanding a community’s needs has remained a key principle of community policing in Britain.

Measuring the outcomes of community policing also remains a persistent challenge for the police, where quantifying change, for example, in relation to feelings of safety and
security, are difficult compared to traditional methods of simply recording the rise or fall in crime. The conflict between proactivity and reactivity, and that community policing tends to be least effective where it is most needed, have become evident in the aftermath of riots in Britain. This problem raises questions as to how close the police should be in certain communities that ‘may not even be geographically based and … even small neighbourhoods can contain a large measure of heterogeneity’ (Williamson, 2005, p.153).

In practice, the process of selecting who the community police should respond to potentially creates a contradiction in the wider concept of community policing, where all communities should, in principle, be the focus of police priorities.

In addition to the complexity of the concept, understanding the challenges related to operationalising the model in the field are equally difficult. The literature on this subject is extensive and studies have been completed in many countries, ranging from those that are developed to those emerging from serious local and regional conflict (Brogden and Nijhar, 2005; Ellison and Pino, 2012). Others focus on one country alone, such as the experience in the US (Rosenbaum, 1994; Skogan, 2004; Mastrofski et al., 2007; van Steden et al., 2014), or in Britain (Innes, 2005; Tilley, 2008; Mackenzie and Henry, 2009). Nevertheless, several of the challenges to implementation crosscut each other and appear to be universal. This literature draws attention to culture, which characteristically indicates two common problems that are most relevant to this study. Firstly, the preference for action based forms of work in police operational culture means that there is some resistance to deviating from the norm. This creates the associated challenges of obtaining higher management, and frontline officer support for the community policing concept (Westmarland, 2008). Secondly, the challenge of implementing innovative problem-solving approaches where there is a high demand for solutions and personnel
with specialised analytical skills are limited means that, in practice, true problem-solving is rarely achieved (Goldstein, 1990). This also highlights how response policing often gets in the way, and consequently, the planned allocation of resources becomes disrupted and removal of personnel from community policing tasks results in a higher risk of programme failure. This is discussed further below.

The effect of organisational culture, including the influence of middle and senior managers and frontline police, described as the ‘dissension in the ranks of practitioner groups’, can contribute to failure when there is conflict between them (Garland, 2001, p.4). Effective community police implementation needs the support of all people involved and especially of managers. Tilley (2008) raises the importance of this issue for achieving success. The challenge appears to be about managing change (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994), and to some extent, this is because ‘community policing demands a significant shift in the way that police officers envision their role and duties’ (Skogan and Hartnett, 1998, p.12). This is because of the contrast of ‘soft’ policing (community engagement and problem-solving) with the ‘hard’ approach of law enforcement (crime control and the arrest and prosecution of offenders), where officers are more critical of the social welfare role that they consider is not connected to ‘real police work’ (Sadd and Grinc, 1994, p.50). Ultimately, there are ongoing tensions and challenges related to the role of the police and whether officers should operate hard powers in law enforcement, with a narrow focus primarily on crime fighting. As Innes (2005) suggests, many advocates argue that this is the main role of the police and that it should not be diluted. In contrast, the alternative approach is that the police should have broader responsibilities in communities and this includes a softer function of policing.
The main challenge is that some officers resist what they see as a change from their traditional role of response and crime fighting that is ‘highly centralized; governed by rules, regulations, and policy directives; accountable to the law [to one that has more] emphasis on local accountability to community needs’, including problem-solving (Trojanowicz et al., 1998, p.23). In a study by Mastrofski et al. (2007, p.226), it was confirmed in one of the conclusions that ‘changing the culture of middle managers, as well as that of rank and file, figured as highly challenging’. These internal issues are very serious for implementation purposes and can be made worse within police organisations with a ‘para-military structure’ and who have ‘highly bureaucratic management orientations … based primarily on law enforcement activities’ (Roberg, 1994, p.250). This was illustrated by Manning (1979), who argues that there is a tension between organisational expectations and the lower ranks who have the power themselves to define policing practice on the ground. This is part of the organisation’s culture and it alone has been described as the biggest obstacle to those charged with implementation of a new strategy for policing (Sparrow et al., 1990). Community policing also creates conflicts within the police organisation itself, which can resist and ultimately thwart change efforts (Guyot, 1979). For example, it competes against specialist teams who carry out police operations in an area, such as, dealing with ‘problems of mass hooliganism, racial tension, drug addiction, distress and degradation’ that may leave the community in need of repair (Alderson, 1979, p.4). This variation in policing styles creates tensions for frontline police and other senior leaders who could contribute to implementation failure if they do not fully support the approach (Irving et al., 1989; Millie and Herrington, 2005).

Operationalising community policing is costly and labour-intensive, requiring a commitment to policy that goes beyond the police to community safety and the challenges
of dealing not just with crime, but with the wider problems of low level anti-social behaviour and perceptions of crime (Skogan, 2004). This demonstrates that policing is about more than crime, and includes other social problems, but this too causes internal conflict within police organisations and the attitudes of officers. Lurigio and Rosenbaum (1994, p.147) argue that the police will not be able to achieve effective problem-solving in partnership with the community until the ‘beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours of individual officers become more compatible with the redefinition and enlargement of their jobs as described by the community policing model’. By not focusing on the personnel and organisation’s limitations, the risk of failure has the potential to increase due to factors such as fear of change or apathy by some officers. But sometimes, the solution is not about trying to change the mind-set of officers who resist change. For many of these issues, organisations embarking on change programmes may need to seek out new supportive people to become involved, who, over time, replace the dissenters (Goldstein, 1990; Weisel and Eck, 1994).

In most studies of community policing, the tension between being proactive to prevent crime and disorder, and reacting to events as they occur in order to meet performance targets, has often been cited as contributing to implementation failure, where the latter draws personnel away from their role (Goldstein 1990; Skogan, 2004; Quinton and Morris, 2008). For proactive problem-solving, for example, the SARA model, although criticised for being over simplistic (Bullock and Tilley, 2009), is, nevertheless, resource intensive, requiring data collectors, analysts, reports, presentations, partnerships and action followed by evaluation, and the lack of qualified analysts in the police is a significant problem (Knutsson, 2003; Tuffin, 2006). If the police applied this methodology to all problems reported to them, the service would become overwhelmed
(Myhill, 2006) and this would be compounded by partnership, multi-agency working that ‘remains fraught with difficulties in practice’ (Innes, 2005, p.165). To be effective in problem-solving, the police are required to invest a substantial amount of time and personnel to the approach and this competes against the public demand for response policing to 999 calls (Bayley, 2006). Consequently, as crime and other emergency demands for service grow, the personnel allocated to community policing often become an easy target to be diverted to other roles, such as crime investigation and response cars. To minimise the impact of the secondments, at least in Britain, the use of an extended policing family, including PCSOs, provides an interface between the police and the public to remain dedicated to neighbourhoods, providing a sustained visible and familiar presence (Crawford and Lister, 2006).

The challenges of proactivity and reactivity also impact externally on the organisation. Applying a problem-oriented policing model requires effective community engagement; however, with this approach, the public have a minimal role in participating beyond consultation to identify problems and have little authority to influence police decisions. This means there is little or no requirement to operate with dedicated teams on a neighbourhood or area basis as part of a community policing style. Advocates of problem-oriented policing argue that the police only need to work where there are problems; however, it is suggested that the police should operate within a variety of styles and not just to a ‘pure bred strain’ (Mastrofski, 1993, p.75), supporting the idea of a mix of policing that is both proactive and reactive. The challenge for the police is that to implement problem-solving as part of the community policing model requires a new class of officers willing to be engaged in supporting changes in organisational culture (Chan, 1997), confident in making decisions by applying devolved authorities, skilled in
applying new management techniques, adaptable to new roles, and willing to participate in specialist training programmes (Kelling and Moore, 1988). It is a change in organisational culture that is required, and this may take many decades to fully complete.

Notwithstanding the challenges associated with implementation, it now seems that problem-solving is ubiquitous in international policing professions (Knutson, 2003). But there is clear evidence in the literature that police officers, in practice, have not fully committed themselves to it, with ‘responsibility for community-based initiatives sometimes relegated to specialized units’ composed of small numbers of officers rather than spread across [the] police’ (Braga, 2015, p.17, my emphasis). What this implies is that there is a challenge for the police to spread the concept of community policing throughout the whole organisation, and in more recent practice, it is now more common for community engagement and problem-solving to become a dedicated role for a selection of officers (Higgins, 2017). This may not be what was originally intended when operationalising the model, but it is argued that, in practice, it may be this type of approach that has the potential to make community policing successful.

In summary, overcoming these challenges requires officers to be better trained to develop new skills for dealing with emerging crimes and solve community problems (Goldstein, 1990; Longstaff et al., 2015). Continued effort to obtain commitment for organisational change internally in the police, among all rank and file officers, to fully commit resources to problem-solving methodology as the core of community policing is essential (Goldstein, 1990; Tilley, 2008). But the resistance to change is common and, consequently, should be anticipated at the onset of a change programme when plans can be drawn up to address the concerns of all stakeholders both internally and externally to
the organisation.

2.5 Conclusion

Building effective police and community relations has been a recurring aim of policing policy since the inauguration of the first police force in London. Yet the journey to achieve success has been problematic and the historical experiences discussed in this chapter emphasise the challenges of operationalising community-focused concepts while facing barriers to change in the form of political, environmental, social and economic factors. Nevertheless, this aim remains one that is considered essential for the effective control of crime and security. It has been acknowledged that the police alone cannot solve all the problems in society, and the cooperation of the public, to share information and to participate in policing has been a constant challenge. In this context, the Peelian principles, albeit a path not taken at the time, have become more relevant recently, underlining policies that aim for the police to be representative of the communities they serve and to work in partnership in the prevention of crime. The apparent success of this idea was most evident during the 1950s, when the importance of visibility, accessibility and familiarity of the police to build community confidence was underlined, and this has become intrinsic to a more recent approaches to ‘neighbourhood policing’.

However, the opportunities that existed then for close, face-to-face interaction between the police and the public could not be sustained and a new approach had to be found. Consequently, various aspects of community policing were further developed. Part of the stimulus for change emerged to some extent from police organisations’ focus on emergency response policing, a priority that meant the model of community policing had collapsed in a sustained way. As communities changed, so did the way in which the police
operated, and they slowly grew apart. Ultimately, relations broke down, and this became a factor that contributed to a series of riots throughout Britain since 1980. An apparent emphasis on the hard role of law enforcement has become the dominant role of the police, one that police officers seem to prefer. Organisational change to embrace a softer role of policing has, therefore, been met with resistance and led in some cases to operational failure. The lack of progress to recommendations from the Scarman Report (1982), for example, is likely evidence of this problem in practice.

Community policing, or whatever label it is given, seems to thrive on expectations of what it aims to achieve for communities in contrast to the policing of communities. This raises a question about the militarism of the police and how this integrates with an organisation that aims to operate closely with the public and engage with them. Yet it is unclear whether militarism is a problem or not, and as discussed above, it might be that the police should not operate to a particular set of ideals but need to be adaptable and flexible in their approach to dealing with all types of crime and security problems. So, community policing is often described as a ‘total policing’ model and in its most recent form, it has aims that range from solving the minor problems of anti-social behaviour to the prevention of terrorism. It purports to improve community relations and build trust and confidence in the police, notwithstanding that it is a nebulous concept. The fluidity of the model is arguably what makes it so attractive to other countries who can adapt it when necessary, taking into consideration local culture and political structures.

Although community policing appeals to governments and the public, the main challenges with operationalising it lie in the culture and structures of the police organisation. After many decades of response-type policing styles focused on crime and
criminals, protective services and the reactive arrest and prosecution of offenders, it has proven very difficult for the police to change, with internal resistance being the most significant obstacle to success. Research shows that this is a common problem, and consequently, in many cases, it seems that community policing roles have been delegated to specialist teams or other personnel. The role of the PCSO in Britain is an example of this, where in practice they are dedicated to neighbourhoods and visible, accessible and familiar to the community. The idea that community policing is a philosophy for the whole police organisation might then be questionable. When attempting to achieve this aim, the risks of failure occur due to the adverse influence of rank and file officers, whereas, if the role is fulfilled by specialist teams, they can at least be left to carry out their duties for problem-solving, partnership working and community engagement.

Paramilitary organisations need to change in some way to become more community-focused, and it is this change that would allow the middle and senior managers to think more about problem-solving as opposed to reacting to incidents as they arise. One way of encouraging the change is to introduce rewards for problem-solving work, such as training, performance practice or promotion. These methods can motivate or cajole officers to carry out community policing work where the emphasis is on a more persuasive mode of social control (Robberg, 1994; Weisel and Eck, 1994; Carr, 2003). However, other factors can take effect on the level of officer interest or cooperation, such as the age of personnel, where education levels, the rank held within a police hierarchy, local rules, and centralisation can all contribute to resistance (Williams and Sloan, 1990). Over the last three decades, for example, community policing has seen a change in focus for policing, which has left the ‘older generation of criminal justice personnel exhausted and disillusioned’ (Garland, 2001, p.5). The implications of this are compounded when
officers are set in their ways or are uncertain as to their new responsibilities. Once an established routine for policing has been reached, ‘it is difficult to alter how they think about their jobs’ (Goldstein, 1990, p.173). This problem is heightened especially for middle and senior management if they actively resist or attempt to disrupt efforts to implement a new programme.

This leads one to consider these key ideas for the transfer of the community policing policy from Britain and elsewhere to Abu Dhabi where, as discussed in Chapter 1, there is no history of serious disorder and where crime is reported to be relatively low in comparison to many other countries. This raises further questions as to how community policing policy is learned, adapted and implemented, and whether there are any unintended consequences in doing so. The next chapter, therefore, reviews the literature related to the subject of policy transfer and develops a framework as a tool to aid the discussion and analysis of the processes involved.
Chapter 3: Policy Transfer

While the main focus of this thesis is community policing, its implementation in Abu Dhabi is considered in terms of ‘policy transfer’. This chapter reviews the literature of policy transfer in order to critically assess and understand the conceptual tools that can be used in this study. The literature is informative in that it defines what policy transfer means and considers what the motivation factors might be for developing new policy ideas, and what the processes are for how policy transfer effectively occurs. Several lessons have also been learned in the literature, including those from two specific criminal justice case studies illustrated by Jones and Newburn (2007), and these lead to a better understanding of what might be ultimately perceived through analysis as levels of success or failure of policy transfer processes. The analysis of policy transfer in this research was undertaken by applying a framework developed and regularly used by researchers and this approach is discussed later in this chapter.

Policy transfer is a complex process and in many ways it is difficult to evaluate because of the extent to which policy mutates as it travels through time and space from one country to another (Benson and Jordon, 2012; Hudson and Kim, 2014). However, as Newburn et al. (2017, p.1) state, the study of policy transfer ‘can enhance our understanding of the local, national and global influences over crime control policy formation’. Consequently, the study of the literature in this chapter sets out the stages of analysis in a way that can be reasonably followed to form views on the extent of transfer and to answer the empirical questions raised in this case study of community policing and Abu Dhabi Police.

The chapter has five main parts. It begins with a general introduction to the concept of
policy transfer, what policy transfer means and the process stages through which it takes place. The framework for analysis popularised in the literature is evaluated as one of the main conceptual tools that can be used in this research. Additionally, the study of policy transfer is not without criticism and a summary of the issues raised are discussed in this part. Part two develops an understanding of what motivates policy transfer through, for example, voluntary and coercive mechanisms, or a mixture of both, described in the framework as the continuum between what an organisation wants to do and what it has to do (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). It also outlines the positive and negative influence that actors have on the transfer process using their knowledge and expertise but also the risks of generating inappropriate solutions to problems if, for example, local culture is ignored.

Part three discusses the role of symbols in policy transfer and their contribution to implementation. This is an issue specifically relevant to this study and includes learning from two case studies, that of the ‘three strikes’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’ (Jones and Newburn, 2007), both of which inform us of the opportunities and pitfalls associated with policy transfer and the phenomenon of transferring slogans, labels and symbols. Part four allows us to discuss how policy transfer occurs, considering processes around policy convergence, lesson drawing and policy emulation, and introduces the recent concept of policy tourism, the process and the reasons as to why policymakers travel abroad to carry out policy learning exercises, and what the benefits and limitations of such activity are.

The final part concludes this chapter, with comments about the future for the research of policy transfer and summaries the key learning points from the literature reviewed here that are applied to this study.
3.1 Introduction to the concept of policy transfer

This section provides a general introduction to the concept of policy transfer and points to the main scholars, who have, over the past 20 years or so, developed models and a framework for its analysis and their approach to defining what the concept means. Unlike the literature review of community policing in the last chapter, where there is a significant amount of material to explore from a long history of policing development, the growing volume of literature relating to policy transfer is more recent and limited, especially in the field of criminal justice (Tonry, 2015). However, similar research undertaken by academics in political science, geography and transport studies inform us sufficiently to create an understanding of the subject in general terms (James and Lodge, 2003; Stone, 2004; Evans, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011; Newburn et al., 2017). There has also been debate about the terminology used for what might include policy transfer. For example, policy diffusion (Walker, 1969), policy learning (Rose, 1991), policy emulation and convergence (Bennett, 1991), harmonisation and policy translation (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009; Blaustein, 2015), among others (Evans, 2009). These have all been used to describe the processes associated with ‘the ways in which policy ideas, institutions and practices flow across national boundaries’ (Newburn et al., 2017, p.2). To inform this discussion, some of these terms are discussed in more detail; however, notwithstanding the debate, it is the approaches associated with ‘policy transfer’ that are applied in this study.

There appears to be a consensus in the literature that Dolowitz and Marsh set out the popular definition and a framework for the analysis of what they have described as the collective term of policy transfer (Evans, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011). It is:

a process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the
This could be described as a form of mobilisation of policy. It is a process that, ‘occur[s] within or between different political contexts’ (Benson and Jordan, 2011, p.367). However, it is widely agreed that this is not a new concept. It is something that has taken place for centuries (Carroll, 2012). Its modern study ‘captures an aspect of the internationalization, transnationalization or globalization of policy regimes’ (Prince, 2010, p.169). Although at face value, it might seem to be a straightforward task to achieve policy transfer by simply copying from one place to another as the definition implies, the reality is somewhat different, as Dolowitz (2003, p.107) explains:

[policy transfer] has been going on ever since a caveman saw how another was more effective at hunting and adopted similar techniques, it is – as the caveman probably found out – not as easy to be successful as it might first appear.

With advances in technology including communication channels, the globalisation of consultancy businesses and the opportunities provided by the internet to spread expertise by non-government entities or individual experts (Evans, 2009), the extent of policy transfer taking place between nations has increased significantly over the last two decades. It is common to see developing countries looking to others with similar traditions to seek out policy solutions for their problems (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

The process of policy transfer might then be learned, but it is distinct from the process of policymaking, which is defined as ‘the process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes and actions to deliver outcomes’ (Wright, 2000, p.15). This also sounds straightforward and seems to oversimplify the whole process of policy
transfer and policymaking. If it is to succeed, the final implementation of any new policy must reflect its initial intentions, something that is inherently difficult to achieve where the challenge of policymaking is known to be ‘messy and unpredictable’ (Duncan, 2009, p.453). It is the process of converting or adapting another country’s policy to a new culture, traditional foundations, legal framework or political drive, that contribute to it being a complex process. Nevertheless, the search for policy ideas by policymakers is recommended as good practice by Dolowitz (2003) and supports a more outward looking approach to thinking and the development of modern policy processes.

Expanding on the definition, Jones and Newburn (2007, p.143) suggest that policy transfer also occurs with the sharing of ‘policy ideas, symbols and labels’. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.12) previously described this as including the ‘transfer of goals, programs, content, instruments, ideologies and attitudes’. This amounts to what could have been described as part of the process of policy diffusion, which has been defined as ‘the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system’ (Berry and Berry, 1999, p.171). To clarify the issue of the intricacy of policy transfer, existing research has shown that some elements of policy are generally much less complex to transfer than others. Ideas (including symbols), ideologies and knowledge are such examples and are often categorised as ‘soft’ transfer elements that contribute to the ‘spread of norms’ (Stone, 2004, p.546). These elements complement others, such as attitude, tools, structures, legislation and practices, which are more problematic to transfer and are referred to as ‘hard’ transfer elements (Stone, 2004; Marsden and Stead, 2011).

This is an important idea as much of the literature refers to policy transfer elements as
being ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ in context, and there is a reason for this. The ultimate success of policy transfer processes is more likely to occur where there is evidence that both the soft and hard elements have been adopted through a learning process to eliminate the chance of inappropriate or incomplete transfer, as described below by (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). It emphasises the point that policy transfer has elements that are inherently difficult to implement and that when categorised as ‘hard’, the more complex the process may become. This may be compounded by a ‘lack of ideological compatibility between transferring countries, and insufficient technological, economic, bureaucratic and political resources’ (Benson and Jordan, 2011, p.372). Drawing the line between soft and hard elements, however, is not always clear. Rose (1993) considered this further when determining how policy transfer is measured and the degree to which it has taken place. He suggests that creating a hybrid of policy elements extends the meaning of what is policy transfer. Copying or emulation, for example, can result in a form of hybridisation where selecting policy ideas has been undertaken from multiple sources. In summary, within any analysis, there should naturally be an assessment of what constituted the soft, hard, or hybrid of the elements transferred, and that this informs the outcome of what has been successfully implemented to different degrees. This idea supports this research in determining what adaptations have been made to policy and is analysed in some detail in Chapters 5 and 6.

3.1.1 The policy transfer process and analysis framework

Evans (2009) divides the process of policy transfer into three stages. The first stage is where the problem is identified and there is an initial search for good practice and ideas to solve it. This leads to establishing the motivation for and how the transfer of those selected ideas can take place by identifying the agents needed to assist the process. This
creates a network of people and organisations to facilitate the transfer of policy, and these agents of transfer are used to fill the knowledge gaps often found in the receiving country or state and help to stimulate changes in the style, organisation and operation of policing (Jones et al., 1994). The second stage concerns planning and making decisions about how to implement the new agenda, evaluating options and the presentation for formal adoption and agreement. Once decisions are made, this leads to the final stage of implementation at an operational level and putting into effect the policy learning process, monitoring and evaluation through an ongoing process of policy learning. What Evans emphasises is that this three-stage process, because of its voluntary nature (explained below), is constantly revolving and allows for policy to be made and remade and that the organisation learning goes through a process of evolution over time. This is an important point to note: in policy transfer, there is rarely a fixed end point in the time in which it is completed. Certainly, in voluntary situations, continuous development and improvement in organisations stimulate further growth in policymaking. Assessing policy transfer in the simple terms of its success or failure at some perceived point in time is, therefore, inherently challenging because of factors like this.

The work of Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) into policy transfer has informed a broad range of case studies and analysis papers, from transport policy through to political science or geographical globalisation studies, many of which are cited in this chapter (James and Lodge, 2003; Stone, 2004; Evans, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) draw out a framework for analysis of the transfer process. This framework (see Appendix G) is discussed in detail below, with the addition of some critique from academics about its modern validity and application. It will be argued that notwithstanding there being some criticism of it, the framework can still be applied and
adapted as a useful analytical tool. The framework also introduced the concept of the policy actors raising the question as to who transfers policy and more detail of this application on the policy transfer process is discussed in the next part of this chapter.

The framework is structured around seven key questions that form the core of policy transfer analysis. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.7) emphasise the need to identify and explain the process used and state that, ‘by placing policy transfer into a conceptual framework [it] can advance our understanding of concepts such as what motivates policy-makers to engage in the policy transfer process’. The framework begins by asking why actors engage in policy transfer. The reference to actors relates directly to the second question of who is involved in transfer. These actors include elected officials, bureaucrats, civil servants, pressure groups, institutions, consultants and experts, think tanks, transnational corporations and supranational institutions (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Policymakers, as discussed later in this thesis, seem to be relying more and more on these types of actors including the experts brought in from other countries and one cannot underestimate the influence they have. In addition, we have already stated that the idea of straightforward copying of policy is rare because of the complexity of transfer and that there is often a difference between intention and application. What is suggested happens in practice is that there will be some form of negotiation between a complex web of actors and policymakers (Dolowitz, 2003; Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009). Applying the framework for analysis to assess the impact of actors, allowing for assessment of any change in motivation, adaptation and implementation of policy, informs the outcomes of Evan’s first stage of policy transfer.

The next issue relates to what policy is transferred and considers the extent to which
policy has been adopted. This may be broken down as goals, structure and content, policy instruments, programmes and even the negative lessons learned. It can be the whole or parts of policy, including ideas, attitudes and concepts (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The varying degrees of transfer results may be revealed in any one or more of these ways, and that might include the whole transfer of some parts but not of others, for example, transfer of a whole structure and only the partial transfer of programmes. In the voluntary transfer of policy, the policymakers searching for new ideas can pick and choose what they feel is most appropriate for their political, social, environmental and legal systems. However, it seems the only real test to establish the extent of what has been transferred is to analyse the results of implementation against the intentions of the policymakers.

What lessons are to be learned points to the international, national or local context, country to country, or state to state. This can occur on a global scale or just across the border, but the analysis allows for some comparison. The different degrees of transfer may be affected directly by the differences in culture, but what researchers look for in analysis is evidence of copying, emulation, combinations of different policies, or inspiration for developing new policy ideas that are more locally suited considering the political contexts (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). It is essential to understand from where policy is drawn and the cultural background to evaluate its suitability for adoption in a new place. Once policy transfer is demonstrated through the media, new policy instruments, conferences, meetings or written statements, the final question in the framework considers how successful the transfer was and the extent of any failure.

3.1.2 Understanding policy transfer success or failure

Analysing the results of policy transfer is a challenging process, especially if the aim to be achieved is to obtain evidence of success or failure; therefore, understanding what
these two terms mean for policy transfer is essential (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012). Success might be based on validating information about the transfer, checking policy against results revealed through implementation and the process that was used to communicate the new policy, for example, via face-to-face meetings or workshops (O’Dolan and Rye, 2012). What might be more appropriate to look for regarding failure is the extent to which failure has occurred. This can be achieved as Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.17) suggest by an assessment as to whether there has been ‘uniformed transfer, incomplete transfer or inappropriate transfer’.

Uniformed transfer is where a borrower receives the new policy but has little or no understanding of how the policy operates in the lender’s country. There is a high risk of this occurrence, where the borrower is under pressure to find a solution to a problem and jumps to the first solution they find without undertaking any analysis or considering other options. What policymakers may miss is that although a policy might work in one country or for one set of people, it does not necessarily mean that it will work in another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012). Incomplete transfer indicates that some transfer of policy has been achieved but some key elements may have been ignored knowingly or unknowingly. These missed elements could potentially be critical to policy implementation. For example, if one considers the policing models discussed in the previous chapter, to be a problem-oriented organisation would be a statement of policy and would require two main elements at implementation, first, that the police operate in a proactive way to solve problems, and second, that they need to work in partnership with other organisations to achieve it. However, if during implementation there is, in practice, limited engagement with partners, this could amount to the potential for incomplete transfer.
Finally, inappropriate transfer is where there is evidence that there has been little cognisance taken of culture, traditions or political structures, the social, economic, legal and environmental factors that affect implementation. This is where one would usually expect adaptation of policy or even dismissal of lessons learned because of the incompatibility of any one of these factors; nevertheless, policy is transferred irrespective of this. Therefore, in the second stage of transfer (Evans 2009), policymakers need to decide what policy or part of a policy is important and the degree to which it will be transferred, and as Dolowitz (2003, p.104) emphasises, ‘the decisions made [at this stage] are probably among the hardest an individual will face in engaging in policy transfer’. Understanding how to avoid policy transfer failure is a useful outcome of applying the framework to establish what can work, how and why, and the empirical questions to be answered in this thesis reflect this.

3.1.3 A critique of the framework

As alluded to earlier, this is a framework that is contested, but Dolowitz and Marsh (2012, p.339) accept that it is simply intended to enable a person to discover or learn something for themselves and it is ‘not a theory’. They suggest it can be improved by users and, therefore, adapted and modified where necessary to suit unique conditions. Nevertheless, within the literature, there is criticism of the general approach to existing policy transfer case studies, definitions and the framework used for analysis. The critique covers four main issues, that of literalism, a limited focus of studies based on the national scale, the disparity between agents and agency, and general positivism. Peck and Theodore (2001, p.449) argue that policy transfer entails an ‘implicit literalism … which tends to suggest the importation of fully formed, off the shelf policies, when in fact the nature of this process is much more complex’. However, this apparent simplicity of dividing up the
policy process does not represent the reality of policymaking where responding to feedback at each stage ultimately alters content. The outcome may lead to an absence of policy instruments or that implementation can take a different form, for example, the transfer of legally binding rules in one country compared to simple informal agreements in another (Brickman et.al. 1985). A relevant illustration of this is the legislation in Britain under s17 Crime and Disorder Act 1988, where certain organisations, including the police and councils, are required in law to work in partnership to solve community problems. This legislative tool, once transferred to another country, could become advisory only and result in a more informal partnership arrangement for working together.

McCann and Ward (2013, p.6) raise further criticisms of policy transfer theory in that existing literature concentrates ‘too much on the national scale’. They also suggest there is too much focus on ‘identifying transfer agents’ and putting them into categories as Dolowitz and Marsh have done, with not enough focus on ‘agency’ and the process of policy mobilization. Finally, they assert that much of the literature is biased in favour of what they describe as ‘positivism’. Regarding the national scale, notwithstanding that Marsh and Evans (2012, p.478) accept that most articles that have been reviewed did indeed concentrate on the ‘role of national and international actors’, they rebut the criticism pointing out that most research has been aligned to local government. Nevertheless, it is important to be able to identify when top-down policy transfer, from a national level, is undermined by local agents at the point of implementation and analysis of the process at this local level is essential (Dolowitz and Marsh 2012). In practice, it is nevertheless, apparent in the literature, that transnational policy transfer is more common, and invariably, countries look to others who have a good reputation for their programmes, as a solution to similar problems faced.
Secondly, the distinction between agents (the actors involved in policy transfer) and agency (the action or intervention producing a particular effect) is important where factors of agency are outside the control of people and organisations. This is the effect on policy that occurs through its mobilisation, with some external action or intervention which might be, for example, as a consequence of variations in local culture and traditions or the environment. It is this aspect of agency that may have a significant impact on policymaking and produces an effect at the point of implementation. The potential of this, is what can be termed as contributing to policy mutation, where policies ‘neither emerge fully formed or intact’ (Newburn et al., 2017, p.10). Consequently, it creates some level of danger in the analysis of policy transfer that should be considered in any empirical research (Benson and Jordan, 2012). Evans (2009, p.246) has a slightly different approach to this type of problem, referring to the factors of agency, not as matters totally out of the control of policy makers, but as ‘cognitive obstacles’, such as, organisational culture and how this should be understood in the way that it affects options for policy alternatives. It follows that, in the context of this study, when police policymakers are in the process of making decisions, they need to consider the obstacles and take into account the opinions of the public on policy choices, the impact of the environment, on population and other domestic influences in such matters including, for example, national security risks or the community’s fear of state authorities.

Finally, there is the issue of positivism represented in many of the existing research findings, and this specifically relates to the assessment of whether policy transfer has been successful. This leads to the analysis of the outcomes based on the application of the Dolowitz and Marsh framework and whether the focus on policy transfer is the correct
approach. Recalling the three types of policy failure discussed above, James and Lodge (2003) take the view that Dolowitz and Marsh do not fully explain the specific details of the features of failure regarding process, but concentrate on commenting on the failure of aims, or the forms of incomplete transfer or some loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public. It is suggested that in this way, the framework for analysis of policy transfer is narrowly defined. The effects are applied to policies through mobilisation and what is learned, adapted, broken down, or reassembled, is not always explained in transfer terms and could be better understood through a focus on policymaking as an alternative (McCann and Ward, 2013). It is during this mobilisation that policy actors interpret and reinterpret ideas, extracting lessons based on their experience and knowledge and forming them into options for consideration by clients. A broad study in this way, by not relying on a single framework, may have less of an automatic positivism effect compared to an empirical study of the whole process of policymaking. This approach considers the direct and indirect influences of policy development and creates opportunities, for example, for the potential of discovering policy mutation (Stone 1999). The critical points raised here can, to some extent, help inform how the analysis of policy transfer can be improved and adapted to remove or reduce the problems raised. A higher level of focus on the function and influences on policymaking and agency of transfer should, therefore, be included in the framework for the analysis. This would, in turn, deal with the concerns about positivism and results in a broader application of the analysis approach.

In summary, notwithstanding that the process for policy transfer is complex, the current Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) framework is the preferred approach adopted in this thesis. In brief, it is split into several empirical questions exploring what is transferred, who the key actors involved are and why those actors engage in policy transfer. They also consider
the framework from where the lessons are drawn, what the different degrees of transfer are and what restricts or facilitates the transfer process. Finally, how processes of policy transfer relate to policy success or policy failure. The first part of the framework is a technical process, where the objects of policy are defined (e.g. elements of community policing) and then adapted for implementation in another place. This gives the policy a ‘global form’, one which is more acceptable across both places, from where the policy emanates to where it is received (Prince, 2010, p.169). The defined global form then needs to be subject to a process of transfer. In seeking to achieve this, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) introduce the concept of the actors involved in the process, the people or institutions playing a key role in influencing policy and its transfer. These actors (discussed in the next part of this chapter) become involved in developing the motivation factors for policy transfer, why and how that transfer takes place and in the process of how policy is transferred and implemented. The involvement of actors in each part of the transfer process as detailed by Evans (2009) has, to a greater or lesser degree, an influence at any given time and, as such, a continuing evaluation of their impact on the motivation for devising new policy should be systematically assessed at those various stages. This framework can then be utilised together with the three-stage process of policy transfer, with the results determined at each level (Evans, 2009).

3.2 The motivation for policy transfer

Abu Dhabi Police are not unique in their determination to search for new policy ideas from several different nations and the recent globalisation of community policing philosophy is just one example of that taking place elsewhere. The policy transfer process that follows, however, does not track the usual route of learning from one country alone. It is more about looking at different countries at the same time in search for multiple
sources of policy ideas. The UK Government Cabinet Office, the Centre for Management and Policy Studies (CMPS), has also encouraged a similar broad approach to search for international good practice, stated within guidance published in a workbook for the civil service:

Looking abroad to see what other governments have done can point us towards a new understanding of shared problems; towards new solutions to those problems; or to new mechanisms for implementing policy and improving the delivery of public services. International examples can provide invaluable evidence of what works in practice and help us avoid ... repeating others’ mistakes. (CMPS, 2002, p.550)

Understanding why policy transfer takes place is fundamental to any analysis framework, and in this section, the concepts of voluntary policy transfer and coercive transfer are discussed to contextualise the environmental and motivational reasons within which a search for policy has taken place. Evans (2009) suggests that there are three broad approaches for how voluntary transfer can be broken down: 1) voluntary transfer or lesson-drawing approaches which are suitable for developed countries, 2) negotiated transfer, and 3) direct coercive transfer for developing countries which are more receptive to being compelled to introduce change often linked to foreign aid or other funding. In brief, policy transfers can be undertaken either voluntarily or through coercive influences, or as commonly illustrated in the literature, many transfers can be a mixture of both, described as ‘voluntary decisions and coercive pressures’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2010, p.16). However, the policy transfer literature consistently distinguishes between both rationales. Where the two issues become blurred and a combination of each other, this is more likely to be described, as Evans (2012, p.155) suggests, a ‘negotiated transfer’. It is the desire of modern governments to find solutions to problems, as emphasised by Jones and Newburn (1998), that generally creates the opportunity for voluntary transfer but
there could be other factors involved. Alternative factors for policy transfer need not directly relate to the emergence of new problems but might be more specifically linked to a ‘desire for international acceptance’ (Dolowitz 2009, p.319). It is further suggested by Dolowitz that this can lead to ‘disequilibrium’ in the transfer process in a way that can force policymakers to respond not just in a voluntary capacity but within a range of coercive elements.

Policy transfer, therefore, may be a response to a problem or a government search for political support to improve its ‘reputation or legitimacy’ or to solve some previous issue of policy failure that creates the need to search for solutions (Jones and Newburn, 2002, p.10). At each stage of the policy transfer process, the motivation as to why it is taking place could, in fact, change, that is, a community problem migrating towards a drive for policing legitimacy or vice versa. The key, therefore, is that the analysis of policy transfer must aim to achieve an understanding of not just what policy is being transferred, but also why the transfer has taken place and the motivation for it, which demonstrates the impact of a voluntary or coercive process or a mixture of both. It is argued that with more time, the process of policy transfer can more realistically be achieved if it is voluntary in nature, and it is suggested that this approach has a better chance of success, a factor that should be explored through the analysis framework.

As an alternative, there are dangers for a government in responding solely to coercive pressures where the risks of failure in policy transfer are increased due to the lack of time to research it and rigorously analyse more appropriate (if available) policy options (Duncan, 2009). An illustration of this taking place in 2015 was the urgent changes in government policy in Schengen countries to deal with the large numbers of migrants who
travelled into Europe and the newly increased emphasis on the protection of open borders. The way in which the police and military are used to enforce the new policy in Europe and the ultimate impact on police legitimacy and accountability could be affected by this action. Notwithstanding that these European states are facing a common problem and are coerced into acting, the urgency for action means that they ‘are more likely to engage in policy transfer with one another’ as volunteers (Evans, 2009, p.253). Therefore, this creates a mix of voluntary decisions based around coercive pressures, as asserted by Dolowitz and Marsh. In these circumstances, this may only result in a form of temporary change in policy, where later, as and when the problem diminishes, a further change in policy could occur. This illustrates the potential for policy not just to mutate as it travels from one country to another, but that it may also mutate over time and be made and re-made.

There is no standard way in which policy transfer takes place or the way in which the motivation for change arises. It can be achieved, for example, through the use of technology, desktop research, and fact-finding visits to other countries. In the literature, there is no definitive list of approaches to this, but Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) emphasise that organisations and people can become what they describe as agents of change. These agents are the actors involved in policy transfer and can include elected officials, civil servants, institutions, think tanks, consultants and experts and other national, transnational or supranational organisations. In general, there has been an ‘emphasis [within these groups] on the role of official agencies in such processes’ (Stone, 2004, p.550). However, with policy transfer and lesson learning, the actors involved may come from a much broader spectrum.

This study demonstrates the involvement of most of these actor groups, where there is a
great reliance on the advice from a wider spectrum of individual consultants and experts as some sort of elite network of people who work with a desire to share experience (Bennett, 1991). These actors draw on their experience of good practice and how their contributions have helped to achieve success in their own domain. This is described as applying a ‘continuous process through which individuals transform the knowledge, truths and effects of power each time they encounter them’ (Herbert-Cheshire, 2003, p.456). In other words, actors applying experience in their own context by negotiation and enactment (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009) is possibly better described as policy translation as opposed to policy transfer (Blaustein, 2015). No matter which way the process is described, international policy actors have a significant influence on generating motivation for change and ultimately for policy agenda setting, facilitating a form of global policy diffusion and acting as ‘policy transfer entrepreneurs’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p.345). It is acknowledged, though, that the motivation for policy transfer rarely comes solely from influences of actor groups. As ‘people can be motivated by different factors … there might be more than one reason driving someone towards [it]’ (Dolowitz, 2003, p.102).

While actors create opportunities and motivation for policy transfer, they can also create the potential for failure. As mentioned previously, best practice in one country may not automatically suit the political or cultural framework in another and may result in transfer of ‘policy knowledge but not a transfer of policy practice’ (Stone, 2004, p.549). This risk may be compounded by the style of consultancy provided, specifically referring to whether the actors’ transfer approach is voluntary or coercive in style. It is said that in some cases, policy actors may have a ‘democratically disproportionate influence over the shape of policies at more and more administrative sites around the world’ (Prince, 2010,
p.171). Consultants can, of course, operate in both ways during the same policy transfer process. By forcing what they perceive as international good practice on another country, they may be acting coercively, whereas, at the same time, simply providing advice might be construed more as a voluntary approach, especially at times when a country is in a period of social, political and economic stability (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

A focus on advice from actors from one country alone may also cause a risk of failure. The literature on policy transfer tells us that learning can come from one or more countries’ experiences and by selecting policy elements from each one, the receiving country may better be able to formulate a new adapted policy approach more suitable for their own local culture and traditions. Transferring community policing policy lends itself as a good example of this, where we know from the review in the previous chapter that the philosophy has been implemented in one way or another in many countries. Therefore, there are opportunities for any country to explore policy ideas widely across the globe as opposed to focusing only on one. Notwithstanding that there are risks when international, non-state actors are involved, their importance in the process has been iterated by Stone (2000, p.50), who emphasised that:

policy transfer occurs when transnational groups of actors share their expertise and information and form common patterns of understanding regarding policy. It required regular interaction of experts and practitioners at the international level, such as through conferences and government delegations, and sustained communication.

It is this group of people, working together in any given discipline, who form the elite network of actors that make policy transfer processes work, with a greater chance, where appropriate, that it may result in some form of policy convergence (Bennett, 1991). It is
at conferences, field trips and tours that actors have an opportunity to persuade and negotiate policy ideas for transfer (McCann and Ward, 2013). It is important to note, however, that whereas most policy actors seem to operate internationally, it does not automatically mean that their policy ideas will be fully understood by other nations. Problems of language and the potential for the meaning of policy being lost in translation tells us that sharing information, ‘should be more frequent between neighbours than between distant countries. A common language or a common cultural background should also positively influence transnational communication’ (Obinger et al., 2013, p.115). The study of the role of policy actors is, therefore, a vital element of the analysis framework. It informs us of their style of influence, the level of influence they have on motivating organisations to embark on a policy transfer process and from where policy ideas are sought. Applying these data to the remaining process stages of policymaking and implementation allows the assessment to be made of the potential for success or failure in transfer and that lessons that can be learned from that for future engagement with policy actors.

In summary, policy transfer is a process initiated, it is suggested, from ideas formed as a response to a problem and then, using technology and visits to other countries, those ideas are developed, and decisions are made as to what policy to transfer. This is done with the aid of policy agents, whether they be supranational organisations or individual consultants and experts. This leads to actions or initiatives intended to implement the policy locally and to ultimately achieve the results, effective implementation, a reduction or eradication of the problem or improved public perceptions. The complex element is the move between policy transfer to policymaking, or the transfer of symbols, in some cases, to implementation. Establishing success or failure in implementation is also
challenging but requires to some extent an understanding of the type of policy transfer process taking place and analysis of it against the outcomes achieved (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012).

3.3 The hierarchy of policy symbols

Although policy transfer appears to be a complex process, it is suggested that ‘policy labels’ travel more effectively at the level of implementation than the whole programme because they can be more flexibly interpreted for a ‘variety of policy purposes’ (Mossberger, 2013, p.688). Drawing on the work of Edelman (1985), Jones and Newburn (2007, p.161) highlight the same issue, where they assert that the transfer of a symbol ‘is significantly easier … to be exported and imported than it is for matters of substance’.

This section includes a discussion on what these symbols or labels are in a criminal justice context and the relevant research findings that provide evidence for the above statements. These symbols, labels, or slogans, can often mean one thing in one country and something else in another, irrespective of whether there is success or failure in policy implementation. Examples of this fact explored below are discussed in two criminal justice case studies, relating to ‘three strikes’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’. Both were ideas of policy transferred in part from the US to Britain during the 1990s. Yet both, for various reasons, had a different effect at the point of implementation and they provide useful learning points to apply to this study.

In the first instance, it should be acknowledged that the transfer of a slogan, even if the remaining content of policy has not equally been transferred, is not necessarily a bad thing (Jones and Newburn, 2007). This type of slogan transfer can be motivated by a government’s desire to improve its performance and recognition by others to achieve high
levels of international status as part of modernisation programmes (Obinger et al., 2013). Slogans can simplify communication with the public when complex issues are raised, for example, by governments generally, for political issues or problems, such as an aim to be ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ (a slogan used by the UK Labour party in 1997). The slogan has the potential to be clearly understandable by the general public, whereas the content of how it is applied, for example, within the criminal justice system, is more complex. Slogans can, therefore, be used efficiently to transfer those complex ideas and they can smoothen out the process of understanding to gain public support (Sharkanovsky, 2002). They are, by their nature, short and striking or memorable phrases used to convey ideas or aims. They can create a positive image or reinforce attitudes and behaviour. Nevertheless, there is always a risk that slogans, if wrongly drafted, can cause confusion or ambiguity. As such, their impact on the public can be harmful and in worst case scenarios, damaging, especially where the slogan has, for example, a racist connotation. In any event, slogans have a positive influence on policymakers but create the challenge on implementation that a successful slogan may not deliver on what it promises. As discussed above, in the same way that a policy may mutate as it travels across nations, so too can the meaning of its symbols.

3.3.1 ‘Three strikes’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’ case studies

Currently, sources of literature are very limited for policy transfer programmes in the field of criminal justice; however, ‘three strikes’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’ are two case studies that illustrate the issues of symbolism and are useful for considering in some detail. The first aimed to impose compulsory extended sentences on offenders convicted of serious crime but failed at implementation due to legal issues. The latter aimed to introduce a style of policing that would eradicate social crime and urban disorder through
positive enforcement, using all the powers that the criminal and civil law would allow, but failed at implementation due to cultural differences. It is, therefore, useful to explore these two programmes to contextualise the distinct issues learned from each and how they might be considered in the analysis of the transfer of community policing policy from other countries to Abu Dhabi.

‘Three strikes’ came about as an issue of policy transfer at a time when the UK government was exploring sentencing reforms and looked to the US for ideas. This is a useful case study within criminal justice that emphasises the problems of differing legal frameworks and cultures across countries and how they affect policy transfer implementation. The ‘three strikes’ (and you’re out) programme related to the provision of mandatory minimum or extended custodial sentences for repeat offenders for serious offences. The programme operated in the US based on a foundation of habitual offender legislation that already provided for extended periods in detention (Jones and Newburn, 2007). In its application, the seriousness of the offence(s) would be considered in triggering the sentencing provisions and based on factors relating to risk to the public, it would justify extended incarceration. In 1995, the UK government suggested adopting a similar version and by 1997, a new Crime (Sentences) Act gave statutory authority for it to be applied. But there was an issue of symbolism. Even in the US, the Department of Justice observed that the ‘three strikes’ policy was ‘largely symbolic’ (Austin et al., 2007, p.83). The UK government also tended to use the phrase as a political tool (Thomas, 1998), concerned more about what the public and media would think about the new law as opposed to whether it would work in practice (Ashworth, 2001). Understanding the extent to which ‘three strikes’ was transferred as a symbol requires an understanding of the extent of policy transfer that took place considering the similarities (emulation) or
differences (diversion). Jones and Newburn (2007) provide a full analysis of this, but the main learning point was that, at best, a ‘soft’ transfer of policy had taken place. There were substantial differences in the legislation between the two countries; the scope of application of the policy was much wider in the US than in Britain, where it was limited by, *inter alia*, legal and cultural issues and the US courts were much more punitive. At the implementation phase in Britain, one major barrier at that point was that of judicial independence and the judge’s discretion in sentencing. British judges had always had levels of discretion in sentencing and would, consequently, not be forced to lose this power through any government scheme such as ‘three strikes’. Therefore, this case study demonstrates that ‘differences in political institutions, legal traditions and bureaucratic cultures between jurisdictions have played a key part in shaping differences in policy outcomes’ (Jones and Newburn, 2007, p.100), resulting in the symbolic elements overshadowing the content of policy.

The symbolism of ‘zero tolerance’ is even more obvious. The concept of ‘zero tolerance’ policing is based on the rigorous enforcement of the law, dealing with minor crime and disorder with the same emphasis and rigour as serious crime. It became famous as a policing policy in New York during the leadership of Chief Bratton in the late 1990s, when significant reductions in crime were attributed to it. However, Jones and Newburn (2007, p.106) describe zero tolerance policing as ‘rather a slippery idea’ and difficult to define, not dissimilar to other academics’ descriptions of community policing and, as such, it too can mean different things in different countries and to different people. While the symbol of ‘zero tolerance policing’ was coming to the fore in New York, it also appeared in parts of Britain, notably in Cleveland, where the senior chief police officer for Newcastle was attempting its implementation. Several policymakers travelled
between the two countries to share ideas but the political drive to use the symbol became the dominant reason for its popularity in Britain.

There was to be some adaptation of its application though, and Jack Straw (a member of parliament and Home Secretary at the time) stated that ‘tackling youth crime is an integral part of our strategy to reduce anti-social behaviour and create a more decent society … this is called zero tolerance policing with a British face’ (Jones and Newburn, 2007, p.110). This was a clear indication that the policy from New York was to be adapted in some way, and in any event, most chief constables in Britain did not support its implementation. This was due to pressures related to the aftermath of riots in Brixton and other cities, and concerns about community cohesion and reassurance (Jones and Newburn, 2007). The British approach can be explained by the difference in policy implementation in Britain compared to the US. First, the use of extreme tactics to deal with low level offending was going to be counterproductive considering recent events. Pollard (1997) commented on the different policing traditions of the British compared to the US, in that dealing with low level crime and disorder had always been the traditional role of the British police officer on the beat and a community policing style. There was a similar experience in France, where the US zero tolerance policy was also being followed. As with Britain and the US, the French media were very supportive of the programme. However:

both at local and national level [in France], this transfer turned out to be illusory, owing to insurmountable disparities between the institutional and professional codes and cultures of the two nations. Zero tolerance is, then, a good illustration of the gap between symbol and substance that may obtain in the transfer of public policies. (Maillard and Le Goff, 2009, p.655)
In conclusion, zero tolerance policing has never really been implemented in the same way in Britain as it was in the US. It has, however, been used as a political symbol, going beyond its crime control and policing foundations, and its study reveals the main learning point highlighted by Jones and Newburn (2007, p.142) that it ‘illustrates the possibility that it is actually rhetoric and terminology that travels most easily, and below this surface similarity, local cultural and political differences may work against any simple or lasting transfer of substantive practices.’ As such, zero tolerance policing is an example of one process that has generally been categorised as a soft transfer of ideas and concepts demonstrating that such a transfer, as discussed above, tends to travel across nations more easily than the hard policy emulation of, for example, legislation or other policy instruments. In the analysis of policy transfer, this is something that can be taken forward in this research.

In summary, symbols have their advantages for supporting the communication of complex ideas, as discussed here, but at the same time, they can represent an element of policy failure within the stages of transfer, including implementation. That failure may be, as with ‘three strikes’, due to the application of legislation or, as with ‘zero tolerance’, be more related to culture differences. In either case, this can create a risk for the public’s perception of a programme who may not see or feel what they hear. Nevertheless, it is often the government’s motivation and political imperative to demonstrate to the public that they are willing to take a strong stance and direct action to combat serious problems in society and, as such, the adoption of a slogan achieves that in some way.

3.4 How policy transfer takes place

In this section, the main forms of policy transfer processes revealed through the literature
are discussed, considering how policy transfer takes place. As discussed above in part one, what is collectively referred to as policy transfer has been described in several ways, including lesson-learning, emulation and policy learning. There are others, such as elite networking, diffusion, social learning and harmonisation (Evans, 2009), of which many overlap with each other. The focus in this chapter generally is on policy convergence and its link to emulation and diffusion. Policy convergence can be defined as ‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performance’ (Bennett 1991, p.215). As an illustration, this is a familiar process taking place in the European Union (EU), for example, with the strategy to develop a closer political union as one of its primary aims and one that is enshrined in the EU treaties. It is a convergence of policy across these neighbouring countries, which have a similar culture, religion and traditions, drawing on a long history of cooperation and a similar vision of unity that seems to create an environment for harmonisation of policy in Europe. It is this proximity of geography, ideology and culture that is likely to make policy transfer occur (Stone, 2004). The same reasons are not as apparent between countries such as in Britain and Abu Dhabi, notwithstanding the close relationship between the two countries at a government level and their long history of support and friendship, as highlighted in Chapter 1. The two countries are far from being neighbours, having different majority religions, legal systems, cultures and traditions and, it is argued, motivations for policy sharing. The motivation for convergence, therefore, could be more related to the ‘outcome of structural forces: that is driven by industrialisation, globalization or regionalization forcing a pattern of increasing similarity in economic, social and political organization between countries’ (Stone, 2004, p.547). These varied

similarities or descriptions of differences between countries engaged in policy transfer, it
is suggested, have a significant impact on the stage within the transfer process where the
policy ideas are adapted and formulated for local implementation.

Policy convergence, whether intentional or not, arises through four processes; 1) emulation, 2) elite networking with the transfer of policy stimulated via transnational
groups of actors, 3) harmonisation between formal intergovernmental organisations and
4) penetration, where there is a significant element of coercion and states are forced in
some way to conform to a new policy (Bennett, 1991). Harmonisation and emulation are
discussed further here followed by elite networking. Policy convergence itself can appear
as one of several concepts of criminal justice and national security policy. For example,
it can refer to common policy, where there are attempts to deal with familiar global
problems, such as urban disorder, international terrorism or drugs and people trafficking.
This is an example of policy harmonisation where there is ‘cross-national lesson-drawing’
(Bennett, 1991, p.224). This appears commonly in policing policy where there is a shared
ambition to respond to international problems of serious crime and a desire to avoid
discrepancies in approach or divergence of policy. As such, policy convergence can
include details about policy content, where, for example, government policy is
reproduced and applied from one country to another, though, as we have established,
copying policies without making any modifications is rare (Evans, 2009). Convergence
can also be achieved through policy instruments, such as strategy and policy documents,
government directives, laws and regulations, as with a traffic management policy to
reduce serious accidents. Finally, Bennett (1991, p.218) explains that convergence can be
revealed through policy ‘outcomes, impacts and consequences’ or through policy style’.
The results of the implementation of a policy will determine the extent of the successful
policy transfer that has, or is taking place, and whether it is deemed to be a full or partial transfer or in conflict with the original aims. Therefore, in summary, convergence means that two or more different countries, states or cities move to a position where there is some commonality, reaching some identified common point (Bennett, 1991).

Policy emulation has been undertaken for centuries in one form or another, where countries have ‘sought to borrow and adapt structures and policies from other societies’ (Siegel and Weinberg, 1977, p.79). Emulation means acting like someone else, a country, a state or a city and implies there is some copying of behaviour, or policy and procedures, accepting in a way that a policy or programme is the best standard to be adopted (Evans, 2009). Bennett (1991) explains that policy emulation, if it takes place, is evidenced through lesson-drawing from abroad, drawing on experience and results in common goals or a commonality in policy content. One would expect to see that the policy from one country has been used as a blueprint for another, where the receiving country has been able to build its structure and implementation outcomes based on following another nation as an exemplar (Stone, 2000). But this needs careful examination and analysis to prove; as one country learns from another, it does not automatically mean that emulation has occurred, and there is a need to look for adaptations in matters such as policy and legislation. Those adaptations may show less effective emulation and more a partial transfer, or even a divergence from policy that has been observed elsewhere. Timing and pressures for rapid change in response to a problem may result in greater potential for emulation as countries copy policy from another without the opportunity to fully analyse the policy and the expected outcomes that it will achieve (Obinger et al., 2013). Where there is more time, emulation can still occur, but in different parts of the process, such as with policy formulation and the implementation stages. Nevertheless, it is accepted that
determining levels of emulation is difficult and is rarely established for certain (Bennett, 1991).

As mentioned above, a government’s desire to be recognised as performing with the best in the world, to achieve international acceptance, policy emulation can take place on a voluntary basis as part of that ambition. It is where (the government) seeks to demonstrate its ability to reflect policy approaches in other countries and join some form of ‘international norm-based community’ (Obinger et al., 2013, p.114). In the extreme, this could mean policy is transferred and emulated as a symbol only where there is no real problem in society for it to solve. Community policing could be a symbol, for example, to join part of a world society (Meyer et al., 1997), or to beat regional competition to be the first to implement the model and achieve a cultural ambition. Following an understanding of the policy emulation process, there is a distinction to be made in how it is achieved through voluntary and coercive policy transfer approaches and the issues discussed above in that regard are considered in this research.

Finally, it is useful to explore the more recent notion of elite networking taking place through policy tourism in practice, as this reflects in many ways the experience detailed in the following chapters. This topic goes further to explore how policy agents learn lessons from abroad, how they process that information, and subsequently, how they use the knowledge to develop policy (Dunlop, 2009). It is a concept of policy learning by policy tourism which occurs simply ‘when officials from particular places visit other places to look, learn and listen’ (Cook and Ward, 2011, p.2523). Hudson and Kim (2014, p.497) suggest that policy tourism is ‘rich in metaphors’ and adds value to the reflection and analysis of policy learning. González (2011, p.1400) observes:
The experiences of professionals who visit cities to learn from their policy success also resemble the ‘tourist gaze’…. Policy tourism just like its leisure counterpart involves the rescripting of places, the reassembling of cities out of the bits and pieces that are visited … some ‘sites’ get turned into ‘sights’ worth photographing, while others are ignored or downplayed. Tour guides [the agents of transfer] play an important role here, choosing and adapting itineraries.

If a policy tourist wants to learn about a programme, there is no better way than seeing it for themselves (Rose, 2005). However, if one reflects on the analogy to a tourist, it does not mean that these professionals get to see everything they need to collect in a short visit to assemble or interpret new policy ideas; a tourist’s view of a city is often limited. In the same way, policy tourism, when it is described as the process of using technology and the internet for desk top research, can never give a policymaker all the facts and learning that they need (Evans, 2009).

Tourism alone is not the solution to effective policy transfer. Even when policy tourists visit another country, they invariable rely on the tour guides to provide them with all the information they need and the sight-seeing experience of seeing programmes in action and the feedback on what works or not, as the case may be. The influence of these local guides on the policy transfer process can be crucial because they may be relied upon as experts in their field. Indeed, it is often that these guides have been tasked with putting together the policy tour and must second guess what the visitors want to see, experience and learn. However, it is the tourists who retain the responsibility to collect all the information they need so as to be able to analyse it when they make ‘sense of the memories they return with’ (Hudson and Kim, 2014, p.504). The purpose of policy tourism is not necessarily about making immediate decisions about what may or may not
work in the policymaker’s own country, but to provide ‘space for release’ when professionals are away from their usual busy work place (McCann, 2011, p.117). It is a time for blue sky thinking and innovation, yet learning is not the same as change and the outcomes of visits abroad can result in little or no change in policy, notwithstanding that new ideas and programmes have been learned (Dunlop, 2009). Invariably, policy tourists may be the seekers of ideas and are policymakers in the sense that they draft policy and make recommendations to higher authorities for approval where other barriers to change may exist.

In summary, the evidence of policy convergence requires several factors to show that it has taken place, including clear lesson-learning from another entity, drawing on evidence of good practice. The adoption and replication of policy instruments and policy with similar goals to the original, as Rose (1991, p.21) describes it, are ‘programmes in effect elsewhere to create a new programme for adoption at home’. This learning process considers an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of a policy and the choosing of whether to adopt it locally (Bennett et al., 2015). The learning is achieved through visits and meetings facilitated by an elite network of actors who play their part in a transfer process, but it is a process that is often ‘ad-hoc and unsystematic’ in its application (Duncan, 2009, p.456).

3.5 Conclusion

The argument made in this chapter is that although policy transfer at face value appears to be straightforward, the processes involved tends to be complex. Further, notwithstanding that there is a framework to assist with its analysis that considers voluntary, negotiated or coercive transfers, testing the definitions against the reality of
implementation is much more problematic. As Page and Mark-Lawson (2007, p.49) affirm:

The term policy transfer might be somewhat misleading. Like heat transfer, or even the transfer of money from one bank account to another, the word suggests that it is straightforward, if not involuntary. It implies a simple movement of a set of policies from one place to another and with no (or limited) change of state, as the policy can be recognised as an import from another jurisdiction … policy transfer in this sense is rare.

The literature on policy transfer fails to provide firm guidance about how to frame research questions or ‘how to pursue them empirically’ (Page, 2000, p.12). Nevertheless, Ward (2006, p.71) suggests that studying policy transfer can ‘open up the black box … to reveal what it means in different contexts’. This was illustrated in a study of policy transfer and attempts to operationalise community policing in Stockholm. The conclusion of the policy transfer study demonstrated that neighbourhood teams and the British community policing practices were ‘hardly recognisable’ in the context of implementation in Sweden (Peterson, 2010, p.43).

In practice, when receiving new policy ideas and adapting them, governments and organisations continue to trust their own instincts, using evidence from abroad to ‘supplement their own knowledge, experience and professional expertise’ (Duncan, 2009, p.457). Why policy transfer takes place can be, as one would expect, for a broad range of reasons. As discussed above, this can be related to a problem or a crisis, and it is natural to expect this when countries are responding to pressures when they need to draw on lessons learned abroad to create a response (Bennett, 1991). For policing, the literature seems to indicate that these issues are usually related to some problem in communities. A breakdown in community cohesion, street crime, riots and urban disorder, the misuse
of drugs or, indeed, terrorism (see Chapter 2) have resulted in policy solutions being sought and transferred, as we have seen here, from the US to Britain and vice versa. But problems are not the only reason for policy transfer to take place. What is important for this research is the acknowledgement that the motivation can come from other factors, such as government or organisation legitimacy, and a search for policy ideas from other global leaders who have international respectability.

Programmes such as ‘zero tolerance policing’ and ‘three strikes’, and not least, ‘community policing’ have been subject to transfer processes between the same countries in both hard and soft forms. There is evidence of the transfer of symbols, ideas and labels that, in practice, can mean something quite different at the point of implementation. This issue, when considering the transfer of community policing policy, must be a prominent part of the subjective analysis. Consideration must be given, not just of the extent to which community policing might have been transferred as a symbol, but also the extent to which the transfer of it creates an advantage or disadvantage in the implementation from a police perspective, and for communicating the idea to the public.

One would think that the policy transfer process should be getting easier over time as access to high speed electronic data is more available now than it was when Dolowitz and Marsh first developed their framework, albeit that was only twenty years ago. Problems of slow downloads of large documents and graphics as an irritant to desktop policy research are virtually a thing of the past. This high-speed data transfer gives greater access now to video conferencing tools, bringing together international elite networks of policy actors without the need for extensive worldwide travel. Yet still, the attraction to travel and physically see and experience policy programmes remains popular, and the recent
research by Hudson and Kim in 2014 demonstrates that. There is a warning though that: there is a danger in these globalized times in assuming that the speed and efficiency of the new forms of communication that link, structure and create the ‘network society’ … mean that policy learning will also become increasingly easy and efficient … this is far from the something that we should take for granted’ (Jones and Newburn, 2007, p.161).

By whatever process, it can be acknowledged that not all transfers can be successfully implemented and that some perceived failure or risks of failure might be revealed through this analysis, notwithstanding that, as established in this chapter, what is success or failure is challenging to analyse in practice (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). The fact that policy is made and re-made as an ongoing process for policymakers amplifies this difficulty in the analysis of results. In any event, the Dolowitz and Marsh framework can be set against the three stages that Evans proposes, which in brief, include the development of ideas (problems identified), making decisions (the planning process) and actions (results through implementation).

In summary, in terms of the aims of this thesis, notwithstanding the academic criticism of the Dolowitz and Marsh framework (see Appendix G), it remains generally accepted in the literature that this framework provides the preferred approach to the analysis of policy transfer. It allows for some innovation, and importantly, some level of adaptation, where needed, to be applied for specific circumstances based on the empirical research aims as with this study. The potential for adaptations has been highlighted in this review of the literature and includes the additional analysis of symbolism in relation to what policy is being transferred, policy tourism as part of how lesson drawing is being achieved, and who is involved, to include policymakers in the list of potential agents of transfer. Emphasis too can be added in relation to the reasons why policy transfer takes
place and the search for the problem in society that it seeks to solve or other motivating factors that lead to it. Addressing the criticisms of the framework can also be included, as detailed above, to include considerations about policymaking and factors of agency. What is most important is to add an analysis of the frontline activity at the point at which policy is demonstrated, a process that is relevant for studies of policing. At the same time, some elements can be removed from the analysis framework for this case study where they are less relevant, such as business activity and loans, the involvement of elected officials, and technology elements. Once adapted, in brief, the framework can be used to underpin the analysis of the transfer of community policing policy from Britain and elsewhere to Abu Dhabi presented in Chapters 5 and 6. But first, the following Chapter 4 details the journey to the decisions made that established the research design and methodology applied in the case study that follows.
Chapter 4: Research Strategy and Methods

This chapter explains the research design strategy and the methods chosen to collect data in this study. It begins by discussing the reasons for the chosen strategy, which draws out the gap between policy and practice through phases of design and implementation. Relevant research methods are considered including the opportunities and limitations of each, leading to the choices made as to why some methods were excluded from the research and why others were selected. This includes a discussion of the strategy chosen to implement a mixed method approach by combining data obtained by different methodological approaches. The second part discusses the process for interviews with senior officers, all of whom were elites and includes details of the pilot and implementation experience. Part three offers a detailed explanation of the quantitative element of the data collection phase and discussion on the process of survey design, piloting and implementation. Part four discusses the ethical considerations of the study before concluding with part five, which reflects on the overall process. This part concludes with comments as to how researchers can learn from this research experience and particularly the challenges of completing further research within the Abu Dhabi police.

The idea for this research was formed in 2010 when I completed my first year working for Abu Dhabi Police as an adviser in community policing. I was involved in the development of new policy ideas and assisting with the process of transferring policy from Britain and elsewhere to Abu Dhabi. What became clear during this early period was the limited understanding of why, what, and how policy was being transferred,
implemented, or subsequently, adapted to local requirements. At the same time, it was challenging to identify what exactly the model for community policing was in Abu Dhabi due to a lack of policy instruments. On reflection, I considered that there was an opportunity to carry out detailed research that would inform the organisation and those involved in policy transfer, would improve its implementation plans for the future and would add knowledge about the issues highlighted here, specifically in terms of policy transfer within the field of criminal justice. The initial study and review of literature both for community policing and policy transfer led to the empirical questions that are being explored. The following parts explain the journey to the choices made as to how the research data was to be collected and analysed to inform the answers to those questions.

4.1 Research design and methodology

This research starts with the assumption that the impact of community policing depends upon both its meaning and its implementation. In summary, Abu Dhabi Police has embarked on the implementation of a community policing model based primarily on an understanding drawn from the British context; however, it may be challenging to implement all the elements of the model in Abu Dhabi because of local political, social, cultural and environmental factors. One can assume that some elements of the model will be more effectively implemented than others, but these variations require an empirical enquiry to establish if there is a gap between policy and practice. It is important that any research plan has a clear strategy in order to set the research questions and design. That strategy might be to focus on one or a number of approaches. For example, focus groups, qualitative interviews, observations and quantitative data collection through self-completion surveys or a mixture of any of these might be suitable for this type of research. Due to the limited and restricted availability of written policy instruments in Abu Dhabi
(documentary guides or doctrine), it was considered that research questions would be best informed by collecting data in a way that engaged with officers and staff of Abu Dhabi Police. Clearly, at some point, the idea of implementing community policing was formed. Understanding this and what that idea was, why it was being implemented and how policy was being transferred addresses the empirical aims of this research. Next, the task was to understand how in fact community policing was being implemented and this would be achieved by collecting and analysing data obtained from officers in the field who were directly responsible for policy implementation. This approach draws on the learning points obtained from existing studies discussed in the last chapter in relation to ‘three strikes’ and ‘zero tolerance policing’, and takes the research a step further, where data collection from the frontline, at the point of policy delivery, is analysed against the elite level of policymaking.

The strategy for this research design, therefore, was focused on an extensive review of available literature and on data obtained from employees who were directly involved in the transfer of community policing policy. This would include data from those involved in its implementation to establish the levels of policy convergence or divergence. This strategy enabled the setting of clear objectives in that the areas of focus of data collection to achieve it would be in two distinct parts (Saunders et al., 1999). First was the need to focus on the central community police department where senior officers worked. Many of these officers were involved in the first stages of the policy transfer process, from the development of initial ideas, as part of an elite network, to the task of policymaking. The second part was to achieve data collection from the community police teams, which were spread across the 23 police stations throughout the country. These teams were, on a day-to-day basis, involved in the implementation of local policy decisions. There were
limitations in gaining access to officers at all ranks within the police requiring specific levels of authority. In part, that authority emanated from my role in Abu Dhabi as an employee and working alongside officers who would be potential participants created that level of access. Other formal and informal requirements to gain access to participants needed careful management and is discussed below. Nevertheless, my role as an adviser created the opportunity to secure this research design as a realistic and achievable strategy for this project.

4.1.1 Documentary research

The purpose of the documentary research for this thesis was to carry out a systematic review of a wide range of literature to inform the aims of the study and the discussions throughout all chapters (Mathews and Ross, 2010; Vito et al., 2014; Bryman, 2016). This was achieved with access to national and university libraries in both the UK and Abu Dhabi, supported by other online resources. In addition, the Abu Dhabi Police organisation provided a source of some limited material, including organisational structures, strategic documents, operational activity and other material available online in the public domain, or held within the community police department. Where documents were not published, such as those relating to crime and security, they were restricted and copying or reproduction was prohibited. This meant that covert observation of policy, for example, was not possible. However, being immersed in the organisation as an employee created an opportunity to develop knowledge of policy through direct access to research subjects, and this approach is discussed below.

Located in Abu Dhabi city is the UAE Federation library: the ‘Emirates Center for
Strategic Studies and Research’. It maintains the national archives and a substantial collection of literature in both English and Arabic texts, most of which are available to researchers by prior arrangement. The collection includes, for example, publications on the history of the Trucial States and regional security events that provided context to the chronology of Abu Dhabi Policing. This library holds the only copy in the UAE of the ‘Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf’ which record the original commentary of the formation of Abu Dhabi Police and other government entities. In addition, for Ministry of Interior and other police employees throughout the UAE, an online ‘smart library’ provides access to a large selection of digital books, international academic journals and media publications; as access to internal police documents was restricted, researching the local media via the smart library was a useful method of collecting data about crime cases or policing initiatives relevant for this study.

In the UK, the extensive literature resources maintained in many of the libraries at Leeds University were used to support the research. The comprehensive collections on the subject of ‘community policing’ were of particular value as most of them were not available in the UAE. Other research included access through the Leeds University search@library online portal to prominent electronic books and articles related to all subjects. Additionally, the UK national archives were invaluable in providing access to historical documents regarding key events that took place in Abu Dhabi. These records informed issues about regional security and policing in the Persian Gulf from a British perspective, the formation of the UAE Federation, and other general data on demography.

Available at: http://library.ecssr.com
Available at: www.smartlibrary.ae
Available at: https://leeds.summon.serialssolutions.com/
Available at: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk
and state development schemes. At the time of writing, a digitisation project agreed between the national archives and the United Arab Emirates aims to make many of the records referenced in this thesis available to researchers online by the end of 2019.

4.1.2 Choosing the subject data research methods

There are many ways in which a researcher can choose to collect data from subjects. As mentioned above, focus groups, individual interviews, observations and self-completion surveys are the most popular methods and any would potentially provide a framework suitable for this research. However, not all options are appropriate in all circumstances and with any option taken, it is essential that the data collected can be relied upon to be accurate and valid (Bryman, 2016). In addition, authenticity in the context of the participants’ understanding of the issues is equally as important (Chadwick et al., 2008). It was essential, therefore, to select the most appropriate method of data collection suitable for the environment within Abu Dhabi Police and in a way that accuracy, authenticity and validity of data can be assured. One approach is to develop an effective research design framework based upon theory, purpose, sampling approach and methods, which are essential for drafting the research questions (Robson, 1993). To do this, each of the four options above need to be considered in terms of their suitability for achieving these aims and each is discussed below.

4.1.3 Focus groups and interviews

The journey to the choices made begins by considering the context of the research aims and that face-to-face interviewing of policymakers lends itself to be the most suitable approach. There are effectively two ways in which this can be done. First, by focus groups, and secondly, on a one-to-one basis. The first option of focus groups can potentially be used for both parts of data collection in this strategy. A focus group is a
qualitative method of data collection that includes observations, interviews and textual analysis (Wilson, 2012). This method allows researchers ‘to probe a sample group of [participants] in an effort to ascertain the full range of ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes and opinions on various topics of interest to him’ (Dexter, 2006, p.4). A focus group is usually organised as, ‘a group discussion on a particular topic organised for research purposes … [and the] discussion is guided, monitored and recorded by a researcher’ (Chadwick et al., 2008, p.293).

The approach means that more people can be sampled for collecting large amounts of data at one time and at greater speed, although in this way, questions can be considered in a different manner than the way in which individuals would do so (Fife, 2005). There is an advantage to this method in that there is an opportunity that group information may come to light that might not normally be revealed in one-to-one interviews (Kamberelis and Dimitriadas, 2005). This can occur because ‘other group members may challenge an answer, [whereas] individuals tend to be more analytical and thoughtful’, and there is some advantage in this for the researcher (Breakwell, 1990, p.75). There are disadvantages, though, with the most significant for this study being that group interviews are usually ineffective in exploring individual knowledge, learning only from the most knowledgeable person present in the group. The very nature of a group is that participants can be ‘challenging … dominant talkers, long-winded participants, the expert, the argumentative type [or] the shy person’ (Wilson, 2012, p.130). The potential for dominance by one person in a group may distort what others are willing to say, for example, if a high-status individual is present, such as a senior officer or influential family or tribal figure. Also, in a discussion with senior officers:

elites might be willing to give some information, but not if there were a
group of witnesses around, who might judge the entire interaction in a negative way that could hurt the elite professionally. (Dexter, 2006, p.5)

The potential for losing face, it is suggested, especially in the cultural context of Abu Dhabi society may result in participants erring towards giving socially desirable responses or remaining silent on issues. There are many reasons why focus groups might be avoided but one of the main risks that is relevant here is where there is a potential for participants to be uneasy with each other to such an extent that they may not discuss their levels of knowledge and opinions openly (Chadwick et al., 2008). In addition, and practically, issues of language and translation are a barrier and need careful consideration (Wilson, 2012). It is, consequently, impossible to mitigate all the risks attributed to focus groups as identified here and, as such, it was decided to exclude this method.

The second option, of conducting one-to-one interviews with individuals, is a common strategy used by researchers and has been used successfully to interview police personnel, including elites (Reiner, 1978). This method provides a deeper understanding of social phenomena than would be obtained from purely quantitative methods (Gill et al., 2014). But, this method is also challenging for the researcher, who needs to be well prepared, adaptable and able to build a rapport with the interviewee to ensure that the best results can be achieved (Mathews & Ross, 2010). Face-to-face interviewing also means the researcher can assess any negative factors like body language, verbal questioning or answers going off track that might indicate the participant is struggling with a question or lacks understanding. The benefits ‘through interviewing, [is that] somewhat more intensive information [can be collected] … than could have been obtained otherwise’ (Dexter, 2006, p.23). Participants may reveal something that is not readily available in official documents, for example.
The advantage of this method is that it allows participants to explain their beliefs and opinions through words that can be classified into themes (coding) and analysed as concepts (Saunders et al., 1999). It allows the researcher to engage with subjects in semi-structured interviews to explore their understanding of the pertinent issues, and through appropriate probing, ensures that rich data focussed on the aims of the research is collected (Robson, 2002). It also creates an opportunity to assess the reaction of the participant to ensure that the researcher can be satisfied of their truthfulness, and in turn, the validity of their contributions. Another advantage of this method is that interview samples can be small in terms of the ‘proportion of your population, if you are dealing with a population that you know is homogenous’ (Breakwell, 1990, p.73). This is certainly the case for the senior officers in Abu Dhabi Police, where they may well be classified as a group of homogenous elites because they are ‘highly skilled, professionally competent, and class specific’ (McDowell, 1998, p.2135). This brings its own challenges and opportunities in terms of interview dynamics when engaging with those who are classified as elites.

There is no specific definition of an elite interviewee, but one that closely resembles the Abu Dhabi officers is that they are ‘nationals who hold positions of power within organisations’ (Herod, 1999, p.313). It is not the intention in this thesis to carry out a full review of literature relating to interviewing elites but highlighting some of the key points to take into account from my perspective is worthy of brief discussion because it contributes to the choices made. It is argued that there is a difference between ‘interviewing up’, with people classified as being elite, to interviews focussed ‘down’, where the interviewer is in a position of power over the interviewee (Smith, 2006, p.643).
It is commonly said that ‘the interview [is] an active relationship occurring in a context permeated by issues of power, emotionality, and interpersonal process’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 2003, p.469). This creates a gap in an approach as to how the two different types of interviews might be managed, where ‘working in an elite field poses major difficulties which stem from the challenges of researching up’ (Desmond, 2004, p.262). This relates to a number of issues, including the difficulty of gaining access to elites, developing a rapport and trust with potential elite interviewees, dealing with power relations, and positionality in terms of being well prepared for the interview. Finally, a number of potential ethical issues, including selective reporting and confidentiality, need to be considered (Darbi and Hall, 2014). Dexter (2006, p.18) describes how these types of interviews might work by providing the following definition of an elite interview:

it is an interview with any interviewee who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given special, nonstandardised treatment. … encouraging the interviewee to structure the account of the situation or letting the interviewee introduce to a considerable extent … his notions of what he regards as relevant, instead of relying upon the investigator’s notions of relevance.

This definition is relevant for the senior officers in Abu Dhabi and takes account of their status in the organisation and specialist knowledge of their policing discipline. This status gives them opportunities to expand on any questions asked, ultimately ‘making the elite feel more special and willing to give information that they might not give under normal different circumstances’ (Dexter, 1964, p.556). This opportunity is strengthened by my own working relationship with the officers, where, as Gorden (1987, p.27) asserts:

in studies where the [interviewer has] many contacts with the respondent, it becomes more possible to build up a rational sharing relationship, even where cultural backgrounds of the interviewer and the respondent may be
quite different.

This is useful in that the relationship I had with the senior officers was such that it could be anticipated that they would provide broad and honest responses to questions, full of rich information that otherwise might not be available from other sources. There is a differentiation though between the officers in the department whom I knew well and those who worked in police stations in the field, most of whom I did not know personally. Therefore, these apparent opportunities in personal interviews would not, it is suggested, be realised other than with the senior officers working centrally in the community police department.

In terms of the issues raised above by Darbi and Hall (2014), the challenges they highlight had a minimal impact on my research. My role in Abu Dhabi Police meant that I had direct access to the senior officers and securing the participation of some of them for an interview was not perceived as a barrier. There were high levels of rapport and trust between us that had been built over a number of years. My knowledge of the subject matter to match theirs, it is suggested, ensured that an interview would be a two-way process, with each side having mutual respect for the other, and the ethical issues that this type of data collection raised could be managed. However, this could not be replicated with interviews of officers working in the field at police stations, for whom, some other form of data collection approach was needed.

Before making the final decision on this method, it is acknowledged that interviewing officers on a one-to-one basis is still not without risk and has its limitations (Dexter, 2006; Harvey, 2011). The perceived risk with this approach is that the participants may feel under pressure to say ‘the right things’ or to demonstrate the correct opinion expected of
them in their position. This might especially be the case when being interviewed because the ‘structures of power [the relationship] between the interviewer and the interviewed are complex’ (Pile, 1991, p.464). This needs to be managed by the interviewer, who should be aware of the potential for it to happen and be able to respond by giving the participant advice (Oppenheim, 1992). Power need not always be demonstrated by the interviewer, even though it may be perceived (Allen, 1997). This is something that the interviewer should manage to prevent the interviewee from perceiving some form of threat from the process (Smith, 2006). A further risk is the subjectivities of being aware of my own professional working relationship with the officers and my knowledge and understanding of community police policy in Abu Dhabi. This had a potential impact for the participant, if encouraged by me, to verbalise their views in a way that could at times be challenging for them. This could occur specifically as a result of leading questions, something that I aimed to avoid in the interview as a delimitation mechanism (Mligo and Shabani, 2016). Taking cognisance of the above discussion, I decided, therefore, to conduct one-to-one interviews with the senior elite officers in the central community police department.

4.1.4 Observation and survey methods

As alluded to above, it was appreciated that interviewing senior officers alone would not mean that all data could be collected to inform all the research questions. Exploring the impact of implementation and adaptation of policy ideas required collecting data from the frontline community police teams, that is, those who delivered community policing on a day-to-day basis. Whereas many of the senior officers in the community police department had good standards of English as a second language, creating opportunities for interviews to be carried out in English, this was not necessarily the case for junior
officers. If interviewing could be employed for these staff, even simultaneous translation of English and Arabic would prove to be difficult.

The next stage, therefore, was to consider the most appropriate method of obtaining data from officers in the field. The first option was to obtain data by observations and as a method it is a way of collecting data first hand (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2005). It permits the study of people and their actions and behaviours in their own environment (Baker, 2006). There is no specific definition of observation, but it seems to ‘involve the systematic recording of observable phenomena or behaviour in a natural setting’ (Gorman and Clayton, 2005, p.40). The observation of policing in this way has been very popular and useful in the study of, for example, frontline police work (Manning, 1997), community meetings (Skogan, 1994) and for the analysis of reassurance policing (Peterson, 2010). Observation as a research method is, however, complex and challenging for securing sufficient relevant data (Baker, 2006).

Language differences are a significant problem where the researcher does not, without a translator, understand the language being used by the officers observed. As well as making written notes of observations, it is good practice for the researcher to clarify with officers at the time ‘to answer other questions … of them [that] have brought to mind’ (Gold, 1958, p.222), and again this would be inherently challenging where there are language barriers. Working alongside officers on foot or vehicle patrol provides an insight into the police role and application of police powers and responsibilities. This is useful for collecting data on police interactions with the public and for the effectiveness of community engagement tasks. However, considering the logistics of the ‘unique factor’ of length of time required in the field to observe (Baker, 2006, p.181), the geographic
distance between teams in Abu Dhabi, the problems of language and lack of available translators, it was decided that this research method would not, in this case, be suitable for fulfilling the above strategy.

This led me to the view that the most appropriate method of achieving the research strategy was to collect quantitative data from frontline staff by means of a self-completion survey. Although even then, as Hibberd and Bennett (1990) point out, is not an easy task to achieve. Survey questions must be drafted in a way that they are understood, and it is clear for the participant as to what they need to do in order to answer the questions. The researcher must take into account the overall level of difficulty of the survey to make sure that the participant can actually complete it. The benefit, however, of this approach is that the collection of quantitative data through the survey ‘enables the researcher to undertake statistical analysis’ (Mathews and Ross, 2010, p.154). The results can then be compared and contrasted with the data obtained from qualitative interviews as part of the analysis of the whole policy transfer process.

This type of method also has its weaknesses including the construction of the survey and what statements can be posed to ensure the results will inform the research questions (Skogan, 2004; Rosenbaum and Wilkinson, 2004; Kassin et al., 2007). The survey also obtains data from a snapshot in time and once completed it cannot be changed (Bell et al., 2014). In addition, some participants may be unfamiliar with questions being asked of them and may interpret them in different ways (Vito et al., 2014) limiting the inferences that can be made through in-depth analysis and the potential of being overwhelmed with statistical data and losing focus (Denscombe, 2010). It is also acknowledged that drafting surveys is a specialised function, however, the risks can be overcome or
minimised with careful construction of clear questions or statements to consider and testing of the survey before implementation. In summary, this review of options led to the final decision to apply a mixed methods approach by carrying out semi structured qualitative interviews on a one-to-one basis with senior officers, and to implement a quantitative method of data collection by way of a self-completion survey with other officers in the community police teams based at police stations.

4.1.5 Making a case for mixed methods

Qualitative research and quantitative research are often described as separate methodological approaches, and each is seen by those who can be described as purists to be incompatible with the other (Howe, 1998). Some authors, on the other hand, argue that in practice they are more closely woven (Brannan, 2005). This may, it is suggested, depend on the research culture or particular researchers’ views that maintain the methods as separate. In some cases, researchers may be pressured to produce volumes of statistical data for clients, for example, on how likely a population is to vote in a forthcoming election and require only quantitative data, whereas other approaches to research might seek to understand why someone might vote one way or the other, a qualitative approach. It is the combination of both data that is more likely to be accepted today, as experienced in Britain, where there seems to be a growth in demand for mixed research around evidenced-based policy (Brannan, 2005). In criminal justice too, mixed methods of research have been applied to studies of policing (Tuffin et al., 2006) and have been described as an approach that is ‘well placed to both detail what changes have taken place and to explain how these have been induced’ (Innes, 2006b, p.96). Equally, it appears that there is a move towards the evaluation of policy using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The demand not just for statistical analysis but raw data on what people think
and say in popular language in a field of research is still developing (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007). As such, researchers in various fields of discipline have drafted their own versions of what are now multiple definitions of mixed methods research, and, in considering most, it has been broadly defined by Johnson et al. (2007, p.123) as follows:

Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration.

Combining data from both interviews and self-completion surveys as a multiple method has the potential to offset the limitations of both methods implemented in isolation and has been described by Denzin (1978) as one of the forms of triangulation that validate the data. Interviewing on a one-to-one basis, as in this study, takes time to organise and complete when there is restricted access to suitable participants and the potential requirements for translation services. Self-completion surveys are also limited in that there is no opportunity to expand on answers to explore responses further to enhance the data. Interviews may also be weak on data about the actual implementation of policy, whereas surveys may be weak on the genesis of policy formation. The mixed method approach, I argue, has the potential to create a more comprehensive account of community policing policy and implementation that, without combining the data, would be challenging to achieve.

Applying both methods of research has implications too for the types of questions that can be asked and the value of the data that may be obtained for analysis. Interviews are best structured with open questions, allowing participants to explain their answers in a
broad way. Answering a question, for example, on why community policing is being implemented in Abu Dhabi lends itself to a more detailed answer, one which can be probed by the interviewer. However, this type of open question is not an effective approach for self-completion surveys where there can be no follow-up questioning or probing. In addition, the volume of data from larger numbers of survey participants makes analysis of responses to open questions a significant challenge. Surveys require a more descriptive question, allowing participants to state, for example, whether they agree or disagree with a statement, something that is useful in assessing general views on policy and its implementation. The use of both methods provides the opportunity to gather sufficient data to achieve all the aims of this research, allowing for a comprehensive analysis of the empirical questions. Interviewing officers about what precisely was the policy of community policing being transferred to Abu Dhabi could then be compared and analysed against the survey with direct questions about role and duties.

The benefits for this study in applying a multi method approach can be specifically attributed to the way in which the management of community policing was structured in Abu Dhabi. The central department where most of the senior officers worked – those who were directly involved in policy and decision-making – was detached from the police stations where community policing was being delivered on the ground. Notwithstanding that there was a flow of information between the stations and the department about their needs for resources and equipment, or to update managers on their activities, it still remained the case that many of the central department officers had little or no experience of frontline policing. It would, consequently, have been difficult for them to answer questions at that level, and vice versa. It was, therefore, important in deciding on research methods for this study that data could be obtained from both the policymakers, and then,
this would be analysed against the data from those who were charged with implementing it. This led directly to the benefits offered by a mixed methods approach.

Furthermore, by exploring policy development and implementation and by combining qualitative and quantitative data, four opportunities were created in this approach (Johnson et al., 2007; Brannan 2005). First was the potential to corroborate the qualitative and quantitative results to show whether they produce the same findings. Convergence of data from more than one method ‘enhances our beliefs that the results are valid and not a methodological artefact’ (Bouchard, 1976, p.268). Secondly, the approach provided an opportunity to elaborate on the findings through quantitative data analysis to provide a more detailed and better understanding. Thirdly, the results might differ but together they could generate insights that would not necessarily be revealed through one research method alone, and finally, the opportunity to contradict where findings conflicted each other was provided. Each opportunity allowed for comparisons and considerations, and to some extent, a weighing of data from either of the qualitative or quantitative approaches. The value of mixed methods for the researcher is being able to create the opportunity to apply the approach to unique problems in different cultures where otherwise there would be difficulties in collecting data. This eliminates the potential weaknesses in the results if a single research method is applied in a broad way (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

In conclusion, it is argued that a mixed methods approach can be accepted as a substantive research methodology, moving away from the dualist hypothesis that qualitative and quantitative research remain separate and exclusive methods (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). It is a creative approach that does not limit the extent to which data can be
collected, it is more inclusive for participants and it increases the likelihood of obtaining the best answers to the empirical questions posed. It is also suggested that the combining of the research methods, improves the strength of the research (Johnson & Turner, 2003). The approach, therefore, in this study began with the implementation of the elite interviews, the process of which is discussed below.

4.2 Elite interviews

This section involves the practical application of the interview phase of the research with senior officers in Abu Dhabi Police, from the first drafting of the interview questionnaire through to piloting and implementation. My reflections are included here and explore the challenges and opportunities faced throughout the process. Firstly, for any researcher, it is acknowledged that ‘the interview is a complex activity’ (Hoffmann, 2007, p.318) and the researcher ‘must remain cognizant of and handle several activities simultaneously’ (Arendell, 1997, p.342). The style of interviewing is important too and can be one of a number of different types, including structured interviews (using a fixed set of predetermined questions), semi-structured (where the interviewer has flexibility to probe and explore issues in more depth, pursuing ideas in more detail) and an unstructured interview, which is performed with little or no organisation (Gill et al., 2014). In terms of this research, I wanted to explore and probe, using my own experience, the knowledge and ideas of the senior officers, but in a fixed framework of policy factors. Although a predetermined list of initial questions would be useful on its own, the opportunity to discuss responses in more detail needed to be enabled in a semi-structured format. As Dexter (2006, p.26) asserts:

valuable analysis of interviews come from one main factor where the interviewer has a good deal of relevant previous experience which enables
him to interpret what he hears and asks meaningful supplementary [semi-structured] questions.

This type of interview allows the participant to provide ‘narratives of incidents and experiences’ (Brannen, 2005, p.182), and these would be useful here for allowing me to modify the format of the interview based on the responses received (Robson, 2002). It also allowed me, in terms of understanding the policy transfer process, to define the questions, but then ‘seek for the interviewee to provide some information as a way of instructing or teaching in response demonstrating the interviewees knowledge’ (Dexter, 2006, p.41). Preparation for interviewing is important and not only includes having suitable questions that would yield information for the study (Gill et al., 2014), but also a location for the interview to take place that maintained confidentiality and anonymity. This included a time and a place for the interview that was suitable for the participant in an environment that supported the process, that is, minimal background noise, limiting interruptions, comfortable settings and minimised distractions from the surroundings. The location of an interview might, therefore, be varied to cater for different participants’ needs but needed to be somewhere that still allowed the interview to have an element of formality to it (Bell et al., 2014). A good interaction between the interviewer and the participant means that the interviewer must maintain eye contact as much as possible and:

- pay close attention to the non-verbal communication patterns of the [interviewee] in order to assess both the impact of … questions and the likely truthfulness of the answers. (Breakwell, 1990, p.42)

Showing interest in the participants’ contributions, engaging with the conversation in a semi-structured way and being able to respond to the participant in a way that encourages them is essential (Mathews & Ross, 2010). But, as Breakwell (1990, p.39) emphasises, researchers should ‘never rely on … memory for what an [interviewee] has said during
the interview’. Electronic audio recording will minimise the amount of note taking by the interviewer so that the participant does not lose vital eye contact. Moreover, and importantly, it ‘protects against bias and provides a permanent record of what was and not said’ (Pontin, 2000, p.289). This type of voice recording is effective but requires the interviewer to have experience in operating the equipment to minimise the risk of data loss. In addition, the participant must know that the recording is being made and consent to that method, a point that should be included in the participants’ consent forms (see Appendix C). A great advantage of this approach is that the interviewer is able to concentrate on the conversation and take away the recording to transcribe later at a more suitable time.

There were several issues to take into account relating to the selection of participants for interview, namely, their rank, role, language skills and availability. The interviews were, if at all possible, to be carried out in English, so it was essential that those selected were able to understand the questions posed, and were capable of articulating their answers sufficiently with or without professional translation. As mentioned previously, translation from English to Arabic can be a complex process and loss of context and understanding is a significant risk. Therefore, the aim was to select, where possible, officers who had good English language skills. There were approximately 40 of these senior (elite) officers in the community police department. The target for the study was to complete between 10 and 15 interviews as a sample group. This group was small enough to maintain confidentiality but large enough to validate and check responses for accuracy by analysing and looking for consistencies.

A structured set of questions was prepared for the interviews (Appendix E), focussed on
four main themes to answer the questions of what policy was being transferred to Abu Dhabi, why was it being transferred, and how and if there were any modifications made to it due to local culture, traditions or other factors. An essential part of the preparation for the interviews was to pilot the questions (Gill et al., 2014). The questions were formulated in a non-technical, semi-structured format to assist development of the conversation and to allow the officers to feel free to give their views, opinions and knowledge. In arranging these interviews, it was important to consider:

the interviewer must be sensitive to the cultural expectations as to how the interview will be arranged with elites. This might be through initial contact by letter, telephone or email to give prior notice of the intention to carry out an interview, in order to give interviewees times to consider their agreement to participate. (Dexter, 2006, p.8)

In these circumstances, and being sensitive to this advice because of having a close working relationship with senior officers, any approach other than face-to-face requests would have been inappropriate and, as a result, all requests to participate were made by me in private and in person supported by provision of the research information letter (Appendix B). All interviews, where possible, took place in private office facilities at a community police department or at other suitable locations selected by the participant and all were given the option of the interview being recorded. The aim was to interview for a minimum of 30 minutes but no more than 60 minutes so as to gain the best possible results whilst avoiding taking up too much time of participants (Robson, 2002). To encourage participation, selected officers were informed that the interview data would be analysed and reported anonymously, with no views being attributed to individuals or to any participant identified by name. The pilot took place with the full agreement of a senior officer, who was specifically selected for this task, who was typical of those whom I
intended to interview as part of the selected population.

The information letter, in Arabic, was provided to the officer and the interview took place in a private office. The interview began, and immediately on my mind was the ethics strategy I had set (see below) to minimise any effect I might have on the process in the transition from being a consultant to a researcher. During the interview, what seemed clear was that even where the officer was competent in the use of English, it still took him a great deal of effort to concentrate and express views. His comment at the conclusion was that he was happy with the interview, the questions, the flow and his ability to fully participate. This pilot was followed with a further 12 interviews with senior officers over a four-month period. At the start of the interviews, a number of positive comments about participation were made; however, the enthusiasm of the officers was of slight concern to me and could have been an indication of the potential for them to ‘say the right things’ simply to please me. This issue had already been anticipated in consideration of reliability of data, and the strategy to minimise the risk was to ensure that questions asked during the interview did not focus on issues relating to other personnel, including other managers or senior leaders. Questions were worded to focus specifically on a pragmatic approach of asking about what, why and how in terms of policy and process. In this way, the opportunity for officers to try to please was reduced, it is suggested, to a point where the risk was virtually eliminated.

At their request, almost all of the interviews took place in a private office at their place of work. In terms of maintaining anonymity, this was achieved as on a normal working basis; it would not be unusual for me to be with the same officers in this environment in my role as an adviser. Two of the interviews took place at other locations away from
work, both in restaurants, which participants specifically requested and where they clearly felt more comfortable. On these two occasions, background noise was a slight problem, but the interviews were completed satisfactorily and within the timescale allocated. Translation services were offered to all participants but only one officer requested them. Surprisingly though, whereas there were eight translators available in the department of Jordanian and Sudanese origin, the officer specifically selected a fellow Emirati officer to translate for him. On face value, there was an advantage to this arrangement in ensuring the participant was happy with taking part in the interview. Significantly though, his choice of translator was an officer who I had already interviewed as part of this research and immediately I considered that there would be a risk of generating a skew in the data by influencing the interviewee. Notwithstanding that he had already been interviewed, a further risk here was that the Emirati translator, being an officer from the community police department, could elaborate when translating by introducing his own ideas, opinions or views reflecting his own interview. My approach to this issue was to first read through the transcript of the interview with this first officer (the translator) to recall his responses, from which I could judge any similarities or differences with his translation of another officer’s contributions. I then proceeded to the interview. The Emirati translator signed a confidentiality agreement form (Appendix D) and the interview commenced. In practice, the risks of a skew did not materialise.

After all the interview data were collected, the recordings were transcribed and prepared for analysis. As detailed above, the structure of the interview was formed in such a way as to raise issues directly aligned to the aims of this research so that through a process of coding of data, themes could be achieved. The stages of analysis followed were those described by Dahlgren and Fallsburg (1991), supporting a grounded theory approach and
first involving familiarisation of the data by listening to the recordings and checking all transcripts for accuracy. Once completed, the key themes from each transcript were then colour coded so that they could be extracted to form a shorter list of comments from participants that would be used later to illustrate points made during the analysis phase. These shorter statements were then compared across the responses of all the participants so those that were similar could be separated from those that differed, allowing for grouping of statements into a number of categories. The final process of labelling the data into categories allowed for the contrasting of the data, searching for similarities and differences in knowledge, and understanding of the empirical questions.

Reflecting on the whole process of interviewing, the anonymity for all participants was maintained and the transcripts provided a substantial amount of data for analysis. Ethical issues were part of my considerations at each interview, maintaining control of the strategy I had set and not influencing answers or leading responses in any way. In fact, participants were not probed as much as one might have done, as I was conscious at all times not to influence their responses, reflecting on the point that:

whether to use leading questions will depend on many variables. The only universal requirement is that the interviewer, in analysing the interview, should try to determine what tactics he did in fact employ and make at least an informed guess as to how the chosen tactics may have affected what the interviewee said. (Dexter, 2006, p.34)

As a result, the delivery of the interviews can be described more closely as structured interviews with some semi-structured elements, but in this regard, it is suggested that this ensured ethical compliance at all times and that consistency with the approach was maintained. This was the completion of the first stage of data collection. The following
part discusses the second stage of collecting the quantitative data from the frontline community police teams.

4.3 Survey of frontline community police

As mentioned previously, self-completion surveys are a common tool used in quantitative research and support a mixed methods approach to data collection and analysis. The purpose of this survey was to identify community policing activity and opinions about implementation, that is, what the community police actually did or considered in terms of their role in Abu Dhabi. It aimed to understand frontline implementation so that through analysis, this could be compared and contrasted with the results of the interviews with their senior officers. The survey had its limitations and could not inform all the research aims as it was more focussed on the specific elements of understanding processes for implementation. It did, however, as previously detailed, provide an opportunity to corroborate data obtained from officers, elaborate on it and provide complementary insights and direct attention to any contradictions (Brannan, 2005).

Through experience and advice from local Emirati officers, it was clear that the survey had to be at a basic level and be understandable to all participants through clear use of (Arabic) language. The survey was prepared (see Appendix F) in a format so that it could be self-completed and it was aimed to take no more than 10-15 minutes to finish, with a ‘tick box’ method of providing answers. The layout of the survey was prepared in a format familiar to the participants by following an Abu Dhabi Police approach, adhering to the internal requirements of the organisation and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in terms of survey construction. Using a five-point Likert scale in the main was a style to which staff were familiar with. This does create an issue of validity for the results when using a
semantic scale where the midpoint is neutral, respondents are potentially able to avoid expressing their opinion as to whether they agree or disagree with a statement posed to them (Mligo and Shabani, 2016). However, this approach was an essential part of the survey construction, ensuring that the risk of spoilt or missing data was reduced by avoiding use of unfamiliar survey formats. The introduction letter with the survey was also concise, as keeping it short and precise was essential.

The target population for the survey was the community police teams throughout the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, where there were approximately 350 policemen and women up to the position of team leader. An initial approach might have been to survey the whole population; however, to do that would have been logistically problematic, creating a significant risk for the whole process. Taking into account that at any given time a number of staff would be on rest days, training courses, sick leave and holidays or attached to other functions, meant that surveying the total population would require a number of months to complete. The critical issue was the problem of maintaining control of the survey over such a long period once delivered to participants at their stations. There was experience within the Abu Dhabi Police with previous surveys that if, for example, an extended period of time was allowed for it to be completed, large numbers of survey forms could go missing, forms would not be returned, or, in some cases, forms would be spoiled and overwritten. At the time of this study, there was no alternative to implementing a paper-based survey by delivering it by hand to participants. An electronic software solution to carrying out surveys was being developed by the MoI and there are other established online survey tools. However, the key problem was that most staff in stations did not have easy access to computer terminals with internet facilities to complete online survey options. Selecting a sample of the population for the survey had to take
these points into account in a way to minimise the risks.

It was, therefore, more appropriate to select a sample of the population that would represent the whole in such a way that their contributions would reflect the whole group of which they were part (De Vaus, 2014). In order to allow for relevant analysis of comparative data, it was still important to achieve a balance in the sample to group participants according to their ‘particular characteristics’, such as gender and rank (Robson, 2002, p.262). To achieve this, it was appropriate to apply probability theory to select the sample to make sure that it was representative of the total population. The key to fulfilling this theory is to collect data from a known group of participants which can be identified (the research subjects). Each member was then chosen at random through this process, as it was not known who exactly would be working in any given week. Finally, participants were selected only because they were members of community police teams. The 350 members of staff in the community police were distributed across four police areas covering the whole of Abu Dhabi, and in any given five-day working week, it was estimated that the actual number of staff available would be approximately 40 per cent of the total. Therefore, 200 copies of the survey were prepared and batches of 50 were distributed to the four policing areas. To explore whether this approach would actually create any potential skew of data in terms of the participants, for example, with rank, gender or experience, the demographic data requested within the survey included these elements for later analysis.

The types of questions asked in the survey aimed to obtain data on attitudes and experiences of key elements of community policing, as identified through the extensive literature review in Chapter 2, and also took into account the responses from the
interviews with senior officers. This included, for example, policy issues about community police visibility, community engagement, problem-solving activity and working in partnership. Questions were drafted after the completion of interviews with officers as they set out the organisation’s understanding of policy being implemented, and the survey aimed to collect data to assist with the analysis.

To move towards implementation of this phase of data collection, the survey needed to be approved at various levels within the police organisation and circulated with the community police department manager’s authority. There was a formal process to follow to gain access to participants and it was a requirement that the MoI, Centre for Studies and Surveys (CSS), had to approve all surveys carried out for research purposes. The whole process of approval took a number of months to complete. There were advantages to this, albeit it was a challenging requirement that needed to be responded to it in a pragmatic manner. It meant that participants could trust the request that would be made of them and that their data would be managed by the organisation to maintain confidentiality. The translated Arabic version of the survey needed to be tested and then verified by the CSS before implementation, and it aimed to protect the organisation to ensure the survey was formulated, distributed and collected in a way that produced valid and robust data.

The target population for the survey were all Arabic speakers and, as such, the survey was presented to them in Arabic only. There were challenges with translation as there were risks of loss of context and understanding and sometimes a requirement for rewording of a question or issue. A two-stage process for translation was implemented. Firstly, the survey was confidentially translated into Arabic by a professionally qualified
translator from the Community Policing and Police Science (training) Institute in Abu Dhabi, an institute that is part of the police organisation. The second stage was to verify the translation and this was undertaken by a police consultant, and a colleague of mine, who had experience in editing and validating Arabic reports, having previous experience of this function for the National Centre for Consultancy and Management Development in Iraq.

The distribution of the survey to all participants would under normal circumstances be difficult; it needed the cooperation of the organisation. With participants spread throughout the country and with no real internal mail delivery system, the task would have involved distribution by hand and later collection and return in the same way. The extensive travel, costs and time needed to achieve this would have been disproportionate and difficult to achieve as a lone researcher. However, with internal support, this was achieved using police couriers. As mentioned above, it also meant that the level of trust of participants in the survey increased as this was the normal accepted way for surveys to be distributed and completed by the organisation. In summary, it is a necessary process that all researchers within Abu Dhabi Police and the MoI have to comply with, but the benefits justified the effort required to complete it.

The pilot of the survey was a critical part of the process to enhance its validity and reliability (Vito et al., 2014). The aim was to test whether participants were able to understand the issues and the way in which the questionnaire needed to be completed by following relevant instructions and examples. Those undertaking the pilot were selected from within the community police department and were not those who would ultimately be part of the sample population completing the survey, avoiding any bias to the final
results. The first pilot took place with two officers, who were selected for a number of reasons. They were known to me, they had good frontline operational experience of community policing and both had very good English language skills, being able to explain their thoughts about issues posed to them. The feedback from these officers after completing the pilot survey showed that the instructions were clear and generally the issues posed were understandable, but with a few minor amendments required to the Arabic phrases used. The survey was reworked by the translator and again verified by the consultant and a second pilot was completed using two different officers. It was decided that identifying different officers for the second pilot would ensure that there was a fresh assessment of the survey from participants who had not previously seen the questions. Again, these officers were from the department and were not included in the final survey. Feedback was supportive and allowed the survey to be reproduced ready for final distribution.

Each printed survey included an envelope with a return address to me personally, and the instruction included a request for the survey to be sealed in the envelope when completed. Later, on receipt, I was the only person to break the seal of the envelopes. Police couriers distributed the surveys throughout Abu Dhabi, and a return date was set for five days later. In response, 182 surveys were returned, all in sealed envelopes. A review of the completed surveys enabled an initial classification. 31 surveys were rejected, including those left blank (14) or spoiled papers (17). The spoiled surveys were discounted because respondents had in the main ticked ‘strongly agree’ to all parts. The construction of the survey was such that this type of response could be easily identified and would indicate incorrect completion of the survey as not all questions would lead to such an answer. The remaining 151 surveys were selected for analysis and all responses to issues posed were
converted to statistical data and input to the statistical package for the social sciences software (SPSS).

On reflection of the process of implementing the survey, I was surprised as to how much more challenging it was to complete compared to one-to-one interviewing. It was, as Hibberd and Bennett (1990) pointed out, a complex task to achieve. Nevertheless, overcoming the challenges of obtaining access to participants, designing a survey tool that could be implemented in an effective and controlled way, obtaining formal authority to implement it, and finally receiving the results, was very rewarding in the end. If there are any concerns, it is that I have no evidence as to how many police stations the survey reached. The number of people who formed the sample population was an estimate and it is not possible to know, due to lack of any duty management system, who actually worked that week; there may have been more than 200. I did not consider that this was critical, however. It simply gave a feeling of lack of control of the survey at the point of final implementation. Nevertheless, from initial assessment of the results using SPSS, a frequency analysis showed that some of the data met the categories described by Johnson et al. (2007) in that it, to varying degrees, corroborates, elaborates, differs and conflicts with the data obtained from the interviews with the senior officers. A full discussion of the results of the survey follows in Chapter 6. In conclusion, as mentioned above, throughout both stages of data collection, several ethical issues were addressed, and these are discussed in more detail in the next part.

4.4 Ethical considerations

The main ethical issues raised by this study included anonymity, confidentiality and privacy, language translation, and potential conflicts of interest. In terms of anonymity,
it was expected that senior police officers and those working on the frontline would be willing to participate in interviews or surveys as proposed here. Both groups needed to do so knowing that the information they provided would remain anonymous in order to maintain a duty of care to them. To address this and reassure participants, the importance of this was made clear prior to the interviews and surveys in information letters (see Appendices B and G) and other instructions, and this was additionally reaffirmed verbally at the start of each interview. The information letter was provided to all participants, giving an overview of the research and their option to consent to take part. The participants for interview were allocated a unique number relating to their rank category (S1 to S13) so that they could not directly or indirectly be identifiable by name and this is reflected in the analysis of the data contained within the following chapters. For survey respondents, names of respondents were not required and completed forms were listed within SPSS as P1 to P151, recording only other personal data relating to gender, age range, police area worked (one of four options), rank and education, which conforms to the standard requirements of the CSS. In terms of confidentiality, the recording and storage of data was completed in accordance with the University’s data protection policy. Confidentiality was promised to participants while they were giving consent for the interview to take place and acknowledged by completing an informed consent form (see Appendix C). Recordings of all the interviews was made to assist with transcribing them; however, in the transcribing process, participants were not identified directly.

Language was a particular problem in terms of ethics to ensure there was English-to-Arabic understanding of questions posed in the research. The self-completion survey comprised a set of closed questions drafted in English and translated thereafter into Arabic. Closed questions meant that there was no further requirement for translation of
answers back into English when completed. As the format of the survey was a ‘tick box’ style and it was easily correlated back into the English version by me for analysis. This approach ensured anonymity for survey respondents by removing the requirement for any other person to be involved in the analysis of results. Conversely, interviews were carried out in English and responses from participants were recorded in English. Interview participants were, however, at the time of giving consent for the interview to take place, given the option to have a qualified translator present to assist them. On the consent form, the options regarding translation were included for the participant to have an interpreter present if they wished. If they did, they were able to choose internally within the organisation any named person (male for female), or if necessary, to select a translator who was external to the organisation, such as those provided by private translation services. Where a translator was required, from internal resources or external providers, a confidentiality agreement was prepared for the translator to sign to ensure that any officers participating remained anonymous, and that no data from the interviews would be disclosed to any other persons (see Appendix D).

To manage any potential for conflict of interest, firstly, I received no personal benefit from Abu Dhabi Police in completing this research. However, as an employee, there could have been a potential for conflict of interest if I felt that I could not report actual findings of the research if, for example, data was in any way critical of the organisation or related to any restricted data. The same would apply to the officers who were interviewed: there may have been the potential to exclude data provided where it was in any way sensitive. In order to avoid any conflict between me as a researcher and an employee within the police organisation, I have not published any sensitive data in this thesis that was restricted to within the organisation. Any other comments made by interviewees that in
my judgement were not helpful to the research have been redacted from transcripts in accordance with the rules and advice of the CSS. In terms of supporting this research, experience in Abu Dhabi Police shows that the organisation is constantly looking for ways to improve its performance. This has included numerous reviews, commissioning of external consultants and formulation of a detailed organisational strategy that is focused on betterment. Finding gaps in implementation of ideas leads to action plans to fill those gaps, training to improve knowledge and skills and sometimes a refocus of work to drive implementation forward. This research adds to this process and I was confident that the potential for conflicts of interest was negligible, although acknowledged.

There is an ethical issue in terms of power relating to elite interviews, as detailed above in part one, when ‘asking questions about sensitive issues relates to the rights and responsibilities of the interviewer, deciding how to go is no easy matter’ (Breakwell, 1990, p.8). Maintaining objectivity meant that questions needed to be put carefully not to lead the participant or encourage them to answer in a particular way that would highlight any risk of skewing data. A focus on ethics was, therefore, maintained at all times to avoid my own beliefs or opinions of the empirical questions posed becoming known to the participant. The strategy pursued to minimise the risks highlighted here was to remind the participant at the beginning of the interview that the contribution they made would be completely anonymous. It was explained to each participant that they should answer questions as if they did not know me, and that they might answer questions in a way that assumed I did not know anything about the subject of community policing in Abu Dhabi. Although the interview conversation was encouraged through a semi-structured approach, no leading questions were asked and I did not show that I agreed or disagreed with any answer given to ensure there was no influencing of responses.
Finally, participants were reminded that they could withdraw from the interview at any point during it, or at a later date, within a period of six months. In any event, no officer withdrew their data either during or after the interviews. The implications, if this strategy had not been followed, would have been to limit the value of the responses to questions, and with limited explanation, the data could have been misleading or inaccurate, affecting the reliability of this study. In summary, the strategy applied to each part of this research maintained anonymity for each participant and maintained confidentiality and the privacy of the data they provided. In addition, translation functions were professionally undertaken and any potential for conflicts of interest was avoided.

4.5 Conclusion

Reflecting on this phase of the research leads me to consider the learning points that can be gleaned from the experience of using the mixed methods approach and to carrying out research in police organisations. Ultimately, the process of interviewing senior officers was very engaging, with rich data being obtained, and the main aims of the research were met to a great extent in this part of the process. This approach to data collection is, therefore, highly recommended for other research students. The investment in time taken to carefully prepare information letters, consent forms, and the interview questions, was essential to ensure the interviews took place without any unforeseen problems. Indeed, the senior officers interviewed expected a professional approach to preparation and systems for protecting their data before they were willing to participate.

For the survey, this was more problematic. Obtaining authority to implement it, the formulation of questions, and the translation and distribution were completed, however,
over a much longer period of time than anticipated and with some difficulty for the reasons explained in the above parts. In addition, piloting both the interview and the survey was a critical element of the preparation for full implementation of these research methods. This was especially the case in terms of the survey in the initial drafting of the questions, testing and redrafting on multiple occasions, and was a critical process to complete to make the survey fit for purpose and achieve validity in the results. Certainly, for any researcher, converting a survey from one language to another should not be underestimated in its complexity to maintain context and focus on the issues being explored to answer the empirical questions posed.

Security clearance to carry out research within the organisation is being tightened up all the time with new rules and procedures implemented. The experience here on accessing participants and obtaining permissions should not be automatically followed as the correct or preferred route. Each research proposal should consider what mechanism needs to be followed to obtain the relevant authority at any given time. It is with some certainty though that I can state that the authority to undertake research within the organisation would only be considered for employees of the police or the MoI for the foreseeable future. It would be difficult for research to take place for any person who is not a part of the organisation simply for issues of security of data and the sensitivities of uncontrolled use of information that a student may obtain.

This chapter has explained the research design strategy and the methods chosen to collect data to answer the empirical questions posed. It includes a discussion of the application of a mixed method approach to data collection and the way in which the analysis of that data has been completed. The following chapters present the results of the analysis of
these data to study the transfer, reception and implementation of community policing policy within Abu Dhabi.
Chapter 5: The Transfer of Community Policing Policy to Abu Dhabi

This is the first of two chapters that present the analysis of the empirical data collected during the study and which aim to answer its research questions. To achieve this, the discussion takes cognisance of the policy transfer framework (outlined and discussed in Chapter 3) to evaluate each stage of the process (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). The structure for the discussion in this (first) chapter, therefore, is to develop an initial assessment of the answers to seven key issues derived from the framework to understand: what motivated actors to be engaged in the community policing policy transfer; who was involved in the transfer; what community policing policy was transferred and from where; what were the degrees of transfer; what constrained or facilitated the process; how policy transfer was demonstrated; and, finally, what initial assessment can be made as to how the translation of policy led to success from an organisational perspective and the mechanisms applied to ensure that risks of failure were minimised or avoided.

The analysis draws from the available (although limited) evidence of policy decisions made by the police at a strategic level, supported by the interview data obtained from 13 senior police officers. These participants comprised a mix of officers of various ranks, all of whom were classified as elites, and all of whom were involved to different degrees in the policy transfer process. The following (second) chapter, in summary, by interrogating the quantitative survey data of frontline community police, develops the

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33 All senior officers interviewed were members of Abu Dhabi Police community police department and their responses are cited as S1 to S13.

34 For consistency in this chapter, all of these participants are referred to as senior officers.
argument that gaps do exist between ‘policy on the books and policy in practice’ (Newburn et al., 2017, p.14). This adds an extra layer of evidence to developing an understanding, at an operational level, of the outcomes of the policy learning processes when put into effect (Evans, 2009). However, both chapters acknowledge the familiar problem of distinguishing between formulating police policy and operationalising it (Lustgarten, 1986). Nevertheless, both illustrate the complexities and degrees of policy transfer achieved in the context of a policing model that is nebulous and creates its own challenges at the point of implementation.

5.1 What motivated actors to engage in policy transfer?

This section discusses the motivation factors as to why actors were engaged in this policy transfer that was aimed at reforming policing in Abu Dhabi. The analysis considers the extent of voluntary action or coercive pressures being applied on the police organisation at the time, or whether there was a hybrid of both these factors. The data show the range of problems that Abu Dhabi Police aimed to solve, which included fear of future known and unknown crime risks, challenges associated with maintaining safety and security of the state, building police and community relations, and engaging with a diverse growing and transient population.

As discussed previously in Chapter 3, the motivation for policy transfer and the search for new ideas, especially within the field of criminal justice, has usually been attributed to a problem in society and this can, in certain circumstances, create a significant amount of urgency to find a solution. The implementation of a new community policing style, for example, may be a response to a problem (Jones and Newburn, 2007) or the ‘dissatisfaction of current policy’, or ‘the status quo’ that has motivated actors to seek out
new ways of dealing with issues (Evans, 2009, p.259). Examples of these were discussed in Chapter 2 relating, for example, to street crime and urban disorder in Britain. Understandably, this might have identified why a new style of policing was needed in Abu Dhabi. Where reported crime was low, with no history of major public disorder, the reasons for reform were less obvious but appeared to be based on external security concerns and international pressures rather than local problems. Nevertheless, one can assume that the external influences of regional political insecurity and associated serious disorder in other countries, might have created a degree of compulsion to engage in a search for policy solutions. As such, there had been growing tensions in the region in previous years (as discussed in Chapter 1), raising these concerns to a higher priority, especially for the government (Moussalli, 1997). This was not about what was happening at the time but related to a fear of what might happen in the future. An early record of this issue is illustrated by Brogden and Nijhar (2005, p.9), who refer to a conference held in Abu Dhabi in February 2000. They state that during the debate:

> Experts from Arab countries and from Singapore, Taiwan, France, Britain, United States and Canada recommended the implementation of community policing, within Sharia and local cultural values, to reduce crime.

This account indicates that a broad spectrum of international opinion in such circumstances acted as a type of pressure group to promulgate policing reform, and one can assume this created a compelling degree of coercion for the senior police officers to comply with the recommendation. Officers pointed out that around the same time, members of Abu Dhabi government executive council were monitoring modernisation

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35 Abu Dhabi Executive Council is the local executive authority of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. It assists the Ruler to carry out his duties and powers through regular meetings to set the Emirate’s general policy, set development plans and supervise its execution, authorise projects laws and decrees before submitting them to the Ruler, supervise work flow in departments, local entities,
programmes for several governmental entities, including the police, and from whom a requirement to search for international good practice was encouraged. Consequently, a group of senior officers undertook international visits to other countries outside of the region to develop their understanding of alternative policing models as part of a new drive to improve knowledge of police structures and procedures including community policing. For Abu Dhabi, this was the start of a selective approach to developing new ideas for policing, as one officer explained:

When we first started to implement the [community policing] model, [senior] officers … went to [Britain], Singapore and to Japan. We went to different countries … [and] what we took is the best suitable for us. (S3)

This was the first phase of policy transfer taking place (Evans, 2009) within the context, which is described as ‘voluntary decisions [being made in response to] coercive pressures’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2010, p.16). Exploring this issue further during interviews, officers were asked about any other concerns they perceived existed in Abu Dhabi that may have motivated the decision to adopt community policing. Two main concerns were raised. Firstly, in relation to the fear of future crime, and secondly, in terms of operational policing policy, which was believed to be causing a confidence gap between the police and the public.

Fear of crime in the future was continually raised in several contexts by most officers. The concerns related to the diversity in the demographics in Abu Dhabi and the potential for increased criminal activity. This brought with it perceived risks for the officers and that a growing transient population created greater challenges for crime and security, as

and coordinate among them to achieve the general wellbeing of the country.
one officer explained:

In Abu Dhabi, we already have good levels of security. [This is] not because we have some problems, but because we have a certain level of security and we want to continue the same level … Abu Dhabi is moving very fast in developing the communities and developing in terms of new streets, buildings, [and] markets … policing [style] is a different issue here. [Abu Dhabi] did not want to be at the back, but to prepare Abu Dhabi Police to face expected problems in the future. So, this maybe gives Abu Dhabi Police some unique model that is different to what is happening in [Britain] or United States. (S6)

In this context, Shearing and Wood (2007, p.100, emphasis in original) explain:

‘examining the nuance of change including the ways in which practical decision-makers and other practical actors deal with the challenges they face [is] based on what is currently thinkable to them’. Fear of future crime, based on the experience the officers had learned in other countries and the visible change in demographics locally, created this thinkable concern of what the future might hold. Responding to prevent unknown crime types in the future, which had not been experienced in the past, is somewhat divergent from the usual approach of preventing known crime problems and is a broad identifiable shift from a standard attitude towards crime prevention. It was fear of the unknown that concerned the officers the most, as another officer explained further:

Abu Dhabi has … a lot of foreigners and … crimes are coming here. Any [type] of crime will come from their countries and will start here again, so if we didn’t start community police and have the trust of the community, engaging and gathering information, seeing community policing as the way to provide a channel for their information … it would be more difficult for us in the future. (S5)

This points to the second issue of the organisation’s concerns in the context of
maintaining safety and security and a feeling of lack of control of the criminal justice challenges associated with it. There was a perceived trust and confidence gap between the police and citizens related to an apparent ‘dissatisfaction with existing policy’, an influencing factor for stimulating policy transfer suggested by Dolowitz and March (2012, p.340). Dissatisfaction, for example, with traditional policing styles can cause the potential for confrontation with the public or for the police becoming disengaged with them, as experienced in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s (Reiner, 2010). This type of concern was raised in Abu Dhabi, as one officer commented:

From what I understand from our leader, he perceived that the traditional police [in Abu Dhabi] did not work well to connect with the people and understand even what they need [and that] our leader feels it is a big gap between the traditional police and the people from our community … [a new community policing style] gives them a way to solve this problem. (S1)

The idea of community policing is that application of the concept facilitates a police and community relationship that is built on trust, with a level of legitimacy that allows the police to operate in communities within the expectations of the public (Morgan, 1990). However, as previously discussed in Chapter 2, care needs to be taken, as stated by Schaffer (1980, p.15), that being too close to communities can cause conflict where ‘a policeman is associated with the community’s weaknesses, troubles and failing, and as such, it is likely there will be tensions between the public and the police’. To some extent, this problem was confirmed by one officer, who stated that ‘[as a young boy] we were scared from the police when we saw them in our street’ (S1). This was further explained in the context of the historical fear of the (traditional) police held by the community, as another officer emphasised:
There is a challenge because we have a gap between the police and the community ... Now we need something to build trust because the community [feared] the police. The community couldn’t give any information to the police, couldn’t discuss his problem with the police ... if you have a problem you do not talk to the police about it, [because the police] couldn’t help you. (S13)

This account indicates that the gap in trust and confidence was not perceived to have been caused by the community itself, but by the organisation’s operating policies. As discussed previously in Chapter 1, for Abu Dhabi police this may be associated with issues of organisational culture, military structures, and hard policing policies of control, arrest, interrogation and punishment in compliance with law and procedures. Clearly, the senior leaders of the organisation had recognised this problem and were consequently motivated to change its style of policing as a solution.

The two main issues of fear of future crime driven by regional insecurity and the confidence gap locally were in many ways connected. The officers interviewed acknowledged that the prevention of crime and maintaining state security in Abu Dhabi needed greater cooperation and communication between the police and the public to share information. The importance of sharing community information and intelligence, for example, as part of a community policing model is an essential element for the approach to be successful when it is information that drives proactivity (Innes, 2006a; Maguire and John, 2006; Tilley, 2008), a point that all officers emphasised.

In summary, this analysis demonstrates that there was a mixture of voluntary lesson learning taking place, underpinned by coercive pressures, motivating policing reform in Abu Dhabi. The reasons for policy transfer have persisted and this was illustrated in the
strategic aims contained in the vision for policing for Abu Dhabi first published in 2003 and later revised in 2008, to include a core business statement to improve community confidence in policing and enhance internal security ‘to ensure that Abu Dhabi remained one of the safest societies in the world’ (Abu Dhabi Police, 2012). Determining the extent of any balance or weighting between voluntary or coercive policy transfer taking place to understand which part of the continuum might have been dominant is problematic. However, this assessment becomes more relevant at the conclusion of this chapter in establishing how effective policy transfer has been and the extent to which either end of the continuum can be attributed to the perceived success or failure of the process.

5.2 Who was involved in policy transfer?

This section illustrates that the actors involved in policy transfer changed over two periods with different categories of professionals and organisations engaging in the process at different times. Initially, there was an internal bias towards those involved being mainly restricted to the Abu Dhabi police and local government entities, with limited external networking taking place. The process began following the conference in 2000 mentioned by Brogden and Nijjar, and as discussed previously in Chapter 1, an active outgoing search for policy ideas was also encouraged later, in 2003, by the president of the UAE in his speech instructing his leaders to ‘engage in interaction with the world around you’ (Al Nahyan, 2003), a statement that officers highlighted was highly motivational for them at the time.

During this learning phase, there was a need to build an elite network to develop policy choices (Bennett, 1991) and additional external support was required to do that. There was evidence of this taking place in 2003, when a new leadership training programme
was delivered in Abu Dhabi by the Central Police Training and Development Authority based in England. Officers recall that this programme focused primarily on the British approach to policing for its structure, function and style, which included implementation of a community policing model. Several of the senior officers attending the training were seconded to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ministry of Interior (MoI), to assist the Chief of Police in developing new strategic plans for reform. Subsequently, a small number of police experts from the UK were recruited by Abu Dhabi Police to assist with the strategic planning process. Their advice was said to have been limited to reforming the structure of the organisation including human resources, general police operations, processes for criminal investigations and a pilot project for community policing.

This narrow range of actors involved in policy transfer remained constant for around five years, until 2008, when a revised strategic plan was published. This was the beginning of the second period of major growth in the network of individuals and organisations recruited to support a re-invigorated approach to policy transfer. This was facilitated by the establishment of a new community police department in Abu Dhabi to manage all stages of the process, from selecting new policy ideas through to implementation in the field. Various mechanisms for policy learning were engaged extensively by Abu Dhabi Police at various times after 2008. The approach taken followed what has become common practice elsewhere and included the use of subject experts, attending conferences, seminars, information exchange, inter-agency cooperation agreements, policy tourism, and media (Jones and Newburn, 2007).

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36 The Central Police Training and Development Authority was known then as Centrex, the primary supplier of police training in England and Wales.

37 Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, appointed Chief of Police in 1995, was to become the Minister of Interior and Deputy Prime Minister for the UAE on 1 November 2004.
As the new strategy was launched, it acted as a new driver for reform, highlighting an aim for wider implementation of the approach to community policing as a philosophy. A new group of senior officers from Abu Dhabi joined a growing network of actors with responsibility for implementation, including a new specialist community policing adviser from Britain. Policy tourism continued to be very popular, with visits being made to other countries including Britain, US, Singapore and Japan, enabling the officers to continue to learn as much as they could about the concept and to make decisions about how to proceed.\textsuperscript{38} But the most popular venue was London, as the following extract from one officer illustrates:

There was an official visit by the manager of the [community police] department and some [senior] officers to [London], and our expert adviser also went … to see their practice and how they implement, and how they [operationalise] community policing. Based on that, we learn their ways of policing and policy and implementation. (S3)

This was a key period of forming new networks of actors, and the appointed head of the new community police department was critical to the organisation, one who could be described as a ‘charismatic leader’, selected to improve the potential for policy transfer success (Weber, 2015, p.138). This senior officer had developed experience of policymaking in his role working as part of the expert team of foreign advisers and he had undertaken several visits abroad to learn new policy ideas. His exposure to these experts and his experience probably meant that his knowledge of community policing was developing better than most, or at least it was a good reason to select him for the role.

\textsuperscript{38} These officers, with knowledge and understanding of community policing in Abu Dhabi between 2008 to 2016 were those who were interviewed as part of this study. Consequently, their responses are referenced to this period.
In fact, charismatic leadership was essential and indeed was encouraged at the time. This approach created opportunities for the implementation of change programmes within Abu Dhabi Police, a bureaucratic organisation that at the time was highly centralised with few specialised policies. The organisation was, however, driven primarily by key performance indicators, but for community policing there were none for 2003 to 2007 and only two were introduced in 2008, tracking annual growth in personnel and counting the number of meetings held with partners as a mechanism to encourage collaborative problem-solving.

Notwithstanding the effectiveness of internal leadership, additional support was also needed to continue progress and it is understood that due to growing requests for assistance made by Abu Dhabi to the London Metropolitan Police, there was an expansion and elevation in the status of the elite network of actors involved. For example, at a high level of the UK government (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), a decision was made to relocate a senior police officer from London to the British Embassy in Abu Dhabi. The purpose of this action was to create a facilitator for further missions by Abu Dhabi officers to Britain and the sharing of policy ideas, information, training opportunities and experience.39 This coincided with a new collaboration between Abu Dhabi Police and the London Metropolitan Police in 2008 when the two organisations signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) as an agreement to share good practice and knowledge. The agreement included two specific objectives for both ‘Participants’:

- to promote and develop co-operation between the Participants in all fields of policing to include sharing expertise, developing and sharing training

39 No role profile is available, but this explanation of responsibilities was supplied to me directly by the Metropolitan Police liaison officer concerned to support this research.
and police techniques and the exchange of information and personnel were mutually agreed upon by the Participants and,

For the purposes of further implementation of the objectives of this Memorandum, the Participants will exchange, if relevant, legislation and regulations in force in their respective States and organisations or agencies, and the results of any research and studies concerning the subject matter of this Memorandum for the information of the competent authority in each Participant’s State. (MetPol, 2008)

There were apparent benefits for both parties in this agreement. For the UK, it could improve diplomatic relations at a government level and thereby gain a range of political benefits. For Abu Dhabi, there were the benefits of gaining access to training, knowledge and experience to assist improvements to policing. In the same year, one of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary was appointed by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) as an adviser to the Chief of Police. This was soon followed by further appointments of other retired senior officers from the UK who were experts in various aspects of policing, including communications, firearms, crime scene management and general policing operations. In addition, other experts followed from Singapore (for serious crime investigation) and Australia (airports and boarders).

This type of action by Abu Dhabi Police to draw from international experts follows established good practice. As Bulmer and Padgett (2005) assert, it is an approach that can legitimise the search for new policies and can have a positive effect on their implementation. Another potential benefit created by using foreign experts is also provided by Evans (2009), in that (policy) receiver states do not always have the level of experience in their employees and advisers to take on new problems and they are, therefore, often likely to look outside their own organisations to fill that gap. In addition,
Jessop (1997, p.575) affirms that ‘foreign actors [add benefit in that they] act as a source of policy ideas and implementation methods’ and this was felt to be a sound approach by several officers, as one illustrated:

The picture was not clear how to apply this [community policing] philosophy and how to develop the structure. Then [in 2008, the senior commanders] decided to bring experts, mainly from the UK and then some from Singapore and from the United States. But mainly until now [most] experts have come from the UK. So [we] study the model and try to implement the experience from [Britain] here … it is obvious when you study Abu Dhabi Police because [we] even use the same terminology, the same issues, the same directions. (S6)

In summary, experts did create opportunities for successful policy transfer because of their ‘concern with the special subject’ (Rose, 1993, p.56). The motivation factors for why actors became involved in policy transfer remained constant in Abu Dhabi, but it is clear from this analysis that the level of their involvement is distinguished over two periods. The first, from 2003 to 2007, was an internal network primarily from within Abu Dhabi Police and, consequently, limited this period to a phase mainly focused on policy learning. In the second period, from 2008 to 2016, there was a much greater emphasis from an external elite network of actors, including those at a government level, which created a more advanced form of policy transfer. Notwithstanding the extent of the elite networks of actors involved in policy transfer, the success or failure of the process, from conception to full implementation, still relied critically on one or more charismatic leaders in the organisation, acting as advocates without whom there was a high risk of programme failure. At face value, it appears that the second period created greater opportunities for policy transfer to take place, but this requires an analysis in the context of what policy was being transferred and from where, and the degree of transfer achieved.
5.3 What policy was transferred and from where?

Based on historical cooperation and the good relations illustrated above, – the British model of community policing, in particular – was the primary focus of attention for policy learning, with some additional lessons drawn from the US, Singapore and Japan. This supported the idea that where two countries have common features, such as diversity in demographics, social problems, infrastructure, languages, or religion and beliefs, they are highly likely to cooperate with each other in policy transfer processes (Evans, 2009). Certainly, in Abu Dhabi, the authorities tend to view Britain as a place against which to benchmark its policies and unite in creative collaboration to seek out good practice because of several of these features (Leech, 2017). Coincidentally, there was much to learn about community policing in London from 2003 owing to the piloting of neighbourhood policing at this time (Tuffin, 2006). Although London might not represent all British approaches to community policing, the international reputation of the Metropolitan Police Service meant that it was selected as one of the main organisations to approach for policy learning. One officer explained ‘everyone knows that London is the capital of the world, because of the multi-cultures and nationalities like [those] that we have here [in Abu Dhabi]’ (S8). This image and reputation motivated the passion for the collaboration, inclusive of the desire to emulate ‘neighbourhood policing’ as the primary community policing model to be replicated, as one officer explained:

This is the story … that they [the senior police managers] saw the style or the philosophy of community policing applied in the US … [Britain] and later [in] Singapore. These are the people, who at that time … were part of Abu Dhabi Police, building the new strategy and new structure. So, community policing was one of the new styles of Abu Dhabi’s approach, to apply it in Abu Dhabi and in the UAE. So, they brought the philosophy
and started to build it [here]. (S5)

At the beginning of the process, the foreign experts, working as part of a small team with other Abu Dhabi police officers, subsequently formulated a new strategic framework in 2003, which included an initiative aimed at responding to the changing demographics and language mix of the Emirate by implementing the community police model. This included a need for dedicated community-based police teams, based on the experience and application of the Safer Neighbourhood Team structure implemented in London. This proposal was presented to the key police decision-makers as a solution to the concerns about maintaining state security and for building good community relations. The plan was readily accepted, receiving high level government support within the MoI and it subsequently became a major ‘whole of organisation’ change programme, as illustrated by one officer who explained that:

His Highness, Sheikh Saif, the Minister of the Interior, was interested in [the British community policing model]. He … knew that this is a new style that will engage the people and will be more active and more available than traditional policing when the police stay within the walls of the police station. (S2)

The same officer concluded by saying, ‘so we work more on the [British] model … which we see as suitable and effective for our environment and in our style of life’ (S2).

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40 This was an initiative aiming to improve public confidence linked to key performance indicators for year-on-year growth in resources and the holding of partnership meetings to stimulate partnership problem-solving.

41 The new seven point plan included focussing efforts on maintaining stability, limiting crime and boosting the sense of safety and security in society; building confidence and spreading tranquillity to all categories of community through consultation and effective contact; developing and improving the quality of services and performance; developing quality police services; developing the capabilities and skills of all staff of Abu Dhabi Police; boosting the concepts of integrity, trade ethics and honesty at all levels; and providing the supplies, buildings and technology that support providing services effectively.
However, in reviewing the policy instruments that existed at the time, there was an apparent lack of any formal definition or guidance as to what the community policing model was to mean or how it was to be operationalised in Abu Dhabi. Implementation was left to officers to progress through consultation with colleagues based on what could be drawn from the initial phase of policy learning. Consequently, the first community police team was established in Abu Dhabi in December 2003, consisting of a team leader, supervisors and patrol officers. The team was confined to one neighbourhood and was the first evidence of the direct transfer of policy and a copy of the London Safer Neighbourhood Team structure, as explained by one officer:

> We use the … model which is based on patrol where we have dedicated teams and every team might be two officers with one supervisor or three with one supervisor, [or] four with one supervisor, with every team responsible for one area. (S2)

The geographic location of the new team (the first of several pilots) was in Bani Yas, which gave an insight as to the problems that they were expected to deal with. The area is a large residential town about 40km outside of the capital city, and had experienced social problems related to disorder, illustrated by one officer who stated:

> We had a problem in Bani Yas. When we started community policing, there was disrespect for police patrols, sometimes people throwing stones and people running away. (S4)

This quotation indicates that, at least initially, community policing had to focus on overcoming problems of poor police and community relations and disorder associated most probably with unruly youth. It is useful to note during this period of 2003 to 2007

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that once the pilot community police teams were formed and the initial instructions given, there was minimal further involvement of foreign experts at the point of implementation and the teams were left to operationalise the concept from the ground up. This may not have been a significant problem, allowing for the frontline supervisors to implement the concept in a way that allowed them to be adaptable to local circumstances. The job description of the community police patrols appeared to support this approach, where it instructed them in their role to ‘follow up on the execution of direction and decisions made by [their] direct manager’ (see Appendix H). However, officers explained that during this first period, the rate of progress was relatively slow. Reasons for this included limited growth in personnel and implementation of other teams after the pilots. This problem was recognised at a strategic level, and a new key performance indicator was launched in 2008 to encourage and monitor growth over a five-year period. Consequently, from a slow increase to 180 personnel allocated to community policing, there was a jump in numbers to over 350 in 2008, with most of the new police recruits being allocated to the role during that year. This increase facilitated the establishment of new policing teams based in all of the country’s main police stations. Despite this expansion, the style of community policing remained a narrow formulation of the idea.

The motivation to expand the role of those officers delegated as ‘community police’ was coordinated by the national community police department and stimulated a return to policy learning missions abroad. An illustration of this was a visit in 2010 to the London Metropolitan Police by senior Abu Dhabi police officials.43 Facilitated by the MoU, it

43 I was the expert included in this visit to London and this illustration of policy transfer in action here by way of policy tourism as a mechanism is based on my personal records of the visit and my observations at the time, leading to the presentation of the findings of the visit to decision-makers back in Abu Dhabi.
aimed to foster learning among these officials about the latest practice for partnership working, problem-solving and volunteer programmes. The itinerary of the visit included presentations by London-based experts and spending the day with an operational Safer Neighbourhoods (community policing) Team comprising a sergeant, two constables and three Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs). During the visit, the visiting delegation witnessed the team discussing their daily tasks, including a plan to search for the most wanted suspects for crime in their area, to visit victims of crimes and to attend new cases of minor crime reported that day. The delegation also went on patrol with the team and witnessed them dealing with a minor road traffic accident, the detention of a youth for anti-social behaviour and visiting volunteers involved in neighbourhood watch. The experiences gave insight into a range of policy initiatives and the officers were especially interested in the role of a PCSO.44

On completion of the visit, a presentation was made to the Chief of Police and other decision-makers, who identified policies that might be suitable for implementation in Abu Dhabi, evidencing a selective approach to policy transfer. This was illustrated in that proactive crime prevention by targeting suspects for arrest was not considered appropriate for implementation. However, the idea of visible patrols along with enhanced community engagement activity and dealing proactively with cases of anti-social behaviour, especially for youth problems, were all reaffirmed, providing continuity for the aims of the community police established earlier. What was new was the agreement to train officers to be specialists in youth development and to launch a police volunteer

44 See https://nationalcareersservice.direct.gov.uk/job-profiles/police-community-support-officer#what-youll-do where the role includes, *inter alia*, uniform foot patrol, dealing with anti-social behaviour, giving crime prevention advice, talking with young people, gathering information and attending community events.
programme. What followed was a new MoU between Abu Dhabi Police and the Abu Dhabi Education Council to coordinate youth development between the two organisations, and later, the introduction of police volunteers followed by the launch of the ‘We are all Police’ programme (Abu Dhabi Police, 2016). The role of the community police teams, consequently, remained limited to a soft policing approach (as discussed in Chapter 2) for community engagement, collecting information and problem-solving, confirming, as one officer stated, that ‘the community police patrol in Abu Dhabi was [being developed similar to that of] the PCSO in [Britain]’ (S11).

With extensive policy tourism taking place, Britain was not the only country from where ideas were drawn. Problem-solving became more dominant in Abu Dhabi as officers visited the US, attending such events as the Centre for Problem-Solving, annual problem-oriented policing conference and workshops in 2010, where they discussed the approach personally with Herman Goldstein. The ongoing influence of this interaction and new learning experience is evident in the responses of most officers interviewed when asked to describe the meaning of the community policing model in Abu Dhabi, as one officer illustrates:

I would say that the community police model … implemented in Abu Dhabi, is a model which is based on patrol, which goes on to collect information about the neighbourhood and about the situation, of the needs of the people, about the problems. This is phase one and phase two, they come on to analyse the information, [then] they see the partners, they work with the partners for those problems and find a better way to improve the life of people. Basically, go to awareness, if they see any phenomena, if

45 See https://weareallpolice.adpolice.gov.ae/#/home
46 See, for example, http://www.popcenter.org/conference/default.cfm
they see a type of crime starts to rise, to have an awareness campaign for those problems. Phase four, which is internal, is improving and developing the way of the community style is used every year. So, it is sharing with the people the idea and their needs and working with partners to solve those things (S4).

This quotation outlines the elements of a policing model that resemble the main principles of a problem-oriented policing approach, as described by Goldstein (1990), a methodology that, as previously discussed, is challenging to fully implement. In addition, following visits to Singapore and Japan, the concept of mini police stations (Community Police Centres in Singapore and the Koban in Japan) resulted in a new programme to develop similar (Smart Police Point) facilities in Abu Dhabi. The reason for this was explained by one officer, in that:

[police visibility] is one of the challenges … So, we are [adapting by] trying to make police points (mini police stations), we are trying to make counters, for example, in [petrol] stations and we are planning [for] the police points to be in neighbourhoods so that the people are seeing us next to their house. (S8)

In summary, there was a selective approach applied to policy transfer occurring at two levels. Firstly, the head of the community police department had the authority to use his own judgement to choose which ideas to put forward to senior decision-makers. Then the proposals were presented for consideration at the highest management level, where senior leaders would again select those ideas they wished to see implemented. These management layers acted as filters for ensuring an appropriate transfer of policy was made in the context of the organisation’s vision and strategy at the time. Over a period of five years, from 2003, the initial structure expanded to other pilot sites, but these were limited in number and the role remained largely unchanged. There was little evidence of
any other programmes being transferred until after 2008, when a renewed period of policy learning took place. After this time, the number of community police teams grew to cover all neighbourhoods in the country and the role was expanded to one that emulated that of a PCSO. But for each element, there were varying degrees of transfer and these are discussed below to understand the level of success of the process.

5.4 What were the degrees of policy transfer?

Taking cognisance of what policy was transferred, this section analyses the degrees of policy transfer achieved and whether each element reflected policy convergence, divergence or a mixture of both. There is evidence of senior management decisions made that inform us about how the model for community policing was to be perceived and implemented in Abu Dhabi relating to the location of community police teams within the structure of the organisation, the social welfare role focused on public safety matters and restrictions on the use of police powers.

Initially, the new teams were located as part of the police social support department within the structure of the organisation, emphasising the cultural influence of what became their initial role in communities. This department was responsible for dealing with highly confidential family disputes, matters relating to children and other social care issues as a type of secret social service in society (Punch, 1979). This decision meant that the community police complemented this approach and expanded the idea of helping communities rather than more traditional approaches to policing and enforcement of the law. This was not explicit, but by positioning the community police at this point in the structure, it demonstrated that intention. However, this caused a degree of confusion about their role, as one officer explained:
In the beginning … the community police patrol transferred cases to the social support centre to carry on the enquiries. The social support department started in 2002 but the community police started in 2003 and their two ways are different. So, for some people they may ask for social support when they need community police, and the same when people ask for community police they mean social support. Some people [were] confused between the roles of the two departments. (S4)

In addition, in support of a similar welfare service, the social relations and orientation section within Abu Dhabi Police also organised regular visits by police officers to patients in hospital, not least as doing so was seen as applying Islamic values to local policing (Lippman et al., 1988). Such visits, it is said, provided psychological support to local citizens and patients were usually presented with gifts and flowers. The new community police teams were tasked to assist with these visits to support their role, in what Nye (2004, p.1) describes as operationalising a type of soft power ‘making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community [in turn] wants to help them achieve shared objectives’. Innes (2005, p.164) goes on to point out that soft policing ‘is important for securing community consent and legitimacy for policing actions in the eyes of the public’. But it represented a significant change in the approach to policing in Abu Dhabi. It also was an approach that was seen as having longer-term implications where the social welfare role of community policing becomes embedded within the organisations strategy and police culture becomes an obstacle for further reform (Chan, 1997). As one officer suggested: ‘if you start soft, it is extremely difficult to change in the future’ (S2). However, as discussed above, this was a key decision made at the start of the implementation phase and for very specific reasons. It aimed to facilitate the building of trust between the police and the public and bridge the confidence gap that persisted at the time.
This softer form of policing was developed further by another decision that prevented the community police from using their enforcement powers, and which therein aimed to differentiate them from traditional law enforcement approaches. This general idea, as an approach, has been previously discussed by Kelling and Coles (1996, p.23), who advocate that in order to reduce police coercion in communities, ‘neighborhood rules were to be enforced for the most part through non-arrest approaches – education, persuasion, counselling and ordering – so that arrest would only be resorted to when other approaches failed’. This idea was re-enforced by one officer, stating that:

First, we must try hard to work with the people, but after that we may use our powers. However, if we use our powers from the start we have crossed the line and we will lose the trust, we will lose everything. (S13)

The decision to restrict the use of police powers, it was envisaged, would lead to better community relations, improved sharing of information and stronger partnerships with the public to solve local problems, as another officer explained:

I think the aspect [of not exercising powers] of arrest and the aspect of search is because in Abu Dhabi we are still building our faith and we are still marketing the community police and if we use those two ways it will affect our image and it will affect our performance and people will see us as the bad guys and they will not approach us. Because of that, I think at the beginning we needed to be a little bit lenient and a little bit soft on the people. I know that in [Britain] their policy is that the community police deal with minor [crime] issues but in Abu Dhabi, in my opinion, it is better that we [leave] the specialist [CID] to do it their way. (S4)

This is relevant for traditional policing roles, in that ‘policing is defined by a variety of intended functions: crime control [law enforcement], order maintenance and public
safety’ (Reiner, 2010, p.17). The first two elements clearly require the police to respond to calls for service, to enforce the law if need be by force, and that means the police use all the powers and equipment they have at their disposal to achieve it, albeit with high levels of discretion to do so. To remove those powers would have the effect of limiting the (community) police role to one of public safety. This results in a mix of low level law enforcement and order maintenance, more aligned, as suggested above, to the role of a PCSO (Crawford and Lister, 2004). In addition, the idea of restricting the role further for frontline response officers who use force was also illustrated by one officer, who explained:

Actually, until now in Abu Dhabi Police, the community police do not have the responsibility for first response. We saw it in Singapore where the community police have the first response and I heard that in [Britain] they do first response and they [also] have light weapons but they do not have a gun with bullets [as with Abu Dhabi Police]. In the community police in [Britain] or in Singapore, they have light weapons like Taser, CS spray and batons, this is what they have, and they work at the first stages of response. But in Abu Dhabi Police, no, not yet. (S8)

There is a significant issue here for police legitimacy and policing by consent, which links to the militaristic style and structure of Abu Dhabi Police (as discussed in Chapter 1). The quotation above raises the questions of whether community police officers in Abu Dhabi should be armed with lethal or non-lethal weapons. In this, community police carried (and continue to carry) side arms (i.e. revolvers) but they were not equipped with any other type of less lethal weapons as in many other developed countries. Importantly, there can be tensions in those communities where ‘everyone has their own perception of what should be done and whether the police should take action [to arrest] or not’ (Schaffer, 1980, p.16). If the public continuously see that the community police, for example, fail
to make arrests in situations where they might reasonably expect them to, or conversely, to use their firearms when least expected to do so, this tension can arise at some point. To restrict the powers and role of the community police whilst providing them with lethal weapons could create confusion about their role. As such, and as Reiner (2010) has argued, decisions to issue officers with firearms should be assessed against the need to maintain or improve legitimacy and for policing by consent.

The restriction of the use of powers was later qualified, and community police officers were instructed to make an arrest if they were confronted by a suspect, not dissimilar to the PCSO power to detain a person in certain circumstances.\(^{47}\) This action was still limited, as explained by one officer:

> If a crime happens in front of [the community police] we [now] give them instructions to interfere, to stop [only], not to stop and search, not to stop and [act] or investigate … they will make the situation calm and make the people calm. After the crime or incident has happened they go out and bring back the confidence for the people, telling them about what happened, explaining the situation and say that everything is under control. In fact, we do not have any powers … for example, for drugs or CID … Our power is just to communicate, to talk to people. (S2)

However, when considering the restricted use of powers in the context of the role of the PCSO, there was clear evidence of policy convergence taking place based on decisions made very early in the policy transfer process. Consequently, incidents leading to arrest by community police were very few, although important when they were made. However, this decision to implement a soft approach to community policing had a long-term impact

\(^{47}\) See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-community-support-officer-powers
on gaining the support of other frontline personnel elsewhere in the organisation, not least as it caused further implementation challenges (see below). This is the dilemma for policymakers when, as Innes (2005, p157, emphasis in original) states, soft policing is hard to maintain where the ‘occupational culture of street cops tends to value the conduct of hard policing functions, such as pursuing real criminals’.

The legacy of the extent to which the police also ‘help members of the community’ (S1) as a social welfare role remains a key part of the more recent community policing approach. The soft approach to policing had not changed. As one officer explained, their role priorities continued to include:

- awareness campaigns … working with young people to try and make them aware of the issues and concerns … maintaining and promoting the cultural aspect of the UAE and customs … by attending public events, hospital visits and such like. (S12)

In summary, the priority given to improving police and community relations and solving minor problems of disorder helped to shape the narrow role of the community police between 2003 and 2007. The second period, from 2008, advanced policy transfer to the extent to which problem-solving became a core element of the approach adopted for community policing. New leadership, teams, programmes, training and an extension of the network of policy actors served to mutate the community policing approach from one that might be described as originally narrow and symbolic of the British model to one that was closer to that originally observed in London, albeit it represented a soft approach in how it has been operationalised locally. Recalling that the Chief of Police was ‘interested in [the British community policing model]’ (S2), the changes in approach after 2008 illustrate that policy in Abu Dhabi was nevertheless evolving over time (Hudson and Kim,
Drawing from what policy was transferred and the varying degrees of transfer for different elements of the model, the results of the analysis can be summarised. The structure of dedicated community police teams in neighbourhoods replicated the Safer Neighbourhood Teams policy developed in London. That said, some aspects of the ‘secret social service’ role of the community police clearly represented a divergence from British policy, although the general idea of helping people in need was not. There was also divergence from the role of community policing in Britain to deal proactively with crime and criminals. However, the focus on developing the role similar to that of a PCSO with limited police powers, emulated British policy, as did the approach to problem-solving, emulating ideas developed in the US for problem-oriented policing. The results demonstrate the complexity of assessing the degrees of transfer for different elements of community policing and that what actually occurred through selection and negotiation would be better described as policy translation. Throughout the process, there were factors that either facilitated or constrained the nature and extent of policy transfer and these are discussed in the next section.

5.5 What facilitated or constrained the policy transfer process?

Several factors facilitated or constrained the nature and extent of policy transfer in Abu Dhabi. This analysis is focused on four important issues, relating to culture and Islamic traditions, the challenges of engaging with diverse populations, paramilitary policing structures and attitudes and, finally, centralisation verses decentralisation of structure and roles. Initially, once knowledge of community policing as a philosophy had been learned from visits to other countries, it was soon understood that there was a potential for a
community policing style to succeed within the culture and Islamic traditions of the UAE. Engaging with citizens, for example, via the Majlis, to discuss concerns, share information and resolve disputes remains a positive example of how activity to support the community policing concept was readily adopted. Consequently, a priority for community engagement for community police patrols was included in the job description (see Appendix H). Most of the officers interviewed emphasised that this was a positive element which facilitated policy transfer, as one officer explained:

His Highness … decided to apply [a community police model] because … what I understand, is [that] he found the community police philosophy is very near to the religion, Islam, and the Arabic culture which is very close to what the community police do. In Islam, history is telling us that 1,400 years ago the prophet Mohammed and the four Caliphs [Rulers] were in touch with the people, they listened to them and visited their families and there are a lot of stories that tells us that those responsible people were in touch with the people and their family. (S6)

However, culture and the approach to community engagement is not a stable feature in all communities, especially in a country like Abu Dhabi where the population is primarily transient. This draws into question how to operationalise the rhetoric that ‘the police are the public and that the public are the police’ (Home Office, 2012), which is widely seen as central to the ambition of enhancing police and community relations. For example, over the last two decades, in order to be more representative of communities, British police forces have pursued recruitment campaigns aimed at increasing the number of black and Asian police officers. However, in Abu Dhabi, recruitment of police employees is limited, with very few exceptions, to local citizens of the UAE.

48 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/318778.stm
Consequently, in Abu Dhabi, consideration was given in 2009 to explore alternative ways to engage with communities and involve them as part of the policing family. One innovative programme involved the organisation looking beyond the UAE to other states where experienced community police officers could be recruited to help overcome the cultural challenges, as one officer explained:

With community engagement, the adaptation of the community-policing model is the employment [by Abu Dhabi Police] of ex-pat police [officers] from Singapore and the UK. This is one of the initiatives where [the community police] engage the English-speaking community in Abu Dhabi and those from South East Asia. Those officers must have extensive experience and exposure in community policing. They must have been involved in initiatives and projects that have been successful, so what they do is that they must engage the communities [where] the local police might have a difficulty with regards to language and with regards to customs. For those from Singapore, for example, they have three distinct races, the Malays from Malaysia, the Chinese and the Indians. So, they are able to adapt, and they are able to assimilate the knowledge that they have with regards to the other races that they have in Singapore and use that to the advantage of engaging with the community in Abu Dhabi. (S11)

In this way, police officers were brought in from abroad and then later became part of the community they served. The project benefited from bringing in experienced officers and achieved the same result of developing a more representative and diverse organisation. It seemed to be a step in the right direction, but as one officer commented:

This [recruitment of expatriate officers] is very unique, but do we have a truly diverse force? No. Increasingly though there is publication of materials in different languages and face-to-face communication and we are also seeing the promotion of volunteers etc. We see the emergence of it, but we are a long way from being a truly integrated police force that is part of the community. (S7)
However, there were limitations to this approach. The expatriate officers were issued with the uniform of Abu Dhabi Police and, in a way, they blended in with the wider organisation. They were recruited on short-term special contracts and, consequently, were not authorised to have any local police powers while working in Abu Dhabi. In addition, of the hundreds of officers in community police teams – thousands in the wider organisation – no more than ten expatriate officers worked in Abu Dhabi Police on uniform patrol at any one time from 2010 to 2016. This indicates that this was very much seen as a pilot initiative, although dealing with diverse populations remains a major issue for the organisation. However, senior officers felt that these officers did carry out a valuable role supporting local police officers who were focused mainly on dealing with small community problems, undertaking presentations for children and staff in schools and attending large public events, where they directly engaged with residents and other foreign workers.

But local culture was a continuing constraint on policy transfer at the point of operationalising frontline community policing. As discussed above, the motivation for engaging in policy transfer was driven partly by the perceived confidence gap between the police and the public, which senior officers explained as improving over time. But as one officer highlighted, the police relationship with some communities was like ‘a wall of ice’ (S13), and another officer explained:

> I think there is [still] a challenge with the culture … because people do not usually see the policeman in the neighbourhood or the community, so when they see him they think, ah, there might have been an incident, or a crime [has] happened. (S2)

The ongoing response to this challenge has been to maintain a soft role for the community
police; however, in the longer term, this also created internal organisational challenges, where, to some extent, there was confusion about the role and what benefits the approach had for the organisation and for the public. This issue, as discussed previously, has been experienced elsewhere, where police organisations, as a consequence of a reluctance to accept a social welfare role, have constrained the transfer of community policing (Innes, 2006b; Mastrofski et al., 2007). There has been some evidence of this in Abu Dhabi where officers explained that competing priorities of crime fighting, and response policing had taken primacy over their ‘community’ responsibilities, resulting in the removal of personnel from their core duties. The pressure of these competing demands can be explained in that soft approaches to policing can be potentially viewed as a weak subculture in paramilitary police organisations, leading to operational anxieties, as Wood et al. (2004, p.136) explain:

> Traditionalist paramilitary opponents … portray [community policing] as reducing the mission of policing to customer service alone; in their caricature, community policing simply involves being nice to the community and the idea that the police should do what the community wants. Instead of seeing problem-solving and other community practices … to more effectively fight crime, they portray community policing as asking them to be a weak cop or Officer Friendly: glad-handing citizens, doing public relations work, being a positive presence in the community.

Nevertheless, it is up to the government or other organisation officials to decide what policy is best suited for them so long as they have the right information and knowledge to make informed decisions (Dolowitz, 2009). This leads to the issue in relation to a further decision, that community policing in Abu Dhabi, at the time of carrying out this study, was a centralised role, and this also caused internal conflict. As community policing is a philosophy and an organisational strategy, Kappeler and Gaines (2015)
emphasise that this means involving all members of the police force, employing community police officers, adopting a proactive approach, engaging in problem-solving with partners including the community, and adopting *decentralised* ways of working (my emphasis). In Abu Dhabi, the approach has achieved the opposite effect, at least for the time being, as one officer explained:

> We are aligning to geographical areas and ... we are aligning to workings within the stations and in certain places we are aligning to the local needs like having some officers in the Malls. So, in many ways we are customizing [community policing] but we have kept a centralised management structure to make sure that the strategy and the policy doesn’t get lost in the wider part of policing. So, in many ways we have adapted to where we are in this moment in time, and [to the] issues and challenges we face. (S7)

This raises the question of whether to centralise or decentralise resources in pursuit of community policing goals. Kappeler and Gaines (2015), state that decentralisation is either implied or explicitly required as a key facet of a community policing approach being responsive to communities. This idea is supported by Tilley (2008, p.379) who states that decentralisation provides for ‘discretion in adapting priorities and tactics to local circumstances and needs’. However, Wycoff and Skogan (1994) have stated that it cannot be proved emphatically that decentralisation is an essential condition for community policing to be successful. In Abu Dhabi, a centralised structure means that there was a subtle distinction for the organisation in that community policing was delivered operationally as a designated specialist role for specific officers. It was not, therefore, a philosophy applied by all the police, as the same officer explained:

> Yes … [community policing] is [a designated role for a limited number of specific officers]. There is an emphasis on police structure which is a
traditional thing putting in a structure and boundaries. Then if you do that, what you do is you narrow the scope and then you narrow the scope at the delivery level ... so we are not truly decentralised at a delivery level. It has been kept very deliberately tight. (S7)

The process of centralisation, however, was unstable throughout the whole implementation phase. As discussed above, the first community police team was formed within a decentralised framework, being a small part of a larger established social support department. Later, by 2008, with extensive growth in personnel and staff, the new structure took effect and senior management responsibility for community policing was split 80/20 between the police stations and the new community police department. This was partial centralisation, giving the new department more control of policy learning and implementation. The officers stated that police station managers had 80 per cent influence over community police teams for day-to-day tasking. The community police department had 20 per cent influence for developing policy, role, procedures and recruitment, as well as leading on various programmes, such as volunteers. However, this approach proved to be problematic, with uncertainty surrounding roles and responsibilities and, consequently, the uncontrolled secondment of community police personnel to other duties became common. To solve this problem, by 2014, community policing became completely centralised, under the total control of the community police department.

It is acknowledged that when engaged in wide-ranging organisational change, it was not expected that a new philosophy could be spread throughout the organisation from its inception. At the beginning of the implementation phase, the very nature of pilot programmes, such as the one in Bani Yas in this study, indicate that it is something that was tried first as a designated role for some officers before it could become a philosophy for all. However, continuing centralisation meant that community policing remained a
designated role for a few (hundred) officers, which continued to restrict the wider development of the philosophy. The issue of commitment from managers to community policing was a continuing challenge to implementation and most officers said that while that challenge still existed, the risk of being assigned elsewhere increased if decentralisation took place too early.

In summary, although culture and traditions created opportunities to facilitate policy transfer, the overriding factors that became constraints to the process were dominated by organisational culture and attitudes. This is especially the case for a police force, such as in Abu Dhabi, where an opposing style of crime fighting and response policing created a potential barrier to change. Being traditionally militaristic only added to the challenges of implementing a softer style of community-focused policing. However, undertaking to bridge the confidence gap between the police and the public required a new approach and one that had clearly been given high level support from the senior leaders of Abu Dhabi Police. It generated innovation and inspiration, and the recruitment of foreign officers to work in communities was evidence of that. Throughout the process of policy transfer to implementation, there was a gradual transition from decentralised teams to a fully centralised model which perhaps created an environment that protected community policing and reduced the risks of policy transfer failure.

5.6 How policy transfer was demonstrated

Once the stage of policy learning had been completed and decisions made, the final part of the process was implementing policy on the ground (Evans, 2009). This required innovation to develop knowledge transfer mechanisms and in Abu Dhabi this was achieved through training, workshops, conferences and use of the media. Having had a
major increase in personnel to community police teams since 2008, the lack of mechanisms to build knowledge and skills to activate policy implementation was a challenge. To address this, a new community policing training institute was established in 2010,\footnote{See \url{http://www.cppsi.com/AboutEn.aspx}} and during the period to 2015, it delivered hundreds of community policing courses to thousands of police employees, spreading the ideas and concepts of the model throughout the organisation, albeit mainly to junior ranks and support staff. In addition, for more senior supervisors and middle ranking officers, the institute coordinated the delivery of several workshops to improve knowledge and understanding.

In addition to training, other communication mechanisms were needed, and the use of media including social media, web sites, magazines and radio, are all extensive tools to be employed in this regard. There is evidence of an abundance of similar media used by Abu Dhabi Police to publicise progress with community policing both internally and externally to the public. For example, there is a community policing website,\footnote{The community police website is available at: \url{https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/citizens/safety-and-environment/safety/abu-dhabi-community-police}} a police Facebook page,\footnote{\url{https://www.facebook.com/pages/Abu-Dhabi-Police-GHQ/219011224798427}} use of Twitter to publish community police activity\footnote{\url{https://twitter.com/adfca/status/727714863368314880}} and extensive use of local media such as newspapers,\footnote{\url{http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/crime/expats-can-join-community-policing-1.1246508}} radio and, in some cases, television, albeit primarily for Arabic services. The marketing of community policing was supported in 2009 with a second major conference in Abu Dhabi, with guest speakers including Professors Wesley Skogan (Chicago) and Nick Tilley (London) and other British senior police officials. This new conference promulgated the advances in community policing and delegates attended from all states within the UAE. One outcome of the conference was a limited publication

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of a community police video, the transcript of which revealed an ongoing police objective, among others, to ‘instil confidence between citizens and the police’ (CpOrg, 2010).

In summary, this brief outline of how policy transfer was demonstrated illustrates that after 2008 there was a significant investment made in communication and training. But this assessment only tells part of the story. Demonstration of policy transfer can also be evaluated by the analysis of data associated with activity at the point of implementation (Evans, 2009), the frontline of community policing, and the next chapter adds that extra layer of assessment.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has explored why policy transfer of community policing took place from Britain and elsewhere to Abu Dhabi, what was transferred and who was involved, leading to an assessment of the degrees of transfer and what facilitated or constrained the process. The data illustrate that there is a distinction in the outcomes of policy transfer over two periods. The first was during a period of policy learning and the development of new policing ideas that took place from 2000 to 2007. For various reasons, including the location of the first community police team and its role, powers and position within the organisation’s structure, the implementation revealed that a partial transfer of policy had taken place that aligned the aims of the concept to what is described as predominantly a social welfare service. Progress with implementing community policing more fully beyond the pilots was slow, although there appeared to be some success in improving police and community relations in some areas.
During the second period, from 2008 to 2016, there was a shift in focus to convert ideas more fully into practice. This period saw a new model developed based on patrol teams, limited powers, community engagement, collecting information, problem-solving and partnership working, emulating the role of a PCSO. Acting as an elite network, the growth in actors involved in policy transfer ranged from high-level government officials, to chief officers, to the police organisations of Abu Dhabi and the London Metropolitan Police, to the UK government and the practitioner experts from the UK and elsewhere, and more was achieved as a result. Notwithstanding the role of this elite network, the critical effect that a single charismatic leader had on the success or otherwise of the transfer should not be underestimated. An advocate for change with authority and power to make policy selections, influence decisions and coordinate policy implementation has a critical effect on the results. This person might hold this power and influence based on their position in the organisation, such as the Chief of Police, but it could also be, as in this study, an individual leader lower down in an organisation, whose motivation and determination makes all the difference. This person is the critical actor and has special importance as an advocate for change in organisations such as Abu Dhabi Police, which rely heavily on charismatic leaders to achieve success.

Differentiating the data over the two periods illustrates that policy transfer is a complex and an evolving multi-tiered process. Decisions were learned, emulated, translated, implemented and, where necessary, rejected, supporting the assertion that policy transfer did evolve and mutate over time (Hudson and Kim, 2014) and space (Benson and Jordan, 2012). One can understand the ambition to replicate, as in this case, a community policing style drawing from good practice primarily in Britain, especially in the context of historical cooperation and the mutual reputation held between the two countries.
Nevertheless, the analysis confirms that close replications are quite rare and the data suggest there was much evidence of policy translation and adaptation taking place.

The constraints to policy transfer experienced in Abu Dhabi produced challenges to the implementation of ideas but they also created interesting results. The move towards more centralised control over community policing helped to ensure its consistent local implementation. This approach maintained the soft role of the community police linked to limitations of police use of powers, an important aspect of the role that aimed to improve police and community relations. It is a challenge, however, when a paramilitary style of policing creates barriers to integrating a community policing model within an organisation. But, delegating the responsibility of community policing to centralised teams created an opportunity to differentiate them from the traditional police who had been feared in the past. Ultimately, not all policing is community policing and there is still a need for ‘crime fighting’ and ‘response’ services, but centralisation may be a way in which community policing can be effectively delivered in a country like Abu Dhabi.

Finally, with such a high degree of policy translation taking place, the potential for incomplete or inappropriate transfer had to be managed. The multi-layered approach to policy selection, by the head of the community police department, and at a senior leadership level in the organisation, appears to have been an effective approach to reducing the risk. This was supported by the fact that transfer appears, especially after 2008, to have been undertaken voluntarily in the continuum between what the police wanted to do, as opposed to what they had to do. However, the complexity of analysing the policy transfer process means that making judgements of success or failure of transfer is likely to achieve different results at different times. But it is also necessary to take this
a step further to complete the analysis by taking account of factors that affected the concept at the point of implementation. To achieve this, the next chapter analyses and discusses data obtained from the survey of community police officers to compare, contrast, contradict or support the accounts given by their senior officers as to the model transferred and adapted in Abu Dhabi.
Chapter 6: The Implementation of Community Policing within Abu Dhabi

This is the second chapter that analyses the empirical data collected during the study. In so doing, it develops its arguments by drawing not only on the interviews with senior Abu Dhabi police officers, but also the results of the survey of frontline community police personnel. This mixed method of analysis follows the approach described by Brannan (2005) and Johnson et al. (2007) as discussed in Chapter 4, exploring whether the quantitative data corroborates the results of the qualitative analysis, whether it provides an opportunity to elaborate on the findings or whether the qualitative and quantitative results might differ or contradict each other. For the study of policy transfer in the field of policing, this approach provides evidence for developing greater knowledge of its impact on the organisation, on experience and on the attitudes at all levels, from senior management to frontline police. This also supports the assertion that ‘the proof of policy transfer lies in its implementation [and] it is at this level where data should be examined to establish the extent to which policy transfer has taken place’ (Evans, 2009, p.246).

The chapter has two main parts. The first presents an analysis of the demographic profile of survey respondents to validate the data and to discuss, in particular, the categories of gender and experience that revealed differences in the responses. The second part uses the survey findings to broaden the understanding of the degrees of policy transfer discussed in the previous chapter and how they were demonstrated through implementation. Discussion of each element highlights further the constraints to policy transfer and contextualises the challenges faced by those charged with operationalising policy. Finally, the concluding part of this chapter summarises the main points developed both in this, and the previous chapter, in order to describe the community policing model.
implemented in Abu Dhabi. These results are compared against the British model from where the major constituents of policy ideas were drawn. The comparison illustrates the argument made earlier in this thesis that community policing is difficult to define and there is no one size fits all approach to how it is operationalised within policy and practice. So, unsurprisingly, through a process of policy translation, community policing in Abu Dhabi has developed into its own unique model.

6.1 The demographics of survey respondents

This section analyses the demographics of survey respondents firstly to validate the data obtained, and secondly to discuss the various categories within which, officers were grouped. This explains how some of the data were used to compare and discuss other major sections of the survey, where depending on gender and experience, for example, the results are evidently different. All the operational community police officers\textsuperscript{54} in Abu Dhabi were deployed into small teams, located at all of the main police stations. The numbers of officers and civilian staff in each team varied, but the majority were allocated almost exclusively to patrols, whereas others were given separate responsibility for specialist roles, such as developing partnerships, raising awareness programs and administration, and this remained consistent with all of the teams. The partnerships function, for example, was very much a liaison role, focused on making sure that all the inter-agency contact details were maintained and that appropriate communication between the organisations took place. Raising awareness included crime prevention activity, primarily through production of information leaflets or carrying out

\textsuperscript{54} The term ‘officer(s)’ relates to all the personnel with nine ranks ranging from policeman through to junior officers who are team managers. Due to the military structure of the organisation, the term ‘officers’ locally refers only to those who hold officer rank. The term is, therefore, used here for representation purposes only.
presentations, for example, at schools and labour camps. Because the number of officers working in partnerships and awareness units was low, the survey did not ask for respondents to indicate which unit they were attached to, in order to ensure anonymity. If they did participate in the survey, their responses were included with all the others.

The format applied to the survey took account of the requirements of the Ministry of Interior Centre for Studies and Surveys (CSS), which limited its length and, thus, focus. The approach explored the interview data obtained from the senior officers, which identified the key elements of the community policing model in Abu Dhabi. Specifically, it sought to understand knowledge and opinions specific to communication and community engagement, problem-solving and partnership working, community police high visibility patrols, the future of community policing in Abu Dhabi and role priorities (see Appendix F).

As discussed in Chapter 4, probability theory was applied to select the sample and to make sure that it was representative of the total population available. This was achieved in three parts. Firstly, data were collected from a known group of participants who could be identified (the research subjects). Secondly, each person receiving the survey was chosen at random, in that it was not known who exactly would be working within the time frame chosen. Finally, participants were selected only because they were members of community police teams. The survey included the collection of demographic data, complying with the requirements of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the CSS, to include gender, age, main police area worked, rank, experience in role and education. The aim was that these data would be from a random selection of respondents who would represent the whole homogenous population (Breakwell, 1990).
Overall, these data were compared and found to be broadly representative. However, notwithstanding that this population was homogenous, the demographics still require some explanation, especially in terms of gender and experience, which have varying degrees of influence on the analysis results for this particular study. For the categories of levels of education and place of work, the results of the analysis showed no discerning difference in responses based on these factors, so these specific parts of the demographic data are excluded. Factors relating to rank and why this was also excluded are explained below.

The gender of respondents (85 per cent male and 15 per cent female) reflects that Abu Dhabi Police is a male-dominated organisation. There is a programme to create opportunities for women to work in the police and increase their representation. This ambition was recently restated by the Chief of Police that ‘Abu Dhabi Police [wants] to fully support women working in the force and to expand and enhance their role in policing’ (Rumaithi, 2016, p.9). Notwithstanding their increased recruitment, very few female officers carried out routine foot patrol duties. This was an element of their role that was restricted owing to cultural reasons, although it was not forbidden, as uniformed women officers were highly visible at locations such as airports, public events and other service centres, including immigration and licensing. To support community police teams, women officers undertook other important roles, including visits to female schools, dealing with family domestic problems and youth crime prevention activities, and some were supervisors of other male officers who carried out foot and other types of patrol duties. Women officers also achieved promotion in the same way as males, and as discussed below, this was relevant for this study relating to experience and rank. The
analysis of the demographic data revealed there was no skew created based on gender, where the distribution of male and female officers across the ranks was broadly similar to the rest of the organisation. Gender did become a factor when prioritising their role, however, and later in this analysis, comparing the responses of women compared to men illustrates a distinction of views relating to other elements, such as community engagement and consultation.

The rank distribution requires further explanation regarding apparent anomalies among respondents (see Figure 1). To simplify the representation of the nine various ranks held by respondents, they have been grouped into one of four categories: low, medium, supervisor and team leader. The data show that only 16 per cent of respondents were in the lowest group which, in comparison to the British police, would be the equivalent to the rank of police constable.

*Figure 1 – Respondents grouped by rank*
41 per cent of those categorised into middle ranks were the equivalent of senior constable and sergeant roles in countries such as Australia, Hong Kong and Canada. The role of the supervisor in Abu Dhabi Police is generally considered to be that of a warrant officer and 37 per cent of respondents were classified as such, contributing to a ratio that is close to one supervisor for every two or three lower and middle ranks combined. In comparison to other international police forces, this supervision ratio may seem disproportionate, where, for example, in Britain, the ratio of constables (and PCSOs) to supervisors is much higher on average (College of Policing, 2015).

The ratio of supervisor ranks in Abu Dhabi is not one that is intentional, but lies in the promotion system – a characteristic that is significant for understanding the rank of officers correlated to their experience. In the lower ranks, promotion is automatically obtained based primarily on time served. Those with experience of more than four years in community police teams (the majority in this study) inevitably have been promoted although, as was customary within the organisation, their role will not have changed in any significant way. Consequently, the rank distribution of respondents was broadly representative of the rest of the police organisation. More importantly, irrespective of rank, an officer’s level of community policing experience, and the analysis of responses from the survey, reveal different approaches and attitudes to priorities such as problem-solving as a result.

The combination of the age of the respondents and the number of years’ experience they had in community policing, at the time of participating in the survey, was also a factor to consider in the survey responses (see Figure 2). As discussed in the previous chapter, the
main influx of personnel to form the community police teams throughout Abu Dhabi took place in 2008 when large numbers of young men and women were recruited directly from police training schools.

The challenges at the beginning of the programme, when so many officers joined the teams who were inexperienced, over time, became less of a problem, with most now having gained at least four years’ service in their role. The earlier recruitment drive explains the high percentage of those in the 25-35 age group of respondents, and this links directly to the number of years’ experience they had in community policing. This had, it is suggested, an advantage for this study in that data collected were from respondents who
had extensive experience and would respond in a way that reflected their knowledge gained over a number of years.

6.2 Demonstrating policy transfer through implementation

This section analyses which community policing policies were effectively translated into practice. The results of the analysis relating to the degrees of policy transferred demonstrated that the location of community police teams within the structure of the organisation shaped a dominant social welfare role. This was focused on public safety matters where restrictions, for example, on the use of police powers, were considered to be essential to enhance police and community relations. Although the structure varied over time becoming a centralised model, this was in the context of a persistent soft approach to community policing methodology, with an emphasis on priorities for community engagement, problem-solving and partnership working, and patrol teams used as a mechanism to achieve visibility in communities. According to the senior officers, the model applied in Abu Dhabi intended to improve confidence in the police organisation by responding effectively to the changing demographics and language mix of society, to maintain security and develop a trusting relationship with the public. The survey of the community police teams sought to advance knowledge about all of these issues based on the practical experience of those involved in implementation. The results of this analysis are presented in four subsections that consider the overarching concepts of communication and community engagement (both internally in the organisation and externally with the public), problem-solving and partnership working, visible community police patrols, and finally, what the respondents’ vision for community policing in the future might be.
6.2.1 Communication and community engagement

Acknowledging that ‘community policing is both a philosophy and organisational strategy’ (Tilley, 2008, p.276), it is accordingly, a theory or an attitude that acts as a guiding principle for each individual. Notwithstanding that the model was applied within a tight structure in Abu Dhabi, the idea still needed to be communicated to others at all levels throughout the organisation to minimise the risks of failure. For policing reform, it is especially important for senior leaders who have influence over the implementation and change process (Adams et al., 2002; Tilley, 2008). It has equal relevance for frontline officers, who must understand what is expected of them, what they should do to carry out their role, and how they can contribute to implementing policy and ideas. Therefore, assessing internal communication also formed part of the survey.

Table 2 – Communication and community engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>(1) I am confident I understand the philosophy of community policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>(2) My managers communicate with me in a clear way about the aims and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>philosophy of community policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>(3) I find that it is difficult to communicate with the public because</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of the different nationalities and languages they have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>(4) I regularly receive information from inside the police station about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>crime hotspots and local crime problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>(5) I am regularly informed about the priorities of the Community Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The statements put to the participants aimed to explore four factors: whether they felt confident that they understood the philosophy of community policing, whether their managers communicated with them in a clear way about the aims and the philosophy, whether they were regularly informed about the priorities of the community police department, and finally, whether they regularly received information from inside the police station about crime and local problems (see Table 2). The results demonstrate positive responses for all of these statements, with the majority of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that they were well informed about all of these issues. This is an encouraging baseline of knowledge for the remainder of the analysis, for it can be assumed that respondents had a good understanding of other issues presented to them in the survey.

The communication of community policing philosophy had not been as successful to other supervisors and managers outside of the community police teams. All the teams operated from police stations and throughout the period of transition from being decentralised to a centralised structure, local managers initially had an influence over their roles and responsibilities. To gain their support, and prevent deployment of the community police to other duties, it is apparent that these managers must have been aware of the benefits of the model, although there is evidence that this was not always the case, as one senior officer explained:

There [were] challenges in Abu Dhabi Police. There [was] a lack of understanding by senior management in the comprehensive police stations … of community policing and how it can be implemented and used to their advantage … [this was] a problem in that when we started community police we started to build trust outside the police, not inside the police. …
Now we need to take the trust inside the police because we can’t take the trust of the people if we don’t have the trust with other police personnel.

Without a clear understanding of the community policing philosophy and the role that the officers undertook on a day-to-day basis, it can create a challenge to implementation, where managers look for alternative roles for the community police personnel to fulfil. This is especially the case for those who see the traditional role of the police as crime control and order maintenance and, consequently, community policing becomes poorly respected and seen as ‘soft on crime’ (Casey, 2010, p.55). This impression might also be exaggerated when policy decisions are made, without a full explanation, to implement a community policing role similar to that of the PCSO. This issue was highlighted by Dolowitz and Marsh (2010, p.17), in that the lack of knowledge among some senior managers can be attributed to ‘insufficient information about the policy/institution and how it operates in the country from which it is transferred’. Senior officers within an organisation who are unexposed to that type of information about the philosophy can, therefore, potentially contribute to a failure of policy transfer. In Sweden, for example, in response to this same management issue and accepting that friction at the top of the organisation existed, the selection of senior officers to lead on policy transfer and implementation was carefully made to ensure their commitment (Peterson, 2010). Nevertheless, Peterson (2010, p.41) concluded that notwithstanding that approach, community policing was still ‘poorly respected’ within the organisation. The head of Abu Dhabi Police community police department from 2007 was an example of this type of elite selection, acting as a champion for the philosophy on behalf of the organisation and directly representing the vision of the Chief of Police. This action minimised the risk of failure and specifically addressed the challenges of changing organisational culture to
assimilate new policy alternatives (Chan, 1997; Sparrow et al., 1990; Evans, 2009).

The additional concern about communication posed in this part of the survey (see statement [3] in Table 2 above) related directly to one of the principles of community engagement. It explored the extent to which participants felt that it was difficult to communicate with the public due to the variety of nationalities and the language mix in communities. The data show that 60 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that this was a problem for them, with only 16 per cent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement. The diversity of the population is certainly an issue and with the majority of residents in Abu Dhabi originating from South Asia (SCAD, 2016), they are from countries where community policing either does not exist or is ‘applied in a different style to the West’ [and Abu Dhabi] (Brogden and Nijhar, 2005, p.170). It is from these countries where the majority of the transient population would likely find the new style of policing unfamiliar and for whom language is a barrier when the frontline police in Abu Dhabi only speak Arabic. This challenge was acknowledged by one senior officer who stated:

Our challenge is … we have more than 200 nationalities … I sometimes feel resistance and that the public are still afraid, and I don’t know why. They have the mind-set that [if they have information] you don’t tell anyone. I have experienced this with some nationalities that have provided information to me and are concerned if I pass it on … Sometimes I think this is a resistance … there is a barrier in languages, and customs. (S1)

It was also noted by several senior officers that they were concerned with their lack of understanding of other nations and that “[culture], is a challenge for us. If we do not know what culture you have … it is quite difficult for us to deal with different nationalities’ (S10). Further, concerns were raised that foreign communities would not understand the
local culture in Abu Dhabi either and that this problem needed to be solved, as another officer explained:

Of course, culture does create a challenge because the way one person greets another or the way another person dresses, or the way a person does something might not be acceptable with local culture here in Abu Dhabi. For example, if you enter a house, the custom here is to take off your shoes before you go into the house, whereas in some communities you can enter the house with the shoes on. Greetings, for example, might be different from different countries and different cultures, so responding to different cultures also plays a part and is a challenge. (S11)

The organisation’s response to dealing with this challenge, as discussed in the previous chapter, was in part, achieved through the diversification of the workforce. As one officer said, ‘we have too many languages, too many kinds of people from the world, so we have to bring [experts] from other countries to help us [communicate with them]’ (S13). However, while acknowledging that community engagement is a challenge due mainly to language and cultural barriers, and that, as a consequence, community consultation becomes generally limited to the indigenous citizens, the language barrier is not a significant problem in practice. There are other ways in which the organisation consults with the wider population and satisfaction surveys, multi-language information leaflets, on-line resources and use of other media, newspapers, radio and television can all contribute to filling the engagement gap. All of these mechanisms have been used by Abu Dhabi Police at various times.

Within the survey, participants were asked to rank the task of consultation among seven other priorities of work, which included patrol, collecting information and attending events (see Appendix H). The results complement the findings discussed above and
although there was a spread of responses across all ranks, the trend indicates that consulting was generally prioritised in the bottom three for most respondents (Figure 3). This was much lower than would be expected based on the high level of importance placed on it by senior officers: it indicates that when frontline police find the task difficult, they will give it less priority. The data in the chart also illustrate the variation in responses related to gender.

Figure 3 – Priority of consulting with the public

This is reflective of the fact that it is mainly male officers who patrol and meet the public, with few women respondents considering that consultation is a high priority for them. As discussed above, this result can be attributed to the fact that women generally have specialist roles within community police teams and, accordingly, their allocated priorities differ from their male colleagues.
Consulting with the public as part of a community engagement strategy was not so problematic when officers connected with the indigenous Arabic speaking population. Other results in the survey highlighted that attempts were made by the community police teams to meet local citizens where they could. One officer stated that this was part of their approach and involved ‘maintaining and promoting the cultural aspect of the UAE and customs [and] this is done by attending public events … and such like’ (S12). The community police web pages reemphasise this point, stating that ‘The Community Police also visits hospitals, distributing gifts to the patients and their families on occasions such as the National Day or Eid. Celebrating together creates a more solid understanding of the Community Police and Support Officers and reinforces their position in society’.55 The same concept applies to attending at citizens’ homes, as another officer explained:

This model [of community policing and community engagement] is related to the society… we have Majlis here for the family, so you spread the idea for the community police by talking to the people directly, go to visit them … a representative from the community police should sit with the people, old people and young. They sit, drink coffee and talk about security in their community, so it is a very good idea. … so, the community police come to visit them and talk to them about their children, their life or security. (S11)

This element of community consultation was described by most of the senior officers as a critical success factor for them. However, the survey results indicate that the culture and diversity of the population and the intention to engage with all communities was a sizeable operational challenge. This illustrates that there was a divide between local citizens and other foreign nationalities, but other solutions were sought to respond to this

problem. An example was a police volunteer programme, launched in late 2016, with a slogan taken from the historical Peelian principles, which stated: ‘The police are our community and our community is the police’ (Abu Dhabi Police, 2016). This initiative was described in the following terms:

[It is] the next step in Abu Dhabi Police's continued commitment to broadening its communication and engagement within the community. This new initiative [of volunteering] will further enhance security and safety in the emirate by enabling members of the public to provide a positive presence in their neighbourhood. [The aim is] to adapt to the continually evolving and rapidly growing population in the emirate of Abu Dhabi by doubling the number of [people] engaged in policing, thereby providing a more community-centric service … [and] continuing to strengthen the relationship between Abu Dhabi Police and the community by empowering individuals to provide a visible and reassuring presence in their neighbourhood. (Abu Dhabi Police, 2016)

This was a new volunteering initiative, with the potential not just to create opportunities for improved community engagement but also to increase police visibility through volunteers, many of whom, it is said, would be expected to wear high visibility tabards for identification at appropriate times, places and occasions. Applicants were accepted from any nationality, which created an opportunity for volunteers to be representative of their own diverse communities, overcoming the limitations of the regular police. As a form of community advocate, and as part of an extended policing family, these volunteers aimed to create a bridge between residents and the police. This approach was explained further by the Chief of Police, in that:

We aim to engage a large number of individuals in Abu Dhabi to preserve the past, present and future of the Emirate because it is a collective responsibility of all people … There are 34,000 police officers in Abu
Dhabi, about 1 for every 81 people. By 2021, the aim is to have more than 47,500 officers and [volunteer] community support officers, representing one to every 58. (Ahmad, 2016, p.4)

This challenging initiative lead to the recruitment of over 10,000 volunteer community support officers, however, there is also a danger in this approach, as previously discussed in Chapter 2, of ‘different providers of reassurance policing’ creating a lack of clarity of their role, which can leave the public unsure about the legitimacy that could be expected of them (Crawford and Lister, 2004, p.viii). For example, in the initial press launch of this initiative, the headlines contained multiple concepts, stating that ‘Emiratis and expats can train to become Abu Dhabi community police officers [and that when] trained as community support officers’ they will support the community police (Ahmad, 2016, p.4, my emphasis). This demonstrates a confusing mix of labels that for the media, the public and other agencies would be blurring to determine what the role would mean in practice. It is uncertain, for example, whether the labels indicate that volunteers were intended to have limited powers or other authority to deal with problems in communities now or in the future.

Another outcome of community engagement, and one of high importance for senior officers in Abu Dhabi, was the management of community information. The police need to engage to ‘collect information about the neighbourhood and about the situation of the needs of the people, and about the problems’ (S2), before they can undertake problem-solving activity with or without partners. Community engagement is widely seen as critical to the success of community policing and without it taking place at the right time and with the right members of the community, the subsequent assessment of problems that needed to be solved in communities could ultimately be flawed. Consequently, the
level of satisfaction the public had with the police where their priorities were not being dealt with, as discussed in Chapter 2, could potentially lead to a breakdown in police legitimacy or private policing organisations filling the gap. The undertaking of this task is also illustrated in the survey results (see Figure 4) and demonstrates it was a high priority for the respondents. This links to the idea that community policing operates best when it is intelligence-led and ‘involves effectively sourcing, assembling and analysing intelligence about criminals and their activities’ to inform [community] policing action (Tilley, 2008, p.375).

*Figure 4 – Collecting community information: prioritising the task*

Because of its importance, it is useful to re-state an extract of the description of the community police role made by one officer in the previous chapter in order to reassess the extent of policy implementation, in that:

[community policing in Abu Dhabi] is a model which is based on patrol,
which goes on to collect information about the neighbourhood and about the situation of the needs of the people, and about the problems. (S4).

This implies that, after patrols, the second priority for the senior officers was the collection of community information, which the survey data corroborates. This observation was also supported with other evidence within the organisation, where a key performance target was to measure the quantity of information that patrol teams reported.

In addition, it was said that the original training provided to community police recruits emphasised the need to carry out local surveillance, checking street by street what they could find related to problems following a problem-oriented policing methodology (Goldstein, 1990). The reporting of information as a key performance indicator indicates why patrol officers gave the task such a high priority. Senior officers stated that, as a result, this approach was very successful, with over 16,000 information reports submitted by the community police patrols every year, much more than any other police department.

However, officers also explained that much of the information reported emanated from the visual identification of problems that they came across, whether on foot patrol or in cars. This information mainly related to environmental and traffic issues that were a danger to the public, such as holes in the road, damage to street furniture, overhanging trees, damage to street lighting, abandoned cars or where labourers were gathering together in the evening, everything that a community police patrol could observe without the need for close contact or verbal communication. As a result, the information rarely came from face-to-face contact with the public, infrequently from other community engagement activity and almost never, it is said, from phone calls directly to the community police teams. Community engagement, therefore, remains a significant challenge for the organisation and this section highlights that there are many factors that
contributed to the problem.

In summary, community consultation is part of a wider engagement approach that also includes sharing information and encouraging the community to participate as volunteers in policing. Community engagement describes ‘how [the police] strike up a relationship with the community so that [they] can enlist their aid, focus on the problems that turn out to be important, and figure out a way [for the police] to be accountable, legitimate and innovative’ (Stone and Travis, 2013, p.21). But where face-to-face consultation and communication might be a problem, the police have to explore other ways to develop that relationship. These data do not contradict the extent to which community engagement has been given a high priority for the community police in Abu Dhabi. But this analysis emphasises the challenges that exist for the frontline police to implement engagement mechanisms in diverse communities where language is a significant problem for them. Nevertheless, the outcomes of community engagement aim to assist the police to understand local problems that need to be solved in communities as part of a collaborative partnership and problem-solving approach. Applying community engagement techniques, for example, through face-to-face contact with the public could encourage the sharing of community information.

6.2.2 Problem-solving and partnership working

Both problem-solving and partnership working are fundamental elements of the Abu Dhabi community policing model. The discussion in Chapter 2, however, emphasised that problem-oriented policing was challenging when trying to convert policy ideas into practice; further, there is much evidence that community policing has the potential to fail as a result (Maguire, 2000; Tilley, 2008). Although problem-solving is ubiquitous in
international policing professions, there is international evidence that police officers have not fully committed themselves to it and that effective problem-solving is rarely achieved (Goldstein, 1990; Braga, 2015).

Several senior officers also raised specific challenges in this context, again raising concerns about senior management support for community policing. The absence, in part, of that support was attributed to a reluctance to accept that a soft policing style could complement a harder traditional policing approach.

Table 3 – Understanding problem-solving and partnership working

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>(1) In your opinion, dealing with crime is only the responsibility of the police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>(2) There are other partners who have responsibility with the police to deal with crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>(3) Our partners work on providing us with their information on a regular basis about local problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>(4) We periodically share crime information with relevant partners to help solve crime problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>(5) Problem-solving is a key task of delivering community policing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

238
But this problem is not uncommon in countries where community policing has been implemented (Rosenbaum, 1994; Innes, 2006b; Mastrofski et al., 2007; Flanagan, 2007). The survey completed for this study explored this issue further by probing the extent to which problem-solving and partnership working were given priority by the community police teams. The results, where 88 per cent of respondents agreed problem-solving was a key task for community policing teams, corroborate the opinions of their senior officers (see statement [5] Table 3). However, notwithstanding that view, the results when prioritising problem-solving activity illustrate a conflicting commitment to the approach when considering the level of experience of respondents (see Figure 5). This indicates a progressive change in attitude as the length of service increases, the priority for problem-solving reduces, and may be due to promotion to higher ranks and a change in individual policing priorities as a result.

*Figure 5 – Comparison of prioritising problem-solving with levels of experience*
Problem-solving is closely linked to partnership working as an essential element of community policing, but it often causes conflicting priorities for organisations, creating barriers to cooperation. In Britain, for example, in order to overcome this problem, legislation was introduced to compel a number of public entities to work together – the police, the local authority and later health and education bodies. In Abu Dhabi there was no similar decree, the absence of which created challenges for partnership cooperation, as one officer emphasised:

the main reason that some of the partners do not cooperate with us, until now, [is that] we don’t have any policy, or any law, which forces the partners to cooperate and to work together, unlike [in Britain]. (S2)

The alternative approach adopted in Abu Dhabi has been to encourage voluntary cooperation. The government Executive Council is the main motivating entity for this to take place. It coordinates the performance of multiple government departments where they have similar cross functional objectives. For example, the police and education authorities are grouped together because they have a mutual interest to keep young people safe and free from crime and vulnerability. Although senior officers referred to partnership working as a challenge, in practice, the results of the survey show that cooperation, at least for the sharing of information between organisations at an operational level, was much more supportive (see statements [3] and [4] in Table 3 above). These data may indicate that the problem of limited cooperation may only exist at a strategic level, where the results from the survey indicate that partners are more amenable at the point of delivery of problem-solving activity. But certainly, this would

56 Section 17 Crime and Disorder Act 1998
require additional research beyond the scope of this study. The survey explored partnership working further by asking participants to prioritise it in the same way they did for problem-solving (see Figure 6). The first results of the analysis showed that there is no specific level of priority given for partnership working; however, when these data are analysed taking account of experience, there is again a notable differentiation between the responses from groups based on levels of experience in community policing. Unlike the results for problem-solving, the group of respondents with experience of four to eight years gave less priority to partnership working than their colleagues with nine or more years’ service where the spread is much more even.

Figure 6 – Partnership working based on experience

These responses might be considered in the context that problem analysis involves an
assessment of whether partners would need to be engaged in the response phases, but they may not be needed in all cases (Goldstein, 1990).

In addition, notwithstanding that respondents acknowledged that dealing with crime was not the sole responsibility of the police (see statements [1] and [2] in Table 3 above), the responses from respondents with four to eight years’ experience (see Figure 6) illustrate that partnership working was nevertheless, a lower priority for them. But, again, it was their senior colleagues who demonstrated a different view with a more balanced approach across all levels of priorities. This is explained, as mentioned above, that within the community police teams, some officers were allocated exclusive responsibility for partnership working. In practice, it is understood that they were often those with the most experience. In practical terms, senior officers explained that this was part of an established process for community police teams. When a patrol officer came across a problem such as damage to street furniture, it was reported to their supervisor and a partnership officer would automatically send a letter to the appropriate agency to deal with it and that was the end of the matter. It was only when problems became more complex that partner agencies were engaged to work together with the police to solve them.

In summary, the survey data generally corroborates the qualitative data from the senior offices. Problem-solving and partnership working were acknowledged to be key elements of the Abu Dhabi model of community policing. The survey data also reinforces the findings in Chapter 5 that the level of priority given to the work illustrates that in practice, problem-oriented policing is challenging to fully implement and that creates a potential constraint to the policy transfer process. This creates a risk, however, as previous research
has shown, that if problem-solving is ineffective, community policing can become vulnerable to competing demands for resources (Goldstein, 1990; Waddington, 1993; Neyroud, 2007; Tilley, 2008).

### 6.2.3 Visibility of community police patrols

The discussion in Chapter 2 illustrated that maintaining police visibility and familiarity through dedicated foot patrols was a success factor for improving police and community relations (Skogan 2004; ACPO, 2006; Tilley, 2008; Reiner, 2010). There is also evidence that this style of patrol, as part of a wider community policing model, does improve community confidence (ACPO, 2006; Flanagan, 2007). The senior officers in Abu Dhabi understood these factors and they too placed foot patrols at the top of their priorities whilst they acknowledged that there were local environmental challenges to fully implement this style of policing. This priority has recently been restated within the Abu Dhabi government online resources, where it is stated that ‘the [community police] patrols operate mainly on foot or motorised conveyance to be closely engaged with all communities’.57 Consequently, the structure of community police teams places the majority of personnel allocated to foot patrol and this remained their main priority. However, and paradoxically, in practice, foot patrols were rarely carried out due to the harsh environment, especially during the summer months. It is said that police officers resorted to mobile patrol in their own private vehicles, or arranged meetings in air conditioned buildings and if they did walk, it was for very short periods, generally undertaken during the hours of darkness when temperatures dropped. The community police, therefore, were visible, but foot patrols were very limited and restricted to certain

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locations and at certain times of day or year. One officer confirmed that:

> It is very difficult [to achieve visibility through foot patrol in Abu Dhabi] … so we just let [the community police teams] work from the 5pm [evening] shift … if they work before that they have to stay in the police stations … until the evening when the weather has become good to walk. (S1)

The environment creates a unique set of circumstances, where the community police have to look for strategic locations to base themselves as an alternative to open air patrol. This is also in the context of policing, as discussed in Chapter 1, where private security personnel, outnumbering the police, take primacy for security and patrol of the ‘mass private property’ sector (Jones and Newburn 1998, p.46). Therefore, even when community police officers did go on patrol, they were restricted to areas of public space. One officer explained:

> The only [community police] activity that takes place during the summer months is driving around in a marked [and unmarked] car(s) but there is no distinction to say that it is community police … There is reluctance to enter areas such as the shopping malls, which are very popular and that is where most people go because of the air conditioning … [because private] security will deal with [issues there], unless there is a particular problem when an incident is reported. So [the community police] only go there when there is a problem. (S12)

Notwithstanding that there had been some implementation of foot patrol duties during cooler months, it was rarely the case that Abu Dhabi Police mirrored the image of the Safer Neighbourhood Teams in London. The survey aimed to explore the issues further and the results tend to corroborate the opinions of senior officers and the paradox (see Table 4). The majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they mainly patrolled
on foot, with 91 per cent acknowledging that it was an effective method of improving community confidence. This broadly represents the expected outcome of opinion. It is also noted that 51 per cent of the respondents confirmed that during the summer months, they reverted to patrolling in vehicles; however, the extent to which approximately a quarter of all respondents remained neutral on these issues may indicate some reluctance to fully commit themselves one way or the other when it could be perceived as a divergence from the local patrol policy.

Table 4 – Being visible in the community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>(1) I mainly patrol on foot, not in a car</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>(2) During the summer months, the hot weather means that I tend only to patrol in a car or in shopping malls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>(3) The basis of community police work is to increase the presence of police officers in neighbourhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>(4) The community police style tries to improve public confidence by making the police personnel more accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>(5) Foot patrol is not a very effective way for the community police to be visible in communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversely, responses to statement [5] raises an interesting issue about perceptions of policy, as the majority of respondents considered that foot patrols were probably not a very effective way for the community police to be locally visible. This is in the context that the same respondents understood its potential to improve confidence in the police
and that it was the main priority for them. This issue was explored further in the final part of the survey. It asked participants to select the priorities for their role, for instance, where they would place foot patrols among other key community policing priorities. Notwithstanding the challenges that the environment creates, and the level of support that the frontline personnel have for the role, the majority of respondents (65 per cent) still placed it in their top three priorities (see Figure 7). This is also one area of the role that highlights the gender difference with regard to a priority for patrolling, as discussed above, where female community police officers were generally allocated to other specialist roles.

*Figure 7 – Percentage priority for foot patrols*

![Figure 7 – Percentage priority for foot patrols](image)

This was not an issue raised by senior officers, however, but should be considered in terms of the extent to which community engagement takes place and where the police
aim to be representative of the community. The results of the analysis show that foot patrols appeared to be a lower priority for women than for their male colleagues (see Figure 8). Although the sample of respondents was low, especially concerning women, there is sufficient data to make the case to demonstrate the difference. This is important because of the challenges faced during implementation, where policymakers wanted the community police to engage with all communities. This would include being sensitive to the needs of individuals who wished to maintain privacy where necessary and engaged only with police officers of the same sex.

Figure 8 – Gender comparison for foot patrols

In Abu Dhabi, this is of particular importance due to the way in which traditional family life protects women. For example, there are separate Majlis facilities, prayer rooms, schools for girls and hospitals for women. This is in distinction to the needs of the male
population as a whole, where the majority of expatriate workers are male, especially those who come from developing countries. However, other expatriate groups from Europe and more developed countries, for example, are more family structured, with both parents and children setting up residence in Abu Dhabi (SCAD, 2016). There is other evidence of positive action being taken to expand the role of women where, in the neighbouring state of Dubai where the culture and traditions of the police are similar to those in Abu Dhabi, the Chief of Police has announced:

[a new] Police stations’ women patrol … the first of its kind in the UAE … to give women complainants privacy and … in addition to the 33 cases women police patrols handled, they responded to the complainants at the scene in five [other] cases. The women’s job includes carrying out court orders by accompanying female suspects and victims, as well as intervening in [child] custody disputes if one of the parents does not abide by the agreement. (Barakat, 2016, p.5)

It is clear that this new role still had a protective element for the female officers concerned, focusing on a social welfare role and providing services and support to women only. Nevertheless, although the data suggest that women were rarely seen on general foot patrols, the survey did reveal that they were as equally involved as men in community awareness programmes.

### 6.2.4 The future of community policing in Abu Dhabi

The final part of the survey presented statements to participants about the future of community policing in Abu Dhabi (see Table 5). The first statement considered views of proactive community policing styles and a more traditional reactive service. The results show that 91 per cent of respondents agreed that in the future, community policing should be both proactive and reactive. This illustrates that the frontline staff, working from local
police stations, probably had some appreciation of the pressures of the performance targets that local police managers faced associated with response policing (Goldstein 1990; Skogan, 2004; Quinton and Morris, 2008). This is emphasised further in responses to statement [3], where again there were mixed views about the police use of powers to arrest suspects with a clear split of opinion.

Table 5 – The future of community policing in Abu Dhabi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>(1) In the future, I think the community police should be both proactive and reactive to crime and emergencies</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Community policing should be only the job of the Community Police Department</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) The community police should not have wider powers to arrest suspects</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Community policing is a philosophy that should be applied by all the police officers in Abu Dhabi Police (GHQ)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) To do my job in the future as one of the community police personnel I need more training and experience</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These views create a direct challenge to the community policing concept and indicate the attitude of the frontline officers and the level of support that they may have for operational community policing policy. This creates a potential challenge, not least as it raises questions about the attitude of the frontline officers and the level of support that they may have for their current social welfare role. The response to statement [2] is less clear, where the results indicate mixed views as to whether community policing should be the sole responsibility of the community police department as a centralised role. Irrespective of their thoughts on this issue, 90 per cent of respondents still agreed that community policing was a philosophy that should be applied by the whole organisation (see statement [4] Table 5). This view was also reflected by some senior officers, as one explained:

My own vision is that I would like this community police model to be implemented again as a concept, not to be as a Department. So, this concept will be distributed all over the UAE as a philosophy, not only in the Ministry of Interior. For example, I would like if we had a problem in the community, this problem as we solved it with the partners like the Municipality, then I would like to have this philosophy between all partners. What I mean is, as a concept of community police or a model; it should be like an attitude for Abu Dhabi Police and for all of our partners from different sectors. I would like to have, for example, a team from each sector to present the community police concept in their sectors, which will help in community satisfaction, because we believe security is the responsibility for everyone not just the community police. (S13)

This illustrates that there was widespread uncertainty about how a philosophy, that in principle should be applied by everyone in the organisation, or beyond, as this officer highlights, could be conveyed within the context of a centralised structure. Whether such a structure creates benefits or risks would require further research and this option is discussed further in the concluding chapter of the thesis. There are risks associated with
the future too, and senior officers raised various issues relating to financial pressures, the lack of resources to expand the role of the teams, reputation damage based on the narrow role of the community police and the pressures to respond to other demands related to crime reduction. One officer explained:

The biggest risks are: there is unforeseen crisis that pushes all the resources into it; and the second one is insufficiencies in terms of resources which are very expensive; and the third one is that there is no buy in where it matters at the coal face, not seeing the value, not seeing the community police as value added. (S12)

These risks reflect experiences in other countries where community policing has become an easy target for reductions in investment, leaving dominant more traditional response policing in place (Tilley, 2008; Kappeler and Gaines, 2015). Equally, the attitude of frontline officers, as Innes (2005) affirms, seems to be a perpetual challenge to effective implementation, and data obtained in this survey tend to highlight a partial ‘dissension in the ranks of practitioner groups’, that may, in the future, contribute to failure (Garland, 2001, p.4). But, as previously discussed in Chapter 2, as Goldstein (1990) asserts, the organisation may need to replace the dissenters with others who support the concept to minimise that risk. This issue also impacted on the views of some senior officers, where it was implied that there was still a long way to go to fully implement community policing, as one explained:

I don’t think in a decade or so [community policing] will become all-encompassing … partly because there remains a challenge of diversity and the changing nature of crime, threats and risks. But I think community policing will get more and more proactive which will lead to a potential of more and more resources, maybe as we deal with more and more issues. Then there will be more value for things like problem-solving. So, I think it will continue to grow and get more and more immersed. (S12)
Future success may require the police organisation to embrace the community policing philosophy for all of its frontline police. This was the vision of more than one senior officer and as one suggested ‘I want it [the community police philosophy] to be a basic and standard practice in every police station’ (S2). Attempting to achieve such an ambition is not without risk, as another senior officer expressed, ‘the risk is the mentality inside Abu Dhabi Police. The community police will take responsibility for all matters [in the future] and this might be a problem for some in the police’ (S4). This problem for the future is emphasised in the current structure and designated roles for community policing to specific officers. It creates a separation of role and a barrier for future development compounded because ‘[senior managers] are focusing on criminals; they are not focusing on communities’ (S2). Future changes, therefore, could exaggerate these internal tensions, but with the right motivation and desire to change, it can be predicted that change, over time, will happen, and all the senior officers interviewed were very positive in this outlook.

Finally, participants considered their training needs and notwithstanding that the community police institute had been delivering training courses to large numbers of people, of those surveyed, 90 per cent stated that to do their job in the future, they would need more training and experience. This tends to indicate that even though respondents had four or more years of experience in their role, they felt there was more to learn about their responsibilities as they were evolving. In 2010, when senior officers from Abu Dhabi met Herman Goldstein in the US, they asked how they could transform Abu Dhabi Police to become a problem-oriented policing organisation, and one officer recalled his response was ‘training, training, training’ (S2). Therefore, it is unsurprising when the complexities of implementing all the elements of community policing are understood that
such a demand for continuous training and development exists.

The results of the analysis in both this and the previous chapter provide data that help to define the community policing model developed in Abu Dhabi (see Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The British Model</th>
<th>The Abu Dhabi Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Style</td>
<td>Unarmed and community focussed</td>
<td>Armed - paramilitary and community focussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>Generally applied across the whole organisation</td>
<td>A designated role for specific officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Devolved to a local level</td>
<td>Centralised management structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Police Teams</td>
<td>Dedicated and flexible structure dependent on local requirements</td>
<td>Emulates British (London) Safer Neighbourhood Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol &amp; Visibility</td>
<td>Foot and other patrols highly visible in the areas where they work</td>
<td>Foot patrols are a priority but generally restricted to certain times of day, seasons and locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community engagement</td>
<td>A priority for all communities</td>
<td>Varied approach dependent on nationality and language mix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence-led Problem-solving</td>
<td>Tasking and coordinating driven by the national intelligence model</td>
<td>Collecting community information only is a priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships</td>
<td>A legal requirement</td>
<td>Voluntary cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare role</td>
<td>Not formally part of the role</td>
<td>Key element of community police work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police powers</td>
<td>Full police powers</td>
<td>Limited use of police powers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notwithstanding that some policy ideas were drawn from other countries, this table is useful to illustrate how the Abu Dhabi model compared with the British model in making a final analysis of the extent of policy transfer achieved, to show where there has been a convergence or divergence of policy, or a mixture of both. What the table shows is the extent to which policy has been translated, with most elements being implemented within a different context to policing in Britain. Whereas the British approach to community policing represents a type of total policing model that is complex and multifarious in its aims and ambitions (Jones and Newburn, 1998), this is not the case in Abu Dhabi, which has a narrower focus on social welfare policing and problem-solving. This accounts for why there has been a persistent ‘soft’ role for the community police teams, with restricted use of powers and a separation from the ‘hard’ policing priorities of crime control and targeting of offenders (Innes, 2005). As discussed above, this approach is protected from organisational resistance to change within a centralised structure, which represents the most significant divergence from British policy.

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter has further explored the outcomes of the policy transfer process. It has analysed the survey data related directly to the implementation of community policing. The results illustrate that various factors relating to demographics, culture, the environment, the attitude of individuals in community police teams, senior management support in the wider organisation and levels of experience all influenced the way in which policy ideas were adapted. The findings relating to community consultation, for example, emphasise the factors associated with implementing this style of policing into a society where the influences of culture, traditions and diversity of languages in the population have created significant communication and engagement challenges. This demonstrates
what Innes describes as policy being influenced by international or local factors that can become ‘cognitive obstacles’ to achieving success (Innes, 2005, p.165). This also points to organisational culture in frontline policing is where there is a real risk that ‘street cops’ could contribute to implementation failure (Irving et al., 1989). However, this problem is potentially minimised while there is a community police department coordinating policy transfer with direct control of implementation. This approach creates greater control of decisions being made that restrict the influence of the frontline police in distorting policy (Neyroud, 2007). But it could be argued that it is those tasked with implementation on the frontline who, facing various constraints, find ways to adapt to suit local conditions. It is in the field where policy continues to be translated and does not always mean that it will automatically lead to failure. Nevertheless, community engagement, for example, is fundamental for effective community policing and from which problem-solving and partnership working become secondary (Somerville, 2009). So, it is this element of the model that stands out as the key to building effective police and community relations and for the sharing of information that is so important for proactive policing (Goldstein, 1990; Tilley, 2008). Community engagement aims to be achieved in Abu Dhabi through a policing style base around a structure of teams carrying out high visibility foot patrols, but, in practice, this has been challenging to implement due to the harsh environment, and other ways to be visible are continually being sought.

Abu Dhabi Police, consequently, remains on a journey of policy translation, adapting ideas learned from elsewhere in a way that illustrates the process is continually evolving over time and space. This is taking place in the context of tensions within the organisation about the priority given to ‘soft’ and more social welfare-orientated aspects of community policing. The survey responses showed, however, that those working on the frontline, in
local communities, wished to see their role broadened to more traditional functions, such as response and crime fighting. Should the wishes of the majority of the frontline police take effect, the future means that community policing will evolve to become both proactive and reactive and will put them into situations where they will face more traditional police problems of crime and disorder, and if this is the case, the pressure for them to use police powers will also increase.

The analyses in this and the previous chapter suggest there are a number of constraints on the implementation of community policing in Abu Dhabi. These include the organisational culture and attitudes, senior management resistance to change, problems of partnership cooperation, responding to the diversity in demographics, and the environment in Abu Dhabi. They have all been presented as constraints to policy transfer at the point of implementation. But that does not mean they are barriers to future development of the model. Challenges can be overcome and that might mean the selection of more (charismatic) advocates to lead on policy transfer and implementation to ensure their commitment, as suggested by Peterson (2010). This can be supported by the introduction of legislation to compel partners to be involved in crime and disorder reduction, greater diversification of the workforce to reflect the diversity in the demographics of the population, and finally, expansion of the role and powers of the community police, step-by-step, taking into account local cultural and traditional values. Ultimately, the challenges related to community policing competing against more traditional crime fighting and response policing remain persistent, and notwithstanding that community police operate in a centralised model, it does not create any guaranteed protection for the future against other competing demands.
The next chapter concludes this thesis bringing together the key themes relating to organisational reform, policy transfer processes, the subject of community policing and the organisational development of Abu Dhabi Police that inform the findings of the research. It broadens our understanding of the empirical questions raised at the outset of this thesis and draws attention to the limitations and strengths of the study. This leads to suggestions for further research and also speculation on what the future of community policing in Abu Dhabi might be, taking account for the challenges that the organisation may have to overcome.
Chapter 7: Conclusions

This thesis has explored the transfer, reception and implementation of community policing policy primarily from Britain to Abu Dhabi from 2000, when the first phase of policy learning began, to the end of 2016. It has aimed to address five key research questions, specifically: the reasons for the transfer of the policy; what precisely the community policing policy was that was being transferred to Abu Dhabi and from where, as well as the ideas behind it; the mechanisms through which the community policing policy was transferred and implemented; what facilitated or constrained the policy transfer process; and finally, to analyse the outcomes of adaptations and modifications to the community policing policy ideas during its implementation in Abu Dhabi.

The key findings of the study are presented in the following four interlocking themes: the challenges of organisational reform; policy transfer and the notion of translating ideas from outside the country into a new context; operationalising community policing to build community trust and maintain security; and finally, implementing a new policing style in the context of policing development in Abu Dhabi. This chapter highlights the limitations of the study and considers the strengths of its contributions to knowledge. In the remaining sections, after recommendations are made for further research in the field of criminal justice and policy transfer, a short discussion of the future vision for community policing in Abu Dhabi is presented. This leads to a final series of factors to consider how the organisation might continue to advance the model, but at the same time highlighting the challenges for the journey ahead.
7.1  **Key findings**

The implementation of community policing in Abu Dhabi was undertaken as part of an extensive reform programme. This was informed by processes of policy transfer from Britain and elsewhere, motivated by a desire to improve police and community relations due to concerns about future crime and risks to security. By understanding why, what and how policies were transferred, the data illustrate that implementation was more about policy translation and adoption where local culture and traditions had previously shaped a social welfare role and a centralised structure for the community police.

The method of reform has included a search for international good practice and ideas leading to local implementation, but this has not been without significant challenges. The foundations of the reforms, as discussed in Chapter 1, were in the context of policing in Abu Dhabi with the strong influence of culture and traditions that informed the role and structure of the police. This has remained highly relevant for more recent policing reform where local culture generates opportunities to support a change in policing style; however, attitudes associated with being a paramilitary institution create elements of complexity too. Da Silva (1999, p.121) has argued that a militaristic style of police can obstruct ‘professionalism … and [the implementation of] community policing’. However, even though militarism is identified as a barrier to changing policing style in this way, the findings in this study suggest that the culture and traditions in Abu Dhabi are more dominant and have greater influence to effectively mitigate this problem. For community policing, this had a positive effect for implementation of community engagement strategies, community volunteer schemes, problem-solving and partnership working grounded in Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment (SARA) methodology (Goldstein, 1990). Nevertheless, this approach has been a major change in policing style
and one that has been challenging to spread throughout the organisation as a philosophy for all personnel.

The motivation for policing reform has arisen in a context of low levels of crime and public disorder compared to Britain (as discussed in Chapter 1). Conversely, the reform taking place is attributed to concerns about the future and the unknown crime and security problems that may arise. This is based, in part, on police officer anxieties that the regional security threats and growing transient population will import new crime problems from other countries. This may include categories of crime that Abu Dhabi has limited experience of, such as major street disorder and terrorism. So, the reason why community policing was implemented is not about prevention of crime and disorder now, or for restoring police legitimacy as a retrospective response to known problems, but an approach to protect Abu Dhabi either from developing similar problems in the future, or to be ready to respond to them if they occur.

This is somewhat divergent from the usual approach of preventing ‘known’ crime problems and is a broad identified shift from a traditional attitude towards crime prevention. It is a different reason for the implementation of community policing from that normally stated in other countries. The reason was more akin to what Shearing and Wood (2007) describe as what was *thinkable* to the officers, based on their own fears of the future, in the context of a safe society that they wish to preserve. As a solution to this fear, the approach taken within the strategy of the organisation was to establish a priority to improve community confidence. Consequently, the main aim of reform and of community policing, in this context, has been to improve police and community relations and to build trust that would encourage the sharing of information. The collection of
information would in turn inform the police how to be proactive to prevent problems of crime and disorder (Tilley, 2008). This does, however, create a problem of measurement of outcomes to secure organisational legitimacy where demonstrating value for money is important.

Secondly, the process of transferring community policing policy to Abu Dhabi illustrates the extent of selection, negotiation and adaptations made within the context of local policing; effectively, it was more about policy translation than policy transfer (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009; Blaustein, 2015). Only those elements of the concept that supported the aim of improving police and community relations were selected, adapted and operationalised. It is an approach that focused on the key elements of the concept to achieve the overarching strategic aim of the organisation to improve community confidence. However, the adaptation of ideas learned, of dedicated neighbourhood teams and problem-oriented policing, with a pick-and-mix approach of taking policing styles and mechanisms from Singapore, Japan, US and Britain, all contribute to the conceptual ambiguity of understanding what policy has been transferred and from where.

Comparing and contrasting policy ideas between countries as they transfer from one to another, as in this study, is consequently complex. This is demonstrated where there is a lack of uniformity for each element of the community police model in how it is applied when operationalised, illustrating that evident gaps do exist between ‘policy on the books and policy in practice’ (Newburn et al., 2017, p.14). For example, in Abu Dhabi, some elements of the model have achieved complete emulation of British policy as described by senior officers, such as the structure of community police teams; but others, including problem-solving and partnership working, are still embryonic due to the challenges of
implementation. This emphasises that there are multiple complex approaches within the model that are continually evolving (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994). It also illustrates that policy can both succeed and fail at the same time for diverse reasons and for different groups of people (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012, p.340). Evans (2009) emphasises that, because of its voluntary nature, the processes of policy transfer are constantly evolving and allow for policy to be made and remade. In this study, as an example, it has rarely been the case that just one conclusion can describe the extent of policy transfer achieved: the transition from decentralisation to centralised structures over several years illustrates this. There is a mix of results at different times and it is challenging to differentiate between them when many elements of policing are closely interwoven. As previously discussed, there is often no clear operational demarcation between community policing and traditional policing and there are practically unlimited possible variations of a community policing style.

This ambiguity has been evident in the distinctions made in this study relating to the periods prior to and after 2007, from an era of lesson drawing and development of new ideas to more complete operationalisation of the model taking place. But it is challenging to pinpoint, at any given time, the real level of success achieved. This adds to the challenges associated with policing reform where the policy applied in Abu Dhabi has mutated over time and space and suffers the effects of other factors of agency. These factors are outside the control of decision-makers and include reductions in police budgets restricting continued investment in growth of personnel and facilities, such as, the expansion of mini police stations.

The Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) framework for policy transfer that underpinned the
analysis was discussed and adapted in Chapter 3. The main strength of the framework is that it leads the analyst through a logical process of evaluation of data to make decisions about the effectiveness of policy transfer. This is particularly relevant where challenges are encountered in the process, and consequently, actions might be taken to overcome them. For example, an analysis of the actors involved in policy transfer might lead, as in this study, to identification of the need for charismatic leaders who contribute to achieving success. Establishing who such people are means that an organisation can ensure that it has the right personnel with the necessary decision-making authority to make policy choices and plans for implementation, without which the risk of failure might be increased.

However, this approach to the analysis is subjective; for example, when considering the mechanisms for policy drawing leading to decision-making, it is challenging to evaluate why certain decisions were made to accept or reject new ideas. The framework helps us to understand how they were made through the process of transfer but analysing the reasons why cannot always be achieved. In this study, for example, it was common for officers to answer questions stating, ‘for what I understand’ (S1) or ‘I believe’ (S10) which illustrates that even at this level of the organisation, senior officers do not always know precisely why decisions have been made. The importance of analysis of frontline activity then emerges as an essential element of the process; but this is not explicitly included in the framework. It is partly for this reason that the framework generally contributes to positivism, for which there has been other criticism (McCann and Ward, 2013).

The framework also focusses on organisational strategy, use of media (social media, web
sites, magazines, radio), conferences (local and international) and meetings/visits to
demonstrate policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh (2000). Consequently, the analysis is
focused at a strategic level and outcomes are biased towards establishing why policy
transfer has failed, as opposed to a more positive approach to establish why it has
succeeded. As discussed in previous chapters, there is evidence of Abu Dhabi Police
officers arranging conferences, attending international seminars, making good use of
social media and carrying out international visits to other countries to study community
policing. However, none of this represents what may or may not be taking place where
policy is being operationalised. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the framework does
receive criticism, its use for research in subjects related to criminal justice is appropriate
where suitable adaptations are made to suit the study.

Thirdly, the results of the study also add to the understanding of community policing and
that the model means ‘too many things to different people’ (Bailey, 1994, p.278). This
does not just mean different people in different countries or cities: community policing
can mean something different to people within the same police organisation. The
variations of role between men and women, the variation in prioritising problem-solving
based on length of experience in community policing, and the fact that the community
police carry out their role with minimal use of powers compared to officers in other roles
create some of these differences. In Abu Dhabi, these variations support the fact that
community policing has different aims compared to those in Britain. As opposed to being
multifarious in nature, the aims are much narrower, being focussed largely on community
engagement and improving police and community relations for the future. As a result, in
practice this policy creates a variation in how community policing fits into the
organisation to achieve this aim, leaning towards a social welfare role, and distant from
the traditional crime fighting and response policing functions carried out by others.

What has evolved throughout the period of reform is a centralised structure of governance for community policing, and this provides an interesting model in contrast to that which is promulgated in the literature. The evidence of this study shows that this approach was not originally intended but arose as a result of a process of policy translation and adoption. Acknowledging that not all policing is delivered by community police officers and there is still a requirement for reactive response capabilities, a centralised model of community policing seeks to ensure that resources are cocooned from the wider pressures created by other demands for service. In this way it is intended to avoid mission creep to other policing roles. However, notwithstanding that the centralised delivery of community policing was a response to certain organisational problems, this approach results in a two-tier policing model. The alternative decentralised approach means that organisational culture could get in the way, and this is a reason why, in history, community policing has failed on its promises, for example, to control crime or prevent problems of serious disorder (as illustrated in Chapter 2). The cocoon plays to this as an alternative to decentralisation, where too much of what gets done ends up in responding to demands. Centralisation is an adaptation of British policy, and this case study advances understanding of the debate as an illustration of the way in which policy has been translated into the context of policing in Abu Dhabi. But it does not mean that the cocoon will always be protected against the risks associated with future policing demands. Fiscal instability, organisational culture and response to crime and security concerns create a constant pressure for all the police to demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness in what they achieve, irrespective of their role. But, maybe, as a model, a centralised structure has potential benefits to protect the community police from these concerns because of the
cocoon within which it operates.

Operating specialised community police teams also means that they are somewhat disengaged from many other sectors of the organisation that would normally, in Britain for example, be directly linked to daily policing operations. With no responsibility for crime investigation or offender management, the community police in Abu Dhabi have limited access to intelligence and information, which creates silos and a lack of integration between departments. Alternatively, they do rely on local knowledge of communities to set their own priorities and are accountable to the community police department. In this way, there is an apparent advantage to the centralised approach where community police teams deliver a more people-centred, bottom-up approach to serving people’s needs, in contrast to the wider organisation’s police-centred, top-down paramilitary policing style.

The closest British comparison of the model of community policing in Abu Dhabi, is that described by HMIC (2017), where several regional and generally more rural police forces in Britain have developed dedicated models. With priorities focused on engagement, problem-solving and crime prevention activity in a specified location, they are deemed to be dedicated teams. The outcome of this approach, but with less emphasis on crime prevention, is that community policing in Abu Dhabi has a greater resemblance to the community police patrols familiar in Britain during the so-called ‘golden years’ of the 1950s, as discussed in Chapter 2, in contrast to the more recent model of neighbourhood policing in London from where policy ideas were primarily drawn.

Ultimately, how successful this model is in Abu Dhabi is unknown at this time, with no
community confidence surveys being undertaken to establish a measure of performance. Nevertheless, policy transfer to Abu Dhabi in this case has achieved much more than symbolism or rhetoric. Through policy decisions, and the careful selection of instruments such as the police use of volunteers, there has been a more substantial outcome. What distinguishes Abu Dhabi from the British model is that the outcomes are more about sets of decisions related to the importance of improving police and community relations through community engagement, compared to the priority for crime prevention and offender management linked to outputs of the national intelligence model processes. The result is an incomplete emulation of the British community policing model, but a selection of elements of it that are subjected to adaptation to suit local needs (Bennett, 1991, Pollitt, 2001), and this is what creates an environment for potential success.

Finally, the above themes should be considered in the context of policing in Abu Dhabi in terms of what community means locally and how this relates to how community policing has been operationalised. The local conditions directly affect this due to the expatriate population being highly transient with only local citizens providing long-term continuity in residential communities. Only by exception is citizenship granted to foreigners and the cases are known to be rare. As discussed previously in Chapter 1, the result is that as each expatriate worker concludes their employment contract they must leave the country. This is in contrast to the UK, where migrants generally, over time, have the opportunity to become citizens so long as they meet government requirements.

The impact of this policy is that less of a social contract develops between the police and expatriates, which results in an exclusive model of community policing. Notwithstanding that everyone living, working and visiting in Abu Dhabi at any given time is protected by
the police, policing is primarily aimed, for the long term, at maintaining the security of the state for the benefit of its citizens. Consequently, the police in Abu Dhabi operate a police-centred approach where the community has little say in setting priorities and where consultation, social welfare (such as visits to hospital patients) and information sharing is limited mainly to local citizens. Even then, an informal approach is taken to meeting citizens, for example, in the Majlis, with no formal structure for community forums or other meetings taking place similar to those undertaken in Britain. That said, the wider population, of all nationalities, are encouraged to become volunteers; but how they are to be utilised to support policing is yet to be determined. This volunteer programme, however, does demonstrate the organisation’s acknowledgement that more needs to be done to include the wider population in crime control and maintaining security.

In this context of complex communities, the data collected for this study illustrate that most of the policy translation aimed to develop a role for community policing that was perceived to be acceptable to local citizens. This is evidenced in that, while motivated by regional security risks and fear of future crime more locally, the transfer of community policing policy from Britain was, nevertheless, translated into a social welfare role. This illustrates that emulating policy from one country to another as if it were a ‘kind of package ready and able to be transplanted or transferred from one setting to another’ is rare (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009, p.677, emphasis in original), and more likely to result in the selection and adaptation of ideas more suitable to be implemented locally. This occurs due to many factors that have been discussed in this study, including: government objectives, policing style, the environment, the dominance of local culture and traditions in communities, a methodology to develop police and community relations, organisational structure, culture and attitudes, and finally, the influence of various actors.
involved in the process with emphasis on the important role of charismatic leaders.

The translation of policy needs to be managed through the control of policy learning (Rose, 1991), the selection of ideas and making decisions. Having charismatic leaders with close management of the implementation phase has improved the opportunities for successful transfer of the community policing model to Abu Dhabi. This strategy for such leaders to drive change programmes is critical and reflects the importance of this type of approach, as emphasised by Peterson (2010) in her study of community policing in Sweden. However, it is not without risk when charismatic leaders with high levels of devolved decision-making powers become isolated from other senior managers and resistance of their position could arise. This can manifest into wider organisational barriers for policy changes, a problem acknowledged by most senior officers who were interviewed as part of this study.

The main findings of this study, however, demonstrate that with the protection of a centralised structure, a social welfare role, restricted use of police powers and an emphasis on developing problem-solving, there is a unique approach to the community policing model applied in Abu Dhabi. This was illustrated in Chapter 6, where its key elements were tabulated and compared to the British model, presenting the final outputs of the policy transfer process, and how the translation of concepts has been implemented into local practice. The varied results between the two countries, however, illustrate imperfections in the policy transfer process, as identified in previous studies of criminal justice subjects (Jones and Newburn, 2007; McFarlane and Canton, 2014; Blaustein, 2015). This problem has often been attributed to the fact that policy is multi-layered and dynamic in nature. The experience in Abu Dhabi has confirmed this, with key factors in
this regard that relate to challenges of transforming organisational culture and policing style, understanding community policing as a single concept or set of concepts, and engaging with diverse communities within highly transient populations.

The resulting community policing model was achieved by applying a selective approach to adopting new ideas and the creation of explicit priorities based around a social welfare role, in contrast to the secret social service version suggested by Punch (1979). This ‘soft power’ role (Nye, 2004), has been enabled in Abu Dhabi by the enduring local culture and traditions, but simultaneously there was evidence of organisational culture creating constraints to policy transfer. This is apparent throughout the history of traditional policing approaches that shaped a bureaucratic police organisation in Abu Dhabi, where managing change to embrace a ‘soft’ policing style is challenging. However, the approach to social welfare policing including community engagement, problem-solving and taking care of citizens in times of need is an overarching priority for Abu Dhabi Police, irrespective of the fact that it is a paramilitary organisation. It is acknowledged that correlating the policing style of such organisations with culture and traditions creates complexity in the analysis. Understanding the extent to which either issue has a positive or negative effect on implementation of community policing is challenging to resolve.

7.2 Limitations and strengths of the research

The limitations of this thesis relate to three main issues: the restrictions of confining the study to the community police department, it being only a small part of a much larger organisation; the limited time frame for the research to take place; and ensuring the validity of the findings. The stakeholders connected with community policing are varied, not just within the police organisation, but extending externally to other partners and to
communities too. All stakeholders have potential valuable data to add to the analysis in answering the study’s research questions, but it was not possible to obtain authority to include them. Nevertheless, the access gained to police personnel and senior officers has strengthened the research outcomes, notwithstanding the limitations in scope. Advisers and officers working with Abu Dhabi Police are not permanently placed in their role and as priorities change, so do the personnel. This highlights that to have had the opportunity to carry out this research during each of the phases of policy transfer is quite unique.

Additional to the narrow focus within the organisation was the limited time frame to complete the study up to the end of 2016. Although a substantial amount of progress with policy transfer and implementation of community policing had taken place by then, there was still much more to do, and the journey being undertaken by Abu Dhabi Police towards a final model, and change in policing style, was not over. Nevertheless, data were collected both retrospectively and concurrently to the time at which key policy ideas were being sought and decisions made by officers who were directly engaged in the process. Most of those officers were redeployed to other roles after 2016, and continued access to them would be problematical due to the complexities of gaining permission. Therefore, the value of the data obtained was sufficient to inform answers to the study’s research questions.

The data collection methods and analysis leading to the findings also takes into account the validity of this research both internally and externally and there were limitations in this respect. The internal validity and reliability of the process faced threats that could underpin the assertions made in the findings associated with the fact that policy and operational decisions were changing and gradually maturing (Mligo and Shabani, 2016).
Consequently, the fluidity of policy and practice could have affected the opinions and considerations of participants throughout the course of this study. Restricting data collection within the boundaries of a narrow time frame of three months for interviews and one week for the survey was a strategy employed to avoid this effect. However, even with this mixed method approach, the breadth of methods employed by excluding observations (Baker, 2006), for example, meant that responses could not be validated any further.

The limitations externally relate to the extent to which the generalisability of the findings is transferrable to other countries or other populations (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Although Abu Dhabi was encouraged to implement community policing, the extent to which local culture and traditions have influenced the policy means that the Abu Dhabi model may not be transferable in all its constituent parts without further adaptation. For example, a centralised structure might be easily transferred anywhere, but the priorities for a social welfare role combined with limited use of police powers may not. Additionally, engaging with citizens in the traditional context of the Majlis may not automatically be suitable to be conveyed except to other countries that are similar, such as those that form the federation of the UAE or others in the Middle East.

7.3 Directions for future research

The available literature on policy transfer in the context of criminal justice is growing and further research in this field would add great value to the knowledge of the subject. Dolowitz and Marsh note that ‘in our view, it is important that we continue to examine policy transfer because it is a common feature of contemporary policy making’ (2012, p.344). The scale of transformation in Abu Dhabi over the past half century and the
policing reforms taking place not just there, but transnationally, create a substantial incentive to continue policy transfer processes. Research into these is essential, especially in the field of crime control where studies of policy transfer and indeed policy-making are rare (Jones and Newburn, 2007, p.163).

For community policing, many areas of interest have arisen in this study that would, it is suggested, be valuable for further research; three specific examples are detailed here. The first relates to the challenges of organisational change associated with the implementation of community policing. There is a substantial amount of literature about the challenges that organisations have faced, but literature about solutions to these challenges is limited. This issue relates to the concept of community policing in that it is not just an organisational philosophy, it is also an organisational strategy. There is a tendency in the current literature to concentrate the debate on the meaning of the philosophy and there is much less debate about what the organisational strategy means, for example, in terms of the approach towards developing policy ideas, decision-making and implementation instruments. One would assume that any change strategy would address the challenges of implementation covering elements of governance, communications systems, rewards programmes and managing demand (Sparrow, 1988) and this would require further research. This also links to the debate about centralisation verses decentralisation, when consistently, in the current literature, the need for a decentralised structure is described as what identifies community policing (Skogan, 2006). This raises the question posed by Skogan (2004): ‘Can it work?’ The study would mean a broader approach to qualitative research to analyse the effect of this type of strategy from across the whole police organisation and not just from within one department.
This study has also demonstrated that community engagement as a concept is widely understood as a key component of community policing. However, the implementation of engagement activity within complex and highly transient communities, like those in Abu Dhabi, is a significant challenge. It may be useful for future research to consider how local police engage with communities who may only work and live in the country for short periods of one or two years, for example, to explore the questions: whether there is a need for the police to engage with such communities; the extent to which a transient society affects the risks to state security; and in maintaining state security, how a community policing philosophy can be implemented without the police being seen, like the French Gendarmerie of the 1820s, to consist ‘of spies and informers’ (Stead, 1983, p.516).

7.4 The future of community policing in Abu Dhabi

Predicting what might happen in the future is always going to be a challenge, but it is interesting to speculate. This assessment is based on three strategic issues: politics and economics; the environment and security; and technology and crime, all of which are emerging themes in the region and in Abu Dhabi. The first point relates to the current political pressures of austerity faced not just in Abu Dhabi, but in many countries. As the fiscal pressures for government entities continue over the next few years, and with persisting demands for organisational improvements and best value in policing, it is uncertain whether the social welfare role of community policing can be maintained within specialised teams. The ‘We are all Police’ volunteer initiative discussed in Chapter 5, takes advantage of local culture and is the first evidence of a broadening of the philosophy of community policing throughout the organisation and to the public. Bringing thousands of people into the programme extends the policing family substantially and, as in Britain,
this can relieve pressure on police resources potentially reducing the need for hundreds of police officers to patrol neighbourhoods.

Major cuts in police budgets in Britain ‘creates alarm bells [for community policing] … for its future survival’ (Police Foundation, 2015, p.53) and there are concerns about the erosion of neighbourhood policing as a result (HMIC, 2016). The same threat exists in Abu Dhabi where, at the time of writing, the police is reorganising, resetting its priorities and reviewing its strategy, and considering major cuts to the current and future annual budgets. Community policing resources are always an easy target for reductions, but the warning for the organisation must be that iterated by the Independent Police Commission (IPC, 2013, p.60) in that, ‘[community policing] needs to be sustained as a key building block for strengthening the relationship between the police and public’. This study in Abu Dhabi has shown that this is also a critical element as to why community policing was implemented and, it is suggested, the police must maintain effort in this area. The prediction by those who participated in the survey as part of this study is that this could be achieved through the integration of resources where response teams merge with community police teams, but the danger, as emphasised by Tilley (2004), is that this type of approach may not work in practice. For example, of the 43 police forces in Britain, only three are assessed as operating a fully integrated model where community police patrols operate alongside response policing and other elements of investigation (Higgins, 2017), illustrating that it is not a popular approach. Other variations exist too, such as partial integration or a prioritised model, and there are concerns about the inconsistent approaches taken to community policing, notwithstanding that different areas may require adaptations to address the local policing priorities. Stepping forward to the future in Abu Dhabi towards a fully integrated model should, therefore, be undertaken with caution and
not without further research and evaluation of international practice in Britain and elsewhere, to ensure that risks of inappropriate policy transfer are avoided.

The second issue relates to the environment and levels of security risks in society. Although serious disorder continues to take place in other countries in the region, Abu Dhabi remains relatively free from violence and associated risks of terrorism. There is no evidence in the public domain that suggests that this will change soon. That said, it could be anticipated that the need for state surveillance of its population, especially due to its diversity and transient nature, will be required. Community policing has to some extent, an important role to play in this process and, as such, it can be anticipated that in the future resources deployed to it may be tasked with seeking out information and intelligence to support this objective. It has been shown in this study that collecting community information is a high priority for community police patrols; however, expanding this towards intelligence gathering about people can create a potential for distrust of the police. The key risk in this type of action was explained by Innes:

Knowing what works does not mean that it will always work. Particularly in the contemporary context, it remains to be seen whether the values and ideals of community policing and its affiliated approaches can be sustained in an environment where there is a pronounced political impetus to create a harsh environment for those who are perceived to threaten national security. (2006b, p.98)

The third issue relates to technology and crime and the increased use of smart devices and social media that means the definition of community is becoming somewhat stretched. The place where people live is no longer a boundary to communication and the same issue arises for crime where recent international developments in cybercrime, child
exploitation, fraud, money-laundering and people-trafficking (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011), are just a few examples of where the traditional approach to community policing, dedicated to specific neighbourhoods, may have to be reconsidered.

The development of a community policing approach is a continuing project for Abu Dhabi Police and what the final model will look like in the future is not yet known. The organisation is only one of seven separate police forces covering the states that make up the UAE and for the future it might be expected that the idea will be shared and implemented by the others. This type of policy transfer is usual amongst cultural neighbours, a concept known as policy diffusion (Kern et al., 2007), and is common between nations with ‘strong philosophical … and traditional ties’ (Ward, 2007, p.369). These changes in nation states are creating a ‘new form of globalisation’ (Evans, 2008, p.265) but as evidence in Britain and elsewhere suggests, there is likely to be inconsistency in the final outcomes of operationalising a community policing model.

### 7.5 Conclusion

While working to complete this study over a period of seven years, there has been a persistent question as to whether it was the right time for community policing to be implemented in Abu Dhabi. Community policing is a fluid concept, challenging to understand, but this is what makes it attractive and enticing as a mechanism that is perceived to be capable of solving many problems in society. Abu Dhabi has not had serious problems of crime and disorder and although there are other reasons for its introduction, it does raise the question as to whether there are enough influential people in the organisation to realise the value of this idea. However, the strong historical culture and traditions of the society are evidence that some of the key elements of community
policing are already embedded in the indigenous population, which is a significant factor in gaining support for the model. But searching for new policy ideas is an ongoing process.

The missions by senior officials to visit other countries to learn about community policing ended around 2012, and the number of actors involved in the policy transfer process has reduced over time to a core team responsible for overseeing its implementation. As innovation in community policing continues to advance around the world, there are likely to be new ideas to be explored, learned, emulated or adapted, creating opportunities for greater success locally, and Abu Dhabi Police might seek to continue to benefit from others’ experience. This should also take account of the warning that:

> there is a danger in these globalised times in assuming that the speed and efficiency of the new forms of communication that link, structure and create the *network society* … mean that policy learning will also become increasingly easy and efficient … this is far from something that we should take for granted (Jones and Newburn, 2007, p.161, emphasis in original).

Nevertheless, the vision for Abu Dhabi Police did receive positive support from the senior officers; as one stated when reflecting on the challenges they may face in the future, ‘there is nothing difficult in this life … [community policing] is a good philosophy and I think if we reach this point, and change all of [the police] departments to the community police [philosophy], it will work very well here in our country’ (S1).
Appendices

Appendix A - Map of United Arab Emirates
Appendix B - Research Information letter
Appendix C - Interview consent form
Appendix D - Non-disclosure confidentiality agreement form
Appendix E - Interview questionnaire
Appendix F - Community police survey
Appendix G - Policy Transfer Framework
Appendix H - Community police job description 2008
Appendix A: Map of United Arab Emirates

Available at http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/united_arab_emirates_map.htm
Appendix B: Research information letter

Subject: Information about Community Police Research

Purpose: Letter to interviewees

Dear Colleague

I am a research student at Leeds University in the United Kingdom and I am reading about Community Policing and its implementation in Abu Dhabi.

Community policing is a well-known policing idea in many countries around the world and I hope in this research that I can help to identify the ways in which, here in Abu Dhabi, we can improve implementation. But to do so, I need to understand more about community policing, why it is being implemented in Abu Dhabi and how effective the implementation is in the field at this time. This research will benefit us all to have a better understanding of our achievements and our progress and also to be able to make recommendations for the future. The method of research includes this survey of the community police in the field, which has been approved by the Center for Studies and Surveys Section of the Ministry of Interior in Abu Dhabi.

In conclusion, I intend to do four things with what I find out:

1. I will write a report for my University. They will look at this and assess my research as part of the PhD program and examination.
2. At the completion of the PhD, I will write a summary of what I find out and send it to you if you wish. You can also see the full report if you want to.
3. I will make recommendations to other people who might be interested in what I find through my research.
4. I may publish information from my research in International Journals

Your responses to the questions are entirely voluntary and will remain confidential to protect your privacy. Responses will not be identified by name or any other personal identifying information. The survey responses will be compiled and further analysed as a group and not individually. Thank you in anticipation for your considerations to support me in my research.
Appendix C: Interview consent form

Consent to take part in Community Policing research project

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<th>Add your initials next to the statement if you agree</th>
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| **I confirm that I have read and understand the information letter dated 1ST April 2014 explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.** |

| **I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time up to 6 months after the interview without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.** |
| You can contact the researcher, Mark Hartley on Tel. xxx if you wish to withdraw from the study after the interview, you can do so and any data you have provided will be deleted providing this is before the 6 months’ time limit. |

| **I give permission to the researcher to have access to my anonymised responses.** |
| I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential |

| **I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant future research in an anonymised form.** |
I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the lead researcher should my contact details change.

Please indicate Yes or No to the following questions regarding translation.

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<td>Would you like a translator present at the interview?</td>
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<td>If yes is your answer, are you happy for an interpreter to be selected from within the Community Police Institute (each translator will sign a confidentiality agreement not to disclose any information you provide during the research)</td>
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<td>If not, do you wish to have an interpreter provided from an external company?</td>
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<td>Do you wish to select a man or woman interpreter?</td>
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<td>Name of lead researcher Mark Hartley</td>
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**Appendix D: Non-Disclosure Confidentiality Agreement Form**

MUTUAL NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

**THIS AGREEMENT** is made on

**BETWEEN**

1. (Translator) and
2. Mark Hartley (PhD Researcher)

The persons (1 and 2 above) signed below have agreed to maintaining confidentiality of data collected by way of interviews of officers within the Community Police Department as part of a PhD research project being undertaken by the researcher, Mark Hartley.

The agreement not to disclose information to any other person relates to,

a) The identity of the interviewees
b) The time, date and location of interviews taking place
b) Responses to questions posed during the interviews
c) Any other information that may identify the participants

This agreement aims to maintain anonymity for participants and ensure that all data collected remains confidential.

The signed version of this form is retained by the researcher and a copy is retained by the translator

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<td>Title: PhD Researcher</td>
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THIS AGREEMENT is made on
Appendix E: Interview Questionnaire

Rank of Participant & Q1 and 2 – for categorising responses only

Rank of participant:

Q1: How many years have you been employed with Abu Dhabi Police?

Q2: How long have you worked in the Community Police Department?

Q3: Can you describe to me in your own words what you understand as the community-policing model that is being implemented here in Abu Dhabi?

Prompts:
If problem-solving is mentioned, probe: “what does problem-solving mean”?
If community engagement is mentioned, probe: “what exactly does community engagement mean”?
What do you see as the core elements of the community-policing model?

Q4: How do you think community policing is different to traditional policing?

Q5: Why is community policing being implemented in Abu Dhabi?

Prompts:
Is that the only reason that you have heard of to implement community policing, has anybody said anything else?
Are there any problems or pressures in society that community policing aims to solve?

Q6: What are the priorities for the Community Police Department in Abu Dhabi?

I would now like to ask you some questions about the UK and other International Models of Community Policing and implementation in Abu Dhabi
Q7: How is the community police model being implemented in Abu Dhabi?

Prompt:
How do you go about benchmarking, foreign missions and the use of advisers?
What about teams?

Q8: Are there any aspects of the community-policing model from the UK or other countries that you feel you would not want to implement in Abu Dhabi?

Prompts:
What about the role of community police to arrest criminals and deal with criminal cases etc?
What about the investigation of crime?
How about the exercise of police stop and search powers as in the UK?

Q9: How, if at all, has Abu Dhabi Police adapted the model of community policing to suit local needs?

Prompts:
How is Community engagement implemented in Abu Dhabi with so many different nationalities and languages?
What is the link between social support and community police?
In terms of adapting the model from the UK to Abu Dhabi, how is Visible patrol maintained in the hot summer months?
How do the community police use of police powers in Abu Dhabi?

Q10: What if any, are the challenges or obstacles to implementation that have been experienced so far in Abu Dhabi?

Prompts:
Are there any challenges internally in Abu Dhabi Police?
Are there any challenges externally with partners for example?
Does culture create any challenge?

Q11: How do community police teams learn about the community police model and procedures in Abu Dhabi and what they have to do to implement it?

Prompt:
What is the nature and extent of training received by the community police staff?

Q12: Is the effect of community policing in Abu Dhabi being monitored and evaluated and if so how?

Prompt:
Your answer (to Q5) talked of the reasons why we have community policing, what about the effect on that (those) problems?

Q13: What internal organisational arrangements have been introduced to implement community policing?

Prompts:
Has there been any structure change to help implementation?
Has Abu Dhabi Police staff changed their views to adopt the new policing style?
How has police communication with the public changed?

Q14: What do you consider the impact to have been so far with police relations externally for example, with the Municipality, schools and public and private sectors?

Final Questions

Q15: What is your vision for the future of community policing in Abu Dhabi?

Prompts:
What do you think the prospects are for the future successful implementation of your vision?
What are the risks for the future?

Q16: Is there anything you would like to add to your answers or anything you would like to explain again?
Appendix F: Community Police Survey

Dear Colleague

This survey will help to develop our plans for the future. To do this we need your help to complete this survey.

Thank you for participating in this survey. Please place the survey in the sealed envelope provided to return the Community Police Department.

Your responses to the questions are entirely voluntary and will remain confidential to protect your privacy. Responses will not be identified by name or any other personal identifying information. The survey responses will be compiled and further analysed as a group and not individually.

Thank you,

INSTRUCTIONS

There are 6 parts to this survey and it should only take you 6 minutes to complete:

Please read each question very carefully and tick your choice

Here is an example of how it should be done

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**EXAMPLE**

How to improve the Police Response to Incidents Goal ‘a’

I think the best way is to respond quickly to incidents is in Police Cars
We can improve our response if we have more police stations
The police should only respond to serious cases and deal with others over the telephone
We should pass most calls received by the police to our Partners to deal with
THE SURVEY

Problem-Solving and Partnership Working  Goal 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In your opinion, dealing with crime is only the responsibility of the police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are other partners who have responsibility with the police to deal with crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our partners work on providing us with their information on a regular basis about local problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We periodically share crime information with relevant partners to help solve crime problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-solving is a key task of delivering community policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How effective is communication and community engagement?  Goal 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am confident I understand the philosophy of community policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My managers communicate with me in a clear way about the aims and philosophy of community policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find that it is difficult to cooperate with the public because of the different nationalities and languages they have</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I regularly receive information from inside the police station about crime hotspots and local crime problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am regularly informed about the priorities of the Community Police Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How are the community police visible in the community?  Goal 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I mainly patrol on foot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the summer months, the hot weather means that I tend only to patrol in a car or in shopping malls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The basis of community police work is to increase the presence of police officers in neighbourhoods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The community police style tries to improve public confidence by making the police personnel more accessible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot patrol is not a very effective way for the community police to be visible in communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The future of community policing in Abu Dhabi  Goal 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the future I think the community police should be both Proactive and Reactive to crime and emergencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community policing should be only the job of the Community Police Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The community police should not have wider powers to arrest suspects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community policing is a philosophy that should be applied by all the police officers in Abu Dhabi Police (GHQ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To do my job in the future as one of the community police personnel I need more training and experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The tasks completed by community police on an average day    Goal 5.

Select from the list below from 1 to 7 as to what are your tasks ON AN AVERAGE DAY in community police with,

No 1 being the task you spend most of your time doing and No. 7 being the task you spend the least of your time

Note: Please answer in accordance with your own job and only use each number once as in the example in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Write your own Answers below</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Patrolling on Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Collecting Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Giving Crime Prevention Advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Attending Public Events and Occasions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Problem-Solving Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Consulting with the Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Working with Partners in their specialized area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Mixtures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Pressures</td>
<td>Bureaucrats Civil Servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Image) (Consensus) (Perceptions)</td>
<td>Externalities Pressure Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditionality Political Parties</td>
<td>Ideologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Loans) (Conditions Attached to Business Activity)</td>
<td>Obligations Policy Entrepreneurs/ Experts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix H: Abu Dhabi Police - Community Police Job Description 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Duties</th>
<th>Percentage of Time Spent</th>
<th>Key Accountabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response to feedback and notes from the public.</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Cooperation and communication with partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and reporting of accidents in area of jurisdiction.</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with members of the public and participating in events at area of jurisdiction.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Assisting the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to members of the public and development of mutual respect and trust.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of safe feeling in the hearts of members of the public.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the resolution of disputes in the area of jurisdiction.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow up on security and social situations in area of jurisdiction.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of locals, residents and visitors about crime and ways of prevention.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow orders given by direct manager.</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Communication with officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting any problems or difficulties that would face any employee and the solution to it.</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow up on the execution of direction and decisions made by direct manager and related to work.</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Implementation of the strategy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography

Al Fahim, M. 2007. Rags to Riches. Makarem G Trading and Real Estate LLC, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates


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WAM. 2011. UAE busts money laundering network - Members of network trying to smuggle money and gold into the UAE have been arrested. [Online]. [Accessed 8.3.2016]. Available from: http://gulfnews.com/


