Discursive and Cultural Representation of China in American Mainstream Newspapers: A Critical Perspective

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

The thesis examines the representation of China in American mainstream newspapers in the intersection of media discourse, knowledge and power. It addresses the following research questions: In what ways has China been defined and represented in the American press? How have linguistic tools been employed to construct China in particular ways? How have such representations and discourse concealed racialised ideology of the press and unequal power between cultures and nations? These research questions are answered through an interdisciplinary approach combining critical discourse analysis (CDA) and a postcolonial perspective. The American press coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in Hong Kong, of the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist aggression, and of China-Africa relations between 2013-2016 are selected for the CDA analysis. Deconstructing the dominant media discourse, the thesis additionally provides alternative interpretations through contextualisation and re-establishing historical connectivities between China as a semi-colonised nation and western colonialism and imperialism. It thus allows the subjectivity of the colonised and oppressed, and a space where the “subaltern” could speak for herself rather than being spoken about as a mere object.

The study finds that American mainstream media has discursively constructed China in a way that is resonant with the racialised “Yellow Peril” imagery and ideology of the imperialist and colonial times. It argues that the construction of a contemporary “authoritarian” “threatening” China vis-a-vis a “democratic” “civilised” west serves to invoke colonial imaginaries and fantasies, inflict epistemic violence, and reproduce and reinforce the existing power structure between the “Self” and the “Other”. The study represents one of the first attempts to apply postcolonial theory and the CDA method in analysing the western media’s representation of China. As such, it contributes to an emerging critical theoretical reflection, and broader and genuinely open scholarly debates about discourse, domination, representation of the ‘Other’, ideology, and the imperative for epistemological decolonisation.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOL</td>
<td>American On Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HKSAR</td>
<td>Hong Kong Special Administrative Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAs</td>
<td>Ideological State Apparatuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAT</td>
<td><em>Los Angeles Times</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>National Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td><em>The New York Times</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OED</td>
<td>Oxford English Dictionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td><em>The Washington Post</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td><em>The Wall Street Journal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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</table>
Notes on Quotation Marks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quotation Marks</th>
<th>Meanings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“” (double quotation marks)</td>
<td>To mark off a word, phrase or sentence that’s being directly quoted from books, articles and news texts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘‘(single quotation marks)</td>
<td>To indicate the unusual or dubious status of a word or phrase.</td>
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This study deals with the representation of China in American mainstream newspapers in the intersection of media discourse, knowledge and power. Critical scholarship has examined the discourse/power/knowledge nexus and revealed that knowledge is constructed through discourses as a site of cultural, political, and ideological contests (Foucault, 1980, Grosfoguel, 2013, He, 2012, Shi, 2007). In other words, knowledge production is imbued with politics, power, cultural interests, information control, and therefore, is dynamic and competing (Grosfoguel, 2013, Mawdsley, 2008, McEwan, 2008, Quijano, 2000). Such research, especially the challenges posed by postcolonial theory to Euro-American-centric interpretations and knowledge of world history, as well as to established notions of development and modernity, have generated scholarly debates and gained increased prominence in various disciplinary and inter-disciplinary fields, such as African Studies, Development Studies and Geo-political Studies. However, with only a few exceptions, these critical perspectives have barely been engaged with the China Studies field. Consequently, western-centric constructions, discourses and knowledge of China and the Chinese culture are scarcely questioned, and the voices of China (as the largest developing country) and non-white Chinese people are hardly heard and represented in academic discourses. This thesis, informed by critical theory of postcolonialism, aims to transcend the dominant Euro-American-centric tradition in China Studies by questioning the nature of knowledge about China discursively constructed through discourse, in particular the American media discourse, through deconstructing such discourses by means of critical discourse analysis (thereafter referred to as CDA). The remainder of this chapter introduces the research questions. Then it discusses the socio-cultural background, the international situation and the intellectual context within which the study is

positioned. The chapter concludes by elaborating on the significance of the study, and providing an outline of the thesis.

1.2 Research questions

The study seeks to address the following research questions:

1. In what ways has China been defined and represented in the American mainstream press?

2. How have linguistic tools been employed to construct China in particular ways?

3. How have such representations and discourse concealed racialised ideology of the press and unequal power relations between cultures and nations?

While interrogating and deconstructing the dominant media discourse, the study provides alternative subaltern interpretations by re-establishing historical connectivities between China as a semi-colonised nation and western colonialism and imperialism.

1.3 Background of the study

The dominant discourse and knowledge about China in the West is part of a much larger political, ideological and cultural process of systemic knowledge production in the world. The structure and system are, as about other non-western societies and cultures, Euro-American-centric in nature, reflecting an asymmetrical power relation between the global North and the global South. Liang (2015, p.228), uses the metaphor of “pilgrimage to the pinnacles of western civilisation” to describe the role of Western higher education in shaping the minds, and limiting the epistemological imaginations, of young people from developing countries like herself. Critical theorists, especially scholars of postcolonial and decolonial theory, such as Grosfoguel (2013), Hall (1992) and Shi (2007), point out that the experiences and worldviews of the global North, despite their historical, political, socio-cultural specificities, are constructed and presented as ‘universal’ and ‘advanced’, and thus constitute the foundation of theories, analytical concepts and
frameworks in the Social Sciences and the Humanities in westernised universities. Subsequently, this western-centric knowledge system is imposed on non-Western nations as ‘objective truth’, ‘universal rules and regularities’. Thus, for non-Western countries to achieve ‘development’ and ‘modernity’, they must imitate the West and Western ‘civilisation’ by repudiating and breaking with their own essentially ‘backward’, ‘decadent’ and ‘bad’ cultures and traditions (cf. Escobar, 2007, Grosfoguel, 2013, McEwan, 2008, Mignolo, 2007, Quijano, 2000, 2007, Shi, 2007). Implicit in such universalism and essentialism is the notion of the West’s ‘positional superiority’ over and against non-Western nations, cultures and peoples (Vukovich, 2012, p.xii). The positional superiority leads to the subalternity of the indigenous knowledge that is held by non-Western nations, and hence gives rise to “asymmetric ignorance” (Chakrabarty, 2000a, p.28), and symbolic and “epistemic violence” (Spivak, 1988, p.281).

This thesis extends the literature on asymmetric structures of knowledge production and epistemic violence to the field of China Studies. It problematises the ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ defined and discursively constructed by the West through hegemonic discourses about China and the Chinese culture. Euro-American-centric perspectives remain dominant in the China Studies field as manifest in its (western) cultural univocity and monolog (Shi, 2007), and its salient dearth of critical, pluralistic and reflexive perspectives. Writings on China are explicitly or implicitly orientalist and often racialised. Such a body of knowledge, instead of being interrogated and deconstructed, tends to be taken for granted, that is, as the departure point and basis for conceptualisation and argumentation, and serves as the prime frame of reference. As Vukovich (2012, 2017) aptly points out, the stereotypes and constructions of China as ‘Oriental despotism’ and an ‘authoritarian’ ‘Other’, and those of the Chinese culture as ‘static’, ‘backward’ and rooted in a ‘bad tradition’, frequently serve as presuppositions, or unquestioned priori assumptions in current studies on China.

The orientalist discourses of China are not restricted to a particular time period, but have historically evolved and continue to the present today. As early as the
thirteenth century, when European travellers such as Marco Polo made their trips to China, China was portrayed in travel books as a land of ‘mystery’, ‘aliens’, ‘exoticism’ as well as ‘barbarism’ and ‘cruelty’. These images of China were reflected in the West’s portrayal of Kublai Kahn in Coleridge’s (1797) poem, in which Kublai Kahn was represented as a combination of a demon and a hero (cited in Jiang, 2006). The discursive constructions of China was a concomitant of the global imperialist and colonial expansion. Following the West’s colonial expansion and its subsequent carving up of China, in the nineteenth century, additional stereotypes and demonising imageries of China and the Chinese culture were created and spread throughout the West, such as the “Yellow Peril”, the “drug addict”, and the “sexual hazard” (He, 2010, p.10). All these came in tandem with the emergence and institutionalisation of a racial hierarchy, in which the West is considered to be ‘superior’ over an ‘inferior’ China. In the 19th century, the colonial powers brought the Chinese to the West as indentured labour or coolies, as they did with many other colonised and oppressed nations and peoples. In this era, the demonising imagery of the ‘Yellow Peril’ was created to represent the Chinese as ‘morally debasing’, and thus a ‘potential danger’ and ‘threat’ to the West, especially the white race. These images and cultural constructions of China and the Chinese served as “a racialist justification for imperialist aggrandizement and expansionism” (Hensman, 1968, p.51), as well as a means to justify the Western invasion, occupation, plundering and exploitation of China.

Following China’s victory over the Japanese imperialists and their fascist aggression in World War II, and its attainment of genuine national sovereignty and independence after the triumph of the socialist revolution in 1949, the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse began to incorporate what would become the well-known Cold War narrative of ‘red communism’ (Hensman, 1968). Since then, China has been represented, on the one hand, as a mixture of a ‘communist’ ‘totalitarian monster’,

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2 Kublai Kahn (Chinese: Chengji Sihan) is the founder of the Yuan dynasty, reigning from 1206 to 1294. The Yuan Dynasty had a territory larger than any other previous dynasties, with its West reaching the Mediterranean sea, South reaching Zengmu Ansha (English: James Shoal), and North reaching Stanovoy Range.
Chapter 1

and ‘unrepentant dictatorship’ (Cao, 2007, Hensman, 1968), and on the other hand, as the non-white, morally ‘corrupt’ ‘Other’. Given the Chinese economy’s rapid growth, which goes hand in hand with the rise of China and its growing global significance during recent decades, images of China constructed by the West, while remaining essentialist in nature, have become more subtle and entangled with old stereotypes and new myths (Cao, 2007). Discourses, such as the ‘China collapse’ and the ‘China threat’ have been dominant, which have discursively represented China and the Chinese in a variety of ways. Implicit in all these historical and contemporary discourses is an enduring pattern of constructing China as the ‘Other’ within the West’s mind. This pattern has permeated various forms of representations, reproduced homogenous and orientalist portrayals, and established a textual authority that is embedded in “asymmetric ignorance” (Cao, 2007, Chakrabarty, 2000a, p.28). The western-centric knowledge about China is derived from this discursive pattern, and has been reinforced as an established “truth”.

The domination of Euro-American-centric knowledge of China has repressed, marginalised and silenced the voices and perspectives of China’s indigenous scholarly community, which, in turn, further enhances the hegemony of the western monological narratives on China. Shi’s (2007) critique highlights that this state of affair has produced and reproduced culturally univocal and circular forms of understanding, impeded the generation of culturally diverse forms of knowledge, invalidated the relevance of genuinely open scholarly debates, and undermined intellectual growth and innovation.

The changing international context has also motivated this study. Economic growth in Asian nations and their participation in global politics, are restructuring today’s world (Liang H., 2015). Lee et al. (2015) observe that “the 21st century is moving back to the Pacific as a centre stage”. In correspondence with the growth of the Asian economies, contemporary discourses, such as the “return of Asia”, the “Asian Century” and the “Chinese Century”, have appeared (Liang H., 2015, p.227). The “return” of Asia, which is different from the “rise” of Asia, should not be regarded as Asia taking the place of twentieth-century Western forms of hegemony in a race
for control (Liang H., 2015, p.227). The “return” should be understood as a move towards a more balanced and multi-polar intellectual, political and cultural world, which is no longer based on unilateral decision, and is no longer exclusively conceptualised according to a western-centric knowledge base (Lee et al., 2015). The return of Asia should not be just economic and political, but also epistemological (Lee et al., 2015). With the “Asian century” looming in the background, cultural-intellectual communities of marginalised and silenced Chinese aspire to become interlocutors in genuine intercultural dialogues and critiques, and reassert their voices and identities (Liang H., 2015, Shi, 2007).

Concerned with the Western cultural domination, epistemological colonisation, and knowledge formation that heavily draws on racially and culturally hierarchical binary frameworks, the study is committed to the Chinese collective cause of altering the unequal cultural relations and uneven knowledge production between the West and China by undertaking a critical discourse research project. Moreover, the “return” of Asia calls for concerted and systematic efforts by Chinese researchers to interrogate and critique Eurocentric framings of the world, and at the same time to take seriously indigenous knowledge and discourses that have emerged or been emerging in China. Based on such a reflective departure point, the study looks at Western media discourses on China, and enquires into these epistemological foundations and the accepted ‘wisdom’, i.e. the superiority accorded to Western knowledge, by critically examining how China is represented in American newspapers.

1.4 Research significance and original contribution

This section discusses the significance of the research inquiry in relation to academic studies on China. It briefly introduces current academic studies on China before outlining the significance and contributions of this research project.

Historically, although China was never fully colonised by a single power and its territory was never made into a foreign possession, the country suffered from
multiple overlapping colonial agendas and was carved up by western powers in the same way as other fully colonised nations, e.g. India (Lee et al., 2015, Liang H., 2015). Chairman Mao Zedong (1936) has used the term semi-colonialism to make sense of colonialism in China. One of the consequences of this unique form of colonialism is that semi-colonialism has often been treated as non-colonialism (Liang H., 2015), and thus is overlooked in postcolonial studies. This way of thinking disconnects China from its colonial past, and has influenced the works of some leading scholars in China Studies, such as Marion J. Levy, Lucian Pye, and John K. Fairbank. Barlow (1993, p.244) criticises Fairbank – one of the leading scholars in China Studies– for treating China and the West as two “internally friable, externally discrete, boundaried, patterned concrete entities”, rather than sites of a world system integrated by colonial relation. Thus, colonialism disappears in Fairbank’s work (Liang H., 2015). More importantly, the perspective which disavows colonialism in China has an impact on the development of the postcolonial turn in China Studies (Vukovich, 2017). Current studies on China tend to keep to their traditional paths – researchers tend to pursue ‘scientific’, ‘objective’ and ‘universal’ theories, methods and research questions, and have largely discarded the relevance of postcolonial theoretical perspectives (Shi, 2007, Vukovich, 2017). Postcolonial perspectives, and especially their challenges to established notions of ‘universalism’, ‘objectivity’, and “modernity” are often overlooked in researchers’ projects (Meinhof et al., 2017). Meanwhile, the majority of intellectuals in China Studies reproduce West-centric discourses by establishing a knowledge classification and educational system based on European ‘universalism’ (Liang H., 2015). Research on China that was often based on only superficial regional knowledge and an application of ready-made methods or theories developed in the West, and that was largely conducted in ignorance of the voices of the indigenous Chinese knowledge is still dominant (Meinhof et al., 2017). There lacks a theoretically informed, self-reflexive approach to studying China (Vukovich, 2012).

Similar to other fully colonised nations, Chinese modernisation has been interwoven with Western imperialism and colonialism, and shaped and limited by
the latter (Meinhof et al., 2017). Therefore, postcolonial concerns matter for China. China Studies needs a postcolonial and decolonising moment, and should open itself up to cultural and political critiques outside the disciplinary confines (Vukovich, 2012). Moreover, the postcolonial turn matters in the sense that it provides a useful paradigm in examining the scope, scale and impact of the colonial and imperial encounters on the West as much as on the former colonised, namely the Third World (Vukovich, 2017).

While there are earlier academic endeavours on the debate concerning China and post-colonialism in China Studies, such as the works by Fengzhen Wang (1988), Kuan Zhang (1993), Qin Bian (2013), Sautman and Yan (2014, 2016), these studies are either concerned with literary critiques or empirical discussions, rather than with theoretical debates. Although there are several works in Migration Studies that explore Chinese migrants from a postcolonial perspective (cf. Hier and Greenberg, 2002), these critical works have not yet been introduced to the field of China Studies due to their disciplinary boundaries. Current studies on China are dominated by Western-centric perspectives, except for a few pioneering works. Qing Cao (2014), Xu Shi (2007), and Hongling Liang (2015) are three of the few scholars in China Studies, who offer a theoretical discussion of Western knowledge construction of China with a focus on a critical cultural perspective. Although their works offer a critical voice that challenges the orientalist underpinnings of the present knowledge systems concerning China, all of these works remain marginal to the overall China Studies field. Theoretical debates on postcolonialism in connection with China are scarce, fragmented and sporadic in China Studies. Systematically postcolonial critiques in China Studies are in dearth, as opposed to, say, India’s subaltern studies or Latin American studies, and so on (Meinhof et al., 2017).

This study deals with the lacunae in current China Studies by applying a postcolonial perspective and critical discourse analysis (hereafter referred to as CDA) to examine the representation of China in American newspapers, and critically analyse the ideology and power underlying the media discourse. Against the background of epistemic colonisation and cultural domination, as well as the
marginalisation of the voices of subaltern China, this study is significant in offering an insight into the relationship between media discourse, knowledge and power that becomes apparent in the Western representation of China. The study extends postcolonial theory and CDA approaches to the field of China studies, whereby it questions accepted ‘wisdoms’ and interrogates taken-for-granted assumptions. Interrogating epistemological superiority accorded to Western knowledge, and deconstructing hegemonic ‘truth’ and ‘facts’, the study opens up the spaces for new voices to be in dialogue with existing, often dominant discourses, and represents an attempt to resist essentialist representations of the ‘Other’ in general, and of China in particular. It contributes to a more balanced and just relationship among different kinds of knowledge, and facilitates the achievement of epistemic justice (Santos, 2014).

As previously discussed, China’s historical semi-colonial status is often considered as non-colonialism, and thus tends to be neglected in postcolonial studies. For that reason, postcolonial theory and China Studies have not yet fully engaged with each other. The study fills this gap, and represents one of the first attempts to apply postcolonial theory and the CDA method to analyse the Western media’s representation of China. The study seeks to uncover how news texts are discursively organised, and how the knowledge which is constructed through these news texts reflects ideologies of the press and power relations between the West and China. The study contributes the Chinese experience and perspective to the postcolonial and CDA studies, and thereby broadens and enriches this body of literature with a China-specific empirical analysis. As such, it contributes to an emerging critical theoretical reflection, and broader and genuinely open scholarly debates about discourse, domination, representation of the Other, and ideology.

1.5 Thesis outline

The thesis, which examines the representation of China in American mainstream newspapers in the intersection of media discourse, knowledge and power, is laid out in eight chapters.
Chapter One introduces the study and maps out its background. The chapter problematises the hierarchical ways in which knowledge is accepted and diffused in the world in general, and outlines the dominance of Euro-American-centric discourses in the discipline of China Studies in particular. Having outlined the aims of this study, the chapter concludes by highlighting the significance and contributions of the research project.

Chapter Two presents the conceptual framework and the theoretical foundations of the study. An interdisciplinary approach combining CDA underpinned by Marxism, and the postcolonial theoretical perspective is developed. Key concepts are identified, elaborated, and their relevance and applicability to the study are established. Chapter Three critically reviews the existing relevant literature, situating the study in the wider body of scholarship. Gaps in existing literature are identified, and the original contributions of the study are highlighted.

Chapter Four presents the study’s methodology. This chapter identifies issues concerning the selections of newspapers, the timeframe, and the three cases (i.e. The American press coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, of the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist aggression, and of China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016). Following an explanation of the rationale for data collection, the chapter further elaborates on the process of data collection. The chapter concludes by illustrating the tools for analysing the data.

Chapter Five, Six, and Seven presents the results of the data analysis of the three cases stated above. These chapters investigate how the media’s representations and discourses on China conceal the ideology of the press and unequal power relations between cultures and nations. Chapter Five problematises the ways in which the media represent the “Occupy Central” event as ‘democratic’, and provides alternative interpretations of the event by historicising and contextualising it in relation to the specificities of the Hong Kong SAR’s colonial past and postcolonial
Chapter Six scrutinises the American media’s coverage of the 2015 anniversary parade. It examines the hidden power of the media discourse in ignoring collective memories and experiences of subaltern China, and representing the commemoration event of China couched in a ‘China threat’ narrative. The analysis also reveals the dominant discourses as ‘myths’ and interrogates the Euro-American-centric knowledge of WWII’s history by bringing back the collective memories and reconstructing the media’s distorted realities of the Chinese people’s resistance against Japanese Fascism.

Chapter Seven is organised around the case of the American press coverage of China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016. It examines the way in which the media represent China-Africa relations in a “neo-colonialism” narrative. Moreover, the analysis deconstructs the dominant discourses, and provides an alternative interpretation of China-Africa relations by building the historical connectivities between the colonialised Africa and West’s colonialism, and contextualising the discussion of China-Africa relations in relation to China’s historical and contemporary role in Africa.

Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by synthesising the key findings and arguments of the research study, and reflecting on the ways in which the research questions have been addressed. Moreover, the thesis’ contributions to scholarship are highlighted, and suggestions for future research directions are offered.
Chapter 2
Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction

The main aim of this study is to investigate the American mainstream media’s representation of China in the intersection of media discourse, knowledge and power. An interdisciplinary approach drawing on concepts and ideas of a few relevant critical theoretical traditions is adopted to address the overall research objective, and to guide the analysis of the selected cases. The conceptual framework developed for this project incorporates Marxism and Foucauldian ideas of the power/discourse/knowledge nexus which underpin CDA (Fairclough, 1995, Van Dijk, 1993a, Wodak, 2001, Wodak and Meyer, 2009), as well as postcolonial and decolonial theory. In this chapter I’ll elaborate on the key concepts of this theoretical framework and discuss how and why it can help shed light on and advance an understanding of the ways in which China has been represented historically and contemporarily in the Western press in general, and in American mainstream newspapers in particular. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses Marxist conceptions of ideology and hegemony, Foucauldian ideas of the power/discourse/knowledge nexus, and establishes the ways in which these analytical concepts connect to the analysis of American newspapers. Section 2.3 introduces postcolonial and decolonial theory, and define their key concepts. The section also establishes the relevance of the postcolonial perspective to the analysis of cultural inequalities between the U.S. and China. Section 2.4 summarises the main arguments put forward in this chapter.

2.2 Marxism, Foucauldian power/discourse/knowledge, and critical discourse analysis (CDA)

The study will critically examine the American media’s discourse on China through case studies. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is identified as a powerful
theoretical and methodological tool in the research. van Dijk (1993a) defines CDA as a theoretically-informed and socio-politically committed approach guided by Marxism, which mainly studies the way in which social inequality, dominance, and power abuse are enacted, reinforced and reproduced by discourse in the form of text and talk in its social and political context. Accordingly, Marxist concepts of ideology and hegemony, and Foucauldian discussions of discourse/power distinctly figure in CDA.

2.2.1 Ideology

Within Marxist theory of culture and society, the concept of ideology has been intensively elaborated by Marxist theorists such as Marx and Althusser. Classical Marxist theory interprets society and ideology by using a base/superstructure model. According to this model, the economic base of society constitutes the primary and crucial organising factor of a human society (Allen, 1992). The economic structure of society, such as the material force of production, is the foundation based on which superstructures such as the arrangement of legal and political systems, institutions, culture, and ideology are built (Berger, 2014, Marx, 1976). The interests of the dominant class, which controls economic and productive resources, are then expressed and manifested in the organisation of the superstructure. Within this mode, the superstructure is not only organised in line with the interests of the ruling class, but thereby functions to transmit dominant ideas and values, and sustain and perpetuate the current dominant mode of production and production relations (Allen, 1992, Berger, 2014).

Within the base/superstructure mode, the dynamics of cultural industries, and in particular the mass media, are understood primarily in terms of their economic determination (Chandler, 2016, Curran and Seaton, 2010, Murdock and Golding, 1977). According to this view, “the contents of the media and the meanings carried by their messages are […] primarily determined by the economic base of the organisations in which they are produced” (Curran et al., 2005, p.13). In other words, the routines employed in the production of news are not neutral, but are
shaped by the political, economic and ideological leanings of the news organisations (Schlesinger, 1989). Consequently, values and beliefs produced by the media within a given mode of production are seen as primarily lining up with, and reflective of, dominant class interests, given that the dominant class controls the ownership of media industries and the revenues of media institutions (Allen, 1992, Curran et al., 2005). The close relationships between a society’s media organisations and other powerful institutional sectors in terms of ownership and management have led to monovocality in the media discourses (Siu, 2009).

Marx and Engels use the term “ideology” to describe dominant ideas and representations that are taken as ‘natural’ and ‘rational’ in a given social order when in fact they naturalise, legitimate, and perpetuate the status quo and the existing institutions and values (Allen, 1992, Durham and Kellner, 2001). For Classical Marxism, the concept of ideology in capitalist nations is interpreted as false consciousness, or “a complex production of illusory ideas about the way society works” in the benefit of the ruling class (Allen, 1992, p.124). According to this view, the ruling class, by controlling the production and distribution of ideas, works to promote its own interests and ideas, and further generalise and universalise them as common interests shared by the whole society, so that oppressed or subservient classes mistakenly adopt the ruling-class ideas as their own (Allen, 1992, Marx and Engels, [1845] 1976). Accordingly, the ideas people have are those that the ruling class wants them to have (Berger, 2014).

Applying the analysis of ideology to the media in capitalist nations, Marx and Engels ([1845] 1976) argue that the mass media and popular culture have a mythologising function. The mass media, owned and controlled by the bourgeois class, play a central role in spreading false consciousness, and in manipulating people to believe that “whatever is, is right”, and thus constitute a core link between the institutions of society (and the superstructure in general) and individual consciousness (Berger, 2014, p.44). Classical Marxism defines the media as tools utilised by the ruling class to disseminate its ideas and world views, and maintain, shore up and universalise the existing ideologies that constitute the dominant
culture (Curran et al., 2005). As Marx and Engels ([1845] 1970, p.64) state, the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class which is the ruling material force in society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.

For classical Marxism, the mass media are regarded as being “locked into the power structure” (Curran et al., 2005, p.16), and function to reproduce the viewpoint of dominant institutions as the ‘central’, ‘natural’ and ‘rational’ perspective. As such, the mass media indoctrinate the mass audience with ideologies of the ruling class, and lead the mass audience to believe that the audience’s actions are motivated purely by their own personal desire and interest. The audience fails to recognise the ways in which their actions are shaped by the ruling class and by what means their ideas and values are formed to serve the interests of the ruling class (Berger, 2014). The mass audience, which exists in a state of false consciousness, can be seen as dupes of ideology, and fails to recognise that people are being manipulated and exploited (Allen, 1992, Berger, 2014).

Althusser further expands the understanding of ideology by introducing the idea of relative autonomy (Allen, 1992). Rather than arguing that political and ideological practices are merely reflections of economic ones, Althusser proposes “the relative autonomy of the superstructure with respect to the base [...] [and] the reciprocal action of the superstructure on the base” (cited in Lapsley and Westlake, 2006, p.5). For Althusser, society is made up of interrelated social and intellectual activities or practices, including the economic, the political, and the ideological. These different practices exert mutual influence on each other, but each practice has its own structures and dynamics, and operates with relative autonomy (Allen, 1992). In rejecting economic determinism, Althusser regards ideology as a determining force in its own right. For Althusser (Althusser, 1971b, p.162), ideology is interpreted as a representation of “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence”. Althusser emphasises that ideology expresses themes and
representations through which people establish their relations to the world (Curran et al., 2005). Thus, ideology has a material existence, and is inscribed within “ideological state apparatuses” (ISAs) – including the mass media, the family, and schooling – and their practices (Chandler, 2016, p.6). Ideology functions to interpellate individuals as subjects, and lead them to fit in with the dominant interests of the ruling class through the normal rituals of everyday life (Allen, 1992, Althusser, 1971a, Curran et al., 2005). Rather than being imposed from above, ideology, as Curran (2005) argues, is interpreted as a medium through which people experience the world.

Althusser’s analysis of ideology in terms of systems of representation and individuals’ relations to the material world offers an insight into the way in which the media ought to be understood. Within Althusser’s framework, the media, as one of ISAs, work by inculcating in all members of society daily doses of dominant ideology by means of the press, the radio and television (Althusser, 1971b). The power of the media lies in their ability to position individuals in a way that the media representations are taken to be reflections of reality (Chandler, 2016). Althusser’s analysis of ideology signals the importance of studying representations in media texts, and recognising that such media representations are socially determined (Allen, 1992, Curran et al., 2005). As Said (2008, p.49) states, “newspapers, news and opinions do not occur naturally; they are made, as the result of human will, history, social circumstances, institutions, and the conventions of one’s profession”; therefore, there is a “qualitative and quantitative tendency to favor certain views and certain representations of reality over others”. In other words, the news media construct the world in a way that is consistent with the interests of people in power (Montgomery, 2007). Herman and Chomsky (1988) offer a propaganda model of the mass media, which suggests that the news production reflects the consensus of the dominant elite. As Herman and Chomsky (1988, p.xii) states,

Most biased choices in the media arise from the preselection of right thinking people, internalised preconceptions, and the adaptation of
personnel to the constraints of ownership, organisation, market and political power.

Because of their socio-cultural and political positionality, the media are not ideologically ‘neutral’ in the making of news. Through the deliberate choice and interpretation of news events, a news discourse, which reflects the dominant perspective and ideology of the elite is created. For example, in a study of the media’s coverage of industrial disputes, the Glasgow University Media Group (1980, cited in Gurevitch et al., 2005, p.313) finds that the news discourse reflects the dominant capitalist ideology and thus serves to maintain the status quo. The group shows that by using subtle verbal and visual techniques, televised news presents a distorted picture of the social reality in their reporting of industrial disputes. While the TV news frames strikers as renegades on strike, management representatives are portrayed as rational and sensible, working away in their offices. It demonstrates that the portrayal of social groups (and by extension, reality and knowledge/truth) from different social strata is never neutral, but differential and biased. Thus, news coverage is never free of ideologies or values.

2.2.2 Hegemony

The notion of hegemony is closely related to ideology and constitutes another important concept of CDA. As Wodak and Meyer (2009, p.8) point out,

organisations that strive for power will try to influence the ideology of a society to become closer to what they want it to be. When most people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that there are alternatives to the status quo, we arrive at the Gramscian concept of hegemony.

Ideology serves to position people into social networks of subordination and oppression, and operates as an instrument of hegemony (Stoddart, 2007). Building on the Marxist conception of ideology, the term hegemony is used by Marxist Antonio Gramsci to illustrate the complicated ways in which the dominant class perpetuates its rule over society (Allen, 1992, Gramsci, 1971). For Gramsci, Hegemony refers to “the maintenance of one social group’s dominance over
subordinate groups through relations of consent and coercion” (Gramsci, 1971, cited in Ekers and Loftus, 2008, p.702). Maintaining hegemony over subordinate groups makes it necessary to “reproduce the social relations that are foundational to a given social formation” (Gramsci, 1971, cited in Ekers and Loftus, 2008, p.702). In addition to political and economic control, the ruling class exercises hegemony and works to “develop acquiescence to its rule” by projecting its own way of seeing the world on subordinate groups as ‘common sense’ (Chandler, 2016). The dominant class exerts intellectual and moral leadership through a nexus of institutions, social relations, and ideas insofar as its interests and ideology are recognised and accepted as the prevailing ones for the majority of people in a society (Allen, 1992, Ekers and Loftus, 2008).

From the perspective of Gramsci’s analysis, media products are regarded as ideological “site[s] of struggle” for hegemony (Curran et al., 2005, p.26). They function as forums for negotiating hegemony. Dominant interests prevail in the media, while the range of competing voices that get heard is restricted (Allen, 1992). Alternative meanings and beliefs are rarely given full access to the media and are ignored in media products (Allen, 1992). Media products are seen as primary expressions of ruling class values (Chandler, 2016). As such, the media play a central role in “providing legitimacy through asserting moral and intellectual leadership and presenting a particular set of interest as the general interests” (Levy and Egan, 2003, p.806). The media products not merely serve as carriers of dominant ideology that manipulate and indoctrinate people with certain views. They, as instruments of hegemonic domination, serve to shape people’s worldviews, maintain, and reproduce ideas and values of those who have privileged access to the media as ‘accredited sources’, and reinforce the existing hegemonic power relations (Berger, 2014, Hall, 1978).

2.2.3 Foucauldian conception of power/discourse/knowledge

Wodak and Meyer (2009) point out that CDA analysts are interested in the ways in which discourse is employed by dominant groups to impose power abuse and
reproduce social domination. Since CDA analyses the use of language by the powerful groups, who are accountable for the existence of inequalities, power is another central concept for CDA (Wodak and Meyer, 2009).

Power is related to an asymmetric relationship among social actors who assume different social positions or belong to different social groups (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Generally speaking, power is defined as the possibility of imposing one’s own will on others regardless of the will or interests of the latter (Weber, 1980; cited in Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). The Foucauldian understanding of power constitutes a theoretical foundation of CDA. For Foucault (1990), power is circular and enacted in all spheres of human activities. As Foucault (1990, pp.92-93) puts it,

[b]y power, I do not mean ‘power’ as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body […] Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.

Foucault does not think that power in society is exercised in a top-down manner as proposed by Gramsci, who argues that “power is mainly exerted by the dominant bourgeois class through the medium of ideology” (cited in Daldal, 2014, p.150). The omnipresence of power transcends institutions, individual power holders and groups. Everyone including oppressors and the oppressed is involved in the circulation of power. Power relations, which remain mostly invisible, exist at all levels, and in every aspect of social life, including in the private spheres, such as a family, as well as in the public sphere, such as the economy, law, etc. (Hall, 1997). As such, power offers an insight into the dynamics of control and domination in modern societies (Wodak and Meyer, 2009).
Foucault (1990) is concerned with the way in which power is exercised, and thus focuses on analysing the importance of discourse in legitimising or de-legitimising power. As Foucault (1990, pp.100-101) puts it:

[...discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.]

Thus, power works through, and is encoded in discourses. Discourses could be used to index and express power, as well as challenge and alter distributions of power. Furthermore, Foucault explains the symbiotic relationship between power, discourse and knowledge. Foucault (1990) points out that power shapes the rules governing discourse and determines the order of discourses, such as the exclusion within discourse. Accordingly, certain kinds of knowledge, interpretations, and discourses are established through power or asymmetrical power relations as ‘truth’, while some other knowledge/interpretations are excluded, silenced and ignored by the established knowledge system. As such, Foucault argues that there is no such thing as the “Truth” of knowledge in the absolute sense – a “Truth” which remains the same irrespective of period, setting, and context – but there is a discursive formation sustaining a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 2001, p.317). Where there are imbalances in power relations, there will be a differential production of knowledge and ‘truth’. In other words, power determines what kind of knowledge constitutes ‘truth’. The knowledge or ‘truth’, in turn, consolidates the particular power (Foucault, 2001).

The Foucauldian conceptualisation of relations between power, discourse and knowledge demonstrate how discursive practices situate individuals and organisations in power relations, which privilege some interests and marginalise others (Livesey, 2002). The Foucauldian perspective on the power/discourse/knowledge nexus offers a useful insight into the analysis of texts
in discourse studies. Discursive differences are negotiated in texts, and serve as finely articulated means for analysing power differences in social hierarchical structures as manifested in the use of language (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). As Fairclough (1995, p.209) argues, “[t]exts are sensitive barometers of social processes, movement and diversity, and textual analysis can provide particularly good indicators of social change”. Since texts manifest traces of differing ideological battles, they are regarded as sites of social struggle (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). Drawing on such theoretical insights, this study considers American news texts as sites of struggles for ‘truth’ within an existing dynamic power relations. In tandem with the interests of dominant groups, the American media construct and naturalise particular discourses on China, which further shape the knowledge construction about China. The study explores how the knowledge of China is constructed by American news texts.

2.2.4 Application of Marxist ideological analysis and Foucauldian power analysis to my research

Marxist conceptualisation of ideology and hegemony and Foucauldian ideas of power/discourse/knowledge shed light on the analysis of the media’s power. Marxist perspectives uncover hidden issues of political and economic interests in the mass media, and surface social inequalities in the media’s representations (Chandler, 2016). The poststructuralist perspective, especially Foucauldian articulations of power/discourse/knowledge, reveals the role of media discourse in exercising, maintaining, and legitimising power. Within the Marxist and Foucauldian framework, cultural artefacts, and in particular media texts, are understood primarily in terms of their ideological contents (Berger, 2014). The media texts express and promote certain values, beliefs, ideas and knowledge in relation to the larger social formations and contexts in which they are situated, produced, distributed and received (Allen, 1992). The American mainstream newspapers are not an exception. Being the mouthpiece of the American dominant class, the newspapers disseminate and reproduce dominant ideas, shape people’s conceptions of the world, and thus serve as important instruments of social control.
Marxist and Foucauldian emphases on the nature of ideology, hegemony and power/discourse allow us to regard the media as a “site of struggle” for ideological meanings, and to understand how media texts specifically embody and enact particular ranges of values, beliefs, and ideas (Curran et al., 2005, p.26). More importantly, such an ideological analysis helps to reveal underlying ideologies and power, expose whose reality people are being offered in media texts, deconstruct taken-for-granted values, and open up the possibility of oppositional readings (Chandler, 2016).

The Marxist’s conceptions of ideology and hegemony are closely linked with class power and domination in the Marxist economic base and superstructure model of society, and prioritise class as the paramount analytical category. However, despite its importance and relevance, in particular in providing the underpinnings of the CDA approach, Marxism alone cannot explain or address other identity-based, socio-economic, political and cultural inequalities and power relations which are generated and reproduced through discourse and representation, for example the cultural inequalities between America and China that are analysed in this research project. Such cultural power inequalities also intersect with national identities and the capitalist world order (Mylonas, 2014). In the following, I will introduce postcolonialism as another theoretical strand of this research. The postcolonial theoretical perspective addresses issues, such as the impact of colonial/imperialist practices on the production and representation of cultural/ethnic identities, and the relevance of race and culture in understanding contemporary relations of power, hierarchy and domination, and thus is used.

2.3 Postcolonialism and decolonialism

Instead of viewing class as a primary analytical category, the postcolonial and decolonial perspective draws particular attention to cultural and racial relations, as well as domination and hegemony by certain cultural/ethnic groups over others through representation and discourse. Post-colonialism emerged from the work of scholars from the Middle East and South Asia, and mainly refers back to Western
colonialism in the Middle East and South Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Drawing on Foucauldian ideas (see Section 2.2.3 above), post-colonialism analyses the power that is involved in culture, discourse and the politics of knowledge (production, control and distribution), and reveals the role of economic, geographic, socio-political, and ideological and epistemic power and domination in sustaining colonialism/neo-colonialism, and cultural imperialism in the postcolonial and globalising era (Ahluwalia, 2007). As Özkazanç-Pan (2008, p.964) points out:

as a field of inquiry, postcolonial studies are made up of the work of diverse theorists who have critiqued Eurocentric and Western representations of non-Western worlds and called attention to the canonical knowledge that makes claims about the non-West.

Decolonialism, which emerged from the work of scholars from South America, extends the postcolonial critiques of the West’s epistemic domination and cultural imperialism to take into account the West’s colonialism in South America, going back as far as to the late fifteenth century. It problematises the (neo)colonial relations of political, social and cultural domination established by Europeans, challenges the Western-centred thinking of the colonial world, and critically analyses the nuanced ways in which the culture, knowledge and racialized hierarchies filtered through the colonial past, continue defining the identity formation, culture and values in postcolonial nations. Therefore, both postcolonialism and decolonialism seek to decolonise and provincialise Western claims of ‘universal’ knowledge by unveiling and critiquing Eurocentrism in the knowledge systems produced by Western power elites (Özkazanç-Pan, 2008), and offer a contrarian to Western-theorising. The following sections further elaborate on the key concepts of postcolonialism and decolonialism especially Orientalism, Othering, coloniality, and Eurocentrism, and explains the relevance of these key concepts to this research inquiry.
2.3.1 Othering and Orientalism

The idea of Othering is central to postcolonial theory. It was originally coined by Spivak to describe the process by which imperialist discourses create ‘Others’ (Ashcroft et al., 2007). Othering, according to Jensen (2011) refers to discursive processes, by which powerful groups construct subordinate groups by means of dividing ‘Us’ from the ‘Other’ in a reductionist way, thereby attaching moral codes of inferiority to these subordinate groups. These discursive processes establish and shore up the identity of the powerful groups as ‘Us’, and affirm their legitimacy and superiority through their opposition to, and stigmatisation of, the Other (Gabriel, 2012, Jensen, 2011, Krumer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012, Staszak, 2009). In other words, the ‘Us/Self’ is defined by constructing the ‘Them/Other’.

Central to the postcolonial elaboration of the ‘Self – Other relationship’ is the politics of “binarism” (Chakrabarti, 2012, p.8). According to Derrida (1972, p.42), binary oppositions like ‘US/Them’, ‘civilised/primitive’, “are not dealing with […] peaceful coexistence […] but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs […] the other or has the upper hand”. The binaries are therefore conceived as essentially unequal, and they exist in closely related logics of domination. The asymmetry in power relationships is a central dimension of Othering. The dominant group imposes the value of its particularity, denigrates the particularity of ‘Others’, and establishes the “normal, normative (good) Self which is mirrored by the abnormal, deviant (bad) Other” (McEwan, 2008, p.123). Groups which are othered are always defined in a way that resonates with stereotypical characteristics, which are largely stigmatising and dehumanising, and thus are rendered ‘pathological’, morally and intellectually ‘inferior’ and ‘subordinate’ (McEwan, 2008, Schwalbe et al., 2000, Staszak, 2009). In this way, the othered groups are deprived of the opportunity to speak for themselves, and instead are defined by demonising qualities that the dominant group wants them to have (Gabriel, 2012). The ‘Others’ are repressed in the ‘Self-Other relationships’ and subject to logics of domination (Creutz-Kämppi, 2008, Krumer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012). By discursively constructing the others as subordinate, the dominant group reinforces its superiority. Subordinate
'Others’, which are constructed as deviating from the norms of the dominant are marginalised and excluded, and the domination of the dominant group is justified and maintained (Staerkle, 2014). By presenting the Western cultural forms and ideas as widely-accepted ‘universal’, ‘superior’ ones, whilst other forms and ideas as portrayed as ‘particularistic’ and ‘inferior’, the dominant form of the culture emerges as, what Gramsci identified, hegemony (see Section 2.2.2) (Clarke, 1993).

The process of Othering has been reified in Said’s seminal work *Orientalism*. Said (1978) demonstrates how the West (especially Britain, France, and the United States) otherises non-Western nations, and constructs stereotypes of ‘Others’ as inferior in relation to European norms by using the Foucauldian conception of power, knowledge and discourse (see Section 2.2.3). He systematically examines the Western knowledge production of non-Western cultures, and its links to the functioning of the colonial power, as well as Western political, economic, and military institutions of domination (Loomba, 2005, Özkazanç-Pan, 2008). According to Said (1978), colonialism works not only through military and economic domination but also operates as a discourse of domination. The ‘Self/Other’ binary opposition is deeply entrenched in imperialist and colonial discourses, and is employed to legitimise and reinforce the power of the West to dominate ‘Others’. Systemic, hierarchical and essentialised constructions of difference between the West and the ‘Oriental’ are established on the basis of factors such as race, ethnicity or culture (McEwan, 2008). Colonised Others are defined in terms of their differences from the West, which are reflected in cognitive dichotomies such as “nature/culture”, “irrationality/rationality”, and “barbarism/civilisation” (McEwan, 2008, p.125). Said (1978) critiques the false assumptions underlying Western attitudes towards, and stereotypes about, non-Western peoples and cultures, in particular Asia and the Middle East as well as Arabs and Islamic peoples and their cultures (McEwan, 2008). Said (1994) emphasises that the colonial discourses about the ‘Orient’ are ideological representations with no corresponding reality. He (1994) argues that cultural representations created by the colonial power, which claims to know about ‘the real Oriental’, are inextricably linked to strategies of power in colonial systems. As Said
(1994, p.5) puts it, “the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony”. Orientalism is a “system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western Empire” (Clarke, 1993, p.142). In other words, Orientalism says more about the power exerted by the West over the Orient than it does about the real conditions in non-Western nations (Lindner, 2010).

Said (1994) points out that the technique of Othering inherent in Orientalism is a political vision of a reality, whose structure promotes the difference between the West and the rest. The binary opposition – “the familiar ‘Self’ (the colonial power, the West, ‘Us’) versus the [‘eccentric’] ‘Other’ (the colonised nations, the ‘Orient’, ‘Them’)” – inherent in Orientalism is crucial to the West’s self-construction (McEwan, 2008, p.63). As Loomba (2005, p.47) states,

> If colonised people are irrational, Europeans are rational; if the former are barbaric, sensual, and lazy, Europe is civilisation itself, with its sexual appetites under control and its dominant ethic that of hard work; if the Orient is static, Europe can be seen as developing and marching ahead; the Orient has to be feminine so that Europe can be masculine.

By denigrating the colonised nations, cultures and peoples as ‘backward’ and ‘irrational’ ‘Others’, the West constructs itself as ‘mature’, ‘rational’ and ‘objective’, and reinforces its self-image as superior (McEwan, 2008). Moreover, Said (1978) argues that colonial discourses – and their false and imperialist visions of particular places and peoples – do not simply serve to reinforce the identity and sense of supremacy of Western culture, but operate to validate the West’s colonial ambitions and policies. The discourses of otherness, which have become ingrained in the Western culture, are central to Western ideals and imaginations of the ‘White man’s burden’ to ‘civilise the Other’. They have become the basis of, and rationale for, colonial oppression, exploitation and domination, and justified racial discrimination and prejudice, cultural violence and social injustice, as well as continued economic and geopolitical interventions in the name of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘development’ in the postcolonial era (McEwan, 2008). Said’s path-breaking
work on Orientalism plays a paramount role in uncovering the subtle and persistent Western-centric project against non-Western cultures, and the links between discourse and representations of the ‘Other’ in Western culture and their colonial and imperial ambitions.

The construction of otherness is discursive. Texts and especially news texts are used in articulating “Us-versus-Them” relations, and can be seen as “elements of social events” that lead to societal change in the form of creating new foci of reporting (Fairclough, 2003, p.8). The concept of *framing* gives an insight into how those who are socially and culturally distant are represented as ‘Others’ within media texts, and plays a central role in shaping and mediating the media’s discourse and knowledge about ‘subaltern Others’ (Breen et al., 2006). Framing, as Cissel (2012, p.67) sees, it is “a schema of interpretation, a collection of anecdotes and stereotypes, that individuals rely on to understand and respond to events”. In other words, individuals build various mental ‘filters’ on the basis of biological and cultural factors. Through these filters, people make sense of the world. Accordingly, frames are mainly implicit and unacknowledged (Gitlin, 1980). Media frames, which shape the way in which journalists report the world, are often formed in accordance with dominant socio-cultural values or rules that represent the interests of elites (Allan, 1999). Entman (1993) argues that the media framing process is highly interpretative and value-laden. Persistent selection, emphasis, and exclusion of events and issues are involved in the mass media process of framing, whereby the media reproduce dominant discourses, construct stereotypical interpretations of socially and culturally distant groups, and define and construct social reality in a way that the interests and ideas of the dominant group based on class, culture, race, gender are reflected and represented as ‘truth’. As such, news frames provide a contrived perspective by which audiences attempt to imagine and visualise the images of the ‘Others’ within the defined frame, and thus shape the way that the ‘Others’ are interpreted and constructed.
2.3.2 Coloniality

The idea of coloniality is central to decolonial theory. It was first used by Aníbal Quijano (2000) to describe legacies of colonialism in the form of social and cultural discrimination that have permeated in contemporary societies. Coloniality is distinct from colonialism. Colonialism refers to a kind of political, economic and socio-cultural power which one nation imposes on another nation through the establishment, exploitation, maintenance and expansion of colonies (Maldonado-Torres 2007). In the twentieth century, colonialism may have ended with the elimination of numerous colonial administrations and subsequent decolonisation of the world (Grosfoguel and Georas, 2010). That notwithstanding, a continuity of the colonial forms of domination, which are filtered through the highly racialised cultures and social structures in the colonial past, remains (Mignolo and Liang, 2012). As Maldonado-Torres (2007, P.243) argues,

[c]oloniality refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus coloniality survives colonialism.

In other words, coloniality is the invisible underlying logic of colonialism, which highlights the continuity of hierarchical socio-cultural relationships of exploitation and domination between the colonisers and the colonised nations. Colonial administrations may have ended but not coloniality. The coloniality of power is manifested in the existing global neoliberal system of capital and labour with its roots located in the racist, patriarchal logic of the colonial system.

Colonality emphasises cultural and social power relations in contemporary societies. It takes form in systems of hierarchy and is entrenched in the West’s colonial and imperialist domination of the rest of the world (Bhambra, 2014, Grosfoguel, 2004, Quijano, 2000). The systems of hierarchy are based on racial classifications and differences, which were established in the 15th and 16th century when Europe expanded its conquest and colonisation of the New World, and scaled up its appropriation of land and its massive exploitation of labour (Maldonado-
Torres, 2007). Using the physical traits of the people as external manifestations of their “racial” nature, the colonisers created a racial hierarchy in which the whites are constructed as ‘superior’ over the ‘inferior’ non-whites (Quijano, 2007; Maldonado-Torres, 2007). As such, social and cultural characteristics of different social, cultural and racial groups came to be stereotyped, and subsequently understood as inherent biological features of entire groups. Within this racial hierarchy, the colonised territories are articulated and stereotyped as ‘disabled’ and ‘uncivilised’ nations characterised by ‘deficits’, which further strengthens the self-image of the colonisers as ‘superior’, ‘civilised’ and ‘rational’. In that way, the colonisers imposed political, economic and social orders on the colonised nations in the name of ‘civilising’ and ‘saving’ the latter. The racial hierarchy, which was constructed by the colonisers, serves to justify their economic exploitation, territorial occupation, and political domination as well as perpetuate the coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000).

In addition to economic exploitation and political domination, the coloniality of power, which originally was based on racial hierarchy, is now strongly associated with a coloniality of knowledge and culture, articulated as modernity/rationality. According to Mignolo (2007), coloniality is the darker side of modernity. There is no modernity without coloniality. The notion of modernity/rationality is a Eurocentric epistemological frame which is built on the presumption that European cultures are the ‘only truly modern’, ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ cultures. During the colonial era, the notion of modernity/rationality was manifested in discourses of ‘civilisation’, and ‘progress’. Disguised under the discourses of ‘civilisation’, and ‘progress’, the colonisers imposed their own cultures and values on the colonised nations as ‘truths’, and inflicted cultural and epistemic violence. Accordingly, the West establishes a hierarchy of the ways in which knowledge is accepted and diffused. Indigenous values, knowledge and aesthetic standards are subalternised and silenced (Lee, et al., 2015). As such, the notion of modernity/rationality serves to affirm the West’s sense of ‘self’, whilst glossing over the colonial and imperialist order that provides the context for its ‘self’-realisation (Bhambra, 2014). Therefore,
modernity/rationality go hand in hand with the logic of coloniality, with coloniality standing for the hidden agenda of modernity (Lee et al., 2015).

In the postcolonial era, the coloniality of power continues to exist and operate in much the same way as it has done in the past (Lee, et al. 2015). Disguised under the notion of modernity/rationality, and expressed through discourses of progress, development, and democracy, the coloniality of power exists as a structure of management and control at all levels, such as at the levels of epistemology, politics, economy, gender and sexuality (Lee, et al. 2015). As decolonial scholars (Mignolo, 2007, Grosfoguel, 2009) point out, after the WWII, the U.S. took over the previous leadership from Europe, and started a global project under the name of development and modernisation. The U.S. continued to impose the regime of global coloniality to the peripheral nation-states and non-European people through international organisations and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Pentagon, and the World Bank (WB) (Mignolo, 2007, Grosfoguel, 2009). China, as a former semi-colonised nation, is not exempt from the coloniality of power. China Studies are dominated by West-centric discourses and colonial stereotypes. The theoretical concept of coloniality helps to identify the continuity of colonial ideology in the construction of contemporary academic and media discourses on China, and gives an insight into the impact of legacies of colonialism on the construction of the identity and collective memories of China.

2.3.3 Eurocentrism

Despite being anchored in different time periods and different geographical orientations, both postcolonialism and decolonity emerged as a consequence of political developments that challenge the colonial world order established by European empires, and are committed to contesting the Eurocentric knowledge production. The concept of Eurocentrism is central to both postcolonialism and decolonialism. Eurocentrism refers to the process by which Europe and European cultural assumptions are constructed as ‘normal’ and ‘universal’ (Ashcroft et al.,
2007), and are regarded as the basis for evaluative judgements concerning the practices of others (Joseph et al., 1990). According to Araújo and Maeso (2012), Eurocentrism is rooted in the colonisation of South America in the 15th and 16th centuries, and marked by the construction of the idea of race. The colonisers essentialised the supposedly biological difference based on skin colour between the colonisers and the colonised, and constructed a system of racial hierarchy in which the colonised nations were placed in a situation of inferiority to the European colonisers (Quijano, 2000, 2007). With the acceleration of European colonisation of the other parts of the world in the 18th and 19th century, the concept of a collective Europe constructed as a sign of superiority and in opposition to the rest of the world’s cultures was actively promoted and firmly consolidated through exploitation and conquest (Ashcroft et al., 2007). The combination of imperialist displays of power and colonialist control of institutions such as schools and universities have led to the establishment of European systems and values as inherently superior to indigenous ones (Ashcroft et al., 2007).

Lindner (2010, p.2) points out that a form of Eurocentrism is “distinguished not only by the presumption that Western societies are superior, but also by the attempt to justify this presumption in rational, scientific terms”. Eurocentrism masks its ideological basis under the pretence of political and scientific civilisation, neutrality and universality (Araújo and Maeso, 2012), implying “evolutionary schemas through which societies inevitably progress” (Sundberg, 2009, p.640). Quijano (2007) argues that Eurocentrism conceives history as an evolutionary binary set: ‘the civilised’ versus ‘the primitive’, ‘the modern’ versus ‘the traditional’, and ‘the rational’ versus ‘the savage’. Europe is conceived as the centre of the modern world against which the world is described, conceptualised, ranked and valued (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). The whole story of the human history becomes posited in the past of a historical trajectory that culminates in Europe (Quijano, 2000). The Eurocentric perspective of history considers Europe to be the mirror of the future of all other societies and cultures, and regards modernity, rationality and democracy exclusive to the West (Grosfoguel, 2004, Quijano, 2000). As such, Eurocentrism is mostly codified dualistic terms, such as civilised/ primitive, scientific/mythic,
advanced/backward, rational/irrational, and developed/undeveloped, with an underlying presumption of “a superior white Western self as referent of analysis” (Sundberg, 2009, p.640). An ‘Orientalist’ way of looking at the non-Western world reflects a Eurocentric point of view. The Western conceptual system includes also Western-centric values and ideas (such as ‘democracy’, ‘modernity’, ‘rationality’ and ‘progress’), which are perceived as ‘universal’ standards against which non-Western nations are constructed as ‘Oriental Others’ by means of denigration, homogenisation, co-optation, and so forth (Lindner, 2010). In that way, non-Western nations “are transformed into distorted mirror images of the European self-image” (Lindner, 2010, p.3). Disguised under the notions of universalism and neutrality, the West imposes its Eurocentric understanding upon the rest of the regions and peoples of the world, denying the validity, equality and value of non-Western knowledge systems and ways of life, and thereby exerting epistemic violence.

Eurocentrism is bound up in an epistemic hierarchy, which emphasises and gives priority to European production of knowledge, memories and histories (Chakrabarty, 1992). This epistemic hierarchy, as Grosfoguel’s (2012a, p.83) sees, is manifested in the knowledge structure in Westernised universities: “[n]early all disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities [in the Westernised university], with very few exceptions, privilege in their canon of thought Western male thinkers”. In contrast, thoughts from non-Western thinkers are excluded. Chakrabarty (1992, pp.1-3) critiques Eurocentrism in respect of its central position given to the West in knowledge production, as shown below.

Insofar as the academic discourse of history […] is concerned, “Europe” remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the one we call “Indian”, “Chinese”, “Kenyan” and so on […] Third-world historians feel a need to refer to works in European history, historians of Europe do not feel any need to reciprocate […] The everyday paradox of third-world social science is that we find these theories, in spite of their inherent ignorance of “us” eminently useful in understanding our societies. What allowed the modern European sages
to develop such clairvoyance with regard to societies of which they were empirically ignorant? Why cannot we, once again, return the gaze? As a consequence, academic products become imbued with Eurocentric biases that have permeated the production, circulation and evaluation of knowledge (Joseph et al., 1990). Brohman (1995, p.128) argues that Eurocentrism “perpetuated intellectual dependence on a restricted group of Western academic institutions that determine the subject matter and methods of research”. In other words, the unequal relation between European culture and the other cultures is casted in a binary opposition: “subject/object” with different value attachment (Quijano, 2007). A hierarchy of the relation between Europe and the rest of the world is thus established, with the former being constructed as the ‘subject’ in the generation of theory and knowledge, while the latter is constructed as the inferior by nature and the ‘object’ of the so-called ‘scientific investigation’ and knowledge production (McEwan, 2008). As pointed out by Spivak (1988), the West is obsessed with preserving itself as the ‘subject’, with talking to itself in a mono-vocal manner about the ‘Other’. Knowledge is in a way always colonial in defining the ‘Other’ as thoughtless, voiceless and deprived of subjectivity, the ‘object’ of study by the ‘subject’, and as a thing that knowledge should be extracted from and brought back ‘here’ (Young, 1990). By representing the ‘Other’ in a way that privileges the West, the West silences subaltern voices. Such silencing not only features in the dominant Western-centric discourse; it also renders the subaltern without a “subject being” (Maggio, 2007, p.426). Given that the subaltern never speaks, or their voices are never heard, they are marginalised or squeezed out in the process of knowledge construction. By neglecting non-Western cultures and relegating their knowledges to an ‘object’ position, the knowledge and theories drawing on the West’s provincial and particularistic experiences are made ‘universal’ and therefore imposed on the rest of the world as the only ‘valid’ ‘truth’ (Grosfoguel, 2012a).

With regard to the construction of world histories, postcolonial historiography points out that Orientalism and Eurocentrism, albeit sometimes in an implicit manner, have underpinned the formation of social science knowledge and in particular, world histories. Bhabha (1994, p.500) argues that “the world-historical
events remain centred upon a narrowly defined European history”. The West presents world histories as the stories of its achievement. The rest of the world is assumed to be external to the world-historical processes selected for consideration. The histories of non-Western nations, which are significant to the world-historical processes, are erased or rendered silent (Bhambra, 2016, 2010). Drawing on the concept of “connected histories” (Bhambra, 2016, p.3), Bhambra deconstructs the Euro-American centric theoretical interpretations and explanations of world-historical processes. As Bhambra (2016) argues, the world was not born out of the West having an impact upon and ‘awakening’ a ‘dormant’ non-West, but born out of the multifarious (unequal, hierarchical and usually coercive) exchanges and interactions between the West and the non-West. Modernity is not what developed in the West and then radiated and dispersed outwards in an automatic and peaceful way, but instead it witnessed and arose from economic, socio-cultural, political and epistemic domination, oppression and violence through colonialism, imperialism, enslavement, and the dispossession of non-western nations.

The epistemological hierarchy inherent in Eurocentrism silences the voices of subaltern nations, leads to epistemic violence, and blocks communication and interchanges of knowledge and modes of knowledge production between cultures (Quijano, 2007). Quijano (2000, p.540) states that “Europe’s hegemony over the new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony”. In a hegemonic structure, resources, such as money, skills, education, etc., are distributed along racial lines (Burawoy, 1998). Moreover, knowledge which is promoted, and categories and approaches of scientific inquiry which are used in European academia help to maintain the political and intellectual superiority of Europe (Joseph et al., 1990). Not only were non-Western specific ideas, beliefs, images, symbols, knowledge and histories repressed and even effaced, but also their modes of knowing, modes of producing knowledge, images, symbols, resources were expropriated. The West constructs its culture as a ‘universal’ model, imposes its beliefs and images on the non-West, and impedes the cultural production of the dominated as well as exerts social and cultural control over non-western nations.
In that way, Eurocentrism damages non-European societies and impoverishes the academic disciplines by colonising non-European intellectuals and being ignorant of other rich sources of knowledge outside mainstream discourses (Joseph et al., 1990).

Meikle (2009) points out that the global news media define reality on the global scale by persistently using narrow cultural preconceptions that lead to misconceptions and misrepresentations of the ‘Other’. China, being the biggest developing country in the world, is not an exception. The rise of China and its increasing global influence, are frequently constructed as a ‘threat’ to the existing international order and power relations (Broomfield, 2003, Gertz, 2001, Storey and Yee, 2004). The Western media tend to lean towards Orientalism when portraying and representing China. The postcolonial theoretical interrogation of, and insights into, the embeddedness of knowledge in the historical processes of colonialism, imperialism and racism, as elaborated above, will help compensate the Marxist and poststructuralist CDA approach by uncovering the ways in which the images and knowledge about China are constructed in the American media, and by showing how the instrument and process of othering is interlinked with western-centric forms of knowledge about and objectification of China. Moreover, this theoretical perspective allows for the contextualisation of the analysis of the three cases (see Section 4.2.4), and reveals how the American media representation of China is closely connected to the knowledge and stereotypes produced in colonialist discourses.

2.4 Summary

This chapter developed and elaborated on the theoretical framework that will guide this study. The framework is interdisciplinary, combining Marxism and Foucauldian discourse/power/knowledge, which underlie the CDA approach on the one hand, and postcolonialism and decolonialism on the other hand. The chapter demonstrated that Marxist and Foucauldian concepts of ideology, hegemony, and power/knowledge/discourse help explain the role of the media in reproducing
dominant ideas, manipulating and indoctrinating people with dominant ideology, and maintaining the hegemony and control of the dominant class. They, however, remain culture-blind and thus cannot fully address the research questions of this study (see Section 1.2). Postcolonialism and decolonialism, including in particular ideas of orientalism, othering, coloniality and Eurocentrism, provide theoretical insights into cultural and racial relations as well as domination and hegemony of certain cultural/ethnic groups over others through representation and discourse. They help explain the effects of colonial ideology in the construction of contemporary Western media discourses and the existing knowledge on China. Therefore, postcolonialism and decolonialism are identified as additional conceptual tools to decode and deconstruct the American media’s representation of China, and investigate the ways that culture, knowledge and racialised hierarchies filtered through the colonial past continue to define the identity formation, collective memories and values in postcolonial China.
Chapter 3

Literature Review: Media Discourse and Representation

3.1 Introduction

Guided by an interdisciplinary conceptual framework which combines a Marxist conceptualisation of ideology and hegemony, and Foucauldian ideas about the power/discourse/knowledge nexus with a postcolonial perspective (see Chapter 2), this chapter critically reviews previous studies on the Western media representation of non-Western nations and cultures in general, and of China in particular. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 reviews critical studies, especially those adopting a postcolonial perspective, that examine the Western media representation of ‘Others’. It highlights key studies and provides an overview of their findings. Section 3.3 extends the review to the field of China Studies, with a particular focus on examining the literature on the Western media representation of China. Gaps in the existing scholarship are identified and the originality of the thesis is established. Section 3.4 offers a summary of this chapter’s main arguments.

3.2 Western media representation of ‘Others’

The media representation of China as the ‘Other’ is a key concern of this study, and this section reviews the literature on the general theme of ‘Others’ before turning to the more specific literature on the representation of China. Cohen and Young (1973, p.9) argue that “the mass media are in the business of manufacturing and reproducing images. They provide the guiding myths which shape our conception of the world and serve as important instruments of social control.” The media, which are entangled with a nation’s present economic and political system, do not mirror reality in a simple and transparent way, but instead operate to spread “false consciousness” as conceived by Marxism (see Section 2.2.1), maintain and universalise the dominant ideology, and thus manipulate public opinions towards the world. What finally ends up as the “news” is only the result of a highly selective
process (Cirino, 1973). As Hall et al (1978, p.53) states, news is “the end-product of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of categories”. Decisions on which stories are covered, and how the stories are interpreted, are shaped by the political and socio-cultural contexts in which the media products are situated. Through their practices of selection, editing and production, the news media determine the kinds of news the public receives about the world, interpret and construct reality in a certain way that is consistent with the dominant ideology, and thus indoctrinate people with dominant ideas (Connell, 1978, Hall et al., 1978, Mahtani, 2001). When it comes to the issue of cultural diversity in a Western context, media images reproduce the dominant ideology. As Mahtani (2001) points out, minority groups are often marginalised, while the dominate culture is reinforced as the ‘norm’.

There has been a burgeoning critical literature on Western media representation of ‘Others’, which also includes race and minorities, drawing on methods of content or discourse analysis, and informed by the insights of postcolonial theory and critical media and cultural studies (cf. Hall, 1997, 1999, Mawdsley, 2008, Pickering, 2001, Stoegner and Wodak, 2016). This body of literature focuses on analysing media representation of race and minorities in the world regions, including Africa (cf. Hall, 1997, Mawdsley, 2008), Middle East and South Asia (cf. Bullock and Jafri, 2001, Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007, Said, 1978), and Latin America (cf. Quijano, 2000, Santa Ana, 2013). One strand of this body of literature on relations between media and race and minority is devoted to examining the ways in which ethnic and racial minorities are represented in Western societies. Here, misrepresentation and typecasting are identified as recurring themes (Fleras, 1994, 1995). Marandi (2009), for example, points to the misrepresentation of social groups, and argues that such misrepresentation is underpinned by deeply rooted racial prejudices and ideologies, such as Euro-American-centrism, Islamophobia, and is increasingly manifested in subtle and almost hidden ways. More importantly, through such misrepresentation, the voice of minorities is silenced or eradicated, which further justifies and reinforces the continued oppression of ethnic minorities (Marandi, 2009).
Research shows that using stereotypes to misrepresent minorities and people of colour is one of the ways, in which Western racial domination and hegemony are materialised and maintained. Early studies, such as Said’s *Orientalism* (1978), explore how the Western media serve as important means in constructing non-Western cultures. Said (1978, p.207) explains: “Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analysed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined”. Through this process, large groups of people with diverse histories, cultures and traditions become oversimplified into one monolithic, subordinate and ahistorical category. Hall (1997) points to the fact that, these representations of ethnic minorities and race are deeply rooted in Western colonisation and imperialism. Since the first encounter between the West and African people in the sixteenth-century – a dark historical period characterised by three centuries of inhumane slave trade— popular representations drawing on the marking of racial difference have emerged (Hall, 1997). In these representations, Africa and Africans are closely associated with negative stereotypical images, such as ‘laziness’, ‘primitivism’, ‘simplicity’, ‘lack of cultures’, and ‘nature’, while at the same time, the contrasting imaginary of the West is associated with so-called ‘civilisation’, ‘work ethics”, ‘sophistication’, and being ‘culturally and materially advanced’ (Hall, 1997). These binary distinctions, Hall (1997) argues, justify the exploitation and degeneration of Africa and black people by Western colonial powers.

The repertoire of these stereotypes, drawn from the days of slavery and colonisation of what is known as the Third World, has largely continued to exist to this today (Hall, 1997). Mawdsley’s (2008) study on British newspapers’ coverage of Africa strengthens Hall’s arguments on the continuity of colonial discourses in contemporary societies. Drawing on critical geopolitics and textual analysis, she examines six UK broadsheet newspapers’ coverage of China-Africa interactions from 2000 to mid-2007 to investigate how the newspapers transmit particular ideology and portray the Chinese-African-Western relations through the use of linguistic tools, such as tropes and narrative structures. Focusing on 230 articles collected from *The Financial Times, The Guardian* (and *Weekly Guardian*), *The
Independent, The Observer, The Telegraph and The Times (and Times on Sunday), Mawdsley (2008) shows how the British press transmits ideology by constructing a discursive dichotomy of ‘Us’ (the West as the ‘savior’) versus ‘Them’ (Africa as ‘villains’ and ‘victims’). Mawdsley (2008, pp.518-523) finds that the dominant themes in regard to Africa centred on “violent conflict”, “corruption”, “genocide”, “authoritarian leadership”, “poverty” and so forth; whereas the West is portrayed as a “well-intentioned” and “benign” “saviour” of the ‘helpless’ continent. She argues that the UK newspapers’ representation of Africa is congruent with the colonial discourse of the “Dark Continent”. By representing Africa and the West in contrasting binary ways with hierarchical and moral value attachments, the media not only gloss over global inequities that can be traced to, and continue from, colonial relations of domination-subjugation imposed by the West on Africa, but also justify the West’s intervention and neo-colonialism in postcolonial Africa. Mawdsley’s findings resonate with McEwan’s (2008) analysis of development discourses concerning Africa. Guided by a postcolonial perspective, McEwan (2008) argues that development discourses conceal a racial hierarchy and neo-colonial ideology by employing the vocabularies that portray African governments and individuals as ‘poor’, ‘brutal’, ‘fragile’, ‘failed’ and ‘undemocratic’, which echo the nineteenth century imperialist discourses. These discourses and misrepresentations disregard the many positive development efforts made by African nations and peoples, and hence deny their agency and subjectivity. They, therefore, misrepresent and degenerate Africa as the ‘Other’, and position neoliberal capitalism, and by extension imperialism and (neo)colonialism, as the only option for African development and global governance.

The linkage between the media (mis)representation and discourse is examined by Van Dijk (1989). Van Dijk proposes a theoretical concept of “ideological square” to analyse ideologies involved in the discursive construction of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. According to him (1989), the “ideological square” encapsulates the paired strategies of positive ‘we-group’ descriptions and negative ‘they-group’ descriptions and functions to polarise in- and out-groups. He analyses the role of the media in reproducing racism, and highlights how the thematic structure, choice
of words, and speech acts are used by the media to construct a ‘positive Us’ and a ‘negative Other’ to represent ethnic minorities as the ‘Other’. Van Dijk (1989) argues that the media reinterpret and reproduce the dominant ideology of racism, and thus, construct ethnic minorities in a way that underlies the racist ideology and practices of society. With the help of Said’s (1978) notion of Orientalism and van Dijk’s (1989) idea of “ideological square”, Izadi and Saghaye-Biria (2007) analyse the way in which Iran’s nuclear programme is represented in the editorials of three American newspapers (i.e. The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal) from 1984 to 2004. They examine the ideological role of the media in their depiction of U.S. policies towards Iran’s nuclear programme together with a focus on the construction of in- and out-group identities. By examining the lexical choices and argumentative structures of the editorials, Izadi and Saghaye-Biria (2007, p.151) find that orientalist themes such as “Oriental untrustworthiness”, “Islam as a threat”, “Oriental irrationality”, and “Oriental inferiority” are adopted to represent Iran as a “threat”. The problematic stereotypes of Iran are rooted in a system of representations framed and constructed by forces that brought the Orient into Western imagination and consciousness, rather than reflecting essential characters of the Orient nations and peoples. Izadi and Saghaye-Biria’s findings are echoed in Santa Ana’s (2013) analysis of the television coverage of Latinos in the U.S. Following the examination of 118 stories, which deal with Latinos and were collected from four networks (ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC) in 2004, Santa Ana highlights the ways in which mainstream American media used metaphors to portray the minority group, and how this has contributed to negative public perceptions. Chavez (2001) combines visual and narrative analysis in examining 70 front-page coverage of immigration across 10 popular American magazines from 1965 to 1999. He highlights the powerful role of the media in shaping national discourses, and argues that migration is more often portrayed as a ‘threat’ or ‘invasion’, especially when it comes to Latino migration.

In addition to race and ethnic minority groups, such as Africans, Latinos, Arabs, and Muslims, studies on the media representations of ‘Others’ also include immigrants and asylum seekers. Critical studies of Western media representations
of migrants and asylum seekers frequently put representations of race, religion and, increasingly, legal status at the centre stage, and form an important part of the critical literature on Western media representation of ‘Others’. This body of research has pointed out that the coverage of migrants and asylum seekers has often centred on negative depictions that reflect deep, underlying racism in the media. Pickering (2001), in her analysis of the representation of asylum seekers in two Australian newspapers (the *Sydney Morning Herald*; the *Brisbane Courier Mail*) over the period of January 1997 to December 1999, argues that the news texts tend to represent the asylum seekers as ‘problems’. Similarly, Mares (2001) points out that asylum seekers arriving by boat in Australia are problematically labelled as a ‘crisis’. Previous studies have indicated that the dominant themes on refugees and migrants centre on ‘deviant’, ‘criminal’ or ‘sub-human’, and ‘illegal’ (O’Doherty and Lecouteur, 2007, Saxton, 2003). Boréus (2006) elaborates on the way in which language is used to instigate and justify discrimination and construct negative stereotypes of immigrants and disabled people in Sweden. He identifies four types of discursive discrimination, i.e. negative other-presentation, exclusion, proposals towards non-linguistic unfavourable treatment, and discriminatory objectification, all of which are used in Swedish media and government reports to assign negative traits to immigrants and disabled people, exclude their voices, and form a discriminatory pattern in discourses. By these means, the media and government construct those immigrants and disabled people as a ‘threat’ and exclude them as ‘Others’. By identifying certain groups as ‘threats’ to social values, and conveying these stereotypical views about migrants through media portrayals and representations, dominant social groups and interests justify their harsh and punitive interventions, racial discrimination, bigotry and hatred (Every, 2006, Every and Augoustinos, 2007, 2008).

In addition to studies which examine the Western media’s misrepresentation of ‘Others’, another strand of the body of literature on relations between media and race and minority is devoted to examining the presence/visibility of positive information about non-white groups. Santa Ana (2013), for example, in his study of the network television news coverage, finds that the proportion of the positive
images of Latinos in the U.S. network TV in 2004 is only 0.9%, considering that Latinos constitute a proportion of 14.2% of the U.S. total population. Here, Santa Ana argues that the underrepresentation of positive images of minorities and race in the Western media is in disproportion to the larger share that they represent of the population in Western countries. Van Dijk (1989) points out that Western media largely ignore racial minorities unless they fit in with the existing ethnic and racial stereotypes or prejudices. For example, news reports tend to associate minority groups with ‘violence’, ‘illegality’, ‘crime’, or ‘strange’ cultural behaviours, which threaten or contradict ‘our’ values and norms.

The existing literature has also examined the effects of misrepresentation and underrepresentation of race and ethnic minorities on the non-whites’ sense of belonging. As Henry (1983, p.10) points out, “stereotypical images are all caricatures of people who intrinsically lack something – who are only half human. […] For non-whites, [this] breeds a sense of inferiority, shame in one’s heritage, and lower expectations of achievement”. Media representations, as such, naturalise and essentialise differences, produce and reproduce the imaginary ‘positive’ and ‘civilised’ ‘Us’ versus the ‘negative’ and ‘backward’ ‘Them’, thereby othering and reinforcing unequal cultural power relations and domination over minorities on the domestic scene, and non-western nations and cultures globally. The underrepresentation of racial minorities in respect of positive images serves to reject minorities as equal citizens, unrecognise their contributions to society, and deny their rights, which further entrenches the invisibility of ethnic minorities and reinforces socio-cultural inequality and prejudice in society (Fleras, 1995). Bullock and Jafri’s (2001) study of the media representation of Muslim women in Canada further confirms this. The researchers conducted a focus group study of Muslim women, and found that many of them are acutely aware that their positive experiences and identity as Muslim women are constantly ignored in media reports (Bullock and Jafri, 2001). The absence of minorities and their voices in the media consolidates whiteness as society’s ‘norm’. As Mizra (1997, p.3) argues, whiteness […] makes invisible or re-appropriates things, people and places it does not want to see or hear, and then through misnaming,
renaming or not naming at all, invents the truth – what [people] are told is ‘normal’, neutral, universal, simply becomes the way it is.

The absence of minorities’ voices in media representation reinforces socio-cultural exclusion and prejudice, and perpetuates the othering ideology and practice against ethnic minorities.

The misrepresentation, and visibility/invisibility of race and ethnic minorities in the Western media are of great interest to scholars engaged in critical studies. The above review of general scholarship finds that current critical research primarily focuses on analysing the Western media representation of formerly colonised regions such as Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as on investigating the impact of the postcolonial turn on the production of knowledge within the field of these former Western colonies. The body of research, however, has hardly engaged with the field of China Studies, which this study shall now turn to. China, as a former semi-colonial nation, historically experienced similar processes of colonial exploitation, oppression, subjugation and occupation as other fully-colonised nations. Thus, postcolonial and decolonial critiques on the production of knowledge matter to China Studies. However, studies on Western representation of China that apply postcolonial theoretical insights are scarce, and this study contributes a Chinese experience and perspective to the postcolonial and CDA studies. In the following section, I turn to China Studies, and examine studies on the western media representation of China in particular.

3.3 China and Chinese represented in western media

When it comes to the specifics of Western media representation of China and the Chinese, research has been conducted primarily in the field of communication/media studies and linguistic studies. Studies concerning Western media representation of China and Chinese could be broadly classified into two categories: the exploration of variation trend at the macro-level, grounded in a positivist epistemology, and the exploration of media discourse on China at the
micro-level, grounded in a constructivist epistemology. I now turn to review the advantages and shortcomings of each category.

3.3.1 Macro-level examination

Exploring the variation trend is an important perspective adopted in studies concerning Western media representations of China (cf. Mosher, 1990, Oksenberg and Oxnam, 1978, Peng, 2004, Xie, 2008). Studies in this area focus on questions as to whether there is any change in Western representations of China over time. Quantitative analysis is widely used to examine the number of news texts and the proportion of different themes concerning China that is covered in the Western media, as well as attitudes/tones (such as positive, neutral and negative) reflected in the media reports, and so on.

With regard to exploring the variation trend, one area of interest focuses on the effects of the media’s production process on its representation of China in general. Specifically, it focuses on analysing how specific institutional constraints on journalists (such as performances, lack of access to information, etc.) have impacted on the media’s coverage of China. Goodman’s (1999) study of the American media’s coverage of China is a case in point. With the help of a quantitative content analysis of more than 1000 articles, published in the New York Times and Washington Post and about 400 government publications on aspects of U.S.-China relations from 1985 till 1993, Goodman (1999) compares the American media’s coverage of China during the period of the Cold War as well as during post-Cold War years. He (1999) suggests that the journalists’ renewed sense of their ‘watchdog’ obligations, combined with an increased access to a variety of sources, contribute to more ‘independent’ coverage of U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold War years. Goodman’s argument resonates with Evan’s (1995, cited in Freedman, 2000, p.151) statement that the Western media need to display “accuracy”, “professionalism”, and “civility” with regard to China.
Within this strand of literature, however, the media are ideally and uncritically conceived as being part of “an open, diverse and equal clash of interests and opinions in a society that shares basic values” (Freedman, 2000, p.150), as well as performing a function in liberal democratic societies “through which governing elites could be pressurised and reminded of their dependency on majority opinion” (Bennett, 2005, p.37). In other words, the media are regarded as performing functions of accurately representing reality and being a ‘watchdog’ for the defence of liberal democracy. However, the routines of news production are not neutral/natural, but shaped by the political, economic and ideological leanings of the news organisations, and those of the embedded producers and professionals (Schlesinger, 1989). News production, therefore, reflects the views and consensus of dominant groups (Herman and Chomsky, 1988).

It is true, as the studies mentioned above demonstrate, that there are specific issues concerning a lack of access to information and background knowledge, which operate to constrain the journalists’ reporting of foreign countries’ affairs. However, this strand of analyses of the production process and professional performance of journalists cannot explain why there are commonly occurring biased assumptions that dominate the discourse of the Western media representation of China (Freedman, 2000). Analyses that remain at this level thus lack any critical reflection on how relations of ownership and control of the media can influence media texts in their interpretation of events and construction of reality. Moreover, these studies fail to unravel the politics, interests and ideology hidden within and beneath the Western media.

Another strand of the literature that explores variation trend is devoted to examining the effects of macro-level factors, such as the economy and politics on the media coverage. This body of literature emphasises the important role of political and economic relations between China and the West (and in particular the U.S.), and China’s increasing economic prowess in determining the volume, prominence, valence and attitudes of Western media’s coverage of China during different time periods.
In her analysis of American news coverage of China, Ting Zhang (2009) employs a quantitative content analysis method to investigate the ways in which U.S.-China economic ties influence the New York Times’ coverage of China. Following the examination of 15,173 news articles concerning China, collected from the New York Times from 1994 to 2003, Zhang argues that with the U.S.-China economic ties being much stronger in 2003 than in 1994, the number of positive images in NYT’s coverage of China has considerably risen in 2003 compared to 1994. She concludes that the quantity and prominence of American media coverage of China are positively related to the development of U.S.-China’s economic relations (Zhang T., 2009). Ting Zhang’s study examines the Western media representation of China by measuring their quantity and prominence. Economic factors determining the amount of media coverage are stressed without considering the nature of the media representation nor a general theory of ideology in capitalist society that affects discourses of American media. Similar approaches can also be found in Stone and Xiao’s (2007) analysis of the American news coverage of China following the dissolution of the former USSR in 1991. They point out that the shift in global power, which followed the event, made the U.S. policy increasingly regard China as an enemy nation. The subsequent changing political relations between the U.S. and China motivated the Western media to produce increasingly negative news stories on China (Stone and Xiao, 2007). A critical review of both Zhang’s and Stone and Xiao’s studies reveals that they consider political and economic factors to be key factors in determining the tone and quantity of the Western media representation of China, without exploring the meanings of these representations. Thus, these studies often take a Euro-American-centric perspective in that they ignore the social and cultural implications of Western media portrayals of China.

Admittedly, an analysis of economic determinants and political relations offers an insight into the variation trend of the Western media representation of China. However, the producers of media texts have been influenced by society’s dominant ideas, which have developed historically and are expressed in the form of various codes and myths. The texts produced by media workers interact not just with the structures of particular media institutions, but also with the structures and
discourses produced by government, elites, financial conglomerates, and so on (Freedman, 2000). It suggests that examining discourse and power in socially constructed knowledge production is vital for the analysis of media representations. Thus, examining discourses is critical to understanding hidden power relations in the Western media representation of China.

3.3.2 Micro-level examination

Examining the way in which the Western media portray China is a key aim of studies concerned with the Western media representation of China (cf. Su, 2004; Wang D., 2010). In contrast to the approach of exploring the variation trends in the media’s coverage of China which looks at the frequency and quantity of media representations, this strand of research focuses on the content of news reports. Qualitative methods, such as content analysis and linguistic analysis, are used to examine news texts, and identify recurring themes and linguistic patterns in media discourse. Within this strand of literature, scholars find that themes with the Western media perpetuate themes with negative connotations that work to portray China in a degraded way. For example, Su (2004), using content analysis, examines 206 news texts concerning China, which were collected from the New York Times between September 1, 2002 and March 31, 2003. Su (2004, p.21) shows that the NYT frequently perpetuates discourses, such as China is “a country besieged with different social problems” and “a violator of international laws”, in order to portray China as ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’. This finding resonates with Di Wang’s (2010, p.2) analysis of the way China has been represented in Time Magazine. He finds that the media’s portrayals of China revolve around themes, such as the “human rights crisis” and the “illegality and immorality of China’s economy”. In that way, China is constructed as “autocratic” and “backward” (Wang D., 2010, p.21). Both Su’s and Di Wang’s studies have attempted to identify stereotypes and orientalist themes that the media have used to portray China. However, these studies do not examine the cultural hegemony and power of the West in constructing the themes and discourses concerning non-Western ‘Others’ in general, and China in
particular. Instead they take these orientalist themes for granted. These studies form part of neo-colonialist discourses.

Scholars in linguistic studies build a connection between the media representations and the linguistic features of texts, and analyse the way in which the media use linguistic tools, such as metaphor, rhetoric and narratives, to represent China. For example, drawing on Fairclough and Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics, Wen Wang (2010) examines 30 news texts concerning China, which were collected from CNN’s international website, with a view to investigate the way in which China is represented in the American media. Following the analysis of linguistic strategies employed by CNN, such as word choice, nominalisation, passivisation, and modality, Wen Wang (2010) argues that the American mainstream media frequently portray a negative image of China by framing the news around themes centred on ‘human rights crisis’, ‘corruption’, and ‘cheap labour force’. Similarly, Yang and Wu (2012) employ corpus-based CDA to analyse the American media’s use of language forms and discursive strategies in representing Chinese women. Through using key words, such as “Chinese women/woman”, they sift through news texts in the New York Times from 1980-2011, and establish a corpus of 280,000 words. Following the analysis of the NYT’s use of linguistic tools, such as lexical choice, discursive stylistics, and rhetorical strategies, Yang and Wu conclude that American media tend to construct a negative image of Chinese women, involving traits such as “passivity”, “poverty”, and “money-worshiping” (Yang and Wu, 2012, pp.53-54). Both studies conduct a linguistic analysis of news texts, and identify discourse patterns that the Western media use to represent China and the Chinese. However, these studies mainly examine the superficial linguistic features of news texts without investigating the underlying meanings of the news discourses. Studies like these lack a critical cultural perspective, and do not question the cultural hegemony and Euro-American-centric power underlying the dominant Western discourses on China, and the epistemic violence that the U.S. imposes on China.
To sum up, studies within this strand of the literature mainly identify dominant themes and images in the Western media coverage of China, and describe linguistic features of the media texts. They direct the gaze to the surface and descriptive meanings of news texts without investigating the deep meanings of media representations of China and unravelling cultural inequality, power relations and ideologies underpinning these media representations. Hence, they uncritically accept the Western media’s hegemonic discourses on China, and thus perpetuate the neo-colonial, Eurocentric knowledge and construct.

3.3.3 Critical perspectives in studies of western media representation of China

A critical scrutiny of the literature on western media representation of China and the Chinese (see Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.3.2) reveals that this body of literature is dominated by Euro-American-centric discourses. The historical legacies of orientalist, racist, and imperialist discourses still impact on the way China is constructed in the China Studies field. While there are occasional counter-narratives, such as works by Qin Bian (2013), Yingzhen Chen (2017), Xin He (2012), Sautman and Yan (2014, 2016) and Giese and Thiel (2014), this body of research mainly concerns itself with re-establishing ‘realities’ or making literary critiques, rather than engaging with the theoretical debates. The postcolonial turn (Vukovich, 2017) has made little impact on the production of knowledge within the China Studies area, except for a few pioneering works, which this section will now review.

The pioneering works (cf. Cao, 2014, Flowerdew et al., 2002, Hier and Greenberg, 2002, Shi, 2015) within this strand of critical perspectives problematise the Western media dominant discourses on China, unravel media representations of China as ‘myths’, and explore colonial ideologies and unequal power relations underpinning such representations. For them, the Western media serve to transmit orientalist ideology, producing and reproducing colonial stereotypes towards China. The media discourse establish a binary between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, and construct China as the ‘Other’. For example, Hier and Greenberg’s (2002) work on the Canadian
media representation of Chinese immigrants is one of the few studies that combine an analysis of the media’s portrayal of the Chinese with critical media and cultural studies. Drawing on CDA and critical discourse analysis, Hier and Greenberg (2002) examine the news coverage of Chinese migrants, who arrived on Canada’s Western shores in 1999, with a view to investigate how the migrants’ arrivals are ‘problematised’ and transformed into a discursive ‘crisis’ centred on the constructs of ‘risk’. Focusing on four mainstream Canadian newspapers (i.e. the National Post, Vancouver Sun, Victoria’s Times-Colonist and the Toronto Sun), they find that the dominant themes on Chinese immigrants have centred on ‘criminalisation’, ‘health risk’, and ‘illegality’. By using the strategies of objectification and amplification, Canada’s newspapers heavily rely on historically derived stereotypes and homogenising racialised imager, such as the ‘Yellow Peril’ and ‘barbarism’, to shape the Canadian perception of Chinese international migrants, and construct the Chinese migrants as a ‘threat’ to the integrity of the Canadian state. Such constructions, as Hier and Greenberg (2002) point out, evoke anxiety among the public, and serve to justify the government’s discriminatory policies towards Chinese immigrants.

Qing Cao further analyses the power relations underpinning Western media representation of China. For him, the Western media portrayal of China is associated with the notion of the ‘Self’. The discursive construction of China as the ‘Other’ draws cultural boundaries between the West and the rest of the world, serving to establish the identity formation of the ‘Self’, and to reproduce and reinforce cultural and power relations between the West and China. In his critical analysis of the representation of China in British television documentaries between 1980 and 2000, Qing Cao (2014) draws on narrative and discourse theories in order to examine key discursive formations (such as ‘technology’ and ‘progress’), and patterns of the portrayal of historical events (such as the Opium War in the 19th century) and historical periods (such as pre-1949 and post-1949 China) in the documentaries. Cao (2014) reveals that China is represented as a ‘myth’, and argues that such representation is underpinned by the West’s self-perceptions and its self-conceptions of ‘modernity’. Within the framework of ‘modernity’ (such as
‘rationality’, ‘development’, and ‘democracy), the media portray China as the ‘deviant’ ‘Other’ that is characterised by ‘irrationality’, ‘undevelopment’, and ‘authoritarianism’. Using the discursive strategy of de-contextualisation, the media ignore the internal historical dynamics and mould a vast and diversified civilisation into “a narrow set of ideologically demarcated spheres of consensus and deviance” (Cao, 2014, p.202). In that way, the media simplify the image of China and reinforce Western stereotypes. Cao (2014) argues that such representation fail to mirror ‘reality’; it is merely a symbolic domain for maintaining and reinforcing the self-image of the West, and reproducing the West’s persistent stereotypes of China.

Some scholars from the strand of critical studies are devoted to establishing the linkages between the process of ‘othering’ and discursive strategies. For example, Flowerdew et al (2002) elaborate on the process of ‘othering’ by analysing the representation of mainland Chinese in one leading English Hong Kong newspaper, the South China Morning Post (owned by News Corporation, an American multinational mass media corporation) during a twenty-month period. They identify the composite taxonomy of discriminatory discourse strategies – i.e. negative other presentation, scare tactics, blaming the victim, and legitimisation – which are used by the newspaper to construct discriminatory discourses of the Mainland Chinese. As one of the most pioneering studies, Flowerdew et al (2002) focus their attention on the linguistic forms of the news texts and explores the discursive strategies used to exclude the Mainland Chinese as ‘Others’.

The discursive construction of a binary between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ is apparent in Shi’s (2015) analysis of international academic discourse on China’s national defence. Drawing on cultural discourse studies, Shi (2015, p.2046) focuses on one English research article, published in the international academic journal Contemporary Southeast Asia in 2013 and concerning China’s national defence, in order to examine the way in which China is constructed as a “regional threat”. Shi points out the journal’s use of linguistic tools, such as selection of words and rhetoric, in order to denigrate China as a ‘dangerous’ and ‘threatening’ ‘enemy’ of the US-led alliance, thereby excluding China as the ‘Other’. Shi problematises the
dominant discourses of China, and argues that the portrayals of China as “threats” and “dangers” are born, not out of the presentation of facts, but out of the particular rhetorical renderings of Western binary thinking and cultural bias, and Euro-American-centric presumptions of the West as the “guarantor-of-world-peace” (2015, p.2046). That notwithstanding, both Flowerdew et al’s and Shi’s studies are more concerned with the discourse analysis of the process of ‘Othering’ than with the theoretical debates on the othering of the Mainland Chinese.

Even though works as those by Cao (2014), Hier and Greenberg (2002), Flowerdew et al. (2002), and Shi (2015) offer a critical voice in challenging the colonial/universalist form of the present knowledge systems concerning China, all of these studies remain marginal to the overall field of China Studies. Research on China remains dominated by Western-centric perspectives. Studies engaging with postcolonial critiques, or Marxist-guided CDA analysis, in China Studies are rare. Hence, the present study contributes to the current literature on the representation of China in the Western media, by adopting a postcolonial perspective to examine the portrayal of China in American mainstream newspapers.

### 3.4 Summary

This chapter has reviewed the existing literature on the Western media representation of non-Western nations in general, and China and the Chinese in particular. A review of the general scholarship reveals that current critical research is devoted to exploring the way in which non-Western nations are represented in the Western media by drawing on postcolonial theory and critical media studies. The misrepresentation and visibility/invisibility of race and minorities are two major themes that are of great interest to scholars within this body of literature. Critical studies find that the media associate race and minority groups with negative and stereotypical images, such as ‘laziness’, ‘primitivism’, ‘simplicity’, ‘lack of cultures’, and ‘nature’, and thus represent them as ‘Others’. At the same time, race and minority groups are ignored and remain invisible in the Western media unless
they fit in with the existing ethnic and racial stereotypes or prejudices. The misrepresentations of racial minorities and the absence of their voices in media representations, as critical studies argue, have reinforced socio-cultural stereotypes and exclusion, and perpetuated the othering ideology and prejudice against ethnic minorities. The review of the general scholarship finds that this body of critical literature primarily focuses on analysing media representations of race and minority groups in regions, such as Africa, Latin America, Middle East, and South Asia, with a particular interest in investigating the impacts of the postcolonial turn on the production of knowledge within these former Western colonies. Current postcolonial and CDA studies have hardly engaged with China Studies.

Moreover, the review of studies on the Western media representation of China reveals that the existing studies on China could be broadly organised into two categories: the exploration of variation trend at the macro-level, and the exploration of media discourse on China at the micro-level. The macro-level examination looks at the quantity and frequency of the media’s coverage of China and is devoted to exploring the impacts of certain issues (such as political and economic relations between the West and China, journalists’ access to information) on the quantity, prominence and valence of the media’s coverage of China. The chapter has argued that studies within this strand ignore the important role of the media discourse in interpreting events and constructing of reality. The micro-level examination looks at the media discourse with a view to identify recurring themes and linguistic patterns in the media’s portrayals of China. However, studies within this strand focus on examining the surface meanings, as well as linguistic features, of news texts, without exploring the cultural inequality and ideology that underpin the media representations. These studies lack a critical culture perspective, and in fact continue to perpetuate the existing neo-colonial, Eurocentric knowledge and construct. Although there are some pioneering works in the field of China Studies, which offer a critical voice that challenges the colonial/universalist form of the present knowledge systems on China, they however remain marginal to the overall China Studies field.
The review has demonstrated that there are considerable gaps in the literature, and that the topic of Western media representation of China is yet to be fully explored. This study deals with the lacunae in the current literature on China Studies by bringing postcolonial perspectives and CDA approaches to the field of China Studies, and questioning the accepted ‘wisdom’. By examining the portrayal of China in American mainstream newspapers, the study aims critically to analyse the ideology and power relations that are hidden in American news discourses, and reveal the power/knowledge nexus in the Western knowledge construction of China. Moreover, this study contributes a Chinese perspective and experience to the general scholarship on postcolonial and CDA studies, and thus broadens and enriches this body of literature with a China-specific empirical analysis.
4.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to outline the thesis’ methodological framework. Organised into four sections, Section 4.2 details the rationale for the data collection, and discusses issues concerning the choice of American newspapers and time periods. In addition, the section explains the reasons for selecting three particular cases for analysis – the American press coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in Hong Kong, of the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist aggression, and of China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016. Section 4.3 describes the process of data selection, explains the steps taken to collect the data, and discusses issues, such as the researcher’s access to newspapers. Section 4.4 introduces the methods chosen for data analysis. I here elaborate on CDA (Wodak, 2001), as well as its relevance to the study. Moreover, the specific discursive strategies used in the media to represent ‘Others’ are defined and discussed. Section 4.5 summarises the main arguments put forward in this chapter.

4.2 Rationale for data selection

The study sets out to analyse news texts, with the aim to uncover the American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China. Given the large number of news texts on China in the newspaper databases, a sample was selected to form the basis for analysis. This section explains the rationale for the data selection, including the choice made around the country, newspapers, timeframes, and news events.

4.2.1 Selection of the country

The study selected the U.S. mass media for analysis because of the special place of the U.S. in the world as a main global hegemon. According to the International Monetary Fund (hereafter referred to as IMF) estimates in 2017, the U.S. has the
world’s largest economy, and China has the second largest economy. Being the top two countries in terms of their economies, academics and government officials consider the relations between China and America as this century’s most important bilateral relationship globally. The importance of China-America relations in the world makes it necessary to examine the American media representation of China. Moreover, being a typical Western country, the U.S. tends to lean towards Orientalism when constructing knowledge on China. As Mawdsley (2008, p.523) argues, the “zero-sum, ahistorical, event-driven and rather superficial understandings, [and thus representation] of China” as a “threat” widely exists in the U.S. government policies and in the public. The Western-centric knowledge on China is perceived as a taken-for-granted ‘truth’, and therefore rarely questioned, resulting into the marginalisation of China’s voice itself. For that reason, a sample of the U.S mass media is selected for analysis with a view to deconstruct the Western dominant discourse on China and allow the voice of China itself to be heard.

Furthermore, the U.S. has dominated the world media and flow of information. The global media market is dominated by a handful of media conglomerates, most of which are based in the U.S. (Jan, 2009, Khattak et al., 2012). According to Jan (2009), out of the top ten largest media institutions in the world, six are located in the U.S., including American On Line (AOL), Time Warner, Disney, Viacom, AT&T (U.S.), and General Electric/NBC (U.S.). These six American media institutions have regulated the majority of the media outlets and monopolised global news services, and in that way manage to dominate the production and global distribution of book publishing, films, news, and popular music (Jan, 2009, Khattak et al., 2012). For example, CNN International, which is owned by Time Warner, is aired in over 200 countries and reaches the vast majority of the world’s population (Khattak et al., 2012). The American media institutions distribute and export news and entertainment that are produced in the U.S. to non-Western nations, and thereby impose American cultures on these countries. As Khattak et al. (2012) argues, non-Western societies are bombarded with news and entertainment that mainly originate in the U.S. American popular culture, such as “American jazz, Hollywood movies,
American slang, American machines and patented products” has become the common cultural denominator for many societies worldwide (Bolton and Olsson, 2010, p.30). According to Khattak et al. (2012), during the 1990s, American studios, such as Disney, Time Warner, and Viacom, dominated global film production. In 1900, Time Warner and Disney generated around 15 percent of their income outside of the U.S. By 2002, this figure rose to 30-35 percent, and reached 25-45 percent in 2007, indicating the sheer power that American media institutions exercise globally through media representations and discourse (Flew, 2007, Jan, 2009). Jan (2009, p.71) considers the global media market to be structured by “an overarching framework of what is essentially an American conception of the world”. In other words, the dominant strain of global media remains mainly centred in the U.S., and the U.S. plays a significant role in generating and directing global cultural flows. Therefore, it is important to examine the American media in my research.

4.2.2 Selection of newspapers

The study examines news reports in four mainstream American newspapers: The New York Times (NYT), The Washington Post (WP), The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), and the Los Angeles Times (LAT). Broadly speaking, these newspapers are chosen due to their large audience, their wide coverage of international affairs compared to other newspapers, their geographical distribution and breadth of readership, as well as their influence on public opinion, policy debate and other media in the world. All four are considered to be elite newspapers (Boykoff, 2007, Peng, 2004) and are among the largest media outlets in the country. The four newspapers have large circulation (Peng, 2004), tend to cover international news with their own interpretations, and are frequently drawn on as a source for other newspapers in the U.S. and globally (Ten Eyck and Williment, 2003). The details of each newspaper are illustrated as follows.

According to Golan (2006), elite newspapers, such as The New York Times, serve to set agendas for other smaller news outlets, in particular with regard to the coverage of international events and issues. Moreover, the newspaper is hailed as
the largest local metropolitan newspaper, as well as the third largest newspaper in the country in terms of circulation (Brown, 2012). For example, in 2016, it had the largest combined print-and-online circulation of any daily newspaper in the country, reaching a daily circulation of approximately 571,500 during any workday (Monday to Friday), and 1,085,700 on Sundays (Jr. and Thompson, 2017). The newspaper also established an online platform, and it was deemed the most popular online platform on the basis of its 122 million visitors per month in 2016 (Jr. and Thompson, 2017). Due to its wide circulation and geographical reach, the newspaper not only sets the agenda for other U.S. news media, but also exerts substantial power in shaping public opinions (Peng, 2004). The Washington Post, located in the country’s capital, is considered a “first-tier” “prestige” press (Boykoff, 2007, p.471). From 2004 through to 2006, The Washington Post ranked fifth among the top 100 American newspapers in terms of circulation (Byng, 2010). In February 2016 alone, it had 890 million digital page views, the second largest among all American online versions of newspapers (WashPostPR, 2016). The paper’s circulation range and readership demographics are indicators of its power and influence in setting political agendas and shaping public understanding of issues and debates (Byng, 2010). The Los Angeles Times is a metropolitan newspaper and ranks fourth in terms of circulation. In contrast to the other selected newspapers, its membership is more diverse (Peng, 2004). For example, nearly half a million Asians in the Los Angeles read the newspaper’s print or online version weekly (Beaudoin and Thorson, 2001). For that reason, the newspaper covers a wider range of Asian affairs (Beaudoin and Thorson, 2001) compared to other daily newspapers. Therefore, the newspaper is also elected for analysis. The Wall Street Journal is a daily paper offering news, analyses and commentaries that cover business and political affairs. It is America’s largest newspaper by circulation, counting more than 2.2 million subscribers (Agility PR Solutions, 2016). In addition, the newspaper has an Asian edition (i.e. The Wall Street Journal Asia), which publishes news and analysis targeted at readers in Asia.

Mainstream media are controlled by a small number of powerful corporate groups (Kellner, 1990), which, in turn, influence media production. Bennett (2005) points
out that media limit their coverage of events and issues to elite views. The four newspapers selected for this study are no exceptions. They possess the resources, power and influence to shape public perceptions of domestic and international affairs (Stokes, 2003), and play a significant role in the construction of reality by means of representation and discourse (Hall, 1978).

4.2.3 Selection of the timeframe

A general timeframe from the beginning of 2013 to the end of 2016 is chosen for the case studies. The reasons for the selection are as follows.

Firstly, this period coincides with the first four years of Xi Jinping’s presidential term, during which the Chinese economy has made considerable progress. For example, between 2013 and 2016, China became the second largest economy in the world. The devotion rate of Chinese economy’s to the world’s economic growth exceeded 30%, thereby surpassing those of the U.S, EU and Japan, and ranking first in the world (Dai, 2017). From the perspective of Chinese people and government, this achievement signifies national independence, self-determination, self-strengthening and liberation from and a farewell to the colonial/semi-colonial history of foreign occupation, oppression and exploitation. The growth of China’s economy has increased its global presence and influence.

Moreover, these four years have witnessed the efforts that China, under President Xi’s leadership, has made to strengthen China’s voice in the world, and enhance South-South cooperation. As of 2016, more than half of all President Xi’s state visits have been to developing countries. For example, President Xi has made three state visits to Southeast Asia, three state visits to central Asia, two state visits to South Asia, two state visits to Northeast Asia, two state visits to Latin America, compared with only two state visits to the U.S. In addition, China initiated a new programme for development, “yidai yilu (One Belt, One Road)” (also known as “Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road”), to boost economic cooperation and strategic partnership between China and its surrounding
developing countries. Furthermore, in 2014, the China-CELAC Forum was established, and in 2015, President Xi attended the Asian-African Summit as well as the China-Africa Cooperation Forum summit in Johannesburg. All of these indicated that China is increasingly taking up its “right to speak” for herself and keen to strengthen the relations between developing countries in the hope of getting voices of non-Western nations heard in the world. Against this background, a flurry of reports on China in western media has appeared. Take the Wall street Journal for an example, which shows an increase in news reports on China, counting 9868 reports in 2013 and 12541 reports in 2016. In fact, the number of news reports on China in 2016 is at a record high, surpassing those published in any year in the 21st century. Therefore, this four-year period is selected to examine American news coverage of contemporary China.

It should be noted that since each of the three cases has its own background and context, each also involves a different and specific time frame within the wider timeline for data collection. The selection and justification of the timeframe for data collection with regard to each case is further elaborated in data collection section (see Section 4.3).

### 4.2.4 Selection of the cases

This study employs the term “case study” in line with Krippendorff (2004, p.98), for whom the term refers to a unit of analysis, which is “distinguished for selective inclusion in an analysis”. In my research, within the time period between 2013 and 2016, three cases – the American mainstream media coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in Hong Kong SAR, the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist aggression, and China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016 – are under examination.

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3 The data is collected from *ProQuest (Wall Street Journal)* newspaper database, using “China” as a keyword.
This section offers a very brief introduction to each case before elaborating on the rationale for selecting them. The in-depth details of each case are mapped out in the introductory section of each analysis chapter. Briefly speaking, the “Occupy Central” event was plotted by a few western-trained elites, aiming to prevent the implementation of the Chinese central government’s policy on electoral processes in Hong Kong. The event started on the 26th of September 2014 and lasted for nearly two months, during which the elites instigated students and young people to occupy Hong Kong’s central business areas in the name of demonstrating for ‘democracy’ (see Chapter 5). The anniversary parade was held in Beijing on the 3rd of September 2015. It aims to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s resistance war against fascist Japan’s aggression together with the victory against Fascism and the end of World War II (hereafter referred to as WWII), with Chinese troops participating in the parade, and heads of state and high-ranking government officials from 49 countries participating in the anniversary event (Yang, 2015) (see Chapter 6). China-Africa relations are related to economic and cultural interactions between China and Africa. The development of China-Africa relations indicates that China attaches great importance to enhancing South-South co-operations (see Chapter 7). The reasons for the selection of these three cases are as follows.

Firstly, not only are these three cases current, but the American mainstream media have intensively reported on them compared to other political or economic affairs/events that happened during the same time period in China. For example, the front pages of Western mainstream newspapers, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, have covered the 2014 Hong Kong “Occupy Central” event between 26 September 2014 and 6 October 2014, i.e. the first nine days after it started. Similarly, Western mainstream newspapers have covered China’s anniversary parade on the front page of their online platform on the 3rd of September 2015, the day when it happened (Zhang H., 2015). Moreover, in terms of China-Africa relations, the year of 2011 saw a notable increase of reports on China-African interactions (Bognár, 2012). For example, since 2011, the number of news reports on China-Africa relations in The Wall Street Journal has risen to 800, compared to
only 200 records in 2009. Hence the three cases are selected as a result of their intensive coverage by U.S. newspapers, and the subsequent availability of large number of news texts on them.

Secondly, all three cases are associated with (neo)colonialism historically and contemporarily in different geographical areas, and fit into a postcolonial framework. Post-colonialism (see Section 2.3) examines the power involved in culture and knowledge relations between the West and the non-West (Ahluwalia, 2007), and is committed to “a radical critique of colonialism/imperialism and neo-colonialism” (Prasad, 2003, p.7). In other words, postcolonialism is concerned with cultural and racial relations of extra-state rather than intra-state. The three selected cases, which involve the historical connectivities between China as a colonised nation and western colonialism and imperialism, are linked to the concept of postcolonialism. Specifically, the Hong Kong “Occupy Central” event is connected to the legacy of British colonialism in postcolonial Hong Kong. The anniversary parade is bound up with relations between China and Japan (a former colonial power in Asia), and the history of Japanese colonialism and fascism in China. The discussion of China-Africa relations cannot be separated from the discussion of Euro-America (neo)colonialism in Africa. These three cases, which involve colonial powers in Europe, Japan and Euro-America respectively, allow the study to examine and question taken-for-granted ‘truths’ and ‘wisdoms’ by establishing the historical connectivities between China as a semi-colonised nation and the West’s colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, these three cases are selected for analysis.

4.3 Data collection

For each case, the combinations of key words and time frames used to search for articles are slightly different, because they had to align with the case. The details of

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4 I get the number of news texts based on the keyword search (i.e. using “China” and “Africa” as key words) in the ProQuest (Wall Street Journal) newspaper database.
the key words and time periods selected for searching news texts on each case are as follows.

For collecting data on the “Occupy Central” event, I selected the period between the 26th of September 2014, when the occupiers entered the Civic Square, and the 6th of October 2014, when the occupiers began to retreat, schools reopened and government offices restarted to operate again. Western media and academic discourses of the event have hailed these nine days as the decisive stage of the “Occupy Central” event. During this time period, mainstream American newspapers have intensively covered the event on the front pages of online platforms, which is the reason for this period constituting the temporal focus. Before collecting the data, I scanned several Chinese and American news reports and websites on the event, in order to ascertain which key terms could be used to collect news reports. I found that the most neutral term for the event is “Occupy Central”. The more subjective terms “pro-democracy movement” and “umbrella revolution” were also widely used in American newspapers to describe the event. Therefore, the key terms “Occupy Central”, “pro-democracy movement”, “umbrella revolution”, “umbrella movement”, “pro-democracy” AND “Hong Kong”, “Hong Kong protest”, and “Hong Kong protesters” were employed to collect the data.

For the anniversary parade, the seven-month time period was selected as the temporal focus, i.e. between the 2nd of March 2015, when China made the announcement on starting its preparations for the parade, and the 30th of September 2015, the end of the month in which the parade was held. Following the initial announcement on the parade, the Western media paid great attention to the Chinese government and its preparations for the Victory Day commemoration (Zhang H., 2015). Mainstream American newspapers intensively covered China’s 70th Anniversary event during this time frame. According to Hui Zhang (2015), a Google News search shows 170,000 records of news reports on the anniversary parade covering the period from 1st of September to 5th of September 2015. The majority of Western mainstream newspapers featured news about the parade on
their front pages. Similar to the case of the “Occupy Central” event, scanning several Chinese and American news reports and websites on the event before collecting the data helped to ascertain the best key terms to use in collecting news reports on the anniversary event. While the Chinese newspapers used assertive terms such as “the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression” and “China victory day parade” to describe the anniversary parade, the American newspapers used more insinuating terms, such as “military parade”, “military display” to represent it as “military”. Based on this, the data collection process employed a combination of these terms, such as “military parade AND China”, “70th anniversary AND China”, “parade AND China”, and “military display AND China”.

With regard to the case of China-Africa relations, key combinations, such as “China AND Africa”, “China OR Chinese AND Africa OR African”, were used to search for news texts reporting on China-Africa relations. The temporal focus was the period from the beginning of 2013 to the end of 2016. This four-year time span was chosen because it captures an increase in the number of news reports on China-Africa relations. In 2013, President Xi Jinping chose Africa for his first foreign visit in his capacity as the president of China. During his state visit to African nations, he presented his plans for a cooperation policy with Africa, featuring sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith, and thus opening up a new chapter for cooperation between China and Africa (He, 2015). The time period chosen for data collection, witnessed an increase in Chinese political, economic and socio-cultural exchange and cooperation with Africa, which was documented by a flurry of news reports in the Western media.

The tools used to collect the data included mainly the online databases LexisNexis and ProQuest, which were conducive to sifting through The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal in search of news reports on the three cases. Due to the fact that these two databases did not fully include news reports from the Los Angeles Times (the databases only included articles from the most recent 2 weeks), I also consulted the website of the Los Angeles Times in order to
collect news articles. Articles from the Asian edition of *The Wall Street Journal* were also included. For each case, all news coverage (including both “hard” news and opinions discourses i.e. editorials, op-ed articles and guest columns) appearing in the sampled sources over the selected period as stated above formed the basis of analysis for the study.

In order to ensure that themes or topics of the media coverage are closely related to each case, and to be able to narrow down the number of the news texts to a manageable range, all the news reports were carefully read, and a specific set of qualifying criteria was applied at this stage. The criteria are elaborated as follows. Firstly, news articles, which only had the key words in the headline but the articles per se are not relevant were omitted. Secondly, articles that only briefly mentioned the cases in passing were disqualified. Using these criteria, only those articles with a detailed discussion of the cases in question were included in the data sample. Articles, which featured an unrelated primary topic but still contained the key words in the main body, were excluded. Lastly, articles that were duplicated across the four newspapers were excluded from the analysis. These qualifying criteria served to ensure that all included articles concentrate on reporting the events. The application of these criteria to the data collection process for each case, generated 47 news texts for the “Occupy Central” event, 48 news texts for the anniversary parade, and 61 news texts for China-Africa relations. In the end, this research study analysed a total of 156 news texts (see Table 4.1).
### Table 4.1 Selected news samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case No.</th>
<th>Selected newspapers</th>
<th>Key words for search</th>
<th>Selected time period</th>
<th>Number of selected texts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case 1: Hong Kong “Occupy Central” event</td>
<td>NYT; WP; WSJ; LAT;</td>
<td>“Occupy Central”, “pro-democracy movement”, “umbrella revolution”; “umbrella movement”, “pro-democracy” AND “Hong Kong”, “Hong Kong protest”, and “Hong Kong protesters”</td>
<td>26/09/2014 – 06/10/2014</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 2: China’s 70th anniversary parade</td>
<td>NYT; WP; WSJ; LAT;</td>
<td>“military parade AND China”; “70th anniversary AND China”; “parade AND China”; “military display AND China”</td>
<td>01/03/2015 – 30/09/2015</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 3: China-Africa relations</td>
<td>NYT; WP; WSJ; LAT;</td>
<td>“China AND Africa”, “China OR Chinese AND Africa OR African”</td>
<td>01/01/2013 – 31/12/2016</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.4 Data analysis: critical discourse analysis (CDA)

Underpinned by Marxism (see Section 2.2), the theoretically-informed CDA is employed as a methodological framework guiding the analysis. In alignment with Marxist critical theories, CDA critically analyses social power, discrimination, dominance, and control which are manifested and legitimised by the use of language (Wodak, 2001). Accordingly, CDA “want[s] to produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection” (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.7). As such, CDA chooses the perspective of those who suffer most from dominance and inequality, and critically targets the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice (Van Dijk, 1993a, Wodak, 2001).

Language, which is composed of a variety of discourses, is not neutral but an instrument, with which ideology is transmitted and reproduced, and domination and
hegemony are maintained and reinforced (Wodak, 2001). As Habermas (1977, cited in Wodak, 2001, p.2) argues, language “serves to legitimise relations of organised power. In so far as the legitimations of power relations [...] are not articulated, [...] language is also ideological”. Ideology serves as an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). The powerful elites establish and maintain unequal power relations with the less powerful groups by using the discourse in different ways and by controlling the access to specific discourses or public spheres. Accordingly, discourses are produced and reproduced through representations to naturalise and universalise a particular view of the world and to shape people’s perceptions of reality (McEwan, 2008). Applying the above insights on discourse and ideology to this research study implies that American media discourses on China are not neutral, and are produced within a certain context. Thus, critical discourse analysis enables us to examine hidden meanings, and reveal the ideology and power relations expressed in American media discourses.

Critical discourse analysis perceives both written and spoken discourses as a form of social practice involved in a dialectical relationship (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). On the one hand, situational and social-political contexts shape and impact on discourses, while on the other hand, discourses are considered to be constituting and affecting discursive and non-discursive social practices (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). To explore the connections between discursive practices and extra-linguistic social structure, CDA relies on an interdisciplinary approach and the principle of triangulation (De Cillia et al., 1999). The principle implies that various interdisciplinary, methodological and source-specified approaches are combined to investigate a particular discourse phenomenon. Accordingly, this study adopted an interdisciplinary approach, which combines CDA approach with a postcolonial perspective, in analysing the American mainstream media representation of China.

Othering, which is defined as a critical discursive tool of discrimination and exclusion, is operationalised through the mechanisms of discourse and
interpretation set by dominant groups (Boréus, 2006, Riggins, 1997). Drawing on previous critical discourse analyses of othering and discriminatory discourses (cf. Boréus, 2006, Flowerdew et al., 2002, Krumer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012, Riggins, 1997), there are several discourse strategies. These discourse strategies, which are operationalised by specific linguistic techniques, are used by the media to reproduce and reinforce power, dominance, and discrimination.

**Negative Other-presentation**

Negative Other-presentation is regarded as an important form of discursive discrimination and a strategy for the justification of inequality (Van Dijk, 1993a). Such presentation is achieved by focusing attention on the “negative social or cultural differences, deviance or threats attributed to ‘them’” (Van Dijk, 1993b, p.263). In other words, the strategy focuses on attributing negative and repugnant characteristics to the ‘Other’ group, and thus portrays the ‘Other’ as inferior to the ‘We’ group (Flowerdew et al., 2002). Nomination is one of the tactics of negative other presentation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). Nomination is the “discursive construction of social actors” which means that it works to define the social role attributed to a social group (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p.95). By assigning and repeatedly using stereotypical names to refer to the minority groups, news reports stigmatise the minority groups as an ‘out-groups’ (Flowerdew et al., 2002, p.333). For example, derogative terms such as Negroes, rather than other neutral words, are used to refer to people with dark skin, which denigrates people of dark skin as ‘Others’.

Negative Other-presentation is also expressed through how people are described and what kinds of traits are attributed to them (Boréus, 2006). A semantic choice of words is used to denote other groups. Richardson (2007) emphasises the ideological significance of lexical choices in conveying society’s value judgments. The deliberate choice of words often has a pejorative/laudatory effect as it reveals “ideological affiliations” on the part of the speaker (Sykes, 1985, p.87), and reflects underlying attitudes, perceptions and judgments from the biased standpoint of certain cultural norms or social expectations (Chen, 2008). For example, negatively
connoted words, such as “poor”, “uneducated”, “ignorant”, or “uncivilised”, are used to denigrate immigrants, attribute negative characteristics to this group, and perpetuate bias (Flowerdew et al., 2002, p.332).

The use of negatively connoted metaphors constitutes another way of negatively presenting the ‘Other’ (Flowerdew et al., 2002). Metaphors carry different connotations, and are commonly used to imbue the meaning with a hidden understanding (Fairclough, 1989). Goatly (1997, p.5) points out that metaphor […] is not a mere reflection of a pre-existing objective reality but a construction of reality, through a categorisation entailing the selection of some features as critical and others as non-critical […] metaphors can consciously be used to construct […] reality. In other words, metaphors could be deployed to discursively and cognitively construct one’s own subjective realities, and shape people’s understanding of a situation. They are “chosen by [writers] to achieve particular communication goals within particular contexts” (Charteris-Black, 2004, p.247), with the aim of persuading others to accept their point of view, drawing attention to, and emphasising, specific meanings (Thomson, 1996). For example, metaphors of natural disasters, such as floods or big waves, are used to portray refugees applying for asylum (Boréus, 2006), which creates an analogy between natural disasters and refugees. The cumulative use of these negatively connoted metaphors denigrates the refugees as ‘threatening Others’.

In this manner, negative traits are attributed to the minority group by deliberately selecting words and adopting negatively connoted metaphors, which will gradually result in the formation of stereotypes about the minority group, and fixate the group as the ‘Other’ (Boréus, 2006, Flowerdew et al., 2002). Thereby, a degraded image against the ‘Other’ group is created, which further leads to social isolation of the ‘Other’ group (Flowerdew et al., 2002).
Exclusion of voices

Exclusion of voices refers to a process in which a group of people is excluded from taking part in debates that are of importance to them (Boréus, 2006). It works to deny the ‘Other’ his/her own voice, and deny him/her the opportunity to speak for him/herself, which is an essential feature of othering (Gabriel, 2012). Van Dijk (1986) describes the denial of voices as silencing. Silencing is a critical component of discourses. Johnstone (2007, p.10) argues that “in addition to being shaped by what is said, the worlds evoked and created in discourse also are shaped by silence: by what cannot be said or is not said”. Silences represent the absent information, ideas and perspectives, which are relevant to a topic but are selectively left out in a text (Huckin, 2002, Riggins, 1997, Van Dijk, 1986). For example, Boréus’ (2006) study shows that in the debate on the sterilisation law which is mainly designed for “mentally deficient” people, the voices of the “mentally deficient” people are totally absent from any of the discussions. Thereby, the “mentally deficient” people are rendered to be ‘intellectually incapable’, ‘subordinate’, and ‘inferior’ and without agency or voice. The exclusion of voices is regarded as a form of unfavourable treatment in that it serves to disempower a minority group, and functions as a means to outcast the minority group as outsiders (Boréus, 2006, Flowerdew et al., 2002).

Scapegoating

Scapegoating is the strategy of “blaming the victim”, which Wodak (1997) calls the “victim-perpetrator inversion”. It refers to the process by which the minority group is constructed as causing all kinds of problems, and thus constitute a burden to the majority group. Accordingly, the minority group is denigrated as the ‘Other’, who should be kept out or expelled. By putting all the blame on the victim or minority group, the majority group denies, and even shifts, the responsibility involved to the minority group. Thereby, the strategy of scapegoating serves to justify the discriminatory attitude of the majority towards the minority group (Flowerdew et al., 2002).

The strategy of scapegoating is expressed in the way in which certain actions are represented as being related to individuals, with individuals being portrayed as
actors or recipients of certain actions. Transitivity is a powerful linguistic approach in analysing “the content of a discourse in terms of what kinds of activities are undertaken, how participants in these activities are described, how they are classified and what they are composed of” (Mohamed, 2014, p.90). In other words, transitivity probes the way in which language represents a reality in terms of how the primary or dominant agents are constructed, what they do to whom and with what consequences (Chen, 2008). It serves to expose the ways in which writers use language to reflect their perception of reality (Bloor and Bloor, 1995, Halliday et al., 1994, Simpson, 1993). Given its focus on the transmission of ideas, transitivity can be used to reveal bias, manipulation, and ideology in discourse.

Transitivity is a system composed of participants, processes, and circumstances. Participants are expressed by means of a noun phrase, process is realised through a verb phrase, and circumstances are expressed through the use of adverbial and prepositional phrases. The material process (the process of doing-and-happening), being one type of process in transitivity, is mainly adopted in this analysis, as it construes the notion of a participant (called actor) doing something to some other entity (called goal). By selecting a particular pattern of linguistic structure, the producer of a text chooses a specific ideological slant for presenting the world to the reader. The discursive choice that a writer makes in terms of describing an action has the effect of foregrounding certain meanings while suppressing or concealing others. People can be presented as actors or recipients of action, setting out an ideological ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. For example, in Flowerdew et al.’s study (2002, p.337), Chinese Mainland immigrants are activated as actors in association with material processes and goals, such as “led to the bloom of squatter areas”, or “causing a rapid increase in population and unemployment rate” in Hong Kong. With the help of these material processes (“led to”, “cause”), the newspaper deliberately constructs the Chinese Mainland immigrants as causing all kinds of problems, thereby putting all the blames on them. In that way, the Chinese Mainland immigrants are denigrated as the ‘Others’, who should be expelled.
Another way of shifting responsibility is through the use of passive agent-deletion. The linguistic tool of passive agent-deletion functions as a means to manipulate agency transparency, which serves to construct a world of various responsibilities, and power (Hyatt, 2005, p.48). By transforming active constructions into passive forms, the agents in a particular process are elided, and thus responsibility for the actions is systematically backgrounded, or in some instances, the responsibility of others is strategically foregrounded (Hyatt, 2005). To sum up, by problematising issues related to the minority group and putting all the blame to them, the strategy of scapegoating works to induce society with fear of the minority group, generate panic among the general public, foment a collective hostile attitude against the minority group, and thus stigmatise the minority group as the ‘Other’ (Flowerdew et al., 2002).

**Distortion**

Distortion is a discourse strategy to present a distorted picture of the ‘Others’. Decontextualisation is one way of presenting a distorted picture. It refers to the process in which an element/behaviour is taken out of a specific context in which it was developed and continues to exist (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, Krummer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012). Certain behaviours are portrayed as having no reason or rationality and lacking complexity. Accordingly, behaviours and occurrences are reduced to constituting the generalised features of many, rather than the specific characteristics of, or specific responses to, particular circumstances, which further serves as evidence for the essential difference between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’(Krummer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012). Dehistoricisation is a manifestation of decontextualisation. Dehistoricisation refers to a focus on the present, which is based on detaching the particular history of an element/behaviour, and ignoring the implications of the history (Krummer-Nevo and Sidi, 2012). Thereby, dehistoricisation results into a distorted understanding of the present situation.
4.5 Summary

This chapter has outlined the methodological design that guides the study, and presented a theoretical rationale for the approach to data collection. Due to the USA’s position as a main global hegemon and its dominant role in the international media and information flows, this study chooses to analyse representations of China in American newspapers. Four mainstream American newspapers, including The New York Times (NYT), The Washington Post (WP), The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), and the Los Angeles Times (LAT), are chosen on the basis of their large circulation, greater coverage of international affairs compared with other newspapers, as well as their influence on public opinions and other media in the world. The study selects the period between 2013 and 2016 for its temporal focus. During this time period, three cases – the American mainstream newspapers’ coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in Hong Kong SAR, the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist aggression, and China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016 – are under examination. This chapter has also detailed the methods of data collection. Databases LexisNexis and Proquest are used to collect news texts on the three cases, facilitating the selection of a total of 156 news texts for analysis. Moreover, the chapter has introduced and explained the CDA approach that underpins the research. Guided by the conceptual framework that Chapter 2 developed, this chapter has discussed various discourse strategies, such as negative-Other presentation, exclusion, scapegoating, and distortion, all of which are useful in analysing the process of Othering.

The theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2, combined with the methods presented in this chapter, will guide the analysis of the three selected cases, which will be detailed in the following three chapters. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are organised around the 2014 Hong Kong “Occupy Central” event, the 2015 China’s anniversary parade, and China-Africa relations respectively. These chapters critically examine the ways in which China and the Chinese are represented and discursively constructed, and uncover hidden ideologies and power relations. In addition to the
deconstruction of the dominate discourse, the chapters provide alternative subaltern interpretations, reconstructing realities as perceived through an indigenous lens.
Chapter 5
Postcolonial Deconstruction of Western Media Representation of the 2014 “Occupy Central” Event in Hong Kong

5.1 Introduction

In 2007, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC) announced a policy on the voting procedure for electing the chief executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereafter Hong Kong SAR) which was to take place in 2017. According to the policy, the chief executive will be elected through a ballot by all the Hong Kong citizens (Huang and Chen, 2014, Kong, 2014). Following the announcement of the policy, several figures representing the few elites including Benny Tai Yiu-ting (a UK-trained law professor of Hong Kong University), Chan Kin-man (a U.S.-trained sociology professor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong) and Chu Yiu-ming (a Baptist church priest) organised a small group of 10 people who called themselves the group of the “Occupy Central” on 27th of March 2013, and declared that their aim was to prevent the implementation of the Chinese central government policy on the electoral method. The group planned to obstruct the policy by occupying the central business areas of the Hong Kong SAR in October 2014 (Huang and Chen, 2014, Jiang, 2014). Since 2013, the small group of Western-trained elites have started plotting a series of activities to draw international, and in particular western, media attention, and they even organised a rehearsal of the “Occupy Central” event on the 2nd of July 2014 in the name of seeking ‘democracy’ (Li, 2015). This caused serious disputes and opposition from the majority of Hong Kong citizens. On the 17th of August 2014, an “anti-Occupy Central” signatory and demonstration were carried out by more than one million people in Hong Kong, aiming to fight against the “Occupy Central” plan, to support the implementation of the central government policy (Kurata, 2015), and to preempt, as it will be analysed in this chapter, the real aim of the ‘Occupy Central’ elite group of annexing Hong Kong from China. Lacking support from the majority of Hong Kong citizens, the Occupy Central group made use of younger Hong Kong Chinese at middle schools and universities, instigated them to boycott classes and
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put them to the front to occupy several areas of Hong Kong while they themselves remained behind scenes. Against a background of increasingly divided public opinions and oppositions to the planned “Occupy Central” event, on the 26th of September 2014 the organisers staged the “Occupy” event with the students and young people starting to occupy the Civic Square of Hong Kong’s central area. On the 28th of September 2014, Benny Tai announced the formal start of “Occupy Central” event (Jiang, 2014, Kong, 2014). Over the course of the subsequent two months, Hong Kong’s central business areas were occupied with some places paralysed by frenzied youngsters aged between their lower teens and early twenties who claimed that they were demonstrating for ‘democracy’. The real purpose of the event organisers, as it shall be revealed in this chapter, however was to restore Hong Kong’s colonial status, at least in their imagination, which not only had nothing to do with the idea of ‘democracy’, but also was contradicting the very principles of genuine democracy⁵.

It is this headline-grabbing event known as “Occupy Central” that catapulted the Hong Kong SAR into the media spotlight in the summer of 2014. Western media representation of the event, and subsequent academic discourses, have discursively constructed it as a “democratic movement” (cf. Bhatia, 2015, Davis, 2015, Kan, 2013, Ortmann, 2015). While this construction (i.e. “democratic movement”), through hegemonic de-historicising, de-contextualising discourses, has become an unquestioned ‘fact’ and accepted ‘truth’ hailed by both the right and left in the West as an “umbrella revolution”, the voices of the majority (of both Hong Kong and mainland) subaltern Chinese have thus far been unrepresented, silenced and completely ignored.

Guided by postcolonial and decolonial theories (see Chapter 2), this chapter applies CDA approach to examine a selection of 47 news texts on the “Occupy Central”

⁵ In his work Human Rights and Empire, Burke (2013) points out that democracy should be first of all under the condition of national self-determination and independence. In the case of Hong Kong, the prerequisite of democracy in Hong Kong should be that Hong Kong has always been part of China and no long been a British colony.
event (see Section 4.3), and investigate the existing hegemonic construction of the event. Following the introduction, the chapter is organised into seven sections. The first five sections shed light on the data and expose the ways in which the media have employed discourse strategies to construct the event and its associated political and socio-cultural processes as a “democratic movement”. In Section 5.7, I interrogate the dominant discourse and provide alternative, subaltern voice and narratives of the event through historicising and contextualising it in relation to the specificities of the Hong Kong SAR’s colonial past and postcolonial present. Section 5.8 offers a summary of the main findings of this chapter.

5.2 A binary of ‘democracy’ versus oriental ‘authoritarianism’

Framing is one way to precipitate the ideological effects of media texts. Media frames play a central role in shaping audience’s perception of a given event or issue. Through using selected words, metaphors and phrases, the media frames tend to reflect a “specific ideology”, and set the “tone” of media coverage (Saleem, 2007, pp.134-135). The celebration of the views held by elites’ and denigration of those of others are indispensable to the process through which news media manipulate the way that readers make sense of the world. In the case of the American mainstream newspapers’ coverage of the “Occupy Central” event, it was evident that labels such as “authoritarian Beijing” (The New York Times, 28 September 2014) and “authoritarian Chinese Communist Party” (The New York Times, 3 October 2014) were used to refer to the Chinese government. By repeatedly using these stereotypical labels to refer to mainland China, the media wittingly stigmatise Mainland China as an ‘out-group’. In contrast, the “Occupy Central” event was predominantly labelled a “student protest” for “democracy”, and a legitimate “insurgency”, rather than riots. Other labels to portray the “Occupy Central” event included “pro-democracy”, “democratic fervour”, and “fighting for freedom”. Correspondingly, occupiers were portrayed as “pro-democracy activists”. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (hereafter referred to as OED), “protest” is defined as “making a strong objection to something, especially a supposed injustice or offence”; “insurgency” describes “an organised rebellion aimed at
overthrowing opposing authority through the use of subversion and armed conflict”. It could be argued that words such as “insurgency” and “protest” often contain a positive evaluation of the event being described, and therefore construct an impression that the event under consideration is a fight against injustice, and plays a central role in waking people up and inspiring people’s enthusiasm. By making sense of the event in these ways, news organisations function as, what Althusser (1971a) calls, the ideological apparatus of the State. By ignoring or suppressing terms, such as “Occupy Central” event, and riots, the Western media contributed to a situation in which an understanding of the real aim of the “Occupy Central” event is limited or reduced to a ‘democratic/authoritarian’ dichotomy.

The Western media’s frequent use of the binary category (i.e. ‘democratic/authoritarian’ category) in its news texts fostered an impression that the “Occupy Central” event was pro-democracy, and those who were not in or even opposed to it were undemocratic. The event was recontextualised as a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. By framing the aim of the “Occupy Central” event in the language of human rights, particularly the values of democratic principles, the media attempt to build the event’s ‘reputation’, and redefine it as a “movement” ‘serving the interests’ of Hong Kong’s citizens. Moreover, the “democratic” frame not only shaped but also constrained the readers’ interpretative paradigm, so that discussions and debates concerning the event could not go beyond the pre-set ‘democratic’ frame.

5.3 Media discourse of a ‘despotic’ and ‘savage’ ‘Other’

A discourse of difference is often constructed by the media to maintain the privilege and hegemony of the ruling class, preclude certain groups from material and symbolic resources, and exclude these groups as ‘Others’ (Hall, 1992). Negative Other-presentation is a strategy which the media adopt to perpetuate existing stereotypes, or shape the formation of new negative attitudes towards dominated groups. The deliberate and strategic choice of words, metaphors, and sentences, enables the media to stigmatisethe dominated groups, and construct them in ways...
that resonate with widely-known stereotypes, thus rendering these dominated groups as ‘inferior’.

In the news coverage of the “Occupy Central” event, the media constructed a negative image of Mainland China by drawing on a range of Orientalist stereotypes and highlighting the words that ascribed negative attributes to the mainland China. As such, the media frame a ‘despotic’ Mainland China and categorise mainland China as an ‘out-group’:

(1) Anger with the Chinese government runs especially deep among Hong Kong residents in their 30s and younger, according to polls. Younger residents feel squeezed by rising housing prices and living expenses and lack of upward mobility, and they often accuse the government of pandering to tycoons. “I think unfairness is spreading in Hong Kong, and because of the political system,” said Edith Fung, 21, a student of land surveying. “I don’t want Hong Kong to change to be like China, with corruption, unfairness, no press freedom, no religious freedom”. (The New York Times, 28 September 2014)

(2) “In the mainland, there’s no freedom; we have to defend our freedoms while we have them,” protester Gary Lam, 44, said. (Los Angeles Times, 27 September 2014)

(3) Pro-democracy groups and parties have said the Chinese government’s proposals betrayed promises that starting in 2017, Hong Kong’s leader, or chief executive, would be chosen by all voters, instead of the 1,200-member committee of elites loyal to Beijing that chooses the leader now. […] Quite a few said they had come to a daytime rally despite parental disapproval. “My mom supports me, but my dad opposed me,” said Oscar Mo Hau-chuk, a slight teenage boy at the protest, where the police gently herded the students behind barriers. “I told him this government is dark, is wrong, because it doesn’t listen.” (The New York Times, 27 September 2014)

The news texts established a discourse of difference between the ‘demonic’ Mainland China and a ‘fair’ and ‘free’ Hong Kong (such as “we have to defend our freedoms while we have them”). Drawing on Orientalist stereotypes, pejorative
words and phrases such as “corruption”, “unfairness”, “no press freedom”, “no religious freedom”, “dark” and “wrong” were deliberately employed to characterise Mainland China, and denigrate it as an ‘undemocratic’ and ‘despotic’ place. Additionally, Mainland China was portrayed as “controlling” the media (*The New York Times*, 1 October 2014) and “betraying” its promises. By assigning these sorts of negative attributes to mainland China, the media created a ‘degraded’ and Orientalist image of Mainland China, formed stereotypes towards mainland China and reduced everything about mainland China to those stereotypes (such as “corruption” and “no freedom”), which fixated mainland China as the ‘degraded’ ‘Other’.

In 1997, Hong Kong was freed from colonial rule and the PRC regained its sovereignty over Hong Kong. In line with the principle of “yiguo liangzhi (one country, two systems)”, Hong Kong SAR was to be subject to the authority of Central People’s Government, but would enjoy a high degree of autonomy (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2014). Hong Kong’s existing social, economic and legal systems were to remain unchanged, as were its way of life, and its status as a free port and an international trade and financial centre. The high degree of autonomy of Hong Kong SAR is not full autonomy, but it should put “one country” as a premise and be subject to the level of the central government’s leadership (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2014). In the news texts, the media distorted the “one country” principle, and inaccurately depicted the relations between China and Hong Kong SAR. Specially, the media portrayed Hong Kong SAR’s administration as “beholden to” Beijing (*Los Angeles Times*, 30 September, 2017). Thereby, the media sought to imply that Hong Kong SAR and China exist as two separate entities rather than one, and that Hong Kong’s government is ‘pandering to’ Beijing. Moreover, by denigrating Hong Kong government and its police as ‘force-oriented’ and ‘brutal’, the media furtively insinuated that the Central People’s Government was ‘uncivilised’ and ‘savage’. The news texts used negatively connoted words to portray Hong Kong’s public administration as a “despicable” and “brutal” government which tends to “use force” (*The Wall Street Journal*, 5 October, 2014)
and “deploy tear gas against crowds” (*The Wall Street Journal*, 1 October, 2014). The Chinese government was portrayed as “endor[ing] the tough approach to the protests” (*The New York Times*, 29 September 2014). Through activating Hong Kong government as actors in relation to material processes and goals such as “use force” and “deploy tear gas”, the media highlighted the Hong Kong government’s readiness to adopt brutal measures in dealing with the occupiers. Hence, the media characterised the Hong Kong government as ‘brutal’ and ‘violent’, and stigmatised the government as ‘atrocious’ and ‘force-oriented’. The discourse of the ‘atrocious’ government is further reinforced by constructing a distinction between the ‘armed’ police and the ‘peaceful’ occupiers. For example:

(4) Hundreds of young protesters faced phalanxes of police officers with shields whose warnings to disperse went unheeded. The nighttime standoff between hundreds of demonstrators and the well-prepared police force came at the end of a week of peaceful student protests over Beijing’s limited proposals for electoral change, released last month. (*The New York Times*, 27 September, 2014)

(5) Hours after the riot police sought late Sunday to break up the protest, large crowds of demonstrators remained nearby, sometimes confronting lines of officers and chanting for them to lay down their truncheons and shields. […] The heavy-handed police measures, including the city’s first use of tear gas in years and the presence of officers with long-barrelled guns, appeared to galvanise the public, drawing more people onto the streets. […]The confrontation threatened to tarnish Hong Kong’s reputation as a safe enclave for commerce, and immediately raised the political cost of Beijing’s unyielding position on electoral change here; Footage and photos of unarmed students standing in clouds of tear gas facing off with riot police officers flashed around the world on Sunday. (*The New York Times*, 29 September, 2014)

Here, the police is framed as “police officers with shields”, “riot police”, “officers with long-barrelled guns”, and “officers in riot gear”. Such a framing of the police insinuates unrequired aggression. Repetition of the terms “riot”, “riot gear”, and “shields” emphasises a heavy-handed approach in the police’s attempts to deal with
the occupiers, and creates an impression that the police tends to deploy force in tackling issues of public concern. Moreover, the media attempt to illusively villainise the police through framing the occupiers as “unarmed”, “peaceful” and “good-mannered”. This sort of words, which are imbued with positive evaluations, are frequently used in American news reports to portray the occupiers. For example, the occupiers were represented as having “unexpected strength”, “enthusiasm”, “determination”, and “energy”. They were portrayed as being “nonviolent”, “assiduously polite”, “clean”, and “with fastidious attention to hygiene and good manners”. Attributes, including “young”, “passionate”, and “punctilious about obeying the law”, were used to personalise the occupiers. The media placed great emphasis on constructing ‘ideal’ qualities of occupiers. i.e., the occupiers are clean, polite, and peaceful, and framed the occupiers as ‘innocent’ and ‘nonviolent’. In so doing, the newspapers created an ‘attack’ versus ‘defence’ divide, which positioned the ‘riot’ Hong Kong police on one side and the ‘defenceless’ students on the other. Such a dichotomy underlined the ‘brutal’ characteristics of the police and degenerates the police as ‘force-oriented’. By purposefully stigmatising the Hong Kong government and its police as ‘atrocious’ and ‘force-oriented’, the media evoked long-existing colonial stereotypes held about non-Western cultures, and insinuated that the Chinese central government is ‘uncivilised’ and ‘savage’. In addition, through constructing the ‘attack VS defence’ divide, the “Occupy Central” event was recontextualised as a violent incident between the police and the occupiers. In that manner, the news texts hijacked the readers’ attention, and completely bypassed the historical background behind the event. Thus, the event is dehistoricised.

The case study newspapers produce and reproduce Orientalist discourses that are deeply rooted in Western cultures, and construct ideological representations of Mainland China as ‘authoritarian’ and ‘uncivilised’. The Orientalist constructions of the Chinese government consolidate false assumptions and stereotypes underlying Western attitudes towards non-Western nations and in particular China. Moreover, the stereotypical representations of China operate as “a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient” (Said, 1978, p.95). A binary
opposition between the ‘normalised’ West and ‘eccentric’ China is constructed. Such a dichotomy debases mainland China as an ‘inferior’ ‘Other’ which should be expelled, while justifying the Occupiers’ action as fighting for democracy.

5.4 Discursive construction of China as a ‘threat’

Media, through manufacturing and reproducing images and messages, provide guiding myths that shape people’s perceptions of the world and manipulate their reactions towards certain issues or events (Cohen and Young, 1973). Scare tactic is often adopted by media to cultivate and sustain prejudices held by dominant groups about certain minority groups, and cast these minority groups as ‘threats’ to the general public. Thus, the media generate panic and contribute to a collectively hostile attitude toward the minority groups (Flowerdew et al., 2002). The scare tactic could also be found in the American mainstream newspapers’ coverage of China. In the news texts, the otherness of Mainland China is highlighted by constructing the country as a possible ‘threat’ to Hong Kong’s public order. One characteristic of the news coverage is that a war metaphor is used to frame the “Occupy Central” event as a fight between the mainland Chinese government and the occupiers. For example, occupiers are portrayed as being “targets” (Los Angeles Times, 29 September, 2014), and needing to “fend off” (The New York Times, 1 October 2014) and “fight” (Los Angeles Times, 29 September, 2014) ‘iniquities’, and “defend[ing]” (Los Angeles Times, 28 September, 2014) themselves. The use of the war metaphor enables the media to encourage resentment against Mainland China as if the latter was an ‘invader’.

As previously discussed in Section 5.2, the ‘authoritarian’ and ‘uncivilised’ frames denigrate Mainland China as an ‘inferior’ and ‘deviant’ ‘Other’. These Orientalist stereotypes tend to invoke “fantasies related to dirt, danger, deviance and crime” (Breen et al., 2006, p.11), and serve to construct mainland China as a rapidly escalating threat to Hong Kong. Playing on the frame of ‘authoritarianism’, the media forge the illusion that the ‘authoritarian’ Chinese government poses a threat to the ‘democratic’ Hong Kong. For example,
Several politicians and protesters at the demonstration said the government might try to clear away the protesters on Sunday, as tiredness took hold and the work week approached. Since Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, the former British colony has kept its independent courts and legal protections for free speech and assembly, as well as a robust civil society. But many democratic groups and politicians say those freedoms have eroded under mainland China’s growing political and economic influence. (The New York Times, 28 September 2014)

Hong Kong was a British colony until 1997, when China resumed sovereignty. Since then, it has operated under a policy of “one country, two systems”, which keeps its independent judiciary and many freedoms, including a robust tradition of free speech. But many democratic groups say that China has chipped away at those freedoms, and that the election law proposals were the latest, most infuriating example. (The New York Times, 29 September 2014).

Lam said there were “credible reports” that the People’s Liberation Army garrison in Hong Kong, which has about 6,000 troops, had been put on alert. “If the Hong Kong police cannot disperse the crowd, there is the possibility of the PLA getting into the action,” Lam said. Such a step, if taken, would mark an unprecedented move by central Chinese government authorities to intervene in Hong Kong affairs. (Los Angeles Times, 29 September 2014)

In the news texts, a discourse of ‘civilisation mission’ is used to gloss over British colonialism in Hong Kong, and implies that British colonial power has brought ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ to colonial Hong Kong. The media construct a picture of a socio-politically ‘robust’, ‘democratic’ and ‘free’ Hong Kong in the postcolonial period, and imply that such a ‘robust’ Hong Kong is the result of the colonial ‘civilisation mission’. Such a construction distorts the history of British colonial rule in Hong Kong, and overlooks British colonial exploitation, power abuse, racial segregation, and land grabbing. The discourse of ‘British colonisers bringing civilisation to Hong Kong’ contains a Eurocentric narrative, which regards modernity and democracy as exclusive to the West. The West is seen as mapping out the future for all non-Western nations and cultures. Here, the superiority of
Western cultures over non-western cultures is established. With the discourse of ‘British civilisation mission in Hong Kong’, the media construct a racial and cultural hierarchy in which Britain is superior and Mainland China is inferior, and Hong Kong ranks somewhere in-between. Thus, the media position Hong Kong as part of ‘US’ pitted against ‘Them’ – Mainland China, and reiterate the superiority of Hong Kong over ‘backward’ Mainland China. Moreover, ‘inferior’ Mainland China is portrayed as “eroding” or “chipping away at”, freedoms, and “intervening in” Hong Kong affairs. These material processes carry a negative connotation of disturbing or hindering an action or development. The media make vivid predictions about various ‘threats’ that ‘inferior’ Mainland China might pose to the public in Hong Kong. A dichotomy between ‘threatening’ Mainland China and a ‘democratic’ Hong Kong is established, which excludes Mainland China as the ‘Other’.

Moreover, the media justify the behaviours of the occupiers by using Mainland China as the scapegoat, and the news texts put all the blame on the Chinese. Mainland China and the Chinese are portrayed as causing a range of problems to the Hong Kong community; hence the imperative to keep them out. Accusations against mainland China and Chinese, as constructed in the news texts, are direct and far-reaching as illustrated in the following examples:

(9) [U]nderlying Hong Kongers’ unhappiness is what they see as an unwelcome influx of mainlanders and an unresponsive city government beholden to Beijing. Locals in the former British territory, which returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, complain about a range of issues, including high housing prices and a growing income gap. “In the mainland, there’s no freedom; we have to defend our freedoms while we have them,” protester Gary Lam, 44, said. (Los Angeles Times, 30 September 2014)

(10) Polls conducted by academic institutions over the past year have indicated that the most disaffected and potentially volatile sector of Hong Kong society is not the students, the middle-aged or even the elderly activists who have sustained the democracy movement here for decades. Instead, the most strident calls for greater democracy – and often for greater economic
populism, as well – have come from people in their 20s and early 30s who have struggled to find well-paying jobs as the local manufacturing sector has withered away, and as banks and other service industries have increasingly hired mainland Chinese instead of local college graduates. *(The New York Times, 1 October 2014)*

(11) Students have led the push for democracy in Hong Kong all summer, tapping into their generation’s frustration over soaring housing costs, an economy dominated by large conglomerates and competition from mainland Chinese for services such as education and health care. The protests come at the start of an important holiday week in China, when Hong Kong traditionally sees thousands of mainland tourists cross the border for shopping sprees. If the tourists are scared away, it could be a big blow to Hong Kong’s already sluggish economy. *(The Wall Street Journal, 29 September 2014).*

The media make use of the water metaphor in order to portray the mainland Chinese who came to Hong Kong. Linguistic realisation of the metaphor can be found in the references to “an unwelcome influx of mainlanders”. This metaphor constructs the mainland Chinese as pouring into Hong Kong at a large scale, implying that such a considerable number of mainland Chinese would have a tremendously negative and unwanted social impact on Hong Kong’s community. The news texts contain various accusations of Mainland China being the source of Hong Kong’s problems. For example, Mainland China is accused of ‘changing’ Hong Kong’s political system, and also giving rise to income ‘inequality’ and economic ‘problems’ *(Los Angeles Times, 27 September 2014).* The Mainland Chinese are blamed for the ‘increase’ in the unemployment rate, and for placing a ‘burden’ on public services, such as education and health care. In so doing, the media construct Mainland China as the scapegoat for high rate of unemployment, structural inequalities, and adverse impacts on education and housing. Historical and contemporary political, economic, and socio-cultural factors (such as the changing position of Hong Kong’s economy in Asia), which contribute to the territory’s problems and the occupiers’ discontent are ignored. The existing problems, which are the consequences of the interplay of different underlying factors, are recontextualised as resulting from the “influx” of
Mainland Chinese. The “Occupy Central” event is decontextualised as being caused by a ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’ ‘Other’ – which is, in this case, Mainland China. By constructing Mainland China as constituting a burden and imposing a threat to Hong Kong, the media misled the public to believe that accepting Mainland China’s policies would lead to an uncontrollable situation, in which the interests and privileges of the local people are adversely affected. Thereby, the media’s efforts to marginalise Mainland China as the ‘threatening Other’ incited panic and anxiety among the Hong Kong public, and legitimised the occupiers’ fight against Mainland China.

5.5 Recontextualising the event

News media is considered as an effective vehicle for disseminating ideologies (Hartley, 1982). In order to produce news, which is intelligible to the readers and effective in disseminating particular views, the media manipulate the process of selecting materials as well as the way of presenting them (Murdock, 1973). Hall et al. (1978, p.54) points out that “the social identification, classification and contextualisation of unusual and unexpected new events in terms of background frames of reference is the fundamental process by which the media make the world they report on intelligible to readers and viewers”. Put differently, the need to make information intelligible to readers requires the media to situate events within frameworks that are already familiar to the reader.

In the case of the “Occupy Central” event, the news texts link it to the “Occupy Wall Street” event occurring in 2011, thus presenting it in a very specific light. For example,

(12) Despite adopting a name similar to Occupy Wall Street, the movement that began in 2011 with protests against economic inequality, the Hong Kong movement has focused on electoral demands, and many of its supporters are middle class, with a few from the city's financial elite. (The New York Times, September 27, 2014)
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(13) The gatherings seemed to share some common elements with the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations of 2011, which attracted thousands of protesters to an encampment in a Lower Manhattan park. As in Hong Kong, the Occupy protesters eschewed a traditional leadership hierarchy but forged an ecosystem all their own, often organising their own medical care and food distribution. (The New York Times, October 1, 2014)

(14) Police moved in early Sunday to surround the remnants of a pro-democracy demonstration as it morphed from a student-led protest into one spearheaded by the Occupy Central movement, which took its name and inspiration from the Occupy movement in the United States. (Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2014)

In the news texts, the case study newspapers detach the “Occupy Central” event from its historical context, and recontextualise it within the framework of the “Occupy Wall Street”. The relative recentness of the “Occupy Wall Street” event guaranteed that it was both familiar and salient to the readers. At face value, the “Occupy Wall Street” event has all the apparent features of the “Occupy Central” event – name, street gatherings, people involved and fighting against injustice – conjuring up a dramatic image which allows the readers to make immediate sense of an ambiguous situation. The news process therefore establishes links between situations, which are not based on their underlying structures and processes but on their associations with immediate forms and images. Situations are identified as being the same if they look the same at the surface (Murdock, 1973). In that way, the historical context of the “Occupy Central” event was removed, leaving only the immediate image to go by. By these means, the American mainstream newspapers dehistoricised the event, and presented it as a ‘fighting against injustice’ for immediate popular consumption.

5.6 Event twisting

The media is closely related to power structures. Media products do not simply and transparently mirror reality, but instead they express the values of the ruling class, which turns them into powerful instruments for spreading false consciousness and
maintaining social control (Chandler, 2016). Selection and omission are two of the easiest and most effective ways by which the media transmit dominant ideologies (Cirino, 1973, Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Certain stories are exaggerated and foregrounded. Stories or bits of information, which are not consistent with dominant ideas are played down or completely left out (Cirino, 1973). Hence, what finally ends up in the newspapers is only the result of a highly selective process (Cirino 1973). Decisions to select items as newsworthy or otherwise have the immediate effect of projecting a partial and dominant view of the world, and of preempting the possibility of presenting a full picture of what has happened. The strategies of selection and omission are used in American mainstream newspapers to perpetuate the dominant discourses on the “Occupy Central” event and exclude alternative voices.

5.6.1 Voice exclusion

In the news coverage of the event, voices in favour of the “Occupy Central” event are magnified, whereas those discrediting the event are backgrounded and even silenced. In the news texts, the media employ metaphors and lexical choices to exaggerate the scale of the “Occupy Central” event, and frame it as winning considerable support from the public. A metaphor of an overflowing substance (such as fire, water) is mobilised by the media to frame the number of occupiers. The event is predicated as “engulfing” the city (The New York Times, 30 September, 2014), with the occupiers “filling” (Los Angeles Times, 30 September, 2014), “flowing into” (Los Angeles Times, 1 October, 2014), “pouring in” (Los Angeles Times, 30 September, 2014), and “spilling onto” (The New York Times, 27 September, 2014) main roadways. “[S]welling” occupiers (The New York Times, 28 September, 2014) “storm” into the streets (The New York Times, 1 October, 2014) and are “clogging” (Los Angeles Times, 29 September, 2014) and “choking off” (The Wall Street Journal, 30 September, 2014) parts of central Hong Kong. With the help of these metaphors, the media concretise the event into a tide, flood or fire, and exaggerate the number of people who participated in what seemed to be a large-scale activity. The discourse of the ‘large-scale’ and ‘widely-supported’ event is
repeatedly reproduced in the news texts, embedding such a representation as a ‘truth’ and ‘fact’.

In reality, however, the “Occupy Central” event, with young students as its main participants and the western trained elites as behind-the-scene organisers, engendered serious disputes and opposition from the majority of Hong Kong citizens (Huang and Chen, 2014). During the time period when the “Occupy Central” event was staged, an “anti-Occupy Central” signature campaign and march was carried out, gathering about two million signatures and more than 190,000 participants in Hong Kong, aiming to support the implementation of the PRC’s policy on the election of the chief executive in 2017 (Yin, 2014). This shows Hong Kong residents’ strong rejection of the planned “Occupy” activities, and indicates, as Kurata (2015) suggests, a lack of popular support among the majority of Hong Kong people. However, the American mainstream media have completely ignored the “anti-Occupy Central” campaign and demonstration, despite their scale and impact, as these did not fit the media’s Orientalist ideology and agenda when representing the ‘Other’. Exaggerating the scale of the “Occupy Central” event, and deselecting and silencing the “anti-Occupy Central” petition and demonstration enabled the Western media to construct the “Occupy Central” event as being overwhelmingly ‘popular’ in Hong Kong. It is argued therefore that what becomes news and what does not have, in the first place, been filtered with coloured lens, and determined by the hidden ‘rules’ and unwritten policies of media organisations, which, in the U.S. (as in many other western countries) tend to be controlled by practices of ‘professionals’ deeply embedded in ethnocentric values, norms and cultural prejudice (and ignorance).

5.6.2 Information exclusion

Critical media theories point out that the routine of news production is biased, and constrained by political, economic and ideological factors (Schlesinger, 1989). The mass media perform their job of “clouding people’s mind” with ideas that the ruling class wishes them to have (Berger, 2005). Different apparatuses are structurally
linked to promote the dominant definitions of events. At the same time, sources that generate counter-definitions of the events are considered to be irrelevant. In so doing, an ideological closure – the prevailing ideology – is maintained (Hall et al., 1977). Sources that generate counter-definitions of the events are often played down or ignored in the press.

In the case of the “Occupy Central” event, while western media rushed to take the opportunity to interpret and construct the “Occupy Central” as a “democratic” “Umbrella Revolution” (cf. Ortmann, 2015, Veg, 2015), which could trigger imaginaries of other “regime-change” “revolutions”, the news sources that provided a counter definition of the event were entirely left out in the media coverage of the event. For example, the “Occupy Central” participants waved the former Empire flag in the name of ‘democracy’. They even openly called for a historical regression with Hong Kong ‘re-joining’ Britain under the terms of the 1842 Nanjing Treaty – the first unequal treaties– imposed on China by the colonial Empire following the Opium War in 1840. The participants also played the British national anthem and visited the British Consulate General in Hong Kong for backup (Figures 5.1-5.3). Such news sources reveal the colonialist nature of the event, which undermines the dominant interpretation of the event as a “democratic movement”. By suppressing or ignoring the sources that reflect the colonialist nature of the event, the media achieved an ideological closure, and maintained the dominant discursive construction of the “Occupy Central” (i.e. “democratic movement”) as an unquestioned ‘truth’.
Figure 5.1 Deconstruction of the “Occupy Central” event: late 2014 the “Umbrella Revolution” participant openly waved the Empire flag seeking backup from the colonial/neo-colonial powers
Source: (EJ Insight, 2015).

Figure 5.2 Deconstruction of the “Occupy Central” event: late 2014 the “Umbrella Revolution” ‘activists’ openly called for a historical regression with Hong Kong ‘re-joining’ Britain under the Nanjing Treaty
Source: (Xinhua News Agency, 2014).
Figure 5.3 Deconstruction of the “Occupy Central” event: organisers visited the British Consulate General in Hong Kong seeking backup from the former colonial power
Source: (Molihua Organisation, 2014).

5.7 The Subaltern voice: historicisation of the event

The mass media and popular culture are centrally important in spreading false consciousness, and leading people to believe that “whatever is, is right” (Berger, 2014, Marx and Engels, 1976, Stokes, 2003). The mass media and popular culture form crucial links between the institutions of a society (and the superstructure in general) and individual consciousness, and are considered to be tools for manipulating people (Marx, 1976, Marx and Engels, 1976). By advancing some narratives and meanings at the expense of others, the media texts reflect the dominant modes of thinking or believing that permeate a society, and define the status quo of ‘common sense’. In the case of the newspaper coverage of the “Occupy Central” event, American mainstream newspapers dehistoricise the event and discursively construct the event into a ‘democratic movement’ by discursively constructing mainland China as an ‘authoritarian’ and ‘threatening’ ‘Other’, and ignoring certain aspects that reflected the colonial nature of the event. So, the question is whether the event was really a “democratic movement”? What would the event look like if we historicise it within the context of Hong Kong’s colonial
past and postcolonial present? What is the real purpose of the “Occupy Central” elites? This section provides an alternative understanding of the event by taking into consideration the historical context of Hong Kong.

Since the early 16th century, which was marked by an accelerating globalisation of capitalism, the British Empire, driven by economic and political ambitions (such as seeking expanded and cheaper sources of raw materials and finding new markets overseas), increasingly expanded its colonial efforts to the New World, aggressively plundering land, and massively exploiting labour and resources in the colonies, such as plantation system, slave trade, territorial annexation etc. (Potter et al., 2004). The British colonisation of Hong Kong in 1842 was not an exception. In order to open the Chinese market for imperial trade in opium, the British Empire started the First Opium War in 1839 which ‘opened the door’ of China by force, and imposed the first unequal treaty – the Treaty of Nanjing – on China in 1842 whereby the British colonial powers annexed Hong Kong Island (Carroll, 2007, Chan, 1996). A couple of decades later, in 1860, the second unequal treaty – the Treaty of Beijing – was imposed by the British Empire on China following the Second Opium War (1856 –1860), whereby the British colonial power took the Kowloon Peninsula from China (Chan, 1996). In the late 19th century, following the footprint of Japanese Imperialist power’s invasion of China between 1894 and 1895, Western imperialist powers such as Russia, Germany, France, Britain etc., came to China one after another and competed to carve up and occupy the territory of China. In the ‘carnival’ of the imperialist powers dividing and looting China in late 19th century, the British colonial powers imposed yet another unequal convention – the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory – on China by force in 1898, and annexed the New Territories (north of the Kowloon Peninsula). Following these three milestone treaties, the British Empire brought Hong Kong into its imperial domain.

When dealing with the history of Hong Kong, Henry John Temple, the British Foreign Secretary in 1841, described Hong Kong as “a barren island, which will never be a mart of trade” (Chan, 1993, p.457). Chan (1993, p.457) notes that “every
British official and semi-official narration of Hong Kong history in the last century and a half has repeated one or another version of the ‘barren island’ remark”. Similarly, both the popular and academic discourses of the West deliberately downplay the colonial history of Hong Kong, along with the socio-economic, political, cultural and racial consequences of Britain’s colonial, and instead frequently reproduce the dominant colonial narrative that Hong Kong’s history began with the coming of the British in 1842, which is then constructed as a history of a benevolent governance and good policy of the colonial ‘civilising state’ (Ngo, 1999, Woronoff, 1980). A compelling example of this kind of historical narrative is Robson’s (1992, p.1) The Potent Poppy, which announces on its cover that “[c]lippers laden with opium launched a golden age of adventure, trade and treachery for merchants and mandarins – and shaped the glittering prize of Empire: Hong Kong”. Such a narrative whitewashed, at a global scale, the brutality of colonialism and imperialism, the historical crimes that the invaders committed against the natives, colonised people of colour and their economies, societies, cultures and indigenous knowledges (Escobar, 2007, Grosfoguel, 2004, Lee et al., 2015, Quijano, 2000, Quijano, 2007). By referring to Hong Kong in particular, such a colonial discourse has helped to construct British colonialism as a ‘transforming agent’, which brought ‘morality’, ‘civilisation’ and ‘modernity’ to an ‘uncivilised’ people, namely the HK Chinese, and turned the “barren-rock-island” into a ‘capitalist paradise” (Carroll, 2005, p.7, Ngo, 1999, p.120).

However, when studying the history of Hong Kong, it becomes apparent that the British colonial powers had looted almost 473 million taels of silver from China in the name of ‘indemnity’ through unequal treaties: the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing (according to which 21 million yinyuan, amounting to 14.7 million tales of silver were looted from China), the 1860 Treaty of Beijing (according to which 8 million taels of silver were looted from China), and the 1901 Boxer Protocol (according to which 450 million tales of silver were looted from China). The so-called ‘indemnity’ stands out for its sheer size: based on the exchange rates at the time, 473 million taels equalled US$352 million gold dollars or GBP £63m (Esherick, 1987). Moreover, after the British Empire annexed Hong Kong, the colonial state
undertook action to maintain a trade-dominated economy at the expense of industrial development in Hong Kong. The official accounts of Hong Kong’s economic history made little mention of the development of the manufacturing industry (Ngo, 1999). In the colonial period, British-owned enterprises controlled almost all the trading and their related businesses. Only manufacturing industry was left to the native Chinese. The entire colonial administration was designed and set up to facilitate trade. Any tariff or market protection measure which could have propelled industrial growth, was rejected for fear of creating trade barriers that would harm the interests of the British-owned trade enterprises. The colonial office rejected any request for assistance to the Hong Kong’s industry including “training facilities, developing industrial estates, selective subsidies, and improvements in the credit and banking system”, in order to prevent colonial competition with British industries (Ngo, 1999, pp.130-132). The resulting economic structure and policies, which favoured the interests of the British-related trade enterprises, engendered a metropolis-satellite relationship between the British colonial powers and colonial Hong Kong. Colonial Hong Kong served as an instrument for the colonial powers to suck capital and economic surplus out of both Hong Kong and Mainland China’s markets. The metropolis-satellite relationship served to maintain the exploitative relationship between the British and colonial Hong Kong, and the British colonial powers were able to promote their own development and enrich their ruling classes (Frank, 1966). As Joseph Esherick (1987) points out, colonialists advanced their own economic and political interests, including exploitation, territorial expansion, socio-cultural and racial domination and oppression of the indigenous people, which turned them into the agents of the imperialist states. Colonial encounters should not simply be regarded as “part of the process of ‘modernisation’” (Liang H., 2015, p.231). For Hong Kong, colonial discourses that highlight the ‘contributions’ of Britain to the modernisation of Hong Kong obscure the colonial realities of British imperialism in Hong Kong. Political and socio-cultural institutions, such as the educational system, language, knowledge systems etc. were established to universalise Western ideologies and justify a highly hierarchical socio-cultural structure in Hong Kong.
During the colonial period, the colonial power ruled Hong Kong by means of a governmental system that included Governor, an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. According to the *Letters Patent*, which was issued by the British Empire on April 1843, Hong Kong was run by a governor, who was directly appointed by the British Crown (Carroll, 2007). The governor is “the single and supreme authority” of the colony (Miners, 1987, p.43). Miners (1987, p.43) commented on the highly dictatorial power of the governor as below:

> [w]ithin the colony the Governor was, and is, the head of the administration and all officials were bound to obey his instructions. He was obliged to consult with his Executive Council on all major policy decisions, but […] he was fully entitled to disregard the Council’s advice if he thought fit. The Legislative Council made laws for the colony, but more than half the members consisted of officials who were bound to vote as he directed. […] The Governor thus had virtually complete control of the executive and legislative branches of government.

Clearly, in colonial Hong Kong, the British Empire established and entrenched its imperialist rule and domination over the colonised by directly appointing the governor who possessed absolute and authoritarian power, or in the words of Alexander Grantham, the governor of Hong Kong between 1947-1957, “in a Crown Colony the Governor is next to the Almighty” (Miners, 1987, p.43). The Hong Kong Chinese suffered under the colonial powers’ despotic dictatorship, and were deprived of any form of political power, their rights to elect the governor or defend their interests, freedom of the press. In other words, democracy was absent throughout the 150 years of the colonial rule.

Hall (1981) discusses how imperialism operates in the colonies. According to Hall (1981, p.38), the idea of race is one of the fundamental axe underpinning colonial conquests, economic exploitation and imperialism, delineating the way in which “the [colonial] races have stood in relation to the ‘native people’ of the colonised”. The colonisers used race, which originated in the phenotypic differences between the colonisers and the colonised, to essentialise the differences between the two
groups, situating the colonised as ‘inferior’ to the colonisers, and justifying their exploitation in the colonial conquest (Quijano, 2000). In Hong Kong, the imperialist domination was also cast in racial terms. British imperialism in the late nineteenth century was characterised by racial discrimination and segregation. The Hong Kong Chinese were racialised by the British colonisers as a ‘source of moral contamination’, and characterised by ‘moral defects’ (Law, 2009, Ngo, 1999). The Colonial Secretary Henry Laboucher’s words effectively capture this phenomenon: “[W]ith perhaps a few honourable exceptions, the Chinese of Hong Kong, like most members of the Chinese race, were very deficient in the most essential elements of morality” (Tsang, 1995, p.65). This kind of racialisation rendered phenotypic differences between white colonisers and the non-white native Chinese to be at the root of ‘inherent’ socio-cultural differences between the colonisers and the colonised, and imposed stereotypical qualities on the non-white native Chinese. In this manner, the colonisers created a boundary between ‘normal’ Europeans and ‘abnormal’ Hong Kong Chinese, established racial superiority, and justified the racial segregation, hierarchical order and colonial brutalities of colonial Hong Kong.

Hong Kong’s colonial society was characterised by a highly racialised hierarchy, which considered the white Europeans as superior to and strictly segregated from, the ‘inferior’ coloured native population (Eitel, 1895, Leonard, 2010, Wu, 1999). With regard to political institutions, the colonisers excluded native Chinese from the Executive Council and Legislative Council (Carroll, 2007, Wang, 1997). Later, in order to be able to exercise control over the native Chinese, alleviate anti-colonial sentiments, and ensure the allegiance of the colonised Hong Kong Chinese to the colonial powers, the British colonisers began to appoint several of Hong Kong Western-trained Chinese elite. However, the colonial powers never included these Western-trained members of the Chinese elite in their core circle of power. For example, in 1880 Wu Tingfang was appointed to the Legislative Council as an unofficial member, following 40 years of British colonial control (Miners, 1987, Wang, 1997). Those members of the Western-trained Chinese elite who identified themselves with the colonial powers seldom spoke up for the colonised Hong Kong Chinese (Law, 2009). The majority of Hong Kong’s Chinese never enjoyed any
right to being politically represented. Those members of the Western-trained Chinese elite, who identified themselves with the colonial powers, were considered to be superior to the broad masses of colonised Chinese, which contributed to ingrowing a highly racialised hierarchy in colonial Hong Kong.

Extending its policy of segregation also to the educational sector, the colonial government forced the Hong Kong Chinese and the Europeans to attend separate schools. This separation further reinforced the Europeans’ racial discrimination towards the non-white native Chinese. The 1902 Report of the Committee on Education evidences this discrimination in the most racist language:

[...] the Education of the European children suffers very much from the fact that Europeans and Asiatics are mixed, and the European children had to be educated side by side in the same class with large numbers of Asiatics [...] But the Chinese boys in the schools are numbered by thousands, large numbers of whom, be it noticed, come from the mainland, and are in no way connected with the colony; and the ordinary standards of truth, honour and morality amongst the masses of the Chinese people undeniably differ very widely from our European standards [...] Constant contact with Chinese, both in class-room and play-ground must affect the formation of the character of the European boy (cited in Law, 2009, p.51).

Clearly, the report denigrated the Mainland Chinese as the source of ‘moral contamination’. The colonial government went as far as to bar schools from enrolling native Chinese children, even if these schools had been set up by the Hong Kong Chinese themselves. In 1902, the colonial government forced the Kowloon school to only enrol European students, even though it originally had been built by the Hong Kong Chinese Ho Tung, who had intended it to be an English school open to all races (Carroll, 2005).

The segregation between the Hong Kong Chinese and the Europeans not only solidified in government institutions and education, but also ubiquitously permeated every aspect of the colony’s social life (Endacott, 1973, Tsang, 2007).
The Hong Kong Chinese lived as second-class citizens throughout the colonial rule of British. The colonial government passed various ordinances, which were designed to discriminate Chinese and deprive them of freedom. The institution of curfew was the most typical one. In October 1842, the colonial government issued a proclamation prohibiting all Chinese citizens, except for watchmen, from walking in the streets after 11:00 pm (Carroll, 2007). Later, in 1857, the ordinance of curfew required the Chinese to carry night passes after dawn, which had to be issued by the superintendent of the police. Moreover, the ordinance also allowed any European 

[...] acting as Sentry or Patrol at any time between the hour of Eight in the evening and sunrise to fire upon, with intent or effect to kill, any Chinaman whom he shall meet with or discover abroad and whom he shall have reasonable ground to suspect of being so abroad for an improper purpose, and who being challenged by him shall neglect or refuse to make proper answer to his challenge (Munn, 2001, p.285).

The ordinance’s stipulation gave the Europeans the prerogative to dispose of the native Chinese at will. In 1896, more than 3488 Chinese were arrested on the basis of the curfew ordinance (Munn, 2001). The ordinance, which legitimised the Europeans’ discrimination towards native Chinese, greatly violated the freedom of Hong Kong’s Chinese. The so-called ‘freedom’ that Hong Kong stood for was never extended to the Chinese. The ordinance epitomised the colonial brutality, the racial discrimination and the unequal treatment that the Hong Kong Chinese experienced. When it came to leisure activities, none of the major European clubs admitted the Chinese, and Chinese citizens were not permitted to hold public meetings. The City Hall museums and libraries, which were open to the Europeans at any time, had special opening times for Hong Kong’s colonised Chinese (Carroll, 2005, Carroll, 2007). The labour market was contingent on race, and thus only few employment opportunities were available for the Chinese. From the late nineteenth century onwards, the colonial powers granted superior status to a growing number of British and other European expatriates, which allowed them to fill the new and various posts in governance organisations, thereby further entrenching hegemonic dominance (Leonard, 2010). For example, senior positions in Hong Kong’s civil service (particularly, the Government Secretariat, the Legal Department, the
Judiciary, the Police, and Departments related to buildings, engineering and lands),
were manned almost entirely with British expatriates (Gaylord and Traver, 1995).
The expatriates were hired to do jobs that could easily be done by the native Chinese.
By 1990, 60% of the most senior staff in the Police still counted expatriates
(Gaylord and Traver, 1995). Even as late as 1997, some 23% of the top 1130
positions in the civil service directorate were held by expatriates (Potter et al., 2004,
p.77).

The racial discrimination and segregation were also reflected in spatiality. European
businesses and residences claimed the better land and left the small huts for the
Hong Kong Chinese to dwell in. The colonial government even enacted laws to
preserve the racial segregation in spatiality. The 1904 Peak District Reservation
Ordinance reserved the Peak (the exclusive hill district on Hong Kong Island) for
European-style houses and European residents. No Chinese, except for servants,
were allowed to live in the Peak. The racial segregation in the Peak was well
described by Carroll (2005, p.90),

[c]omplete with convenient facilities such as its own station and water
supply which was pumped from below, the Peak had all the features of
a quaint English town – English-style homes and villas, clubs, a hotel,
a hospital, and an Anglican church – connected to the city below by the
Peak Tran which opened in May 1888. No Chinese, except for the
servants, cooks, and drivers in their special uniforms, were to live there.

The colonial government’s efforts to separate the Hong Kong Chinese from the
Europeans in terms of government institutions, education, social life and spatial
areas testified to the colonial structure’s deep-seated racial discrimination (Carroll,
2005). Kennedy (1987, p.189) argues that “the power to shape and control social
identity, to determine the distinctions between [the white community] and others,
was crucial to [the white community’s] predominance”. The colonisers established
the racial segregation between the colonisers and the colonised Hong Kong Chinese
in order to fix the boundaries between the white British/Europeans and the non-
white native Chinese, and justify a racial hierarchy in which the white colonisers
were superior and the non-white native Chinese were inferior. The Chinese’s
racialised socio-cultural segregation from the European communities persists well into the twentieth century after the PRC regained its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. According to Wang et al. (2013), racialised spatial segregation continues to exist in contemporary Hong Kong, with British and other Western expatriates occupying prestigious residential areas at the higher end of the price scale. Places like Mid-level and Lan Kwai Fong where the former colonisers used to live their lives of privilege, are now populated mostly by British and other Western expatriates. The expatriate communities show no interest in learning the local language or mixing with the local Chinese population, and instead form a “society in the society” (Wang et al., 2013, p.80). Although the colonial era has long ceased, the racialised socio-cultural hierarchy continues.

Quijano (2000) points out that based on the idea of race, a cultural system around Eurocentric hierarchy is established to naturalise the colonial relations between Europeans and non-Europeans, and strengthen cultural hegemony and racial hierarchy in the colonies. Raponi (2014) clarifies that cultural imperialism is a complex cultural hegemony, which is capable of exporting the most fundamental Western ideas and concepts in the name of promoting ‘civilisation’. For Hong Kong, British imperialism was not confined to a territorial conquest. British colonisers have paid considerable attention to the cultural aspects of imperialism. The cultural imperialist idea was effectively captured by a writer in the Edinburgh Review in 1850 (cited in Eldridge, 1973, p.238):

[i]t is a noble work to plant the foot of England and extend her spectre by the banks of streams unnamed, and over regions yet unknown – and to conquer, not by the tyrannous subjugation of inferior races, but by the victories of mind over brute matter and blind mechanical obstacles. A yet nobler work it is to diffuse over a few created worlds the laws of Alfred, the language of Shakespeare, and the Christian religion, the last great heritage of man.

These discourses highlight the ‘contribution’ of the British colonisers to the civilisation of the Hong Kong Chinese. This notion of the ‘civilising mission’, as the subsequent discussion will reveal, serves to mask the colonial exploitation and
brutality, and cannot not simply be regarded as part of ‘modernisation’. The British ‘civilising mission’ has been the footprint of the British Empire’s expansion.

During the middle of nineteenth century, Hong Kong first set up its educational system. An elementary-level Central School, which combined several schools together within the perimeters of Hong Kong’s metropolis, as well as Hong Kong University were established. Looking closely at the history of Hong Kong’s educational sector, it is not difficult to see its connections with the ideology of the British ‘civilising mission’, which aimed to establish cultural imperialism, create colonial hierarchy, produce subordinate citizens, and separate the colonisers from the colonised. Carroll (2005, p.75) describes colonial education as “[....] designed to shape and discipline both the body and the mind, from the inside out”. During the colonial period, an educational system, which was modelled on the British system, was established in Hong Kong. Colonial education was divided into four consecutive levels: three years of junior high school, two years of senior high school, two years of sixth form and three years of university (Yang, 2014). The colonial educational system has left its colonial legacy on the current Hong Kong educational system. Even after 1997, the educational system in postcolonial Hong Kong remained unchanged for 12 years. It was not until 2009 that this old colonial educational system was abolished. In 2009, Hong Kong adopted an educational system, which is similar to the educational system in Mainland China, that is, three years of junior high school, three years of senior high school and four years of university.

During colonial times, expatriate teachers from the British Empire were hired to deliver classes at the intermediate level as well as college level education in Hong Kong. Lugard, the Governor of Hong Kong from 1907-1912, forced Hong Kong University to recruit staff members from Britain, asserting that “[i]n the Hong Kong University the staff will be wholly British, except perhaps for a few Chinese specialists” (Pennycook, 1998, p.120). Moreover, in 1984, an Expatriate English Teachers Scheme was introduced to ensure that a large number of expatriate teachers from Britain taught English in Hong Kong secondary schools. The
dominant proportion of expatriate teachers remained unchanged in the educational system in postcolonial Hong Kong. In 2010, nearly 50% of the City University of Hong Kong’s faculty came from overseas (Liang H., 2015).

The historical textbooks used in the colonial schools omitted accounts of the British Empire’s iniquities and encroachments on Chinese sovereignty. According to Kan (1996), the colonial historical textbooks replaced “the First Opium War” with “the First Anglo-Chinese War” was used to account for in historical textbooks in the colonial period, in order to gloss over the imperialist nature of the war, which only served the interests of the colonial authorities. It was not until 1996 that the colonial account of the Opium War was radically changed (Kan and Vickers, 2002). The large number of expatriate teachers in the colonial educational system, along with the dissemination of a colonial interpretation of history devalued and even discriminated against indigenous members of staff and their indigenous knowledge, and further reinforced the superiority of the Western knowledge system.

Moreover, the colonisers prioritised English-language teaching in the colonial schools. According to Tong and Cheung (2011, p.58), language is a special tool in operating imperialism, as language is also the carrier of cultural identities. Dominant cultural identities, in this case, the British, are able to influence and even change non-English cultural identities by teaching foreign languages. The ambition to introduce the English language into colonial Hong Kong is evident in Legge’s (the initiator of the colonial education program in Hong Kong) presentation to the Legislative Council in 1861:

> [t]his plan [that appealed for full-scale teaching of English] makes the teaching of English a more prominent part of the education in the Government Schools than it has hitherto been. But I beg to submit to you that it ought to be so. It ought to be so in this Colony where the administration of justice is conducted in the English language. It ought to be so, that an influence may go forth from the Island, which shall be widely felt in China enlightening and benefiting many of its people (cited in Sweeting and Vickers, 2007, p.14).
The Eurocentric discourse, which highlights the ‘civilising mission’ of English-language teaching, racialises the whole indigenous educational system as being suffused with an atmosphere of ‘low’ morality, and again reiterates the superiority of Western culture and language. In 1862, the Central School, where English was the medium of instruction, was founded with the aim to carry out the imperial mission of promoting English-language instruction (Chan, 1996) and perpetuating the idea of British superiority (Law, 2009). In 1865, the colonial government forced all schools to make English-language teaching compulsory. Later, in 1878, the colonial government arranged an educational conference to discuss the policy on language-in-education policy, based on the premise that “the primary object to be born in view by the Government should be the teaching of English”. This resulted in the passing of an English-oriented policy to further privilege the English language (Evans, 2006). Accordingly, the daily number of hours devoted to teaching English at the colonial schools was extended to five, while the hours allotted to teaching the Chinese language were reduced to two and a half. The majority of indigenous schools found it impossible to implement the policy which afforded priority to the English language, because they received only minimal funding from the colonial government and their student bodies consisted mostly of members of the poorer classes. As a result of not being able to fulfil the requirements of the policy, indigenous schools were forced to shut down. Apart from that, the colonial government also passed other policies to undermine indigenous schools. In 1913, an Education Ordinance was passed to make school registration mandatory. The ordinance conferred unlimited power on to the colonial government to control the organisation and curricula of indigenous schools, in an effort to ensure close supervision of all Chinese schools (Pennycook, 1998, p.122). Furthermore, the colonisers tried to uphold the dominance of the English language in colonial Hong Kong by establishing language institutions and offering generous funds for language-related research. For example, a raft of language institutions were established to promote English language teaching. These were sponsored by British-related enterprises, such as the Centre for Professional and Business English, which was housed in the former Hong Kong Polytechnic (now the Hong Kong Polytechnic University), and opened in May 1989; or the Language Resource
Chapter 5

Centre, which was situated in the Institute of Language in Education, and opened in May 1991 (Choi P., 2003). In 1990, businesses with British-linked interests also set up a Language Development Fund to support a “coherent programme of language-related research and development projects” (Choi P., 2003, p.684). Much of the funded research considerably influenced education policies in colonial Hong Kong. These research studies that promoted the colonisers served to privilege English language teaching (Choi P., 2003). In that way, the predominately English-language education system was established, which undermined the indigenous language and culture, and remained unchanged for more than one and half century of colonial rule.

Meanwhile, the colonial government employed an “English for success” rhetoric to establish the hegemony of the English language, which was further strengthened by high-profile propaganda activities. Since 1988, businesses with the British-linked interests have launched various language campaigns. In 1992, the language campaign displayed advertisements about Hong Kong’s need to have “plenty of good English speakers […] if it is to maintain its international competitiveness”. Major newspapers, such as “South China Morning Post, the Asian Wall Street Journal and Time magazine”, ran these advertisements in colonial Hong Kong, (Choi P., 2003, p.685). All of these newspapers and magazines offered their advertising spaces free of charge for an extended period of time. Also, the colonisers made efforts to invite guests to write, deliver speeches and conduct interviews in order to hammer similar messages into the public mind (Choi P., 2003). In so doing, the colonisers constructed discourse that conveyed the ‘unquestionable’, almost ‘natural’, importance of the English language, thereby legitimising the subordination of all educational goals to the dominant goal of mastering English (Li, 2002). Taken together, the predominantly English-language educational system, along with the public rhetoric of English being the language for achieving success, assigned superiority and power to the English language, presented it as the ‘universal’, only ‘rational’ and ‘civilised’ language, and legitimised its dominant position. Even after 1997, the hegemony of English remains unchanged in postcolonial Hong Kong. Not only is English the official language in the fields of
law and business, but also all the 114 Brand I (the top 25%) schools in postcolonial Hong Kong have adopted English as the medium of instruction (Choi P., 2003). The “English for success” rhetoric continues to influence the Hong Kong Chinese in postcolonial Hong Kong. The continuity of English hegemony asserts a racial-cum-linguistic superiority and ideology well beyond 1997, which contributes to the racialised socio-cultural hierarchy, according to which Western culture is superior and the Chinese culture inferior.

A similar form of cultural imperialism can also be found in the field of law. In 1843, a justice system, which was modelled on the British system, was established in Hong Kong (Ngo, 1999). The ambition to introduce the British law system into Hong Kong is captured in Governor John Bowring’s (1854-59) words:

[i]t is of the highest importance that native population especially should know that the administration of justice is held by us to be a sacred and responsible duty, and that every man’s life and liberty on British soil is intended to be most reverently protected by every security against wrong which legislation can provide (cited in Ngo, 1999, p.46).

The discourse, which racialises indigenous justice systems as ‘arbitrary’ and ‘backward’, highlights the ‘contribution’ of the Western colonisers by bringing the ‘rule of law’ to the colonised. According to Lee et al. (2015), coloniality is constantly disguised under the notion of ‘modernity’ such as ‘civilisation’, ‘progress’, and ‘development’. The rhetoric of the ‘rule of law’ masks the imperialist nature of British colonial rule in Hong Kong.

While the British colonisers claimed to bring the ‘rule of law’ to Hong Kong and “apply the full apparatus of English law equally to all inhabitants” (Ngo, 1999, p.48), it is precisely this very justice system, which the colonial powers used to oppress the local population. As Munn (1997) argues, for the great majority of the Chinese population, the ‘rule of law’ in Hong Kong meant intrusive policing, racial and class discrimination, and repression of anti-colonial protests. Hong Kong’s Chinese suffered as a result of the local Europeans’ scorn and disdain, and were racialised as “a menacing construct, symbolically assimilated as the mirror image
of the colonial (dis)order: barbaric, criminal, rootless, lawless, savage, and marauding danger” (Carroll, 2007, p.77, Wu, 1999, pp.153-154). Moreover, intrusive control was imposed by the colonial state on the innocent native Chinese, which included expanding the power of the police, tightening the curfew for the Hong Kong Chinese, and increasing the use of flogging, hanging, and deportation – “not only for convicted criminals, but also for beggars, lepers, and ‘dangerous’ or ‘suspicious’ characters” (Carroll, 2007, p.51). The native Chinese were usually punished more severely than the Europeans. For example, public flogging was routinely applied to the native Chinese. Punishments such as caning, wearing the cangue, etc. were applied only to the Chinese (Carroll, 2007). Indeed, some of the tenets of the justice system, which disadvantaged and racialised the Hong Kong Chinese community, remained unchanged throughout the colonial period, and as Ngo (1999, p.9) puts it: “until the very last few years of British rule, all legislation and all court proceedings were in English, while residents were required to be able to speak English in order to serve as jurors, thereby excluding the majority of residents”. The justice system, which was hidden under the rhetoric of the ‘rule of law’, asserted a racial-cum-judicial superiority and ideology, racialised the Hong Kong Chinese, established the superiority of the colonisers, and strengthened the racial hierarchy in colonial Hong Kong.

With the help of racial separation and cultural imperialism, the British colonisers established a highly racialised socio-cultural structure in colonial Hong Kong, which had a great influence on the identity formation of the Hong Kong Chinese. Using cultural institutions, such as colonial education, the British justice system, etc., the colonisers established their colonial cultural hegemony in Hong Kong. Western discourses and culture, which were based on the idea of race, were made to appear as ‘natural’, ‘universal’ and the only ‘rational’ ‘truth’. Indigenous cultures were marginalised. The Eurocentric constructs further strengthened the racial hierarchy between the colonisers and the colonised, with the Western colonisers being considered superior and the colonised Hong Kong Chinese inferior. Even after the PRC regained its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, the cultural institutions continue to exert considerable cultural coloniality in postcolonial Hong
Kong. For instance, English continues to be the official language in finance, legal systems, government business, and education. The educational system and some legal systems, including the jury system, judicial judgment system, and legal aid system, which were modelled on British systems remain structurally unchanged. Moreover, the colonial matrix of power continues to persist in every aspect of social life in postcolonial Hong Kong. The material fabric of the city, ranging from separated residential areas, right-hand drive vehicles, English-language street signs, double-decker buses and post offices, fire stations and hospitals built in a colonial British style, consistently generate the illusion that the colonial period is still ongoing, and that it is not coming to an end any time soon (Wang et al., 2013). This historically informed institutional continuity implicitly blurs the boundary of time and space between the colonial and the postcolonial, and presents the colonial past as cherished memories that distinguish Hong Kong from Mainland China. It thus contributes to maintaining the dominance of Western culture in the social fabric. Dominated by the highly racialised socio-cultural structures, in which Western cultures continued to be considered mainstream and non-Western cultures continue to be marginalised, the Hong Kong Chinese turn the Western discursive and cultural hegemony on the non-western cultures into a new vision of superiority of the Hong Kong Chinese over the mainland Chinese (Yang, 2014). The Western cultural coloniality in Hong Kong perpetuates Western cultural hegemony, influences the identity formation of the postcolonial Hong Kong Chinese, and creates a racial hierarchy in which the Hong Kong Chinese are considered superior and the mainland Chinese are considered inferior.

Moreover, using the rhetoric of modernity such as ‘rule of law’, ‘laissez-faire’, ‘English for success’, etc., the colonisers constructed Western culture as ‘civilising’ the ‘backward’ and ‘inferior’ indigenous culture, thus masking colonial exploitation, iniquity and racial discrimination. By employing rhetoric of modernity to disguise cultural coloniality, the colonisers distorted the colonial history, and effectively turned the colonial trauma, which Hong Kong experienced under the imperial rule, into imperialist fantasies. The continuity of many colonial institutions, ideologies, hierarchies of race, nationality and language further produces and reproduces
imperialist fantasies and consciousness, filtered identities, and has ultimately contributed to a colonial nostalgia and an associated identity anxiety and crisis in postcolonial Hong Kong SAR, particularly against a backdrop of the rapid rise of Mainland China.

Since the PRC regained its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, the Chinese economy has achieved rapid and sustained growth. While the rest of the world, including the Hong Kong SAR, has been struggling since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, Mainland China not only successfully survived the difficult financial times, but in 2010 even surpassed Japan in becoming the second biggest economy after the U.S. (Gao, 2015). With the establishment of the Shanghai free trade zone in 2013 and the establishment of international airports and harbors in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, Mainland China’s import and export has grown, and Shanghai has morphed into one of Asia’s remarkable financial, economic and cultural hubs (Huang, 2007). In 2014, Shanghai surpassed Hong Kong in the throughput of port containers, and became the biggest container port in the world (China Ports Association, 2014). Moreover, in 2007, the total value of the stock market in Shanghai and Shenzhen surpassed that of Hong Kong. The pillar industries in Hong Kong SAR, such as traditional port trade and finance, have been gradually losing their edges (Huang, 2007). Furthermore, the commencement of direct flights, shipping and post between Mainland China and Taiwan in 2008 has resulted into the Hong Kong SAR losing its lucrative role as the middleman in international trade (Huang, 2007).

Against the backdrop of the Hong Kong SAR’s economic decline and its subsequently changing position in Asia, the continuity of colonial institutions, language, and ideologies contributes to a highly racialised socio-cultural hierarchy, which renders the former colonial powers superior and the mainland Chinese inferior, with the Hong Kong Chinese conceiving themselves as sitting somewhere in between. Adding to the mix is a small group of the Hong Kong Chinese, who are overcome by “colonial nostalgia”. The racialised socio-cultural hierarchy and “colonial nostalgia” are well reflected in some of the events that happened in recent
years, such as the 2011 protest against Chinese language education, or the 2014 overt discrimination and harassments of mainland Chinese tourists as ‘locusts’ (pronouncing as “huang chong” in Chinese, a homonym for ‘yellow worms’), etc. The “Occupy Central” event in the summer of 2014 is no exception, as this event too is the product of the coloniality of power in postcolonial Hong Kong.

Burke (2013, p.474) discusses the genuine meaning of “democracy” by highlighting the correlation of “national liberation” and “human rights”. According to Burke, the term “human rights” should be understood to refer to racial equality that sees all individuals as equals. Self-determination, which is about the collective right of the people to determine their status and government, is its cornerstone, but also constitutes an essential prerequisite for all other human rights, such as democracy, human welfare, etc. National liberation enables individual freedom. Self-determination and individual freedom are practically inseparable. Burke (2013) emphasises that the concept of human rights is incompatible with colonialism and imperialism. Under the guise of modernity, the colonial rule claimed to be “an efficient vector” for transmitting civil and political rights and advancing human welfare which held origins in Western civilisation (Burke, 2013, p.478). But realities of imperial rule “so frequently departed from these ideals that they were learnt much more in the breach than the observance” (Burke, 2013, p.478). The practice of colonial power eschewed the notions of equality, autonomy and personal freedom inherent in the concept of universal human rights. Human rights can only be respected within the context of national independence (Burke, 2013). In the case of the “Occupy Central” event, the real purpose of the small elite group, who organised the event, however was to restore Hong Kong’s colonial status, at least in their imagination. The real purpose of the event not only had nothing to do with ‘democracy’, but also actively sought to erode genuine democracy, which requires first of all conditions of national self-determination and independence – in this case, of China which Hong Kong has always been part.
5.8 Summary

Analysis of the media representation of the “Occupy Central” event reveals that the ideological manipulation of the meanings of the news reports is achieved by the discursive construction of Mainland China as the ‘Other’. By presenting the event in a ‘democratic’ frame, the media essentialised the understanding of the event in a binary construct of ‘authoritarianism’ versus ‘democratisation’. Thus, the media pre-empted and delimited the interpretation of the event within the pre-set ‘democratic’ frame. Additionally, the media reproduced Orientalist stereotypes towards non-Western nations, and in particular China. Making use of linguistic tools such as lexical choice, the media attributed negative characteristics to Mainland China, and denigrated it as ‘despotic’ and ‘uncivilised’. These discourses played on deeply rooted Western stereotypes of China, and stigmatised the mainland China as the ‘Other’.

Moreover, the discourse of Mainland China as a ‘threat’ to ‘democratic’ Hong Kong is constructed to justify the occupiers’ struggle against Mainland China. Drawing on the discourse of ‘civilisation mission’, the media glossed over British colonial exploitation in Hong Kong, and represented the ‘robust’ civil society and ‘democratic’ institutions in postcolonial Hong Kong as the outcomes of colonial rule. In the same vein, the media established a socio-cultural hierarchy, in which the British colonial powers were superior, Mainland China was inferior, and Hong Kong situated in-between. Playing on the frames of ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘inferiority’, Mainland China was constructed as the scapegoat, and received the blame for being the root of all problems in Hong Kong, about which the occupiers’ complained. The media completely ignored the interplay of historical and contemporary political, socio-cultural factors that have contributed to the problems in Hong Kong. Accordingly, the “Occupy Central” event was decontextualised as being caused by a ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’ Mainland China. The “Occupying” behaviours were legitimised by stigmatising Mainland China as the ‘threatening Other’.
Furthermore, in order to make the event intelligible to the readers, the media situated the “Occupy Central” event within the old and familiar framework of the “Occupy Wall Street” event. In so doing, the media directed the readers’ attention to the form and image of the “Occupy Central” event (such as street gatherings, name, etc.), and eliminated the historical background of the event. In addition to the discursive construction of Mainland China as the ‘Other’, the media adopted techniques of selection and omission in order to reproduce dominant discourses of the event, and silence any information that could generate an alternative understanding. By omitting any information about the large-scale “anti-Occupy Central” petition and demonstration, and by silencing any news sources that reveal the colonialist nature of the event, the dominant interpretation of the event as a “democratic movement” is maintained as a ‘truth’.

In addition, the chapter has problematised the media representation of the “Occupy Central” event, deconstructed such ‘facts’ and ‘truth’, and unveiled their natures as myths. Alternative, subaltern interpretations and narratives of the event were offered by historicising and contextualising it in relation to the particularities of the Hong Kong SAR’s colonial past and postcolonial present, its relationships with the British Empire, the Chinese mainland and its changing position in Asia. The chapter argued that “Occupy Central” is a political, ideational and historical process rather than a discrete incident. It is the continuity of many colonial institutions, ideologies and hierarchies of race, nationality and language that have contributed to the perpetuation of highly racialised socio-cultural structures, persistently permeating the social fabric, producing and reproducing imperialist fantasies and consciousness, filtered identities, and ultimately, the colonial nostalgia and its associated identity anxiety and crisis in the postcolonial Hong Kong SAR. The discursive construction of the “Occupy Central” event into a “democratic movement” glossed over the racial divide and the very different forms of colonialism that Hong Kong has experienced under British colonial rule. The implication is, as this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, that the discursive construction of the “Occupy Central” event offered a way for several “occupy central” elites to unmoor themselves from
the economic decline of Hong Kong into an imagined affinity with the former colonial power, that is, to fall into “colonial nostalgia”. 
Chapter 6

Media Discourse and Discursive Power: American Mainstream Newspapers’ Representation of China’s 2015 70th Anniversary of the Victory Day

6.1 Introduction

On the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of September 2015, a parade was held in Beijing to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s resistance against Japanese aggression together with the victory against Fascism and the end of World War II. Chinese troops, including land, air, and naval forces participated in the parade, as did 300 Chinese veterans who bravely fought in the resistance war, as well as 17 troops from countries who fought against the Fascist aggressions in WWII (Huang, 2015). 30 countries’ heads of state and another 19 countries’ high-ranking government officials came to Beijing to participate in the anniversary event (Yang, 2015). However, despite the Chinese government’s invitation, no heads of state from Western countries that were allies of the Chinese government during WWII participated in the Anniversary event, the reasons of which I will analyse below. Such an event means not merely a remembrance of those who laid down their lives in the war. The anniversary brings back to life collective memories of Chinese people’s struggle against Japanese invasion and occupation, and their fight for national independence and liberation, particularly against a backdrop of the revival of far right politics and militarism in Japan, and the U.S.’ interference in the East Asian region. For example, Japan has attempted to ‘nationalise’ the Diaoyu Islands (English: Senkaku Islands) since 2012 (Wang and Hou, 2015). In July 2016, Japan started a process of fundamentally altering its Constitution\textsuperscript{6}, undermining the post-1947 international order in East Asia that aims to rein in Japan’s right-wing forces and restore peace in Asia. Meanwhile, America has shifted its foreign policy focus to the Asian-Pacific region (Jia, 2015). Continuing its foreign policy of ‘containing

\textsuperscript{6} After WWII, a Constitution in which Japan was forbidden to maintain armed forces with war potential was made under the supervision of the Allied forces. The Constitution came into effect on May 3, 1947, aiming to maintain an international peace based on justice and order.
China’ in the wider context of China’s rapid rise, the U.S. formulated and put in practice the so-called ‘strategic rebalance in the Asia-Pacific’ and increased its interfering in the region, with a view to expand the American ‘sphere of influence’ and its domination and hegemonic power in the East Asia region (Jia, 2015). Under such international circumstances, China’s 70th anniversary event brings to light the historical consciousness of maintaining international peace and security, and resisting the revival of neo-fascism in Japan and Asia. Such historical consciousness, which is generated by past experiences, contributes to consolidating national confidence and unity, catalysing the decolonisation of culture and epistemology, and strengthening national identities for current and succeeding generations.

However, in contrast to the Chinese (who in the past have been colonised and oppressed by both Western and Japanese imperial powers), Western politicians and media alike interpret the anniversary event through an Orientalist paradigm. There is an all too predictable raft of political statements making noise about China’s ‘military capabilities’ and ‘lack of human rights’, and discursively constructing the ‘China threat’ image. As pointed out by the American journalist James Mann, “the media coverage of China tends merely to reinforce whatever is the reigning stereotype or image, or “frame”, of China in any particular decade or era” (cited in Pan, 2012, p.13). In other words, Western media discourses have been in full alignment with rather than independent from their politicians’ position. As this chapter will attempt to show, the U.S. media frequently distort the history of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Fascism, by re-interpreting and reconstructing the event as China ‘showing military muscles’, which resonates with the ‘China threat’ discourse (cf. Buckley, 2015, Rauhala, 2015).

There has been a growing interest in studies on memorial landscapes and their histories. For example, Wodak and De Cillia (2007), in a study on Austrian commemorative events that took place in 1988, identify these events as discourse arenas in which dominant groups try to transmit their discourses of history to the public. Mininni et al. (2013), in a case study on Italian commemorative events, consider these as discursive resources of historical identity. While recent research
extending the focus of such events to the people – who have witnessed and experienced the violence of war (and genocide), and enacted many individual and collective memories – is steadily growing (cf. Drozdzewski et al., 2016), however, it tends to attend to those in western countries and regions, such as Europe and Australia. Whereas the studies on memorial landscapes have explored war memories in association with places and identities, they tend to neglect questions about the nature of the place (the ‘Other’ place), memories and experiences, as well as the question of how the Other’s memories, experiences and commemorations are represented and constructed.

When it comes to studies on WWII, the existing literature tends to be dominated by the so-called ‘standard’ historical narratives of WWII. These narratives locate the outbreak of WWII in the narrative of “Hitler’s and Germany’s invasion of Poland” in September 1939, and focus on the battles that happened in places, such as Dunkirk, Stalingrad, and Normandy, rather than on non-Western battle grounds, especially the Eastern front of China where the Chinese people battled against Japanese Fascism for 14 years from 1931 to 1945. (cf. Hart, 1999, Haruo, 2011, Weinberg, 1995). Current discourses and knowledge about WWII have shaped the formation, articulation, and memories, which, as Chakrabarty (2000b) argues, are Euro-American-centric. The WWII experiences, memories, narrations and understandings of non-Western nations – China, in this case – are marginalised, ignored and their voices remain unheard.

This chapter seeks to address the lacunae in the current literature by critically examining the portrayal of China’s anniversary parade in the case study newspapers, with a view to deconstruct the Western media’s dominant discourses on China’s collective memories of WWII and its commemoration event, as well as make the collective memories and experiences of subaltern Chinese represented in world histories. Guided by a postcolonial perspective, this chapter examines the selected 48 news texts on the anniversary event (see Section 4.3) by employing the CDA approach.
The chapter is laid out in five sections. Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 zero in on the data and reveal the ways that discursive strategies are employed by American mainstream newspapers in their attempt to de-historicise China’s 70th anniversary event, and construct it in a highly racialised “China threat” narrative. Section 6.5 problematises the dominant discourses on the anniversary event and interrogates the Euro-American-centric knowledge of WWII’s history by bringing back the collective memories and reconstructing the media’s distorted realities of the Chinese people’s resistance against Japanese Fascism. Section 6.6 summarises the main findings in the chapter.

6.2 The ‘China threat’ narrative

Constituting a key aspect of the “ideological state apparatus”, the news media are considered to be on a par with major political institutions, with a role to play in distributing the ruling elites’ ideology, shaping people’s conceptions of the world, and reinforcing and perpetuating prevailing patterns of domination (Berger, 2014, Curran and Seaton, 2010). Framing is one of the ways by which the media shape public perceptions of political events and issues. In terms of discourses on China in international relations, there is a dominant and recurring theme on China’s rise: ‘the China threat’ (Pan, 2004). The ‘China threat’ image and framing casts China’s rise, and its international implications, primarily in a negative, alarming, and threatening light (Pan, 2004), and offers a construct from the viewpoint of ‘Us’ versus the ‘Other’. With the help of the schema of framing and discourse, the ‘fact’ of ‘China’s rise’ is turned into a ‘threat reality’, in a manner that conveys the authority and power of a “regime of truth” (Turner, 2011). This section analyses the ways in which the American mainstream newspapers constructed the event as a ‘China threat’ narrative.

The proposition that China is a ‘potential enemy’ to the U.S.-led world security order is a central and recurring theme in the news coverage of China’s anniversary event. The media attempt illusively to construct a ‘threatening’ message about China by predefining the 3rd September anniversary parade as a “display of
weaponry” (The Wall Street Journal, 3 September 2015), “a martial spectacle” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015), a “military parade” (Los Angeles Times, 1 September 2015) and “militarism” (The Washington Post, 3 September 2015), thus discrediting China as a “bellicose” country. Adding to this impression of “bellicosity” is a reference to the parade as “China flexing its military muscle” (The Wall Street Journal, 3 September 2015). Linguistic realisations of the ‘China is a muscle person’ metaphor can also be found in the references to “China’s expanding military muscle” (The New York Times, 4 September 2015) and the parade being described as “the latest display of muscle-flexing” (The Wall Street Journal, 3 September 2015). The media personify China, and construct an impression of China as militant. The strategies of pre-definition, along with the muscle metaphor, place China in a conceptual frame of ‘warlikeness’. Such a conceptual frame serves the function of fixing discussions on the parade within the boundaries of ‘threat’, and thus insulates alternative perspectives on the parade. The parameters of the discussions on the parade are pre-defined, eliminating those aspects of the parade that are not of advantage to the West, in this case, the U.S and its alliance (Japanese Fascism). Within the context of the parade, the boundary of ‘threat’ shuts down discussions about the history of the Chinese struggle against Japanese Fascists and the horrors of Japan’s colonial exploitation.

Moreover, China’s status of the ‘perfect enemy’ (Pilger, 2016) is rendered ‘true’ and ‘real’ by establishing an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ division, and forming a discourse that resonates with the prevailing historical narrative and image of the ‘Yellow Peril’:

(15) China celebrates a new national holiday on Thursday, honouring the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II with events across the country, a three-day holiday and a martial spectacle that will rumble through the ceremonial heart of the capital… Though billed as a commemoration of the war’s end, the holiday has been carefully conceived to project Mr Xi’s vision for a “rejuvenated” China: a rising military power that will stand up to rivals – most notably Japan and its main ally, the United States. (The New York Times, 2 September 2015)
Chapter 6

(16) Xi’s announcement [of military reduction] came near the start of the highly choreographed ceremonies in central Beijing, which included a military parade showing off a slew of new armaments… Pentagon officials warn that China’s rapid military modernisation is aimed at projecting power in East Asia and at raising the risks the U.S. faces if it intervenes in maritime hot spots, such as the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, where Beijing has long-standing territorial claims. For that reason, they say, China has spent heavily on anti-ship cruise missiles, air defence systems, submarines and other advanced weapons in hopes of forcing U.S. aircraft carriers and fighters to operate farther away from the Asian mainland if a conflict broke out. (Los Angeles Times, 4 September 2015)

(17) Beijing’s reading of history [referring to China’s Victory Day over the Japanese Occupation in 1945] is intended to serve two purposes: to emphasise the war guilt of Japan, China’s archrival, and elevate the role of the Chinese Communist Party in defeating Japanese militarism. Both support President Xi Jinping’s aspirations for China to throw aside the postwar order in Asia and assert itself more vigorously. That’s the message China will send next week as warplanes streak over Beijing and missiles, tanks and goose-stepping soldiers parade through Tiananmen Square. Mr. Xi is intent on challenging a regional security arrangement dominated by the U.S. and its military alliance with Japan. (The Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2015)

The media reframed the purposes of the anniversary event in a way that the event is predicated with “elevating” the role of the Chinese Communist Party in defeating [the] Japanese” and “projecting” Mr. Xi’s vision for a “rejuvenated” China: a rising military power”. Separating the word “rejuvenated” from the rest of the clause supports Ashley and Olson’s (1998) findings that quotation marks surrounding non-speech draw attention to phrases that denote a negative connotation – in this case, a ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’ China. Moreover, the predications mentioned above implicate that the “Chinese Communist Party” failed to play a role in the resistance against Japanese imperialism; and that an ‘aggressive’, ‘expansionist’ China is ‘on the rise’. These implications not only distort the history of WWII (which Section
6.5 will analyse), but also represent China as potentially ‘dangerous’. Moreover, derogatory and insinuating phrases are chosen by the media to construct the parade as “highly choreographed”, “carefully conceived” and “well-planned” (The Washington Post, 3 September, 2015). These phrases insinuate that the parade served China’s “ambition” to be a “military power”, rather than, as what China “billed”, “the commemoration of the war’s end”. These insinuations refute the intentions of the parade as a commemoration of the victory of WWII, and implicate that the parade epitomises a ‘rising’, ‘threatening’ and ‘militant’ China.

In the news texts, the media activate China as an actor in relation to material processes and goals, such as “projecting power in East Asia”, “raising the risks the U.S. faces”, “throw[ing] aside the postwar order”, “forcing U.S. aircraft carriers and fighters to operate farther away from the Asian mainland”, and “challenging a regional security arrangement dominated by the U.S. and its military alliance with Japan”. The material processes (such as “projecting”, “throw[ing] aside”, “raising”, “forcing” and “challenging”) insinuate that China ‘stirs up trouble’. By deliberately associating China with negatively connoted material processes, the media portrayed China as the ‘Other’ – a ‘threat’ to the world and regional peace, which is ‘policed’ and ‘protected’ by the U.S. In that way, China was framed as ‘deviant’ or ‘Othered’ in a U.S.-centred world. Thereby, the media produced a division between ‘Us’ (the U.S., constructed as the ‘international peace-keeper’) and the ‘Other’ (China as the ‘threat’ to ‘world peace’). The binary opposition between ‘Us’ and the ‘Other’, as Derrida (1972) explains, is positioned hierarchically, with one pole of the binary being dominant and the other pole being dominated. This kind of binary, oppositional way of discursive construction favourably presents the U.S. and its alliance (Japanese Fascism) as ‘peace-loving’ and ‘civilised’ while China is ‘savage’, ‘uncivilised’, ‘risk’ and ‘dangerous’.

In the same vein, the media reframed China’s reductions of military troops (which President Xi announced at the anniversary parade) by constructing a ‘provocative’ China versus the ‘defensive’ U.S. (although, in fact, the U.S. troops have travelled thousands of miles away to project their heavy military presence in China’s
doorsteps of the East and South China Seas, and the Asia Pacific):

(18) Many outside observers saw [the parade] as a display of the assertive posture China has taken in the region as territorial disputes have flared, prompting the United States to underline its military dominance of Asian seas. Rory Medcalf, the head of the National Security College at the Australian National University in Canberra, said the reductions [President Xi announced that China will reduce military personnel numbers by 300,000, showing China’s commitment to peaceful development and the sacred duty of safeguarding world peace] were unlikely to ease regional worries about China’s growing military strength, because they were part of the modernisation program to shift the People’s Liberation Army’s resources from traditional land forces. “It would seem to be a pleasant surprise, because he’s clearly dressing it up as a signal of peace and good will … But China probably doesn’t need an army as large as it has.” (The New York Times, 3 September 2015)

(19) Nor is the region keen to see America’s role diminished to accommodate a rising China. On the contrary, China’s assertiveness has triggered a clamour among its neighbours for America to beef up its military presence. (The Wall Street Journal, Aug 25, 2015)

In the news texts, by citing “Rory Medcalf”, a member of a Western elite think tank, the media excluded the voice of China, and wilfully refuted what China says with regard to the military reductions. The U.S. media reframed the military reductions in a way as if it should read as a gesture by which China intentionally challenged the world or regional peace. Moreover, the media activated China as an actor in relation to material processes and goals such as “prompting the United States to underline its military dominance of Asian seas” and “trigger[ing] a clamour among its neighbours for America to beef up its military presence”. The selective choice of the material processes, such as “promoting” and “trigger[ing]”, enabled the media to portray China as a force that drove the U.S. to “beef up” and “underline” its military dominance in Asia. The U.S. intervention in Asia is constructed as responding to, or defending against, a “rising military China”. Thus, the media constructed a binary opposition between the ‘attacker’ and the ‘defender’. Within
the ‘attack versus defence’ frame, the U.S. forces is represented as upholding ‘international law’ and ‘order’ – thus ‘good’, and China is represented as the ‘violator’ of the U.S.-set ‘rules’ and ‘world order’ – thus ‘evil’. Such a binary opposition denigrates China as the ‘inferior’ ‘Other’, and strengthens the persistent Eurocentric prejudices and stereotypes towards China. As such, the media represented China’s Victory Day anniversary event in a ‘China threat’ narrative, which correlates with the prevailing historical colonial narrative of the ‘Yellow Peril’. More importantly, the otherness of China serves as an implicit justification for the American heavy military presence, neo-colonial domination and hegemonic power in the East Asian region.

The image of the ‘Yellow Peril’ can also be found in the discourse on the Chinese economy, with which the media attempted to associate the Victory Day parade. The conceptual metaphor “economy/finance is a patient” is used to frame China’s economy in a bad condition. The metaphor is evidenced by statements, such as China is an “anxious nation in economic trouble” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015), a nation “experiencing various crises” and having “the raft of bad economic news”. China is concerned with “the weakening Chinese economy” (The Wall Street Journal, 30 August 2015). The commemoration event is, thus, an attempt to “divert domestic attention” from the “economic crisis” (The Wall Street Journal, 17 September 2015), and “boost national pride” (The Wall Street Journal, 3 September 2015). In addition, an orientational metaphor is deployed by the media to express a state of crisis whenever the motion takes a downward direction: China’s economy is “plummeting” (The New York Times, 1 September 2015) or “slumping” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015). Furthermore, the metaphor of “China is a building to collapse through natural forces” are employed by the media to invoke a ‘China collapse’ thesis (The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2015): the Chinese markets are predicted to be in an “economic turbulence” or “economic squalls”, and will soon “collapse” (The New York Times, 22 September 2015; Los Angeles Times, 6 September 2015;). Moreover, China’s President Xi’s agenda of change (including Xi’s announcement about the reduction of troops at the Victory Day parade) is portrayed as “faltering” amid “economic squalls and a grinding anticorruption
campaign” (*The New York Times*, 4 September 2015). The parade is represented as “an effort to instil political loyalty” (*The Washington Post*, 3 September 2015). Such discourses imply that China is stricken with various economic and political crises. Moreover, the natural force metaphor implies that China’s ‘economic crisis’ is ‘unavoidable’, and insinuates that the Chinese government’s efforts to change are ‘futile’. Such a representation of China silences the fact that, in 2015, China’s economic growth, at a GDP rate of 6.9%, ranked second in the world amid the gloomy economic conditions of the rest of the world. By portraying China as experiencing ‘economic and political crises’ and as a ‘military threat’, the media frame the anniversary event in an Orientalist “China threat” narrative, which resonates with the historical narrative and image of the ‘Yellow Peril’, and creates the same image of the ‘uncivilised’, ‘aggressive’ and ‘threatening’ ‘Other’ – which is, in this case, China.

Researchers have pointed out that the origin of the ‘China threat’ discourse can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when the ‘Yellow Peril’ metaphor prevailed in Western societies (Wu, 1982). This metaphor, as Chen (2012) argues, is a racist fallacy against numerous non-white Asian nations, particularly China. The Westerners’ racialisation of Asians, which the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse incorporates, is usually epitomised by vilified, debased and demonised fictional Eastern figures that can be found in popular Western culture, such as Fu Manchu, Madam Butterfly and Dragon Lady. In the English novel *The Mystery of Dr Fu-Manchu* published in 1913, Fu was portrayed as

>a person tall, lean and feline, high-shouldered, with a brow like Shakespeare and a face like Satan, a close-shaven skull, and long, magnetic eyes of the true cat-green. Invest him with all the cruel cunning of an entire Eastern race, accumulated in one giant intellect, with all the resources of science past and present, with all the resources, if you will, of a wealthy government-which, however, already has denied all knowledge of his existence. Imagine that awful being, and you have a mental picture of Dr Fu-Manchu, the yellow peril incarnate in one man (Rohmer, 1913, p.11).
Fu Manchu is constructed as a ‘sinister’, ‘evil’, and ‘aggressive’ embodiment of the ‘Yellow Peril’, and thus completely different to the fictional ‘heroes’ of the ‘civilised’ West (Western civilisation is epitomised, for example, by Dr Livingstone, as an intrepid individual braving the wilds of Africa on his mission to bring European ‘civilisation’ to the benighted “dark continent”). Chan (2001, p.16) critically analyses the image of Fu Manchu, and points out that “Western male supremacy, as an ideological construct, is re-established as Asian men are ritualistically vilified in order to maintain a sense of superiority among white men”. In other words, the denigration of the non-Western nations in general, and Asian nations in particular, serves to strengthen the self-image of the West as superior.

Figure 6.1 “Peoples of Europe, Defend your Holiest Possessions” by Hermann Knackfuss

The painting was created in 1895. As pointed out by Lyman (2000, p.689), “in the painting, Archangel stood before the people from nations of France, Germany, Russia, etc., sword in one hand while pointing with the other towards a horrible spectacle in the East. High in the smoke of the burning cities of Europe a Chinese dragon, symbolic of destruction, emerged bearing a seated Buddha upon its back. Beneath the picture German Kaiser Wilhelm II placed the words: ‘Nations of Europe! Join in Defence of Your Faith and Your
Home! The painting evoked the need for an Occidental alliance against the threat to Christian civilisation supposedly posed by the rising races of the Orient. It was this painting that called onto centre stage the present era’s stereotypes with the ‘Yellow Peril’.

Source: (Tchen and Yeats, 2014.)

Figure 6.2 The image of Fu Manchu
Source: (Tiexue.net, 2015).

Said (1978) argues that there is a feminisation of the Orient which is rooted in colonialism and imperialism. The images of Chinese femininity which are created by the West legitimise the Orient’s subordination. For instance, the American media created and perpetuated the “Dragon Lady”, which stereotypes Chinese women as ‘deceitful’, ‘domineering’ or ‘mysterious’ (Wu, 2010, p.11). This is contrasted with the stereotypical representation of the submissive sexualised Asian female, such as “China dolls”, “Geisha girls” or prostitutes (Wu, 2010, p.11). These stereotypes represent Chinese women as ‘submissive’, ‘sexy’, ‘coquettish’, ‘manipulative’, and having a tendency toward ‘disloyalty’ or ‘opportunism’ (Wong, 2013). Such villainous images of the Chinese have continued to appear in films, TV series and other media representation to maintain racialised stereotypes and the image of the
‘Yellow Peril’. During the turn of the 20th century and at the height of the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse, the Chinese were portrayed as “by nature physically and intellectually inferior, morally suspect, heathen, licentious, disease-driven, feral, violent, uncivilised, infantile” (Marchetti, 1993, p.3), “opium and gambling addictive” and a potential threat to the white people (MacDonald, 1974, p.543).

Figure 6.3 Chinese were portrayed as ‘opium addictive’ and physically and intellectually ‘inferior’
Source: (Tiexue net, 2015).
Figure 6.4 ‘Yellow Peril’ Poster: “The Yellow Terror in all his Glory”, 1899
Source: (Sharp, 2014)

Figure 6.5 Chinese were portrayed as an ‘evil’ which was driving the white men out of employment, hurling them from the windows and kicking them out of the doors
Source: (Tiexue net, 2015).
As Lyman (2000, p.687) points out, the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse, under the cover of “a guarded defence of the Occidental-under-siege”, positions the Orient in a racial hierarchy in which the non-Western people and in particular Chinese are defined as ‘inferior’ to the ‘superior’ West. Chen (2012) argues that the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse was closely associated with colonialism and imperialism in the 19th century. The essence and core of the ‘Yellow Peril’ discourse lies in the justification of the West’s imperialist invasion of, and scramble for, China, its predation and looting of China’s resources, and its exclusion, oppression and discrimination of the Chinese on the basis of race. The contemporary ‘China threat’ discourse is the continuation of this historical process of colonial formations. The ‘China threat’ discourse is a discursive strategy of Othering, which is predicated on certain presuppositions found in the Western tradition of (neo)colonial desire and imagination (Pan, 2004). As Campion (2014) argues, the ‘China threat’ discourse reveals more about the West than about the country that it portrays. As this section will demonstrate below, the discourse reflects a power/knowledge nexus in the Western understanding of China’s rapid rise, and its impact on contemporary international relations.

Pan (2004, 2012) offers a critical analysis of the ‘China threat’ narrative. He points out that ‘China threat’ is essentially “a specifically social meaning given to China by the West, a meaning that cannot be disconnected from the dominant West’s self-construction” (Pan, 2004, p.351). According to Spivak (1988), the West authoritatively presents itself and its produced knowledge and ideas about the Other culture not as historically particular but as ‘truly universal’ and ‘objective’. This perspective constructs the West as the centre of the modern world against which the world is described, conceptualised and ranked. Such Eurocentric self-knowledge considers the West to be a mirror of the future for all the other societies and cultures (Grosfoguel, 2004, Quijano, 2000). Pan aptly captures this point as follows (2004, p.312):

by envisioning a linear process of historical development with itself at its apex, the West places other nations on a common evolutionary slope
and sees them as inevitably travelling toward the end of history that is the West.

In this context, those cultures and societies that are different from the West are marginalised as ‘Other’. The Western knowledge of the ‘Yellow Peril’ and ‘China threat’ concepts is based primarily on the lingering Western/American colonial desire for “subjectivity”, i.e. the colonial desire about how the world should be run and about how history should progress (Pan, 2012). So the ‘China threat’ perspective is not a reality about China that the West has discovered, but instead it is a ready-made category of thought within the West’s self-imagination.

The construction of China as the ‘Other’ is not only a product of the West’s self-imagination, but also an instrument for the formation and maintenance of the West’s self-identity. A state’s identity cannot be fully conceived without understandings about its opposing others (Turner, 2011). As Said (1995, p.1) states, “the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience”. In other words, the ‘evil’ and ‘barbarity’ of the colonised Other are what makes possible the ‘goodness’ and ‘civility’ of the European self. By constructing the event in form of a ‘China threat’ narrative, and stigmatising China as the other, the media are able to reinforce the self-image of the U.S. as a ‘superior’ and ‘rational’ ‘subject’ capable of knowing the ‘hard facts’ of non-Western cultures and societies (Pan, 2004). Moreover, the construction of China as the ‘Other’ not only helps maintain the credibility of the allegedly “universal” path trodden by the U.S., but also serves to highlight the ‘indispensability’ of the U.S. (Pan, 2004).

In conclusion, the ‘China threat’ discourse in the American news coverage of the anniversary event has nothing to do with China’s realities. As revealed here, it is a discursive construction closely linked with Western/American colonial desire for cultural and political dominance and hegemony in the postcolonial world, as well as the desire for reinforcing its self-definition as ‘superior’. Moreover, such a ‘China-threat’ narrative deprives the anniversary parade of its historical meanings and memories, which are entangled with Japanese colonialism and imperialism in China and wider Asia.
6.3 The ‘Anti-communism’ narrative and Cold War Mentality

Said (1978) argues that Orientalist thinking (such as the notion of the Othering) provides the most essential epistemological foundation for the various hegemonic, if not imperialist, practices undertaken by the West against its imagined Oriental other. In his view, Orientalist discourse serves as a means “by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily and ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively” as ‘inferior’ to the West (Said, 1978, p.11). Such historically situated stereotypes can be found in the American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China’s anniversary event. An ideological ‘communism’ frame has been widely used by the media to construct a sense of ‘Us’ versus the ‘Other’. Rooted in such frame, China has been portrayed as a ‘Communist Other’, harkening back to the Orientalist assumption of Western ideological ‘superiority’.

In the news texts, the word “communist” is used to frame China and the Chinese authorities, for example in references to “Chinese Communists” (The New York Times, 9 May 2015), “Communist China” (The New York Times, 4 September 2015) and “the Communist-led government” (Los Angeles Times, 2 September 2015). Since the Cold War, the words “communism” and “communists” have been constructed in such a way that they have become synonyms with “tyranny”, “dictatorship”, and “totalitarianism” in Western societies. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the virulent “anti-communist” rhetoric of the Cold War era may have receded, but it managed to leave behind a stereotyped view of communism in Western consciousness, and forms an important element of latent public opinion (Naduvath, 2014). Defining China in a pre-set ‘communist’ frame rekindles the memory of the cold war fault-line between capitalism and communism, and constructs China in a ‘communist Other’ narrative.

Moreover, the media try to construct China as the ‘communist Other’ by associating China with the heads of state who attended the Victory Day parade, especially those from non-Western countries. For example:
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia topped the list of foreign attendees, and audience members in the stands clapped loudly when he was shown on TV in the square. The president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, indicted by the International Criminal Court on genocide charges, was the most prominent African leader in the stands. Mr. Xi welcomed him here on Tuesday as an “old friend of the Chinese people.” Though Beijing pressured Western European countries to send high-level officials, few promised to do so. The United States sent its ambassador to China, Max Baucus. (The New York Times, 3 September 2015)

In the news texts, the media vilify China by representing President Xi as “the old friend” of non-Western state leaders such as Russian leader Putin, and Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir (who was “indicted by the International Criminal Court on genocide charges”). In this context, the media lead readers in its implication of Xi Jinping as ‘hard-line’, ‘conservative’, ‘strongman’, ‘brutality’ as they’ve portrayed Russian leader Putin, Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir and other non-Western state leaders. By invoking the notion of international justice and law, a distinction between the ‘civilised’ West (America, in this case, as the safeguard of international law), and the ‘barbarian’ non-Western nations (China, in this case, as a ‘lawless’ ‘outsider’), is established. Also, the media activate China as an actor in relation to material processes and goals, such as “[Beijing] pressured Western European countries to send high-level officials”. The material process “pressured” connotes force. The media imply that China (the ‘lawless’ ‘outsider’) tries to force the Western countries (‘safeguards’ of the law) to attend the parade in order to legitimise the parade. This construction not only strengthens the divide between the ‘civilised’ West and ‘barbarian’ China, and marginalises China as the ‘Other’, but it also decontextualises the Victory Day parade and suggests that it was ‘illegitimate’. Constructing the parade as “illegitimate” also enables the media to justify the absence of the Western leaders in the parade. In effect, the Western leaders’ absence, as this section will go on to show, reflects the West’s amnesia of China’s struggle and fight against Japanese Fascism, and the atrocities that Japan committed during the war.
Naduvath (2014) points out that the ‘anti-communist’ rhetoric seeks to create a binary opposition of ‘Us versus Them’ by associating communist thought and practice with notions and ideas such as a party press, and a one-party rule, among others. In the case of the parade, the media play on the frame of the ‘communist Other’, and build narratives around themes of, economic, socio-cultural, and political deprivation, which perpetuates the discourse of difference, as outlined by Said (1978). For example:

(21) In his third year in office, Mr. Xi is moving further along the spectrum. He’s pushing a resentful strain of nationalism that harps on China’s “century of humiliation” at the hands of Japan and the Western imperial powers starting with the Opium Wars, and he adamantly rejects liberal Western values. Talk of democracy is banned on college campuses. [...] And Mr. Xi’s challenge to the West is growing more muscular. (The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2015)

(22) They [authorities] have also ramped up media and Internet censorship ahead of the parade, according to a propaganda department circular leaked to the California-based news website China Digital Times. (Los Angeles Times, 2 September 2015)

(23) If China continues to ring-fence military spending, despite the economic slowdown, it could eat into outlays in other areas, such as health and education, presenting the leadership with tough choices it isn’t used to making, those experts said. (The Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2015)

(24) The extravagant military display comes as China has more than doubled its published annual defence budget and projected its armed forces’ growing capabilities farther from home with increasing assertiveness, particularly at sea, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. (Los Angeles Times, 2 September 2015)

From a postcolonial perspective, the media represent China in terms of the Western culture superiority. In the news texts, the word “published” is deployed by the media to describe the “annual defence budget”. Through the careful selection of the word “published”, the media implicate that there must also be some sort of ‘unpublished/secret/hidden’ “military spending” in China. Moreover, China is
predicated with “has more than doubled its published annual defence budget”, and “projected its armed forces’ growing capabilities farther from home”. These predications insinuate that the Chinese government is ‘stealthy’, ‘non-transparent’, ‘aggressive’ and ‘sinister’. Furthermore, the news discourse constructs a contrast between ‘backward’ China and the ‘civilised’ U.S. The media activate China and its authorities as actors in relation to material processes and goals such as “adamantly rejects liberal Western values”, “ramped up media and Internet censorship”, “banned” the talk, “eat into outlays in other areas”, and “clamping down on drones” (The Wall Street Journal, 26 August 2015). By using these material processes with a negative semantic field (such as “adamantly reject”, “ramp up”, “clamp down” and “banned”), the media portray China as ‘dictatorial’ and ‘lacking freedom’, and construct the nation as one, which is different from the ‘liberal’ West. These findings align well with Peerenboom’s (2007, pp.1-2) argument, which points out that Western commentary routinely portrays a dark image of China as a “brutal authoritarian state that violently opposes its citizens […] arrests political dissidents, censors the internet, imprisons its courageous lawyers and [is] eager to attack Taiwan and suppress dissidence in Tibet”. These findings fit in with the Orientalist premise of civil superiority, which is regarded as exclusive to the West.

In the news texts, the word “propaganda” is widely used to frame Chinese government departments and their activities, such as “propaganda department”, “propaganda officials”, and “propaganda activities” (Los Angeles Times, 1 September 2015). The historical use of propaganda for dastardly purposes evokes an implied negative meaning of the word that goes beyond its literal meaning. Historically, propaganda was instrumental to the Nazis’ war effort and their project of “social engineering”, which involved murdering six million Jews, Roma, homosexuals and handicapped (Howington, 2012). The careful selection of the word “propaganda” enables the media to imply that China is as ‘tyrannical’ and ‘repressive’ as the Nazis. In addition to that, the news texts allege that the Chinese President is “pushing a resentful strain of nationalism” and “whipping up nationalist fervour” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015), which are predications that
imply irrationality. In so doing, the media discursively construct China as a ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilised’ ‘Other’, and glorify the superiority of the Western culture.

MecLeod (2000) points out that the Orient is frequently represented in a series of negative terms that serve to buttress a sense of the West’s superiority and strength. The Orientalist representation of non-Western nations (in this case China) posits the notion that Oriental people needed to be ‘civilised’ and made to conform to the allegedly higher moral standards upheld by the West. This ‘civilising mission’ can also be found in the media representation of the parade. Through carefully framing sentences, such as “[if] China continues to ring-fence military spending, despite the economic slowdown, it could eat into outlays in other areas, such as health and education.”, and “China’s military don’t have the organisation or the culture they would need to actually become one [as effective as the U.S.] (Los Angeles Times, 2 September 2015)”, the media implicate that the U.S. is a sort of ‘civilising master’ who ‘should teach’ the ‘threatening’ and ‘barbarian’ Chinese how properly to act in its own (the ‘barbarian/uncivilised’) interests. Non-Western nations are orientalised as having no access to ‘reason’, ‘logic’ and ‘rationality’. In creating these stereotypes, the West (in this case the U.S.) justifies its interferences in non-Western nations by claiming that the latter needs saving from themselves.

Moreover, the media portray China from a Euro-American-centric perspective, and celebrate Western knowledge production as privileged by introducing words associated with Western elites such as “those experts” and “Roger Cliff”. Grosfoguel (2012b) critically deconstructs the Euro-American-centrism and points out that the West camouflages its ‘provincial’ values as ‘universalist’ and ‘scientific’ ones. Meanwhile, the values of non-Western nations are marginalised. By carefully selecting sentences, such as “he adamantly rejects liberal Western values […] Mr. Xi’s challenge to the West is growing more muscular”, the media frame the Western liberal form of democracy as the only one that should be considered legitimate and accepted. Grosfoguel (2012b) points out that the West usually imposes its liberal form of democracy on non-Western nations by force, calling it ‘progress’ and
“civilisation”. Forms of democratic alterity – in this case Chinese culture– are orientalised as “backward” and rejected a priori. Yu (1998) observes that deeply-rooted prejudices, ethnocentrism and stereotypes influence a great number of American journalistic reportages on China. Within the frame of Western ‘universalism’ and ethnocentrism, China is constructed as a ‘barbarian’ and ‘threatening’ ‘Other’. Such construction not only maintains the superiority of the Western culture, but also justifies the West’s interferences in China’s domestic issues in the name of ‘civilisation’.

6.4 Construction through distortion

Wertsch (2008) points out that collective memory is a group’s shared narrative of the past, which organises how the group recounts and relates to, its past by embedding it in acts of commemoration, politics and customs. As a cultural practice, collective memory thus becomes collaborative, defined not so much as “memory of a group” but “memory by a group” (Wertsch, 2008, p.121). Various groups in the society compete for the one and only hegemonic narrative (Wodak and De Cillia, 2007). Wodak and De Cillia (2007) identify commemoration events as discourse arenas, in which dominant groups try to transmit their discourses of history to the public. In the case of the Victory Day parade, the media discursively constructed a collective and consensual narrative of the parade that coincides with the Western interpretation of the history of WWII.

6.4.1 Glossing

In the news texts, the media try to essentialise the understanding of the anniversary event, and distort China’s memories of WWII by constructing a dichotomy between an ‘evil’ China as the enemy and a ‘peace-loving’ Japan as the ally of the West, for example:

(25) Washington has expressed unease with the parade’s demonisation of Japan, saying it would prefer that China hold a forward-looking event that promotes reconciliation and healing. (*The New York Times*, 2 September 2015)
Moreover, there’s little desire outside China to vilify a peace-loving and democratic postwar Japan (South Korea is a notable exception) or to celebrate China's military rise, which explains why so few world leaders plan to show up for the Tiananmen spectacle. [...] Where does all this lead? Bitter disputes over wartime history roil the politics of Asia, and may sow the seeds of new tragedies. The rise of nationalism around the region exacerbates the dangers. (The Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2015)

The parade was designed to serve as a reminder of China’s role as an allied power, and of the millions of its people who died during Japan’s 1937-1945 occupation, say Chinese experts. (The Wall Street Journal, 29 July 2015)

The news texts only address in extremely vague terms the brutal and bloody massacres and atrocities committed by Japan during its invasion of China between 1931 and 1945, such as the abstract noun “tragedies” or the phrase “wartime history” in the above examples. Similar abstract nouns and phrases can also be found in other news texts, such as “unfortunate events of the past” (The Wall Street Journal, 3 September 2015), and Japan’s “wartime behaviour” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015). Such abstract nouns and phrases considerably belittle the murder and atrocities of Japanese Fascism. Also, noteworthy in the media are, among other features, the lexical means used to refer to the deaths of victims: “millions of its people died during Japan’s 1937-1945 occupation”; “14 million to 20 million Chinese died” during World War II” (The New York Times, 9 May 2015). The language used to portray the crimes of Japanese Fascism not only deletes the perpetrators, but also leads to a euphemisation of the death of those murdered in the massacre. The more accurate word, “massacre”, is only once explicitly mentioned in all the news texts. For example, “tens of thousands of unarmed civilians were massacred over several weeks in 1937” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015). However, through formulating the sentence in passive voice, the perpetrators escape being named. Such passivisation and agent-deletion, according to Wodak and De Cillia (2007), make it possible to keep the criminals obscured, and reinforce the impression that the events were ‘unavoidable’ and ‘fated’.
In addition, an orientational metaphor (i.e. “Forward-looking is good”, “Backward-looking is bad”) is deployed by the West to distort the history of WWII and gloss over the history of Japan’s fascist occupation. Linguistic realisation of the orientational metaphor can be found in statements, such as Western leaders urged China to hold “a forward-looking event that promotes reconciliation and healing” (The Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2015). The statement implies that looking back at the horrors is psychologically unhealthy as well as politically unhelpful, and the injustices of the past should be separated from the present and the future. This finding corresponds to what Waterton (2010) refers to as the trope of “moving on”. Waterton (2010) argues that the notion of “moving on” is a pervasive and persuasive attempt to mitigate or gloss over social inequities and reproduce a range of social disadvantages. By encouraging China to “move on”, the media gloss over the brutalities of Japanese Fascism in China.

The use of the orientational metaphor also helps to imply that China has been ‘backward-looking’, and it is China (rather than Japan) who has hindered “reconciliation” and “healing”. It is interesting to discover that a medical metaphor is also employed by the media to orientalise China and background the crimes of Japanese Fascism. Linguistic realisation of the medical metaphor can be found in the use of the word “healing”. By using the medical metaphor, the media conjure up a picture of China as the patient who has to be cured, or at least treated preventatively. The conceptual frame of “healing” also implies that, technically, it is possible to make China better. The medical metaphor liberates China of any free will – medicine takes over, and conscience fails to matter. The Orientalist construction of China can also be found in the narrative of “there’s little desire outside China to vilify a peace-loving and democratic postwar Japan. […] Bitter disputes over wartime history roil the politics of Asia, and may sow the seeds of new tragedies. The rise of nationalism around the region exacerbates the dangers.” Here, the media imply that China is the only one to ‘obsess over’ the “disputes over wartime history”. By portraying the disputes as “roil[ing] the politics of Asia”, and “sow[ing] the seeds of new tragedies”, the media insinuate that it is China that poses a danger to the Asian region. Moreover, the orientational metaphor – i.e. more is up;
less is down – is deployed to portray an intense ‘nationalist fervour’ exerted by China (such as “the rise of nationalism”, “rising Chinese nationalism” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015)). These orientational metaphors enable the media to insinuate that China is ‘past-oriented’, and therefore ‘threatening’ regional peace and order.

Furthermore, the media create a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ divide, which categorises China on the ‘bad’ side and Japan on the ‘good’ side, by portraying Japan as a ‘peace-loving and democratic post-war’ nation and an “ally of the United States” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015). The binary construction allows the media to justify the West’s absence from the parade. In fact, such a construction glosses over Japan’s atrocities. During the Meiji era in the 19th century, Japan had launched a programme of “modernisation” modelled on the West, and declared its exit from Asian, and announced its intention to align itself with Europe (i.e. Japan’s “De-Asianisation” or “Leaving Asia”). The programme aimed to transform Meiji Japan and its people just like the European countries and their people. The programme led Japan to mirror Europe’s development in such a way that Japan too commenced imperial invasion and occupation in Asia. By drawing a ‘fault line’ between Japan and China, the media paint a contrast between what is ‘authentically’ Chinese (i.e. ‘authoritarian’) and what is ‘authentically’ Western (i.e. a unique combination of ‘universal’ values such as democracy, and individualism) (Pan, 2012, p.53.). In this way, the cultural differences between China and the West become a fixed dichotomy of ‘deviance’ versus ‘universality’, which is a typical discursive construction of Orientalism and Euro-American-centrism. Euro-American-centrism assumes that modernity and rationality are exclusively European products and experiences (Quijano, 2000). The West presents its own experiences and its own interpretations of the world history as a ‘universal’ ‘truth’, and imposes it on the rest of the world. For Euro-American-centrism, the rise of the modern world is regarded as initiated and motivated by developments in Europe (Mahoney, 2016). Here, Japan followed in footsteps of the West, and is regarded as ‘democratic’ and an “ally” of the West. Meanwhile, China’s different historical trajectory, which is not rooted in linear Aristotelian logic, is orientalised as ‘backward’ and ‘threatening’, and marginalised
as the ‘Other’. Japan, which perpetrated colonialism and genocide in China, is instead framed as the ‘victim’ of a ‘threatening’ and ‘past-oriented’ China by the media. Such narrative distorts the history of WWII, interprets the past from a Western-centric perspective, and glosses over the crimes of Japan’s colonisation and exploitation in China.

Such a Eurocentric interpretation can be found in quite a few of major works on WWII. For example, in Parker’s (1989, p.74) analysis of Japan’s invasion of northeast China, he writes that “Japanese essential trade with China was threatened by Chinese nationalism. Japan desires to make markets secure by political or military action”. There is no mention here of the fact that the war on China had been pre-mediated and planned by Japan. Parker’s accounts offer a rather sanitised version of Japanese colonialism and exploitation. The violent and bloody conquest of China is presented as Japan’s orderly and regulated self-defence. These dominant discourses of colonial conquests have served as prime justification for the conquests of other subaltern cultures (Bhambra, 2016). Moreover, in most of the historical literature, the Chinese people’s resistance against Japan is termed “the Sino-Japanese War”. The term manages to whitewash Japan’s bloody conquest of China, the expropriation and genocide of indigenous peoples, land grabbing, exploitation and oppression. It also elides the many mass struggles, violent and less so, that constitute the history of decolonisation. Miyoshi and Harootunian (1993, p.20) point out that there seems to be “a tacit accord among Western industrialised nations to be amnesiac about Japan’s past”. Western media and cultural products, such as Hollywood films, are dominated by the memories of the Western allies’ encounters with imperial Japan, such as Pacific War, the attack on Pearl Harbour, and the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The heinous war crimes and brutal colonial atrocities that imperial Japan committed in Asian nations are completely erased (Weiner, 1994). Hence, the tribulation of Japanese colonies, which involved tens of thousands of Asians, particularly Chinese women who served as battlefield “sex slaves” in military brothels, innumerable massacres, and ruthless economic exploitation, have been relegated to oblivion (Choi J., 2003). In the following parts, I problematise the dominant discourses of WWII by connecting the history of
Japan’s industrial capitalism with the history of its violent and bloody conquest of the Asian nations, in particular China, and thus provide an alternative understanding of Japan’s colonialisation in Asia and particularly China.

Japan’s colonial ambitions can be traced back to the nineteenth century, which was marked by industrial colonialism in the world. During the era of industrial colonialism, the dynamics of capitalism made manufacturers in Europe eager to expand by tapping into cheaper sources of raw materials and accessing new markets overseas. Capitalism led Europe to increase its territorial acquisition and resource exploitation in Asia. Against the background of global industrial colonialism, Japanese leaders looked to what they called “Euro-America” for the “prerequisites of ‘civilisation’” (Gluck, 1997, p.561), and launched a Western-inspired programme of “modernisation” in Japan during the Meiji era (1866-1912), with a view to “establish a new, European-style empire on the edge of Asia” (Myers and Peattie, 1984, p.64). In the Meiji era, the energies of the “restless samurai class” were deflected in the modernising project to make the Empire like the countries of Europe (Bush, 2006). Japan’s programme of “modernisation” increasingly adopted a military emphasis, with imperialist expansion being regarded as an inevitable path for a ‘vigorous and healthy’ polity that prepares to exit Asia and join Europe (Myers and Peattie, 1984). The establishment of a capitalist economy and the introduction of European technologies bolstered the expansionist ideologies and racist beliefs inherited from the pre-Meiji period.

In 1894-1895, Japan waged a war against China, in which Japan annexed the Liaotung peninsula and Taiwan and Penghu Islands. Ten years later, following the Russo-Japanese War (fought out in northeast China), Japan further strengthened its position and presence in northeast China (Dai, 2015, Lary, 2007). The early success of Japanese imperialism, generated wartime profits, reparations, and the opening of new markets, and thus enabled the rapid advance of Japanese capitalism, especially for those large-scale companies, the Zaibatsu, which had strong government links (Beasley, 1987). At that time, Meiji Japan’s social base was an alliance between the military and the emerging bourgeoisie under the aegis of the monarchy. Japanese
imperialism was characterised by “the concentration of power in the hands of the military”. The development of capitalism and the formation of monopoly enterprises, such as the Zaibatsu, were impaired by a lack of purchasing power in Japan. Moreover, social tensions and conflicts surfaced as social and political changes lagged behind. Older, militaristic values within the modern state resurfaced (Bush, 2006). An imperialism, which was based on “mythical military nationalism”, and “in symbiosis” with the need for overseas expansion as a valve for domestic tensions (Martin, 1986, p.71), led to Japanese imperialism and colonialism in Asia.

In a 1907 policy statement, the Japanese army set forth its basic strategy for aggressive operations on the Asian mainland (Peattie, 2011). During this era of imperialism and colonialism, Japan, the only Asian imperialist power, regarded China as its source of resources for its industries, as a lucrative field for its capital, as its overseas market and as a springboard for further expansion and control of the entire Asian region (Hu and Han, 2005, Iriye, 1987, Peattie, 2011). During World War One (hereafter referred to as WWI), Japan rapidly increased its economic and industrial exploitation in China, especially in northeast China, Shandong, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Japan saw itself increasingly as “an imperial power, the Asian imperial power, moving toward and then beyond the status of one of the Western imperial powers” (Lary, 2007, p.4). At the end of WWI, Japan annexed the Shandong Peninsula, and imposed an unequal treaty known as the “Twenty-One Demands” on the Republic of China (Hebei Provincial Party History Research Group, 2015). The “Twenty-One Demands”, which greatly extended Japan’s control over Manchuria and gave it considerable control over the entire Chinese economy, lays bare Japan’s ambition to subjugate and colonise China (Hebei Provincial Party History Research Group, 2015). In 1927, Japan published a strategic planning document, known as “Tanaka Memorial”7, and pursued its colonial occupation and

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7 In 1927, Japanese Prime Minister Baron Tanaka Giichi convened an infamous “Far East conference”, and planned to conquer China by force (Hu and Han, 2005; Dai, 2015). After the conference, Japan published a strategic planning document, known as “Tanaka Memorial” (Hu and Han, 2005; Dai, 2015). In the Memorial, Tanaka laid out a strategy for Emperor Hirohito to take over China and the world. Tanaka suggested to use force to occupy northeast China, which is known as his “blood-and-iron policy”. He assumed that if Japan could conquer northeast China, Japan could use that as a base to conquer the whole
exploitation in China with greater urgency (Dai, 2015, Hu and Han, 2005). In 1932, Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo in the wake of the Manchurian Incident of September, 1931. In November 1936 Japan signed an anti-Comintern pact with Germany and aligned itself with the Fascist powers in Europe (Hebei Provincial Party History Research Group, 2015, Kitchen, 1990, Peng, 2015). On 7 July 1937, Japan waged a war at the Lugouqiao (English: the Marco Polo Bridge), and started its full-scale war of aggression in China (Hebei Provincial Party History Research Group, 2015, Peng, 2015).

During its colonial occupation of China, Japan pursued a policy of “sustaining the war by means of war” (which refers to “Japan’s policy of ruthlessly plundering of the Chinese areas under its occupation to meet the expenses of its aggressive war”) (Mao, [1965] 2014, p.268). Japan tried to legitimise its imperialist aggression by arguing that it sought to establish a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ based on a Pan-Asian (or “Asia is one”) ideology. In effect, the concept emphasises the link between race and imperial power, and justifies Japan’s imperialism by asserting its racial superiority over the people it dominated. The colonial statement masks Japan’s atrocities that brought destruction and misery to China. Japan adopted a horrible strategy to strengthen its rule, which was based on terror, forced relocation, and plunder – known as the “sanguang zhengce” (three-all policy, i.e. “kill all, burn all, and loot all”) (Drea and Van de Ven, 2011, p.39, Zhang, 2015). Japan’s terrible atrocities in China, particularly the Nanking Massacre of more than 300000 Chinese people in December 1937, epitomised the unfathomable brutality of Japanese fascism and colonialism, and the appalling hypocrisy of the ideology of Asian cooperation (Hu and Han, 2005, Zhang, 2015).

By portraying Japan as “peace-loving” in the news texts, the media reconstruct a historical narrative that denies Japan’s brutal ambitions for colonial expansion, and the heinous atrocities and abominable racist genocide it committed. The absence of
Western leaders at the parade was not, as the West alleged, because the representatives of the state were “wary of being seen to support a growing Chinese military” (*The New York Times*, 3 September 2015), but instead, it reflects the West’s effort to gloss over Japan’s iniquities of the past.

### 6.4.2 Silencing

In addition to backgrounding Japan’s colonial exploitation and fascist aggression in the Asian nations and particularly in China, the American mainstream newspapers also deprived China of its own collective memories of WWII. As such, the Western-centric interpretation of the history of WWII is universalised as ‘truth’ and ‘fact’, the voices, collective memories and experiences of the Chinese are silenced. In the news texts, the media marginalised the subaltern Chinese memories and expressions of WWII by orientalising China as ‘backward’ and ‘unable’ to produce thoughts worthy of being considered part of the world history:

> (28) Although China often asks Japan to take a “correct” view of history, *many historians* say the Chinese Communist Party itself *takes liberties with* history - *playing down or ignoring* the fact that it was Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces, not Mao's guerrillas that took the fight to the Japanese. Xi's comments *made no mention* of this fact [...] The version of history *being crafted* by Xi and his peers is of a country that triumphed under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and is being led forward by the party - ever stronger and more forceful, but still, as Xi stressed several times, committed to peace. (*The Washington Post*, 4 September 2015)

The news texts represent China and interpret the history of the Chinese people’s resistance against Japanese Fascism from a Euro-American-centric perspective. By activating China as an actor in relation to material processes such as “take liberties of”, “crafted”, “made no mention”, “play down or ignore”, and “manipulate”, the media imply that China is ‘uncivilised’ and ‘irrational’ and ‘cannot produce absolute theoretical insights’. This construction is a typical discourse of “epistemic racism”. Grosfoguel (2012b) critically analyses “epistemic racism” and points out that it assumes that “absolute knowledge” could only be achieved by white
Christian-heterosexual-European men. Non-Western nations and people, which are considered ‘primitive’ and ‘backward’, are not granted the capacity to produce thoughts worthy of being considered a part of the philosophical legacy of humanity. The West authoritatively presents itself and its produced knowledge about the other cultures as ‘objective’ and ‘universalist’, while the knowledge and philosophies of non-Western nations are deemed to be ‘inferior’. In terms of the American mainstream media coverage of the event, by orientalising China as ‘uncivilised’, the media refused to grant China the ability to produce ‘absolute knowledge’. Whatever knowledge China produces cannot be regarded as worthy of being part of world history. In so doing, the West maintains its privilege of knowledge production, and makes its own Euro-American-centric interpretation of the history of WWII appear ‘universal’ and ‘scientific’. The voice of China is silenced. The media further distorted the history of China’s resistance against Japanese Fascism, by making statements, such as:

(29) “The Communists didn’t fight much, but they need to take credit for winning the war […]” Sun says. (Los Angeles Times, 1 September 2015)

(30) “The Chinese Communist Party didn’t defeat Japan; this is very painful to see,” […] “During those eight years, it was us Nationalists who were fighting – the Communists were not doing battle with the Japanese.” (Los Angeles Times, 2 September 2015)

“Communist Party” is activated as an actor in relation to material processes such as “didn’t defeat Japan”, “didn't fight much”, and “were not doing battle with the Japanese”. These material processes suggest that the “communist party” is ‘backward’ and ‘non-resistant’. Such a construction downplays and silences the role of the Chinese Communist Party in fighting against Japanese Fascism.

By constructing a division between an ‘evil’ China and a ‘peace-loving’ Japan, and orientalising China as ‘uncivilised’, the media interpret the history of WWII from a Euro-American-centric perspective and silence the memories of China of WWII. The media reconstruct a history that glosses over the atrocities and racist genocide committed by Japan’s colonial powers, and erases the ‘Other’, i.e. the Chinese people and the Chinese communist party, from the history of WWII with regard to
their sufferings under resistance against Japanese militarism and Fascism and the overall global victory over Fascism. The amnesia of China’s suffering and struggle against Japanese militarism is embodied in the absence of Western leaders at the parade.

6.5 Restoring collective memories of Chinese people’s war against Japanese Fascism

The American mainstream newspapers ignored the collective memories of China’s war against Japan’s aggression during the WWII, glossed over Japan’s colonisation in the Asian nations and in particular China, and thus represented the anniversary parade in a discourse of ‘China threat’. In that way, the media constructed the narrative of the parade in a way that is consistent with the West’s interpretation of WWII, and justified the privileges of the West in the production and distribution of knowledge on modern world history. Modern world history, especially the history of the Global War against Fascism, is Euro-America centric. In the field of historiography, the vast majority of the literature is written by, and about, only some of the Euro-American peoples and battles. Although centrally concerned with the WWII, historiography has paid little attention to the devastating wars which took place in non-Western nations – in this case, the Japanese colonial conquest of China. Also scant attention is being paid to the anti-colonial wars fought for independence. The existing body of knowledge on the WWII has overlooked the histories of the rest of the world.

When dealing with the history of the Global War against Fascism, most historical accounts produced in Europe and the United States concentrate on the British and Americans fighting in Europe and the Pacific. The role of China’s War of Resistance against Japan’s invasion during the WWII has not been properly represented (Xie, 2016). Despite the scale and importance of the Chinese people’s resistance in the Global War against Fascism, the names of legendary battles in China, such as that of Lugouqiao, Xuzhou, Pingxingguan – battles that were as critical in the conflicts that gripped the world in the late 1930s and the 1940s as Dieppe, Stalingrad, or
Normandy – are hardly known to the world (Lary, 2007). The names of Chinese generals such as Zhang Zizhong, Tang Enbo, etc. – whose achievements during China’s war of resistance were on a par with those of Montgomery or Patton in Europe – are seldom mentioned in historiography (Lary, 2007).

For example, in his *History of the Second World War*, Hart (1999) never mentions military operations in China. The overlook of battles and resistances in the China battlefield is not rare, and can be found in the majority of historical works. In Hattori’s (1953) *Complete History of the Great East Asia War*, only a couple of sentences in the background chapter are devoted to China battles (including fights and conflicts in China during WWII), even though the book claims to present a large-scale military history of the Pacific War. China’s battles are rarely accorded a similar status, that is, of being an essential part of world history, which contributed to the defeat of World War II’s fascists. Similarly, in volume ten of *A global history*, edited by the former Soviet Science Institute (1978), only ten pages are dedicated to describe Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression. Among the spate of books published on the World War II, scholars only pay scant attention to China’s war against Japanese invasion. Few histories on World War II have included the Chinese war experience in their sense making of the war.

In historiography, the dominant narrative of WWII is that it all began with Hitler’s and Germany’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 (cf. Weinberg, 1995). There is no mention of China having already resisted against Japan’s invasion in the northeast of China since 1931. In fact, given that Japan had begun its imperialist conquest of Northeast China already in 1931, China had been fighting the war against fascism 8 years before the outbreak of WWII in Europe in 1939. Following the Japanese occupation of Northeast China in the wake of “the September 18th Incident”, large numbers of Chinese volunteer armies fought against Japanese and *Manzhouguo* (Manchukuo) forces over wide areas of Northeast China (Liang Z., 2015). In November 1931, a Jilin Provincial *Kangri zhengfu* (Anti-Japanese Government) was established to coordinate military resistance (Hu, 2015, Lary, 2007). Ordinary Chinese, including peasants, workers, students, policemen,
tradesmen, in addition to the well-to-do were willing to take up arms and join the anti-Japanese forces (Coogan, 1993). Coogan (1993, p.37) points out that “the volunteer armies were the main anti-Japanese force in Northeast China during 1932 and posed a serious obstacle to Japanese attempts to dominate the country”. Moreover, Chinese Communists organised a *Dongbei kangri lianjun* (Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army), open to all who wanted to resist the invasion, and conducted a protracted campaign which threatened the stability of the *Manzhouguo* (Manchukuo) regime, especially during 1936 and 1937 (Coogan, 1993, Wang, 1995).

By 1939, China had already been at war with Japan for 8 years. It makes China the nation who first started to fight against Fascism, which is well captured in Lary’s (2007, p. 1) words:

> [T]he all-out war that started in China with the Japanese invasion in 1937 and lasted until 1945 was the longest conflict of any in the warfare that then engulfed the world – World War II.

The Chinese people’s war of resistance, which started 8 years earlier (if using 1931 as a start point) than the war in Europe and lasted twice as long as the Soviet-German and the American-Japanese conflicts, has been deliberately downplayed and remained in the shadows of historiography (Mitter and Moore, 2011). The history of the Global War against Fascism is reduced to the history of Euro-American war against Fascism.

The Euro-American centric interpretation of the WWII, with its origins in the particular knowledge of European battlefields and wars, is devised to make sense of the behaviour of power and culture under Western capitalist modernity (Seth, 2011). It is typically from such particulars that the statements about WWII have been produced. Through a deafness towards the world, the West camouflages its European interpretation of the history as ‘universalist cosmopolitanism’ and imposes it on the rest of the world as the ‘truth’. Considering that these statements about WWII are derived from a historically very peculiar, temporally very thin, and spatially very narrow slice of human history, they absolutely ignore the majority of
Chinese experiences, and fail to help, if not even impede, people’s understandings of, what happened in the non-Western battle grounds, particularly at the Eastern front of China. Consequently, the Eurocentric construction of WWII results in the exclusion and silence of indigenous knowledge (Chowdhry and Nair, 2002). The Eurocentric construction of the world’s history reduces a complex phenomenon to a simple and patterned framework of understanding, which locates its origins in an exclusive representation of the West’s historical experience and is couched in orthodox Euro-American philosophical terms (Seth, 2011).

The West-centric construction of knowledge about the global war against Fascism has given rise to a distorted view of the Chinese people’s struggles and resistances against fascism in WWII. In addition to the American media discourses, which downplay the role of China in the global war against Fascism, similar discourses can be found in the majority of major works on the WWII. For example, in discussing the strategic connection between the Pacific wars and China’s war of resistance against Japanese fascism, Haruo (2011, p.434) writes that

   the direction of the Japanese-American war could no longer be determined by the settlement of the Sino-American War. At the end of 1943, it could be said that Japan was fighting two independent wars with marginal connections between them.

He (2011, p.440) continues to point out that

   China was unable to make substantial contributions to the final result of the Asian Pacific War. Indeed, it was the U.S. Navy’s thorough destruction of Japanese shipping, the U.S. Air Force’s strategic raids launched from the Mariana Islands on Japan proper, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that crushed Japan’s economy and its ability to continue the war.

Haruo attributes Japan’s surrender alone to the U.S. air forces and their atomic bombings. There is no mention of the Chinese people’s struggles. Echoing Haruo’s argument, Spector’s (2011) account of the “Sino-Japanese” war in the context of world history is a story of the West’s achievement, and also downplays (and even ignores) the contributions made by non-Western nations, such as China. Spector
(2011, p.479) writes that rapid technological advances, especially in long-range heavy bombers and aircraft carrier task forces, diminished China’s value near the end of the war as a base to launch aerial assaults against the Japanese home islands. Yet the inability of the Japanese army to withdraw substantial numbers of troops by 1944 from the theatre to more critical battlefields elsewhere was due less to the danger posed by Chinese military forces than to the relentless American and Allied submarine and air attacks that destroyed Japan’s merchant marine fleet, leaving Tokyo without sufficient shipping to redeploy forces or move essential raw materials and finished goods.

Both Haruo’s and Spector’s views of Chinese forces and the outcome of the war privilege Western military effectiveness. The Eurocentric view of the outcome of the war is echoed throughout Western academic works on the topic of WWII, whereby the Chinese resistances efforts are constructed as irrelevant to the outcome of the war, and China orientalised as “backward”, “corrupt”, “incapable” or even “unwilling to manoeuvre large numbers of units on the grand scale required and mount effective resistance against the Japanese invasion” (cf. Haruo, 2011, p.447, Hsiung and Levine, 1992, p.141). This view is problematic considering that it not only belittles China’s war effort, but also ignores the enormous suffering that the war caused, as well as China’s dogged resistance during the war.

In order to counter Japan’s full-scale aggression against China, the Chinese Communist and Nationalist parties joint up to form a Kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian (an anti-Japanese United Front) on the 8th of July 1937 (Zhang, 2015). The union saw China’s Communist and Nationalist parties cooperatively fight against Japanese Fascism on battlefields and behind enemy lines, and effectively foil Japan’s ambition to “invade China within three months” (Peng, 2015, p.50). In the battle behind enemy lines, the Chinese Communist party established Kangri genjudi (anti-Japanese base areas), such as the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base areas, Shanxi-Hebei-Henan base areas, and organised more than 1600 counteroffensives between July 1937 and October 1938 (Zhu, 2005). During the Pingxingguan war in
September of 1937, China’s central army and the communist Balujun (Eighth Rout Army) annihilated a brigade of the Japanese Fifth Division (Drea and Van de Ven, 2011, Wang, 1995). When defending Shanghai in October 1937, 40000 Japanese men were stuck in the China battlefield (Drea and Van de Ven, 2011, Williamsen, 1992). According to Drea and Van de Ven (2011, p. 35), “by the end of 1937 the equivalent of Japan’s peacetime army establishment of sixteen divisions and 600000 men was struck in the protracted war in China”. In central China, Japanese imperial army forces had been worn down by heavy casualties, insufficient stocks of ammunition, and inadequate logistical support. Other significant Chinese counteroffensives in the war included the battle of Taierzhuang in March 1938 – April 1938, the battle of Xuzhou in April 1938, and the battle of Wuhan in the summer of 1938. Such counteroffensives impaired Japan’s ability to conduct large-scale operations (Liang Z., 2015, Peng, 2015).

In order to fend off Japan’s brutal colonial exploitation and occupation, Chinese Communists organised guerrilla wars to fight against Japanese plunder, and launched the Baituan dazhan (Hundred Regiments Offensive) in August 1940 (Liang Z., 2015). Designed to sever Japanese road and rail communications, pin down Japanese armies, and destroy Japanese-controlled factories and mines, the wide-ranging, well-coordinated attacks struck a deadly blow on Japanese soldiers and their puppet troops (Drea and Van de Ven, 2011, Liang Z., 2015, Zhu, 2005). In the same year, the Chinese people organised more than 20000 counteroffensives against Japanese forces (Liu 2015). When the Pacific war broke out in 1941, China had already singlehandedly been fighting against Japanese Fascism for 10 years. The scope and intensity of the Communist and Nationalist counteroffensives on Chinese battlefields meant a big blow to Japan, and terminated Japan’s policy of being able to “sustain war by means of war”. More importantly, the Chinese counteroffensives effectively broke up Japanese “North-forward” aggression against the Soviet Union and delayed Japan’s “South-Forward” plans targeting Southeast Asia Pacific (Hu, 2015, Peng, 2015). The significance of Chinese successes in fighting Japanese forces during WWII is well captured in the statistics in Mawdsley’s (2009, p.68) *World War Two: a New Story*:
One estimate is that the Japanese lost (in deaths) 220000 personnel in China in 1937-9, and 100000 in 1940-1. (Reflecting the more static situation of later years, the Japanese would lose only 157000 men in China in 1942-5.). […] by contrast, in the Battle of France in 1940 - the costliest German campaign before June 1941 – German losses were 45000 and French losses 90000.

As a result of the Chinese people’s resistance, the Japanese army were forced to enter the war with Britain and the United States in 1941 with two-thirds of its ground forces still deployed on the Chinese mainland, including in northeast China (Peng, 2015).

After the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Japan attacked and occupied Guam, Manila and Singapore in rapid succession (Ch'i, 1992). In order to prevent Japan from occupying strategically important Burma, China reacted quickly, and sent the Chinese Expeditionary Army (hereafter referred to as CEA) to undertake a campaign in Burma in cooperation with the British (Ch'i, 1992, p. 158). During Burma’s war against Japan, the British dismissed Burma as a “‘disease-ridden country’ that was hardly a worthwhile objective” (Kitchen, 1990, p.163). Following the unannounced retreat of British units from the battle, the Chinese armies ended up fighting against the Japanese armies alone (Peng, 2015). Propelled on by their successful defence of Mandalay, the Chinese army made great progress in their fight against Japan in northern Burma. By January 1945, the Chinese army had recovered the strategic town of Myitkina, decimated the renowned Japanese 18th division in the process, and completely opened the Sino-India Road (Chi, 1992). The Chinese soldiers, who participated in the second Burma campaign, delivered devastating blows to the Japanese troops in one battle after another. According to the statistics in Chi (1992, p.162), “the Japanese suffered 48,850 dead, and 647 captured, along with the loss of a large quantity of weapons”. The Chinese forces not only saved their allies from a dangerous situation, but contributed to the liberation of South-Asian countries.
In the summer of 1945, when the global anti-fascist forces were on the verge of victory, Chinese armies started a great counteroffensive against the Japanese in the north, central, south and northeast of China. Chinese counteroffensives, combined with Soviet attacks on Japan’s Kwantung Army in the northeast of China and U.S. raids on Japan, resulted in the surrender of 1200000 Japanese armies in China (Hu, 2015, Peng, 2015). It is evident that China’s War of Resistance against Japan’s invasion constitutes an indispensable component of the global war against Fascism.

Regrettably, the collective memories of China’s struggles against Japan’s fascism have completely been silenced in the West-centric accounts of WWII. The media discourses of the anniversary parade reproduced the dominant interpretation of WWII, silenced the voice of China, and constructed the parade in a decontextualised way. The West imposed its own knowledge of WWII on the rest of the world as the ‘truth’, which further maintained and strengthened cultural inequalities between the West and China.

6.6 Summary

The CDA of the media coverage of China’s Victory Day parade has been the focus of this chapter. The analysis revealed that the media discursively constructed the parade in a decontextualised way, glossed over China’s traumatic experiences, and silenced China’s struggles against Japanese Fascism. The news texts established a dichotomy between a ‘threatening’ and ‘uncivilised’ China and a ‘peace-defender’ and ‘liberal’ U.S and its allies (in this case Japan), evoked historical colonial ‘yellow peril’ stereotypes: ‘threatening’ and ‘aggressive’, strengthened the self-definition of the U.S. and Japan as ‘superior’ and ‘civilised’, and justified the U.S. intervention in the Asian-Pacific region. The strategic use of metaphors such as muscle flexing, and negatively connoted words, enabled the media to construct China as a scapegoat for stirring up troubles in the Asian region, and denigrated China as the ‘military’, ‘warlike’ and ‘dangerous’ ‘Other’. In addition, the media adopted an ‘anti-communism’ frame to construct narratives around themes of socio-cultural, economic, and political deprivation. Making use of linguistic tools such as
transitivity and selection of negatively-connoted words, the media represented China in a ‘China collapse’ narrative, and stigmatised China as ‘totalitarian’ and ‘uncivilised’. By playing on the discourse of ‘uncivilised’ China, the media denigrated China as an ‘irrational’ ‘Other’, who is incapable of producing thoughts that are worthy of being regarded as essential knowledge. It is in these ways that the otherness of China was effectively constructed. The construction strengthened the deeply-entrenched colonial image of China, and decontextualised the anniversary parade in a way that it was represented in an ‘attack’ versus ‘defend’ frame. In so doing, parade was decontextualised as a ‘means of showing military power’.

In addition, this chapter has argued that the decontextualised representation of the anniversary parade not only whitewashed Japan’s colonial expansion and racial genocide in the colonised Asian nations, and in particular in China, but also silenced China’s various struggles against Japan’s fascism. The sum of these strategies allowed the media to construct a narrative of the parade that favoured the West’s interpretation of the history of WWII. By contextualising the discussion of the parade in relations to the history of China’s war against Japan’s fascism between 1931 and 1942, the chapter deconstructed the dominant discourses of the parade and produced an increasingly comprehensive account of WWII that extends beyond the Eurocentric narrative. The chapter also pointed out that the Eurocentrism embedded in the Western culture continues to generate a hierarchy in the production of knowledge, whereby the West is presented as superior to non-Western nations. The West has constructed its own interpretation of the WWII by downplaying, if not ignoring, China’s contribution to the success of the war, and continues to impose the Western interpretation on the rest of the world as the ‘truth’, thus establishing its epistemic hegemony/violence.
Chapter 7
Analysis of American Mainstream Newspapers’ Representation of China-African Relations

7.1 Introduction

With the advent of globalisation, national economies are increasingly connected by means of international trade. At the same time, globalisation has intensified inequalities and polarisation between the global North and the South (Amadi, 2012). The core zones of the capitalist world economy overlap with predominantly Euro-American societies, while peripheral zones tend to be found in previously colonised non-Western nations. The economic and political systems of the peripheral states are shaped by their subordinate position in a capitalist world system organised around a hierarchical international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1979, 1984, 1995). The world system perpetuates the wealth of the “core” (global North) at the expense of the periphery (global South). Since the 1970s, the rise of China has fundamentally disrupted the existing “world order”. China’s economic role has gained significant prominence in a system once dominated by capital from developed countries. The increasing economic and political interactions between China and Africa mark a trend of declining dominance of the “core economies”. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has made efforts to further strengthen its relations with Africa by convening several high-level summits between Chinese and African leaders, such as the convocation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (hereafter referred to as FOCAC) in 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015 (Okolo and Akwu, 2016). Since 2000, Chinese investment in Africa has increased rapidly (Okolo and Akwu, 2016). Meanwhile, driven by the strategy of “Zouchuqu” (“going out”), Chinese enterprises have strengthened cooperation with Africa in a range of fields, including investment, trade, cultural exchange, etc. Moreover, the Chinese government has offered priority policies and commercial lending for outward investment projects in several sectors. This has encouraged economic cooperation between China and Africa, and resulted in many
African countries gaining huge leverage and an enhanced position in the global economy.

There has been some scholarly interest in the cultural exchanges and historical relations between China and Africa. Recent studies extend the focus to economy and development in China-Africa relations (cf. Alden, 2007, Amadi, 2012, Ampiah and Naidu, 2008, Lee, 2006, Taylor, 2005, Taylor, 2006). However, a critical review of this research shows that this body of work tends to be dominated by Euro-American-centric perspectives, which consider China as the ‘Other’ threatening the established ‘sphere of influence’ of Anglo-Saxon and American powers. Thereby, China is portrayed as a ‘neo-colonial power’ in Africa. While there are occasional counter-narratives such as works by Sautman and Yan (2014, 2016) and Giese and Thiel (2014), they are more concerned with re-establishing ‘realities’ than engaging with theoretical debates. Current scholarship in the field ignores the importance of discourse in constructing national images and international relations and the ideology and power associated with the construction of international relations.

Based on a selection of 61 American news texts on China-Africa relations, this chapter contributes to the current literature in a novel way by adopting a postcolonial theoretical perspective to 1) examine the frame that the American mainstream newspapers have used to construct China-Africa relations as ‘colonial’, and 2) reconstruct the story of China-Africa relations, and allow for the voice of China as a developing country, thus providing a counter-narrative to the hegemonic discourse.

Additionally, the chapter contributes to the growing literature on postcolonial international relations (hereafter referred to as IR). Current studies on IR (cf. Brown, 2012, Mandaville, 2003) are dominated by ideas produced in, and by, the West. A storyline of international order, which is derived from a particular representation of the West’s Post-Renaissance historical experience, is presented as the ‘universal’ and ‘true’ account of the world, and is imposed on the rest of the world. The voices and political thought of non-Western nations are marginalised and silenced. Although recent studies have extended their focus to non-Western regions, such as
China and African countries, they tend to reproduce the same Western-centric framework. This chapter will argue that the existing Euro-America-centric theoretical concepts are inadequate for facilitating an understanding of what happened in non-Western regions. By examining the American mainstream media’s representation of China-Africa relations, this chapter deconstructs Western epistemologies, and explores how the American mainstream media position the West, particularly the U.S., in relation to China and Africa.

The chapter is organised into six sections. Section 7.2 provides an overview of the history of China-Africa relations, and sets out the context in which current relations between China and Africa are to be understood. China’s strengthened relation with Africa is significant as it comes at a time when African countries remained marginal to the international trade system, and are frequently ignored in discussions and negotiations of global trade, commerce and politics. Sections 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 present the data and offer an analytical interpretation of the media’s representation of China-Africa relations. Section 7.6 summarises the chapter’s findings and arguments.

### 7.2 Contextualising China-Africa relations

George (1994, p.ix) points out that the discipline of IR is related to a discursive regime of exclusion, silence, and intolerance that “reduces a complex and turbulent world to a patterned and rigidly ordered framework of understanding, derived from a particular representation of post-Renaissance European historical experience, articulated in orthodox Anglo-American philosophical terms”. In other words, the discipline of IR is an Anglo-American-centric social science, in which the voices of non-Westerners are silenced. The West projects its values of a Westphalian international society, articulated in a language of rights and authority, on to the non-West in an effort to assimilate it. Otherwise, the non-West’s difference is translated as ‘inferiority’ and pathologised as ‘danger’. The silencing of the postcolonial non-West is effectively materialised in the subsumption of decolonising moments under the ‘civilising’ tropes, such as the “expansion of international society”, or
‘modernisation’ and ‘development’. The richness of political thought coming out of the non-West, particularly the cooperation and relations found within the “global South”, is yet to be fully understood and integrated into IR. Niang (2016) points out that the development of “global South” relations, particular China-Africa relations, provides an Asian-African approach to the provincial, if hegemonic, self-understanding of IR, and presents a space where non-Westerners are able to present themselves, rather than being merely represented or spoken about. The following sections revisit China-Africa relations with a view to offer a small exploration into the paradoxical links between the expansion of IR and the marginalisation of the voices of the postcolonial non-West. The following sections situate China-Africa relations in the specificities of Africa’s colonial past and postcolonial present, while also considering the West’s historical and contemporary roles in Africa, and China’s changing position in the world.

7.2.1 The West’s historical and contemporary roles in Africa

The contact between Africa and the West began with the slave trade, which saw the capture and forceful transportation of millions of Africans across the Atlantic to work in plantations in the Americas (Alemazung, 2010). During the seventeenth century, the colonisation of America by Europeans fuelled the capture, transport, and enslavement of Africans in the Americas and the Caribbean. The Atlantic slave trade during Western colonialism represents the largest slave trade in human history. An estimated 2.75 million slaves were taken from West Africa to the Americas in the seventeenth century. The number rose further to a massive 7 million in the eighteenth century (Potter et al., 2004). A decree issued by Louis XIV of France in 1670 (cited in Potter et al., 2004, p. 59) read, “there is nothing which contributes more to the development of the colonies and the cultivation of their soil than the laborious toil of the Negros”. The trade enabled Europeans to expand their settlement in the New World, but also earn substantial capital to finance the industrial revolution back in Europe. Inevitably, it caused an unparalleled number of human deaths as well as immense suffering for Africa and its peoples. The slave trade pauperised and depopulated the African continent, stealing its young and
productive members and derailing the political history and economic development. In addition, the slave trade drew many parts and peoples of the non-European world into the capitalist system, consolidated the dominant-dominated relations between Europeans (mainly white men) and non-Europeans (the so-called coloured peoples), making racism the primary justification for full colonial exploitation of non-European nations (in this case Africa) (Bulhan, 2015).

The expansion of maritime and financial capitalism facilitated the peak of African slave trade, and was immediately followed by the colonisation of African countries in the nineteenth century. A systemic violence was inflicted upon Africa, which was not only integral to capitalism, but also coexistent with racism, cultural domination, and European economic, political and military aggrandisement (Bulhan, 2015). Biological differences were used to justify the notion of a racial (by extension, cultural) binary (white versus non-white; Western versus non-Western) and hierarchy (superiority versus inferiority) between Europeans and non-Europeans. Science, reason and civilisation were assumed to be exclusive to Europeans, whereas colonial Africans were defined as ‘primitive’, ‘poor’ and ‘savage’, and constituting an ‘inferior’ ‘other’. Said (1994) examines the centrality of alterity to colonialism, and exposes the ways in which the subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudices against non-European peoples and their cultures have served as implicit justifications for Europe’s colonial and imperial ambitions. As Potter et al. (2004 p.65) argue,

The rationale for the colonial project itself was provided by a consolidation of the ideology of justifiable intervention and occupation of what had become either ‘uncivilised savages’ or traditional groups whose history was ignored and whose societies and activities were seen as either static or disintegrating.

Western colonial projects were based partly on an imagination of the world which legitimised and supported the power of the West to dominate ‘Others’. The denigration of the oppressed, colonised peoples and their rendering as objects were crucial to the self-definition and assumed superiority of the colonisers (McEwan, 2008). By representing colonial others, in particular Africans and the blacks, as
backward’, ‘lazy’ and ‘irrational’, the West (the white man) project itself as ‘advanced’, ‘adventurous entrepreneurial’, ‘rational’ with ‘work ethics’. The power to represent other places (to name, describe, publicise, claim and construct knowledge) was instrumental in establishing and reinforcing superiority and inferiority on the basis of superficial differences of skin colour, language, cultural practice, religion, and so forth between the West and non-West, the North and the South, and was subsequently utilised to justify imperialist military invasions and occupation, and later interventions in the name of development. With the help of the hegemonic discourse, Europeans created a “Western-style for dominating”, and invented the authority and legitimacy to subjugate and oppress non-Western peoples by means of colonialism (McEwan, 2008, p.131). The Europeans occupied the African continent, and implemented a series of economic and socio-political institutions that could help them to dominate and control different territories in Africa.

Under colonialism, Western colonialists exemplified the concept of a biological and cultural hierarchy, which deemed Africans to be ‘not equal human beings’ but slaves. The colonialists established the division of labour on the basis of race, and naturalised work suitability by race-based inequalities. Africans were considered to be manual workers by nature, while Western colonialists were well-suited to be masters (Sautman and Yan, 2006). The colonial powers set up administrative apparatuses on the continent that virtually destroyed all indigenous political systems and established the colonial powers’ own networks of administrators (Wengraf, 2016-17). All top bureaucrats in Africa were drawn from the metropolis (Sautman and Yan, 2006). Slaves were denied almost all rights, and few colonised people were accorded citizenship. Racialisation of labour enabled Western colonialists to exploit African workers by paying lower wages under worse conditions than those for white workers. The colonial society was vertically stratified, and a racial hierarchy was established with Europeans on the top, and Africans at the bottom. The latter were employed in menial jobs and Europeans described African miners as their “tools” (Sautman and Yan, 2006). Moreover, there were huge differences in living standards between the colonisers and the colonised.
Racial segregation characterised the colonial city. The institutional arrangement was such that railway lines, parks or gardens strictly separated from the dwelling places of the colonisers from the indigenous living quarters. Little face-to-face contact took place between the colonisers and the colonised, except within a dominant-subordinate relationship (Potter et al., 2004). By representing colonised Africa as the ‘savage Other’, the discourse of race and racial hierarchy proved central in legitimating colonial domination and expansion.

Moreover, the colonisers used the discourse of race and “divide-and-rule” to differentiate, manipulate and control colonised peoples and countries. According to Shillington (1989, p.356), the colonial powers developed a “racial science” to stratify diverse ethnic groups. Such a stratification led to divisions within and between these groups, which enabled the colonial powers to weaken the opposition of the colonised Africa, and maintain the colonial domination. Shillington continues that, until then these groups had lived as a people speaking the same language, inhabiting the same area and following the same traditions. The colonisers created and amplified the differences amongst African people who live in the same nation even when these differences did not exist, only to serve their own goal of continued domination and exploitation (Alemazung, 2010). It is the colonial authorities who invented “tribalism” in Africa. The colonisers’ creation of, and insistence on, the racial differences between the peoples of Africa resulted in a hierarchy amongst different ethnic groups in one nation. The colonial creation of artificial racial divisions is at the root of much of the present-day tensions and civil strives in Africa.

Said (1978, 1994) maintains that colonialism existed to impose the superiority of the European way of life on that of the Orient – it was a colonisation of minds and bodies as much as that of space and economies. In addition to the territorial occupation, the establishment of the administrative control, and the hierarchical order on the base of race, colonialism has at its heart the drive for economic profit (Potter et al., 2004). Employing politico-military means of control, the colonisers imposed a colonial monopoly complex – a systematic dominance – in every major sphere of colonial economies with a view to extract capital from the continent and
ensure the profitability of European settlers’ factories, farms and mines (Campbell, 2008). Within monopoly complexes, colonial regimes seized land from the Africans and gave it to settlers. In many parts of Africa, poll taxes and hut taxes were introduced to finance their administration, while “tax evasion”, according to Binns (1994, p.10), “was brutally discouraged and could lead to harsh punishment and forced labour”. Moreover, a new agricultural system was established in which the range of crops produced was narrowed to those commodities required by metropolitan industries, such as cocoa, coffee, and cotton (Potter et al., 2004). Colonies thus became associated with the production of one or two raw materials, and were forced to import whatever else was needed. As Binns (1994, p.10) points out, “economically, colonialism programmed [African] countries to consume what they do not produce and to produce what they do not consume”. During the decades of colonialism, the growth of cash crops (e.g. coffee, cotton) reached such an extreme that it resulted in monoculture in many colonies. Inevitably, the imposed cash crops and monoculture destroyed the bargaining position of colonised African peoples. Africa could only import products from the metropolis and had to maintain very low or no tariffs. The regime of monopoly commanded that colonial exports could be made only to the metropolis (Sautman and Yan, 2006). In order to maintain their monopolies, the colonial powers in Africa limited the amount and kind of investment by others, destroyed Africa’s existing trade, and curbed or banned indigenous industries that competed with those of the colonial power (Sautman and Yan, 2006). Manufacturing was relatively limited in colonial Africa. Existing manufacturing activities were largely concerned with the preliminary processing of products. Most of the more sophisticated processing (and thus profit-making) occurred within the industrial areas of the metropolitan countries. Colonial rule and its institutions ensured the absence of conditions that were necessary for industrialisation and genuine development in Africa. More importantly, these conditions ensured that the colonised suffered double, first by having to the labour in the cropfields, and then subsequently by having to purchase the manufactured goods at exorbitant prices (Potter et al., 2004, p.68). Effectively, Africans were discriminated against in most areas of economic life and wages were kept very low, while the profits from the exploitation of African labourers went directly to
European bankers and trading companies. The raw materials and other natural resources were ruthlessly exploited by the colonial powers.

The discourse of ‘otherness’ was also a critical element in constituting ‘the White man’s burden’ of ‘civilising’ the Other (in this case Africa). This ‘civilising mission’, as the chapter shall reveal below, masked the colonial exploitation and brutality, and should not simply be regarded as part of the process of ‘modernisation’. While the colonisers claimed to bring the ‘rule of law’ to colonised Africa and apply the law to “safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of the individual” (Alemazung, 2010, p.67), it is precisely by judicial means that the colonial powers oppressed the local population. In reality, the colonial administrations failed to implement the so-called ‘rule of law’ in their colonies. According to Shillington (1989), the colonised enjoyed neither property, nor citizens’ rights, and in most cases, were even denied the right to citizenship. In many cases, colonial laws gave free reign to colonial administrators to “imprison any African subject indefinitely and without charge or trial” (Shillington, 1989, p. 355). The discourse of ‘civilisation mission’ can also be found in the colonisers’ investment in Africa. Contrary to colonial propaganda, which involved colonisers’ claiming to invest in the ‘well-being’ of the colonised, the limited colonial investment went towards the military or the colonial administration rather than on projects to transform and improve local productive capacity. In addition, colonial policy actively suppressed education for the majority. Technical education was introduced only in rare instances. For example, Congo had only sixteen secondary school graduates at the time of independence, out of a total population of thirteen million. Likewise, not one doctor was trained in Mozambique during the 500 years of Portuguese colonial rule (Potter et al., 2004). Even if there was some limited investment into the colonised, it went into extractive industries or the infrastructure to facilitate extraction. The priority of resource-extraction decisively shaped how the infrastructure was developed. For example, the investment into setting up electricity grids and power stations was heavily geared towards digging mines and wells. In the same vein, the laying of railroad tracks and the digging of harbours were done for the purpose of moving African raw materials abroad (Wengraf, 2016-17). Most
of these attempts at developing an infrastructure served to meet the economic needs of the colonial powers and had little to do with the contemporary needs of independent states. As Rodney (1972) argues so succinctly, “colonialism had only one hand – it was a one-armed bandit”. Colonialism left destruction and ruin in its wake: life expectancy plummeted, and ecological devastation spread across rural areas that received minimal social services (Wengraf, 2016-17).

Although, Africans finally ‘won’ their fight for liberation and were ‘freed’ from colonial rule, the ideologies of colonialism, which are disguised with the discourse of ‘development’, continue to present. Grosfôguel (2009) points out that modernity and coloniality are closely related to each other, with coloniality being the darker side of Western modernity. Following independence, the ex-colonial powers continued imposing, what they called, development politics on the ex-colonies, driven by the desire to secure the control of the ex-colonies’ economy, politics, and resources, as well as a sense of superiority, in what became known as neo-colonialism (Alemazung, 2010). Since the 1980s, the structural adjustment programmes of the WB and the IMF have imposed liberal economic policies and a wide range of conditions on the poor countries that have sought financial help (Potter et al., 2004). Economically, the U.S. extended its influence through global financial institutions, such as the WB and the IMF (founded in 1944 with heavy US support), which have used private and public loans to impose their financial terms on the rest of the world, and open up new markets on terms favourable to the West. Shrouded in the discourse of ‘aid’ and ‘development’, the terms of these global financial institutions belied the intentions of extending the subordinate role of African economies into the new era (Wengraf, 2016-17). The chapter returns to deconstructing the discourse of ‘aid’ and ‘development’ in Section 7.5.

A consequence of neo-colonialism is the patron-client relationship, which in some cases still exists between the ex-colonial powers and the African governments. As resource-based economies, which is propagated and supported by neo-colonialism, African states are rendered permanently dependent, unable to assert their independence and develop their nations. The patron-client relationship between the
ex-colonial powers and the ruling neo-colonial elite constitutes a foundation for the West’s performance of neo-colonial control in Africa (Alemazung, 2010). For Porter (1995), the ideologies of both neo-colonialism and development are underpinned by “master metaphors”. This is complemented by a parent-child metaphor, which is often expressed vividly by the image of the “mother country” and her fledgling colonies, and also employed to shape and reproduce the neo-colonial relations between the West and Africa. These discourses give rise to a modernist theme, a universal process of change, which is clear and predetermined by the West (Potter et al., 2004). In conclusion, Africa suffered great economically, politically, social and human losses under the exploitative and brutal colonial rule. Colonialism and neo-colonialism have left African states with a weak economy, limited control over territory, and regimes that rely on ethnic divisions, a centralised authority, and a patronage systems inherited from colonial rule.

7.2.2 Postcolonial orders and decolonial visions

Against the background of six centuries of exploitation, genocide and slavery formally instituted through colonialism, China-Africa relations disrupt the linear narrative of the “expansion of international society” (Seth, 2011, p.169), and focus our gaze on the relations between North and South, the colonised and the decolonised. During the colonial period when the majority of the ‘darker nations’ had not yet gained independence, anti-colonial sentiment was the glue, which bound Africa and Asia. International relations, as Pasha (2013, p.146) argues, “has failed to recognise decolonisation as rupture”. The political awakening of the ex-colonial world (in this case China and Africa) has been silenced or excluded in any accounts of the established norms and practices of the international, which instead continues to be anchored in European political and economic thoughts. This section offers a broad purview of China-Africa relations from a decolonial perspective. Contemporary economic cooperation and socio-cultural communication between China and Africa are not new but locate their roots in policies pursued by China since the mid-1950s as well as earlier historical precedents. The historical girders
that uphold this relationship have proved enduring in defining the current norms and principles of China-Africa relations.

Contact between Africa and Asia dates back to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). In the early days of the Ming Dynasty, a mighty armada of 62 ships commanded by Zheng He\(^8\) crossed the China East and South Sea, and ventured West to South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa (Lou, 2005). Between 1405 and 1433, Zheng launched eight great expeditions, making calls at more than 30 countries and territories, including what is now Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania (Li, 2010). This maritime activity, which took place about half a century before Columbus’s voyage to America in 1492, was different from the latter. As Lou (2005, pp.13-14) explains,

Columbus’s voyage was driven by an ambition to occupy new territories, expand colonies, exploit resources and expand new market. The voyage was characterised by colonial exploitation, and aimed to achieve the primitive accumulation of capital. […] Unlike Columbus’s voyage, Zheng He’s maritime activities were characterised with equal commodity exchanges, and aimed to develop cultural communication and establish diplomatic relations with nations in South Asia and Africa. […] What Zheng He has brought to other nations were China’s silks and porcelains; however, what Columbus has brought to other nations were swords and diseases.

China’s historical engagement with Africa was distinguished from the historical contact between Europe and Africa which was marked by the experiences of European conquest, plunder and destruction in the wake of the transatlantic slave trade and large-scale colonisation of the African continent during the second wave of colonialism (Campbell, 2008; Potter et al., 2004). The earlier contact laid the

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\(^8\) Zheng He (1371-1433) was a Chinese mariner, explorer, diplomat, fleet admiral, and court eunuch during China's early Ming dynasty. Zheng commanded expeditionary Voyages to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Western Asia, and East Africa from 1405 to 1433. His voyages have greatly contributed to economic and cultural communications between China and nations in Asia and Africa.
foundation for present-day cultural, social and economic exchange and diplomatic ties between China and Africa.

Contemporary relations between China and Africa have their origins in the 1950s. The Bandung Conference (also known as Asian-African Conference), held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, was a milestone in the history of contemporary China-Africa relations. The Bandung Conference took place at a time when African countries were concerned with independence projects (Phảm and Shilliam, 2016). It was the shared memory of colonial oppression that bound the delegates from 20 Asian and African countries in Indonesia’s Bandung to confront colonialism and introduce anti-colonialism and anti-racism as constitutive principles of a new world order (Phảm and Shilliam, 2016). The Bandung Conference enunciated an anti-colonial project by aiming its efforts at cultivating deeper relationships with other colonised peoples not just in Asia and Africa but also in Latin America (Weber, 2016). At the conference, Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai inspired the African representatives with his messages of solidarity and encouraged them to forge ahead with their struggles for the decolonisation of the continent, as well as economic self-reliance (Mu, 2015). Cultivating deep relations with other colonised peoples was considered important not merely for political and strategic reasons, but also because of an awareness of its intrinsic value for recovering human dignity and the strength of solidarity (Weber, 2016). A major achievement of Bandung was to banish ideology as a pretext to subvert sovereignty. Undergirding this feat was the acceptance of the principles of non-interference and diplomacy to advance state sovereignty. Premier Zhou proposed Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in international relations, i.e. mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence (United Nations, 1954). The principles have continued to be the basis of China’s foreign policy in general, and its relations with African states in particular (An, 2009).

From a de-colonial perspective, Bandung remains a defining moment in twentieth-century international relations, although it is being marginalised in IR’s self-
accountings (Shani, 2016). According to Shani (2016), IR is marked by an exclusion and silencing of marginalised nations. Hegemonic self-accounting of IR believes that the West is the maker of history, perpetuating the idea that the world has a permanent geographical centre and a permanent periphery: an ‘Insider’ and an ‘Outsider’, with the former leading, and the later lagging. The Bandung Conference provides an opportunity to recover some of the subaltern thoughts and imagination, and the right for the Global South to exercise a voice. According to Niang (Niang, 2016, p.165),

this desire [to exercise a voice] was grafted onto the possibility of an Asian-African approach to international relations – embedded in the desire of the formerly colonised to bring about a new political order in which to recalibrate the imperial footprint and to promote postcolonial ideal that transcended alienation and victimhood but also hubris and conceit as the unthought foundation of Western knowledge.

In other words, the ascendency and consolidation of neo-liberal orthodoxy on a global scale marginalise the postcolonial world in IR. The Bandung conference, and the values and ideas of solidarity and brotherhood that it proclaimed, led to durable changes in the provincial and hegemonic self-understanding of IR. For many newly independent countries, Bandung was the first event where they were able to present themselves rather than being merely represented or spoken about.

Particularly for African countries, Bandung provided an impetus for a reinvigorated politics of emancipation. The Bandung impulse could be found in various political and socio-cultural co-operations between China and Africa between the 1960s and 1970s, focusing mainly on the shared purpose of struggling against imperialism and hegemony. In 1956, China established diplomatic relations with Egypt, which was the first country on the continent that established diplomatic ties with China. Between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s, China channelled economic assistance to agriculture and light industries, contributing US$ 2.5 billion to 36 African countries (Adebajo, 2008). China funded a range of direct and unconditional projects in Africa, covering sectors as diverse as animal husbandry, textiles and energy, transportation, public and civil construction, education and health. One of the grand
projects funded by China was the 1860-km Tanzania-Zambia Railway (hereafter referred to as TAZARA), which was completed in 1975 (Huang and Lang, 2010). The TAZARA was an impressive feat of engineering that took five years and more than 50,000 workers to finish, and has greatly facilitated trade in local products across previously isolated communities (Huang and Lang, 2010). China provided long-term, interest-free loans to complete the project after the World Bank, Washington, London and Ottawa had turned down requests from Zambia and Tanzania to fund the project (Zhang X., 2009). The most profound symbol of the China-Africa axis was when China, supported by African countries, assumed its seat in the UN Security Council in 1971 (Zhang X., 2009).

Weber (2016) points out that hegemonic accounts of global development begin with narratives of liberal internationalism, which result in a disconnection from prior colonial history and its legacies – a history that enables and sustains ‘development’ experiences of the Western states not least through plantation labour and the social suffering of many in the Global South. Bandung provided an insight into the politics of development in the global social and political context, and constituted an alternative archive of knowledge, one that provided a distinctively different account of global development. The Bandung conference redressed the (economic) legacies of the colonial development architecture, and addressed concerns relating to the colonial (international) division of labour that new independent (and soon to be independent) states had inherited. The “values of Bandung” not only disrupt the ahistorical understanding of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’, but importantly also restore colonialism and its legacies in the analysis of development (Weber, 2016, p.154).

The concerns and concrete strategies for development, which were cultivated at Bandung, gathered momentum and guided China-African cooperation, against the background of the West’s neo-colonial rule. The West’s colonialism had left Africa with a weak economy, unstable political situations, and a plethora of civil wars. The former colonial powers were reluctant to invest in Africa to redress the colonial legacies, and intended to continue their neo-colonial exploitation of Africa. Africa
was, and still is, occupying a subordinate position in the international division of labour. Under these circumstances, China has been concentrating on addressing the adverse effects of economic globalisation, improving the mechanics of South-South partnerships and bridging the North-South divide. Within the context of Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up Policy, initiated in the late 1970s, China prioritised its domestic economic development, focused on a strategy of promoting trade and investment to strengthen its economy, and adopted a policy of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Adebajo, 2008, p.229). China’s economic shift, combined with the Western countries’ considerable reluctance to invest in Africa, allowed China to develop key political and economic relationships with African countries. Following the astounding growth of China’s economy, the country has attached great importance to offering official loans with government-subsidised interest rates in order to facilitate the development of joint ventures between African and Chinese companies (Yan, 2013). China has outlined the long-term goal of China-Africa cooperation to be the development of commercial and trade interactions, with private industries from both sides becoming the main actors in economic cooperation, thereby creating a paradigm shift in globalisation that favours Africa and China alike, and opens new avenues for South-South interaction (Grion, 2007, p.145, Shelton, 2007, p.104). The growing economic ties between China and Africa were further strengthened in the 21st century. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, established in Beijing in 2000, provides a new institutional base and mechanism for dialogue in consolidating and broadening China-Africa cooperation (Pan, 2008). Since the first China-Africa Forum in Beijing in 2000, more than 40 agreements were signed, doubling trade to more than $ 20 billion over four years (Grion, 2007, p. 145). By the end of 2015, China’s trade with the African continent reached US$ 1491.2 billion. China has been Africa’s single biggest trading partner (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, 2015). In December 2001, China joined the World Trade Organisation (hereafter referred to as WTO). In concert with other developing countries, China has paid great attention to confronting the asymmetries that exist around issues of access to trade and markets, and has sought to address the marginalisation of African countries in the global trading system (Zhang X., 2009).
Trade, investment and improved infrastructure are but parts of a whole that define China-Africa relations. Social development also forms an integral part. Between 1961 and 2015, 40,000 students from 52 African countries studied in China, while more than 20,000 Chinese medical personnel have been working in 50 African countries and over 10,000 agro-technicians from China have been sent to work on some 200 agricultural projects in Africa (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, 2015). The Chinese National Overseas Engineering Corporation has built two pharmaceutical plants in Africa for the sole purpose of manufacturing artemisinin, which is very effective in treating malaria. In 2014, when Ebola broke out in Africa, 1200 Chinese doctors and nurses were sent to the affected countries to help fight the disease alongside African medical staff (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, 2015). At the 2015 FOCAC summit, President Xi Jinping also announced China’s support for building malaria-prevention and treatment centres in Africa, and cooperating with 20 African hospitals over the next three years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). By 2018, the number of government scholarships awarded to African students to study in China is expected to increase to 30,000, which also facilitates socio-cultural cooperation between China and Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015).

Guided by the “spirit of Bandung”, China-Africa relations have presented a challenge to a ‘normalised’ world order. Such the ‘normalised’ world order has abandoned the question of racial equality and inclusion of marginalised populations with a view to favour a fictitious “totem pole” of development (Shani, 2016, p.147). Historically, China’s relations with African countries have been grounded in a shared experience of political and economic dominance by Western colonial powers. The historical-political dynamic provides the foundation for the contemporary nature of China-Africa communication. By strengthening cooperation and consultation between China and Africa, China aims to strengthen the negotiating place and the collective voice of developing countries in formulating a multilateral economic and trade system. In so doing, China and Africa are equipped jointly to move towards establishing a fair and reasonable international economic order.
7.3 The ‘neo-colonialism’ narrative

The political and economic underpinnings of China-Africa relations receive a great deal of attention in the academic literature (cf. Alden, 2007, Amadi, 2012, Ampiah and Naidu, 2008). Studies on the China-Africa relations have been dominated by the concern as to whether China is a neo-colonial power in Africa. The discourse of ‘China’s neo-colonialism in Africa’ casts China as a ‘threat’ to the interests of both Africa, and the West, which clads itself as the international community. In the American mainstream newspapers’ coverage of the China-Africa relations, the critical discourse analysis reveals a central theme: ‘China as a plunder of resources in Africa’. This section analyses the ways in which the American mainstream newspapers construct China as a ‘plunderer’, and thus a ‘neo-colonial power’.

Driver and Yeoh (2000) point out that the West has used binaries to differentiate itself from the non-West. The identification of the West as the ‘norm’ and the non-West as climatically, geographically and morally ‘Other’ was deeply entrenched in imperial and colonial discourses. Such binaries became part of an enduring imaginative geography, which continues to shape the production and consumption of knowledge in the twenty-first century world. The binary oppositions have also shaped the ways in which the American mainstream newspapers represent China-Africa relations. The media deliver the ‘China threat’ image by framing China in a stereotypical way, as ‘authoritarian’, ‘backward’, and ‘aggressive’, constructing it as a ‘threatening’ and ‘Orientalist’ ‘other’. In the news texts, China is represented as “challeng[ing] Western security partnerships that have underpinned the world order since 1945” (The Wall Street Journal, 19 August 2016). China is “expanding the geographical reach of its armed forces” (The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2015), “projecting power far into the Pacific and Indian oceans and the Mediterranean” (The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2015), and “having its ambitions to become a global maritime power” (The New York Times, 27 November 2015). Moreover, China is portrayed as “encroaching” into Africa (The Washington Post, 17 January 2016), exerting “unbridled influence” on Africa (The New York Times, 18 September 2013), and treating Africa “rapaciously” (The Washington...
In addition, drawing on Orientalist stereotypes, the media represent China as a nation full of “inequality” (The New York Times, 5 August 2014), with an “authoritarian system”, “corrupt” officials (“abus[ing] power”) and a ‘backward’ culture (such as “China consumes tons of ivory every year, and mixes [ivory] into holistic medicine with no proven value” (The Washington Post, 9 October 2015)). By representing China with negative descriptors and terms, a dichotomy between ‘Us’ (i.e. the West as the ‘defender’ of the world order) and ‘Them’ (i.e. China as the ‘menace’ to the world order) is established. The media define China in terms of its difference from the West (Western security partnerships), which is a dichotomy informing the representation of China. By framing China in terms of its difference from the west, the media naturalise and universalise a particular negative view of China, and reproduce the colonial discourse of an ‘Orientalist’ China that render China ‘threatening’.

The ‘China threat’ image is further strengthened by framing China as ‘resource-hungry’. The media adopt a “Desire is Hunger” metaphor to construct China as ‘avaricious’. Linguistic realisations of the metaphor can be found in references to China’s “insatiable” or “ravenous” “appetite for raw materials” (The New York Times, 3 December 2015), and “China’s thirst for South Africa’s natural resources” (The Wall Street Journal, 6 May 2014). By means of this hunger metaphor, China is portrayed as a monolithic ‘beast’ and ‘predator’ with an ‘avaricious’ desire for resources, hence implying that China is eager to expand its influence and exploit resources in Africa. Moreover, China’s investment is concretised into liquid material that floods into Africa. For example, China “pumped in $600 million in Zimbabwe 2013” (Los Angeles Times, 2 December 2015), and China “has poured billions of dollars into infrastructure in in Kenya and elsewhere” (The Washington Post, 16 April 2016). The small-scale mining activities of the Chinese “have flooded into Ghana's gold-producing regions” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013). Similarly, the Tanzanian government “open[s] the floodgates to Chinese petty traders” (The New York Times, 17 May 2014). Metaphors with references to natural disasters, such as flood, establish a negative image of China in Africa as hefty, unwanted, dangerous and disastrous. Furthermore, China’s investment in Africa
tends to be framed as ‘unsound’, ‘frantic’ and ‘irrational’. For example, China is portrayed as “getting unsound deals [in Africa] by handing over bags of cash” (The New York Times, 17 May 2014). China is “throwing money at anyone who would take it” (The Wall Street Journal, 6 May 2014), and “[making] a lot of strange decisions” (The Wall Street Journal, 6 May 2014). The “irrational China” frame is further consolidated by referring to China’s domestic social-culture as ‘weak’ and ‘backward’. For example, China is portrayed as a nation with “underfunded health and education systems” (The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015), “atmospheric pollution” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2013) and “poverty” at home (The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015). China is facing a “growing burden of an aging population”, and a “large volume of both public and private debt throughout the economy” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2013). Moreover, China is portrayed as having “sluggish Chinese car sales”, “fewer new apartment buildings”, and “diminished appetite for gadgets”. China is in an “economic turmoil” (The Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2015), with its economy growing “slowly” and having a “slack demand” and “slash revenue” (The Wall Street Journal, 17 August 2015). Accordingly, China’s government is portrayed as “not [being] accountable to” its domestic economic and socio-cultural development (The New York Times, 30 July 2015). By framing China in negative descriptors and terms, the media represent China as ‘irrational’ and ‘irresponsible’, which resonates with the Orientalist discourse of the ‘uncivilised’ ‘other’. The discourse of “irrationality” not only orientalises China as a ‘deficient’ and ‘threatening’ ‘Other’, but also implies that ‘deficient’ China should be ‘taught’ by the ‘civilising’ West. The media imply that China should follow the same trajectories as Western economies in order to ‘catch up’, both in economic terms and in terms of ‘civilisation’.

Playing on the conceptual frames of China as ‘resource hungry’ and ‘exploitative’, the media further vilify China by constructing a ‘resource extraction’ narrative:

(31) In Africa, Beijing’s particularly broad involvement has generated political friction. China’s aid has focused on infrastructure investments, such as dams and roads, which some African experts and politicians have said has paved
the way for resource extraction on terms detrimental to host nations and the environment. *(The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015)*

(32) The summit meeting, a mix of plenary sessions and elaborate dinners that also included leaders of major American corporations, was a determined, and splashy, initiative by Mr. Obama to stake a claim for the United States against other countries doing business there, especially China, which is investing heavily in infrastructure projects and *using Africa as a source of vital oil and metals*. *(The New York Times, 11 August 2014)*

(33) The loan from state-owned China Development Bank was meant to finance *infrastructure projects*, including building a pipeline to bring gas to Ghana from an offshore project. The loan was collateralised by Ghanaian crude production. *(The Wall Street Journal, 6 May 2014)*

In the news texts, the elites’ discourse such as the words of “some African experts and politicians” are quoted to frame China’s investment in Africa in terms of ‘resource exploitation’. The voices of the majority of Chinese investors and African workers (who are the main actors in China’s projects in Africa) are excluded. The media further materialise the frame by selectively foregrounding the relations between China’s investment in infrastructure projects and ‘resource extraction’. Other aspects of China’s investment in Africa, such as China’s investment in education, health, and the role of China’s investment in encouraging African local development are backgrounded, and even silenced. The media activate China and China’s investment in Africa as actors in relation to material processes (such as “focused on”, “investing heavily in”, “was meant to finance”) and goals (such as “infrastructure investments/projects”), which imply that the trading and investing relationship between China and Africa is basically restricted to infrastructure projects. The media frame the purpose of China’s investment in African infrastructure projects in a way that Chinese funding is predicated with “pav[ing] the way for resource extraction on terms detrimental to host nations and the environment”, “using Africa as a source of vital oil and metal”, and “[being] collateralised by Ghanaian crude production”. These predications orientalise China as an ‘opportunistic’ and ‘egoistic’ ‘Other’, and insinuate that China only invests in industries which could facilitate China’s “extraction” of African natural resources.
These insinuations silence the role of infrastructural projects in encouraging local development and an improvement of Africa’s industrial and competitive capacity, and imply that what China does in Africa only serves to extract African raw materials. Moreover, China is marginalised as the ‘Other’ by establishing a division between a “determined and splashy” U.S. who calls for ‘initiatives’ to protect Africa, and a ‘threatening’ China who “exploits” African resources. The media’s binary oppositions not only obscure the West’s role in the “scramble for Africa” during colonialism, but also reproduce dominant interpretations that see the West as an embodiment of democracy, liberty, and universal rights, as opposed to “a colonialist product which guards its comparative wealth carefully” (Danewid, 2017, p.1681).

The construction of China as a ‘resource-grabber’ in Africa is rather a myth than a truth. As Brautigam (2009, pp.279-280) argues, the “roads, bridges, sewer systems, and power plants built with Chinese finance in places such as Botswana, Kenya, Rwanda, Madagascar, Mauritius, and so on, do not map out some kind of master plan for resource extraction”. Similar to Brautigam, Rotberg (2014, cited in Haslam et al., 2015, p.877) further argues,

few African countries have failed to benefit from China’s willingness to build dams, hydroelectric facilities, and thermal power plants; construct roads; elect stadiums, hospitals, and party headquarters; renovate railways; refurbish ports; and upgrade mining projects. In fact, the World Bank has identified poor infrastructure as a major endogenous factor inhibiting Africa’s growth. For decades, developed countries have been largely unwilling to fund infrastructure projects due to the low profits rate (Sautman and Yan, 2006). China’s investment in infrastructure projects has paved the way for African economic growth (Sautman and Yan, 2006). As Edinger and Pistorius (2011, p.505) highlight, the “biggest opportunity and advantage for Africa represented by China’s engagement in the mining section” is China’s commitment to providing the “much needed supporting infrastructure”, considering that Africa has “the highest transport cost per unit in the world” and will “benefit greatly” from improved transportation networks. Rather than extracting resources in Africa, China’s investment in infrastructure projects has benefited Africa.
The media further construct China as an emerging ‘colonial power’ in Africa by framing the China-Africa trade relations in a way that is reminiscent of the economic relations between colonising and the colonised nations during the colonial period:

(34) [Lamido Sanusi, who was recently suspended as Nigeria’s central bank governor] wrote: “In much of Africa, they have set up huge mining operations. They have also built infrastructure. But, with exceptions, they have done so using equipment and labour imported from home, without transferring skills to local communities. So, China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism.”

[…] In Ghana, an estimated 50,000 new migrants, most of whom are said to have hailed from a single county in southern China, showed up recently to conduct environmentally devastating gold mining. (The New York Times, 17 May 2014)

(35) Some African officials have voiced fears that China’s dominance as an exporter of cheap garments, appliances and other goods, and its appetite for unprocessed raw materials, have skewed economic ties and undermined African hopes to advance into industrial prosperity. (The New York Times, 26 March 2013)

Again, the news texts employ the words of African elites (such as African officials) to portray China-Africa trade as asymmetric. China is portrayed as the one importing resources, raw materials and unprocessed products from Africa, while simultaneously exporting manufactured goods and daily necessities to Africa (see reference to “China’s dominance as an exporter of cheap garments, appliances and other goods, and its appetite for unprocessed raw materials”). Moreover, other descriptors in the news texts refer to China’s role being ‘dominant’, ‘superior’ and ‘advantageous’ in China-Africa economic relations. For example, China is portrayed as “dictat[ing] the schedule”, “mak[ing] the rules” and “hav[ing] the upper hand” (The New York Times, 12 September 2014) in its deals with Africa. “Trade balance vastly skewed toward China” (The New York Times, 12 September 2014). Accordingly, the China-Africa relationship is “in China’s favour” (The New York Times, 5 December 2015). The media continue to communicate a sense of
‘certainty’ with regard to China’s superiority by using the modal verb “will”. For example, “[t]he distribution facilities for Chinese imports will be built first, and facilities for the export of Tanzanian goods will be constructed later” (The New York Times, 5 December 2015). Such portrayal resonates with the colonial discourse of ‘subordinate’ Africa in colonial trade. The discourse of ‘subordinate’ Africa is further materialised by personifying China as a ‘master’ who “takes us [African] primary goods” and “sells us [African] manufactured ones”. As such, the media fix a division between China (as an exporter of manufactured products) and Africa (as a supplier of raw materials and a consumer of manufactured products) in terms of international division of labour. China is framed as the ‘exploiter’, who enjoys her superiority and benefits from international trade at the expense of Africa (i.e. the ‘victim’). The media further strengthen the division between China and Africa by using the pronoun “they” to refer to China, in contrast to ‘Us’ – Africans, and thereby marginalise China as the ‘Other’. Moreover, the “business is war” metaphor is adopted to portray the economic relations between China and Africa as conflicting. Linguistic realisation of the metaphor can be found in references to African nations as “unconditional surrenders” (The New York Times, 18 September 2013) when they conduct business with China. Allegedly, African nations find themselves “hostage” (The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2015) to China’s economy. African nations are “in constant struggle with the Chinese” when it comes to the oil business (The New York Times, 18 September 2013). Reports of Chinese companies’ ‘misbehaving’ in Africa provide African nations with “ammunition” (The Washington Post, 9 October 2015) for their business negotiations with China. By conceptualising economic relations between China and Africa in terms of warfare, the media represent China and Africa as two supposedly hostile sides in the trade. In addition, the war metaphor implies that one side’s gain is possible only at other side’s expense. In that way, the adoption of the war metaphor enables the media to imply that China’s gain in the trade is achieved at the expense of African countries. As a result, Africa is portrayed as a ‘victim’ (“surrender”, “hostage”) in the trade relations between China and Africa. The media construct an unequal and hierarchical economic relation between China and Africa, and again orientalise China as a ‘threatening’ ‘Other’. 
Furthermore, the media adopt derogative words or phrases to denigrate China in Africa and strengthen the discourse of ‘Other’. For example, by activating China as an actor in relation to material processes, such as “showed up to conduct”, “skewed”, “undermined”, and goals, such as “environmentally devastating gold mining”, “economic ties” and “African hopes”, the media construct China’s trade with Africa in an ‘exploitative’ narrative. The media imply that China’s trade with Africa does not reshape Africa’s position in the international division of labour, but is instead harmful to the African economy. The media deliberately frame the economic relations between China and Africa in a way that makes no difference between the exploitative activities of the former Western colonial powers, and frame China as ‘neo-colonial’. Sautman and Yan (2006) argue against this China-as-colonialist discourse by pointing out that the asymmetries of China-Africa economic relations should not be misrepresented as colonialism. According to them (2006, p. 55), “raw material/manufactured goods trade has long characterised developed countries’ exchanges with both colonised and non-colonised less-developed lands, as well as urban-rural exchanges”. The trade of raw material and manufactured goods indicate not a colonial relationship, but is a constant feature of capitalism. Colonial economic dominance featured more than exploitation of raw materials or exchange for manufactured goods. It was a systematic privileging of colonisers in every major aspect of colonial economies, and excluded any third parties (Sautman and Yan, 2006). The sale of raw materials under colonialism was often based on forced labour and involved colonial government or state-chartered company monopolies.

Junbo and Frasheri (2014) deconstruct the ‘neo-colonial’ discourse concerning China-Africa economic relations by pointing out that the media deliberately silence alternative voices in the representation of China-Africa economic relations. According to them, although China imports raw materials and resources from Africa and exports manufactured products there, the prices of the merchandise are agreed by both sides as well as being determined by the international market; they are not only decided by China. In other words, the China-Africa trading relationship is equal in terms of pricing. In fact, the increasing demands of China (and other emerging powers) for materials and resources, has resulted in a remarkable rise in
the prices of many goods and materials, like mineral stones, metals and woods. Meanwhile, inexpensive Chinese goods are being exported to Africa, and not only promote the living standards of African people, but also meet the basic technological and material needs of fledging local industries. Obviously, the China-Africa trade, which is based on the prices made by both sides in an equal status, is a fair business, and has nothing to do with colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Drawing on the ‘neo-colonialism’ frame, the media construct China’s growing role on the African continent as a ‘threat’ to the interests of Africa and the international community. Hirono and Suzuki (2014) deconstruct such a ‘neo-colonialism’ frame by pointing out that the ‘neo-colonialism’ frame is a manifestation of the ‘China threat’ discourse. The ‘China threat’ discourse is considered to be a co-product of Eurocentrism which remains dominant in the field of IR (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). Acharya and Buzan (2007, p.293) argue that “the main ideas in traditional IR are deeply rooted in the particularities and peculiarities of European history, the rise of the West to world power, and the imposition of the West’s own political structure onto the rest of the world”. The built-in Eurocentrism of IR theory has resulted in the West being considered “the only power whose national identity is defined by a set of universal political and economic values” (Huntington, 1993, p.32). The European regional order is, thus, conceptualised as a product of ‘rationality’ and ‘liberty’. Such Eurocentrism interprets the expansion of the European regional order in the nineteenth century as an event where “Europe expands outwards and graciously bequeaths sovereignty and Europe's panoply of civilised and rational institutions to the inferior Eastern societies” (De Carvalho et al., 2011, p.745). In other words, the West presents its own values as international ‘norms’, and impose them on the non-Western nations. The Eurocentric perspective on the expansion of international society is a sanitised version of “expansion”. The history that includes the bloody conquest of the African continent, the transatlantic slave trade, the expropriation and sometimes genocide of indigenous peoples, wars of conquest, land grabbing, exploitation and oppression, is elided (Seth, 2011). Kayaoglu (2010, pp.195-196) points out that the Eurocentric narrative of the expansion of global order “allows for the continued imagination and invention of Europe’s intellectual
and political superiority, treating the West as a perennial source of political and religious tolerance”. In other words, the Eurocentric line of thinking has generated a partisan interpretation of global order, in which the West’s domination is considered to be ‘progressive’ and thus “the only form of hegemony that matters historically and normatively” (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014, p.451). The Eurocentrism of IR, which has an exclusive focus on the historical period of Western dominance, ignores the long periods in international history, in which the West interacted with non-Western people and polities (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). Therefore, the rise of non-Western nations (in this case China) are poorly theorised and considered to be a ‘threat’ (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014).

With regard to the American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China-African relations, ‘neo-colonial’ discourse, which is a manifestation of the ‘China threat’ discourse, implies that China is considered to a threat to the West’s traditional dominance in Africa. Hirono and Suzuki (2014) argue that the ‘neo-colonialism’ narrative surrounding China-Africa relations is not a concern over China posing a ‘threat’ to the interests of African peoples. Rather, it implicitly reflects deep anxieties held by the West about its traditional dominance in Africa being overturned by a non-Western power (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). Junbo and Frasheri (2014) point out that current Africa-Western relations are still influenced by the colonial legacy. The soft power of the West in Africa has far-reaching influence. As an ex-colonised region, the economic, socio-political and religious systems in many African countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa), were established by modelling their previous Western suzerains, and remain unchanged in the postcolonial era. According to Haslam et al. (2015), African mass media highly depend on Western media. In a study of 543 news stories on Africa published in Ghana’s newspapers, Sautman and Yan (2009) find that 64% news stories are from the BBC. Moreover, the West continues to maintain its ‘old’ relations with Africa by means of political penetration, such as attaching special economic and political conditions to its aid and investment projects in Africa. The implication of these special conditions, which are attached to aid and investment, is that to some extent Africa’s economy and politics are still deeply influenced by the West.
Disguised with the rhetoric of ‘protector’, special ‘partner’ and ‘international Philanthropist’, the West engages with the African continent by means of huge financial investment and aid with political conditions. Traditional economic relations between the West and Africa remain unchanged, such as the West’s investment in raw materials, and export of manufactured goods to Africa. In reality, the West and Africa failed to build a relationship on equal terms when the colonial system collapsed. For Africa, the adjustment from a colonising-colonised to a donor-recipient relationship after de-colonisation has not fundamentally changed the West-African relational nature. The unequal relations between the West and Africa remain. Africa is still regarded as the West’s the backyard for sourcing raw materials.

As Campbell (2008, p.96) notes, Chinese investment in, and trade with, Africa challenge “USA global hegemony”, and has enabled “Africans to defy the conditionality of the Bretton Woods institutions”. The growing status of China on the African continent challenges the entrenched notion of the Western ‘Self’. As Mawdsley (2008, p.512) notes, “Western political imaginaries of itself in relation to Africa remain dominated by an enduring notion of trusteeship, despite a long and ongoing history of exploitation, and lack of sufficient action to address systemic inequalities and injustice”. Therefore, the narrative concerning ‘China’s neo-colonialism’ in Africa could be considered to be a debate about the West’s own deeply-rooted anxieties, rather than about what China is, and is not, effectively doing in Africa (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). The ‘neo-colonial’ discourse or the ‘China threat’ discourse in the context of Sino-African relations is nothing but a by-product of Western anxieties about the loss of its hegemony and power in Africa.

7.4 The narrative of ‘China’s racialisation of Africa’

In the wake of China’s rapid economic development and its growing role in Africa, there are increasingly heated debates around the world on how China affects Africa, and specially Africans. Popular representations in the Western media concerning China’s growing role in Africa often suggest that there is a Chinese ‘racialisation’
of Africans on the continent (Cook et al., 2016, Liu, 2007). The colonial concept of “racialisation” is evoked by the media in order to construct China as ‘racialist’. Omi and Winant (1994) point out that racialisation extends racial meaning to social groups and their practices. The mode of racialisation, as Banton (2005) argues, is a way of designating groups to be subject to the relative privileges and dis-privileges on the basis of earlier misrepresentations of their biological distinctiveness. The concept of racialisation is exemplified by Western colonialists’ racialisation of Africans in terms of division of labour (see Section 7.2.1). In the news coverage of China-Africa relations, the colonial concept of “racialisation of labour” is employed to frame employment relations between Chinese workers and African workers, and orientalise China as a ‘racialist’ in Africa.


(37) Below Mr. Gado’s (Niger’s oil minister) seventh-floor office, reached through a dark stairwell because there is no working elevator, his fellow citizens are living in mud-brick houses without electricity and washing their clothes in the river. Oil production in Niger began nearly two years ago but has yet to make a dent in living standards […] Seven hundred miles away in the oil-producing region, Chinese refinery workers and engineers massed boisterously at a crumbling and otherwise unused airport for their quarterly holiday flights out, one of the many costs that Mr. Gado said Niger, at the bottom of the United Nations human development index, could not afford […] In return, the Chinese got access to untapped oil reserves in the remote fields on Chad’s border on terms that still make Oil Ministry officials here wince. Beyond that, local residents have protested that the Chinese presence has brought few jobs, low pay and harsh working conditions. (The New York Times, 18 September 2013)

The news texts adopt a ‘master’ frame to construct China-Africa employment
relations in a ‘brutal master’ versus ‘obedient subject’ division. For example, Chinese workers are activated as actors in relation to material processes such as “shouted over” and “watched over”. These material processes suggest that Chinese workers are ‘oppressive’ in their dealings with African workers. The media portray Chinese workers as the ‘ruthless’ ‘supervisors’ in Africa who are standing with their arms folded, and ‘supervising’ Africans to do the hard labour. In so doing, the media construct a relation between Chinese workers and African workers in which the former are superior over the latter. The media further strengthen this alleged hierarchy between Chinese workers and African workers by contrasting African workers’ impoverished living conditions with the Chinese workers’ luxurious life. African workers are portrayed as “living in mud-brick houses without electricity and washing their clothes in the river”, while Chinese workers are portrayed as “massing at a crumbling and otherwise unused airport for their holiday flights out, one of many costs that Niger could not afford”. By describing African airport as “crumbling and otherwise unused”, the media implicate that African are unable to afford the costs for flights. Moreover, through activating China in relation to the material process, such as “has brought”, and the goal, such as “few jobs, low pay and harsh working conditions”, the media imply that ‘the Africans are being mistreated by the Chinese’. The media reinforce the ‘Africans are being mistreated by the Chinese’ frame by portraying Chinese companies in Africa as ‘brutal’. Chinese companies in Africa are framed by their ‘ruthlessness’ and ‘inequality’. For example, Chinese-run operations in Africa are portrayed as offering “unequal pay and brutal treatment” to local workers (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), and being guilty of “the systematic violations of workers’ rights” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), because Chinese operations “make Chadian workers remove [crucial oil in ditches] with no protection” (The New York Times, 18 September 2013). The media portray the labour relations and practices of Chinese companies as “unacceptable” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013). Making use of negative descriptors and terms, the media attribute racialisation to Chinese firms, and represent Chinese employers as ‘disregarding human rights’, and being ‘indifferent to’ labour conditions. By referring to the notions of Chinese ‘cruelty’ and their ‘disregard for human rights’, the media evoke memories of the racial exploitation
of African slaves during the colonial period, and insinuate that the increasing presence of Chinese firms in Africa can be seen as a new trend toward the process of racialising Africa. Thereby, the discourse of ‘racialisation of Africans at the hands of the Chinese’ suggests a ‘threatening’ image of China.

Sautman and Yan (2016) argue against the discourse of ‘racialisation of African at the hands of the Chinese’ by pointing out that the existing concept of racialisation of labour, which locates its origin in the North-South interactions, should not be extended to explain the dramatically different employment relations in South-South interaction. According to Bonacich et al. (2008), racialisation of labour is conceived as whites benefitting by denying rights to peoples of colour. The concept of racialisation of labour has its origins in the Western colonialism and was devised to make sense of the behaviour of power and culture in the context of Western colonialism and capitalism (Sautman and Yan, 2016). The concept of racialisation of labour fails to facilitate an understanding of South-South interaction (Sautman and Yan, 2016). By evoking the concept of “racialisation”, the media impose the Western views of Africans onto China-Africa relations. In other words, the discourse of “racialisation of Africans” reflects the West’s representation of Africa, rather than the realities of China-Africa relations. In fact, Giese’s (2013, p.151) study of relations between Chinese traders and their Ghanaian employees concludes that “Chinese traders rarely engage in active racial discrimination. This is demonstrated in their almost egalitarian behaviour towards employees and members of the lower social strata, such as female head porters”. Sautman and Yan (2016), based on an ethnographic study of Chinese enterprises in Africa, point out that unlike the West’s colonial powers in the colonised Africa, Chinese in Africa do not deny the political and labour rights to Africans on the basis of the biological or meta-cultural differences. The Chinese in Africa tend to live among Africans and work together with Africans. As is described by a Namibian journalist in von K’Orinda-Yimbo’s (2008, p.5) study,

the Chinese are indeed not living in mansions with an arm of African domestics. They dig, shovel, saw, clear and carry away the rubble
themselves, instead of standing around raving sharp orders to African workers.

However, as Miller (2005) argues, racialisation does influence many non-Chinese workplaces. For example, senior positions in the white-owned South African supermarket chain Shoprite (a ubiquitous supermarket in African countries) are mainly occupied by the white. The ‘superiority versus inferiority’ hierarchy, which scholars of racialisation of labour have identified at the West-owned enterprises in the Global South, does not exist in the relationship between Chinese and Africans.

In conclusion, the West’s racialised view of African labours, which is derived from North-South interaction, is simply imposed on South-South interaction. By evoking the concept of “racialisation”, the media ignore the realities of Chinese activities in Africa, and reproduce a colonial discourse of China that misrepresents the Chinese in Africa as a racist. The narrative of Chinese activities in Africa is part of the ‘China threat’ discourse, which the Wet has spread since the nineteenth century.

7.5 ‘Weak’ Africa, ‘rogue’ China versus the ‘ethical’ West

Hirono and Suzuki (2014) point out that the assumption underlying the Western studies of China-Africa relations is that of the Orientalism, which casts Asian states as entities which are different from the West by nature. Any sort of influences in Africa other than Western ones, are considered to be ‘unethical’ and ‘undesirable’. Such Orientalist thinking could also be found in the American news coverage of China’s loans to, and investment in, Africa. Unlike major international lending institutes, such as the IMF or the WB, China’s loans to African countries are not contingent on socio-political conditions because it promotes a strict policy of non-intervention in the affairs of recipient states. The media have used an ideological ‘rogue aid’ frame to construct China as a scapegoat, and orientalise China’s aid in Africa as a ‘threat to healthy and sustainable development’ in Africa.

In the news texts, the media adopts the metaphor of “China is a Dependee” in order to construct a “dependee VS dependant” relation between China and Africa.
Linguistic realisation of the metaphor can be found in statements such as “China has quickly become its most important patron, building its roads and pumping its oil” (The New York Times, 25 July 2015), and “Beijing coddles the continent’s authoritarian rulers” (The New York Times, 5 December 2015). The metaphor generates the impression of Africa being ‘dependent’ and ‘childish’. Such portrayal of Africa jibes with traditional and longstanding Western stereotypes of the ‘uncivilised and childlike’ Africans. A particular prevalent negative image of Africans during the nineteenth century was their representation as indolent children (McEwan, 2008). Images of ‘infantilism’ and general ‘incompetence’ were used to legitimate colonialism and imperialism under the guise of paternalism. Cairns (1965, p.95) points out that the child analogy reflects and strengthens the idea that African cultures do not represent worthwhile achievements. The analogy serves as a justification and sanction for the West’s control and intervention in Africa. The “dependee” metaphor enables the media to impose the West’s racist image of Africans on the portrayal of China-Africa relations. A hierarchical relation between China and Africa is constructed, in which China is regarded as ‘superior’ over Africa. Moreover, by associating China with “the continent’s authoritarian rulers” (The New York Times, 5 December, 2015), the media imply that China is not the ‘guardian’ of ‘childlike’ Africa. The cumulative effect of these metaphors and statements not only generate the impression of China ‘imposing its authority’ on Africa, but it more importantly, also transforms Africa into a predetermined universalised figure in need of the West’s protection, thereby, reproducing the narrative of the West’s (in this case the U.S.) ‘goodness’ and ‘benevolence’.

Doty (1996, p.161) points out that scholarly discourse on North-South relations in international relations “becomes imbued through and through with the imperial representations that have preceded it”. There are striking similarities between representations of Africa in the nineteenth century and popular representations today. In the coverage of China-Africa relations, the media have adopted a discourse of ‘crisis’ to construct African countries as suffering from China’s decreasing demand for resources in Africa, thus framing China as the ‘culprit’ who is causing the African economic crises. Narratives around the theme of economic
deprivation in Africa are built, perpetuating the ‘dependent versus dependee’ discourse. The news texts make use of an orientation metaphor to illustrate the considerable state of crisis which Africa is suffering under: African nations have watched growth and currencies “plummet” or “plunged” or “fell” this year as China’s demands for raw materials have decreased (*The Wall Street Journal*, 2 December 2015; *The Washington Post*, 12 January 2016). Moreover, a coldness metaphor is adopted to describe African sales to China as having “cooled” (*The Washington Post*, 12 January 2016). Such discourse implies that Africa is stricken with various crises due to its excessive reliance on China. The metaphor enables the media not only to frame China-African relations in a ‘dependent’ frame, but also allows the news to imply that it was this ‘dependent’ relation between China and Africa that has led to the economic crisis and underdevelopment in Africa. These partial, stereotypical and de-contextualised accounts convey a dominant image of Africa being a place of ‘misery’ and ‘chaos’. Echoing nineteenth century imperial discourses, African governments and individuals are seen as ‘incapable’ of harnessing Northern notions of law and order, and establishing markets that are considered the prerequisites to development (McEwan, 2008). By selectively foregrounding the discourse of crisis, the media create an impression of African ‘weakness and vulnerability’ and Chinese ‘ruthlessness and threat’. Juxtaposed with this impression is the notion that the presence of Europe and the U.S. in Africa is strategically necessary to ‘save’ Africa from China, based on an ethical concern for postcolonial Africa (McEwan, 2008). The media’s demonisation of China not only silences China’s role in encouraging African development, but also exculpates the West, and dismisses the structural inequalities it perpetuates.

With the help of such personification, the media evoke the West’s deep-seated stereotypes towards non-Western nations, and orientalise China as the ‘backward’ and ‘opportunistic’ ‘Other’. Constructing China in an ‘Othering’ discourse allows the media to imply that such an ‘opportunistic’ China is ‘dangerous’. Moreover, the media adopt denigratory descriptors and terms in order to frame China’s investment in Africa as ‘destructive’. The news texts define Chinese investment by its ‘opacity’. For example, China is portrayed as making “shady arrangements” in its political system (The New York Times, 17 May 2014). Its contracts with Africa are greased with “monetary bribes and other enticements” (The New York Times, 17 May 2014). China “does not release data on its annual foreign aid” in Africa (The New York Times, 27 September 2015). The deals between China and Africa are “unpublished” (The New York Times, 18 September 2013) and “isn’t clear” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2013). Chinese investors are represented as “not good” and “not satisfactory” (The Wall Street Journal, 22 May 2014). Moreover, Chinese companies in Africa tend to be framed by their ‘illegality’. For example, Chinese companies are portrayed as “disregard[ing] for local laws, customs and labour rights” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), “flout[ing] contracting rules” (The Wall Street Journal, 6 January 2014), “involve[ing] in rhino horn smuggling” (Los Angeles Times, 6 November 2014), “sneaking ivory” (The Washington Post, 9 October 2015), “colluding with corrupt Tanzanian officials” (The New York Times, 5 November 2014), [engaging in] “unauthorised small-scale mining” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), and other “illegal activities that threaten marine resources” (The New York Times, 21 May 2015). Furthermore, negative attributions such as ‘environmental-unfriendliness’ is assigned to China. Chinese companies in Africa are portrayed as “engag[ing] in ecologically ruinous bottom trawling”, having “environmental missteps and mismanagement” (The New York Times, 18 September 2013) and “a downside, environmentalists allege” (Los Angeles Times, 6 November 2014), and causing “devastating environmental cost” (The New York Times, 5 November 2014) and “environmental damage” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 Oct 2013). In addition, negatively connoted words such as “gouging, polluting or hogging valuable tracts” (The New York Times, 18 September 2013) and “bloated costs and unfair charges by the China National Petroleum Corporation” are used to
portray Chinese companies as ‘predatory’ in Africa. The media stigmatise China as a ‘destroyer’, which strengthens the West’s underlying stereotypes towards China. As such, the media frame China in a discourse of alterity, and construct China as the ‘Other’, who ‘threatens’ African political, economic and socio-cultural development.


Moreover, the media construct a division between a ‘threatening’ China and a ‘victimised’ Africa to further orientalise China as the ‘Other’. In the news texts,
China is activated as an actor in relation to material processes (such as “accelerate”, “disregard”, “hollow out”, “stall”, “miminsis”, and “suffocate”) and goals (such as “environmental destruction”, “labour rights”, “local industry”, “the continent’s democratisation”, “the boost for [African] local economies”, and “African efforts to nurture industry and jobs”). The media imply that China’s investment in Africa has ‘undermined’ good governance, and is a ‘threat’ to African environment, economy and politics. The media orientalise China as a ‘rogue’, who has brought disasters to Africa. Reference to Africa as “experiencing environmental damage from aggressive Chinese mining and related operations” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 October, 2013) adds to the impression of a ‘rogue’ China. The media deliberately construct a division between a ‘destroyer’ (China, in this case) and a ‘victim’ (Africa, in this case). China is orientalised as the ‘Other’, i.e. a “rogue creditor” practicing opportunistic lending. In framing the African economic and socio-political crisis as a result of China’s ‘inhumane’ and ‘rogue’ policies, the media obscure and dehistoricise the West’s role in having created the conditions under which Africa suffers today (which will be analysed below). By divorcing the ongoing African crisis from the West’s long history of colonial exploitation and racial violence, the media turn questions of colonial plunder into matters of China’s ‘inhuman’ policies.

Furthermore, the media seek to essentialise the way China’s investment in Africa should be understood, and distort China-Africa relations by constructing a binary opposition between an inherently ‘immoral’ China and an ‘ethical’ West in Africa:

(38) Mr. Obama, speaking to the BBC, said China had been “able to funnel an awful lot of money into Africa, basically in exchange for raw materials that are being extracted from Africa.” “What is certainly true is that the United States has to have a presence to promote the values that we care about,” he said. (The New York Times, 25 July 2015)

(39) Whether [Mr. Obama] has succeeded in this mission remains to be seen. But at all of his stops, he laid out the case that Africa should be wary of China’s appetite for oil for its own use and instead embrace an American relationship that seeks to foster economic growth, democracy, health care, education and
electrification. […] “But economic relationships can’t simply be about building countries’ infrastructure with foreign labour or extracting Africa’s natural resources,” he said. “Real economic partnerships have to be a good deal for Africa. They have to create jobs and capacity for Africans.” “That,” he added, “is the kind of partnership America offers.” (The New York Times, 30 July 2015)

McEwan (2008, p.122) points out that the notion that the ‘Self’ is defined by constructing the ‘Other’ is central to Western philosophy. Binary oppositions have shaped Western knowledge forms. Far from being innocent, these binaries are bound up in a logic of domination and have material consequences. In terms of the case study newspapers’ representation of China-Africa relations, the newspapers’ construction of a binary contrast between the U.S. (the ‘drive of Africa towards independence and democracy’) and China (the one who ‘thwarts the drive’) serves to demonise China’s role in Africa. For example, by portraying China’s investment in Africa with references to “exchanging for raw materials”, “extracting Africa’s natural resources” and “only using China’s labour”, the media implicate that there is an unequal economic cooperation between China and Africa. Contrary to the portrayal of China as ‘exploitative’, the media activate the U.S. as an actor in relation to material processes such as “promote”, “foster”, “offer”, and goals such as “values”, “economic growth”, “partnership”. These material processes, such as “promote”, “foster”, and “offer”, are suggestive of cooperation and equivalence. The media construct the U.S. as the one who brings ‘civilisation’ and ‘democracy’ to Africa. By invoking notions of development and humanitarianism, the media construct a divide between ‘Us’ (the U.S., in this case, as the ‘safeguard of democratic values’) and the ‘Other’ (China, in this case, as the ‘destroyer’ of African good governance and development). China is represented as an ‘authoritarian’ regime that has been let loose on Africa and ‘threatens’ its ‘development’ and values (such as ‘rationality’, ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘democracy’), which the West is trying to protect in Africa. By orientalising Chinese investment as ‘rogue aid’, the media position the West as a model of ‘morality and correctness’ in the field of global development policies, and thus justify the West’s new imperialism in Africa. Such a ‘new’ imperialism is couched
in terms of a new ‘civilising mission’, and the West (in this case the U.S.) uses the discourse of development to narrative itself as ‘civilised’, ‘developed’ and ‘modern’.

differences, centring on a ‘civilised’ West and a ‘weak’ Africa. More importantly, the media imply that ‘savage’ Africa is in dire need of salvation by Northern ‘benevolence’, and thereby justify Western interference and interventions in Africa’s affairs. Any responsibility for creating underdevelopment and poverty within the context of colonialism and global capitalism is effaced by positioning the West as the ‘benevolent’ hand that will ‘lift’ the impoverished out of their state of degeneracy. Furthermore, the role of the Western world in Africa’s colonial past is concealed by using the strategy of nominalisation, as in “decades of hard lessons about heedless resource-grabs”. Through employing the nominal “resource-grabs” – rather than the sentence “the West grabbed resources in Africa” – to refer to the West’s colonial exploitation of Africa, the media obscure the perpetrators of colonial exploitation, which works to de-emphasise the negative portrayal of the West, and exculpate it from its colonial plunder. To sum up, by constructing China in the discourse of ‘unethical’ and Africa in the discourse of ‘primitive’, the media dehistoricise the West’s colonial past and its neo-colonial present, and reconstruct the African crisis as a matter of ‘China threat’, thus obscuring the systemic and underlying causes for African underdevelopment.

Frank (1989) challenges the discourse of development by pointing out that existing theories and knowledge on development as well as corresponding development policies have located their origins exclusively in the historical experiences of the West’s (and in particular European and North American) developed capitalist nations, and thus entirely fail to reflect the past of the emerging parts of the world. Euro-American centric discourse of development generally assumes that economic development of today’s underdeveloped countries is considered to be in the past of a historical trajectory that culminates in the now Euro-American developed countries. Accordingly, a country’s underdevelopment is considered as a consequence of its own political, economic and socio-cultural deprivation (Frank, 1989). The discourse of development, as Frank (1989) argues, ignores the interconnected relationship between the now-developed metropolitan countries, on the one hand, and colonialism, imperialism, colonial exploitation, unequal development, on the other hand. Going further, Grosfoguel (2009) deconstructs the
discourse of development by pointing out that coloniality and modernity constitute two sides of a single coin. According to Grosfoguel (2009), coloniality is the darker side of Western modernity, yet is constantly disguised with the rhetoric of salvation, civilisation, progress, development, and market democracy. By representing Western aid in Africa in a ‘promoting development’ narrative, the media disguise the reality of the West’s colonial exploitation of Africa, and absolve it of its responsibility for African underdevelopment.

Frank (1970) analyses the nature of underdevelopment. He regards contemporary underdevelopment as a historical product of the West’s colonial and imperialist exploitation as well as the continuing neo-colonial economic relations between the now-developed metropolitan countries and the underdeveloped satellite in the postcolonial era. These relations serve as underpinnings of the structure of the capitalist system, and facilitate its development on a global scale (Frank, 1970). Preobrazhensky (1965) points out that the destruction of the natural economy and mode of production in Africa is closely related to primitive accumulation during the colonial period. Marx et al. (1887) expose the primitive accumulation by defining it as the historical process by which the basic condition for the capitalist system was achieved. Overseas expansion and forced colonisation are ways by which the process of “primitive accumulation” was achieved in the sixteenth- and eighteenth-century (the detailed narrative of colonialism in Africa could be found in Section 7.2.1). The legacy of colonisation has been the expansion of capitalism as a system and the massive accumulation of colonial nation-states at the expense of greatly weakened political systems and economies in Africa. “The wealth that was created by African resources was grabbed by the capitalist countries of Europe,” writes Rodney (1972), “[r]estrictions were placed upon African capacity to make the maximum use of its economic potential […] African economies are integrated into the very structure of the developed capitalist economies, and they integrated in a manner that is unfavourable to Africa and insures that Africa is dependent on the big capitalist countries” (Wengraf, 2016-17, p.4). The colonial monopoly led to Africa being subjected to “capitalist penetration without capitalist development” (Phillips, 1989, p.162). Colonial modes of production ensured that Africa was
drained of its capital in the form of bullion, consumption goods, raw materials and so on. McEachern (1979, p.13) posits that the colonial mode of production “transmitted to the colonies the pressures of the accumulation process in the metropolis without unleashing any corresponding expansion in the forces of production”. In other words, the West increased and concentrated capital through colonialism, including taxes, seizure of land and livestock, conversion of conquered peoples to slaves, conquest of trade routes, and state loans (Amin, 2001, Preobrazhensky, 1965). Consequently, colonialism left Africa with a highly distorted and fragile economy, which resulted in economic systems being anchored in narrow export bases, with a concomitant weak industrial sector and rates of growth. African states inherited an underdeveloped infrastructure geared toward exports, which lacks capital and is skewed towards supplying unfinished goods to the advanced countries. In essence, “the development effort of late colonial regimes never did provide the basis for a strong national economy. Economies remained externally oriented and the state’s economic power remained concentrated at the gate between inside and outside” (Wengraf, 2016-17, p.4). Africa was reduced to exclusive European domains in disregard of pre-existing economic, cultural and linguistic ties among peoples. The West’s colonial conquest resulted in Africa being involved in the expansion of global mercantile and industrial capitalist system, and brought the monopolistic metropolis-satellite structure of capitalism to African domestic economy. These conditions have posed severe challenges for Africa and its prospects for building sustainable economies that are capable of lifting the population out of poverty and achieving development in the international order (Wengraf, 2016-17). As a direct consequence of protracted colonial conquest and imperialism, contemporary Africa is marked by the economic, social, and political structure of satellite underdevelopment.

Furthermore, imposing the international division of labour under formal colonialism had the indirect effect of laying the foundations for continued economic control and domination over colonial resources even in the absence of direct political administration (Hoogvelt, 1997). The implication is that decolonisation resulted not in the colonial powers ceding their grip on the economic levers of the
African economic machinery. The exploitation of colonies continues to adversely impact Africans, an impact aggravated by the neo-liberal policies pursued by developed states and their international financial institutions in recent decades. Political independence was followed by other strategies of economic control that included ‘aid’ for economic development to the African continent. Amadi (2012) deconstructs the nature of ‘aid’ and points out that it is a feature of neo-colonialism in the postcolonial period. According to Amadi (2012), the conditionality of the WB and IMF has ensured that African nations have to open up their economies and serve as exporters of primary products. In order to secure more financial support from the West and its institutions, the poor countries compete with each other by means of offering reduced wages, lower standards, as well as providing raw resources at a lower price. As such, these countries get involved in a spiralling race to the bottom. Sanou Mbaye (2010, cited in Haslam et al., 2015, p. 878), a senior official at the African Development Bank, points out that “‘aid’, as it now stands, is an industry allowing the West to keep Africa hostage, starved, bound, and addicted to hand-outs”. In other words, the exploitive loans and grants fraught with conditions tie the developing African countries to developed counties or international financial institutions, with rules of engagement being dictated by rich Western nations (Okolo and Akwu, 2016). The aid of the IMF and WB, as many academics (cf. Haslam et al., 2015, Okolo and Akwu, 2016) argue, often benefits the donor countries and further marginalises the local communities. In conclusion, African underdevelopment cannot be ascribed to its own economic, political, social and cultural ‘backwardness’ as well as China’s role in Africa, but was and still is the consequence of the historical process of capitalist development.

7.6 Summary

The CDA of the American mainstream media’s representation of China-Africa relations reveals that the media gloss over Western colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa, and ignore the importance of China in facilitating African decolonisation and independence, and discursively construct China-Africa relations in a ‘China threat’ narrative. The media construct an image of China as ‘threatening’ and
‘uncivilised’, which evokes deep-seated oriental stereotypes of China, and
denigrates it as the ‘Other’. Specifically, the news texts adopt metaphors of hunger
and disasters to construct China as ‘avaricious’, and portray China’s investment in
Africa as ‘dangerous’. Moreover, the media construct a distinction between a
‘threatening’ China and a ‘victimised’ Africa by strategically employing negative
descriptors and terms. China is orientalised as an ‘authoritarian’ and ‘aggressive’
‘Other’. Chinese companies in Africa are portrayed as ‘ruthless’, ‘predatory’,
destructive’, ‘racialising Africans’, and ‘environmentally-unfriendly’. The
Chinese in Africa are framed by their illegality and criminality, and are represented
as ‘unethical’ and ‘dangerous’. The media construct China’s role in Africa as ‘neo-
colonial’. Furthermore, the media essentialise the understanding of China-Africa
relations by constructing discourses of African ‘weakness and vulnerability’,
Northern ‘trusteeship’, and Chinese ‘ruthlessness’. The use of negative descriptors
and terms ensures that Africa is represented as ‘poverty-stricken’, ‘barbaric’, and
in need of ‘salvation’ by Northern ‘benevolence’. In addition, the media adopt
nominalisation to conceal the role of the West in the colonial plunder, and thus stage
a spectacle of colonial amnesia. In so doing, the media reconstitute the West (in this
case the U.S.) as ‘ethical’ and ‘good’, and innocent of its imperialist histories.

The narrative of a ‘weak’ Africa, ‘ruthless’ China, and ‘ethical’ West epitomises
Euro-American-centrism in international relations. Drawing on postcolonial IR on
world order, this chapter has argued that the ‘China-as-colonialist’ discourse has
little to do with the realities of China-Africa relations, but merely reflects the
anxieties of traditional powers to lose their hegemonies and control in Africa. The
chapter has also deconstructed the discourse of ‘racialisation of Africans by the
Chinese’ following the revelation that the West imposes its racist representation of
Africans on the analysis of China-Africa relations. Furthermore, the chapter has
shattered the ‘Orientalist’ myth that often describes China’s role as that of a ‘China
threat’ driven by the desire to monopolise markets and undermine development on
the continent. In contrast, Western powers such as the U.S. are portrayed as knights,
seeking to assist Africa’s economic recovery and spread democracy. These
portrayals contribute to an ideological formation that erases history and unravel the
historical links that bind the West and Africa. In framing China as a ‘threat’ in Africa, the media exculpate the West from its brutality, exploitation, plunder, and transforms the colonial agent into an innocent bystander, confirming its status as ‘ethical’, ‘good’ and ‘humane’. By placing the discussion in the historical context of the West’s colonial and neo-colonial control in Africa, the chapter has argued that the contemporary African crisis and underdevelopment constitute a historical process rather than existing in a vacuum, and that it is the colonial plunder and hierarchies of race that have interacted with the continuous “neocolonial” hegemony, producing Africa’s instable political situations, ethnical conflicts, weak economy, and contributing to its peripheral position in the world order.
8.1 Introduction

This study examines the American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China in the intersection of power, media discourse and knowledge. The study seeks to address the following research questions:

1. In what ways has China been defined and represented in the American mainstream press?
2. How have linguistic tools been employed to construct China in particular ways?
3. How have such representations and discourse concealed racialised ideology of the press and unequal power relations between cultures and nations?

These research questions are addressed through applying postcolonial and decolonial theories and the CDA approach which is underpinned by Marxism and Foucauldian discourse/power/knowledge. Three cases are analysed, i.e. the American press coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in Hong Kong, of the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist aggression, and of China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016. The study reveals that China is discursively constructed in a way that is resonant with the racialised “Yellow Peril” imagery and ideology of the imperialist and colonial times. Deconstructing dominant discourses and representations, the study provides a subaltern interpretation and reconstruction of the events through contextualising and re-establishing historical connectivities between China as a former semi-colonised nation and Western colonialism and imperialism.

In what follows, I synthesise the main findings and arguments of the research, as well as point to areas where further study could be conducted. Section 8.2 summarises the main findings of the study. Section 8.3 explains the contributions
and implications of the study. Section 8.4 puts forward suggestions and recommendations for future research.

8.2 Key findings and arguments

The thesis’ critical review of literature concerning theoretical debates and media representation of ‘Others’ shows that Western media associate non-Western cultures with negative and stereotypical images, such as ‘laziness’, ‘primitivism’, ‘simplicity’, ‘lack of cultures’, and ‘nature’, and ignore their visibility unless the non-western cultures fit with existing ethnic and racial stereotypes or prejudices (see Chapter 3). Western media discourses, as such, are underpinned by deeply rooted racial prejudice of the West against non-western nations, cultures and peoples, and thus constitute part of Euro-American-centric knowledge. Such Euro-American-centric knowledge construction of non-western cultures and societies leads to the subalternity of the indigenous knowledge of non-western nations, hence “asymmetric ignorance” (Chakrabarty, 2000a, p.28), and symbolic and “epistemic violence” (Spivak, 1988, p.281). China Studies is not exempt from such an asymmetric structure of knowledge production and epistemic violence. Euro-American-centric perspectives remain dominant in the field of China Studies, which is manifested in its (western) cultural univocity and the scarcity of critical and pluralistic perspectives. Writings on China are explicitly or implicitly orientalist and often racialised. Such a body of knowledge of China is uncritically accepted as unquestioned ‘facts’ and ‘Truths’. Although research has started to emerge in recent years, such as that from Qing Cao (2007, 2014), Hongling Liang (2015), Xu Shi (2007, 2015), and Vukovich (2012, 2017), providing a critical voice and paying particular attention to China, such critical voices are scarce and remain marginal in the China Studies field. Furthermore, despite that postcolonial and decolonial theories challenge western-centric thinking about the colonial world and the Euro-American-centric interpretations and knowledge of world history, the dialogue and mutual engagement between postcolonialism and decolonialism on the one hand and China Studies on the other hand are absent. Against such a scholarly background, this study focuses on news discourses, and investigates the
representation of China in American mainstream newspapers from a critical perspective. It thus, contributes to emerging critical debates in China Studies.

Discourse could be used to index and express power, as well as challenge and alter distributions of power. CDA approach, which is underpinned by Marxism and Foucauldian notions of discourse/power/knowledge, aims to analyse the way that discourse is employed by dominant groups to impose power abuse and reproduce social domination. Marxism, however, remains culture-blind and thus cannot fully address the research questions guiding this study. A postcolonial perspective is introduced in order to provide theoretical insights into cultural and racial relations as well as domination and hegemony by particular cultural/ethnic groups over others through representation and discourse. Drawing on the CDA approach, with a focus on a postcolonial perspective, the study analyses the way in which China is represented in American mainstream media discourse, and uncovers ideology and power relations between cultures hidden in such representations. The key findings are elaborated as follows.

8.2.1 Discursive construction of China as the ‘Other’

American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China is inherently associated with the notion of Orientalism. The notion of Orientalism is an underlying repertoire, based on which a variety of discourses are produced to construct China as the cultural ‘Other’. My research confirms findings from Chakrabarty (1992) and Liu (2017), who argue that the orientalist discourses of non-western cultures and societies are underpinned by self-perceptions of the West as ‘superior’ on the basis of racial differences, and deeply rooted in the Western colonial project that has historically defined ‘exotic’ ‘Others’ from the gaze of the West. Postcolonial and de-colonial theories direct our attention to the historical linkages between orientalist discourses and the West’s colonialism and imperialism.

Following the colonial encroachment of the world beyond Europe in the early 16th century, white colonial power constructs a racial hierarchy and domination of the
Europeans in which the colonised is placed in a situation of inferiority to the colonisers (Grosfoguel, 2013, 2015, Quijano, 2000, Said, 1978). Drawing on the idea of race, the West essentialises the difference between the colonisers and the colonised, and exercises white colonial power through colonial expansion and representational practices in which the colonised ‘Others’ are defined in terms of their differences from the ‘civilised’, ‘rational’ and ‘superior’ West, and are orientalised as ‘mysterious’, ‘eccentric’, ‘primitive’, ‘despotic’ and ‘cruel’ (McEwan, 2008, Grosfoguel, 2015, Quijano, 2000, Said, 1978). By comparing the extent to which other societies resemble or are different from the European prototype of ‘civilisation’, the West creates a binary opposition between the West and the Rest, imposes its Euro-American-centrism on the rest of the world, marginalises and excludes indigenous values, cultures and languages, and exerts epistemic violence. Such representational practices contribute to the colonial perspective that privileges the ‘superiority’ of the West in the production of ‘universal’ knowledge, seeks to restrain, regulate, and control the colonised, and justifies the West’s colonial occupation and oppression. As Goldberg (1996, p.184) notes, “materially colonialism seeks to strengthen domination for the sake of human and economic exploitation”. Representationally, it constructs an ‘oriental myth’, and seeks to maintain and perpetuate epistemic conditions through creating an ideological or discursive image of the colonised (Goldberg, 1996).

Such epistemic violence underpinned by the idea of race continues to exist in the postcolonial period and is embedded in the notions of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’. The West is represented as an embodiment of a range of ‘universal’ economic and political values such as ‘progress’, ‘rationality’, and ‘innovation’ (cf. Huntington, 1993). These values are presented as international ‘norms’ and are imposed on the non-West. As De Carvalho et al. (2011, p.745) say, “Europe expands outwards and graciously bequeaths sovereignty and Europe’s panoply of civilised and rational institutions to the inferior Eastern societies”. Such Eurocentric assumptions result in a racialised epistemological hierarchy, i.e. the West is regarded as a ‘norm’/‘standard’ against which the non-West, in particular, China, is rated and judged, as uncovered by this study.
In applying CDA, the thesis has shown that Euro-American-centrism underpins American mainstream newspaper coverage of the 2014 “Occupy Central” event in Hong Kong, the 2015 China’s 70th victory anniversary against Japan’s fascist aggression, and China-Africa relations between 2013 and 2016. Eurocentric assumptions and ideological structures in American mainstream newspaper coverage of China are reflected in their discursive construction of the otherness of China through the use of various linguistic strategies, such as negative other-presentation, scapegoating, exclusion of voices, and distortion, and linguistic tools such as lexical choice, metaphors, transitivity. As such, the media establish a binary discursive construction, i.e. a ‘threatening’, ‘authoritarian’ China (the out-group, Other) versus a ‘civilised’, ‘democratic’ West (the in-group, Self).

The study finds that the media repeatedly assign negative attributions to China, which construct China as inherently different from the West. An ideological ‘communist’ frame has been used by the media to define, and bring back the memory of the Cold War ‘fault-line’ between capitalism and socialism. Negatively connoted words, such as “corruption”, “unfairness”, “no press freedom”, “no religious freedom” (The New York Times, 28 September 2014), “dark” and “wrong” (The New York Times, 28 September 2014) are adopted by the media to frame China. The media create an image of China as ‘totalitarian’, which is the opposite of the ‘liberal’ West. Through such frames, the media construct and perpetuate the discourse of an essentially different, morally ‘evil’, and ideologically ‘threatening’ ‘Other’.

The media additionally constructs a discourse of ‘crisis’ to denigrate China and the Chinese economy. Conceptual metaphors such as the ‘patient’, ‘natural disaster’, and an orientational metaphor are adopted by the media to portray China as ‘suffering’ from profound ‘crisis, and thus as a society that is about to ‘collapse’. The ‘patient’ metaphor that is used suggests that China’s economy is “weak”, and in bad condition (The Wall Street Journal, 30 August 2015). The ‘natural disaster’ metaphor suggests that China is hit by “economic squalls” (The New York Times,
22 September 2015) and thus is in “economic turbulence” (Los Angeles Times, 6 September 2015). The orientational metaphor represents China’s economy as “plummeting” (The New York Times, 1 September 2015) or “slumping” (The New York Times, 2 September 2015), serving to invoke and generate an image of “China collapse”. This group of metaphors paints a picture of ‘negativity’ and the ‘failure’ of China.

Another discursive practice adopted by the American mainstream newspapers to debase China and Chinese culture is through the discourse of ‘deficit’. This discourse works through the idea that non-western nations are ‘deficient’ or essentially ‘lack’ ‘rationality’ and ‘progress’, and thus should “develop by modernising and should follow the same trajectories as western economies in order to ‘catch up’, both in economic terms and in terms of civilisation”, as pointed by McEwan (2008, pp.131-132) in her analysis of development texts. Through associating China with negatively connoted predications such as “not [being] accountable to” its domestic economic, and socio-cultural development (The New York Times, 30 July 2015), the media insinuate that China is ‘irrational’ and ‘irresponsible’ and as such resonant with the orientalist discourse of the ‘uncivilised’ ‘other’. Such a discursive construction of China as the ‘uncivilised’ ‘Other’ is also manifest in the media’s portrayals of China as “adamantly reject[ing] liberal Western values”, (The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2015), “endor[s]ing] the tough approach to the protests” (The New York Times, 29 September 2014), and “ramp[ing] up media and Internet censorship” (Los Angeles Times, 2 September 2015). Moreover, China is portrayed as a nation with “underfunded health and education systems” (The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015), “atmospheric pollution” (The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2013) and “poverty” at home (The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015). As such, the media construct China as ‘savage’, ‘force-oriented’, and ‘despotic’, and China’s domestic socio-culture as ‘weak’ and ‘backward’. Using such lexical choice, the media stigmatise China and Chinese culture as essentially ‘deficient’ and different from a ‘civilised’ West. This implies that the China ‘in deficit’ should be ‘taught’ by the ‘civilising’ West through its ‘civilising missions’.

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Making use of linguistic tools such as lexical choice and metaphors, the media deliberately attribute negative characteristics to China and denigrate China as ‘authoritarian’, “uncivilised” and ‘backward’, in opposition to the ‘democratic’, “civilised” and ‘advanced’ West. The repeated use of negative characteristics harks back to the Orientalist assumption underlying western attitudes towards China. As such, the media create a distinct sense of “Us” (the West) versus the “Other” (China) and reinforce the stereotypes and prejudice against China.

Furthermore, central to the media representation of China is the attempt to make the ‘China threat’ discourse ‘real’. The discursive strategy of scapegoating is adopted by the media to construct China as a nation which has constituted a ‘threat’ to the existing ‘world order’. This is also often performed through the use of metaphors. For example, the ‘hunger’ metaphor is adopted to represent China as having an “insatiable” “appetite” for African raw materials (The New York Times, 3 December 2015), implying that China is a ‘dangerous’ ‘alien’ nation that can ‘harm’ Africa. Moreover, the ‘flood’ metaphor is used to depict Chinese people in Africa as well as mainland Chinese in Hong Kong as ‘invaders’ (such as Chinese “have flooded into Ghana’s gold-producing regions” (The New York Times, 7 June 2013), “an unwelcome influx of mainlanders” (Los Angeles Times, 30 September 2014)). These metaphors construct a negative image of Chinese people as ‘dangerous’ and ‘disastrous’, in an attempt to stir up panic among the public and exclude China and Chinese people as ‘Others’.

In addition, the media activate China as an actor in relation to material processes in a negative semantic field such as “projecting [power]” (Los Angeles Times, 4 September 2015), “throwing aside [the postwar order]” (The Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2015), “eroding [freedom in Hong Kong]” (The New York Times, 28 September 2014), and “undermining [good governance and economy in Africa]” (The New York Times, 26 March 2013). As such, the media ascribe ‘threatening’ characteristics to China, portraying China as a ‘trouble maker’, and representing China as an ‘aggressive’, ‘sharp’ power which ‘threatens’ the existing western-
dominated world order (see Chapter 6). Similarly, making use of denigratory words, the media frame mainland Chinese people as ‘secretive’, ‘unethical’ and ‘dangerous’ ‘aliens’ that cause all kinds of ‘problems’ in Hong Kong and Africa. For example, the mainland Chinese are represented as causing ‘an increase in the unemployment rate’, and ‘putting a burden’ on services such as education and health care in Hong Kong (see Chapter 5). Chinese people in Africa are framed using connotations of ‘illegality’ and ‘criminality’, and are represented as causing ‘environmental devastation’ and ‘economic instability’ in Africa (see Chapter 7). Making use of scapegoating, the media discursively construct a dichotomy between China as a ‘world order violator’ (the ‘Other’) versus the West as a ‘world order defender’ (the ‘Self’) under a fundamental assumption that the existing ‘world order’ is universally and globally accepted as just, fair and should be maintained. The media stigmatise China and Chinese people as a ‘threat’ (the ‘Other’) that should be kept out. The thesis argues that such a present-day media discourse of ‘China threat’ reproduces and extends the historical colonial discourse of the ‘Yellow Peril’, thereby entrenching the essentialist racial differences and representations of China, Chinese cultures and Chinese people, and serving to perpetuate unequal power relations. As such, the media normalise racialised practices that exclude and marginalise China, and justify American imperialist military presence and hegemony in the Asian Pacific area, in Africa and globally.

The study also shows that juxtaposed with the media discursive construction of otherness of China is the idea of the “West”. According to Hall (1992, p.277; cited in Cao, 2014, p.130), the discourse of the West refers to “a set of images that integrates a range of characteristics into one picture”. Such a set of images serve as a system of representation. On the basis of these representations, the West constructs a schematic knowledge, which is well manifested in the notions of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ (Cao, 2014). The West as an image is considered to be a ‘standard’ or ‘model’ for comparison (e.g. ‘rationality’, ‘science’, and ‘progress’) and provides criteria for evaluation around which the images of other cultures and societies are constructed (Hall, 2002). This study on American mainstream media representation of China confirms these theoretical insights;
discourses of an ‘ethical’, ‘civilised’, ‘peace-keeping’ and ‘modern’ West are constructed, against which China is culturally portrayed as ‘immoral’, ‘uncivilised’, ‘threatening’, ‘traditional’ and ‘backward’. Through the binary framework of the ‘positive’ West and ‘negative’ China, the media establish and exercise a hierarchy of cultural power where China is degraded not only as essentially ‘different’ (‘strange’) ‘Other’/‘Them’, but also ‘unpredictable’, ‘aggressive’, ‘dangerous’ and most importantly, ‘inferior’ to the ‘Self’/‘Us’.

Media representations do not simply and transparently mirror reality. The media disseminate and reproduce dominant ideologies in a hidden way and are allied to “cloud the mind of people”, with ideas that the ruling groups want them to have (Berger, 2014). In addition to the discursive construction of otherness of China, the media reinforce the dichotomy between the West and China through exclusion and purposeful omission of information that could undermine dominant discourses. For example, during the American mainstream newspapers’ coverage of the 2014 Hong Kong “Occupy Central” event, the “anti-Occupy Central” campaign and demonstration – which were carried out against the planned ‘occupy’ – was completely ignored by the American mainstream newspapers despite their scale and impact, as these campaigns and demonstrations did not fit the media’s Orientalist ideology, and the Eurocentric positioning and agenda when representing the ‘Other’.

The American mainstream media representation of China is regarded as a symbolic struggle for ‘truth’ within existing dynamic power relations. Historically orientalist stereotypes that are closely linked with the western/American colonial project of cultural and political dominance, hegemony and interest, continue to provide the fundamentally epistemological foundations for the American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China. Making use of discursive strategies as well as the strategy of selection, exclusion, omission, and silencing, the media invoke colonial imaginaries and fantasies, reproduce the West’s deeply-entrenched stereotypes, orientalist ideology, and racialised discourses on China, whilst silencing other discourses that are inconsistent with the orientalist ideology. The media construct China as the ‘negative, uncivilised and threatening Other’, which
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is in stark contrast to the ‘positive, civilised and security-protecting’ West. As such, the media confirm the assumed ‘superiority’ of the West, and reinforce the dichotomy between the ‘civilised’ West and ‘threatening’ China. This entrenched binary dichotomy operates to frame the way in which China is understood through Western eyes, and structures knowledge and patterns of thought when talking about China. Accordingly, the media naturalise the Western-centric discourse of China as a ‘truth’ and ‘fact’, which, in turn, reinforces the existing unequal power relations between the West and China, and maintains the hegemony of the West. The effect of interwoven relations between colonial ideologies and American media representations on the construction of western-centric knowledge of China reifies the power-knowledge-discourse nexus (Foucault, 1980).

8.2.2 Identity, collective memory and connected histories

American mainstream newspapers assign negative and deviant attributions to China and construct a contemporary ‘authoritarian’ ‘threatening’ China vis-a-vis a ‘democratic’ ‘civilised’ West. Such an American media representation of China does not bear a close resemblance to reality. McEwan (2008, p.129) points out that the West “produces the Third World and the subaltern through discourse to suit [its] own image and desire”. The American representations say more about the West, which does the representation, than about China, which is represented. The dominant discourses of China as a cultural ‘Other’ reinforce the self-image of the West as ‘superior’, and justify the ‘positional superiority’ of the West against non-western cultures and in particular indigenous Chinese values and cultures, which leads to the subalternisation of the collective memories and histories of China and influences the construction of identity in both mainland China and postcolonial Hong Kong.

The discourse of otherness fixes China as always, irrevocably different. A highly racialised hierarchy between ‘inferior’ China and the ‘superior’ West is established. The denigration of China as a subaltern subject is crucial to the self-definition of the West as ‘superior’. Such a core contradiction between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’
justifies the West’s colonial expansion in semi-colonial China and in particular in colonial Hong Kong (see Chapter 5), and constitutes ‘the white man’s burden’ to ‘civilise’ the ‘Other’, which has a great impact on the identity construction of postcolonial Hong Kong people. The discourses of the civilised West’ and ‘civilising mission’ gloss over the West’s racial segregation, colonial domination and exploitation in colonial Hong Kong, and play an important role in shaping the domination of colonial Hong Kong, and contribute to the construction of a socio-cultural hierarchy in which the Britain is superior, mainland China is inferior and Hong Kong sits in-between. As I have argued in the analysis of the ‘Occupy Central’ event in Chapter 5, the media construct a dichotomy between ‘uncivilised’ and ‘authoritarian’ China versus the ‘civilised’ and ‘democratic’ West and dehistoricise the interpretation of the event, thus depicting the event as ‘democratic’. Moreover, in the analysis, I deconstruct the dominant interpretation of the event and provide an alternative interpretation by contextualising it in relation to the specificities of the Hong Kong SAR’s colonial past and postcolonial present, its relationships with the British Empire and the Chinese mainland and its changing position in Asia. I argue that the ‘Occupy Central’ event reflects identity anxieties in the postcolonial Hong Kong and is the result of ‘colonial nostalgia’ in Hong Kong. The continuity of many colonial institutions, ideologies and hierarchies of race, nationality and language in postcolonial Hong Kong influence the construction of its collective identity. The continuity of colonial institutions and ideologies have permeated the social fabric and thus contributed to the continuity of highly racialised socio-cultural structures. These persistently produce and reproduce imperialist fantasies and consciousness, resulting in filtered identities, and ultimately, the colonial nostalgic and its associated identity anxieties and crises in the postcolonial Hong Kong SAR.

Moreover, fundamental to an orientalist fantasy of China as the ‘inferior Other’ is an assumption that the ‘uncivilised’ and ‘primitive’ China is incapable of producing knowledge and thus the media necessitate ‘objective’ western ‘scientific’ values and thoughts. The discourse of the otherness of China justifies the West’s privilege in the production and construction of knowledge and history, and serves as a means
for the West to impose Western-centric knowledge and values on the rest of the world. Non-western nations and in particular China are represented as unable to produce thoughts worthy of being recognised as knowledge, and are degenerated as ‘objects’ which are spoken about. The West produces knowledge based on its provincialised experiences, marginalises and silences indigenous cultures and values, and imposes western-centric knowledge on other nations as the ‘truth’, which greatly affects the construction of collective memories and national identities in non-western nations. As I have discussed in Chapter 6, the media establish a dichotomy between a ‘threatening’ and ‘uncivilised’ China and the ‘peace-defending’ and ‘liberal’ U.S and its allies (in this case Japan), silence China’s struggles against Japanese Fascism and discursively construct the parade in a decontextualised way resonant with the ‘Yellow Peril’ narrative. As such, the media construct a collective and consensual narrative of the parade that coincides with the western interpretation of the history of WWII. Such a Euro-American-centric interpretation of WWII is mainly concerned with wars/battles in the European battle-ground. Little attention has been paid to the devastating wars that took place in non-western nations – in this case, the Japanese colonial conquest in China. Such an amnesia of Chinese sufferings and struggles against Japanese militarism has silenced the collective memories and commemorations of the subaltern China and influenced the construction of national identity in China. Through contextualising the discussion of the parade in relations to the history of China’s war against Japan’s fascism between 1931 and 1942, I deconstruct the dominant discourses of the parade, bring back collective memories of the Chinese people, and produce a more comprehensive account of WWII that moves beyond a Eurocentric narrative. I argue that the atrocities and the most evil forms of racist genocide committed by the Japanese colonial expansion in the colonised Asian nations and in particular in China, as well as sufferings of Chinese people and Chinese communist party in the context of the resistance against Japanese militarism and fascism and the overall global victory over Fascism are erased from the history of WWII. The West imposes the Euro-American-centric interpretation of the history of WWII to the rest of the world as a ‘truth’, marginalises the voice of subaltern Chinese in the construction of history, and establishes its epistemic hegemony/violence.
In addition, postcolonial theory explains that creating an image of the ‘Other’ is central to the identity construction of the ‘Self’ (Hall, 1992, Said, 1978). Media reporting is part of a constant negotiation in drawing cultural boundaries between the West and the rest. In this way, cultural and power relations between the West and the rest are reproduced, maintained and reinforced (Cao, 2014). In the process of denigrating China as the other, the cultural consensus and the self-identity of the West is confirmed and strengthened. Notions of ‘civilisation’, ‘progress’, ‘democracy’ and ‘modernity’ are represented as exclusive to the West. As I have discussed in Chapter 7, through portraying China as a ‘rogue’ which ‘threatens’ and ‘undermines’ the socio-political and economic development of Africa, the media maintain the self-image of the West as an ‘ethical’ ‘knight’ seeking to ‘save’ the ‘weak’ Africa (see Chapter 7). Such a self-image of the West as an epitome of ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ disconnects the West from its colonialist past, and confirms Kapoor’s (2004, p.630) argument that the discourse of ‘development’ “ignores colonialism, or situates [colonialism] securely in the past to make [people] think it is now over and done with”. The West ignores the interrelationships between advanced economies on the one hand, and colonial exploitation in the South that have contributed to industrial capitalism, on the other. I problematise the dominant discourses and provide an alternative interpretation through building historical connectivities between colonised Africa and the West’s colonialism, and contextualising the discussion on China-Africa relations in relation to China’s historical and contemporary role in Africa. I argue that the media construction of the discourse of a ‘weak’ Africa, ‘ruthless’ China and the ‘ethical’ West erases the colonialist and imperialist history, the West’s brutal conquest of the African continent, the transatlantic slave trade, the expropriation and genocide of indigenous peoples, wars of conquest, land grabs, exploitation and oppression. The complicated situation in Africa, including its unstable political situations, weak economy, environmental degradation, and its ‘peripheral’ position in the world order is considered to be caused by the presence of China’s investment and Chinese people in Africa, rather than as a consequence of historical processes that stem from the colonial plunder and the hierarchy of race, which further strengthens the West’s
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stereotypes towards non-Western nations. As such, the West reimagines its colonialist/imperialist past, justifies the continued economic, geopolitical and (neo)colonial interventions in Africa in the name of ‘development’ and ‘democracy’.

8.3 Contributions and implications of the research

The study demonstrates that the Western colonial and imperialist ideologies and racial and cultural hierarchies are reinforcing and reproducing one another, and continue to constrain how non-white people and in particular China are represented in Western media discourse, lead to a hierarchisation of the ways knowledge is accepted, recognised, and diffused, and exert epistemic racism and violence. The findings from this research carry theoretical and practical significance concerning thinking and practices in terms of discourse, representation and the nature of knowledge.

Theoretically, the study has attempted to bring critical perspectives into China studies. Current writings and discourses on China are explicitly or implicitly orientalist by nature. China Studies are dominated by west-centric perspectives which are manifested in the cultural monolog and the lack of reflexive and critical perspectives as well as lack of voices of the subaltern Chinese. Such a body of knowledge on China is taken to be the accepted ‘wisdom’, unquestioned ‘fact’, and the ‘truth’. Although a few pioneering works (cf. Cao, 2014, Shi, 2007, and Liang H., 2015) have started to question the accepted ‘wisdoms’ by interrogating these assumptions, they remain marginal to the dominant discourse in the China Studies field. Systematic postcolonial critiques in China Studies remain scarce. This study deals with the lacunae in the current literature by applying an interdisciplinary conceptual framework which incorporates CDA and postcolonialism to critically analyse American mainstream newspapers’ representation of China and reveal the ideology and power relations hidden in such discourses. The study contributes to emerging theoretical debates on postcolonialism and China (cf. Lee, et al., 2015, Liang H., 2015, Vukovich, 2012, 2017). It thus allows for the subjectivity and
agency of the formerly colonised and oppressed China and for a space where the ‘subaltern’ Chinese could speak for themselves rather than being spoken about as a mere object.

Secondly, a postcolonial lens has been adopted in the study to unveil the colonial and imperialist ideologies embedded in the American media discursive practices concerning China. The study brings a Chinese experience and perspective to postcolonial and critical discourse studies, and as such it broadens and enriches this body of literature with a China-specific empirical analysis. Current postcolonial and critical discourse studies have focused on analysing colonial discourses and ideologies in the world regions including the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Latin America and other former colonies by American and European (western) powers. Postcolonial perspectives have rarely been engaged with China. China’s unique experience of colonialism, i.e. semi-colonialism, tends to be regarded as non-colonialism, and overlooked in postcolonial studies. Although never fully colonised by a single Western power and although its territory was never made into a foreign possession, China, as a semi-colonised nation, suffered from multiple colonial agendas (Liang H., 2015) and was carved up by western powers in the same way as other fully colonised nations in Africa, Latin America and South Asia (Lee et al., 2015). The study extends the postcolonial and critical discourse analysis beyond the above-mentioned geographical areas, shows the “continuing economic, social, political, and cultural effects of colonialism” on China (Nkomo, 2011, p.281), and examines how the colonial relationship shapes the West’s media discourse on China. Such a postcolonial lens has been particularly helpful in examining how American mainstream newspapers draw on and transmit colonial and racialised ideologies across time and space to produce and shore up U.S. global hegemony and domination. Guided by the postcolonial perspective, the study has sought to explore how colonial discourses of China as a non-western ‘Other’ are produced and reproduced and universalised by American mainstream media, and sought to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions underpinning the discursive construction of the ‘threatening’ China. The study represents one of the first attempts to apply postcolonial theory and the CDA method to an analysis of western media’s
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representation of China. As such, it enriches empirical analysis in postcolonial and critical discourse studies and contributes to an emerging critical theoretical reflection, and broader and genuinely open scholarly debates about discourse, domination, representation of the Other, and ideology.

On a practical level, the study pays attention to the possibility of bridging theoretical discussions on the representation of the ‘Other’ with socio-cultural problems that China and other non-western nations face. The study has shown how discourses of the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ are employed by the media to place China in a hierarchical power order and construct China as a cultural ‘Other’. Moreover, the study has revealed the inseparable relations between power and media discourse in the construction of knowledge in general and that about China in particular. Such findings imply that to counter such a cultural demonisation undercurrent, Chinese media can play an important role in building China’s international image informed and underpinned by critical theories and by a better understanding of discourse construction. Such an endeavour would also potentially challenge the western dominated discourse and representation of the Third World and contribute to the fundamental altering of the politically, culturally and racially constructed hierarchy and its underpinned ‘world order’.

Moreover, in practical terms, the study contributes to the collective efforts associated with the epistemic and psychological decolonisation in China. The study reveals that marginalisation and othering occur in a hidden, unconscious and subtle way. Rather than assuming a conscious silencing and exclusion of the ‘Other’ by elites (Van Dijk, 1993a), the Euro-American-centric ideology and the marginalisation of cultural ‘Others’ are realised through unconscious mechanisms such as linguistic discursive techniques. Such unconscious mechanisms are not easily detectible by readers. In so doing, the media insidiously impose on readers Euro-American-centric knowledge and discourses of the non-west. In this respect, the findings of the study bring awareness to the level of asymmetric ignorance and epistemic violence exercised by non-western cultures and peoples. A greater sensitivity to the colonial assumptions embedded within media discourses on China
is called for. Moreover, the findings from this study call for meaningful, complex and honest discussions, and scholarly debates on the ways of deconstructing Euro-American-centric epistemologies and discursive practices. These range from the language used when discussing the representation of the ‘Other’, to the national efforts in strengthening the voice of China.

8.4 Future Research

The study mainly examines the representation of China in American mainstream newspapers through adopting an interdisciplinary approach that combines CDA with a postcolonial perspective. Due to word count limitation, the study mainly focused on news texts, and did not include visual features such as images and videos in the analysis. Recommendations for future studies are as follows.

With the development of technology, interactive digital media technology plays an increasingly important role in transmitting information, constructing knowledge and encouraging social interaction (O'Halloran et al., 2017). Meanings are created not only through texts, but also through different visual and audio features. In terms of future research, scholars might wish to extend this study by examining representations of China in multimodal texts such as social media postings, websites, films, documentaries and videos. Accordingly, scholars could explore how China is defined and in what way China is represented in the multimodal texts, and reveal ideologies and unequal power relations embedded in the representations.

Theoretically, there is a new, ‘Sinological’ form orientalism at work in the world, which has dominated and defined the Western knowledge production about China (Vukovich, 2012). As Vukovich (2012) points out, such Sinological-orientalism construes China as being in a process of becoming-the-same as ‘Us’, i.e. the ‘open’, ‘liberal’ and ‘modern’ West. The new Sinological-orientalism – which is manifested in the discourse of ‘becoming-the-same’ – implies a hierarchical difference between Orient and Occident and is considered to be part of a neo-colonial and imperial project (Vukovich, 2012). In addition to Sinological-
orientalism, another kind of self-orientalism occurs in the face of western economic pressure to satisfy a white imperialist imagination. As Hirose and Pih (2011) point out, the Orient internalise and self-inscribe orientalist images on the basis of pressures to conform to the West’s fantasies and definition of ethno-racial identity. Future research could also examine the processes of self-Orientalism and Sinological-orientalism and explore their implications for knowledge construction, power relations between cultures, identity construction as well as their implications for work and organisations in great depth.

Empirically, discourses of Chinese elites play an important role in disseminating western-centric viewpoints, and colonising the mind of people. Future research could also examine Chinese elites’ discourses from a critical perspective and explore the way that China and the West are represented in the elites’ discourse and unravel ideologies and power embedded in those discourses.
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- References -


# Glossary of Chinese Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese in Pinyin</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balujun</td>
<td>八路军</td>
<td>Eighth Rout Army (led by the Chinese Communist Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baituan dazhan</td>
<td>百团大战</td>
<td>Hundred Regiments Offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang chong</td>
<td>蝗虫</td>
<td>a homonym for ‘yellow worms’, meaning “locusts” in English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongbei kangri lianjun</td>
<td>东北抗日联军</td>
<td>Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangri genjudi</td>
<td>抗日根据地</td>
<td>anti-Japanese base areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian</td>
<td>抗日民族统一战线</td>
<td>an anti-Japanese United Front between the Chinese Communist party and Nationalist party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangri zhengfu</td>
<td>抗日政府</td>
<td>Anti-Japanese Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzhouguo</td>
<td>满洲国</td>
<td>Manchukuo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanguang zhengce (Shaoguang, Shaguang, Qiangguang)</td>
<td>三光政策（烧光，杀光，抢光）</td>
<td>three-all policy, i.e. kill all, burn all, loot all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yidai yilu</td>
<td>一带一路</td>
<td>One belt, one road, also known as “Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yiguo liangzhi</td>
<td>一国两制</td>
<td>One country, two systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zouchuqu</td>
<td>走出去</td>
<td>going out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix A

**Table 1. List of selected news articles on the 2014 “Occupy Central” Event in Hong Kong**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Sep 27, 2014</td>
<td>Pro-Democracy Students Are Arrested in Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Sep 28, 2014</td>
<td>Pro-Democracy Group Shifts to Collaborate With Student Protesters in Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Sep 29, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Police Confront Crowd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Sep 30, 2014</td>
<td>After Tear Gas, Hong Kong Protesters Defy Officials’ Call to Disperse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Oct 1, 2014</td>
<td>Told to End Protests, Organizers in Hong Kong Vow to Expand Them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Oct 1, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Protests Are Leaderless but Orderly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Oct 3, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Leader Refuses to Resign, but Deputy Meets With Protesters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Oct 3, 2014</td>
<td>Some City Residents, Weary of Disruptions, Find Fault With Protesters' Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Oct 4, 2014</td>
<td>Attackers and Hostile Crowds Besiege Hong Kong Protesters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Sep 28, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong pro-democracy activists commence mass protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Sep 29, 2014</td>
<td>Pro-democracy protest erupts in Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Sep 30, 2014</td>
<td>In Hong Kong, a conundrum for Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Oct 1, 2014</td>
<td>In Hong Kong protests, holiday may sway future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Oct 2, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong protesters, government grope for advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Oct 3, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong leader refuses to resign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Oct 4, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong protesters stay despite attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Oct 5, 2014</td>
<td>Attacks revive main camp, but endgame seems near</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Oct 6, 2014</td>
<td>In Hong Kong, protest evolves into stalemate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Sep 27, 2014</td>
<td>Thousands Gather in Hong Kong After Police Clash With Protesters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Sep 27, 2014</td>
<td>Occupy Central Launches Hong Kong Protest Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Sep 28, 2014</td>
<td>Supporters of Hong Kong's Pro-Democracy Protesters Undaunted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Sep 29, 2014</td>
<td>Pro-Democracy Protests Shake Hong Kong</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Sep 29, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong on Edge as Protests Grow</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Sep 30, 2014</td>
<td>China's Democracy Dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 1, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Protesters Brace for a Holiday Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 1, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Government Seeks to Wait Out Protesters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 1, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Government Open to Meeting With Protesters, Official Says</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 1, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Protesters Extend Beyond Organizers’ Grasp</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 2, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Leader Offers Talks With Protesters</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 3, 2014</td>
<td>Clashes Break Out at Hong Kong Protest Site</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 5, 2014</td>
<td>Positions Harden Among Hong Kong Protesters, Government</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 5, 2014</td>
<td>A Hong Kong Protest Run on Fumes and Instant Noodles</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 5, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Students Say Protests Will Continue</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 6, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong Protests Enter New Phase</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>WSJ</td>
<td>Oct 7, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong government refused to negotiate with protesters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Sep 27, 2014</td>
<td>Anger grows in Hong Kong;</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Sep 28, 2014</td>
<td>Faceoff at Hong Kong protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Sep 29, 2014</td>
<td>China tested on Hong Kong;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Sep 30, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong leader urges protesters to go home, says he won't resign</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Sep 30, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong shopping district becomes political protest haven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Sep 30, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong police shut down main protest site</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Oct 1, 2014</td>
<td>Protests overshadow China's National Day ceremonies in Hong Kong</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Oct 3, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong talks planned;</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Oct 4, 2014</td>
<td>Foes attack Hong Kong protesters;</td>
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<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Oct 5, 2014</td>
<td>Hong Kong protesters stay in streets, but schools reopen</td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>Oct 5, 2014</td>
<td>Deadline for Hong Kong protest;</td>
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**Table 2. List of selected news articles on China’s 2015 70th Anniversary Commemoration of the Victory Day against the Japanese Aggression**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>May 9, 2015</td>
<td>On Day That Defines Russia, Putin Reaches Out to China</td>
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</table>
### Table 3. List of selected news articles on China-Africa relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Mar 26, 2013</td>
<td>China's New Leader Tries to Calm African Fears of His Country's Economic Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Jun 7, 2013</td>
<td>Ghana Arrests Chinese in Gold Mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Jun 11, 2013</td>
<td>Chasing a Golden Dream, Chinese Miners Are on the Run in Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Sep 18, 2013</td>
<td>China Finds Resistance To Oil Deals In Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Dec 16, 2013</td>
<td>Africa and the Chinese Way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>May 17, 2014</td>
<td>Into Africa: China's Wild Rush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Aug 5, 2014</td>
<td>The Battle of the Regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Aug 11, 2014</td>
<td>President Obama's Africa Push</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Sep 12, 2014</td>
<td>China Expands Investment in Tanzania</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Sep 17, 2014</td>
<td>China Under Pressure to Increase Ebola Aid as Crisis Grows</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Sep 23, 2014</td>
<td>South Sudan: China to Send Troops for U.N. Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>Oct 20, 2014</td>
<td>Beijing Donates $6 Million for Food Aid in Ebola Fight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Appendix A -