Cosmopolitan Sentiment: Motivating Global Justice

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Chris Raymond

I would like to thank the family and friends who have supported me through the Ph.D. process. Especially Mum, Paul, Toby, Rachel, Sarah, Grandma, Grandad, Mark and Suzanne.

I would also like to thank my supervisors Kerri Woods and Derek Edyvane.
Abstract

This thesis examines the motivational deficit facing duties falling on individuals in affluent countries to act to address global poverty, and develops a novel dialogic sentimental cosmopolitan answer. The argument begins by drawing a distinction between charitable and political accounts of duties to address global poverty. Chapter one defends a focus on a political account of these duties as necessary to achieve long-term solutions to global poverty, and argues that there are independent normative reasons to favour a political approach. Chapter two examines, and rejects, the nudge solution (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) to the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty. This strategy, deriving from behavioural economics, argues that, rather than seeking to alter attitudes, motivational failures can be addressed through prompting unreflective changes in behaviour. I argue that in order to motivate sustained political action to address global poverty a broader change in attitudes is required. Chapter three moves on to examine the sentimental cosmopolitan suggestion that we can motivate action to address global poverty through a process of ‘sentimental education’, in which sympathetic portrayals of distant others in the media and narrative art serve to cultivate greater affective attachments to these others (Nussbaum, 2001; Rorty, 1998). I argue that, although promising, motivating long-term compliance with political duties to address global poverty requires moving beyond the models of sentimental education currently on offer.

In order to begin to develop an alternative account of sentimental education suitable for motivating compliance with political duties to address global poverty, chapter four examines the focus on empathy within the sentimental cosmopolitan approach, arguing that the sentimental cosmopolitan project ought to be broadened to include the cultivation of a number cosmopolitan emotions – especially anger and shame. Chapter five offers an in depth analysis of the mechanisms through which strategies of sentimental education are thought to function to increase affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally. Here, I reject strategies that emphasise the suffering and vulnerability of individuals facing global poverty as a means to increase affective concern. I
argue that these strategies serve to portray individuals facing poverty globally in a manner that obscures their capacity for agency, leading to a number of adverse motivational effects. Attention to our shared vulnerability to suffering as a means to overcome these adverse motivational effects is examined, but ultimately rejected. The final section of this chapter argues that rather than seeking to present distant others in a certain way, strategies of sentimental education ought to proceed by facilitating interactions, and, where this is not feasible, allowing individuals to take the lead in determining how they are presented. In doing so, distant others take an active role in cosmopolitan sentimental education, and are encountered as agents.

**Chapter six** examines a pressing barrier thought to face the extension of affective concern to distant others, injustice within one’s own political community (Straehle, 2016). This chapter examines the potential conflict between motivating support for justice within national borders, and support for basic global justice. I argue that at the level of motivation the two projects are interrelated in a number of complex ways, making them potentially complementary, rather than competing projects.

Drawing on the arguments advanced in the rest of the thesis, **chapter seven** develops a positive account of sentimental education suitable for motivating political action to address global poverty. Moving beyond the unidirectional models of sentimental education advocated by previous sentimental cosmopolitan accounts, this chapter developed a novel dialogic model of sentimental education, realised through processes of sensitive mediation, that aims to establish two-way ties between individuals in more affluent countries and particular individuals and groups facing poverty globally. As dialogue between individuals in more affluent countries and groups and individuals facing poverty globally faces a number of practical obstacles, dialogue operates here as a guiding ideal rather than a requirement. Finally, through the use of detailed examples this chapter demonstrates that the solution to the motivational deficit facing political duties to address global poverty advanced in this thesis is not only practically feasible, it is a reality in action.
## Contents

List of Abbreviations  

**Introduction**  

1. Defining Global Poverty  
   p.5  
2. How to Talk  
   p.7  
3. The Motivational Deficit  
   p.9  
4. Methodology  
   p.13  
5. Chapter Outline  
   p.15  

**Chapter One: Charitable and Political Accounts of Duties to Reduce Global Poverty**  

1. Political and Charitable Approaches to Global Poverty Reduction  
   p.20-28  
   1.1 Defining political and charitable approaches  
   p.20  
   1.2 Justifying a focus on a political approach  
   p.23  
   1.3 Two objections  
   p.25  
2. Defining a Political Approach  
   2.1 The content of political duties  
   p.31  
   2.2 The degree of action required by political duties  
   p.36  
3. Political Duties and Demandingness  
   3.1 Questioning the demandingness of the political approach  
   p.41  
   3.2 Four motivational advantages of political duties  
   p.43  

Conclusion  

**Chapter Two: Altering Actions: The Nudge Solution**  

1. Definitions and Distinctions  
   51-59  
   1.1 Defining nudge  
   p.51
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Three types of nudge</td>
<td>p.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Nudging charitable giving and nudging political action</td>
<td>p.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 First-category nudges</td>
<td>p.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Third Category Nudges</td>
<td>60-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Circumventing reflection</td>
<td>p.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Second Category Nudges</td>
<td>64-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Motives and outcomes</td>
<td>p.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Second-category nudges and motives</td>
<td>p.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Effectiveness</td>
<td>p.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Second category nudges and changes in attitude</td>
<td>p.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>p.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Three: Altering Attitudes: The Sentimental Cosmopolitan Solution</strong></td>
<td>80-116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>p.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Sentimental Cosmopolitan Approach</td>
<td>81-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Sentimental</td>
<td>p.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Cosmopolitan</td>
<td>p.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Sentimental education</td>
<td>p.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>p.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Conceptual Objections</td>
<td>91-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Solidarity and redistribution</td>
<td>p.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Scale/numerical concerns</td>
<td>p.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Tensions with national solidarity</td>
<td>p.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Efficaciousness</td>
<td>p.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Empirical Objections</td>
<td>101-114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Sentimental Education: Rorty and Nussbaum</td>
<td>p.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Motivational power</td>
<td>p.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 The role of representations</td>
<td>p.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Complexity</td>
<td>p.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Multiple sources of identification</td>
<td>p.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>p.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Six: National Injustice and Cosmopolitan Motivation</strong></td>
<td>170-204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>p.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Competing for Our Sentiments</td>
<td>172-185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Politically constructed solidarity</td>
<td>p.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Other factors</td>
<td>p.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 National, local, and partial</td>
<td>p.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sentimental Education and Justice within National Borders</td>
<td>186-202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Creating compassionate citizens</td>
<td>p.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Sentimental miseducation</td>
<td>p.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Sympathy and security</td>
<td>p.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>p.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Seven: Political Sentimental Education</strong></td>
<td>205-240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>p.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Political Solutions, Agency, and Abstraction</td>
<td>206-217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 The traditional model of sentimental education</td>
<td>p.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sentimental Education Reconceived: Political Sentimental Education</td>
<td>218-230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 A dialogic model</td>
<td>p.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Mediation</td>
<td>p.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political Sentimental Education in Practice</td>
<td>231-238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Journalism</td>
<td>p.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 NGO practices</td>
<td>p.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Formal education</td>
<td>p.236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Abbreviations

ASAP – Academics Stand Against Poverty.

BIT – Behavioural Insights Team.

DBIS – Department for Business Innovation and Skills (UK Government).


ITU – International Telecommunications Union.

ITUC – International Trade Union Confederation.

KKPKP – Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (Union of waste-pickers based in Pune India).

UNPD – United Nations Development Programme.

WEIGO – Women in Informal Employment Globalising and Organising
As the continuing plight of the global poor makes clear...the problem of world poverty lies not just with the identification of the injustice it entails or even the articulation of an obligation to address it, but with the transposition of that moral obligation into ethical action. (Bittner, 2001, p.24)

It is not an accident or a limitation or a prejudice that we cannot care equally about all the suffering in the world: it is a condition of our existence and our sanity. (Williams, 2006, p.147)

More than a billion people face severe poverty worldwide (UNDP, 2016). These individuals typically lack enough food for sustained survival, have no assets that can be traded or utilised to obtain food, and are entirely dependent on others for the continued existence of themselves and their children. They lack a home or even a shelter that is considered acceptable in their community, have no access to healthcare, and no ability to obtain education for themselves or their children (Cudd, 2014, pp.200-201). As a result of this dire situation estimates suggest around 50,000 people, including 25,000 children, die from poverty related causes every day (Overland, 2013, p.281). This is equivalent to one hundred average sized jumbo jets, each carrying around five hundred people, crashing every day with no survivors (Riddell, 2007, p.121).

When presented in these stark terms this situation is shocking. However, in another sense it is not. Although we may not be familiar with the exact numbers, most individuals in the more affluent communities of the world are already aware that global poverty represents one of the most pressing moral issues of our time; yet, this is an issue which is being addressed slowly, if at all (Long, 2017).

Current estimates suggest that the number of child deaths from poverty related causes has declined since this 2013 statistic (Rosa and Ortez-Ospina, 2017); however, it is unclear how much of this decline can be attributed to changes in how the relevant variables are determined. We should also note that the World Health Organization (2017) expect this figure to rise through the effects of anthropogenic climate change, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (2017) has forecast a decline in progress due to changes in the spending priorities of wealthier countries, particularly the United States.
This gap between the pressing normative urgency of addressing global poverty and a relative lack of action on the part of the globally affluent forms the subject matter of this thesis.

My argument begins from two compelling and potentially contradictory thoughts, represented in the epigraphs above. The first of which, represented by the quote from Rudiger Bittner, is that global poverty requires action on the part of ordinary citizens in the more affluent communities of the world, and that clearly stating the nature of these obligations, or offering rational arguments in support of these obligations, although important, does not represent all of the solution. Indeed, as I argue below, this does not represent the limits of what political theory can usefully say on the matter. The second thought, represented by the quote from Bernard Williams, is more complex. It includes both a broad picture of humans as not purely rational, but in part affective creatures, where the scope of our affective commitments plays a central role in our moral deliberation and motivation, and the thought that determining the nature and scope of our moral obligations to distant others requires taking these motivational capacities seriously.

Typically, responses to these two claims fall in to one of two camps. Those who emphasise the dire facts of global poverty, and the relative ability of the globally affluent to address this, tend to conclude that there is something wrong with the people, and despair at apparent indifference in the face of widespread mass suffering (Unger, 1996; Singer, 1972). In contrast, theorists with a greater degree of sympathy for the latter claim tend to conclude instead that there is something wrong with the theory, and trim and shape our obligations to distant others in order to fit our current motivations (Miller, 2010; Cullity, 2004). This thesis takes a different route, and examines how these two claims can be reconciled. The contention of this thesis is that we can take motivation seriously without sacrificing our normative ideals, as our motivational capacities are not fixed. The costs we are willing to bear for others are responsive to various situational and social factors, and our affective relationships to particular others shape our perceptions of whether acting to address their suffering constitutes a significant cost. Therefore, we may be able to significantly reduce this gap between motivation and morality without sacrificing our normative ideals.
Unlike previous work in this area that tends to focus on a charitable model\(^2\) of our obligations to address global poverty (Lichtenberg, 2014; Singer, 2010), where these obligations are understood as requiring sacrificing a certain percentage of one’s income, this thesis focuses on what I shall term a political account of these obligations. This will be understood as requiring individuals to act to support institutional strategies to address poverty globally, promoting the reform of current institutions, at both the national and international level, and supporting the creation, and maintenance, of alternative institutional arrangements.

There are four reasons for this focus on political strategies. Firstly, political strategies are likely to be necessary in order to effectively address global poverty in the long-term (Gilabert, 2012, p.147). This is not to suggest that charitable donations cannot be an effective means of alleviating the suffering engendered by poverty globally; rather, I proceed from the lesser assumption that financial donations can be part of effective strategies to reduce global poverty, but that any long term solution will require institutional change. Secondly, institutions can distribute resources effectively to where they are needed rather than leaving certain causes, or areas, over or under funded (Gilabert, 2012, p.147). Thirdly, institutions can serve to fairly distribute burdens arising from duties to act to address global poverty between the relevant parties. Fourthly, when established, institutions can reduce the motivational demands of action to address global poverty. As Graham Long notes, ‘an institutional focus removes the sense that as individuals, we are faced with a situation that we are powerless to change’ (2009, p.319). Moreover, over time institutions can serve to shape our motivations and dispositions in a more cosmopolitan direction (Axelsen, 2013).

In this thesis I examine various strategies by which this motivational deficit facing political duties to address global poverty may be addressed. First, I examine whether, through prompting unreflective changes in behaviour, so-called ‘nudges’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) may be able to achieve the desired result without altering our broader normative attitudes and affective

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\(^2\) Charitable will be understood to refer to charitable giving, rather than suggesting that these actions are supererogatory.
commitments. After rejecting this route, the argument moves on to examine how our affective connections to individuals facing poverty globally may be deepened, in order to motivate political action to address global poverty. Building on Richard Rorty’s (1998) concept of a ‘sentimental education’, and Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) account of a cosmopolitan education, the thesis develops a novel dialogical account of sentimental education, suitable for motivating political action to address poverty globally. This account builds on Carol Gould’s (2007) theoretical analysis of transnational solidarities, but goes beyond Gould’s account to examine what cultivating these affective relationships entails in practice, offering a novel answer to the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty. In reflecting on our obligations to address global poverty, and the seemingly intractable motivational problems these obligations face, the discussion also has broader appeal as these are natural things to think about at a pre-theoretical level. As the thesis progresses, it offers some practical recommendations regarding how we ought to proceed to render these motivational problems more tractable, which it is hoped can serve to guide action outside of an academic context.

It should be noted that this focus on what individuals in the more affluent communities of the world ought to do, does not preclude individuals facing global poverty acting to address this issue. Indeed, the account offered here explicitly serves to recognise individuals facing poverty globally as capable agents, rather than as passive victims in need of our help. However, as Judith Lichtenberg notes, ‘insofar as I am not you or he or she and we are not they, it is appropriate for me and for us to ask, what, if anything, I and we should do’ (2014, p.13).

In what remains of this introduction I will address the four following areas in order to lay the groundwork for the argument that follows. First, I set out how the target of the thesis, global poverty, will be understood, settling on a working definition of severe poverty as a lack of fulfilment of basic socioeconomic rights. Second, I clarify the terminology I will use to refer to the two central parties who feature in the discussion, individuals facing poverty globally, and individuals in more
affluent countries – whose duties to address this poverty form the subject matter of the thesis. In the third section, I examine the nature of the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty in some detail, and defend a pragmatic approach to three substantive debates: (i) the nature of emotions, (ii) motivational internalism and externalism, and reasons internalism, and (iii) the role of normative argument in motivating action. In the fourth section I move on to explicate and defend the novel methodology that I employ in the thesis, setting out the role empirical evidence will play in the argument to follow. The introduction concludes with a brief chapter outline, in which I lay out the subject matter to be addressed, and summarise the argument of the thesis in some detail.

1. Defining Global Poverty

How global poverty is best defined is a complex question, and could constitute sufficient material for a thesis in itself; however, there is some consensus that global poverty is best understood as a lack of the conditions necessary for a minimally decent life, rather than simply the conditions necessary for the biological survival of the human organism. This is reflected in the United Nations Multidimensional Poverty Index (2016), and in even the more minimal accounts offered within political theory (Miller, 2012) – which include lack of access to education and other basic goods. In the thesis I will employ the following working definition from Pablo Gilabert, where severe poverty is understood as a lack of fulfilment of basic socioeconomic rights.

Basic socioeconomic rights include access to food, clothing, housing, basic medical care, and basic education... [These] are associated with extremely important human interests whose satisfaction, or real opportunity for satisfaction, are conditions for living a minimally decent life. (Gilabert, 2012, p.113).

In employing this working definition the language of basic rights functions as a shorthand, rather than offering a specific vision. I leave open the question of whether a substantive account
understood in terms of rights, interests, or capabilities, is preferable, in order to speak to as broad a constituency as possible. However, what these accounts all share is the conviction that poverty cannot be simply understood financially, as functionings will vary with equal resources, due to a variety of factors. Following Gilabert (2012), I employ the shorthand ‘basic global justice’ to refer to the fulfilment of these basic socioeconomic rights. Here, the term ‘basic’ is intended to signify that this is not an attempt to offer a comprehensive sufficientarian account of global justice, and that were this basic account fulfilled, this would not exhaust the content of our duties.

My argument begins from noting a broad consensus within the theoretical literature that severe poverty, thus understood, is a bad state of affairs, which requires urgent attention, and that those with the ability to act to address this issue ought to do so (Miller, 2012; Gilabert, 2012; Shue, 1996). At an intuitive level this claim has also wide assent, and operates as a relatively fixed point in our moral outlooks. As Lichtenberg notes, ‘you don’t need industrial strength ethical theory to know that it would be better if billions of people didn’t live in dire poverty’ (Lichtenberg, 2014, p.109). Rather than offering an argument for this claim I will assume it is correct, and instead address the much neglected motivational question.

The claim that those with the ability to do so ought to act to address global poverty might be thought to directly follow from this first claim; however, for a variety of reasons, this has not always been thought the case. Broadly speaking, there are two strategies by which this second claim has been resisted. For libertarian thinkers, who deny the existence of positive duties, a causal relationship, demonstrating that those with the means to act are responsible for the suffering in question, must be established in order for this second claim to hold (Nozick, 1974). This thesis does not aim to address libertarians directly; however, insofar as Pogge’s arguments, which attempt to

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3 Most notably, due to differences between individuals, such as disability or old age. However, differences between cultures also have an effect here. As Gilbert notes, ‘what people need so as to secure self-respect, and to “appear in public without shame” varies in different cultural environments’ (2012, p.666).

4 This is not to downplay the fact that this is an intuition which may not have been widely shared at previous points in human history. Nevertheless, we have to start from somewhere.
establish a duty on the part of the affluent to address global poverty from libertarian premises, are successful my argument will have relevance for libertarians (Pogge, 2002, p.13).

Secondly, thinkers concerned by the potential demandingness of duties to address global poverty have resisted this second step, after a certain point (Miller, 2010; Cullity, 2004). These theorists have argued that, due to a legitimate interest in pursuing our own lives, strict duties to address global poverty are fairly minimal, after which further action may be praiseworthy but is ultimately supererogatory. In focusing on the topic of motivation I take these demandingness concerns seriously, however, it is important to note two things. Firstly, even these more minimal duties appear to face a motivational deficit, as I take it that most of us fail to live up to even these standards; therefore, the arguments of the thesis have relevance for these accounts. Secondly, the thesis argues that demandingness is plausibly much more elastic than these accounts suggests, as our motivational capacities are not fixed; as such, it is a mistake to draw a sharp distinction between the obligatory and the supererogatory on the basis of demandingness.

2. How to Talk

Discussing the obligations of individuals in the more affluent communities of the world to assist individuals facing poverty globally is further complicated by a legacy of colonial exploitation between many of the more affluent countries and countries where severe poverty is prevalent. This is a history that plays a significant role in current global distributions of wealth (Pogge, 2002). More recently, this has been compounded by exploitative trade practices, and attempts by former colonial powers to address global poverty, which in many cases have been rightly regarded as forms of neo-imperialism (Hayter, 1971). This situation leaves us with a lack of neutral terminology, and a healthy suspicion regarding many of the substantive assumptions with which discussions of global poverty in normative political theory, with its tendency toward ahistoricism, begin (Williams, 2015, pp.405-
412). To prevent misunderstandings, I offer the following brief clarificatory remarks concerning the terminology I employ.

At points within the thesis I use the terms “global poor” and “distant others” to refer to individuals facing poverty globally. I do so as these terms serve as a useful shorthand, and are standard within the literature, however, I acknowledge that they are far from perfect. Where possible, I refer to ‘individuals facing poverty globally’, but this slightly unwieldy phrase is not grammatically appropriate in all cases. Similarly, as is standard in the literature, I use the “globally affluent”, or the “comfortable” to refer to those on whom duties to address global poverty fall. There are two substantive issues that the use of these terms can mask, which require addressing explicitly.

Firstly, as Kirk notes, the “global poor” is often used as a shorthand for ‘Africa, where nothing ever changes’ (2012, p.248). It is important to emphasise that Africa is a continent that contains huge disparities in wealth, and that these occur even within areas of Africa where severe poverty is prevalent. None of this should be taken to deny that many of the world’s poorest people do live in Sub-Saharan Africa; however, the facts that there ‘are more people living below the UN poverty line of $1 a day in India than in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa’\(^5\) (TUC, 2006), and that ‘most of the world’s poor live in Asia rather than Africa’ (UNDP, 2016, p.218) are often obscured.

Secondly, terms such as the ‘global poor’ can serve to present individuals facing poverty as a homogenous mass, obscuring their individuality and capacity for agency. As I argue in the thesis, this can increase perceptions of distance between individuals in the richer communities of the world – for whom these traits feature heavily in their self-understandings – and those facing global poverty, rendering the motivational problems addressing global poverty faces more intractable. Accordingly, the idea of an affective connection to a single (fictional) entity termed “the global poor”, is itself a fiction. Moreover, discussions of individuals facing global poverty as a single entity can obscure

\(^5\) This figure refers to the common international poverty line employed in 2006 (See Sachs, 2005, p.20). The World Bank and the UN currently employ a revised figure of $1.90 in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). Here, PPP refers to the international equivalent of what $1.90 could buy in the US in 2011 (UN, 2016).
significant differences in the situations faced by individuals affected by different instantiations of global poverty, and accordingly, effective solutions. The concern here is that global poverty consists in severe deprivations regarding a variety of distinct, though related, phenomena, and that the situations of individuals facing severe poverty (by any reasonable definition), may look rather different in practice.

3. The Motivational Deficit

The thesis proceeds on the assumption that affect is central to moral motivation; this is a claim that is widely supported in the empirical literature on moral motivation (Prinz, 2006; Nichols, 2002; Green et al., 2001; Izard and Ackerman, 2000). As a wide ranging meta-study on the topic notes, a weight of evidence suggests that ‘not only are emotions engaged during moral cognition, but that emotions…are in fact critical for human morality’ (Young and Koenigs, 2007, p.69). In this section I will clarify a number of terminological issues and substantive debates, concerning the role of affect in moral motivation, as this appears in the thesis.

I employ the terms ‘affect’, ‘emotion’, and ‘sentiment’ interchangeably, unless otherwise stated. When discussing an affective relationship of care towards certain others, I will follow Woods (2012), and use the phrase ‘affective concern’. This will be taken to be broadly synonymous with Nussbaum’s use of the term ‘compassion’ (2001), and Batson’s use of the term ‘empathy’ (1991). Following Batson’s terminology, empathy will be used to refer to ‘feeling for’ certain others, rather than ‘feeling with’ these others, unless otherwise stated.

As the argument proceeds the concept of ‘solidarity’ will be discussed in detail, particularly in the final chapter; this term has been, and continues to be, employed in a variety of ways, referring to quite different phenomena (see Taylor, 2014). I make no attempt to adjudicate between these

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6 I am aware that ‘care’ has a specific meaning within the literature on care ethics. However, here I use the term to refer to some degree of affective involvement in the situation of others, such that their suffering causes some level of concern.
various uses of the term. However, unless otherwise stated, in this thesis ‘solidarity’ refers to a specific affective relationship that is different in kind from compassion, empathy, or sympathy, and is bound up with political action, and includes an assumption of basic equality between all parties in the relationship. As Carol Gould (2007, p.154) argues, at the heart of this assumption of equality lies an implicit reciprocity condition, or an assumption of mutual aid. However, in the case of solidarity with individuals facing severe poverty, this reciprocity condition may not always be feasible in practice. Nevertheless, as I argue in the final chapter, a relationship of solidarity assumes the agency of all parties within a solidaristic relationship – in a way that a relationship of empathy or compassion need not.

The first substantive debate that needs to be addressed concerns the nature of emotions, as, in discussing the emotions, it is necessary for me to offer some clarity regarding what I take emotions to be. There is a significant philosophical literature on this topic, which I cannot do justice to in this context; however, my interest in the role of the emotions in the thesis is primarily a pragmatic one. Therefore, following Long (2009), I avoid these debates where possible, and focus on consensus, so as to speak to as broad a constituency as possible and as engaging in these debates would take me far from the central argument of the thesis.7 In a review of the current literature on the emotions within moral psychology, Tiberius (2015) observes the following points of agreement.

> [W]hatever emotions are, they are not (or not all) blind urges that tell us nothing about the world. Furthermore, the fact that emotions are directed at something in the world means that they can be evaluated for their appropriateness, correctness or fittingness. (2015, p.74)

Alongside these two claims I make the further assumption that emotions can be educated, both through processes of habituation (Kristjansson, 2014a) and the influence of critical reason (Woods, 2012). This follows from the first of Tiberius’ two claims, as insofar as emotions are not blind urges,
and contain rational elements, they may be responsive to educative processes. As Nussbaum suggests in the case of compassion, ‘since compassion contains thought it can be educated’ (2001a).

The second substantive issue that requires discussion is the distinction between internalism and externalism, concerning both judgements and reasons. As my concern with motivation is primarily a practical one, I hope to avoid these meta-ethical debates where possible – which concern the conditions in which it is appropriate to refer to someone as having made a moral judgement, or as having a reason (Tiberius, 2015, p.51). This pragmatic focus should not be taken to play down the philosophical significance of these debates. As this thesis is concerned with motivating action, I am primarily interested in motivating reasons, or what Williams (1981) terms internal reasons – that is to say reasons that can latch onto something already present in an agent’s motivational set, and, in the right conditions, inspire action. However, this focus does not rule out the existence of non-motivating, or external reasons. As Graham Long argues, ‘regardless of our theoretical commitments, there are strong pragmatic reasons to engage with the content of agents’ evaluative frameworks, though depending on the theory of justification invoked, the role of these reasons might be described rather differently’ (2009; p.323). Regarding the debate over motivational internalism or externalism, the thesis makes the general claim that increased affective concern for certain others will, all other things being equal, increase the likelihood of an agent acting to aid these others. I take it that this is a view that can be accepted by competing positions within this debate, as it does not assume that the connection between caring and acting always holds, nor does it make the claim that rational conviction can never motivate action.

Although the thesis approaches the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty as primarily a matter of affect, this should not be confused with either the stronger claim that the motivational deficit is purely a matter of affect or the claim that motivation constitutes the only feasibility constraint facing attempts to address global poverty. In response to the first claim it should be noted that a number of theorists (Lichtenberg, 2014; Ulas, 2013, pp.156-187) have argued

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8 No pagination.
that individuals in more affluent countries have self-interested reasons to act to address global poverty;⁹ for example, the existence of severe poverty is thought to contribute to global instability, and to increase the likelihood of global outbreaks of disease (Lichtenberg, 2014). Nothing in my argument denies that self-interested motivations have a role to play in motivating action to reduce global poverty. However, I assume that such self-interested motivations do not get us far enough, as there are typically other ways to address these prudential problems, which do not take the welfare of individuals facing global poverty into account, such as stricter border controls, or immunisation programmes within wealthier countries. For the affluent there is always the option to pull up the drawbridges. Put our fingers in our ears. Look the other way.¹⁰

Regarding the second claim, the concerns of the thesis are necessarily narrower than the burgeoning literature on the topic of political feasibility (Lawford-Smith, 2013; Raikka, 1998), which identifies a number of different feasibility constraints that the implementation of political projects face, such as coordination problems, a lack of the necessary institutions, or the appropriate technology. However, as the argument of the thesis develops, it should become clear that these feasibility constraints cannot be fully disentangled from the topic of motivation. Institutions in particular, can serve to limit or expand the scope of our affective attachments, address concerns that our individual actions to address injustices on a global scale are futile, and reduce the demandingness of our duties. However, the continued existence of the appropriate institutions ultimately relies on sufficient levels of popular support. As Graham Long notes, institutions ‘cannot be all of the solution, because we need in turn to motivate support for these institutions. In this regard, the doubts are merely moved back a stage’ (2009, p.326).

Finally, it is important to clarify that although the thesis takes affective connections to distant others to be centrally involved in motivating action to address global poverty, this should not

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⁹ Self-interest is understood here as referring to our current prudential concerns, rather than to an enlightened self-interest that collapses the distinction between moral and prudential reasons for acting; for example, the argument that acting morally is ultimately in our own best interests.
¹⁰ Moreover, both of these prudential worries potentially allow for a Malthusian solution.
be taken to imply that arguments have no useful role to play in motivating action to address global poverty (Rorty, 1998, p.125). Exposure to cosmopolitan arguments can bridge part of the motivational gap facing duties to address global poverty. The relationship suggested here between affective concern for individuals facing poverty and moral arguments to this effect is a circular one; where affective concern allows for the motivational force of arguments to gain purchase, which in turn can deepen levels of motivation to address global poverty. However, for this relationship to operate there needs to be at least a minimum level of affective concern present for the subject of the argument. As Woods argues, ‘moral argument has no purchase if it cannot latch on to something that is present in the agent’s motivational set.’ (2012, p.36). Here, affective concern can do important work at both a motivational and a justificatory level. At a justificatory level, increased affective concern for the global poor serves to increase the extent to which justificatory arguments are convincing. At a motivational level, increased affective concern can motivate action where individuals rationally assent to arguments that they ought to act to address global poverty yet fail to do so.

4. Methodology

This is a work of analytic normative political theory, situated in the liberal tradition in its basic ontological and epistemological assumptions; however, in its concern with the motivational deficit facing political duties to address global poverty this thesis constitutes a work of non-ideal theory. This distinction, originally deriving from the work of John Rawls (1971, p.216), has developed into a recognised area of political theory in its own right that is concerned with how we move towards justice from our current unjust state (Rawls, 1999, p.90). It is important to note that the exact nature

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11 Ultimately, justification and motivation cannot be fully separated, as Long (2009) argues, justificatory arguments constitute attempts to motivate at some level.

12 As noted above, rationalist motivational internalists would be unlikely to take this declaration of assent seriously.
of the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory has been the subject of significant debate (Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012; Valentini, 2012). However, I concur with Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012) in taking the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory to be most helpful when understood as a spectrum, rather than as a strict binary; with work towards the non-ideal end of the spectrum concerned to a greater extent with empirical realities, specifying incremental improvements, and problems raised by non-compliance.\footnote{Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012, pp. 48-49) identify four points of divergence between the two approaches: (i) An assumption of full compliance in ideal theory and non-full compliance in non-deal theory. (ii) A distinction between idealisation (understood as making false assumptions) and abstraction (understood as legitimate simplifications), where ideal theory used in a pejorative manner to refer to the former case. (iii) Ideal theory as fact-insensitive, and non-ideal theory as fact sensitive. (iv) Ideal theory as concerned with perfect justice, and non-ideal theory as concerned with more modest improvements in justice. In each case Hamlin and Stemplowska argue that the ideal/non-ideal distinction is best understood as a spectrum, rather than as a strict binary.} Following Carens (2013) and Valentini (2012) I take the appropriate level of engagement with these issues, especially the relevant level of fact-sensitivity, to be determined by the question a text seeks to address.\footnote{It is questionable whether any political theory can avoid attention to empirical matters entirely. For further discussion of this view see Miller (2013).} Therefore, as this thesis examines the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty, I engage with empirical research on moral motivation where necessary. As this attention to empirical research may not be thought typical for a work of political theory I will offer some brief remarks regarding how, and why, I do so.

I do not employ empirical research concerning human motivational capacities to place a limit on the scope of our normative ideals. Indeed one of the central claims of the thesis is that these motivational capacities are not fixed, and are instead subject to influence by situational and social factors. Rather, I employ empirical research to lend weight to, or to question the credibility of, different theoretical claims concerning how the gap between our current unjust state and our normative ideals may be bridged. In these circumstances empirical research concerning human motivational capacities is necessary in determining, not only which courses of action are feasible, but also, which courses of action are desirable. This is because the costs of realising a given political
programme, such as whether their implementation necessitates the use of coercive or manipulative techniques, need to be factored into ‘all things considered’ judgements of desirability (Raikka, 1998).

As McTernan notes, here ‘empirical research has a role to play within political philosophy, and a role that does not involve merely paying lip-service to the possibility that empirical research could be relevant, but instead active engagement with that empirical research’ (McTernan, 2014, p.104). Therefore, the questions the thesis addresses are not amenable to a strict disciplinary division of labour, between political theory determining what ought to be done, and the social sciences determining how we ought to put these ideals into practice, as they necessarily span this divide. In these circumstances, as David Miller rightly observes, ‘political philosophers...must be prepared to learn from social scientists’ (2014, p.37); however, importantly they must also be political philosophers, and bring their stock-in-trade of normative reasoning and analysis to bear on the conclusions of this research. Therefore, the argument of the thesis is necessarily conditional – if the broad empirical picture that I offer is correct – then these conclusions follow. Due to the subject matter it could not be otherwise. These are normative questions that cannot be answered without attention to empirical research; however, neither can they be answered by the employment of empirical methods, or attention to empirical research alone.

5. Chapter Outline

The argument begins by drawing a distinction between charitable and political accounts of duties to address global poverty falling on the affluent. Chapter one defends a focus on a political account of these duties as necessary to achieve long-term solutions to address global poverty, and argues that there are independent normative reasons to favour this approach. The chapter then examines the content of political duties, and outlines the motivational deficit these duties face. It then moves on to rebut the claim that a political model of duties to address global poverty is prima facie more demanding than a charitable account – focused on financial donations to aid organisations.
Chapter two examines the nudge solution (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) to the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty. This strategy, deriving from behavioural economics, argues that, rather than seeking to alter attitudes, motivational failures can be addressed through prompting unreflective changes in behaviour. The chapter rejects the nudge approach, and argues that, in order to motivate sustained political action to address global poverty, a change in attitudes is required.

Having rejected the nudge approach, chapter three moves on to examine the suggestion that, through a process of ‘sentimental education’, we can cultivate greater affective attachments to distant others (Nussbaum, 2001; Rorty, 1998). The chapter argues that a moderate version of this approach offers a prima facie promising means by which to motivate political action to address global poverty. In doing so, the chapter examines, and rejects, conceptual objections to the idea of cosmopolitan sentiments. I then move on to examine the social psychology literature on the role of empathy in motivating prosocial action (Batson, 1991), arguing that this offers reasons to be optimistic regarding the broad sentimental cosmopolitan approach. However, I argue that motivating long-term compliance with political duties to address global poverty requires moving beyond the models of sentimental education offered by Rorty (1998) and Nussbaum (2001).

In order to begin developing a positive account of sentimental education, appropriate for motivating compliance with political duties to address global poverty, chapter four argues that the sentimental cosmopolitan project ought to be broadened, moving from an exclusive focus on cosmopolitan empathy to include the cultivation of a number of cosmopolitan emotions, especially anger and shame. I argue that, through their ability to accommodate responsibility for injustice, anger and shame are especially well-suited to motivating political action to address global poverty. Moreover, not only can anger and shame offer additional motivational resources, these emotions are also a normatively appropriate response to the injustice of global poverty.

Hereafter referred to via the shorthand of a ‘political sentimental education’.15
Chapter five examines in detail the mechanisms through which strategies of sentimental education function to increase affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally. In this chapter I reject portrayals of individuals facing poverty globally which serve to emphasise their suffering and vulnerability in order to increase affective concern – prevalent in both the fundraising material employed by many International Humanitarian NGOs and the accounts of sentimental education offered by Nussbaum and Rorty. As these strategies serve to portray individuals facing poverty globally in a manner that obscures their capacity for agency, they offer an ineffective means by which to motivate political action to address global poverty. An emphasis on shared vulnerability as a strategy by which to overcome the adverse motivational effects of a focus on suffering is examined, and ultimately rejected. The final section of the chapter argues that, rather than seeking to present distant others in a certain way, strategies of sentimental education ought to proceed by allowing these individuals to take the lead. In doing so, distant others take an active role in cosmopolitan sentimental education, and are encountered as agents.

Chapter six takes a detour from the positive argument in order to examine a pressing barrier thought to face the extension of affective concern to distant others – injustice within one’s own political community (Straehle, 2016). This chapter examines the potential conflict between motivating support for justice within national borders, and support for basic global justice. It is argued that at the level of motivation the two projects are interrelated in a number of complex ways, making them potentially complementary, rather than competing, projects. In particular, it is argued that if strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education are to be effective, the culture within a society – as reflected in both institutions and personal behaviour – must be conducive to developing and sustaining empathetic or compassionate dispositions.

Drawing on the arguments advanced in the rest of the thesis, chapter seven develops a positive account of sentimental cosmopolitanism, suitable for motivating political action to address global poverty, which explicitly recognises individuals facing global poverty as capable agents. Moving beyond the unidirectional accounts of sentimental education advocated by sentimental
cosmopolitan thinkers, such as Martha Nussbaum, this chapter develops a dialogic model of sentimental education, realised through processes of sensitive mediation, which aims to establish two-way ties between individuals in more affluent countries and particular individuals and groups facing poverty globally. As dialogue between individuals in more affluent countries and groups and individuals facing poverty globally faces a number of practical obstacles, dialogue operates here as an ideal rather than a requirement. It is argued that the use of materials authored by individuals facing poverty globally, as a means to encourage the development of affective ties, can function as a form of second order inclusion where dialogue is not presently feasible. Finally, through the use of detailed examples, this chapter demonstrates that the solution to the motivational deficit facing political duties to address global poverty advanced in this thesis is not only practically feasible, it is a reality in action.

The argument of this thesis shows that we can reconcile a picture of humans as affective partial creatures with a significantly greater level of action to address global poverty than that which currently exists. We need reject neither Williams’ sublunary picture of humanity nor Bittner’s call to action. We can have both.
Chapter One: Charitable and Political Accounts of Duties to Reduce Global Poverty

Introduction

There is some consensus that individuals in more affluent countries are under an obligation to act to address global poverty. A significant body of literature examines the sources of these duties (Pogge, 2002; Singer, 1972); however, there has been much less discussion of exactly what actions these duties entail at the level of the individual. In this chapter I aim to provide some clarity on this topic. In order to do so, I draw a broad distinction between charitable and political accounts of duties to reduce global poverty, and explicate and defend a political approach. I argue that political action is necessary in order to effectively address global poverty in the long-term, and that there are independent normative reasons to favour political action.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one draws a distinction between political and charitable accounts of duties to reduce global poverty, and argues that this distinction is both useful and sustainable. The section then turns to justifying the thesis’ focus on a political account of these duties. Section two examines what political duties to reduce global poverty require of individuals in more affluent countries, aiming to specify both the content and the extent of the action these duties entail. I argue that attempts to offer a high level of specificity concerning the scope and content of political duties offers a misleading picture, and defend an agent specific account of these duties. This section also address demandingness concerns, arguing that demandingness will place a limit on the degree of action these duties entail, however this limit is not fixed. Section three addresses the claim that political duties are particularly demanding of individual agents, requiring significant commitments of intellect, time, and resources. Here, I argue that (i)
pursuing effective charitable and political action to address global poverty may be equally demanding, and (ii) offer four tentative mechanisms through which the very features of political action widely cited as sources of demandingness can offer additional motivational resources to duty bearers.

1. Political and Charitable Approaches to Global Poverty Reduction

This section draws a distinction between charitable and political accounts of duties to address global poverty, arguing that, although a strict separation is implausible, this distinction is both useful and sustainable. The discussion then turns to justifying the focus on a political account of these duties in the thesis. I argue that (i) political strategies are likely to be necessary in order to achieve long-term solutions to global poverty, and (ii) there are independent normative reasons to pursue a political strategy.

1.1. Defining Political and Charitable Approaches

There is some consensus within liberal political theory that individuals in the richer communities of the world ought to act to address global poverty. A significant literature exists on the source of these obligations, however much less attention has been paid to exactly what actions these obligations entail. Within this literature there are two broad approaches. The first approach, as exemplified by Peter Singer, is that the relatively affluent ought to divert a sizable portion of their income to the more effective aid organisations. Singer offers a number of examples of such organisations, but in particular he focuses on those addressing infectious diseases and delivering supplies in the aftermath of humanitarian crises (Singer, 2010, pp.81-105). The second approach, associated with the work of Thomas Pogge, argues that the globally affluent ought to pressure their own governments to support the reform of global institutions that act to systematically disadvantage less
affluent nations (Pogge, 2002). In keeping with the current literature (Kuper, 2002; Langlois 2008) I will refer to these two approaches as charitable and political accounts of duties to reduce global poverty; however, I use this terminology with the following two qualifications. Firstly, to avoid potential misunderstandings, the use of the term “charitable” in no way implies that proponents of the former approach take donations towards aid organisations to be supererogatory. Secondly, although I use the term “duty” this should not be taken to imply that what is required of agents in this context can be specified with a high degree of precision;¹⁶ this is a point to which I return in section two.

In drawing a distinction between political and charitable accounts of duties to reduce global poverty previous discussions have highlighted the following two features: (i) charitable accounts tend to emphasise financial donations in contrast to political activism, and (ii) political accounts typically focus on long term solutions to chronic poverty, whereas charitable accounts primarily focus on alleviating immediate need (Singer, 1972). I take these two distinctions to capture important differences between charitable and political accounts, but it is important to note that this is a question of emphasis rather than a strict binary. In the first instance, financial donations may serve to support organisations agitating for political reform, and political activism can be intended to achieve financial transfers – such as an increase in the percentage of government spending devoted to aid. However, government aid spending does not only differ in magnitude from individual donations. Government aid will typically represent a more stable source of revenue than individual donations, and, as such, may be better suited to longer term poverty reduction strategies.

Conversely, political activism can sometimes proceed by drawing attention to humanitarian crises in order to increase levels of individual donation, although this is not typical.

In the second instance, political activism may aim to achieve temporary changes, such as one-off transaction taxes, and charitable donations directed toward development assistance can be

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¹⁶ It might be thought that reference to imperfect duties could solve this problem, however this would suggest a greater degree of discretion over how these duties are discharged than I intend. See section two for a fuller discussion.
intended to have long-term effects. As Jennifer Rubenstein (2007) has noted, the important insight here is that chronic poverty and humanitarian crises are linked. Development assistance, or institutional changes, intended to reduce chronic poverty will typically reduce instances of humanitarian crisis, or render them less severe. Similarly, although less frequently, aid intended to address short term suffering may facilitate political change. As Judith Lichtenberg argues, ‘there is historical support for the view that people are more likely to rise up against unjust institutions when their prospects have improved’ (2014, p.204). Much attention has rightly been paid to the political relationship inherent in aid, reflecting a power differential between giver and receiver; however, immediate reductions in absolute levels of need can also have positive political effects, for example increasing the relative bargaining power of recipients of aid when dealing with their own governments or other parties.

Despite these complexities, we can draw a broad distinction between attempts to offer long-term solutions to chronic poverty through structural change, and short-term strategies in response to humanitarian crises – where the aim is to save lives that are in immediate danger. This former strategy is primarily pursued through political activism, broadly understood to include all manner of activities intended to put pressure on national governments and international institutions. Similarly, attempts to mitigate the suffering caused by humanitarian crises are typically pursued through financial donations to aid organisations. Whilst acknowledging the complexities just raised, I take it that it is still plausible to see the former strategy as addressing the causes of global poverty – where individuals are rendered particularly vulnerable due to radically unequal distributions of power and resources, and the latter as addressing the symptoms – where this increased vulnerability to a variety of harms leads to a lack of food, water, or other necessities, or to outbreaks of infectious disease. There is also necessarily a collective element to political approaches to reducing global poverty, which is less pronounced on a charitable approach. As Jennifer Rubenstein observes, this is reflected in the ethos surrounding charitable giving, with charitable approaches tending to frame duties to reduce global poverty through the lens of individualism, and to suggest that ‘doing good is
largely an individualistic project’ (Rubenstein, 2016, p.519). Moreover, at a practical level although sufficiently large individual donations to aid organisations may potentially have positive effects for a given recipient, political pressure, whether exerted through formal democratic processes or protest, requires action on the part of larger numbers of people in order to be effective.

1.2. Justifying a Focus on a Political Approach

In this thesis I focus on a political approach to duties to reduce global poverty and examine how individuals in the more affluent communities of the world might be encouraged to live up to these duties. In doing so, it is important to note the following two caveats. Firstly, although I am concerned with the political duties that fall on individuals to act politically to address global poverty rather than with the duties of the state, this should not be taken to deny the importance of the latter. Rather, I focus on duties falling on individuals as this is how the decision problem confronts us, at an individual level, and insofar as action to address global poverty faces a motivational barrier, rather than coordination problems or a lack of social technology, this exists at the individual level. Secondly, charitable and political approaches to reducing global poverty need not be mutually exclusive. Insofar as charitable approaches typically aim to address immediate need, whereas political approaches aim to seek long term solutions to chronic poverty, the two approaches may be complimentary. As the most complete analysis to date of the role of motivation in understanding our duties to reduce international poverty focuses on a charitable account of these duties (Lichtenberg, 2014) my focus on political duties is justified as this route is currently underexplored. However, I will now offer three further reasons in favour of my focus on a political approach, before moving on to forestall two potential objections to this route.

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17 As I argue below, individuals may often find that the most effective way to pursue political change to address global poverty is through the state, but in other cases it may be through NGOs.
My first reason for favouring a political approach is that institutional change is likely to be required in order to provide effective long term solutions to global poverty. Offering emergency aid where humanitarian crises occur will fail to address the underlying causes of these crises. I take these underlying causes to include both international institutions and practices that systematically disadvantage poorer countries (Pogge, 2002) and poor governance at a local level (Risse, 2005). As Pogge argues, these two factors are related, as aspects of the international order provide incentives for poor governance at a local level. For example, Pogge cites the resource and borrowing privileges, where groups who assume power by force are legally entitled to control a country’s assets and incur debt in the country’s name, as increasing instability by incentivising coups (2002, pp. 169-172). I take Pogge’s broad point to be correct, however, in focusing almost exclusively on the responsibility of individuals in affluent countries, this account risks infantilising elites in poorer countries – who themselves bear a significant share of blame for poor governance (Risse, 2005). The claim that institutional solutions can facilitate long term change in a way that emergency aid cannot is one that I take to be fairly uncontroversial, and as chronic poverty increases both the instance and severity of humanitarian emergencies, institutional change can address not only chronic poverty but also future humanitarian emergency. Controversy only arises where resources that could be used to alleviate immediate need are directed towards long term solutions, a concern I address below.

A second justification for a focus on a political approach to reducing global poverty is that a political problem exists that cannot be addressed through charitable donations. As Pogge has plausibly argued, much global poverty can be attributed to unfair international institutions and trade rules that systematically disadvantage poorer countries (2002, 169-172). Therefore although charitable donations may alleviate the suffering resulting from global poverty they will do nothing to address the structural factors that are often responsible. This poses a separate concern to worries over long-term effectiveness raised above, as charitable donations will leave these institutional structures intact; this is normatively problematic for the following two reasons. Firstly, inequalities in power deriving from international institutions that systematically disadvantage the poor unfairly
limit the level of control the less affluent have over their own lives, even if the worst effects of poverty are mitigated through charitable donations. Secondly, where more affluent individuals benefit from an unjust international system charitable solutions do not directly address this complicity. Although, compensatory donations to those worst affected may go some way towards this, fully addressing responsibility for global poverty will typically require political change.

Finally, increasing levels of cosmopolitan solidarity, a primary focus of this thesis, is necessarily a long-term project. As in the case of national solidarity, the sources of cosmopolitan solidarity likely lie deep within individuals’ self-conceptions and sense of identity. These factors plausibly take a long time to shift, and may be particularly entrenched during an individual’s early life and formal education (Nussbaum, 2001). The long-term nature of this project lends itself to political strategies, which themselves aim to achieve results over a longer time period. Furthermore, there is plausibly a particular link between political institutions and solidarity, with institutions shaping individuals’ self-conceptions, and accordingly the ease with which they affectively identify with particular others. As will be explored later in the thesis, global institutions that reduce global poverty can be seen as both the product of a deepening cosmopolitan solidarity and as functioning to deepen cosmopolitan identities.

1.3. Two Objections

A focus on motivating political action to reduce global poverty, rather than charitable donations aimed to alleviate immediate need, faces two potentially serious objections. Firstly, it may be objected that time and resources devoted to long-term structural change could be better used to save lives in the present (Valentini, 2011). This potentially poses a special problem for an account that foregrounds the role of sentiment in motivating individuals to act to address global poverty as present suffering is likely to provoke strong affective reactions. Secondly, outsiders may be thought poorly placed to act to achieve political resolutions to global poverty, a task better left to individuals
in less affluent countries with a greater knowledge of local conditions, and should instead focus their energies on the less complex task of alleviating immediate need through charitable donations (Rubenstein, 2016, p.519).

The first objection is a concern for any strategy that advocates pursuing effective long-term change over action to alleviate present need. As noted above, these two projects can often be pursued in tandem and be mutually reinforcing, with long-term strategies reducing instances of humanitarian emergency, and emergency aid creating facilitating political change; however, due to limited resources there will necessarily be hard choices in some cases. These choices necessarily cut across the charitable/political distinction as the benefits of some of the most effective projects towards which charitable donations can contribute, such as immunisation programmes, will not be immediate. For advocates of charitable approaches to reducing global poverty, such as Peter Singer and members of the Effective Altruism movement, such as William MacAskill, this conclusion presents little problem due to the utilitarian assumptions that underlie their accounts (MacAskill, 2016; Singer, 2010, pp.3-23). For these thinkers, whether we ought to prioritise immediate need or long-term strategies will be determined by the effectiveness of the intervention in question. The complexity of making such calculations in practice should not be understated, and faces both epistemic concerns over our ability to determine the effectiveness of interventions as the timescale increases and the relative normative priority of addressing present and future suffering. I will assume long-term effectiveness gives us a reason to prioritise institutional solutions (in at least some cases), but I want to examine whether this poses a special problem for sentimental cosmopolitan accounts, which focus on the role of sentiment in motivating action, as these look less amenable to making such utilitarian judgments.

The concern here is that insofar as global poverty exerts an effect on our sentiments, it does so because people are suffering now. Where images of famine are broadcast in news media, or NGOs employ images of the suffering engendered by global poverty, the sentimental pull of these
images and any corresponding sense of urgency derive from present suffering. Moving from our affective reactions to global poverty in the present to support for political action seeking to provide long-term solutions faces two concerns. Firstly, there is a motivational concern that the effectiveness of sentiment in motivating action is compromised by mediation between our emotional reactions to present suffering and long-term solutions. Secondly, there is a broader concern that insofar as our emotions are thought to tell us something about our moral obligations this strategy ignores this insight, and in doing so undermines a focus on sentiment in the first place.

In response to the motivational concern it can be replied that theorists who foreground the role of sentiment in motivating action to address global injustices are still concerned with motivating effective action (Woods, 2012; Nussbaum, 2001). Accordingly, our unreconstructed emotional reactions need to be directed towards effective solutions, and if they lose some of their strength and immediacy in the process then this is a necessary trade-off. Contemporary research in neuroscience and moral psychology suggests that emotions play a central role in moral motivation (Jeffery, 2014, pp. 157-193; Krause, 2008, p.8). Therefore, if we accept that political approaches to reducing global poverty are particularly effective, then motivating these strategies still requires cultivating the appropriate emotional reactions, regardless of whether it is easier to utilise emotions to motivate less effective strategies.

The second concern, that our emotions have an epistemic role in revealing the content of our moral obligations – that is ignored when we attempt to achieve long-term solutions to global poverty rather than addressing immediate need, misunderstands the role emotions are intended to play in the sentimental cosmopolitan project. Sentimental cosmopolitans aim to achieve greater sentimental identification with individuals beyond national borders in order to motivate action to address global injustices (Long, 2009), and because this process is held to have intrinsic normative value (Nussbaum, 2001). The broad intent here is to bring our emotions closer in line with our ideals rather than for our unreconstructed emotional reactions to dictate the content of our duties – a

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18 The use of such images faces a number of normative concerns, discussed in chapters six and eight
recipe for parochialism. However, this relationship is necessarily more complex. As I discuss below, the principle of “ought implies can” suggests that the emotional capacities of ordinary human beings will place some limit on the content of our duties, but this limit will not be determined by the current extension of our sentiments.

The second significant objection to focusing on political action to reduce global poverty on the part of individuals in more affluent countries is that addressing symptoms through charitable donations may be a more appropriate role for outsiders (Rubenstein, 2016, p.519). This is a very important objection as in many cases the underlying causes of poverty within less affluent countries may derive from poor governance or a lack of stable institutions within these countries themselves (Risse, 2005). In these instances attempts by the globally affluent to influence or reform international institutions may have little effect, and attempts to influence politics within less affluent countries may be both inappropriate and ineffective due to a lack of local knowledge and experience. However, global poverty is a highly complex phenomenon and in many cases international institutions and practices, such as unfair trading terms, plausibly play a direct causal role. In other cases international institutions may exacerbate local causes by incentivising poor governance at a national level (Pogge, 2002). Where global institutions play some causal role in global poverty concerns over the appropriateness of political action on the part of the globally affluent are misplaced, as in these cases the globally affluent are already involved. Here charitable donations will increase levels of involvement, with affluent countries imposing unfair institutional arrangements partially responsible for global poverty and then acting to mitigate their worst effects though aid – especially where NGOs offering emergency aid originate from more affluent countries. Similarly, concerns over ineffectiveness due to lack of local expertise apply to both political and charitable approaches to global poverty reduction; however, these can be mitigated on either account by taking the views and expertise of individuals affected by particular instances of global poverty into account when devising poverty reduction strategies. Political approaches to reducing
global poverty may allow more space for this process, for example by providing deliberative forums in which affected communities can play a role in determining solutions.\textsuperscript{19}

In this section I drew a distinction between charitable and political accounts of duties to reduce global poverty and defended my focus on a political account of these duties. I argued that political strategies are likely to be necessary in order to achieve long-term solutions to global poverty, and that there are independent normative reasons for pursuing political solutions. Finally, I addressed two important objections to a political approach.

2. Defining a Political Approach

In this section I outline what political duties to reduce global poverty require of the globally affluent. This is a complex task as although the decision problem of how best to act to address global poverty confronts us at the level of the individual, political action will typically need to be collective in order to be effective; accordingly, the exact content of individual duties will be shaped by what other people are doing. There are two separate but related concerns here: specifying (i) the nature, and (ii) the degree, of action these duties entail. In both cases this appears to pose a particular problem for political accounts of duties to reduce global poverty. In the former case, political duties plausibly entail a much broader range of actions than charitable duties, as a variety of different strategies of achieving political reform can be effective, and within these strategies different actions may be required of different individuals.

In the latter case it is important to note that concerns over the degree of sacrifice required on the part of the globally affluent apply on either a charitable or a political approach. Peter Singer’s highly demanding Principle of Sacrifice, for example, that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something

\textsuperscript{19} Deliberative forums and similar strategies may be particularly important as communities are unlikely to speak with one voice on all issues. Less comprehensive attempts to involve communities in poverty reduction campaigns often place resources in the hands of community leaders, such as village elders, potentially serving to entrench serious inequalities based on ethnicity or gender.
bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally, to do it’ (1972, p.231), is silent on the nature of action required, and could apply equally to a charitable or a political account of our duties. It might be thought that time devoted to political activism can offer a reliable metric through which to specify the degree of political duties, in a similar manner to which Singer and others use percentage of total income to specify the degree of donation required by charitable duties (Singer, 2011). However, time as an isolated factor does not tell us very much, as different individuals’ temporal contributions can vary significantly in both effectiveness and demandingness. There is a greater possibility of commensurability in the case of financial donations, whereas, it does not look particularly plausible that a certain number of hours signing e-petitions can be cashed out in a lesser number of hours attending protests in person, for example. There are also likely to be significant asymmetries between individuals in their ability to pursue certain strategies of political activism which may require particular skills, such as public speaking or a high level of knowledge of global affairs. Similarly, relative levels of influence on political processes can vary according to factors such as profession, social status, and class.

Before outlining the content of political duties to address global poverty it is worth offering a little clarity regarding who these duties fall on. Precise definitions are not standard in the literature, and run the danger of false precision, with Simon Caney, for example, discussing ‘the advantaged’ (Caney, 2005), and Lichtenberg focusing on those ‘who live well by any reasonable standard’ (Lichtenberg, 2014, p.1). However, there is some agreement on the following two points. (i) Duties to address global poverty do not fall exclusively on citizens of more affluent countries and include some wealthier individuals in less affluent countries; conversely, neither do these duties include all citizens of affluent countries, with some of the least advantaged being excluded (Caney, 2005; Pogge, 2002). (ii) These duties are scalar, with the degree of action required typically thought to differ based on both a given individual’s ability to assist and the extent to which they benefit from injustice (Singer, 2011, pp.157-193; Pogge, 2002, p.66).
I take these two points to be correct; however, my argument does not focus on wealthy individuals in less affluent countries where severe poverty is prevalent as their situation is rather different from that of individuals in more affluent countries. These individuals share a relationship of co-nationality with some of the globally least affluent, and have greater opportunities for interaction with these individuals. As I argue in chapters six and seven, the relationship of co-nationality, and opportunities for face-to-face interactions provide strong normative and motivational reasons for prioritising the welfare of these particular individuals. I address the question of which individuals in affluent countries fall outside the remit of these duties below, which I take to involve not only socioeconomic status, but also demandingness concerns – including other caring commitments.

The second point might be thought to pose a particular problem for a political account of duties to address global poverty, as the relationship between ability to assist and benefiting from injustice appears to come apart rather quicker on a political account of these duties than on a charitable account. To simplify slightly, political duties require we sacrifice time in order to engage in various forms of activism, whereas charitable duties require we primarily sacrifice money. On the latter account it looks like there will be a greater correlation between ability to assist and benefitting from injustice, however on the former account the financially rich may be time poor. There are three reasons to resist this conclusion. Firstly, we can draw a distinction between time spent working and time spent working in order to meet an acceptable standard of living, with only the latter placing a legitimate limit on ability to assist. Secondly, financial wealth often translates into other forms of power, with the wealthy typically having a greater ability to influence policy through connections or lobbying. Thirdly, as noted above, political reforms may sometimes be effectively pursued through financial donations. As a result of these factors the wealthy are particularly well situated to address global poverty even on a political model of these duties.

2.1. The Content of Political Duties
In order to pursue political change to address global poverty various sorts of action are plausibly required. Although a strict separation between the actions entailed by political and charitable approaches to global poverty reduction is untenable the actions typically required by a political approach will include the following: (i) political activism of various sorts – pursued in person through attendance at political protests or through the signing of e-petitions or written campaigns, (ii) support for certain policies through formal democratic processes – or in a professional role, (iii) educating oneself and others in order to participate more effectively in political processes, and (iv) providing financial support for organisations agitating for political reform, in some cases. This list is likely to raise two concerns. Firstly, the actions suggested here, particularly the suggestion that education is required in order for political action to be effective, may give the impression that political duties are highly demanding in comparison to charitable duties. Secondly, this leaves significant scope for personal choice in how these duties are best fulfilled. I will address the first concern in detail in section three; however, it is worth noting at this stage that if charitable donations are to be effective then this also requires duty bearers to educate themselves regarding the relative effectiveness of various aid organisations.

In response to the second concern I concur with Lichtenberg’s view that the language of duty implies a degree of precision which is not appropriate in these circumstances, failing to take into account the varied sources of the moral demands falling on individuals; offering a misleading picture that obscures the complexity of the situation (Lichtenberg, 2014, p. 109). There are two further reasons to think that attempts to specify with a high degree of precision the actions political duties to address global poverty entail is misguided. Firstly, political duties need to take into account differences between individual agents. As noted above, different individuals will have different capacities and occupy different social or professional positions, which will likely determine how they can contribute most effectively to support political approaches to reducing global poverty. As the actions entailed by political duties can vary significantly, the demandingness of different actions will
likely also vary between agents. Accordingly, specifying that political duties are fulfilled in a specific way may make them unreasonably demanding for particular individuals. Secondly, differences between societies mean that effective political action will vary with context. This will be due to both differences in the formal political institutions and processes that exist in these societies and to cultural differences. To illustrate the latter case, consider assertive political protest, which can be very effective in societies with a tradition of civil disobedience but can serve to delegitimise certain views in more conservative societies.

At a more general level, political duties to reduce global poverty require individuals to act to support institutional reform or the creation of new institutions to address global poverty, and to maintain these institutional changes once established. Institutions should be understood in a broad sense here, including both formal political institutions at the national and international level and more informal structures – such as trade agreements. How these institutions operate at a local level ought to be determined by the communities facing poverty that they are intended to serve. As Jennifer Rubenstein has argued, this may also encompass the rules governing the behaviour of the larger international NGOs responsible for distributing a significant portion of both emergency and development aid, as these have now become an established feature of the international order (Rubenstein, 2015). This focus on institutions is necessary in order to provide effective long-term solutions, as institutions can solve coordination and collective action problems by effectively distributing the content of duties and ensuring compliance over time.

The exact practical strategies we ought to favour to pursue these political changes is in large part an empirical question, and will vary between societies; however, we can draw the following four broad conclusions from the empirical literature. (i) Where political activism has specific goals, such as discrete policy changes, it will be more difficult for those in power to ignore its demands as

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20 At the extreme, attending political protests in person will be unreasonably demanding on agoraphobic individuals, for example. However, other commitments, such as caring for dependents, may make certain forms of activism unreasonably demanding.

21 Of course there may be other normative reasons for pursuing assertive protest in these contexts. This point is purely about effectiveness in a given instance.
these are more easily quantifiable (Burnstein and Linton, 2002). (ii) Citizens in affluent democracies are in a unique position to pressure their own governments to alter policy at a national level and to advocate for reforms at the international level. Insofar as representatives from more affluent countries have a disproportionate degree of influence over the policies of international institutions, citizens of more affluent countries have an ability, and a responsibility, to utilise this advantage to address poverty globally (Pogge, 2002, p.172). (iii) Forms of political activism that impose costs, such as boycotts on goods or campaigns that harm the international reputation of governments, may be thought particularly effective (Freidman, 1999). However, political activism can also serve to alter attitudes in some cases, drawing attention to previously neglected issues or getting people to view issues in new ways (Thomas and Winnifred, 2014, p.273). This is a process in which the media plays a significant role, serving to amplify certain causes, whilst obscuring others (Thomas and Louis, 2013). (iv) Where political activism represents a significant break with the status quo it will be less easy for those in power to dismiss; for example, where protests include very large numbers of people or those not typically involved in political activism (Thomas and Winnifred, 2014, p.273).

However, duties falling on individuals will necessarily form part of collective solutions, as political action is a collective process, and requires some level of popular support in order to be effective – at least within democracies. Where political decisions are subject to democratic processes, a relatively broad level of popular support is required in order for political programmes to be stably implemented. As G.A. Cohen has convincingly argued, the stability of political programmes is as much a feature of their feasibility as the ease with which they can be implemented (2009, p. 57). Where political programmes are implemented by small numbers of dedicated activists, democratic processes will threaten the stability of these changes if broader popular support is absent.22 What this suggests is that the exact content of political duties will be in large part determined by levels of compliance; as some political actions, such as signing e-petitions or

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22 This should not be taken to imply a total consensus is required, but broad popular support. The degree of support required will vary between different democratic systems.
attending protests, will be ineffective when compliance is below a certain threshold. This is in contrast to charitable accounts of individual duties to address global poverty in situations of partial compliance, which suggest we either perform the same actions required in situations of full compliance (Miller, 2013, p.211) or these same actions, but to a slightly greater degree (Murphy, 2003). Instead, here the relevant thresholds below which certain forms of political activism are ineffective will differ between actions, and individuals will face epistemic difficulties in determining levels of popular support. However, we can make the broad claim that as levels of popular support for global poverty reduction decrease, the degree to which political duties to reduce global poverty require individuals to discuss, educate, and attempt to persuade others to support strategies of global poverty reduction increases.

It may strike the reader as odd that in outlining the content of political duties to address global poverty this section has not advocated a specific institutional scheme by which this goal ought to be realised. In part this is because I take it that basic socioeconomic rights for individuals facing poverty globally can be realised under a variety of institutional schemes, and in addressing the much neglected motivational question I aim to proceed from as much consensus as possible; however, I also do not endorse a specific institutional scheme by which to realise basic socioeconomic rights for two substantive reasons. Firstly, as argued above, I accept Gould’s requirement of deference (2007, p.157) – that individuals facing a given injustice ought to take the lead in determining appropriate courses of action. This is especially important in the case of global poverty, as this encompasses a range of phenomena; with particular instantiations of poverty globally differing from one another, and plausibly requiring different strategies in order to be effectively addressed. Accordingly, the requirement of deference necessitates that we consult particular communities facing poverty globally rather than representatives from a monolithic (and fictional) “global poor”. Secondly, although I do not fully endorse the view that political theory has no business in offering institutional

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23 As I argue in section three of this chapter, there may be psychological reasons for thinking that engaging in political activism to reduce global poverty can deepen normative commitments and provides additional motivational resources.
arrangements for others to live under, as in doing so it usurps collective processes of decision making (Finlayson, 2015, Chapter Six; Baderin, 2013, p.135), I take this concern to be particularly pertinent in the case of global poverty, where it is magnified by a complex legacy of imperialism and neo-imperialism between many globally affluent countries and countries where severe poverty is prevalent. This is a legacy in which purveyors of abstract institutional arrangements from within the academy are not entirely blameless.24

2.2. The Degree of Action Required by Political Duties

Specifying the level of action political duties require of the globally affluent faces similar concerns over offering false levels of precision. It is difficult to specify with any degree of certainty how much political action on the part of the globally affluent would be required to offer a solution to extreme poverty globally. As poverty is to some extent a comparative phenomenon25, and has myriad causes, talk of solutions as opposed to reductions may be inappropriate. Similarly, what people can be brought to do to address global poverty is an empirical question that cannot be easily answered in the abstract, and specifying the degree of action that duties to address global poverty entail presents a concern for either a political or a charitable account.

The first point to note here is that the degree of action required by the globally affluent to address global poverty must plausibly bear some relationship to the motivational capacities of these individuals. The principle of “ought implies can” suggests that at the extreme it makes little sense to talk of duties that are beyond the capacities of duty bearers. However, levels of motivation do not represent a strict barrier to possibility as they can be altered to some extent. As Lichtenberg argues,

24 For example, we can note both John Stuart Mill’s work for the East India Company (Harris, 1964) and his defence of empire in his theoretical work, e.g. ‘despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement’ (Mill, 1998, p.13).

25 Absolute poverty can be specified in a non-comparative manner. However, some absolute deprivations such as poor health appear to be heavily linked to comparative factors such as inequality (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010).
some humans are capable of making extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of others, whereas others display very limited altruism; accordingly, ‘we cannot simply accept any old conception of “human beings as they are” as the standard by which to determine how people ought to act’ (Lichtenberg, 2014, p.100). Equally, it makes little sense for rules intended to guide human conduct to ignore actual human capacities. As Lichtenberg notes, this view ‘makes no moral sense insofar as it may require more of human beings than it is reasonable to ask of them. And it’s also conceptually confused, insofar as it envisions ethics as more autonomous, more precise, and more divorced from the practical realm than it really is’ (Lichtenberg, 2014, p.100).

I concur with Lichtenberg’s broad point that human capacities place some limit on the extent of our duties. However, taking motivational constraints seriously need not lead to undue conservatism regarding the possibilities for political change. As Lichtenberg goes on to argue, as human are social creatures, highly responsive to the behaviour of others, the costs we are willing to bear to address global poverty will be significantly determined by the norms operative in our society (2014, pp.122-135). Therefore, the point at which the level of action entailed by political duties becomes unfeasibly demanding will be partially dependent on the behaviour of other people within a particular society. A further feature of “human beings as they are” that influences the relative demandingness of levels of political action is our relational nature. The costs people are willing to bear for others varies depending on our relationship to these individuals; for example, people will typically incur greater costs for loved ones or friends than they will for strangers. As I argue in chapter three, this suggests that the extent to which the globally affluent will be motivated to act to address global poverty will depend on the extent to which they emotionally identify with individuals facing global poverty. As sentimental cosmopolitan theorists have argued, levels of emotional identification with distant others are not fixed and are plausibly amenable to correction through a variety of strategies (Long, 2009, Nussbaum, 2001). This offers a further reason why, although the motivational capacities of ordinary people have some bearing on the extent of the action that can reasonably be required by political duties to reduce global poverty, we cannot specify the level of
action required in a precise manner. Levels of action that may not be motivationally feasible at present may become feasible if levels of affective concern for distant others are increased. Pursuing strategies of sentimental education, aimed at increasing levels of affective concern for distant others, both form a part of political duties and determine the level of action such duties feasibly entail.26

What we can say with some certainty is that political duties to reduce global poverty will require sustained action, as effective long term solutions, such as institutional change, require long-term support. Moreover, levels of action that can be sustained over long time periods will plausibly be lower than levels of action that can be directed towards short-term solutions. Maintaining modest levels of consistent action represents a different, and potentially more complex, task to motivating short-term strategies, one that plausibly requires broader changes in attitudes – especially in individual identities and self-conceptions. How such broader changes in attitudes may be brought about will be examined in detail later in the thesis, but at this point it is important to note that a commitment to sustained action does not directly translate into discrete duties. There is necessarily significant room for individual discretion in how political duties are fulfilled over the long-term as temporally these commitments can be fulfilled in various ways; for example, with low levels of sustained action, or shorter periods of intense activity. Attempting to specify strict temporal patterns of how these duties ought to be fulfilled also fails to take differences between individual agents seriously; for example, differences based on class, cultural difference, or gender norms, which may be reflected in very different models of the working week, or additional caring roles. Moreover, as discussed, the degree of action required by political duties, and the demandingness of these commitments, cannot be understood purely in temporal terms, as some ways of fulfilling political duties may be more demanding of an agent’s resources and capacities than others.27

26 This has affinities with Pablo Gilabert’s concept of dynamic duties, which require us to act ‘to expand...our feasible sets of political action’ (2011, p.59).
27 The exact nature of this will vary between agents.
In summary, this section has advanced three claims. Firstly, demandingness will place a limit on the level of action entailed by political duties to reduce global poverty, as an account of these duties intended to guide action must take the capacities and motivations of ordinary humans seriously. Secondly, the demandingness of political duties is not fixed, as perceptions of demandingness are highly responsive to what other people are doing (Lichtenberg, 2014), and demandingness contains a relational element – what we are prepared to do for others depends on our affective relationship to them (Long, 2009). Therefore political duties that are too demanding at present may become feasible in the future. Thirdly, in order to be effective, political duties to reduce global poverty need to be sustained over the long-term. (i) Attempting to specify the exact levels of action entailed by long-term commitments to political action is implausible as these duties can be fulfilled in a variety of ways, and (ii) allowing significant discretion in how these duties are fulfilled is necessary in order to account for differences between agents.

3. Political Duties and Demandingness

I have argued that demandingness is not a fixed concept as what we are prepared to sacrifice for others depends on our relationship with these others, and the norms operative in our society governing this behaviour. I have also suggested that in order to provide effective long-term solutions to global poverty, political action, aimed at achieving institutional change, is likely to be necessary. Although levels of action required by duties to reduce global poverty raise equal demandingness concerns on both political and charitable accounts of these duties, the content of political duties may be thought *prima facie* more demanding. The brief overview of actions political duties of global poverty reduction are likely to entail, offered in section two, suggests the following three conclusions.

Firstly, many of the actions entailed by political duties require individuals to engage in complex behaviours, such as public speaking or organising demonstrations, which are not only time
consuming but may require certain social, professional, or organisational skills. Secondly, in order to fulfil political duties individuals plausibly need to be relatively well informed regarding global political affairs. Global poverty encompasses a variety of distinct phenomena, which may differ significantly in practice for different communities facing poverty globally, and a variety of institutional solutions are offered by competing political perspectives. Although charitable duties to address global poverty require individuals to make hard choices, such as choosing between supporting aid to different places (discussed below), political duties add further complexity for two reasons. (i) Political duties require duty bearers to choose between supporting institutional change at a national or a global level. (ii) The metric through which political change is pursued is not fixed; accordingly, individuals are required to make some sort of assessment regarding how a given proposal is best supported. Rather than directing financial contributions in a particular direction, agents must decide between engaging in, or prioritising, various forms of activism.  

Thirdly, the actions entailed by political duties may be thought to be particularly motivationally demanding in some cases. To put the point bluntly, educating oneself in the complexities of global affairs and engaging in political activism are not things people typically enjoy. 

One response to these concerns is simply to acknowledge that leading an ethical life is demanding, and that none of the modest hardships listed above are in any way comparable with those endured by individuals facing poverty globally. As political strategies are plausibly necessary in order to address global poverty effectively in the long-term, and insofar as individuals in affluent countries have some responsibility for global poverty, the demandingness of political duties may be thought irrelevant. I have some sympathy for this approach; however, if political duties are sufficiently demanding in comparison to charitable duties, and the latter have some success in addressing global poverty, then favouring political duties may appear to be a case of “letting the perfect be the enemy of the good”.

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28 As argued above, answering this question will be to some extent agent dependent.
29 A view illustrated in the quote attributed to Oscar Wilde that “the problem with socialism is that it takes up too many evenings”, but expressing a sentiment I take to be quite prevalent.
In the final section of this chapter I intend to show that this assumption that political duties to reduce global poverty are significantly more demanding than charitable duties is misplaced. In order to do so I make two arguments: (i) a negative argument that effective charitable action is equally as demanding as effective political action, and (ii) a positive argument that some of the very actions widely perceived as sources of demandingness of political duties can in fact offer additional motivational resources to duty bearers.

3.1. Questioning the Demandingness of the Political Approach

*Effective donation and demandingness.* Charitable duties to reduce global poverty may be equally as intellectually demanding as political duties, if duty bearers are required to make sure their donations are effective in addressing global poverty. There are numerous international NGOs operating to reduce global poverty, or ameliorate its worst effects, and these organisations often work in different areas and provide different forms of assistance. Therefore, charitable duties to address global poverty require duty bearers to be relatively well-informed concerning both global poverty and the behaviour of these NGOs in order to be confident their donations have utility. To be clear, this applies regardless of whether one accepts the claim popularised by the Effective Altruism movement that individuals are under an obligation to maximise the effectiveness of their donations (MacAskill, 2016). If we take the substantial literature on aid effectiveness seriously then ensuring individual donations are simply effective, rather than maximally effective, will also necessitate individuals are well informed concerning global poverty and NGO practices, as in many instances aid programmes may have little or no benefit (Easterly, 2006; Riddell, 2007). Moreover, as Leif Wenar has argued, even donations to reputable international NGOs can have a negative effect in some

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30 This requirement to maximise the effectiveness of individual contributions will significantly increase the intellectual demandingness of either a charitable or a political account of duties to reduce global poverty.
cases, actively harming individuals facing poverty globally (Wenar, 2010, p.117). This suggests that charitable duties require individuals to do their own research in order to ensure their donations are minimally effective, and that this research is likely to require looking beyond the reputation of a particular NGO to the specific project towards which one is contributing.

It might be objected that defenders of charitable duties have a persuasive two-part response to attempts at equivocation over intellectual demandingness. Firstly, the intellectual demandingness of charitable duties is reduced as there is only one metric through which they are typically discharged, financial donations. The only question facing the duty bearer is where they direct their money. Secondly, third parties, such as the organisation GiveWell, can significantly reduce the intellectual and temporal burden by ranking the relative effectiveness of NGOs working in global poverty reduction (GiveWell, 2017). Even if we allow that GiveWell and similar projects cannot meet the demanding criterion of determining that donations are maximally effective, they may still plausibly ensure donations meet the broader effectiveness condition.

I take the first claim to be broadly correct; however, in the next section I offer some reasons for thinking that this reduced intellectual demandingness may not translate into an overall reduction in demandingness. Here, I want to briefly suggest two reasons to doubt the plausibility of the second claim. Firstly, we have reason to question the validity of the effectiveness assessments offered by GiveWell, and similar projects, as these focus on short-term results, and do not take the long-term consequences of supporting certain interventions into account. This is no doubt in large part because the long-term consequences are not easily quantifiable. However, more significantly, effectiveness assessments for individual donations may offer poor advice for larger numbers of donors. In some cases the reason an individual organisation may be ranked as particularly effective is due to providing a high pay-off for relatively low levels of funds. If larger amounts of money were

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31 It is important to note that this applies not only to development assistance, but also to emergency aid; for example, where resources in response to humanitarian crisis have been diverted towards forces involved in genocide (Uvin, 1998).

32 It may not always be possible to determine the specific project to which donations are contributing. This compounds the problem, making determining effectiveness even more difficult.
directed to other organisations these may actually be more effective once donations pass a certain threshold.\textsuperscript{33} Similarly, past a certain level of funds some of the more effective strategies will no longer offer the same benefits.\textsuperscript{34}

Secondly, there is the potential for third parties to help facilitate effective political action in a similar manner to organisations such as GiveWell. Third parties may be able to reduce the demandingness of political duties by offering guidance regarding effective institutional reforms to support in order to reduce global poverty and effective strategies for providing this support. An example of this strategy can be found in the work of the non-profit organisation Academics Stand Against Poverty (ASAP), which employs the latest academic research on the political factors that underlie instances of global poverty in order to encourage informed support for effective political solutions (ASAP, 2018). Admittedly, this may be a more complex task than ranking the effectiveness of aid organisations; however, this complexity primarily derives from the fact that political strategies operate over longer time periods. There is no reason to think that quantifying the long-term effects of charitable donations will prove an easier task.

### 3.2. Four Motivational Advantages of Political Duties

Although the content of political duties to reduce global poverty may be thought \textit{prima facie} more demanding than charitable duties, on closer inspection the actions these duties entail may offer additional motivational resources to duty bearers. I now want to suggest four tentative mechanisms through which the actions required by political duties to address global poverty can actually reduce the motivational demandingness of these duties. The account offered here is necessarily a little

\textsuperscript{33} For example, if a concerned individual wanted to use £100 effectively to improve public health in their city the best advice might be for them to pay to train a first aider. However, if one were advising 1000 people funding a hospital would be a better strategy than training numerous first aiders.

\textsuperscript{34} Insecticidal mosquito nets are often cited as a particularly effective strategy for preventing deaths in some of the poorest areas, many of which are from malaria. However, due to their effectiveness appealing to donors some areas were oversaturated with these nets (Easterly, 2006, p.12).
speculative, however the intention is not to show that political duties are necessarily less demanding than charitable duties; instead, these mechanisms are offered in order to question the presumption that the content of political duties is significantly more demanding. Combined with the arguments offered in section two, that political strategies are necessary to effectively reduce global poverty in the long-term, these mechanisms support my focus on a political account of duties to reduce global poverty.

\textit{i. Increased knowledge concerning global poverty can lead to affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally.} Political duties to reduce global poverty are typically thought to require duty bearers to educate themselves about global poverty to a significant degree. However, as discussed, both effective political action and effective charitable action require duty bearers to educate themselves concerning the facts of global poverty – as effective donation also requires donors to be well-informed; but once a recipient for a donation has been selected the educative element of charitable duties typically ceases. In contrast, the content of political duties can themselves serve an educative function; for example, requiring duty bearers to advocate for political reforms in writing, online, or in person. A greater understanding of what global poverty entails can increase levels of affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally, a claim I argue for in detail in chapter seven. As sentimental cosmopolitan theorists suggest, these increased levels of affective concern can in turn motivate individuals to live up to their obligations to reduce global poverty (Long, 2009; Nussbaum, 2001). To be clear, this link is not guaranteed, and as we are dealing with the reactions of autonomous agents a number of responses are possible. However, I take this to offer a plausible mechanism through which the increased level of knowledge required by political duties to address global poverty may serve to entrench commitments to reducing global poverty, rather than simply increasing the demandingness of these duties.
ii. Increased temporal commitments required by political duties may lead to the injustice of global poverty becoming especially salient to duty bearers. A further reason why political duties are thought to be particularly motivationally demanding is that political activism typically entails a significant time commitment. I take this claim to be broadly correct; however, even when engaging in political activism serves little educative function, the increased time spent on activities intended to reduce global poverty may increase the extent to which global poverty, and the normative problem it presents, is consciously available to duty bearers. The nature of these actions may play a role in this process (examined below), but simply spending long periods of time engaged in activities aimed at reducing global poverty can serve to increase the salience of the injustice of global poverty (Fiske and Morling, 1996). This is not to make the naïve assumption that all time spent engaged in political activism is spent thinking about the cause one is advocating. Rather, I am suggesting that these activities typically lead one to reflect on global poverty more regularly than charitable donations, for example, which may take the form of direct debits that donors pay little attention to. Whether the increased salience of global poverty will motivate individuals to engage in further action to address global poverty is of course an empirical question, the answer to which may differ between agents. However, I take it to be plausible that increasing the salience of global poverty can have motivational benefits; either by heightening affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally or by the drawing attention to the problem of global poverty, and any corresponding normative demands to address it.\(^{35}\) The suggestion here is not that regularly reflecting on global poverty will necessarily translate into increased remedial action, rather that the assumption that the increased temporal demands of political duties are exclusively motivationally burdensome offers an incomplete picture.

iii. The active nature of much political action can serve to deepen cosmopolitan commitments.

Political duties plausibly require a greater degree of active participation from duty bearers than charitable duties. Although not all political actions require similar levels of active participation, high

\(^{35}\) We should also note that awareness of global poverty may have intrinsic normative value.
levels of active participation are a feature of the forms of political action typically taken to be especially motivationally demanding, and are cited as a source of this demandingness. In a comprehensive study of public attitudes to political participation in liberal democracies Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) note that political protest is widely considered to be significantly demanding (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). Similarly, where political duties require individuals to advocate for political positions in person, this typically requires, not only relevant knowledge, but social and rhetorical skills that do not come naturally to everyone and take time to develop. I do not want to deny that these features of political action can be particularly demanding; however, I want to suggest that they can also offer motivational advantages, which are not immediately apparent, serving to deepen cosmopolitan commitments.

This process can occur through two mechanisms: (i) the active nature of political engagement, or (ii) through advocating for a position in person. On the first mechanism, the active participation required by political duties can potentially deepen commitments to reducing global poverty and render these commitments more fundamental to an agent’s sense of identity. The role of physical activity in rendering certain commitments or identities fundamental to an agent’s sense of self is supported by an extensive moral psychology literature on the salience of actions (Jeanerod, 2006). To illustrate, consider the difference between donating money towards a playground for underprivileged children and taking part in building the playground yourself. In the latter case the event is likely to be memorable, potentially rendering the values involved more fundamental to an agent’s self-conception. On the second mechanism, when advocating for a position in person, the experience of defending a given position and the feeling of being associated with it can lead one to identify more deeply with this position. In response to the link between advocacy and the deepening of commitments it may be countered that in advocating for a position one sometimes encounters resistance and counterarguments resulting in a loss of resolve, whereas in quietly donating to charity the opportunity to have beliefs actively tested may never arise. This is certainly possible; however,
given that there are independent normative reasons to favour argument and inquiry this is an acceptable risk.

**iv. The social nature of much political action can reduce the demandingness of political duties.**

Finally, the social nature of much political activism can reduce the demandingness of political duties. There are three mechanisms through which this can occur. Firstly, the motivational demandingness of political duties can be reduced by participating in a community that shares these values. The presence of similarly committed individuals can serve to validate these commitments, and individuals can provide motivational support to each another in living up to their demands. As Judith Lichtenberg argues, the behaviour of peers has a significant effect on the acceptance of moral norms (2014, pp.122-136); accordingly, the motivational demandingness of cosmopolitan duties can be reduced by time spent around likeminded persons – a claim I explore in more detail in the next chapter. Secondly, time spent around individuals who share given political commitments can provide additional prudential motivations to maintain these commitments. Maintaining the respect of peers and saving face, for example, may make it more difficult to renege on political duties due to their social nature (Griskevicius et al., 2010); similarly, if these individuals become significant persons in our lives, such as friends, this can offer further prudential reasons to maintain these commitments. In the case of charitable duties this social dimension does not generally exist, as financial donations are essentially a solitary affair. Thirdly, group identity based on shared political values is likely to increase the extent to which individuals identify with these values. Social psychology research suggests that when we pursue projects as part of a group we come to identify with this group and the projects themselves (Pinto et al., 2014; Oyserman, 2009). Accordingly, participation in group

36 A claim that will be examined, and defended, in Chapter Two.
37 However this does not preclude the possibility that the charitable approach might take advantage of social sources of motivation by making duties more explicitly public. For example, the ‘Giving What We Can’ (2017) project, which includes a public commitment to donate ten percent of all personal income to charity.
activism intended to address global poverty, such as attending protests, can lead individuals to identify with these values more readily.

The mechanisms highlighted in this section offer four means by which the very aspects of political action thought to render political duties \textit{prima facie} demanding can in fact provide additional motivational resources to duty bearers. Although necessarily a little speculative in nature these mechanisms serve to question the presumption that political duties are necessarily more demanding than charitable duties. Combined with the plausible assumption that political strategies are necessary in order to effectively reduce global poverty in the long-term, this further supports the thesis’ focus on a political account of these duties.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter has examined what duties to reduce global poverty entail at the level of the individual, and defended a focus on a political account of these duties in the thesis. Section one drew a distinction between political and charitable accounts of duties to reduce global poverty. It argued that, although drawing this distinction is more difficult than it first appears, this distinction is both useful and sustainable. This section then offered two arguments to support the focus on political duties in the thesis. (i) Political strategies are likely to be necessary in order to achieve long-term solutions to global poverty. (ii) As the current international order plausibly plays some causal role in global poverty this offers an independent normative justification for pursuing a political approach.

Section two examined the precise content and degree of action entailed by political duties to address global poverty, and defended the two following points. (i) The exact content of political duties will be agent dependent, both due to demandingness concerns and as differences in individual skills and situation mean individuals are best placed to support political strategies to reduce global poverty in different ways. (ii) Demandingness plausibly limits the degree of action required by political duties; however, this limit will not be fixed as the demandingness of political
duties to address global poverty is responsive to both social norms and levels of affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally.

Section three addressed the popular conception that in comparison to charitable duties political duties are particularly demanding of individual agents, requiring significant commitments of intellect, time, and resources. Here, I argued that charitable duties to reduce global poverty are equally as demanding as political duties if duty bearers are under an obligation to aid effectively.

Finally, I offered four tentative mechanisms through which some of the more demanding actions required by political duties can serve to provide additional motivational resources to duty bearers.

Having defended a focus on a political account of duties to address global poverty, the next chapter moves on to examine whether altering actions through the use of situationist nudges (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) offers a straightforward solution to motivating compliance with these duties.
Chapter Two: Altering Actions: The Nudge Solution

Introduction

In order to motivate individuals to act to address global poverty two broad strategies have been proposed. Firstly, that we attempt to alter the underlying dispositions of individuals, increasing levels of concern for persons facing poverty globally. Secondly, that we attempt to influence actions directly, prompting changes in unreflective behaviour, or altering the conditions in which choices are made. The broader argument of this thesis focuses on the former strategy; however, before doing so, it is necessary to examine the merits of the latter strategy in some detail.

Currently, there is significant enthusiasm for this approach in the form of Nudge theory (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). Advocates argue that altering seemingly minor situational factors can lead to significant changes in behaviour, and that nudges offer a solution to a number of diverse problems arising from motivational failures at the individual level, including motivating action to address global poverty. This view has gained a lot of traction, both within policy circles – as evidenced by the British Government’s Behavioural Insights Team (2013), and corresponding ‘Nudge Units’ in the United States and elsewhere (Charities Trust, 2014) – and within political theory, where advocates include Judith Lichtenberg (2014) and David Miller (2013). Lichtenberg’s Distant Strangers (2014) offers the most comprehensive account to date of how the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty can be tackled, and explicitly defends a nudge approach. Supporters argue that altering behaviour directly is a much less complex and normatively problematic affair than attempting to alter attitudes (Lichtenberg, 2014). This chapter argues that this view is incorrect and that enthusiasm for nudge in this context is misguided. Instead, addressing the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty necessitates pursuing attitudinal change.

The argument consists of three parts. Section one outlines and clarifies the nudge approach, offering a three-part typology of nudge appropriate for the context of charitable giving. It then
proceeds to assess nudges in the first category, arguing that their (first-category nudges) use in this context is relatively benign. Section two examines nudges in the third category, typically considered the most pernicious form of nudge in the critical literature. It argues that as these nudges circumvent reflection on an issue, their use to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty faces significant normative objections. However, opportunities for their employment in this context are limited. The third section, comprising the bulk of the discussion, examines the complex case presented by second-category nudges. It argues that these pose a distinctively problematic means of altering other directed behaviour, as they are unlikely to engender a corresponding change in normative attitudes.

1. Definitions and Distinctions

1.1. Defining Nudge

In the book in which they coined the term, Thaler and Sunstein describe a nudge as ‘any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives’ (2009, p.6). This is unhelpfully broad and encompasses some techniques they explicitly rule out, such as minor fines or other low level sanctions (2009, pp. 81-103). However, Thaler and Sunstein’s definition draws attention to a key difference between nudges and more traditional persuasion techniques. Distinct from traditional fundraising techniques or government use of social advertising, nudges primarily aim to alter behaviour, rather than achieve attitudinal change. As Mols et al. put this, nudge attempts to achieve norm compliance as opposed to norm internalisation (2015, pp. 81-98). Similarly, McTernan differentiates between traditional interventions, ‘where the cause of the behaviour is internalising the norms of one’s society and acting accordingly...[and] nudges, where behaviour is influenced through minor situational factors’ (2014, p.100).
Nudge is typically illustrated through the use of examples. The paradigm cases being the etching of a fly in the urinals at Schiphol Airport in order to “improve aim”, and the ‘Don’t Mess With Texas’ anti-littering campaign; in which American Football players were employed to help create associations in the minds of young men between disposing of rubbish responsibly and masculinity (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, p.64). Judith Lichtenberg offers the following diversity of examples in her account of utilising nudges to facilitate charitable giving. The use of defaults ‘for example, an opt-out system on income tax forms in donating a certain amount to reducing poverty’ (2014, p.243). Pre-commitment, capitalising on the widespread bias to ‘overvalue present satisfactions and undervalue future ones’, so as to encourage people to commit now to substantial future donations (2014, p.243). And framing donations so as to make them seem less burdensome; eschewing larger upfront figures in favour of a focus on ‘pennies a day’ (2014, p.243). The breadth of these examples demonstrates that any attempt to subject nudges to normative assessment requires drawing finer distinctions, as a number of different strategies of behavioural modification are encompassed under the general term. Accordingly, both the effectiveness and the normative status of these strategies as a means to motivate donations to global poverty charities will differ.

It is important to note the two following factors, which are specific to the assessment of nudge in the context of charitable giving. Firstly, nudges are being used here to alter other-directed behaviour, not self-directed behaviour such as lifestyle choices. Therefore, paternalism, as traditionally understood, is not the main concern in this context. Thaler and Sunstein define paternalism as ‘making choosers better off, as judged by themselves’ (2009, p.5). However, nudges aimed at promoting charitable giving neither require the nudging authority to know an individual’s best interests nor do they aim to make nudged individuals better off. Similarly, the use of nudge is often objected to on the basis that it is manipulative, or even coercive (Hausman and Welch, 2010); but there is a strong prima facie normative justification for the use of such techniques in this context, in the form of realising the basic rights of the global poor.
Secondly, nudges are not being employed here to address bounded rationality leading to reasoning failure by the well-intentioned. Instead, the issue nudges seek to address is, in significant part, attitudinal, with individuals not caring, or not caring enough, about the problem presented by global poverty. Accordingly, employing nudges faces distinct normative concerns in this context, as they do not simply operate to bring actions into line with considered attitudes, but to achieve behavioural changes which may not reflect an underlying normative commitment.

1.2. Three Types of Nudge

To effectively assess the use of nudge as a means to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty it is necessary to separate nudges into three distinct categories. I broadly follow the three-part distinction drawn by Baldwin (2014); however, whereas Baldwin’s central concern is the extent to which nudges interfere with autonomy, the following categories differentiate between the different ways nudges interact with an agent’s motivational structure.

*First-category nudges:* Nudges in this category have been the source of some controversy in the literature. Many critics do not consider them to constitute nudges at all, as they operate at a reflective level (Yeung, 2012; Hausman and Welch, 2010). First-category nudges aim to enhance decision making through ‘the supply of simple information…or the imparting of reminders’ (Baldwin, 2014, p.835). Examples include ‘warning labels on cigarettes’ and ‘signs warning people on a hot day to drink more water’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, pp.189-244). These interventions are characterised by operating at a deliberative level, and aiming to alter behaviour without attempting to alter an agent’s existing motivations.

*Second-category nudges:* Baldwin’s second category contains nudges that ‘build on behavioural or volitional limitations so as to bias a decision in the desired direction…[Where] the target of the
nudge would be capable, on reflection, of realising that a nudge has been administered’ (2014, p.836). I define second-category nudges as those that utilise non-altruistic motives to increase giving. Where this second category overlaps with Baldwin’s is that in both cases the nudge is available to conscious reflection. The paradigm example of a second-category nudge on either account would be the ‘Don’t Mess with Texas’ anti-littering campaign. Here, the decision not to litter is biased in the desired direction by the motive to live up to an ideal of masculinity. However, on reflection, the campaign’s attempt to influence behaviour is consciously available.

**Third-category nudges**: Rather than taking advantage of an alternative source of motivation these nudges operate by circumventing motives altogether; with the agent making a donation without necessarily being aware they have done so. A typical example would be switching from an opt-out to an opt-in default in a workplace giving scheme. Rather than capitalising on prudential motives the desired behaviour is primarily secured through inattention, with the success of the nudge relying on this lack of transparency. This has affinities with Hansen and Jespersen’s definition of a non-transparent nudge where ‘the citizen in the situation cannot reconstruct either the intention or the means by which behavioural change is pursued’ (2013, p.18).

Thaler and Sunstein are likely aware that this form of nudge is normatively problematic and, influenced by Rawls, include a publicity condition in their account – where a government must be ‘able or willing to defend [nudges] publically to its own citizens’ (2009, p.244). Crucially however, this is only a hypothetical requirement because, as Thaler and Sunstein acknowledge, pointing out a default would render the default ineffective. In contrast, Rawls’ publicity principle is not hypothetical, requiring ‘that principles be known and understood by the public, not merely that they be publically defensible’ (1971, p.48). Due to the deceptive manner in which they operate, third-category nudges are considered the most pernicious form of nudge in the critical literature (Mols et al., 2015; Hausman and Welch, 2010).
1.3. Nudging Charitable Giving and Nudging Political Action

The discussion in this chapter follows current literature on nudge as a means to motivate action to address global poverty, in that it primarily examines the use of nudge as a means to increase charitable donation towards this end (Lichtenberg, 2014; Behavioural Insight Team, 2013). This may be thought not to be a concern for a thesis that addresses the motivational deficit facing a political account of our duties to address global poverty.

There is a practical reason for this, as nudges as a means to motivate political action to address global poverty are very rare in practice – and the literature on the subject is scant at best. However, the conclusion of this chapter, that nudges cannot offer a comprehensive solution to the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty, applies to a greater extent to a political account of these duties. This is for two reasons. Firstly, as discussed in chapter one, political duties to address global poverty may face additional demandingness concerns to a charitable account of these duties. Insofar as this is correct then the additional motivational burdens political duties face cannot be bridged through the use of nudges alone. Secondly, the task of motivating the complex behaviours required to fulfil political duties to address global poverty plausibly relies on achieving attitudinal change to a greater extent than the task motivating charitable donations.

Moreover, although a modest literature exists on utilising nudges to increase participation in formal political processes, such as voting in national elections (John et al., 2009), I do not address this directly here. This is because the motivations for increased participation in formal political processes do not look analogous to those for pursuing a specific goal (reducing global poverty) through political channels. For example, in the case of participating in national elections there are prudential reasons for participating, as the outcome of these elections will typically affect oneself and those closest to us38, and attachment to the political community may also feature. Accordingly, I assume that the motivations for pursuing political strategies to reduce global poverty will have more

38 Though this may not always be the case.
in common with those for undertaking charitable donation in support of the same cause, than with the motivations for engaging in quite different forms of political participation in order to achieve alternative goals.

I now move on to examine the use of these three types of nudge as a means to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty. It is important to note that the categories are discussed out of numerical order. I begin with the more straightforward cases of first and third-category nudges, and then move on to examine the complex case presented by the employment of second-category nudges in this context.

1.4. First-category Nudges

First-category nudges consist in the public display of factual information; accordingly, the idea that they are intrinsically normatively problematic is unpersuasive, as this would rule out public information signs and other everyday instances of straightforward information provision. Therefore, if first-category nudges face normative objections these must derive from their employment as a means to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty.

Firstly, I examine the objection that first-category nudges are inapplicable when motivating donations to reduce global poverty, as instances of ‘pure information provision’ cannot occur in such emotive conditions. Having established the applicability of first-category nudges in this context, I move on to examine their use as: (i) a means to facilitate donations, and, (ii) to inspire deliberation on global poverty. I conclude that although first-category nudges face no significant normative objections in this context, their ability to address motivational failures is fairly minimal.

Information provision. Instances of ‘pure’ information provision may be thought unlikely to occur once we move from the heavily debated terrain of health nudges to the context of motivating donations towards reducing global poverty. This is due to the emotive nature of the information
typically featured in these campaigns. The information that ‘25,000 children die of poverty related causes everyday’ (Overland, 2013, p.281), for example, is likely to provoke a significant affective reaction. This has led some critics to conclude that first-category nudges, understood as ‘simple information provision’, cannot exist in this context. Hansen and Jespersen, for example, understand attempts to solicit donations that provoke an emotional response as attempts to interfere with ‘rational deliberation’, constituting manipulative cases of nudge proper (Hansen and Jespersen, 2013).

I believe that this conclusion is incorrect, and demonstrates that these accounts of nudge are inadequate in the context of charitable giving. This is because they operate with accounts of rationality inappropriate in a normative context, which fail to recognise the centrality of affect in moral deliberation. As Williams (1981) has convincingly argued, and recent advances in neuroscience have shown (Krause 2008, p.8), moral deliberation necessarily involves a significant affective component. This is a claim I substantiate in detail in chapter three. Therefore, it is unclear that limiting the emotive force of information will necessarily lead to the more ‘rational judgement’, as normative reasoning involves both affective and deliberative elements. Accordingly, materials that provoke sentimental concern cannot be assumed an attempt to take advantage of our ‘bounded rationality’. In the context of charitable campaigns, instances of information provision provoking affective concern are therefore still plausibly classified as first-category nudges. This still allows that highly emotive campaigns interfere with rational deliberation, as I have not claimed moral deliberation is purely affective, but that it is implausible to view ideal moral deliberation as free from affect.

First-category nudges can be utilised in campaigns to address global poverty in two different ways. Firstly, they can help facilitate donations by providing information concerning ways to donate, such as offering reminders or making donating easier. Secondly, they can provide factual information concerning global poverty aiming to inspire deliberation which may, in turn, lead to a donation.
Facilitating charitable giving. On the first method instances of information provision draw attention to opportunities for charitable giving, making donating easier or more salient. Here, the motivational structure of potential donors remains unchanged; but the situation is framed such that a correlation between the behaviour and attitudes of individuals who already care about the issue of global poverty becomes more likely. As this technique leaves the motivational structure of potential donors unchanged it is unlikely to engender significant shifts in behaviour, having only modest effects. Therefore, employing first-category nudges to facilitate donations in this manner appears uncontroversial.

However, David Miller has raised the possibility that making altruism easier fails to sufficiently exercise our altruistic motives; undermining the capacity for altruism in the long run. As Miller puts this, ‘the theory here being that altruism is a quality that is strengthened by being exercised and atrophies otherwise’ (2013, p.199). This is not simply the argument that the correct motives must be present, either for intrinsic or consequential reasons, which would be unpersuasive; as first category nudges do nothing to facilitate non-altruistic sources of motivation. Instead, it is the claim that if the correct motive is present it ought to be ‘strengthened’ to yield beneficial long term consequences. The concern with this argument is that it provides no way of knowing when the point is reached at which the beneficial consequences of the altruistic act outweigh the beneficial consequences of developing the altruistic capacity. The broad empirical claim underlying this argument, that altruism develops when it is tested, also does not withstand scrutiny. Numerous social psychology studies testify to the common-sense conclusion that making altruism more difficult typically results in altruistic behaviour becoming less likely (Zimbardo, 2008; Darley and Batson 1973).

Inspiring moral deliberation. Alternatively, information provision can focus on the charitable cause itself, with the aim of inspiring deliberation on global poverty. For example, information concerning
the over 700,000 children under five who die from malaria each year, when an insecticidal net costs $4 (GiveWell, 2014), leads to deliberation and ideally a donation. It is difficult to discern the utility of applying the nudge label to these interventions. However, Hansen and Jespersen define this as a ‘type-two’ nudge, which targets a deliberative, as opposed to an automatic, thought process (2013, p.27). The rationale for labelling this a nudge is that it relies on ‘framing effects’; where the frame, or context, in which a decision problem is formulated is used to influence reflective choice.

As Thaler and Sunstein note, it is impossible to avoid framing effects altogether as all information is presented in a context (2009, p.36). However, this fails to distinguish between active and passive senses of framing. With active framing consisting in attempts to influence behaviour by altering the context in which information is presented; and passive framing constituting the acknowledgement that context influences how information is perceived. Attempts to ‘frame’ global poverty as a normative problem in order to encourage charitable donations can only constitute framing in the passive sense, as this is the context in which this information typically features in charitable campaigns. Defining passive framing as a type-two nudge fails to distinguish between attempts to alter behaviour through manipulating context and the fact that all attempts to alter behaviour take place in a context thought conducive to this purpose. Instances of information provision presenting global poverty as a normative problem constitute the typical method through which charities appeal for donations. As these interventions operate at a reflective level, and in a transparent manner, with the resulting donations typically supported by corresponding moral attitudes, these are straightforward cases of information provision. However, as I argue in chapter three, there is substantial empirical evidence to doubt that rational reflection alone concerning the facts of global poverty will engender significant action in individuals not already motivated to do so. Therefore, although first-category nudges are unlikely to offer a comprehensive solution to the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty, they can play a modest role in facilitating donations. As their use in this manner faces no significant normative objections, first-category
nudges will be absent from the rest of the discussion in this chapter. I now move on to discuss nudges in the third category.

2. Third-category Nudges

Third-category nudges are considered the most normatively problematic form of nudge in the critical literature as they operate by bypassing reflection altogether, and their effectiveness is dependent on this lack of transparency. As Bovens notes, these nudges ‘work better in the dark’ and their ‘effects...are likely to disappear if they become transparent’ (2008, p.207). The typical mechanism through which third-category nudges operate is switching from an opt-out to an opt-in default, where the nudge succeeds through capitalising on the agent’s inattention. An example of this is automatic enrolment in workplace charitable giving (Behavioural Insights Team, 2015). I do not want to deny that third-category nudges operate in a manner that is normatively problematic. However, in practice, opportunities for utilising third-category nudges as a means to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty are strictly limited.

In order for a third-category nudge to operate two things are necessary: there needs to be a transaction with a default option, and it needs to be possible that this default can be altered. In the context of charitable giving we have reason to doubt both will obtain. Transactions with a default option are limited in this context as most attempts to solicit donations do not have this structure. Governments and NGOs are both in a position to potentially automatically enrol their own employees into workplace giving schemes. Beyond this example, any use of a third-category nudge would require a financial transaction with a third party where a donation was automatically included – such as a default donation to Oxfam included when purchasing a cinema ticket. It is not difficult to imagine instances where an opportunity to donate might be included in such transactions; however, it is difficult to see why a third party would agree for this to employ an opt-in default. This would make their partnership with the charity less obvious, and the potentially deceptive nature of the
transaction might engender ill will towards the third party. Cases where third-category nudges are applicable in this context face a further practical constraint as opt-in defaults on charitable giving have been legally prohibited in some countries, such as the United Kingdom (Charities Trust, 2014).

Therefore, third-category nudges are not a primary concern when examining the use of nudge as a means to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty. However, as this limited scope is in part due to legal prohibition, and as such subject to change, there is potential for their use in this context to become more widespread. Therefore, I want to draw attention to a novel feature of employing third-category nudges in this context, which both compromises their effectiveness, and raises significant normative concerns. I do so in order to demonstrate that even where third-category nudges are applicable, we have reason to favour alternative methods of motivating donations.

2.1. Circumventing Reflection

Third-category nudges operate by circumventing reflection on a given issue. The problematic nature of this process has not been addressed in the critical literature. In campaigns to address global poverty this presents a distinct concern due to the normative nature of the deliberation being prevented. In typical cases where third-category nudges are employed as a policy tool, prudential deliberation, concerning the relative benefits different courses of action will have for the deliberator, is circumvented in order to improve the situation of the deliberator. The deliberation the nudging authority has circumvented involved the individual reflecting on their own situation. However, in campaigns to secure donations to reduce international poverty the deliberation that is circumvented involves the donor reflecting on the situation of individuals facing poverty globally. This act of reflection may be both intrinsically normatively valuable and instrumentally useful, inspiring further action to address global poverty.
Intrinsic value. There is plausibly some inherent normative value in donors reflecting on the situation of individuals facing poverty globally, deriving directly from the act of reflection itself. As Luc Boltanski (2009) argues, recognition of their suffering is something we fundamentally owe to those in need. I take this claim to be intuitively plausible, and it may account for some of the value placed on apologies and processes of restorative justice. However, it is difficult to offer support for this position beyond this intuitive plausibility, as the normative claim that it makes is so basic. It is also important to stress that recognising the suffering of individuals facing global poverty is distinct from exclusively viewing these individuals through the lens of their suffering, something which may serve to obscure their status as capable agents; a topic I address in detail in chapter five. Despite these concerns, a weaker version of this argument obtains without relying on an appeal to potentially diverging intuitions. That it is normatively preferable for a campaign to foster reflection on the poverty it seeks to address, and as third category-nudges fail to do this, they limit the normative value of the campaign. This argument offers a reason why third-category nudges are prima facie normatively inferior to methods of motivating donations that engender reflection on global poverty.

Instrumental value. More significantly, by circumventing reflection on global poverty third-category nudges fail to provide any mechanism through which further action to address global poverty can occur on the part of donors. This act of reflection has instrumental value as it may increase affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally, and increase the conscious availability of global poverty, and any corresponding moral demands, to potential donors. The claim that reflecting on global poverty may inspire sentimental concern for individuals facing poverty globally takes its inspiration from the sentimental cosmopolitan strategy of fostering global empathy or solidarity (Nussbaum, 2001); a project I discuss in detail in chapter three. However, here I am concerned with the more modest role appeals to sentiment can play in motivating action to reduce global poverty within charitable campaigns. This finds some support in the thought that reflecting on an issue is more likely to lead to sentimental engagement with this
issue than not reflecting on it; however, the strength of this effect is unclear. Whether reflection on
the existence of global poverty leads to affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally will
also depend to some extent on individual psychology and character. Therefore, it is probably
unreasonable to expect the brief reflection on global poverty following a request for charitable
giving to result in anything more than a modest affective reaction in most cases. Nevertheless,
insofar as the absence of reflection cannot engender any degree of sentimental engagement, this
provides a modest reason to favour alternatives.

Even where the degree of reflection a third-category nudge bypasses is thought to provide
insufficient stimulus for significant sentimental engagement, it is important to note that alternative
tries to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty typically attempt to engage
sentiments directly. Such appeals to sentiment are a defining feature of charitable fundraising
campaigns. Insofar as NGOs and governments have limited resources to devote to fundraising, the
use of a third-category nudge will displace an alternative strategy offering a more significant
sentimental stimulus.

Social psychology literature on salience also suggests that increased instances of reflecting
on an issue cause this issue to be more consciously available (Fiske and Morling, 1996, pp.502-522).
Therefore, insofar as third-category nudges bypass reflection they serve to reduce the availability of
the phenomenon of global poverty to potential donors. Whether conscious availability will inspire
action is a different matter, and this link cannot be guaranteed. However, as we are dealing with the
reactions of autonomous agents, all that can be expected to hold is the modest conditional claim
that an issue being consciously available increases the chances of the agent taking action to address
this issue.

In support of this conditional claim I offer three mechanisms through which the conscious
availability of global poverty can serve to motivate remedial action. Firstly, for individuals already
disposed to aid those facing poverty globally, increased instances of reflection may make this
demand more salient, increasing the chances they will act. Secondly, for individuals who are already
altruistically disposed, the increased availability of global poverty may increase the chances they will devote their altruistic attentions to this particular cause. Thirdly, reflection on global poverty may increase the likelihood of disinterested individuals becoming more disposed to act to address this issue. What these mechanisms suggest is that an issue being consciously available to an agent is more likely to inspire action to address the issue than inaction, all other things being equal. Therefore, third-category nudges undermining awareness of the issues they aim to address, coupled with this conditional link between conscious availability and action, provides a modest reason to favour strategies that encourage reflection on global poverty – as these are likely to engender more comprehensive action. Alongside the legal and practical obstacles the use of third-category nudges face in this context, the two arguments advanced in this section suggest we ought to favour alternative methods of motivating action to address global poverty. This conclusion is further supported by the argument advanced in the third part of this chapter, which applies equally to the use of third-category nudges as to nudges in the second-category.

3. Second-category Nudges

I now turn to the complex case of employing second-category nudges to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty. As discussed, the defining feature of second-category nudges in this context is that they utilise non-altruistic sources of motivation to facilitate giving. This is typically achieved through attempts to link charitable donation with high social status. This is exemplified in a recent study in which ‘offering to publicise the names of everyone who donated a book to the local library increased donations compared with not offering that incentive’ (Behavioural Insights Team, 2013, p.10). Second-category nudges present a complex case as a means to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty. Here a good outcome is achieved in the form of the donation; however, this is not primarily motivated by concern for individuals facing global poverty, or a corresponding normative commitment.
3.1. Motives and Outcomes

In her book *Distant Strangers* (2014), the most comprehensive account to date of the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty, and how it may be addressed, Judith Lichtenberg advocates utilising nudges as a means to encourage donations towards reducing global poverty. Lichtenberg’s argument is of particular relevance in assessing second-category nudges, as it is primarily concerned with justifying why we ought to be more concerned with consequences than with motives in poverty reduction campaigns. Therefore, it is helpful to examine Lichtenberg’s argument in some detail.

Lichtenberg’s argument in favour of valuing consequences over motives in cases where they conflict is characteristically nuanced. Starting from a commitment to pluralism over sources of value, she argues that criticism of nudged charitable giving rests on a confusion between two separate interests we have in morality: ‘the outer realm of consequences and outcomes on the one hand, and the inner realm of character, motives, and reasons on the other’. She goes on to argue that ‘we should care, about people’s motives intrinsically’ but that ultimately ‘reducing suffering is more important than the existence of good motives’ (2014, pp.206-209). It is worth quoting Lichtenberg’s argument at length here:

Suppose we have to choose between the following alternatives...we can eliminate A’s malnutrition, disease, and ignorance without requiring that B act from good motives. Or, on the other hand, B has the best will in the world, exerting herself greatly to alleviate A’s suffering, but...A’s malnutrition, disease, and ignorance remain. If these are our only alternatives, we should choose the former (2014, p.210).

Set out in this binary manner Lichtenberg’s account is very persuasive. Favouring motives over consequences when the consequence in question is the reduction of global poverty is *prima facie* wrong. Here, favouring consequences over motives seems not only justifiable, but even obligatory. However, this clear separation between motives and outcomes is only persuasive, and possible, in
the context of a philosopher’s hypothetical. This temporal snapshot is not the end of the matter; countless other starving individuals remain after A’s ‘malnutrition, disease and ignorance’ have been eliminated. Similarly, B’s motives remain, altruistic or otherwise. Just as a one shot prisoner’s dilemma cannot tell us very much about social cooperation over time, this single instance cannot tell us very much about how to think about the normative significance of motives.

In order to challenge Lichtenberg’s argument I could defend one of two claims. The stronger claim of the virtue consequentialist position, that we exclusively value motives insofar as certain motives typically produce good outcomes (Driver, 2001). Or the weaker claim that we primarily value motives due to the outcomes they typically produce. This is consistent with the common-sense claim that we also value motives intrinsically to some degree. Due to reasons of space, and doubts over strong virtue consequentialism, I will focus on the weaker claim – that we cannot easily separate motives from their long term effects. Accordingly, it is mistaken to assess the normative permissibility of a motive in a given context by weighing it against the normative value of the consequences it achieves in this situation, narrowly construed.

I offer two arguments in support of this claim. Firstly, an explanatory argument, which attempts to demonstrate that some of the plausibility of separating motives and consequences derives from conflating backwards looking and forwards looking reasoning. Secondly, that separating motives from their longer term consequences loses further plausibility when assessing nudge due to the institutional context in which nudges typically operate. Rather than ascribing praise or blame to the actions of individuals, the primary concern here is whether institutions ought to capitalise on, or encourage, the development of certain motives.

The typical situation in which we make normative judgements concerning motive is in ascribing praise or blame to individuals over actions that have already taken place. This usually occurs in a legal context, or when judging everyday conduct. There is typically a single act we are
assessing, and we consider motive insofar as it mitigates praise or blame for that act. \(^{39}\) Assessment takes place after the fact and relevant information is limited to a strictly defined temporal context, which ignores, or does not prioritise, long term consequences. An example of this in a legal context would be the role motive plays in establishing the verdict of attempted murder, or in differentiating between murder and manslaughter (Crown Prosecution Service, 2015). Further support may be found in the law’s focus on transgression. Legal assessment of motives is also primarily concerned with cases where good motives mitigate blame for a bad action, rather than where bad motives mitigate praise for a good action. This may lead us to underestimate the normative significance of future consequences in the latter case. To clarify, this is neither the claim that motives have future consequences nor the argument that consequentialist reasoning faces epistemic difficulties concerning future action. Instead, I am suggesting that the pervasiveness of backwards looking reasoning in making normative judgements over motives may lend unwarranted plausibility to the idea that motives can be assessed in isolation from their potential future consequences.

These problems are further compounded when assessing nudge theory due to the institutional context in which nudges typically operate. Nudges to motivate charitable giving take place in an institutional context, either directly through governments or through NGOs. Here we need to be especially mindful of the link between motives and future consequences for the following two reasons.

Firstly, any negative consequences will be compounded by aggregative effects, as institutions affect the behaviour of large numbers of people. Secondly, these institutions are significant in shaping ‘public morality’, or cultural expectations of what is deemed acceptable within a given society. To some extent, people look to governments and NGOs for normative guidance. This encompasses both the perhaps slightly naïve assumption that values being propounded by these institutions increases the credibility of these values and the expectation that these institutions in

\(^{39}\) Admittedly, in a legal context certain motives might provide a reason to detain an individual due to their likely future consequences.
particular will act to promote normative values. Therefore, incorporating a motive into these institutions may have a didactic function, appearing to sanction or encourage this motive.

This magnifies potential concerns over the longer term consequences of encouraging non-ideal motives. For example, one might hold that acting from a level of self-interest is a legitimate motive for individuals, but deny that institutions ought to encourage the development of this motive, even to achieve short term goods. There are two separate concerns here. Firstly, that encouraging non-ideal motives may directly lead to negative consequences. Secondly, that sanctioning non-ideal motives may indirectly encourage morally objectionable attitudes. For example, donating to charity may become increasingly viewed as a means to increase social status; leading to normative reasons for donating, and the recipients themselves, being obscured from the picture. Such attitudes are both intrinsically normatively problematic and, more significantly, may have far reaching pernicious consequences – such as a general coarsening of public culture and attitudes.  

I have argued that the separation of motives from their long-term consequences that underpins Lichtenberg’s argument is implausible. Instead, assessment of motives within a given context needs to take into account the longer term consequences of cultivating these motives. Therefore, it mischaracterises employing second-category nudges to motivate charitable giving to portray it as a case of favouring positive outcomes over positive motives. This fails to take into account the long-term effects of the prudential motives being employed, and to compare these with alternative sources of motivation. Having demonstrated why I take Lichtenberg’s account to be inadequate, I now offer an alternative assessment of the normative status of employing second-category nudges in the context of international poverty reduction.

3.2. Second-category Nudges and Motives

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40 This is not to deny concerns over the credibility of both institutions exist in certain sections of the public.
Second-category nudges can potentially secure the desired changes in behaviour in the instances in which they are employed. However, as they rely on prudential sources of motivation they do not attempt to alter attitudes. Therefore, second-category nudges faces two significant objections as a means by which to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty. Firstly, there may be some intrinsic value in people doing the right thing for the right reasons. Secondly, altering attitudes may have positive consequences in the longer term, leading to further action to reduce global poverty. Although I take the first objection to have significant merit, I confine my focus to the second objection, as the consequences in question are of such normative significance. To support this second claim I will argue that, by altering behaviour without altering attitudes, the effectiveness of second-category nudges as a means to motivate effective action to address global poverty is compromised.

Before doing so, it is necessary to answer two immediate objections that may occur to the reader at this point. The first objection is that this argument relies on the assumption that a single source of motivation is typically responsible for a given act, which presents an overly simplistic picture of human psychology and motivation. That this is overly simplistic is correct; however, I am operating on the assumption that a degree of altruistic motivation is present, but one insufficient to motivate a donation without the additional prudential motivation provided by the nudge. Charitable campaigns that attempt to alter attitudes, for example by fostering sentimental or moral concern, can potentially develop these more altruistic sources of motivation. However, in instances where second-category nudges are employed this function is absent.

The second objection is that by criticising the use of second-category nudges that aim to alter actions, securing donations without a corresponding change in attitudes, I am letting the perfect be the enemy of the good; operating from an idealised baseline, where donations deriving from largely non-altruistic motives are wrongly criticised in comparison to donations stemming from altruistic motives. Here, it may be objected that I am failing to take into account that the donation in the former case would not take place without the nudge (Lichtenberg, 2014, p.243).
However, this objection implausibly assumes a baseline of inaction, which takes all charitable giving as supererogatory. Even if we grant that a baseline of inaction is appropriate in the moral assessment of individual donors, this does not apply when assessing the use of second-category nudges by NGOs and governments as a means to facilitate charitable donations. In these institutional cases the adoption of nudge strategies is a zero-sum issue, as NGOs and governments only have finite resources. Therefore, employing second-category nudges will necessarily be at the expense of alternative approaches. As such, the correct baseline for assessing second-category nudges in these circumstances is in comparison to alternative methods of motivating donations.

3.3. Effectiveness

Fundraising campaign to reduce global poverty can be effective in two different ways. In the more obvious sense effectiveness can be understood as a function of the amount of money raised and the success of the scheme to which this is directed. However, fundraising campaigns can also be effective by motivating changes in attitudes; encouraging normative reflection on global poverty or increasing levels of affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally. These changes in attitudes may in turn motivate further action to reduce global poverty, such as future donations, lifestyle changes, or commitments to political action. Second-category nudges, which rely on prudential sources of motivation, aiming to alter actions not attitudes, cannot contribute towards this second type of effectiveness.

In contrast, more traditional methods of motivating donations, which aim to provoke moral or sentimental concern for individuals facing global poverty, may lead to the development, or strengthening, of broader motivating commitments to reducing global poverty. There is significant empirical support for the claim that the traditional fundraising strategies employed by NGOs working to reduce global poverty are effective in altering normative attitudes towards global poverty (Albertson and Lawrence, 2009), and in increasing levels of affective concern for individuals facing
poverty globally (Jeffery, 2014, pp.157-193). Social-psychological studies also lend weight to the
further claim that altering normative attitudes (Bolderdijk et al., 2013; Fischer, 2008) and affective
responses (Thomas et al., 2009; Izard and Ackerman, 2000) towards instances of global injustice
leads individuals to engage in action to address these injustices; a claim argued for in detail in
Chapter Three. Broader research in the psychological sub-field of social influence further supports
the general claim that altering normative attitudes is necessary to achieve lasting behaviour change
(Mols et al., 2015; Sparks and Shepherd, 1992).

It might be objected that second-category nudges are sufficiently effective in achieving the
desired behavioural changes in the instances in which they are employed so as to outweigh any
advantages traditional interventions can offer via this second type of effectiveness. The
effectiveness of second-category nudges in motivating donations in the specific instances in which
they are employed will depend on the specific nudge in question, and likely differ between agents.
However, it is by no means clear that prudential motives offer a more effective means of motivating
charitable donations in the short term than appeals to moral or sentimental concern. Studies by
Heyman and Ariely (2004) suggest that appealing to incentives undermines the effectiveness of
fundraising campaigns as this encourages individuals to perceive the transaction in market terms,
causing potential donors to focus on instrumental losses and gains, and to ignore the normative
element. The same result is replicated in separate studies by Kamenica (2012) and Kosters and van

Although answering this empirical question definitively is beyond the scope of this chapter,
the three following reasons suggest that the burden of proof is on the advocate of second-category
nudges. Firstly, in order for a second-category nudge to be preferable to an alternative means of
motivating a donation its effectiveness in motivating a donation would need to be sufficiently great
so as to outweigh the combined benefits of the alternative approach; both as a means to secure
donations and as a means to alter attitudes. Absent strong empirical evidence in favour of the
effectiveness of second-category nudges, this supports a presumption in favour of alternatives.
Secondly, the empirical literature on poverty reduction suggests that many charitable schemes prove ineffective, or even counterproductive (Lichtenberg, 2014, pp.193-194; Easterly, 2006, p.178). Although this is not typical, the outcome is by no means unusual. Determining the effectiveness of a given charitable scheme also faces epistemic limitations, and is vulnerable to brute luck. Employing second-category nudges limits possible positive consequences to this specific context. In contrast, fundraising techniques that attempt to alter normative attitudes, or increase concern for the global poor, can potentially contribute towards reducing global poverty – even when the specific campaign they are part of proves ineffective. Therefore, modesty over our ability to determine the effectiveness of a given charitable scheme in advance offers a further reason to place the burden of proof on the advocate of second-category nudges.

Thirdly, charitable contributions alone are unlikely to provide a comprehensive solution to global poverty. Alongside financial support for the work of NGOs, political reform of global and national institutions or changes in lifestyle on the part of individuals in more affluent countries, are likely to be required. Recognition of the need for a broader approach is commonplace in both international political theory (Singer, 2010; Pogge, 2002) and international development (Oxfam, 2015b). As second-category nudges aim to alter behaviour in a given instance, without provoking a corresponding change in attitudes, they are unlikely to contribute towards motivating more comprehensive solutions.

### 3.4. Second-category Nudges and Changes in Attitude

I have argued that although second-category nudges may secure desired behavioural changes in the short-term, these are not supported by corresponding changes in normative attitudes. However, Luc Bovens (2008) has suggested that by altering an individual’s behaviour, second-category nudges may lead to changes in attitudes over time. I now examine the plausibility of this claim. First, I assess the three mechanisms that Bovens outlines, through which nudges may prompt attitude changes in
individuals who are subject to them. I then consider a final possibility, that second-category nudges may alter attitudes indirectly, through prompting reflection on the part of non-donors. I argue that, on either method the role of second-category nudges in altering attitudes through altering behaviour is likely to be minimal.

**Direct Mechanisms**

Bovens offers three mechanisms by which, through altering behaviour, nudges might lead to corresponding changes in attitudes: (i) changes in behaviour may serve an ‘educative function’, (ii) by performing certain actions ‘feelings may simply shift’, and (iii) ‘one may come to self-identify as a person who acts [in a certain manner] on grounds of cognitive dissonance’ (2008, p.214). I will address each in turn.

*The educative function of actions.* Unlike health nudges, which are the focus of Bovens’ account, the experiential content of the action performed by donating to charity is fairly minimal. Plausibly, an agent learns more about running by going running than they learn about charity by setting up a direct debit or physically handing over money. More significantly, the act of donating has little educative function concerning the charitable cause itself. However, in altering patterns of behaviour the nudge may inspire reflection on the issues the charity seeks to address, and, in doing so, potentially inspire a genuine moral commitment. As John et al. put this, ‘a nudge may lead to a demand to think’ (2009, p.369). For example, a second-category nudge leading an individual to donate to charity may result in this individual reflecting on the value of the work the charity does, leading to the development of a moral commitment.

However, in this instance the educative function is primarily performed by the attempt to solicit a donation, in the form of media developed by the charity, or an encounter with a fundraiser. Accordingly, a nudged act of charitable giving does not offer a greater opportunity for reflection on
the charitable cause than an attempt to solicit a donation that fails. The prudential motivation provided by the second-category nudge may help direct the attention of the nudged individual to this information; but, unlike nudges aimed to prompt changes in lifestyle, the action itself has little educative function.

*Shifts in feelings.* The experience of donating to charity may have little educative value, but it does have potential positive content. On the ‘warm glow theory of altruism’ the positive feelings resulting from performing altruistic acts serve to make altruism attractive (Stich et al., 2010, p.197; Andreoni, 1990). Therefore, a second-category nudge may have the potential to inspire further commitments, as these ‘hedonistic’ benefits might not be obvious prior to giving.

However, the simplicity of the mechanism suggested by this argument does not offer a plausible basis for the development of the complex phenomenon of a normative commitment to reducing global poverty. The hedonistic benefits of giving provide a reason to think that additional donations may follow when the nudge is no longer in place, and potential support for the thought that the nudge may inspire further acts of charity. But it presents an implausibly simplistic and deterministic picture of human psychology to suggest that the development of complex normative beliefs concerning global poverty can be primarily attributed to this mechanism. This simplistic picture relies on a very strong reading of the warm glow theory of altruism, rather than a more nuanced account. Experiments by Batson et al. that attempted to isolate the desire to behave altruistically from causal responsibility for the altruistic act have cast serious doubt on the plausibility of a strong reading of the warm glow theory. In these experiments altruistic choices did not decrease despite the warm glow theory suggesting otherwise (Stich et al., 2010, p.197). This does not rule out the more sophisticated psychological egoism of the ‘empathic-joy hypothesis’, which suggests that altruism results from the hedonistic benefit we derive from the pleasure of others (Batson, 1991, pp.153-163). However, the empathic joy-hypothesis suggests that hedonistic benefits result regardless of an agent’s own causal responsibility for another’s pleasure. Therefore, it is unclear that
changes in attitudes can be directly attributed to the experiential content of the donation itself, and that the nudge is primarily responsible for altering attitudes.

*Cognitive dissonance.* Bovens’ most promising suggestion as to how second-category nudges might lead to changes in attitudes is through the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. ‘Cognitive dissonance’ is used here to refer to the unpleasant feeling when our beliefs and actions do not cohere. The significance of this for second-category nudges is that, in an attempt to achieve consistency, individuals often alter their beliefs rather than their actions. As Stoker notes, ‘psychologists suggest that people seek consistency between their beliefs and their behaviour. However, when beliefs and behaviour clash, we frequently alter our beliefs instead of adjusting our behaviour’ (2014, p.227). Therefore, where a second-category nudge leads an individual to donate towards reducing global poverty, they may come to identify with this end in order to achieve cognitive consistency. This suggests a potential mechanism by which nudged charitable giving could lead to the development of a corresponding normative commitment.

However, instances where this mechanism results in a change in attitudes will be limited for the following two reasons. Firstly, some people can live with a high degree of inconsistency between their attitudes and actions. Political philosophers are likely more troubled by dissonance than other people. Secondly, it is an assumption of this argument that it offers a fairly novel method of belief formation, and instead actions typically reflect attitudes. Despite these qualifications, this strikes me as a plausible account of how a second-category nudge might play a limited role in altering attitudes. However, this argument offers no reason to think any changes in attitude that occur will be sufficiently robust to motivate further action. On this model the dissonance is solved by the thought that one cares enough about global poverty to make the donation resulting from the nudge. This brings attitudes into line with actions rather than motivating further action. Therefore, this mechanism offers little reason to think that any changes in belief that result will be significant enough to motivate further action towards reducing global poverty.
Indirect Mechanisms

However, the role of second-category nudges in altering attitudes may be more indirect. Rather than altering the attitudes of nudged individuals, second-category nudges may alter the attitudes of non-donors. Through increasing instances of charitable giving, second-category nudges may lead to increased instances of non-donors reflecting on global poverty, which may in turn lead to normative commitments to donate. In the final section of this chapter I suggest two tentative mechanisms through which this process could occur, and offer some reasons for thinking their role will be limited. Although neither mechanism accords second-category nudges a central role in attitude change, they may suggest a modest role for second-category nudges in this process.

Valuing altruism. Where second-category nudges operate by capitalising on a desire for esteem or social status this relies on the existence of a culture in which charitable contributions, and other altruistic actions, are socially valued. Here, the use of second-category nudges may cause non-donors to reflect on why charitable giving is socially valued; which may in turn lead to a normative commitment to donate.

The first concern here is the highly abstract nature of the deliberation, which sits uneasily with the assumption of bounded rationality underpinning the nudge approach. This is less of a concern for deliberation prompted by traditional fundraising campaigns, which operate at a more affective level, employing emotive portrayals of distant others to engage sentimental concern. Secondly, this mechanism relies on donating to charity in general being socially valued, rather than the specific concern of addressing global poverty.\textsuperscript{41} Charity being held in high regard may encourage reflective commitments to donating, but this offers no reason to motivate broader commitments to

\textsuperscript{41} The global poor may be thought to feature in this deliberation in the wrong manner, where donating is valued, rather than the global poor themselves.
addressing global poverty; for example, through lifestyle changes or political channels. Finally, this mechanism operates on the basis that donating to charity is socially valued, not the recognition of an obligation to donate. Where social norms reflect the belief that donations towards global poverty are supererogatory, any moral commitments arising as a result are likely to be relatively weak in nature.

*Social pressure.* Where second-category nudges lead to increased instances of charitable giving, this behaviour may alter perceptions of the norms operative in society; with nudged charitable giving being taken by non-donors to reflect a corresponding normative belief on the part of donors. Here, social pressure may provide an additional incentive for non-donors to reconsider their own views, potentially leading to a change in normative attitudes. This is supported by recent work in moral psychology on social norms that suggests ‘that injunctive norms—what people ought to do—...can be overwhelmed by descriptive norms—what people are actually doing’ (Campbell Arvai et al., 2014, p.469).

However, the role for second-category nudges in altering perceptions of social norms is likely to be relatively modest for the following reasons. Firstly, many acts of charity are not publically observable, or minimally observable, therefore it is hard to see they can play a significant part in altering perceptions of social norms. Secondly, this mechanism is too localised to play a substantial role in altering social norms. Available information would differ too substantially from person to person to plausibly account for the development of norms that existed beyond the level of the individual. Finally, according a primary causal role to deductive inferences from personally observed behaviour offers an implausibly atomistic account of social norms. This ignores the social nature of these norms, and fails to take into account the role of the media, and communication more generally, in their development and propagation.

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42 Admittedly, this is partially mitigated where second-category nudges operate by making acts of charity more observable, in order to increase social benefits deriving from giving.
I have outlined two tentative mechanisms through which second-category nudges might play a limited role in achieving attitude change over the long-term. However, on either mechanism the role for nudges in addressing the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty will be fairly minimal. In sum, nudges provide no easy substitute for the complex and vital task of altering attitudes towards global poverty.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the use of nudges by NGOs and governments as a means to motivate individuals to act to address global poverty. I began by arguing that the definitions of nudge provided in the literature are unsuitable in this context, failing to distinguish between very different methods of behavioural modification. To address this I offered a three-part typology of nudge, based on how a nudge interacts with an agent’s motivational structure. I then assessed the use of nudges in each category as a means to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty, drawing the following three conclusions. (i) The use of first-category nudges faces no significant normative objections in this context; however, their role in addressing the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty will necessarily be very modest. (ii) The use of third-category nudges as a means to facilitate charitable giving towards reducing global poverty faces distinct normative concerns, as these nudges circumvent reflection on the poverty they seek to address. This is something that has intrinsic normative value, and can serve to develop value supported commitments to reducing global poverty. However, scope for their employment in this context is limited, as they face both legal and practical obstacles. (iii) Second-category nudges, which aim to secure charitable donations by capitalising on prudential sources of motivation, present a complex case; but, where possible, we ought to favour alternative methods of motivating individuals to act to address global poverty.
To support this conclusion I advanced the following two claims. Firstly, that it oversimplifies the complexity of using second-category nudges to motivate prosocial action to portray this as a case of choosing good outcomes over good motives. Instead, as second-category nudges aim to achieve changes in behaviour without altering attitudes, the positive consequences of their employment in campaigns to encourage action to address global poverty are limited. Secondly, although it has been suggested that, by altering behaviour, second-category nudges might themselves engender a change in normative attitudes over time, their causal role in this process is minimal. In sum, the utility of nudge as a means to address the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty has been oversold. Attempts to prompt unreflective changes in behaviour provide no easy substitute for the complex and vital task of altering attitudes towards global poverty.
Chapter Three: Altering Attitudes: The Sentimental Cosmopolitan

Solution

Introduction

The previous chapter argued that in order to motivate sustained action to address global poverty it is not enough to alter actions, instead a broader change in attitudes is required. This is a thought that is familiar in the views of those who argue that motivating support for even a basic level of global justice is a utopian proposal. The view that individuals in more affluent countries ultimately just do not care, or care enough, about the weal and woe of distant others facing severe poverty and other injustices to undertake action on their behalf is a mainstay of popular discourse, and has its defenders in the academy (Lenard, 2010a; McConnell, 2002).

Sentimental cosmopolitans accept this view, but add the further insight that these levels of concern are not fixed, and, as such, may be amenable to correction (Woods, 2012; Nussbaum, 2001). Accordingly, for the sentimental cosmopolitan, a change in attitudes is both necessary and possible. This chapter examines the sentimental cosmopolitan project of cultivating increased levels of affective concern for distant others. I argue that, suitably modified, the sentimental cosmopolitan approach offers a promising means by which to motivate individuals to undertake political action to address global poverty.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one outlines and clarifies the sentimental cosmopolitan approach, and offers a moderate sentimental cosmopolitan strategy as a prima facie promising means by which to address the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty. In section two I examine conceptual objections to both to the broader sentimental cosmopolitan project, and to a moderate sentimental cosmopolitan approach as means to motivate action to address global poverty. I conclude, that conceived of as conceptual objections, these do not obtain.
Section three examines the sentimental cosmopolitan practical proposal of a ‘sentimental education’ – In which media and narrative art featuring the lives of distant others serve to encourage the extension of affective concern – in detail. I begin by explicating the accounts of sentimental education offered by Rorty (1998) and Nussbaum (2001) in some detail; noting that despite points of divergence these accounts share a number of broad similarities. I then move on to examine a number of empirical objections to this project, arguing that a moderate sentimental cosmopolitan strategy represents a promising means by which to motivate individuals to undertake action to address global poverty. However, I note that the practical projects of sentimental education suggested by Nussbaum and Rorty face a number of significant concerns as a means to motivate support for sustained political action to this end. Here, I draw attention to a shared emphasis on cultivating cosmopolitan empathy, or affective concern, rather than a broader array of cosmopolitan emotions, and to an overreliance on depictions of distant others in art and media as a means to encourage affective concern. I conclude, that although promising in many respects, addressing the motivational deficit facing political duties to reduce global poverty requires going beyond the models of cosmopolitan sentimental education advocated by Nussbaum and Rorty.

1. The Sentimental Cosmopolitan Approach

In contrast to the nudge approach (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), which recommends prompting unreflective changes in behaviour, sentimental cosmopolitan theorists argue that motivating action to address global poverty, and other injustices, requires a change in attitudes on the part of the affluent. However, rather than being pursued through rational argument alone, these thinkers argue that this change in attitudes is to be primarily achieved at an affective level. Strictly speaking, ‘sentimental cosmopolitanism’ is an umbrella term that serves to capture important similarities between a number of theorists ‘who foreground particular sentiments, the cultivation of which they argue is necessary to achieving the cosmopolitan goal of global justice’ (Woods, 2010, p.89). Most
significantly this term refers to the work of Martha Nussbaum (2001), and Richard Rorty (1998), but also includes a secondary literature by Kerri Woods (2012; 2010), and Graham Long (2009). Other significant advocates of this approach include Renee Jeffery (2014), within international relations, and Carol Gould’s (2007) theorisation of ‘transnational solidarities’; and the broad project can be traced back to the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as David Hume and Adam Smith (Frazer, 2010).

The works of these diverse thinkers contain both a number of differences and important similarities, with the notion of cosmopolitanism itself being highly contested, and the exact role of sentiment in motivating moral action ambiguous. Therefore, the first section of this chapter aims to clarify the sentimental cosmopolitan approach, paying attention to both elements of the term and outlining what this project entails in practice; in doing so, I draw on the works of Rorty (1998) and Nussbaum (2001) in particular. I suggest that a moderate version of this approach offers a prima facie promising strategy by which to approach the motivational deficit facing political duties to address global poverty. I then move on to address conceptual objections and empirical objections to this approach, in sections two and three respectively.

1.1. Sentimental

As noted above, sentimental cosmopolitan theorists share an emphasis on sentimental connections to distant others as able to motivate action to address global injustices where rational argument alone cannot. Although this emphasis on the motivational work that sentiment can do is shared, it is important to note that some accounts – particularly the account offered by Nussbaum (2001), also take cultivating these sentimental connections to be intrinsically valuable, as rational or normatively appropriate responses to global injustice (Nussbaum 2001, p.25).

A second shared characteristic of these accounts is that the sentiment intended to do this motivational work is a form of ‘affective concern’ or identification with distant others, variously
referred to as ‘sympathy’ (Rorty, 1998), ‘empathy’ (Gould 2007), or ‘compassion’ (Nussbaum, 2001). I do not wish to claim that the sentiments advocated by these theorists are identical, and I examine relevant differences between Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s accounts in chapter five, and Gould’s distance from these two accounts in chapter seven. However, neither do I intend to get stuck in definitional debates over appropriate terminology that may lead us away from the practical motivational question of the thesis; therefore, I wish to draw attention to the following two commonalities between ‘sympathy’, ‘empathy’, and ‘compassion’ as these authors use them. Firstly, all three terms serve to pick out affective identification rather than disinterested perspective taking. Accordingly, we are exhorted to care for distant others to a greater extent than we do now rather than simply ‘imagine ourselves in their shoes’; although, as I outline towards the end of section one, the latter may offer a practical strategy by which to achieve the former. Secondly, the sentiment intended to do this motivational work is a positive affective identification with the others in question rather than a ‘self-blame emotion’ concerning our own complicity in global injustice – such as guilt or shame, or an ‘other-blame emotion’ at other responsible parties – such as anger or indignation (Haidt 2003; Ben-Ze’ev 2000).

In response to the first claim it is important to note that sentimental cosmopolitans are not suggesting that affective connections to distant others facing global poverty and other injustices will necessarily lead to action to remedy these injustices; both because choosing agents may respond in a variety of ways and these connections may compete in practice with other affective commitments, for example to family or conationalists – a claim I examine in detail in chapter six. Instead, the sentimental cosmopolitan claim is the conditional one that increasing levels of affective concern for distant others typically increases a propensity to act to address the injustices they face. This is not to deny the possibility that absent any degree of affective concern some heroic individuals may be motivated to come to the aid of distant others by rational commitment alone, but to suggest that this is not the norm. A significant body of research on the neurological processes involved in motivating moral action supports this focus on the significance of sentiment in motivating moral
action; as Tiberius notes after surveying the empirical literature on the topic, ‘moral action is more strongly correlated with changes in moral emotion than with moral reasoning’ (Tiberius, 2015, p.97; Haidt, 2001).

Regarding the second claim, although this research supports according a primary role to positive affective identification with particular others, such as sympathy or empathy (Greene et al., 2001; Izard and Ackerman, 2000; Batson, 1991), in motivating action to come to their aid, it does not support an exclusive focus – as there is evidence that a broader range of emotions are implicated in motivating moral action (Nichols, 2004, Prinz, 2007). Therefore, although affective identification with particular others plausibly serves a primary role in motivating moral action, sentimental cosmopolitan accounts neglect the supporting role other sentiments can play in this process. As I argue in chapter four, anger and shame in particular may be especially important in motivating responses to injustice (Solomon, 1995) and support for political action (Chakravarti, 2014), due to their structural links with responsibility.

However, the sentimental cosmopolitan point concerning the role of sentiment goes beyond an emphasis on sentiment in motivating moral action, as sentiment is also thought to be centrally involved in moral deliberation (Jeffery, 2014; Woods, 2012, p.36). This is a point that receives significant empirical support (Nichols, 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio, 2000). In particular, studies on individuals with significant damage to the part of the brain primarily associated with processing emotions suggest that moral deliberation necessarily involves an affective component (Tiberius, 2015, pp.67-86; Krause, 2008, p.3). As Woods notes, ‘people do not rationally deliberate in the ways that we regard as characteristic of moral thought on issues that they do not care about’ (Woods, 2012, p.36). The significance of this point is twofold. Firstly, affective concern is central in motivating action, but this action is not an arbitrary response and includes deliberating on appropriate courses of action. Here, we can note the role of reason in selecting effective approaches. Secondly, however, it would mischaracterise the situation to claim

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43 As above empathy refers here to ‘feeling for’ rather than just ‘feeling with’ particular others (Batson, 1998).
that all the work sentiment does is in turning the deliberative gaze towards a particular issue as this deliberation itself includes an affective component.

1.2. Cosmopolitanism

Sentimental cosmopolitanism does not straightforwardly map onto any of the binary distinctions traditionally drawn in cosmopolitan theory. In aiming to cultivate sentimental concern in order to pursue global justice sentimental cosmopolitanism is closer to moral cosmopolitanism, the position that moral equality transcends national boundaries, than political cosmopolitanism, the creation of global institutions. However, sentimental cosmopolitanism does not rule out the pursuit of cosmopolitan affective concern through the creation of global institutions, although it is associated with a scepticism that these institutions could be developed and maintained absent pre-existing levels of affective concern for distant others (Long, 2009, p.325). Similarly, sentimental cosmopolitans such as Nussbaum (2001) have advocated identifying oneself as a ‘citizen of the world’ as a means of motivating a commitment to redistributive policies beyond national borders. As Long notes, this does not straightforwardly map onto Samuel Scheffler’s (2001) distinction between cosmopolitanism about culture – a view of human flourishing, and cosmopolitanism about justice (2009, p.330). The crossover between the two concepts here is the notion of identity, which is both bound up with culture and can serve to motivate moral action. This is illustrated in the case of national identity, which is both maintained through cultural institutions and arguably serves to reinforce compatriot favouritism. Sentimental cosmopolitanism thus combines an empirical motivational claim concerning how moral cosmopolitan goals may be achieved, with a normative claim concerning how they ought to be achieved (at least on Nussbaum’s account).

A further source of potential ambiguity concerns the breadth of uses of the term cosmopolitan to refer to differing forms of moral cosmopolitanism within the global justice literature. Some theorists, for example Long (2009, p.319), use the term to refer to all positions that
affirm the ‘basic equal status of persons’ and recognise a global commitment to basic rights, including both Rawls’ (1999) and David Miller’s liberal nationalist accounts (2007). At the other extreme, some reserve the term to refer exclusively to a commitment to global egalitarianism (Caney, 2005a). Others, for example David Axelsen, use the term to denote commitment to at least a high global sufficientarian position, and label not only liberal nationalists but also more moderate global sufficientarians as ‘realist anti-cosmopolitans’ (2014, p.453). Within the sentimental cosmopolitan literature there is also a broad spectrum of moral cosmopolitan positions. Rorty focuses on the promotion of human rights globally (1998), whilst advocating the centrality of the nation in struggles for social justice in other work (1999a). Nussbaum advocates a more thoroughgoing moral cosmopolitanism (1996), although she takes this to be compatible with the existence of nation states in some form (Nussbaum, 2001).44 In contrast, Jeffery (2014) focuses on a narrower account of basic rights as a means to address global poverty. I do not want to deny that behind these various uses of the term ‘cosmopolitan’ lie substantive disagreements over the content of global justice, however, this thesis has a narrower focus on motivating action to address global poverty – understood as the underfulfilment of basic socioeconomic rights. Therefore, although I will not be concerned with whether this moderate cosmopolitan position is properly described as cosmopolitan, this should not be taken to suggest that this account exhausts the content of our duties of global justice. This narrower focus offers two advantages for the plausibility of my argument. Firstly, it renders the sentimental cosmopolitan project prima facie compatible with both more extensive duties to conationals45 and the continued existence of nation states. Secondly, as the motivational deficit facing more extensive accounts of global justice is likely greater, this renders the narrower sentimental cosmopolitan project of this thesis more practically feasible. However, as I examine below, a moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism may also encounter obstacles not faced by a more extensive sentimental cosmopolitan account.

44 As noted in the introduction, Nussbaum moves towards a weaker moral cosmopolitan position in her later work. See, for example, Nussbaum (2008).
45 I examine the truth of this claim in detail in chapter six.
1.3. Sentimental Education

In order to pursue these cosmopolitan goals sentimental cosmopolitan theorists advocate a process of sentimental education. This concept of a cosmopolitan sentimental education has been developed in recent scholarship (Woods, 2012; Long, 2009), but has two primary sources. Firstly, Richard Rorty’s (1998) argument that journalism and literature encouraging sentimental identification with groups previously seen as other have played a key role in promoting respect for human rights globally. Secondly, Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) highly influential account of the role of art and literature within formal education as a means to encourage the extension of compassion beyond national borders. Although the accounts offered by Nussbaum and Rorty differ in some respects they share a number of important features, and taken together offer a representative account of the sentimental cosmopolitan practical project of cosmopolitan sentimental education.

The basic claim that underlies the idea of cosmopolitan sentimental education is that exposure to representations of the lives of distant others in literature and other art forms, and in journalism – particularly print and television journalism, can lead to increased sentimental identification with these others. This increased sentimental identification can in turn motivate a greater propensity to undertake action in support of these distant others. Alongside this basic claim I wish to emphasise three elements shared by both accounts, (i) the nature of the sentimental connection, (ii) how this connection is achieved, and (iii) the role of depictions of suffering in this process.

In the first instance, both accounts are concerned that those in positions of relative power develop kinder feelings towards marginalised others. Rorty focuses on the extension of sympathy to those suffering from human rights abuses, arguing that ‘the emergence of the human rights culture seems to [me to] owe nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad sentimental stories’ (1998, p.172). Nussbaum’s account advocates exposing citizens of affluent
liberal democracies to art and literature featuring the lives of distant others, primarily through processes of formal education, as a means to develop compassion for the sufferings of individuals beyond national borders (1993). If successful, this process of ‘cosmopolitan sentimental education’ serves to replace ‘the inclination of both students and educators to define themselves primarily in terms of local group loyalties and identities’ with a ‘sympathetic understanding of other cultures’ (Nussbaum, 1998, 65-69). It is important to note here that both accounts primarily focus on developing a unidirectional sentimental connection on the part of those in positions of relative power for those suffering injustices. Moreover, on both accounts attention is directed towards the suffering other, with notions of responsibility for this suffering playing a minimal role in the structure of the emotional reaction; a claim I examine in detail in the next chapter.47

Secondly, both authors also share the conviction that representations of the lives of distant others encountered in literature and other art forms, and within the media – particularly within the work of journalists, are the primary means through which to achieve this extension of affective concern. However, there is a difference of emphasis between the two accounts, with Rorty’s account focusing on the role of journalism, and what he terms ‘middlebrow art forms’, such as popular novels and television shows, encountered in day to day life (1991, p.60). Nussbaum does not deny that these mediums are important, but rejects a focus on the media due to its vulnerability to market pressure, and favours a focus on the content of formal education. As she notes, ‘there is one salient asymmetry between the media and the classroom: their relative vulnerability to market pressures’ (2001, p.434). Accordingly, Nussbaum’s account focuses on the role of narrative art forms encountered during the process of formal education as a preferable means of promoting sentimental identification (2001, p.434). Her account privileges the novel in particular due to its

46 Graham Long’s excellent 2009 paper on the topic directed me towards this particular set of quotes (Long 2009, p.330).
47 Two caveats are in order here. Firstly, Rorty’s focus on human rights may offer a way of incorporating responsibility, although discussion of responsibility is relatively absent from his account (See Woods, 2009). Secondly, Nussbaum suggests that for compassion to be an appropriate response suffering must be undeserved (2001, pp. 414-425). However, Nussbaum’s primary focus here is that the agent did not bring the suffering on themselves, not that others were responsible.
ability to connect the affluent reader to ‘highly concrete circumstances other than her own, making her an inhabitant of both privileged and oppressed groups’ ...[exercising] the muscles of the imagination, [and] making people capable of inhabiting, for a time, the world of a different person’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p.431).

Thirdly, depictions of the suffering of distant others play an important role in the representations employed in sentimental education on both accounts. Nussbaum’s account of the structure of compassion makes it clear that she considers the emotion to primarily arise in response to suffering. As she notes, for compassion to arise an agent must ‘consider the suffering of another as a significant part of his or her own scheme of goals and ends’, and take this suffering to be both serious and undeserved (Nussbaum, 2001, p.319). Similarly, Rorty suggests that sentimental education proceeds by encouraging people to ‘turn their eyes toward the people who are getting hurt, [and] notice the details of the pain being suffered’ (Rorty, 1998, p.80). The normative concerns arising due to this reliance on depictions of suffering in strategies of sentimental education have been discussed in Woods (2012), and the potential adverse motivational effects of this strategy will be discussed in detail in chapter five.

1.4. Moderate Sentimental Cosmopolitanism

Having outlined the broader sentimental cosmopolitan project I now turn to the narrower topic of sentimental cosmopolitanism as a means by which to address the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty, and a political account of these duties in particular. Within the rest of this chapter I will refer to this project as moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism. This is a _prima facie_ less demanding task than achieving more comprehensive sentimental cosmopolitan accounts. As noted above, this confined focus makes the sentimental cosmopolitan project distinctly less
demanding insofar as it reduces both the level of sentimental identification required and the motivational work sentiment is required to do.⁴⁸

However, it is important to note at this stage that the converse may be true, and a moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism encounter motivational obstacles not faced by a more extensive sentimental cosmopolitan approach. This is because a stronger cosmopolitan identity may be able to motivate significant behavioural changes, but a weaker level of cosmopolitan sentimental identification unable to motivate a more modest level of redistribution. I can see two reasons why this might potentially be the case. Firstly, sentimental identification might only be sufficient to motivate action after a certain threshold has been passed. Very modest degrees of empathetic concern for the suffering of others do not necessarily motivate action, as in the case of charitable campaigns aiming to motivate donations towards reducing international poverty.⁴⁹ Secondly, as Long suggests, the ‘situation with our emotions may be more zero-sum’ (2009, p.334) and a pervasive cosmopolitan identity may be able to motivate action, but a more modest sentimental cosmopolitanism rendered ineffective by countervailing influences. This is a particular worry in the case of a national identity supporting compatriot partiality, as this could undermine the motivational force of moderate cosmopolitan sentiments but lose out were a cosmopolitan identity more fundamental (Axelsen, 2014). I address these objections below, but raise them now in order to draw attention to the fact a moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism faces unique empirical and theoretical obstacles.

I now turn to address objections to this approach. Although empirical objections are overlooked in the current literature it is important to note that these are not the only relevant concern. Even where our interest in sentimental cosmopolitanism is primarily motivational, sentimental cosmopolitan approaches face potentially serious conceptual objections (Lenard, 2010; Lenard, 2010; Gilabert, 2012 =143).

⁴⁸ ‘It is clear that schemes of non-basic justice will prove harder to pursue than schemes of basic justice...It would then be wise is strategies of reform start with basic global justice.’ (Gilabert, 2012, p.143)
⁴⁹ Of course it is possible that the campaigns fail as they fail to move us, rather than moving us to an insufficient degree to motivate action. Personal experience suggests that the latter is at least sometimes the case.
2010a). Therefore, in section two, I will address conceptual objections to sentimental cosmopolitan strategies in general, and to moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism in particular, arguing that these conceptual objections do not obtain. I then move on to examine empirical objections to this approach in section three, arguing that although further empirical research is required to provide a decisive answer, moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism offers a promising approach to addressing the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty; however, this requires going beyond the practical proposals recommended by Rorty (1998) and Nussbaum (2001).

2. Conceptual Objections

In this section I examine conceptual objections to the broader sentimental cosmopolitan project in general, and to a moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism in particular. It is important to note at the outset that I will be using the terms ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’ and ‘moderate cosmopolitan solidarity’ to refer to the affective connections the broader sentimental cosmopolitan project and moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism aim to respectively engender. In doing so, I am using the more concise term ‘solidarity’ as a placeholder for ‘affective concern’, rather than using the term to refer to an explicitly political relationship (Gould, 2007), or a more robust relationship based on shared interests such as labour movement solidarity (Fantasia, 1988). This use of the term ‘solidarity’ is in keeping with recent literature on sentimental cosmopolitanism (Ulas, 2017; Axelsen, 2014; Lenard, 2012; Woods, 2012), and where I discuss theorists who use the term solidarity in an alternative sense it will be noted.

Firstly, I will examine two conceptual objections to the broader sentimental cosmopolitan project: (i) that solidarity or fellow-feeling is too weak to motivate sustained action even at the national level – where redistributive policies typically rely on coercive political institutions, and (ii) that cosmopolitan solidarity is implausible due to the sheer number of people involved. I then move on to examine two conceptual objections peculiar to more moderate sentimental cosmopolitan
positions: (i) that moderate cosmopolitan solidarity is incompatible with the continued existence of national solidarity, and (ii) that moderate cosmopolitan solidarity is not the sort of affective relationship able to motivate sustained action. I conclude that conceived of as conceptual criticisms, none of these objections obtain.

2.1. Solidarity and Redistribution

The first objection to the sentimental cosmopolitan approach is that solidarity is insufficient or tangential to motivating significant action to address injustices even at the national level; for example, in the case of support for the redistributive policies of welfare states. As Weinstock suggests, what redistribution exists at the national level is not given willingly, but is the result of transactions backed up by the coercive power of the state (2009, p.94). Therefore, as Ulas notes, ‘cosmopolitans...implausibly expect a more demanding variety of solidarity to be possible at the global level than has been achieved in the domestic context’ (Ulas, 2017, p.13).

It is difficult to discern the exact nature of this objection as the significance of the empirical claim can be interpreted in a variety of ways. If the argument makes the strong claim that solidarity is always insufficient to motivate redistribution absent coercive institutions, it is not particularly plausible. This is largely an empirical question, and one for which it is difficult to provide an exact answer due to the difficulty of discerning the precise motives behind any act of redistribution. However, redistribution regularly takes place outside of coercive institutions, and solidarity, or affective concern, is regularly cited as a motive for these acts. Similarly, the empirical claim that national redistribution takes place absent any significant degree of solidarity is difficult to sustain. I do not want to deny that some people pay taxes without feeling any meaningful degree of national solidarity, but community cohesion, national charitable organisations, and volunteer work, all suggest that national solidarity contributes to prosocial behaviour beyond what is coercively enforced. Furthermore, the existence of coercive redistributive institutions does not in itself point to
a general absence of solidarity, as their function may be primarily to solve collective action problems, or coerce a limited number of particularly selfish individuals.

A more plausible interpretation is that where solidarity is supported by coercive institutions it is more effective in motivating redistribution than in cases where these institutions are absent. This is straightforwardly true, as institutions can incentivise compliance and address coordination and free-rider problems; however, the significance of this for cultivating cosmopolitan solidarity is easily overstated. As Long notes, institution’s ‘cannot be all of the solution, because we need in turn to motivate support for these institutions’ (2009, p.325). Therefore, cultivating solidarity is still necessary both in order to increase compliance with the dictates of the institutions themselves, as coercion alone does not guarantee compliance, and to ensure the stability and continued existence of these institutions – particularly where institutions are subject to democratic control. Even where stability and compliance may be achievable through sufficient coercion we have strong normative reasons to prefer these goals are achieved through public support for the institutions themselves.

At the global level coercive redistributive institutions are also currently absent (or highly minimal), and plausibly one potential obstacle to whether such institutions are feasible is a lack of sufficient support for these institutions. Therefore, if the significant degree of redistribution that exists nationally (in some cases) requires the existence of coercive institutions then any attempt to realise this degree of redistribution globally will still require the cultivation of cosmopolitan solidarity. Conversely, if we concede that the creation of the relevant global institutions is not feasible in the foreseeable future then moderate increases in cosmopolitan solidarity motivating a modest degree of global redistribution may be the only means by which to move towards global

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50 Here I am concerned with the claim that solidarity is insufficient rather than the sources of solidarity. I acknowledge that coercive institutions may serve to increase feelings of solidarity but address this below.

51 ‘No constitution will ever be good and solid unless the law rules the citizens’ hearts. So long as the legislative force does not reach that deep, the laws will invariably be evaded.’ (Rousseau. J. 1985. The Government of Poland. First Edition Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett, p.179.)

52 These institutions also face significant practical challenges such as coordination problems, and an absence of political will, distinct from levels of popular support. National governments may be unwilling to bear the opportunity costs, despite a popular mandate.
justice. On either account, cultivating solidarity with distant others has a role to play in motivating global justice.

### 2.2. Scale/Numerical Concerns

A second conceptual objection to cosmopolitan solidarity is that it is implausible in contrast to national solidarity, due to the sheer number of people involved (McConnell, 1996, p.81). In drawing this contrast with national solidarity this argument is unpersuasive if it aims to put a specific limit on the number of people who can partake in a solidaristic relationship. As Axelsen notes, this stipulation is somewhat arbitrary, as the boundary would have to lie somewhere between the population of China, or whatever one took to be the most populous solidaristic nation, and the population of the world (2014, p.461). More importantly, the scope of national solidarity is in no sense natural, as solidaristic relationships between conationals are the result of intentional processes of nation building (Anderson, 1991). It is ultimately an empirical question whether similar processes are feasible at a global level, but the constructed nature of national solidarity suggests global solidarity is conceptually plausible for two reasons. Firstly, solidarity deriving from the nation building process suggests that the scope of solidarity can be expanded. Secondly, due to the scale of nations, national communities are necessarily imagined. As Anderson famously observes, ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.’ (1991, p.6).

This is significant as there are no clear numerical limits to the number of people we can imagine sharing a common life with. It also might be taken to imply that solidaristic relationships

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53 I use ‘nation’ in keeping with the literature on national solidarity, and draw no distinction between nations and states as distinct sources of solidarity in this discussion. Admittedly, this arbitrariness objection would not apply to those who considered national solidarity the exception not the rule, existing only within certain European welfare states for example.

54 Of course this does not mean there are no limits to the number of people we can imaginatively identify with. Axelsen provides examples where we do imagine ourselves as part of a world community (2014, p.461). I address the issue below that the degree of identification may be the problem rather than sheer scale.
do not rely on daily interaction with the individuals involved, thus increasing the plausibility of cosmopolitan solidarity (Axelsen, 2014, p.461); however, this inference is too quick as it can be plausibly argued that national solidarity is a case of moving from the particular to the general and, as such, is developed and sustained through encounters with particular conationals. Despite its *prima facie* compelling nature, this response suffers from two objections. Firstly, this does not conceptually rule out cosmopolitan solidarity as modern life typically involves interactions with individuals of different nationalities that could serve as the basis for cosmopolitan solidarity; a claim I examine in detail in chapter seven. Secondly, and more significantly, this argument assumes that interaction with conationals leads to national solidarity which begs the question, as this might equally be characterised as interactions with humans leading to broader human solidarity. Here, viewing the individuals concerned as ‘conationals’ rather than ‘humans’ is the result of educative processes, and cannot be thought to derive from the interactions themselves.\(^{55}\)

Rather than there being a strict numerical limit to the number of people who can be included in a solidaristic relationship, the scale of cosmopolitan solidarity may be problematic due to demandingness concerns. More specifically, a cosmopolitan solidarity sufficient to motivate redistributive obligations might be thought too demanding to be plausible given the number of people in need at the global level. There may appear to be something paradoxical in this objection as the very conditions creating the demandingness are those in which the motivational force of solidarity, or affective concern, is typically thought to come into play; as this is conceptualised (at least in part) as an empathetic response to the suffering of others. However, the motivational work that solidarity is required to do at the global level is *prima facie* greater, as there is more suffering to be rectified, and emotional responses may be limited as the suffering is less immediate.\(^{56}\)

\(^{55}\) Admittedly the same cannot necessarily be said for more parochial identities.
\(^{56}\) A further concern is that numerical scale does not typically increase emotional responses to suffering. Slovic (2007) provides evidence that typically the opposite is true and that the number of victims typically decreases the extent of our sentimental concern. There may also be some limits to the amount of sentimental concern we can feel, and its motivational force, past a certain point.
Despite this, I think we have no conceptual reason to rule out cosmopolitan solidarity simply due to demandingness stemming from increased scope. The first thing to note here is that at the global level, both the number of people in need and the number of people able to offer assistance increases. Therefore, the degree of sentimental identification required at the global level to effectively motivate redistributive obligations need not be as implausible as it first appears. Secondly, if we confine redistributive obligations to those necessary to realise basic global justice then we further increase the conceptual plausibility of the level of sentimental identification in question; as, despite their increased scope, the extent of these obligations is less than the higher level of sufficiency aimed at by some of the more generous national welfare states. Furthermore, the motivational work national solidarity has been traditionally required to do goes beyond even the more generous schemes of redistribute taxation, including, for example, a willingness to fight in national armies. Whether sufficient solidarity can be developed at the global level to motivate redistributive obligations is ultimately an empirical matter; however, we have no conceptual reason to rule out cosmopolitan solidarity, especially a moderate account, on the basis of demandingness.

Moderate cosmopolitan solidarity, understood as the degree of cosmopolitan solidarity necessary to motivate obligations to realise basic global justice, may be empirically more plausible than thicker accounts of cosmopolitan solidarity, as the change in attitudes required is less extensive. Conversely, more pervasive accounts may avoid conceptual objections that apply to more moderate accounts. I now address two conceptual objections that are specific to a moderate cosmopolitan solidarity: (i)...

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57 This raises the question of the extent to which national solidarity and self-interest are interrelated, at least traditionally. Therefore much of the motivation for contributions towards welfare systems, or participation in defensive wars might be attributed to prudence rather than solidarity. I cannot address this fully here, but note that this can be partly attributed to the existence of institutional structures linking self-interest with the interests of conationalists. Such institutions might be plausibly created at the global level, especially to tackle environmental concerns.

58 A further conceptual issue often raised as an objection to cosmopolitan solidarity is whether solidarity necessarily requires a common enemy or ‘other’. I think there is potential room for cosmopolitan solidarity to incorporate this oppositional dimension as there is no conceptual reason why the relationship must include all of humanity. It might be conceptualised as solidarity with ‘those in need’ and a common enemy found in abusers of human rights for example. However, strictly speaking I see no reason why solidarity understood as ‘affective concern’ need include this and see this oppositional dimension as conceptual baggage deriving from labour movement solidarity.
that moderate cosmopolitan solidarity is implausible as it is incompatible with national solidarity, and, (ii) that the modest degree of identification involved would be insufficient to motivate a commitment to redistribution.

2.3. Tensions with National Solidarity

For moderate cosmopolitan solidarity to be plausible it needs to be able to coexist with some degree of national solidarity. The idea that this coexistence is implausible forms the basis of a variety of objections to attempts to develop cosmopolitan solidarity; however, this is particularly significant for moderate accounts, as proponents of a stronger cosmopolitan position can deny the two are compatible and reject national solidarity along with the nation state. This response clearly raises feasibility issues for the strong cosmopolitan position, but as it is unavailable to the moderate cosmopolitan, this objection presents a distinct conceptual problem for a more moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism. This argument can take a variety of forms, none of which are particularly persuasive.

In its simplest form this objection suggests that ‘creating cosmopolitan solidarity is impossible, and...the current practice of creating national solidarity is preferable to having no solidarity at all’ (Axelsen, 2014, p.467). 59 Without further argument this is not a conceptual objection but an empirical feasibility claim. I examine empirical objections to cosmopolitan solidarity below, but it is important to note at this stage that this argument only goes through if the incredibly strong empirical claim can be sustained. Taken as a strictly conceptual objection this argument is unpersuasive as it needs to deny that cosmopolitan solidarity and national solidarity can coexist, not that there must be some degree of trade-off between the two identities. Clearly, multiple solidarities are conceptually possible, for example solidarity with coreligionists and conationals, and whether such multiple identities are inherently unstable cannot be answered at the conceptual level, as this

59 Axelsen is summarising this position not advocating it.
will depend on facts about the specific identities in question. This is not to deny that national solidarity may prove an impediment to establishing moderate cosmopolitan solidarity in some cases.

Developing moderate cosmopolitan solidarity will necessarily conflict with stronger versions of national solidarity. However, moderate cosmopolitan solidarity, understood as the degree of solidarity necessary to motivate obligations of basic global justice, still allows room for weaker versions of national solidarity, such as liberal nationalist accounts that include a commitment to universal human rights (Miller, 2007, pp.163-201).\(^{60}\) If we accept that solidarity is deeply bound up in motivating redistributive obligations then the argument that we ought not to pursue moderate cosmopolitan solidarity where it conflicts with stronger versions of national solidarity collapses into the normative claim that we ought to favour comprehensive justice within the state over basic justice globally (Miller, 2013, p.178). As my argument takes the normative desirability of basic global justice as a given and aims to provide support for a sentimental cosmopolitan approach to the motivational deficit such an account faces, I will not address this normative claim here; however, I note in passing that it seems hard to justify this degree of compatriot favouritism.

### 2.4. Efficaciousness

A further conceptual objection to moderate cosmopolitan solidarity is that whilst such a relationship may be conceptually possible it would be insufficient to motivate individuals to live up to their duties to address global poverty. This is distinct from the empirical claim that affective concern is a poor source of motivation (Prinz, 2011), addressed below, and is instead the conceptual claim, as made by David Miller, that only ‘fundamental relationships’\(^{61}\), such as a shared national identity, can motivate

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\(^{60}\) It should be noted that the existence of the nation state may be potentially incompatible with basic global justice. I do not agree with the general argument but think this may apply to the nation state in its current form, however this is an issue I do not have space to address here.

\(^{61}\) Miller defines a fundamental identity as ‘one that people understand as playing a central role in a good human life, and one that plays a large part in determining whether or not people’s lives are successful’ (2007, p.35).
support for redistributive obligations (2007, p.35). Therefore, although a strong cosmopolitan solidarity could plausibly motivate a commitment to global redistribution if it constituted a ‘fundamental identity’, a moderate cosmopolitan solidarity would be unable to motivate action of this character. It is unclear exactly what Miller is referring to by ‘redistributive obligations’ here. He cannot simply mean financial donations, as individuals offer charitable donations to a variety of causes without sharing ‘fundamental relationships’ with the groups or individuals in question. However, Miller offers the example of support for progressive taxation to fund a national welfare state as a paradigm example of a redistributive obligation (2007, p.35). From this I take it that Miller is referring to support for consistent action, either in the form of regular donations or through supporting the institutionalisation of redistribution through political channels. As argued in chapter one, political duties to address global poverty may be thought at least equally demanding to duties to address global poverty through financial donations; therefore, if a fundamental relationship is necessary to motivate consistent action in the latter case this plausibly also applies in the former.

Miller’s argument assumes that where moderate cosmopolitan solidarity and national solidarity coexist, it is the national solidarity – sustained by national identity – that will be fundamental. Given the resources nation states typically employ to inculcate a sense of national identity this is plausible as a short term feasibility claim; however, utilising these resources to increase a sense of cosmopolitan identity is precisely what is advocated by proponents of sentimental cosmopolitanism (Ypi, 2008; Nussbaum, 1996). Admittedly, educative programs can only achieve so much given the continued existence of the nation state in anything like its current form. Therefore, it is probably more plausible that such programmes would lead to individuals becoming more cosmopolitan rather than viewing the identity as fundamental. Nevertheless, it is conceptually possible that the two identities could coexist but the cosmopolitan identity be fundamental.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{62} For example, through financial donations to dogs homes or donkey sanctuaries.

\textsuperscript{63} A concern I do not address here, and which Miller’s argument ignores, is whether it is more motivationally efficacious to cultivate cosmopolitan solidarity directly or indirectly – as an element of national identity. An example of the latter case would be the tradition within a section of the British Conservative party of viewing Great Britain as a humanitarian leader with obligations to the global poor through noblesse oblige. Whilst this
Whether this argument represents a plausible challenge to the motivational efficaciousness of a moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism depends on the degree of action to address global poverty that can take place where such an identity is absent. On this point Miller is slightly unclear, arguing that absent a shared fundamental identity people are ‘unable to support extensive redistributive obligations’ (2007, p.35), whilst also advocating global humanitarian rights – including socioeconomic rights (Miller, 2007; Miller, 2013). Whether realising basic global justice constitutes an extensive obligation is in large part an empirical question (beyond the scope of the current discussion) however many political theorists argue that the actions required to realise basic global justice are relatively modest, at least when undertaken collectively (Gilabert, 2012, pp.111-151; Murphy, 2003; Pogge, 2002, pp.196-214).64

Faced with this question Miller has three options. The first option is to accept that fundamental identities are unnecessary to motivate basic global justice as this does not constitute an extensive obligation. In this case Miller’s objection does not apply to my argument. Moreover, this leaves Miller’s account incomplete as he needs to say more regarding how the global humanitarian rights he advocates are motivated. The second option is to deny that basic global justice can be motivated absent a shared fundamental identity, as the obligations involved are extensive. However, this leaves Miller’s account of global humanitarian rights motivationally unsustainable and seems to be open to empirical counterexamples; for example, widespread support for global redistributive policies and human rights and individuals who already donate a significant portion of their time or income towards reducing international poverty.65 The third option is to claim that for those individuals who are currently motivated to act to address global poverty,

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64 As argued in Chapter One, whether financial redistribution absent significant political reforms offers a genuine solution to severe poverty is highly questionable. However, we can assume that, targeted correctly, the figure Pogge has in mind would at least make a significant contribution.

65 Admittedly these individuals are unusual but that they even exist suggests that fundamental identities developed and sustained through institutions are not a necessary condition for people acting to realise global redistributive obligations (although they may be for most of us).
'cosmopolitanism' constitutes a fundamental identity, but by taking this option Miller would have to concede that moderate cosmopolitan solidarity can motivate sustained action to realise basic global justice. It might be objected that this is of limited significance as it only occurs in the case of a relatively small number of people. That such behaviour is not the norm is correct; however, this fails to take into account that these people act this way despite cosmopolitan solidarity not being actively promoted, and in spite of significant countervailing influences from the state aiming to render national solidarity fundamental. Therefore, were moderate cosmopolitan solidarity to be more actively promoted we can assume that such behaviour would be more prevalent.

In this section I have examined four objections to the sentimental cosmopolitan approach to the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty. First, I examined two conceptual objections to the broader sentimental cosmopolitan project: (i) that solidarity or fellow-feeling is too weak to motivate sustained action even at the national level, where redistributive policies typically rely on coercive political institutions, and (ii) that cosmopolitan solidarity is implausible due to the sheer number of people involved. I then moved on to examine two conceptual objections particular to moderate sentimental cosmopolitan strategies. (i) That moderate cosmopolitan solidarity is incompatible with national solidarity, and (ii) that moderate cosmopolitan solidarity is not the sort of affective relationship able to motivate sustained action. I concluded that these arguments are unpersuasive when understood as advancing conceptual claims.

3. Empirical Objections

Absent compelling conceptual objections, whether a moderate sentimental cosmopolitanism provides a promising solution to the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty is ultimately an empirical question. This is because the sentimental cosmopolitan project is not primarily destructive, pointing to an affective deficiency in rationalist accounts, it also presents a solution to the problem it identifies – the practical project of sentimental education. Although
answering this empirical question definitively is beyond the scope of the thesis, the third section of this chapter engages with the empirical literature on moral motivation in order to assess a number of empirical objections to the sentimental cosmopolitan practical proposal. In order to do so I first briefly set out Martha Nussbaum’s and Richard Rorty’s positive suggestions as to what a sentimental education actually consists in, making some specific critical remarks, before moving on to address these practical objections in detail.

3.1. Sentimental Education: Rorty and Nussbaum

Nussbaum’s account of a cosmopolitan sentimental education is primarily intended to serve as an alternative to the more nationally focused education typically provided in schools. I do not have the space here to do full justice to Nussbaum’s nuanced account (1996, pp.3-21; 1998) but will attempt to summarise her overall approach, which contain three main aspects. Firstly, Nussbaum’s sentimental education is predominantly focused on young people; and, as already noted, it is intended as a curricula focus for school education. Secondly, exposure to art, and in particular literature, from diverse global cultures and traditions serves as the primary means by which Nussbaum’s educative programme aims to increase sentimental identification with distant others (Woods, 2012, p.39). Thirdly, Nussbaum’s educative project employs a critical approach and a distinct liberal focus, where both our rational faculties and our emotional capacities are cultivated together. Indeed, on her neo-Stoic theory of emotion the two are not entirely separable and the whole educative project is based on the understanding that ‘since compassion contains thought it can be educated’ (1996, p.13).

The first thing to note about Nussbaum’s model of sentimental education is that by employing a critical approach, and encouraging rational discussion as a response to emotional stimuli, it avoids objections that it is manipulative. However, employing a critical approach potentially compromises motivational efficaciousness as there is arguably some degree of trade-off
between cultivating strong affective connections and encouraging critical distance. This is not to suggest that an uncritical approach is normatively preferable, but that by encouraging such a critical perspective there is ‘no guarantee that the conclusions drawn would be the ones that the cosmopolitan would want.’ (Long, 2009, p.333).

A second concern with Nussbaum’s account is that, in its focus on worthy literary texts, it invites charges of elitism (Jollimore and Barrios, 2006; Rorty, 1991). Her account offers little in the way of concrete examples of the novels she intends to fulfil this role in the case of extending cosmopolitan compassion; however, she approvingly cites Rabindrath Tagore’s novel *The Home and the World* (1996, p.3) and discusses the role of Ralph Ellison’s *Invisible Man* in encouraging the extension of compassion across racial lines in domestic politics in the United States (2001, p.430). Although explicitly noting that what she wants from literature is ‘not erudition; it is empathy and the extension of concern’ Nussbaum does goes on to state that she ‘believe[s] that there is a prima facie and general correlation between artistic merit and the ability to engage the personality at a deep level’ (2001, p.432).

Against the specific claim that literature, as opposed to potentially more accessible art forms, is the most effective means of cultivating sentimental concern, worries over elitism may be warranted. However, as a point about reform in education this is unpersuasive, as replacing the study of literary classics encouraging imaginative identification with conationals with texts encouraging like identification with individuals beyond national borders makes no claim regarding the relative value of the medium. Rather than a concern over elitism as such, this objection is significantly more damaging if it is reformulated as the worry that, by privileging the literary form, Nussbaum’s sentimental education assumes an overly narrow conception of the agent. Personal experience and psychological research (Silvia, 2005) attest that different people are moved to differing degrees, both by different works of art and, more importantly, by different artistic mediums. As a writer it is perhaps no surprise that Nussbaum feels great affinity with the literary medium, and literature may be relatively unique in the degree of insight that it can offer regarding
the inner life of a particular other; however, other mediums – such as the film and television discussed by Rorty, and even lyrical music\textsuperscript{66} – are plausibly equally important for expanding the scope of cosmopolitan sentimental concern.

Richard Rorty’s (1998) account of what a sentimental education consists in is less fully developed than Nussbaum’s account. This is because Rorty is primarily concerned with identifying a mechanism by which increased support for human rights has been brought about, rather than setting out a positive programme for future increases. Despite this, Rorty’s account has been highly influential, and is worth elaborating in its own right as, despite being broadly similar to Nussbaum’s account, it is strikingly different in a number of ways. Although both accounts share an emphasis on literature as a means to expand the scope of sentimental concern, for Rorty literature serves to complement the work of journalists and news media (1998, p.180) in encouraging cosmopolitan sentiments in the general populace, rather than as a key focus of a cosmopolitan curriculum within formal education. Rorty primarily focuses on what he terms “middlebrow literature”, which he takes to include ‘movies and television’ alongside popular novels, noting that the ‘extraordinary delicacy and...consequent “incalculable specificity”’ of highbrow literature ‘makes it relatively useless for purposes of moral instruction’ (1991, p.60).\textsuperscript{67}

Rorty also has a much less rationalist focus than Nussbaum, for whom recognition of the rational capacitates of others is employed in tandem with appeals to sentiment, and his account is largely silent on whether a critical approach to materials inspiring sentimental concern is appropriate. It is important to note here that Rorty is not as hostile to reason as some of his fiercer critics have suggested (Hayden, 1999), and does not deny that sentiments can be educated, or that it is appropriate to do so, rather he rejects the claim that we are united with distant others through a

\textsuperscript{66} The much maligned Band Aid single ‘Do They Know It’s Christmas?’ offers an example of lyrical music aimed at encouraging sentimental concern for individuals facing poverty globally. However, I take it that the criticism this song has faced concern the message and the messengers (see chapter seven) rather than the medium.

\textsuperscript{67} Rorty does not consider highbrow literature to have no value, but sees it as functioning in the private sphere in ‘individual projects of self-creation’ rather than fulfilling a social purpose (Rorty, 1991, p.60).
shared rational faculty that is ‘distinctively and transculturally human’ (1998, p.181). A further key difference between the two accounts is that Rorty acknowledges that there are conditions in which cultivating sentimental concern can be ineffective in motivating action; explicitly stating that absent personal security appeals to sentiment will fail, as ‘sentimental education works only on people who can relax long enough to listen’ (1998, p.180).

By focusing on the role of news media and popular journalism in cultivating sentimental concern Rorty’s sentimental education is less open to charges of elitism than Nussbaum’s account, as these mediums are more widely consumed and arguably more accessible than the art forms Nussbaum privileges. However, the very accessibility of these mediums raises its own problems, as the limited temporal dimension, and superficial nature of the coverage, is part of what renders these mediums accessible. As commentators have noted, these factors undermine the potential for these mediums to develop and sustain robust levels of sentimental concern for distant others (Gould, 2007). Reliance on these mediums faces further concerns as perceptions of the situation of distant others are necessarily mediated by news organisations. Mediation within strategies of sentimental education may be unavoidable in practice, as I argue in chapter seven; however, as Woods (2012, p.42) has argued, mediation faces a number of normative concerns, at least in practice, serving to present distant others in a manner that emphasises their suffering and/or obscures their capacity for agency in some cases (Woods, 2012, p.42). This is a particular problem for Rorty’s account, which both relies on depictions of suffering to motivate action and on the role of mediators to a greater extent than Nussbaum’s account, with Nussbaum placing a greater emphasis on the works of art that ought to form the basis of a cosmopolitan education being authored by ‘distant others’ themselves (1998, pp.65-69).

Where Rorty’s account is more persuasive than Nussbaum’s is in its recognition that exposure to the relevant emotive stimuli will not typically be effective in cultivating sentimental concern if certain background conditions are not met. As previously noted, Rorty’s account emphasises the background condition of security in particular. Despite what I take to be the inherent
plausibility of the security condition, strictly speaking it is not a necessary condition, as cases exist where people both display and act on sentimental concern for others despite a lack of security in their own lives. Cases where this applies to distant others are all the more unusual, but nevertheless exist. Conversely, cases where people fail to be moved by the plight of distant others, despite security and appropriate stimuli are not uncommon, so sympathy and security cannot constitute sufficient conditions. For a full discussion of Rorty’s security condition see chapters five and six.

A further concern for a sentimental education relying on sympathetic news media is that sentimental concern may be invoked, but at a level insufficient to motivate action, due to the fleeting nature of the coverage. Personal experience is likely to attest to the fact that instances where the media engages our sentiments in response to the suffering of distant others do not typically result in action to address these issues. This is not to deny that such action does sometimes occur, especially in response to sustained media campaigns, but to emphasise that such cases are not the norm. This raises a number of broader practical issues for the efficaciousness of a sentimental education more generally, which will be addressed below.

This brief review of the strategies of sentimental education proposed by Nussbaum and Rorty suggests that a more comprehensive approach is required than that offered by either account in order to develop a level of cosmopolitan affective concern sufficient to motivate sustained action to address global poverty. I hope this brief exposition of two influential accounts of what a sentimental education entails in practice offers a useful reference point as I move on to examine what I take to be the three most serious objections to a moderate cosmopolitan sentimental education as a means to motivate action to address global poverty. These objections are taken up in detail in the chapters that follow; accordingly, my intention here is not to solve these concerns, but to highlight areas of the sentimental cosmopolitan practical project where further work is needed.

3.2. Motivational Power
One of the most serious practical objections to attempts to motivate action to realise basic global justice by cultivating affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally is not to deny that cultivating such concern is possible, but to deny that such concern is effective in motivating action. This claim is made by Jesse Prinz in his paper ‘Against Empathy’, which argues that ‘evidence suggests that empathy is not very effective in motivating action. Studies show that empathy promotes prosocial behaviour, but only when there is little or no cost (Neuberg et al., 1997)’ (Prinz, 2011, p.225). Here Prinz is not simply referring to the phenomena of perspective taking, or ‘feeling with’, but includes accounts where empathy is understood as ‘feeling for’ or ‘concern’ within his critique (2011, p.231).

The first thing to note here is that Prinz’s empirical claim does not withstand scrutiny, as a significant body of research within moral psychology supports the view that empathy, understood in Batson’s (1991) terms as ‘feeling for’, is central to motivating moral action (Jeffery, 2014; Thomas et al., 2009; Ahmad et al., 2005; Izard and Ackerman, 2000; Batson, 1991). This is in contrast to the one empirical study cited in Prinz’s (2011) paper. However, even if we accept Prinz’s preferred empirical conclusion this does not undermine the case for cultivating cosmopolitan empathy as a plausible method of motivating action to address global injustice. As Prinz accepts Neuberg et al.’s ‘little or no cost’ proviso, his argument still allows room for empathy as a means to motivate action towards basic global justice, as on this account the motivational efficaciousness of empathy is only compromised by the cost of prosocial action – and it is plausible the cost involved to individuals might be fairly minimal if action to address global poverty took place on a sufficient scale. Moreover, as Judith Lichtenberg has argued, the costs of action to address global poverty cannot be taken as fixed, and collective sacrifices potentially involve comparatively low costs as the salience of losses will be mitigated (2014, pp.122-133). What Lichtenberg’s argument serves to highlight is that what is doing the argumentative work on Prinz’s account is perceived cost, rather than an absolute notion.

68 If Prinz’s concern is simply with a narrow account of empathy as a cognitive process of perspective taking then his arguments need not concern us here as they have a different target.
of cost. This is significant as perceptions of cost are subject to influence by social and psychological factors, and constitute a less fixed constraint than an absolute notion of cost. It is also important to note that an agent’s perception of relative cost may itself be influenced by their levels of empathetic concern for the beneficiaries of the action in question.

However, this is a dispute between sentimentalists, and Prinz does not deny that sentiment is the primary source of moral motivation; instead he is making the claim that moral motivation depends on a broader array of ‘moral emotions’, such as anger, guilt, and shame, rather than empathy alone (2011, p.219). Here Prinz highlights an important shortcoming of the sentimental cosmopolitan practical project of sentimental education, an overemphasis on encouraging empathy for distant others at the expense of utilising a broader array of emotions to motivate action to address global injustices. This is a point that is echoed by Sonali Chakravarti (2014) and Robert Solomon (1995) who stress the neglected role of anger, in particular, in motivating moral action, and one that also receives significant support from the empirical literature, which highlights the role of a range of emotions in moral motivation (Haidt, 2003; Ben-Ze’ev, 2000).

There is a broader empirical question here of whether feeling empathy for particular others is necessary for, or at least highly conducive to, these other moral emotions, for example with some degree of empathetic concern for distant others necessary for anger to arise at their ill treatment by other parties. I address this question in detail in the next chapter, but note at this stage that, even if this is the case, there are three reasons why it may benefit sentimental cosmopolitans to directly cultivate a broader range of cosmopolitan emotions. Firstly, relying on a range emotions may be particularly motivationally efficacious due to differences in individual psychology and character. Secondly, there may be normative reasons to favour cultivating emotional responses to injustice that include attributions of responsibility, such as anger and shame. Thirdly, emotions featuring attributions of responsibility may be especially effective in motivating support for political strategies to address global injustices, and, as Chakravarti notes, anger is particularly central to motivating political action (Chakravarti, 2014, p.128). Accordingly, attention to cultivating a broader array of
cosmopolitan emotions within strategies of sentimental education may offer distinct advantages for motivating support for political strategies to address global poverty.

3.3. The Role of Representations

The projects of sentimental education proposed by Nussbaum (2001) and Rorty (1998) both heavily rely on depictions of distant others encountered within the media and in various art forms as a means to encourage the development of empathy or affective concern. There is significant empirical support for empathy as a means to motivate action, although, as noted above, an emphasis on a cultivating a greater number of emotional responses offers potential benefits. Moreover, the effectiveness of art, and narrative art in particular, in encouraging empathetic responses is backed up by a range of studies in social psychology (Jollimore and Barrios, 2006; Silvia, 2005).

However, the use of representations to provoke affective reactions faces three significant concerns. Firstly, empathy or affective concern for distant others encountered in journalism and art needs to be generalised to actual individuals and groups facing poverty globally in order to motivate action. Secondly, there is a concern with how these affective reactions are provoked. As Woods (2012) notes, there is an overreliance on depictions of suffering to do this motivational work on both Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s accounts. Thirdly, the use of representations may serve to displace actual interactions with distant others, which poses normative concerns, especially where these representations are created outside of countries where global poverty is prevalent, and, as I argue below, there are reasons to favour interaction from a motivational perspective. I will take each in turn.

*Generalising from sentimental stories.* The ‘capacity on the part of the sympathetic to generalise from one ‘sentimental story’ to others similarly affected’ is something that the sentimental cosmopolitan project of sentimental education takes for granted (Woods, 2012, p.62). It is important
to note that individuals may respond in a variety of ways to sentimental stories encountered in art and media, as here we are dealing with the behaviour of choosing agents. Social psychology research supports the view that typically ‘valuing of [a given members] welfare should generalise to valuing the welfare of the stigmatized group as a whole.’ (Ahmad et al., 2005, p.369; Aronson, 2005); however, I take it that individuals weeping sensitive tears for characters in novels, whilst failing to act to address those facing like circumstances in real life is by no means uncommon.

Here the sentimental cosmopolitan has a persuasive answer, as although the sentimental cosmopolitan project foregrounds the role of emotion, it does not entail the replacement of reasoning in moral judgment. Therefore, in such circumstances, the sentimental cosmopolitan can argue that reason has important work to do in highlighting the inconsistency in such a response. This need for the cultivation of cosmopolitan sentiments to be complemented by critical reasoning is explicitly noted by Nussbaum (1998) who maintains that a sentimental education must be critical, and is at least tacitly accepted by Rorty who approving quotes Annette Baier’s interpretation of Hume that ‘corrected (sometimes rule corrected) sympathy…is the fundamental moral capacity.’ (Rorty, 1998, p.181). Therefore, this point does not serve to undermine the plausibility of a sentimental education as a means to address the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty, but it does require that any strategy of cosmopolitan sentimental education includes exposure to rational cosmopolitan arguments, whether in academic or popular form, if it is to be effective in motivating action.

However, this does not escape the further concern, raised by Sandra Bartky (2002), that in subjecting our sentiments to this critical process some of the motivational force of our uncorrected sentiments may be lost. As I argue below, if cosmopolitan sentiments are to motivate effective action then this appeal to reason is a necessary trade-off, however, our sentimental reactions can only be corrected so far before they lose their motivational force. As empirical work by Slovic (2007) attests, it is the very specificity of individual cases that renders emotional identification easier, and provokes a strong affective reaction. Here there is a need for strategies of sentimental education to
prioritise specificity where possible, and to directly cultivate concern for particular individuals and groups facing global poverty and other injustices.

The role of suffering. A second concern for the practical project of sentimental education concerns its overreliance on depictions of suffering to provoke an affective response. This faces normative concerns, as these depictions may serve to both reinforce power relationships inherent in networks of giving and receiving (MacIntyre, 2013, p.108) and to portray individuals facing global injustices in a manner that is inconsistent with their own self-images and understandings. Although I address these normative issues in detail in chapter seven, my present focus is the motivational problems presented by this emphasis on suffering. Here I wish to highlight two motivational concerns, which I address in detail in chapters five and seven respectively.

Firstly, attention to suffering can lead to reactions of avoidance, as exposure to depictions of suffering is typically a distressing experience. Rather than acting to address distant suffering individuals may seek to distract themselves from this unpleasant reality and limit their exposure to processes of sentimental education. As Batson notes, ‘[i]n the booming, buzzing confusion of modern life, we can almost always find a way to direct our attention elsewhere or to convince ourselves that inaction is justified’ (1991, p.217).

Secondly, representations of individuals facing global poverty and other injustices, that emphasise their suffering may serve to increase perceptions of distance rather than encourage identification. As Woods argues, where distant others primarily appear to affluent publics in this manner it can serve to obscure their capacity for purposive agency, or other characteristics – such as rationality or a capacity for dialogue – central to the self-conceptions of affluent individuals (Woods, 2012, p.41). Where such characteristics are obscured this not only serves to render identification more difficult, but to present a motivational barrier to potential solutions to the very suffering highlighted. This is a point made by Onora O’Neill (2000) with reference to trade and aid, as these
presuppose a capacity for agency on the part of participants; and, as I argue in chapter seven, also applies to participation in political strategies to address injustice.

*Interaction.* Other cosmopolitan theorists broadly sympathetic to a sentimental approach have advocated cultivating cosmopolitan concern through interaction with distant others, either through social media (Gould, 2007) or in person (Schwarzenbach, 2009, p.152). Such face-to-face interactions, whether through the use of information technologies or in person, will not always be feasible in practice as there are a number of practical obstacles to their implementation. However, as I argue in chapter seven, where these strategies are both possible and normatively appropriate they ought to be pursued. A greater emphasis on facilitating interactions within strategies of sentimental education can offer the following advantages. Firstly, as discussed above, affective connections to particular individuals and groups facing severe poverty and other injustices may be more motivationally efficacious than affective concern cultivated via generalised representations encountered in art and media. Secondly, this strategy features distant others in an active role within the process of sentimental education; as I argue in the final chapters of the thesis, this can serve as a much needed corrective to strategies of sentimental education that present distant others in a manner that obscures their capacity for agency. Thirdly, specific connections can help facilitate specific solutions, with groups and individuals facing particular injustices well placed to suggest appropriate courses of action.

### 3.4. Motivating Effective Action

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69 The exchange programmes recommended by Schwarzenbach (2009), in which affluent youths visit communities facing severe poverty and perform manual labour face a number of significant normative concerns, in particular.
The third concern cultivating cosmopolitan empathy faces as a means of motivating action to realise basic global justice is that empathetic concern may inspire ineffective or tokenistic action. This is distinct from broader feasibility concerns facing basic global justice, and is instead the worry that empathetic concern in particular may be correlated with certain forms of ineffective action. This can be divided into two separate, but related, concerns. Firstly, that the process by which empathy is typically thought to lead to effective action in face-to-face interactions, as suggested by Batson et al. (1991, pp.61-74), breaks down in the causally complex case of global poverty, leading to tokenistic action. Secondly, empathy may struggle to motivate political action in particular, due to the demanding nature of political action and the complex behaviours required.

Extensive studies by Batson et al. (1991) suggest that empathy typically causes individuals to act to alleviate an other’s suffering, as perception of this suffering causes us to experience a negative emotional reaction that is alleviated by remedial action. However, in the case of global poverty the causal chain is highly complex, as there is no consensus over effective courses of action, and no clear feedback regarding whether one’s actions have been effective. These complications suggest that tokenistic actions may be an equally effective means of reducing adverse emotional arousal resulting from empathetic concern for suffering distant others, than more effective remedial action. However, as in the case of generalising from one sentimental story to like cases, the sentimental cosmopolitan has a persuasive answer via an appeal to the necessary role of critical reason within strategies of sentimental education; here, critical reason can serve to direct empathetic concern towards effective solutions.

A final concern for the sentimental cosmopolitan practical strategy of sentimental education as a means to address the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty is that cosmopolitan empathy may struggle to motivate political action in particular. As argued in chapter one, this thesis favours a political account of these duties as political reform is necessary to provide

70 This is not to suggest these problems are entirely absent in more localised cases, but that they are more significant in the case of global poverty.
effective long-term solutions. There are two version of this objection, which I will address in turn. The first version appeals to empirical evidence, for example empirical studies by Ahmad et al. that suggest that there is a greater correlation between empathy and charitable donations than between empathy and political action (Ahmad et al., 2005, p.373). This argument is easily addressed by appealing to the contingent nature of this claim. The actions empathetic concern typically inspires will depend on which remedial actions are salient to individuals or popularised within the society they inhabit, and the existence of the relevant institutional structures to facilitate these actions. Therefore, a significant part of why empathy typically inspires charitable actions within our society, if this is indeed the case, can plausibly be attributed to the salience of charitable solutions and a relative lack of opportunities for political action.71

The second version of this objection does not point to a particular link between empathy and charitable giving, but instead highlights the demandingness of political action. As discussed in chapter one, political action requires time and energy, and some of the more effective means by which to pursue political change, such as attending protests in person, are prima facie particularly demanding.72 I take this objection to pose a genuine concern for existing accounts of cosmopolitan sentimental education, and note that, although neither Rorty’s nor Nussbaum’s account offers a detailed picture of the action they seek to engender, both authors appear to operate with a primarily charitable model of this action. Political strategies to address global injustices typically proceed by identify institutional causes; yet, there is scant attention to the institutional causes of global poverty, and identifying responsible parties, on either Rorty’s or Nussbaum’s account. However, as I shall argue in the remaining chapters of this thesis, there is no necessary connection between cosmopolitan sentimental education and charity, and a suitably modified account of

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71 Arguably social biases against collective action may also play some role. The studies took place in the United States but I take it that they have at least some relevance to behaviour in the United Kingdom.
72 Although, as I noted in Chapter One, due to difference between individuals, in both psychology and character, and lifestyle and living situation, this may not always be the case. However, individuals who are particularly disposed to engage in political action, or who actively enjoy it, are not the concern of the thesis – as in these cases there is no motivational deficit to address.
sentimental education offers a promising means by which to motivate political action to address global poverty. In the next chapter I offer the beginnings of this account, arguing that, alongside cosmopolitan empathy, an emphasis on anger and shame can serve to turn the gaze of the would-be cosmopolitan towards political solutions.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the sentimental cosmopolitan project of cultivating increased levels of affective concern for distant others. I argued that, suitably modified, the sentimental cosmopolitan approach offers a promising means by which to motivate individuals to undertake political action to address global poverty.

The argument proceeded in three parts. In the first section I outlined the sentimental cosmopolitan approach, and offered a moderate sentimental cosmopolitan strategy as a prima facie promising means by which to address the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty. In section two I examined conceptual objections to the broader sentimental cosmopolitan project, and to a moderate sentimental cosmopolitan approach as a means to motivate action to address global poverty. I concluded that, conceived of as conceptual objections these do not obtain. Section three examined the sentimental cosmopolitan practical proposal of a ‘sentimental education’ in detail. I began by explicating the accounts of sentimental education offered by Rorty (1998) and Nussbaum (2001), noting that despite points of divergence, these accounts share a number of broad similarities. I then moved on to examine a number of empirical objections to this project, arguing that a moderate sentimental cosmopolitan strategy represents a promising means by which to motivate individuals to undertake action to address global poverty. However, I argued that the practical projects of sentimental education suggested by Nussbaum and Rorty face a number of significant concerns as a means to motivate support for sustained political action to this end. These concerns are taken up in detail in the chapters that follow. Therefore, although the
broader sentimental cosmopolitan approach is promising in many respects, addressing the motivational deficit facing political duties to reduce global poverty requires going beyond the approach to cosmopolitan sentimental education advocated by Nussbaum and Rorty.
Chapter Four: Cosmopolitan Anger and Shame

Introduction

In the previous chapter I argued that although the sentimental cosmopolitan strategy of cultivating empathy for distant others offers a potentially promising means by which to motivate individuals to live up to their duties to address global poverty, it has a number of weak points. Central to these concerns was a blind spot regarding responsibility. This chapter argues that the sentimental cosmopolitan project ought to be broadened to include the cultivation of a number of cosmopolitan emotions, especially anger and shame.

There can be a tendency to think of anger and shame as base motives to be overcome, or as bound up in parochial political projects, but I argue that in fact they constitute an important resource for the motivation of global justice; able to contribute to sentimental cosmopolitan efforts to address global poverty in ways that an exclusive focus on empathy cannot. Through their ability to accommodate responsibility for injustice, anger and shame are especially well-suited to motivating political action to address global poverty. Moreover, not only can these emotions offer additional motivational resources, they are also a normatively appropriate response to the injustice of global poverty.

The argument proceeds in three parts. Section one offers some definitions and explicates the relationship between empathy, and anger and shame. Section two examines the link between anger and shame, and notions of responsibility for injustice. It argues that the structures of anger and shame are especially well-suited to capturing notions of responsibility for global poverty, something lacking within sentimental cosmopolitan strategies primarily focused on the cultivation of empathy. Section three provides two further arguments suggesting that anger and shame can offer distinct motivational resources to help us live up to our duties to address global poverty: (i) Anger
represents an effective motivational resource by which to address the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty as it constitutes a powerful source of energy, reliably motivating action. (ii) Through its link with social pressure, shame can motivate individuals who lack empathy for distant others to act to address global poverty.

1. Sentimental Cosmopolitanism, Anger, and Shame

1.1. Sentimental Cosmopolitanism

Sentimental cosmopolitanism was discussed in detail in the previous chapter, where I argued that it offers a promising means by which to motivate compliance with duties to address global poverty, and, appropriately modified, to motivate individuals to live up to a political account of these duties. For clarity, it is worth briefly recapping the key commitments of sentimental cosmopolitan approaches which, although different in some respects, share the following three features. Firstly, sentimental cosmopolitans argue that cultivating empathy, or a similar prosocial emotion, is the primary means through which a greater degree of sentimental engagement with distant others is best achieved (Woods, 2012, p.36; Long, 2009, p.330). Secondly, although these accounts emphasise the role of cosmopolitan sentiments in motivating action to realise duties of global justice, this sentimental identification is also held to be intrinsically valuable. Exactly how this is articulated differs slightly between theorists, but these accounts share a broadly Aristotelian view on which cosmopolitan emotions are to be recommended as normatively appropriate responses (Nussbaum, 2001, pp.49-56). Thirdly, although sentimental cosmopolitans emphasise the role of sentiment they do not do so at the expense of reason; rather, both reason and emotion are thought to play necessary and complementary roles in moral life. Therefore sentimental cosmopolitans recommend a process of ‘sentimental education’ (Rorty, 1998), in which both appropriate sentimental stimuli
and critical reason serve to correct the more parochial tendencies of our unreconstructed sentiments.

As argued in the previous chapter, I am broadly sympathetic to the sentimental cosmopolitan approach, and do not intend to deny the general validity of any of these three claims. However, in this chapter I want to suggest that the degree of emphasis that has been placed on the first claim – that the sentimental cosmopolitan project ought to be primarily (if not exclusively) concerned with the cultivation of empathy beyond national borders – ought to be softened in favour of a broader emphasis on the cultivation of a number of cosmopolitan emotions, especially anger and shame. I shall argue that cultivating anger and shame alongside empathy in response to global poverty can offer additional motivational resources to attempts to motivate compliance with duties to address global poverty, providing particular benefits for motivating compliance with a political account of these duties. Insofar as political action to address global poverty may be thought especially motivationally demanding, the cultivation of additional motivational resources is advantageous for a political approach in particular; however, as I argue in this chapter, anger and shame can offer two further advantages for motivating political action to address global poverty. Firstly, anger and shame at global injustices may be particularly conducive to motivating political action to address global poverty as the structures of these emotions typically feature responsible parties. Secondly, through these emotions structural links with responsibility, the disruptive potential of anger, and the role of community in the structure of shame (Williams, 1993), these may be thought to be especially political emotions.

It is important to state explicitly at this stage that I recognise that anger and shame are typically viewed as particularly normatively problematic emotions. I do not deny that anger and shame have a dark side – both emotions can be corrosive of care and happiness, and there are troubling links between anger and violence, and shame and perceptions of worthlessness and inaction. I address these concerns in the argument below. Moreover, I hope that that argument of this chapter, in demonstrating the potential utility of these prima facie problematic sentiments,
offers support for a broader reappraisal of the utility of including of a number of emotions within the sentimental cosmopolitan project.

### 1.2. Defining Anger and Shame

Before I begin my positive case for the inclusion of anger and shame within sentimental cosmopolitanism three points need to be clarified: (i) what is meant by cosmopolitan empathy (ii) how cosmopolitan anger and shame are to be understood, and (iii) the relationship between cosmopolitan empathy and cosmopolitan anger and shame. I will address each point in turn.

Firstly, in this chapter, as elsewhere in the thesis, ‘cosmopolitan empathy’ is understood in a broad sense to refer to an increased degree of sentimental identification or affective concern for distant others. Therefore, I follow sentimental cosmopolitan theorists in understanding empathy primarily as ‘feeling for’ others rather than ‘feeling with’ them. Batson’s definition captures what I am referring to here: empathy is ‘an other-orientated emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another person’ (1995, p.1042).

Secondly, in discussing cosmopolitan anger and shame I do not intend to refer to an entirely distinct pair of emotions, but to anger and shame as we know them now directed towards cosmopolitan issues. However, the anger and shame I have in mind here are what might be referred to as ‘moral emotions’ in the sense that they arise as a response to the suffering or ill-treatment of others. The anger I am primarily concerned with is that which arises in response to the behaviour of a third party towards certain distant others. Therefore, cosmopolitan anger will be understood as typically having a tripartite structure, where the agent, a responsible party, and a wronged distant other (or others) are referenced in the structure of the emotion. The wrong involved can be taken to refer to either an act – such as complicity in global poverty, or an omission – such as a failure to aid.

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73 For a further discussion of different understandings of cosmopolitan empathy see the introduction.

74 I accept that not all instances of cosmopolitan anger and shame need have this moral character.
The account of shame offered in this chapter also has a tripartite structure, but with the agent herself as the party responsible for wronging distant others. The third reference point is the party, real or imagined, before whom the agent feels shame. This third party is particularly important in distinguishing between shame and its close relative, guilt. It should be noted that drawing a precise distinction between shame and guilt is difficult in practice, as the emotions are closely related. This is especially so in the case of sentimental cosmopolitanism, where the focus is on cultivating certain emotional responses, as it is unlikely the methods for doing so could be so precise as to lead to only one of the two emotions. However, I will follow the majority of philosophical and psychological accounts in taking the demarcation between shame and guilt to be that shame is linked to the perceptions of others to a greater extent than guilt (Prinz and Nichols 2010; Solomon, 2007; Williams, 1993). As Robert Solomon notes, ‘[s]hame [is typically inspired by] failing to live up to the standards of the group through which one gains one’s self-identity’ (2007, p.294). I do not deny that guilt may also provide an important motivational resource for global justice; however, I confine the present discussion to shame as it has traditionally been considered the more normatively problematic of the two emotions and, as I hope will become clear, the structure of shame offers a distinct opportunity for sentimental cosmopolitans that guilt does not.

Finally, I need to clarify what I take to be the correct relationship between cosmopolitan anger and shame, and cosmopolitan empathy; both overshoot and undershoot pose potential problems. As someone sympathetic to the sentimental cosmopolitan project of cultivating transnational empathy I do not want to suggest that anger and shame can entirely replace a focus on empathy and, insofar as this chapter addresses an internal debate within sentimental cosmopolitan theory, defending empathy as integral in motivating global justice is unnecessary. There are also good reasons to reject this route as some degree of empathy with distant others seems structurally

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75 Anger at one’s self is both qualitatively different from shame, and structurally different, as a third party, either real or imagined, is not referenced in the structure of the emotion. Anger at one’s own complicity in injustice maintains the tripartite structure detailed above; however, here the agent herself serves as both the first, and the second reference points.
necessary in order to feel anger at their ill-treatment, or shame at one’s own complicity in this ill-treatment. However, this is not to suggest that cosmopolitan anger and shame cannot be cultivated directly, or function as distinct motivational resources. Therefore, although I take some degree of cosmopolitan empathy to typically be structurally necessary for cosmopolitan anger and shame to function, I do not think it plausible that the only way to cultivate cosmopolitan anger and shame is by increasing levels of empathy. This is because although empathy may be a necessary condition for these emotions arising, in the majority of cases it is not a sufficient condition; further conditions, particularly attributions of responsibility (explored below), typically need to be met.

To further clarify the relationship between empathy, and cosmopolitan anger and shame, it is helpful to distinguish between thicker and thinner accounts of cosmopolitan empathy. This can be understood as a spectrum, with thicker accounts requiring a significant degree of sentimental identification with distant others, and thinner accounts a more minimal level. On the account I am offering thin cosmopolitan empathy should typically be understood as a precondition for cosmopolitan anger and shame, but thicker cosmopolitan empathy is unnecessary. This suggests a role for attempts to directly cultivate anger and shame within sentimental cosmopolitanism, but raises the question of why this approach is preferable to cultivating thick cosmopolitan empathy directly.

There are two reasons to be cautious of attempts to cultivate thick cosmopolitan empathy. Firstly, there is the practical worry that the feasibility of the sentimental cosmopolitan project decreases as the thickness of the empathy required increases. Whilst there is little doubt we can increase our levels of empathetic concern for distant others considerably, there is likely some limit to the extent of this process. Moreover, as Graham Long argues, at some point thicker accounts of cosmopolitan empathy will encroach on our partial commitments to the extent that we may have normative reasons to resist this route (2009, p.335).

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76 Although, as I elaborate in the final section of the paper, there may be some circumstances in which cosmopolitan shame can operate absent empathy with distant others.
A second concern relates to how this thicker empathy is to be brought about. Following Nussbaum (2001), the most plausible strategy is an education employing the arts to inspire imaginative identification with the lives of distant others – leading to greater cosmopolitan compassion or empathy. Whilst I am broadly sympathetic to this route I have reservations over the thickness of the empathy that results for the following reasons. Firstly, this strategy relies too heavily on our capacity for imaginative identification as a means to increase levels of empathy for distant others. A degree of modesty is required here regarding our ability to imaginatively identify with experiences radically different from our own; accordingly, the thickness of the resulting empathy will be limited by our relative ability to imagine lifestyles and hardships beyond our experience – I address this concern directly in chapter seven. Secondly, it is doubtful that any strategy of sentimental education can develop empathetic ties that are anything other than relatively thin due to the sheer number of people involved. Thirdly, it will likely be easier to achieve greater agreement over the nature and desirability of a thinner cosmopolitan empathy than a thicker account. Where the level of empathy required is more minimal, this can help lessen concerns over sentimental cosmopolitanism functioning as a neo-imperialist project. Moreover, a thinner account offers practical benefits in securing agreement, as a thinner notion of cosmopolitan empathy may have greater utility; both in convincing those not especially sympathetic to the sentimental cosmopolitan approach that it represents a plausible strategy and in minimising disagreement amongst sentimental cosmopolitans.

2. Anger, Shame, and Responsibility

Critics of sentimental cosmopolitanism argue that an exclusive focus on increasing levels of empathy for distant others serves to obscure responsibility for global poverty and other injustices. This view is exemplified by Andrew Dobson’s call for ‘less empathy, more causal responsibility’ (2006, p.172). Andrew Linklater goes a step further arguing that a focus on anger and shame, and other emotions
arising as a result of responsibility for harms, ought to replace a focus on empathy altogether, as ‘[C]osmopolitan emotions are most likely to develop when actors believe they are causally responsible for harming others’ (2006, p.111). This is particularly important as much global poverty and related sufferings can plausibly be attributed to unfair trading regimes imposed by the international community (Pogge, 2002, pp.15-20). In this section I examine the utility of anger and shame as a means to motivate action to address global poverty due to their shared emphasis on responsibility, arguing that these emotions can potentially serve as correctives to sentimental cosmopolitan strategies that are largely silent on questions of responsibility for injustice. In order to make this case it is necessary to examine the link between anger and shame, and responsibility in some detail.

2.1. Responsibility and Structure

Traditionally anger as a response to injustice is thought to involve responsibility in a way that empathy does not (Solomon, 2007, pp.20-23); this is for two reasons. Firstly, anger in response to injustice draws an agent’s attention towards perpetrators, or responsible parties. Secondly, as Nussbaum notes, ‘anger tracks harm’ in the sense that it typically arises as a response to perceptions of harms to self or others.77 This focus on harm directs attention towards questions of responsibility (2006, p.345). Shame also incorporates responsibility, however, as a ‘self-blame’ emotion, shame typically directs attention towards one’s own responsibility rather than that of others (Haidt 2003; Ben-Ze’ev 2000). As Robert Solomon puts this, guilt and shame ‘are not only emotions about the self but emotions about responsibility, including moral responsibility’ (2007, p.90).

However, the exact notion of responsibility operative in the case of shame has been the subject of significant debate as some instances of shame do not appear to track modern notions of

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77 Plausibly, empathy also tracks harm, but does not include the further step of directing attention towards responsible parties.
responsibility. We can be ashamed of our height or features, for example, despite bearing minimal responsibility for these aspects of our person. Two of the most prominent theoretical accounts of shame respond to this objection in different ways, however they both leave the link between shame and responsibility intact. Nussbaum argues that ‘shame’ refers to two different emotions, ‘adult shame’, which tracks modern notions of responsibility, and ‘primitive shame’, which is linked to our incompleteness and a desire to transcend our ‘animality and mortality’ (2006, p.186). Despite concerns over the former implicating the latter, Nussbaum allows for constructive shame—where the pressure of shame functions to help us live up to liberal ideals. Conversely, Bernard Williams, in a generally sympathetic treatment of shame, argues that instead of seeing instances of ‘primitive shame’ over aspects of ourselves beyond our control as totally disconnected from responsibility, such shame instead reveals that we continue to hold onto some premodern notions of responsibility. I do not aim to adjudicate here between these two seminal treatments of shame, but rather to demonstrate that both accounts draw a clear link between shame and responsibility. To further explicate this link it is helpful to examine the structure of moral anger and shame more carefully.

Empathy in response to global poverty (and other injustices) can be taken to involve two reference points, the subject in whom the empathy arises and the person or persons who are the object of this emotion. Whilst the question of responsibility may be factored in at a later stage, it does not feature in the structure of the uncorrected emotion. In contrast, anger and shame in response to global injustice both have a tripartite structure featuring responsible parties. In the case of anger at a given global injustice three parties are present: the subject in whom the anger arises, a wronged party, and a third party—responsible for the injustice in question—towards whom the anger is directed. It is important to note at this stage that anger at global injustice may be misdirected in some cases, for example towards third parties bearing little responsibility for the injustice in question. This is something that highlights the necessary role of reason within the sentimental cosmopolitan project, an issue I address in detail below.
In the case of shame at an agent’s own complicity in global injustice we can employ a similar model, but one where the notion of responsibly operative is one of self-blame. It might be thought that this would suggest cosmopolitan shame has a dual structure, featuring the agent herself – complicit in the injustice in question, and the affected party. However, although this could provide an adequate model for cosmopolitan guilt this fails to take into account the way that shame is typically understood to involve the perception of others. Unlike guilt, shame generally serves as a community sanction against the individual enforcing community norms rather than autonomous moral judgements (Prinz and Nichols, 2010, p.136; Williams, 1993, p.78). Accordingly, typical instances of shame at global injustices have three reference points: the agent herself as the responsible party, the persons suffering as a result of the injustice, and a third party before whom one feels shame. The identity of this third party will be examined in detail in the final section of this chapter, but two things are worth noting at this stage. Firstly, following Solomon, this third party should be understood as a representative of ‘the group through which one gains one’s self-identity’ (2007, p.294); however, it is important to emphasise that this group could take a number of different forms. Secondly, this representative can be either an identifiable member of this group – physically present or otherwise during the experience of shame, or an internalised representative who, as Williams notes, is ‘abstracted and generalised and idealised, but...[still] somebody rather than nobody, and somebody other than me’ (1993, p.84).

The claim I want to make here is that, due to their structures, anger and shame are particularly well suited to capturing notions of responsibility for global poverty. This is something that is lacking in sentimental cosmopolitan strategies that focus primarily on cultivating empathy or compassion for individuals facing global poverty. As I shall go on to argue, there are practical and normative advantages to paying greater attention to questions of responsibility for global poverty, especially where we are interested in motivating political solutions. However, it might be objected that these structural features are minimally relevant as sentimental cosmopolitans are interested in ‘corrected sentiment’ rather than automatic emotional reactions, with ‘corrected sentiment’
understood as emotion combined with critical reason; accordingly, empathy may be equally able to take responsibility into account, but at the level of correction (Gould, 2007, p.160).

It is important to be clear that if cultivating cosmopolitan emotions is to be an effective means of motivating action to address poverty globally then correcting these emotions, to some extent, is both necessary and desirable. Therefore, reason necessarily has important work to do in directing the motivational power of emotional responses to injustice towards appropriate targets and effective solutions. However, sentiments can only plausibly be corrected so far, and, in order to be feasible, cosmopolitan emotions need to resemble their regular counterparts to some degree. There is a necessary balance to be struck here between the visceral power of uncorrected sentiments, and the effectiveness that can be gained by these sentiments being subjected to direction by critical reason. Some degree of direction is clearly necessary, but in the process some of the power and immediacy will presumably be lost; accordingly, I want to suggest that, all other things being equal, a lesser degree of correction is preferable. Therefore, whilst corrected empathy may be able to take responsibility for global injustice into account, the structures of anger and shame require less correction in order to do so, suggesting they are particularly plausible in this role.

I have suggested that anger and shame are well suited to incorporating notions of responsibility; however, this leaves open both the nature of the responsibility in question and why this task is of value. To address this first question the next section briefly examines the concepts of responsibility typically thought to be operative in cases of global injustice, drawing a distinction between causal responsibility and remedial responsibility. The answer to the second question proceeds in three parts. Firstly, I examine Andrew Linklater’s (2006) claim that anger and shame as a response to causal complicity in global injustice are particularly motivationally efficacious, arguing that appeals to causal responsibly are unlikely to be an especially effective strategy to motivate action to address global poverty. I then argue that anger and shame can serve to motivate action to address global poverty by directly appealing to remedial responsibility. Finally, I argue that even
where appeals to responsibility for injustice lack significant motivational force, there are further advantages to cultivating anger and shame, with their attendant focus on responsibility.

2.2. Causal and Remedial Responsibility

We can distinguish between two concepts of responsibility for global injustices that appeals to anger and shame may draw on, causal responsibility and remedial responsibility. Causal responsibility can be understood as involving some degree of complicity in creating and sustaining a given injustice, and remedial responsibility can be understood as a moral responsibility to address or rectify a given injustice. In the case of global injustices causal responsibility is typically taken to lead to remedial responsibility; however, remedial responsibility can arise absent causal responsibility. For example, remedial responsibility can arise due to ability to address suffering at little cost, or through special responsibilities for the welfare of certain others, such as familial ties or responsibilities to conationals.

This distinction is important as attributions of causal responsibility are thought to be especially motivationally efficacious. As Andrew Dobson notes, ‘we are more likely to feel obliged to assist others in their plight if we are responsible for their situation – if there is some identifiable causal relationship between what we do, or what we have done, and how they are’ (2006, p.171). This claim relies on the minimal psychological assumption that duties to rectify harms for which one is causally responsible have greater normative significance than duties to rectify like harms for which one is not causally responsible (Pogge, 2002, p.13), coupled with the further assumption that this translates into greater motivational force, all other things being equal. In many instances of global

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78 Generally, causal responsibility need not entail moral responsibility, as we can be causally responsible but not morally responsible for actions that result from our non-culpable ignorance. However, in the case of global poverty I take the severity of harm to typically entail that ignorance is culpable, to some extent. I take moral responsibility to entail remedial responsibility. However, here remedial responsibility may be indirect, requiring pressuring actors with the power to address global injustices to act, or the creation of the necessary actors.
injustice establishing causal responsibility can be a highly complex affair; however, where global injustices consist of straightforward negative rights violations the causal responsibility of certain actors may be more easily established. Examples of such situations would be human rights abuses by corrupt governments, or potentially hazardous labour practices by multinational corporations. In these circumstances appeals to anger and shame are plausibly an effective means of motivating action through attributions of causal responsibility.

Dobson (2006) and Linklater (2006) argue that this link between anger and shame and causal responsibility can continue to provide additional motivational resources outside of cases of straightforward negative rights violations, operating in instances where causal responsibility is diffuse or collective, such as complicity in global poverty. This has affinities with Lawford-Smith’s (2010) argument that presenting global poverty as an injustice, where individuals in developed countries actively harm individuals facing poverty globally through the collective imposition of an unjust international order, is more motivationally efficacious that presenting it as a humanitarian crisis. However, Dobson and Linklater include the additional step that it is negative emotions, such as anger and shame, that serve to translate this account of responsibility into action. Despite being sympathetic to a greater emphasis on anger and shame within sentimental cosmopolitanism in general, and as a response to global poverty in particular, I have reservations over their motivational value in such cases, where causal responsibility for harms is diffuse. The following three arguments substantiate these reservations.

Firstly, if we accept that causal responsibility for harm typically increases the motivational power of remedial duties, it is unclear that this applies in the causally complex circumstances of global poverty. As Judith Lichtenberg argues, when the concept of harm is detached from more intuitive cases and applied to causal complicity in a collectively maintained unjust state of affairs it is questionable that it retains the motivational power it has in more straightforward cases (2014, p.77; Satz, 2005). In the case of global poverty, preventable human suffering combined with the ability of some parties to address this at little cost may provide a more powerful motive for remedial action.
Secondly, it is unlikely this thinner account of causal responsibility effectively translates into emotional responses of anger and shame, as the conclusion that individuals in developed countries actively harm individuals facing poverty globally is derived from a complex causal story. Offering this argument, or similar arguments, does not seem to be an especially effective strategy by which to generate emotional responses sufficient to motivate action. This is due the difficulty of these emotional responses carrying across the complex moral argument by which responsibility is established, and practical worries over effectively targeting significant numbers of people with this strategy. Accordingly, any additional motivational force provided by understanding global poverty as a harm may be compromised by the abstract route by which this is established.

Thirdly, on this account, responsibility for global poverty may be causal but it is also collective, implicating all of the ‘globally affluent’. This poses particular problems for attempts to effectively cultivate cosmopolitan anger and shame, as it is unclear whether any additional motivational force anger and shame may derive from their link with responsibility would still function on an account where we are all appropriate targets for anger and shame – through our complicity in a collectively imposed unjust world order. This is especially so in the case of shame, as if we are all deficient in the same manner, it is doubtful whether this can be a proper object for shame. More significantly, any motivational resources shame may derive through social pressure are weakened if responsibility is evenly distributed. One reason why shame is a particularly effective source of motivation, that humans are social creatures who are deeply responsive to the behaviour of others, works against the effectiveness of shame in this context. Here, the similar situation of our peers provides a disincentive for action as ‘if we fail to act and are blamed for our moral failure, we will not be blamed alone’ (Woods, 2015, p.103). Comparable worries arise for cosmopolitan anger, which will likely struggle to gain purchase where responsibility is evenly distributed, creating difficulties in finding appropriate targets and diluting its motivational power.

This term is standard in the literature, and precise definitions are rarely offered. In the introduction I outline my own preferred understanding of the term.
A more promising route in circumstances where causal responsibility is collective or diffuse, such as global poverty, is that anger and shame can offer additional motivational resources by incorporating remedial responsibility directly. Here, anger and shame function to provide additional motivational resources to an empathy based approach, as a degree of empathy for distant others is plausibly necessary for individuals to feel shame at their own failure to act to address global poverty, or anger at the failure of others to do so. However, as argued in section one, cultivating anger and shame alongside a thin cosmopolitan empathy has a number of advantages in comparison to relying on a thicker cosmopolitan empathy.

It might be objected that direct appeals to remedial responsibility face similar worries to attempts to link anger and shame to collective accounts of causal responsibility for global poverty; where, as responsibility is evenly distributed, the motivational power of anger and shame fail to gain purchase. However, this fails to take into account that remedial responsibility need not be evenly distributed just because causal responsibility is absent, as certain parties may have particular responsibilities for the welfare of those suffering as a result of global poverty. These could arise either through pre-existing special responsibilities or through relative ability to assist. In the former case national governments failing to address high levels of poverty, or inactive global institutions claiming responsibility for these issues, would be appropriate targets for cosmopolitan anger. In the latter case cosmopolitan shame can serve to capture the responsibility of the particularly affluent to assist those in poverty, absent attributions of causal responsibility, due to their ability to offer assistance at comparatively little cost to themselves.

A second response to this objection is provided by David Miller’s answer to what he takes to be the central question global poverty presents to the globally affluent: ‘when should I be altruistic?’ Miller argues that the problem here is primarily one of coordination rather than causal responsibility; accordingly, we should focus on ‘encourag[ing] the growth of norms that connect particular people in need of help to particular other people who are able to give it’ (2013, p.202).
take Miller’s claim to be that what is significant is developing such norms, not that they track normative responsibility in any deep sense; and paradoxically, once established, these norms translate into normative responsibility due to their role in dividing up a collective duty to aid. Accordingly, where remedial responsibility is collective we may still be able to differentiate between the responsibilities of various actors to a sufficient degree for cosmopolitan anger and shame to be motivationally efficacious, as long as norms exist to divide up this collective responsibility. Whilst robust versions of such norms may not currently exist at the international level, cultivating cosmopolitan anger and shame alongside the development and strengthening of norms according remedial responsibility for given instances of global poverty to particular parties, offers an opportunity for advocates of a sentimental cosmopolitan approach.

2.3. Responsibility, Appropriateness, and Political Solutions

Alongside motivational efficaciousness, the structural link between anger and shame and responsibility can offer further advantages to sentimental cosmopolitan strategies to motivate action to address global poverty. Here I will briefly discuss two potential benefits that this link with responsibility can offer. Firstly, through incorporating responsibility for injustice, anger and shame may be normatively appropriate responses to global poverty. Secondly, this link with responsibility can serve to direct attention towards political strategies by which to address poverty globally.

The notion of appropriateness operative here can be understood in two ways. Firstly, these reactions may be appropriate in the sense that they are rational. Sentimental cosmopolitanism relies on a broadly Aristotelian account of the emotions, where emotions have a cognitive element, and are not simply bodily responses but contain thought (Nussbaum 2001, p.25). This is both part of the justification of the appropriateness of a focus on sentiment and is evidenced in the practical approach of correcting our sentiments to better accommodate distant others. As Nussbaum notes, ‘since compassion contains thought it can be educated’ (1996, p.13). On such an account,
cosmopolitan sentiments are to be recommended insofar as they accurately reflect the reality of the situation, and accordingly are rational responses. This is illustrated in Aristotle’s treatment of anger, where both a failure to get angry in the appropriate circumstances and responding with an inappropriate degree of anger are thought to be irrational (1991, pp.31-33). Therefore, where responsible parties exist, they ought to be factored into our emotional responses to global injustice, as a failure to do so undermines the case for these sentiments being rational.

Secondly, emotional responses to global poverty that recognise responsibility may be normatively appropriate. Emotions such as anger and shame that implicate responsible parties, plausibly demonstrate a greater degree of respect for those affected by injustices than emotions that respond purely to the resulting need. The claim here is not that empathetic responses to global poverty are necessarily patronising, but that anger where other parties are responsible, or shame at our own responsibility, includes a recognition that those affected have been wronged, and demonstrates an appropriate acknowledgement of this fact. As Pamela Hieronymi notes, ‘[t]o be angry and resentful is to be involved with and committed to these judgments in a way that goes beyond merely assenting to their truth’ (2001, p.530). This is not to suggest that at a remedial level we should treat instances of global poverty resulting from injustice as more significant than like cases resulting from misfortune, but that recognising the complicity of ourselves or others in global poverty, where appropriate, has significant normative value. Indeed, it would be hard to make sense of processes of restorative justice or the value typically placed on apologies, if people did not accord significant normative worth to the recognition that they have been wronged.

A number of critics have argued that, due to its focus on empathy, sentimental cosmopolitanism places too great an emphasis on motivating charitable donations to address global poverty, and other injustices, at the expense of approaches focused on political activism and institutional reform (Woods 2012; Dobson 2006). It is important to stress that this need not reflect any intrinsic link between empathy and charitable giving, as there may be a number of explanatory factors; for example, a greater availability of opportunities for charitable donations rather than
political action in this context, or pre-existing biases favouring charity over political activism amongst the globally affluent. Therefore, whilst I reject the claim that empathy is somehow ‘apolitical’, the ability of anger and shame to capture responsibility for injustice may be useful in directing attention towards explicitly political approaches to reducing global poverty.

Anger is often taken to be an especially political emotion (Chakravarti, 2014, pp.128-153) and empirical research suggests that moral anger is a central feature in the formation of protest movements (Jasper 2014). As noted above, anger that does not arise in response to transgressions against the self is typically directed at the behaviour of others towards a third party; here, attention to both the subject of our concern and a responsible party highlights a political dimension of the situation largely absent from an empathetic response focused on the former. This draws attention to the responsible party, and highlights the causal and power relationships between the two parties. All other things being equal, this directs attention to aspects of the situation requiring a political solution. For example, when we see X exploiting Y donating money to Y is not an intuitive response, as our anger is concerned not just with the need of Y but the relationship between the two parties. Therefore, it is plausible moral anger will direct us towards political solutions, as these seek to alter this relationship. A further link between anger and political action may be found in anger’s uniquely disruptive potential. Due to its confrontational nature, expressions of anger typically disrupt and challenge social and political order to a greater degree than other emotions (Chakravarti, 2014); in doing so, anger can serve as a catalyst for political action or highlight the need for political change.\(^\text{80}\)

The case with shame is less clear cut. As noted above, the structure of cosmopolitan shame is similar to that of cosmopolitan anger, insofar as it identifies a relationship of responsibility for the suffering of distant others; however, in this case the agent herself is the responsible party. By incorporating responsibility, shame highlights a political relationship between the agent and those in need, absent, or minimal, from a purely empathetic response. What remains unclear is whether

\(^{\text{80}}\) This should not be taken to suggest that anger is especially linked to progressive political action, as anger is clearly implicated in social movements across the political spectrum.
highlighting this relationship will always translate into political solutions. We might think that an agent’s shame at their own causal responsibility for global poverty would typically lead to action to limit this responsibility and, given the complex institutional structure of this causal chain, this would require political change – establishing a link between shame and political solutions to global poverty. I take this to offer a route by which shame can motivate political action, but it is important to note that there is no guarantee that the action engendered by shame will always be this comprehensive. In some cases, comparatively minor charitable donations, for example, may be sufficient to mitigate feelings of shame. However, in directing the agent’s attention towards aspects of the situation requiring political action, and potentially engendering reflection on these features, shame can make a political response more likely.

In this section I have examined the link between the structures of anger and shame and notions of responsibility, arguing that this provides reason to recommend that sentimental cosmopolitan strategies to motivate action to address global poverty ought to be broadened to include the cultivation of anger and shame; this is especially so where the intention is to motivate political responses to global poverty. In the third section of this chapter I outline two further reasons to recommend cultivating cosmopolitan anger and shame respectively, unconnected to their ability to capture notions of responsibility: (i) a link between anger and action, and (ii) a role for shame in motivating compliance with duties to address global poverty in persons lacking affective concern for distant others.

3. Two Further Arguments

3.1. Anger and Action

Alongside a structural link with notions of responsibility, anger may also have utility in motivating action to address global poverty due to its active nature. As Sonali Chakravarti (2014) argues, even
the most visceral and extreme cases of anger at injustice can serve as a source of energy for political change, something which she terms the ‘kinetic dimension of anger’. I take the significance of Chakravarti’s claim to be that behind the association of moral anger with protest, and anger with acts of physical violence, lies the more basic idea that anger is an emotion that is highly correlated with action in some form. This has affinities with Aristotle’s use of the term ‘thumos’ to ‘connote passion and spiritedness in addition to anger itself’ (Chakravarti, 2014, p.134). Hoffman makes a similar point, but takes the additional step of linking anger with effectiveness.

[I]t seems likely that, since anger in response to a threat to oneself ‘mobilizes energy and makes one capable of defending oneself with vigor’...anger in response to a threat to someone else would mobilize energy and make one capable of defending the victim (2010, p.101).

Empirical evidence supports the claim that anger reliably motivates action, and that this extends to behaviours typically understood to be moral. As research by Fehr and Gachter (2002) demonstrates, ‘studies using economic games [show]...that, when angry, people are...willing to pay significant costs to punish those who fail to cooperate’ (Prinz, 2010, p.221). If correct, this suggests that cultivating cosmopolitan anger may be of use for sentimental cosmopolitanism due to anger’s ability to reliably motivate action. However, a degree of caution is required regarding Hoffman’s additional claim, as this moves from the claim that anger can contribute to effective defence against physical threats – something which plausibly has an evolutionary explanation – to the conclusion that this effectiveness also applies to responses to injustice. Whilst this mechanism may be operative at a personal level, for example in intervening to stop a physical assault, it is unclear this applies in cases of global injustice, as physiological responses aiding physical conflict bear little relationship to effective action when addressing global issues.

Fehr and Gachter’s example offers a further reason for caution, as although anger reliably motivates action it is typically associated with retributive behaviour. However, it is important to note that retributive action need not always be an ineffective means of addressing global poverty, as retribution can take a number of forms. Boycotts on the goods of companies responsible for
removing natural resources from less affluent countries, for example, may both be retributive and lead to fairer practices, potentially improving the situation of the individuals concerned. However, there is a genuine worry that retributive action will be ineffective in many cases, as responsible parties may not be easily identifiable, and action targeting these parties directly is unlikely to alter the broader institutional and political structures in which they operate.

This objection is mitigated, to some extent, as sentimental cosmopolitanism does not aim to cultivate uncorrected sentiments, instead reason plays a necessary role in directing sentiments towards appropriate parties and actions. Just as Woods argues that cosmopolitan empathy should not be understood as ‘hysterical weeping at the unfortunate fate of others’ (2012, p.40), cosmopolitan anger should not be understood as blind rage at global injustices; reason can function as a necessary corrective in both cases. When cosmopolitan anger is understood as a ‘corrected sentiment’, in much the same manner as cosmopolitan empathy, then it may be plausible to think that it can retain its effectiveness in motivating action, but be decoupled from a link with retribution in favour of motivating effective responses to global poverty, and other injustices.

However, it might still be objected that anger is not as easily educated as other sentiments, perhaps due to the strength of the emotion, or its ‘primal nature’. As Panksepp notes, the emotion of anger is particularly basic and is ‘commonly thought to have clear analogues in lower mammals’ (1998, p.187). This former claim is unpersuasive as, like other emotions, anger admits of various degrees, however the latter claim merits further attention. Anecdotal evidence suggests that anger can be educated, and indeed regularly is, even if such a process is difficult. Sports training and military drills both provide examples where anger is plausibly channelled towards achieving difficult tasks. Moreover, even if educating anger is particularly difficult, it may still represent a worthwhile strategy for motivating global justice if anger offers an especially reliable means of motivating action.

There are no easy answers here to what is in large part an empirical question, but it may be helpful to return to my earlier claim that although sentimental cosmopolitanism is, and to be viable
must be, concerned with corrected sentiment, sentiments can only plausibly be corrected so far. Therefore, the relevant concern is whether this link with retributive behaviour is as integral a part of anger as its link with notions of responsibility, as if this relationship with retribution defies correction we ought to be cautious over recommending attempts to cultivate cosmopolitan anger. I cannot provide a definitive answer here, but offer two brief points to support the claim that this link with retribution may not be so comprehensive. Firstly, not all anger at global injustice is primarily about retribution. Attention to responsible parties need not lead to punitive measures, but may instead serve to highlight causal relationships leading to suffering. Where causal chains are highly complex, causal responsibility need not engender moral responsibility, and retribution is plausibly bound up with moral responsibility to a greater extent than causal responsibility. Secondly, NGOs already regularly appeal to the language of anger to motivate action to address global injustice, and these campaigns appear to be effective in channelling this anger towards constructive behaviour such as charitable donation and peaceful protest. This is illustrated by Greenpeace’s recent campaign to ‘Save the Arctic from Shell’, which employs language clearly chosen to evoke anger: ‘Shell is getting increasingly desperate to plunder the Arctic in any way possible. It has recently made a deal with the devil’ (Greenpeace, 2016).

3.2. Shame and Community

Shame cannot serve as a substitute for empathy within sentimental cosmopolitan strategies to motivate action to address global poverty, as for shame to be operative the relevant standards and norms must already be in place within a given community. Whereas empathy can increase levels of concern for distant others, and therefore contribute towards the development of more cosmopolitan norms, shame can only function to enforce compliance with norms that already exist. However, this should not be taken to imply that shame has little utility for motivating action to address global poverty; as although shame cannot replace the role of empathy, it may be able to
offer distinct motivational resources, fulfilling a function empathy alone cannot. Here, shame can
serve as a means to motivate individuals who feel little, or no, empathy with distant others to live up
to their cosmopolitan obligations, where cosmopolitan norms are sufficiently widespread in their
reference group. For example, where a norm of acting to address global poverty, through donating
to development organisations or attending political protests, is operative in a given society,
individuals within that society who personally do not feel a great deal of concern for distant others
may be motivated to participate in these behaviours through shame avoidance.

This mechanism can function either directly or indirectly. In direct cases shame operates
through social pressure before actual others, such as where we behave in a certain way to conform
to the norm before identifiable others; for example, donating to avoid the disapproval of the charity
fundraiser, or attending a protest alongside friends and colleagues. In indirect cases we internalise
the norm sufficiently to feel shame when we fail to live up to it, without necessarily feeling empathy
for those who benefit from the application of the norm. To illustrate the direct case consider the
strategy, employed by the American organic ‘health food’ retailer ‘Wholefoods’, of encouraging
donations to charity by asking customers at the end of a purchase whether they would like to donate
their change to charity (Stoddard, 2016). Whilst contributions could result from empathy with the
beneficiaries, the public context of the request, and the fact that it is made during a purchase at a
higher end establishment, suggests that shame could also be doing the motivational work – even
where empathy for the beneficiaries is absent.

The indirect case is more complex. In his seminal account of shame Bernard Williams argues
that shame can operate through something analogous to social pressure, but before an internalised
representative of a given community. On Williams’ account this representative does not reflect an
identifiable other, but is ‘abstracted and generalised and idealised, but...potentially somebody rather
than nobody, and somebody other than me’ (1993, p.84). However, this internal representative
need not be so generalised, as they could represent an actual other, such as a parent or sibling,
whose opinion we valued, or who had a significant place in our moral development. On either
account, the role for shame suggested here is not as an ideal goal regarding the extension of cosmopolitan sentiments, but as a temporary means of achieving compliance with cosmopolitan norms. This is aptly illustrated by Kristjansson’s image of shame as a ‘Wittgensteinian ladder’, functioning to motivate moral behaviour, but ideally discarded when this compliance can be achieved through empathetic concern (2014, p.506).

The difficulty this account faces is in determining the relevant community through which shame ought to function to motivate compliance with duties of global justice, as for any given individual there are a variety of communities that might serve this purpose. Moreover, where we feel shame before an ‘internalised other’ rather than actual members of a given community, this need not be a community we spatially inhabit. Although we can assume the social pressure to follow cosmopolitan norms will typically be stronger where other members of the community are present.

It might be thought that the relevant community could be genuinely cosmopolitan, encompassing all humanity. This is plausibly already part of what is being appealed to in campaigns by NGOs and Human Rights organisations, at least in some cases. The extent to which the existence of such organisations allows for a genuinely cosmopolitan shame merits further analysis, beyond the scope of this thesis. However, where shame appeals to a cosmopolitan community it would be unlikely to be able to fulfil a distinct function within a sentimental cosmopolitan approach to motivating action to address global poverty, as here shame would struggle to motivate action where cosmopolitan empathy was absent or minimal. Sufficient levels of identification with a cosmopolitan community for shame to be operative would likely require a significant degree of empathetic identification with distant others.

For shame to fulfil this role it would need to operate through a more localised identity; this could take a number of forms, such as membership of a national community or a religion. Here I will focus on the former. In such cases members of a national community might feel shame at a failure (individual or as a collective) to live up to broadly cosmopolitan values bound up in their national culture. This has affinities with Nussbaum’s account of ‘constructive shame’, where levels of
domestic inequality cause ‘Americans... [to] examine their ways of life and their commitments, and, so doing, realize with shame that we have failed to live up to ideals of equal respect that are central in our society’ (2006, p.241). A practical example of this approach can be seen in the ‘Shame on Europe’ campaign by Save the Children, in response to the recent European migration crisis (Martin, 2016). This campaign clearly appeals to shame and, whilst this may operate in a number of ways, the choice of language is telling. I think it is reasonable to suggest that this campaign appeals to a broad regional identity; the implication being that, by neglecting to address the migration crisis, Europeans are failing to live up to universalist values contained within European culture.

Despite the limited role for shame this account suggests, it faces two significant objections: (i) whether many, or even any, national traditions or religions sufficiently embody cosmopolitan values in order for this to be effective, and (ii) whether the structure of this shame, by referencing exclusionary identities, serves to reinforce anti-cosmopolitan attitudes. The first concern is primarily empirical and cannot be fully answered here, but universalist strands are arguably present in most major religious traditions and liberal democracies. Even if this does not apply in the case of every national or religious tradition, this is no reason not to capitalise on these motivational resources where they do exist. The second concern is that appeals to national or religious values serves to reinforce these identities, presenting a barrier to greater levels of cosmopolitan sentimental identification in the longer term. The significance of the problem this poses depends on the degree of cosmopolitanism advocated. National (and religious) identities need not present a barrier to more moderate cosmopolitan positions, such as the account offered in this thesis, which are concerned with realising basic socioeconomic rights globally. Nussbaum has also emphasised the important role national identity can play in motivating global justice (2008, pp.79-83). However, this appeal to potentially exclusionary identities does present a genuine problem for stronger cosmopolitan accounts.

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81 This is not to assume that national communities uncontroversially embody a single set of values.
A final concern for attempts to appeal to the motivational power of shame is that some psychologists link shame with avoidance behaviour rather than prosocial action. As Tangney and Stuewig note, ‘shame motivates people toward separation, distance, and defence’ (2005, p.329). This empirical question cannot be decisively settled here, but two pieces of evidence suggest we should not let this obscure the prosocial possibilities of shame. Firstly, there are reasons to doubt the validity of broader conclusions derived from social psychological studies of shame questioning the ability of shame to motivate prosocial action. As Kristjansson argues, these studies have primarily focused on pathological cases and, as such, depict shame in an overly negative light, having limited relevance for ‘ordinary people experiencing shame as part of their ordinary lives’ (2014, p.509). Secondly, numerous studies draw more positive conclusions. After collating and assessing multiple studies into the relative merits of shame De Hooge et al. conclude that, ‘[r]epeated studies have found that shame does motivate prosocial behaviour (by activating approach-and-restore behaviours) when its experience is relevant for the decision at hand, and thus serves an important interpersonal function’ (2008, p.502). Although further empirical research in the area is needed to draw definitive conclusions, these studies show that the empirical evidence does not tell decisively against the motivational efficaciousness of shame, and supports shame as having a prosocial role.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that sentimental cosmopolitan strategies to motivate action to address global poverty ought to broaden their focus from cultivating empathy for distant others, to cultivating a range of cosmopolitan emotions, especially anger and shame. Despite the common tendency to think of anger and shame as unworthy, or base motives to be overcome, I have argued that in fact they constitute an important resource for the motivation of global justice, and can contribute towards the sentimental cosmopolitan project in ways that an exclusive focus on empathy cannot. In order to reach this conclusion I have made three claims.
Firstly, the structures of anger and shame suggest they may be especially well suited to capturing notions of responsibility for global injustice. Increased attention to responsibility is to be recommended as it is normatively appropriate that cosmopolitan sentiments incorporate responsible parties; moreover, this can serve to direct attention towards political strategies by which to address global poverty. Secondly, anger represents a powerful source of energy for political life, and the reliability with which anger motivates action suggests it can offer useful motivational resources to attempts to motivate action to address global poverty. However, anger has a darker side, and this strategy relies on cultivating a corrected anger that is decoupled from retributive action.

Finally, I suggested a distinctive role for shame in motivating individuals who feel little empathy for distant others to live up to their duties to address global poverty through the medium of social pressure. However, in order to fulfil this role cosmopolitan values must be relatively widespread within an individual’s reference group. Therefore, although anger and shame cannot replace empathy as the primary focus of sentimental cosmopolitanism, they can offer valuable resources for motivating political action to address poverty globally. In the next chapter I argue that the issue with empathy in this context is not simply one of overreliance, but also concerns how empathy is engendered.
Chapter Five: Suffering, Vulnerability, and Agency

Introduction

Depictions of individuals facing global poverty that focus on their suffering and vulnerability are a familiar feature of the fundraising material employed by many International Humanitarian NGOs (Kirk, 2012; Chouliaraki, 2010). The accounts of sentimental education offered by Rorty and Nussbaum also emphasise the role of depictions of distant suffering encountered in the media and narrative art in encouraging the extension of cosmopolitan concern (Nussbaum, 2001, p.319; Rorty, 1998, p.80). This chapter examines the role of depictions of suffering in cosmopolitan sentimental education. I argue that they present an obstacle to motivating political action to address global poverty, and reject an emphasis on a shared vulnerability to suffering as a means to overcome these adverse motivational effects. Finally, I offer the beginnings of an alternative approach.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one explicates the problems facing strategies of sentimental education that focus on suffering as a means to encourage the growth of affective concern for distant others; arguing that attention to the suffering of distant others may increase perceptions of distance between affluent publics and the global poor, and lead to reactions of resignation, avoidance, and apathy. Moreover, I argue that this emphasis on suffering can serve to obscure the fact that these individuals are capable agents – able to benefit from and participate in political strategies to address poverty globally. Section two examines whether these problems can be mitigated by an emphasis on a shared vulnerability to suffering, common to individuals in affluent countries and those facing global poverty (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 304-327; Woods, 2012, pp. 43-44). It argues that, although important, too great an emphasis on shared vulnerability may undermine the effectiveness of a sentimental education in motivating action to address global poverty, due to the ability of perceptions of vulnerability to undermine perceptions of security. The final section of the
chapter offers the beginnings of an alternative strategy. Here, I argue that rather than seeking to present distant others in a certain way, strategies of sentimental education ought to proceed by allowing these individuals to take the lead; in doing so, distant others take an active role in the process and are encountered as agents.

1. The Role of Suffering in Sentimental Education

Depictions of suffering distant others are a familiar feature of NGO campaigns intended to encourage donations towards reducing global poverty. As discussed in Chapter Three, these depictions are also a feature of broadly sentimental cosmopolitan strategies to encourage affective concern for individuals facing global poverty, and other injustices beyond national borders. On Nussbaum’s (2001) account it is recommended that these depictions are primarily encountered through literature and other forms of narrative art; whereas Rorty (1998) places a greater emphasis on the role of the media in exposing affluent publics to suffering beyond national borders. To some extent, a focus on suffering as a means to motivate action to address global poverty cannot be avoided, as at least part of the normative significance of severe poverty is the suffering it engenders, and the alleviation of suffering has both motivational and justificatory significance. Furthermore, reducing suffering is quite a minimal goal in comparison to positive projects such as promoting human flourishing, and as such can plausibly secure a broader consensus over its normative significance. However, despite the normative significance of suffering, depictions of suffering distant others have had limited success as a means to motivate action to address global poverty and other injustices (McIntyre and Sobel, 2017; Chouliaraki, 2010). This section first offers three mechanisms that may account for this phenomenon – suggesting why repeated exposure to the suffering of distant others is often counterproductive from a motivational perspective. The section then moves on to argue that a focus on the suffering of individuals facing global poverty and other injustices
represents a particularly ineffective strategy by which to motivate political action to address global injustices.

1.1. Increasing Perceptions of Distance

The first concern a focus on suffering in strategies of sentimental education faces is that this can serve to increase perceptions of distance between duty bearers in more affluent countries and individuals facing poverty globally. Perhaps the most widely discussed mechanism through which this can take place concerns depictions of suffering as a means to arouse compassion or empathy. Typically, the depictions of suffering employed by fundraising campaigns or featured in news reports highlight the physical aspects of these sufferings, as these arguably have the greatest emotive potential. However, this emphasis on the physicality or corporality of those in poverty may serve to obscure other shared characteristics featuring heavily in the self-identities of affluent publics – such as a capacity for agency or dialogue – increasing perceptions of distance (Dogra, 2012). As Woods notes of a representative depiction of a “needy” individual in a piece of campaigning literature, ‘she is described in terms that emphasise her animality, her physical neediness, her mortality. She has no words’ (Woods, 2012, p.41).

A number of concerns are raised by such examples, not least the extent to which the reactions of affluent individuals to these depictions of suffering are themselves the result of self-images that are to some extent illusory – failing to take their own vulnerability to suffering seriously (Woods, 2012, p. 44), a concern I address below. However, at this stage I want to examine whether the problem lies with how suffering is depicted rather than with attention to suffering itself; with one dimensional depictions of suffering distant others serving to increase perceptions of distance through primarily focusing on the corporeal aspects of their suffering.

How suffering is depicted clearly matters, and silent images of individuals experiencing severe physical hardship employed in fundraising campaigns need to be distinguished from more
comprehensive strategies of sentimental education, for example the kind of formal education recommended by Nussbaum (1996; 1998). On Nussbaum’s account the lives of people beyond national borders are depicted in works of literature and other art forms, or the work of journalists telling ‘sad sentimental stories’ – something which Rorty also argues is central to expanding the purview of our ‘human rights culture’ (1998, p. 185). These strategies clearly offer a more nuanced picture, portraying distant others and their sufferings in much greater complexity than is possible in the fleeting images encountered in NGO fundraising campaigns. As such, my concern here is not to criticise fundraising material for failing to offer the degree of complexity possible in a literary depiction\textsuperscript{82} of the lives of distant others, or an in depth news story. Fundraising material must typically operate in much shorter timeslots than literature or art, and as such cannot offer the same degree of nuance in its portrayal of individual’s in poverty; although a greater attempt to do so would arguably be welcome. Instead, my concern here is with strategies of sentimental education that primarily portray distant others through the lens of their suffering. This is something that can serve to increase perceptions of distance, regardless of the complexity of the depiction offered. This is for the following two reasons.

Firstly, the degree of vulnerability to suffering faced by individuals who live in communities where severe poverty is prevalent is beyond the experience of the majority of people in more affluent countries. In section two I examine whether a focus on our shared vulnerability can overcome this divide; however, regardless of an awareness of the shared vulnerability of all humans to certain harms, the degree to which we are vulnerable will typically differ to a significant extent.\textsuperscript{83} Accordingly, attention to the sufferings of distant others can serve to distance the situation of individuals facing poverty globally from individuals in more affluent countries, due to the difference between the degree and the nature of the sufferings highlighted and affluent citizens’ own

\textsuperscript{82} Who creates these depictions also matters. See Woods (2012, pp. 40-44) on the problem of mediation, a topic I discuss in detail in chapter seven.

\textsuperscript{83} There will of course be exceptions to this rule, as levels of vulnerability to suffering differ significantly within countries as well as between them.
experiences. This is not to suggest that making an ‘imaginative leap into the life of the other’ (Nussbaum, 1996a, p. 132) is impossible in such cases, but that attention to suffering, regardless of the nuance with which it is presented, can serve to highlight difference rather than commonality. This concern is compounded in the case of those most able to act effectively to address global poverty due to political influence or wealth, as the very means that allow them to offer assistance further distances their own situation from that of individuals facing poverty globally.  

Secondly, and more seriously, strategies of sentimental education focusing on the suffering of individuals facing poverty globally run the risk of defining these individuals to affluent publics through their suffering. Regardless of the nuance of the picture presented, if depictions of individuals in poverty primarily focus on their suffering this may still serve to increase perceptions of distance. It might be thought that the primary concern here is that depictions of suffering may serve to normalise this suffering; although this is a worry, my point here is distinct. Where individuals facing poverty globally primarily appear to individuals in more affluent countries in depictions that highlight their suffering this can lead to these individuals being defined by their suffering. This serves to increase perceptions of distance between ‘them’ – an undifferentiated group without intrinsic strength’ who always suffer, and ‘us’ – the “affluent”, who must address the problem, with whom agencies lies, and whose own vulnerability to suffering this picture obscures (Kirk, 2012, p.248). As Onora O’Neill (2000, pp.115-143) and Woods (2012, p.43) note, depictions of poor people in less affluent countries that focus on their suffering largely fail to depict these individuals as autonomous agents engaged in purposive activities, serving to increase perceptions of distance between affluent publics and individuals facing poverty globally.

1.2. Avoidance

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84 This is not to suggest that these barriers cannot be overcome, but that they make identification more difficult.
The second concern I wish to highlight with focusing on the suffering of individuals facing poverty globally as a means to encourage affective connections to these individuals, is not particularly complex; however, it is nonetheless significant from a motivational perspective. Rather than inspiring remedial action, a focus on suffering may instead lead to reactions of withdrawal and avoidance. This receives significant empirical support from the psychological literature on compassion fatigue and vicarious trauma in response to relentless media coverage of distant suffering (McIntyre and Sobel, 2017; Rothschild, 2006). To put this point somewhat bluntly, thinking about suffering is not a particularly pleasant experience, and strategies of sentimental education that rely on this too heavily may have limited success in getting affluent publics to engage with issues of global justice. This is not to suggest that avoidance behaviours when confronted with suffering of the magnitude that results from global poverty are a normatively justifiable response; rather, given the sheer magnitude of the problem, it is a reaction that is both understandable and all too familiar. Part of the problem here arguably derives from the potential emotional demandingness of engaging affectively with distant others in general, something that has been noted by a number of critics (Long, 2009, pp. 334-335; Lenard, 2010a). There are two aspects to this. Firstly, engaging affectively with the weal and woe of a greater number of people may be emotionally taxing regardless of content. Secondly, affective connections to individuals facing global poverty and other injustices may just be emotionally taxing, regardless of a direct emphasis on suffering; because, as a matter of fact, these individuals suffer as a result of global injustices. Accordingly, if affect is thought to play a central role in moral motivation, as argued in Chapter Three, then this may just be the inevitable cost of motivating action.

Despite this, strategies of sentimental education that focus on suffering may be emotionally demanding to a greater extent than approaches that attempt to increase levels of sentimental concern via alternative strategies; as attention to human suffering is typically quite emotionally taxing.\footnote{I hope that this claim strikes the reader as intuitive.} It might be objected that the extent to which the affective ties to suffering distant others
recommended by sentimental cosmopolitans are thought to be a painful experience will depend on the nature of the sentiment advocated. We can distinguish here between accounts that recommend cosmopolitan sentiments that are stronger and more visceral (Chakravarti, 2014) and those that recommend sentiments that are more detached or cerebral (Hanley, 2011), with the former plausibly being the more emotionally demanding.

It is difficult to adjudicate over which approach is preferable in the abstract, however, I think we ought to favour the latter as a means of motivating effective action to address global injustices for the following reason: whilst a stronger or more visceral sentiment might be thought to be effective in motivating action, it is unclear that the action motivated by such a sentiment would be particularly effective. Conversely, a sentiment that involves a greater degree of detachment may allow for more reflection, and therefore be better suited to directing attention towards effective solutions. This raises a further worry for strategies of sentimental education that focus heavily on the suffering of distant others as a means to encourage an affective response. As already argued, this strategy may lead to avoidance behaviour due to the emotionally painful nature of the stimuli; however, even where this strategy succeeds in encouraging an affective response, there are concerns over this response as a means of motivating effective action. As I argued in Chapter Four, visceral sentimental responses may be powerful but will likely struggle to motivate effective action, and it is plausible that the sentiments aroused by depictions of distant others that focus primarily on their suffering will fall into this category.

### 1.3. Resignation

A third issue with focusing on the sufferings of distant others as a means to encourage the extension of affective concern is that an emphasis on suffering can lead to reactions of resignation or passivity. As with the concern raised above regarding avoidance behaviour, this is not an especially complex point. However, motivationally this is a very real concern when fundraising campaigns and media
sources bombard people in affluent countries with images of suffering distant others (Lichtenberg, 2004); especially so where these depictions constitute the primary means by which these individuals are encountered by persons in affluent countries. This can be broken down into three separate but related concerns. (i) Depictions of suffering distant others can lead to attitudes of resignation through normalising this suffering (Bruna Seu, 2013). (ii) Too great an emphasis on the suffering engendered by global poverty can lead to perceptions that the problem is insurmountable through the ‘drops in the bucket’ effect – where courses of action available to the individual look unable to address a problem of this magnitude (Lichtenberg, 2014, pp. 235-253). (iii) Exposure to depictions of suffering distant others can lead to resignation, either through compassion fatigue (Rothschild, 2006) or via ‘blunting effects’ – where individuals become desensitised to depictions of suffering (Slovic, 2007).

In the first instance, attitudes of resignation or passivity may arise through depictions of suffering distant others normalising suffering in a general sense. This is distinct from the concern raised earlier that defining distant others through their suffering may lead to the attitude that ‘this is just the way it is for them’. Here the concern is that too great an emphasis on the sheer scale of suffering in the world may lead to reactions of passivity, or a sense that this is just ‘how things are’. It is important to note that responses of resignation or passivity are something that are a concern for any attempt to motivate action to address large scale injustices, and are to some extent agent relative – as different individuals vary significantly in their attitudes and motivations. Nevertheless, I take this to pose a particular problem for strategies that proceed by attempting to emphasise suffering directly. This is evidenced in the extensive empirical literature on the phenomenon of psychological numbing in response to media coverage of distant suffering (Slovic, 2007; Nandy, 2002).

On the second mechanism, continued exposure to depictions of suffering distant others leads to attitudes of resignation; where action to address the problem is thought to have little tangible effect. Here the concern is not that the suffering resulting from global poverty is
normalised, but that attention to the scale of the suffering engendered increases perceptions that it cannot be easily remedied, serving to compound ‘drops in the bucket’ effects – where an agent’s individual actions look like they will be of little consequence given the scale of the problem (Lichtenberg, 2014; 2004). It is important to stress that perceptions that one’s own individual contributions to addressing injustice have little effect can be remedied through a focus on collective solutions and feedback regarding the impact of donations where appropriate. Here my aim is not to suggest that drops in the bucket effects cannot be overcome, but rather to suggest that a focus on the scale of the suffering engendered by global poverty and other injustices can serve to render this mechanism more intractable.

The third concern is that there is plausibly a limit to the regularity with which depictions of suffering distant others can be presented to individuals and consistently motivate action. There are two mechanisms through which this can occur, through compassion fatigue, or blunting effects. In the case of compassion fatigue overexposure to depictions of suffering leads to attitudes of resignation as a defence mechanism (Rothschild, 2006). ‘Blunting effects’ lead to the same result, but here, rather than affecting stimuli leading to overload, repeated exposure to depictions of suffering leads to these depictions eventually losing their power to move (McIntyre and Sobel, 2017; Slovic, 2007). On either mechanism the suggestion is not that depictions of suffering cannot prompt effective action, but that this strategy loses its motivational force after a certain point, resulting in diminishing returns. This is a problem that is compounded by the effects of market pressures and the competitive impulse on news media covering global poverty, leading to an overreliance on extreme depictions of distant suffering (Chouliaraki, 2010). We should also note that beyond its adverse motivational effects widespread usage of extreme imagery in media depictions of global poverty may be intrinsically normatively problematic, and has been labelled “starvation pornography” by critics in the global South (Migro, 2011). Accordingly, whilst this may represent an effective means to prompt occasional charitable donations, for example, this is unlikely to offer a
viable strategy by which to motivate sustained commitments to addressing global poverty and other injustices.

1.4. Suffering, Agency, and Political Solutions

I have argued that strategies of sentimental education that attempt to increase affective concern for individuals facing global poverty by emphasising their suffering and vulnerability face a number of motivational concerns; increasing perceptions of distance, and prompting reactions of avoidance and resignation. However, now I want to suggest that an emphasis on suffering as a means to provoke affective concern for distant others poses a problem for motivating political action in particular, as a means to address global poverty. If individuals facing global poverty primarily appear to individuals in affluent countries in depictions that emphasise their suffering and vulnerability, this can undermine perceptions of these individuals as capable agents – a quality that features heavily in the self-understandings of many individuals in affluent countries.\(^{86}\) As argued above, this presents an obstacle to motivating action to address global poverty as it can serve to increase perceptions of distance on the part of affluent individuals, between themselves and persons facing poverty globally. There are two further reasons why this represents a particular problem for motivating support for political action.

Firstly, political strategies to address global poverty that aim to alter institutions at the global level thought to be responsible for causing or entrenching global poverty, such as unfair trade rules or the resource and borrowing privileges (Pogge, 2002, pp. 169-172), themselves presuppose the agency of individuals facing global poverty. This is because taking advantage of alternative institutional setups requires individuals facing global poverty to engage in complex practices, such as international trade, which require a high level of agency (Woods, 2012; O’Neill, 2000). Where the global poor are not viewed as purposive agents such strategies will appear implausible.

\(^{86}\) A narrative arguably reinforced by much liberal political philosophy (See MacIntyre, 2013; Woods, 2012).
Secondly, as argued in chapter one, many political strategies to address global poverty require actively engaging with particular individuals facing global poverty as purposive agents. In some cases this can entail working together to achieve a solution, such as supporting the political struggles of individuals and groups facing global poverty. Alternatively, groups in more affluent countries may act alone, but enter into processes of dialogue in order to determine what action it is appropriate for outsiders to take. This is a strategy that is both normatively appropriate – as we plausibly ought to consult those facing a particular injustice in determining appropriate solutions (Gould, 2007), and practically sensible – as these individuals are likely to have relevant experiential knowledge of the situation. Where duty bearers in more affluent countries are presented with a picture of individuals facing global poverty which obscures their capacity for agency, encouraging support for these strategies will be especially difficult.

In this section I have outlined three mechanisms, distance, avoidance, and resignation, which offer plausible explanations of why exposure to depictions of suffering distant others does not offer an effective means by which to motivate sustained action to address poverty globally. I then suggested that a focus on suffering can serve to undermine support for political strategies to address global poverty in particular. These mechanisms suggest that sentimental strategies to motivate action to address global poverty need to move beyond a focus on the suffering of distant others as a means to engender affective concern. However, it may be objected that the problem here does not lie with the strategy but with the people – in the form of a pervasive self-image amongst the affluent that masks our own vulnerability to suffering (MacIntyre, 2013; Fineman, 2008). Accordingly, drawing attention to our own vulnerability may lead us to respond more readily to distant suffering with compassion or affective concern (Woods, 2012; Nussbaum, 2001), rather than with avoidance, distance or resignation. The next section of this chapter turns to examine this claim.

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87 This can also be a feature of sensitive aid practices, but an emphasis on collective solutions is typical of political strategies.
2. Suffering, Motivation, and Shared Vulnerability

Where people in affluent countries respond to depictions of the suffering of the global poor with attitudes of distance, resignation, and even disgust, this may be thought to be the result of a mistake; the mistake being that many individuals in affluent countries fail to recognise, or be sufficiently aware of, a shared vulnerability to suffering characterising the situation of all humans. This awareness on the agent’s part of their own vulnerability to suffering has been thought, by a number of theorists, to be particularly important in eliciting a compassionate response to the suffering of others (Nussbaum, 2001; Rousseau, 1991; Woods, 2012). As Nussbaum puts this, ‘[t]he recognition of one’s own vulnerability, is then, an important and frequently indispensable requirement for compassion in human beings’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p.319).

It is important to distinguish Nussbaum’s psychological claim that recognition of one’s own vulnerability to suffering plays an important role in responding to the sufferings of others with compassion from the more straightforward empirical claim that all humans share a vulnerability to suffering. The latter claim, that all humans are bodily creatures, necessarily vulnerable to accident, illness, and death – Shakespeare’s ‘poor, bare, forked animal’88, and that we are also vulnerable to a degree of emotional suffering that may set us apart from other animals (Rorty, 1989; 1998) is both important and true. This is a fact that has arguably been obscured in much liberal political philosophy, which tends to overemphasise autonomy at the expense of vulnerability (Fineman, 2008).89 However, I have some reservations regarding the former psychological claim and the work it can do to address the concerns (outlined in the previous section) which face a focus on suffering as a means to increase affective concern for distant others.

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88 King Lear III, iv. Ignatieff (1984) drew my attention to this quote. These need not be mutually exclusive. For further discussion of this see Miller (2007, pp. 81-109) on the false dichotomy in political philosophy between ‘patients and agents’.
In a thought provoking article on this topic Kerri Woods develops Nussbaum’s psychological claim; arguing that in order for depictions of suffering in strategies of sentimental education not to lead affluent publics to distance themselves from the situation of individuals in severe poverty, strategies of sentimental education must also be critical - highlighting our own vulnerability (Woods, 2012, p. 41). As Woods notes: ‘The reflections of capable agents to themselves is, therefore, as important in the project of sentimental cosmopolitanism as are the representations of people living in severe poverty’ (2007, p. 44). It is important to be clear here that Woods’ argument is in large part directed towards the language typically employed in rationalist cosmopolitan accounts of global justice, something that may be thought particularly guilty of presenting ‘duty bearers’ in a manner that obscures their own vulnerability. Moreover, neither the lack of emphasis on vulnerability within liberal political philosophy nor current distributions of relative vulnerability – at a national and a global level – are the result of happenstance; in both cases there is a political dimension. Current patterns of vulnerability are neither, typically, natural nor inevitable but result, at least in part, from political decisions (Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, 2014; Fineman, 2008). Similarly, a lack of emphasis on vulnerability within political philosophy arguably reflects the background of a majority of practitioners, whose own vulnerability has been obscured by structural factors (Woods, 2012; Fineman, 2008). It is also important to note that Woods’ argument, and the response to this argument offered below, both proceed from an understanding that choosing agents may respond to their own vulnerability in different ways. Therefore, what is of interest are broad patterns of behaviour, rather than the idea that reflection on one’s own vulnerability necessitates a certain response.

It might be objected that the degree to which individuals facing poverty globally are vulnerable to suffering differs significantly from the situation of many, if not most, people in affluent countries. Therefore, as Woods notes, given the radical difference in situation, cultivating a thick

90 Here I refer to gender, wealth and social class in both perpetuating actual differences in relative vulnerability, and in obscuring awareness of an agent’s own vulnerability.
sense of shared vulnerability between globally affluent individuals and individuals facing global poverty will be difficult in practice. Even if successful, attempts to cultivate a thick sense of shared vulnerability have the potential to obscure differences between the situations of individuals in more affluent countries and the globally poorest individuals. More problematically, this approach may mask the extent to which the globally affluent are themselves complicit in creating and sustaining global poverty, through the collective imposition of an unjust international order (Pogge, 2002). Accordingly, the notion of shared vulnerability that can be operative here must be understood in a thin sense, for both practical and normative reasons.

There is a very real concern here over whether a thin sense of shared vulnerability is sufficient to overcome the potential distancing effects of depictions of the suffering of individuals facing poverty globally, as a means to encourage the extension of affective concern. At some point a sense of shared vulnerability will become too thin to do the work required to provide the foundations for the ‘imaginative leap into the life of the other’ thought to be necessary for perceptions of distant suffering to lead to a compassionate response (Nussbaum, 1996a, p.132). It is difficult to say anything precise about the exact point at which this is the case, and it will no doubt differ between individuals. However, for a sense of shared vulnerability to be thick enough to motivate action it is likely to require a degree of reflection on one’s own mortality and vulnerability to suffering that is not purely cerebral, but also a matter of affect at some level. My concern here is that this degree of attention to the vulnerability of would-be cosmopolitans raises its own motivational concerns. Drawing on Rorty (1998), the next section argues that too great a degree of attention to our own vulnerability to suffering in strategies of sentimental education raises motivational problems, which undermine the effectiveness of attention to shared vulnerability as a means by which to address the potential distancing effects of a focus on the suffering of distant others.

2.1. Sympathy, Security, and Vulnerability
In his Amnesty Lecture (1998) Rorty famously argued that strategies of sentimental education require two factors in order to be effective, sympathy and security.

Security and sympathy go together, for the same reasons that peace and economic productivity go together. The tougher things are, the more you have to be afraid of, the more dangerous your situation, the less you can afford the time or effort to think about what things might be like for people with whom you do not immediately identify. Sentimental education works only on people who can relax long enough to listen. (Rorty, 1998, p.180)

The point Rorty is making here is ultimately an empirical one, and as such it is beyond the scope of this chapter to establish whether it is true, however I take it to be a plausible claim, as have other theorists (Elijah Dann, 2010; Woods, 2009, p.54). Sentimental cosmopolitan arguments have focused on Rorty’s latter condition, of sympathy, and in particular the positive role attention to shared vulnerability can play in promoting the extension of sympathy, or a similar prosocial emotion, on the part of affluent publics towards distant others (Nussbaum, 2001; Woods, 2012). Attention to how perceptions of shared vulnerability interact with Rorty’s first condition, of security, has been largely absent.

In part, this absence may be down to the assumption that on Rorty’s account security ought to be understood in an absolute, or agent neutral sense. However, as we are primarily concerned with the role of security in altering individuals’ emotional attitudes to distant others what is doing the work here are perceptions of security, or security in an agent relative sense; this is evident in the attention to fear in the above quote. In making this point I am not suggesting that security in an agent neutral sense does not play an important role in determining perceptions of security, but that

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91 Although, as Norman Geras (1995) has shown, empirically there are counterexamples to Rorty’s claim. The most notable counterexample being the behaviour of rescuers during the Holocaust – but these heroic individuals were the exception rather than the rule.
92 Work by Woods (2009) has examined the extent to which the security of individuals in globally affluent countries is itself the result of human rights violations, and may be undermined by anthropogenic climate change. (See especially pp. 61-64).
this is not the only factor involved in determining perceptions of security. For example, imagine a case where the absolute risk of terrorist attack within a given country is decreasing, yet still constitutes a genuine threat, but media attention to terrorism is increasing. In this case the real threat to security may be decreasing, but perceptions of insecurity are increasing as a result of the disproportionate media attention. In this case the absolute threat is not irrelevant, but neither is it the decisive factor. My concern here is that strategies of sentimental education that highlight the vulnerability of affluent publics may operate in a similar manner to the media attention in the above example, undermining the perceptions of security of would be cosmopolitans, and accordingly the effectiveness of strategies of sentimental education.93

Rather than addressing the problems facing strategies of sentimental education that proceed by highlighting the suffering of distant others – that this attention to suffering may lead to reactions of distancing, avoidance, and apathy – this focus on shared vulnerability to suffering may compound these issues. Where a focus on the sufferings of distant others fails to gain traction, as this is understandably something people find distressing to contemplate, certainly on a regular basis, this problem may be compounded where strategies of sentimental education attempt to get affluent publics to contemplate their own vulnerability to suffering, for similar reasons.94 Although some degree of understanding of an agent’s own vulnerability to suffering is plausibly necessary for the experience of compassion (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 319; Rousseau, 1991, p. 185), compassion is by no means the only reaction to attention to one’s own vulnerability; as noted earlier, choosing agents may respond to this experience in a variety of ways. Denial, escapism, and limiting one’s own emotional connections to other human beings in order to limit the extent to which one is vulnerable

93 Rorty makes a similar point in his essay ‘Love and Money’ though the example of Leonard Blast in E.M. Forster’s novel Howards End, who becomes ‘obsessed with the need to feed himself and his wife, [and] could think and talk of nothing else’. His perceptions of his own insecurity not the reality of his situation leaves him unable to identify emotionally with others. (1998, p.223).
94 It might be thought that the first claim here begs the question, as this assumes precisely what is at issue; that people in more affluent countries are moved by the suffering of distant others. However, this need not be the case, as affluent individuals lacking cosmopolitan commitments could be moved by the extent to which this suffering highlights their own vulnerability to suffering, something further compounded by strategies of sentimental education that actively highlight this.
to emotional suffering are also possible responses. Moreover, this negative route receives significant empirical support from social psychology research into the role of stress responses in blocking empathetic behaviours. As Paul Zak argues ‘nature assumes that if we are in dire straits ourselves, we can’t so easily afford to invest time and resources in helping others. High stress blocks oxytocin release’ (Zak 2012, p.64; Edge, 2016, p.238). In contrast, it is difficult to see how an agent’s attention to their own vulnerability could increase their perceptions of security.\textsuperscript{95}

It might be thought that what is required here is striking the right balance, finding a degree of emphasis on the vulnerability of would-be cosmopolitans that serves to highlight a shared vulnerability to suffering sufficient for a compassionate response to the suffering of the global poor, but to do so without emphasising this vulnerability to suffering to an extent which undermines perceptions of security, and accordingly a receptiveness to strategies of sentimental education. To some extent this is correct, but drawing attention to a thin vulnerability to suffering shared by all humans, not just would-be cosmopolitans and poor people in less affluent countries, faces a more substantive concern. Drawing attention to the vulnerability to suffering we share with all humans does not necessarily lead us to be concerned with this vulnerability to suffering in all instances; as the fact that we all suffer\textsuperscript{96} does not alone establish whose sufferings are relevant for any given individual.

Just as drawing attention to our own vulnerability to suffering may lead to the cases of self-concern noted above, it can serve to reinforce levels of concern for a smaller group of people. This has affinities with the argument offered in section one that the extension of the boundaries of the community in which suffering moves a given individual does not necessarily follow from the depiction of suffering alone; however, here the thought is that attention to a shared vulnerability to suffering will reinforce concern for suffering within this community. I use community here to refer to

\textsuperscript{95}Admittedly, attention to the sufferings of the global poor might have this effect though comparison, but only at the expense of increasing perceptions of distance between their situation and that of people in more affluent countries.

\textsuperscript{96}Strictly speaking what this establishes is that we are all vulnerable to suffering, rather than that we all suffer, but it would be a rare human life where this potentiality was never translated into an actuality.
the boundaries of the extension of moral concern for a given individual. The claim that perceived threats to security lead to the strengthening of already existing affective ties is one that I take to be plausible, and receives support from empirical studies in social psychology (Vezzali et al., 2016). In cases where individuals have a strong affective attachment to a national identity this may serve to direct attention towards the vulnerabilities facing infirm, elderly, or poor, compatriots. In other cases, this may direct attention towards more localised partial commitments, for example to family or close friends. However, these accounts are not mutually exclusive, and a combination of the two positions is perhaps most likely. This is not to suggest that the extension of people’s moral concern typically stops at national borders, but that attention to shared vulnerability to suffering may serve to reinforce more parochial commitments where these exist. To be clear, this argument should not be taken to deny that our shared vulnerability to suffering is a true and important fact. As Raimond Gaita notes, alongside our mortality and our sexuality, our shared vulnerability to suffering constitutes one of the central elements of the shared human experience (2000, p.239); however, what I am primarily concerned with here is motivating action to address global poverty. Therefore, what is at issue is not the truth of this claim, but the degree of emphasis that ought to be placed on this claim within a project of sentimental education.

To sum up the argument so far. In section one I argued that a sentimental education that focuses on the suffering of distant others in order to provoke an empathetic or compassionate response faces a number of motivational concerns. These can be broadly divided into two categories; (i) reactions of apathy or withdrawal due to the level of attention to suffering, and (ii) an emphasis on the suffering of individuals facing global poverty serving to distance their situation from that of the globally affluent – both by highlighting differences in their relative vulnerability to suffering and obscuring the agency of individuals facing poverty globally. I then argued that the latter mechanism can serve to render motivating support for political action to address global poverty particularly intractable, as these strategies typically operate under the assumption that individuals facing poverty globally are capable agents. In this section I have argued that if Rorty is
correct that strategies of sentimental education typically require both sympathy and security in order to be effective, then we should be cautious of an emphasis on affluent individuals’ own vulnerability to suffering as a means by which to address these motivational concerns, as this can undermine perceptions of security; and accordingly, the ease with which strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education gain purchase.

3. Multiple Sources of Identification

In the third section of this chapter I offer the beginnings of an alternative to a focus on the suffering engendered by global poverty – or attention to this suffering alongside critical attention to shared vulnerability, as a means to encourage affective connections to individuals facing poverty globally. This account will be developed in detail in chapter seven. The model offered here draws on Richard Rorty’s suggestion that rather than emphasising ‘one big thing we all share’ strategies of sentimental education ought to instead proceed by highlighting the ‘little things we share’ (1998, p. 181). However, it is important to note that the model outlined here takes this element of Rorty’s account as a starting point and goes beyond it, rather than attempting to remain true to all aspects of Rorty’s original model.

Rorty argues that rather than focusing on ‘one big thing we all share’ strategies to extend affective concern to groups and individuals previously seen as “other” ought to proceed by emphasising ‘little superficial similarities’ between ourselves and these individuals (Rorty, 1998, p.181). By doing so, Rorty suggests we can ‘extend our sense of “we” to people we have previously thought of as “they” (1989, p.192). This emphasis on ‘little things we share’ offers a promising alternative to attempts to cultivate affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally, either by emphasising one big thing we all share – such as our vulnerability to suffering, or a defining feature of this group – such as the suffering engendered by global poverty.
In highlighting this strand of Rorty’s account it is important to note two things. Firstly, Rorty’s own discussion itself places a significant emphasis on suffering as a means to encourage the extension of sympathy to distant others, and Rorty notes our capacity for emotional suffering, and humiliation in particular, in this process. Although Rorty explicitly rejects an emphasis on ‘one big thing we all share’ (1998, p.181) in emphasising suffering, and a capacity for emotional suffering in particular, his account appears to be guilty of this move itself (Berry, 1986). Secondly, the rejection of ‘one big thing we all share’ on Rorty’s account plausibly derives from his anti-foundationalism (1998). In advocating the practical value of attention to ‘little superficial similarities’ I am not embracing these other elements of Rorty’s account. As argued in section one, I reject an exclusive emphasis on suffering as a means to promote the extension of affective concern as this faces its own motivational concerns, especially in encouraging political action to address global poverty and other injustices. Similarly, I have no wish to embrace Rorty’s anti-foundationalism, and his corresponding denial of the importance of the justificatory enterprise within political philosophy. Here I am concerned with the relevance of Rorty’s motivational claim in the context of the primarily practical problem of motivating action to address global poverty.97

3.1. Complexity

From Rorty’s argument I want to draw out the idea that encouraging globally affluent individuals to extend their sense of ‘one of us’ to include individuals facing global poverty is better served by exposure to a plurality of characteristics, rather than an emphasis on a single shared characteristic – such as our vulnerability to suffering, or a characteristic taken to be constitutive of the “global poor” – such as the suffering engendered by global poverty. As Rorty notes, identification with particular

97 We can separate, at least to an extent, the motivational problem from the justificatory problem. For example, as Raimond Gaita (2000) rightly notes, although a capacity for rational agency may be significant from a justificatory perspective, ‘You should help her because she is a rational agent’ does not offer a promising motivational strategy. Gaita takes the further step of suggesting that this exhortation can only be understood as parody (2000, p. 282).
others can derive from multiple sources which may be trivial from a justificatory perspective, such as a fellow member of the same union or profession, or a fellow bocce player, or a fellow parent of small children’ (1989, p.190). However, before I expand on this idea further it is necessary to note the following complexities.

I have employed the terms “the global poor” and “the globally affluent” at points as a useful shorthand, and these terms are prevalent in the philosophical literature on global poverty. However, neither group exists in a definite sense and, in picking out broad similarities, these labels obscure relevant differences. In the case of “the global poor” what is obscured is that ‘global poverty’ refers to a number of distinct, but related, phenomena that manifest themselves quite differently for diverse individuals and communities facing poverty globally – as discussed in chapter one. Two substantive points follow from this diversity. Firstly, effectively addressing particular instantiations of poverty globally will require different strategies. Secondly, rather than attempting to extend affective identification to an abstract (and fictional) entity – “the global poor”, motivating action to address poverty globally instead requires the extension of affective ties to particular individuals and groups facing poverty globally.

Similarly, as discussed in chapter one, the “globally affluent” encompasses a broad range of differently situated individuals with significant disparities in resources, best able to contribute effectively to address poverty globally in different ways. These differently situated individuals will also typically have different senses of who counts as “one of us”, and the extension of these identities will plausibly be determined by different features that we cannot always know in advance. Furthermore, individuals typically have multiple overlapping identities, identifying as belonging to a number of different groups to varying degrees (Erskine, 2004; 2002). Therefore, a sense of who counts as ‘one of us’ will not only differ between agents, but also be both multiple and a matter of degree. As Toni Erskine notes, the appropriate image here is not the Stoic model of a series of concentric circles with the individual at the centre – extending outwards with decreasing levels of
identification, but of a series of overlapping circles, representing multiple sources of identification, with “I as the point where circles intersect” (Erskine, 2002, p.476).

3.2. Multiple Sources of Identification

Rorty’s point that rather than “one big thing we all share” a number of seemingly trivial characteristics can serve as a basis for the extension of affective identification with particular others is therefore further complicated. Rather than attempting to extend a single sense of “us” to include a monolithic “them” – “the global poor”, we are faced with the much more complex task of extending differing and multiplicitous senses of “us” to include myriad “thems” – various groups and individuals facing poverty globally. Neither attention to “one big thing we all share” nor strategies of sentimental education which attempt to reflect distant others in a certain light, emphasising various shared characteristics, are suitable for accommodating this level of complexity. This is due to both significant differences between groups and individuals facing poverty globally, and to differences between individuals in affluent countries over possible sources of identification.

What I want to suggest is that we reject approaches where agents in affluent countries depict individuals facing poverty globally in a manner that emphasises any particular feature, or features, of these individuals thought to be conducive to the extension of affective concern. Instead, I propose that (i) strategies of sentimental education ought to employ a default position of increasing exposure to the multiple lives of various groups and individuals facing poverty globally, rather than emphasising certain shared characteristics of these groups and individuals. (ii) Where possible, these strategies should proceed by facilitating interactions, and (iii) allow for individuals and groups facing particular instances of poverty globally to take the lead in how they are presented to affluent audiences. I develop this alternative strategy in detail in chapter seven, where I illustrate

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what this account entails in practice through the use of in-depth examples, but note the following three advantages at this stage.

Firstly, attention to particular groups and individuals facing poverty globally can plausibly lead to more robust affective ties. A significant body of research in social psychology suggests that affective connections are particularly motivationally efficacious, and enduring, when they have individuals or small groups as their object (Slovic, 2007; Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997). Developing robust affective ties is especially important for motivating political action to address global poverty, as political duties to address global poverty are plausibly particularly motivationally demanding – as argued in chapter one. Secondly, attention to particular groups and individuals facing specific instances of poverty globally will be conducive to motivating support for effective political action. As global poverty encompasses a number of different phenomena with a variety of causes (see chapter one) solutions will need to be tailored to specific circumstances to be effective. Thirdly, where strategies of sentimental education proceed by encouraging interactions, or, where this is not feasible, groups and individuals facing poverty globally taking the lead in how they are presented, this positions them in an active role in this process. In doing so, this foregrounds their capacity for agency within the process of sentimental education. As I argued in section two, this offers a particular benefit for motivating support for political strategies to address poverty globally, as a capacity for agency is necessary both to benefit from and participate in political solutions (see chapter seven).

It may be objected that rather than leading to greater identification, this strategy may instead serve to increase perceptions of distance between individuals in affluent countries and individuals facing poverty globally. To put the point bluntly, when presented with a complex picture rather than a gloss people may not like what they see. To some extent this is correct, as choosing agents will necessarily respond to others in a variety of ways, but this is a concern for any approach, and there are independent reasons to favour this strategy (beyond those already outlined). Firstly, there are normative reasons to favour accurate depictions, rather than emphasising particular
features of distant others’ lives when presenting these individuals to affluent audiences which may be at odds with these others’ self-understandings. This is especially so given the complex legacy of colonialism and exploitation which exists between many affluent countries, and countries where severe poverty is prevalent (MacQueen, 2007). Secondly, where affective connections are based on an inaccurate picture of distant others these connections will be unstable, with accurate information potentially undermining these ties, or leading to reactance (Brehm, 1966).

A further concern which may occur to the reader at this stage is that encountering distant others in this manner will potentially be highly difficult in practice, as exposure to the lives of distant others is typically mediated, for example, through the presence of journalists or filmmakers. In selecting particular cases over others as subjects of attention and through the process of mediation itself, whether or not this is intentional, distant others are necessarily presented to affluent publics in a certain light. Whilst it is correct that mediation is likely to remain a feature of these interactions for the foreseeable future, we can distinguish between active and passive versions of this process. In the case of active mediation, distant others are purposefully presented in a certain manner, emphasising chosen characteristics, such as their suffering or vulnerability. This poses a significant concern for this strategy, but this is not a necessary feature of our encounters with distant others, and can plausibly be minimised. Mediation in a passive sense, referring to the fact that distant others will be presented in various forms of media, is a more built in feature of our encounters with distant others, and poses less of a concern. However, as encounters with these representations are fleeting, and are no substitute for actual interactions, passive mediation still serves as a potential barrier to the extension of affective concern. In order to address these concerns chapter seven develops a substantive alternative model of sentimental education as dialogue, featuring an account of what sensitive processes of meditation entail in practice.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the role of depictions of suffering distant others in cosmopolitan sentimental education. I argued that an emphasis on depictions of suffering as a means to encourage the development of affective concern presents an obstacle to motivating political action to address global poverty. I then examined an emphasis on a shared vulnerability to suffering, common to all humans, as a means to overcome these adverse motivational effects. Here I argued that, although our shared vulnerability to suffering is a true and important fact, this strategy is prone to versions of the concerns facing an emphasis on suffering. Finally, I offered the beginnings of an alternative approach – to be developed in detail in chapter seven.

The argument proceeded in three sections. Section one explicated the problems facing strategies of sentimental education that focus on suffering as a means to encourage the growth of affective concern for distant others; arguing that attention to the suffering of distant others may both increase perceptions of difference between affluent publics and the global poor, and lead to reactions of resignation, avoidance and apathy. Moreover, this emphasis on suffering can serve to undermine perceptions of individuals facing poverty globally as capable agents – able to benefit from and participate in political strategies to address global poverty. Section two examined whether these problems can be mitigated by an emphasis on a shared vulnerability to suffering, common to individuals in affluent countries and those facing global poverty (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 304-327; Woods, 2012, pp. 43-44). Here I argued that, although our shared vulnerability to suffering is a true and important fact, an emphasis on shared vulnerability may undermine the effectiveness of a sentimental education in motivating action to address global poverty due to the ability of perceptions of vulnerability to undermine perceptions of security. The final section of the chapter offered the beginnings of an alternative strategy. Here I argued that rather than seeking to present distant others in a certain way, strategies of sentimental education ought to include these individuals in the process, allowing them to take the lead. What this looks like in practice will be examined in chapter seven. However, before doing so, I turn to examine whether the many
injustices that exist within the borders of more affluent nations threaten to undermine this positive project of cosmopolitan sentimental education.
Chapter Six: National Injustice and Cosmopolitan Motivation

Introduction

This thesis has argued that strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education, suitably modified, represent a promising means by which to motivate individuals in more affluent countries to act politically to address global poverty. However, the discussion up to this point has been relatively silent regarding the injustices that exist within these more affluent nations themselves. Our apparent tolerance of local injustice stands as a stark rebuke to the feasibility of the project outlined; and injustice within national borders threatens to pull our sentiments in a competing direction, away from cosmopolitan concern for distant others, and towards local injustice. Here, the projects of national and global justice are argued to be in conflict, not simply at the level of principle, but in practice (Miller, 2013; Straehle, 2016).

Rousseau famously derides ‘those cosmopolitans who search out remote duties in their books, and neglect those that lie nearest’ (1991, p.7). However, this may be though a particular concern for sentimental cosmopolitan approaches, with injustice both within and beyond the nation state competing for our finite motivational resources (Long, 2012). Moreover, as the sentimental cosmopolitan suggests that the extension of affective concern is bound up with notions of identity, we may have to choose between promoting a primarily national or primarily cosmopolitan identity in order to effectively motivate action (Miller, 2013, p.176). This chapter grants that these two points are broadly correct, but argues that the overall situation is more complex; as levels of justice within national borders are related to the effectiveness of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education in a number of ways. Therefore, the promotion of justice within the borders of more affluent countries, and strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education aimed at promoting basic global justice, are potentially complementary, rather than competing, projects.
The argument proceeds as follows. In section one I argue that the picture typically presented of a straightforward conflict between national and global justice is too simplistic, as ‘the national’ in these cases encompasses a number of distinct and complex relationships that potentially stand in opposition to cosmopolitan concern, beyond the relationship of conationality. I argue that this model fails to take into account the role of partial commitments and suffering encountered in person in the motivational conflict between national and global justice. Accordingly, the conflict between global justice and justice within national borders is both more complex and more intractable than it first appears.

In section two I argue that if strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education are to be effective, the culture within a society, as reflected in both institutions and personal behaviour, must be conducive to developing and sustaining empathetic or compassionate dispositions. In order to reach this conclusion I make two arguments. Firstly, I argue that tolerance of injustice within national borders acts as a form of sentimental miseducation, serving to undermine acceptance of cosmopolitan values. This is illustrated through an examination of the expressive role of tolerance of homelessness within national borders.

Secondly, drawing on Richard Rorty’s claim that both sympathy and security are necessary in order for strategies of sentimental education to be effective (Rorty, 1998), I argue that failures to address injustices within national borders can serve to undermine citizens’ perceptions of their own security, and accordingly the success of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education. Therefore, institutions promoting justice within a society, particularly those offering health and social care, have important work to do in creating a climate in which citizens are receptive to strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education.

1. Competing for Our Sentiments
Injustice within national borders may be thought of particular relevance for the prospects of the spread of cosmopolitan concern for two reasons. Firstly, at a time where welfare states are being eroded (Rummery, 2016; O’Hara, 2014), and levels of homelessness are rising rapidly (Rummery, 2016; Burgi, 2014), our apparent tolerance of local injustice stands as a stark rebuke to the feasibility of the project outlined. Secondly, injustice within national borders threatens to pull our sentiments in a competing direction; away from cosmopolitan concern for distant others, and towards local injustices. These may be thought to be of a lesser magnitude and severity than the basic rights violations that characterise global poverty, but are nonetheless serious, and are often encountered first-hand.

These concerns draw on David Miller’s (2013) argument that global justice and justice within national borders necessarily conflict, as both the financial and material resources that can be devoted to addressing injustice and, more importantly, the emotional resources we can draw on in order to motivate us to act to address injustice, are themselves finite. As Miller notes, we may have to choose between encouraging people to see themselves primarily as ‘members of a particular political community, and as responsible for the welfare of people belonging to that community, and encouraging people to see themselves as citizens of the world, with responsibilities to the needy and vulnerable, no matter where they live’ (2013, p.175).

I take both of Miller’s general claims to be broadly correct, but with a number of caveats. I will outline these caveats, before moving on to address Miller’s specific reading of the second claim. Regarding the first claim, although the financial and material resources of states and individuals may be finite, the proportion of these resources which we devote to addressing injustice, at both a national and global level, is not fixed. Therefore, resources to address global injustice need not always be transferred from domestic welfare budgets to international development budgets, but

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99 I accept that some people may consider the erosion of the welfare state to be compatible with the pursuit of local justice, or even to be a necessary condition for this project, for example libertarians. The argument of this chapter does not directly speak to these people. All arguments must being with some starting assumptions, and the argument of this chapter assumes that the welfare state offers an effective means by which to pursue justice within national borders, an assumption which Miller (2014) shares.
may come from elsewhere. However, as policies within democracies require sufficient levels of public support in order to be stably implemented, absolute levels of resources, such as the overall size of the tax burden, are arguably restricted by public opinion.\textsuperscript{100}

In the case of Miller’s second claim I accept that the emotional resources we can devote to addressing injustice are ultimately finite, as non-heroic individuals will face compassion fatigue or emotional overload if they devote all their energies to addressing injustice – whether within or beyond national borders. However, this is subject to three important caveats. Firstly, although there is arguably an upper limit to the emotional resources that can be drawn on to address injustice, as individuals can only give so much of themselves, the extent to which this translates into effective action is much more variable. As Woods (2012, p.40) has argued, critical reason necessarily plays an important role in directing our affective concern for those suffering injustices into effective action to address these injustices. Furthermore, the ease with which our affective responses to injustice can be translated into effective action will be mediated by the availability of institutional structures through which the problem can be addressed. For example, where political institutions or redistributive programmes already exist these will help facilitate effective action. Therefore, a given level of affective concern may bring about radically different results when directed towards different strategies through which injustice may be addressed.

The second and third caveats are both drawn from Graham Long’s paper ‘Moral and Sentimental Cosmopolitanism’ (2009) and suggest that, although our absolute levels of affective concern may be fixed, Miller overstates the situation; as we may be able to increase levels of motivation to address global justice, without simultaneously depleting the motivational resources necessary for justice within national borders. Long offers two suggestions as to where these additional motivational resources could come from: (i) they could be drawn from the significant emotional resources we devote to the subjects of our partial commitments, such as friends or

\textsuperscript{100} It is important to note that Miller appears to understand addressing global poverty in primarily financial terms, and that these limits are arguably less pronounced when addressing global poverty is understood as entailing political action. Nevertheless, temporal resources are also finite.
family, or (ii) citizens of developed countries may possess spare emotional capacity. Accordingly, we could care more for people beyond national borders without simultaneously caring less for either our compatriots or those closest to us (Long, 2009, p.336).

Regarding the first suggestion, it is correct that this suggests an alternative source from which emotional resources for global justice could be derived without simultaneously depleting the resources on offer for justice within national borders. Furthermore, there may be compelling normative reasons why we ought to devote more of our attention to global justice, and away from our partial commitments, if this can be achieved without sacrificing these commitments altogether.\(^{101}\) However, there are two reasons to think that the extent to which we can divert our emotional attachment away from our partial commitments and towards global justice is limited. Firstly, given the great degree of value people typically place on their partial commitments as a source of meaning and happiness, this seems to be a particularly difficult place from which to secure additional emotional capacity. As Williams famously argued, these commitments are also in some way fundamentally constitutive of our identities, and accordingly too great a strain on these commitments may threaten to undermine our ability to care about anything, including global justice (Williams, 1981). Secondly, the relationship between our partial commitments to particular others and our normative commitments to humans in general, is plausibly much more complicated than one of competition.

The second claim, I also take to be broadly correct, but it is important to highlight the extent to which it is necessarily agent relative, as the spare emotional capacities of citizens of more affluent countries will vary depending on personal circumstances and temperament. For example, we can expect someone caring for a terminally ill relative to have less emotional capacity to devote to global justice than someone in less emotionally demanding circumstances. Although, even in these circumstances it is important to note the relationship may not be so straightforward, as engaging in

\(^{101}\) Of course, it may be argued that we ought to pursue global justice at the expense of these partial commitments altogether. I take the arguments offered below, alongside Williams’ (1981) seminal discussion of the topic to show why this approach is misguided.
caring behaviour may plausibly increase our capacity to care. A further complexity highlighted by the case of caring for a terminally ill relative is the extent to which the emotional, but also the financial and temporal, demands placed on individuals will be politically determined; as the nature of the institutions providing (or failing to provide) health and social care within a society will determine the extent of these demands. This will be discussed in detail below, but at this stage it is important to note two things. Firstly, that the institutions within a society will affect the degree to which injustice encountered within national borders competes for our finite emotional resources which might be directed towards global justice. Secondly, the extent to which citizens possess differing levels of spare emotional capacity that might be directed towards global justice, will not only be affected by circumstances and temperament, but also by potentially unequal access to certain basic goods within society – which itself will be politically determined.

1.1. Politically Constructed Solidarity

I have argued that, as the emotional resources that we can draw on in order to motivate action to address global injustice and injustice within national borders are finite, global and local justice are in prima facie conflict at the level of motivation. I have also noted a number of complexities at this stage, which suggest that in practice the picture may be somewhat different from one of simple opposition. These complexities will be examined in detail below. However, in arguing that national and global justice are in direct conflict at the level of motivation, David Miller makes a further claim regarding the politically constructed nature of nationalist or cosmopolitan motivation. I now turn to examine this claim. As with the previous claim, I do not wish to deny it outright, but to complicate it.

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102 Other factors will be significant here, such as the temperament of the individual concerned, the nature of the relationship, and even the illness. I also note the twin dangers of romanticising the situation, or presenting it as an anomaly destructive of care – rather than as a standard feature of human life.
Miller argues that whether we see ourselves as primarily citizens of the world or of a particular political community depends in large part on the content of the education we receive as children, and the norms prevalent in the society that we inhabit (Miller, 2013, p.176). The content of this education and the nature of these norms do not arise by accident, but are politically constructed. As has been noted by Benedict Anderson, and others, modern national identities are the end result of a complex process of nation building which was typically consciously implemented (Anderson, 2006; Axelsen, 2013). Therefore, Miller suggests that insofar as primarily national and primarily cosmopolitan identities are mutually exclusive, we may have to choose between encouraging people to see themselves primarily as members of a particular political community, responsible for the welfare of people within this community, and encouraging people to see themselves primarily in cosmopolitan terms, with responsibilities to the needy and vulnerable regardless of where they live (2013, p.176).

I take Miller’s claim to be broadly correct. However, it is important to note three things. Firstly, the claim is not that national and cosmopolitan identities cannot coexist, but that ultimately one of the two identities must be rendered fundamental. Secondly, we should note that this conflict is likely to be less pronounced where the standards of cosmopolitan justice in question are minimal; as in the case of the account of basic global justice defended in this thesis. Thirdly, it is also important to stress that underlying this practical question is a genuinely difficult normative question that applies regardless of this thesis’ comparatively weak cosmopolitan focus on basic global justice. If we are faced with a straight choice between acting to realise significant human rights within national borders – for example providing an additional level of care for people with severe disabilities, allowing them to live in a dignified manner and exercise some degree of autonomy over their lives – and acting to realise basic human rights globally – for example through providing basic sanitation – it is by no means clear how we ought to proceed.103 However, although the normative

103 If it is denied that we owe any special duties to compatriots whatsoever it might be suggested that this is actually a very easy question. I do not find this a particularly plausible position, and as I outline below, there may be both normatively and motivationally significant differences here that go beyond co-nationality.
question raised by these conflicts is both real and highly complex, the scenario is somewhat artificial, and the likelihood of such conflicts occurring in practice is rare. As argued above, at the levels of both material resources and motivation there will typically be alternative places from which resources may be drawn.

It is highly plausible that a significant part of the explanation for why people are typically more readily moved by suffering within national borders than beyond them (to the extent that they are)\textsuperscript{104} is due to national identities that have been constructed, and continue to be reinforced by state institutions (Axelsen, 2013, p.462). Although the fact that an identity is constructed does not in itself imply it is especially amenable to change, it does suggest that over time an alternative identity may be constructed in its place. However, a contrast between a politically constructed national solidarity and a politically constructed cosmopolitan solidarity represents a false dichotomy. This is not only because the practical question typically will concern how much we have of each, rather than a straight choice, but, as I shall argue below, that this opposition masks other normatively and motivationally significant relationships.

1.2. Other Factors

As discussed, where injustice within national borders and injustice beyond national borders compete for our finite emotional resources, politically constructed solidarities will play an important role in determining where our primary attentions are directed. This is a very important point, but it should not lead us to ignore other relevant factors that may be less amenable to correction. I will now briefly discuss two such factors that might be thought to advantage global poverty where it competes for finite emotional resources with injustice within national borders, arguing that the

\textsuperscript{104} It is important to emphasise that this is not the only factor, and that spatial distance need not always lead to emotional distance, or spatial proximity to emotional identification. For example, raising funds for drug addicts within national borders, plausibly faces further barriers to raising funds for child poverty abroad, due to attributions of responsibility. However, spatial distance is nonetheless an important factor.
motivational significance of these factors is typically overstated. I then move on to examine some features of injustice within national borders, which I suggest represent a significant obstacle to attempts to divert motivational resources elsewhere, regardless of politically constructed solidarity.

The sheer scale and direness of the suffering engendered by global poverty is something that it is difficult to overstate. More than a billion people face severe poverty worldwide. Estimates suggest that around 50,000 people, including 25,000 children, die from poverty related causes every day (Overland, 2013, p.281). These deaths result not only from short-term development emergencies such as famines, but also from chronic poverty.\textsuperscript{105} The suffering involved in these deaths, primarily from disease, dehydration and malnutrition, defies comprehension. The scale and seriousness of this suffering is clearly highly normatively significant; however, it is by no means clear that these two factors lead directly to increased levels of affective concern on the part of individuals in more affluent countries.\textsuperscript{106} In the former case, empirical research by Slovic (2007) suggests that numerical scale does not typically translate into increased levels of affective concern; in fact the opposite often occurs. Two psychological mechanisms are thought to be responsible for this: the identifiable victim effect, where we typically feel greater levels of affective concern when presented with individual cases (Lichtenberg, 2014, p.244), and psychic numbing, where the sheer magnitude of suffering can overwhelm our ability to respond affectively to suffering (Slovic, 2007, pp.79-95).

The role of intensity or direness of suffering in increasing levels of affective concern is more difficult to ascertain, as this includes a significant psychological component, and is to some extent agent relative. If a positive relationship exists between levels of affective concern and the seriousness of suffering, this does not directly map onto the distinction between the basic rights

\textsuperscript{105} As argued in Chapter One, a strict separation between chronic poverty – the subject of development initiatives, and disasters such as famine – the subject of emergency aid, is untenable as the former renders communities especially vulnerable to the latter.

\textsuperscript{106} As discussed in previous chapters, how global poverty is presented is critical to the degree of affective concern it engenders, but here I focus on other factors. In doing so I in no way intend to deny the motivational significance of how poverty is presented.
violations that characterise global poverty, and the inequalities in access to health and social care, for example, that are typically a feature of injustice within more affluent countries. Although this may plausibly apply as a broad pattern, it does not translate into individual cases. For example, consider the difficulties facing attempts to compare a child cancer patient receiving inadequate medical care in a relatively affluent, although highly unequal, society, and a child suffering through famine in one of the poorer communities of the world. Here, levels of suffering may be equally terrible in both cases, and, even if all other things are equal, it is unclear which case would, or should, provoke the more significant affective response. Furthermore, this example highlights both the difficulty and the lack of utility in attempting to compare cases of serious suffering. When suffering gets beyond a certain level of seriousness, attempts to adjudicate between different cases appears misguided. I also do not find it especially plausible that when sufferings are perceived as being highly serious our affective responses will differ greatly based on judgements of additional seriousness.

It might be objected that, in focusing on a particularly extreme case of suffering within national borders, this discussion ignores more typical cases where relatively minor injustices at the national level compete for our affective concern with serious injustices beyond national borders. I do not want to deny that such cases exist, or that they constitute a significant portion of the cases where our sentiments are pulled in both a national and a cosmopolitan direction. However, to consider these cases as the norm arguably underestimates the seriousness of the preventable suffering that regularly takes place within more affluent countries, especially due to inadequate access to medical and social care. To be clear, these claims are not intended to deny the significance

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107 This is a highly emotive example, but given that starving children are the typical example used to illustrate the sufferings engendered by global poverty, the comparison is appropriate in this context. The example also allows judgements of responsibility to be bracketed off at present, although these will be discussed below.

108 In practice of course all other things are rarely, if ever, equal. An important consideration here is that the ability to imaginatively identify with the suffering of another may be increased not only by perceptions of similarity stemming from a constructed national identity, but superficial similarities in lifestyle and experiences.

109 Admittedly, the discussion here concerning judgments of seriousness would be unlikely to convince a utilitarian.
of the suffering engendered by global poverty, or that this suffering takes place on a scale rarely seen in affluent liberal democracies. The point is instead that serious preventable suffering takes place both within and beyond the borders of more affluent countries, and that, past a certain level of seriousness, intensity of suffering is not a reliable measure for increased levels of affective concern.

I have argued that where national and global justice compete for finite motivational resources, the scale and seriousness of the sufferings engendered by global poverty, although clearly of great normative significance, may not represent a motivational advantage – translating into increased levels of affective concern. In order to do so I advanced the following three claims. Firstly, the sheer scale of global poverty may make the extension of affective concern more difficult due to entrenched psychological biases. Secondly, where instances of suffering are judged to be serious, further increases in seriousness may not translate into additional affective concern. Thirdly, individual cases of preventable suffering within affluent countries may sometimes be of similar seriousness to instances taking place beyond national borders.110

1.3. National, Local, and Partial

I will now outline two motivational advantages that benefit justice within national borders when it competes with global justice for our affective concern. These take the form of two distinct relationships that exist below the national level: firstly, the role of the local, understood as the spaces we physically inhabit, and secondly, the role of partial commitments. These factors are absent from the current literature on the conflict between national and global justice, which operates with a sharp national/global binary, and primarily focuses on national identity or compatriot partiality (Straehle, 2016; Miller, 2013). Furthermore, unlike national solidarity, artificial

110 As noted above, the number of individuals affected by serious preventable suffering will be much greater beyond the borders of more affluent countries. My point here is that seriousness of suffering alone, may be have much less motivational significance in these circumstances than it first appears.
processes of nation-building play no significant role in the development and maintenance of these relationships; therefore they may be particularly difficult to alter.

i. Locality. Some instances of preventable suffering that are encountered within national borders are encountered in person. These will be especially common for individuals who work in healthcare or social services – who are more frequently exposed to preventable suffering – but encounters with homeless individuals are a relatively common occurrence for most city dwellers. However, for most individuals in more affluent countries, their personal experience of global poverty will typically be highly limited. As discussed in Chapter Three, encountering instances of suffering in person is plausibly thought to lead to increased levels of affective concern, in comparison to cases where this process is heavily mediated. For example, where people encounter homeless individuals in person, who are suffering due to a lack of adequate health and social care, there are a number of reasons why this may be more affecting than when this situation is presented in the news media. The immediacy and vividness of personal encounters suggests a plausible mechanism through which personal experience of a particular injustice may lead to increased levels of affective concern for the sufferer. This receives anecdotal support from the significance people typically place on personal experience in altering attitudes, as attested to in phrases such as ‘you had to be there’ or ‘you have to see it for yourself’. To be clear, I am suggesting that this is an important factor, not the only factor, as temporal exposure or attributions of responsibility can serve to impede or facilitate the extension of affective concern.

It might be objected that a distinction between suffering encountered in person and suffering encountered through media representations does not neatly map onto a national/global distinction, as through international travel some individuals will have first-hand experience of

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111 It is important to note that art forms, such as the novel, that encourage empathetic identification, can offer their own advantages, and may be able to increase our affective responses to suffering in ways that personal experience cannot (See for example, Nussbaum, 2001). I do not wish to deny this, but rather to make the point that personal experience also offers distinct advantages in increasing the extension of affective concern.
injustices such as global poverty. This is correct, but it has limited significance for my overall argument for two reasons. Firstly, this level of international travel only reflects the situation of a limited number of people, and even for these people this will typically only constitute a relatively small portion of their personal experiences. Secondly, the links between suffering encountered in person and where these encounters take place are highly complex. As such, as I will now argue, suffering encountered in person that takes place within national borders, and/or within the local area one inhabits may take on additional affective significance. It is important to note that, although affective ties between conationals may be doing some of the work here, the significance of preventable suffering encountered within the borders of more affluent countries cannot be explained by the strength of the compatriot relationship alone. For example, this relationship of conationality cannot account for why the situation of hungry and homeless migrants might be thought to take on additional affective significance for affluent individuals when this is encountered within their (the globally affluent’s) own country or neighbourhood.

Judith Lichtenberg offers a persuasive alternative explanation via the concept of psychological proximity, in which physical proximity and personal encounters both play an important role (2014, p.164). The exact relationship between these three factors is highly complex, as psychological proximity can exist regardless of physical proximity. However, typically physical proximity will increase psychological proximity, especially where physical proximity is highlighted through face-to-face encounters.112 As Lichtenberg notes, ‘the poor may be continually confronted with those who have more – on the street, in stores, and in schools – just as the better-off are confronted by those who have less’ (2014, p.164). This suggests two mechanisms through which face-to-face interactions can increase the affective significance of injustice where these encounters take place within affluent countries.

The first mechanism is that face-to-face encounters may serve to magnify the role of locality in increasing perceptions of psychological proximity, resulting in these encounters gaining additional

112 I am suggesting a general pattern here, and note that this will not always apply.
affective significance. This may be mediated through the national, where preventable suffering takes on additional affective significance due to the fact it occurs within the borders of an affluent country, both coexisting with high levels of wealth and happening here. Moreover, certain deprivations may have more normative significance in an absolute sense when they occur within an affluent country, due to the relative costs of partaking in the patterns of behaviour prevalent in the society (Lichtenberg, 2014, p.162). However, additional affective significance may also derive from identification with localities narrower than the national, as exemplified in thoughts of the form ‘in this town, in my neighbourhood, down my street, outside my house – someone is hungry and homeless.’ These localised identities are highly important, as they are likely to be perceived as significant regardless of the extent to which a politically constructed national identity is replaced or supplemented by a more cosmopolitan identity.

A second mechanism is provided by Lichtenberg’s suggestion that where affluence and need coexist within a locality these deprivations may take on additional significance for the worse off. Both the inequality itself and face-to-face interactions that draw attention to it take on a communicative role in this context, as there is ‘an expressive aspect to such deprivations – they say something about and to poor people in rich societies – that turns insult into injury’ (Lichtenberg, 2014, p.163). For example, in a society where the poorest are unable to afford dental care, tolerance of this deprivation may take on an expressive aspect for these individuals; one that is reinforced in interactions with more affluent individuals able to afford dental care, which draw attention to this deprivation.113

This provides an additional normative reason why injustices within affluent countries may be especially significant, all other things being equal. In some cases this additional normative reason may increase levels of motivation to address injustice within national borders. More significantly, the expressive aspect of these deprivations will be particularly pronounced in cases of face-to-face interaction, and this will alter the affective reactions that result. In particular, the presence of the

113 For a further exploration of expressive harms see Anderson and Pildes (2000).
affluent in this context may be an affront to the poor, giving rise to self-blame emotions, such as guilt and shame on the part of the affluent. This effect will plausibly be more pronounced in liberal democracies where a background expectation of equality of opportunity is arguably present. As discussed in Chapter Four, moral psychology research suggests that, despite significant scepticism, negative emotions such as guilt and shame may be particularly motivationally efficacious in some cases.

**ii. Partial Commitments.** A second advantage injustices within national borders face when they compete with global justice for our finite motivational resources is that it may be particularly difficult to separate the considerations favouring national justice from those favouring the subjects of our partial commitments. Partial commitments are typically, though not exclusively, to particular individuals who live within the borders of the same state as oneself. Although this does not apply in all cases, especially with rising freedom of movement and an increasingly globalised world, it still remains the case that for the majority of people their friends and family inhabit the same state as themselves.\(^{114}\)

The significance of this is obscured where cases of the conflict between addressing injustices within national borders and addressing global injustices is modelled on charitable giving; with agents facing a choice in distributing a particular sum of money between charities operating at the national and the global level. On this model the subjects of our partial commitments will be typically absent from the conflict. However, when conflict between national and global justice is understood as primarily a case of where emphasis is placed when engaging in political action, such as supporting particular policies or devoting time to specific causes, the role of partial commitments becomes more pronounced. This is because policies that address injustices at the national level, such as

\(^{114}\) This may cease to be the case if globalisation and the movement of people across national borders continues. However, there are both signs of a resurgence of the nation-state globally and increasing restrictions on freedom of movement. The focus of this thesis is the more immediate question of how we motivate action towards basic global justice on the part of the globally affluent, within the institutional frameworks that currently exists at a global and national level.
unequal access to adequate health and social care, will potentially benefit ourselves and the subjects of our partial commitments to a greater extent than policies that address injustices beyond national borders. There will necessarily be a prudential component to this, as we may have self-interested reasons to favour policies that directly benefit ourselves; although, we should note that there are also prudential reasons to address injustices at the global level due to their role in contributing to global instability. Accordingly, I take our affective concern for the subjects of our partial commitments to provide an additional motivational factor in favour of policies that address injustice within national borders.

It might be objected that although this applies to members of affluent societies with average, or below average, incomes it provides no additional incentive for the especially affluent members of affluent societies to support policies to address injustices within the societies they inhabit. As Miller notes, sacrifices made in the promotion of global justice will necessarily be unevenly distributed (2013, p.178). The especially affluent will have sufficient resources to maintain high standards of health and social care (for example) for themselves, and the subjects of their partial commitments, regardless of the political institutions that exist in their society. However, this situation only applies to a relatively small amount of people, with the percentage of the UK population with private healthcare currently at ten percent (Collinson, 2017); although, the number of people able to afford private healthcare will necessarily be higher.

A modified version of the argument developed in the previous section also applies here, albeit to a much lesser extent. Encountering suffering in person is not just affecting, it is typically a distressing experience. Limiting this experience, both for themselves and for the subjects of their partial commitments, provides a modest reason for the affluent to support policies that address injustices within their own societies rather than global injustices. We should note that where the very affluent are able to sustain patterns of behaviour that enable them to avoid coming into

115 This is not to suggest that they do not also have compelling normative reasons to address injustice, but these apply regardless of where injustice takes place.
contact with instances of preventable suffering in their own societies, the significance of this mechanism will be limited. However, the number of individuals who are sufficiently affluent for this to apply will necessarily be relatively small.

In this section I have argued that where injustices at the national level compete with injustices at the global level for our finite motivational resources, injustice within national borders faces distinct advantages. This is due not only to politically constructed national identities, but also to the affective significance of suffering encountered in person, and the extent to which institutional solutions to national injustice affect both our own lives and the subjects of our partial commitments. Therefore, precisely due to extent to which injustice within national borders faces significant advantages when it competes with injustice beyond national borders for our sentimental concern, I want to suggest that addressing injustices within affluent societies may further the development of sentimental cosmopolitan goals by reducing competition for our sentimental concern. To be clear, the claim here is the conditional one that the less injustice that exists within a society, the easier it will be to further the development of cosmopolitan sentimental concern. However, there is still a separate normative question concerning the extent to which it is permissible to favour addressing less serious injustices within national borders over promoting basic global justice. This is especially significant because, as Miller suggests, social justice within national borders may not be a satiable goal; as in the case of meeting medical needs, for example, there will always be room for improvement (2014, p.178).

2. Sentimental Education and Justice within National Borders

This chapter now turns to examine how the pursuit of justice within national borders may directly further sentimental cosmopolitan goals by providing an environment that is conducive to the development and maintenance of cosmopolitan sentimental concern. Accounts of cosmopolitan sentimental education have tended to focus on the role of educational institutions and the media in
the extension of sentimental concern beyond national borders (Nussbaum, 2001). This is highly important; however, this focus might be thought to neglect the prior question of the conditions within a polity that are conducive to the development of compassionate dispositions more broadly. In the next section I argue that the social institutions that exist at the national level, in particular what might be termed caring institutions – those which deal with the provision of health and social care – are very important in creating a compassionate citizenry.

In order to provide further support for this claim, the final section of the chapter offers two negative arguments concerning the role of injustice at the national level in undermining the effectiveness of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education. First, I argue that tolerance of injustices within national borders undermines respect for the universal values that underlie the sentimental cosmopolitan project. I illustrate this with an examination of the expressive content of tolerance of homelessness. Finally, drawing on Rorty’s suggestion that strategies of sentimental education require both sympathy and security on the part of the recipients in order to be effective (1998, p.180), I argue that the institutions typically associated with the welfare state may not only offer a means of promoting justice within national borders, but also increase the extent to which citizens are receptive to strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education.

2.1. Creating Compassionate Citizens

Discussions of sentimental cosmopolitanism have tended to focus on the role of educational institutions, the media, and popular art; both as a means of encouraging empathetic identification with distant others and extending our general capacity for responding to the sufferings of others with affective concern (Nussbaum, 2001; Rorty, 1998). Although these factors are highly important, I want to suggest that other national institutions play an important role in creating compassionate citizens, who are disposed to respond with affective concern when confronted by instances of suffering. To be clear, narrative art forms and journalism are particularly important in expanding the
constituency of individuals with whom we readily identify (Nussbaum, 2001); however, other factors plausibly influence both our tendency and capacity to respond affectively to suffering. In particular, I want to suggest that the existence of effective caring institutions within a society, such as those offering medical and social care, will be conducive to the development of compassionate citizens. Institutions can perform an educative function in both teaching individuals to behave in a compassionate manner and to view other human beings in a certain light. As Raimond Gaita suggests, this contains both a negative and a positive element: ‘The struggle for social justice...is the struggle to make our institutions reveal rather than obscure, and then enhance rather than diminish, the full humanity of our fellow citizens.’ (Gaita, 2000, p.xxi). Here, I focus on the positive element; the negative case is discussed below.

There are three mechanisms through which these caring institutions can perform this educative function. Firstly, the values that the institutions are seen to embody can directly perform an educative function. For example, where hospitals offer high quality care to all patients, this can serve to reinforce the idea that all persons are owed certain basic goods regardless of wealth or background; something that, in the right circumstances, supports the teaching of cosmopolitan values within formal processes of sentimental education. Support for the effectiveness of this approach can be derived from social psychological studies that suggest that where injunctive norms – those learnt through instruction – and descriptive norms – those based on the patterns of behaviour prevalent in a society – conflict, the latter typically overwhelm the former (Campbell-Arvai et al., 2014, p.469). This is not to suggest that attempts to teach values within formal education are unimportant, but that individuals will be more receptive to these values if they are seen to be embodied in the practices of the society in question. Secondly, the behaviour of the individuals who staff these institutions can perform an educative function. As theorists in the tradition of virtue ethics have argued, we learn moral values most effectively when we witness them in the behaviour

116 Where individuals in these institutions fail to treat individuals receiving care (broadly conceived) with respect then the converse will apply. However, I do not take this to be typical.
of virtuous exemplars (Kristjansson, 2014a). This also receives significant empirical support from research in educational psychology (for a review of the evidence see Kristjansson, 2015). The words and behaviour of individuals who work in caring professions may also have particular authority in teaching compassion as they will derive from lived experience of demanding situations, calling for and testing this particular virtue (Gaita, 2000, p.xxxxvi). Thirdly, being treated with compassion is typically thought to increase our own propensity to act compassionately. This insight is perhaps most associated with Okin’s work on the need for certain virtues to be present within the family in order for a society to effectively create just citizens (Okin, 1989). However, as Matt Edge has argued, interactions within a society will also condition the extent to which individuals are disposed to respond with empathy or compassion to the sufferings of others (2016, pp. 115-119). This is supported by social psychology research that suggests that being the subject of caring behaviour reliably leads to an increased stable disposition to act in a compassionate manner (Edge 2016, p.116; Mikulincer et al., 2005, p.837). 117

It is important to note that whilst the first mechanism only requires knowledge that caring institutions exist within a given society, the latter two mechanisms require personal experience of caring institutions in order to be operative. This is something that is a feature of most individual’s lives, especially at the start of life, with children being exposed to health services in various ways; for example, through vaccination programmes, or doctor’s appointments, and where educational institutions fulfil caring roles. Similarly, exposure to social and medical care is typically prevalent in the latter stages of life. However, many individuals are regularly exposed to health and social care throughout their lives, and parents are exposed to these services through their children. Here we

117 The claim here is that witnessing caring behaviour, and being the subject of caring behaviour both typically increase an individual’s propensity to act in a compassionate manner. The claim is neither that this is always the case (as we are dealing with the behaviour of choosing agents this would be implausible), nor that this relationship is exponential, but rather the effects of repeated exposure to caring behaviour are mitigated after a certain point (Edge, 2016, pp.115-119).
can note the positive role the common human experience of vulnerability can play in fostering compassionate dispositions, as discussed in Chapter Five.\textsuperscript{118}

A second concern for the latter two mechanisms derives from Michael Ignatieff’s seminal discussion of the welfare state in \textit{The Needs of Strangers} (1984). Here, Ignatieff argues that a significant advantage of the institutions of the welfare state is that they function to mediate networks of giving and receiving within a society, such that those receiving care are not only claiming what they are owed, but perceive themselves as doing so. This may be thought to undermine perceptions of individuals working within these institutions as behaving in a compassionate manner, and accordingly, the success of the second and third mechanisms, as rather than behaving compassionately they are \textit{delivering what is owed}. There is no direct contradiction here, as individuals can be owed caring behaviour\textsuperscript{119} and, although the duties of individual citizens are institutionalised and discharged via the welfare state rather than through private charity, it is the individuals working in these institutions whose caring behaviour is relevant on the mechanisms I have outlined. I take it that (these) individuals can, and do, behave in a compassionate manner when operating in a professional capacity, and their behaviour be interpreted as such.\textsuperscript{120} Conversely, an emphasis on the care delivered by the welfare state as something that is owed potentially serves to reinforce the first mechanism (where these institutions perform an educative function); strengthening commitments to the idea that people are owed certain basic goods, such as health and social care, regardless of wealth or background.

It might be objected that the basic empirical claim I am making here is false, and that the existence of caring institutions within a society has little, or no, effect in increasing the propensity of individuals to respond to the sufferings of others with compassion, or affective concern. A full

\textsuperscript{118} As argued in Chapter Five, this is distinct from an emphasis on vulnerability at the expense of other shared characteristics, such as agency.

\textsuperscript{119} For example, in the case of children being owed care (in more than a formal sense of the word) by their parents.

\textsuperscript{120} Admittedly, this may idealise the welfare state a little, but this has been my own experience of it, and this mechanism can do important work in creating compassionate citizens even if it does not apply in all cases.
empirical defence of this claim is beyond the scope of this thesis, but I take this to be an intuitive point, and have provided some support for this position in the empirical claims canvassed above. Moreover, I am only advancing the modest claim that this offers advantages – which is not to deny that these advantages are sometimes subject to countervailing factors. However, there are two further objections that require answering in detail. Firstly, that these institutions play a role in creating compassionate citizens, but will typically lead to insular caring communities, rather than the extension of cosmopolitan concern. Secondly, that the argument advanced here is just too convenient, explaining away a real conflict at the level of motivation between global and national justice. I will take each point in turn.

In response to the first objection, I do not want to deny that highly insular communities, where individuals show a significant level of sentimental concern for their fellow citizens but little concern for individuals beyond national borders, can exist. However, I take this to be a less common phenomenon than cases where societies fail to meet these standards both externally and internally. There also does seem to be some correlation between strong welfare states and significant levels of public support for relatively high levels of international aid spending (Noel and Therien, 1995). More significantly, this objection misunderstands the role I am suggesting for institutions offering health and social care at the national level in increasing cosmopolitan concern. I am suggesting that we need both caring institutions at the national level and strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education. Here, the former serves to increase receptiveness to strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education, and the latter operates to correct a tendency for compassionate dispositions to be parochial.

The second objection, that the model I have presented dissolves the conflict between national and global justice, misunderstands my argument. I have argued that the extent to which strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education will be effective will itself be dependent on institutions within national borders fostering an environment conducive to the development of compassion or affective concern. Rather than dissolving the conflict between national and global
justice this is instead a case of biting the bullet, and accepting the hard conclusion that the promotion of justice within national borders is a necessary step in order for a cosmopolitan sentimental education to be effective. This is especially significant as policies at the national and international level aimed at reducing global poverty require popular support in order to be effective; both to ensure that there is sufficient political pressure for these policies to be implemented and for the outcomes of democratic processes to remain stable.

2.2. Sentimental Miseducation

I have argued that institutions promoting justice within national borders are conducive to the development of a compassionate citizenry; and accordingly to the development of the motivational resources necessary for strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education to be effective. Now I turn to defending the same claim via the negative argument that tolerance of injustices within national borders undermines the effectiveness of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education. This negative focus is particularly important in examining how conditions within national borders affect our broader emotional dispositions, as it is injustice rather than justice that arguably has the more powerful emotional impact. As Judith Shklar argues, ‘when justice and fairness do prevail they are undramatic’, rather it is experience of injustices, and the resulting suffering, that leaves the bigger emotional impression (Shklar, 1990, p.112).

In order for strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education to be effective, sentimental cosmopolitan theorists argue that not only must individuals be taught cosmopolitan values, but that these values must be backed up by corresponding affective commitments in order for them to reliably motivate action (Woods, 2012, p.36). This is not to suggest that we must feel the affective force of these duties directly, but that these duties must be broadly supported by our affective dispositions. I want to argue that tolerance of injustice within a society can function as a sort of cosmopolitan miseducation serving to undermine commitments to universal values, and the
affective dispositions conducive to the pursuit of these values. Individual behaviour and institutional arrangements that ignore, or fail to address, instances of significant injustice within national borders can perform an expressive function, sending out a message that directly contradicts the universal values on which cosmopolitanism is based. This is particularly significant, because, as noted above, social psychology research suggests that for children learning moral values, and adults maintaining commitments to moral values, descriptive norms – deriving from observed behaviour, are often taken as a more authoritative source of moral instruction than injunctive norms – communicated through didactic processes (Campbell-Arvai et al., 2014).

To illustrate, consider the example of homelessness, an injustice that is tolerated to various degrees within the richer communities of the world. It is important to note that homelessness is a complex phenomenon, with some homeless individuals and families existing out of sight in various forms of temporary and insecure accommodation. Nevertheless, I take homelessness to typically be a particularly visible instance of injustice. Tolerance of homelessness within more affluent countries sends a message at odds with respect for the universal values that underlie cosmopolitanism. Where behaviour is taken as authoritative, this may undermine acceptance of these values.

The most direct mechanism through which this process can occur is through witnessing behaviour in person. Where individuals routinely ignore the homeless when they encounter them on the street, this behaviour has an expressive function. From a normative perspective the most significant expressive aspect of this behaviour may be what this communicates to homeless individuals themselves. Where homeless individuals are ignored in person by more affluent members of their society this can undermine their perceptions of self-worth or claims to equal

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121 It might be objected that some countries with relatively low levels of homelessness are highly communitarian and display relatively low levels of cosmopolitan concern, as perhaps reflected in a lack of public support for public spending on international development or acceptance of refugees. I do not want to deny the cases exist. However, my primary focus here is on Western liberal democracies, and the argument is that both addressing injustices within national borders and cosmopolitan sentimental education are required. It is also important to note that significant injustices within national borders may take other forms than homelessness, due to the cultural status of homelessness in different societies.
status. However, what I am primarily concerned with here is what this behaviour communicates to other individuals who regularly witness these interactions.

A second mechanism occurs through the broader tolerance of these injustices at the level of society as a whole. Within democratic societies a failure to address injustices though democratic processes communicates the same message but on a large scale. Although Judith Shklar (1990, p.45) rightly observes that we may tolerate certain injustices for the sake of other positive social goods, and in doing so express concern or compassion for our fellow citizens; I take this mechanism to be implausible in the case of homelessness due to the normative significance of the basic goods homeless individuals are unable to access. Thirdly, our own failure to address national injustices (where this occurs) such as homelessness, can serve to weaken our individual commitments to universal values. Social psychology research suggests that individuals are typically troubled by cognitive dissonance when their beliefs and actions fail to cohere and, that in an attempt to achieve consistency, we often alter our beliefs rather than our actions. As Stoker notes, ‘Following Festinger (1957) psychologists suggest that people seek consistency between their beliefs and their behaviour. However, when beliefs and behaviour clash, we frequently alter our beliefs instead of adjusting our behaviour’ (2014, p.227). Accordingly, regularly failing to address injustices encountered in person may lead to the weakening of individual commitments to universal values in order to achieve consistency.

By acknowledging the role of tolerance of national injustices in undermining levels of motivation to address global injustice, this argument can address a compelling objection to the sentimental cosmopolitan project; that many people draw the boundaries of their moral community at a level that excludes not just individuals facing poverty globally, but many of their own conational. To put this objection more pejoratively: ‘How can we expect to encourage affective

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122 I am not suggesting that cosmopolitan values are undermined by a failure to achieve equality at the national level, or that these values necessarily require equal treatment. The concern here is that homelessness is a serious injustice, and that a failure to address instances of serious injustice at the national level undermines a commitment to addressing significant injustices globally. Accordingly, my argument is consistent with a moderate sufficientarian position.
concern for people beyond national borders, when people are barely moved by the plight of the homeless people they walk past on the street every day?‘ What this objection fails to take into account is that attitudes to homelessness are not fixed, and that current levels of tolerance of injustice at the national level play a significant role in compounding and entrenching the restriction of the extension of affective concern.

The three mechanisms I have outlined operate where behaviour that appears to tolerate injustice within national borders serves to undermine commitment to cosmopolitan values. However, I now want to suggest that the influence of this behaviour on our values may go further, conditioning the reach and motivational power of our moral concepts; in particular, the work that appeals to a shared humanity can do in motivating cosmopolitan concern. In his seminal work *A Common Humanity* Raimond Gaita argues that the limits of our notion of common humanity, understood as an affective notion defining membership in our moral community, can be expanded or contracted through the patterns of behaviour prevalent within a society. For example, Gaita argues that where racist behaviour is common in a society this can serve to render a particular group of human beings invisible to the moral faculties of their fellows (Gaita, 2000, p.xx). The thought here is that identification as a member of this moral community is necessary in order for rational moral argument to gain purchase, and that rather than being coextensive with biological membership of the species *Homo sapiens* the limits of this concept are conditioned through behaviour. Tolerance of homelessness and other significant injustices within national borders serves to drive a wedge between membership of the human species and identification within an affective understanding of shared humanity – to borrow Rorty’s phrase, those whom we feel are “people like us” (1998, p.168). This is damaging for sentimental cosmopolitan strategies that aim to proceed in the opposite direction, and bring the affective recognition of shared humanity closer in line with the limits of the biological concept – as discussed in Chapter Five.
I have argued that tolerance of injustice at the national level has an expressive content that may undermine respect for cosmopolitan values, serving to limit the work that the bare fact of shared humanity can do in motivating affective concern for distant others.\(^\text{123}\) However, it may be objected that this argument suffers from three significant flaws. Firstly, this argument ignores the role judgements of responsibility for suffering play in the development of affective concern. Secondly, direct encounters with injustices within national borders are typically distributed unevenly between the more affluent and less affluent members of society. Accordingly, this argument appears to suggest that the less affluent are particularly responsible for the motivational failure to address global poverty. Thirdly, tolerance of homelessness within a society need not imply tolerance of injustice, as profound inequality of outcome may be compatible with justice, at least on some conceptions. I will address each in turn.

The substance of the first objection is that there is an important disanalogy between how the situation of individuals facing global poverty and individuals suffering injustices, such as homelessness, within affluent countries are perceived. There may be a popular perception that the homeless within affluent countries are in some sense responsible for their situation, failing to take advantage of opportunities available to them, whereas poor people in less affluent countries suffer due to political instability, and a lack of functioning institutions and opportunities for employment. I am not suggesting that the description of the situation of poor people in affluent countries offered here is correct, but that this perception means that tolerance of homelessness within national borders need not imply a lack of affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally.\(^\text{124}\) Where judgments of responsibility lead to a failure to address serious injustices within affluent countries, it

\(^{123}\) It might be objected that the empirical assumptions underlying this argument are incorrect, and that witnessing others fail to respect cosmopolitan values may reinforce some people’s commitment to these values and lead them to fight harder to defend them. I do not want to deny that this may sometimes be the case. However, I take these cases to be highly praiseworthy exceptions rather than the rule, as is suggested by the social psychology research outlined above.

\(^{124}\) To be clear, I hold the normative judgment that people are owed certain basic goods in virtue of their human status to apply regardless of their responsibility for their situation, however, what I am concerned with here is the role of judgments of responsibility in undermining the extension of affective concern.
might be thought that this is of little concern for proponents of cosmopolitan sentimental concern as a means to promote basic global justice. However, this is incorrect as injustices such as homelessness within affluent countries themselves constitute a failure to realise basic global justice.

There will be cases where this objection obtains, as we have to allow for the possibility that some people will be more motivated to address injustices at a global level rather than a national level, and that judgements of responsibility may play a role in their reasoning. For these individuals the argument advanced above will have little relevance. However, the significance of this point is limited, as these cases are not typical. Instead, we are more regularly confronted with either a greater level of motivation to address the suffering of conationalists or a lack of motivation to address injustices at either a local or a global level. In many cases, the attribution of responsibility to those suffering significant injustices within affluent countries may be misinformed (a claim I address below with regards to homelessness), or fail to take into account that poor choices typically only lead to homelessness for individuals who lack robust safety nets (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2016). Here, there is an important role for critical reason within sentimental cosmopolitan approaches, not just in directing our motivation to address injustices towards the most effective solutions (Woods, 2012, p.40), but also in removing barriers to the extension of affective concern. Despite this, there may still be individual cases where critical reflection reinforces judgments of responsibility for suffering. In such cases it is important to note that attempting to separate causal responsibility from moral responsibility does not provide an easy solution. As Williams (1993) argues, for most of us, most of the time, judgments of causal responsibility cannot be fully disentangled from attributions of moral responsibility, especially so at the level of affect. However, these judgements made in individual cases need not pose a serious threat to my argument, as where support for policies addressing homelessness and other significant injustices within national borders is threatened by judgments of responsibility, these are general judgments regarding the group in question rather than judgements in individual cases. Accordingly, critical attention to broader patterns of responsibility for injustice still represents an effective strategy.
The second objection is that where regular experience of injustices within national borders is thought to play a role in undermining cosmopolitan commitments, this suggests that those who regularly witness injustices in person may represent a particular barrier to the extension of cosmopolitan sentimental concern. The worry here is that exposure to injustices within unequal societies is typically distributed unevenly on the basis of wealth and class, and other inequalities; as such, the argument of this chapter appears to blame the less affluent members of affluent societies for the motivational failure to address global poverty. There are two mechanisms through which this process can take place. Firstly, as suggested by the arguments canvassed in the first section of this chapter, preventable suffering encountered in person will typically compete and win against global justice in securing our finite levels of sentimental concern. Secondly, witnessing failures to treat individuals within national borders in line with cosmopolitan values may express that others fail to hold these values in practice, potentially undermining respect for these values, as argued above. What this objection fails to acknowledge is that the patterns distributing personal exposure to suffering others within a society are neither random nor the choice of less affluent members of society. For example, where homeless people are prevented from congregating in affluent neighbourhoods this is due either to the result of political decisions that affect the more and less affluent members of a society unequally, or, perhaps more typically, the unequal enforcement of the outcomes of these political processes. Therefore, responsibility for any negative effects of unequal exposure to injustices within a society, does not lie with the less affluent individuals themselves. Moreover, this objection only applies to cases where tolerance of injustices within national borders is witnessed in person. It does not affect the institutional component of my argument – where tolerance of injustice is reflected in a failure on the part of citizens to address these injustices through democratic institutions.

The third objection is that the profound equality of outcome evidenced by homelessness need not be the result of an injustice. I do not agree with the substantive account of justice that underpins this objection; although I take inequality of outcome to be compatible with justice in
some cases, I do not think this applies in the case of serious deprivations such as homelessness. However, rather than defending this particular conception of justice I instead offer the following three responses. Firstly, whilst some homelessness in affluent societies may indeed result from poor choices that may be compatible with equality of opportunity, it is implausible to suggest that affluent societies currently exhibit equality of opportunity. Accordingly, homelessness in actually existing societies is evidence of injustice, even on an account of justice that subordinates equality of outcome in favour of equality of opportunity. Secondly, there is significant empirical evidence (Nishio et al., 2017) that treatable mental health issues are a major factor in individuals becoming homeless. This suggests that actual existing homelessness will not be compatible with justice as equality of opportunity. Thirdly, and more significantly, my argument still applies where profound equality of outcome is not understood as injustice, strictly conceived, as a society that tolerates profound inequality of outcome, including homelessness, is likely to be one in which cosmopolitan values struggle to gain traction.

2.3. Sympathy and Security

Finally, I want to suggest that tolerance of significant injustices within national borders can undermine citizens’ receptiveness to strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education. The previous two arguments have focused on the normative role of institutions promoting justice within a society, particularly those providing health and social care; serving both as a school for compassion and to reduce instances where injustices that fail to respect cosmopolitan values are tolerated within a society. However, I now focus on the way in which institutions promoting justice within national borders can increase citizens’ perceptions of their relative security, leading them to be more receptive to strategies of sentimental education.

This argument derives from Richard Rorty’s claim that strategies of sentimental education will fail to gain purchase where individuals feel their own security is under threat. As discussed in
chapter five, Rorty (1998, p.180) argues that in conditions where our security is under threat our first concern is our selves, and those with whom we immediately identify; accordingly, our horizons are narrowed and we can less afford the time and effort to imaginatively engage with the lives of distant others. As noted in Chapter Five, ultimately, the claim Rorty is making here is an empirical one; however, it is a claim that I take to be intuitively plausible. As Woods notes in a paper defending the relevance of Rorty's security condition in understanding the causal role of environmental degradation in the under-fulfilment of human rights, ‘where one’s own security is threatened, one’s first concern is normally for oneself’ (Woods, 2009, p.62). This is a claim that can plausibly be broadened to include the security of the subjects of our partial commitments, such as close friends or family.

In endorsing Rorty’s claim it is important to acknowledge that vulnerability is a fundamental component of human life. Moreover, as Rousseau suggested (1991, p.185), vulnerability is plausibly bound up in the extension of compassion; a point I discussed in detail Chapter Six. However, this does not imply that individuals cannot take reasonable steps to limit their own vulnerability. Neither does it imply that awareness of one’s own vulnerability will lead us to address the vulnerabilities of distant others rather than individuals for whom we already feel a great degree of affective concern. Moreover, both Rorty’s broader point and the inclusion of the security of those closest to us within the security condition receive significant empirical support from social psychology research into the role of stress responses in blocking empathetic behaviours. As Paul Zak argues, ‘nature assumes that if we are in dire straits ourselves, we can’t so easily afford to invest time and resources in helping others. High stress blocks oxytocin release’ (Zak 2012, p.64; Edge, 2016, p.238).

If we accept that Rorty’s security condition is an important factor in determining the acceptance of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education, then this suggests that levels of injustice within national borders will directly affect the success of sentimental cosmopolitan approaches. There are two mechanisms through which this process can occur. In a relatively straightforward manner, a failure on behalf of affluent societies to provide access to effective health
and social care will directly undermine perceptions of security on behalf of those individuals unable to access this care for themselves and those closest to them. We should note that within affluent societies ill health (of various forms) and infirmity are typically the greatest threats to individual security. However, what is actually doing the work on Rorty’s account is not simply security in an absolute sense, but perceptions of relative security on behalf of individuals. Therefore, the existence of significant levels of inequality within national borders may also play a role in undermining perceptions of security within a society and, as such, the success of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education.

Where societies are highly unequal this can undermine perceptions of security on the part of all but the most affluent members of society. As previously noted, relative deprivation within a society can both have an expressive function, conveying a lack of worth to the less affluent and translate into absolute deprivations in access to certain goods – such as self-worth or autonomy (Lichtenberg, 2014, pp. 163-164). This can lead to reduced perceptions of security, and to reductions in absolute security in some cases. Where inequalities in wealth translate into, or are accompanied by, significant power differentials this can directly affect an individual’s ability to exercise agency over their own life. In some cases this can directly lead to a decrease in absolute levels of security. The effects on physical health of a lack of agency in the workplace, for example, are well documented (Lichtenberg 2014, p.162; Marmot, 2004). More typically, power differentials can undermine absolute levels of security through one’s relative ability to compete for certain scarce goods, such as the best quality health and social care. Significantly, where fellow citizens are taken as an individual’s reference group, inequality in access to advances in medical treatment may undermine perceptions of relative security to a greater extent than inequalities in access to medical treatment across borders. For example, where the more affluent members of society can access
cutting edge cancer treatments, an inability to access these treatments will undermine perceptions of security on the part of those who cannot.\textsuperscript{125}

It might be objected that perceptions of security have more to do with the content of the media than the availability of adequate health and social care within a society. Here, national media might be thought responsible both for reinforcing perceptions that conationals are our primary reference group and devoting attention to highlighting inequalities within societies rather than between them. The tone of media discourse also arguably plays a significant role in how secure citizens perceive themselves to be. Where media reporting focuses on imagined crises in national institutions, for example, this is likely to undermine citizens’ perceptions of their relative security. There is some truth to this line of argument, as the media will clearly play an important role in shaping citizens perceptions of relative security; however, this should not be overstated. Perceptions of relative security are likely to bear some relationship to a more objective understanding of security, based on the actual conditions existing in a given society. Although important, the force of this objection is limited as media serving to increase perceptions of insecurity will only be regularly consumed by certain groups within society. Within liberal democracies the media typically offers a broad range of perspectives, and it is unlikely that these will all serve to reinforce perceptions of insecurity. We should also note the increasing role of non-traditional media, operating across borders, in undermining conationals as an individual’s primary reference group, and potentially increasing perceptions of relative security through global, rather than national, comparisons.

Conclusion

\textsuperscript{125} In some cases the converse will be true, with perceptions of security on the part of majorities being increased by the promotion of national injustices, targeting minorities, where these minorities are perceived as a security risk. For example, illiberal security measures targeting minority groups, such as stop and search policies, or the Prevent agenda, can contribute to perceptions of security on the part of the majority. Of course, it is highly questionable whether these policies increase actual security rather than just perceived security, as they can serve to inflame tensions. See Elshimi (2017) for an argument to this effect regarding the United Kingdom’s Prevent agenda.
This chapter has examined the complex relationship between injustices within national borders and the development of cosmopolitan affective concern. It argued that the promotion of justice within the borders of more affluent countries and strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education aimed at promoting basic global justice, are potentially complementary, rather than competing, projects.

The first section of the chapter examined cases where national and global justice compete for our emotional resources. It argued that where injustices within national borders compete with global injustices for our affective concern, the former derive a significant advantage due to the way they interact with our concern for our partial commitments and the affective significance of encountering injustice in person. These advantages are likely to remain, regardless of attempts to supplement, or replace, politically constructed national identities with more cosmopolitan identities. Accordingly, where like cases of national and global justice conflict for our finite levels of sentimental concern it may be necessary to address injustices within national borders, in order to more effectively foster the extension of cosmopolitan affective concern.

The second section of the chapter examined the role of the promotion of justice within national borders in creating conditions conducive to the success of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education. I first made a positive argument, that the culture within a society, as reflected in the institutions and personal behaviour of citizens, plays an important role in fostering compassionate dispositions in individuals. This is important for the success of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education in extending these dispositions beyond national borders. I then advanced a negative argument, that tolerance of injustices within national borders can have an expressive content, serving to directly undermine cosmopolitan values. In order to support this I drew on social psychology research suggesting that norms deriving from observed behaviour are typically taken as authoritative where they conflict with injunctive norms (Campbell-Arvai et al., 2014). Finally, I examined Rorty’s claim that both sympathy and security are necessary in order for strategies of sentimental education to be effective (Rorty, 1998). After defending the plausibility of this claim, I argued that failures to address injustices within national borders can serve to undermine
citizens’ perceptions of their own security, and accordingly the success of strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education. Therefore, institutions addressing injustices within a society, particularly those offering health and social care, have important work to do in creating a climate conducive to the development of cosmopolitan affective concern.

Having addressed this important objection to a sentimental cosmopolitan approach, chapter seven returns to the positive project of the thesis. Drawing on the arguments of previous chapters, I offer a comprehensive account of what a sentimental cosmopolitan solution to the motivational deficit facing political duties to address global poverty entails in practice.
Chapter Seven: Political Sentimental Education

Introduction

This chapter develops the arguments of the thesis to offer an account of sentimental education suitable for motivating support for political strategies to address global poverty. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one outlines the traditional model of sentimental education, as developed in the accounts offered by Richard Rorty (1998) and Martha Nussbaum (2001). I argue that, despite a number of important differences, there are significant commonalities between these two accounts. Drawing on arguments advanced in Chapter Five of the thesis, I argue that this traditional model of sentimental education faces two key shortcomings as a means to motivate support for political strategies to address global poverty. (i) Traditional strategies of sentimental education can serve to present a picture of individuals facing poverty globally that obscures their capacity for agency. As argued in Chapter Five, this can serve to increase perceptions of distance between individuals in more affluent countries and those facing poverty globally. Here, I argue that this represents a particular problem for motivating support for political strategies to address global poverty, as these strategies rely on a picture of individuals facing poverty globally that assumes they are capable agents. (ii) Traditional strategies of sentimental education operate to create affective connections with distant others that are insufficiently specific in nature. I argue that motivating political action to address instances of poverty globally requires the development of specific connections between persons in more affluent countries and particular groups and individuals facing poverty globally.

Drawing on the arguments advanced in section one, and in earlier chapters of the thesis, section two develops a positive account of political sentimental education. This operates on a dialogic model, but as processes of dialogue may not always be possible in practice, dialogue

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126 See Woods (2012), which this discussion was indebted to.
operates here as an ideal rather than a requirement. The use of materials authored by individuals facing poverty globally, as a means to encourage the development of affective ties, can function as a form of second order inclusion where actual dialogue is not feasible. However, I argue that both processes of dialogue and the use of representations will typically be mediated in practice. Therefore, this section develops an account of sensitive processes of mediation conducive to motivating political action. Section three examines what the model of political sentimental education developed in this chapter entails in practice, applying the account developed to four sites of sentimental education: (i) The media, (ii) NGO practices, (iii) formal education, and (vi) the international trade union movement, in order to further explicate this account through the use of detailed examples. I highlight examples of good practice that serve to demonstrate that the account offered here is not only practically feasible, it is a reality in action.

1. Political Solutions, Agency, and Abstraction

1.1. The Traditional Model of Sentimental Education

Cosmopolitan sentimental education has been offered as a promising means by which to motivate support for action to address global injustices, including global poverty. This concept of a cosmopolitan sentimental education has been developed in recent scholarship (Woods, 2012; Long, 2009), but primarily derives from the work of Richard Rorty (1998) and Martha Nussbaum (2001), as outlined in Chapter Three. The basic claim that underlies the idea of cosmopolitan sentimental education is that exposure to representations of the lives of distant others in literature, and other art forms, and in journalism – particularly print and television journalism, can lead to increased sentimental identification with these individuals. This increased sentimental identification can in turn motivate a greater propensity to undertake action in support of these distant others. Rather than fully outlining the traditional model of sentimental education here, and risk repeating the
discussion in Chapter Three, I will highlight four salient features shared by the accounts offered by Nussbaum and Rorty that I take to be constitutive of the traditional model. The picture offered here is not intended to be exhaustive, but to serve as a point of reference for the argument that follows.

The nature of the connection. The accounts offered by Nussbaum and Rorty are primarily concerned that those in positions of relative power develop kinder feelings towards marginalised others. Rorty focuses on the extension of sympathy for those suffering from human rights abuses (1998), whereas Nussbaum’s account advocates that citizens of affluent liberal democracies develop compassion for the sufferings of individuals beyond national borders (1993). It is important to note that in both cases the sentimental connection advocated is primarily unidirectional – arising on the part of those in positions of relative power for those suffering injustices. Whether these particular connections ought to be reciprocated (Gould, 2007), or whether it would be beneficial to encourage affective connections for individuals beyond national borders on the part of the less advantaged is not discussed (Spelman, 2000). Moreover, as argued in chapters three and four, on these accounts attention is directed towards the suffering other – with little attention paid to identifying responsible parties, and notions of responsibility for this suffering playing a minimal role in the structure of the intended affective reaction.127

How this connection is achieved. Both authors also share the conviction that representations of the lives of distant others encountered in literature and other art forms and within the media – particularly within the work of journalists, are the primary means through which to achieve this extension of affective concern. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, there is a difference of emphasis, with Rorty’s account focusing on the role of journalism, and what he terms ‘middlebrow

127 Two caveats are in order here. Firstly, Rorty’s focus on human rights may offer a way of incorporating responsibility, although discussion of responsibility is relatively absent from his account (See Woods, 2009). Secondly, Nussbaum suggests that for compassion to be an appropriate response suffering must be undeserved (2001, pp. 414-425). However, Nussbaum’s primary focus here is that the agent did not bring the suffering on themselves, not that others were responsible.
art forms’ – such as popular novels and television shows, encountered in day-to-day life (1991, p.60). Nussbaum does not deny that these mediums are important, but rejects a focus on the media due to its vulnerability to market pressure, and primarily focuses on the role of literature and other narrative art forms encountered during the process of formal education as a preferable means of promoting sentimental identification (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 431-433). On both accounts encounters with representations of the lives of distant others operate in place of actual interaction with these others. To be clear, in these circumstances actual interactions face practical obstacles, and normative concerns over the complex power relationships at play. Moreover, artistic depictions of the lives of others may encourage perspective-taking more successfully than actual interactions, and such depictions may be more reliably directed towards desired ends than interactions – with their necessary spontaneity and unpredictability. These are concerns to which I will return below.

As discussed in Chapter Five, depictions of the suffering of distant others also play a central role in how this connection is achieved on the accounts offered by Nussbaum and Rorty, serving as a means by which to engender affective concern. Nussbaum’s account of the structure of compassion makes it clear that she considers the emotion to primarily arise in response to suffering; for compassion to arise Nussbaum argues that an agent must ‘consider the suffering of another as a significant part of his or her own scheme of goals and ends’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p.319). Similarly, Rorty suggests that sentimental education requires people to ‘turn their eyes toward the people who are getting hurt, [and] notice the details of the pain being suffered’ (Rorty, 1998, p.80). It is important to note that for both theorists, apprehension of suffering is not enough for the extension of affective concern, as everything turns on whose suffering matters.128

128 Depictions of suffering play a complex role in both accounts. Attention to the suffering of certain others operates to include these others within the purview of those whose suffering matters to a given individual. However, the quality of these depictions operates to bring about an affective change, accordingly neither theorist begs the question here.
Mediation. A further feature of these accounts is that encounters with depictions of the lives of distant others are necessarily mediated to some degree (Woods, 2012, pp. 41-44). There are three levels at which this may occur. Firstly, there is the question of authorship; whether representations of distant others encountered in the process of sentimental education are authored by distant others themselves. Here there is a degree of divergence between the accounts offered by Rorty and Nussbaum. Nussbaum suggests that, where possible, we ought to employ works authored by distant others, but many, if not most, of the examples she offers of literature functioning to aid the extension of compassion to particular out-groups are not authored within these groups (Nussbaum, 2001, pp.429-433). Rorty does not discuss who ought to author the relevant works, but the examples he employs, such as Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, involve a member of an advantaged group depicting the lives of “others” in such a way as to provoke sentimental identification with these others on the part of members of the advantaged group (Rorty, 1998, pp.178-183). A second level of mediation occurs where literary depictions are translated, and where literature, photos, and film are edited; this level of mediation has received little attention. A third level of mediation occurs where materials are distributed and employed in certain ways. In the case of journalism, it is the news agency that is primarily responsible for this process. In the case of the materials employed in formal education, which Nussbaum’s account emphasises, this level encompasses both determining the content of the curriculum and how educators approach these materials.

The end towards which this connection is put. Finally, although both accounts offer a relatively incomplete picture of the action they hope increased affective connections to distant others to motivate, neither account offers an explicitly political model of this action. We should note that neither Nussbaum nor Rorty exclusively focuses on motivating action to address global poverty. For Nussbaum global poverty is one of a number of cosmopolitan injustices that a cosmopolitan sentimental education can motivate action to address. Nussbaum also appears to hold that affective
identification with individuals beyond national borders has an intrinsic normative value (Nussbaum, 1996, pp. 3-17). The focus of Rorty’s 1993 Amnesty lecture is reducing negative human rights violations (traditionally understood). In other work Rorty does suggest a sentimental education can help motivate action to address global poverty; however, here he is relatively silent on what action this might entail (Rorty, 1998; 1991).

Neither account rules out political strategies to address global poverty; however, both authors appear to operate with a primarily charitable model of the action required to address global poverty – understood here as requiring financial donations to aid agencies. Political responses to global poverty aim to identify institutional causes of global poverty and promote alternative institutional arrangements; however, there is scant attention to the institutional causes of global poverty, and identifying responsible parties, on both Rorty’s and Nussbaum’s accounts. As noted above, responsibility features on Nussbaum’s model insofar as for compassion to be an appropriate response an agent’s suffering must be undeserved; however, Nussbaum does not take the further step of identifying responsible parties or institutional causes of this suffering. The lack of emphasis on responsibility for suffering in Rorty’s work has been highlighted by Woods, who observes that on Rorty’s account ‘sympathy floats free from responsibility, suffering exists almost spontaneously. Agents encounter suffering independent of causal factors and respond to it without questioning its roots’ (2009, pp. 60-61).

1.2. Concerns for the Traditional Model

Having outlined the traditional model of sentimental education I will now argue that this model requires some modification in order to effectively motivate support for political action to address global poverty. To do so I will make two arguments. Firstly, I will argue that the means by which the

129 Elsewhere Nussbaum has addressed the causes of global poverty in her work on the capabilities approach and women in human development (2001a). However, she does not explicitly connect this to her work on sentimental education.
traditional model of sentimental education aims to bring about increased sentimental identification with individuals facing global poverty risks obscuring the agency of these individuals. A number of theorists, most notably Woods (2012), and O’Neill (2000), have highlighted the adverse effects obscuring the agency of individuals facing global poverty may have on motivating support for strategies to reduce global poverty. However, here I argue for the specific claim that this poses a particular problem for motivating support for political strategies to reduce global poverty. Secondly, I will argue that the use of representations of distant others on the traditional model of sentimental education, to bring about a unidirectional increase in affective concern on the part of more affluent individuals, lends itself to the development of an excessively abstracted form of affective identification. As argued in the first chapter of this thesis, political strategies to reduce global poverty face particular motivational demands. Motivating support for political action to reduce global poverty requires the cultivation of a more robust affective relationship. Taking these concerns into account, the rest of the chapter develops an alternative model of sentimental education appropriate for motivating political action.

Agency and Political Action

*Political action and perceptions of agency.* The claim that support for political strategies to reduce global poverty is especially linked to perceiving individuals facing global poverty as active agents may, on the face of it, appear a puzzling one. However, a link between perceptions of particular others as active agents, and a willingness to come to the aid of these others, is a feature of much of the theoretical literature on the concept of solidarity (Straehle, 2010; Gould, 2007). Solidarity, understood as a particular kind of affective relationship binding individuals or groups, and particularly conducive to political action, is thought to differ in kind from the affective relationship underlying charitable donation. There is a danger of begging the question at issue here, and drawing an overly sharp theoretical distinction between a political solidarity and an apolitical pity or
compassion, where whatever affective relationships motivate support for political action necessarily fall into the former category, and those motivating charitable donation, the latter. I do not wish to claim that such a sharp distinction is tenable, or that those moved to act by solidaristic feelings will not on occasion find that their aims are sometimes best served by charitable donation, or vice versa. Nevertheless, I do wish to argue that a form of affective concern that recognises the agency of its subject may be particularly conducive to motivating political strategies to reduce global poverty.

An initial route links agency to the expectation of reciprocity, or mutual aid, thought to differentiate a robust disposition of solidarity from feelings of pity or compassion. As Carol Gould notes, ‘solidarity, rather than pity or compassion, is thought to presuppose some degree of equality between agents, and an expectation of reciprocity’ (2007, p.154). This expectation of reciprocity or mutual aid necessarily requires that we see those we stand in a solidaristic relationship with as agents, capable of returning the favour, either now or at some future time (Woods, 2012, p.41). Accordingly, solidarity may be more motivationally efficacious than compassion as it includes a weak prudential incentive. Political solutions to global poverty, which are thought to place particular motivational burdens on individuals, can take advantage of these additional motivational resources. However, this route faces two very serious concerns. Firstly, a reciprocity condition looks unlikely in the case of distant others; as Gould suggests, ‘it is not yet clear that reciprocity can be operative in most cases of solidarity with distant others, since these others may not be aware of one’s actions in solidarity with them’ (Gould, 2007, p. 154). Secondly, this appears especially unlikely in the case of individuals facing global poverty, as their resources and ability to assist are necessarily limited at present. I do not think we should totally disregard this route, as neither objection is insurmountable. A more dialogical model of sentimental education, as outlined below, can address the first concern, and where attempts to address global poverty are successful, these will mitigate the second concern. Moreover, even if a weak expectation of reciprocity provides little in the way of additional motivational resources, perceiving distant others as active agents can make sentimental identification with these others easier or more robust, as a capacity for agency is an important
feature in our self-understandings (as argued in Chapter Five). Therefore, I take affective relationships with particular others that recognise these others as active agents as typically more motivationally efficacious than affective relationships that obscure this capacity. However, rather than pursuing this route further, here I will offer two arguments why recognising individuals facing global poverty as active agents is particularly important for motivating support for political strategies to address poverty globally.

Firstly, political strategies to address global poverty, which aim to alter global institutions thought to be responsible for causing, or entrenching, global poverty – such as unfair trade rules, or the resource and borrowing privileges (Pogge, 2002, pp. 169-172), presuppose the agency of individuals facing global poverty. This is because taking advantage of alternative institutional setups requires individuals facing global poverty to engage in complex practices such as international trade that presuppose a high level of agency (Woods, 2012; O’Neill, 2000); where the global poor are not viewed as purposive agents such strategies will appear implausible. It is important to note that all attempts to address global poverty presuppose some degree of agency on the part of individuals facing global poverty. However, support for financial donations to provide emergency food, or immunisation programmes, is compatible with a view of individuals facing global poverty that attributes them a more minimal level of agency.

Secondly, political strategies to address global poverty often require engaging with particular individuals facing global poverty as active agents. In some cases this can entail working together to achieve a solution, for example in supporting the political struggles of individuals and groups facing global poverty. Alternatively, groups in more affluent countries may act alone, but enter into processes of dialogue in order to determine what action it is appropriate for outsiders to take. In both instances Carol Gould’s requirement of ‘deference to those in need’ is operative – where it is both normatively appropriate to consult those facing a particular injustice in determining solutions.

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130 This can also be a feature of sensitive aid practices, but an emphasis on collective solutions is typical of political strategies.
and practically sensible, as these individuals are likely to have relevant experiential knowledge of the situation (Gould, 2007, p.157). This is significant, as deference to the judgments of individuals facing global poverty presupposes, not only a particularly high degree of agency on their part, but respect for this agency. Such strategies are not only incompatible with a picture of individuals facing global poverty that obscures their agency, but also with considering these individuals to be purposive agents with a lesser capacity for agency than individuals in more affluent countries – or with taking this capacity for agency less seriously.

_Sentimental education and agency._ Chapter Five of the thesis argued that strategies of sentimental education that rely on portraying individuals facing global poverty as suffering and vulnerable in order to provoke affective concern may have adverse motivational effects, increasing perceptions of distance between affluent individuals and individuals facing global poverty. These depictions can undermine perceptions of individuals facing poverty as capable agents, a quality that features heavily in the self-understanding of many individuals in affluent countries, and one reinforced by the typical narrative in liberal political philosophy. This chapter also argued that attempts to emphasise our shared vulnerability to suffering, a true and important fact, may not offer an easy solution, both due to the degree to which this self-image is entrenched and adverse motivational effects of emphasising our shared vulnerability to suffering. I will not fully rehearse these arguments here, but, for clarity, restate the general claim and note two further ways in which the traditional model of sentimental education can serve to obscure the agency of individuals facing global poverty.

Strategies of sentimental education that attempt to increase affective concern for individuals facing global poverty by emphasising their suffering and vulnerability face a number of general normative and motivational concerns. Moreover, if individuals facing global poverty primarily appear to individuals in affluent countries in this manner it will undermine perceptions of these individuals as capable agents. Such depictions are a feature of the traditional model of sentimental education, and especially pronounced in much of the campaigning literature employed
by NGOs working in this area. Due to the link between political strategies to address global poverty and perceptions of individuals facing global poverty as active agents outlined above, this poses a particular problem for motivating political action.

Where sentimental education focuses on cultivating affective concern for those suffering as a result of global injustices, without also attending to questions of responsibility, particularly at the institutional level, the agency of individuals facing global poverty may be further obscured. As noted above, a lack of attention to responsibility for injustice is a feature of both Rorty’s and Nussbaum’s accounts. This point was discussed in detail in Chapter Three, where I argued that attention to cultivating empathy or compassion for distant others within sentimental cosmopolitanism ought to be broadened to include cultivating anger and shame in response to global injustices, as these emotions are especially well-suited to incorporating notions of responsibility. The concern here is that where global poverty is encountered absent attention to its political causes, we are offered an incomplete picture – of individuals unable to secure the means to survive, rather than of capable agents constrained by unjust institutions. Here perceptions of agency are compromised in two ways. Firstly, poverty may be interpreted as resulting from a lack of ability of the part of individuals facing global poverty, rather than resulting from features of the national and international institutional order. Secondly, insofar as a capacity for agency is compromised by the effects of global poverty, this diminished agency may be taken for the norm, rather than a temporary situation.

A second concern is that charity is the current paradigm through which global poverty is viewed by many, perhaps the majority, of individuals in more affluent countries. Empirical studies by Kirk et al. suggest this is certainly the case within the United Kingdom, where ‘the charity paradigm for global development…persist[s] “despite massive campaigns such as the Jubilee 2000 debt initiative…and the establishment of a Westminster consensus on core elements of development policy”’ (2012, p.248). Here we can note two concerns. Firstly, where sentimental education does

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131 I include here, both poor governance at the national level, and features of the global institutional order that systematically disadvantage poorer countries.
not explicitly focus on the political causes and solutions to global poverty, it will typically be interpreted within the dominant paradigm. Secondly, a focus on encouraging reactions of sympathy or compassion within the traditional model of sentimental education may lend itself to interpretation within a charitable paradigm. As a number of theorists have argued (Lichtenberg, 2014, pp.180-184; Woods, 2012, p.42), charitable relationships are traditionally understood to involve a significant power differential between a powerful giver, and a beneficiary. As Kirk observes, ‘most conceive of aid and development as being acts of charity. Charity, in turn, rests on the interaction between a powerful giver—be that an individual or a nation—and a grateful receiver. In this paradigm, agency lies almost exclusively with the powerful givers’ (Kirk, 2012, p.248). Characterising duties to address global poverty within this paradigm can serve to further obscure the agency of individuals facing global poverty.

Abstraction

A second issue facing the traditional model of sentimental education as a means to motivate political action to address global poverty concerns the level of abstraction at which the process operates. Depictions of individuals facing injustice globally, encountered in art or literature, can lead to reactions of affective concern, but there are a number of issues regarding how this can translate into affective concern for actual groups or individuals facing like injustices and remain sufficiently robust to motivate action. This poses a particular problem for motivating political action, because, as argued in Chapter One, political action can place particularly strong motivational demands on duty bearers. This is distinct from the agency concern raised above where I argued that the presence of mediators, such as authors and journalists, serves to obscure the agency of individuals facing global poverty, both by telling their story for them – such that individuals facing global poverty are silent in the process of sentimental education – and by presenting these individuals in a manner that focuses

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132 This need not be a feature of all charitable donations, the claim here is that this is a common perception.
on their suffering and vulnerability. Here the concern is that the process of mediation itself leads to affective concern for either abstracted representations of individuals facing global poverty or particular individuals – from which we are then encouraged to generalise to like cases, and that in either instance this abstraction compromises the motivational efficaciousness of the sentimental connection. This should not be taken to deny that mediation may be required in the process of sentimental education (section two outlines what sensitive mediation might entail), but that it necessarily comes with costs.

The first concern is with the process of generalisation itself, as plausibly the motivational efficaciousness of affective concern for specific individuals (real or imagined) facing global poverty will be compromised as we generalise to other cases. This is an issue for all attempts to move from affective connections to particular others to connections to groups to which these individuals are taken to belong (Bartky, 2002). However, where connections are to narrow groups of similarly situated individuals affective connections are likely to be more robust, and better able to motivate informed action, as knowledge of the specifics of others’ situations is only possible at this level. This knowledge is important, not only for identifying effective solutions, but also for developing sufficiently robust affective relationships; as Woods notes, ‘the motivational gap in cosmopolitan thought proceeds in part from an epistemic one’ (2012, p.91). As such, in order to care for others we plausibly need to know something about their actual situation. A generalised affective concern looks both too thin to motivate sustained action and prone to motivating ill-informed action.133

A second issue concerns the feature, or features, that serve as the basis for generalising from a particular sentimental story to other cases. Aside from issues over how far affective concern deriving from a representation of a particular instance of global poverty can generalise to other cases and remain efficacious and informed, extension based on shared poverty faces two concerns. Firstly, generalisation based on shared poverty can undermine perceptions of individuals facing

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133 We might not only wonder whether affective concern for individuals facing global poverty based on perceptions of these individuals as passive victims can successfully motivate political action, but also whether it can survive an encounter with a more accurate picture of the situation, necessary for effective action.
poverty globally as distinct capable agents. Here, not only are individuals facing poverty globally conceptualised as a single amorphous group, the many different causes and manifestations of global poverty are ignored, and instead what is identified is a shared form of suffering – which is not interrogated to address questions of responsibility or blame. Secondly, this offers a misleading picture that may obscure salient differences between different cases of poverty globally and appropriate solutions. Rather than attention to specifics, and the attendant level of complexity, this encourages an image of a single body, ‘“[T]he poor” [who] are understood as an undifferentiated group without intrinsic strength, often referred to through the shorthand of “Africa,” where nothing ever changes.’ (Kirk, 2012, p.248).

In this section I have outlined the traditional model of sentimental education, as offered by Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty, and highlighted two significant concerns this model faces as a means to motivate political action to address global poverty: (i) this model presents a picture of individuals facing poverty globally that serves to obscure their capacity for agency, and (ii) the affective connections arising from this approach are likely to be highly abstract in nature. Successfully motivating political action to address global poverty requires an alternative model of sentimental education, one that both establishes robust ties to particular individuals and groups facing poverty globally and presents these individuals in a manner compatible with their status as capable agents.

2. Sentimental Education Reconceived: Political Sentimental Education

Having outlined the shortcomings of the traditional model of sentimental education as a means to motivate political action to address global poverty, this section offers an alternative model of sentimental education suitable for the task. The model presented here is dialogic, focusing on the development of two way ties between duty bearers in affluent countries, and particular groups or individuals facing global poverty. This account draws on Carol Gould’s theorisation of ‘transnational
solidarities’, understood as solidaristic ties linking particular groups and individuals across borders, through the connections offered by the process of globalisation (Gould, 2007). However, the model I develop differs from Gould’s account in four key respects: (i) I examine closely what the extension of these affective ties entails in practice; accordingly, the focus is more applied than in Gould’s theoretical discussion. (ii) Rather than examining transnational solidaristic ties in general, my account is tailored to the specific case of global poverty and the attendant problems this brings for processes of dialogue. (iii) Dialogue operates on my account as a guiding ideal rather than a strict requirement, with depictions of the lives of individuals facing poverty globally, encountered in literature and journalism, serving as a form of second-order inclusion (Cabrera, 2010, p.249) where actual dialogue is not possible. (iv) I argue that in practice processes of dialogue will often have to rely on the presence of mediators, such as journalists, and develop an account of what sensitive mediation entails.

Before discussing the role of dialogue in political sentimental education, it is worth briefly recapping the arguments advanced in the earlier chapters of the thesis, concerning what else strategies of sentimental education conducive to motivating political action to address global poverty will entail. As argued in Chapter One, in order to motivate effective action, sentimental education must be critical; attendant to both the empirical facts of global poverty and to institutions – at a local and global level – responsible for causing or entrenching poverty. Directing attention towards institutional causes plausibly requires the cultivation of cosmopolitan emotions beyond compassion or empathy for individuals affected by global poverty. As argued in Chapter Four, anger and shame, with their structural links to questions of responsibly for injustice offer useful, and neglected, motivational resources in this process. We should also note that institutions do not serve a merely instrumental role, as a means by which cosmopolitan goals can be furthered or frustrated, institutions also serve to shape our affective dispositions. As discussed in Chapter Six, institutions within national borders are significant in creating compassionate individuals, who are receptive to strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education. I discuss below the role of institutions in
facilitating cosmopolitan dialogue, not simply as the outcome of sentimental connections to individuals and groups beyond national borders, but as a means by which these connections may be deepened. Finally, as discussed in Chapter Five, strategies of sentimental education that proceed by employing representations of individuals facing global poverty that emphasise their suffering may serve to undermine perceptions of these individuals as capable agents – something that can increase perceptions of distance between individuals in more affluent countries and those facing poverty globally. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, this poses a particular concern for motivating political action to address global poverty, as political solutions to global poverty both presuppose the agency of individuals facing global poverty and can require engaging with these individuals as capable agents.

2.1. A Dialogic Model

On the dialogic model of cosmopolitan sentimental education that I am proposing, dialogue between individuals and groups facing poverty globally and individuals and groups in more affluent countries can take place in person – such as through political or sporting exchange programmes, or be facilitated through communication technologies – for example through interactive development projects utilising the internet. I discuss a number of such cases in detail below. This model goes beyond simply consulting individuals facing global poverty over the content of our duties, and instead aspires to featuring these individuals as equal conversation partners. As discussed, this is a relationship conducive to motivating effective political action. However, it is important to note at this stage that such interactions may not always be possible in practice. In these circumstances dialogue can operate as a guiding ideal for more traditional methods of sentimental education; for example, with journalism or narrative art created by individuals facing particular instances of poverty globally serving as a form of second order inclusion (Cabrera, 2010) where dialogue is not presently feasible. This is a point to which I will return.
There are four main advantages to a cosmopolitan sentimental education that proceeds through processes of dialogue rather than through the use of depictions of the lives of distant others in narrative art forms and journalism. Firstly, dialogue with particular individuals and groups can plausibly lead to more robust affective ties. There is some consensus in the psychological literature that affective ties tend to be more robust when they have individuals or small groups as their object (Slovic, 2007). Moreover, relationships based on interaction are more likely to be based on an accurate picture of the other than those based on representations alone. Where affective connections are based on an inaccurate picture further interaction may undermine these ties, or lead to reactance (Brehm, 1966). As discussed in section one, theorists of solidarity suggest affective relationships that include a condition of reciprocity are typically more robust. Insofar as this is correct, processes of dialogue can also lead to more robust affective ties by exhibiting an (admittedly weak) form of reciprocity in the process of discussion. As Gould suggests, dialogue can be ‘reciprocal to the degree that interlocutors are ready to learn from others.’ (Gould, 2007, p.188)

Secondly, processes of dialogue will be conducive to motivating effective political action as individuals facing particular manifestations of poverty globally will typically have an informed perspective on potential solutions. We should note that individuals within these groups may have conflicting interests; however, this is a concern for any attempt to address global poverty, and a failure to consult in determining solutions will still advantage certain groups. Thirdly, processes of dialogue with individuals facing poverty globally are normatively appropriate in determining what action (if any) ought to be taken by persons in more affluent countries. As Carol Gould argues, a practice of deference to those in need in determining appropriate courses of action is both normatively appropriate and can diminish concerns over international poverty reduction functioning as a neo-imperialist project (Gould, 2007, p.157). Finally, processes of dialogue will typically present

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134 It is important to note that patriotic ties are often based on myths or falsehoods, and appear to be both highly motivationally efficacious, and not especially vulnerable to correction where they are not confirmed by the facts. However, there are strong prudential reasons to maintain these, as with flattering self-images, as they serve as a source of individual self-esteem. We should also note the level of political power employed to maintain these images. Neither currently applies in the case of connections to distant others.
individuals facing poverty globally in a manner that does not obscure their capacity for agency. As argued above, this is conducive to motivating political solutions. Rather than being silent in strategies of sentimental education, individuals facing poverty globally necessarily demonstrate their agency by engaging in processes of dialogue. As I argue below, this is also the case where materials employed in cosmopolitan sentimental education are created by distant others themselves; however, this is something than can be obscured where interactions are heavily mediated.

Despite dialogue offering a number of advantages for cosmopolitan sentimental education aimed at motivating political strategies to address global poverty, it may be objected that it is not workable in practice. Although dialogue offers a plausible means by which to pursue cross-border ties, establishing processes of dialogue with individuals or groups facing poverty globally is rendered highly difficult by conditions of severe poverty. Poverty serves as a barrier to many forms of participation, and in conditions of severe poverty access to the necessary infrastructure to facilitate processes of dialogue, such as communication technologies, is strictly limited. We should also note that, separate from its practical feasibility, processes of dialogue between affluent individuals and individuals facing poverty globally face normative concerns over the complex power relationships at play in these interactions.

Although conditions of severe poverty do make dialogue difficult, this concern can easily be overstated. There are two separate issues here, the effects of extreme poverty rendering individuals unable to participate in processes of dialogue, and access to the relevant technologies to allow for processes of dialogue to occur. In the first case, a picture of global poverty informed by a “Live–Aid” model (Kirk, 2012, p.254) depicting individuals facing global poverty in positions of extreme vulnerability, brought about by drought, famine, and disease, can mislead us over the feasibility of dialogue. Whilst it is clearly implausible to expect dialogue to occur in these conditions, most of the globally poorest, the so called “Bottom Billion”, live in conditions that render them highly vulnerable to these sufferings rather than being presently affected by them. When environmental or political
conditions alter, these individuals are especially vulnerable to conditions that render dialogue highly difficult, however they are not typically affected by these extreme sufferings at present (Collier, 2007); accordingly, dialogue is possible in principle.

The second concern is more serious, as for dialogue to regularly occur in practice it would typically need to be facilitated by communication technologies. Access to the relevant technologies will vary between different instances of severe poverty worldwide, and between the technologies in question. Sub-Saharan Africa for example, has some of the lowest rates of internet availability worldwide, although internet access is growing rapidly, and mobile phone use is widespread (ITU, 2015). In contrast, in India, which contains more of the world’s very poorest individuals than Africa (UN, 2016, P.218), internet access is more readily available (Real Time Statistics Project, 2017). The availability of communication technologies will depend in part on whether the necessary infrastructure is available, which will in turn depend on the quality and stability of governance at a national level – itself thought to play a significant role in global poverty (Risse, 2005). However, as the examples of Sub-Saharan Africa and India show, severe poverty occurs globally in very different contexts and, as such, the extent to which the relevant communication technologies are available will vary. It is also important to note that, where dialogue may not be currently feasible, processes of sentimental education can play a role in rendering dialogue possible in future. For example, where dialogue is not possible for technological reasons, sentimental education can serve to motivate support for action to create the infrastructure necessary for communication technologies, allowing processes of dialogue to occur in future, and in turn deepening affective commitments.

As discussed, processes of dialogue between individuals in affluent countries and individuals and groups facing poverty globally can either occur through meetings in person or through the use of communication technologies. Examples of the former case are Sibyl Schwarzenbach’s proposal that young people from more affluent countries undergo a programme of ‘international civic service’, where they travel to countries where severe poverty is prevalent and help with everyday

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135 Internet access is still relatively limited, especially in rural areas, but developing rapidly.
tasks, such as manual agricultural labour (2009, p.271). A similar example is provided by the
“solidarity brigades” that are a feature of some socialist organisations (Cuba Solidarity Campaign,
2017), and fulfil similar tasks to those proposed by Schwarzenbach.\textsuperscript{136} Transnational sporting
projects offer a further opportunity for such interactions, as illustrated by the team twinning and
exchange programmes organised between the Hamburg football club St. Pauli and community sports
teams in areas where poverty is prevalent, such as Rwanda’s Gorillas Handball club (MEYLE, 2017).

This strategy faces two significant normative concerns. Firstly, it may privilege the more
wealthy members of affluent societies, as international travel is expensive and requires the ability to
take time out from other responsibilities. Secondly, these interactions can foist complex power
relationships upon individuals and communities facing poverty globally, for example in the hosting of
would-be helpers; due to both significant differences in wealth and power and negotiating the
difficult social dynamics between giver and receiver (MacIntyre, 2013; Woods, 2013, p.91). The first
concern can be mitigated where interactions are facilitated through processes of formal education,
or through trade unions, as in these cases funding can be supplied by the organisation in question.
However, involving the more privileged members of affluent societies in process of sentimental
education may actually be an advantage, as this privilege can translate into a greater ability to effect
change (Rorty, 1998, p.182). Although, as Rorty notes, the suggestion that we may ‘have to wait for
the strong to turn their piggy little eyes to the suffering of the weak, slowly opening up their dried-
up little hearts’ (1998, p.182) is one we typically resent (1998, p.182).

The second concern is more significant, however no strategies to address poverty globally
that involve action on the part of individuals in more affluent countries can avoid these power

\textsuperscript{136} It might be objected that this approach conflates interaction and dialogue, which are not strictly the same
thing. I take dialogue to be a form of interaction, but one that involves the use of language. However, the
benefits discussed apply to both dialogue and interaction, but to interaction to a lesser extent. Both may lead
to increased affective concern, be conducive to recognising the agency of the other, and inform participants
regarding the situation of the other. Observing and working alongside others, can offer its own insights, and
lead to affective connections. However, dialogue will typically allow for a more nuanced understanding of how
the other feels and views the situation. Language use is also a paradigmatic human ability, and engaging in
conversation plausibly demonstrates a capacity for complex agency.
relationships entirely. There is a necessary trade-off here, as increased levels of interaction may entrench power relationships, but can also serve to deepen affective connections to individuals and groups facing poverty globally, and encourage recognition of these individuals as capable agents. What this highlights is the necessity for instances of dialogue to form part of a broader critical process of sentimental education, where attention is paid to the political causes of global poverty and broader questions of responsibility, in order for individuals engaged in processes of dialogue to appropriately contextualise these interactions. The underlying differences in relative wealth and power characterising the relative situations of affluent individuals and individuals facing poverty globally, and the power relationships engendered by these bare facts, cannot be altered without a change in one, or both, groups concrete situation. However, critical attention to the political causes of global poverty, including the agent’s own causal complicity in global poverty (where appropriate) can help minimise power relationships deriving from a charitable model of these interactions – with a blameless donor and a grateful recipient. To be clear, I am not suggesting that these schemes are unproblematic; exchange programmes can have unintended side effects, for example raising expectations that are not met, or spreading disease. Where language barriers exist, even these forms of direct interaction are likely to be mediated in practice through the presence of translators. Moreover, financial cost and logistics prevent these schemes from offering a feasible strategy of sentimental education that can target large numbers of people. However, the experiences of participants in these schemes can be incorporated into more traditional forms of sentimental education, such as classroom based learning in formal education, and reach larger numbers of people indirectly (Cabrera, 2010, p.252).\textsuperscript{137}

Communication technologies offer a means by which processes of dialogue can feasibly reach larger numbers of people. As discussed above, access to the relevant technologies represents a practical obstacle, but one that does not exist in all cases, and can be overcome – rendering

\textsuperscript{137} Of course, this would involve an additional level of mediation. However, testimony from classmates (for example) offers some advantages over traditional mediators such as journalists, as they may be trusted by the people they are addressing, and able to offer experiences in a more relatable manner.
dialogue possible in future. In practice, instances of dialogue between individuals in more affluent
countries and individuals facing poverty globally are already occurring through the use of the
internet. The Guardian sponsored Katine village project (discussed below) offers an excellent
example, with blogs and webchats by villagers featured in the development project (Collender,
2014). These types of projects can involve larger numbers of people at significantly less cost than the
face-to-face interactions discussed above. Moreover, they can include conditions of anonymity,
where appropriate, and do not place undue burdens on communities in the hosting of international
civic service volunteers or solidarity brigades.

In addition to actual dialogue, or where actual dialogue is not feasible, strategies of
sentimental education can utilise materials authored by individuals facing poverty globally depicting
their own lives and circumstances. As Cabrera notes, such materials can function as a ‘potentially
significant form of secondary inclusion in dialogue’ where actual inclusion is not currently feasible
(2010, p.249). This allows individuals facing global poverty to take an active role in strategies of
sentimental education and, where this authorship is made clear, encourages perceptions of these
individuals as capable agents. As people are typically well-placed to offer accurate portrayals of their
own lives and circumstances, these accounts can also help inform effective strategies to address
particular instances of poverty globally. Where detailed journalistic accounts, or narrative art forms,
are produced by individuals depicting their own experiences of severe poverty, these should not be
seen as a poor substitute for actual dialogue. There is evidence to suggest that the kind of
perspective-taking encouraged by narrative art forms, and literature in particular, may have
advantages as a means to encourage affective concern not offered by actual interaction (Jollimore
and Barrios, 2006).

2.2. Mediation

Where art and literature authored by western journalists or writers feature in strategies of sentimental
education, there are separate normative concerns, with these works displacing the actual voices of individuals
facing global poverty.
I have argued that strategies of sentimental education ought to include instances of actual dialogue where possible, and aim to approximate a dialogical process where actual dialogue is not feasible. However, there are a number of pragmatic reasons why these processes will necessarily be mediated in practice, to varying degrees, in all but a few cases. Face-to-face interactions will encounter language barriers in many cases, requiring the presence of translators for effective communication. Dialogue through communication technologies will encounter language barriers and will typically require hosting platforms, such as websites, that will need to be publicised if they are to reach large numbers of people. Literature and journalism produced within communities facing severe poverty globally may require translation, and certainly require distribution. These materials reaching large numbers of people will typically rely on distribution through news agencies, or publishers, and when employed in processes of formal education, will be further mediated by the presence of educators. What these diverse examples suggest is not only that avoiding mediation will be difficult in practice, but that a number of very different processes fall under the general concept of mediation, bringing quite different benefits and challenges. Some of these processes may serve to increase perceptions of distance between individuals in affluent countries and individuals facing poverty globally, undermining perceptions of agency, and impeding processes of dialogue. Alternatively, some of these processes may be relatively benign, and simply facilitate dialogue or serve to amplify the voices of individuals facing global poverty.

I want to suggest that mediation within strategies of sentimental education can be divided into three levels, each facing different concerns and, in some cases, offering distinct benefits. The first level of mediation concerns the creation of content, for example authoring journalistic accounts, or producing images or video. This level ought to be minimised, where possible, through the use of materials created by individuals facing particular instances of poverty globally, or dialogue either in person or through communication technologies. An excellent example of bypassing this

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139 Translation software offers an opportunity here, but current versions are prone to mistakes.
level of mediation is the documentary ‘The First Movie’, by the filmmaker Mark Cousins, in which displaced Kurdish children were given cameras and shot the majority of the footage themselves, choosing the stories they wished to tell (Cousins, 2013). There may be some practical advantages offered by mediation at this level such as skill in the use of video or photographic equipment, or other technologies, allowing messages to be communicated clearly; however, these factors can be accounted for through editing, at the second level of mediation, where necessary.

The second level of mediation concerns refining content, or rendering it more accessible. This is typified by processes of editing or translating. There are practical reasons why this step cannot always be skipped, especially where language barriers exist. As long as interference at this stage is fairly minimal it poses no serious concerns. A presumption in favour of ‘raw content’ is preferable here, but may not always possible in practice. Heavily editing accounts produced by individuals facing poverty globally, for example, can serve to impede processes of dialogue and obscure aspects of the intended message. Insofar as editorial processes involve the selecting or rejecting of particular images or accounts, this level of mediation can play a more significant role in determining how individuals facing poverty globally are portrayed. Some role for individuals featured in the content in the selection of images (and other content) can minimise concerns here, such as in the Save the Children campaign (discussed below) where Syrian teenagers in refugee camps both took and selected the photos of themselves employed by the campaign (Save the Children, 2014).

The third level of mediation concerns the distribution of content by news outlets, NGOs, and publishers, or within formal education. There are two aspects to this process, the scale and nature of distribution, and how content is featured. This second aspect is distinct from the concern addressed above regarding what content is selected or rejected at the editorial stage. This stage of mediation can rarely be removed if strategies of sentimental education are to reach large numbers of people. Nonetheless, the opportunity offered here is double-edged, as this process can both amplify the

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140 For example, where many hours of footage need to be condensed.
voices of individuals facing poverty globally and radically distort them. Beyond ability to reach large numbers of people, mediators at this stage may have significant expertise in successfully communicating messages. However, commercial pressures facing news outlets and publishers, and NGOs operating with a charity focused account of what action global poverty requires of the affluent, mean that this expertise may not always be applied in a manner conducive to motivating political action to address global poverty as these organisations have alternative goals (Chouliaraki, 2010). An additional level of complexity occurs at this level in the selection of appropriate materials within formal education. In the case of works of literature, for example, not only are works rejected or selected at the editorial stage, they are then selected or rejected in the determining of curriculums. Finally, the attitudes and behaviours of individual educators within the classroom will have a significant effect on how these works are interpreted and received. I will discuss the complexities facing different organisations at this level of mediation in detail below. At this stage I note that the inclusion of individuals facing poverty at this level, in the creation of charters concerning how content is used by NGOs, or in determining the content of curriculums, can help ensure they are portrayed in a sensitive manner.

This section has argued that, although dialogue offers a number of advantages for strategies of sentimental education aimed at motivating political action to address global poverty, strategies of sentimental education will require the use of representations, and rely on the presence of mediators, for the foreseeable future. Rather than replacing all traditional forms of sentimental education with dialogue, political sentimental education ought to employ dialogue as an ideal and ensure that mediation occurs in a sensitive manner. At a general level, sensitive processes of mediation will not obscure the voices of individuals facing poverty globally and present these individuals in a manner that does not obscure the fact that they are capable agents. As previously argued, this will entail less of a focus on portraying individuals in poverty through the lens of their suffering and vulnerability, and greater attention to the institutional factors at a local and a global level responsible for causing or entrenching poverty. Here, Gould’s requirement of deference to
those in need (2007, p.157) in determining appropriate courses of action ought to be extended, so as to allow these individuals to take the lead in how they feature in materials employed in processes of sentimental education.

However, relatively few concrete conclusions regarding what sensitive mediation entails can be drawn at this level of generality, as mediation encompasses a number of different processes that entail different things at different sites where sentimental education may occur. The two main sites through which sentimental education operates, discussed by Rorty (1998) and Nussbaum (2001), are journalism distributed by news agencies, and narrative art and factual accounts employed within formal education. Woods (2012) has also highlighted the role of fundraising materials created by NGOs working to address global poverty in sentimental education. We should also note that processes of dialogue, typically facilitated through communication technologies, can also occur at these sites, such as the dialogue enabled by the Guardian’s Katine project website, and the face-to-face interactions facilitated through formal education discussed above. The International Trade Union movement offers a further site where dialogical processes of sentimental education can occur (Gould, 2014, p.125). In the next section I examine in more detail what sensitive processes of mediation entail at these four sites.

3. Political Sentimental Education in Practice

The final section of this chapter applies the dialogic model of political sentimental education and the attendant account of mediation I have developed to four sites where cosmopolitan sentimental education occurs: (i) journalism, (ii) NGO practices, (iii) formal education, and (iv) trade unions. Through the use of detailed examples and case studies I demonstrate what the account of sentimental education developed in this chapter entails in practice; highlighting incipient cases of cosmopolitan political sentimental education and offering further practical recommendations. The cases discussed here serve to substantiate the theoretical account I have outlined; demonstrating
not only that the account offered is both intuitively plausible and practically feasible, but that it is a reality in action.

3.1. Journalism

Journalism offers a unique opportunity as a means of sentimental education as it regularly reaches large numbers of people, including those with relatively little concern for the lives of distant others. However, depictions of individuals facing poverty globally encountered in journalism are typically fleeting, and commercial pressures shape journalistic content. This can lead to sensationalised depictions of distant others, and a focus on extremes (Nussbaum, 2001, p.434). As journalism moves online this offers unique opportunities for sentimental education by allowing for interactive processes of dialogue facilitated through websites. Moreover, there are some notable examples of online and print journalism cutting out the first stage of mediation and featuring content created by individuals facing poverty globally in their development reporting. Here, I will discuss two examples of good practice, the Guardian newspaper’s Katine project website (The Guardian, 2009), and the Panos network – based in the global South – which focuses on informing public debate and allowing individuals facing global poverty to communicate their own development agendas (Panos Network, 2017).

The Guardian’s Katine project followed the progress of one village in Uganda that was part of an area featured in a three year development project by the Nairobi based NGO Amref Health Africa. The Guardian followed the progress of the project over a three year period, and then returned in 2015 to solicit opinions from villagers and assess the results. The project featured in the Guardian’s standard print and online journalism, but also had its own website, allowing for interaction with villagers, and much detailed content created by inhabitants of Katine (Collender,
Although the project itself in part served as a fundraising exercise, the detailed and highly specific coverage, and the interactive nature of the journalism offer an excellent example of the kind of journalism conducive to motivating informed political action to address poverty globally. Firstly, the journalism was highly specific to a particular location, and occurred over a long time period, offering a nuanced picture conducive to motivating effective action; for example, the website featured a detailed interactive map of the village featuring videos created by villagers, and interactive scenes (Collender, 2014). Moreover, this specific picture was contextualised through further reporting that situated Katine in a broader political context. As discussed above, strategies of political sentimental education need to be both well-informed and focused on the broader political factors that cause or entrench poverty globally. Secondly, the project aimed to create interactive ties with particular others, who were allowed to tell their own stories through the use of videos and photo diaries, and in some cases through actual processes of dialogue, such as webchats. These strategies offered a picture of the villagers as capable agents, which, as previously argued, may be particularly conducive to motivating support for political action to address instances of poverty globally. Although this style of reporting has a relatively narrow readership at present, the success of the Katine website shows that journalism conducive to political sentimental education is both possible and commercially viable.

The Panos Network is a media network based in the global South that offers a platform for individuals and communities facing poverty to communicate their own development agendas, and what action, if any, they require from individuals in more affluent countries. The network also works to inform individuals and communities facing poverty concerning the broader political and economic factors involved in poverty globally, and to encourage debate over potential courses of action (Panos Network 2017). This network, and similar organisations, can serve to combat media portrayals of individuals facing poverty globally as passive victims by amplifying the voices of these individuals.

141 It is important to note that Amref Health Africa offers a good example of NGO practice, working to support projects originating within local communities, and focusing on long term development.
Where individuals facing global poverty communicate their own development agendas to the globally affluent this presents them as active agents, and can help inform effective political solutions – especially where there is an emphasis on the political causes of global poverty – as in the case of the Panos network. The Panos network also offers a good example of how communities affected by global poverty can exercise a greater degree of control over the third level of mediation, the distribution of content.

### 3.2. NGO Practices

The materials employed by NGOs working to address global poverty represent a potentially fertile site for political sentimental education as NGOs are often trusted brands with advocacy that reaches large number of people. However, NGOs are also often responsible for impeding support for political change, as NGOs bear a significant share of the blame for public perceptions of reducing global poverty as a primarily charitable enterprise, requiring financial donations and little else (Kirk, 2012). Moreover, short-term fundraising goals play a significant role in shaping the content of the materials employed by NGOs in promotional materials, with depictions of individuals facing global poverty that focus on their suffering and neediness often employed to motivate donations (Woods, 2012). As argued in in the first section of this chapter, these depictions can undermine support for political strategies to address global poverty, as they present a picture of individuals in poverty that obscures their capacity for agency.

Whether images of suffering and vulnerable others offer a particularly effective means of motivating short-term donations is unclear but, insofar as this is the case, there may be more justification for these images being employed here than at alternative sites of sentimental education. This is especially so as both charitable donations to address immediate need and political reform to target the structural causes of global poverty are likely to be required for the foreseeable future. The key concern here is balance, as where individuals facing poverty globally are primarily
encountered in depictions that emphasise their suffering and vulnerability this can obscure perceptions of their agency. However, when these images are used sparingly, and individuals facing poverty are regularly encountered in processes of dialogue or depictions that do not represent them in this way, we will be less likely to lose sight of their capacity for agency. In order to address the former concern, NGOs ought to regularly employ their considerable influence to encourage political action to address global poverty, alongside soliciting donations. Whilst it may be too much to expect NGOs to avoid emotive images of suffering as a means to motivate financial donations altogether, it is important that they depict individuals facing poverty globally as capable agents more regularly in order to address the latter concern.

Two very different campaigns involving Oxfam represent divergent attempts to incorporate calls for political change into the remit of NGOs, the Make Poverty History campaign, and Oxfam’s programme of Global Citizenship Education. The former campaign features some notable shortcomings, whilst the latter offers an example of good practice. The Make Poverty History campaign turned the traditional techniques of charitable campaigning towards a political goal, and encouraged individuals within developed countries to speak to their parliamentary representatives in order to improve aid, achieve better trade terms, and implement debt relief in countries where severe poverty was prevalent (Make Poverty History, 2005). However, the campaign made little attempt to alter long term attitudes to global poverty, or to include the perspectives of individuals and communities facing poverty globally (Kirk, 2012, pp. 253-255). It also epitomised the vision of global poverty as a monolithic entity, rather than being context and community specific. A better example of NGOs working for political change is Oxfam’s programme of Global Citizenship Education, which works with schools to give pupils a deeper understanding of global issues, and encourages children to see themselves as part of a global community with political responsibilities to fellow ‘global citizens’ (Oxfam, 2015). This programme aims to encourage long-term attitudinal change by fostering empathy for distant others, as in a traditional model of sentimental education; however, it also aims to highlight the causal complexity of global poverty and presents individuals
facing poverty and other hardships in an active role, as capable agents, emphasising how they are fighting for their rights (Oxfam, 2015). The campaign also encourages students to engage with children in less affluent countries as “fellow students”, and aims to facilitate interactions with these students; for example, advising teachers to ‘exchange and perform poetry on a particular local-global issue with other schools locally, nationally and internationally’ (Oxfam, 2015a, p.3).

As discussed, how individuals facing poverty globally are portrayed in NGO campaigns is of particular concern, as portrayals that present these individuals as suffering and vulnerable are regularly featured here, and some use of these images may be justified in this context. We should also note that encounters with NGO fundraising materials are typically fleeting, which leads to both a greater reliance on the use of images and poses an obstacle to contextualising these images in any depth. To some extent, the use of images, regardless of their content, poses greater difficulties in portraying individuals facing poverty in a manner respectful of their agency, than alternative mediums. Individuals featured in images have no words, which both renders dialogue impossible and can serve to obscure a capacity for rational agency as ‘we conventionally think of language as emblematic of the distinctive human capacity for rational communication’ (Woods, 2012, p.41). In order to address these concerns images ought to be contextualised, and accompanied by text or audio allowing those depicted to speak – where possible. As this may not always be practically feasible, allowing the individuals depicted to create their own images, or to play a role in the editorial process, selecting appropriate images, can ensure that images used are respectful. Publicising this involvement can help contextualise the images and increase perceptions of those involved as capable agents. An example of good practice here is the Save the Children campaign featuring teenagers in a Syrian refugee camp creating and editing their own photo portraits, a process which the campaign publicised (Save the Children, 2014).

3.3. Formal Education
Formal education is perhaps the most discussed site for strategies of sentimental education, and the focus of Nussbaum’s account (2001, pp. 425-433). It has a number of significant advantages as it occurs over a long time period, reaches a large number of people, and offers an opportunity for coordinated strategies of sentimental education to be implemented. As Nussbaum notes, formal education also typically faces fewer commercial pressures dictating content than alternative sites (2001, p.434). Formal education also offers a unique opportunity for materials depicting the lives of distant others to be contextualised and interrogated. However, this critical focus relies on the presence of educators, who serve to add an additional level of mediation to encounters with texts authored by distant others.

I will keep the discussion relatively short here, as this area has already been widely discussed, and Oxfam’s programme of Global Citizenship Education, addressed above, offers an example of good practice in this area. As discussed, attention to complexity and the political causes of poverty globally, alongside greater attention to accounts authored by individuals from communities affected by poverty globally, and the inclusion of dialogue (where possible) are all appropriate here. I make two further recommendations. Firstly, school twinning and pen pal schemes, taking full advantage of modern communication technologies, offer further strategies through which formal education can incorporate greater opportunities for dialogue between students in more affluent countries, and communities affected by poverty globally. Secondly, in order to ensure that journalism or literature authored by individuals from communities affected by poverty globally is approached in a sensitive manner in the classroom, representatives from these communities ought to be included in determining how these materials are featured. Although this strategy may not always be possible, and may appear a little utopian, this process has been

142 However, the content of school education is typically shaped by nationalist agendas. This need not pose a problem for addressing global poverty, which I take to entail a weak cosmopolitanism, but does pose an obstacle to formal education as a site for advancing strong cosmopolitan positions.
employed to ensure that Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders are depicted appropriately in the Australian curriculum (Clifford and Montgomery, 2017; Education Services Australia, 2017).

3.4. Trade Unions

Trade unions feature in Carol Gould’s account of transnational solidarity movements (2014, p.125), but otherwise remain a little discussed site for processes of sentimental education. Rather than offering a platform through which depictions of distant others are distributed, unions are a potential site for transnational dialogue and shared activism. Trade unions offer some distinct advantages for political sentimental education. They allow opportunities for dialogue, are underpinned by notions of reciprocity – as they operate to pursue common goals, and individuals featured in trade union activity are conceptualised as workers; accordingly, transnational union activity engages with distant others as autonomous agents. The language employed in the TUC White paper on ‘Trade unions and world poverty’ offers a representative example: ‘How can poor men and women be empowered to demand action from their governments and hold them to account?’ (TUC, 2006, p.10). The nature of union activity is also inherently political, as unions engage in processes of collective bargaining and aim to reform institutions.

Although unions have a number of distinct advantages as a site of sentimental education they may struggle to reach large numbers of people. Union membership is relatively low in some more affluent countries with, for example, 24.7% of UK workers being members of a trade union (UK Government, 2016). More significantly, trade unions face a serious concern as a means by which to encourage affective connections to individuals facing poverty globally as they can struggle to include the very poorest, with many of the poorest individuals working in the informal economy, as

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143 As Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students are subject to this curriculum there is admittedly an added incentive here that they are depicted in a sensitive manner. However, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander views were marginalised, and they were portrayed in a negative manner in Australian education until comparatively recently.
domestic workers, or engaging in subsistence farming. ITUC Africa offers an example of how the former concern can be overcome as it has a significant media presence that aims to target non-union members. The ITUC Africa website features much content created by union members, including a ‘Workers Voice’ section with a number of in-depth video and audio interviews in both English and French. The website also details the campaigns the union is involved in and how supporters can get involved (ITUC Africa, 2017).

Addressing the latter concern is a top priority if trade unions are to offer an effective means by which to encourage affective ties with individuals facing poverty globally. However, progress is already being made in this area, with unions being formed in countries with high instances of global poverty in areas of the economy that were not previously recognised by labour unions and typically employ some of the globally least affluent individuals. These are involved in the international trade union movement, and able to reach the attention of larger numbers of people through their own online presence and the traditional media. The Nepal Independent Domestic Workers’ Union (NIDWU) offers an excellent example of an internationally active union that supports some of the poorer members of Nepali society, and operates in an area of the informal economy not previously recognised by union activity (WIEGO, 2017). Further examples are the Indian union of waste pickers Kagad Kach Patra Kaghtakari Panchayat (KKPKP, 2017), which has unionised some of the poorest members of Indian society and received a significant amount of media attention worldwide (Carr, 2014), and Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement, which has successfully included subsistence farmers and agricultural day labourers into union activity, securing them collective rights to work unused land. (Gould, 2014, p.125).

In this section I applied the dialogic model of sentimental education developed in this chapter to four sites: journalism, NGO practices, formal education, and trade unions, highlighting examples of good practice. These examples serve to explicate what sensitive mediation entails, and demonstrate that the account of sentimental education developed here not only represents a practically feasible alternative to the traditional model, it is a reality in action.
Conclusion

This chapter has developed the arguments of the thesis to offer a novel dialogic account of sentimental education, realised through processes of sensitive mediation, suitable for motivating support for political strategies to address global poverty. In order to develop this account, the chapter first advanced two arguments. (i) Traditional strategies of sentimental education present a picture of individuals facing poverty globally that can obscure their capacity for agency. I argued that this represents a particular problem for motivating support for political strategies to address global poverty, as these strategies rely on a picture of individuals facing poverty globally that assumes they are capable agents. (ii) Motivating political action to address instances of poverty globally requires the development of specific ties between individuals in more affluent countries and particular groups and individuals facing poverty globally. These are plausibly sufficiently robust to meet the significant motivational demands entailed by political strategies to address global poverty, and are conducive to motivating effective political action. Having identified these shortcomings facing the traditional model of sentimental education as a means to motivate support for political strategies to address global poverty, I then advanced a positive account of political sentimental education.

The account developed took processes of dialogue as its starting point, but as dialogue between individuals in more affluent countries and groups and individuals facing poverty globally faces a number of practical obstacles, dialogue operates here as an ideal rather than a requirement. Accordingly, the use of materials authored by individuals facing poverty globally, as a means to encourage the development of affective ties, can function as a form of second order inclusion where dialogue is not presently feasible. These interactions between individuals in more affluent countries and individuals facing poverty globally, whether through processes of dialogue, or indirectly through self-authored accounts featured in traditional processes of sentimental education, will typically be mediated in practice. As mediation is likely to remain a feature of strategies of sentimental
education for the foreseeable future, I developed an account of sensitive mediation – conducive to motivating support for political action. Finally, I applied the account of political sentimental education developed in this chapter to four sites of sentimental education. Through the use of detailed examples highlighting good practice I hope to have demonstrated the practical implications of the theoretical account advanced in this chapter. Moreover, although the account of political sentimental education offered here may strike some as utopian in character, these examples serve to demonstrate that not only is this account practically feasible, it is a reality in action.


Conclusion

*Only connect.* (E.M. Forster)

_We are not concerned with the very poor. They are unthinkable, and only to be approached by the statistician or the poet._ (E.M. Forster)

This thesis has examined the motivational deficit facing a political account of duties to act to address global poverty. In summarising the broad argument of the thesis it is helpful to consider the two epigraphs above. E.M. Forster’s aphorism ‘only connect’ was taken up by Rorty (1999) in his advocacy of a ‘sentimental education’ as a means to motivate action in support of human rights globally. Here, ‘Only connect!’ serves as an exhortation in favour of feeling, where increasing affective connections to groups and individuals previously thought of as other can both facilitate understanding and motivate action to address injustice. As Rorty observes, for Forster this was not a panacea, rather, as ineffective as it might be, it was our best option; not to realise a utopian end state, but to prompt a ‘shy crablike movement towards tenderness’ (Rorty, 1999, p.224). Regarding this latter observation, the argument of this thesis is in agreement with both authors.

However, we should note that the phrase ‘only connect’ occurs in Forster’s novel a second time, when the character Margaret Schlegel recommends ‘only connect the prose and the passion’. Here, reason and emotion are not simply opposites. Rather than a Romantic exultation of feeling over reason, the thought here is that both are needed. In concluding it is helpful to emphasise that this is central to the sentimental cosmopolitan approach, and is something which I have tried to bring to the fore in the broader argument of the thesis.

In enjoining us to ‘only connect’ Forster is not simply advocating that we feel certain emotions towards others, but that we understand them, to some extent, and our affective

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144 Both quotes are taken from Forster’s novel ‘Howards End’ (Forster, 2012, p.198. p.47).
connections derive from this understanding. It is here that the second quote from Forster stands as a potential corrective to the first. The imperative to connect has its limits, as there are those with whom connection may not be possible, as we struggle to understand lives so far removed from our own – such as those of individuals facing severe poverty globally. Forster suggests two figures who may bridge this divide – the statistician and the poet. As I noted in the introduction, the bare statistics of global poverty – the 50,000 people, mostly children, who die from poverty related causes every day (Overland, 2013) typically fail to move us to action. Empirical studies by Slovic (2007) suggest that attention to the sheer scale of the problem may make things even worse – as the quote by Mother Theresa attests, ‘If I look at the mass I will never act, if I look at the one I will’ (Slovic, 2007, p.79). This is not the sort of understanding that facilitates an affective connection.

The sentimental cosmopolitan insight, and Forster’s own, is that it is the alternative perspective – the figure of the poet, attentive to the specifics, the details of individual lives, who can bridge this divide, and, in the right circumstances, move us to action. Here, Forster along with Rorty, and other proponents of the traditional model of sentimental education, offer the same picture. ‘We’ approach ‘them’; it is the representative of the affluent who exhibits the agency – who if skilful enough – sympathetic enough – can show ‘them’ to ‘us’ in such a way as to facilitate understanding and create an affective connection.

This is a picture that this thesis rejects. Instead, I have argued that the understanding necessary for the development of robust affective connections and to facilitate effective political action is specific in nature, and is to be found through interactions with particular individuals and groups facing poverty globally. Although imaginative portrayals of distant others created by outsiders have their uses in cosmopolitan sentimental education, they ought not to occupy a primary role in encouraging us to undertake political action to address global poverty. Rather, this thesis has contended that sentimental education ought to approximate a process of dialogue, favouring actual interactions, or interactions facilitated through communication technologies. Where these are not feasible I have argued that distant others ought to take the lead in sentimental
education, with art and literature authored by individuals facing global poverty functioning as a form of second order inclusion in processes of dialogue. In this process individuals facing poverty globally feature not simply as vulnerable sufferers, but also as capable agents – two qualities we all share. I have also argued that attention to cultivating a broader array of cosmopolitan emotions, rather than just empathy, can offer valuable motivational resources to the sentimental cosmopolitan project; with anger and shame, in particular, facilitating support for political strategies to address global poverty and other injustices, by directing attention towards questions of responsibility.

The argument began by drawing a distinction between charitable and political accounts of duties falling on the affluent to address global poverty. Chapter One defended a focus on a political account of these duties as necessary to achieve long-term solutions to address global poverty, and argued that there are independent normative reasons to favour this approach. The chapter then examined the content of political duties, and outlined the motivational deficit these duties face. I then moved on to rebut the claim that a political model of duties to address global poverty is prima facie more demanding than a charitable account – focused on financial donations to aid organisations.

    Chapter Two examined the nudge solution (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) to the motivational deficit facing duties to address global poverty. This strategy, deriving from behavioural economics, argues that rather than seeking to alter attitudes, motivational failures can be addressed through prompting unreflective changes in behaviour. In this chapter I rejected the nudge approach and argued that, in order to motivate sustained political action to address global poverty, a change in attitudes is required.

145 Schopenhauer famously noted that ‘the appropriate form of address between man and man ought to be, not monsieur, sir, but fellow sufferer, compagnon des miséres’ (2015, p.50).
146 This echoes David Miller’s distinction between viewing humans as ‘patients’ and ‘agents’; however, Miller’s use of the former term is in part disparaging (2007, p.81).
Having rejected the nudge approach, **Chapter Three** moved on to examine the suggestion that through a process of ‘sentimental education’ we can cultivate greater affective attachments to distant others (Nussbaum, 2001; Rorty, 1998). Here, I argued that a moderate version of this approach offers a *prima facie* promising means by which to motivate political action to address global poverty. In doing so, the chapter examined, and rejected, conceptual objections to the sentimental cosmopolitan approach. I then moved on to examine empirical objections to the sentimental cosmopolitan practical project of a sentimental education, in which media and narrative art serve to facilitate the extension of affective concern to distant others. Here, I argued that although the broader sentimental cosmopolitan approach offers a promising means by which to address motivational failures to act to address global poverty, motivating long-term compliance with political duties to address global poverty requires moving beyond the models of sentimental education offered by Rorty (1998) and Nussbaum (2001).

In order to begin to develop an alternative account of sentimental education suitable for motivating compliance with political duties to address global poverty, **Chapter Four** examined the focus on cultivating empathy within the sentimental cosmopolitan approach, arguing that the sentimental cosmopolitan project ought to be broadened to include the cultivation of a number of cosmopolitan emotions, especially anger and shame. Here, I argued that through their ability to accommodate responsibility for injustice, anger and shame are especially well-suited to motivating political action to address global poverty. This chapter further suggested that not only can these emotions offer valuable motivational resources, they are also a normatively appropriate response to the injustice of global poverty.

**Chapter Five** examined in detail the mechanisms through which strategies of sentimental education function to increase affective concern for individuals facing poverty globally. In this chapter I rejected portrayals of individuals facing poverty globally that serve to emphasise their suffering and vulnerability in order to increase affective concern – prevalent in both the fundraising

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147 Hereafter referred to via the shorthand of a ‘political sentimental education’.
material employed by many International Humanitarian NGOs and the accounts of sentimental education offered by Nussbaum and Rorty. Here, I argued that as these strategies serve to portray individuals facing poverty globally in a manner that obscures their capacity for agency, they offer an ineffective means by which to motivate political action to address global poverty. I then examined whether an emphasis on our shared vulnerability to suffering can overcome these adverse motivational effects, arguing that, although our shared vulnerability to suffering is a true and important fact, drawing attention to this within strategies of sentimental education is vulnerable to similar adverse motivational effects to a focus on the suffering of others.

The final section of this chapter argued that rather than seeking to present distant others in a certain way, strategies of sentimental education ought to proceed by facilitating interactions, and, where this is not feasible, allowing individuals to take the lead in determining how they are presented. In doing so, distant others take an active role in cosmopolitan sentimental education, and are encountered as agents.

Chapter Six took a detour from the positive argument in order to examine a pressing barrier thought to face the extension of affective concern to distant others, injustice within one’s own political community (Straehle, 2016). This chapter examined the potential conflict between motivating support for justice within national borders and support for basic global justice. It argued that at the level of motivation the two projects are interrelated in a number of complex ways, making them potentially complementary, rather than competing projects. In particular, I argued that if strategies of cosmopolitan sentimental education are to be effective, the culture within a society, as reflected in both institutions and personal behaviour, must be conducive to developing and sustaining an empathetic or compassionate disposition.

Drawing on the arguments advanced in the rest of the thesis, Chapter Seven developed a positive account of sentimental cosmopolitanism suitable for motivating political action to address global poverty, which explicitly recognises individuals facing global poverty as capable agents. Moving beyond the unidirectional accounts of sentimental education advocated by previous
sentimental cosmopolitan accounts, this chapter developed a dialogic model of sentimental education, realised through processes of sensitive mediation, that aims to establish two-way ties between individuals in more affluent countries and particular individuals and groups facing poverty globally. As dialogue between individuals in more affluent countries and groups and individuals facing poverty globally faces a number of practical obstacles, dialogue operates here as an ideal rather than a requirement. I argued that the use of materials authored by individuals facing poverty globally, as a means to encourage the development of affective ties, can function as a form of second order inclusion where dialogue is not presently feasible. Finally, through the use of detailed examples, this chapter demonstrated that the solution to the motivational deficit facing political duties to address global poverty advanced in this thesis is not only practically feasible, it is a reality in action.

In sum, this thesis has clarified the motivational deficit facing a political account of duties to address global poverty, and developed a novel dialogic sentimental cosmopolitan answer. This answer serves to show that we need not choose between a picture of humans as affective partial creatures and realistic hope for a significantly greater level of action to address global poverty than that which currently exists. We can have both.
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