Sir Francis Walsingham and Mid-Elizabethan Political Culture

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

This thesis addresses Sir Francis Walsingham’s place in and thinking about mid-
Elizabethan political culture. Often seen as the dour Puritan among Elizabeth’s advisers,
this thesis aims to recalibrate opinions of Walsingham, in light of his conscious and
sophisticated engagement with the currents of political thought and action through which
he moved. Chapter 1 explores Walsingham’s early life and education, between his birth (c.
1532) and his appointment as special envoy to France in 1570, aiming to more thoroughly
analyse and contextualise the impact this had on his later life. Chapter 2 examines
Walsingham’s self-conscious construction of his role as adviser to Elizabeth through his
correspondence with her, engaging particularly with his vocabulary and rhetorical strategies,
including humanist-classical ideas of counsel. This chapter also analyses his longer political
writings on the issues of Elizabeth’s projected marriage to the duke of Alençon and
English intervention in the Low Countries, comparing Walsingham’s techniques and
expression to the developing language of the “art of the state”. Chapter 3 and 4 explore
Walsingham’s patronage in the Church of England and in English government in Ireland,
to uncover the motivations and priorities that governed his interventions in these areas.
Chapter 5 traces Walsingham’s career-long preoccupation with Scotland, as the principal
event of his tendency to offer advice to foreign rulers, examining his contacts with key
figures north of the border, the advice he offered directly and indirectly to James VI, and
the language he used to describe Anglo-Scottish relations, and analysing his motivations
and intentions for these unprecedented interventions.
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Abbreviations

BL.  British Library, St Pancras
LMA  London Metropolitan Archives
PRO  Public Record Office
SHC  Surrey History Centre, Woking
SP   State Papers
TNA  The National Archives, Kew

Conventions

Throughout, the year is assumed to begin on 1 January. Original spelling and punctuation have been retained. For clarity’s sake, all references to the ‘duke of Anjou’ signify Henri of Valois (later Henri III), and all references to the ‘duke of Alençon’ signify his younger brother, François (later duke of Anjou). Lord Burghley is referred to as ‘William Cecil’ until his ennoblement in February 1571, after which he becomes ‘Burghley’.
Introduction

When embarking on the study of Sir Francis Walsingham, whatever one’s exact interest, there is both too much and too little material. Though information on his early years and private life is notable mostly by its absence, anyone studying the politics of the 1570s and 1580s will be hard-pressed to avoid him: his spiky scrawl covers folio upon folio in the State Papers in the National Archives and in the Harley and Cotton manuscripts in the British Library. This reflects his position at the heart of the Elizabethan regime from his appointment as Principal Secretary in 1573 to his death in 1590, which placed him at the centre of the administrative life of the government, and his concurrent appointment as one of Elizabeth’s Privy Councillors, which saw him counselling the queen, and making and implementing policy. Turning the pages of his ledger book from the 1580s provides an illustration of the multifarious nature of his activities, and the sheer weight of administrative work that Elizabeth’s ministers shouldered. From Parliament matters, to the reform and administration of Ireland, to instructions for ambassadors to Muscovy, to correspondence with continental counsellors and thinkers, to moving Elizabeth in suits, and just about everything in between, there was little government work with which Walsingham was not involved. However, in much of the historiography of Elizabeth’s reign, Walsingham is rarely seen in three dimensions. Most often, he is Elizabeth’s Puritan spymaster. This Walsingham is a stereotype, a caricature. It is the aim of this thesis to go beyond these labels and understand Walsingham as a conscious political actor in the political and religious context of the 1570s and 1580s, letting him speak, as much as possible, for himself.

The academic historiography of Walsingham himself is limited to Conyers Read’s monumental *Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth* (1925), and two doctoral theses by Mitchell Leimon (1989) and Hsuan-Ying Tu (2012), as well as one article by Leimon, written jointly with Geoffrey Parker. There have also been several works of

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varying quality for a more popular audience. These tend to be most interested in Walsingham's intelligence work, as the titles show. We have Stephen Budiansky's *Her Majesty's Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham and the Birth of Modern Espionage*, Alan Haynes' *Walsingham: Elizabethan Spymaster and Statesman*, and Robert Hutchinson's *Elizabeth's Spymaster: Sir Francis Walsingham and the Secret War that Saved England*. These books all, to a greater or lesser extent, rely on Read’s work for aspects of their characterisation of Walsingham, but often descend to outright anachronism in their depiction of Elizabethan politics. Particularly egregious in this regard is Hutchinson’s comparison of Walsingham with Goebbels, which adds nothing to our interpretation of either man, and shows a wilful blindness to context. Other books for a non-academic audience provide a much more authentic picture of the context in which Walsingham operated, though the demands of the genre do not always allow them space to fully explore some of their most interesting aspects. John Cooper’s *The Queen's Agent* engages with Walsingham’s intelligence work but is at its most interesting in its treatment of his involvement in colonisation projects in Ireland and in North America.

As a cursory glance at the references of these works and others in which Walsingham plays a part indicates, Read established the trajectory of Walsingham’s career that has been accepted largely uncritically by later historians. Read described his three-volume magnum opus as ‘something more than a biography of Walsingham and something less than a history of Elizabethan policy’. As expressed in *Mr Secretary Walsingham* and an earlier article in the *English Historical Review*, Read’s version of Walsingham’s life has him beginning his public career under the auspices of Lord Burghley, professing ‘I owe myself and all that I have to your Lordship’. But as the 1570s progressed, Read saw Walsingham increasingly diverging from the Lord Treasurer and growing closer to the earl of Leicester.

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4 Hutchinson, p. 39.

5 John Cooper, *The Queen’s Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I* (London: Faber and Faber, 2011).

6 Read, I, p. vii.

7 BL, Cotton, Vespasian F VI, fol. 120, cited in Conyers Read, ‘Walsingham and Burghley in Queen Elizabeth’s Privy Council’, *English Historical Review*, 28.109 (1913), 34-58 (p. 34)
contributing to the formation of two coherent and mutually opposed ‘parties’ in the Privy Council based on personal antipathy and differences of world view.\textsuperscript{8} The primary difference between Walsingham and Burghley, Read argued, was religious. Walsingham’s ‘religion coloured his whole view of foreign policy’ and he was ‘prepared to sacrifice England’s interests for the sake of what he considered the greater cause’, in contrast to Burghley who was ‘more of an opportunist in religious matters’ and placed ‘national considerations before religious ones’.\textsuperscript{9} Each ‘party’ ‘had its leader and its programme, to which each lent fairly consistent support’.\textsuperscript{10}

In 1576, the first signs of serious division became apparent, Read claimed, over differences of opinion over assistance for the Dutch rebels.\textsuperscript{11} Though this was an issue that saw differences of opinion in the Council, it is noticeable that much of Read’s evidence is drawn from the dispatches of Spanish ambassadors or envoys. For example, the Sieur de Champagny, an envoy from the Spanish governor of the Low Countries, reported that Burghley was growing jealous of Walsingham, as he was encroaching on his credit and this was cited by Read as evidence of the split between the two men. Even if Champagny’s report was accurate, this is only evidence of tension between two individuals and not two rival camps or followings. Dutch envoys reported only that Walsingham had dealt ‘honestly’ with them and that Burghley had dissuaded Elizabeth from aiding them – no mention was made of him working against his colleague, only of giving contrary advice.\textsuperscript{12} In fact, at the height of this supposed conflict in 1576, Burghley interceded with Elizabeth on Walsingham’s behalf when she was suspicious of his advocacy of the Dutch.\textsuperscript{13}

Differences of opinion between advisers were, as Walsingham acknowledged, part of political life. During a disagreement about Scottish policy in 1584, he urged Lord Hunsdon, ‘lett not the dyuersitie of our opinions in this matter of Scotlande (which falleth out of tentimes betweene Counsellors of estate) breeade anie dislike of vnkyndenes betweene vs’.\textsuperscript{14}

Read’s conception of a perpetual split caused by a combination of religious and personal differences does not hold water. He embraced the partisan exaggeration of Spanish envoys, without being sufficiently critical of their information and motivations.

\textsuperscript{8} Read, ‘Walsingham and Burghley’, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{9} Read, ‘Walsingham and Burghley’, pp. 36-37.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{13} Walsingham to Burghley, 16 October 1576, BL, Harley 6992, fol. 56.
\textsuperscript{14} Walsingham to Hunsdon, 7 November 1584, TNA, SP 59/23, fol. 71.
However, his work is generally factually accurate with a wealth of contextual detail and thorough knowledge of primary sources, though not always in the original – State Papers Online was, after all, a distant dream for an American scholar in the early twentieth century. It is lack of proper analysis that renders some of Read’s conclusions suspect, and the primary problem with Read’s work is simply that the practice of history has changed since 1925, as have the sorts of things in which historians are interested. As a result of the turn towards studies of ‘political culture’ (see below), Read’s work can seem dry and dusty, but it remains useful – especially for his publication in full of sources not otherwise available.

The next work under consideration actively resisted the turn towards ‘political culture’. Although extremely critical of Read’s ‘embarrassingly crude’ approach, Mitchell Leimon’s doctoral thesis, ‘Sir Francis Walsingham and the Anjou Marriage Plan, 1574-1581’, otherwise adheres closely to Read’s conception of a seriously divided Elizabethan regime. Like Read, his was a policy-focused approach, based on criticism of Burghley’s pacific programme and approval of Walsingham’s broader vision. Leimon argued that a factional split between Walsingham and Burghley was ‘inevitable’, and increasingly wide from 1576. Leimon was, therefore, sharply critical of the work of Simon Adams, arguing that vicious factional conflict continued throughout the 1570s and 1580s, and was not just confined to the 1590s. It is perhaps telling, however, that in depicting factional strife he has recourse to patronage and politics in Ireland – whether this was representative of the situation in England is arguable, and he thus performs the very sleight of hand which he criticised in others: making ‘some particular phase’ the ‘norm’. Leimon never manages to prove that the very real disagreements that occurred between courtiers involved rival groups, instead they look very much like two individuals disagreeing, and he therefore inadvertently confirms Adams’ argument.

Leimon offers a bolder view than Read of Walsingham’s outlook, which he describes as ‘highly dynamic’, where ‘[a]ll problems meshed together, and were linked to the apocalyptic religious confrontation’, which has meant that Walsingham has been ‘too often portrayed as an impractical zealot’. He was, Leimon claims, ‘the first English statesman to think in terms, not limited to the borders of England’s neighbours, but of

15 Leimon, pp. 60-61, 71.
16 Ibid, p. 5.
17 Ibid, p. 10.
18 Ibid, p. 70.
19 Ibid, pp. 72, 200.
global strategy’.  

His observation that ‘[w]hen Elizabeth’s stock is lower, Walsingham’s rises’ is an astute comment on the trends of Elizabethan historiography, and his claim that listening to Walsingham broadens and complicates our understanding of Elizabethan government is also certainly true.  

His study therefore, despite its flaws, offers a number of compelling insights into Walsingham’s political life, though these ought to be interrogated with caution by the reader.

Neither Read nor Leimon were particularly interested in Walsingham’s intelligence work, but the same is not true of the most recent thesis to deal with Elizabeth’s Secretary – which is also concerned with the issue of “faction”. Hsuan-Ying Tu’s thesis argued that by the late 1570s there existed in Elizabeth’s government a rigid divide between two groups, one led by Burghley and one by Walsingham and Leicester based on primarily the same political and religious differences identified by Read, though she also emphasises patronage disputes. Tu argues that it was Walsingham’s arrival on the scene of high politics in 1573 that began the polarising processes that resulted in factional conflict between rival intelligence networks, especially from 1576, as Walsingham moved away from Burghley’s orbit.  

She argues that each ‘party’ competed over intelligence and sought to use information to further their desired policy and undermine the objectives of their rival party. Walsingham, for instance, ‘manipulated espionage to promote his godly ideology’. This political divide, for Tu, ‘peaked in the mid-1580s’, due to differences over the question of intervention in the Low Countries.

Tu’s analysis is riven with oversimplification and confusion. Her attempt to posit rigid intelligence networks without much overlap (this being the key to their identification as “faction”) is undermined by neglecting key information. For example, Sir John Conway is described as ‘Burghley’s informant’, but he also corresponded with Walsingham and often requested his favour. More problematically for her overall argument, the earl of Shrewsbury, guardian of the Queen of Scots, is repeatedly described as ‘pro-Cecil’, despite his warm and grateful relationship with Walsingham. This undermines Tu’s argument that Shrewsbury’s 1584 replacement with Sir Amias Paulet, identified as a Walsingham partisan,

21 Ibid, p. 145.  
22 Ibid, pp. 4-5.  
23 Tu, pp. 67, 71.  
24 Ibid, p. 6-8.  
26 Ibid, pp. 140-141; see for example Sir John Conway to Walsingham, 28 January 1587, TNA, SP 84/12, fol. 51.
was motivated by factional feeling on Walsingham’s part. This change of personnel is itself problematic, given Tu’s claim that Elizabeth (and Burghley) sought to limit Walsingham’s control over intelligence and diplomacy in the mid-1580s – if this was the case, why would they appoint a man known to be close to Walsingham to such a sensitive position?

Tu’s work on the fate of Walsingham’s papers after his death, however, is interesting and valuable. She traces the path of his documents from his death, when ‘all his papers and bookes both publike and private were seazed on and carried away’ by his servants and the government, to their arrival in the archives. It is, as she wrote, documentary problems that hinder a full assessment of Walsingham’s working (and private) life. Among other problems, some documents were deliberately destroyed on receipt; public and private documents were often mixed together; on his death his servants might have stolen items to use with new masters; when the documents arrived in the State Papers any private material was removed and destroyed; and later users of archival collections also often stole or failed to return items which they had consulted. This partly explains the presence of letters to Walsingham in collections like the Hatfield and Finch manuscripts.

It is not the intention of this study to deny that there were serious disputes from time to time among the queen’s advisers. However, a slight detour to analyse a supposedly factional incident in 1585 illustrates the shortcomings of this approach to Elizabethan politics and something of the style of this thesis. Walsingham most often deployed the specific word “faction” in the context of those holding opposing views in other courts, especially anti-English or anti-Protestant groups in France and Scotland. For example, during his resident embassy in Paris he reported on the machinations of the ‘faction of Guise’ and ‘Scottishe Queenes faction’. In the same foreign contexts, particularly Scotland, Walsingham referred to pro-English figures as belonging to Elizabeth’s ‘party’.

Even references to a “Spanish faction” did not necessarily denote his opponents in

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27 Tu, pp. 14, 178; Gilbert Talbot to Shrewsbury, 29 January 1581, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Honourable the Marquis of Bath, preserved at Longleat, Wiltshire, 5 vols (London: H. M. S. O., 1904-80), V, pp. 31-33; Walsingham to Shrewsbury, 26 September 1582, ibid, p. 39; 2 October 1583, ibid, p. 46; Shrewsbury to Walsingham, 6 January 1582, TNA, SP 53/12, fol. 1.
29 Tu, pp. 17-17.
30 Ibid, pp. 21, 23.
31 Walsingham to Burghley, 8 February 1571, TNA, SP 70/116, fol. 70; Walsingham to Burghley, 4 March 1572, BL, Cotton, Caligula C III, fol. 230.
32 Walsingham to Earl of Huntingdon, 6 February 1581, BL, Harley 6999, fol. 34.
England. 33 Sometimes, however, he clearly had in mind opponents at home when he used this phrase. For example, in 1576 he told the Prince of Orange’s adviser, Monsieur de Villiers, that the Dutch seizure of English merchant shipping ‘greatly hindered their plans and favoured those of the Spanish faction, who continue by these means to anger the Queen more and more’. 34 So Walsingham clearly, at least some of the time, saw a group opposed to his policies at the English court.

Whoever Walsingham meant when he used the word, a clear sense of personal interest, rather than public service, comes through in his usage, sometimes accompanied with allegiance to a foreign power. In France, Walsingham thought that those of the “Spanish faction” there would use Philip’s victory at Lepanto to urge their own king to forget injuries done to him by the Spanish. 35 In 1580 he was concerned that France would let slip the opportunity for closer alliance with England while attending to their ‘inward dissension, nourished by faction, upon private quarrels’, and that as a result the ‘realm would go to ruin’. 36 When a motley group of Anglophile nobles and Presbyterian ministers arrived in England from Scotland in 1584, fleeing respectively the king’s wrath and stricter religious legislation, Walsingham urged Elizabeth to support them and work to return them to James’ good graces. 37 Walsingham was disappointed, however, by the lukewarm reception the exiles received. The Secretary blamed those that valued ‘neither the authoryte of ther place nor the care they owght to have of her majestes savetye’. Walsingham wrote that he expected nothing better ‘from them that vse relygyon for pollecye and many tymes abvsed yt for factyon’. 38 Rather than sincerely concerned with the fate of Protestantism in the British Isles, which would have seen them whole-heartedly support the exiles, those who espoused the alternative course were acting to the detriment of religion, queen and country for personal gain. It is also pretty clear from at least Walsingham’s usage of the term that “faction” was collective – it was not something that occurred between competing individuals. This brings us to our case study.

In 1585, a severe disagreement between Walsingham and Burghley was solved by airing their differences. In January, each man suspected the other’s goodwill and considered breaking with the other based on these suspicions. These concerns led Burghley to write to

33 Walsingham to Burghley, 3 November 1572, BL, Harley 260, fol. 151.
34 Walsingham to Villiers, 6 September 1576, TNA, SP 70/39, fol. 144.
35 Walsingham to Burghley, 3 November 1572, BL, Harley 260, fol. 151.
36 [? Walsingham] to Cobham, 15 April 1580, TNA, SP 78/4A, fol. 55.
37 John Colville to Walsingham, 13 March 1584, BL, Cotton, Caligula C III, fol. 376; Bowes to [Walsingham], 15 March 1584, BL, Cotton, Caligula C VII, fol. 378; Read, II, pp. 226-27; Walsingham to Angus and Mar, 5 May 1584, TNA, SP 52/34, fol. 50.
38 Walsingham to Davison, 3 June 1584, TNA, SP 52/35, fol. 3v.
Walsingham, asking for an explanation of his behaviour. Burghley’s letters are not extant, but we can reconstruct what happened through Walsingham’s replies. Tu argued that this incident exposed the ‘papered over antagonism beneath Elizabeth’s seemingly harmonious regime’. Only a couple of weeks prior to this conflagration, however, Walsingham’s manner of writing to Burghley was as frank and familiar as ever. On 11th January, he wrote to his colleague of his view that Elizabeth should take the Low Countries under her protection in order to prevent them falling into the hands of the French. Walsingham concluded his letter ‘alwaies referringe my self to yor L: better judgement’, and acknowledging that he had been ‘moved to delyver myn opinion more resolutelie then wiselie in this so weightie a cause’. Rather than demonstrating, as Tu suggests, Burghley’s ‘tolerance of his hot-tempered junior’, the exchange of views about the Low Countries is suggestive of a fairly equal relationship (Walsingham’s wonted deferential phrases notwithstanding). In some ways, therefore, what followed on 30th January was a continuation of these qualities rather than a rejection of them.

Walsingham’s first letter recorded his acceptance of Burghley’s ‘honorable and playne manner of proceading’, which prompted him to ‘howld the like coorse’. Later in the same letter, the Secretary assured his colleague that even if he had decided to view him ‘rather as an ennemye then as a frende’, he would have ‘broken with your L. therin’ before making ‘open shewe vnto the world thereof’. Walsingham made much of his reluctance to believe the worst of Burghley, claiming to be ‘one that dyd greatly affect’ his ‘frendeship and good opinion’. This language of plainness and friendship was also present in an earlier falling out between Walsingham and Lord Hunsdon. Walsingham’s letter addressing Hunsdon’s grievances similarly thanked Hunsdon for ‘dealing so planelie’ by informing him of ‘the caawse of yor greife’. He added that he would ‘do you great wronge if I should not accept the same in good perete’ and use ‘the lyke playnnes’. This mitigates against a factional environment: frank exchanges of views would be almost impossible if the two men had belonged to two separate factions.

Walsingham explicitly rejected the idea that the breach with Burghley was at all a “factional” issue. He had, he admitted, harkened to some reports against Burghley. However, once he suspected that ‘the grownde therof grewe of factyon […] and that the

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39 Tu, p. 6.
40 Walsingham to Burghley, 11 January 1585, TNA, SP 12/176/1, fol. 7v.
41 Tu, p. 246.
42 Walsingham to Burghley, 30 January 1585, TNA, SP 12/176/1, fol. 34v.
43 Ibid, fol. 34.
44 Walsingham to Hunsdon, 7 November 1584, TNA, SP 59/23, fol. 69v.
awthorores thereof sowght by sooche indyrect meanes to drawe me to be a partye with them’ he had distanced himself from them. Walsingham’s use of “faction” shows that he thought group rivalries were alive and well in Elizabeth’s court. But, again, it is impossible to establish who these people were and what their intentions were, and so again there is an absence of hard evidence for faction at Elizabeth’s court.

The ultimate catalyst for the quarrel, Walsingham wrote, was his belief that Burghley was stymieing his suit for the farm of the customs. This, combined with more nebulous resentment and the tale-telling of certain unnamed individuals had ‘conyfirmed’ for Walsingham the lord treasurer’s ‘myslyke of me’. Rather than opposition between two opposing camps (political, religious, or personal), one specific incident (or perceived incident) was the cause of this falling out. Having explained his actions, Walsingham concluded by reasserting his ‘good wyll’ to Burghley.

A further exchange of letters on the same day saw this newly reminted friendship confirmed. Walsingham thanked the Lord Treasurer for his ‘frendely acceptyng of my playne manner of wrytyng’, and promised ‘all dewe and synceare performavnce of my promysed good wyll.’ Despite Walsingham’s professed honesty, he declined to produce those who had informed him against Burghley. He claimed that ‘yt may reatche to sooche persons as are not to be cavled in question’, possibly an oblique reference to the queen, but promised that ‘hereafter I wyll not fayle to acquaynt you wt the reports befor I geve credyt vnto them’. This reiterates the importance of openness and honesty – and of the language of openness and honesty – between colleagues in Elizabeth’s government. Had Walsingham or Burghley proved unreceptive to these discourses of friendship and frankness, this quarrel over an apparently minor issue could have seen the end of their cooperation, which would have completely hamstrung Elizabeth’s government. That both men were sensitive to the need to share their suspicions and the importance of mutual goodwill suggests that, far from a permanently tense and acrimonious relationship caused by their leadership of rival “factions”, they maintained a usually positive and cooperative relationship.

If you look for “faction” at Elizabeth’s court, you will certainly find it, but it is unlikely to conform to historians’ understandings of what it looked like. It was a far more nebulous concept, just as much a phenomenon or something one did as it was a group or something to which one belonged. And it was not a neutral term. It was something bad.

45 Walsingham to Burghley, 30 January 1585, TNA, SP 12/176/1, fols 34-34v.
46 Ibid, fol. 35.
47 Ibid, fol. 36.
advisers and selfish courtiers did. Accounts of Walsingham’s career in factional terms are insufficiently attentive to his choice of words and too willing to accept his interpretation as confirmation of their own view of a factionally divided court, without adequately interrogating his meaning. Far from exposing the damaging divisions of Elizabeth’s government, these letters instead demonstrate the means by which these were resolved and avoided. What these differences with Hunsdon and Burghley show is that differences of opinion between councillors were an expected part of government life, and that political and patronage issues could spark resentment but serious breaches were avoided and healed by the language of frankness and friendship.

This thesis is influenced by the trend over the last 30 years or so to take early modern political actors seriously, contextualising them within their political milieu in terms of theory and practice. Work by Simon Adams on the earl of Leicester, Stephen Alford on Lord Burghley, and by Paul Hammer, Janet Dickinson and Alexandra Gajda on the earl of Essex, has brought these central figures into clearer focus, not as the stereotypes of old – dilettante, politique, and playboy – but as self-conscious political actors who were the products of and contributed to the social, religious and political context(s) in which they lived.48

This has gone hand-in-hand with a turn towards ‘political culture’, which has been described as ‘the interface between politics and political ideas’ and involves investigating ‘the values, assumptions, linguistic and conceptual resources, and social and political predicaments of the actors and speakers’ of the period under consideration.49 In other words, it is ‘the codes of conduct, formal and informal, governing’ political action.50

Patrick Collinson’s work on the ‘monarchical republic’ remains a touchstone of the historiography of Elizabethan political culture. Insisting that the queen’s classically-educated advisers were ‘citizens’ concealed within ‘subjects’ and that as a result of their educational experiences and the development of critiques of monarchy in the late- to mid-

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century some of these thinkers, writers, and advisers saw monarchy as a ‘ministry exercised under God and on his behalf’ – just another ‘public office’ – and that the monarch was ‘accountable, certainly to God and perhaps to others’ who exercised other public officers under God.51

Scholars like Simon Adams have argued for the absence of faction in Elizabeth’s government outside of chronologically specific flashpoints, and replaced this with an image of homogeneity of experience and outlook among the queen’s advisers. There were disagreements between individuals over the detail of policy, but these were differences over means, not the essential interpretation of England’s situation. Both Walsingham and Burghley, for instance, disagreed about the correct response to requests for aid from the Prince of Orange, but both saw the world through remarkably similar lenses: both believed in a Catholic conspiracy against England in conjunction with the Anti-Christ and hence subscribed to a similarly apocalyptic world view. Where they differed was their solutions to the problems they both saw.52

A lot of valuable work has been done by John Guy, Natalie Mears, and Jacqueline Rose, among others, on the issue of counsel – how monarchs received advice – which has drawn attention to the theoretical considerations that governed this process, and the queen’s active role within it.53 The languages of political expression and the importance of rhetoric has also been the subject of detailed investigation by scholars like J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, Peter Mack, Joanne Paul, and Markku Peltonen.54 Political actors had a

range of vocabularies and traditions to choose from when expressing themselves, and whether they chose a feudal-baronial mode harking back to ideas of the ancient nobility, or a humanist-classical mode which asserted the virtues of public life and service, or the emerging vocabulary of “reason of state” with its emphasis on necessity and expediency, or a combination of these, or another mode entirely, speaks volumes about the speaker’s perception of themselves, their political environment and the issue under discussion.  

Influenced by this scholarship and my own research, this thesis accepts a picture of Elizabethan politics that was based on cooperation, at the centre and at the peripheries, where the queen was an active participant in the process of government and particularly in taking counsel, and where close attention to the language of politics can be extremely revealing.

Accordingly, the following thesis is interested in issues of the education of political actors, their formative relationships and networks, the languages and practice of counsel and political argument, and overarching motivational factors. Chapter 1 deals with Walsingham’s youth, using under-used or new sources to examine some of his early influences, especially his family ties to the Henrician court, his education at Cambridge, and his life just prior to his official entry into public life.

Chapter 2 examines Walsingham’s place in and thinking about the mid-Elizabethan polity, through the analysis of several think pieces he wrote addressing the important contemporary issues of the queen’s marriage and intervention in the Low Countries, alongside an evaluation of his advice to Elizabeth. Next, the third and fourth chapters address some broader thematic motivations behind Walsingham’s activities, using his church patronage in England and political patronage in Ireland to argue that he was not always propelled by his own personal beliefs and that he was capable of extreme pragmatism.

Chapter 5 addresses Walsingham’s activities in Scotland, an area often ignored by English historians of Elizabeth’s reign. One of the remarkable aspects of Walsingham’s political conduct is the frequency with which he gave advice to foreign rulers without Elizabeth’s knowledge. Key figures in Scotland were the most frequent recipients of such advice, and therefore this chapter uses the Scottish context, which also sees Walsingham at his most theoretical about politics, to discuss why he did this and how successfully.


Ultimately, I want to provide a deeper and more authentic understanding of Walsingham’s political thought and action by close analysis of his writings over the course of his career, from about 1570 to his death in 1590. If Burghley is the defining personality of the politics of the 1560s, and Essex of the 1590s, the field of mid-Elizabethan politics is more crowded, but Walsingham certainly has a claim to be a useful lens through which to examine the intervening period. Like Thomas Cromwell and William Cecil before him and Robert Cecil after him, Walsingham made the principal secretaryship count in a way Sir Thomas Smith and Thomas Wilson did not. Using his trusting and effective working relationship with Elizabeth as well as the control over royal and conciliar correspondence with which the secretaryship endowed him, Walsingham carved out a place for himself at the heart of policy-making and implementation. A failure to understand Walsingham is a failure to understand the middle years of Elizabeth’s reign.

Therefore, in this thesis I aim to reconstruct and interrogate Walsingham’s political and religious thought by examining his attitude to the queen, the wider structures of the Elizabethan state and the vital issues that engaged the “political nation” in the later sixteenth century: the future of the church, foreign policy, the queen’s marriage and succession. Through a detailed analysis of the language of Walsingham’s political writings and a broader exploration of his role within Elizabethan government I will offer not so much a rehabilitation as a recalibration of Walsingham in mid-Elizabethan political culture.

The main sources for this research are, largely, the usual suspects. The State Papers in the National Archives, and the various collections of original and copied documents in the British Library’s Cotton and Harley collections, and the Historical Manuscript Commission volumes on the Hatfield MSS. It also, however, utilises less-used sources, including the Loseley manuscripts held at Surrey History Centre in Woking, which include the correspondence of one of Walsingham’s friends, Sir William More. The holdings at the Kent History and Library Centre, King’s College Cambridge, and the London Metropolitan Archives were also consulted, in order to offer fresh insight into his activities. I have also made use of printed collections of primary sources including calendars, and, especially, the collection of parts of Walsingham’s correspondence as ambassador to France, published in 1655 as the *Compleat ambassador*, which contains some material no longer extant in manuscript.

I have avoided certain sources. An apparently useful-looking essay attributed to Walsingham, ‘Sir Francis Walsingham’s anatomizing of Honesty, Ambition, and Fortitude’, published in *Cottoni posthuma: divers choice pieces of that Renowned Antiquary, Sir Robert Cotton,*
Knight and Baronet (London: M. C. for C. Harper, 1651), which both Read and Tu accepted as a product of Walsingham’s pen, was almost certainly a seventeenth century composition with Walsingham’s name tacked on to add weight.\textsuperscript{56} The editor of the collection, James Howell, also printed ‘Valour Anatomized in a Fancie’, which he attributed to Sir Philip Sidney, but the work in question first appeared in Overbury’s Characters (1622), and was later printed with an attribution to John Donne, so the chances of Walsingham actually having written the piece attributed to him are slim.\textsuperscript{57} Although in-keeping with opinions of Walsingham’s character, its views are so hackneyed as to be completely useless for analysing the author’s convictions in any detail.

Given the dearth of information about Walsingham’s houses and household, it is almost impossible to tell what Walsingham read, or even what books he owned, and this presents obvious problems for a study of Walsingham’s political life. However, apart from one or two especially famous examples, writers on Walsingham have hitherto ignored dedications to him. The most famous of these is undoubtedly the first edition of Richard Hakluyt the younger’s Principall navigations. In his dedication, Hakluyt recorded ‘how honorably both by your letter and speech I haue bene animated in this and other my trauels’ and therefore presented the work ‘as the fruı́ts of your owne encouragements’.\textsuperscript{58}

Forty-eight printed works have been identified as dedicated to Walsingham over the course of his career, along with a few manuscript treatises.\textsuperscript{59} The subjects of these were fairly varied, though there is a preponderance of religiously-themed pieces, particularly until 1582. The most dedications appeared in 1582 (seven), and these heights were not reached again until 1589, when six books were dedicated to him. Generally, the variety of topics increased as time went on: the later 1580s saw works on music, languages and civil law enter the arena, where before works had been largely concerned with religion, with two on what might be termed ‘politic’ issues, and two on travel/foreign news. In fact, most dedications of all kinds of works were published before 1584 (thirty-two), with sixteen after that date. Though it cannot be assumed that a dedication denotes complete agreement with the content of the work (or even that Walsingham was aware for the content in any detail) the fact of the dedication suggests a sympathy and interest, which has been useful particularly in examining Walsingham’s religious priorities.

\textsuperscript{56} Read, III, p. 441; Tu, p. 321.
\textsuperscript{58} Hakluyt, Principall navigations (London: George Bishop & Ralph Newbury for Christopher Barker, 1589). *3.
\textsuperscript{59} Franklin B. Williams, Index of Dedications and Commendatory Verses in English Books before 1641 (London: Bibliographical Society, 1962). See Appendix 1 for a full-title list of these works.
Walsingham certainly owned books on matters of government and administration, which he sometimes lent to friends. His brother-in-law, William Dodington, an officer in the Mint and a long-time friend, wrote that

I find great light, touching mint matters in your book. Some want I have for lack of a dictionary, which I pray you lend me for a while. There is in this many things referred to the ancient orders of their mint, whereof there is no mention made in the book. If you could be any means help us to understand what they were, you should do us a great pleasure, and the whole commonwealth withal [...] I pray you, therefore, give us your help, and direct us to come to so needful information.60

Exactly what this book was is frustratingly obscure. It is impossible to say even which language it was in.

Walsingham does not seem to have made use of the English ambassadors in Paris to acquire books less easily available in England, unlike Burghley, though he did sometimes use them to source presents for the queen.61 Ironically, Walsingham probably owned the largest collection of anti-Elizabeth literature in England. English ambassadors in France, in particular, as well as his contacts in the Low Countries, regularly sent him objectionable items printed there. In 1581, for example, Henry Cobham sent a French book about the deaths of Campion and another Jesuit.62 Cobham’s successor, Sir Edward Stafford, was particularly punctilious about sending material of interest to Walsingham. In 1584, for example, he sent various recently-printed books, including one about the new orders governing the royal household, as well as the answer to Burghley’s The Execution of Justice in England (1583), which he asked Walsingham to show the Lord Treasurer.63 Walsingham even received inflammatory material aimed at the French government, such as a book attacking Epernon, Henri III’s favourite, and indirectly attacking the king himself.64 This flow of printed polemic helped keep Walsingham up to date about developments abroad, especially France and the Low Countries.

60 Dodington to Walsingham, 1573/74, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury: Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, 24 vols (London: Eyre and Spottiswood for H. M. S. O., 1883-), II, p. 66. Hereafter, HMC Hatfield.

61 For Burghley, Pamela Selwyn and David Selwyn, ‘“The Profession of a Gentleman”: Books for the Gentry and the Nobility (c. 1560-1640)’, in The Cambridge History of Libraries in Britain and Ireland, ed. by Elisabeth Leedham-Green and Teresa Webber, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), I, pp. 489-519 (p. 515); Cobham to [Walsingham], 12 July 1580, TNA, SP 78/4B, fol. 120.

62 Cobham to Walsingham, 5 January 1581, TNA, SP 78/7, fol. 6. See also John Gylles to Walsingham, 5/15 June 1589, TNA, SP 84/33, fol. 21.

63 Stafford to Walsingham, 28 December 1584, HMC Hatfield, III, p. 76; 29 December 1584, HMC Hatfield, III, p. 77.

64 Stafford to Walsingham, 6 June 1588, TNA, SP 78/18, fol. 236.
Walsingham certainly understood the utility of print for acquiring and spreading politically useful information. He seems to have been involved, for instance, in the production of the publication of the defence of the Estates-General against Don John. William Herle, an informant for both Burghley and Walsingham in the Low Countries, sent a copy of the surrender of Oudenaarde and a recently-printed book of intercepted letters. William Waad sent Walsingham 'a booke of the secret of the ffynances discoveringe inwarde secretes of the state'. This was probably *Le secret des finances de France* by Nicholas Barnaud (S.I.: s.n., 1581), and/or the second or third instalment of this.

Religious concerns also feature largely in literature sent to Walsingham. In an ongoing correspondence, the Strasbourg educator and Reformer, Johannes Sturm requested and received Walsingham's assistance particularly in his struggle against attempts to force Strasbourg in a more Lutheran direction and, in return, sent news from central Europe. Cobham sent Robert Persons' *De persecutione Anglicana Epistola* (Rome: Ferrarius, 1582). In 1585, Stafford sent Walsingham a book of ‘[Plessy’s] doinge’, which Henri III had seen before it was printed and ‘lyketh mervellous well’. This is perhaps most likely to be *Advertissement sur l'intention et but de ceux de la maison de Guise en la prise des armes* (S.I.: s.n., 1585) given that Stafford thought it should be translated into English and Flemish, though in 1585 Duplessis Mornay also published *Declaration du Roy de Navarre sur les calomnies publies contre luy és protestations de ceux de la Ligue qui se sont eslevez en ce Royaume* (Ortès: Louis Rabier, 1585) and *De la verité de la religion chrestienne* (Paris: Claude Micard, 1585), which could also be likely candidates.

As well as the flow of polemical printed material across the Channel, Walsingham also corresponded with leading lights of Protestant theology and politics on the Continent, particularly France and the Low Countries. These included academics like Joannes Sturm and John Lobetius, princes and leaders like the Prince of Orange, counsellors and

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66 Herle to Walsingham, TNA, SP 83/16, fol. 61.
67 Waad to Walsingham, 5 May 1581, TNA, SP 78/5, fol. 68v.
70 Cobham to Walsingham, 28 March 1582, TNA, SP 78/7, fol. 43.
71 Stafford to Walsingham, 4 May 1585, TNA, SP 78/13, fol. 121v.
72 Pettegree, II, p. 414.
diplomats like Hubert Languet and Philippe Duplessis Mornay. The State Papers produce something like a deluge of letters from foreign Protestants asking or thanking the Secretary for his help with persuading Elizabeth listen or accede to their requests. Henri of Navarre made sure to sign himself ‘vostre byen afectyone e meyleur amy’ when writing to Walsingham because he knew the Secretary’s support was essential to Elizabeth approving aid.73 Similarly, on 25th December 1583, the ‘Syndics and Council of Geneva’ thanked Walsingham for showing his ‘acustomed kindness towards those who are persecuted for the religion which we profess’, and his ‘diligence’ in ‘having greatly aided us to obtain what it has pleased her Majesty to grant us’ and asking him to keep them in Elizabeth’s ‘good graces’.74 The Elector of Cologne asked Walsingham to ‘obtain from her Majesty the [military and financial] help for which we are entreating her’ because ‘we have heard from our counsellors that you love and further the service of God’.75 Among others, there are letters from the Princes of Condé, Nassau, and Chimay; as well as from the elector Palatine the cities of Elbing and La Rochelle. The volume of correspondence between Walsingham and these foreign Protestant figures draws attention to Walsingham’s obsessive interest in the cause of what might be termed “international Protestantism”, in that he and his correspondents saw themselves as part of a pan-European community, which included Lutheran princes and territories as well as Calvinist ones, and was defined in opposition to an international, aggressively repressive Catholicism espoused by Spain, the Papacy, and sometimes the French monarchy.76 Although sometimes disappointed by their reluctance to respond enthusiastically to Elizabeth’s overtures, Walsingham clearly desired and expected the Lutheran princes/electors of Germany to participate in cooperative action in defence of ‘the Comon cause of religion’.77 In a letter to Daniel Rogers, who had been sent to canvas formal collaboration between England and the German princes, Walsingham was emphatic about the need for unity among Protestants because of their shared danger. He wrote that the ‘intent of thenemy’ was ‘to distroy all that make profession of any other religion sauinge the Romishe’ and that it was obvious that the best way for the enemy to accomplish this was ‘by separatinge vs the one from the other’. He urged the importance of

75 Elector of Cologne to Walsingham, 22 November 1583, Cal. Foreign, XVIII, p. 227.
77 Walsingham to William Davison, 30 December 1584, TNA, SP 83/23, fol. 211.
being ‘touched with the sense & feelinge of others sufferinges’ as a key part of this unity.\textsuperscript{78} Divisions between Protestant denominations were therefore to be submerged in the face of the extreme Catholic threat that endangered them all equally. In 1577, despite Walsingham’s pessimism, Elizabeth did agree ‘formal cooperation’ with the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, and the duke of Brunswick, and also potentially the landgrave of Hesse – all Lutherans.\textsuperscript{79}

All this means that Walsingham did not just acquire information and opinions from secret sources. He was tightly bound in to a European-wide network of correspondence and political argument. It is one of the central arguments of this thesis that awareness of developments in this milieu influenced Walsingham’s political expression. He was fluent not only in Latin, French and Italian but also the language of humanist-classical public service. Additionally, in some contexts, his words and advice closely replicate the style of the emerging “reason of state” theory, which developed from the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini and others, and was associated with the late sixteenth century vogue for Tacitus. Coined by Guicciardini, the phrase was used extensively by the 1540s.\textsuperscript{80} Given its pedigree, “reason of state” was often associated with ‘political actions that were, on the face of it, contrary to “Divine Law” or morality’, and was popularly understood to mean the actions of rulers that produced beneficial effects but were not morally right – actions that were, in Ciceronian terms, \textit{utile} but not \textit{bonestum}.\textsuperscript{81} This disparity between the emerging language and more traditional humanist discourses of politics was most clearly demarcated by Machiavelli.\textsuperscript{82} However, in the later sixteenth century writers like Giovanni Botero, Scipione Ammirato, and Tommaso Campanella sought to make “reason of state” acceptable by bringing it into line with Christian morality. Writers in this vein argued that there were two kinds of reason of state: ‘the acceptable, Christian kind and the unacceptable, Machiavellian variety’.\textsuperscript{83} The three authors mentioned above were all Catholics, and all insisted, in their efforts to synthesise aspects of reason of state with Christian ethics, that deception and the other traditionally reprehensible techniques of the former could only be deployed by a prince in pursuit of European unity.

\textsuperscript{78} Walsingham to Rogers, 31 October 1577, TNA, SP 81/1, fol. 98v.
\textsuperscript{79} Trim, p. 159. See also Walsingham to Robert Beale, 2 November 1577, TNA, SP 81/1, fol. 103.
\textsuperscript{83} Malcom, p. 98.
against the Turk and under the re-established hegemony of the Roman church. Though parts of this message would have been abhorrent to Walsingham, writers of other religious allegiances also sought to synthesise pragmatism and Christianity. One of the most famous theorists in this tradition was Justus Lipsius, though he preferred the term ‘mixed prudence’. Lipsius acknowledged that it was impossible to create a completely virtuous reason of state, and only accepted the use of deception in the pursuit of the ‘common good; any deception not aimed at that end was a great sin’. Lipsius was closely connected to Philip Sidney and the earl of Leicester, and it is therefore conceivable that Walsingham was familiar with his ideas. At a later juncture, Thomas Hobbes also emphasised ‘the safety and well-being of the people (as assessed and defended by their sovereign) must trump the ordinary norms of behaviour’. The key qualifier in this quotation paraphrasing Hobbes’ view is the notion that the common good was to be determined by the prince, which challenged classical-humanist notions of a body of active public servants with a duty to pursue these ends themselves. Instead, the freedom from moral action in certain circumstances was conferred only upon the ruler. This was accompanied by the insistence of theorists like Lipsius, Botero, and Jean Bodin on the importance of centralising and increasing power under the prince. “Reason of state” was thus not so much ‘a complete body of political philosophy’ but rather ‘embodied a set of assumptions’ about the operation of politics and the nature of political power. Lipsius even noted the inadequacy of ‘precepts’ for political action, instead emphasising flexible prudence and experience. The phrase itself gestures to another, related, development – the articulation of an idea of “the state” in something approaching modern terms as the location of political power and agency in the polity. This relationship will be further explored in chapter 2.

In Botero’s view, “reason of state” was ‘based around the empirical collection of knowledge and its deployment in administration and industry’, and he defined the concept as ‘information concerning the ways to found, preserve and expand a constant dominion over a people’. The discourse was thus often connected to the developing idea of “the state” as public authority over a people. Another Italian writer in the reason of state

84 Tuck, pp. 66-71.
87 Malcolm, p. 117.
88 Gajda, pp. 290, 292.
89 Malcolm, p. 105.
tradition, Giuliano, recommended that for ‘the security of the state, it is of the utmost importance to be always informed’, and therefore to ensure your ‘spies are vigilant and well remunerated’.\(^{92}\) Largely as a result of his intelligence work, Walsingham has a reputation for being “Machiavellian”, though the literal justification for this is difficult prove – we cannot tell if he owned any works by the Florentine or his followers.\(^{93}\) L. Arnold Weissberger found ‘nothing’ in the State Papers relating to Walsingham which indicated his knowledge of Machiavelli, but he was looking for direct influences: references, quotations, allusions, whereas the influence of this kind of political writing on Walsingham was more subtle than that.\(^{94}\) Machiavelli may not have had any ‘appreciable influence on the thought or policy of Tudor England’ but knowledge of similar works did influence the language and terms in which those thoughts and that policy were expressed.\(^{95}\) Machiavelli’s works were printed and translated into different languages throughout the sixteenth century, especially in Basel, London and Geneva, and an Italian edition was printed in Venice in 1554, not long before Walsingham’s arrival in Italy. Many of Walsingham’s friends and acquaintances owned copies of his different works, including Sir Thomas Smith, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, Alberico Gentili, Sir William More, Lord Burghley and John Dee.\(^{96}\) Throckmorton was even called a ‘Macchiavellist’ by Richard Morison, for his accurate predication of the duke of Somerset’s actions following his restoration to some measure of political power.\(^{97}\) Given this, and his manifest interest in Italian culture and fluency in the language it seems likely that Walsingham did read some of this pragmatic political literature – as the following chapters will show – as well as more conventional humanist discourses. There is also evidence that he was influenced by later trends in the “reason of state” tradition, combining flexible political pragmatism with a sincere commitment to his Protestant faith.

\(^{92}\) Viroli, p. 137.
\(^{95}\) Weissberger, p. 605.
\(^{97}\) Morison to Throckmorton, 18 November 1551, TNA, SP 68/9, fol. 111.
Chapter 1: ‘Serviceable to Our Age’: Walsingham’s Early Life, c. 1532 – c. 1570

In stark contrast to the huge number of documents dealing with Walsingham’s political career, there is an extreme dearth of information about his life before his appointment as special envoy to France in 1570. Even when it is possible to establish where he was at a given point it is difficult to offer much qualitative information about exactly what he was doing or thinking while he was there. Historians have either tended to scurry over this early part of Walsingham’s life, eager to move on to his espionage or policy activities, or get lost in wealth of contextual detail. This chapter aims to strike a path between these pitfalls, attempting to situate Walsingham firmly within the familial, educational, religious and political contexts in which he grew up, with particular emphasis on the people around him.

Though many of the fragments of evidence examined in this chapter are well known, I have sought to more fully explain the significance of these, while also introducing new or under-used sources (the Loseley manuscripts, for example, and material in the archives at King’s College Cambridge) to produce a more intricately-textured picture of Walsingham’s formative years. The chapter is structured around Walsingham’s few appearances in the surviving documents, to illustrate the potential influences of specific people, places and contexts, starting with that over which he had least control: his family.

1534: ‘Francis my Son’: Walsingham’s Family

In 1534, a London- and Kent-based lawyer, William Walsingham, made his will. He made provision for his widow and the marriages of his five daughters, as well as what would happen if his widow died before his son Francis came of age. The exact date of Francis’ birth is uncertain but was probably in about 1532. He was born into a rather rambling family tree with a tendency to numerous children in each generation. Francis himself had seven siblings who survived to adulthood, his father and grandfather were each one of six, and his paternal uncle had seven children. Coupled with the marriages of all these kinsfolk there were few families in Kent and at court to whom the Walsinghams were not somehow connected.

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1 Walsingham’s advice to his nephew, printed in Conyers Read, Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), I, p. 18 (see below).
related, and these marriages in turn brought in additional relations, providing a deluge of “cousins” by the time Francis Walsingham took up office in the 1570s. Over a couple of generations, the Walsinghams, like many families, successfully made the transition from merchants to country gentlefolk by a series of canny marriages and cultivating ties with the court. Walsingham’s family provided contacts, his education, and, later, even household servants and political allies. In particular, his uncles, courtiers to Henry VIII, are likely to have been important influences, though often skated briefly over by historians.

Even some of Walsingham’s very earliest identifiable ancestors are potentially illuminating. In particular, the early Walsinghams were immersed in the commercial life of the City of London, as Francis Walsingham would be in the 1560s. The first recorded Walsingham with a demonstrable connection to Sir Francis was Alan, a cordwainer, who was clearly a man of some property in the City in the early fifteenth century. Alan was succeeded by two Thomases, his son, and grandson, both members of the Vintners Company. Thomas I (d. 1459) married into an illustrious city family, the Bammes. He bought the manor of Scadbury, near Chislehurst in Kent (now in the London borough of Bromley), which remained the seat of the senior branch of the Walsinghams throughout the sixteenth century. Thomas I’s will reveals him to have been a man of some personal wealth and prominence in the City. He left his amber rosary beads ‘which my lord Cardynalle gave me’ to his son, with the injunction to never part with them, and his ‘grete Bibille’ (also from ‘my lorde Cardinale’) to his son-in-law. The Cardinal in question was Henry Beaufort (1375–1447), half-brother to Henry IV, and a key member of the regimes of Henry IV and V. This elevated connection is suggestive of a well-connected family on their way up the social hierarchy.

The impression of an upwardly-mobile family is borne out by the fact that in 1462, the Hustings Rolls designated Thomas II (d. 1467) as a gentleman, son of the late vintner. To consolidate the family’s new ‘gentle’ status, this Thomas married a Kentish gentlewoman. It is with their son, James (d. 1540), however, that the family consolidated their position in Kent society. James was sheriff of Kent in 1486–87, and was regularly

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5 See, for example, BL, Harley 6035, fols 11, 12v, 25v, 36, 55v, 98.
6 A fuller discussion of these early confirmed antecedents is given in Read, I, pp. 1-5.
7 Read, I, pp. 4-5.
8 Webb, p. 375.
10 Read, I, p. 5.
appointed to commissions of the peace under Henry VIII between 1514 and 1540. James sought to maintain and, ideally, improve the family’s situation and he provided for the futures of his two sons accordingly. The eldest, Edmund, seems to have received a martial education, while William, whom we have met already, became a lawyer.

Edmund certainly showed an aptitude for fighting, both licit and illicit. By 1516 he was one of the jousting young men around the young Henry VIII, probably through the influence of Thomas Howard, earl of Surrey (later duke of Norfolk) to whom he was attached from at least 1513. That year, Edmund and two other Howard men perpetrated an ugly attack on Nicholas Eliot and his wife near Guildford, in which they allegedly cut off Eliot’s ears. The same year, he put his talents to better use at Flodden, where he was knighted by Surrey. In 1521, Sir Edmund was one of Henry VIII’s sewers, alongside Francis Bryan as a cupbearer, and Sir William Kingston, Sir Nicholas Carew, Sir Geoffrey Gates, and Sir John Carey as carvers. These were some of the king’s closest companions, and Kingston would later be constable to Edmund’s lieutenant of the Tower.

Sir Edmund’s ties to his colleagues at court are also borne out by his participation in their legal affairs, along with a group of recurring names. He was, for example, a feoffee in the will of George Neville, Lord Abergavenny, along with Sir Thomas Boleyn, Sir Henry and Sir Edward Guildford, and Sir Henry Wyatt.

With his father, James, Sir Edmund was present at the meeting between Henry VIII and François I at the Field of the Cloth of Gold in 1520. James was one of three representatives of Kent in the king’s entourage. James was presumably summoned to attend with a letter similar to that received by Sir Adrian Fortescue, requesting the presence of the recipient and any attendants appropriately attired ‘for the honour of us and this our

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14 June 1524, *Letters and Papers*, vol. IV, part I, p. 195 (no. 2 (2)).
realm’. Sir Edmund was to attend upon the king at the meeting. Listed among the ‘knights bachelors’, Sir Edmund was allowed a chaplain, eleven servants and eight horses.

In an account of expenses for the jousts at Guînes that accompanied the meeting of the kings in 1520, Sir Edmund received ‘cloth of silver of damask’ for a half-coat. Edmund would have had the opportunity to compare the grand meeting with the French king with the meeting between Henry and Charles V held that July at Gravelines. He went on to participate in other grand ceremonial occasions. Although the Walsinghams do not feature much by name in the accounts of the prolonged meeting between the two kings and their entourages in 1520, they participated in an occasion of almost unparalleled grandeur to uphold the magnificence and power of their king, and tales of what they saw and did during those few days across the Channel must have entered family folklore.

From this ceremonial service, Edmund progressed to a sensitive government office, following a familiar path from friendship with the king to power. As lieutenant of the Tower of London from 1521, Sir Edmund had custody of politically-sensitive prisoners, including John Fisher, bishop of Rochester, Sir Thomas More, and members of the Pole family. Sir Edmund successfully held Henry’s trust throughout his career, and he must have been both loyal and circumspect. In reward for all these services, Sir Edmund received regular grants of lands and other rewards, including the manor of ‘Strete’ and lands in parishes of Lympne, Burmarsh, Newchurch, and Dymchurch in 1526.

As these grants suggest, Sir Edmund continued to be important in Kent, and it was here that he requested, in his will, to be buried. Specifically, he asked to be interred in the church at Chislehurst, in the chapel ‘where myself have usually sitten’, and left money for the parish poor. His executors honoured his request and his sword and helm hung over the tomb until they were stolen in 1952. They were recovered, however, by the then-lord of the manor, Major John Marsham-Townshend, and after his death in 1998 were on permanent loan to the Royal Armouries at the Tower of London.

Other details in the will confirm Sir Edmund’s court ties. One of his kinsmen was left Sir Edmund’s annuity of £7 which had been paid by Walter Cromwell alias Williams,
and was being paid at the time of Sir Edmund’s death by the executors of Sir Richard Cromwell. The Cromwell-Williamses were descended from the marriage of Thomas Cromwell’s sister, Katherine, to Morgan Williams. That Sir Edmund was receiving an annuity paid by these men suggests at the very least a close working relationship between him and the Cromwells, and possibly a closer personal relationship than is apparent elsewhere. He had certainly worked closely with Cromwell, as one would expect of the occupant of a sensitive government office. In 1532, Sir Edmund showed kindness to Cromwell’s chaplain, ‘Curtoyse’. He agreed with Cromwell on the evangelical John Frith: ‘[a]s you said, it were great pity to lose him if he may be reconciled’. The end of this letter expressed Edmund’s dependence on the king: it was ‘[o]ur greatest comfort here is to hear of the King’s health. God send him a safe return [from Calais]’.

Walsingham and Cromwell worked together to serve the king, and there is perhaps hint of sympathy for the cause of reform in Sir Edmund – but no more than a hint.

Walsingham’s father, William, also had links to Cromwell, to whom he owed money in 1529. The ‘acceptors’ of debts due to Cromwell were named in the same document as including Sir George Throckmorton, William Brabazon, Sir John Wallop, and Sir John Russell. Descendants of all of these Cromwell allies and Henrician courtiers would be known to William’s son. By 1522, William was a senior barrister, or ancient, of Gray’s Inn, and in 1530 he was elected one of the Inn’s Readers, whose main responsibility was leading the educational exercises of the Inn and who also formed the Inn’s governing body. The same year William was the first recorded Treasurer of the Inn. He was clearly a man esteemed by his peers and making progress through the ranks of his profession.

William was also appointed to legal offices in the City. In 1526, a letter from the king endeavoured, successfully, to have William appointed common serjeant of London. In 1530, William was one of those appointed to investigate the London possessions of the late Cardinal Wolsey. The same year he was promoted from common serjeant to under sheriff. Presumably some of these benefits came at the behest of his brother, Edmund,

32 Read, I, p. 9.
and they became neighbours when William bought the manor of Footscray, conveniently adjacent to his brother’s property.  

At some point around this time, William made a marriage, to Joyce Denny, which strengthened his court ties. Joyce’s brother was Sir Anthony Denny (1501–1549), who was associated with the royal household from the late 1520s, and a gentleman of the privy chamber and deputy groom of the stool from about 1539. Denny was close to Cromwell, further tying the Walsinghams into reform-leaning circles at court. In the 1540s, Denny became keeper of the privy purse, handling large amounts of cash, and was increasing in the king’s confidence. He was even entrusted with joint custody of the sign manual, enabling him to add the facsimile of the king’s signature to documents. A former student of the famously erudite St John’s College, Cambridge, Denny was ‘a patron of humanist letters and a firm friend to religious reformation’, praised by humanist scholars like Sir John Cheke and Roger Ascham. Denny was, however, ‘moderate in the expression of his religious views’, and he retained the trust of the king until the latter’s death in 1547. He was named an executor and counsellor to Edward VI in Henry’s will, and was bequeathed £300 by the king. Francis Walsingham continued to be close to the Dennys in later life, as we shall see.

Joyce and William had six children, of whom Francis was the youngest and the only son. The marriages of his five older sisters show a determination to increase the family’s links with government and court circles. The marriage of the eldest daughter, Barbara, is the only one that does not fit the pattern. However, she married Thomas Sidney (d. 1585), of Walsingham in Norfolk, suggesting the family were keen to assert their ties to their namesake. In the 1580s Walsingham’s grants to Sidney of manors and leets in Norfolk, in his capacity as chancellor the duchy of Lancaster, were the cause of some bad feeling amongst local officials of the duchy.

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33 Read, I, p. 9.
35 *ODNB*, ‘Denny’.
The other sisters all married prominent or coming men at court. Elizabeth married Geoffrey Gates, brother of Sir John Gates, a member of Henry VIII’s privy chamber, who was married to another of Sir Anthony Denny’s sisters.\(^{38}\) Elizabeth Gates later remarried, this time to Peter Wentworth, Elizabethan Parliamentary troublemaker.\(^{39}\) Eleanor married Sir William Sharington of Lacock Abbey (c. 1495-1553), but seems to have died by 1542, when he remarried. Like Denny, Sharington was a member of Henry VIII’s privy chamber.\(^{40}\) Christian Walsingham married John Tamworth (c. 1524-1569), and then William Dodington, an officer in the Mint, who was also close to Walsingham. Under Elizabeth, Tamworth was associated with the earl of Leicester, and received various grants from the crown.\(^{41}\) As well as Walsingham’s future friend Thomas Randolph, Tamworth was close to Sir Walter Mildmay, who married the last Walsingham sister, Mary, in 1546.\(^{42}\) Mildmay was then an up-and-coming member of the royal financial apparatus, and his progress continued under Edward VI and Mary.\(^{43}\) Sir Walter was made a privy councillor on Elizabeth’s accession and appointed chancellor of the Exchequer in February 1559.\(^{44}\) He became an important patron and ally for his younger brother-in-law, interceding on his behalf with Cecil during his embassy to France (1571-73).\(^{45}\) They were also personally close.\(^{46}\) In his will of April 1589, Walsingham was named one of Mildmay’s executors.\(^{47}\)

After William’s death, Joyce married again, to Sir John Carey, younger brother of Sir William Carey, who had been married to Mary Boleyn. William Carey had been one of Henry VIII’s gambling partners by 1519.\(^{48}\) Sir John was from Hertfordshire, the same county as the Denny seat of Cheshunt, and it was probably here that Francis Walsingham

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43 Ibid, pp. 17, 30.
45 Mildmay to Burghley, November 1571, Lehmberg, pp. 107-08.
46 See for example Walsingham to Mildmay, 2 January 1571, Digges, sig. D2v¹.
47 Lehmberg, p. 306.
grew up. With Sir John, Joyce had two sons, Edward and Wymond. Edward Carey seems to have served as an assistant to his half-brother, Francis, deputising for him during an absence from court in 1575, for example. Walsingham’s other half-brother, Wymond, was also involved in the disputes about grants of duchy land in the 1580s.

Despite the winnowing effects of the religious and political controversies of the 1530s, both Sir Anthony and Francis’ other courtier uncle, Sir Edmund Walsingham, stayed the course. What they and their fellow royal servants who lasted the distance had in common was a profound sense of personal loyalty to the king they served, and a commitment to follow his lead in religious matters. The success of Sir John Russell, later earl of Bedford, was attributed by at least one biographer to the fact that he ‘advocated no policies of his own and expressed no religious preferences’. Similarly, Denny never let his evangelical sympathies interfere with his friendship with the king.

The evangelical leanings of some of Walsingham’s relatives did not preclude ties to families with different religious stances. Walsingham seems to have been close to the Southwells, a family of Suffolk-London lawyers, whose Henrician representatives were Sir Robert and Sir Richard, both royal servants. Both inclined more to the conservative end of the spectrum, and were antecedents of the celebrated Jesuit, Robert. This did not stop Francis Walsingham associating with their descendants. What was surely drilled into young Francis by his elders and companions was the primacy of the royal will; the necessity of flexibility in the face of royal religious decrees. Francis Walsingham was born into an extremely well-connected family. Their friends and acquaintances reached to the top of Henrician government. Though religious factors may have played a part in forming personal and political networks, what tied all these families together was direct, personal royal service.

Towards the close of Henry’s reign, the household of Katharine Parr, Henry’s sixth and last wife, provides a more specific context for Walsingham’s early life, including relatives and future colleagues. This has gone surprisingly unremarked upon by previous writers on Walsingham. Walsingham’s uncle, Sir Edmund, served as the queen’s vice-

49 Edward Carey to Walsingham, 11 March 1575, TNA, SP 53/10, fol. 20.
50 Nathaniel Bacon to Roger, Lord North, [May 1591], Stiffkey, III, pp. 122-23.
52 For relations with Walsinghams see: 2 May 1543, Letters and Papers, vol. XVIII, part I, p. 360.
53 Thomas Southwell to Walsingham, 3 November 1589, TNA, SP 12/228, fol. 49.
chamberlain from about 1544. William Sharington was also a member of the queen’s household. One of Sir Edmund’s colleagues was George Day, later bishop of Chichester, who served as Katherine’s almoner. Day was also the provost of King’s College, Cambridge, Francis’ alma mater, from 1538 until 1548. Francis Walsingham’s future political master, Nicholas Throckmorton, also served the queen.

The queen’s household was an important locus for evangelically-inflected humanism at court. Katherine and those around her popularised this style ‘through patronage of devotional manuals and theological translations for the edification of a mixed audience of elite and ordinary readers’. One of these influential projects was the translation of Erasmus of Rotterdam’s paraphrases on the New Testament, which Katherine patronised. Published in 1548, the Edwardian injunctions stipulated that the first volume of the Paraphrases was to be bought by every parish church.

Among this circle of evangelically-inclined women was to be found Walsingham’s aunt, Joan Denny (née Champernowne), wife of Sir Anthony. Lady Denny was one of Katherine’s friends suspected of sending money to Protestant martyr Anne Askew. Walsingham was still in touch with his Champernowne relatives in 1587, when Arthur Champernowne wrote to him of his experiences of campaigning in the Low Countries. The reformist position of the Dennys and their relatives is suggestive, though not conclusive, of the religious milieu in which Walsingham grew up.

Queen Katherine exercised a profound influence on the educations and upbringing of the royal children, Mary, Elizabeth and Edward. She is credited with appointing the eminent Greek scholar, John Cheke, to assist Richard Cox with Prince Edward’s education

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59 King, p. 48.
60 Ibid, p. 45.
61 Champernowne to Walsingham, 13 August 1587, TNA, SP 84/17, fol. 77; 18 September 1587, SP 84/18, fol. 94.
62 King, p. 51; Mueller, pp. 225, 230.
from 1544. Katherine’s circle, including Katherine Brandon, duchess of Suffolk, also patronised some of most talented scholars of the day, including Roger Ascham, John Aylmer, John Foxe and Thomas Wilson. On the death of the two Brandon boys, Wilson and Walter Haddon edited a collection of poems celebrating them. Contributors included John Cheke, William Cecil, and Nicholas Udall, ‘all of whom had risen at court under Catherine Parr’s patronage’. Many of these men would also be known to Francis Walsingham.

The reformist milieu of Katherine’s household and the interests of the people within it form a tangential but probably important early context for thinking about Walsingham’s life and career. Apart from anything else, it gave him some common ground with his future mistress, in whose development Katherine took such an interest. These were reformers who deferred to the king, the source of all they had, in matters of religion; careful moderates who knew better than to rock the boat – and who valued a Cambridge education.

1548: ‘Ad Mensa Sociorum’: Walsingham’s Education

After his father’s will in 1534, the next reference to Francis Walsingham in contemporary documents is when his first payment for commons is recorded in June 1548 as a fellow-commoner at King’s College, Cambridge. This environment meant that there was a certain amount of overlap between the educational establishment of the newly-crowned Edward VI and Walsingham’s own education. He remained at King’s until at least 1550. Neither of his half-brothers seem to have gone to Cambridge, which perhaps suggests that Walsingham was being deliberately groomed for public employment. Where he had received the earlier parts of his education is unknown and probably ultimately unknowable. It seems possible, however, that he may have gone to Eton, for reasons that will become apparent.

Wherever Walsingham received the rudiments of his education, it is likely to have followed the fashionable humanist trajectory. Grammar school education in Latin was based, with royal sanction, on “Lily’s” grammar, with the ultimate aim of Latin learning being to prepare the boys to study rhetoric in order to develop ‘eloquent [and] persuasive

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64 King, p. 44.
65 Ibid, p. 56.
speech’. The first stages of education were focused on the acquisition of a thorough knowledge of Latin grammar through standard textbooks with short Latin phrases for translation or memorisation, and contact with the simpler works of writers like Cicero. More authors and more complex texts were introduced as boys gained experience and proficiency, and the focus shifted from grammar to rhetoric and logic. Throughout their education, pupils learnt style and content from the ‘outstanding authors’, and were expected to cull potentially useful material and eloquent phrases from their classical reading for their own use. More complex exercises for advanced students included double translation, composing “themes” or essays on a given topic as well as verses, and writing and delivering orations. Letter writing was another important skill, taught through emulation and the use of textbooks like Erasmus’ De Copia. Students might also be introduced to Greek, though this was considered less important.

Cicero was probably the most ubiquitous author. He was admired all over Europe, by people of all shades of religious opinion, and was seen as ‘the ideal of the civilized man’: a skilled orator, an accomplished writer of letters, and an important moral philosopher, who appropriately discharged his public duties and occupied his leisure time. Cicero’s ideas about the importance of virtuous men pursuing public lives and his view that rulers were to rule for the benefit of the people became political commonplaces. With Quintilian, he was essential for the study of rhetoric, a key political skill of early modern public careers, in which we will see that Walsingham had evidently received a thorough training.

The surviving curricula for early modern schools almost all include some Roman history. Sallust and Caesar were the most common included historians, with Livy and Justin appearing less often. Important in the value attributed to history was the idea that it

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69 Green, p. 203; Baldwin, p. 90.
70 Baldwin, p. 363.
71 Green, pp. 254-59.
72 Ibid, p. 196.
repeated itself, and that ‘similar situations would offer similar moral choices’, and that reading it therefore taught moral behaviour.\(^7^6\)

Walsingham certainly internalised many of the lessons of a classical education. This is most obvious, perhaps, in his regular use of Latin mottoes in correspondence with his colleagues. In 1567, complaining of the recalcitrance of his new brother-in-law, John Worsley, in the administration of Richard Worsley’s estate, Walsingham quoted a Roman proverb sometimes attributed to Juvenal, to the effect that ‘the love of money increases as wealth itself increases’.\(^7^7\) Two of the books dedicated to Walsingham as Principal Secretary would have been of use to scholars. In 1589, John Rider dedicated to him his English-Latin and Latin-English dictionary. The dictionary was one of the ‘most commonly used’ Latin dictionaries of the period.\(^7^8\) Walsingham was also the dedicatee of a popular anonymous version of Simon Pelegromius’ book of Latin synonyms.\(^7^9\)

A document attributed to Walsingham in which he supposedly made a series of recommendations to one of his nephews about how to spend his time while touring Europe perhaps shows which of his own reading as a youth he found most useful in his political life. The original is not extant, but a transcription was printed by Read.\(^8^0\) The attribution is not certain, as only the document’s title contains any reference to Walsingham. However, it does bear significant similarities to some of Walsingham’s later priorities, and its presence in the papers of the Finch family (which also contain other more personal, items related to Walsingham) also tends in favour of its authenticity. The author recommended

for that knowledge of histories is a very profitable study for a gentleman, read you the lives of Plutarch and join thereto all his philosophy, which shall increase you greatly with the judgment of most part of things incident to the life of man. Read also Titus Livius and all the Roman histories which you shall find in Latin, as also all books of State both old and new, as Plato, de Rep., Aristo. polit., Xenophon […] orations.\(^8^1\)

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\(^7^7\) Walsingham to Sir William More, 2 October 1567, Surrey History Centre, Woking, LM/COR/3/74.

\(^7^8\) John Rider, *Bibliotheca Scholastica* (Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1589); Green, p. 38.

\(^7^9\) Green, p. 244; Anon. [H.F.], *Synonymorum synpha olim a Simone Pelegromio collecta* (London: Thomas Vautrollier, 1580).

\(^8^0\) Read, I, pp. 18-20. Before it was destroyed in a fire, a transcription was made by Karl Stählin and printed in German in *Sir Francis Walsingham und seine Zeit* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1908), p. 80, citing ‘Instructions which Sir Francis Walsingham gave his nephew when he sent him into Forayne parts to travell’, from the collection of G. H. Finch at Burley-on-the-Hill, Rutland. For the manner in which Walsingham’s papers may have come into the Finch collection, see Tu, p. 17.

\(^8^1\) Read, I, p. 18.
In reading these texts, one was to pay particular attention to ‘how matters have passed in government in those days’, and apply their content ‘to these our times and states and see how they may be made serviceable to our age, or why to be rejected’. This would ‘cause you in process of time to frame better courses both of action and counsel, as well in your private life as in public government if you be called’. Livy was almost universally admired for style and utility, recommended by the likes of Erasmus, Vives, Elyot and Ascham, though his books were rarely printed in England so readers had to rely on imported copies. Other admirers of Livy included Roger Ascham, Sir Walter Mildmay, Sir Thomas Smith, Sir Philip Sidney, Thomas Wilson, and, of course, Machiavelli.

The emphasis on history in the advice attributed to Walsingham is significant, and echoes his later references to “histories” as sources of political information. Thomas North, translator of Plutarch, believed that no ‘prophane studye’ was better than history, because “[a]ll other learning is private, fitter for Universities then cities […] more commendable in the students them selves, than profitable unto others.” The nature of the recommendations, therefore, suggest parallels with the late-sixteenth century trend towards a kind of history designed ‘to teach men political wisdom’. While not denying the importance of providence, writers in this vein looked for coherent secondary causes for human events, and sought to ‘establish maxims which, applied to given situations, produced predictable results’.

Livy was considered especially useful for these aims.

Historians have generally seen a shift at the end of the sixteenth century from the pre-eminence of the greats of republican Rome, like Cicero and Livy, to the observers of imperial Rome, especially Tacitus, alongside a corresponding increase in cynicism about politics. This trend can be overstated, as multiple readings were always possible, and

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82 Ibid.
84 Jardine and Grafton, p. 55.
85 Levy, p. 204. See also, for example, Sir Thomas Elyot, *The boke named the Gouernour* (Menston: Scholar Press, 1970), pp. 38’, 243-46’.
possibly the difference was in fact between different kinds of readers. Some preferred historians who sought the underlying causes of events (like Polybius, Livy, and Tacitus), while others still wanted to derive both ‘pleasure and profit […] from reading the “lives” and “characters” penned by Plutarch, Suetonius and Curtius’. Historians in the former camp, especially Tacitus, were important in the developing doctrine of “reason of state”, and Walsingham’s interaction with these ideas will be explored in chapter 2.

The suggestions made by “Walsingham” bridge both categories of history writing: what drew them together was the way they were to be read: for practical use not, in the first place, moral example. This is classic ‘[a]ctive reading’, defined by Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton in their seminal article on Gabriel Harvey’s readings of Livy’s Decades as ‘reading as intended to give rise to something else [their italics]’. This is how Walsingham used history in his political career, and the recommendations in the document attributed to him would have equipped the recipient for public service and private life: not just with information but with information to be used. In Gabriel Harvey’s readings of Livy with Sir Philip Sidney, their discussion covered some of the same topics as Walsingham recommended to his nephew to have in special consideration, including ‘the forms of states, the conditions of persons, and the qualities of actions’. The nature of “Walsingham”’s advice in general, in that it was delivered to someone about to set off on their travels, demonstrates the contemporary idea that ‘the study of history was part of a two-part plan for the acquirement of political prudence which also included personal observation through methodical travel’. This was political rather than moral wisdom.

Walsingham’s conviction of the practical utility of history is further borne out by the fact that, in 1581, he asked Thomas Norton, then a prisoner in the Tower, to answer three questions using ‘the English chronicles’. Walsingham wanted to know ‘what warres eche prince hath had since the Conquest’, what had caused these, what the outcome was, and how they were funded; ‘what good Lawes haue ben made […] that haue concerned the public state’, and what rebellions had occurred in past times, their causes and outcomes.

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89 Green, p. 237; Kewes, p. 525.
91 Jardine and Grafton, p. 30.
92 Ibid, pp. 36-37.
94 Walsingham to Sir Own Hopton, 4 January 1581, BL, Additional MS 48023, fol. 44b, cited in Anthony Martin, ‘The End of History: Thomas Norton’s “v periodes” and the Pattern of English Protestant
In the Finch document, the author also gave guidance on how to read the texts mentioned which showed a predictable admiration for Cicero. In order to really benefit from reading secular and holy histories, and be a ‘good Christian commonwealth’s man’, it was necessary to bring these examples and ideas ‘which you shall find in reading or learn by conference, to the rule which Tully [Cicero] calls the rule of honesty, accounting no act as good that proceedeth not from that fountain’. If he were to follow this advice, the young man would be ‘framing your understanding to make it a good treasure-house to serve the commonwealth’. In addition to histories and books of state, he should focus on acquiring the languages which were ‘necessary for the state you live in; the French, Italian and Spanish, and above all the Latin, wherein you have to exercise so well that you may have a ready use of it to serve all public service’. For teachers like Cheke and Ascham, the primary purpose of the study of the classics was the inculcation of ‘moral and ethical’ virtues; their literary value was not a primary concern. In that “Walsingham” emphasised the utility of languages in functional terms, rather than for their own sake, his intentions were probably similar to theirs.

This advice had much in common with other advice doled out to parents, sons, and students. In 1578, for example, Burghley similarly urged the study of ‘Cicero for the Latin language, Livy and Caesar for Roman history “exceeding fitt for a gentleman to understande”, and Aristotle and Plato for logic and philosophy’. The point of which was to create ‘a fytte servaunte for the Queene and your countrey for which you weare born and to which, next God, you are most bounde’.

The educational scheme on which this advice was based continued at a more advanced level at Cambridge, where humanism was becoming the language of scholars of all religious stripes, though medieval scholastic authors continued to be read. The Henrician injunctions of 1535 for the university stipulated that there were to be public lectures in Greek and Latin, and that, for the first time, the Scriptures were to form the basis of lectures on theology. Recommended authors included Aristotle, Rudolphus Historiography,’ in John Foxe and his World, ed. by Chris Highley and John N. King (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 37-53 (p. 45).

95 Read, I, p. 18.

96 Baldwin, p. 245.


Agricola, Philip Melanchthon and Trapezuntius. In 1540, Regius professorships in Greek, Hebrew, divinity, law, and medicine were established.

These requirements were updated by Edward’s government in 1549, the year after Walsingham is first recorded at the university. The Edwardian statutes commanded that the lectures on civil law should be on ‘the pandects, the codex, or the ecclesiastical laws of our kingdom’, and that the lecturer in philosophy was ‘publicly to teach Aristotle’s problems, morals, and politics, Pliny or Plato’. The texts for dialectic and rhetoric were Aristotle’s *Elenchi*, Cicero’s *Topics*, Quintilian, or Hermogenes. The injunctions stipulated texts for the mathematics professor: Mela, Pliny, Strabo or Plato for cosmography; Cuthbert Tunstall or Cardanus for arithmetic; Euclid for geometry; and Ptolemy for astrology.

The statutes also set down the way a student should spend his time at university. He was to spend the first year studying mathematics (geometry and arithmetic, and ideally also astrology and cosmography). The second year was to be spent on dialectics, while the third and fourth brought in philosophy. Over the four years spent at university, every student was to debate publicly, and only after all these stipulations had been met was he to receive his BA. Walsingham did not spend four years at Cambridge and, like other gentleman-students, did not take a degree. Given his privileged status as a fellow-commoner, Walsingham is unlikely to have followed the statutes to the letter, but they probably represent a fairly accurate guide to the kinds of topics he covered with his tutor, Thomas Gardiner, during his time at Cambridge.

Like the curriculum, the religious character of the university was also fluid in the last years of Henry VIII and the early years of Edward VI. Protestant doctrines were spreading in Cambridge, but this by no means went unchallenged, and Richard Rex has suggested that even the doctrine of transubstantiation was not seriously assailed in Cambridge until after Henry VIII’s death (1547). There was, however, ‘a strong, though far from uncontested, evangelical tradition in Henrician Cambridge’ from the 1520s, distinguished by solafidianism rather than by ‘party line[s] on sacraments, ceremonies or church order’. This was the religious environment into which Walsingham arrived in
1548: a university with a wide spectrum of religious opinions, which could exist in harmony but often did not.

Walsingham might have seen some of this religious controversy during his time at King’s, where he was in residence from at least June 1548 to at least Michaelmas 1550. The account books for 1546-7 and 1550-1 are not extant, so it is impossible to tell exactly when he arrived and exactly when he left. King’s College’s famous chapel, completed in 1535-36, had its high altar ‘thrown down’ during Edward’s reign. Founded by Henry VI in 1441, part of the appeal of King’s might have been its status as a Tudor project, given that, as we have seen, several members of Walsingham’s family had made careers out of personal loyalty to the Tudors. The college chapel was completed by Henry VII and Henry VIII, and is covered in Tudor iconography.

However, if the family wanted to proclaim their loyalty to the Tudor dynasty, a more obvious choice might have been Henry VIII’s new foundation of 1546, Trinity College, endowed by the king with formidable financial resources. Trinity seems, though, to have housed a large number of religious conservatives, some of whom clashed with the newly-arrived Martin Bucer in 1549-50. It is possible, therefore, that religious considerations played a part in Walsingham’s choice of college. This would be in-keeping with the explanation usually favoured by historians: that King’s was a centre of intense Protestantism and that Walsingham’s evangelical family was keen for him to continue his education in a strongly reformed environment. Beyond this, historians have paid little attention to Walsingham’s time in Cambridge, so this section explores this period of his life in more detail, using previously neglected sources in the college archives.

Founded by Henry VI specifically for scholars from Eton, King’s was perhaps rather an odd choice for Walsingham, unless, of course, he had studied at Eton, something which scholars have not hitherto considered. Sources for attendance at Eton are lacking.
so it is impossible to establish with certainty that Walsingham attended.\textsuperscript{112} However, from its beginnings, Eton had accepted paying sons of nobles and gentlemen, alongside the scholarships provided by the foundation, either residing in college or in the town.\textsuperscript{113} Given his privileged status at King’s, if Walsingham had attended Eton, it would probably have been as one of these paying students. Though their numbers and identities are unclear, the records of the college suggest that some paying scholars were in attendance in 1547, for example, and, in 1550, the college audit book records expenditure on food for various tables, including the ‘gentlemen’s table,’ as opposed to the ‘scholars’ table.’\textsuperscript{114}

Some of the personnel associated with Eton at this point also act as circumstantial evidence of an Eton association for Walsingham. Since 1534, the master of Eton had been Nicholas Udall (1504-1556), who was also a member of Katherine Parr’s household. Udall was probably related to the Uvedales of Hampshire, and, as late as 1588, a Captain Edmund Uvedall wrote to Walsingham of his gratitude for the secretary’s favour, claiming ‘for my part I desier no mor Reward then to be held [an honest man] of your honor […] and in your good openeon from home I do aknoleg to haue aull I poses.’\textsuperscript{115} Additionally, in 1541, Udall was accused of organising a burglary of silver and plate from Eton, in conjunction with two current or former pupils there, John Hoorde and Thomas Cheney.\textsuperscript{116} A Captain Thomas Hoorde later described himself as one who ‘depended of’ Walsingham.\textsuperscript{117} The name is unusual enough that he is likely to be a relative of the felonious John, and the association with Walsingham may have been formed at Eton: Thomas could be a son of a schoolfellow, or, indeed, a schoolfellow himself. Again, this is suggestive, rather than conclusive, but is probably a more reliable explanation for Walsingham later attendance of King’s than the latter’s religious make-up.

The Udall link might also suggest that the choice of college for Francis was made as a result of ties formed by service to Katherine Parr. Shortly before Walsingham’s arrival, the provost of King’s was George Day (c. 1502-1556), Katherine’s almoner, who was thus known to Sir Edmund Walsingham. Day had resigned as provost in April, and was replaced in October 1548 by Sir John Cheke, another member of the evangelical educational circles.

\textsuperscript{113} Sterry, p. xiv.
\textsuperscript{114} Sterry, p. xxi; Eton College Records, 62/3, fols 12\textsuperscript{v}, 13\textsuperscript{v}. I am grateful to Professor Alford for this reference.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{ODNB}, ‘Udall’.
\textsuperscript{117} Hoorde to Walsingham, 19 November 1580, TNA, SP 63/78, fol. 110.
around Katherine Parr. Cheke’s arrival was not necessarily a watershed moment, because, as well as being occupied by his duties at court he was also a protégé of Day’s.\textsuperscript{118}

Day’s tenure raises the question of King’s religious character, and a closer examination of the religious views of the college’s members can allow us to judge the traditional explanation for Walsingham’s choice of college. King’s did produce two Protestant martyrs, Robert Glover, a fellow until 1543, and Lawrence Saunders, who obtained his BA from King’s in 1541, both of whom were burnt at the stake in 1555.\textsuperscript{119} Despite this, the college housed a multifarious array of religious opinions, much like the university itself. Day, a former fellow of St John’s College and a protégé of John Fisher, bishop of Rochester, was a conservative-minded conformist to the royal will. Fisher noted of Day that he ‘studies to obtain the goodwill of both sides’, and from the late 1530s Day, a royal chaplain, was often at court, and maintained good relations with Henry VIII. Day was a staunch opponent of the Edwardian religious changes in the House of Lords. However, despite his opposition to the 1548 order of communion, he enforced its use in his diocese, though he refused to replace altars with tables. As a result, he was imprisoned in the Fleet and deprived of his bishopric.\textsuperscript{120} Day’s resignation as provost followed an incident the previous year where he had protested at the fellows’ discontinuation of private masses. This perhaps suggests a conservative provost trying to control a more progressive fellowship, but the primary theme of Day’s court career was obedience to the royal will.

At least one of the fellows during Walsingham’s time at King’s seems to have shared Day’s more conservative views. Philip Baker remained at the college until Elizabeth’s reign, when he was appointed provost. In 1565, the fellows of the college complained of his maladministration and papist tendencies. He had been deprived of a living three years previously for refusing to subscribe to a confession of faith. In response to the prospect of investigation in 1570, Baker fled abroad.\textsuperscript{121}

In contrast, many of the others inclined to Protestantism. Nicholas Carvell (or Carbill/Carvill/ Kervile) became a fellow around the same time Walsingham joined King’s. In 1551, Carvell contributed to the book of memorial epigrams on the death of Martin

\textsuperscript{118} Mueller, pp. 223, 225.


Bucer. During Mary’s reign Carvell left England, and after Elizabeth’s accession, he became chaplain to Edmund Grindal. With Thomas Sampson, dean of Christ Church, Oxford, and Lawrence Humphrey, president of Magdalen, Oxford, Carvell was one of those who petitioned to be exempted from wearing vestments.\textsuperscript{122} So there were clearly radical voices in college too.

Edward Brocklesby, a fellow at King’s from 1545, also fled to the continent during Mary’s reign. By 1561, he was minister of the parish of St Nicholas Olave in London, though he was residing in the household of Edmund Guest, another Kingsman. In 1565 Brocklesby was one of those questioned, with Sampson and Humphrey, over their refusal to cooperate with Archbishop Parker’s conformity drive. Brocklesby refused to wear the surplice, and, as a result, was deprived of his vicarage of Hemel Hempstead.\textsuperscript{123}

Despite the apparent closeness between Brocklesby and Edmund Guest, there were divisions even here. As bishop of Rochester in the mid-1560s, Guest was one of Parker’s major supporters in his ‘drive for ritual conformity’. Therefore, when Brocklesby was deprived for refusing to use the surplice, Guest, with Parker, presided over the deprivation proceedings.\textsuperscript{124}

Perhaps nowhere is the variety of religious feeling at King’s better exemplified than the division between the Day brothers. George Day’s brother, William, who had been a scholar at King’s since 1545 and a fellow from 1548, was a Protestant, and would go on to serve Elizabeth. The difference of religious outlook caused such bad feeling between the brothers that George refused to supply money for William to buy books, as he was unwilling to ‘assist anyone who was not a member of the true church’.\textsuperscript{125} William remained at King’s under Mary, though, suggesting the variety and complexity of responses to the religious changes of the sixteenth century. It is difficult, therefore, to posit a strictly religious motivation for Walsingham’s attendance at King’s.

As a fellow-commoner, Walsingham enjoyed certain privileges, including sitting at high table with these fellows and their colleagues (‘ad mensa sociorum’). The meals they shared are recorded in the King’s College commons books, a day-to-day account of expenditure on food for the members of the college. Some of these meals involved ox tongue, rabbits, pigeons, eels, perchs, capons, larks, veal, whittings, beef, chickens and saltfish, seasoned with combinations of pepper, cinnamon, and even saffron. These sources show someone with access to the heart of the college, and the dinner-time debates of its members.

It is impossible to establish exactly what effect this had on Walsingham, but it is certainly tempting to see, for instance, his living and eating alongside eminent civil lawyer Walter Haddon (1514/15-1571) as contributing to his later decision to study civil law at Padua. In 1551 Haddon became Regius Professor of Civil Law at the university and during Walsingham’s attendance it is easy to imagine him urging this scion of a court family to pursue the civil law as preparation for his future role in government. After the abolition of canon law at Cambridge in 1535, civil law was seen to need reviving, and this was a cause close to the hearts of Haddon and the second professor of civil law, Thomas Smith.

At least it is reasonably easy to identify some of the fellows from Walsingham’s time at King’s. The same is not true of his fellow students. The other fellow-commoners during his residence are difficult to identify, as they are often identified only by their surname. Of the identifiable ordinary students, one was future master of the Merchant Taylors’ and St Paul’s schools, Richard Mulcaster, who later transferred to Peterhouse. Another of Walsingham’s contemporaries was future master of Eton, William Malym (or Malim). In the 1570s, Malym dedicated a translation of a pamphlet on the Ottoman capture of Famagusta to the earl of Leicester, and also delivered a Latin oration to John Casimir on

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126 See for example KCAR/4/1/6, vol. 15, fol. 4v-5.
127 John Venn and John Archibald Venn (eds), *Alumni Cantabrigienses: A Biographical List of All Known Students, Graduates and Holders of Office at the University of Cambridge, from the Earliest Times to 1900*, part 1, to 1751, 4 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922-54), II, p. 280; KCAR/4/1/6, vol. 15, fol. 2.
129 KCAR/4/1/6, vol. 15, fol. 2r, 24v.
his visit to London in 1578. Walsingham and Malym were moving in the same circles, therefore, even thirty years later. Despite this, there is no evidence of close relations between Walsingham or any of his fellow students during or after their time at King’s.

Indeed, it is difficult to tell how much affection Walsingham felt for his college in later life. He continued his ties to the college, so he presumably felt some sort of affection for or gratitude to the institution. On at least two occasions he patronised scholars there, including the Irish Protestant divine, Roland Lince. He also seems to have taken an interest in the education of John Harrington, the queen’s godson, who was at King’s in the 1580s. The only other scholar Walsingham patronised was a relative of his wife’s, suggesting that scholars at King’s perhaps had a special claim on his purse. Additionally, in 1585 William Harrison, a fellow of the college, dedicated to Walsingham, his ‘Maccenas’, a poem addressed to the pope as the Antichrist.

Walsingham’s continuing links to his former college are best demonstrated by his donation of two books, although in some ways the nature of these volumes raises more questions than it answers. One of these donations consisted of five volumes of an eight-volume multi-language edition of the Bible. The official title of this was *Biblia Sacrae Hebraice, Chaldaice, Graece, Latine*, known as the “Antwerp Polyglot”, published between 1568 and 1573 by Christopher Plantin in Antwerp. The Polyglot was produced in an edition of 1200, of which ultimately probably only 600 were in circulation, each volume consisted of about seven hundred pages, and the whole thing cost about 300 guilders. At the time it was printed, it was ‘the largest and most ambitious printed bible project in history’, and was ‘intended to provide a new standard in biblical scholarship to counter’ the challenge posed by Protestant productions.

As a polyglot, the Antwerp Bible was laid out so that the different languages could be examined ‘side-by-side’. Walsingham donated volumes one to four (Old Testament

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132 Lince to Walsingham, 24 October 1585, TNA, SP 12/183, fol. 148.
134 William St Barbe to Walsingham, 2 September 1580, TNA, SP 12/142, fol. 8.
135 Harrison to Walsingham, 16 December 1585, TNA, SP 12/185, fol. 49.
137 Brekka, pp. 38, 76.
and Apocrypha): one (Pentateuch, 1569), two (Joshua to 2 Chronicles), three (Ezra to Sirach (Ecclesiasticus)), and four (Isaiah to 3 Maccabees, 1570). These four volumes contain Hebrew, the Vulgate Latin translation of the Septuagint, the Greek Septuagint, and a Chaldee paraphrase of the text with a Latin translation. He also donated volume seven, a complete Bible with the Old Testament in Hebrew with interlinear Latin translation, and the New Testament in Greek with the Vulgate interspersed interlinearly (1571/2).

The Polyglot has obvious relevance to an environment heavy on translation and language-learning, and to Walsingham’s interests in languages, and spreading scriptural knowledge. However, it was published under the auspices of Walsingham’s least favourite contemporary head of state, Philip II of Spain, and the oversight of Philip’s adviser, librarian and chaplain, Benito Arias Montano. The donation seems especially peculiar in light of the fact that the Polyglot’s apparatus and ‘visual programme […] promotes Philip’s geopolitical worldview’, including a depiction of the king as Josiah – hardly a programme to which Walsingham would subscribe. Plantin and Montano had originally wanted to use a new Latin translation rather than the Vulgate, but, because criticism of the Vulgate was associated with Protestant theology, Philip refused to allow this. Perhaps the irony of using a work intended to promote Catholic scholarship to further English, Protestant scholarship appealed to Walsingham. He may also have intended an underlying spiritual purpose for the work, in much the same way as Montano conceived of it: ‘with its original scriptural sources, dictionaries and treatises, [the Polyglot] helped the Christian to know God by uncovering the arcane meanings hidden in the Hebrew text’.

The other work which Walsingham donated to his former college was described by Read as ‘Lexicon Hebræum Pagnini’. In fact, the volume consists of 20-50 different items of different lengths, all bound together, including Thesauri hebraicae linguae, by influential Hebraist Sancti Pagnini (Antwerp: Plantin, 1572). Most of the other items in the volume were also printed by Plantin in the early- to mid-1570s. They could represent some of apparatus of the Polyglot otherwise missing from the donations, and it is probable that all

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139 I am grateful to Gareth Burgess, King’s College assistant librarian, for providing this information. The volume can be found at shelfmark A.2.9-12 in the College Library.


141 Shelfmark A.3.3.

142 Brekka, pp. 18, 21.

143 Ibid, p. 22.

144 Ibid, p. 21.
the items in the volume were donated by Walsingham. This book and each of the donated volumes of the Polyglot contains a bookplate inscription: ‘[e]x dono Honoratissimi viri Francisci Walsingami quondam alumni huius Collegij. Anno Domini. 1583’. Joseph Wilson thought that Walsingham had also donated a book of psalms ‘taken from the Spaniards at the siege of Cadiz’, but this actually seems to have arrived at the college after Essex’s sack of Cadiz in 1596 rather than the raid of 1587.

In 1587 the former Regius professor of Hebrew at Cambridge, Edward Lively, dedicated his *Annotationes in quinq[ue] priores ex minorib[us prophetis cum Latina eorum interpretation…* (London: George Bishop) to Walsingham. This was a Latin translation of five books by the so-called “minor prophets” from the Hebrew Bible (or Tanakh), Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, and Jonah, with Latin annotations. Lively also dedicated a manuscript work to Walsingham on the superiority of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament compared to the Vulgate, sometime between 1587 and 1590. Walsingham’s patronage of Lively and his donation of Hebrew works to King’s College suggests that he was anxious to improve English competence in the language. Hebrew was not usually taught in schools, and its tuition was largely confined to the keen and the privately taught. Skill in Hebrew ‘was often associated with membership of a “godly” network’.

Beyond these donations, the college also has some correspondence which perhaps showed that Walsingham still felt some responsibility for his old college into the mid-1580s. In 1586, Walsingham and Burghley (the chancellor of the university) tried to persuade the fellows of King’s to agree to the ‘demising’ of their manor of Sandford Courtney to the queen, in accordance with Elizabeth’s wishes. They told the fellows that she was already highly displeased with them, and warned them to do as they were bid, ‘lest by the contrary ye incure her displeaser furder than is for you to beart’. This joint missive was followed by a letter from Walsingham himself, in which he reiterated how much the fellows’ refusal had ‘mislyked’ the queen. He reassured them, however, that ‘for the

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145 I am grateful to Gareth Burgess, King’s College assistant librarian, for providing this information. The volume can be found at shelfmark J.28.13 in the College library.
147 University of Cambridge, GBR/0012/MS. Add. 3066.
148 Green, pp. 259-61.
149 Burghley and Walsingham to the Fellows of King’s, 21 June 1586, King’s College, Cambridge, King’s/KC/KCAR/6/2/140/06, SAC/64.
opinion & good will I have particularly carryed to you, And as one desirous to maynteyne the Credit & reputation generally of all the good sorte of your profession & calling (which I do reverence), he had ‘laboured’ to appease the queen ‘by keeping from her […] som thinges which if she had known, would have increased [her] mislyking towards you’.

Walsingham promised to ‘repayre her majestes decayed opinion of you, and mayntayne your Credit with her Majestie & otherwise, as much as I can’, but again warned the fellows that some of their number should be ‘more circumspecte in their vsages’.¹⁵⁰ Even some three decades after leaving the college, Walsingham was still careful of its reputation.

The college records hold relatively few other traces of Walsingham. His German biographer, Karl Stählin, was told that ‘we have no information in the College which would be of service’ except records of Walsingham’s residence in college and the Antwerp Polyglot.¹⁵¹ However, the college did have some interest in acquiring documents connected to Walsingham, whether signed by him or in his handwriting, and several such documents were collected by the college in the twentieth century. On three occasions in the 1960s, an American businessman, James Hill, donated to the college letters signed by Walsingham, which he had purchased at auction. Correspondence relating to these donations records ‘how welcome’ these documents relating to ‘our great Elizabethan alumnus’ were.¹⁵²

There is one event at Cambridge that seems to have had quite an impact on Walsingham. In April 1549, influential ‘theologian, ecclesiastical administrator and reconciler of conflicting views on doctrine’ Martin Bucer arrived in England from Strasbourg at the invitation of Archbishop Cranmer.¹⁵³ By the end of the year, Bucer had taken up the post of Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge.¹⁵⁴ For N. Scott Amos, Bucer’s acceptance of Cranmer’s invitation to come to England was due to ‘the measured approach to reformation which Thomas Cranmer sought to implement in England’, an approach which Bucer had ‘exemplified’ in his activities from the 1530s.¹⁵⁵ Bucer was an

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¹⁵⁰ Walsingham to the Fellows of King’s, 10 July 1586, King’s College, Cambridge, King’s/KC/KCAR/6/2/140/06, SAC/64.
¹⁵¹ Miss M. T. Martin to King’s, 22 September 1902, King’s College, Cambridge, KCHR/3/1/34/93.
¹⁵² College to Hill, 11 February 1960 (Hill to College, 26 January 1960, King’s College, Cambridge, Misc 17/17); College to Hill, 17 April 1964, King’s College, Cambridge, Misc 17/19. See also College to Hill, 10 April 1962, King’s College, Cambridge, Misc 17/18.
enthusiastic advocate of preaching, and a believer in double predestination who was prepared to accept differences between believers on ‘non-essential’ issues, as long as these did not undermine the ‘first and necessary doctrines of our religion’.\textsuperscript{156}

Bucer was well-connected at Cambridge, despite the occasional clash with Protestants with different views (the so-called Zürich party), and conservatives.\textsuperscript{157} Among his friends were to be numbered many of the “Athenians”, including Sir Thomas Smith, Roger Ascham, John Cheke, Edwin Sandys, Matthew Parker, Walter Haddon and Edmund Grindal.\textsuperscript{158} Parker and the Kingsmen Cheke and Haddon were especially close to Bucer. Haddon and Parker presided over Bucer’s funeral in 1551.\textsuperscript{159} In 1558-1559 when the Elizabethan religious settlement was being thrashed out, many of the figures involved in this process were friends or acquaintances of Bucer, especially Parker, and Grindal.\textsuperscript{160} However, for reasons including his general ill health, his ignorance of English and the shortness of his stay in England the influence he exerted on the progress of the English reformation was ‘directly personal rather than of a broader character’.\textsuperscript{161}

Bucer’s main contributions to Cambridge life were his lectures and sermons. Out of term time, he taught on Micah, from the Old Testament, and he also preached a series of sermons on holy days on John 6.\textsuperscript{162} Most importantly, as professor of divinity he lectured on the book of Ephesians from 10\textsuperscript{th} January 1550 until about February 1551.\textsuperscript{163} Bucer’s only full term of lectures was Michaelmas Term 1550, exactly the time when the records of Walsingham’s time in Cambridge stop. It seems unlikely that the Walsingham of, say, 1580 would have left the city while Bucer’s lectures were still on-going, missing the rest of a series of lectures by a giant of the continental reformation. Though these two Walsinghams did not necessarily have the same priorities, given the novelty of Bucer’s presence, doctrine and technique, and the stir these caused in Cambridge, it is likely that Walsingham attended at least some of his lectures. These lectures, which were in line with the 1535 injunctions and as such were ‘unlike theology lectures as they had traditionally been given at Cambridge’, were apparently very well received and well attended. They ‘represented the largest presentation to date of evangelical doctrine by a Professor in a Cambridge lecture

\textsuperscript{157} Hall, ‘Bucer in England’, pp. 149-54; Scott Amos, ‘Protestant Exiles’, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{158} Hall, ‘Bucer in England’, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{160} Amos, ‘Protestant Exiles’, p. 173.
\textsuperscript{162} Amos, ‘Alsatian’, pp. 100-01.
\textsuperscript{163} Amos,\textit{ Bucer}, p. 70.
Bucer used Paul’s letter to set out the basic tenets of reformed doctrine, especially on the issue of salvation (a major theme of Ephesians), using the latest exegetical techniques, to show how these ideas applied to the life that Christians should live.

Walsingham’s links to Bucer’s thought on some of these issues will be explored more fully in chapters 3 and 4, but for now it is important to note that Bucer was ‘committed to reform, but a comprehensive, measured and ecumenical reform’, which was to be pursued gradually. Bucer married his careful approach to reform with some work for the Edwardian government. He was involved in the revision of the Book of Common Prayer of 1549, including approving the use of the sign of the cross at baptisms, something to which more radical Protestants later objected.

Bucer’s career in England ties together the important threads of Walsingham’s life up to this point: intimately connected to and influenced by scholarly circles at Cambridge, with access to those with influence at the highest level of government, and, of course, a commitment to Protestant doctrine broadly defined. The young Francis Walsingham existed as part of a coherent international network of courtiers and scholars, most of whom inclined in the direction of reform. His next step, probably deliberately designed to bind him further into these networks of government and learning, was admittance to Gray’s Inn.

1552: ‘The Suburbs of the Court’: Walsingham and Gray’s Inn

According to an epitaph on Walsingham’s tomb, after his time at Cambridge he travelled on the continent. There is no other source for this information however, and Walsingham’s next appearance in extant documents is when he joined Gray’s Inn in 1552. Gray’s was one of four Inns of Court, which acted as professional associations for common lawyers, and provided training for those who wished to enter the profession. The Inns also acted as social centres for members, and membership was not restricted to those practising or planning to practise law; by the time Walsingham arrived at Gray’s, the Inns had long acted as ‘a university in the modern sense, a place to grow up, to learn about life,

164 Amos, Bucer, pp. 4, 49-52, 62.
165 Amos, Bucer, pp. 60, 133, 152.
to make useful contacts, even to misbehave a bit’. Like colleges, the Inns were both communal and exclusive institutions, and they were ‘embedded within larger cultural, political, and artistic contexts and networks’, and therefore a good springboard to other things if a young man’s plans did not include taking up the law as a profession.

The Inns were self-governing institutions, electing their officers annually. In 1561, Gerard Legh compared the Inner Temple to a ‘Platonic academy’. It was a place where students learnt ‘to govern and to serve their “prince and common weale”’, and ‘to use all other exercises of bodye and minde […] to adorn by speaking, countenance, gesture, & use of apparel, the person of a gentleman, whereby amitie is obtained and continued’.

As well as legal method, attendance at the Inns could also give a gentleman courtly polish. Not for nothing were the Inns described as ‘the suburbs of the court’.

Partly because of this, university, followed by a spell at an Inn of Court was becoming a recognised path to the royal court for those who did not intend to follow a strictly legal career. Walsingham’s brother-in-law, Walter Mildmay, had taken the same path, as had William Cecil. Both of these had chosen Gray’s, and Walsingham’s father had trained for the law there too. Mildmay was friendly with Cecil by Edward’s reign, and he could have provided, at this point or later, an introduction for Walsingham.

It is difficult to know exactly what Walsingham was getting up to during his own time at Gray’s. Wilfrid Prest argued that the parents of gentlemen-students at the Inns ‘expected them to acquire some knowledge of the law while they were there’, but also noted that ‘at no time did the Inns compel their junior members to make even a pretence of studying law’. There were three components of law-learning at the Inns: ‘private reading, court attendance, and participation in the aural learning exercises’ such as moots (mock cases). Students would also attend the courts in session at Westminster during

171 Jayne Elisabeth Archer, Elizabeth Goldring and Sarah Knight, ‘Preface’, in *The Intellectual and Cultural World of the Early Modern Inns of Court*, ed. by Jayne Elisabeth Archer, Elizabeth Goldring and Sarah Knight (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), pp. 3-7 (pp. 4-5).
174 Green, p. 303.
175 Lehmberg, p. 46.
177 Ibid, p. 25.
term time, with the readings (lectures on statutory texts) in the vacations. It was, however, mainly a process of ‘mental drudgery’, which even motivated and intelligent students found difficult.\(^{178}\) As a result, Prest claimed, ‘it would be very rash to assume that the mere record of an individual’s admission to an Inn of Court is sufficient evidence that he received there a legal education of any kind’.\(^{179}\)

In 1588, discussing the cautionary towns given by the States General to Elizabeth in return for aid against the Spanish, the civil lawyer Valentine Dale wrote to Walsingham, ‘[a]s for the delyverie of the townes I warrant yow old lawiers have lerned how to hold fast’.\(^{180}\) Though not especially obvious in Walsingham’s own writings, Dale’s joke suggests that his contact with the common law at Gray’s was still visible even in 1588.

Although young students at the Inns had much more freedom than their counterparts at university, both the government and the Inns’ governing bodies regularly sought to control the behaviour of members. Cardinal Wolsey, for instance, had instructed the Inns to ensure that their gentlemen students did not leave site after 6pm and that they did not wear weapons.\(^{181}\) Despite this, there were occasional confrontations between Inns and with other groups in London. In 1554 Walsingham might have witnessed the armed affray that took place between the servants of the Lord Warden and members of Gray’s and Lincoln’s Inns.\(^{182}\) The unruliness of some of the students at the Inns was partly due to the fact that few parents sent their sons with a tutor, instead relying on friends or kin to keep an eye on him.\(^{183}\) Walsingham’s informal keepers were probably men of some importance, and tied him into powerful Protestant political networks.

When Walsingham joined the Inn the Treasurer was Nicholas Bacon, later to be Elizabeth’s Lord Keeper.\(^{184}\) Rodney Fisher argued that men like Bacon, Mildmay and Cecil, along with Richard Goodrich and possibly Richard Bunny and Thomas Wrothe, were ‘members of a more discreet reformed circle which developed late in Henry’s reign and continued in some form to the 1550s’.\(^{185}\) Fisher acknowledged, however, that such circles were not ‘well-disciplined groups’.\(^{186}\) The Inns would, though, have provided a place from

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\(^{178}\) Ibid, p. 31.
\(^{179}\) Ibid, p. 38.
\(^{180}\) Dale to Walsingham, 23 April 1588, TNA, SP 77/3, fol. 190.
\(^{181}\) William Ralph Douthwaite, Gray’s Inn, Its History and Associations compiled from original and unpublished documents (London: Reeves and Turner, 1886), pp. 88, 90.
\(^{183}\) Prest, p. 26.
\(^{184}\) Fletcher, Pension Book, p. 500.
\(^{185}\) Fisher, p. 798.
\(^{186}\) Ibid, p. 799.
which a young man interested in religion could explore all that London had to offer in this regard.\textsuperscript{187}

Never religiously or politically homogenous, the Inns would certainly have been a stimulating intellectual and cultural environment. It was conservative common lawyers like Edmund Plowden, Anthony Brown and John Rastell who applied the ancient concept of the king’s two bodies to the difficulties of Elizabeth’s reign. The theory says that the monarch has two bodies, both contained in one body, one natural and fallible, and one ‘perpetual’, infallible and mystical.\textsuperscript{188} These lawyers later used the concept to oppose Elizabeth’s wishes in specific legal cases, and to argue for their preferred candidate as successor, Mary Stuart. They opposed the wishes of Elizabeth’s body natural, her personal desire, by emphasising their loyalty to her body politic.\textsuperscript{189} It was possible to use the theory without implying a criticism of Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{190} As ambassador in France, Walsingham made use of the doctrine (see chapter 2).\textsuperscript{191} Penny Roberts has drawn attention to the frequency with which those on both sides of the politico-religious divide in the French Wars of Religion used the idea of the monarch’s two bodies to make their arguments, often alongside a conception of the realm as diseased and in need of cure.\textsuperscript{192} Though Walsingham’s familiarity with this literature is impossible to establish for certain, he shared (as we will see), the compulsion to describe and analyse political problems in medical terms. Just as Walsingham did in England, writers of different persuasions in France ‘personified’ the kingdom ‘as a body assailed by injury, infection and corruption’ and insisted on the ‘need to purge the bad humours afflicting the realm’. Although the remedies recommended differed across the confessional divide, there was ‘universal consensus’ among French writers that it was the monarch’s responsibility to heal the realm’s diseases, whereas Walsingham, as we shall see in chapter 2, sometimes saw his own monarch as the patient in need of metaphorical medicine.\textsuperscript{193}

The Inns have also been portrayed as defenders of the mixed polity against more absolutist interpretations of monarchical power.\textsuperscript{194} It would be an exaggeration to say that Walsingham acquired political principles from his time at Gray’s, but he was inhabiting a

\textsuperscript{187} Green, p. 295.
\textsuperscript{188} Marie Axton, \textit{The Queen’s Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession} (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977), p. 12.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{191} Walsingham to Burghley, August 1581, Digges, sig. Aaa2\textsuperscript{iii}.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{194} Raffield, p. 45.
space where learned men regularly discussed and articulated political questions, and sometimes political opposition. One of the major ways in which members of the Inns interacted with government and articulated their opinions on major issues was through original drama, especially at Christmas. The members of each Inn created a miniature kingdom, choosing a temporary prince and officers such as might populate a royal or noble household, ‘to the intent, that they should in time to come know how to use themselves’. These events gave participants ‘practice in the arts of giving counsel on the political questions of the day’. These temporary monarchs received ambassadors from other Inns, took counsel, heard news and conducted war. Some of these roles involved actually performing the duties associated with the real office in the mock-prince’s court, while others were simply titles.

The first well-documented Christmas Prince was George Ferrers of Lincoln’s Inn, whose second “reign” (1552-3) coincided with Walsingham’s time at Gray’s. The festivities featuring Ferrers were huge events, involving spectacular progresses through the City, and he also acted as the lord of misrule at Edward VI’s court over the same period. Therefore, the revels also involved ‘significant contact with the governing bodies of city and state’, to which the participants might later belong. For example, the Inner Temple Christmas prince in 1561 was Robert Dudley, and his revels Chief Baron of Exchequer, Roger Manwood, was actually appointed to that office in 1578. Though little-documented for Walsingham’s time there, Gray’s had a proud tradition of ‘large revels’. If he participated, Walsingham was part of an effort to reproduce ‘often before an audience of actual notables, the ceremonial texture of courtly society, its oratorical style, visual spectacle, ritualised actions, and management of diplomatic challenges’. Even as a spectator Walsingham would have seen how ambitious, articulate and learned men could

195 Fletcher, Pension Book, p. 496.
196 Axton, pp. 6-7.
199 Axton, p. 8.
201 Axton, pp. 9-10.
202 Leonidas, p. 117.
use their “play” to contribute to matters of ‘the government, safety and future of the realm’, without receiving too much censure.\textsuperscript{204}

In later life, Walsingham continued his connections with members of Gray’s Inn. Thomas Snagge, who had joined the Inn in the same year as Walsingham, later became a client. A Reader from 1574, in the 1570s Snagge served as Attorney-General of Ireland, and, after his return to England, was chosen as joint Treasurer.\textsuperscript{205} In 1577 Snagge helped another of Walsingham’s clients, the Secretary’s solicitor, Alexander Fisher, to obtain a chamber at the Inn.\textsuperscript{206} Fisher was also a member of Gray’s, and Walsingham’s continued contact with Fisher and Snagge suggests that he sought servants and clients from the members of his old Inn.

Burghley remembered Gray’s Inn as ‘the place where myself came forth unto service’, though he was excused attendance at readings and probably was not a “serious” student of the law, that is, with intent to practice as a lawyer.\textsuperscript{207} It is likely that, had Edward lived, Walsingham would have followed (or hoped to follow) the same path from university to Inn to court. His progress, however, was soon interrupted.

\textbf{1555: ‘Among the True-Hearted Swiss: Walsingham’s Marian “Exile”}\textsuperscript{208}

If it is hard to know what Walsingham was doing or thinking during his time at Gray’s Inn, the problem is compounded for the next few years of his life, some of which he spent abroad. After Mary’s accession in 1553, small waves of English people left the country for Europe, up to a total of perhaps eight hundred.\textsuperscript{209} Although often lumped together as the “Marian exiles”, motivations for leaving the country were varied. Not all those who left for the continent did so without permission and not all remained there throughout Mary’s reign.\textsuperscript{210}

Historians tend to draw a distinction between those who went to Germany and Switzerland, who are said to have left for religious reasons, and those who went to Italy

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{204} Axton, p. 10.
\item\textsuperscript{205} Foster, Register, p. 22; Fletcher, Pension Book, pp. 15, 500.
\item\textsuperscript{206} Walsingham to Thomas Snagge, 20 November 1577, TNA, SP 63/59, fol. 122.
\item\textsuperscript{207} Fletcher, Pension Book, p. xxvii.
\item\textsuperscript{208} Walsingham to Archibald Douglas, 22 June 1588, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury: Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, 24 vols (London: Eyre and Spottiswood for H. M. S. O., 1883–), III, p. 332.
\item\textsuperscript{210} N. M. Sutherland, ‘The Marian Exiles and the Establishment of the Elizabethan Régime’, Archiv für Reformationgeschichte, 78 (1987), 253-84 (p. 257).
\end{itemize}
and France, said to have left England for “political” reasons.\textsuperscript{211} That Walsingham is to be found in both Switzerland and Italy suggests the problems with this rigid division. He was in Basel in the autumn/winter of 1555, with his cousins, the sons of Sir Anthony Denny, and then in Padua where he remained until spring 1556. This is all the information we have about his time abroad. Even when he went is unknown, as is the reason for his departure. This is usually attributed to his zealous Protestantism.\textsuperscript{212} However, it could be that a spell abroad spent at least partly in Switzerland caused his later evangelicism rather than being a symptom of it. Certainly, his half-brothers seem to have remained at home, though they had presumably been exposed to the same religious influences. Several King’s College fellows and students made their way to the continent including the aforementioned Cheke and Carvell, and it is possible that Walsingham left with one or other of them.\textsuperscript{213}

It is tempting to speculate that Walsingham had been involved in Sir Thomas Wyatt’s failed rebellion against Mary and had found it expedient to make himself scarce. Many historians combine this possibility with religious factors to explain his departure.\textsuperscript{214} Some of his Carew and Champernowne relatives had been involved with the planned western rising.\textsuperscript{215} Though Walsingham’s first cousin, Thomas Walsingham, accompanied Cardinal Pole through Kent when he returned to England in November 1554, he was also required to give a bond to the Council to be forthcoming when requested, suggesting that the family did not escape suspicion of involvement in the rising.\textsuperscript{216}

Walsingham was not, then, ‘forced into exile’. It is not clear, however, that this was the result of unbending religious scruples: that he was, unlike Cecil, ‘unwilling to be a reed bending before the wind’.\textsuperscript{217} Instead he may have chosen to continue his learning and travel, while conveniently avoiding having to conform to rites which he found uncongenial. It seems fair, however, to conclude that Walsingham might have hoped in vain for preferment from Mary’s government. As with many of his co-travellers, he may have been motivated as much by “political” as “religious” factors.

Whenever and why-ever he left England, the advice Walsingham purportedly gave to his nephew perhaps gives us some clues about how he spent his time abroad. Again, this

\textsuperscript{211} This goes back at least to Garrett, pp. 32-33, 38, and can also be seen in Hasler, I, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{212} See for example Read, I, p. 17; John Cooper, The Queen’s Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I (London: Faber and Faber, 2011), p. 32.
\textsuperscript{213} Garrett, pp. 110, 121-22, 224.
\textsuperscript{214} Garrett, p. 319; Fisher, p. 794.
\textsuperscript{217} Cooper, p. 32.
advice has a lot in common with what we know of Walsingham’s later interests and priorities, even if it is impossible to say with certainty that he did in fact write the document in question. Predictably, the author first emphasised that so that ‘God may bless your travel’ it was necessary ‘to appoint some time of the day for prayer and reading of the Scriptures’. After this, he moved briskly on to stress the importance of spending some time translating every day ‘[t]hat you may profit in your tongues’, recommending that the recipient translate an ‘epistle of Tully into French and out of French into Latin’. This process of double translation was an important part of humanist-style language learning, as applied by teachers like Roger Ascham.

The advice then took on the tone of contemporary recommendations for educational travel, with its emphasis on observation, good company, and future utility. It was necessary for a traveller to ‘join himself to some company, for books are but dead letters, it is the voice and conference of men that giveth them life and shall engender in you true knowledge’. As well as languages, especially Latin, French, Italian and Spanish, the traveller was to ‘take some taste of the mathematics’, especially cosmography, which would help observe the ‘countries themselves, first without any consideration of the persons’, and learn about fortifications. Walsingham seems to have taken a special interest in fortifications. Paul Ive’s *Practise of Fortification*, ‘a succinct manual on the design and construction of Italian and Dutch style angle-bastioned fortifications’ was dedicated to Walsingham and Lord Cobham.

Then the traveller was to observe ‘the manners and dispositions of the people, as in general, so chiefly of the nobility, gentry and learned sort and have their company as much as in safety of conscience [...] you may’, noting the disposition of each man. The author also advised him to ‘acquaint yourself as well as you can with men of state’ to learn about ‘such dealings as daily pass in affairs of state and counsel of princes, whether they appertain to civil government or warlike affairs’, and with ‘men of experience’ like ‘secretaries, public notaries, and agents for princes’. Later, Walsingham described himself as one of these...
‘[m]en of state’, indicating his self-image as an expert participant in political affairs. All the traveller learned should be noted down, ‘keeping as it were a diary of all your doings’. As Read noted, these are ‘councils of perfection, and therefore quite as likely to record what Walsingham in his youth left undone as what he did’. They do, however, probably indicate what Walsingham thought would be most useful to a public servant.

In practice, Walsingham matriculated at the university of Basel in the autumn of 1555, along with the three Denny boys (Henry, Charles and Anthony), John Bale, James Banks, and Thomas Bentham. Walsingham may not have officially matriculated as the register does not record that he or his cousins paid the usual fee, though, equally, it does not specify that they did not pay.

James Banks was a printer, who collaborated with John Foxe to publish the letters of Lady Jane Grey, which he had presumably acquired through his friend James Haddon, Jane’s tutor and an ex-Kingsman. Thomas Bentham had been at Magdalen College Oxford and acted as a preacher to the exiled English community in Basel. Interestingly, given Walsingham’s later efforts to increase English facility in Hebrew, Bentham was a noted Hebraist whose advice was sought on the production of the Geneva Bible. John Foxe also arrived in Basel in September 1555 and matriculated at the university the following year. Foxe worked on the first edition of his account of the persecution of “true” Christians, Acts and Monuments, while in Basel, helped by Laurence Humphrey. In 1578, Foxe would dedicate one of his books to Walsingham in terms suggestive of familiarity with Walsingham and his family. The Basel Englishmen probably lived in the Clarakloster even before it was leased to them in 1557, where they conducted services according to the 1552 Prayer Book.

Basel was a place of intensely partisan Protestant scholarship in the mid-to-late 1550s, during Walsingham’s residence. As Mary’s reign wore on, exiled Protestants struggled to come to terms with the about-face in their country’s religious character. The

224 Walsingham to Sir John Maitland, 28 April 1586, TNA, SP 52/39, fol. 56.
225 Read, I, pp. 19-20
226 Read, I, p. 20.
228 Garrett, p. 79.
229 Ibid, p. 86.
230 Ibid, p. 156.
232 See chapter 3.
233 Garrett, pp. 55-56.
resulting propaganda war waged by the exiles from the Protestant cities of Europe urged those left behind to repentance, as the primary solution, though others went further. Walsingham’s fellow Basel resident, John Bale, translated and published Martin Luther’s *Warning to his Dear German People* as *A Faithful Admonition of a True Pastor*, which included pro-resistance messages from Melanchthon and Bale himself. Bale believed that it was unlawful to obey the commands of a tyrant who contravened God’s word and who subverted their country, and that it was permissible in these circumstances to defend God and their ancient laws. Bale was not alone in urging active resistance, though writers often differed on who should be doing the resisting and what form it should take. Walsingham may have discussed these ideas with Bale and his fellows in exile, and his opinions on these issues will be discussed in chapters 2 and 4.

Though we only have evidence of a brief stay, Walsingham’s later letters show a marked nostalgia for Switzerland. In 1586, Walsingham told Leicester that he wished himself ‘amongst the trewe harted Swy[ss]’, and to Archibald Douglas he wished to be in Basel in order to ‘pray for princes’. This indicates that he spent longer there than the few weeks accounted for in the surviving sources.

Walsingham was in Padua by 29th December 1555, when he was elected *consiliarius* of the English “nation” at the law university, suggesting that he was studying civil law. He held the office until 8th April 1556. Padua had an excellent reputation in England for legal and medical studies, and was the ‘most favoured destination for English students’ between 1485 and 1603. An additional part of Padua’s cachet was that it was the ‘university city of the last Italian state to remain truly autonomous from imperial influence after 1530’ – a Renaissance city-republic.

As *consiliarius* Walsingham could exercise significant influence over the affairs of the university and his fellow students. His responsibilities included reporting the names of matriculating students to the university, as well as, with his fellows, electing the rector and

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236 Ibid, pp. 127.
237 Dawson, pp. 266-69; Bowler, p. 129.
240 Woolfson, *Padua and the Tudors*, pp. 4-5.
lecturers. The structure of the university at Padua thus acted as ‘a playground of politics’, where students could gain ‘practical education in civic participation and governance’, Walsingham, then, was an active member of this semi-autonomous institution, which offered unparalleled opportunities for playing at politics with other young men from all over Europe.

Walsingham’s connection to things Italian predates his time in Padua. William Thomas dedicated his Italian Grammar (1550) to Walsingham’s future brother-in-law, John Tamworth, and it was helped into print by another brother-in-law, Walter Mildmay. Mildmay, Tamworth and Thomas formed a cluster of Italophiles at Edward’s court, which also included John Dudley, who sponsored many travellers to Italy. An admirer of Cicero and Livy, Thomas was also strongly influenced by Machiavelli, acting as a ‘conduit for Machiavellian thought in English’, which he adapted ‘to suit and serve the English monarchy in a period of minority’. He did this most famously through the questions and essays which he worked on for Edward VI, which echo Machiavelli’s political theory. Thomas’ belief that the ruler existed for the benefit of the nation and not vice versa could lead in the direction of resistance, and Thomas was executed for his part in Wyatt’s rising. Switzerland, and the Reformation, need not be the only source for radical political ideas in Walsingham’s writings.

Part of Padua’s appeal might even have been its involvement in helping Henry VIII out of a tight spot. The law faculty had decided in Henry’s favour in their review of his divorce case. The civil lawyers at Padua therefore gave judgements with political import – they were expert counsellors. England’s legal system was little indebted to the Roman civil code, derived from the Corpus Juris Civilis, Roman law as recoded under Justinian,

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241 Woolfson, Padua and the Tudors, pp. 11, 25.
242 Woolfson, Padua...Revisited’, p. 584.
243 Woolfson, Padua and the Tudors, pp. 6-7, 37.
248 Shrank, pp. 140-41.
249 Woolfson, Padua and the Tudors, pp. 41-42.
though it was used in specialist courts like those of Arches and the Admiralty. More importantly, the study of the civil law was seen as excellent preparation for a political career. Thomas Starkey, for instance, making the case for his aptitude for royal service to Thomas Cromwell wrote that:

bycause my purpos then was to lyve in a polytyke lyfe, I set my self now thes last yeres past to the knolege of the cyvyle law, that I myght therby make a more stabyl & sure jugement of the polytyke order and customys usyd amongst us here in our cuntry.251

Diplomacy was seen as a field in which civilians were especially useful as part of the civil law dealt with international relations. For this, Padua was particularly well-placed. One could learn the theory at the university in Padua and the practice in neighbouring Venice. Both Walsingham and fellow Italy-dweller, Thomas Wilson, served as Elizabethan diplomats, and one of Walsingham’s fellow Kingsmen, the civilian Walter Haddon, also served as an ambassador.253

Civilians were ‘economically dependent upon and administratively subordinate to high officials within the […] government and church’, for employment in the church and specialist courts. Although the civil law maxim that what pleased the prince was lawful was an absolutist’s dream, some commentators used the Code to argue that the people merely delegated their authority to the prince and therefore could reclaim it at any time. Hence, while Richard Morison’s civilianism manifested itself in an acceptance of a wide ranging royal prerogative, his friend Thomas Starkey was by the same influences led to see the necessity of a prominent role for the nobility, and a restriction of the prerogative. Similarly, two of Walsingham’s colleagues as Secretary, Sir Thomas Smith and Thomas Wilson, were led by their civilian backgrounds in very different directions. For Smith, government was ‘participatory’, in that those with different skills and experiences should be listened to, and could offer counsel. Wilson espoused a more ‘authoritarian’ vision, seeking

251 Woolfson, Padua and the Tudors, p. 40.
256 Woolfson, Padua and the Tudors, pp. 69, 65.
to use rhetoric to control the populace." His civilian studies need not, therefore, have straightforwardly dictated Walsingham’s political opinions.

The faculty at Padua was conservative in its approach to civil law. It remained strongly Bartolist, that is, it resisted the humanist rejection of the value of the medieval glossators of the law code, though humanist interests were pursued by members of the faculty in other spheres. The evidence suggests that Walsingham’s continued interest in civil law was influenced along these lines. The key characteristic of Bartolus’ approach was that ‘where the law and the facts collide, it is the law that must be brought into conformity with the facts’. This pragmatic flexibility is reminiscent of Walsingham’s political writings (chapter 2), though on the basis of available evidence it would be misleading to argue that this was direct result of his studies at Padua. He did, though, patronise the celebrated Italian Protestant civilian Alberico Gentili, who was himself unfashionably Bartolist. Through Walsingham’s patronage, in 1587 Gentili was appointed to the recently-vacated position of Regius Professor of civil law at Oxford. The same year, Gentili dedicated a collection of disputations to Walsingham. Gentili also dedicated a book to Sidney, in which he praised Machiavelli, and to Leicester he dedicated a critique of the humanist method of legal studies.

There were also opportunities to improve oneself outside or alongside study at the university. Many English travellers visited Padua but did not necessarily enrol in the university. Some may have only registered because students at the university were protected from being investigated for heresy. Walsingham certainly seems to have been enjoying himself. In early 1556, he bought a clavichord and a quantity of wine. The purchase was witnessed by Edmund Wyndham, a fellow civil law student, though not one who shared Walsingham’s religious views: under Elizabeth he was penalised for recusancy. In later life Walsingham continued an interest in music. In 1585, John Cosyn dedicated his collection of psalm settings to him. He employed musicians such as Daniel Bachelor in his household and commissioned a book of music for his household with pieces named for

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257 Shrank, Writing the Nation, pp. 154-55, 165, 183, 189, 197.
258 Woolfson, Padua and the Tudors, pp. 46-49.
261 Alberico Gentili, Disputationum decas prima (London: John Wolfe, 1587), fols A3-A3v.
263 Woolfson, Padua and the Tudors, pp. 16, 18.
264 Ibid, pp. 280, 288.
265 John Cosyn, Musike of six, and fiue partes (London: John Wolfe, 1585).
himself, his wife and daughter.\textsuperscript{266} He also evidently became a skilled speaker of Italian, entrusted with the handling of sensitive Italian intelligence sources in the 1560s, and known as a patron of Italians.\textsuperscript{267}

Walsingham might have been one of the Englishmen encountered by Thomas Hoby in August 1554, as this group included his future brother-in-law, John Tamworth and his Denny cousins, as well as Sir John Cheke.\textsuperscript{268} Many of these Englishmen never enrolled in the university, instead seeking more informal educational opportunities. Cheke had been found guilty of treason in 1553, though he was released, and licensed to go abroad. He arrived in Padua in July 1554, where he planned to study civil law and Italian.\textsuperscript{269} In Padua, Cheke lectured to the Englishmen on the orations of Greek politician, Demosthenes. Walsingham might have attended these lectures, though as usual hard evidence is lacking. The orations were translated and published in Elizabeth’s reign by Thomas Wilson, with a strongly anti-Spanish tone, where Demosthenes’ tyrant, Philip of Macedon, was compared to the contemporary tyrannical Philip.\textsuperscript{270}

Italy might also be the source of some of Walsingham’s later contacts. Walsingham travelled south to Padua at around the same time as Francis Russell, 2\textsuperscript{nd} earl of Bedford arrived in Venice. Bedford was permitted to travel on the continent by Mary, despite his complicity in opposing the regime.\textsuperscript{271} Direct evidence of Walsingham’s early ties to Bedford is hard to come by, but they may have met in Italy. There is evidence that they were still close in the 1580s. Edmund Tremayne, later clerk of the council, who also spent time in Italy around this point, shared this connection to Bedford, as did the future Lord Deputy of Ireland, Arthur, Lord Grey de Wilton. In a 1580 letter to Walsingham Tremayne referred to ‘our good Erle of Bedford ; who can never saie ynough of you, in commendacion of the discrete and honorable corsse that you holde in the service of hir majestie’ and ‘accompteth himself much bound vnto you’, as did his countess, ‘for no cause

\textsuperscript{267} It was Walsingham who explained to Bernadino de Mendoza the reasons for his expulsion from England in 1584 on account of his facility in Italian, Mendoza to Philip II, 26 January 1584, M. A. S. Hume, (ed.), \textit{Calendar of Letters and State Papers relating to English Affairs, preserved principally in the Archives of Simancas}, 4 vols (London: Eyre and Spottiswood for H.M.S.O, 1892-99), III, p. 513. Walsingham was also charged with composing an answer to an Italian pamphlet that criticised Elizabeth, Walsingham to Burghley, 12 October 1585, BL, Harley 6993, fol. 110; See also for example Tommaso Sassetti to Walsingham, 15 or 25 April 1583, Joseph Stevenson, (ed.), \textit{Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth, 1538-1589}, 23 vols (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1863-1950), XVII, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{268} Cooper, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{269} ODNB, ‘Cheke’.
\textsuperscript{271} Woolfson, \textit{Padua and the Tudors}, p. 267.
more then for that you mak so grete demonstrans of the care that you take of that noble genteman the L. Gray.²⁷² Bedford may have been responsible for Walsingham’s seat in the Parliament of 1559. Grey’s letters to Walsingham often refer to their shared ties to Bedford. In May 1581, for example, he asked Walsingham to make Bedford acquainted with the contents of his letters.²⁷³ Walsingham was one of Bedford’s executors, and, when Bedford’s heir was killed in a border affray in 1585, Walsingham lamented his death because of the ‘great love and honnor that in his lyfetyme I bore him’.²⁷⁴ William Russell, the earl’s youngest son, asked Walsingham to be godfather to his son in 1587.²⁷⁵ His association with Bedford and Grey puts Walsingham at the heart of the militant Protestant network at court.

Walsingham kept in touch with some contacts from his time in Padua, including Pietro Bizari.²⁷⁶ By the 1560s, Bizari was part of the household of the earl of Bedford, although he travelled Europe and he regularly sent Walsingham and Burghley news.²⁷⁷ He was in Paris in 1572, when he credited Walsingham with saving him from the massacre of St Bartholomew’s Day. Bizari was well-connected in England, counting among his friends the earl of Leicester, the Cecil and Russell families, Nicholas Throckmorton, and Thomas Randolph. These were all people with whom Walsingham was also associated, placing him squarely in this nebulous circle of Protestant patrons of learning. In 1583, Bizari sent Walsingham two copies of his Persian history, one for himself, and one to present to Elizabeth. Walsingham also received another copy of this work from William Parry, bound with Pontus Heuterus’ history of Burgundy, Rerum Burgundicarum libri sex (Antwerp: Christopher Plantin, 1584).²⁷⁸

The exact impact of Walsingham’s time abroad is hard to judge, though it is likely to have been significant. It seems likely that Walsingham’s Marian sojourn was part of the reason for his later impassioned identification with international Protestant communities – he knew these as real people, rather than as an abstract community or a political nuisance. Along with a number of other young men who spent time abroad under Mary he came

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²⁷² Edmund Tremayne to Walsingham, 24 October 1580, TNA, SP 12/143, fol. 106. For Tremayne’s movements, see Garrett, p. 309.
²⁷³ Grey to Walsingham, 12 May 1581, TNA, SP 63/83, fol. 11v. See also 14 May 1581, SP 63/83, fol. 46.
²⁷⁴ William Russell to Walsingham, 16 March 1586, TNA, SP 84/7, fol. 30; Walsingham to Wotton, 2 August 1585, TNA, SP 52/38, fol. 4v.
²⁷⁵ William Russell to Walsingham, 24 October 1587, TNA, SP 84/18, fol. 336.
²⁷⁷ Bizari to Walsingham, 5/15 July 1583, TNA, SP 83/19, fol. 76v.
back with contacts and experiences of contemporary foreign cultures that must have broadened their horizons. The view of historians like Garrett and Neale that on their return to England on Elizabeth’s accession the “exiles” constituted a coherent radical Protestant party that opposed government policy has long since been jettisoned.\(^{279}\) Nineteen of those who had spent time abroad under Mary sat in Elizabeth’s first parliament in 1559, including Walsingham.\(^{280}\) N. M. Sutherland found no evidence tying these men to opposition to the bills for uniformity and supremacy except in support of the government.\(^{281}\) Some protected more radical men or winked at ‘local deviations’ from the religion by law established but, in Sutherland’s words, they generally ‘loyally upheld the Elizabethan regime, doing more to assist the queen to fashion and enforce’ the religious settlement ‘than they ever did to undermine it.’\(^{282}\)

Walsingham certainly fits this pattern. He spent the following decades participating in Elizabethan government in one way or another, initially as an MP, and a Justice of the Peace, and head of a household, before graduating to more sensitive and influential positions.

**The 1560s: ‘Mr Walsingham to be of the House’: Early Government Service**

In accounts of Walsingham’s life, he often seems to spring into being fully formed with a series of letters to Sir William Cecil in 1568. He had, however, been known to Cecil for some time prior to this. In 1566 Cecil scribbled a note at the end of a memorial of business to be considered in preparation for the forthcoming Parliament which read ‘Mr walsyngham to be of the howss.’\(^{283}\) Exactly why it was important that Walsingham be returned to the House of Commons is hard to tell. However, it does show that Walsingham was known to Cecil for some years prior to the flurry of surviving letters in 1568. Walsingham certainly knew other government officials, including Thomas Randolph, long before his first government employment.\(^{284}\) Cecil may have had some special purpose in mind for Walsingham. This might have been assisting the Muscovy Company pilot a bill


\(^{280}\) Sutherland, pp. 260-61.

\(^{281}\) Ibid, p. 276.

\(^{282}\) Ibid, p. 284.

\(^{283}\) TNA, SP 12/40, fol. 149. The document is bound with papers from 1566, but Walsingham’s entry in the *ODNB* dates it 1563, on what basis is not clear.

\(^{284}\) See for example Randolph to Henry Killigrew, 15 April 1560, SP 52/3, fol. 67.
in their interest through the House. This exploration of Walsingham’s life in the 1560s begins with his private life, in order to shed some light on the context for his emerging political career, before returning to Walsingham’s early government service.

Alongside his developing political profile, a substantial part of Walsingham’s activity in the 1560s was related to the City of London. He may even have been a freeman of the City. In 1562 the Court of Aldermen’s decision to admit him to the freedom as a member of the Mercer’s Company on payment of £20 is recorded in the Court documents, but he is not included in Records of London Livery Companies Online. It is possible that he did not, in fact, pay the stipulated amount and therefore was never formally admitted to the freedom. He often requested the privilege for others, however, and on various other occasions throughout his career Walsingham and members of his household requested that their servants be made free of the City.

That Walsingham sought admission to the freedom in 1562 is interesting because the same year he married Anne, the daughter of Sir George Barne, former Lord Mayor, and widow of Alexander Carleill, merchant. Anne’s first husband had left her his house in the parish of St Michael Paternoster, and it seems to have been here that she married Walsingham, although the entry is dated after her death. An influential City family, the Barnes were just the kind of family the earlier generations of the Walsinghams would have sought to marry into.

Anne brought Walsingham into the orbit of the Muscovy Company, of which her father and first husband had been founder-members. The Company was founded by charter in 1555 ‘for the discovery of lands, territories, isles, dominions, and seigniories unknown, and not before that late adventure or enterprise by sea or navigation, commonly frequented’, with a monopoly of trade with Russia, and for a time with Persia, too. By the terms of its charter, the Company had one or two governors, four consuls and twenty-four assistants, the last two categories to be made up of the ‘most sad, discreet, and honest’ members. Walsingham was somewhere in Europe when the Company was granted its privileges but he was a member of the company by 1568, and an

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286 London Metropolitan Archives, COL/CA/01/01/017/01/031; Records of London’s Livery Companies Online <www.londonroll.org> [accessed 3 Oct. 2016].
287 LMA, COL/CA/01/01/021/458/B; COL/CA/01/01/023/012/2; COL/CA/01/01/022/368/1.
288 17 June 1564, St Michael Paternoster Composite Register, 1558-1653, LMA, P69/MIC/A/001/MS05142.
assistant in 1569. As one of the assistants, Walsingham probably helped ‘determine the trading policy of the company’, make ‘orders for the good government of the Company’, and issue instructions to its factors abroad.

This was another environment in which Walsingham’s humanist-inspired skills and values of honestas, civility, and good counsel would have been helpful. The Company conceived of itself as a “commonwealth”; as a chartered company which traded on behalf of all of its investors, this was perhaps an easier link to draw than in other companies where members traded as individuals, and the same language can be found in the documents of the East India Company. Later, Walsingham was the dedicatee of an anonymous treatise, *Cyuile and vncyuile life*, a dialogue about the relative merits of different lifestyles, it is critical of the “old ways” of extravagant hospitality and “honest” life, which it reveals to be a mask for self-interest. It instead suggests that ‘only negotiation between competing interests can properly be described as both honest and profitable’, and therefore asserts the value of moderate self-interest to the commonwealth. The anonymous author was in favour of grasping economic opportunity, and an active life in the towns and cities of the realm – something Walsingham would presumably have agreed with.

Like Walsingham, many of the investors and members of the Muscovy Company were also involved in other exploratory voyages as investors and promoters, including John Dee, Anthony Jenkinson, Christopher Hoddesdon, William Borough and William Bond. Several of the early members of the Muscovy Company also had industrial interests. For example, about twelve charter members were also members of the Mineral and Battery Works or the Mines Royal, of which Walsingham later served as governor. Again, like Walsingham, many of those involved in the Company also participated in other enterprises. Lionel Duckett, John Marshe and John Rivers, for instance, were members of the Spanish Company founded in 1577. Some of the members had kinship ties to Walsingham,

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297 Stout, p. 23.
including Blaise Saunders. Walsingham’s friend, Richard Martin, was also an active member of the Company, and served several times as its governor. The Company also had more than its share of illustrious members, including Nicholas Bacon, later Lord Keeper; Sir William Cecil; John Russell, earl of Bedford, father of Walsingham’s probable patron; and Sir Henry Sidney. Walsingham’s involvement in the Company in the 1560s is in line with a man with his City ties and international interests, taking the opportunities with which his marriage presented him to improve his fortunes.

The Company certainly had close ties to the court. Its efforts to open up trade with Russia went hand-in-hand with increased Anglo-Russian communication, but the missions of ambassadors to Russia, who were usually charged primarily with negotiating trade privileges for the Company, were paid for by the members, not by the Crown. Throughout her reign, Elizabeth resisted more usual diplomatic exchanges with the tsars, and frustrated Ivan IV in particular with her reluctance to move beyond mercantile matters. Walsingham’s membership of the upper echelons of the Company brought him into further contact with Cecil and the court. In 1568, along with other influential members of the Company, Walsingham was being kept up to date with the progress of the Randolph embassy to Russia by Randolph’s helpers Thomas Bannister and Geoffrey Duckett. In August, Bannister and Duckett wrote to Cecil of the bad state of the Company’s affairs in Russia, and for more information referred him to

suche worshipfull personnes of the Compaigne to whom we have wryttine the holle staite therof, as namely Sir William Garret. Sir William Chester master haward. master ducket alderman / the right worshipfull Master Tamworth. Master Walshingham gentilmen. Master Gilbart master Gammaige. Master field. and master atkinsonne Commoners not dowingte but according vnto there dewties after they have consideride the matters they will appoynte some of them to attend aponne yor honnor and the rest of the lords of the quenes maiesties most honnorable Counsell.

This is one of the earliest references to Walsingham in the State Papers. His inclusion shows that he was an important, trusted member of the Company. 1568 seems, at least from extant archival evidence, to have been something of a watershed year for Walsingham. Heavily involved in Muscovy Company affairs, and emerging as a source for

\[\text{Willan, Muscovy Merchants, p. 121.}\]
\[\text{Willan, Early History, p. 209.}\]
\[\text{Willan, Muscovy Merchants, p. 10.}\]
\[\text{Ibid, pp. 91-109, 114-16.}\]
\[\text{Bannister and Duckett to Cecil, 12 August 1568, TNA, SP 70/101, fol. 324.}\]
the most powerful man in Elizabeth’s government, he was a man with the right contacts to
go far.

Even as Principal Secretary, Walsingham’s ties to the Russia Company continued. He
seems, for instance, to have been able to exert some influence over those they sent as
ambassadors to Russia. It was at Walsingham’s behest that Jerome Horsey continued to
serve on missions to Russia, despite his fraught relationship with the Company as a result
of his serious misconduct. Horsey helped his patron benefit financially from his
membership of the Company, especially by taking advantage of the opportunities it
presented for private trade with Russia. Both Walsingham and Sir George Barne, the son of
his first wife’s father, were described by Horsey as his ‘good frendes’. In 1587
Walsingham and Barne imported 83, 600 lbs of flax, and Walsingham ‘and company’
8000¾ lbs of flax, all from Russia in the Company’s ships, and all in defiance of the ban on
individual trade by members of the Company, which both Walsingham and Barne probably
still were. The Company may have winked at this private trade, either because Walsingham
and Barne were in positions to be useful to it or because it knew it could do nothing to
stop them.

Horsey paid testimony to Walsingham’s patronage by dedicating to him his
manuscript account of his Russian travels, ‘[h]avinge found and felt your love and favour
so great towards the furtheringe of my well doinge and prefirment […].’ Horsey noted
Walsingham’s ‘disposicion, and desier to understand the estate and forren occurants’, and
seems to imply that his account was compiled at least partly at Walsingham’s behest:
‘accordinge to your advice and instructions (hertofore geaven me), I hold it noe less a dutie
of thankfulnes in me to render an accounte of such things as most pro
pperly are due unto
your place […] to be advertised of’. There are echoes here of Hakluyt’s dedication of his
Principall Navigations to Walsingham, who paid tribute to Walsingham’s

wisdome to haue had a special care of the honor of her Maiesty […] & the advancing of navigation
[…] and whereas I acknowledge […] how honorably both by your letter and speech I haue bene

304 Willan, Early History, pp. 198-205, 209; Stout, p. 191; Horsey to Walsingham, 12 April 1590, TNA,
SP 82/3, fol.120; Horsey to Walsingham, 17 April 1590, TNA, SP 82/3, fol. 122.
307 Edward A. Bond (ed.), Russia at the Close of the Sixteenth Century: Comprising, the Treatise “Of the
Russe Common Wealth,” by Giles Fletcher : and the Travels of Sir Jerome Horsey, Now for the First
308 Ibid.
animated in this and other my trauels, I [...] make presentment of this worke to your selu'e, as the fruits of your owne encouragements.\textsuperscript{309}

Walsingham was an active patron of travel, navigation and trade. In Hakluyt’s case, Walsingham facilitated his sojourn in France, where he stayed with the English ambassador, Sir Edward Stafford, and availed himself of the knowledge of French experts on navigation and leaders of expeditions.\textsuperscript{310}

During his marriage to Anne, Walsingham also kept a country establishment, leasing the manor of Parkbury in Hertfordshire. Though they were married for only two years, Anne’s will of 1564 is suggestive of the couple’s circle.\textsuperscript{311} Walsingham was left £100 and entrusted with custody of her son, Christopher, ‘to be by him virtuously brought up’. Anne also made bequests for her siblings-in-law, suggesting they were close. Walsingham’s sisters Elizabeth and Christian were left some of Anne’s garments. Christian’s future husband, William Dodington, described by Anne as ‘my friend’, also received a bequest. Barbara and Mary, and their half-brothers Edward and Wymond Carey, were also remembered. There was a bequest for her son-in-law, Christopher Hoddesdon, and her daughter, Alice, was left Anne’s ‘booke of golde with the cheyne’ and ‘all the rest of myn apparell’.\textsuperscript{312} Walsingham seems to have faithfully discharged his responsibilities towards Anne’s children. In 1580, he contributed to Christopher Carleill’s financial relief and advancement, and was believed to be the cause of Hoddesdon’s ‘greater credit’ and Alice’s ‘estimation’ in Antwerp. Alice, Hoddesdon told Walsingham, could ‘not but in truth confesse your honour to be a very loving father vnto them both’.\textsuperscript{313}

In 1566 Walsingham remarried. His second wife was Ursula, the daughter of Henry St Barbe of Somerset and the widow of Richard Worsley, captain of the Isle of Wight. Together, they had two daughters, Frances (1567-1633) and Mary (1573-1580). The Worsley family had connections to the court of Henry VIII, especially through Thomas

\textsuperscript{309} Richard Hakluyt, \textit{Principall Navigations} (London: Christopher Barker, 1589), sig *3.
\textsuperscript{310} Peter C. Mancall, \textit{Hakluyt’s Promise: An Elizabethan’s Obsession for an English America} (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 2007), chapters 6 and 7.
\textsuperscript{311} PCC 32 Stevenson, printed in Webb, p. 380.
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{313} Hoddesdon to Walsingham, 22 October 1580, TNA, SP 83/13, fol. 68.
Ursula’s uncle, William, had been one of Henry VIII’s intimates, and her sister, Edith, married the Elizabethan clerk of the privy council, Robert Beale.

A misunderstanding seems to have nearly scotched Walsingham’s courtship of Ursula, and occasioned his earliest surviving letter to his ‘verry good frende’, Sir William More, an influential Surrey landowner and administrator. Written unusually neatly in Walsingham’s hand, this first deferential letter asks More to read and decide whether to pass on an enclosed letter to Ursula in which he sought ‘to excuse myself [...] by rendring an accompte of the cause of my proceadinges’, hoping More would ‘be an instrvment of reconcylyatyon, where offence before vnwittingly hathe ben ministred’. Walsingham committed the matter entirely to More’s discretion, being ‘ryght lothe to presse you to the doing of any thing that myght in any respect misleake you’. In similarly deferential terms, Walsingham later promised that he would be ready as far as ‘my lyttel abylytye is abel to plesvre you’. Later, Ursula sent More’s wife samples of cloth, promising to ‘at all tymes be pvrveior for them’, and conveying Walsingham’s ‘hartye commendatyons vnto your selve and mr moore’.

After Walsingham rose above More in government service he tried to secure advancement for his old friend. In 1577, Walsingham mentioned More to Elizabeth as a possible vice-president of Wales. Another result of their role reversal was that where before Walsingham had politely requested More’s help, by 1580 his requests could border on the pre-emptory, as in his request that More assist Edward Stafford in his efforts to enjoy the fruits of a grant of forfeitures.

Other letters continued to show the warmth of their relationship, however, and More clearly remained an important contact and friend despite Walsingham’s changing role. Asking More for a favour on Ursula’s behalf, Walsingham urged his friend to ‘[b]eare [...] with my earnestnes in recommedyng my wyfes causes. you are your self a maried man. you knowe therfor of what force mres moores commendementes are [...]’.

317 Walsingham to William More, 2 October 1567, SHC, LM/COR/3/74.
318 Ursula Walsingham to Mrs More, 24 May 1567, SHC, LM/COR/3/68.
319 John Wolley to Sir William More, 3 July 1577, SHC, 6729/7/51.
320 Walsingham to Sir William More, 27 April 1580, SHC, 6729/5/65. For Walsingham’s requests of More, see also 8 August 1582, SHC, LM/COR/3/334.
gentle jocularity of the letter evokes the closeness between the Mores and Walsinghams. Similarly, lord justice of Ireland Sir William Pelham, a cousin of Francis and Ursula, often ended his official letters to Walsingham with affectionate postscripts referring to Ursula. In February 1580, for example, Pelham told Walsingham that whenever he and Sir Henry Wallop were together ‘and recone the Callender of saintes lives; her name commeth in question nevertheles I praie yow ser tell her that yow are the cause that she is Canosise [canonised?], for that yow never disturbe her patience’. Given the absence of almost all of Walsingham’s private correspondence, snippets in letters like this are evidence of the warm, affectionate relationships that he forged with those around him, especially his wife, who played an important though little-documented role in his life and career.

Ursula was often mentioned by her husband’s international correspondents and certainly took her part in his political life, associating for instance with the family of French ambassador Mauvissière. Though lesser in scale than the literary activities of, for example, Lady Burghley, Ursula did act as a literary patron. At least four works were dedicated to her. These were all religious in nature, and suggest that Ursula shared her husband’s religious opinions and was keen to spread basic Protestant doctrine. Perhaps most interestingly, Laurence Tomson, one of her husband’s secretaries, dedicated his translation of Pierre de La Place’s *De l’excellence de l’homme chrétien et manière de le connaître* (1572 or 1575, P. de Farnace) to Ursula. Later, Egremont Radcliffe would dedicate a translation of another of La Place’s works to Walsingham, perhaps suggesting a special interest in the Huguenot writer on the Secretary’s part. The Bodleian’s copy of Tomson’s translation bears the signature of another of Walsingham’s secretaries, Francis Mylles, and the date 1577. In his dedication, Tomson recalls how ‘[a]ccording as your Worships pleasure was, I haue perused this booke, and […] haue brought it out of France into England’. Ursula seems, therefore, to have commissioned the translation. Ursula was also

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322 Pelham to Walsingham, 16 February 1580, TNA, SP 63/71, fol. 102v.
323 Mauvissière to Walsingham, 6 May 1582, *Cal. Foreign*, XVI, p.11. See also, for example, Villiers to Walsingham, 7 or 17 March 1586, *Cal. Foreign*, XX, p. 425.
326 Laurence Tomson, *A Treatise of the Excellence of a Christian man, and how he may be known* (London: Christopher Barker, 1576).
the dedicatee of Thomas Stocker's translation of French Reformed theologian Daniel Tossanus' paraphrase of the book of Jeremiah in 1587.\(^{327}\)

In two of the works dedicated to Ursula, the dedication was a joint one with her husband. They were dedictees of Nathaniel Baxter’s translations of Calvin’s “lectures” on Jonas, which were accompanied by a translation of Augustin Marlorat du Pasquier’s exposition on the last two letters of John. It was the latter section that was dedicated to Ursula. Baxter claimed that he was

perswaded that they wyll so much the sooner of the godlie be read and wel liked, as they shalbe accepted of you, whose vertuous life deserueth no lesse commendations in this your country, then did that Ladies life to whome the Apostle directed these Epistles.\(^{328}\)

Ursula had visited her husband in Paris in the 1570s, where she witnessed the massacre of St Bartholomew’s Day in 1572.\(^{329}\) These experiences of France may have precipitated an interest in French religious works on Ursula’s part.

Lastly, the otherwise apparently unknown Richard Saintbarb dedicated his *Certaine points of christian religion* to the couple. Saintbarb was presumably a relative of Lady Walsingham’s, though there is a certain decorous distance in his dedication: he wrote that ‘as one who as well by the report of Gods deere children, both of preachers and others, as in some measure himselfe hath beene made acquainted with your holie & religious dispositions’.\(^{330}\)

Walsingham obviously trusted Ursula a great deal. Her assistance was invoked in his efforts to bring the Catholic exile Sir Thomas Copley back into the fold, on the basis that Copley was a kinsman of hers.\(^{331}\) Ursula was also entrusted with the diamond Don Antonio had given her husband as security for a loan raised in the City of London.\(^{332}\) Given all this, it is not surprising that Ursula was often called upon to exercise patronage. Lady Burghley had a similar role; on at least one occasion Mildred herself accepted money

\(^{327}\) Thomas Stocker, *The Lamentations and holy mourninges of the Prophet Jeremiah* (London: John Windet for Humphrey Bate, 1587).

\(^{328}\) Nathaniel Baxter, *The Lectures or daily Sermons, of that Reuerend Diuine, D. John Caluine* (London: Edward White, 1578), fol. Xi.


\(^{331}\) Copley to Ursula, 3 January 1582, TNA, SP 15/27/1, fol. 91.

\(^{332}\) The episode is summarised in Read, II, pp. 56-57, 81-82, and referred to in Burghley to Walsingham, 2 September 1581, Digges, sig. Hhh2; and Mendoza to Philip II, 7 September 1581, *Cal. Spanish*, III, p. 166.
(£250) from a suitor for a wardship. There is no evidence of Ursula accepting payments from suitors, though this certainly shows just how sought-after the influence of privy councillors’ wives was. When William Davison was appointed joint Principal Secretary in 1587 Ursula tried to place an unnamed place-seeker with him as a page. Davison politely turned down her recommendation, however, on the grounds that he did not want to take on too many servants too quickly. Ursula’s gracious reply was conveyed through Francis Mylles, who told Davison that Ursula’s request was the result of being ‘over much pressed to pray you herein’, which she had done ‘more for satisfying of the partie that intreated her’ than out of any real conviction. It is a shame that more evidence of this kind of activity on Ursula’s part does not survive as her role in dispensing patronage was probably considerable, either as an intermediary with her husband or by herself.

Unlike Mildred Cecil, Lady Walsingham was not a member of Elizabeth’s privy chamber. However, both women participated in the tradition of giving new year gifts to the queen. Mildred generally gave ‘elaborate jewellery,’ and received plate in return. In 1588-9, Ursula gave Elizabeth ‘one skimsyn of cloth of silver, ymbrodered all over very faire with beastes, fowles, and trees, of Venis gold, silver, silke and seed pearles’ and a pair of similarly decorated perfumed gloves. With elaborate presents like this, it is no surprise that Ursula seems to have been popular with her husband’s colleagues and with the queen. While Walsingham was absent in the Low Countries in 1578, for example, several of his colleagues, including Burghley, wrote Ursula ‘comfortable’ letters.

In 1581, Walsingham sought to persuade Elizabeth to authorise a favour for one of Ursula’s brothers. He hoped that Elizabeth would acquiesce because, as well as not inconveniencing her at all, the beneficiary ‘is brother to a gentlewoman of whom she seemeth to have a good liking’. In the complex financial circumstances of Walsingham’s death, Elizabeth seems to have made an effort to protect Ursula’s income. In a letter of 1591, Thomas Cely relayed to Burghley and the Lord Admiral his efforts to recoup the money he had laid out in 1588 for ‘bryngyng vp’ Spaniards captured during the Armada crisis to London. They had told him, he reminded them, that he would get his money from

334 Francis Mylles to William Davison, 27 October 1586, TNA, SP 12/194, fol. 94.
338 [Walsingham] to [Burghley], 2 September 1578, TNA, SP 83/9, fol. 5v.
339 Walsingham to Hatton, 27 July 1581, Sir Harris Nicolas, Memoirs of the Life and Times of Sir Christopher Hatton, including his Correspondence with the Queen and other Distinguished Persons (London: R. Bentley, 1847), pp. 182-83.
Lady Walsingham, as her husband had negotiated the ransom of the Spanish prisoners and she still had custody of the money. Cely reported Elizabeth’s reaction when he ‘was a svter vnto her ma\textit{\textasciicircum}este for the money’. Elizabeth had answered, he wrote, that ‘she wolde see her [Ursula] hanged vp befoer that she wolde wryte vnto her for yt’ – even if it was a thousand pounds. Such was the ear-bashing he received from Elizabeth that Cely swore he ‘wolde never aske yt ageyen of her ma\textit{\textasciicircum}este for I never had syche a cowntenan\textit{es} from her […] as I had at that tyme in all the day\textit{es} of my lyffe’.

340 That the queen wanted Ursula to retain the money is suggestive of a positive relationship, especially given Elizabeth’s usual unwillingness to part permanently with financial resources. Ursula was clearly an integral part of her husband’s political life, well-liked by his friends and colleagues, and capable of exercising patronage on a broad scale.

In the early to mid-1560s, Walsingham’s London residence was probably in St Giles Cripplegate, but in 1568 he bought a large house in All Hallows on the Wall, and it was here that his younger daughter, Mary, was baptised in 1573. 341 The purchase of the London house in 1568 coincides neatly with Walsingham’s appearance in the State Papers, as a go-between for Sir Nicholas Throckmorton and Sir William Cecil, so this was presumably a time when his increasing involvement in government business made it necessary for him to have a suitable London base. From at least 1576 and probably 1575, Walsingham spent time at Odiham in Hampshire. 342 In 1580, Walsingham bought the headquarters of the Muscovy Company on Seething Lane, and this remained his primary London residence until his death in 1590. 343

The parish registers for St Olave Hart Street, at the end of Seething Lane, show regular entries for members of Walsingham’s household. On 15th November 1585, for example, it records the baptism of Walsingham’s granddaughter, Elizabeth, and later the baptisms of the children of his daughter’s second marriage, to the earl of Essex. 344 Members of the household were also buried in the parish, and these records show that a good proportion of the servants and familiars of the Walsingham household were relatives of the Secretary and his wife. These included an Elizabeth Denny, buried in January 1581,

340 Cely to Lord Treasurer and Lord Admiral, 17 July 1591, TNA, SP 12/239, fol. 122v.
341 Read, III, p. 431; LMA, 1 March 1573, All Hallows London Wall Composite Register: Baptisms and Marriages 1559-1653, Burials 1559-1651, P69/ALH5/A/001/MS05083.
342 Walsingham to Sir Henry Wallop, 29 July 1575, TNA, SP 12/45, fol. 9v; Walsingham to Burghley, 12 September 1576, SP 12/109, fol. 10; Walsingham to Burghley, 23 November 1577, SP 83/3, fol. 121.
and William ‘Simbarbe’, Ursula’s brother, in 1587.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 117, 121.} There are also records of marriages for members of the household or clients and friends who were married from the Walsinghams’ house. Again, these were often relatives. In 1586, for example, Katherine Denny married George Fleetwood, and in 1589 Mary ‘Simbarbe’, widow, married Edmund Verney.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 252, 253.}

Amidst his commercial and domestic concerns, Walsingham also began to participate in government. He may have been involved in such work as early as September 1567, when he told a correspondent that the bearer of the letter would ‘make reporte of my state’ as he himself did not have ‘leysvre […] to wryte at large’.\footnote{Walsingham to William More, 26 September 1567, SHC, LM/COR/3/73.} The first direct evidence of Walsingham’s relationship with Cecil is a series of letters in 1568. In the first of these Walsingham passed on a message from Sir Nicholas Throckmorton as Throckmorton himself was too ill to write. On Throckmorton’s death in 1571 Walsingham lamented the ‘losse of soe deere a frind’, so his relationship with Throckmorton was obviously important to him and was probably key in his entry into government service in the 1560s, though little evidence of their relationship survives.\footnote{Walsingham to Leicester, 5 March 1571, BL, Harley 260, fol. 28.} It is tempting to speculate that they may even have crossed paths in the household of Katherine Parr. Walsingham informed Cecil of Elizabeth’s displeasure with the envoy sent to her by the Prince of Condé. Walsingham also told Cecil ‘[t]owchinge thos matters wherein you appoynted me to deale / I wyll tomorrowe in the mornynge attende vppon your honor to advertyce yo[u] what I have don therin’.\footnote{Walsingham to Cecil, 18 August 1568, TNA, SP 12/47, fol. 84.} The letter therefore clearly implies that Walsingham had been working with or for Throckmorton and Cecil on highly sensitive matters for some time, though evidence for the exact nature of these activities is lacking.

It seems, as Read suggested, that Walsingham was handling the activities and information of Captain Franchiotto, an Italian Protestant who had spent many years in France.\footnote{Walsingham to Cecil, 7 September 1568, TNA, SP 12/47, fol. 115.} In December, Walsingham wrote to Cecil of his friend’s report that France and Spain had a ‘practye’ in hand in England for the ‘alteratyon of relygion, and the advauncement of the Queene of Scottes to the Crowne’. Initially, he told Cecil, he had been reluctant to report such a vague, general advertisement. However, after considering the informant’s ‘earnest protestation’, the ‘credyt of the partye yt came from’, the fact it was matter of ‘the greatest importavnce’, ‘the mallyce of this present tyme’, ‘the alleageavnce, and pertycvler good wyll I owghe to her majestye’, and, finally, ‘the daynger, that myght
growe vnto me, by the concealynge therof, yf any sooche thing [...] hereafter, should happen, I saw in dvtye I coold not forbeare to wryte.\footnote{Walsingham to Cecil, 20 December 1568, TNA, SP 12/48, fol. 165.} One of the really interesting things about this passage is Walsingham’s claim that, as well as owing ‘alleageavnce’ to Elizabeth, he also owed her ‘pertycver good wyll’, which is suggestive of some special favour she had showed him. No evidence of exactly what he meant survives.

The most famous part of the letter comes just after this justificatory passage. Walsingham concluded by asserting ‘that in this devysion, that reygnethe emongest vs there is lesse daynger in fearing to myche then to lyttle and that ther is nothinge more dayngerowse then secvryte’.\footnote{Ibid.} These aphorisms are regularly quoted by authors seeking to establish Walsingham’s character and priorities. Though he may have composed these compelling blocks of politic wisdom himself, Walsingham may have derived them from his reading (though from whence has proved impossible to establish) and brought them into play here as he would have done in composing themes or orations as a student. Either way, his words to Cecil in 1568 remained Walsingham’s watchwords for the rest of his career, which was dominated by the fear that Elizabeth did not take the threats she faced seriously.

As one of her MPs, Walsingham was involved in trying to remedy this neglect. Walsingham sat in every Elizabethan parliament until his death. He first sat as one of the two members for Bossiney (Cornwall), which was almost certainly orchestrated by the earl of Bedford. In 1563, Walsingham was one of the two members for Lyme Regis (Dorset), another west country seat under Bedford’s patronage. He was not one of the original MPs of the 1572 parliament, but he took his seat on his return from France as one of the knights of the shire for Surrey, and took the same role in the three subsequent parliaments. In 1584 and 1586 Walsingham’s fellow knight of the shire was his old friend Sir William More.\footnote{H. E. Malden (ed), \textit{The Victory History of the Country of Surrey}, 4 vols (Westminster: Constable, 1902-14), I, p. 437.}

After the 1568 letters, Walsingham’s progression in government service appears swift. In 1569, he was entrusted with the keeping of an Italian banker and suspected plotter, Roberto Ridolfi. In this capacity, he received his instructions in joint letters from both Leicester and Cecil, dealing only indirectly with the queen.\footnote{Leicester and Cecil to Walsingham, 4 October 1569, TNA, SP 12/59, fol. 11.} The letters Walsingham received from his two superiors verge on the familiar. At the end of one letter, for example, they wished Walsingham ‘hartely well to fare, \textit{which} you shall the better do, if you be
circumspect in this time to avoyde infect[ed] places as much as ye may. They made sure to pass on to Walsingham the fact that Elizabeth ‘alloweth very well of’ his ‘diligence in the examination’ of Ridolfi. It is clear that Walsingham was in the confidence of these two political heavyweights and that he was considered well-qualified to be involved in such sensitive and important work. Part of his suitability in this case was probably his fluency in Italian, but his previous intelligence work under Cecil must have played a part too.

Read thought that Walsingham was called upon to compose a pamphlet against Norfolk’s marriage to Mary Stuart, *A Discourse Touching the Pretended Matche betwene the Duke of Norfolke and the Queene of Scottes*, though this has also been attributed to Thomas Sampson, the Puritan divine, and, perhaps most plausibly, Thomas Norton. The pamphlet certainly parallels Walsingham’s views on many of the issues on which it touched, including his wish that Elizabeth should fully embrace the Protestant cause, for then God would bless her government.

Walsingham’s next significant government appointment was as special ambassador to France in 1570. His mission initially was to help the Huguenots reach an accord with the French king, although by the time he set out for France a peace had already been concluded and he was instead simply to convey Elizabeth’s formal congratulations. Even before Walsingham had left England he had been considered as a replacement for the resident English ambassador, Sir Henry Norris. In a letter to an unknown woman his reluctance to serve the crown in this way is apparent. He hoped that ‘her matye will fynd so smale taste in this my present service that she will forbeare to employe me any further by makynge choise of some other of more sufficiency’. If he could dispose of himself, he told her he would rather be ‘your neighbour […] with a pece of bread & cheese then to haue in the contrye to the whic h I am gowing ther beste delicat es & intertayngment’. The reasons for Walsingham’s reluctance are hard to uncover. Denying one’s sufficiency was an established technique for wriggling out of unwelcome assignments, though in this case it might ring truer than in others: as far as we know, Walsingham had no experience to prepare him for the role of envoy, and certainly not for the role of resident ambassador. He seems an odd choice for a special envoy, especially because Elizabeth often sent noblemen

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355 Leicester and Cecil to Walsingham, 19 October 1569, TNA, SP 12/59, fol. 84v.
356 Leicester and Cecil to Walsingham, 1569, TNA, SP 12/74, fol. 43.
357 Read, I, pp. 63-65.
358 Ibid, p. 64.
359 Walsingham’s instructions, 11 and 15 August 1570, Digges, sigs B; Bv4.
360 Walsingham to anon, undated, TNA, SP 12/45, fol. 1v.
Partly his reasons may have been financial, as Paris was notoriously expensive, though Cecil considered Walsingham’s finances equal to the task.\textsuperscript{362} Walsingham kept Cecil and Leicester updated on his activities in France, and Elizabeth seemed to approve of Walsingham’s conduct there. On 7\textsuperscript{th} September, she wrote to him that she could see from his letters to Cecil how ‘diligently and orderly’ he discharged his office, and was ‘glad to understand your abilitie and fitness to do us further service hereafter’.\textsuperscript{363} This was surely an ominous letter for Walsingham to receive. There was some delay in his formal appointment, however, which gave him hope that she ‘hathe made choyce of some other, for skyll, and coventenavnce, more fytt’. If Elizabeth did intend to make use of him despite his ‘meane cavlynge, and abylytyle’, she would have to ‘inhable’ him to bear the expenses of the place to which she appointed him as it was proving unbearable even for Norris. Walsingham assured Cecil (and Elizabeth) that his unwillingness was not the result of a general reluctance to serve, and he acknowledged that his life and goods belonged ultimately to Elizabeth, and that it was unbecoming for a subject to disobey their prince.\textsuperscript{364} By December, Elizabeth had finally ‘made speciall choice of you upon a singular liking of your vertuous and good conditions to serve us’.\textsuperscript{365} The same month, Walsingham’s journal records his preparatory meetings with the key figures at court. On 16\textsuperscript{th}, he ‘spake with the Queenes Majestie’. Three days later he ‘went to the Courte to speake with Sir Will. Cicill aboute my dispatche’, and again on 24\textsuperscript{th} he saw Cecil, this time with Leicester, ‘about a matter of greate importance’. He received his instructions for the embassy on 23\textsuperscript{rd}.\textsuperscript{366}

Leaving Walsingham on the cusp of his time as resident ambassador, we can perhaps see him about to enter the stage in the manner of the participants in the Gray’s Inn court entertainment of 1594-5, described by Eric Leonidas as ready to ‘put their experience of law, trade, finance, the natural world, and general social negotiation into the language of the court, if not always into the court’s pattern of values’.\textsuperscript{367} Walsingham similarly put his


\textsuperscript{362} Cecil to Sir Henry Norris, 7 February 1570, \textit{Scrinia Ceciliana, mysteries of state & government in letters of the late famous Lord Burghley, and other great ministers of state, in the reigns of Queen Elizabeth, and King James, being a further additional supplement of the Cabala} (London: for G. Bedel and T. Collins, 1663), sig. Aa2v\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{363} Elizabeth to Walsingham, 7 September 1570, Digges, sig. C.

\textsuperscript{364} Walsingham to Cecil, 22 October 1570, TNA, SP 12/74, fol. 43.

\textsuperscript{365} Elizabeth to Walsingham, 19/22 December 1570, Digges, sig. C\textsuperscript{‘}.


experiences, which included the Inns and their didactic drama, at the disposal of his queen, despite their political and personal differences. Walsingham, as he emerges from the archival void in 1568, was a man shaped by multiple contexts; a student of many masters. He had, however, been a part of a coherent network of royal servants throughout his life, and spent much of his time in semi-autonomous institutions, such as his college and Gray’s Inn. Sir Thomas Elyot wrote that ‘the end of all doctrine and study is good counsel’, and it is Walsingham’s application of his education and experiences that forms the subject of the next chapter.\footnote{Elyot, p. 254.}

If Walsingham was technically inexperienced in 1570/1 at the time of his appointment as resident ambassador, he had served a long apprenticeship, apparently with a view to political service. All the evidence suggests that he learned the rules of the game very quickly, if he had not known them before. His conduct as ambassador was praised by Elizabeth, who, Sir Thomas Smith told him, ‘thinketh none can do what she would have done there as well as you’. His competence as ambassador and the trust Elizabeth placed in him delayed his return home in 1573 when she insisted he remain and begin negotiations for her marriage to the duke of Alençon, on the basis that his successor was ‘but a symple man & she liketh not that he should deale’ in the delicate negotiations. Walsingham started counselling Elizabeth and her advisers even before his return from France, and in the early months of 1573 the earl of Leicester told him ‘the place you alreadie hold is a Counsellours’ and ‘[y]ou know what opinion is here of you, and to what place all men would have you vnto’. Despite the occasional clash, Walsingham never lost Elizabeth’s trust, and this has not infrequently baffled historians. It is part of the argument of this chapter that we ought to see these moments of tension as exceptional rather than the rule, and also give adequate weight to the fact that these were always resolved and the manner in which this was achieved. This chapter examines Walsingham as a counsellor and political thinker at the heart of the regime, through an analysis of his advice to Elizabeth, his relationships with his colleagues, and his longer political writings or policy papers. It examines his political vocabulary and convictions, comparing these to contemporary traditions, both classical-humanist and the art of the state.

‘Using the Best Words I Might’: Walsingham's Advice to Elizabeth

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2 Smith to Walsingham, 27 September 1572, Sir Dudley Digges, *The Compleat Ambassador, or, Two Treaties of the Intended Marriage of Queen Elizabeth of Glorious Memory; Comprised in Letters of Negotiation of Sir Francis Walsingham, her Resident in France. Together with the Answers of Lord Burleigh, the Earl of Leicester, Sir Tho: Smith, and others* (London: Tho: Newcomb for Gabriel Bedell and Thomas Collins, 1655), sig. Mm.

3 Sir Thomas Smith to Burghley, 7 January 1573, BL, Harley 6991, fol. 19.

4 Leicester to Walsingham, 8 January 1573, Digges, sig. Tt2v.

5 Walsingham to Burghley, 22 April 1571, Digges, sig. M.
It is widely assumed by historians that Walsingham’s blunt and critical counsel meant that he and Elizabeth had a tense relationship and were never close. They generally see this as the result of his religious zeal, which lead him to harangue the queen. Historians have, therefore, been baffled by Elizabeth’s tolerance, and generally attribute this to her wisdom and forbearance. In Sir John Neale’s words, ‘there was no greater tribute to the tolerance, sagacity, and masterful nature of Elizabeth than her choice of ministers such as Walsingham’.

This section examines Walsingham’s correspondence with Elizabeth in order to build a picture of his advisory style, rhetorical techniques and political opinions. It argues that, far from frank, Walsingham carefully constructed his approaches to Elizabeth.

In another context, he described the carefulness with which he dealt with sensitive topics as ‘using the best words I might to breed contentation’ and the evidence suggests that he chose his words carefully when addressing Elizabeth, too.

The vast majority of Walsingham and Elizabeth’s interactions cannot be directly recovered as, given his daily attendance on her, these were mainly verbal and thus have left few archival traces. The letters Walsingham sent during periods of absence on diplomatic business or sick leave stood in for his physical presence, and as such he chose his words and arguments extremely carefully.

There evidently were disagreements, over the general thrust of policy, with Walsingham repeatedly lamenting Elizabeth’s ‘indisposition to deale effectually’, that is, her preference for a reactive, opportunistic policy as opposed to committing to a course of action and seeing it through to the end.

There were also serious breaches around specific issues from time to time, as over Walsingham’s close contact with the Dutch in the mid-1570s. However, there is also substantial evidence of a more amicable relationship.

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8 Walsingham to Burghley, 22 April 1571, Digges, sig. M.

9 See especially Walsingham’s letters to Elizabeth in February, March and April 1575 in SP 12/103, and August and September 1581 in SP 78/6 and also printed in Digges, *The Compleat Ambassador*.

10 Walsingham to Sir Christopher Hatton, 23 June 1578, BL, Additional MS 15891, fol. 45v.
Historians’ reliance on the accounts of Spanish agents in England for some aspects of court life is largely responsible for the impression of a difficult relationship between Elizabeth and Walsingham. Read’s reliance on these sources also led him to posit a more heavily-divided Privy Council than is borne out by other evidence.\(^{11}\) A particularly commonly-cited example is the account of former ambassador to England, Bernadino de Mendoza, that in response to a report that the Spanish king was preparing a ‘great naval force’ which was perhaps intended for England, Elizabeth ‘turned to Secretary Walsingham […] and said a few words to him […] after which she threw a slipper at Walsingham and hit him in the face’.\(^{12}\) This incident and others like it have been regularly repeated by historians to exemplify Elizabeth’s famous temper and in particular her stormy relationship with her Principal Secretary.\(^{13}\) However, scholars have tended to be less alive to the potentially performative nature of some of these incidents than contemporary observers. In 1576, it is surely no coincidence that Elizabeth was scathing about Walsingham and his motivations in her audiences with the Sieur de Champagny, a representative of the Spanish governor of the Low Countries, presumably to demonstrate her intention not to involve herself in the conflict there.\(^{14}\) In contrast, she praised Walsingham to French agents at court.\(^{15}\)

Read between the lines, the antipathy towards Walsingham displayed by Mendoza and other Spanish agents actually indicates the strength of Walsingham’s influence at court – influence he could not have exercised without a close relationship with Elizabeth. It was Walsingham’s ability to undermine Mendoza’s efforts to persuade Elizabeth of his master’s goodwill that so enraged the Spaniard.\(^{16}\) Walsingham was recognized – by Mendoza – as one of the most influential men at court.\(^{17}\) He soon overtook the senior secretary, Sir

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\(^{11}\) Conyers Read, ‘Walsingham and Burghley in Queen Elizabeth’s Privy Council’, *English Historical Review*, 28.109 (1913), 34-58.


\(^{14}\) Read, I, p. 322. See also, for example, Mendoza to Philip II, 9 October 1581, *Cal. Spanish*, III, p. 185.


\(^{17}\) In a letter of 31 March 1578 to Philip II, Mendoza described the workings of English government thus: ‘Although there are seventeen councillors […] the bulk of the business really depends upon the Queen, Leicester, Walsingham and Cecil’. *Cal. Spanish*, II, p. 476.
Thomas Smith, and Smith’s replacement, Dr Thomas Wilson, never attained the same level of influence, despite his rhetorical expertise.\(^{18}\) Despite their abilities, neither of these men were personally close to the queen. There is evidence that Walsingham’s strong personal relationship with Elizabeth provided a firm foundation for criticisms and disagreements.

Walsingham’s intimacy with Elizabeth was illustrated by her bestowal of a nickname on him. He was her “Moor” or “Ethiopian”. When he criticised Elizabeth in September 1581, Sir Francis could trade on his intimacy with her to remove the sting. He began this letter with a reference to the ‘Laws of Ethiopia (sic), my native soil’.\(^{19}\) Neale described the recipients of such nicknames as Elizabeth’s ‘close friends’.\(^{20}\) Indeed, a list of these men bears out their close political and personal ties to the queen. In particular, Lord Burghley was Elizabeth’s “Spirit” and the earl of Leicester her “Eyes”. When Walsingham acquired his nickname it was a sure sign that he was included in Elizabeth’s inner circle.

Traditionally, historians have explained his nickname in terms of Walsingham’s dark colouring, with Neale calling him ‘dark-featured’.\(^{21}\) However, closer inspection sheds more light on the reasons for Elizabeth’s choice. In the context of the fifteenth-century reconquista and the ongoing conflict between Spain and the Ottomans in the Mediterranean, it seems a wry nod to Walsingham’s Hispanophobia. Perhaps more importantly, Moors could not disguise their difference or alter it. In Titus Andronicus, Aaron boasts that blackness ‘scorns to bear another hue’. The conceit was reinforced in Scripture: ‘The blacke More […] [cannot] change his skin [any more than] the leopard his spots’.\(^{22}\) Elizabeth herself played on this quotation to acknowledge Walsingham’s constancy. In 1578, Leicester wrote to Walsingham that she had:

expressed very great favour with many favourable words towards you; and […] she willed me to say thus to you, that, [a]s she doth know her Moor cannot change his colour, no more shall it be found

\(^{19}\) Walsingham to Elizabeth, [1]2 September 1581, Digges, sig. Hhh 2v\(^{4}\).
\(^{20}\) Neale, Queen Elizabeth, p. 214.
\(^{21}\) Ibid, p. 215. For a more recent example see Doran, Elizabeth and Her Circle, p. 258.
that she will alter her old wont, which is, always to hold both ears and eyes open for her good servants.\textsuperscript{23}

“Moor” encapsulates both Walsingham’s political persona, and something of his relationship with Elizabeth, which could be light-hearted and apparently affectionate.

Walsingham’s centrality, personally and politically, to Elizabeth’s government was exemplified in 1586, while he and Lord Burghley were both away from court attending the trial of the Queen of Scots. Elizabeth wrote them a joint letter, addressing them informally at the outset as ‘Sir spirite, myne and yow master Moore’. She ended the letter, ‘I haue commanded this bearer to bring me word of both your healthes And so when a foole hath spoken, she hath all done’, and signed herself ‘[s]uch am I to yow as your faiths haue deserued’.\textsuperscript{24} William Davison also passed on to Walsingham Elizabeth’s hope that the commissioners were ‘neer growen to some end so as by thursday next she may see you here’.\textsuperscript{25} These letters demonstrate the affection and dependence of Elizabeth on her two most famous advisers: she could not be without her Moor or his counsel for long.

In addition to a strong personal relationship, Walsingham and Elizabeth had a shared education, which enabled them to craft a successful working relationship based partly on affection, partly on trust, and partly shared expectations. Elizabeth and her advisers had all benefitted from the early sixteenth century humanist educational programme advanced by writers like Erasmus and Sir Thomas Elyot.\textsuperscript{26} As a result, they shared a substantial bank of knowledge and expectations, derived from a curriculum of texts composed by writers from the ancient world and contemporary thinkers writing in the same vein. One of the central tenets for princes and their advisers was that rulers would and should take counsel, as monarchs could not be experts in all things and might not always rule virtuously.\textsuperscript{27} However, rulers were free to appoint their counsellors and were

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[23] Leicester to Walsingham, 30 July 1581, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury: preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, 24 vols (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode for H. M. S. O., 1883-), II, p. 403. Hereafter Hatfield MSS.
\item[24] [Elizabeth] to Burghley and Walsingham, October 1586, BL, Lansdowne 10, fol. 213; see also Melanie Evans, ‘ “By the Queen”: Collaborative Authorship in Scribal Correspondence of Queen Elizabeth I’, in Women and Epistolary Agency in Early Modern Culture, 1450-1690, ed. James Daybell and Andrew Gordon (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 36-54 (pp. 40-43).
\item[25] William Davison to Walsingham, 15 October 1586, TNA, SP 12/194, fol. 70.
\item[26] For Elizabeth’s education see, for example, T. W. Baldwin, William Shakespere’s Small Latine and Lesse Greeke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944), pp. 257-84. For Walsingham’s education see chapter 1.
\item[27] Sir Thomas Elyot, The book named the governor, 1531 (Menston: Scolar Press, 1970), sig. B5v\textsuperscript{1}.
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not obliged to accept the proffered advice. Walsingham’s education gave him the tools to deliver advice in accordance with the established conventions. Elizabeth’s education gave her the tools to hear counsel intelligently, with an ear tuned for techniques and references, ready to engage critically on an intellectual and technical level with those advising her. Walsingham saw Elizabeth as his intellectual equal, and their letters show that, whatever their differences on policy, they shared a common vocabulary of politics, drawn from their shared educational experiences. Walsingham sometimes used Latin sayings in a gesture to this common language. On 10th August 1581, trying to persuade Elizabeth to commit herself to financially support the duke of Alençon’s campaign in the Netherlands, he argued that if the expense was likely to be more than England could bear that would be a sound reason for refusal, ‘for that utra posse, non est esse’ (i.e. what is beyond possibility cannot exist). Latin tags also feature in Walsingham’s correspondence with his male colleagues.

But Walsingham as good as admitted that his style of advising Elizabeth required an apology, hoping that she, ‘seeynge the grownd of this my zeale will most graciously incline to pardon my rude & plaine (thoughe dutifull) maner of writynge’. Historians have generally taken his assertion of plainness at face-value, but Walsingham’s apology for his style raises the question: why did he not change or improve it? The answer, surely, is that his style conveyed important information about his character and motivations, and therefore was an important part of his rhetorical technique. Their tutors had taught Elizabeth and her advisers that true rhetoric should be moral, tend to the good of the audience, and the speaker should be a good man. Therefore, the speaker’s character as established in their oratory or writing could carry significant persuasive weight, and a key means of expressing that character was through the rhetor’s choice of style, as writers like Cicero and Thomas Wilson, author of the Arte of Rhetorique (1560), recognised.

30 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 10 August 1581, TNA, SP 78/6, fol. 4v.
31 [Walsingham] to Robert Beale, 2 November 1577, TNA, SP 81/1, fol. 103.
32 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 12 April 1575, TNA, SP 12/103, fol. 59.
the way in which Walsingham presented himself to Elizabeth, his *ethos*, was an important part of his persuasive technique.

Walsingham’s self-presentation is clear in a letter to Elizabeth of 12th September 1581. Walsingham had been dispatched to France to negotiate for a league in lieu of the Alençon marriage, but the negotiations were marred by Elizabeth’s wavering and uncertain course, which led the French to think a marriage was still on the cards, and therefore to reject a league without a wedding. Walsingham complained bitterly that Elizabeth seemed ‘to affect a league’, then when a league was offered fell back on the marriage and vice versa, and these tergiversations were making her hated at the French court. Anglo-French amity was particularly important at this time, when a joint military venture to break Spanish power in the Netherlands was under discussion. In turn, Elizabeth had been annoyed with her Secretary’s behaviour, especially towards Alençon himself. This had been at least partly mitigated by an exchange of letters, which had seen Elizabeth inform Walsingham that her ‘mislike conceived of my dealinge with the duke is in part qualified’ and lay ‘open vnto me your disposition touching the charge committed vnto me’. Walsingham wrote his strongly-worded letter on the 12th, therefore, in the full knowledge that he had angered Elizabeth already.

In the letter of 12th, he asserted his loyalty and obedience to Elizabeth in fairly effusive terms, telling her that his duty ‘teacheth me not to condemn those that I am bound to defend’ (i.e. Elizabeth herself) and a wrongful condemnation would, deservingly, result in severe punishment for him under ‘Draco’s Laws’, referencing the famously harsh legal provisions of the Athenian legislator. This is not quite the tone one would expect from Walsingham, given his reputation for uncourtly tactlessness. Before launching into his criticism of the queen, Walsingham made much of his disinterestedness and his affection for her: ‘if either ambition or riches were the end of my strife, my grief [at her displeasure] would be the less’, and he hoped that ‘if any thing shall escape my pen, that may breed offence’ she would ‘ascribe it to love’.

His justifications completed, Walsingham criticised Elizabeth’s conduct of the marriage negotiations in detail, including reminding her that

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35 Walsingham to Burghley, 21 August 1581, Digges, sig. Ggg*.  
36 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 16 August 1581, TNA, SP 78/6, fol. 13.  
37 Walsingham to Elizabeth, [1]2 September 1581, Digges, sig. Hhh 2v*.
when your Majestie doth behold in what doubtful terms you stand with Forreign Princes, then you do wish with great affection, that opportunities offered had not been slipped. But when they are offered to you (if they be accompanied with charges) they are altogether neglected.\(^{38}\)

He told her, ‘[c]ommon experience teacheth, that it is as hard in a politique body, to prevent any mischief without charges, as in a natural body diseased, to cure the same without pain’, so every course of action would involve compromise.\(^ {39}\) Moving onto more general criticism of Elizabeth’s political conduct, Walsingham accused her of maintaining a ‘sparing and improvident course’, piling error upon error into a damning indictment of Elizabeth’s conduct: her unwillingness to spend had ‘lost Scotland’ and was risking her hold on England, prevented her from concluding any meaningful foreign alliance, and was an invitation for the Queen of Scots to alienate her impecunious gaoler’s loyalty.\(^ {40}\)

Walsingham presented himself as a loyal counsellor reluctantly delivering hard truths, playing on his nickname to assert that if she continued her course ‘no one that serveth in place of a Councellor, that either weigheth his own credit, or carrieth that sound affection to your Majestie as he ought to do, that would not wish himself in the farthest part of Ethiopia’.\(^ {41}\) He built a picture of the dangers facing his queen and country in order to both excuse his frankness and create a sense of urgency which would induce Elizabeth to act. It was his duty as one of her advisers to provide her with honest counsel to avert the disasters he saw approaching. This is all in-keeping with his humanist education: advisers were meant to be plain and honest, and that is how Walsingham wanted Elizabeth to see him, in order to convince her of the validity of his advice. The idea of boldly giving plain advice was something Walsingham shared with the good adviser, Philanax, in Philip Sidney’s *Arcadia*.\(^ {42}\) Presenting Elizabeth’s situation as critical gave Walsingham the opportunity to advise her, and also justified his frankness. Model orators like Isocrates and Demosthenes justified their frank speech in a similar manner, emphasising the good of the state and their own disinterested motives.\(^ {43}\)

\(^{38}\) Ibid, sig. Hhh 2v\(^ \dagger \).  
\(^{39}\) Ibid, sigs Hhh 2v\(^ \dagger \) – Iii.  
\(^{40}\) Ibid, sig. Iii.  
\(^{41}\) Ibid, sigs Hhh 2v\(^ \dagger \) – Iii.  
We should be wary, then, of accepting Walsingham’s “plainness” unquestioningly. And yet there is evidence of serious clashes with Elizabeth from time to time. What caused these, if not his bluntness? It seems, in fact, that it was when Elizabeth perceived that Walsingham was not being frank with her, or when she believed that his self-presentation as loyal and impartial adviser masked ulterior motives (such as putting the interests of others before hers), that clashes occurred.

In counselling Elizabeth, Walsingham showed a self-conscious sensitivity to the practical issues of advising a monarch and the basis of these in rhetorical thought. For example, Walsingham recognized that the timing and content of approaches to the queen were vital in determining their success: a keen awareness of opportunity or kairns could be the difference between success and failure. Walsingham often provided detailed advice to others about how to approach Elizabeth on matters of both patronage and politics, and his advice or assistance in this was also regularly sought by the agents of foreign powers. In a letter to William Davison concerning Davison’s suit for a fee farm, Walsingham told him that because Elizabeth was ‘presently so disquieted with […] theis affaires of Scotland I could therefore fynd no apt tyme to move hir yet therein’. Walsingham therefore advised him to write directly to Elizabeth explaining just how necessitous his situation was, ‘[w]hervppon I will take occasion to deale with her earnistly againe’ now that Davison had given him ‘ground to worke vppon’.

Walsingham made full use of the potential of the secretaryship for controlling the flow of information to Elizabeth in order to paint the grimmest possible picture of her situation in the hope that this would persuade her to act in earnest. This idea of kairns as not simply ‘an opportune time for speech, but for action’, was particularly central to Machiavelli’s understanding of the word, and there are certainly shades of this idea in Walsingham’s articulation. In 1575, for instance, he urged Elizabeth to act now to protect her country because it could not be done simply ‘by consultation, when nothyng resolved on is put in execution’.

45 Walsingham to William Davison, 15 May 1584, TNA, SP 52/34, fol. 69.
46 Walsingham to Davison, 20 May 1584, TNA, SP 52/34, fol. 77.
48 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 16 January 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 150; [Walsingham] to Bowes, 1 September 1580, TNA, SP 52/28, fol. 149; Walsingham to Davison and Bowes, 6 February 1583, TNA, SP 52/31, fol. 28.
Walsingham often relied on others to help influence Elizabeth in the desired direction. In 1581, for example, in response to what he considered an over-optimistic assessment of the loyalty of the north of England from the earl of Huntingdon, Walsingham wrote that though he was glad of Huntingdon’s view, he feared that the ‘good show of liking of the present state would be found very dangerous and doubtful in obedience’ if given the opportunity, and ‘therefore I wish her Majesty still to doubt the worst, and the worst accordingly to be provided for’.\(^49\) Similarly, in 1586, striving to overcome Elizabeth’s reluctance to pay James VI a pension, Walsingham urged the English agent in Scotland, Thomas Randolph, to ‘caule often & earnestly vppon vs to hasten the sending […] of the promised pencion’. He justified this to Randolph on the grounds that ‘we do no more here […] then we are vrged vnto by necessity’.\(^50\) Walsingham had also complained to the vice-treasurer of Ireland, Sir Henry Wallop, that ‘unless we be called on here rather importunately than earnestly, we shall, without regard of a great deal of treasure consumed to no purpose, continue our lingering and irresolute manner of proceeding, and blame you there’.\(^51\) Although this might seem to undercut Elizabeth’s authority, the fact that Walsingham worked so hard to manage the information that reached Elizabeth confirms her centrality in the political process and his acceptance of this in practice.

On multiple other occasions, Walsingham offered advice that seemed inherently subversive of Elizabeth’s authority. Before he had been Secretary a year, the Lord Justice of Ireland, Sir William Fitzwilliam, acknowledged Walsingham’s advice ‘not to be to scrupulous vpon directions, but to vse discreción as the service requireth’.\(^52\) Similarly, Walsingham advised Fitzwilliam’s successor, Sir Henry Sidney, then engaged in quashing a rising in Connacht, to ‘execute justice without direction hence, and then to advertise of your proceedings’.\(^53\) Walsingham did not hesitate to suggest amending Elizabeth’s orders if conditions on the ground seemed to warrant it. In 1588, writing to the earl of Derby and Lord Cobham with Elizabeth’s instructions for their negotiations with the duke of Parma, Walsingham added to the royal orders his opinion that if they found the duke well-

\(^{50}\) Walsingham to Randolph, [2] April 1586, TNA, SP 52/39, fol. 41.
\(^{52}\) Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 12 September 1574, TNA, SP 63/47, fol. 149.
intentioned, they could refrain from fulfilling part of their instructions, lest this hinder a positive outcome.\textsuperscript{54}

In 1587, the Privy Council’s independent action in dispatching the warrant for the execution of the Queen of Scots cast a long shadow over relations between Elizabeth and her advisers. Two months after the execution, Walsingham reported to Leicester that Burghley

remayneth styl in dysgrace, and behinde my backe her Majestie giveth out very hard speeches of myself, which I the easier credit for that I fynd in dealing with her I am nothing gracious; and if her Majestie could be otherwyse served, I knowe I should not be used.\textsuperscript{55}

If this were not distressing enough, Walsingham also reported that this ‘dyscord between her Majestie and her counsell hindereth the necessary consultation that were to be desyred for the preventing of the manifest perrylls that hang over this realme’. In fact, Walsingham claimed, ‘[h]er Majestie doth wholly bende herself to devyse some further meanes to dysgrace her poore counsell that subscribed, and in respect therof she neglecteth all other causes’.\textsuperscript{56} As a result, Walsingham enjoined Thomas Wilkes not to take the absence of instructions in ‘evil part’, and explained that this was due to his inability to persuade Elizabeth to arrive at a resolution. Walsingham further explained that Elizabeth’s ‘late seure dealing […] towarde mr Secretarie dauison and others of hir Counsell’ was making himself and his colleagues ‘verie Circumspect and Carefull not to proced in anie thing but wherin we receiue direction from hir selfe, and therefore you must not find it straunge if we be now more sparing then heretofore hathe bin accustomed’.\textsuperscript{57} Davison’s fate had clearly made Walsingham and his colleagues think twice about using their initiative!

Sometimes, in particularly delicate situations, Walsingham declined to proffer advice to Elizabeth at all. In 1578, he told Sir Christopher Hatton that ‘yf I stoode (as I heere I doo not) in her majesties good grace […] I would then discharge my dewtie, playnly vnto her’ by urging her to seize the opportunity for amity with Scotland offered by the contemporaneous Scottish embassy to her court. However, he added that ‘my state

\textsuperscript{54} Walsingham to Derby and Cobham, 27 March 1588, TNA, SP 77/2, fol. 331.
\textsuperscript{55} Walsingham to Leicester, 3 April 1587, Thomas Wright, \textit{Queen Elizabeth and her Times, A Series of Original Letters, Selected from the Inedited Private Correspondence of the Lord Treasurer Burghley, the Earl of Leicester, the Secretaries Walsingham and Smith, Sir Christopher Hatton, and Most of the Distinguished Persons of the Period}, 2 vols (London: Henry Colburn, 1838), II, p. 335.
\textsuperscript{56} Walsingham to Leicester, 3 April 1587, Wright, \textit{Queen Elizabeth and her Times}, II, p. 336.
\textsuperscript{57} Walsingham to Wilkes, 13 April 1587, TNA, SP 84/14, fol. 71.
standing as it doth, having no hope to doo good, I thincke it wisdome to forbeare to offend'. 58 This shows the importance of Elizabeth’s consent to being counselled, and Walsingham’s yielding to this, though such deference to the mood of the monarch was criticised in contemporary literature on advisory relationships as dishonest and craven. 59

During his 1581 embassy, Walsingham thanked Elizabeth for explaining her wishes and intentions more clearly to him, and promised to use this ‘as a lodestarre the better to direct my course’. 60 ‘This metaphor perfectly encapsulates Walsingham’s attitude to Elizabeth’s wishes: they were a lodestar, not a map: he would use them as his guiding principles while taking whatever means presented themselves to achieve his instructions. 61 This encapsulates the importance of personal understanding and trust in early modern political relationships – on both sides – and explains Walsingham’s independent action, though this could get him into trouble.

Elizabeth sometimes suspected that Walsingham was not entirely honest with her, as Walsingham himself realised. He admitted that sometimes she ‘dothe suspect that I alledge reasons and suggestions not altogether agreable wuth truthe’. 62 When Elizabeth’s suspicions were aroused in this way, she could prevent Walsingham from succeeding in his persuasive efforts, denying their validity when his behaviour did not match his claim to frankness.

In 1576, Walsingham’s close relationship with the Prince of Orange led to a confrontation with Elizabeth, because she thought he had been led away from his duty to her. Anglo-Dutch relations were particularly fraught at the time, as a result of Orange’s seizure of the ships belonging to the Merchant Adventurers in order to extort a loan to fund his anti-Spanish campaigning. Walsingham’s whole position on the Dutch question aroused Elizabeth’s suspicion and irritation, and she believed that Walsingham was at least partly to blame for this inflammatory act. 63 She imparted her suspicions to Burghley who did his best to alleviate them. Despite Burghley’s involvement, the key factor in resolving this crisis of confidence was a face-to-face meeting between Walsingham and the queen. The former described to Burghley how he had had ‘longe tavlke’ with Elizabeth about the issue and had found her ‘verry well cavlmed […] and wylyng ynowghe to heare what I could saye’. To Burghley, and presumably to Elizabeth in their conversation, Walsingham

58 Walsingham to Hatton, 23 June 1578, BL, Additional MS 15891, fol. 46.
59 Sir Thomas Elyot, Pasquil the playne (London: Thomas Berthelet, 1531), sigs A5-B.
60 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 16 August 1581, TNA, SP 78/6, fol. 13.
61 Ibid, fol.13.
62 Walsingham to William Davison, 20 May 1584, TNA, SP 52/34, fol. 77.
63 Read, I, p. 322.
protested his innocence and that ‘as I never gave the advyce [to seize the ships], so dyd I never allowe of the fact’.64

Walsingham actually opposed the Dutch action, because it would alienate the queen and other potential supporters of their cause in England.65 However, Walsingham was providing detailed advice to Orange on other matters through the prince’s advisers.66 Hence a long letter to Monsieur de Villiers, one of Orange’s semi-official agents in his relations with England, in which he advised Orange on how to assuage Elizabeth’s wrath. The Prince, Walsingham suggested, should write to Burghley, Leicester, and other key figures at the English court bemoaning Elizabeth’s ‘evil opinion’ of him and promising to do all in his power to recover her favour. He should ask these disparate figures to intercede with the queen on his behalf, or else, devoid of her favour, ‘he must either be enforced to abandon the cause by retiring into Germany, or to reconcile himself with Spain upon any conditions, or to yield those countries absolutely into the French King’s hands’.67 Walsingham astutely calculated that Elizabeth’s fear of French dominance in the Low Countries might induce her to make fair weather with Orange, when presented by these, her loyal advisers. In years to come, he would continue to stress the menace of a French-controlled Netherlands to persuade Elizabeth to support the rebels herself.68 Here, again, Walsingham selected arguments to suit his audience, though in this case Elizabeth denied the appropriateness of this.

As we will see in chapter 5, this was not an isolated incident. It was, however, one thing to advise a client on how to obtain their fee farm and another to advise a foreign ruler on how to work on Elizabeth, so her annoyance in 1576 was understandable. Walsingham was, after all, supposed to be her secretary and not pursue his own agenda. As Conyers Read noted, though ‘it can hardly be said that Walsingham was guilty of treachery to the Queen in writing such a letter’, it was true that ‘his sympathies with the cause of the Dutch Protestants were leading him far away from his duties as the royal amanuensis’.69

It seems pretty obvious from his conduct, though, that Walsingham did not see himself as simply an ‘amanuensis’. Walsingham saw his duty to counsel Elizabeth in religious terms. Walsingham described counsellors as ‘watchmen’ ‘whome god hathe

64 Walsingham to Burghley, 16 October 1576, BL, Harley 6992, fol. 56.
65 Walsingham to Robert Beale, 28 May 1576, BL, Egerton 1694, fol. 12.
66 Walsingham to Burghley, 16 October 1576, BL, Harley 6992, fol. 56.
67 ‘Negotiations of M. de Villiers with the Prince of Orange’, TNA, SP 70/140, fol. 153, cited in Read, I, pp. 333-34.
68 Walsingham to Burghley, 3 August 1578, TNA, SP 83/8, fol. 7.
69 Read, I, p. 334.
appointed [...] over that piece of his house’, who had a duty to uphold the Protestant religion in their countries and to work with those of the same religion, at home and abroad, to further the Gospel, which Walsingham described as ‘the dutie I owe to th’advancement of the Kingdome of God and maintynnce of the same’. Walsingham here conflated the good of Protestantism and the good of England and asserted his duty to champion both. Walsingham conceived of his role as one in which he owed a duty directly to God, bypassing Elizabeth. This broader conception of his role could sometimes lead him to activities that did not meet with Elizabeth’s complete approval.

Elizabeth seems, however, to have been mollified by his assurance that he was not involved in the wilder excesses of the Dutch cause. Walsingham justified his contact with Orange on strategic grounds: like Morton, he was one of the pillars of English security. Mendoza claimed that Walsingham saw Casimir, Orange, Morton and Leicester as the ‘pillars’ of Protestantism. In 1581 he was apparently dismayed that two of the four had failed them: Casimir had ‘bent’ and Morton ‘had been broken’. One wonders where Elizabeth was in this listing of allies of Protestantism. Walsingham certainly saw the Protestant, anti-Spanish Orange as England’s natural ally against their common enemy, Philip II. He quite explicitly wrote that to assist the prince was ‘to assist our selves’. For Walsingham, therefore, his actions were an extension of his duty to preserve his own prince and country, but to Elizabeth Walsingham’s behaviour did not match his claims about his character as a loyal servant. The breach was mended, however, by a frank exchange between queen and adviser, as we have seen.

Walsingham’s relationship with Orange was not always so unwelcome to Elizabeth. On at least one occasion she used Walsingham to pass on her wishes to the prince when she could not be seen to be involved herself. In 1577, the besieged people of Brouage, near La Rochelle, asked Elizabeth to help them with supplies, otherwise they would have to surrender. Elizabeth was hindered from helping them directly due to the ‘alliance between her Crown and that of France’, but, considering the ‘ill consequences’ that would follow from their defeat, she had ‘bidden’ Walsingham ask Orange if there he could help by revictualling the town to the tune of £2000, to be paid in the last resort by Elizabeth. Orange was to take the letter and request as if ‘signed by her Majesty’s own hand, as she

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70 Walsingham to Randolph and Bowes, 16 March 1578, BL, Harley 6992, fol. 100.
71 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 1 January 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 150v; Mendoza to Philip II, 6 April 1581, Cal. Spanish, III, p. 93.
72 Walsingham to Leicester, 26 July 1572, BL, Harley 260, fol. 71.
would very willingly have done but for reasons which you will be well able to divine’. It was Walsingham’s use of his relationships with foreign princes that was sometimes problematic, not the relationships themselves, but it was Elizabeth who had the power to decide when these were appropriate and useful.

In 1577, Walsingham was knighted by Elizabeth, a public statement of her confidence in him, although his enthusiasm for the Dutch cause drew him into trouble again the following year. The occasion this time was his joint embassy to the Netherlands with Lord Cobham. Whether it was not writing in enough detail about their negotiations, or not meeting Alençon (in his guise as protector of the Dutch) quickly enough, the envoys felt they could do nothing right. Elizabeth was particularly irate when Cobham and Walsingham raised a loan of £5000 for the Dutch on their own private bonds. Walsingham was driven into a deep despair by her unwillingness to grasp the offered opportunity to provide for her security and by her refusal to accept his advice on the matter. He complained to Burghley that the ‘persons that wysshe best and the cavses that worke best are the most myslyked’.

Elizabeth was angry that her ambassadors had exceeded their remit, offering concrete financial support to the Dutch at a time when she was very reluctant to do such a thing herself. Perhaps in particular, she was angry with Walsingham, the more experienced diplomat, her trusted adviser, for his disobedience, his apparent putting of Dutch interests before hers. Walsingham was frustrated with her prevarication, and upset by her denunciations of her ambassadors in their absence. As their queen, she was supposed to uphold their ‘credit’, not threaten to hang them on their return. This would only discourage others from serving in a similar capacity. Also, she would not accept their assessment of the necessity of aiding the Dutch, a cause close to his heart and, in his mind, essential to the safety of Protestantism, England and herself. However, she remained willing to comfort and listen to her envoys.

A long letter of instructions from Elizabeth on 8th August acknowledged that ‘yow may conceave that we have had misliking of some parts of your proceedings’ and that as a

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73 Walsingham to Orange, 27 August 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, XII, p. 117.
74 *ODNB*, ‘Walsingham’.
75 For a detailed account of this embassy, see Read, I, pp. 373-422; private bonds: p. 394.
76 Walsingham to [Burghley], 20 September 1578, TNA, SP 83/9, fol. 28v.
77 See for example, [Walsingham] to Sir Thomas Heneage, [2? September] 1578, TNA, SP 83/9, fol. 64v; and [Walsingham] to the earl of Warwick, 18 July 1578, TNA, SP 83/9, fol. 60v.
78 Walsingham to Elizabeth, [1]2 September 1571, Digges, sig. Hhh 2v; [FW] to [WC], 2 September 1578, SP 83/9, fol. [12] and for Elizabeth’s threats see Walsingham to Thomas Randolph, 29 July 1578, TNA, SP 83/7, fol. 90.
result ‘the L Cobham and yow maybe in your mindes somewhat greeved’, but ‘considering we are well assured of bothe your good willes and faithfull meanings in all your actions, we could not that you shuld dismeye your selues’. She reassured Walsingham in particular that she would hear him out: ‘And yow Walsingham shall at your retourne know what we have misliked in your actions at which tyme we will not refuse like a good Mastress to heare your aunswere with our accustomed favor’. This document, a draft mostly in Burghley’s hand, maintains a balance between formality and informality. It employed a formal greeting at the outset; it used the royal “we”; and it was primarily concerned with instructions on how to proceed. However, it is also concerned with the fears and complaints of her ambassadors. The letter therefore conveys both her displeasure and her willingness to mend the breach. Elizabeth gestured self-consciously to her role as the “good mistress” and recognised her responsibility to hear his defence.

One of the key mechanisms that enabled Elizabeth and her Principal Secretary to work together so successfully was the queen’s willingness to listen not only to his counsel but to his justifications of his behaviour. On these two occasions in the 1570s when Walsingham allowed his sympathies for the Dutch rebels to run away with him Elizabeth made time to clear the air and talk out their differences.

The year following his embassy to the Low Countries, Walsingham attracted Elizabeth’s ire for his opposition to her projected marriage to the duke of Alençon. Walsingham’s own correspondence indicates that he was in deep disgrace in late 1579, but the causes of his absence from court are not entirely clear. In Paris, it was rumoured that Walsingham had played a role in John Stubbs’ infamous pamphlet opposing the match, The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf, and that Elizabeth had banished him from court as a result. However, Walsingham’s health was also bad at this point, so perhaps that too influenced his departure. When he did return to court at the end of the year, Walsingham complained that he was still ‘interreined as a man not throughly restored to hir favouer’. It seems unlikely, given Walsingham’s sensitivity to approaching Elizabeth, that he would have had any direct involvement with Stubbs’ writing. Perhaps Elizabeth suspected him

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79 Elizabeth to Walsingham, 8 August 1578, TNA, SP 83/8, fol. 16v2.
80 Evans, ‘By the Queen’, pp. 43-51.
81 John Zouche to Walsingham, 27 December 1579, TNA, SP 63/70, fol. 163; Walsingham to Sir Henry Cobham, 30 December 1579, TNA, SP 78/3, fol. 60; Read, II, p. 22; William Pelham to Walsingham, 15 December 1579, TNA, SP 63/70, fol. 148; Pelham to Walsingham, 29 December 1579, TNA, SP 63/70, fol. 171.
82 Read, Mr Secretary, II, p. 22.
83 Walsingham to Sir Henry Cobham, 30 December 1579, TNA, SP 78/3, fol. 60.
nonetheless, which would certainly account for her extreme anger with him. Ultimately the incident is too shrouded in obscurity for any concrete conclusions about their relationship to be drawn from it. However, if Elizabeth did suspect Walsingham of involvement, this would fit the pattern I have sketched here – it would be hard to imagine a greater deviation from the humanist model of counsel and Elizabeth’s expectations. Elizabeth, self-consciously aware of her responsibility to accept honest counsel, accepted Walsingham’s frankness, even celebrated it in his nickname, because she understood it as a rhetorical device designed to make his counsel more convincing and as part of what a monarch-counsellor relationship was meant to look like. Therefore, she could dispute his deployment of the trope when she believed he was not being truly frank with her.

This view that it was deviations from the norms of counsel that led to clashes is also borne out by a careful reading even of the Spanish sources. Even when Elizabeth’s anger may have been genuine rather than performative, as in Mendoza’s oft-quoted report that during the Alençon marriage negotiations in 1579 the queen had ordered Walsingham ‘to begone, and that the only thing he was good for was a protector of heretics’, the subtext is that Elizabeth thought Walsingham was putting other interests before hers in his advice to her, not that his bluntness had upset or offended the queen.85 Again, in 1581, Elizabeth ‘made an appearance of being very angry with Walsingham’, because she had found out he had written to the earl of Sussex criticising the duke of Alençon. This might be considered a betrayal of the confidential advisory relationship between queen and secretary: Walsingham should not have openly doubted Alençon’s commitment to Elizabeth, and written of this to one of his colleagues. However, Mendoza also reported that ‘some people think that it is all put on, and that she herself ordered Walsingham to write this, so as to hinder the marriage, as she is a woman very fond of adopting such tricks’.86 Even if Elizabeth’s anger was real, it was occasioned not by frankness but by deception or attempted manipulation.

A run of letters from 1575, which Walsingham wrote to Elizabeth while absent from court due to illness, will now form the basis of a more detailed examination of Walsingham’s style of counsel and, especially, his vocabulary. The letters are primarily concerned with Anglo-Scottish relations, and a recent plot against Elizabeth. Among other things, they show that even early on his career Walsingham did not shy away from giving his opinion with relatively little sugar-coating – but this is not the same as careless

85 Mendoza to Zayas, 16 October 1579, Cal. Spanish, II, p. 704.
86 Mendoza to Philip II, 9 October 1581, Cal. Spanish, III, p. 185.
rudeness. In one letter of March 1575 in which he urged her to secure Scotland’s friendship he bluntly told Elizabeth that if she ignored the advice of her best counsellors and things went badly ‘the burden of the error wilbe only cast on your majestie’.\textsuperscript{87}

The first of the series is dated 16\textsuperscript{th} January 1575. It provides an excellent summary of Walsingham’s assessment of the problems facing Elizabeth. Enclosed advertisements, he wrote, would tell her ‘howe hardly the twoe great Princes your neighbors are affected towards you, as also what vnsownd subjectes you have at home’. As far as he was concerned, abroad, Elizabeth was faced with the malice of France and Spain, and at home she was faced with the uncertain politico-religious allegiances of her people. One of Walsingham’s greatest fears, which recurs throughout his correspondence, was that ‘when soever the forrayne troobles of the Princes your neighbors shall be at an end’ they would turn their attention to England.\textsuperscript{88} Walsingham’s solution to the problem was for Elizabeth to act preventatively, while her enemies were still fully occupied with their own affairs, by implementing ‘such remedies as good policie, and the necessitie of your estate requireth’.\textsuperscript{89}

This is an occasion where he stressed the opportunity to act, not just to advise.

Walsingham’s language here is significant. “Policy” and “necessity” are words that often occur in Walsingham’s letters. The former could be used in both positive and negative senses. Positive meanings included statesmanship, diplomacy, and strategy, while negative associations included cunning, self-interest and intrigue.\textsuperscript{90} Walsingham used it in both senses; here he employed it in its positive sense but elsewhere we find his enemies at court using religion as a cloak for ‘pollicye’, that is, ambition and intrigue.\textsuperscript{91} “Necessity” had its modern sense of inevitability; something that was unavoidable.\textsuperscript{92} It was also the chief consideration for those analysing political problems through the lens of “reason of state”. Francis Bacon described it as ‘the great god of the powerful’ and the only sure guide to what princes would do – far more than any treaty or promise. Princes’ actions were constrained by what was necessary in order to avert ‘peril of state’ and in order to buttrees their ‘interest’.\textsuperscript{93} In Walsingham’s advice to Elizabeth and in his longer policy papers, positive action (policy) would address the problems Elizabeth faced (her necessity). The

\textsuperscript{87} Walsingham to Elizabeth, 20 March 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 159.
\textsuperscript{88} Walsingham to Elizabeth, 16 January 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 150.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Walsingham to William Davison, 3 June 1584, TNA, SP 52/35, fol. 3v.
\textsuperscript{92} ‘Necessity’, Crystal.
language of “policy” is generally considered characteristic of Italian-style political thought, especially that of Machiavelli, and is prevalent in works inflected with this kind of thinking. It has overtones of ‘expediency and the pursuit of secular advantage as opposed to morality or religion’. A debt to this style of political analysis is also evident in Walsingham’s use of ‘estate’ in his reference to ‘good policie, and the necessitie of your estate’. In the entry for Walsingham in the ODNB, the authors note his ‘quite precocious employment of the vocabulary of the state, something not shared by his colleagues’. Long used to refer to ‘either the state or condition in which a ruler finds himself (status principii); or else the general “state of the nation” or condition of the realm as a whole (status regni)’, by the later sixteenth century the word “(e)state” had a range of meanings. It could mean ‘the preeminent status or the regime of a prince (or a citizen, or faction)’, or ‘the territory over which a prince or republic have sovereignty’. ‘Any form of political organisation’ could also be described as a state. Alongside these meanings, “state” began to acquire a more ‘abstract’ sense, denoting ‘a form of public power separate from both the ruler and the ruled, and constituting the supreme political authority within a certain defined territory’. Though in these formulations the prince is often identified with the state – they are said to be concerned with “maintaining their state”, for instance – the usage of the term sometimes developed into a sense ‘that there is an independent political apparatus, that of the State, which the ruler may be said to have a duty to maintain’. English writers in this vein included Thomas Starkey, who sometimes used “state” to mean the government or the practice of government, as well as to mean the condition of something, whether the

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96 ODNB, ‘Walsingham’.
100 Skinner, II, p. 353.
prince or the realm. Another early user of ideas drawn from recent Italian political writing was William Thomas, who we met in chapter 1. Thomas was close to two of Walsingham’s brothers-in-law, John Tamworth and Walter Mildmay, and in fact was married to Mildmay’s sister, Thomasina. As well as the time he spent in Italy, Walsingham could have interacted with these ideas through this connection, too.

A related though not always synonymous development was the rise of the concept of “reason of state”, characterised by its emphasis on necessity and policy, and pragmatic, sometimes amoral, political reasoning. Maurizio Viroli has argued that there was a difference between the language of “politics” derived from the works of Aristotle and Cicero and with which the political traditions of civic humanism, particularly in Italian city-republics, were imbued, and the emerging language of the “art of the state”. Viroli argued that where the former emphasised virtuous political conduct and asserted that what was right (bonestum) should correlate with what was useful (utile), the latter emphasised that in order to achieve political success it was necessary (at least sometimes) to deviate from the traditional requirements of morality or religion: bonestum and utile did not always conveniently mesh. Richard Tuck characterised these differing approaches as “old” and “new” humanism; one ‘dominated by the ideas and the style of Cicero’, and the other ‘by those of Tacitus’. Cicero generally stressed the conflation of right and benefit and that these were to be pursued through service to one’s polity, primarily through living ‘a life defined by the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude’ and denied that the ‘interests of the state could lie in any other kind of conduct’, though he did accept that some circumstances could warrant breaching a promise. The newer way of writing about politics demonstrated a preoccupation with centralising political authority and forging or maintaining stability. For post-Reformation rulers, these aims also had religious dimensions. Certainly, in England, where the monarch was also Supreme Governor of the national church, exercising authority and maintaining stability could never be purely secular concerns. As we are beginning to see, Walsingham would have absolutely agreed that the primary objectives of rulers were internal peace, security within and without, and the upholding of their state’s religion. The “art of the state” was considered to be particularly

103 Viroli, chapter 3, pp. 126-77 and chapter 4, pp. 178-200.
104 Tuck, p. 5.
105 Tuck, pp. 7.
applicable to what many saw as the corrupt state of political life in and the serious dangers afflicting early modern polities. Viroli argued that when discussing political life in idealised terms, both Machiavelli and Guicciardini returned to the active, conventionally-virtuous, republican-inflected language of “politics”, but when discussing how it worked in practice, they used the language of the “state”, which they saw as more appropriate to the realities of contemporary experience.\textsuperscript{106}

There was thus a strong connection between views of political power and the language used to discuss politics. If ‘State is a stable rule over a people’, where the people are ‘separate from the princely ruler to be controlled and dominated’, then it is easy to see how many reason of state thinkers came to see the prince as the sole person with the power and responsibility to judge what was necessary and useful to be done for the preservation of the state.\textsuperscript{107} This went hand-in-hand with a more “absolutist” conception of political power, which wanted to see authority concentrated in the hands of the prince: a strong, centralised authority that would ensure the peace and security of the state in both secular and religious matters. They were to use this omnipotence in the interests of their people – not for their own gain. This distinction was important to writers like Justus Lipsius who sought to integrate pragmatic political practice with Christian morality. For Lipsius, deception was perfectly permissible for princes, but only if it were used for the benefit of their subjects.\textsuperscript{108} Interestingly, many of the recommendations for the selection of counsellors to this all-powerful prince could have been lifted verbatim from more conventional humanist works on political conduct. Just as Erasmus and Thomas Elyot would have recommended, advisers were still expected to be sober, honest, pious men.\textsuperscript{109}

Though, as we have seen, Walsingham frequently sought to portray himself in these terms in his interactions with Elizabeth, he also claimed for himself the language and skills of the “man of state”.

Walsingham’s deployment of “state”, though, was often ambiguous. It is not always clear whether he had in mind the condition or position of a ruler, or in the emerging sense of ‘an independent political apparatus’, which the ruler was responsible for maintaining.\textsuperscript{110} Sometimes he deployed “state” in a sense which suggests he saw this as different from but connected to the monarch themselves, distinguishing often between a monarch’s ‘estate &

\textsuperscript{106} Viroli, pp. 130-31. See also Tuck, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{107} Gajda, ‘Gordian Knot’, p. 292.
\textsuperscript{110} See for example [? Walsingham] to Cobham, 15 April 1580, TNA, SP 78/4A, fol. 55. Skinner, II, p. 353.
person’, as in a letter to Davison on the dangers of James VI’s ‘violent and bloody coorse’, which apparently threatened his estate as well as his person, suggesting that Walsingham had in mind Scotland or Scottish government more generally as something distinct from the king.\(^{111}\)

On another occasion, Walsingham wrote that James VI acknowledged his ‘owne state […] to be weak’. Walsingham added that James’ subjects were so discontented ‘that there might easely faule out such a reformacion of the state as would be to great good purpos for bothe realmes'.\(^{112}\) These comments indicate that Walsingham was thinking of the condition of political authority in Scotland, which in James’ hands was ‘weak’, and the personnel exercising some of that authority, as what he hoped for in 1584 was for those who thought more like him to get their hands on the reins of power. It seems, therefore, that Walsingham subscribed to some aspects of the definitions of “state” traced above in that he used the term in ways that had to do with abstract authority and those who exercised it. In his conference with James in 1583, Walsingham used “state” in a similar way. He told the king that piety and justice were the ‘very foundation of all states’, and suggested that James release those imprisoned until they could be tried if they promised to ‘be of good behavior to the state’.\(^{113}\) Both of these comments seem to suggest a distance between the person of the monarch and the entity they governed: “the necessity of the state” is quite different from what was good for the monarch. He could think of one without the other, but they were intimately connected – and this seems also to be the sense of his usage of ‘estate’ in his letter to Elizabeth, where it is her estate.

In his conference with James in 1583, Walsingham used “state” in a similar way. He told the king that piety and justice were the ‘very foundation of all states’, and suggested that James release those imprisoned until they could be tried if they promised to ‘be of good behavior to the state’.\(^{113}\) Both of these comments seem to suggest a distance between the person of the monarch and the entity they governed: “the necessity of the state” is quite different from what was good for the monarch. He could think of one without the other, but they were intimately connected – and this seems also to be the sense of his usage of ‘estate’ in his letter to Elizabeth, where it is her estate.

In the letter of 16th of January, Walsingham piled metaphor upon metaphor, urging Elizabeth to act, ‘to set hand to the healme, and not to suffre your saftie and the quietnes of your state to depend as it dothe on others harmes’.\(^{114}\) In referring to the common conceit of the ship of state, Walsingham encouraged Elizabeth to take control of the direction of her country, and no longer allow it to drift on the tide at the mercy of others.

From ships, Walsingham moved to bodily metaphors. The presence of suspect subjects was a ‘maladie’ within the body of the realm, which was in danger of growing ‘vncurable’. Completing the trio of metaphors is that of fire. Walsingham told Elizabeth

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\(^{111}\) Walsingham to Davison, 22 June 1584, TNA, SP 52/35, fol. 15.

\(^{112}\) Walsingham to Stafford, 13 April 1584, TNA, SP 78/11, fol. 74.

\(^{113}\) I am quoting here from ‘The Heads of the Conference betwene the kinge of Scotts and Secretary Walsingham’, 12 September 1583, BL, Additional MS 48044, fols 307, 307; ‘be of good behavior to the state’ appears in this version, but not in the version in TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 39, which forms the basis of my analysis of this interview in chapter 5.

\(^{114}\) Walsingham to Elizabeth, 16 January 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 150.
that a lack of expedition on her part would mean that ‘the hidden sparkes of treason that nowe lye covered will […] breake out into an vnquenchable fyer’. Therefore, he exhorted her,

ffor the love of god madam let not the care of youre diseased estate hange any longer in delyberation. diseased states are no more cure by consultation, when nothyng resolved on is put in execution, than vsnownd and diseased bodies by only conference with physicians without receavyng the remeadies by them prescribed.\textsuperscript{115}

In Walsingham’s passionate construction, he and other councillors are physicians who have prescribed Elizabeth/England a remedy for their ills. The body/disease imagery was the most common political comparison used by Walsingham in his correspondence, especially with Elizabeth, though he was more original elsewhere.

This kind of medical and bodily imagery was ubiquitous in early modern political discourse, used by writers in different traditions.\textsuperscript{116} That this was Walsingham’s favoured metaphorical imagery suggests that it held special significance for him and this has implications for his political thought.\textsuperscript{117} Walsingham compared ‘Councellors of State’ to ‘wise Physicians’.\textsuperscript{118} The use of the body or medicine as an analogy for politics went back to Plato’s \textit{Republic}, which often featured in humanist educational recommendations – including Walsingham’s.\textsuperscript{119} Plato compared the art of medicine to the art of politics in that the former developed in order to ‘provide [the body] with the things which were good for it’. Accordingly, ‘the art of medicine does not think about what is good for the art of medicine, but what is good for the body’, and therefore all branches of specialised knowledge were designed to work for what was best for the things under their control, whether the bodies of patients, or the lives of subjects.\textsuperscript{120} Just using medical metaphors,

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} For other uses of medical/bodily imagery, see Paul Archambault, ‘The Analogy of the “Body” in Renaissance Political Literature’, \textit{Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance}, 29 (1967), 21-53.
\textsuperscript{118} Walsingham to Wotton, September 1585, TNA, SP 52/38, fol. 73.
\textsuperscript{119} Starkey, \textit{Dialogue}, p. 47.
therefore, was a way for Walsingham to reinforce his disinterested persona: he gave advice, and this specific advice, because it was good for the “patient”.

Walsingham’s use of medical language also paralleled the comments of Guicciardini that ‘the art of the state cannot consist of general rules to be applied to any government’, so the ‘statesman must imitate the skill of prudent and experienced physicians’, firstly considering the ‘nature of the disease’ and the condition of the patient, then ‘administering the right treatment’, which is exactly what Walsingham sought to do in his advice and longer policy documents.\(^\text{121}\) In his formulations, the nature of the patient is fluid: most often he means England/the commonwealth, but sometimes he meant Elizabeth. For example, in 1585, because ‘those that are hardlie drawne to resolue cannot easelie be drawne to attempt any thing that is subject to hazarde’, he explained that counsellors, like good doctors must, ‘applie the remedie agreable with the nature of the patient and not that whic maie seeme most proper for the desease’. This does not quite adhere to the image of “physicians” as honest, and bound to administer what was best for the patient even if this was unwelcome which is inherent in some usages of this metaphor. Because of Elizabeth’s reluctance to pursue Walsingham’s preferred Scottish policy, it was necessary to implement another, though Walsingham complained about the dangers of the approach he outlined, arguing that ‘in deseases of perill […] the applieng of lenetiues where [corrosives] should serve, though it yeldeth ease for a season yet in the ende it rendreth the desease incurable’.\(^\text{122}\) Both rulers and counsellors could be referred to as physicians and therefore this imagery illustrates the extent to which Walsingham did not differentiate between their responsibilities. It also bolstered his claim to expert knowledge: medical language bridged the gap between monarch and counsellor. He asserts that he has the necessary knowledge and the responsibility to cure even Elizabeth.

Though this metaphorical section of the letter may appear decorative, it seems actually to carry much of the weight of Walsingham’s argument. The purpose of the letter is to show that decisive action is necessary, at home, abroad and in Scotland. Rather than pointing out to the queen all the actual ills that could befall her if she failed to deal with seditious subjects or foreign malice, Walsingham instead used this emotive language presumably to frighten Elizabeth into yielding to his advice. Historians acknowledge that often the only way Elizabeth could be bounced into making a decision was if one could elicit an emotional response; if she were angry or frightened she was far more likely to act

\(^{121}\) Viroli, p. 138.
\(^{122}\) Walsingham to Wotton, September 1585, TNA, SP 52/38, fol. 73.
decisively. She could argue against specifics and quibble with his interpretation but it would be difficult to argue with these common themes.

Having shown the need for action, Walsingham delivered his specific solution. Elizabeth must yield to the demands of the regent, Morton, *which tend only to your majesties saftie*. Implicitly identifying himself with them, Walsingham claimed that ‘there is no man of judgement that loveth your majestie that can imagine any perill can befall vnto you so great as the losse of that gentleman ether by death or alienation’. Walsingham consistently identified his advice with the opinions of ‘men of judgement’ and those who had her interests at heart, as opposed to those who, transported with partiality, most certainly did not. In 1578 he lamented Elizabeth’s unwillingness to assist the Dutch with the words:

> By whose advice her Majestie is directed to deale so hardly with those of this country [...] I knowe not: but sure I am, that the alienation of theise peoples hartes from her [...] will breede so great perill to her highness self, and so great mischief to the whole Realme [...] as she will cursse them that were the authours of the advice, whom she shall perceave that they had more regard to som particuluer profit [...] then to her highnes safties as in true course of duty they are bound.

His plainness implicitly served as an assertion of his good faith and honesty and the quality of his advice. Thus, a decision not to use heavily patterned language or rhetorical flourishes was intended, paradoxically, to have a persuasive effect.

After delivering his advice in 1575, Walsingham sought to justify his lengthy writing by insisting that it arose from his dutiful concern for Elizabeth. He wrote that he was ‘drawen (transported with zeale of your salfitie) as in trewe dutie I am bownd) to bee over tediouse’, which he hoped Elizabeth would ‘graciously pardon’.

124 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 16 January 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 150v.
125 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 12 April 1575, TNA, SP 12/103, fol. 59.
126 [Walsingham] to Burghley, 2 September 1578, TNA, SP 83/9, fols 61-61v.
127 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 12 April 1575, TNA, SP 12/103, fol. 59.
128 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 20 March 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2 fol. 159.
that was loyal, dutiful, impartial, and wise, with the best interests of Elizabeth and England at heart, in the humanist-classical tradition.

In the second of the letters (7th February), Walsingham declined to comment on enclosed advertisements because ‘the rypenes of your rare iudgement can easely ynoough without others glosses dyscerne the mysteryes conteyned in the text’. Walsingham only asked ‘him that dyrectethe all princes hartes resolutely to inclyne your majesties mynde to doe that spedely that may prevent the myschefes that most dangerously hang over your majesties heade’. Through this flattering reference to Elizabeth’s own abilities, the letter manages the trick of doing exactly what the author ostensibly refuses to do: while asserting his reluctance to comment on the news he was sending Elizabeth, Walsingham nonetheless urged her to act on it speedily to prevent the dangers he saw approaching. Elizabeth would have been well aware of what Walsingham wanted her to do in this situation, and therefore the letter implicitly contains that advice even in its silence.

Even Walsingham’s efforts to manipulate Elizabeth, however, show that he accepted her primacy in the political process. Elizabeth presided over a group of active and capable advisers who, influenced by their own training, saw advising her as necessary even when their opinions were not solicited. It was necessary, therefore, for the queen to develop mechanisms for retaining control and asserting her primacy over her counsellors. A key aspect of Elizabeth’s practice was the appointment of small groups of advisers to discuss particular issues, separate from the council as a whole. Natalie Mears has termed these ‘probouleutic groups’. For Walsingham, the next letter in the series shows that by 1575 at least, this practice was an expected and accepted part of counselling the queen.

Elizabeth had charged Walsingham with overseeing the interrogation of Henry Cockyn, a London stationer suspected of intriguing on behalf of Mary Stuart, which can be seen as an extension of his involvement in sensitive matters before his official entry into public life. Walsingham assumed that Elizabeth would only involve selected counsellors, writing of ‘such tyme as you shall communike this matter to such of your counsell as to your majestie shall seeme fitt’. Walsingham expected that after Elizabeth had read his enclosed advertisements she ‘maye make choyce of such of your counsell as you shall thinke fitte to have the consideration thereof committed vnto’.

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129 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 7 February 1575, TNA, SP 53/10, fol. 7.
130 Mears, Queenship and Political Discourse, pp. 35-40.
131 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 22 February 1575, TNA, SP 53/10, fol. 12.
132 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 16 January 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 150.
Elizabeth did not usually receive advice from her council in corporate fashion. Instead, Walsingham and each of his colleagues had an individual relationship with the queen based on her appreciation of their abilities and on personal affection. This concept of direct personal service was reinforced by the language of the oath that new privy councillors took on their appointment. Each swore to ‘beare trew fayth and allegiance’ to the queen and to advise her ‘as maye best seme in your conscience’ for her safety and the good of the commonweal. No mention was made of the new councillor’s responsibilities to his colleagues.133

This was how Walsingham’s relationship with Elizabeth worked in practice, too. As Walsingham investigated the Babington plot in 1586 he again kept Elizabeth informed of developments while keeping his colleagues in the dark. He promised that ‘I wyll as dvtye byndethe me most preycely observe your majesties commavndement espetyally in keping to my sleve bothe the depthde and the manner of the dyscoverye of this great & weyghtye cauze’. Again, Walsingham and Elizabeth worked closely together on matters of sensitive security. Elizabeth had even suggested using a cipher of Ballard’s to extract further mileage from the conspirators, though as Walsingham did not have any such ciphers, ‘nothing can be wrowght that waye as your h[ighness] most polytkely advysethe’.134 Walsingham’s use of “politicly” here as a compliment has the meaning of pragmatic prudence, and works through its association of them both in skilfull political action.135

The letter of 22nd February also saw Walsingham carefully managing his relationships with his conciliar colleagues. He asked Elizabeth, when she appointed councillors to discuss the issue, that she would explain to them that ‘at my departure from the Court you gave mee especiall co[m]mamdment in the tyme of my absence to send vnto yo[r] majesties selfe all such matters of consequence as should come into my hands withoutt communicatyng them to any other’. He feared that otherwise his colleagues might think that their exclusion from the secret proceeded ‘ether of a certayne distrust of their loyaltie, or of a kynd of ambition in my selfe’.136 Contrary to the impression of a carelessly tactless Walsingham, this letter reveals a certain political astuteness. Despite professing to depend ‘only vpon god and yo[ur] majestie’, he was well aware of the perils of alienating his colleagues. He told the queen that he wanted his colleagues ‘to thyncke that in fullfillynge yo[ur] majesties commamdment I carie no respect to persons […] and yet do beare towards

133 ‘The othe of a Consellor’, 17 November 1558, TNA, SP 12/1, fol. 3v.
134 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 5 August 1586, TNA, SP 53/19, fol. 17.
135 ‘Politic’, Crystal.
136 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 22 February 1575, TNA, SP 53/10, fol. 12.
them that reverent respect that their callyng & places requireth’. This concern was also apparent right at the end of his career, when in response to a request that he obtain a royal audience for Scottish envoy Richard Douglas Walsingham asked ‘to be excused’ from doing so and suggested that Douglas instead approach the Lord Chamberlain, ‘whose province it is’. His reason for doing this, he explained, was that the Lord Chamberlain ‘otherwise will conceave, as he doth alreadie, that I seke to drawe those matters from him’. 138

Walsingham evidently considered it part of his own role to remind Elizabeth of her omissions and neglects. On 20th March 1575, Walsingham reminded Elizabeth of Regent Morton’s demands so that she could give her answer to these to her soon-to-be dispatched envoy. He wrote, ‘I thought it my dutie […] to send you your highnes a note of the same fearynge that yt he shall not receave some such answere as shalbe to his contentment, your majesties sendynge thither may rather prove priuadiciall than profittable’. 139 This was an unsolicited reminder, driven by Walsingham’s conviction of the necessity of Morton and Scottish amity for English security. He encouraged other crown agents to act in the same way. In 1583, Walsingham reassured Robert Bowes, the English envoy in Scotland, over Elizabeth’s annoyance at his recent letters. He urged Bowes to ‘continewe your former Course of advertisement; and if that proffitt be not taken therof that reason and pollicy commandeth, the fault is not in you who do discharge your dutie but in thos whom I paye god may be free from the smarte therof’. 140 The fault, in other words, was Elizabeth’s, and all Bowes could do was continue to sound the alarm about the dangers of French money and influence in Scotland.

In 1575, Walsingham drew attention to the unprecedented opportunity offered by Morton’s Anglophilia, and he did this in the language of “policy”. Anglo-Scottish amity was ‘more necessarie for your majestie than for them, for that it is apparent that none will ever assayle Scotland but with intention to have a foote in England’. 141 If she did not avail herself of this opportunity, ‘the burden of the error wilbe only cast on your majestie by refusynge contradrie to the advise of your Cowncell that amitie offerd vnto you, that vnoffred in due pollicie ware most necessarie to be sought for, a thinge your majesties predecessours, whoo stoode not in like neede of their amitie, would have redeemed with

137 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 22 February 1575, TNA, SP 53/10 fol. 12. See also [Walsingham] to Elizabeth, 26 February 1575, TNA, SP 53/10, fol. 13.
138 Walsingham to Archibald Douglas, 27 January 1590, HMC Hatfield, IV, p. 3.
139 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 20 March 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 159.
140 Walsingham to Bowes, [27 February] 1583, TNA, SP52/31, fol.45v1.
141 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 20 March 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 159.
any treasure’. Here Walsingham made use of England’s historical attempts to subjugate or otherwise secure Scotland to demonstrate both the desirability and necessity of amity with Scotland. He acknowledged Elizabeth’s freedom of action (she can/has refuse(d) advice) but tried to make this seem unappealing by stressing that any ill effects of her inaction would be her responsibility. Not content with this, Walsingham also threatened that the alienation of Scotland could also affect the loyalty of her own subjects ‘in that you laye them open to so many manifest perils’. This hints at the Secretary’s conception of Elizabeth’s role; ultimately she ruled for the benefit of her subjects, not herself.

Scotland was absolutely essential to Walsingham’s political understanding and plans. To him, it was essential that “the postern gate” needed to be secured with pensions and friendship. This, he pointed out to Elizabeth, was the advice of ‘such of your Counsell as are most carefull for your majesties salutie & look depeliest into your estate’. By referring to this group of good, wise councillors with which he implicitly identified himself, Walsingham was able to bolster his argument and assert the uprightness of his advice. This trope of the good advisers appears time and time again in Walsingham’s correspondence, usually reflecting by implication his own views or those of Anglophile, Protestant individuals in other polities. In 1571, for example, he described the Huguenot leaders as ‘such as are of judgement here, and wish well unto her Majestie and our Country’.

Walsingham also tailored the content of his advice to his audience. One of the striking aspects of Walsingham’s written advice to Elizabeth is his habitual omission of arguments based on the interests of international Protestantism. In these letters to Elizabeth in 1575 in which he urged her to ally herself with the Scots he made no mention of the countries’ shared religious outlook despite the fact that Walsingham felt the emotional and ideological pull of this himself, and expressed this in contemporaneous letters to Morton. Knowing such arguments would cut no ice with Elizabeth, he instead focused on the practical dangers facing her, especially the threats posed by France and Spain, so securing the northern border was supremely necessary. This was part of Walsingham’s rhetorical training, to select appropriate arguments for his audience, just as much as Elizabeth used her own training to discern the merits and flaws of the various pieces of advice she received.

142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Walsingham to Leicester, 9 March 1571, Digges, sig. H2v.
145 Walsingham to [Burghley], 24 July 1577, BL, Cotton, Caligula C III, fol. 529. See chapter 5.
146 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 20 March 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 159.
In one of these letters, Walsingham summed up his conception of how their relationship worked: ‘having plainly layde before your majesty my opinion […] as in dutye I am bownde I refer the same to your majesty grave consyderatyon beseeching god to inclyne your majesties harte to resolve as may moste tende to your hyenes savety’. Though again deferring to Elizabeth’s ‘consyderatyon’, Walsingham considered it his ‘dutye’ to point out her errors and their consequences, and to provide advice even when not requested to do so. However, he would obey her commands even if he disagreed with them. On 9th March, to the earl of Leicester, he wrote in despair that Elizabeth was ‘bent rather to cover […] than to cure’ the ‘sores of this diseased state’. However, he added that as Elizabeth ‘hathe power to punishe and pardon whom shee listeth, shee shall fynd me readie […] to execute such directions as I shall receave from hir majestie’. He accepted that the queen’s counsellors were ‘Councellors by choyce, and not by birth, whose services are no longer to be used in that publicke function then it shall please her Majestie to dispose of the same’.

The pattern of their advisory relationship was for Walsingham to discuss the issue of the moment with the queen, sometimes arguing strongly against her preferred course of action, but ending with his acceptance of her decision and obedience to her wishes. In 1586, Walsingham conveyed to Sir Amias Paulet, gaoler of the queen of Scots, Elizabeth’s order to seize Mary’s money and dismiss her servants, apparently in the hope that these indignities would induce a final decline in his prisoner. Walsingham disapproved of these instructions, but told Paulet that as he was away from court on sick leave, ‘I cannot debate the matter with her majesty as I would’. His advice to Paulet was that the queen’s ‘pleasure being suche I do not see why you should nowe any longer forbeare the putting of the same in executio[n], Yf afterwardes thinconvenienc[es] happen […] her majesty can blame none but her selfe for yt’. Walsingham gave advice to Elizabeth because it was his duty as a loyal counsellor. However, once he had discharged this duty, if she refused his advice, the responsibility for the consequences was hers alone. This hints at another key part of the Walsingham-Elizabeth relationship. She knew he could be relied upon to execute her commands, no matter how much he had previously opposed them. As he put it: ‘seinge I am borne a subiecte & not a prynce I am tyed to the condition of obedience & com[maundemente]’. This was not, apparently, qualified by her gender.

147 Ibid.
148 [Walsingham] to Leicester, 9 March 1575, TNA, SP 53/10, fol. 18.
150 Walsingham to Sir Amias Paulet, 5 September 1586, TNA, SP 53/19, fol. 87.
151 Walsingham to [unknown], 1570, TNA, SP 12/45, fol. 1v.
Walsingham endowed Elizabeth with all the powers of a king in theory, though she needed encouragement to be truly seen this way in practice. In 1571, for example, Walsingham hoped that Elizabeth would ‘take proffyt’ of the discovery of the Ridolfi plot by ‘shewing some good example of ivstycye wherby she may be restored to the repvtatyon dewe to a prynce’. If, on the other hand, she ‘contynewe her wonted remissnes in that behalf I feare her majestye can not longe stande’. Similarly, the following year, he lamented that Elizabeth was ‘carryed awaye wi\textit{th} overmyche lenite, in a tyme so nedefvll to doe ivstycye’. As well as ‘her home dayn\textit{ger}’, her reluctance to punish plotters with sufficient severity also ‘makethe her of lesse repvtatyon here abrode for that theynke she can not in pollecye longe stande’. Walsingham’s emphasis on “reputation” here is reminiscent of the concerns of “reason of state” theorists, especially Machiavelli, who dwelt the importance of a prince’s reputation in political success. The execution of justice (including the punishing of offenders) was one of a monarch’s god\textit{given} duties, and Elizabeth’s reluctance to do this properly was also a practical problem in that it risked her life and the safety of her subjects. Walsingham certainly endowed Elizabeth with the power to do this. Despite his criticism of Elizabeth’s slackness in dealing with more plotters in 1575, he nonetheless promised to execute her orders. He told Leicester, ‘for that hir majestie hathe power to punishe and pardon whome she listethe, shee shall fynd me readie to execute such directi[...] to execute such directions as I shall receave from hir’.

From the very earliest moments of his career, Walsingham seems to have genuinely accepted this dynamic. As resident ambassador in Paris (1570-73), Walsingham was forced to address one of the thorniest issues of Elizabethan politics: the queen’s marriage. Though Elizabeth’s advisers and subjects expected her to marry from her accession, Walsingham’s letters to his superiors at this time betray little such expectation and in fact show considerable anxiety about the prospect of a match.

In January 1571, before he had received official commission to deal in the matter, Walsingham wrote to the earl of Leicester that ‘whensoever it shall please God to incline’ Elizabeth to marry ‘I should forget my dutie towards her and my Countrey, if I should not like very well thereof’. This was hardly a ringing endorsement. Before his arrival,

152 Walsingham to l Burghley, 8 November 1571, TNA, SP 70/121, fol. 6.
153 Walsingham to Burghley, 2 March 1572, TNA, SP 70/123, fol. 3.
155 [Walsingham] to Leicester, 9 March 1575, TNA, SP 53/10, fol. 18.
Walsingham added, the French had considered him ‘a very passionate Enemy’ to the marriage.\textsuperscript{156} Walsingham insisted, however, that

I left my private passions behind me, and do here submit my self to the passions of my Prince, to execute whatsoever she shall command me, as precisely as I may, not presuming to do any thing further then I shall be commanded.\textsuperscript{157}

In a similar vein, Walsingham described his job to Burghley as being ‘to advertise and not to advice’, though he promised to occasionally write his ‘private opinion’ as a ‘private man, and not as one that beareth a publique office’ to Burghley.\textsuperscript{158} Walsingham thought that the advantages and disadvantages of the marriage were plain to see, so once they had been properly considered by Elizabeth and her advisers, ‘a speedie resolution were best to cut off many inconveniences that delay of time commonly bringeth’. He professed to have no preferences one way or the other in regard to the marriage, as long as the chosen remedy were applied swiftly.\textsuperscript{159}

As well French suspicion, Walsingham had to contend with Elizabeth’s doubts about his commitment to the marriage. He told Burghley that he was reluctant to ‘make mention of any thing that may any way concern Monsieur’ in his letters to be showed to Elizabeth because she ‘doth suspect that I am inclined that way in respect of his Religion’. He assured Burghley that, in fact, he saw ‘so great necessitie of her marriage, as if it may be to her Majesties contentment, and the benefit of the Realm, by judgement of those that are fit to deal and advise in a matter of so great weight’, he could ‘be content as becometh me to subscribe the same’.\textsuperscript{160} Walsingham admitted to Burghley that ‘[t]he only scrvple I have is the exercyce of his relygyon being my selfe not perswaded that evyll may be don whereof good may growe’. Despite this, given the peril in which he saw England and Elizabeth he was ‘lothe […] that this matter should quayle thorrowghe my defavte’, and was prepared to do all he could to further it.\textsuperscript{161}

Walsingham managed to find a way of walking the line between obedience to the letter of the queen’s wishes and their spirit. Though not enthusiastic about the match, Walsingham was convinced of its necessity for England’s security, and he was worried

\textsuperscript{156} Walsingham to Leicester, 28 January 1571, Digges, sig. E2v.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid, sig. E2v.\textsuperscript{1}
\textsuperscript{158} Walsingham to Burghley, 5 April 1571, Digges, sig. K2v.\textsuperscript{4}
\textsuperscript{159} Walsingham to Leicester, 3 February 1571, Digges, sig. Fv.
\textsuperscript{160} Walsingham to Cecil, 18 February 1571, Digges, sig. Gi.
\textsuperscript{161} Walsingham to Burghley, 28 April 1571, TNA, SP 70/117, fol. 154v.
about Anjou’s reluctance and the rumours in France regarding Elizabeth’s sincerity. Walsingham had just received instructions from Elizabeth ordering him to continue to refuse the prince freedom of worship should the marriage take place. Though Walsingham approved of these instructions, he also suspected that, should he convey her answer to the French, they would see her reluctance as an excuse to break the marriage off. As a result, Walsingham declared himself ‘very much perplexed what course to take’, but ultimately decided to stick as closely as possible to his instructions, while omitting to mention religion in his next audience with the queen mother. It was, he told Burghley, ‘most fit for me to forget my selfe and to thinke only of her majesty and of her savetye’.162

Walsingham explained his decision by comparing himself to that Roman, that notwithstanding a Law was made that no man should hazard to come on the Wall without consent of the Magistrate, yet he seeing the enemy preparing for the scale, and that the delay of time in asking the Magistrates consent might have hazarded the losse of the City, preferring a publick safety before his private peril, repaired to the Walls and repulsed the enemy; the matter afterward being called in question, he was acquitted of the penalty, and adjudged a good member of the City: like consideration made me to take this course.163

This is one of the clearest statements of how Walsingham thought about his place in Elizabethan politics. His assertions of to-the-letter obedience notwithstanding, Walsingham used his initiative in pursuit of his objective. He saw himself as a citizen, with a responsibility to do what was necessary to protect his country.

By the autumn, however, the negotiations had completely fallen through because of Anjou’s intransigence. Walsingham promised to do what he could to revive the matter, but despaired of this ‘utterly’, though in his letters to Elizabeth he had thought ‘good […] to saye somewhat […] to contente her’. Walsingham, despite his reservations, was so convinced that Elizabeth needed the marriage that he was prepared to breathe new life into the negotiations.164 One of the reasons for this was that he believed that if Anjou were rejected, he would make a Spanish marriage and help them execute their designs against England.165 Walsingham’s letters to both Leicester and Burghley in April and May 1571

162 Walsingham to Burghley, 1 April 1571, TNA, SP 70/117, fols 64-64v.
163 Walsingham to Burghley, 1 April 1571, Digges, sig. K2v.
164 Walsingham to Burghley, 8 October 1571, TNA, SP 70/120, fol. 69.
165 Walsingham to Burghley, 4 April 1571, TNA, SP 70/117, fol. 107.
were full of fear that the projected marriage was the only thing keeping England’s enemies at bay.\textsuperscript{166} He therefore explicitly put national security ahead of his religious concerns.

With the Anjou marriage in abeyance, French amity was instead to be secured with a league, the negotiations for which culminated in the Treaty of Blois, signed 19\textsuperscript{th} April 1572. However, all the effort at goodwill came to nothing four months later, when another mixed religious marriage, between the Huguenot Henri of Navarre and the Catholic Marguerite of Valois, sparked the massacre of St Bartholomew’s Day. This, as the second part of this chapter will show, had a serious impact on Walsingham’s opinion of the queen’s marriage.

Walsingham’s experience in France also saw him managing perceptions of Elizabeth and her regime for external consumption. During Walsingham’s special embassy to France in 1570 he had defended Elizabeth’s control over the political process. The queen mother, Catherine de Medici, asked him about the ‘present estate’ of Mary Stuart. Walsingham answered ‘according to the tenor of my Instructions’. Catherine then asserted that she knew that if Elizabeth ‘did deal anything hardly with the Queen of Scots, it rather proceeded from some of her Ministers, than from her Majesties self’. Walsingham could not let this pass, and replied that:

I was glad to understand, that she conceived so well of the Queen my Mistress’s good disposition; so I was sorry, that she should think that she would be, by any of her Ministers or Councellors, drawn to any thing […] that might not stand with her honour; for that her skill and years was now to direct, and not to be directed.\textsuperscript{167}

On the other hand, Walsingham also on occasion emphasised Elizabeth’s dependence on her advisers. When, for instance, England’s friends in Scotland were concerned by the queen’s negotiations with James’ exiled favourite, the duke of Lennox, Walsingham reassured them that Elizabeth ‘wilbe verie well aduised before she do yeld her consent or furtheraunce to a matter that may bring so much prejudice to hir self and to them no lesse dainger’. He also reminded them that it was ‘the manner of all prince\textsuperscript{s} in dewe coorse of wisdom and pollecye to enterreyne the offers of thos, with whom notwithstanding they will beware not to deale further then maye be for their owne advauntage with thadvice and counsell of their trustiest senuaunte\textsuperscript{s} and Counsellors’.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{166} See for example, Walsingham to Burghley, 14 May 1571, TNA, SP 70/118, fol. 22; Walsingham to Leicester, 14 May 1571, Digges, sig. N2\textsuperscript{v}; Walsingham to Burghley, 30 June 1571, TNA, SP 70/118, fol. 131.

\textsuperscript{167} Walsingham to Burghley, 29 August 1570, Digges, sigs Bv\textsuperscript{2-3}.

\textsuperscript{168} [Walsingham] to Bowes, 29 May 1583, TNA, SP 52/32, fols 49-49\textsuperscript{v}. 
These comments, intended to steady the loyalty of these allies in Scotland, show a confidence in the ability of her advisers to bridle Elizabeth which Walsingham almost certainly did not feel. Walsingham’s utterances on the subject of politics tend to be highly dependent upon contingency, as in these examples, and, as such, it is difficult to establish what his “real” beliefs or views were, but the extreme flexibility of his approach is suggestive of a practical mindset, governed above all by “policy” and “necessity”.

He does, however, seem to have considered it Elizabeth’s responsibility to rule for the benefit of her (Protestant) subjects, not herself. Accordingly, while he and Sir Thomas Smith were negotiating what became the Treaty of Blois in 1572, Walsingham urged Charles IX to put his assurance of aid in the event that England be attacked for religious reasons in the treaty rather than in a private document on the grounds that, though Elizabeth might be content with a private assurance, ‘some of her Council would not, and leagues must be made not only to satisfie the Prince, but also the Subjects’. This idea surfaced again in 1581 when Walsingham was charged with letting the duke of Alençon down gently in his marriage suit. Walsingham claimed that ‘the good will and love’ of one’s subjects was ‘the true strength and glory of a Prince’, and he emphasised the disjunction between Elizabeth’s own feelings and her desire to act in the best interests of her people with a reference to the idea of the monarch’s two bodies. Walsingham told the duke that:

when she did with the eye and affection of her natural body, look into his constant love born towards her […] whereof her Majestie at his last being with her, grew to have so great a liking, as she rested greatly afflicted and perplexed in mind, because that in respect of those impediments that concerned her politique body (which did so greatly import her, as the alienation of her Subjects good wils from her, in case her Majestie should be accompanied with a War) she could not proceed as she did desire.

As well as convenient way of explaining her reluctance to marry Alençon, the idea of Elizabeth’s two bodies might have fused with Walsingham’s use of the vocabulary of state, enabling him to justify his independent action as for the good of her body politic, and/or the state, regardless of the wrath of her body natural, as Plowden et al had done in the law courts. Even nearly thirty years later, these ideas may have still marked some of Walsingham’s political actions.

169 Smith and Walsingham to Elizabeth, 1 March 1572, Digges, sig. Zv.
170 Walsingham to Burghley, August 1581, Digges, sig. Aaa2v1, Aaa2v3.
Walsingham’s comments elsewhere, especially obvious in his insistence that Elizabeth should deal firmly with Mary Stuart or her subjects would be in danger, suggest that his invocation of Elizabeth’s duty to retain her subjects’ goodwill was a way of putting pressure on the queen to do as he thought necessary.\textsuperscript{172} One of the ways he might have sought to do this – but did not – was through Parliament, seen by historians of Neale’s generation as an emerging part of government.

Walsingham was described (anachronistically) by Conyers Read as a ‘good Royalist and a bad Parliamentarian’, and his parliamentary performances have been described as ‘perfunctory’.\textsuperscript{173} Though Walsingham believed that Elizabeth ought to listen to her ‘subjects in Parliament’, for example in their efforts to provide for her safety by neutralising the threat posed by the Queen of Scots in 1572, this is not the same as constraining her rule.\textsuperscript{174} He certainly accepted that Parliament had the power to decide the succession, at least by barring certain individuals. The evidence suggests that Walsingham approved of the political nation being consulted and allowed to discuss important matters, but as a practical concession to the political process, not necessarily out of any constitutional principle. Parliament also featured in Peter Wentworth’s designs for the settling the succession, though, interestingly, in his last treatise on the matter he had changed his mind, arguing in the late 1590s that a successor chosen by Parliament would be weak, and favouring instead the hereditary right of James of Scotland. As Paulina Kewes has argued, this was ‘less an ideological shift […] than a function of circumstance’.\textsuperscript{175} For Walsingham, a Parliamentary statement of the succession would almost certainly have had the advantage of excluding Mary Stuart. By the 1590s, it was no longer necessary to take measures to prevent this, though godly opinion by no means swung unanimously and immediately behind James upon his mother’s execution.\textsuperscript{176}

There is no evidence of Walsingham ever making much of a contribution to Parliamentary debates despite his presence in every Parliament between 1559 and his death. In 1576 he sat on some minor committees, and in 1581, he made two interventions.\textsuperscript{177} Hasler was puzzled by Walsingham’s failure to exploit his ‘almost boundless opportunities’

\textsuperscript{172} Walsingham to Burghley, 31 January 1572, TNA, SP 70/122, fol. 148.
\textsuperscript{173} Read, III, p. 414; ODNB, ‘Walsingham’.
\textsuperscript{174} Walsingham to Sir Thomas Smith, 10 August 1572, Digges, sig. Hh. See also Walsingham to Wilkes, 3 December 1586, TNA, SP 84/11, fol. 51v.
\textsuperscript{175} Paulina Kewes, ‘The Puritan, the Jesuit and the Jacobean Succession’, in \textit{Doubtful and Dangerous: The Question of Succession in Late Elizabethan England}, ed. by Susan Doran and Paulina Kewes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), pp. 47-70 (pp. 64-65).
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid, passim.
for parliamentary patronage: he apparently never asked the boroughs where he held ceremonial office to return his nominees. In 1586, Walsingham completely missed the opportunity to nominate MPs at Colchester but approved the borough’s choice without hesitation.\textsuperscript{178} There is no evidence of wholesale manipulation of elections on his part, except for those preceding the 1584 parliament, which was called to make provision for the queen’s security and to approve a subsidy for this purpose. Walsingham and Leicester, and possibly some of their conciliar colleagues, ‘engaged in a massive and hasty trawl through the boroughs, regardless of previous connection’ in order to secure the return of men who would support the measures under consideration.\textsuperscript{179}

On occasion, Walsingham did intercede in local election processes though often this was clearly at the behest of the council and not on his own account. It was in these terms that he wrote in 1586 to instruct Sir William More and his colleagues to prevent Mrs Copley nominating the two burgesses for the borough of Gatton, ‘for that she is known to be evell affected’, and to return William Waad and Nicholas Fuller. Even here, though, the recipients had the freedom to reject the suggested names, as long as ‘discrete persons be chosen and well affected’. This letter hints at Walsingham’s desired qualities in MPs. He told the recipients that ‘specyall choice should be had for this present parlement of fyt persons known to be well affected in Relygion and towards the estate’.\textsuperscript{180} There are perhaps echoes here of the “art of the state” in that key government positions were ‘filled with friends of the state’.\textsuperscript{181} Their responsibility, by implication, was not to debate or criticise, but to act, and to act in support of the government. This accounts for the negative comments Walsingham made about Parliament that led Read to issue his judgement.

Walsingham complained on several occasions about the institution. However, most of these complaints relate specifically to the Parliament of 1581, so it seems unreliable to extrapolate from this to assume that he always viewed it so negatively. In fact, Walsingham had a reasonable, if not exalted, opinion of the institution and its functions. Walsingham’s criticisms of Parliament imply a specific conception of how it ought to function which was not being met. It is worth investigating, however, why the 1581 proceedings so attracted his ire. This session, from January to March, was a reconvened session of the 1572

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid, p. 574.
\textsuperscript{180} Walsingham to Sir Thomas Browne, Richard Bostock, Sir William More, 27 September 1586, SHC, 6729/7/80.
\textsuperscript{181} Virolì, p. 146.
Parliament, and was called in order to deal with the mounting Jesuit threat to the religious and political stability of the land.182

At the very outset of the meeting, Walsingham complained to Huntingdon that ‘[o]ur Parliament hath had a sore beginning’ because of Paul Wentworth’s motion for a public fast, ‘a matter not to be disallowed of in case the same had been orderly proceeded in’.183 The fast motion proposed by Wentworth, whose brother was married to Walsingham’s sister, contravened Elizabeth’s direction that the MPs were not to meddle in religious or prerogative matters, and as such provoked a rebuke from the queen.184 By the end of January, Walsingham feared that Parliament would be dissolved ‘without doing anything wherein honest men may take comfort’.185 This was despite the fact that ‘many good things are presently set afoot’.186 On 7th March, Walsingham was still grumbling to his correspondents about the lack of progress. Apart from some measures against recusants, to which Elizabeth had not yet assented, he told Huntingdon that ‘otherwise there hath not passed any matter of importance, so careful have men been to prefer their private causes before the common benefit of the state’, with connotations of “realm”.187 He complained similarly to Robert Bowes that ‘little has been performed […] tending either to God’s glory or her majesty’s safety’.188

The language of Walsingham’s complaints suggests that one of the reasons for them was the time spent on private bills. Private bills, concerning the interests of both individuals or specific localities took up about a third of Parliament’s time as a result of their sheer number and also because they were often ‘contentious’.189 Seventeen statutes and thirteen private bills were passed in 1581.190 It was true that the ‘Act to restrain the Queen’s Majesty’s subjects in their due obedience’, which imposed penalties for recusancy, was a toned-down version of the original proposals.191 Walsingham may have been disappointed with the relatively milder nature of the bill as passed. A bill prohibiting the

mystical sect, the Family of Love, which denounced their doctrines as ‘not only heresy, but also tending to sedition and disturbance of the State’, was heavily disputed and abandoned.\footnote{192}{Ibid, p. 410; Thomas Cromwell’s Journal, 16 January 1581 – 8 March 1581, Trinity College Dublin, MS 1045, fols 96-115, printed in Hartley, pp. 524-47 (p. 539).} A bill tightening the penalties against the spreaders of seditious rumours and writings was passed, after much debate.\footnote{193}{Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, 1559-1581, pp. 393-97.} Walsingham was probably also disappointed at the continued lack of religious reform, a concern his fellow MPs shared. The Commons sent Walsingham, his fellow Secretary, Thomas Wilson, Sir Walter Mildmay, and Sir Christopher Hatton to confer with the bishops on the issue, and persuade them to continue to press Elizabeth for further reform. These meetings led to a suit to Elizabeth to consider the matter, which received a gracious answer, but no concrete result.\footnote{194}{Ibid, pp. 399-402; Cromwell’s Journal, in Hartley; ecclesiastical articles, Hartley, pp. 510-21.} The bishops were blamed by Mildmay, among other members of the House, for the lack of progress.\footnote{195}{Ibid, p. 404.} Walsingham may have shared this frustration, and this might account for his later proposal to fund intervention in the Netherlands partly through the conversion of bishops’ temporalities into fee farms – they would help protect England one way or another.\footnote{196}{See chapter 3.} It is hard to know how representative Walsingham’s opinions about Parliament were. In \textit{De Repubica Anglorum}, Sir Thomas Smith had named the changing of the rights of ‘private men’ first in his description of Parliament’s functions.\footnote{197}{Dean, Law-Making and Society, p. 217.} Walsingham’s criticism of the volume of private legislation in Parliament may therefore represent a different conception of the institution, one in which its primary function was the passing of government initiatives. He probably felt this was especially urgent in a time of crisis.

On balance, then, it seems that Walsingham appreciated Parliament’s role in English government, but ideally wanted it to focus on passing government legislation, rather than on private or local bills. He was especially focused on Parliament when he thought it would force Elizabeth’s hand. However, the institution otherwise features little in Walsingham’s correspondence, which probably reflects the relatively minor place of Parliament in policy formation and diplomacy, and certainly Walsingham’s focus on council and monarch as the places where the most important politics happened. Parliament, it must be remembered, was summoned by the monarch, and it was not, therefore, illogical for Walsingham to see the institution as the junior partner. It is not that Walsingham was a
‘bad Parliamentarian’, simply that he had a view of the institution which differed from some of his contemporaries, and the unrealistic expectations of later historians.

A similarly top-down vision of political action was apparent from Walsingham’s opinions on Irish politics in 1577. Walsingham offered Elizabeth written advice about the turbulent situation in Ireland, caused by the attempts of Lord Deputy Sidney to convert the cess, a sort of taxation in kind, into a fixed monetary contribution. Sidney’s programme was resented by the landowners of the Pale as an attempt to impose an arbitrary tax.198 In February 1577, the Palesmen despatched three agents to London with a list of grievances against Sidney. It seems that Walsingham’s paper was not written specifically at the queen’s behest. He justified his writing as being the result of having ‘pervsed sooche wrytynges as have ben sent owt of Irelande concernyng the matter of cesse’, either to the Council or to himself. He added, ‘I thought yt my dvtye being best acquaynted wi the present matter of any other of your majest cowncell in respect of the place I vnworthelly howld’.199 As Secretary, he received official, public reports from the viceroys, regional presidents, army commanders, nobles and so on, and he conveyed these to the Council and the queen. He drafted correspondence for Elizabeth, relayed her instructions and participated in discussions about policy. This ubiquity gave him an extremely thorough grasp of events, views and policies. It shows on what basis Walsingham might presume to advise Elizabeth: his claim to special knowledge legitimises his counsel, and elevates it above that of others.

Perhaps surprisingly, Walsingham was not unsympathetic to the Palesmen’s mission, although he thought they might have gone about it better. He would have been more sympathetic if, rather than refusing payment of the composition money outright, they had pleaded the dearth caused by bad harvests and raids and requested ‘to have ben […] eased of some parte’. This would have been ‘verry tollerable and fyt to have ben harkened vnto’.200 This is quite revealing of the way in which Walsingham thought subjects ought to approach the queen and the ways in which grievances were to be articulated, that is, with deference, and based on reasonable grounds, which could then be magnanimously acceded to as a favour, without undermining the crown’s rights.

In contrast, requesting the remission of the cess in its entirety was to ‘goe abowt […] vterly [to] ever throwgh your majestes progatyve’ which was ‘no waye tollerable’ and evidence of the great ingratitude and contempt for the government exhibited by the Irish.

199 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 15 April 1577, TNA, SP 63/58, fol. 11.
200 Ibid, fol. 11.
It was especially outrageous that they should refuse to pay something that had ‘had contynewavnce ever sythence Rycharde the secondes tyme’. This defence of Elizabeth’s prerogative has to be seen in light of the fact that Walsingham believed the Irish sought only ‘eyther the defacyng of your majesties deputy or to shake of ynglyshe governement’. He argued that this refusal to contribute was intended to make Elizabeth ‘wearye’ of ‘bearing the whole bvrden’ and withdraw her own forces from Ireland, leaving the government ‘to some of yryshe byrthe’, or reduce her forces, making ‘that contrye an easyer praye to a forreyn enemyme’. The invocation of the queen’s prerogative may have been a cynical move. Walsingham would have known how sensitive Elizabeth was to challenges to her rights, and he had promised to uphold Sidney’s authority. Making the issue one of the prerogative, in which Sidney was cast as the defender of the queen’s rights was a shrewd way of trying to persuade Elizabeth to take Sidney’s side.

Despite this, Walsingham concluded that ‘yt standethe with ivstyce that they be harde at fvll’ and that their complaints should be accommodated wherever these did not infringe on Elizabeth’s prerogative. In a slightly less magnanimous move, he also recommended that they nevertheless be imprisoned, having so disloyally left Ireland without permission. It was necessary, though, to address these ‘greeves’ because of the ‘generall dyscontentement that reygnethe in that realme’ and the ‘intellygence’ that ‘forreyn prynces’ had there. Walsingham advised Elizabeth (as he had ‘heretofor’) that she should ask for Sidney’s ‘plate’ of how to reform Ireland, which would both content her subjects and reduce her expenses there. Walsingham’s advice was self-consciously balanced a (possibly) assumed defence of the prerogative with more corporate, and noble, ideas of counsel, in order to uphold governmental authority while addressing subjects’ grievances. His prescriptions were pragmatic, and grew out of the nature of the current crisis.

Walsingham also recommended that Elizabeth summon all her Irish nobles to court for a ‘generall consvltatyon for the easyng of ther greeves and the better dyrectyon of the pollecye of that realme hereafter’. This would reduce the discontent and would also lead to the ‘redresse of dyvers thinges presently owt of frame’ there. It would also recover

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201 Ibid, fol. 11v.
202 Ibid. fol. 11v.
203 Ibid, fol. 12v.
204 Walsingham to Sidney, 8 April 1577, HMC D’Lisle and Dudley, II, p. 53.
205 Mark A. Hutchinson has also considered this incident in the light of the increasing use of the terminology of “state” in Ireland and in shifting conceptions of viceregal power: ‘The Emergence of the State in Elizabethan Ireland and England, c. 1575-99’, Sixteenth Century Journal, 45.3 (2014), 659-82 (pp. 662-64).
206 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 15 April 1577, TNA, SP 63/58, fol. 13.
for Elizabeth ‘sooche of your subjetcst hartes as are nowe alyened from you’.\textsuperscript{208} This is similar to advice Walsingham gave to James VI in 1583. Having delivered his advice to Elizabeth, Walsingham ended his letter by beseeching God ‘to dyrect your harte to followe that waye of cowncell that may stand beste with your Highness savetye & the contynnewavnce of your realmes in good quiet’.\textsuperscript{209}

Similarly, in 1586, Walsingham advised the Lord Deputy of Ireland, Sir John Perrot, not to go ahead with his planned imposition on corn and cows on the basis that it might ‘breed a generall discontentment through out the whole realme’. Walsingham noted that ‘often times’ similar charges ‘laied vppon our people hath bredde verie dangerous tumultes’, and that was especially like to occur in Ireland, ‘where there are so manie hollowe harted subiectes’. Now was not the time to provoke discontent in Ireland, considering ‘the estate of our affaires at home beinge entered into a warre against the kinde of Spaine who to annoy vs is like to seeke to raise some disturbance in that realme’. As a result, for the time being, it was far better to ‘seeke to frame our gouernment to the subiectes liking’.\textsuperscript{210} These recommendations are all politic suggestions, all based on necessity, not reference to political theory or convention, with a strong emphasis on fitting the remedy to circumstance.

Elizabeth’s irresolution and half-measures were sources of significant frustration to Walsingham throughout his career.\textsuperscript{211} Praising the conduct of Lord Deputy Perrot, Walsingham lamented that his policies had not proved ‘agreable to our humour’. Perrot would have been better off, Walsingham claimed, if he had served ‘in the time of k. Henry the eight when Princes were resolute to persist in honorable attemptes’, that is, with the thorough reformation of Ireland. It was Perrot’s misfortune that ‘our age hath been given to other manner of proceedinges, where unto the l. deputy must be content to conform himselfe as other men doe’.\textsuperscript{212} We have seen how Walsingham accommodated himself to the nature of politics under Elizabeth. There are potentially shades here of similar views held by Machiavelli and other Italian theorists. They considered that they lived in corrupt times in which the characteristics of humanist political behaviour would do political actors harm rather than good and that therefore actions that might appear immoral or unethical

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid, fol. 13\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid, fol. 13\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{210} Walsingham to Perrot, February 1586, TNA, SP 63/122, fols 205-05\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{211} [Walsingham] to Bowes, 22 July 1583, TNA, SP 52/32, fol. 107; 13 December 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 101.
\textsuperscript{212} Walsingham to John Long, bishop of Armagh, December 1585, TNA, SP 63/121, fol. 181\textsuperscript{v}.
were actually beneficial. It was necessary therefore to have been born in a time that valued your particular attributes, and where these would enable you to succeed. You also needed to fit your actions to the times. There was no point acting cautiously when the time required speed and decisiveness, hence Walsingham’s urgency in trying to overcome Elizabeth’s inertia.

Walsingham certainly thought that he was living through a time of crisis. On the basis of the evidence considered here he believed that, in monarchy as in Irish provinces, ‘it were very necessary to have one commander, for sundry directors do breed confusion, especially when they are more transported with desire of gain, than with care to discharge their duty’. This was especially true in the context of rebellion. In Ireland, Walsingham wanted Elizabeth to appoint a president of Munster so that when Ormond stood his forces down, if the former rebels ‘that have dissembled their treasonable disposition, will break out into open action’ they could be dealt with most efficiently. It seems reasonable to argue, therefore, that, mapping this concern to dilute executive power as little as possible, especially during a crisis, onto the larger context, Walsingham was not anxious to limit the power of the English monarchy, especially when he could claim some of this for himself to pursue what he considered the desirable course of action. Commenting on the dissensions between Charles IX and his brother, the duke of Anjou, which he witnessed as ambassador in France, Walsingham expressed to Burghley his belief that ‘[t]her wyll never growe redresse this realme vntyll they have fewer kynges, and be restored to a monarchye’.

Walsingham’s autocratic impulses mirror those identified by Mark Hutchinson in the behaviour and rhetoric of the viceroys in Ireland in the 1580s in response to unrest from below and criticism from above. That the perceived and actual crises of Elizabeth’s reign should lead to emphasising the monarch’s power and the importance of obedience is not a new theory, but it is often associated with the 1590s, and Walsingham’s example shows that this phenomenon had deep roots, and did not spring into being fully formed in Elizabeth’s last decade.

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214 *Reflections*, p. 49; *Prince*, p. 71.


216 Ibid.

217 Walsingham to Burghley, 17 January 1572, TNA, SP 70/122, fol. 72v.

218 Hutchinson, ‘The Emergence of the State’, 659-82.
Walsingham saw himself as a physician to the state, with the knowledge and responsibility to provide “cures” for its diseases. In advising Elizabeth, Walsingham described his role primarily in the classical-humanist language of honest counsel, always deferring obediently to his sovereign and never undermining her authority. In practice, though Walsingham accepted that Elizabeth’s centrality to the political process he also thought more widely about the need to maintain ‘the state’ which was mostly but not completely identified with Elizabeth. In much the same way as the purpose of medicine was the health of the body above all else, the purpose of Walsingham’s advice to Elizabeth was to preserve the state. Walsingham’s deployment of the politic language of reason of state comes across even more strongly in his longer political writings.

‘Matters of State’: Walsingham’s Political Argument

The next section of the chapter considers several documents written by Walsingham over the course of his career, dealing with particular political problems facing Elizabeth’s government, not addressed to the queen herself. These are very different in nature to Burghley’s _utramque partem_ memoranda or memorials, where he weighed up pros and cons of similar issues. These have been an essential tool for historians in reconstructing the Lord Treasurer’s modes of thought and methods. Like Burghley’s, in each of his papers Walsingham considers ‘definite’ questions, which are those relating to a specific issue, with named places and people. However, although Walsingham considers arguments against his desired course of action, his treatment of these is not a weighing up of pros and cons but instead is designed to do away with the objections altogether. These documents are intended to persuade others, either in council/counsel or perhaps in circulation in manuscript, not think through the issue himself. Unlike Burghley’s memoranda, where ‘it is often impossible to work out [his] position’, Walsingham’s policy documents convey a clear sense of his own opinion on the desirable response to a particular situation.

In that these documents almost exclusively focus on the practical aspects of the problem under consideration, his style is perhaps similar to that of writers like Machiavelli,

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219 ‘Whether it be good for hir Majesty to assist the D. Aniou in his entirprise of the lowe cuntryes’, November 1581, BL, Harley 1582, fol. 38.
221 Thomas Wilson, _The arte of rhetorique for the vse of all soche as are studious of eloquenc, set forthe in Enghishe_ (London: John Kingston, 1560), sig. a.f.
222 Alford, _Early Elizabethan Polity_, p. 19.
whose analysis focused on ‘practical solutions which eschew the conceptual straitjacket of classical logic’, and argued ‘within the causal structure of a self-justifying political world’, but Walsingham did not try to apply the lessons ‘like a set of political recipes’, instead borrowing the general approach. In their efforts to uncover the influence of Machiavelli, especially in Tudor England, several scholars consider Walsingham as a potential disciple, though without providing much evidence. Others, like Felix Raab, argued that Englishmen did not and could not fully understand Machiavelli in his entirety. Instead, he argued, when they wanted to persuade and convince they always wrote in a ‘theological manner’, which was ‘pious, optimistic – and completely unreal’, and rarely engaged with the practicalities of ruling.

Walsingham’s political writing is completely the opposite of this sweeping statement, which seems to presuppose that there is a “right” way to read, interpret and use a particular text, when it is in fact the different ways in which these things might be done that is revealing and interesting. Though the documents we will consider here are evidently drafts, they are intricately reasoned and robustly argued. Throughout, Walsingham’s vocabulary contains hints of a familiarity with the developing “art of the state” emerging from Italian-style political writing pioneered by Machiavelli and Guicciardini, and developed by later commentators into a unification of what was expedient with what was right. Girolamo Frachetta maintained that ‘reason of state is of two types: one, the true, which […] is separated neither from moral virtue nor religion, and which is the true reason and rule of government. The other is only its counterfeit, and is concerned only with the advantage of him who uses it, with no consideration for God or duty’. Walsingham’s deployment of the language of extreme pragmatism in pursuit of peace, security, and the preservation of his country’s religion certainly fits with these parameters.

All the documents considered here address two particularly fraught issues for Elizabeth’s government: her marriage (and the succession) and the advisability of intervening in the Low Countries. Walsingham was in favour of one of these, but not the other.

Diseases and Remedies: The Alençon Match

224 Raab, pp. 9-11.
225 Frachetta, Discorso…intorno le ragione di stato, cited in Tuck, p. 122.
In about 1579, Walsingham responded to the renewed suggestion that Elizabeth marry the duke of Alençon with ‘A consyderatyon of the dyseased state of the realme and howe the same may in some kynde of sorte be cvred’. The document gives us some idea of how Walsingham saw England’s position, the main problems he identified, and how he thought these might be addressed. Given that the remedy some of his colleagues favoured was for Elizabeth to marry, the French marriage looms large in the document, despite its general title, as do issues of the succession. Walsingham was mainly concerned to undermine the rationale for the marriage and suggest alternative solutions. Though Walsingham’s opposition to the marriage is obvious, the second part of his title betrays some uncertainty about the remedies suggested.

At the outset, Walsingham established the main ‘dyseases’ of the realm, which he divided into ‘inwarde and owtwarde’ problems (i.e. domestic and foreign). Starting at home, Walsingham identified three problems: a widespread discontent at Elizabeth’s failure to marry or otherwise secure the succession; the diversity of religion; and, finally, the transference of Elizabeth’s subjects’ loyalty to Mary Stuart ‘in respect of relygyon and the expectatyon she hathe of this crowne’. England’s foreign problems were also three in number: the enmity of the kings of France and Spain; the danger posed by James of Scotland; and, lastly, the possibility that, if the marriage to Elizabeth fell through, Alençon would instead make a Spanish match and help execute Philip II’s designs against England.

There were, Walsingham wrote, only two solutions to these knotty problems. Either Elizabeth must marry Alençon, or ‘provyde sooche remedyes as may bothe staye the inward corrvptyon as also brydell forreyn mallyce’. Walsingham’s concern with “corruption” echoes that of Philip Sidney in his treatment of the political problems plaguing the fictional land of Arcadia, and links into a conception shared by Sidney and others that disloyalty, division and a lack of public spiritedness, were deadly ills in the commonwealth. In fact, on the issue of the queen’s marriage and foreign policy, Walsingham often exhibits a striking closeness in outlook and opinion to Sidney’s ideal counsellor, Philanax: in rhetoric ‘animated’ by love and duty, they both frankly urge active

226 ‘A consyderatyon of the dyseased state of the realme and howe the same may in some kynde of sorte be cvred’, c. 1579, BL, Harley 1582, fols 46-51v.
227 ‘A consyderatyon’, fol. 46.
228 Ibid, fol. 46v.
responses to political problems for the good of the realm. What the remedies Walsingham wanted to apply were is not immediately clear because he moved on to lay out ‘two most necessary consideratyons’ relating to the marriage. Was the marriage offer, he asked, sincerely meant, and ‘expedyent’? Walsingham seriously doubted Alençon’s sincerity and French friendship, given what he described as Henri III’s ‘dyshonorable dealyng’ with Elizabeth, and the careless, leisurely nature of Alençon’s courtship.

He acknowledged that others thought Alençon sincere based on the ‘benefyt’ that he would receive from the marriage and wondered why the prince would pursue Elizabeth if he were not sincere. To these, Walsingham argued that Elizabeth’s age made it unlikely that she would have children and that the absence of issue from the marriage would undermine Alençon’s position as heir to the French throne just as it was weakening his brother’s position as king. Given this, the duke was probably only pursuing Elizabeth ‘to serve a tvrne’, probably to raise his price in future marriage negotiations with Spain. Another draft of the document, in the National Archives, also suggests an additional objection to the marriage. It was likely, Walsingham wrote, that Alençon would inherit the French crown on his brother’s death, Henri III being ‘syckely & voyde of all hope of yssve’. Should Elizabeth marry him, this could cause serious problems, prominent among which was the fact that, if Alençon were king of France, England could expect to be ruled by viceroys. Walsingham darkly hinted ‘what inconvenience were lykely to ensve therby ar of the governement of vyceroyes in naples mylan Cycelia & the lowe contryes may teache vs’. Walsingham gestured to the contemporary instability of these polities to elicit concern from his audience about England’s future, and about its independence, should the marriage go ahead.

Having cast aspersions on Alençon’s motivation in answer to his first doubt, Walsingham then addressed his next concern: was the marriage expedient? He particularly wanted to consider how it would solve the internal and external diseases he had identified, and ‘whether the inconveniences that are lyke to ensve therby are not greater then the releefe’. Walsingham acknowledged that the marriage might result in an heir, resolving the discontentment over the succession. Those subjects who had drifted away to Mary Stuart would ‘retvrne to their former loyaltye’. The aggression of France and Spain would be

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231 Ibid, fol. 46v.
232 Ibid, fol. 47.
233 Ibid, fol. 47v.
234 Ibid, fol. 48.
235 [untitled], TNA, SP 12/133, fol. 50v.
‘brydeled’. Additionally, James of Scotland would have no ability to express his displeasure at losing his place in the succession given his penury and the neutralisation of the possibility of French aid.236 The marriage, according to these calculations, would cure a number of the “diseases” Walsingham had indentified.

Despite these heady possibilities, Walsingham saw several potential ‘inconveniences’. He divided these again into two kinds: those that pertained to Elizabeth’s marriage ‘generally’ and those related to this specific match. Of the general inconveniences, he was worried that if Elizabeth were drawn into marriage ‘contrarye to her owne natvre and dysposytyon’, she would be ‘throwen into a great dyscontentemement’ which might hasten her death. Additionally, Walsingham was worried about ‘the danger that wemen of her majesties yeares are most commonly subiect vnto by bearing of children’. Both concerns threatened Elizabeth’s life, which, as Walsingham knew, was ‘owre only comforte and staye’. Walsingham here sought to undermine the major argument for Elizabeth’s marriage – that it would shore up this ‘staye’ – by suggesting that it would in fact have the opposite effect.237

236 ‘A consyderatyon’, fol. 48v.
237 Ibid, fol. 49.
238 Ibid, fol. 49v.
239 Ibid, fol. 49v.
massacre, its apparent providential nature, acted as a powerful warning to Walsingham not to put religious considerations second to national security again.

Another of Walsingham’s objections was the age difference between Elizabeth and her intended, ‘which by dayly exsperyence we see bredethe discorde betwene the partyes [...] thorrowghe iealowsye & other acydentes which may shorten her dayes’. As well as the terrifying threat to Elizabeth’s life evident in concerns like this, it seems that Walsingham was also worried that Elizabeth would not be happy if she married this much younger man against her long-stated disinclination to marry. He was certainly convinced that it would do nothing to salve the domestic diseases of England, and would actually increase discontentment and danger. Walsingham also noted the murmurings against the marriage in England, ‘some for relygyon & others for the myslykyng they have of the natyon, in respect of awntyent quarrels’, and the fear that the advice of Alençon’s mother (the fabled Catherine de Medici) would cause him to ‘breede some broyle’ in England. The dangers of alienating her subjects by marrying a foreigner were also spelled out to Elizabeth by Sidney in his Letter advising her against the marriage.

The document ends with a consideration of the harm a rejected Alençon could do, supported by a Spanish marriage alliance. As in 1571, one of Walsingham’s worries was that a rejected Alençon might make a Spanish match and thus become dangerous to England, though he dismissed the threat in 1579, where he had previously thought this a reason in favour of the marriage. Unusually, here, Walsingham played down the danger the united powers of France and Spain posed to England, because he thought the fear of Alençon acting as ‘executyoner of the Spa. mallyce’ could prevent his audience from opposing the marriage. He asserted that Philip of Spain had been weakened by the ‘cyvell warres’ in the Low Countries, and ‘therfor can yelde no great supporte’. Walsingham also noted that it was pointless fearing a French-Spanish-papal coalition in the future and acting to prevent its creation, as this already existed, and had only been prevented from executing its malicious designs so far because of God’s protection. The implicit question here was whether such divine mercy would continue if Elizabeth married Alençon. Walsingham’s confidence in dismissing the dangers of rejecting Alençon reveals the reversal in the positions and vocabularies of the two camps: now the advocates of the marriage took on
the alarmist vocabulary usually employed by counsellors like Walsingham to urge interventionist policies, and the opponents of the match expressed confidence in England’s ability to “stand” alone against Catholic malice.246

What ‘A consyderatyon’ is short on is concrete remedies for the problems identified, apart from a very brief consideration of the necessity of excluding James VI from the succession (see chapter 5). By implication, Walsingham wanted Elizabeth to depend on God’s providence, which almost certainly meant support for the rebel Dutch and other beleaguered Protestants. Elsewhere, he lamented that:

She greatly presumethe [on] fortune, which is but a [very] weake foundatyon to buylde uppon. I would she dyd buylld and depend uppon God, and then all good men shoold have les cause to feare any chaynge of her former good happ.247

This echoes his earlier stated preference for depending on God rather than “human policy”. The selfish and foolish king Basilius in Sidney’s Arcadia also relies on ‘earthly calculation’ rather than ‘being true to God’, which is the true way to proceed politically: if political actors do this, ‘God will be true to [them] and to the virtue with which he has entrusted us’.248 Those who thought like Sidney and Walsingham were convinced that England’s problems were not the result of inherent national weakness, but rather of Elizabeth’s ‘temerity and inertia’: when she should have intervened on behalf of Protestants on the continent, she had held back, and as a result England was now isolated.249

Walsingham’s vocabulary in the above quotation shows the contiguity of interest between himself and Sidney. They both, like others with similar policy priorities, used the language of ‘foundations, ground, stand, depend, build’ to articulate their conviction that Elizabeth should ‘commit her policy and her trust to God, however bleak her own and her country’s predicament might seem’ because ‘[d]ependence on God [was] dependence on “truth”’, on which, according to the New Arcadia, “all other goods” are “builded” and have their “ground”’. The opposite of such reliance on God was reliance on human effort.250

Walsingham’s preferred “remedies” appear more clearly in the TNA draft. Walsingham thought better of including a section considering Spanish power, urging

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246 Worden, Sound of Virtue, pp. 106-07.
248 Worden, Sound of Virtue, p. 137.
249 Ibid, p. 115.
250 Ibid, p. 118.
financial assistance for the Low Countries by claiming they were stronger now than they had been when the ‘whole bvrden of the warres dyd lyght vppon the two provynces of Holland and Zelande’. Anyway, Elizabeth was not to enter into this course of action, Walsingham wrote, ‘wiþbout the allowance of perlement / and promyse of large contribution to maynteyn the actyon’. At first glance this might appear to be a restriction of the monarch’s power and freedom of action, but merely reflects the reality that Parliament’s sanction would be needed to raise the necessary taxation. As in the Harleian draft, Walsingham uncharacteristically played down the threats from France and Spain. It was much less, he argued, than at the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign. France and Spain were now weaker, while ‘her majesty & the realme’ were ‘growen thorrowge gods goodnes & her provident governement to be of more strengthe bothe in threasvre and shippes’. Elizabeth was strong at sea, and had the means to distract Spanish aggression by intervening in the Low Countries. Therefore, he implied, she had no need of the Alençon marriage to secure her position. The interplay of arguments for and against the marriage caused a reversal Walsingham’s usual position: he was calm and assured of England’s safety, arguing for reliance on God’s protection. His shifting arguments show how fully he had internalised his rhetorical training, especially the need to change his presentation of circumstances depending on his purpose.

In 1579, Walsingham was unequivocally opposed to the queen’s marriage to Alençon. In fact, he wryly told Burghley that he was more afraid of what might come of Alençon’s projected visit to court than he was of James Fitzmaurice’s invasion of Ireland. This was almost certainly largely for religious reasons, given the experience of 1572, but it also involved a sure grasp of the importance and danger of the succession in both England and France.

For the proponents of the marriage, it would solve of all England’s problems: it provide a strong foreign ally and an heir, and it would neutralise the threats posed by Mary Stuart and her son. Walsingham would have preferred a raft of policies dealing with each threat separately: execute or restrain Mary more strictly, pension off James and prevent scheming successors in Parliament, help the Dutch against Spanish might, and, by 1581, secure a treaty with France instead of a marriage, and ensure religion was protected by strong penal laws and diligent clergymen.

251 TNA, SP 12/133, fol. 51v.
252 Ibid, fol. 52.
253 Walsingham to Burghley, 6 August 1579, TNA, SP 12/131, fol. 169.
254 TNA, SP 12/133, fols 50, 50v, 51v.
In deciding how he felt about the queen’s marriage, ‘above all things’ Walsingham sought ‘god’s glorrie and next the Q[ueen’s] savetye’. If a match ‘may advancke them bothe then I wyssh ye to proceade, otherwise not’. By 1579, he had come to think that the specific marriage on offer promised neither of these things. It would undermine England’s religion, risk God’s protection, and endanger the queen’s life rather than providing security. By 1579, Alençon was in line to be the next king of France. Ultimately, as well religious concerns, it was Alençon’s position in the French succession that rendered the marriage impossible for Walsingham: how could the duke sincerely desire a marriage with a woman who could probably never give him an heir; how would England fare if ruled by French viceroys?

Walsingham’s consideration of the Alençon marriage in 1579 demonstrates some of his key opinions and strategies. Chief among these was his use of medical metaphors for discussing political matters: the question and its considerations are couched in the language of diseases and remedies. Also important is that fact that, despite the significance Walsingham gave to religious reasons for his objection to the marriage, generally the situation and consequences were described in secular terms: providence might govern everything, but there were also secondary causes requiring explanation and analysis. His suspicion of both the French and Spanish comes across strongly, though his decision to emphasise or denigrate the threats posed by either or both of these powers based on his purpose gestures to his rhetorical training and persuasive intent. All of these features are also present in his consideration of another knotty issue: should England assist the Dutch in their revolt against Spanish power?

Commodities and Inconveniences: Intervention in the Low Countries

One of Walsingham’s most consistently-held political positions was his conviction of the necessity of English aid for the Prince of Orange and his allies in their campaign to throw off Spanish “tyranny”. This section examines three policy papers written by Walsingham on this issue from about 1571 to 1581, tracing the shifts in his persuasive strategies and emphases. His earliest surviving policy paper (c. 1571) was occasioned by this matter, ‘Whether it maye stand with good pollicy for her Majestie to ioyne withe Spaine in the enterprise of Burgundie’. The document is sometimes attributed to Burghley, but the language and style are more characteristic of Walsingham’s writing. It also seems likely that

255 Walsingham to Leicester, 28 April 1571, TNA, SP 70/117, fol. 156’. 
it was composed by Walsingham after his meetings with Louis of Nassau in Paris in order to justify his own enthusiasm for the enterprise and to persuade others to agree with him on the necessity of the campaign.256

Walsingham set out his plan for the document at the outset, observing that ‘[a]s Cullers by theire Contraries are best descerned, wherby perfecte Choise may followe, soe in matters of moment propounded in Consultacio̧n, the best and soundest resolucions are taken by Comparinge Comodities w̩th inconvenienci̧s’. Then he noted that ‘[g]enerallie it may be obieected, that Nothinge canbe more daungerous then for princes to enter into warres’, because their outcomes were uncertain, and that there might also be objections ‘perticulerie’ to Elizabeth entering into a war, of which he identified three.257

The first of these was that ‘her Majestie beinge by sexe fearefull, cannot but be irresolute, Irresoluc̩on beinge an ordinarie Companion to feare’.258 This passage seems to indicate that Walsingham shared the contemporary anxieties about female rule. On many occasions, Walsingham was exasperated by Elizabeth’s irresolution, and her parsimony, which were considered stereotypical feminine attributes.259 However, this is the only instance in which he explicitly linked these criticisms to the queen’s sex. And even on this occasion, Walsingham put the issue of Elizabeth’s ‘ sexe’ into the mouths of those who opposed English intervention in the Low Countries, the very outcome his paper was designed to secure. When he came to counter this objection, Walsingham thought that if Elizabeth were offered an enterprise that offered ‘all possibillitie of good successe wh̩t little or no danger’, fear would be overcome with ‘reason’, which would ensure Elizabeth remained ‘[re]solute’ and saw through the action to its end. Reason, in this passage, is male, in contrast to Elizabeth’s supposed feminine weaknesses: if offered the opportunity of an easy enterprise, ‘reason shall haue his full Course to directe her Majestie’.260 This echoes the argument of Victoria Smith that some Elizabethans, particularly Thomas Randolph and Nicholas Throckmorton, reconciled themselves to female rule through their belief that it was masculine virtues rather than masculinity itself that was desirable in a ruler: through the

256 Walsingham to Burghley, 12 August 1571, Digges, sig. R2.
257 ‘Whether it maye stand with good pollecy for her Majestie to ioyne withe Spaine in the enterprise of Burgundie’, BL, Harley 168, fol. 54. For a discussion of this document’s attribution, see ODNB, ‘Walsingham’.
258 ‘Whether it maye stand with good pollecy’, fol. 54.
259 See for example Walsingham to Henry Cobham, 7 June 1582, TNA, SP 78/7, fol. 96; Walsingham to Robert Bowes, 22 July 1583, TNA, SP 52/32, fol. 107; Walsingham to Sir Henry Sidney, 30 June 1577, HMC D’Lisle and Dudley, II, p. 59; [Walsingham] to Shrewsbury, 27 November 1580, HMC Hatfield, II, p. 353.
260 ‘Whether it maye stand with good pollecy’, fol. 55.
masculine quality of reason Elizabeth was to achieve military success, despite her ‘sexe’.\textsuperscript{261} Masculinity, in other words, was something that could be learned. By assuming aspects of the ‘austere and rational manliness’ Walsingham advocated, Elizabeth could achieve success as a ruler.\textsuperscript{262} The idea that rational considerations should override negative emotions was also something to be found in the works of writers like Justus Lipsius, who, influenced by stoicism as well as his engagement with the literature of reason of state, argued that ‘fear of the future or despair’ was unfounded because ‘all is as God wills it to be’, and that therefore the proper attitude in political life was a controlled emotional state: ‘moral action require good judgement and the capacity to act, and they in turn required the control of emotion by emotion’.\textsuperscript{263} Rather than fear the situation in the Low Countries or waver over what was to be done, Walsingham wanted Elizabeth to act calmly and resolutely in accordance with reason and God’s design.

Arguments against delay were made especially forcefully by writers in the reason of state tradition. Machiavelli argued that slow decisions could be the result of the selfish action of those who ‘moved by their own appetites seek either the downfall of the government or the fulfilment of some other aim of theirs […] whereas good citizens […] never place obstacles in the way of a decision, especially if the matter be urgent’.\textsuperscript{264} Guicciardini also emphasised that being slow to decide was not necessarily a fault, but that being slow to execute the decision once made certainly was, sentiments echoed by Walsingham.\textsuperscript{265} Machiavelli agreed, and also asserted that ‘[j]iresolute republics never choose the right alternative unless they are driven to it, for their weakness does not allow them to arrive at a decision where there is any doubt; and, unless this doubt is removed by some compelling act of violence, they remain forever in suspense’. ‘Slow and tardy decisions’ were especially dangerous when the question as whether or not to assist an ally, because ‘nobody benefits’ from the delay, and it actually does harm.\textsuperscript{266} These fears were especially relevant to the issue at hand in Walsingham’s paper.

The second and third objections Walsingham raised in his consideration of the Low Countries enterprise were England’s lack of sufficient money and skilled soldiers. Against these, Walsingham asserted that a ‘prince is not counted to lacke that hath welthie

\textsuperscript{262} Worden, \textit{Sound of Virtue}, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{263} Tuck, pp. 52, 54.
\textsuperscript{264} Stark, \textit{Discourses}, p. 396.
\textsuperscript{265} Reflections, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{266} Stark, \textit{Discourses}, pp. 395, 301, 396.
Subiectes, who alwaies in furtherance of enterprices that tende to safetie, and the benefite of the Common weale, are readie to yeald most bountifull and liberall Contributions’. He claimed that, just as ‘euerie good Englishe man’ would generously contribute to the recovery of Calais should the opportunity arise, they would also willingly contribute to the enterprise of Burgundy. As for the dearth of soldiers, Walsingham countered that this would indeed by a serious problem if England’s assistance would be largely land-based, but that as this was likely to be naval in nature ‘no Prince in Europe, is better furnished […] then her majestie’.267

Having dealt with these objections, Walsingham also raised four other potential concerns of opponents of the enterprise: the apparent injustice of a war in aid of rebels; the ‘Auntient league’ between England and Burgundy; the puissance of Philip II; and that ‘an other’ power (unnamed, but clearly France) may become even more powerful as a result of the enterprise.268 He then countered these.

He began by asserting that though wars where ‘Princes seeke to attaine to that which an other hath’, grounded on ambition, were unjust, wars based either on ‘pollicie’ or ‘necessitie’ were ‘most lawfull’. Wars fought out of policy were those that ‘to prevent that an other doe not vsurpe theirs’, and wars fought out of necessity were those where ‘they stande upon their defence against those that assalle them’. When the possibility of a war based on these latter two causes occurred, Walsingham argued that ‘reason’ and ‘pollicey’ meant that advice to prosecute the war ‘cannot but containe more safetie then daunger’.269

Walsingham’s strategy for answering the objection that it was unlawful to aid rebels like Orange is perhaps a surprising one. Instead of a detailed justification of the revolt, Walsingham merely referred ‘those that are curious in that behalfe’ to the supplication the rebels had exhibited to the Emperor at the diet of Speyer (1570). Instead, he asserted that ‘her Majestie may iustlie take profitt of them, what soeuer they be, to be revenged of such invries and indignities […] as also to preuent such dangerous practises’ as her foreign enemies had in hand.270 It would be hard to imagine a more Machiavellian justification: Walsingham literally denies the relevance of such high-flown concerns and insists that it is necessary that Elizabeth help the rebels for her own advantage. Though there may have been moral objections to assisting rebels, the usefulness of doing this for England made intervention “just”, and Walsingham’s articulation of the case for intervention in these

267 ‘Whether it maye stand with good pollicey’, fol. 55.
268 Ibid, fol. 54v.
269 Ibid, fol. 54v.
270 Ibid, fol. 55v.
terms perhaps reflects a position similar to Tommaso Campanella, a writer influenced by the “reason of state” tradition, who claimed that ‘power and right would never ultimately conflict: it would always be God’s intention that the two should coincide in order to further his intentions for the world’.  

The list of indignities Walsingham provided focuses on Spanish denigration of Elizabeth in a way that makes the prince’s dishonour grounds for war (such as the fact that in Spain people ‘ordinarily raile at her Majeste […] vsinge most dishonorable villainous speeches’) though it also included the fact that the servants of the English ambassador in Spain had been forced to attend mass. Then Walsingham listed the injuries Spain had supposedly done to Elizabeth and England, including the fact that the northern rebellion had been ‘kindled by the Ambassador of Spaine’ in England, that English rebels were ‘Maintained’ in flauders’, that Philip had ‘become protector of the Queene of Scottes, her majesties Capitoll enemye’, and that Spain had interfered in Ireland. This section on Spanish enmity carries a lot of the positive persuasive weight of the paper: these are the reasons for intervention, while everything else was designed to counter potential objections. It also subtly set up the next step, which was untying the bond with “Burgundy”.

Walsingham was well aware of the siren call of England’s ‘Auntient League’ with Burgundy, and that some insisted that this alliance necessitated good relations with the king of Spain, who now ruled what had been Burgundy. Walsingham argued, however, that though this alliance ‘did yeild vnto vs proffite when it was to vs inferioure’, now that the provinces were ruled from Spain, ‘who latelie hath made greate demonstracion of great ill will and malice’ to England, behaving as if the alliance were unchanged would more ‘preiudice, then benefite vs’. Given this, he argued, the ‘best polecie’ would be to ‘reduce the Hollandars to his auntient estate, from a kingedome to a dukedome’, as the enterprise would do. Walsingham also emphasised that Spanish power would be no match for the ‘Confederates’ and the ‘discontentment of the people’ with Spanish rule. This defence of Spain as England’s main enemy was important in the early 1570s, as the regime had just started to consider that this was the case. Arguing against a Burgundy-based alliance with
Spain meant jettisoning arguments about the honour of political agreements and insisting on the changed circumstances – circumstances and necessity made Walsingham a reason of state thinker.

Finally, Walsingham considered the fear that success in the planned Anglo-French enterprise would merely bolster France’s position. His confidence in the good faith and Anglophilia of the Huguenots to act as a brake on the king’s ambition comes across strongly. He also expected them to distract the king from completing the conquest of the Low Countries by emphasising his need to recover the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the duchedom of Milan, and parts of Navarre. Here, we see a parallel conviction of the contiguity of interest between different populations of Protestants regardless of national boundaries to that Walsingham exhibited with regard to Scottish policy (chapter 5).

Walsingham did not believe that there was any conflict between nationalism and religion. Throughout his French embassy, Walsingham had been in close touch with the Huguenots, and he constantly evinced a strong concern for their welfare, telling Cecil that ‘nothing would grieve me more then that they of the Religion, whom I wish chiefly to further, should receive by me any hindrance’. This attitude is also reflected in this document. It also shows Walsingham’s conviction that upon the fate of the Low Countries depended the fate of Protestantism in Europe, and that all with an interest in that fate ought to join together to assist.

If England did not assist Orange, Spain would form an alliance with France, as the ‘Burgundians’ (which now, craftily, seems to designate the rebels) would not have the strength to throw off Spanish might. When Spain and France were allied, the ‘suppression of those […] of the Religeon’ would be a key outcome, along with the rise of the Hispanophile Guise, and all this would result in a pan-Catholic alliance in support of the cause of the queen of Scots. Walsingham played on the fear of French power but emphasised that the danger of a French alliance with Spain was greater than that of France in the Netherlands, which could always be dealt with at other times in other ways.

In contrast to these dangers, Walsingham claimed that assistance for Orange would ‘advance the Cause of Religeon throughout all Christendome, an Acte worthie of a Christian prince’. Elizabeth would also ‘remove an evell neighbour whose Terranouse governement cannot but be preiidicall vnto her majestie and Subiectes’, because he had adversely affected English trade with the Low Countries. This is the first time Walsingham

278 Walsingham to Burghley, 5 April 1571, Digges, sig. K2v4.
279 ‘Whether it maye stand with good pollecy’, fols 56-56.
had mentioned Spanish “tyranny” in the Netherlands in his analysis in the document. The idea seems devoid of all morality and is presented as merely a practical problem facing the English.

Walsingham claimed that the campaign would also ensure the continued importance in French politics of ‘they of the Religeon’ who would ‘be able to doe good offices betweene the two Crownes in maintenance and increase of Amytie’, while keeping down the Guise. Lastly, he added, by helping push the Spanish out of the Low Countries, Elizabeth would ‘adde increase of dominacion vnto her Crowne, as much to her Honour as the losse of Callice was dishonoure to her sister’. Walsingham’s means of persuasion here are almost entirely political; even the point about the Huguenots was couched in terms of political utility, not religious brotherhood. In invoking Calais in his argument, Walsingham probably thought he was being clever, as this was something of an obsession for Elizabeth, who had continued to angle for the return of the city in her negotiations for her marriage in which Walsingham had participated, and he probably expected this to appeal to his colleagues as well. Here was an opportunity to gain a new Calais. However, Elizabeth had no interest in conquering new territories, only in regaining what had been lost, and Walsingham’s advice on this occasion was to no avail.

In 1575-76, Walsingham again addressed the issue of English intervention, in ‘Whether it be requisite for the Q to ayde the Prince of Orange ageinst D. D. notwithstanding the league betwene us and the howse of burgundye’. Many of the same concerns recur, though there are significant differences of emphasis. Again, Walsingham gave a prominent place to the potential dangers and of the justice of wars. In this document, Walsingham insisted that it was sometimes safer to fight than to avoid war, and that though ‘warres grounded vppon ambytyon’ (i.e. wars fought to enlarge a prince’s territory) ‘are most vniuste/ and therfor by gods iust iudgement have most dayngerouse & perylowse eventes as by sondry histories dothe most manifestly appeare’, wars fought out of ‘necessyte’, ‘not for sovereynte but for savetye […] are most ivste’. God and history are united here: God’s judgement is visible in the working out of history, which provides political examples or warnings. Unlike the earlier paper, here he seemed to deny that Elizabeth would or should permanently acquire territory in the Low Countries. Having

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280 Ibid, fols 56-57.
282 ‘Whether it be requisite for the Q to ayde the Prince of Orange ageinst D. D. notwithstanding the league betwene us and the howse of burgundye’, TNA, SP 70/136, fol. 214.
served as Secretary for a few years, Walsingham probably knew Elizabeth’s reluctance to do this, though he remained convinced of the necessity and utility of her doing so even in 1585.283

Naturally, then, Walsingham moved on to assert that ‘ther is bothe necessyte ivst occasion and also an especyall opportvnitie’ to go to war. First, he listed the ‘certeyn intelliengence’ of the ‘confederacye made at the last cownsell of Trent […] of all sooche princes as terme them selfes Catholyckes for the rootyng owtby vyolen[ce] of all sooche as profess the gosspell’. He also cited the intended invasion of England and the duke of Alva’s role in directing this conspiracy, and his contemptuous treatment of Elizabeth, which had also featured in the 1571 paper.284 This proved, Walsingham thought, that Elizabeth had just cause to help Orange.

Further, he argued that the cause was legitimate because ‘what ivster cavse can a prynce that makethe profession of the gospell have to enter into warres / then when she seethe confederacyes made for the rootynge owt of the gospell & relygion he professethe’. ‘All creatures’, he continued, ‘are created to advavnce goods glorye: therfor when his glorye is cavled in question: no leage nor pollecye can excvse any prynces yf by all meanes he seeke not the defence of the same / ye with the losse of lyfe’.285 This would, Walsingham believed, dispense with that objection. Of all of Walsingham’s policy papers, this is the most focused on religion as a motivating factor for intervention, and he was certainly not the only counsellor to oppose intervention in the Low Countries on the grounds of territorial expansion but support it in the name of ‘liberation from “oppress[ion]”’.286

However, what about aiding rebels? Walsingham’s comments on this will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, but, essentially, he repeated the justification of the conduct of the rebels which they themselves propagated, emphasising the attempted imposition of religious oppression, the involvement of the nobility, the gradual transition from privately raising grievances with the Regent to full-blown resistance in the face of the indifference of their prince.287 He emphasised the legitimate defence of their liberties against Spanish tyranny.

283 Walsingham to Burghley, 11 January 1585, TNA, SP 12/176/1, fol. 7.
284 ‘Whether it be requisite’, fols 214-14*.
285 ‘Whether it be requisite’, fol. 214*.
Walsingham’s dwelling on the justification of the revolt, perhaps responding to queenly or conciliar reluctance to aid “rebels”, where before he had merely claimed that their exact status did not matter is probably significant. This document shows how Walsingham’s arguments evolved over time, though the reasons for this are not entirely clear. It could simply be that this document was for a different audience to the previous piece, and that Walsingham changed his arguments accordingly. A further significant change occurred when Alençon agreed to help Orange, and this was the situation that precipitated Walsingham’s last consideration of aid for the Dutch.

In 1581, as Alençon joined with Orange in the campaign against the Spanish, Walsingham again wrote a lengthy document addressing ‘Whether it be good for hir Majesty to assist the D. Aniou in his enterprise of the lowe cuntries’. At the outset of the document, Walsingham addressed the ‘longe continewed amity’ with ‘Burgundy’ compared to England’s ‘auncient ennimitye’ with France. And, as in the 1570s, Walsingham argued that if Burgundy were still just Burgundy and ‘depended of the amitye of England’ as in times past, ‘for that alwayes the stronger giueth lawe to the weaker’, that the amity would have remained ‘perfect and entire’. Now, however, being ‘annexed’ to Spain, ‘who is growen to that greatnes that he thinketh to giue lawe vnto his neighbour’ they ought to think again.  

Walsingham explained that the venerable Anglo-French enmity was the result of the fact that in the past England had been ‘possessed of a good portion’ of France ‘and did continewe a footinge in that realme vntill of late yeares’. Now, however, England had no such territory and ‘there is no reason but that they should desire the amitye of the Crowne of England’. Some of Walsingham’s colleagues seem to have clung to the idea of the ancient alliance with “Burgundy”, but Walsingham grasped that the geopolitics of Europe had shifted. He wrote that:

if such alterations be well weyed as tyme hath wrought, it wilbe found necessary in matters of state with alteration of Circumstances to alter also iudgement, even as skilfull physicians […] doe alter […] their medecine accordinge to such alterations and changes as they obserue in their patient.

There is no suggestion whether these changes are to be considered good or bad, just that they require a rethinking of England’s position. Mitchell Leimon argued that Walsingham...

288 ‘Whether it be good for hir Majesty to assist the D. Aniou in his enterprise of the lowe cuntries’, November 1581, BL, Harley 1582, fol. 38.
289 ‘Whether it be good for hir Majesty to assist the D. Aniou’, fol. 38.
290 Ibid, fol. 38.
was the first Englishman to espouse this kind of balance of power theory, concerned to prevent one power becoming overmighty. Leimon accepted this was out of necessity, because of England's comparative weakness, as if this detracted from the sincerity of the doctrine.291 This was probably exactly its appeal, however. Walsingham believed passionately in Spanish enmity and the league against England and Protestantism, so necessity made him seek to balance their power. Though first used by Guicciardini in the early sixteenth century to describe the practices of Lorenzo de Medici, the advent of a theory of political action that sought to balance equally powerful but opposed polities is more usually associated with the seventeenth century. In 1629 the duc de Rohan, for instance, stressed that 'the role of France was not to overcome Spain but to balance it', and similar views were apparent in literature produced in England and Venice, also threatened by Spanish hegemony.292 There is further evidence in this section of contact with reason of state: ‘matters of state’ divided off a sphere of activity with its own rules and logic, and its own experts, like physicians.

Having explained the current positions of the two countries as he saw them, Walsingham moved on to consider the ‘persons of the Princes who are possessed of the said Cuntryes’. Starting with the French king, Walsingham described Henri III as ‘peaceable enoughe’ and ‘altogether giuen ouer to pleasure’, but was concerned by ‘howe he is transported by thaduise of that howse that is ennemy to this Crowne’, and therefore he could be considered England’s most dangerous enemy. The Guise again featured in a key role in Walsingham’s view of French politics. However, Walsingham continued, God had raised up in France a prince ‘greatly affected to hir ma\textit{jesty}', with a strong party there, so it was unlikely that the king would be able to ‘attempt anie thinge against this Crowne’.293 In contrast, turning to Philip II:

\textit{theffecte\textit{r} of his malice towards hir ma\textit{jestie haue so apparently broken out as every man that is not carryed away with passion […] may easely see what a daungerous ennemy he is lyke to proue if his malice and greatnes be not provided for.}\textit{294}

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\textsuperscript{291} Leimon, p. 143.  \\
\textsuperscript{292} Tuck, pp. 95, 91-92.  \\
\textsuperscript{293} ‘Whether it be good for hir Majesty to assist the D. Aniou’, fol. 38\textsuperscript{v}.  \\
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid, fol. 38\textsuperscript{v}.
\end{flushleft}
As in the advice he gave directly to Elizabeth, Walsingham emphasised the suspicious ‘private’ motives of his opponents to denigrate their arguments and emphasise his own cool assessment of the situation and political expertise.

Having established the status quo, Walsingham then set down three statements that he thought would be generally accepted: that the Low Countries could not hold out against Spain without the support of a foreign ally; that there was little chance of a reconciliation between the two parties there; and that, given England’s weakness at home and abroad it would be very difficult to defend itself against its enemies. These being granted, it was necessary to consider three questions: ‘whether it were better that the lowe Cuntries should be in the hand of a k. of Spaine that is an ennemy or of the d of Aniou [Alençon] that is a frend’; whether it would be better if the Low Countries were under the control of a prince who would ‘be content with a gouuernment lymited’ or one ‘that seakith to be absolute’; and whether it would be better if they were controlled by a prince that was ‘ennemy to the reliigion’ or one that ‘yealdeth to a toleration’. 295 As in the first document, Walsingham then proceeded to consider the objections to these questions and their solutions.

The first objection was one that exercised many of Walsingham’s colleagues and his mistress: it was very important to consider ‘in due course of pollecye’ that the French crown ‘growe not great by the possession of the lowe Cuntries’. In answering this concern, Walsingham explicitly drew a comparison between the arts of medicine and of politics to justify his opinion. Just as in the ‘true vse of naturall bodyes present greefes being daungerous are to be preferred before coniecturall doubtes of future diseases So in matters of state the staying of present mischeefes is to be preferred before the prevention of further perill’. Therefore, given the profound danger currently being posed by Spain, those that cared about Elizabeth’s safety, ‘whatsoever may hereafter come to the Crowne’, should act accordingly. 296 Spain was dangerous now. France only might prove dangerous in the future. Walsingham’s argument was urgent, compelling, and focused on the immediate threat to England/Elizabeth. It was necessary to counter this threat to ensure the long term survival of the Protestant religion.

Next Walsingham noted that the ‘quarrell for the lowe Cuntries between Spaine and ffraunce will not so speedily be ended’, and thus Spain would ‘be kept from annoying vs’. And, paralleling his comments in a previous document, once France had beaten Spain, it would be concerned to recover dominions elsewhere, and therefore no threat to

295 Ibid, fol. 39.
296 Ibid, fol. 39.
England. Even if this were not the case, he wrote sanguinely that if France looked like threatening England, Elizabeth ‘in the ordinary course of pollicy amongst other Princes in the lyke cases vsed may change the ballance’. Here Walsingham advocated stirring up the internal troubles of other rulers in order to distract them. In a similar vein in 1583, he casually told Robert Bowes that if Henri III took it upon himself to help James VI against Elizabeth, ‘hir majesty wanteth not the best meanes to keepe him occuppied at home’.

Anyway, Walsingham added, Alençon had already agreed that when he became king of France he would give up the sovereignty of the Low Countries on receipt of sufficient consideration of the expenses he had incurred in freeing them from Spanish tyranny. Walsingham acknowledged the validity of doubts about whether Alençon would be content to rule within limits. However, he reassured doubters that, ‘if the state [i.e. constitution/political organisation] of the lowe Cuntryes be duely considered’, it would be seen that this would not be much of a problem. The provinces were in a strong strategic position, their towns were strongly fortified, and the people who held the towns were so ‘jealous’ of their liberties that they would make ‘no difference between a french and a spanish tyrant’. Though the nobles might be easily corrupted, they were few in number and, they had ‘no authority or sway in the said Townes’. All these things being considered, it would not matter if Alençon tried to rule absolutely – the Dutch would defend their liberties. Walsingham accepted the possibility of resistance in response to infringed liberties, but he does not describe a right or duty to resist, he merely presents the potential outcome of oppressive government.

Though this discussion of the political situation in the Low Countries was pointed, not an objective assessment, it shows respect for the republican organisation and political traditions of the polity. There is evidence that one way in which Walsingham tried to persuade Elizabeth to aid the Dutch was by encouraging her to take their political organisation and justification for their actions seriously. In 1585, Jacques Rossel sent Walsingham a book of ordinances, statutes and proclamations of princes and lords of the Low Countries to show Elizabeth that the provinces were sovereign, presumably to encourage her to assist the rebels. The timing of this is interesting; Elizabeth signed the Treaty of Nonsuch, promising aid to the Dutch on 10th August, and Rossel sent the book on 3rd (O.S.). It seems unlikely that the book would have arrived in time to influence

297 Ibid, fol. 39v.
298 Walsingham to Bowes, 20 August 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 15.
299 ‘Whether it be good for hir Majesty to assist the D. Aniou’, fol. 40.
300 Rossel to Walsingham, 3 August 1585, Cal. Foreign, XIX, p. 648.
Elizabeth, but it is suggestive of the lengths to which Walsingham was prepared to go to nudge her into overt support for the Dutch.

Next, Walsingham addressed the ‘inconvenience’ that might result if Alençon were not financially supported by Elizabeth. Already angered by the failure of the marriage negotiations, and receiving no other kind of ‘frendshippe’, the duke might become an ‘ennemye’. Additionally, Spain would take advantage of Alençon’s ‘alienation’ to draw him into a coalition with the papacy to attack England. Here, Walsingham reverted to asserting the dangers of a Franco-Spanish compact, where he had downplayed these in arguing against the Alençon marriage. The puissance of this alliance would cause the ‘ill affected of this realme’ to overcome the ‘lymites of duetifull subiection’, and rebel against Elizabeth. As a result, the ‘warres that otherwise might be kept farre of shalbe brought into this realme and hir majesty voyd of all forraine frendshippe to withstand the same’. Walsingham assumed that war was a certainty, all that could be controlled was how it was to be fought.

All these things considered, it was necessary to give Alençon some support, and Walsingham then gave his opinion about the matters to be discussed when this was to be negotiated, and discussed the necessity of securing parliamentary sanction before doing so. Walsingham wrote that it would be ‘necessary to haue the matter propounded in Parlement and the realme made acquainted with such reasons as doth induce hir majesty to yeald support […] least otherwise […] they may enter into some hard conceptions touching the same’. The phrasing here is interesting. Does the ‘and’ link or separate Parliament and the realm; are they basically equated? On the occasion of Sir Thomas Heneage’s mission to the Netherlands in 1586, Heneage asked Walsingham ‘who be the States’, (i.e. the Estates General). Walsingham had replied that they were an ‘assembly much lyke that of our Burgesses that represent the state’. "State" here seems to mean “realm”, and is apparently conflated with Parliament, further suggesting that a division between the monarch and their government. The content of Walsingham’s advice in 1581 made sense on a purely practical level: if covert English involvement turned into open war with Spain, Elizabeth would need parliamentary approval for war-time taxes. He also thus implicitly acknowledged Parliament’s role in the discussion of matters of high policy and was aware of its potential to provide a forum for criticising the government, though he did not condone or give its members a right to do this.

301 "Whether it be good for hir Majesty to assist the D. Aniou’, fols 40-40i.
302 Ibid, fol. 41.
303 Walsingham to Davison, 25 February 1586, TNA, SP 84/6, fol. 285.
These are political documents, with no literary pretensions or allusions to general norms or rules, except “sundry histories”. Walsingham reasoned his answers to these questions solely with reference to recent political and religious developments. They have powerful persuasive structures, with careful and detailed refutations of opposing arguments. This perhaps reflects the convention of the language of the “art of the state” in that it was usually ‘invoked to justify a decision that contradicts the rational principle of justice embedded in the republican idea of politics’, or political norms like not aiding other rulers’ rebels. Religion was important in these documents, too. This is reminiscent of the language and aims of late sixteenth century “reason of state” theorists in its combination of politic prudential discourses with Christian concerns. Walsingham was writing in what he considered to be a tense, troubled time, when England was beset by enemies on all fronts: across the Channel, in Scotland, in Ireland, and even in England itself. These pressures produced a mindset where preserving the condition or state of England was the primary goal, and in this context it is not surprising that the language of the art of the state would be deployed. It fitted Walsingham’s dark and urgent view of the world around him – the time for the art of politics was over.

**Conclusion**

Ultimately, it was Elizabeth who had the power to set the parameters of counsel. Walsingham’s success or failure therefore depended on his sensitivity to her opinions and practices, as well as his knowledge of the norms governing such relationships and of the best techniques to use within them. His command of the rhetorical skills and techniques was a key means by which he was able to articulate his advice and escape censure for his frankness.

However, Walsingham conceived of his role more widely than simply advising the queen of England when called upon to do so. For him, being a counsellor involved acting in the best interests not just of his queen and country but also Protestantism whether or not he received specific instructions to do as he did, because this was necessary in order to protect all three. In describing and justifying his actions and preferred policies, Walsingham used off-the-peg humanist-classical tropes of honest counsel and loyal service, but he also deployed the sharper, darker language of reason of state.

If it is surprising that Walsingham supported Elizabeth’s prerogative so completely in some of his utterances, the explanation lies in his conception of the magnitude of the

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304 Viroli, p. 134.
threats facing England: at such a time, the prince was owed obedience, which, in the long run, would be best for the “state” or “realm”. This did not preclude personal acts of manipulation or dishonesty. Walsingham reconciled his autocratic conception of the government with his independence of mind and action as a counsellor through his belief that he had a God-appointed responsibility to protect his religion, country and queen through his exercise of “state” power. The next chapter examines the ways in which Walsingham contrived to further the security of the English church and English government in Ireland.
Chapter 3: To ‘Join the Hands of Fellowship Against the Open Enemy’: Walsingham’s Religious Patronage

This chapter and the next examine Walsingham’s patronage activities in two apparently disparate spheres: his patronage of divines and religious writers in England, and of political and administrative figures in Ireland, in order to illustrate some of the central principles that governed his political action. In both areas, Walsingham displayed a concern with broadening the support for English institutions (whether the church, or the English state more broadly). Rather than a particular doctrinal position or consistent response to England’s “Irish problem”, Walsingham worked to spread moderate reform and Protestant ideas, and to create as broad a basis of support as possible for the English state in Ireland among members (or potential members) of the English administration there, against a background of serious unrest. In this, too, he may have been influenced by the axiomatic necessity of creating a ‘reliable network of partisans to check the opponents of the state’, as recommended by the proponents of the art of the state. These chapters investigate Walsingham’s activities, his motivations, and the success of such initiatives in these two areas. The fundamental argument is that the similarities between Walsingham’s activities in these spheres demonstrates that one of his fundamental political instincts was hegemonic, based on consensus and compromise, that this was a response to division and potential chaos, and he could conceive of desirable political action that did not necessarily coincide with his own personal or private wishes.

Walsingham’s religion is his most obvious characteristic in much Elizabethan historiography. In the litany of Elizabeth’s advisers, Burghley is the ‘scholar’, Leicester the ‘courtier’, and Walsingham the ‘puritan’. However, as Conyers Read noted, Walsingham’s religious allegiances are more complicated than this simple designation allows. Read suggests that in examining Walsingham’s religious activities we must distinguish between his professional and private capacities; that while ‘his personal sympathies lay with the reformers’, the ‘almost complete absence of any evidence revealing a disposition on his part

1 Walsingham to Bishop of Winchester, 11 July 1575, TNA, SP 12/105, fol. 35.
3 F. J. Levy, Tudor Historical Thought (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press & Renaissance Society of America, 2004), p. 249.
to support the Puritan movement in his conduct of office’ is striking. This part of the chapter seeks to explain why that was, what Walsingham did instead and why. In doing so, it suggests that Read’s conception of public/private is too narrowly bound by Walsingham’s offices and does not allow adequately for his own sense of calling.

Knowing Elizabeth’s antipathy to those who desired further reformation, Walsingham’s career in fact betrays a self-conscious care to avoid being labelled as a “puritan”. In 1575, Walsingham politely declined to recommend the godly minister Edward Dering to Elizabeth. In part, this was probably due to Elizabeth’s personal antipathy to Dering, who had used a sermon before the court to rebuke her about her governance of the church. Walsingham also feared that his recommendation of Dering would ‘hvrte the cavse’ rather than helping, ‘consydering the svspytyon that her majesty hathe already conceived’ that he, Walsingham, was a ‘favtor of thos whom are termed by svme pvritaynes’.

Elizabeth was certainly well aware of his religious inclinations, but there is no evidence that this was the direct cause of moments of tension in their relationship as Read thought. If the Spanish ambassador is to be believed, Elizabeth did often refer to Walsingham as a “puritan”. In 1581, for example, in response to a recent incident where, following a Scottish raid, Lord Hunsdon had authorised a English counter-attack in which 200 Englishmen died, Elizabeth supposedly stormed at Walsingham for keeping this from her: ‘You Puritan, you will never be content until you drive me to war on all sides and bring the King of Spain onto me’. However, in this outburst, if indeed Mendoza’s account is reliable, an angry Elizabeth reached for the insulting designation “puritan” in the heat of the moment, as a distinguishing feature of the person being insulted, but Walsingham’s religion was not the reason for the anger on this occasion, it was caused by his withholding of information.

The issues of Walsingham’s religion and religious policy are additionally complicated by the lack of consensus among historians about what it actually meant to be a “puritan” in Elizabethan England. It was not a neutral term. It was the insulting opposite

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6 Walsingham to Burghley, 27 September 1575, BL, Harley 6992, fol. 21v. See also Walsingham to Burghley, 27 April 1586, TNA, SP 12/188, fol. 141.
7 Read, *Mr Secretary*, II, p. 259.
of “papist”, and as a result it was rare for people to identify themselves as “puritans”, though they may have answered to the label “godly”. Generally, however, it is understood to mean a group of people within the Church of England who desired and worked for further reformation of that church along more thoroughly Reformed lines. They had much in common with other members of the church, and were mainly distinguished from them in degree not in kind, that is, in the intensity of their belief and religious activities, rather than in the detail of doctrine.9 “Puritans” believed in predestination, in simplicity of worship, in the importance of the Word and of preaching and reading the Bible, and in the necessity of further reforming the church. Despite their dissatisfaction with aspects of the established church, “puritans” supplemented their public worship with private activities, reading, praying, fasting alone and with groups of like-minded people, rather than leaving that church.10 Additionally, “puritan” could also have a more political dimension. By 1574, the French ambassador in England described Walsingham as a puritan, by which, according to the ODNB, ‘he meant an ally of the Huguenots; the term was also used by the queen of Scots to identify her enemies and by Spanish agents to identify Orange’s sympathisers’.11 Walsingham certainly seems to tick many of these boxes.

However, Walsingham’s own religion is hard to reliably recover, partly because of the lack of documents relating to his household and partly because of the circumspection with which he approached the question of religion in his public life. Several members of his household and secretariat were individuals who have been designated “puritans” by historians. William Davison, later Principal Secretary, was described by Walsingham in 1574 as ‘a man of myne’.12 There was also Nicholas Faunt, who disapproved of the petty wranglings of bishops and of the immorality of court life.13 Laurence Tomson, one of Walsingham’s secretaries from 1575, was associated with several individuals with

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10 Cambers, Godly Reading, pp. 7, 13-14.
12 Walsingham to Burghley, 26 July 1574, BL, Harley 6991, fol. 95.
Presbyterian sympathies and was instrumental in the production of the Geneva Bible (see below). A more occasional member of the household was Walsingham’s brother-in-law, Robert Beale, who clashed with more conservative members of the religious establishment.\(^\text{14}\) Although circumstantial, the evidence of Walsingham’s association with, and employment of, such figures does suggest strong sympathies in the direction of further reformation, even if he could not publicly express these too strongly.

It is possible to identify two men as his chaplains, though little is known about them. The first of these was a Mr ‘Soothacke’, described by Walsingham as his chaplain in a letter to Burghley in 1587. ‘Soothacke’ was to inform Burghley about the harsh proceedings of the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, John Copcot, a defender of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, towards Mr Harrison, a fellow of Trinity College. Copcot also apparently intended to proceed harshly against other ‘well affected persons’ in contravention of collegial privileges. Walsingham requested the help of Burghley, the Chancellor of the university, in preventing this.\(^\text{15}\) The reference to Trinity makes it likely that Walsingham’s chaplain was Alexander Southake or Southaicke, who gained his Bachelor of Divinity there in 1581.\(^\text{16}\)

The other man identified as a former chaplain of Walsingham’s was Michael Rabbet, vicar of Streatham, who later worked on the King James Bible with another of Walsingham’s protégés, John Rainolds, and the above-mentioned Thomas Harrison.\(^\text{17}\) The relative obscurity of Walsingham’s chaplains complicates an assessment of his personal religious inclinations, though Southake’s involvement in the controversies at Trinity is suggestive of godly views, and Rabbet’s involvement in high-profile translation work is indicative of a reputation for sound scholarship. These two themes, support for the godly-inclined and for skilled translators, are also found in Walsingham’s more public religious patronage.

\(^{16}\) John Venn and John Archibald Venn, Alumni Cantabrigiensi: a biographical list of all known students, graduates and holders of office at the University of Cambridge, from the earliest times to 1900, part I, to 1751, 4 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922-54), IV, p. 124.
Returning to Walsingham’s own religious opinions, there are hints that he was not entirely convinced about bishops, which indicates some sympathy with more radical Protestants. A letter from Edward Waterhouse, for instance, included a snide remark about the ‘See apostolick’ of Canterbury, which he presumably expected Walsingham to appreciate. In 1581 Walsingham planned to finance a campaign in the Low Countries by converting the bishops’ ‘temporalytes’ into fee farms. These views no doubt contributed to his sympathy for more radical, anti-episcopacy figures. However, on the other hand, opposition to the diversion of episcopal resources for secular ends was sometimes a hallmark of “puritan” criticism of Elizabethan church government, so Walsingham’s suggestion arguably says more about his determination to fund the war with Spain than it does about his views of ecclesiastical structure.

His faith certainly helped Walsingham cope with the ups and downs of his career. He commiserated with William Davison when his conduct as envoy in the Low Countries was criticised at home, telling him to take this setback as a ‘crosse from above’, and would help Davison understand that ‘worldely repvtatyon […] carryethe withall no perpetvytye’, instead one must depend on God to deflect ‘blastes of envye’. Similarly, Walsingham reassured the earl of Huntingdon that ‘[a] Christian man armed with innocence never taketh harm by the knowledge of such like thwarts: for that they minister rather cause of comfort than of grief: when they be argument of God’s love towards us, who doth correct those that he loveth’. All of this, though short on doctrinal details, certainly marks Walsingham out as one of the “godly”, and is also reminiscent of neo-stoic ideas about weathering political setbacks with fortitude. Though the latter clashed with Christian ideals, several writers in the later sixteenth century sought to reconcile the two, chief among them being Philippe Duplessis Mornay, who corresponded with Walsingham.

Walsingham had plenty of opportunity to apply the wisdom he dispensed to Davison and Huntingdon to his political career, though otherwise the Stoic emphasis on

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18 Waterhouse to Walsingham, 12 January 1575, TNA, SP 63/49, fol. 72.
19 ‘Whether it be good for hir Majesty to assist the D. Aniou in his entrance of the lowe countrys’, BL, Harley 1582, fol. 41.
21 Walsingham to Davison, 2 May 1578, TNA, SP 83/6, fol. 84v.
resignation does not fit very well with Walsingham’s activist policies and his efforts to manipulate Elizabeth’s decisions. He often had to contend with “crosses” especially because of a fundamental mismatch in his relationship with Elizabeth: his desire to offer overt support to foreign Protestants, and her reluctance. Walsingham saw England as special, as a ‘Sanctuary’, with special responsibilities to help and provide a refuge for beleaguered Protestants. He complained to Burghley in 1585 that the arrival of religious refugees was ‘so greatly grvedged at’, when it had been provided for by God, who ‘hathe vsed this realme as a sanctvarye for them’, hence the ‘many extraordynerye blessyngs’ He had bestowed on England. God had preserved England specifically so she might help all Protestants.

Walsingham felt a strong connection to his co-religionists abroad, and this was not just an abstract, spiritual bond, but also an emotive and visceral one, evident in his description of them as ‘thos whoe […] have wth the shedding of ther bloode provcred [Elizabeth’s] savetye’. Walsingham’s impulse to Protestant unity was not hampered by doctrinal or ecclesiastical differences. As far as he was concerned they were all in this together, all threatened by the same forces. They were ‘professors of the one selfe same God, after one selfe sorte, and in one selfe peril’. Therefore, as he often told correspondents, Walsingham believed the ‘tyme requyreth vnitie […] in them that make profession of that truthe which is elswhere impugned’, which would be ‘a strengthe to oyr selves and an ayde vnto oyr Neighbors’, while division promised ‘ruyne’.

Elizabeth’s reluctance to embrace the cause of the godly, in England and elsewhere, was a cause of serious concern, though even this was seen in providential terms. As he told Hatton in 1578, ‘[w]here the advice of faithfull counselors cannot prevale with a prince of her Majesties rare iudgm ent it is a signe that god hath closed vp her majesties hart from seeing & executing that whIch may be for her safety’. As Blair Worden has observed, it was when a council united in a course of action could not convince Elizabeth to do as they thought necessary that Walsingham was at his most alarmed. When it was a division between advisers that was the problem, there was at least the possibility that Elizabeth

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25 Walsingham to Leicester, 11 January 1573, Sir Dudley Digges, The Compleat Ambassador, or, Two Treatises of the Intended Marriage of Queen Elizabeth of Glorious Memory; Comprised in Letters of Negotiation of Sir Francis Walsingham, her Resident in France. Together with the Answers of Lord Burleigh, the Earl of Leicester, Sir Tho: Smith, and others (London: Tho: Newcomb for Gabriel Bedell and Thomas Collins, 1655), sig. R121.
26 Walsingham to Burghley, 4 November 1585, BL, Harley 6993, fol. 114v.
27 Walsingham to [Burghley], 24 July 1577, BL, Cotton, Caligula C III, fol. 529.
28 Walsingham to Bowes, 10 August 1580, TNA, SP 52/28, fol. 222v.
29 Walsingham to Randolph and Bowes, 16 March 1578[8], BL, Harley 6992, fol. 100.
30 Walsingham to Hatton, 2 [?] September 1578, TNA, SP 83/9, fol. 62v.
could be drawn to listen to different advice.\textsuperscript{31} It was, Walsingham believed, ‘[o]wre synnes’ and especially ‘owre vnthankefvlnes for the great and syngvler benefyttes yt hath pleased god to blesse this land w/ihall’ that prevented Elizabeth from heeding his advice and acting in what he considered to be her own best interests.\textsuperscript{32}

Individual English people needed, therefore, to be more religious. In 1584, for example, Walsingham despaired of Scottish affairs unless ‘we were here more relygyose and resolvtte then we are’.\textsuperscript{33} His colleagues also interpreted events in a similar light.\textsuperscript{34} Even events in the natural world were seen as warnings of God’s wrath. In 1580, Walsingham hoped that a recent earthquake would induce them ‘become more zealous in the advancement of Godes glorie then hitherto wee haue bein but I feare that wee shall neglect Godes mercifull admonicion […] and […] draw one vs a more sharpe measure of Judgment’.\textsuperscript{35} Walsingham also worked with the earl of Derby on ‘Suggestions for reforming the enormities of the Sabbath’, which, in response to the number of fairs, markets and games on the holy day, recommended that local officials were to stop unlawful pastimes on Sundays with offenders to be presented to the quarter sessions, and the number of alehouses was to be reduced, and the parents of bastards were to be punished.\textsuperscript{36}

Given the dire international situation England faced, it was especially necessary to appease God. In 1577, Walsingham complained to Burghley of Elizabeth’s proceedings against Archbishop Grindal. Even bad news from France had not forced Elizabeth to reconsider, ‘which at this tyme howe so ever he hathe offended were in trewe pollecye most requysyte’. Instead, ‘we proceade styll in makyng warre ageynst god: whos yre we shoold rather seeke to appease that he may kepe the warres (that most apparently approche towardes vs) from vs’. He prayed for God to open the queen’s eyes and show her ‘from whence the trewe remedye is to be sownght’.\textsuperscript{37} “True” policy was to depend on God, embracing His cause as their own, not to bring down godly members of the church and regime. The opposite was human policy. It was imperative for Elizabeth to pursue godly policies, or God would withdraw his protection. As Walsingham explained as part of his

\textsuperscript{32} Walsingham to Burghley, 18 September 1587, BL, Harley 6994, fol. 98.
\textsuperscript{33} Walsingham to William Davison, 3 June 1584, TNA, SP 52/35, fol. 3v.
\textsuperscript{35} [Walsingham?] to Cobham, 15 April 1580, TNA, SP 78/4A, fol. 55v.
\textsuperscript{37} Walsingham to Burghley, 31 May 1577, TNA, SP 12/113, fol. 44.
consideration of the desirability of the Alençon marriage, ‘the prosperyte or the adversyte of kyngedomes dependethe of gods goodnes whoe is so long to extende his protectyon as we shall depende of his provyidence [...] not seeke owre savetye (carryed awaye by hvmane pollecye) contrarye to his woorde’. As we have seen, this consideration weighed heavily on Walsingham in his attitude to the match. 38 By depending on God, Walsingham did not mean passive resignation, but to seize opportunities as they presented themselves. Like Sidney and other opponents of the marriage, for Walsingham ‘virtuous action derives from the self-reliance which God requires of us’ and, as Amias Paulet expressed it, ‘God will help us to avoid’ the peril confronting us ‘if we help ourselves’. 39

Despite the importance of providential and religious considerations in Walsingham’s political calculations, these are remarkably absent from his various extant draft position papers or policy documents on English foreign policy, especially on the question of assistance for the Prince of Orange. On only one occasion does he explicitly advocate war on religious grounds. Urging the necessity of England assistance, Walsingham reasoned,

All creatures are created to advance goods glorye: therfor when his glorye is cavled in question: no leage nor pollecye can excvse any prynce yf by all meanes he seeke not the defence of the same / ye wíth the losse of lyfe. 40

This is exactly what one would expect from Walsingham, and he certainly did think England should militarily aid her neighbours in their hour of need. However, it does not tell the whole story, in which Walsingham plays a more cautious part than one might expect. Though he certainly thought that by joining in the opposition to Spanish forces in the Low Countries Elizabeth would ‘advauce the Cause of Religeon thoroughout all Christendome, an Acte worthie of a Christian prince’, he was also aware of the obstacles to this. 41 On some of these we even find him in agreement with Elizabeth: he could not, for instance, ‘greatly blame’ Elizabeth for her reluctance to renew her overtures for a league

38 ‘A consideryatyon of the dyseased state of the realm and howe the same may in some kynde of sorte be cvred’, BL, Harley 1582, fol. 49v.
39 Worden, Sound of Virtue, p. 140.
40 ‘Whether it be requisite for the Q to ayde the Prince of Orange ageinst D. D. notwithstanding the league betwene us and the howse of burgundye’, c. 1575-76, TNA, SP 70/136, fol. 214v.
41 ‘Whether it maye stand with good pollecye for her Ma.tie to ioyne withe Spaine in the enterprise of Burgundie’, undated, probably c. 1572, BL, Harley 168, fol. 57.
including the German Protestant princes given their lack of enthusiasm in response to earlier initiatives.42

As we have seen in chapter 2, though Walsingham tried every trick in the book to persuade Elizabeth to do as he thought necessary and right, he accepted that he could not force her to act. Accepting this was easier when you believed that God had disposed of matters this way in response to the sins of the populace and in accordance with His own grand design, or, in Walsingham’s words, ‘a signe that god hath closed up her Majesties hart from seeing & executing that which may be for her safety; which we that love her […] cannot but with griefe thinck of’.43

Walsingham could, however, keep the lines of communication with foreign Protestants open for future necessity, keeping up with developments in France, the Low Countries and elsewhere. This may have been useful for Elizabeth too, keeping her informed of news and giving her a line of communication to foreign leaders with an element of plausible deniability. Walsingham corresponded with prominent Protestants in Europe, including Johannes Sturm, who urged Walsingham to persuade Elizabeth to continue her efforts to organise a pan-Protestant league. Walsingham sent Sturm money, and in return received detailed news from central Europe.44 Walsingham also corresponded with Philippe Duplessis Mornay, an adviser to Henri of Navarre, who asked Walsingham to extend his good offices in maintaining good relations between their princes.45 A letter from Mornay in 1581 showed, for Walsingham, that the ‘practises agreed on at the Councell of Trent are begunne to be put in execucion in Germanye’, and ‘it behoueth all those Princes that make profession of the reformed religion to ioyne togither in opposinge themselfes effectually against their aduersaries’.46 He was thus plugged into a Europe-wide network of men who thought like him, and he did his best to “spin” Elizabeth’s actions positively to this audience, including trying to bribe an envoy sent by Duke John Casimir to soften the queen’s answer to his request for support.47

If Elizabeth would not overtly help her co-religionists abroad, in a domestic context Walsingham could at least help those fleeing continental conflicts. Walsingham was

42 [Walsingham] to Beale, 2 November 1577, TNA, SP 81/1, fol. 103v.
44 129.
46 Walsingham to Randolph, 4 February 1581, TNA, SP 52/29, fol. 26.
47 La Huguerye to Walsingham, 19 May 1587, Cal. Foreign, XXI part 1, June 1586 – June 1588, p. 301.
known to be sympathetic to the stranger churches founded in England by French and Dutch religious refugees. One of Walsingham’s secretarial staff, Ciprian, was the son of an elder of the French church.\textsuperscript{48} Walsingham’s assistance was sought by two preachers of Colchester, where he was recorder, in preventing the expulsion from the town of the strangers of the Dutch church.\textsuperscript{49} There certainly seems some justification for one correspondent’s remark that ‘all refugees for religion are particularly indebted to Walsingham’.\textsuperscript{50} He clearly saw aiding exiles as a moral, religious and politically advantageous duty, as the following incident demonstrates.

In 1584, a number of Scottish divines fled to England after James VI passed the so-called “Black Acts” imposing royal control over the hitherto independent kirk. The exiles included the aggressively Presbyterian Andrew Melville, who had defended the kirk’s independence from secular control, and two correspondents of Walsingham, James Lawson and James Carmichael. They followed a group of Scottish nobles, including the earl of Angus, who had fled to England after a failed coup against James’ hated favourite, the earl of Arran.

Walsingham was extremely disappointed with the ‘cold’ reception the nobles and ministers received, but, he wrote, this agreed with England’s course in ‘dysplacyng & depryving the best affected ministers’.\textsuperscript{51} This is the closest Walsingham came in surviving documents to criticising the government of the Church of England and it was in response to Archbishop Whitgift’s crackdown on the fringes of the Protestant movement. He complained that Whitgift and ‘certain others of the Clergye’ had persuaded Elizabeth that the exiled ministers should not be allowed to preach, and that as a result of this hostility from on high, ‘no man dare harbovr them for feare of offence’. He lamented this poor treatment of those who had ‘best deserued at our handes which cannot but greatly wound and greeue the best affected men of that realme’.\textsuperscript{52} Walsingham saw the exiles, both clerical and noble, as England’s natural allies in Scotland, so, as well as an indictment of English piety and charity, the mistreatment of the ministers would also undermine political relationships between the two countries. This could only alarm Walsingham, given his suspicions of the Scottish king and fear of invasion from that direction: England needed to

\textsuperscript{48} Lord Cobham to Sir Robert Cecil, 1604, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury: Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, 24 vols (London: Eyre and Spottiswood for H. M. S. O., 1883–), XVI, p. 244 (hereafter HMC Hatfield); Noel de Caron to Sir Robert Cecil, 30 May 1598, HMC Hatfield, VIII, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{49} Nicholas Chalyner, Robert Lewis et al to Walsingham, 8 November 1580, TNA, SP 12/144, fol. 45.

\textsuperscript{50} Fremin to Walsingham, 21 February or 3 March 1586, Cal. Foreign, XX, p. 388.

\textsuperscript{51} Walsingham to Davison, 3 June 1584, TNA, SP 52/35, fol. 3[r].

\textsuperscript{52} Walsingham to Davison, 13 August 1584, TNA, SP 52/36, fol. 15.
seize this God-given opportunity to improve relations with her natural allies for both political and charitable reasons. He complained to Davison that the exiles ‘who have shewed them selves good instrvmentes for the interteyning of the amytye betwene the two crownes are but hardly thought of here and therfor not lykely to be vsed with that kindenes that eyther Christyanyte or pollecye requirethe’. Ideally, therefore, Walsingham wanted the exiles returned to Scotland and returned to James’ favour.

Walsingham did his best to help the exiles regardless of official attitudes, facilitating their arrival in London. It was to Walsingham that Carmichael turned for advice and approval in getting a defence of their conduct published. It may also have been at Walsingham’s behest that Melville was allowed to preach at the Tower of London, which was exempt from the jurisdiction of the bishop. Walsingham certainly met with Melville and his companions on a number of occasions. Such favour as Melville did receive was attributed by his friends primarily to Walsingham.

As well as his sympathy to religious exiles, this incident also shows Walsingham’s concerns about Whitgift’s crackdown on more radical ministers in the Church of England. This exacerbated an existing problem for Walsingham and many others concerned with the religious state of the nation: the shortage of competent preaching ministers. This was a major obstacle to spreading Protestant doctrine and maintaining God’s protection of England. Elizabeth herself was reluctant to institute a nationwide preaching ministry in the numbers required for full-scale indoctrination. Walsingham continually lamented what he saw as a lack of genuine religion in England. England was so threatened by her enemies that only ‘patience and prayer’ were left, ‘which if we could offer up hartely vnto God I wold take more comforte thereof then of all the leagues that are grounded and depende vppon the arme of man’. He knew that ‘God hathe [...] wrought moste mightely for vs when in the ey of the world we semed altogther giuen ouer for a pray vnto oar ennemyes’, and, though concerned about the effects of our ‘synnes and vnthankefullnes’, ‘when I

53 Walsingham to Davison, 17 June 1584, TNA, SP 52/35, fol. 14.
54 Walsingham to Angus and Mar, 5 May 1584, TNA, SP 52/34, fol. 50; Walsingham to Angus, Mar, et al, 24 January 1585, TNA, SP 52/37, fol. 7.
57 [Robert or James] Melville to Archibald Douglas, 18 October 1586, HMC Hatfield, III, p. 182.
consyder howe deere his owne glorye is vnto him I dowbt nothing but that he wyll confownd in the end’ England’s enemies.\textsuperscript{59} Just audible here is the familiar Calvinist angst: caught between the assurance and doubt of election.

In the face of Elizabeth’s indifference, Walsingham showed himself committed to the provision of a skilled preaching ministry which lived exemplary lives. There is little evidence of him directly presenting candidates to particular livings, though he did donate the advowson of Thurcaston (Leicestershire) to the newly-founded Emmanuel College, Cambridge, designed to train up a new generation of godly ministers.\textsuperscript{60} It is otherwise extremely hard to reconstruct Walsingham’s religious patronage, but it was probably more considerable than surviving documents indicate. In 1589, one correspondent noted that people seeking church office applied to Walsingham as if he was a bishop.\textsuperscript{61} In his efforts to secure England’s Protestant future, Walsingham gave an important role to the clergy. It would be necessary, he wrote, to ‘put duly in execution the lawes provided for the evill affected in religion’ and ensure ‘the clergy men discharge ther dutye in the diligent instructing of the people’.\textsuperscript{62}

In pursuit of these objectives, Walsingham often supported divines who might be termed “puritans”, though not exclusively. In 1584, for example, Sir Thomas Scott wrote to Walsingham on behalf of ministers who needed more time before submitting to Archbishop Whitgift’s conformity drive.\textsuperscript{63} Walsingham had also successfully moved the bishop of Chester to exempt eight ministers from wearing the surplice. After Walsingham’s death, the exemption continued at the instigation of first Sir Thomas Heneage and then Burghley, and in 1602 Robert Cecil was asked to renew the privilege.\textsuperscript{64} Given the longevity of this measure, it seems to have been effective in keeping moderately dissenting ministers within the church, and exemplifies Walsingham’s pragmatic approach to church government and patronage.

One of the early-Elizabethan radicals patronised by Walsingham was Thomas Cartwright. In a 1582 letter, Walsingham told Cartwright, then in Antwerp, that the queen ‘taketh your being there offensiuely, by what occasions I know not, neither may we inquier of those matters but only content our selves in dwtiefull sortes to stand to hir H pleasure’.

\textsuperscript{59} [Walsingham] to [Cobham?], October 1580, TNA, SP 78/4B, fol. 171.
\textsuperscript{61} Battista Aurellio to Walsingham, 11 May 1589, TNA, SP 12/224, fol. 51.
\textsuperscript{62} TNA, SP 12/133, fol. 50.
\textsuperscript{63} Scott to Walsingham, 6 March 1584, TNA, SP 12/169, fol. 22.
\textsuperscript{64} Ottywell Smith to Robert Cecil, 5 May 1602, \textit{HMC Hatfield}, XII, p. 142.
Striking a balance between observing Elizabeth’s wishes and helping talented individuals, Walsingham pushed Cartwright away with one hand but then drew him closer with the other. Walsingham wanted Cartwright to help respond to Catholic publications, especially the Reims New Testament, and promised him £100 a year and money for as many assistants as he liked. It seems unlikely that Walsingham thought he could persuade Elizabeth to pay Cartwright to do this, so he may have planned to fund this himself or through raising contributions among the godly. He recommended that Cartwright dedicate works produced under this umbrella to Burghley, if not the queen, as this was the best way to ‘mak an ouverture for your further favour’. In the event, Cartwright’s *Confutation* only appeared in 1618, but Walsingham’s priorities are visible here: aid and employment for militant Protestant divines to proselytise and write polemic.

Walsingham was also a long-term patron to the vehement Calvinist John Rainolds. He smoothed over Rainolds’ falling out with the earl of Warwick in 1580, and continued to patronise him until his death in 1590. Rainolds came from a family of Catholics, and his conversion may have made him an additionally attractive client to Walsingham. Rainolds was one of those whose services Walsingham used in responding to papist books. In a letter of 1582, Rainolds apologised with a jocular reference to Euripides for the delay in producing a counter-Catholic book in consultation with the priest John Hart. The letter was written from Walsingham’s house at Barnes, indicating the intimacy of this relationship. Walsingham must have had great respect for Rainolds and his views, because in 1586 he founded a lectureship in ‘controversial theology’ for Rainolds at Oxford. Designed specifically to counter the lectures at Rome of the Jesuit Robert Bellarmine, Rainolds’ performances attracted huge audiences. This was another of Walsingham’s targeted efforts to counter the spread of Catholicism and he was prepared to spend his own money to do this.

A more surprising recipient of Walsingham’s attention is Lancelot Andrewes, who received Walsingham’s patronage in the 1580s (and, perhaps, earlier). There may have been a falling out over Andrewes’ antipathy to aspects of Calvinism, but this was apparently overcome through mutual respect. In 1589, Andrewes expressed his gratitude to

65 Walsingham to Cartwright, 5 July 1582, TNA, SP 12/154, fol. 87.
67 Rainolds to Walsingham, 1 November 1580, TNA, SP 12/144, fol. 5.
68 Rainolds to Walsingham, 25 June 1582, TNA, SP 12/154, fol. 28.
69 *ODNB*, ‘Rainolds’.
Walsingham for obtaining for him two consecutive prebends.71 A few months later, Walsingham wrote to Burghley, recommending that Andrewes not be appointed master of Pembroke Hall, and that he should instead continue to be employed 'in these parts'.72 Rather than a return to academia, Walsingham wanted a preacher of Andrewes’ talents working in parishes. Like Rainolds, and some other recipients of Walsingham’s patronage, Andrewes later worked on the King James version of the Bible, highlighting Walsingham’s ability to pick out men of skill.

A man who could patronise both Rainolds and Andrewes was not a man who had much time for variations of belief among Protestants. Accordingly, Walsingham went out of his way to resolve disputes, which were a source of great regret to him: ‘I wishe with all myne harte we had lesse occasion of appeasinge strifes amonest our selues that we might more ioyntly & roundly ioyne the handes of fellowship against the oppen enemy’.73 A particularly interesting example occurred in 1575, when the president of Magdalen College, Oxford, Laurence Humphrey, expelled three junior fellows, William Powell, Nicholas Lombard, and Thomas Cole. Cole wrote to Walsingham’s secretary, Laurence Tomson, himself a former fellow of the college, complaining of their expulsion and asking for advice on how to obtain redress. Cole also wrote to Francis Mylles, asking him to persuade Walsingham to write in their favour to the bishop of Winchester, the college visitor.74 Although Cole described the dispute as arising from a disagreement about college statutes regarding elections, it seems actually to have been the result of their religious differences, with the expelled fellows being more radical than Humphrey.75 On 11th July Walsingham wrote to the bishop of Winchester urging him to help restore the expelled men.

In light of the fact that Walsingham had been Secretary for less than two years at the time of this intervention, it shows a certain confidence, and sense of duty. It shows his strong commitment to promoting Protestant harmony and, potentially, a sympathy with his more radical co-religionists. However, Walsingham had little to no authority for his intervention. Walsingham’s shifting pronouns indicate the dilemma he was in. The letter opens with an assertion of ‘[h]ow nerely the quyet estate of godes Churche and the

71 Andrewes to Walsingham, 24 May 1589, BL, Harley 6994, fol. 179.
72 Walsingham to Burghley, 28 August 1589, BL, Harley 6994, fol. 191
73 Walsingham to Bishop of Winchester, 11 July 1575, TNA, SP 12/105, fol. 35.
74 Cole to Tomson, 25 June 1575, TNA, SP 12/103, fol. 143; Cole to Mylles, 26 June 1575, TNA, SP 12/103, fol. 145. Nicholas Lombard also wrote to Mylles and Tomson: 29 June 1575, TNA, SP 12/103, fol. 151; 2 July 1575, TNA, SP 12/105, fol. 3.
furtheraunce of the gospell doth touche vs accorginge to our callinge’ and ‘what trauaile hath and is daily taken by vs, to suppress the aduersary and further the trueth the best we can [emphasis mine]. These opening lines carry a strong impression of Walsingham’s sense of vocation as a counsellor to protect the harmony of the Church of England and initially suggests that he is writing with the corporate authority of the council behind him. However, as the letter progresses, it becomes apparent that Walsingham is writing on his own initiative, without official conciliar backing, and without Elizabeth’s knowledge.

Walsingham’s concern was expressed in personal terms. He explained his initial interest in the reports of a controversy at Magdalen as the result of ‘the loue I haue borne a great whyle to the head’, i.e. Humphrey, who had been in Basel with Walsingham, and his desire to compose the matter to save ‘creditt on all sides’. On hearing of the dispute, Walsingham had written to Humphrey, who had sent the expelled fellows’ opponents to explain matters to the Secretary. At this point, Walsingham told Winchester, he had thought it only right to hear what the expelled fellows had to say for themselves. Walsingham then wrote to Humphrey again, asking him to reply to the fellows’ accusations in detail, and he was annoyed that the president had continued in his ‘accustomed generalities’.

Later, he expressed concern at ‘how greatly the gospell is hindred’ by the falling out, and ‘how the ennemies triumphe’ at it. He especially emphasised the diligent preaching of the expelled fellows, telling Winchester ‘[h]ow they travailed also in preacheinge the word both in the towne and ells where abroade, yt is so well knowen, that thanckes are give[n] to god for the proffit the Churche hath receaved by them’.

Walsingham’s primary aim was to persuade Winchester to support the restoration of the fellows in good terms, and thus end ‘broyles’ at the college. Quoting Mathew 23:24, Walsingham expressed his wish that ‘the Camells might be taken heede of, and theis knattes let goe’. Persecuting good ministers harmed the church – Humphrey ought to have had bigger fish to fry.

When Walsingham most wanted to put pressure on the bishop to restore the ‘poor men’, he returned to plural pronouns and references to conciliar and royal authority. He noted, for instance, that Humphrey’s victims ‘haue been commended by sum of the IIs to

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76 Walsingham to Bishop of Winchester, 11 July 1575, TNA, SP 12/105, fol. 35.
77 Ibid, fol. 35.
78 Ibid, fol. 36.
79 Ibid, fol. 36.
80 Ibid, fol. 35v.
81 Ibid, fol. 36v.
honnorable office in the Church, so generally they are so well liked of vs, that we thincke we haue iust cause to seeke for their relief, and to helpe them’. Similarly, Walsingham threatened that if the fellows were not restored by ‘ordinary meanes’, then ‘I will deale with her majestie in yt and my lls of the Councell, of whose honnorable protection for the poore men I nothinge doubt’. It seems unlikely, despite this bravado, that Elizabeth would in fact have supported the restoration of these radicals to their positions, and that Walsingham knew this. It in fact looks like a personal intervention to pre-empt royal involvement, before the matter reached the queen’s ears, when the expelled fellows might have found themselves worse off.

In another interesting intervention, in 1579, Walsingham wrote to Richard Curtis, bishop of Chichester, urging him to deprive the vicar of Cuckfield (West Sussex), ‘his ignorance beyng so great and his lyfe so vyle’, and ‘plant some good & fitt man in his place’. Walsingham’s intervention was occasioned, at least ostensibly, by the complaints of the inhabitants of the parish. Walsingham urged Curtis to do as he was asked in order to benefit the parish and rescue the bishop’s own reputation for allowing ‘so vnmeete a minister’. In the absence of any evidence showing Walsingham’s connection to Cuckfield, it seems important that residents concerned about the quality of their minister should appeal to Walsingham, presumably relying on his godly reputation to ensure a sympathetic hearing. They do not seem to have complained to the bishop himself, though this may have been because the vicar was his kinsman. Walsingham wrote here without the sanction of queen or council, merely in this case in response to the complaints of parishioners.

Walsingham’s concern for the quality of the ministry and harmony in institutions is clear, what is less obvious is how he justified his interventions in the affairs of the church in these two examples. This highlights the uneasy intersection of religious and secular power in this period. Elsewhere, Walsingham justified his intervention in unusual contexts on the grounds of the duty he owed ‘to th’advancement of the Kingdome of God and maintynnce of the same within this Isle, which God graunte wee maie holde, and leave to our posteritie to be inherited and possessed by them as the greatest and best parte of theyr Inheritance’. The origins of this duty to maintain Protestantism now and into the future are not explicitly stated, but Walsingham’s phrasing suggests that it was not the result of his offices as Principal Secretary and Privy Councillor. In an earlier passage, Walsingham had

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82 Ibid, fol. 36.
83 Ibid, fol. 36.
85 Walsingham to Randolph and Bowes, 16 March 1578, BL, Harley 6992, fol. 100v.
referred to the duties of those ‘whome god hathe appointed watchmen over that peece of his house [Scotland]’ to do all they could to uphold ‘vnitie’ among themselves, protect the ‘profession of the gospell and the free course thereof’, and to maintain ‘good amitie with their frindes which make the same profession as them selves’. Although he was referring to the counsellors of Scotland, this might also represent how Walsingham saw his own position: at God’s behest he had been made a “watchman” in England and he therefore had a responsibility to promote and protect the gospel. The responsibilities he attributed to his counterparts in Scotland certainly neatly match his own interventions and priorities (see chapter 5). Walsingham’s conception of his role in this passage owes a lot to the Protestant tradition of “inferior magistrates”, to whom God had also given authority and responsibility to govern, and who were included in St Paul’s “the powers that be” which were to be obeyed.86 Writers like Martin Bucer emphasised the duty of ‘all Christian rulers’ to restore and maintain true religion in their country, as they were bound to work for the wellbeing of their subjects, and therefore ‘must procure and secure for them not only happiness in this world but also eternal salvation’.87 Bucer saw both the state and church as ‘divine institutions that are meant by God to serve as instruments for the realisation of his ends [Pauck’s emphasis]’.88 As a result, rulers were responsible for ensuring the correct ordering of the Church, particularly the recruitment, training, and appointment of ministers.89 It was necessary, Bucer wrote, ‘to see to it that all governors of commonwealths, when they realise that all their power is from God alone and that he has appointed them shepherds of his people, to govern and guard those subject to them according to his judgement’.90 Preaching had a special place in Bucer’s view of the process of reformation and of how a Christian society should operate.91 Sharing views like this probably provided a powerful motivation for Walsingham’s interventions in ecclesiastical affairs. Bucer, after all, exhorted readers of his De Regno Christi that:

as it is a principal function of kings and of governors to search and explore what function of life has been designed by God for each citizen […] so certainly the same persons ought to exercise utmost interest and a primary concern among their subjects, and, wherever possible, to

90 Ibid, p. 189.
91 Ibid, pp. 197, 226.
seek and find those whom the Lord seems to have appointed to this supremely salutary work [...] of preaching the gospel.\textsuperscript{92}

He also sought to instil in his readers ‘how salutary it is for all men to have the Kingdom of Christ firmly restored among them and how necessary it is for salvation that every Christian, according to his place in the body of Christ and the gifts he has received from him, aim and work toward this with deepest concern’.\textsuperscript{93} Even secular magistrates, therefore, were encouraged to think of the health of the church and to work hard to maintain this – exactly the purpose of Walsingham’s interventions in 1575 and 1579. Walsingham even echoed Bucer’s use of ‘watchman’ to describe the role of magistrates.\textsuperscript{94}

An incident in 1578 further illustrates Walsingham’s religious priorities, especially his appreciation of the necessity of uniformity, and of the danger of suspicions of religious innovation reaching Elizabeth. The Merchant Adventurers had appointed a new minister at their base in Antwerp. The man they had chosen was Walter Travers, a leading light of the Presbyterian movement in England. In May, the month after Travers’ appointment, Walsingham wrote to William Davison, the English envoy in the Low Countries, about the situation. The Merchant Adventurers in England had informed Walsingham that Travers, encouraged by Davison, intended to cease using the English Book of Common Prayer. Walsingham advised Davison, one of his protégés, to ‘forbeare fvrther proceadyng therin’ because ‘yf yt shoold come to her ma\textit{jestes} cares yt woold greatly kyndell her offence’ against both Davison and the merchants. Walsingham’s sensitivity to Elizabeth’s centrality and her preferences is clear here, and her antipathy to further reformation was a serious problem, though Walsingham himself was not ‘one that myslykethe of sooche a foorme of prayer’, he told Davison. However, he continued, ‘I woold have all reformations don by pvblycke awthoryte’, and ‘yt were verruy dayngerowse \textit{that} evry pryvat mans zeale shoold carry svfftyyte adwthorite of reformyng thinges amysse’.\textsuperscript{95} Walsingham was opposed to further reformation unless this was pursued through the appropriate political channels (presumably parliamentary statute). Travers, like other divines, may not have seen himself as a mere “private man” with no responsibility for the nation’s spiritual welfare. The incident suggests that Walsingham had some personal sympathy with Presbyterian forms of worship, though in England it would have to await a more appropriate moment.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, p. 227.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, p. 259.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, p. 361.
\textsuperscript{95} Walsingham to Davison, 8 May 1578, TNA, SP 83/6, fol. 106.
Walsingham’s profound sense of the precariousness of Protestantism and godliness in England comes across strongly in the next part of the letter, in which he told Davison, ‘[y]f you knewe with what dyffycvlye we reteyne that we have: and that the seekyng of more myght hazarde [...] that which we alreadye have: you woold [...] deale warely in this tyme when pollecye carrythe more swaye then Zeale’. Here we again have “policy” opposed to “zeal”; human wisdom versus faith in God. Despite the disappointment latent in these comments, Walsingham nonetheless believed they should ‘thank god’ for the benefits they did enjoy, ‘having gods woorde synectarly preached and the sacramentes truly mynstred’. These were considered the marks of the true church, evidence of the validity of English worship despite the need for improvement. Everything else, they were to ‘beg by prayer, and attende with patyence’.

This letter certainly reveals a surprising caution in his desire for further reformation, and a strong grasp of the possible, concerned throughout not to rouse Elizabeth’s ire.

That was not quite the end of the matter, however. During their embassy to the Low Countries that summer, Walsingham and Lord Cobham spoke to Travers and he reassured them of his intention to conform to the rites of English worship. Despite this, the governor of the Merchant Adventurers, Nicholas Loddington, had silenced Travers, which led to another letter from Walsingham, this time ordering Loddington to let Travers conduct his ministry without interference now that he had promised conformity. In doing this, he said, Loddington had done ‘my L Cobham and me a great deale of wronge’ because ‘youe will take vppon youe beinge only a minister to a company of marchantes to redresse that, whic by [us] was not myslyked, as though youe could better iudge what were fit to be donne in those causes then we’.

A few days later, Walsingham received news that Travers and Loddington had resolved their differences, and sent a more conciliatory letter. He approved of their plans to use the prayer book, as it was ‘good and commendable’, and he promised the company his favour in their ‘Lawful’ suits. If Travers were conforming to the English ceremony, there was no need to silence him, and in fact a Travers in post was better for the stability of the English church than a resentful, stymied Travers searching for employment.

This example shows that Walsingham was capable of real compromise. Additionally, despite his personal reservations about Whitgift’s crackdown on non-conformity, Walsingham seems to have sought to moderate the severity of the archbishop’s
initiative, suggesting that only new entrants into the ministry should have to subscribe the proposed articles, with incumbent ministers merely being required to give a written assurance that they would use the Book of Common Prayer in line with the law.

Walsingham also apparently promised Whitgift that he would ‘join with him against such as should be breakers of the orders of the Church established’. This perhaps indicated that Walsingham was concerned about the wilder excesses of the puritan movement and was prepared to act to curb these where necessary – just as he had with Travers in 1578. In 1586, he supposedly told Drue Drury that there was not even a particularly urgent need to reform the church as ‘theyr is enough extant to satesfi anne that ar resonable’, which supports this view of a cautious Walsingham, opposed to precipitate action on this matter.

Though Walsingham acknowledged that further reformation would need to await due process, he sought other opportunities to improve the religious health of the nation. In 1589, he tried to establish a framework for mass religious education in London: his ‘Plott for the creatyng of a pvblycke exercyce of cathechisyng wth in the cytte of london’ which provides clear evidence of his concern to spread the basics of Protestant doctrine to a wide audience. Walsingham may have believed, like Martin Bucer, that if the Word of God was preached and taught sufficiently then the people ‘would themselves agitate for reform’, and this would provide a plausible explanation for his reluctance to pursue further reform at an institutional level, while promoting religious literature and talented divines.

Walsingham’s scheme was occasioned by ‘the malice of this present time through certaine Jesuites and Seminaries latelie creapt vp’, who both at home and abroad ‘have caried away a great nombor of her majesties good subiectes from the profession of the gospell’. As a result, it was necessary to produce a new catechism specially designed to counter the ‘false principells and sclanderous brutes’ of the Jesuits and their allies.

Walsingham’s plan provided for the choice of ‘two excellent and rare persons’ from the

101 ‘Plott for the creatyng of a pvblycke exercyce of cathechisyng wth in the cytte of london’, TNA, SP 12/223, fols 182-185.
103 Ibid, fol. 182.
universities who were 'good schoolmen & such as are well acquaynted w
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th matters of
controuersie' to do this and to take turns to perform the catechising on Sundays. The
catechisers were also to be part of Walsingham’s campaign against Catholic literature (if
they had time): to ‘aunswere such bookes as are published by the aduersaries’.

Walsingham provided for the catechisers’ maintenance through contributions from
parishes, the twelve main livery companies of the City, and ‘well affected persons’, and
suggested that they be appointed to prebends of St Paul’s or Westminster. He also
considered the best place to hold the events, and suggested the ‘lower ende of the Church
of the gray ffriers’, especially if ‘skillfull men’ built ‘some stages Theaterwise’. The mayor,
aldermen and the bishop of London should attend at least once a quarter, and members of
the Inns of Court were to be in attendance. It would also be necessary to appoint some
children from the ‘common scholes’ in the City, well-primed by their masters beforehand,
to be publicly catechised on these occasions.

This was quite an ambitious scheme for mass religious education, rooted in
Walsingham’s fears over the menace of the Jesuits and seminary priests and his desire to
secure the future of Protestantism by ensuring as many people as possible came into
contact with the key doctrines in the face of Elizabeth’s antipathy to an extensive preaching
ministry. His plan involved representatives of major institutions, especially the bishop, the
corporation and the Inns of Court, yoking together religious orthodoxy and civic authority.
Beyond countering the lies of the Jesuits, the doctrine and content of the catechism is not
specified. Again, this was a religious initiative not directed to advance a specific kind of
Protestantism, but to target threats to them all: ignorance and irreligion.

Though the catechising programme never got off the ground, Walsingham had
already been busy organising counter attacks on papist books produced on the continent,
particularly those of the Jesuits. Ten years earlier, Walsingham had devised ‘The order of
proceedinge to be helde for the awntswering’ of such books, in which he considered ‘what
bookes are fyt to be awntswered […] by whom […] And how the charges shall be
defrayed’. The decision on the first point was referred to a list of experts, many of whom
were personally known to Walsingham, including Robert Beale, Walter Travers, John
Rainolds, Thomas Norton, Laurence Tomson, and one ‘Sootheacke’, presumably
Walsingham’s chaplain. The books themselves, once decided upon, would be countered by

104 Ibid, fol. 183.
105 Ibid, fol. 183v.
106 Ibid, fols 184v-85.
107 Ibid, fol.185v.
men chosen from among divines and university scholars. Many of the men Walsingham chose to consider the ‘Popishe’ works belonged to the militant Protestant end of the spectrum, suggesting not only doctrinal sympathy but also perhaps that he was keen to find an outlet for the energies of these men in a way that harnessed their talents in the service of the regime. Rather than turned inward on each other, arguing about vestments, their energies were to be turned outwards to defend Protestantism against its enemies using the pen where others used the sword.

That a similar policy was put into execution is borne out by the increase in dedications of books of a religious nature to Walsingham in the 1580s. Historians have paid surprisingly little attention to the nature of works dedicated to Walsingham, but a consideration of this is revealing of some of his central priorities. Of forty-eight works identified as dedicated to him, thirty-one could be considered religious in nature, which suggests that he encouraged the authors of such texts (see Appendix for details of works dedicated to Walsingham). Space prohibits a full discussion of all these works, but three broad and sometimes overlapping themes can be identified in the subjects of these texts: some were designed to promulgate the basics of Protestant religion, some addressed the godly for their comfort, and some attacked opponents of England and Protestantism.

The largest number of religious works (6) were dedicated to Walsingham in 1582, the year after the Jesuit Edmund Campion’s martyrdom, and two years after the first Jesuits arrived in England – surely not a coincidence. This anti-Jesuit impulse was explicitly addressed by John Keltridge, the author of *Two godlie and learned sermons appointed, and preached, before the Jesuites, seminaries, and other aduersaries to the gospell of Christ in the Tower of London*. Keltridge explained that he dedicated his ‘shorte Confutation of their Heresies’ to Walsingham because the responsibility for redressing these lay ‘on your shoulders, and is required at Gods handes of the Lordes of her Maiesties […] priuie Councell’. Of the six works dedicated to Walsingham in 1582, three can be identified as broadly polemical, addressing the abuses of the Jesuits and their allies (those by Thomas Lupton, Anthony Munday, and Barnaby Rich), and two as catechetical (those by John Prime and Robert Some). Only Stephen Gosson’s attack on stage plays seems addressed to the spiritual concerns of the godly. Ultimately, however, all the religious works dedicated to

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108 ‘The order of proceedinge to be helde for the awntswering of the Iesuite and other Popishe bookes’, 1579?, TNA, SP 12/133, fols 80-81.
109 John Keltridge, *Two godlie and learned sermons* (London: [John Charlewood &] Richard Jones, [1581]), sig ii'.
Walsingham tend in the same direction: to strengthen Protestantism in England, and to defend the religion and regime there.

When considering these dedications, it is important to remember that the process did not just go one way. The authors wanted something in return, whether this was financial support, or something less tangible. John Garbrand, for instance, called on Walsingham to ‘step forthe in freshe courage into the battale of the Lord of hoastes’ and to ‘employ the great giftes of wisedome and authoritie which God hath bestowed vpon you, and to excite and stirre vp others the worthie and notable captaines set ouer the people, to be a fenced wall betweene them, & these […] daungerous enimes’, especially by ‘giuing life to all suche lawes, whiche haue beene devised […] to the setting foorth of Goddes glorie’.110 By attributing to Walsingham these responsibilities, often noting his zeal in them, these authors sought to persuade Walsingham to conform (or continue to conform) to these qualities and expectations. This was a common rhetorical technique in other literary contexts, too, especially suitors’ letters to their patrons.111

Sometimes Walsingham had even heard or read the text prior to its publication, which might suggest a higher degree of agreement with its content. John Baker explained that he had chosen to dedicate his book of ‘lectures’ to Walsingham because ‘you had heard them read vnto you’ and Walsingham’s ‘accepting of them as fauoring the trueth shall incourage others to doe the like’.112 Similarly, John Foxe’s De olive evangelica, translated, dedication to Walsingham and all, by James Bell as A sermon preached at the christening of a certaine Iew at London by Iohn Foxe, noted that when ‘this sermon was first preached […] you so earnestly required the sayde matter agayne to bee repeated in your chamber being sicke’.113 The dedication also shows a familiarity with Lady Walsingham and ‘the yong litle plants of your domesticall Oliue sitting about your table’ suggestive of the close relationship between dedicator and dedicatee. Foxe had, after all, been based in Basel at the same time as Walsingham. Both Foxe’s original and Bell’s translation were published by Barker, using his designation of queen’s printer, which he only used when the works in question fell within the remit of his patent to produce religious works for the benefit of the

110 John Garbrand, An exposition vpon the two epistles of the apostle Saint Paule to the Thessalonians, by the reuerende Father Iohn Iewel, late Byshop of Sarisburie (London: Ralph Newbury and Henry Bynneman, 1583), sig. A4v.
113 James Bell, A sermon preached at the christening of a certaine Iew at London by Iohn Foxe (London: Christopher Barker, 1578), sig. Aii.
commonwealth. Readers would have understood the designation of Barker as the queen’s printer on the title page as an indication of official sanction.\textsuperscript{114}

Walsingham’s more active involvement can also be discerned in Garbrand’s \textit{An exposition[n] upon the two epistles of the apostle S. Paul to the Thessalonians by the reverend Father John Jewel}. Garbrand, the son of a religious refugee from the Low Countries, had a long association with Jewel, the late bishop of Salisbury, and was left the bishop’s papers on his death in 1571.\textsuperscript{115} Garbrand asked Walsingham to ‘accept my simple endeuour herein, as I haue beene careful to aunsweare your Honores commaundement, in giuing forth some parte of his [Jewel’s] laboures to light’.\textsuperscript{116} To Jewel’s sermon, he added the dedication and some Latin verses. In many ways, Jewel was of obvious interest to Walsingham. He was the ideal Protestant bishop, committed to exercising his office conscientiously, in preaching and pastoral care, a defender of the English church in print, and a conformer to the status quo. Walsingham may also have had personal ties to Jewel, who was known to his friends Thomas Randolph and Sir Nicholas Throckmorton.\textsuperscript{117}

Almost all of the religious works dedicated to Walsingham are in English; only three are in Latin.\textsuperscript{118} This suggests that Walsingham’s purpose in patronising at least some of these writers was to spread the basics of Protestant knowledge in England. For example, in 1589, Richard Saintbarb, presumably a relative of Lady Walsingham, dedicated his \textit{Certaine points of christian religion} to Walsingham and his wife.\textsuperscript{119} Saintbarb’s treatise took the form of questions and short answers, starting with questions on the nature of God and the Holy Trinity, moving on to the creation and the fall of man, and through other major issues like the meanings of the ten commandments, the nature of providence, the fact of predestination, the doctrine of salvation by faith, and so on. These are exactly the kind of material that could help spread Protestant knowledge and understanding.

\textsuperscript{114} Katherine Diamond, ‘Reducing these loose papers into this order: A Bibliographical Sociology of \textit{The Principall Navigations} (1589)’, (unpublished doctoral thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2012), pp. 87, 96.
\textsuperscript{116} Garbrand, sig. A4.
\textsuperscript{118} Conrad Hubert and Johan Sturm, \textit{Scripta Anglicana} (Basel: Petri Pernae, 1577); Peter Baro, \textit{De fide} (London: Richard Day, 1580); and William Tomson, \textit{In canticum, canticorum} (London: Robert Waldegrave, 1583).
\textsuperscript{119} Richard Saintbarb, \textit{Certaine points of christian religion} (London: For W. Young and R. Jackson, 1589).
Some of the dedications explicitly announced their educational, almost catechetical intent. For example, in his *A short treatise of the sacraments generally, and in speciall of baptisme, and of the Supper* John Prime described the book’s purpose as ‘to set forth the truth, to instruct the simple, & to saue soules’. Similarly, John Baker’s *Lectures […] upon the xii. Articles of our Christian faith*, which also contained a “confession” of the Christian faith written by John Hooper, justified his explanations of the Creed on the basis that it would enable the ‘simple and ignorant, which can but onlye reade’ to understand ‘the true and playne meaning of euery article of their faith’. Baker stated that if the people only ‘rehearsed’ the Creed ‘without the meaning of it in more words then they can not take such comfort out of these articles as were requisite, because they do not understand them’. This emphasis on understanding, not just knowing, was important in Protestant ideas about salvation. Walsingham’s patronage of these writers, then, can be seen as part of his efforts to improve religious provision and strengthen Protestant feeling in the country at large.

A variety of Protestant positions are represented amongst the authors of works dedicated to Walsingham, and it is important to remember, therefore, that these dedications are not necessarily evidence of Walsingham’s own beliefs. John Prime, for instance, despite his ‘reputation for aggressively Protestant preaching’ and his insistence on ‘the indefectibility of election’, was attacked by name in the Marprelate tracts. While Robert Some, author of *A godlie treatise of the Church*, started out as a radical who opposed the Court of Faculties and the episcopal hierarchy, promotion may have endowed him with more moderation by the time he came to Walsingham’s attention.

Some of the works dedicated to Walsingham, however, are indicative of his sympathies with those saw themselves as “godly”, and bolster his reputation as an enthusiastic Calvinist. The most famous instance of Walsingham’s religious patronage is undoubtedly the Geneva Bible, an English translation of markedly Calvinist flavour. Initially published in Geneva, from 1575 it was published in England by Walsingham’s

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client, Christopher Barker, and Walsingham’s device of a tiger’s head appears on the title page for the New Testament. Barker had not yet gained the position of Queen’s printer, so his patent to print the Geneva Bible was a special privilege, as Bible production was usually the monopoly of the holder of the royal patent.\textsuperscript{124} This clearly advertises Walsingham’s support for a more advanced Protestantism than that contained in the officially-sanctioned “Bishops’ Bible”. Later versions of the Geneva Bible incorporated a slightly different version of the New Testament based on the work of Laurence Tomson, one of Walsingham’s secretaries. In 1576, Tomson dedicated his English translation of Theodore Beza’s New Testament to his master and also Francis Hastings, brother of the earl of Huntingdon. Tomson explained his motivation for translating Beza’s Latin as being for ‘my poore brethrens sake, which want the blessing [of the text] for the understanding of the Latine’. Tomson further asserted that, in performing the translation, ‘my chiefest respect was to further & helpe the more simple sorte’.\textsuperscript{125} Again, therefore, this was a work designed to improve religious knowledge among the laity, and probably especially among those who already identified themselves as “godly”.

Two of the dedications prefaced translations of work by Calvin, and both of these seem to fit with the theme of edifying or comforting the non-Latinate godly. Nathaniel Baxter dedicated \textit{The lectures or daily sermons, of that reverend divine, D. Iohn Caluine [...] uppon the prophet Ionas} to Walsingham, alongside Walsingham’s friend Sir John Brocket, and Brocket’s neighbour, Sir Henry Cock. Baxter explained that his book was designed to remedy the ‘ignoraunce’ and ‘vanitie of many of our own people’ and bemoaned the fact that frivolous plays and books were more popular than God’s word. He noted ‘the good liking that you haue had alwayes of M. Caluines works’.\textsuperscript{126} Baxter was one of those who criticised Thomas Cartwright for allowing that ministers could conform in dress and ceremony to the church orders in 1577, and he wrote and translated various works which established him as ‘a vociferous Calvinist, critical of the established church’.\textsuperscript{127}

Similarly, William Becket offered his \textit{A commentarie of M. Iohn Caluine uppon the Epistle to the Philippians} to the Secretary, ‘for your great loue of godlines, & singular Zeale in furthering of religion’. The book was intended to:

\textsuperscript{124} Diamond, pp. 78-80, 86.
\textsuperscript{125} Laurence Tomson, \textit{The New Testament...translated out of Greeke by Theod. Beza...} (London: Christopher Barker, 1576), sigs †j, †iiij.
\textsuperscript{126} Nathaniel Baxter, \textit{The lectures or daily sermons, of that reverend divine, D. Iohn Caluine} (London: Edward White, 1578), sigs Alii, Aiiii, Bi.
set out the condition of the godly, how the Lord in this life humbleth them by afflictions and after receiveueth them to eternall glory [...] their assurance of Gods fauour [...] the benefite that commeth by preaching of the gospel [...] the necessity of vnity and agrement among the faithfull.\textsuperscript{128}

This is a particularly interesting dedication given Walsingham’s interest in Paul’s letters to early Christian communities, especially Ephesians and Colossians, which emphasise the importance of unity among the believers (see chapter 5). Philippians is one of the same series, as was Thessalonians, the subject of Jewel’s text published by Garbrand.

These works and others like Thomas Wilcox’s \textit{Summarie and Short Meditations, touching sundry poyntes of Christian religion [...] published for the edification and profit of Gods Saints} dedicated to Walsingham and his wife, could be considered comforting for those who already identified themselves as “godly”. Wilcox’s book gives a narrative summation of some of the main aspects of Protestant doctrine from an avowedly godly perspective. In his dedication, Wilcox emphasised the need even for the “saints” to ‘looke vnto themselues’, and fear God and ‘stande in awe of his iudgements’, as well as his desire for the sinful to ‘be brought to the sense and feeling of their iniquitie’, while comforting the godly with ‘sweete promises of the gospell’.\textsuperscript{129}

Reading religious texts both alone and in company was a key aspect of puritan religiosity. The books Walsingham patronised could have provided godly readers with material for these voluntary religious activities, where reading interacted with other key aspects of puritan activity, such as dwelling on the word of God, examining themselves for signs of election, travelling to attend godly sermons (“gadding”), and fasting.\textsuperscript{130} Even John Cosyn’s dedication of \textit{Musike of six, and five parts} (London: John Wolfe, 1585), a collection of music settings for psalms, could be considered as contributing to the milieu of the godly household. In this context, it is interesting that Ursula Walsingham often appears alongside her husband in these religious dedications, but not in secular books dedicated to Walsingham. The Walsinghams’ patronage of such texts may hint at their own household religious practices in that they chose to patronise writers who knew what godly audiences, including themselves, wanted.

\textsuperscript{128} William Becket, \textit{A commentarie of M. Iohn Caluine vpon the Epistle to the Philippians} (London: [John Windet] for Nicholas Lyng, 1584).
\textsuperscript{129} Thomas Wilcox, \textit{Summarie and Short Meditations, touching sundry poyntes of Christian religion [...] published for the edification and profit of Gods Saints} ([T. Dawson] for George Bishop, 1580), sigs A2-A4\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{130} Cambers, \textit{Godly Reading}, pp. 7, 14.
Walsingham’s godly credentials were sufficient that he was the dedicatee of Stephen Gosson’s *Playes Confuted*. An anonymous correspondent of 1587 also expected Walsingham to share his antipathy to plays, asking that the Secretary suppress them so as to render England more pleasing to God. Gosson hoped that Walsingham would perform a Herculean labour and cleanse England of these ‘filthy’ plays. Yet Walsingham was instrumental in establishing the Queen’s Men the following year. Why should Walsingham have involved himself in this? It has been argued that the Queen’s Men tended to perform plays that espoused a patriotic Protestant version of English history, so it could be that Walsingham was not opposed to drama as such, only to particular kinds of drama. Earlier Protestant leaders, including Thomas Cromwell and William Cecil, had used theatre for propaganda purposes. The Queen’s Men have also been identified as having an important role in spreading at least the illusion of royal influence deep into the remoter parts of England and possibly in gathering information for the government during their peregrinations. These concerns would also have been important to Walsingham. Additionally, Walsingham would have been aware of a growing chorus of opposition to the theatre among the ranks of the godly (like Gosson), which threatened to divide the precarious Protestant consensus, which Walsingham worked so hard elsewhere to avoid. The foundation of the Queen’s Men, therefore, might represent an attempt to reclaim the theatre for a patriotic, Protestant agenda, which ‘could displease only those reformers opposed to playing itself’, mitigating the chorus of disapproval, and preventing the sort of noisy, public rupture that might have drawn Elizabeth’s attention in a negative way. To a certain extent, Walsingham may also have been under pressure to conform to the reputation he wished to cultivate as a godly magistrate by allowing writers like Gosson to dedicate their works to him, even if they did not wholly represent his views.

132 Stephen Gosson, *Playes Confuted in fiue Actions* (London: for Thomas Gosson, 1582). The first pages of the dedicatory epistle have no page or folio numbers, or other identifying marks. Counted from the first page of the dedication, the quotations are on pages 7 and 8.
134 McMillin and MacLean, pp. 25-26, 32-36.
136 McMillin and MacLean, pp. 23, 27-29.
137 Ibid, p. 32.
Walsingham also received the dedication of Thomas Stockwood for his *A right godly and learned discourse vpon the book of Ester*, translated from Johann Brenntius’ Latin.\(^{138}\) Stockwood was an outspoken critic of drama, even for academic purposes.\(^{139}\) His dedication to Walsingham records that he was appointed master of the school at Tonbridge in 1575 on Sir Francis’ recommendation despite being a ‘meere straunger vnto you’. The lengthy dedicatory epistle explains the arguments of the book of Esther, glossed to encourage magistrates, both higher and lesser, to speak out against irreligion, idolatry and tyranny, and to protect the godly. Stockwood stressed Walsingham’s international reputation as one ‘whome the children of God both of our owne church at home, and also abroad in other countries, as occasion hath bene offered, hath found forward in all their good causes’.\(^{140}\) He urged Walsingham and his colleagues to prevent Jesuits and the like from abusing the people – something Walsingham already had well in hand.

As set out in Walsingham’s plan of 1579, many of the works dedicated to him were directed explicitly against Catholics (especially Jesuits) and their publications. Thomas Lupton dedicated his *The Christian against the Iesuite* to Walsingham, which dealt with the controversy between John Nichols, a Jesuit who had returned to the Church of England, and Robert Persons who had refuted Nichols’ accusations while attacking another book by Lupton. It was dedicated to Walsingham as a ‘zealous fauourer of the Gospell, a perfect professour of Gods worde, & an affable Magistrate’.\(^{141}\) This neatly summarises the reasons for which Walsingham would be a suitable dedicatee for these writers.

Similarly, the two books John Prime dedicated to Walsingham, *A fruitefull and briefe discourse in two booke: the one of nature, the other of grace* (Thomas Vautrollier for George Bishop, 1583) and the aforementioned *A short treatise of the sacraments generally*, were directed to contradict the Reims New Testament. In a similar vein is the cleric Edward Bulkeley’s *An answer to ten frivolous and foolish reasons, set downe by the Rhemish Iesuits and papists in their preface before the new Testament by them lately translated into English* (George Bishop, 1588). Bulkeley had received Walsingham’s favour in the past, and was friendly with dangerous political theorists like George Buchanan and Christopher Goodman.\(^{142}\)

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140 Stockwood, sig. A2v.
Other attacks on Protestantism’s adversaries, perhaps designed for a more popular audience, came from other writers. Anthony Munday, who had worked for Walsingham as an intelligencer, wrote *A breefe aunswer made vnto two seditious pamphlets*, rebutting the arguments of two works, one French and one English, which had defended Campion and his ‘complices’ and their ‘moste horrible and vnnatural Treasons’. A work by Barnaby Rich professed to uncover papistical deviousness. Purporting to be *The true report of a late practise enterprised by a papist with a yong maiden in Wales* ([J. Kingston] for Robert Walley, 1582), thought by ‘our Catholiques […] a greater prophetise, then euer was the holiemade of Kent’, until she ‘confessed how she had been seduced by a ronegate priest, and how by his instructions she had feined to see certaine visions’, the tract’s title promised to provide amusement for ‘the reformed Protestaunte’, shame for ‘the wilfull papist’, and for everyone else ‘good example to be warned at’. Exposing such alleged Catholic credulousness and deviousness was designed to increase suspicion of Catholics and their religion.

Catholicism was not the only religious deviance tackled by writers dedicating works to Walsingham. In 1579, John Roger, in his *An answere vnto a wicked & infamous libel made by Christopher Vitel, one of the chiefe English elders of the pretended Family of Loue* (John Day, 1579), claimed that it was essential that the false doctrines of the Family, a mystical Christian sect founded in the Low Countries, be contradicted in print as ‘it is very necessary that the simple people should be warned to beware of this so suttle a doctrine*. Again, Walsingham patronised a writer determined to protect the spiritual well-being of the populace at large.

Walsingham’s anti-Catholic activities were celebrated in Anthony Anderson’s *A sermon profitably preached in the church within her Maiesties honourable Tower* (Robert Waldegrave, 1586). This was a response to the recently-exposed Babington plot. In the dedication, Anderson railed against the ‘Popish aduersarie’, which he promised ‘to discouer […] for the benefit of many’. He had chosen Walsingham as the dedicatee for two reasons. Firstly, it was in acknowledgement of Walsingham’s ‘goodnes’ in procuring him an unspecified ‘benefite’. More importantly in the context of a sermon in which a conspiracy against King David is compared with the recent plot against Elizabeth, Anderson emphasised that he had dedicated his work to Walsingham

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144 John Rogers, *An answere vnto a wicked & infamous libel made by Christopher Vitel, one of the chiefe English elders of the pretended Family of Loue maintaining their doctrine* (London: John Day, 1579), sig. Aiii.ii.
for the discoverie of the present dissembling hate in the *Catholike Romaines* [...] the Lorde [...] hath allotted you the height of such honour, and the paine of this Pleasure, to sounde the depth, & by seasonable search to finde out [...] the chiefe of the deepest dooers in this their most bloody attempt.\(^{145}\)

In other words, God had raised up Walsingham for him to discover the evil plot against their queen. This interpretation of the Babington Plot was in-keeping with Anderson’s oeuvre in that it emphasised the sacredness of Elizabeth, and the support of God for the English regime and English church.\(^{146}\) It is perhaps telling that Anderson’s dedicatory epistle is dated September – the month before the commission met at Fotheringhay to determine the fate of the Queen of Scots, the plot’s primary beneficiary, and the month before Parliament met. The sermon, as well as influencing perceptions of its readers and hearers, may also have been designed, through this process, to put pressure on Elizabeth to act in accordance with God’s will and see Mary destroyed, given the miraculous way in which He had intervened to save her. Anderson’s view of the plot and Walsingham’s role within it was echoed by Richard Fletcher in his sermon before Elizabeth after Mary’s execution. Fletcher used the Old Testament analogy of ‘Elisha’s divination of the secret war councils of King Ben-Hadad’ to praise Elizabeth’s advisers, and perhaps particularly Walsingham, for their part in Mary’s destruction.\(^{147}\)

This may be considered unsurprising given that Walsingham was and is renowned as the primary persecutor of Catholics, having what one Catholic correspondent described as a ‘fervencie of zeale [...] againste our aunciente catholike Religion, and the professoars thereof’, because of which he was considered one of its ‘moste severe persecutores’.\(^{148}\) It is not my intention to rebut this part of Walsingham’s reputation entirely, but the following section aims to complicate and correct the received picture of his religious patronage impulses. Walsingham’s contempt for Catholicism was sometimes revealed in punning references to the rites of the other faith, as in 1578 when he told the earl of Warwick,


\(^{148}\) Richard Hopkins to Walsingham, 11 August 1582, TNA, SP 12/155, fol. 16.
...either confession: contricon: or satisfaction may cancell my error (in that I haue falsified my faith, & not according to my promisse advertised your L of the state of thinges here) what so ever penance youe will impose vpon me, I will very religiously and catholickly perfourme.\textsuperscript{149}

However, three of the authors who dedicated works to Walsingham also show his concern with keeping those of different religious beliefs on side.

This is especially apparent in his relationship with Henry Howard, later earl of Northampton, who dedicated to Walsingham his \textit{A defensatiue against the poyson of supposed prophesies}. The Catholic Howard had been repeatedly suspected of complicity in plots against Elizabeth, resulting in five spells in prison. He wrote various treatises, hoping to use these as means to royal favour. In the dedication to Walsingham, Howard wrote effusively of the Secretary’s friendship and favour. He had, he claimed, ‘greatest cause to loue’ Walsingham, and who, after all, was better placed to ‘iudge of my conceyte, then he that hath been best acquainted from the first beginning with mine aunswer’. Howard claimed that he had written the book in fulfilment of a promise made to Walsingham and ‘others of your calling’ to publish his views on prophecies, suggesting that Walsingham had been engaged in Howard’s writing from an early stage.\textsuperscript{150} As early as 1575, Howard had sought Walsingham’s help to regain Elizabeth’s favour, and in 1588 he was still asking the secretary to protect him from the allegations of his enemies.\textsuperscript{151} Howard seems to have been particularly dependent on Walsingham’s favour in the early 1580s, after he was suspected of involvement in the Throckmorton plot.\textsuperscript{152} Unfortunately, Walsingham’s replies to Howard’s letters are not extant, but he must have given sufficient encouragement for Howard to keep writing, and the correspondence suggests that Walsingham was concerned to rehabilitate where possible suspect individuals who might be of use to the crown.

The same might be said of Egremont Radcliffe, half-brother of the earl of Sussex. Though, like Walsingham, related to the Mildmays, they did not have much else in common. Radcliffe was a Catholic who had joined the Northern Rising in 1569, after which he fled to the continent. By 1574, however, he was seeking a pardon from Elizabeth’s government, and he returned to England in 1575, where he was imprisoned in

\textsuperscript{149} [Walsingham] to Warwick, 18 July 1578, TNA, SP 83/9, fol. 60v.
\textsuperscript{150} Henry Howard, \textit{A defensatiue against the poyson of supposed prophesies} (London: John Charlewood, 1583), sig. ¶ii. See also Howard to Walsingham, 14 September 1582, TNA, SP 12/155, fol. 84.
\textsuperscript{151} Howard to Walsingham, 28 May 1575, TNA, SP 12/103, fol. 11; 7 July 1588, SP 12/212, fol. 33.
\textsuperscript{152} Howard to Walsingham, 12 January 1581, TNA, SP 12/147, fol. 8; 1 December 1581, SP 12/150, fol. 150.
the Tower. While in the Tower he translated Pierre de La Place’s *Discours politiques sur la voie d’entrer deuëment aux estats, & maniere de constamment s’y maintenir & gouverner* (1574), published in 1578 which he dedicated to Walsingham, ‘a personal volte-face, advocating acceptance of the social and political order’.

The dedication to this non-religious work is generic, offered to Walsingham as ‘a testimonie of a hartie desire to gratifie your Honor with any agreeable seruice’. Interestingly, Radcliffe was released the same year. He returned to Flanders, where he was suspected of complicity in Don John’s death, for which he was executed that December. Walsingham heard that Radcliffe had implicated him in the supposed plot to kill Don John, and asked Davison to see the rumour quashed.

Walsingham’s involvement in the putative assassination attempt seems unlikely, but he does seem to have been cultivating Radcliffe, allowing him to dedicate his book to him, and apparently meeting with him at Hampton Court. This Hampton Court meeting may well have been Radcliffe’s undoing; noticed by a hostile witness, it resulted in suspicion and, ultimately, execution.

One final surprising dedicator shows Walsingham’s flexibility in the face of contemporary religious controversy. The harbourer-of-priests, Sir George Peckham, dedicated to him his *A true reporte, of the late discoueries, and possession, taken in the right of the Crowne of Englands, of the new-found landes* (London: John Charlewood for John Hinde, 1583). Peckham had invested in Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s exploratory efforts in the New World in 1578 and 1581 and saw the possibility of plantations in North America as a solution to the problems faced by English Catholics. Gilbert’s death put an end to the project, though Peckham tried to raise interest by publishing this work, and Walsingham assisted with a letter of recommendation.

Peckham noted in his dedication that Walsingham had been ‘a principall Patron of this Action’, and praised Walsingham’s ‘ready and virtuous disposition, bothe honorably to fauour, and fauourably to further all such attemptes as seeme pleasing to GOD and profitable to your Countrey’, as these ‘Westerne Discoueries doo certainly

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155 Walsingham to Davison, 10 January 1579, TNA, SP 83/11, fol. 51.
156 *ODNB*, ‘Radcliffe’.
Walsingham’s apparent tolerance of Peckham’s plan to export loyal Catholicism to the New World seems rather surprising, but again suggests a more flexible Walsingham than one might expect.

Walsingham’s patronage of these writers parallels his efforts to mend breaches with less literary-minded Catholics. Thomas Copley, for instance, in exile on the continent since 1570, corresponded with Walsingham in the hope of reconciliation with the regime, something Walsingham promised to raise with Elizabeth. Although the overtures to Copley came to nothing, Walsingham was almost certainly genuine in his desire for a workable settlement, which would have detached Copley from the English exiles. The attempted rapprochement foundered, however, on Elizabeth’s reluctance to make the desired concessions to Copley.

Copley was just one of several exiles with whom Walsingham corresponded in an apparent effort to regain them for the regime. The recipients of such overtures were carefully chosen; they were not among the die-hard plotters and Jesuit converts but instead were scions of gentle English families with much to lose from their scheming. For instance, Copley does not seem to have been involved in any of the plots against Elizabeth, he had been requesting permission to return to England for years, and in Mary’s reign he had spoken up for Elizabeth.

Another recipient of a last chance was Charles Paget. A scion of a largely Catholic noble family, Paget had been living in France since 1581, where he quickly involved himself with the affairs of Mary, Queen of Scots. He was also implicated in the sea of exile intrigue out of which grew the Throckmorton plot of 1583. Again, disrupting the English exile community by detaching Paget would have been a major coup for Walsingham, though in this case the obstacle to success was, apparently, Paget’s bad faith. It seems to have been Paget who first approached Walsingham, possibly during the latter’s embassy to France in 1581, and by 1582 he was asserting his desire for Walsingham and the queen’s favour and promising to follow the Secretary’s advice in everything except religion. However, by May, Walsingham had withdrawn his favour. The problem seems to have been a ‘token’

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159 Copley to Walsingham, 4 April 1582, TNA, SP 15/27/1, fol. 108.
160 Copley to Walsingham, 8 July 1583, TNA, SP 15/28/1, fol. 28
162 Paget to Walsingham, 8 January 1582, TNA, SP 15/27/1, fol. 93; 6 April 1582, fol. 108.
Paget sent.163 Walsingham replied, telling him that ‘if you thinke me mercenary you mistake me’, and informing Paget that his plan to use Walsingham as a ‘stalking horse’ to obtain his own ends was known to him. Instead of being genuinely committed to returning to England as a loyal subject, Walsingham thought that Paget was merely “abusing” him to gain ground for the opposing side. He wrote that it was ‘very hard for men of contrary dispositions to be vnited in good will you loue the Pope and I hate not his person but his calling’, and until that were to change they would not agree in religion or loyalty to Elizabeth.164 There were clear limits, therefore, on Walsingham’s willingness to extend the hand of friendship to English exiles. He had to believe in their good faith, and any suspicion would lead to the withdrawal of his favour. Trying to recover figures like Copley and Paget was a way of extending the hegemony of the regime, broadening its base of support and undermining opposition at home and abroad.

Walsingham’s programme of reaching out to certain Catholics is perhaps partly explained by comments he made to the earl of Rutland in 1584. Discussing the disgrace of the earls of Northumberland and Arundel after the Throckmorton plot, he told Rutland that:

The greatest cause of the errours these personages have fallen into, is their contrariety in religion, which I wold to God by some good meanes were so compounded betwene them and us as that wee might all consent in the true religion thereof, and so the ill cause being removed, all good effects might ensue.165

Although his comments to Rutland hint at a more pragmatic and conciliatory Walsingham than one might expect, the reasons why his hegemonic policy was not totally successful are also visible. For instance, the clear conception of “them and us”, that prevented him from really approaching Catholics as equals, and his straightforward equation of Catholicism with disloyalty: once the errant earls stopped being Catholics, they would stop being disloyal.

From all this it is apparent that there are compelling parallels between Patrick Collinson’s comments on Edmund Grindal’s religion and what has emerged of Walsingham’s. Like Grindal, one of the problems facing Walsingham’s scholars is how ‘to

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163 Paget to Walsingham, 30 May 1582, TNA, SP15/27/1, fol.129.
164 Walsingham to Paget, 4 May 1582, TNA, SP 15/27/1, fol. 123.
place him in the right relation to Elizabethan puritanism’. As with Grindal, Martin Bucer ‘provides the key’. For Collinson, much of Bucer’s teaching ‘was an anticipation of what would later be called puritanism’, especially his emphasis on the doctrine of election, his ‘exalted conception of the ministry’, and his ‘sense of reformation as an ongoing process of ceaseless edification’. Grindal ticked all of these boxes, and Walsingham seems to have done, too. Bucer was ‘unsympathetic to those characteristics of puritanism which attracted the pejorative adjective “precise”’, i.e. scrupulousness with regard to remnants of Roman ceremony and concern with institutions. These were also areas about which Walsingham was less concerned, as we have seen. Grindal, Walsingham and Bucer are further tied together by the collection of Bucer’s writings related to England published by Conrad Hubert and Johann Sturm (Basel: Petri Pernae, 1577) as *Scripta Anglicana*. The work is prefaced with Hubert’s dedication to Grindal, followed by Sturm’s to Walsingham. This suggests that Walsingham was known to be an admirer of Bucer, whose lectures and sermons he had probably heard at Cambridge in the 1550s. Walsingham’s religious policy was generally designed to produce competent ministers, further the gradual spread of Protestant knowledge and to prevent disputes between Protestants undermining the movement as a whole. In this, he seems to have been close to Bucer and his priorities. Like Bucer, Walsingham was prepared to accede to ‘temporary compromise’ on some controversial issues, and to countenance ‘a larger measure of outward conformity with past practice than those keen on more rapid reform’, but would not compromise on the necessity of preaching and ‘teaching the people’.

Though Walsingham may have drawn a distinction between his personal piety and his responsibilities as a public man as Read suggested, it is also clear that he was prepared to involve himself and his finances in religious matters as part of his calling. The dedications of religious works to Walsingham suggest the porous boundary between public and private: the more godly texts dedicated to him are perhaps suggestive of Walsingham’s own religious opinions, but, more importantly, many of the others reflected acceptable “public” concerns like the advent of the Jesuits and the provision of basic religious instruction. Despite real sympathy with Presbyterians like Melville and Travers,

Walsingham’s endeavours were designed to ensure as many Protestants as possible were pulling in the same direction, within the established framework of the church, and to secure a Protestant future for England. Accordingly, he sometimes acted to silence voices of all kinds who threatened this. In the face of increased Jesuit activity, Walsingham’s religious patronage increased, but he was wary of Protestant-on-Protestant religious controversy which threatened the unity he saw as essential to defeating Catholicism at home and abroad. Throughout, Walsingham’s involvement in religious affairs was characterised by a concern to expand the hegemony of the Church of England and get as many people as possible inside that tent, while turning their attention outwards to face the Catholic threat. Radical reformation was not his priority.
Chapter 4: ‘To Favour with the Best Credit I Have’: Walsingham’s Irish Patronage

As in his religious patronage in the English Church, in his patronage of figures in Ireland Walsingham sought to smooth over disagreements and controversies, this time between members of the English administration there. Harmony between the administrators and soldiers who carried out the work of the English state in Ireland was especially important in the face of the volatility and violence that characterised events in Ireland in the period as a result of English efforts to “colonise” the island. Walsingham also sought to expand English hegemony in Ireland by drawing into the administration figures from the Old English and Gaelic Irish communities. Again, this was designed to secure maximum support for the regime by co-opting potentially disruptive individuals and thereby to address the threats of rebellion and invasion. This mirrors Walsingham’s religious patronage in terms of a focus on cooperation between people of differing opinions and backgrounds in the pursuit of the defence of the realm against external threats. These priorities slotted into Walsingham’s broad principal objective, which was keeping the island quiet, to minimise the danger of foreign invasion and to reduce pressures on Elizabeth’s coffers. In 1577, he told Sir Nicholas Bagenall that he wished ‘all occasion of expence of hir majesties treasure for that realme weare cutt of’ because the queen was ‘so wearie of the dayly growing charges’ there.² English government in Ireland, both secular and spiritual, was complicated by history, geography and ethnicity. Of the three ethnic groups co-existing in Elizabethan Ireland, Walsingham is considered to have been closest to the “New English”, soldiers and administrators who had arrived in Ireland during the sixteenth century. This makes sense in the context of Walsingham’s fear that the island could act as an invasion platform and his suspicion that its “barbarous” inhabitants sought to ‘shake of ynglyshe governement’.³ But Walsingham also corresponded with and sought to patronise the Old English (descendants of Norman settlers), and the Gaelic Irish (descendants of the Celtic inhabitants). Walsingham’s contact with members of each group could be considered hegemonic and this chapter considers Walsingham’s policy in this light, comparing his strategy and its success with his religious policy. It should be noted that my use of the terms “harmony” and “hegemony” refers to Walsingham’s policy of pursuing these

¹ Walsingham to Lord Deputy William Fitzwilliam, 8 July 1589, TNA, SP 63/145, fol. 128.
² Walsingham to Bagenall, 2 November 1577, TNA, SP 63/59, fol. 100. See also Walsingham to Davison, 12 November 1578, SP 83/10, fol. 25v.
³ Walsingham to Burghley, 8 February 1572, TNA, SP 70/116, fol. 70; Walsingham to Lord Deputy Perrot, February 1586, SP 63/122, fol. 205; Walsingham to Elizabeth, 15 April 1577, SP 63/58, fol. 11; Walsingham to Burghley, 26 March 1572, SP 70/117, fol. 51.
objectives with regard to actual or potential members of the English administration in Ireland, rather than my opinion on the state of the island as a whole, which, as we will see, was anything but harmonious in this period.

Walsingham was a desirable correspondent for figures in the Irish administration because of his office, his own intense interest in Irish affairs, and his close relationship with Elizabeth. He could provide reliable and high-quality news, defend officials’ conduct to the queen and council, broker patronage and provide this himself. As a result, practically everyone wrote to Walsingham whether on official business or in pursuit of a favour. As Lord Deputy Sir Henry Sidney put it, ‘as you are in place ther nere her Majestie for the furthering and dispatche of her services: So I, and soche others of my sorte (as serve her highnes in remoter places) must resort to youe in Cawses of hers’. News was particularly important in Walsingham’s correspondence, and he acted as both a source of this and a collector. He regularly sent correspondents, including those in Ireland, information about the situation at court and the queen’s disposition, and information about international events, some of which he received from English agents and ambassadors abroad and passed on to his correspondents often as a sign of favour.

The two most important figures in Walsingham’s Irish network were the New English Edward Waterhouse and Sir Nicholas Malby, both of whom had served in Ireland for some years. Both seem to have entered Walsingham’s orbit soon after his appointment as secretary, possibly as a result of their trips to London to act as agents for Walter Devereux, 1st earl of Essex in his Ulster colonisation project. As the 1570s wore on, the positions occupied by Malby and Waterhouse made them even more important to Walsingham: Malby became president of Connacht, a distant potential invasion platform frequently riven with localised unrest, and Waterhouse became increasingly central to the

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4 Leimon, p. 90.
5 Sidney to Walsingham, 15 November 1575, TNA, SP 63/53, fol. 161.
7 See for example, Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 6 February 1574, TNA, SP 63/44, fol. 78; Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 11 October 1574, TNA, SP 63/48, fol. 16.
8 Edward Waterhouse to Walsingham, 14 June 1574, TNA, SP 63/46, fol. 146; Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 15 May 1575, SP 63/51, fol. 88; Essex to Walsingham, 9 May 1575, SP 63/51, fol. 21; Waterhouse to Walsingham, 6 May 1576, SP 63/55, fol. 138.
administration in Dublin, ideally placed to provide detailed information on Irish events and to distribute letters for more far-flung members of the network.\(^9\)

Information provision was undoubtedly one of Malby and Waterhouse’s primary functions. In 1577, for example, Malby sent a long letter detailing his proceedings against the rebellious Burkes and O’Conor Roe.\(^{10}\) Waterhouse also provided information. In 1574, he reported briefly on the state of Ulster, Leinster, Connacht and Thomond. He also gave his opinion that the earl of Desmond’s misbehaviour was the result of personal animosity to Sidney rather than opposition to Elizabeth and her government. This is likely to have helped shape Walsingham’s willingness to appease Desmond.\(^{11}\)

In turn, they relied on Walsingham for news from court, patronage and support in their endeavours, and political capital. Waterhouse relied heavily on Walsingham as an intermediary with Elizabeth when his service first as a councillor and then as keeper of the boats at Athlone was criticised at court.\(^{12}\) Malby also relied on Walsingham’s help for suits at court and to manage Elizabeth’s opinion of him.\(^{13}\) In 1580, Malby claimed it was the ‘generall opnion here that I dwell so farre in your honors favo that any man shall spede well that commethe recommended from me’. He went on to acknowledge the benefits of this for himself, as this conviction ‘dothe increase my credyt mouche’.\(^{14}\) Any breaks in their correspondence with Walsingham caused serious anxiety for Waterhouse and Malby.

Malby’s dismay at prolonged gaps in their correspondence in 1581 and 1583 reflected his dependence on Walsingham.\(^{15}\) Waterhouse was distressed when he heard that he had incurred Walsingham’s ‘heavy displeasuerg’.\(^{16}\)

If Malby and Waterhouse were anxious and exposed, the predicament was heightened for the most prominent New English in Ireland, the viceroys. The general trends of Tudor government in Ireland meant that deputies and their advisers tended to drive Irish policy (especially by coming up with programmes for its “reform”), but remained vulnerable to central odium, so they needed all the friends at court they could

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\(^9\) Waterhouse to Walsingham, 28 May 1582, TNA, SP 63/92, fol. 246. See for example, Francis Agard to Walsingham, 20 May 1577, SP 63/58, fol. 103; Sir Nicholas Malby to Walsingham, 3 May 1578, SP 63/60, fol. 24\(^{iv}\).

\(^{10}\) Malby to Walsingham, 17 March 1577, TNA, SP 63/57, fol. 196.

\(^{11}\) Waterhouse to Walsingham, 14 June 1574, TNA, SP 63/46, fol. 145\(^{v}\); Walsingham to Burghley, 16 July 1574, BL, Harley MSS 6991, fol. 96.

\(^{12}\) Waterhouse to Walsingham, 22 June 1583, TNA, SP 63/102, fols 231-231\(^{v}\).

\(^{13}\) See for example, Malby to Walsingham, 27 November 1579, TNA, SP 63/70, fol. 74.

\(^{14}\) Malby to Walsingham, 10 June 1580, TNA, SP 63/73, fol. 115.

\(^{15}\) Malby to Walsingham, 17 April 1581, TNA, SP 63/82, fol. 81; Malby to Walsingham, 21 December 1583, SP 63/106, fol. 50\(^{v}\).

\(^{16}\) Waterhouse to Walsingham, 24 October 1584, TNA, SP 63/112, fol. 80\(^{v}\).
Walsingham proved especially valuable in this regard, frequently upholding the authority and defending the conduct of viceroys to Elizabeth. When Sidney’s attempt to reform government exactions resulted in a conflagration with the Pale community in 1577, Walsingham praised his swift response to the issue and his reasonable offers to mitigate the discontentment. Walsingham could not prevent the viceroys receiving the occasional stinging rebuke from Elizabeth, though he could offer comfort, as when he wrote to Sidney of his ‘regret’ that rumours of discontentment in Ireland made Elizabeth ‘write somewhat offensively at this present’, and, a few months later, reassured the deputy that that Elizabeth’s ‘displeasure […] proceeded of some passions for the tyme’ instead of ‘any grounded conceipte of ill opinion or dislikinge of you’. In return, Walsingham received information directly, and sometimes exclusively, and he could lean on the deputies to favour his clients, and strengthen his position in England by acting as an Irish specialist.

The sort of relationship Walsingham cultivated with successive viceroys is exemplified by his contact with the incumbent lord justice at the time of his appointment as secretary, Sir William Fitzwilliam, who gratefully received Walsingham’s reports of the tides of court occurrences and his advice on how to conduct himself. In February 1574, Fitzwilliam wrote of his delight at the fact that God had ‘provided well’ for Elizabeth’s service by having her appoint Walsingham, ‘so fit a man in that function’, and for himself in ‘providing me so good a frinde in a place so behoovfull for me to be frinded in’. In July, Fitzwilliam turned to Walsingham to ‘mitigate’ Elizabeth’s ‘mislyke’. Walsingham gave the lord justice ‘good and sownde advice’ about his dealings with Essex, which he took as proof of the secretary’s favour and friendship. The viceroy promised to do all he could to assist Essex. Walsingham’s friendliness towards Fitzwilliam was probably occasioned by a desire to improve relations between the two, allowing Essex’s Ulster colonisation enterprise to be effective.

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17 Grey to Walsingham, 15 January 1581, TNA, SP 63/80, fol. 10. Ciaran Brady’s treatment of the careers of successive viceroys shows this clearly, though his explicitly factional explanation is not always convincing, The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536-1588 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), see especially, for example, pp. 113-58.


20 Lord Deputy William Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 6 February 1574, TNA, SP 63/44, fol. 78.

21 Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 12 July 1574, TNA, SP 63/47, fol. 24.

22 Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 18 April 1574, TNA, SP 63/45, fol. 202.

23 Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 11 October 1574, TNA, SP 63/48, fol. 16.
In a reflection of his efforts to mediate disputes between divines in England, Walsingham thus often intervened to smooth over similar conflicts between English governors in Ireland. He intervened in the 1585 dispute between Lord Deputy Sir John Perrot and Archbishop Adam Loftus of Dublin over the projected conversion of St Patrick’s cathedral into a university. Having made it clear that he saw equal merit in both their arguments, Walsingham promised that:

as one that wisheth [...] well to your L, and that desireth also nothing more, then the sound amitie and good Concurrency betwen the Principall Ministers of that Realme I will be all good meanes I Cann impoye my selfte to worke a perfect reconciliacion betwen yow.24

He reminded Loftus that both his and Perrot’s schemes were motivated by the same considerations, ‘zeale to the advancement of her majestes service’ and ‘the advancemement of the Gospell’.25 This mirrors Walsingham’s activities elsewhere, where he exerted himself to bring harmony between warring parties, as with his commissioning Robert Bowes, former ambassador to Scotland, to reconcile the serving envoy, William Ashby, and another English agent on the grounds that ‘it is verie unfitt that particuler quarrells should raigne betweene her majesties subiectes’, because ‘all should join in her service’.26 Walsingham was anxious to secure the cooperation of all parties in the queen’s service, in order to improve the security of the realm, and, as we have seen, the stability of the religious establishment. This was especially important in Ireland, where it was perceived to be necessary for the English administration to present a united front against opposition to the regime, up to and including serious rebellions led by, for example, James Fitzmaurice, the earl of Desmond and Viscount Baltinglass.

That Walsingham was close to the New English officials is both a reflection of his policy preferences and of the vulnerability experienced by the most newly-arrived individuals. Having key figures in the administration and garrison depend on him was important but he was ultimately driven by a concern to see English interests well served and crown servants working together against their enemies. He considered it essential that the English could cooperate in their efforts to “reform” Ireland, or the “Irish” would take advantage of their division. Walsingham warned Sidney against falling out with the earl of

24 Walsingham to Archbishop Loftus, 20 or 22 September 1585, TNA, SP 63/119, fol. 99.
25 Walsingham to Loftus, 20 or 22 September 1585, TNA, SP 63/119, fol. 99.
26 Walsingham to William Ashby, 3 December 1589, Joseph Bain and others (eds), Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, 1547-1603, 10 vols (Edinburgh: H. M. S. O., 1898-1969), X, p. 209.
Essex on the reports of Irish ‘tale-bearers […] That natyon, as I learne, is cunnyng in that professyon’, and cooperate instead.\(^{27}\) However, despite his deep-seated suspicion of the Irish-born, Walsingham was by no means averse to extending his patronage to “Irish” individuals, and in fact this seems to be have been an attempt to broaden the base of support for the regime in Ireland among the Old English and Gaelic Irish. As the quotations above suggest, Walsingham was extremely suspicious of these groups, and saw them as threatening to the continuance of English government in Ireland, and his suspicions were confirmed by the participation of members of these groups in anti-regime activities, from the Palesmen’s protest against the cess, to the Desmond and Baltinglass rebellions. In face of such violent opposition, Walsingham sought to tie members of both groups and their interests to those of the regime.

In his examination of Walsingham’s Irish network up to 1581, Mitchell Leimon concluded that though Walsingham and his clients survived the crisis of 1579, which saw the Secretary’s disgrace and the earl of Desmond’s defection to the rebels, after this the network included a narrower political and religious cross-section of Ireland’s governors: the ‘broad church became a sect’.\(^{28}\) It appears, however, that the years around 1580 saw a widening of Walsingham’s already fairly diverse network in Ireland. His correspondence had always included Anglo-Irish aristocrats like the earls of Ormond and Kildare, but from the late 1570s Anglo-Irish administrators and lawyers like Sir Nicholas White and Sir Lucas Dillon were drawn increasingly into his orbit.

Sir Lucas Dillon’s importance was recognised by Waterhouse, and he was clearly a trusted and integral part of the network, who sometimes went out of his way to help Walsingham’s servants and clients.\(^{29}\) Dillon delivered Walsingham’s advice about the dispute with Perrot over the establishment of a university to Loftus.\(^{30}\) In 1589 Dillon was one of those on whom Walsingham called as he sought to mobilise his clients and friends to come to the defence of Sir Richard Bingham in his dispute with the lord deputy.\(^{31}\)

In this Dillon was joined in the early 1580s by Nicholas White, the Master of the Rolls, who had previously been closer to Burghley than to Walsingham. Relations began to

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\(^{28}\) Leimon, p. 194.

\(^{29}\) Edward Waterhouse to Walsingham, 24 October 1584, TNA, SP 63/112, fol. 80; W. Johnes to Walsingham, [16 November] 1584, SP 63/112, fol. 171.

\(^{30}\) Loftus to Walsingham, 21 March 1585, TNA, SP 63/115, fol. 15.

\(^{31}\) Sir Lucas Dillon to Walsingham, 13 October 1589, TNA, SP 63/147, fol. 74.
warm up around 1580, with Walsingham lending White money. This thaw was marked by closer relations with other members of Walsingham’s network, including Malby. White often requested the Secretary’s assistance with various suits at court. By 1589 White had become a sound member of the Walsingham network, who could be relied upon to exert himself in its interests, and wrote to Walsingham of his determination to show Bingham ‘assurid friendship’. Men like Dillon and White joined the principal targets of Walsingham’s hegemonic goodwill in Ireland, the Anglo-Irish earls of Desmond, Kildare, and Ormond, who often acted as executors of English government policy there, and were thus particularly important targets for efforts to create or sustain a coincidence of interest with the regime.

Walsingham’s relations with Desmond are perhaps the hardest to uncover, but seem to have been reasonably amicable. Even in 1579, on the cusp of Desmond’s defection to his rebellious kinsmen and followers, Walsingham thought him ‘sowndely affected’. Walsingham corresponded with Lady Desmond, who in 1578 thanked him for his letters and requested that he write regularly. She also asked him to accept ‘as a token of my good will half dusen marten skynnes’. After her husband’s death, the countess continued to depend on Walsingham for his assistance. The earl had already shown himself dubiously-inclined to Elizabeth’s government in 1574, and it is logical to conclude that Walsingham’s attention to Desmond was to monitor his activities and also assure him of an ally at court in the event of a significant grievance. However, his treasonous action in 1579 showed the shortcomings of Walsingham’s approach, and in fact it was one of his clients, Malby, along with Walsingham’s friend Pelham, who more or less forced the earl to turn traitor.

Walsingham’s correspondence with the earl of Kildare was probably motivated by similar factors. The Kildares had been viceroys of Ireland until 1534, when the then-earl had rebelled against Henry VIII. The Elizabethan earl spent time at court, though he was arrested in 1575 and again in 1580 on suspicion of collaborating with rebels. Throughout this time, he seems to have enjoyed Walsingham’s support and provided the Secretary in turn with news and information about Irish affairs. He assured Walsingham that he would

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32 Nicholas White to Walsingham, 31 May 1580, TNA, SP 63/73, fol. 90.
33 White to Walsingham, 20 June 1585, TNA, SP 63/117, fol. 112.
34 Edward Waterhouse to Walsingham, 28 August 1589, TNA, SP 63/146, fols 76-76v; Waterhouse to Walsingham, 30 August 1589, SP 63/146, fol. 78.
35 Walsingham to Burghley, 6 August 1579, TNA, SP 12/131, fol. 169.
36 Eleanor, countess of Desmond to Walsingham, 30 September 1578, TNA, SP 63/62, fol. 61.
37 Eleanor, countess of Desmond to Walsingham, 4 September 1585, TNA, SP 63/119, fol. 5.
39 See for example, Gerald, 11th earl of Kildare to Walsingham, 7 January 1579, TNA, SP 63/65, fol. 39.
be ‘directed as sone by yow as by any frend I haue’ and requested ‘that I may haue your friendly advice from tyme to tyme’.\(^{40}\)

Kildare was in a difficult position at the time of Baltinglass rebellion in 1580. His prior detention in England had weakened his hold over his traditional dependents in Ireland and made it difficult for him to act decisively against the rebels for fear his kinsmen and dependents would turn on him. He was still suspected by some in the English government, too.\(^{41}\) Walsingham remained confident however that what they had uncovered of the earl’s activities ‘will not extend so farre as to be proued treason’.\(^{42}\) After Kildare’s arrest, he and his wife placed ‘speciall truste’ in Walsingham’s assistance, and they continued to depend on his favour on their return to Ireland.\(^{43}\) Corresponding with both Desmond and Kildare provided these potentially rebellious aristocrats with an outlet for their suits and grievances and was intended to contribute to the harmony and stability of Ireland – though not always successfully.

Walsingham’s ties to Kildare may have been shaped partly by two other relationships. Robert Pipho, one of Walsingham’s “cousins” in Ireland, was married to a relative of Kildare, and potentially a very useful satellite: he could help monitor Kildare and influence him in a dutiful direction.\(^{44}\) The second potentially influential relationship is with the earl of Leicester. Kildare has been identified as a beneficiary of Leicester’s favour, so it is perhaps to be expected that Walsingham, traditionally seen as a Leicester ally, would help the earl.\(^{45}\)

However, the same was not true of the earl of Ormond, sometimes seen as one of Leicester’s keenest rivals.\(^{46}\) And yet Walsingham made strenuous efforts to be friendly with Ormond. The development of their relationship is indicated in letters across successive years. From a seemingly rather functional letter in 1576, by 1579 Ormond insisted that he wished Walsingham as well as ‘anye frend you haue’. They had friends in common.

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\(^{40}\) Kildare to Walsingham, 14 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74, fol. 55.


\(^{42}\) [Walsingham] to Lord Deputy Grey de Wilton, 29 January 1581, TNA, SP 12/45, fol. 36.

\(^{43}\) Mabel, Countess of Kildare, to Walsingham, 1 February 1581, TNA, SP 63/80, fol. 143. See also: 3 April 1581, SP 63/82, fol. 7; Mabel, Countess of Kildare, to Walsingham, 26 March 1584, SP 63/108, fol. 153.

\(^{44}\) Gerald Fitzgerald, 11th Earl of Kildare to Walsingham, 14 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74, fol. 55; Robert Pipho to Walsingham, 18 July 1580, SP 63/74, fol. 85.

\(^{45}\) Brady, *Chief Governors*, p. 102.

especially Sir William Pelham. Ormond attributed Elizabeth’s letter encouraging the
deputy and council to favour him in his legal causes to Walsingham’s ‘procurement’ and
promised to hold this and ‘many other your friendly partes […] in memorye’.

Walsingham continued his positive personal relationship with Ormond despite the
reservations of his other correspondents. Waterhouse complained of Ormond’s tendency
to get distracted by ‘privat injuries’. In 1581, Malby tartly remarked that it was no wonder
the rebellion in Munster dragged on for so long when Ormond was making so much
money out of his employment for its suppression. In 1583, however, Walsingham
described himself as ‘one that hath always honoured and loued your l’ and promised ‘I
wilbe ready to be vsed in anything that is to be don here towards the advance of your
service in that Charge’. When Walsingham was in disgrace at the end of 1579, one of the
fullest declarations of commiseration and sympathy came from Ormond. In January 1580,
the earl assured Walsingham that ‘he liues not […] that I woll loue the less for fortunes
frowning on him, much less m’ secretary walsingham to whome I haue found my self
always greatly beholding’. He comforted Walsingham with the thought that, given his
‘loyalty and trothe’ towards Elizabeth, any ‘mislyke […] cannot be of contivance’. The earl
frankly revealed his frustrations with Elizabeth: ‘she suffereth all thinges nedfull to be
supplyed, to want’, and he vowed that if there was no improvement he would not serve her
again in the same manner. Such frankness suggests a relatively close relationship and
certainly a great deal of trust. Several of Ormond’s letters also testify to a close connection
between himself and his wife and the Walsinghams. Ormond added a holograph postscript
to a letter of 1583, urging Walsingham ‘tell your lady I wol prove as kinde a husband as
your self’.

They could also work together to further Irish policy. In 1582, Walsingham
conferred with Ormond about Elizabeth’s refusal to sign documents increasing the pay of
the soldiers and then ‘we dealt both with hir ma[to] moue her to assent’. After this,

47 Leimon, ‘Anjou Marriage Plan’, p. 88; Pelham to Walsingham, 26 November 1579, TNA, SP 63/70, fol. 60.
48 Ormond to Walsingham, 12 November 1576, HMC D’Lisle and Dudley, II, p. 48; Ormond to
Walsingham, 14 October 1579, TNA, SP 63/69, fol. 117.
49 Waterhouse to Walsingham, 13 August 1580, TNA, SP 63/75, fol. 82v.
50 Malby to Walsingham, 6 April 1581, TNA, SP 63/82, fols 238-238v. See also Sir Henry Wallop to
Walsingham, 7 February 1583, SP 63/99, fol. 124; Wallop to Walsingham, 23 April 1581, SP 63/82, fol. 121v; Grey de Wilton to Walsingham, 12 May 1581, SP 63/83, fol. 11.
51 Walsingham to Ormond, 25 March 1583, TNA, SP 63/100, fol. 97.
52 Ormond to Walsingham, 4 January 1580, TNA, SP 63/71, fols 6-6v.
53 Ormond to Walsingham, 28 February 1583, TNA, SP 63/99, fol. 185.
54 Walsingham to Burghley, 13 November 1582, TNA, SP 63/97, fol. 172.
Walsingham’s correspondence with Ormond seems to tail off. This was probably caused by the end of the Desmond rebellion in 1583. After this, Ormond spent more time at court, and he also no longer needed to write for help obtaining funds and supplies.

For Ormond’s part, having the Secretary on side would make obtaining his suits easier, and Walsingham clearly appreciated that being on good terms with Ormond was important, given his power in Ireland and his close relationship with the queen. As he wrote to Sidney in 1577, Walsingham was convinced that ‘it is necessary for him that shall govern Ireland to have the Earl of Ormonde for a friend; he has credit with Her Majesty and the Court’. Walsingham worked hard to avoid a widening of the breach between Sidney and the earl, interceding with Ormond to shelve a suit until he had heard Sidney’s full answer and advising the latter to ‘deal so with him, as he may have no just cause of offence’.

Walsingham’s efforts to keep Ormond on side demonstrate his shrewd grasp of political realities and his skill as a diplomatic political operator.

Walsingham’s correspondence with these Anglo-Irish magnates is indicative of his efforts to contain potential sources of disruption to the English regime, in much the same way as he sought to rein in or channel the activities of more radical Protestants to prevent disputes rupturing the church.

Even more than the Anglo-Irish, it is Walsingham’s Gaelic-Irish patronage and its hegemonic implications that is interesting. From 1579, as well as including New English soldiers and administrators, and Anglo-Irish officials, Walsingham’s network embraced Gaelic and Gaelicised figures. Walsingham’s contacts with these figures demonstrate his desire to expand cooperation with the English government. As well as advocating the use of force for the “reform” of Ireland on some occasions, Walsingham was prepared to secure cooperation and peace by any means available. He did this in response to increased unrest in the island as a whole around this time, and in particular in Connacht, the area over which he could exert most control, and to enable the regime to focus on its enemies in mainland Europe. As he explained to the lord justices in 1583, the news that ‘somewhat may be attempted against vs this next Sommer’, made him ‘wish that all thinges were compounded in that realme’.

However, Walsingham’s efforts to quieten Ireland through patronage and securing the cooperation of individuals did not address the underlying causes of the unrest.

55 Walsingham to Lord Deputy Sir Henry Sidney, 11 June 1577, HMC D’Lisle and Dudley, II, p. 57. See also Walsingham to Drury, 14 June 1579, TNA, SP 63/67, fol. 6v.
56 Walsingham to Lord Deputy Sir Henry Sidney, 11 June 1577, HMC D’Lisle and Dudley, II, p. 57.
57 Walsingham to the Lord Justices, 1 February 1583, TNA, SP 63/99, fol. 89v.
Walsingham’s willingness to patronise Gaelic-Irish figures in order to secure their loyalty to the regime was sufficiently well-known for members of his network to recommend appropriate individuals. For example, in 1583, Sir Henry Wallop recommended Shane O’Reilly in his suit to succeed his father on the grounds that he ‘lyverte of his owne lands and Indvstrye, after the Inglyshe maner’ and his succession would ‘incourage others of his sorte to do the lyke’.\(^{58}\) This suggests that his reaching out to Gaelic individuals was a conscious policy, though also one that took advantage of opportunities as they arose.

In 1582, Malby recommended to Walsingham one Roger O’Flaherty, a native of Connacht, who desired to serve at the English court ‘to be the better instructed in cviviltye’.\(^{59}\) By 1585, O’Flaherty was describing himself as Walsingham’s servant, and confidently invoking his assistance in a dispute over inheritance with his kinsman, Morough Ne Doe O’Flaherty.\(^{60}\) Malby’s recommendation of O’Flaherty on the grounds that he was ‘very well bent to good behavio a matter rare among the name of the offlarties’, suggests the prime motivation for Walsingham’s willingness to accept such men to his household.\(^{61}\)

Connacht was of particular interest to Walsingham. Partly this must have been to do with its remote location on the west coast where it was vulnerable to invasion. This in turn led him to nominate presidents of Connacht who were key parts of his network. The second president was Malby, and we have seen how closely he was allied to Walsingham. A similar relationship existed between Walsingham and Malby’s successor after 1584, Sir Richard Bingham, who had been described by Walsingham as his ‘servant’.\(^{62}\)

Walsingham’s close relationships with Bingham and Malby meant that he could exert significant control over goings-on in the province. Walsingham’s attitude to Connacht and the policy he sought to pursue there were determined by the situation there, the situation in Ireland, and the situation in England and beyond. The dynamics of his policy there could therefore change under external pressures of the international situation and internal fluctuations in the power-politics of the province. In the late 1570s and early 1580s, he sought to patronise Gaelic- and Anglo-Irish individuals (like O’Flaherty, and Theobald Dillon) in Connacht, extending English hegemony by giving these men a stake in the

\(^{58}\) Wallop to Walsingham, 4 June 1583, TNA, SP 63/102, fol. 148.
\(^{59}\) Malby to Walsingham, 31 May 1582, TNA, SP 63/92, fol. 293.
\(^{60}\) Roger O’Flaherty to Walsingham, 17 June 1585, TNA, SP 63/117, fol. 87.
\(^{61}\) Malby to Walsingham, 31 May 1582, TNA, SP 63/92, fol. 293.
\(^{62}\) Bernardino de Mendoza to Philip II, 15 June 1581, *Cal. Spanish*, III, p. 130; Sir Richard Bingham to Lady Walsingham, 14 January 1585, TNA, SP 63/114, fol. 53.
English regime – mediated through himself – while still advocating occasional violent repression of local unrest there. Over time, Walsingham came to adopt a more straightforwardly martial response, illustrated by his tighter connection to the 3rd earl of Clanrickard and defence of the behaviour of Bingham, in the context of continued restlessness in the province and the turbulence caused by the passing of the Armada, when some inhabitants of the province had sought to aid the Spanish.

In 1576, Walsingham was worried that the rebellion of the *mac an iarlas*, Ulick and John Burke, in response to Lord Deputy Sidney’s plans to impose “composition” would jeopardise the whole scheme. Their father, Richard, the 2nd earl of Clanrickard, either could not or would not restrain his unruly sons, and Walsingham urged Sidney to proceed with ‘severity’ in quelling the rising. Against this background, many of Walsingham’s correspondents, including President Malby and Sir Lucas Dillon all stressed the loyalty to the crown of the lesser branch of the Burkes, the MacWilliam Burkes of Mayo, and particularly their leader, the MacWilliam Íochtar, Seán Mac Oliver Burke. The MacWilliam Burkes of Mayo, like their Clanrickard kinsmen, were descended from the medieval Norman settlers of Ireland but over the intervening centuries had become so assimilated into Gaelic culture that they were considered more “Irish” than “English”.

The loyalty of the MacWilliam Íochtar was so well-established by 1579 that Malby recommended Walsingham accede to the MacWilliam’s request to accept his ‘only Legytymat son’, William, into his household. This promotion of his legitimate heir (according to English law) was an important statement of the MacWilliam’s willingness to dispose of his patrimony along English lines, with primogeniture, a strong argument of his loyalty to the English crown. These competing strategies, crush the rebels but promote their loyal relatives, were intended to act as stick and carrot, encouraging loyalty to the English administration.

The following year, the MacWilliam wrote, in Latin, thanking Walsingham for the ‘fatherly affection’ with which he had heard he was treating his son. Soon, however, the MacWilliam was dead and his children competed amongst themselves over the succession.

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65 Francis Agard to Walsingham, 11 September 1576, TNA, SP 63/56, fol. 56; Sir Lucas Dillon to Walsingham, 19 September 1576, SP 63/56, fol. 66; Malby to Walsingham, 24 July 1579, SP 63/67, fol. 115.
67 Malby to Walsingham, 24 July 1579, TNA, SP 63/67, fol. 115.
68 Mac William Eighter [Íochtar] to Walsingham, 4 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74, fol. 13.
to the lordship. Malby urged Walsingham to give ‘your man’ William licence to come over to claim his inheritance.\textsuperscript{69} In April 1583, William wrote to Walsingham, his ‘assured louinge maister’, that though he was in ‘noe peace with my brothers nor my kindsmen\textsuperscript{70}’, Malby had appointed him sheriff of Sligo, as Walsingham requested.\textsuperscript{70} In 1584, William asked Walsingham to write to Bingham to continue the favour shown to him by Malby.\textsuperscript{71} Later, William acknowledged that Bingham was ‘my very good frend […] for your honnors sake’. He asked that Walsingham write to the Lord Deputy and Bingham to ensure he got a good share if they divided up the MacWilliam Íochtar’s country between the rival claimants.\textsuperscript{72}

Walsingham’s patronage of William was a very small scale but important effort at extending English culture through non-violent means in a particularly wild corner of Ireland. Walsingham must have intended for William to return to Connacht and assume the leadership of the MacWilliam Burkes, bringing this part of the province under the control of the (he hoped) Anglicised and loyal William. However, he grossly overestimated what William could achieve against his older, more established kinsmen. This strategy has echoes of earlier Elizabethan policies, influenced by the the constellation of policies pursued by Henry VIII’s government in Ireland, known as “surrender and regrant”, as part of which Irish lords submitted to the king’s authority and in the process surrendered to him the lands they claimed were theirs and received these again, this time from the king. Under Henry and Thomas Cromwell, this amounted to a comprehensive and consistently-pursued policy, whereas in its Elizabethan form the idea was ‘[a]dministered sporadically and in a decidedly ad hoc manner’, designed to play off lesser local powers, weary of doing fealty to more powerful clans, against those more powerful clans in order to begin radically restructuring the pattern of Irish land-holding and concentrate power and control in the hands of the crown.\textsuperscript{73} In light of Elizabeth’s unwillingness to spend money in Ireland, Walsingham had to take this kind of initiative into his own hands, extending English hegemony by rewarding loyalty, and hoping to secure the harmony of the province in the future by ensuring that the MacWilliam Burkes’ lands were controlled by a friend of the regime.

However, the arrest and transport to London of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} earl of Clanrickard gave Walsingham another opportunity to subdue Connacht. Walsingham lent the earl assistance

\textsuperscript{69} Malby to Walsingham, 21 September 1581, TNA, SP 63/85, fol. 131.  
\textsuperscript{70} William Burke to Walsingham, 7 April 1583, TNA, SP 63/101, fol. 40.  
\textsuperscript{71} Burke to Walsingham, 15 June 1584, TNA, SP 63/110, fol. 141.  
\textsuperscript{72} Burke to Walsingham, 30 January 1586, TNA, SP 63/122, fol. 110.  
and money during his time in England after his release, and he gave advice about the earl’s approaches to Elizabeth. Walsingham promised that he would ‘not fayle to mediate’ Elizabeth’s permission for the earl to come to court but suggested that he ‘forbeare’ for the time being his suit for a pension in case Elizabeth suspected that he came rather ‘to seeke your owne benifit then for any other dutifull respecte’. In 1580, prior to his return to Ireland, Walsingham personally lent Clanrickard the huge sum of £350. Probably a condition of the loan was cooperation with Malby, as well as a promise to do all he could to end the rebellious activities of his sons in Connacht. It was especially necessary to secure Clanrickard’s compliance while the Desmond rebellion was still raging. If he could be brought to heel, Connacht might remain aloof. However, any efforts in this direction were curtailed by the earl’s death soon after his return to Ireland.

He was succeeded as earl by Ulick, his formerly-rebellious son, who soon came to realise the benefits of cooperation with Malby. The support he received from English counsellors (especially Walsingham and Leicester) in his claim to the earldom seems to have induced Ulick to reconsider where his best interests lay, and he embarked on a new career as a staunch supporter of English administration in Connacht and as a correspondent of Walsingham. Ulick praised the work of Malby and Bingham in “civilising” the province. Malby commended Ulick’s conduct to Walsingham on several occasions, praising the new earl as ‘a singuler honest noble man and the greatest imbracer of cyvylite and the most desirous to do her majetie somme acceptable service to recover his credyt that ever I sawe of any of the cuntry byrthe’. Malby’s successor, Sir Richard Bingham, also commended him to Walsingham. Clanrickard professed to depend ‘only and altogethеr’ on Walsingham’s favour, stressing on another occasion that ‘I doe only depend of youe and all your freindes both in England and here’. Ulick’s cooperation meant that it was less important to cultivate the MacWilliam Burkes, though as we have seen Walsingham continued to help William Burke with Bingham’s regime. Walsingham also did not abandon existing clients in Connacht like the Dillons and O’Flaherty.

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74 Walsingham to Richard, earl of Clanrickard, 2 June 1580, TNA, SP 63/73, fol. 97.
75 Walsingham to Clanrickard, 25 August 1580, TNA, SP 63/75, fol. 156; Wallop to Walsingham, 8 March 1583, SP 63/100, fol. 12. See also Malby to Walsingham, 8 December 1582, SP 63/98, fol. 87; Ulick, earl of Clanrickard, to Walsingham, 7 January 1585, SP 63/114, fol. 28; Ulick to Walsingham, 16 June 1585, SP 63/117, fol. 83.
76 Richard, earl of Clanrickard, to Walsingham, 25 July 1582, TNA, SP 63/94, fol. 113.
77 Ulick to Walsingham, 26 November 1584, TNA, SP 63/112, fol. 216.
78 Malby to Walsingham, 24 March 1583, TNA, SP 63/100, fol. 89.
79 Sir Richard Bingham to Walsingham, 20 August 1584, TNA, SP 63/111, fol. 148.
80 Ulick to Walsingham, 31 January 1584, TNA, SP 63/107, fol. 154; Ulick, earl of Clanrickard to Walsingham, 26 November 1584, SP 63/112, fol. 216.
Walsingham aimed more widely than simply securing the loyalty of the powerful regional magnate to himself or even to the regime. That this was a long-term plan is borne out by the fact that when Ulick sent his eldest son, Richard, to England as a pledge for his good behaviour, placing him at the University of Oxford, it was on Walsingham that he relied to ‘see him want no thinge as becometh his degree or callinge’, and even to pay Richard’s expenses at the university, though the earl promised to see him repaid for this.\(^81\) Raising these heirs in the English manner, Walsingham was attempting to secure an Anglicised (and, presumably, Protestant) future for Connacht, complementing the work of the presidents, his clients Malby and Bingham, on the ground. Walsingham’s efforts at Anglicisation may have been reasonably successful, but any attempts to convert the heirs to Protestantism seem to have been less so.\(^82\) Walsingham sought to secure the loyalty of future participants in government in Ireland.

In Connacht, Walsingham’s hegemonic initiatives ultimately foundered on the inability of his protégé William to assert control over the MacWilliam Burkes, who grew increasingly restive as a result of Bingham’s over-assertive behaviour. Another problem was Walsingham’s refusal to countenance the efforts of the viceroy and the Irish privy council to curb Bingham’s excesses.

Like Malby, Walsingham had asked Bingham ‘from time to time’ to inform him of ‘the state of things in this Province’.\(^83\) This gave him the opportunity to shape Walsingham’s perception of events and personalities in a way that served his own ends and cast himself as the defender of the queen’s rights in the province. When Bingham found, contrary to an earlier commission, that lands at Ballislow rightfully belonged to the queen and not to Donough O’Connor Sligo, Walsingham backed him unequivocally, retorting that the Sligo’s complaint ‘conteineth no matter of substance’.\(^84\) He rejected, however, Bingham’s suggestion to increase exactions upon some of the Gaelic-Irish inhabitants of Connacht, because ‘the tyme wil not be seasonable to enter into any sharpe coorse in that Prouince vntill that vlster shalbe thoroughly quieted’. He also exempted O’Connor Sligo from any future increase because ‘he hath carryed himselfe duetyfully in the generall revolt

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\(^81\) Ulick to Walsingham, 16 June 1585, TNA, SP 63/117, fol. 83. See also Richard Burke, Baron of Dunkellin, to Walsingham, 8 September 1588, SP 63/136, fol. 71.


\(^83\) Bingham to Walsingham, 23 May 1589, TNA, SP 63/144, fol. 175.

\(^84\) Walsingham’s answer to O’Connor’s complaints, undated [c. 1589], BL, Cotton, Titus B XII, fol. 203. For a fuller account of Bingham’s conduct as president and his troubles in 1589, see Rapple, *Martial Power*, pp. 256-82
of the Cuntry’, and any further impositions might ‘provoke him to forget himselfe’.\textsuperscript{85} Despite his commitment to Bingham, Walsingham was still concerned to limit discontent in Connacht and reward loyal service.

More problematic than the dispute with Sligo was Bingham’s conduct of his office and his ruthless response to unrest among the MacWilliam Burkes, which led two members of his administration to report his misconduct to the Irish privy council. In turn, Bingham accused them of encouraging the Burkes in their unrest. Though he was validated by Sir Henry Wallop and Archbishop Loftus in letters to Walsingham and Burghley, Lord Deputy Perrot ordered Bingham to end the revolt by issuing protections to the rebels. Later, Bingham was able to capitalise on Perrot’s “undermining” of him in this way to convince Walsingham that successive deputies had been his enemies. When it was reported that the MacWilliams were seeking to involve Scottish mercenaries in their disorder, Bingham received permission to engage with them, culminating in his victory at Ardnary in September 1586.\textsuperscript{86} This cemented Bingham’s reputation as a skilled soldier, and he even persuaded the Burkes to attest that his behaviour was not the cause of their unrest.

In the long run, the Burkes refused to tolerate the excesses of Bingham and his lieutenants and they again rebelled, insisting that they were loyal to the crown but that Bingham’s government was unacceptable. This time (1589), Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam organised for commissioners to hear their grievances, which Bingham vehemently opposed. Bingham constantly complained to Walsingham of the conduct of the deputy and commissioners, especially that they had not made him aware of the charges against him, and that he had been denied the chance to answer them. He accused many of the commissioners of being his ‘Ennymyes’, naming in particular Adam Loftus, the archbishop of Dublin, Thomas Jones, the bishop of Meath, Sir Robert Dillon, and Geoffrey Fenton.\textsuperscript{87} He attributed their malice to the fact that he had overturned their decision on the Ballislow lands.

This is an odd list of enemies of one of Walsingham’s clients. Loftus, Fenton, and Jones all corresponded with Walsingham, and Jones apparently owed his position to Walsingham’s intercession.\textsuperscript{88} It may be, therefore, that Bingham, for all his mendacity, really thought these men were his enemies. Alternatively, he might have had such faith in his ties

\textsuperscript{85} Walsingham to Bingham, 6 February 1585, TNA, SP 63/114, fol. 159.
\textsuperscript{87} Bingham to Walsingham, 11 July 1589, TNA, SP 63/145, fol. 149v.
\textsuperscript{88} Thomas Jones, bishop of Meath to Walsingham, 13 May 1584, TNA, SP 63/110, fol. 65.
to Walsingham that he felt he could accuse those who annoyed him with impunity. Fenton and Loftus seem to have escaped the Secretary’s ire, possibly because he was better acquainted with them and less willing to believe that they truly were Bingham’s enemies. In fact, along with Sir Nicholas White, Sir Lucas Dillon, and Waterhouse, Loftus was one of those whose help Walsingham invoked in order to secure a favourable outcome for Bingham. 89

Jones, however, was not so lucky, though there is little evidence that he deserved the stinging rebuke he received from Walsingham in June 1589 for his ‘ill vsadge’ of Bingham. Walsingham identified Jones’ animus against Bingham to have begun over the Ballislow dispute. Walsingham accused the bishop of having ‘miscarried’ himself in finding against the queen, and more recently in negotiating with the rebels in Connacht as one of the commissioners appointed for that purpose. Walsingham bitterly reproached the bishop for ingratitude, calling him ‘an hipocrite’, and criticising Jones’ proceedings with the rebels, claiming ‘yf you had bene, soe wise, eyther in divynitie, or pollicie as you woulde be taken to be, you mighte easilie have considered, that suche loose persoones, as they are […] coulde and shoulde, in noe better sorte, be repressed: then by the sworde’, which was what Bingham had done. 90 Invoking the spectre of the queen’s authority, Walsingham was able to protect his client, the supposed upholder of the crown’s rights.

Despite providing Walsingham with a detailed defence of his actions and those of the commissioners, Fitzwilliam also struggled to allay Walsingham’s ire. 91 Walsingham wrote a furious reply, claiming that ‘I never sawe in anie cause so strange so hard & so vniust a course taken’. He complained that some of the commissioners charged to look into Bingham’s conduct were his ‘mortall enemies’, echoing Bingham’s own words. Also, Walsingham wrote, Fitzwilliam had denied Bingham the chance to answer the accusations against him and not even told him what they were. 92 Walsingham threatened the deputy that Bingham ‘is not so weakely frended, nor hath deserved so yll both of this state and of that too, as he shall be shaken out of his government without good cause’. 93

Walsingham was not impressed with Fitzwilliam’s treatment of the rebels, telling him that ‘yt standeth not wth the Queenes honour that they should bee dandled in so dishonorabale a sort’. If the deputy had had the wisdom to commit the matter to Bingham,

89 Adam Loftus to Walsingham, 31 August 1589, TNA, SP 63/146, fol. 84.
80 Walsingham to Thomas Jones, 24 June 1589, TNA, SP 63/145, fol. 61.
81 Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 3 July 1589, TNA, SP 63/145, fols 113v-114.
82 Walsingham to Fitzwilliam, 8 July 1589, TNA, SP 63/145, fols 126-126v.
83 Ibid, fols 127-127v.
'it would have been performed with great honour, and lesse extraordinarie charges then the
diet of the Comissioners'. Walsingham asserted his support for Bingham, 'whom I [...] doe
not meane to abandon but to favouer with the best credit I haue'. The Burkes were no
longer allies, they were rebels against the queen’s president, and should be dealt with
accordingly. These letters to Jones and Fitzwilliam constitute a clear statement of
Walsingham’s commitment to Bingham, in the face of plausible and serious accusations
about his conduct. It also reveals how uncritically he relied on Bingham’s information.
There was in fact considerable substance to the assertions of deputy and council that their
actions were driven by a desire to secure peace and redress legitimate grievances.
Walsingham also deployed the language of royal dishonour, caused by too much leniency
to rebels, which was often utilised by members of the garrison in Ireland to justify their
behaviour. Walsingham justified Bingham’s conduct and, implicitly, his own intervention
on Bingham’s behalf on the grounds that Fitzwilliam’s harkening to the rebels dishonoured
the queen and undermined her authority.

Walsingham’s convinced support for Bingham demonstrated his commitment to
martial “New English” officials in Ireland. In this case, Walsingham’s intervention was
rather short-sighted, and did nothing to address or defuse the grievances of the Burkes and
their allies, storing up resentment for the future. Bingham’s place in Walsingham’s
patronage and political network shows that this was a very broad church: Bingham himself
hardly shared his patron’s sober living, having been condemned for treason in 1563. Bingham’s
demonstrable military prowess, most obviously on display at his victory at
Ardnary, meant that he was ‘cherished’ by Walsingham, who was primarily concerned with
the dangers of a foreign invasion. Bingham was also secure in the Secretary’s favour
because he successfully presented himself as the defender of Elizabeth’s rights and the
crown against the corrupt findings of the commissioners. Walsingham was almost certainly
convinced that Bingham’s actions were driven by the same motivations that drove him
rather than ‘brute self-interest’. As well as his position in Walsingham’s strategic vision,
the Secretary’s committed defence of Bingham might also have been related to the fact that
he was or had been a Walsingham “servant”.

94 Ibid, fol. 128.
95 Rapple, Martial Power, p. 209.
97 Ibid, p. 298.
Mitchell Leimon argued that Walsingham’s patronage of soldiers ‘brought to Ireland men of the highest calibre’, singling out Malby and Bingham. They were skilled but the bloodletting that accompanied Walsingham’s clients and allies in their work surely alienated as many Irish as it retained in obedience. The violence of English governors in Ireland fuelled discontent and contributed to the island’s descent into war in the 1590s. However, from an English perspective, the excesses of Richard Bingham at least prevented substantial local insurrection at the time and saw off Spanish/rebellious forces. This was a primary motivation of Walsingham’s continued support, but he either did not or could not see that this severely undermined the long-term goals of expanding English rule throughout the island and retaining the goodwill of the Irish. Elizabeth has often been criticised, with some justification, for her short termist and opportunistic perspective. Walsingham’s alarmist viewpoint could also lead him to be guilty of the same thing: long term success was sometimes sacrificed to fending off an immediate crisis, with detrimental effects on the people of Ireland.

Despite Bingham’s posturing, as work by Rory Rapple has shown, New English soldiers in Ireland were not straightforwardly obedient, disinterested agents of the crown. They had their own exalted conception of their authority, and justified this by yoking it to Elizabeth’s, in order to maximise their freedom of action in their own interest under the cover of loyally upholding the queen’s authority. Bingham is the example of this *par excellence*. Having helped the soldier and administrator, Francis Agard, among others, in the 1570s, Walsingham gained a reputation among other soldiers in Ireland as someone who would listen to their complaints, opinions and suits. By 1588 he could be described as ‘the chyfeste by whose means suche as profes armes ar advanced’. A veritable avalanche of letters from distressed, aggrieved and hopeful soldiers rolled across the Irish sea and onto Walsingham’s desk. Walsingham’s patronage of the soldiers in Ireland shows his willingness to support a martial solution to England’s Irish problem. It also reflects his view of the international situation, through his efforts to reward and train skilled soldiers for the looming and inevitable clash with Spain and the forces of the

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99 Leimon, p. 96.
101 Owen Moore to Walsingham, 14 January 1575, TNA, SP 63/49, fol. 87.
102 Captain Arthur Brett to Walsingham, 15 December 1588, TNA, SP 84/29, fol. 77.
103 Among many others: Jacques Wingfield to Walsingham, 20 November 1579, TNA, SP 63/70, fol. 34; James Cruce to Walsingham, 18 February 1581, SP 63/80, fol. 187; John Zouche to Walsingham, 5 January 1582, SP 63/88, fol. 13; Martin Couche to Walsingham, 4 January 1585, SP 63/114, fol. 18; W. Piers Snr to Walsingham, 20 November 1586, SP 63/126, fol. 226; Nicholas Merryman to Walsingham, 26 January 1588, SP 63/133, fol. 47.
Antichrist. Additionally, it acts as a form of hegemony, bringing potentially restless and discontented seekers of fortune into the fold. The first three decades of Elizabeth’s reign saw continuous muttering from among men with martial pretensions, who believed that the regime did not value or reward them appropriately, and Walsingham’s patronage of soliders therefore suggests not only that he had one eye on the coming war but also that he was aware of the dangers these discontented spirits could cause.\textsuperscript{104}

As early as 1572, Walsingham explained to Leicester his willingness to recommend certain soldiers to the earl was because ‘I feare her Majesty shall haue good cause to vse them […] for nowe that the Prince of Orrenge is retyrred, her Majesty maye no longer looke to lyve in repose’.\textsuperscript{105} In recommending Malby as the new president of Connacht in 1575, Walsingham gestured to the perceived anti-militarism of the English government: he was convinced of Malby’s ‘valewe’ and ‘I knowe him not in this Lande more fytt to beare the Tytle of Presydent then he’, lamenting that ‘Yf he lyved in any other Cuntrye then this, where martyall Men presently beare no Pryce, he shoulde not have ben so longe kept under Foote’.\textsuperscript{106} Given his dire assessment of the international situation, it was logical that Walsingham would be keen to nurture the prowess of English soldiers. In Ireland, he did so almost right from the start of his career, with early beneficiaries being Francis Agard and Malby.\textsuperscript{107} This provided a substantial motivation behind his harkening to the gripping of discontented soldiers and his extension of favour to them. Malby expressed his gratitude for his ‘good and comfortable Letter’, with its ‘good advyce whch truly is nedefull to a solidoar, and to all others that may be thought to be afflycted in mynde’.\textsuperscript{108} Walsingham’s correspondence and advice was valued by the recipients and was important in including them in politics and comforting them in distress. He advanced individuals wages when these were late, and gave a ready ear to suits.\textsuperscript{109}

It was not just that the garrison needed encouraging in their work and to know that they were listened to and valued at home, which were concerns of Walsingham’s. Soldiers could also be dangerous to their own government. The English soldiery in Ireland hardly adhered in all cases to Walsingham’s own religious and political stances. Walsingham

\textsuperscript{104} Rapple, \textit{Martial Power}, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{105} Walsingham to Leicester, 8 October 1572, BL, Additional MS 32091, fol. 262v.
\textsuperscript{106} Walsingham to Sir Henry Sidney, 15 May 1575, Arthur Collins, \textit{Letters and Memorials of State, in the reigns on Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, King James, King Charles the First, part of the reign of King Charles the Second, and Oliver’s usurpation}, 2 vols (London: T. Osborne, 1746), I, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{107} Waterhouse to Walsingham, 12 January 1575, TNA, SP 63/49, fol. 72v.
\textsuperscript{108} Malby to Walsingham, 19 April 1581, TNA, SP 63/82, fol. 110.
\textsuperscript{109} Thomas Jenison to Thomas Wilson, 14 December 1579, TNA, SP 63/70, fol. 143.
himself acknowledged that he had often promoted ‘bad instrumentes’. This may have been justified by Walsingham’s conviction of the necessity of procuring experienced soldiers, but may also reflect the position that public life required a different set of (moral) qualities to private life. Rapple has shown that very few of the cadre of New English governors were at all concerned with furthering the protestantisation of the island, and the allegiances of many of these men were complicated by their service under Mary and Philip and their subscription to a cross-confessional set of chivalric and martial values that were not always embodied by the government of Elizabeth. Additionally, frustration with a lack of advancement as much as any latent religious conservatism could cause English officers to defect to the “enemy” – the most famous example being Thomas Stucley.

One of these potentially-compromised men was Malby, who had served in Spain, and in the 1570s associated with the Spanish ambassador, Gureau de Spes. Similarly, in 1574 Bingham offered to serve Philip II by seizing Rotterdam, and talked of organising a landing in Ireland. This was about the time at which Malby and Bingham became known to Walsingham, so perhaps these initiatives were part of Walsingham’s broader effort to gather information about Spanish intentions at this time. If this is true, it would suggest Walsingham was aware of these potentially-compromising ties, an additional motivation for Walsingham in his patronage of such men could conceivably have been to prevent a repeat of Stucley’s example. The dangers of disaffected, under- or unemployed martial men are reflected in the high numbers of these in the immediate circle of Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex in the build-up to his ill-fated attempted coup of 1601.

The career of one of Walsingham’s clients shows just how much damage a disillusioned soldier with suspect religious inclinations could inflict. The crypto-Catholic Sir William Stanley was obviously eager for Walsingham’s patronage. In January 1582, he asked Walsingham as one in whom, after God and Elizabeth, he placed his ‘chefest trust [...] hauinge had good tryall of your favourable goodnes’, to either help him in a suit with Elizabeth or find him some employment. Two years later, Stanley asked Walsingham to help him be appointed president of Connacht in succession to the recently deceased.

110 Walsingham to Leicester, 11 April 1586, John Bruce (ed.) Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, during his Government of the Low Countries, in the Years 1585 and 1586 (London: John B. Nichols and Son, 1844), p. 222.
111 Rapple, Martial Power, pp. 87-126.
113 Rapple, Martial Power, pp. 102-03, 106-07.
114 Gajda, Essex, p. 58.
Malby. As we have seen, the appointment went to Bingham instead, though Stanley did hold other important offices.

Walsingham seems, however, to have gone out of his way to help Stanley in other ways, reassuring the queen about his religion. A few months later, Stanley wrote of Walsingham’s ‘comfortable and lovine’ letters, and promised to rest ‘vnder your honours patronadge and tuyen’. This was the high point of Walsingham’s relationship with Stanley. The following year, Stanley, then campaigning in the Netherlands with Leicester, surrendered Deventer to the Spanish. Perhaps all this effusive gratitude and obedience masked a growing discontentment with the lack of “appropriate” reward. Whatever the truth of the matter, the nature of Elizabethan military service meant that Stanley was doomed to frustration and underemployment, which surely contributed to his defection in 1586. This shows the limits of Walsingham’s hegemonic patronage of martial men.

To a certain extent, then, ‘one can detect [Walsingham’s] policy in his personnel’, and his patronage was ‘conditioned by his policy’ – but they were not necessarily either the personnel or the policy one would expect. Walsingham’s patronage and correspondence was far from exclusive. He used his most trusted contacts in Ireland to build up a portfolio of relationships with diverse figures, including perpetually rebellious chiefs like Turlough Luineach O’Neill. It seems likely that this was motivated by a desire to give these individuals a stake in the Elizabethan regime by helping them in their suits, listening to their grievances, and even including them in his household. He applied these policies even to the soldiers. Though Walsingham was prepared to engage personally and financially in small scale but significant efforts to increase English hegemony in Ireland through building up concentrated spheres of influence, this was not the same as advocating a coherent programme of “reform”. These schemes could be undermined, however, as with Bingham in 1589, by Walsingham’s willingness to countenance violent short-term solutions to prevent a wider-scale eruption (particularly post-Armada) and his over-reliance on the New English soldiers who were involved in such initiatives. His suspicion of the Irish-born ultimately prevented his hegemonic enterprises from being really successful: to be successful Walsingham would have had to more completely internalise their concerns.

116 Stanley to Walsingham, 17 March 1584, TNA, SP 63/108, fol. 58.
117 Stanley to Walsingham, 20 June 1585, TNA, SP 63/117, fol. 114. For Walsingham’s efforts to convince Elizabeth of Stanley’s religious reliability see also Stanley to Walsingham, 22 March 1585, Extracts of letters to Walsingham with postilled answers, 3 March 1585, TNA, SP 63/115, fol. 15.
118 Stanley to Walsingham, 9 July 1585, TNA, SP 63/118, fol. 29.
119 Leimon, p. 97.
This inability to approach different views with neutrality also explains the failure of Walsingham’s conciliatory policy towards Catholics, as discussed in the previous chapter. He did not understand them or their concerns the way he did those of the godly. He was, however, responsive to perceived threats to the regime. The increase in religious dedications to Walsingham was a direct response to the challenge posed by the Jesuits, and patronage of the Gaelic Irish came in response to rebellion and the possibility of invasion. Despite his own profound religious conviction, Walsingham’s actions as a magistrate with a responsibility for the spiritual well-being of the commonwealth were dictated not by allegiance to a specific doctrinal position, but by a desire to maximise support for the Church of England. A similar conception of his responsibility for the well-being of Protestantism also led Walsingham to involve himself controversially in the affairs of England’s northern neighbour.
Chapter 5: Curiosus in Aliena Republica: Walsingham and Scottish Politics

Walsingham’s responsibility to counsel Elizabeth was clear, and his position in English politics was supported by practical and theoretical precedents. However, he also felt compelled to offer advice to key figures in other countries. The most regular recipients of Walsingham’s advice were prominent men in Scotland, including the regents who ruled on behalf of the infant James VI, and James himself, as well as some of the other important individuals around him. The extent to which Walsingham advised foreign rulers is unprecedented. It has no justification in the contemporary literature of advice for princes and their advisers, which is all predicated upon the assumption that one would be advising one’s own prince. It was common for counsellors to princes to correspond with their opposite numbers, but it was not at all common for them to advise another ruler.

Walsingham himself was aware of the anomalous nature of his activities. In a letter probably intended for James, Walsingham defended his being ‘Curiosus in aliena repub’, i.e. interfering in another realm, on the grounds of his ‘desyre of the good of that King and cvntrye’. One obvious motivating factor was the English succession problem given Elizabeth’s childlessness and the proximity of James and his mother, Mary, to the English throne. Walsingham’s attitudes to the complex issues raised by the succession problem will be addressed as part of this chapter’s exploration of Walsingham’s activities, contacts, and vocabulary in a Scottish context in order to explain what led him to intervene in foreign politics in this way.

In 1580, Walsingham advised Henry Cobham, Elizabeth’s ambassador in France, to raise with the king and queen mother the issue of the recent ‘hard Course’ held against the Huguenots, and in particular to explain how these internal problems threatened France’s stability and its relationship with England. Walsingham told Cobham that ‘by my owne experience heretofore, when I suppplied that place yow now hould’, similar ‘speech’ was ‘verie acceptablie taken’ by the then-king and the queen mother, though ‘howesoeuer yt were taken’, if it assisted ‘the furtherance of her Majestis servcie I neuer wayed the acceptacion of the same; and yet had I due regard to deliuer my speech in such sorte, as there might followe no iust cause of offence’. Walsingham’s advice to foreign rulers was, therefore, often motivated by English needs.

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1 [Walsingham] to Thomas Fowler, 22 December 1588, TNA, SP 52/42, fol. 129v.
2 [? Walsingham] to Cobham, 15 April 1580, TNA, SP 78/4A, fol. 55.
Cooperation over shared objectives characterises Walsingham’s earliest recorded contact with Scottish authorities, during his missions to Paris in the 1570s. This correspondence is incomplete, and Walsingham was almost certainly known to certain figures in Scotland before he was appointed special ambassador in 1570. He was congratulated on his longer-term appointment by the Scottish regent, Matthew Stewart, 4th earl of Lennox, suggesting some prior contact. This probably came through his many friends and acquaintances who served as diplomats in Scotland, including Thomas Randolph, Nicholas Throckmorton, Henry Killigrew, and even, briefly, John Tamworth. As early as 1560, Randolph, then ambassador in Scotland, wrote to Killigrew, requesting him to ‘[c]omende me wher you lyste especiall to ffances walsingham’.

Walsingham’s connections in Scotland are also borne out by a letter he wrote to Cecil in November 1568, offering to procure, through a ‘frende’, proof that Mary, Queen of Scots had been complicit in her husband’s murder. The timing of this offer is significant. The York conference of October 1568 and the Westminster conference in January 1569 had been set up at Elizabeth’s order to examine Mary’s conduct and determine whether she should face trial for the murder of her husband. This was thus a time when it would have been useful to Elizabeth’s government to have additional evidence on the matter, and perhaps even proof of Mary’s complicity.

English goals and interests were certainly important motivations for Walsingham’s interest in Scotland. This, and his on-going preoccupation with the Queen of Scots, is also apparent in Walsingham’s resident embassy to France (1571-1573). Walsingham cultivated good relations with successive regents Lennox and Mar, who governed Scotland on behalf of the young king, providing them with information and advice, especially on the activities of Mary Stuart’s partisans in Paris. Only a few of these letters survive, but they reveal some of Walsingham’s long-running concerns about Scotland.

In particular, the continued divisions in Scottish politics between supporters of the deposed queen and supporters of the infant James alarmed Walsingham. He told Mar that the Scots should emulate mariners, who might quarrel over honour or treasure but ‘in the

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3 Lennox to Walsingham, 15 October 1570, National Records of Scotland, GD 149/266, fol. 72.
5 Thomas Randolph to Henry Killigrew, 15 April 1560, TNA, SP 52/3, fol. 67v.
6 Walsingham to Cecil, 20 November 1568, TNA, SP 53/2, fol. 46.
7 Walsingham to Lennox, 15 September 1571, Joseph Bain and others (eds), Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, 1547-1603, 10 vols (Edinburgh: H. M. S. O., 1898-1969), IV, p. 688. Hereafter Cal. Scotland.
time of tempest and storm they forbear not each man to set his hand to the tackling, leaving private grudges aside in respect of a common danger. I would the mariners of your ship – whereof God has placed you governor under the King – could, in this great tempest drawing on, grow to like union’. Using the metaphor of the ship of state, Walsingham also here emphasised the necessity of concord and harmony during moments of crisis, a recurring theme in his correspondence. And he was convinced that these were years of crisis for England, for Scotland, and for Protestants all over Europe. It is also worth dwelling here on the language Walsingham used of the source of Mar’s power. Mar had been called to his eminent position by God, and he exercised that office ‘under’ the king, maybe or maybe not accountable to the king, but owing his power to God and therefore responsible ultimately to Him. Lesser magistrates were also directly God-appointed, and therefore had an independent duty of accountability to Him.

Between his return to England in May 1573 and appointment as a Principal Secretary and Privy Councillor in December, Walsingham was called on by Mar’s successor as regent, James Douglas, 4th earl of Morton, for help in his campaign against Mary Stuart’s partisans. Morton was a powerful Protestant magnate, who had spent time in England, and who sought an active alliance with England during his regency, something to which Elizabeth was reluctant to commit herself. In November 1573, Morton asked Walsingham to ‘be a mean that some better consideration may be taken and new commandment sent’ for the final stages of the campaign. Walsingham was obviously an important contact for Morton even before his formal admittance to the Privy Council.

For Walsingham, Morton was vital for English security. He wanted Elizabeth to seize the opportunity offered by Morton’s goodwill and need for external allies to secure Scotland for English interests. Because French influence remained strong in Scotland, mainly in the persons of Mary Stuart’s supporters, Walsingham believed that England ought to support Morton and the so-called ‘king’s party’, hopefully securing them for the future, and so breaking the traditional alliance between France and Scotland. Accordingly, Walsingham urged Elizabeth to do all she could to maintain good relations with the regent because ‘there is no man of judgement that loveth your majesty, that can imagine any perill can befall vnto you so great as the losse of that gentleman ether by death or alienation’. Elizabeth’s refusal to make the most of this opportunity was intensely frustrating for

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10 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 16 January 1575, TNA, SP 52/28/2, fol. 150v.
Walsingham, and he did his best to prevent and smooth out these problems in Anglo-
Scottish relations.

Walsingham and Morton used the language of common objectives and challenges
to develop and maintain their relationship. In 1576, Walsingham expected Morton to share
his assessment of the Prince of Orange’s recent God-given victory, and prayed that ‘God
make them thankful for the same, and kindle in them an earnest zeal’ to pray that Orange
may ‘serve for God’s good instrument to the suppressing of God’s enemies’.11 Elsewhere,
Walsingham passed Morton news of the Netherlands and commented on how unlikely a
good peace was in France. He added, outlining his conception of the European situation,
‘Spayne ffraunce & the pope noe doubt concurre & conspire in all thinges’. The only way
to combat the ranged forces of the Counter Reformation was ‘a genrall amitie &
combination between all princes of the religion at the lest to defen

Morton reciprocated this language of common objectives. In 1575, in the context
of a border incident at Redswyre which had outraged Elizabeth, Morton asked Walsingham
to ‘extend yowr frenndlie and effectuall

treavellis, Sa as our common Inimeis […] may fynd thame frustrat of thair expectationn’. He professed himself ready to make such amends as
Elizabeth should stipulate, and claimed that Anglo-Scottish amity was his ‘cheif desyre’.13
Walsingham urged the Regent to use ‘severity’ in order to prevent subsequent outbreaks of
border quarrels, which could ‘breed a war’ which ‘both realms shall rue’. The Secretary
ended his letter by asserting his confidence in Morton’s ‘integrity’ and ‘wise handling of the
matter’.14 This language of shared threats helped forge a strong working relationship, where
both Walsingham and Morton felt that they could rely on each other to defend their
respective political positions and interests.

As part of these efforts towards cooperation, Walsingham sent Morton news, such
as the ‘foreyn occurrentis’, for which Morton thanked him in April 1575.15 This was
because he knew very well ‘how necessary it is for [Morton] to understand how things pass
in other countries at this dangerous time, subject to so many evil and dangerous practices
against the professors of the Gospel’.16 Morton obviously saw Walsingham’s advice as vital

11 Walsingham to Morton, 12 February 1576, Cal. Scotland, V, p. 211.
12 Walsingham to Morton, 26 February 1577, TNA, SP 52/27, fol. 15.
13 Morton to Walsingham, 8 July 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 173.
15 Morton to Walsingham, 1 April 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 161. See also Morton to Walsingham, 20
September 1575, SP 52/26/2, fol. 212.
16 Walsingham to Morton, 12 February 1576, Cal. Scotland, V, p. 211.
to the success of his regime and policy, and his dependence on Walsingham was such that ‘be yow is all my intelligence’. In 1578, while Walsingham was in the Low Countries, Morton wrote that ‘nathing grevit me more […] then to ynderstand yow absent from court’ because the envoy he was sending to Elizabeth would thus be ‘destitute of youre guidwill and favo’ in his mission. However, Walsingham provided for his absence by advising that the envoy ‘addres him self vnto Mr vice chalmerlayn [Hatton]’. This exemplified Walsingham’s concern with Scottish affairs and his attempts to forward good relations, as well as his practice of providing advice on approaching the queen to foreign envoys.

Walsingham acted as an intermediary between Elizabeth and Morton, in his capacity as Principal Secretary. He did his best to excuse Elizabeth’s delays and neglects, and to persuade her to listen to Morton’s requests in order to prevent a breakdown in relations. For instance, he reassured Morton that when he understood the cause of the delay in sending an envoy he would ‘rest satisfied’.

However, over the course of the 1570s, Walsingham increasingly appeared to step out of his role as Elizabeth’s Secretary and give Morton, the governor of a foreign country, detailed advice about how to deal with Elizabeth. In chapter 2, we saw that Walsingham’s advice to the Prince of Orange drew Elizabeth’s ire because she saw this as a deviation from his proper function. There do not seem to have been any adverse consequences as a result of his advice to Morton, but the fact that Walsingham continued to provide such advice to foreign rulers speaks volumes about how he saw his own role. He certainly believed that he had a responsibility not just to England, but to Scotland. As we also saw in

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17 Morton to Walsingham, 18 August 1576, TNA, SP 57/27, fol. 10.
18 Morton to Walsingham, 9 July 1578, TNA, SP 52/27, fol. 47.
21 Walsingham to Leicester, 10 March 1575, BL, Cotton, Caligula C IV, fol. 321v.
chapter 2, he believed he had a duty to ‘to th’advauncement of the Kingdome of God and maintynnce of the same within this Isle’.

Walsingham especially tried to use Morton to encourage Elizabeth to take the necessity of securing Scotland’s amity more seriously. In 1575 Walsingham hoped that advertisements of Catholic machinations from Morton would force Elizabeth to act. More subversively, in 1577 Walsingham evidently asked Morton to write to Elizabeth and even suggested the terms in which he might do this. In a draft of a letter to Morton, Walsingham wrote of (then crossed out) his satisfaction that ‘it pleased you at my request to write in such sort as you did vnto her [emphasis mine]’. Morton’s statement of Scotland’s necessity had, Walsingham claimed, led Elizabeth to enter ‘into a deeper care and consideration of the defenc of hir owne realms & of hir good neighbours’. This letter shows just how far Walsingham and Morton were cooperating at this stage.

The close relationship between Walsingham and Morton was possible because their self-presentations usually matched their actions. Walsingham’s persona as a concerned, conscientious advocate and friend was plausible to Morton and his allies because it was borne out by his actions: the sending of news, the imparting of advice, the intercessions with queen and council. Similarly, Morton’s self-presentation as a loyal ally of England was demonstrated by his swift responses to crises; the policies he pursued in Scotland; and, perhaps especially, his impressive maintenance of order on the borders.

For Walsingham, therefore, it was extremely unfortunate that in the late 1570s Morton’s dominance of Scottish politics began to be eroded by James VI’s powerful favourite, his French cousin, Esmé Stewart, Sieur d’Aubigny (later duke of Lennox). This context saw Walsingham make his first real references to James VI as a power to be reckoned with in Scottish politics. While Morton had had his hands on the reins of government, it had been easy to ignore the young king, and James had been almost totally absent from Walsingham’s correspondence until 1579, when his antipathy to Morton and affection for d’Aubigny began to manifest itself. Sir Francis summed up the reasons for his own suspicion of d’Aubigny: he was ‘alltogether ffrench and besydes a papist’. As well as his influence with the king, Walsingham feared the Frenchman’s efforts to win the Scottish nobility ‘to incline to ffraunce’, despite his outward show of favouring amity with

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22 Walsingham to Thomas Randolph and Robert Bowes, 16 March 1578, BL, Harley 6992, fol. 100r.
23 Walsingham to Elizabeth 16 January 1575, TNA, SP 52/26/2, fol. 150.
24 Walsingham to Morton, 26 February 1577, TNA, SP 52/27, fol. 15.
26 Walsingham to Bowes, 3 May 1580, TNA, SP 52/28, fol. 41.
England. Walsingham was especially worried that ‘the common people be so diversely drawn into faction’, when he would have expected them to be united by the ‘common hatred they naturally have agaynst the servitude vnder anie foraine power’, which was what d’Aubigny and his French masters were planning. Some of Walsingham’s deepest assumptions are visible here: it was impossible for a French Catholic to be truly well-disposed to England, and Morton’s ties to England (much resented by some sections of the Scottish political nation) were not the same as Lennox’s ties to France. For Walsingham, Anglo-Scottish cooperation was logical and natural; France was “foreign” and offering subjection and abuse, while England was implicitly not foreign, and offering an alliance against common enemies.

As Morton was forced to step down as regent and Lennox emerged as one of James’ most important advisers, Walsingham and the English government became increasingly concerned. Walsingham complained that ‘the yong king of Scotts beginneth to be caried awaye with yong cownse loosrs’, and that Lennox ‘amongest the rest growe the to bee over great withe him’. These concerns intensified when it was rumoured that James planned to transfer custody of Dumbarton castle into Lennox’s hands. Walsingham believed that James’ affection for Lennox was leading the young king to forget ‘the duty he oweth to god and the care he ought to haue of his crowne and state’. Walsingham laid the blame for this primarily on the king’s other advisers. Walsingham and Elizabeth marvelled that the Scottish counsellors could ‘suffer the king […] to be so abused whose lack of experience & tender yeres cannot be able as yet to discerne the bottome of such kind of […] devises’. While his inexperience was buttressed by Protestants who desired friendship with England, the young king did not present much of a threat. Now that he was in thrall to Lennox, however, it was a very different story, and Walsingham looked to James’ advisers to salve matters. Their job was to counteract his inexperience and point out to him the dangers that might ensue from letting the subject of a foreign prince control a major fortified port, not to cower before the all-powerful favourite. Later, in 1588, Walsingham told one correspondent that ‘God maketh Princes good, for that they are his lieutenants here on earth, but by a common mishap Princes are made naught by ill instruments about them, which turneth most to the prejudice of honest men’. Lennox and others of James’
suspect advisers lurked behind this pronouncement, and his ascendancy also reanimated concerns about the succession which, as Susan Doran and Paulina Kewes have argued, were relatively dormant during Morton’s years in power. Now, however, James’ ‘emerging propensity for Catholic favourites’ rang noisy alarm bells.33

For Walsingham, French influence in Scotland threatened not only the stability and religion of that kingdom, but also of England and Protestantism in general. If James continued to be advised by Lennox, Walsingham was convinced that the result would be flight to France, marriage to a Catholic princess, and conversion to Catholicism.34 Sir Francis lamented Lennox’s ‘misguiding of the king’ and how he was drawing James’ ‘mynde from the godlie vertuous coorse he was entred into’. He also complained that James ‘suffereth him selfe so easely to be caried into a wrong coorse wherein he maie abuse the same his good giftes that god hath bestowed on him’.35 James’ susceptibility to the blandishments of Lennox was undermining all the work of his tutors, George Buchanan and Peter Young, to create the ideal godly king.

As well as selfish advisers, James’ position was undermined by the chronic lack of royal authority in Scotland as a result of his minority. Walsingham told Hunsdon in 1584 that ‘such attemptes as havee fallen out in Scotland haue onely proceeded of the particular divisions and pykes that havee taken foote amongst the noblemen of that realm by reason of the minority of the king’.36 Walsingham thought that ‘the only way of cure for this disease must be to remove the euill affected’ persons around James.37 Given his dire predictions, it was easy to justify using force to remove Lennox from James as ‘tending nothing to the kinges prejudice’ and to claim that ‘to those that are not carryed away with passion that her majestie doth deale both honorably and prouidently’ in considering this course.38

As a result of these impulses, and possibly with tacit English support, William Ruthven, 1st earl of Gowrie, led a group of Scottish nobles of generally Anglophile, Protestant sympathies who opposed the government of Lennox and his ally the earl of Arran in a coup on the 23rd August 1582. They seized James VI, imprisoned Arran and

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34 ‘Inducements to draw on the K to yeld sober & more willingly to his transportation into France’, TNA, SP 52/28, fol. 62; Walsingham to Bowes, 4 January 1583, SP 52/31, fol. 6.
35 Walsingham to Randolph, 9 February 1581, TNA, SP 52/29, fol. 33.
36 [Walsingham] to Hunsdon, [November 1584], TNA, SP 52/36, fol. 101.
37 Walsingham to Randolph, 9 February 1581, TNA, SP 52/29, fol. 32.
38 Walsingham to Randolph, [18 March] 1581, TNA, SP 52/29, fol. 46.
eventually secured the banishment of Lennox. The coup did not last long, however. In June 1583 James escaped, and he long retained an antipathy towards those who had been involved.

Walsingham’s sympathies were squarely with the Ruthvenites, and, as the ODNB notes, he ‘has been widely suspected of instigating the conspiracy’ through his contact with Morton’s allies who had fled into England after the regent’s execution.\(^{39}\) It is true that on 7\(^{th}\) August 1582 Walsingham passed on a warning to the plotters that Lennox had discovered their conspiracy, and this probably caused them to bring forward their plans.\(^{40}\) There is no concrete evidence of any more active involvement on Walsingham’s part, but he was enough in their confidence to be aware of their plans, and evidently wanted them to succeed. Whether or not Walsingham was actively involved in the coup, rumours of his support cannot have endeared him to James or temporarily-displaced ministers like Arran.

Walsingham had greeted the seizure of James with optimism, and was concerned by his escape.\(^{41}\) The English believed that this regime change would lead to the end of amity with Scotland, and James did nothing to dispel their fears, instead persecuting individuals associated with English interests.\(^{42}\) James’ time with the Ruthvenites had done nothing to alter his antipathy to the individuals involved or to the more Anglophile policy they espoused. Given this, and given Walsingham’s close ties to members of the group, it is perhaps not surprising that his embassy to Scotland in 1583 did nothing to improve Anglo-Scottish relations. Before his arrival, Walsingham had believed it would encourage England’s friends.\(^{43}\)

In this embassy (13\(^{th}\) August – 21\(^{st}\) October), Walsingham’s primary instructions were to explain English grievances and obtain redress. Walsingham was instructed to set before James the (to English eyes) discrepancies between his protestations of friendship and his actions, including his persecution of individuals identified as Elizabeth’s supporters. He was also to prevail on James to reform and explain recent events. These instructions were accompanied with a hint that Elizabeth might increase her previous offer of £2500 as a pension for James if he showed himself amenable. Walsingham was also to declare the

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\(^{39}\) ODNB, ‘Walsingham’.

\(^{40}\) Bowes to Walsingham, 15 August 1582, Joseph Stevenson (ed.), *The Correspondence of Robert Bowes of Aske, Esquire, the Ambassador of Queen Elizabeth in the Court of Scotland*, for the Surtees Society, 14 (London: J. B. Nichols and Son, 1842), p. 177.

\(^{41}\) Walsingham to Cobham, 31 August 1582, TNA, SP 78/8, fol. 32; [Walsingham] to Bowes, 22 July 1583, SP 52/32, fol. 107.

\(^{42}\) [Walsingham] to Bowes, 22 July 1583, TNA, SP 52/32, fol. 107.

\(^{43}\) Walsingham to Burghley, 26 August 1583, BL, Harley 6993, fol. 56; ‘A memorall for master Bingham, deliuered by Secretary Walsingham’, 5 September 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 58.
English solutions to these problems, including reconciliation with all his nobles. If Walsingham was unable to persuade James to accept these points, he was to investigate ways to bring down the allegedly “anti-English” faction around the king.44

Walsingham had his first audience with James at St Johnstone on 9th September, accompanied by the English ambassador, Robert Bowes. Together, they laid out the reasons Elizabeth was concerned by the recent regime change, ‘as a thing no lesse prejudityall to him self then dishonorable’ to her, because he had removed her supporters who were the men who would serve him best. James replied in ‘generall termes’ that he had always favoured Elizabeth’s friendship, meant to continue doing so, and was better able to do so now that his nobility were ‘at his devocion’ rather than two or three controlling him as the Ruthvenites had.45

Bowes and Walsingham were not impressed with the king’s replies. They tried to make James answer the charges specifically by laying before him ‘therrors of his gouernement’, and the dangerous consequences to James if he did not address these. James defended his actions, and asserted ‘that he was an absolut king’ so Elizabeth should leave him do as he saw fit in Scotland and ‘be no more curious to examin th’affection of his Councelours then he is of yours’. In response to James’ self-assertion, the English envoys ‘shewed him how farr fourth his regality stretched, & that his yong yeres culd not yet so well iudge what apertheynid to matters of gouernement as the necessitye of his estate required’.46 Walsingham continued by ‘letting him vnderstand’ that he had not been sent to seek James’ friendship but only to ‘charge him with his unkind dealing towards’ Elizabeth.47 They may have slightly exceeded their brief in pointing out the errors of James’ rule, but it was certainly one way of making ‘little accompt’ of the king in the hope that he would see the error of his ways and dismiss Arran and his party, as they had planned.48

The interview with James convinced Walsingham that ‘there is no hope of the recovery of this yonge Prince’ and if James ‘power may agree to his will, will become a daungerous enemy’.49 Walsingham also complained that James appeared unwilling to follow Elizabeth’s advice and claimed that he ‘letteth fall som speches secretly in dislyke of

44 ‘A memorial of the chief matters committed to the charge of Sir Francis Walsingham…’, 13 August 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 9.
45 Walsingham and Bowes to Elizabeth, 11 September 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 33.
46 Ibid, fol. 33.
48 ‘A memoriall for master Bingham, deliuered by Secretary Walsingham’, 5 September 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 58.
49 Walsingham to Burghley, 11 September 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 35.
Religion’ and was to send an envoy to ask for help from the Pope and Spain. This was one of Sir Francis’ great fears; if James converted to Catholicism, it opened England’s back gate wide to her enemies.

Against this background, on 12th September Walsingham had a second, private audience with the seventeen-year-old king. An account of the interview under the title ‘The heads of the conference betwene the King of Scottes and Secretary Walsingham’ survives in the State Papers, and several later copies also reside in the British Library. The document is written in the third person so it seems that it was compiled by someone in Walsingham’s retinue, whether or not they were actually present at the interview. As the title suggests, it provides a summary of what passed between James and Walsingham, although mainly lists the latter’s criticisms of the king. Although it is only a summary, it contains one of Walsingham’s most dense and pointed discussions of political issues and institutions.

James, recognising that if Walsingham left dissatisfied with his answers his more Anglophile subjects might be suspicious of his intentions, asked the Secretary how he could satisfy Elizabeth. Walsingham replied that his mistress only desired James to ‘forbeare to proceed in the violent Course of gouernement that he was nowe entred into’ and proceeded to outline the chief problems James faced and their solutions.

According to Walsingham, the main problem James faced was that by this ‘violent Course’ he had placed himself in a precarious position and alienated the hearts of his subjects. That is, by following the advice of Arran and his allies in proceeding harshly against those associated with English interests, James had made himself so unpopular that his person and his regime were at risk. His misgovernment meant he had to ‘stand vppon his garde in his owne Realme as thoughe he did live amongst his enemyes’. This assessment is particularly interesting in light of Walsingham’s comment that subjects’ good will was ‘the true strength and glory of a Prince’. A monarch’s relationship with their

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51 ‘The heads of the conference betwene the King of Scottes and Secretary Walsingham’, 12 September 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 39; BL, Additional MS 12520, fol. 49; Additional MS 48044 [Yelverton 49], fols 306b-09, Harley 787 fol. 52, Harley 4111, fol. 143, and Harley 4808, fol. 80; Sloane 1856 fol. 34.
52 Read, Walsingham, II, p. 216.
53 ‘heads of the conference’, fol. 39.
54 Ibid, fol. 39.
55 Ibid, fol. 39.
56 Walsingham to Burghley, August 1581, Sir Dudley Digges, The Compleat Ambassador, or, Two Treatises of the Intended Marriage of Queen Elizabeth of Glorious Memory; Comprised in Letters of Negotiation of Sir Francis Walsingham, her Resident in France. Together with the Answers of Lord Burleigh, the Earl of Leicester, Sir Tho: Smith, and others (London: Tho: Newcomb for Gabriel Bedell and Thomas Collins, 1655), sig. Aaa2v.
subjects was important because they were ordained for the good of their subjects, and, also, because fear of one’s subjects was a mark of a tyrant. A true monarch trusted their subjects, a tyrant put their faith in guards and foreigners.  

Once their goodwill was lost, therefore, it was essential to regain it.

Sir Francis asserted that this “alienation” had been occasioned by ‘ill choyce of Counsellors, being young men voyde of experience and full of passion, and such as sought by the ruyn of others to advance themselves’, whereas ‘yong Princes had more need of grave and auncient Counsellors that might by their temperance and wisdome brydle such passions as Commonly they that were of his yong yeares were subiecte vnto’. For Walsingham, then, the crisis of 1582-3 was largely a problem of counsel: James was being badly advised by poorly-chosen counsellors. Therefore, much of Walsingham’s advice to him was an assertion of stock, humanist conceptions of the ideal characteristics of advisers and what the advisory relationship should look like, though there are also echoes of his familiarity with reason of state discourses.

Walsingham had been concerned about the age of James’ advisers since 1579, as we have seen. Walsingham’s emphasis on this seems odd, considering that Arran (the main cause of England’s concern) was about 38 in 1583, and so hardly a young man. In addition, his ally, Colonel William Stewart, was about 43. Attacking James’ advisers allowed Walsingham to criticise his actions without appearing to criticise the king; any faults committed by his government were the result of being “ill-counselled”. This was a common technique used by rebels and respectable diplomats alike to enable them to express dissent without criticising the monarch. Given this, perhaps the “youth” of James’ counsellors served as a fairly transparent way of covering a critique of the king’s own age and resulting failings. Emphasising James’ youth was also a way of forcing him into the role of the counselled party, as young rulers were understood to be especially in need of counsel, and therefore further justifying Walsingham’s advice. Presumably, had the king’s

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58 ‘heads of the conference’, fol. 39.

advisers (however young) espoused an overtly Protestant and Anglophile agenda, their age would not have been such a problem. Additionally, the youth of a ruler’s advisers was part of stock descriptions in the “evil counsel” tradition, and so Walsingham’s emphasis on the youth of Arran and Stewart probably reflects an application of this kind of literature, regardless of the specifics of the case.

After recommending the qualities of a good counsellor Walsingham moved on to their prime responsibilities: they should be charged to focus especially on the causes of piety and justice, these ‘being the foundation of all States’. This was important in order that ‘Religion be mainteyned and the Contemners thereof punished’ and ‘to see the meaner sort deliuered from the oppression of the greater And that euery one might receive, according to their desertes ether punishment or reward’ as this was the ‘principall meanes to encourage the well affected and brydle the Contrary sorte’. That justice and the upholding of religion were key responsibilities of advisers was a commonplace. Thomas Starkey, for example, asserted that princes and magistrates must ensure ‘first & above all the people may be instruct [sic] with the doctrine of christ’, and that they may ‘quietly labour, both without outward impediment & hurt of enemies & also without inward injury among themselves, one oppressing an other with wrongs’.

Additionally, in his commentaries on Livy’s Decades, Machiavelli had noted the importance of curbing the ‘arrogance of the nobility’, as Walsingham urged James to do, though this was also something of a contemporary commonplace. Livy’s work had been recommended by Walsingham to his nephew. However, it may be significant that James was emerging from the shadows of others as the primary power in Scottish politics, as the advice to bridle the power of the nobles and be a friend to the people, protecting them from oppression, was the advice Guicciardini gave to new princes.

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60 ‘heades of the Conference’, fol. 39v.
61 Paul, ‘Counsel and Command’, pp. 72-78. For an English example of the association of youths and ‘evil counsel’ see Greg Walker, ‘The “Expulsion of the Minions” of 1519 Reconsidered’, The Historical Journal, 32.1 (1989), 1-16 (pp. 3, 10). I am grateful to Kit Heyam for drawing my attention to this issue.
64 Stark, Discourses, pp. 217, 237.
To address the problem of bad counsel, Walsingham recommended that James should ask his soon-to-be-convened Parliament to nominate possible advisers who were ‘best experimented in matters of government and were esteemed freest from partialityes’ from which James could choose ‘some Convenient number’. This was because ‘th’Assemblye of States in Monarchyes’ was intended to advise ‘remedies’ for the ‘diseases’ of the realm.\textsuperscript{66} Walsingham thought the Scottish political nation ought to have a say in who advised their king, and thus a say in government policy. This was probably because he believed that they would force Protestant, pro-English advisers on James, to England’s advantage. He even told James that ‘his subiectes wold be best enclyned to yeld him due obedience when they shold find him guyded by th’advice and Counsell of those whom they themselues shold recommend’, thus reconciling their alienated hearts to James again.\textsuperscript{67} That Parliament ought to vet the advisers of the prince was one of Thomas Starkey’s suggestions for a well-governed commonwealth, but it seems a world away from Walsingham’s conception of the English Parliament. Machiavelli, in \textit{The Prince}, saw parliaments as having a responsibility to bridle the nobility.\textsuperscript{68} Walsingham gave Parliament a more prominent role in Scotland, possibly reflecting an opinion that it was to act as a brake on bad rulers. This would perhaps explain his more limited view of Parliament’s role in England, where it was to act on Elizabeth as an occasional reminder of her duty to which she was expected to be receptive, rather than an instrument to impose counsel on her.

Walsingham told James in 1583 that because Scotland had long been governed by regents, ‘the reverence of th’Authoritie of a king was taken awaye so as euery great personnage within his realm did thinke himselfe as it were exempt from th’ordinarye obedience of Common subiectes’.\textsuperscript{69} While concerned to restrain James with pro-English advisers, Walsingham also believed that Scotland’s ills were due to the crown’s weakness and the nobility’s strength, so he proposed measures to redress this, too, such as reserving forfeitures of property to the crown.\textsuperscript{70} This is consistent with his views of the English polity in that he considered a strong, centralised monarchy desirable. However, because he thought that James posed a threat to England, he sought to balance his influence with the advice of those who were more likely to concur with English interests. If this were successful, a strong crown would be good for international Protestantism and England, as

\textsuperscript{66} ‘heades of the Conference’, fol. 39v.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid, fol. 39v.
\textsuperscript{69} ‘heades of the conference’, fol. 39v.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, fol. 39v1.
long as James behaved himself. A weak Scottish monarch might be inclined to alliances
with France and Spain, which, Walsingham thought, would be disastrous for England and
international Protestantism.

Walsingham did not mean, however, for James to govern “absolutely”. Having
encouraged James to consolidate his power, Walsingham proceeded to lay out the bounds
of a king’s authority and the possible consequences of governing badly. He claimed:

yong Princes were manny tymes Carryed into great errores vpon an opinion of th’absolutnes of
their Royall authoritie, and do not Consider, that when they transgresse the boundes and limittes of
the Lawe, they leave to be kings and become tyrantes.71

Exactly which law Walsingham meant here is not clear, which has implications for the
radicalism of this statement. Given the context in Scotland, especially the irregular legal
proceedings against England’s allies there, Walsingham probably meant the man-made laws
of that ruler’s country. Many contemporary authors insisted that princes were bound to
obey not only the laws of God and nature, but also the human laws of their countries.
Thomas Starkey, for instance, insisted on the necessity of rulers being bound by law, and
also having their authority contained by councils and by Parliament.72 Like Walsingham, in
his classic of Marian exile polemical literature, A shorte treatise of politike power (Strasbourg,
1556), John Ponet had argued that monarchs must obey the positive laws of their country,
as well as the ordinances of God: it was “transgressing” the laws that made princes into
tyants. Particularly striking is a shared concern with the illegitimacy of princes’
confiscations of their subjects’ goods and property. This was one of Walsingham’s primary
objections against James’ government, and Ponet made the unique point of stressing the
‘inalienable’ right of subjects to their property in direct response to the efforts of the
Marian government to strip exiles of their property in England.73 As one of those who
would have been affected by such an initiative, Walsingham may have been additionally

71 Ibid, fol. 39v.
73 Walsingham to Burghley, 30 August 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 25v; ‘A memorall for master
Bingham, deliuere by Secretary Walsingham’, 5 September 1583, SP 52/33, fol. 58; John Ponet, A
shorte treatise of politike power and of the true obedience which subjectes owe to kynges and other ciuile
gouernours, with an exhortacion to all true naturall Englishe men (Strasbour: heirs of W. Köpfel, 1556),
sig. Fii-Fii; Barbara Peardon, ‘The Politics of Polemic: John Ponet’s Short Treatise of Politic Power
and Contemporary Circumstance 1553-1556’, Journal of British Studies, 22.1 (1982), 35-49 (pp. 44-45,
35). A concern with the crown’s (lack of) rights to it subjects’ property is also apparent in Huguenot
writing, Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge
receptive to arguments that protected his material possessions at home in this way. His comments in 1583 may, therefore, reflect a familiarity with the anti-Marian literature of the 1550s.

Walsingham’s disparagement of royal ‘absolutnes’ was clearly a rebuke to James for asserting that he was an ‘absolut’ king in their first interview. Elsewhere, Walsingham also seemed to incline to “limited” government. In 1581, as part of a discussion of whether Elizabeth should assist the duke of Alençon in his Dutch enterprise, Walsingham considered whether it would be better for the provinces to be in the ‘possession of a Prince that can be content with a gouuernment lymited or in the handes of one that seakith to be absolute’. He acknowledged that it was fair to fear that though Alençon might initially be ‘content to accept a lymited gouuerment’, given French behaviour elsewhere it was likely that he would soon ‘hardely be contained wthin lymites’. Exactly what these limits were is unclear, but their necessity and Walsingham’s approval of them is clear. He argued that Elizabeth should still help Alençon, despite the danger he may prove “absolute”, because this quality would be resisted by the people of the provinces who were extremely jealous of their privileges, and would just as easily revolt against a French as a Spanish ‘tyrant’.74 In these examples, Walsingham was critical of rulers who did not consider themselves bound to obey the law; who did not allow themselves to be limited by positive checks on their authority. Though the practical working out of these comments is rather vague, what comes across strongly is Walsingham’s conviction that a “limited” government was a good government, and an “absolute” one was not. This initially seems incompatible with his comments on English government, as do the comments following this section of the “Heades”. However, by “limited” he may not have meant anything more radical than an expectation to act for the benefit of his subjects, ‘take good counsel, and protect religion’.75

‘[D]iuerse Princes’, Walsingham told James in their interview in 1583, having been advised by flattering, self-serving and greedy counsellors, ‘have bene deposed’ because they failed to remove these bad advisers when asked, ‘wherof both the Histories of England and Scotland did give sufficient Presidentes’. Sir Francis continued, ‘as subjectes are bound to obey dutifully so were Princes bound to Commaund iustlie; whi(ch reason and ground of gouernement was sett downe in the deposicion of Edward the second, as by auncient

74 ‘Whether it be good for hir Majesty to assist the the D. Aniou in his enterprize of the lowe cuntryes’, November 1581, BL, Harley 1582, fols 39, 39v-40.
Records therof doth appeare’. Walsingham used specific historical precedents (a technique that characterised humanist- and reason-of-state-style treatises alike) to highlight the danger of kings failing to heed counsel or govern within the limits of the law. Walsingham also gave James specific examples of occasions when his own behaviour had been unwise, almost paralleling the two cases. He noted particularly James’ allowing the execution of Morton, and advancing the Stewart family of which the earl of Arran was the leading member. Instead, James should accept the service of a greater number of his subjects, and not allow Arran’s monopoly to continue.

That Edward II was the monarch with whom Walsingham chose to compare James is significant. In the 1550s, John Ponet had cited Edward to prove that English history could provide examples of depositions of tyrants. Edward, Ponet explained, was deposed because ‘without lawe he killed his subjectes, spoiled them of their goodes, and wasted the treasure of the Realme’. From the 1590s onwards, James was frequently compared to Edward, especially in terms of his relationships with his male favourites. Like James, Edward had been a king carried away with affection for powerful favourites, first the French (Gascon) Piers Gaveston, and then the two Hugh Despensers. Edward’s relationship with Gaveston was romanticised in the sixteenth century as a relationship of love and immoderate affection, while his relations with the Despensers were no less dangerous, but more mercenary in nature. This pattern seemed to fit James’ favourites, too, from his overflowing affection for Lennox to his dependence on the greedy Arran. James had even been captured by his other nobles and forced to banish Lennox, as Edward had Gaveston. Unlike the Scottish ministers aghast at the king’s favour for Lennox, who threatened ‘the punishment of Sodom and Gomorrah to be poured over the realm’, Walsingham chose a secular example that stressed not the immorality of James’ putative sexual relationship with Lennox, but the political consequences of being carried away with such affection. The dangers of private vices undermining a prince’s security were

76 ‘heades of the conference’, fol. 39v1.
78 Ponet, shorte treatise, sig. Giii.
81 Young, King James, pp. 56-57.
82 [blank] to [blank], [September] 1581, Cal. Scotland, VI, p. 52.
described by writers like Machiavelli, who emphasised the appearance of virtuous conduct rather than its reality as more traditional humanist texts would have done.\textsuperscript{83}

The other historical ‘Presidentes’ to which Walsingham alluded, and the legitimacy of deposition in these cases, perhaps hints also at some familiarity with the writings to George Buchanan. Buchanan’s \textit{Rerum Scotiarum Historia} (1582) provided a narrative of Scottish history that ultimately sought to justify the deposition of James’ mother, Mary, by insisting, in its vignettes of past monarchs, on the contractual nature of Scottish monarchy and the precedents for the legitimate destruction of bad or tyrannical rulers by the nobility and/or the people. The work was explicitly intended to guide and direct the behaviour of James, Buchanan’s former pupil, as the dedication shows. Buchanan wrote that in it he was sending the king ‘Faithfull Counsellors from History, that you might make use of their Advice in your Deliberations, and imitate their Virtue in Your Actions’.\textsuperscript{84} The monarch’s choice of counsellors is particularly important in the history, and was certainly one of Walsingham’s reservations about James’ rule. Among Buchanan’s examples, there are kings who ‘made the Corruptest Youngesters’ their ‘Familiar and Bosom Friends’ and were defeated in battle by their nobles; kings who ‘banish’d’ ‘Sober and Prudent Counsellors’ from court and instead relied on ‘[o]nly Flatterers’ and ended up being put to death after a ‘general Combination of almost all sorts of People’; and kings who ‘by false Accusations, cut off some of the Nobles, who were averse to their humours and desires, and dared to speak freely of the State of the Kingdom’.\textsuperscript{85} In some cases, Buchanan’s treatment of past monarchs seems to deliberately evoke the power of the duke of Lennox over James, as in his discussion of Alexander Boyd, a favourite of James III.\textsuperscript{86} It is hard to prove that Walsingham was directly familiar with Buchanan’s work, though he certainly associated closely with those who were, including Daniel Rogers and Thomas Randolph.\textsuperscript{87} What is clear from a comparison of the Scottish history and Walsingham’s remarks to James in 1583 is a shared concern for the counsellors around a monarch and a shared conviction that tyrannical rulers could be legitimately removed, though there were some differences. Among other things, although Buchanan’s Scottish history condemned the innovation of King Mogaldus in passing a law that ensured criminals’ property was forfeit to the crown as

\textsuperscript{83} Machiavelli, \textit{Prince}, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{The History of Scotland, Written in Latin by George Buchanan. Faithfully Rendered into the English} (London: Edward Jones for Awnsham Churchill, 1690), sig. b\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, sigs O\textsuperscript{i}, O\textsuperscript{2}, Hh2\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, sig. Fff2\textsuperscript{2} – Fff2\textsuperscript{3}.
\textsuperscript{87} James E. Phillips, ‘George Buchanan and the Sidney Circle’, \textit{Huntington Library Quarterly}, 12.1 (1948), 23-55 (pp. 25, 44)
‘unjust and inhuman’, we have seen that Walsingham advocated just this course of action to James as a way of strengthening his position.  

Elsewhere, Buchanan set out his political vision more explicitly, and we can make some broader comparisons between this and Walsingham’s own view. In his De Iure Regni apud Scotos Dialogus, which he wrote ‘in haste’ at the time of Mary Stuart’s deposition, Buchanan, like Walsingham in his utterances on the deposition of monarchs, was ‘responding to an immediate political crisis’. A further similarity is the largely secular character of the grounds put forward for deposition. Buchanan was little concerned with ‘legal niceties and procedural practice’ compared to his emphasis on ‘the moral basis of sound government’, and this again suggests similar priorities to Walsingham who was extremely vague about the processes by which monarchs might be deposed but robust in asserting that they deserved such treatment for unacceptable conduct. This was linked strongly to their shared adherence to the idea that ‘kings are created, not for themselves, but for the people’, and should rule in line with the laws. Unlike Walsingham, however, in De Iure Regni Buchanan espoused ‘a radically populist conception of sovereignty’, in which it was legitimate even for private individuals to depose their ruler, whereas Elizabeth’s Secretary seems to have conceived of action by members of the political nation.

It is also important to note that Walsingham stressed the natural condition of obedience to the prince. James’ subjects, he said, thought of themselves as loyal servants because of the ‘Common dutye of a Subiect ingraffed by Godes ordnaunce in euery good mans mynd and by the ordinary Lawes & Constitucions of all Kingdomes’. Obedience was obviously conditional on the prince’s demands and conduct, however.

The idea that subjects were only required to obey their rulers while those rulers governed “justly” was used in contemporary discourses of resistance that grew out of the reformation and counter-reformation. It is likely that Walsingham encountered some of the people and texts advocating varying levels of resistance to secular power during his time abroad in the 1550s. Ponet had argued that magistrates and princes were ordained for the benefit of the people, to whom they owed an account of their actions, and who could, in the last resort, rise up to destroy a tyrant. The responsibility for tyrannicide devolved first,

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88 History of Scotland, sig. P2v.
91 Ibid, p. 16.
92 Ibid, pp. 51, 107-08.
93 Ibid, pp. 11, 121.
94 ‘heades of the conference’, fol. 39v².
} Unlike Knox and Goodman, Ponet did not argue that the imposition of false religion was grounds for rebellion, instead providing political or constitutional grounds.\footnote{Peardon, p. 35.} As outlined above, there are some similarities between Ponet’s arguments and Walsingham’s claims in 1583, though there are plenty of other potential sources for these ideas.

Commenting on this interview with James, Read claimed that ‘the political theories which it enunciates were clearly borrowed from the \textit{Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos}.\footnote{Read, \textit{Walsingham}, II, p. 219.}’ Attributed to various writers including Hubert Languet and Philippe Duplessis Mornay, both of whom were correspondents of Walsingham, the treatise (Basel, 1579) set out on what grounds it was permissible to rebel against a ruler. It represents a middle ground between absolute obedience and the more radical resistance doctrines of thinkers like Christopher Goodman, in that resistance is only permissible if it is led by a magistrate, which was a common mediating position.\footnote{Dan G. Danner, ‘Christopher Goodman and the English Protestant Tradition of Civil Disobedience’, \textit{Sixteenth Century Journal}, 8.3 (1977), 60-73 (p. 63); \textit{Vindiciae}, p. 46.}

Because of the generic nature of \textit{Vindiciae}, it is hard to prove that Walsingham got his ideas from this specific text. In discussing both Edward’s actual and James’ possible deposition Walsingham is extremely vague about the identity of those doing the act, and it is not even clear that the deosers had a right or duty to do this, just that it had happened in the past and might happen again. There are, however, many echoes of the \textit{Vindiciae} in Walsingham’s lecture to James in 1583. Most obviously, perhaps, there is its assertion of the importance of obeying the ‘two tables of the law handed to Moses […] the first comprises the worship of God, and the second duty towards neighbours: the first […] piety; and the second, justice’.\footnote{\textit{Vindiciae}, p. 30.} The text also insisted that the prince ‘cannot remain standing without the people’, echoing Walsingham’s assertion of the importance of subjects’ good will, and criticised counsellors or officers who usurped the prince or controlled them, ‘as histories teach and recent memory sufficiently demonstrates’.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 76, 88, 143.} The author asserted that the people would ‘obey faithfully so long as [the prince] commanded justly’, which is very similar to Walsingham’s formulation of the relative responsibilities of prince and people.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 130, 158.} The \textit{Vindiciae}’s conception of tyranny was primarily religious – an
impious king, or the imposition of false religion by such a king – but it also accepted, like Walsingham, that a prince who ignored and perverted the laws of the kingdom was a tyrant to be deposed, though its treatment of this contingency is subject to many more qualifications.\textsuperscript{102} Given these similarities, it is likely that Walsingham did support a similar position to the author of that text. Walsingham’s comments to James posit secular reasons for his unpopularity and danger, though his support for the Dutch rebels suggests that Walsingham could also conceive of a legitimate rebellion based on the infringement of primarily religious liberties.

A consideration of Walsingham’s other uses of “tyrant” and “tyranny” might be useful here. In 1571, he contrasted the Spanish, ‘who do rule altogether by tyranye, as dyvers of the countreyes where they governe do witnesse’, with English government in Ireland, where the Irish ‘enioye as greate lybertye as any nac\'ion dothe’.\textsuperscript{103} Tyranny was therefore opposed to liberty, but what exactly it was about Spanish government that was tyrannical is not explicit.

Walsingham’s ideas about what constituted tyranny are perhaps clearer in another example. He urged assistance for the Dutch rebels against Spanish rule in terms opposition to tyranny. In a policy document Walsingham drafted in 1575-76, to counter the objection that Orange was ‘repvted for a rebell’, he emphasised the projected imposition of the Inquisition by Philip II as the cause of the unrest, claiming that ‘the people’ then ‘grewe to a mvtyunse kynde of speeche protestyng rather to loose ther lyves then to yelde therto’. In response to this muttering, ‘the nobyltye, forseening that thos speeches myght growe to vppores and cyvell dyssentyon’, raised the people’s grievance ‘pryvatlye’ with the regent but to no avail. They then embarked on the next logical step, exhibiting ‘a pvbblycke svpplicatyon’ showing how the establishment of the Inquisition ‘tended to the breache of ther lybertyes’. This, too, was ignored. Only then did ‘the people’ take up arms, ‘with protestation that they sowght nothinge but fredome of conscyence & the mayntenavnce of ther lybertyes / withowt intention to denye to the k ther sovereigne any thing dewe to him’. This was classic measured resistance to tyranny – not rebellion against a legitimate monarch. It also reproduces the narrative that the “rebels” themselves promoted of their history and intentions.\textsuperscript{104} The end of the document is slightly ambiguous about exactly who

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Vindiciae}, pp. 41, 64, 148-72.
\textsuperscript{103} Walsingham to Burghley, 26 March 1571, TNA, SP 70/117, fol. 51v.
has the right to resist when liberties were threatened. Philip’s deafness to his responsibilities was the result of his being ‘abused by the ambytyon of certeyn of his spanyshe crownsell / whose sowght therrowghe their pryvat lvcre the losse of ther lybertyes / which they by cavlyng were bownde to defende with losse of ther lyves’. Whose “calling” is it to defend these liberties with their lives? The counsellors seem an unlikely choice, though the most obvious in the context of the sentence, for what responsibility would Spanish counsellors have for the rights of the Dutch? It could be the nobles, or the people. It could be both. The ambiguity might even be intentional – it was not good political practice to appear to defend the right of the people at large to resist in Elizabethan England.

These examples show that, while Walsingham did uphold monarchical authority, this was conditional on ruling well; i.e. ruling with regard to Protestant piety and justice. Failing to live up to these criteria constituted legitimate grounds for deposition or rebellion. As Buchanan put it: ‘if a good prince must be obeyed, it does not follow that a bad one must not be resisted.’ Walsingham also, at least sometimes, saw tyranny as the result of bad or selfish advisers, both in the Netherlands, and potentially in Scotland.

Another aspect of Walsingham’s expression, evident in the account of his audience with James in 1583, is a propensity to use medical metaphors or the language of the body to describe political points. Because royal authority was patchy in Scotland, Walsingham recommended that James, like ‘wyse and discreet Physitians’ treating ‘long Continewed diseases’, should ‘proceed by degrees’ because ‘violent medicynes throughe a desyre of speedy remedye do work daungerous effectes’ so ‘ouer much seueritye’ was likely to exacerbate the problem in a realm with a weak crown. This echoes Ponet’s language in many passages in his tract. For example, he claimed that magistrates (including members of Parliament) were ‘not only kepers of Goddes people […] but also as phisicianes and Surgeons, to redresse, reforme and heale, if any thing be amysse’.

As we saw in chapter 2, Walsingham’s deployment of medical language in a political context was one way of asserting his impartiality and responsibility to advise.

Despite these common threads as represented in this document, Walsingham’s opinions seem very different to those on English politics, but it is important not to just assume that these, seemingly more radical positions, were Walsingham’s “real” views.

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105 'Whether it be requisite for the Q to ayde the Prince of Orange ageinst D. D. notwithstanding the league betwene us and the howse of burgundye’, c. 1575-76, TNA, SP 70/136, fol. 215.
106 Buchanan, De Iure Regni, p. 112.
107 ‘heads of the Conference’, fol. 39v.
which he was prevented from expressing in an English context due to fear of the consequences. The advice he gave James was dictated by the situation in Scotland and its likely effects on England – not abstract political theory. The extent to which ostensibly theoretical pronouncements on the nature of politics were conditional on the detail of contemporary circumstance is not always sufficiently appreciated by historians. This is not to say that these were always false or deliberately untrue, but that, in some ways, the political theories espoused by political actors were entirely contingent on their position in the situation – on who was doing what to whom. For instance, Mark Hutchinson’s interesting and perceptive article on the development of the idea of the state in Ireland in the 1580s does not take into consideration the fact that one of the primary reasons why, in his disputes with Lord Deputy Perrot, Adam Loftus, archbishop of Dublin, used discourses of limited government in opposition to Perrot’s more “absolute” claims because that was a convincing way of defending his own authority, threatened by Perrot’s interfering.\footnote{Mark A. Hutchinson, ‘The Emergence of the State in Elizabethan Ireland and England, c. 1575-99’, \textit{Sixteenth Century Journal}, 45.3 (2014), 659-82 (p. 676).} It was the direct result of an attack on Loftus’ own sphere of influence and may or may not reflect a sincerely-held commitment to limited government \textit{per se}. To some extent, then, even theoretical comments on politics can be seen as rhetorical strategies, designed to convince an audience of the validity of the rhetor’s own position.

According to Walsingham the outcome of his meetings with James was, \textit{inter alia}, that the king agreed not to further pursue the Ruthven raiders, that he would take Parliament’s advice about his counsellors, that a treaty for formal amity go ahead, and finally that James should have personal direct contact with Elizabeth.\footnote{‘A note of such especial heads as by the King’s majesty of Scotland were delivered unto Secretary Walsingham to be communicated unto the Queen’s majesty his sovereign’, 12 September 1583, \textit{Cal. Scotland}, VI, p. 607.} However, Walsingham told one correspondent that though he had left James seemingly ‘well inclynid’ to amity with England, he had reneged on similar promises before and was ‘still possessed by thos ill instrumentes’ that were the cause of all the trouble. Because of this and because James’ age meant that he lacked ‘sufficient iudgement & discretion’ to decide on state affairs, Walsingham did ‘greatly doubt’ that he would keep his promises.\footnote{[Walsingham to Sir Edward Stafford], 26 October 1583, TNA, SP 78/10, fol. 65.} Walsingham left Scotland telling Elizabeth that James was ungrateful, and if he had the ability to do so he would do her harm. He also told the queen that he and Bowes had found out that his inclination had ‘growen altogether from the advice of his mother’, who had told him that distancing himself from Elizabeth and changing Scotland’s religion would win him a strong
party there. Walsingham wrote that James intended to pretend otherwise for now but that he secretly planned to follow this advice.\footnote{Walsingham to Elizabeth, 12 September 1583, \textit{Cal. Scotland}, VI, p. 611.}

None of Walsingham’s advice was very welcome to James, and its blunt delivery confirmed his suspicions of the Secretary’s enmity. He appeared as just the bullying, interfering, Ruthven raid-supporting foreigner that James and his allies suspected him of being. Or, as George Buchanan described himself in his dedication of \textit{De Iure Regni} to James, a ‘harsh and sometimes insolent critic’ who sought to countervail the influence of ‘evil company’.\footnote{Buchanan, \textit{De Iure Regni}, p. 37.} In an anonymous document probably dating from late 1583 or early 1584, James’ suspicions of and antipathy towards Walsingham are evident. When Walsingham was ‘comended for his religion and zele’, James replied that ‘notwithstanding that outward profession he is a very machiavell’, who had advised him to ‘vse religion’ to obtain his subjects’ obedience. James also complained that Walsingham had not given him ‘faitfull concele’.\footnote{BL, Harley 290, fol. 84.}

As we only have Walsingham’s account of the interview in the ‘Heades’, it is hard to tell how justified James’ comments were, but they may have been occasioned by what he would have seen as the gap between Walsingham’s professions of good will and his actions (harsh criticism and involvement with those James considered his enemies). It is true that Machiavelli in his commentary on Livy wrote of religion as ‘the necessary instrument above all others for the maintenance of a civilised state’ which ‘helped in the control of armies, in encouraging the plebs, in producing good men, and in shaming the bad’. He also wrote that rulers should ‘uphold the basic principles of the religion which sustains them in being’, to keep their state religious and quiet.\footnote{Discourses, pp. 240-46: 240, 244.} It is possible that Walsingham also said something to James of the need for him to appear truly religious and uphold the kirk to secure his people’s loyalty, as Walsingham generally believed that certainly the middling sort in Scotland were committed Protestants, and that this was to what James referred.\footnote{Walsingham to Thomas Fowler, 22 December 1588, TNA, SP 52/42, fol. 129.} However, the difficulty of pinning down the meaning of “Machiavellian” in the sixteenth century has been the subject of much attention: often the damning label was used to mean “immoral”, rather than technical agreement with the Florentine’s arguments.\footnote{Alessandra Petrina, \textit{Machiavelli in the British Isles: Two Early Modern Translations of The Prince} (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 14-45.}
James had also apparently asked Walsingham ‘of whome learned he all these precepts and consells that he delyvered’ in their ‘conference’. Rather than a description of his reading to help future historians understand his political thinking, Walsingham, James said, answered that ‘he culd not haue leasure to reid these bookes him self but he had him [sic] off mr Archibald dougles’.118 Possibly this meant that Douglas had given or lent Walsingham some books and he had not yet had time to read them, but it certainly seems an odd answer to the question. It was also not one that would endear him to James, who cherished a strong antipathy to Douglas.

After Walsingham’s departure from Scotland, James’ government seems to have attempted to change Walsingham’s negative impression. David Lyndesey told Bowes that James thought Walsingham ‘the wysest man that ever he spak with and the mair he rememberis his consell findis it bettar & profitable onto him’.119 Given James’ comments above, and that Lyndesey’s message was undoubtedly intended to be conveyed to Walsingham, it is perhaps worth taking this with a pinch of salt. Similarly, James Melville wrote directly to Walsingham of James’ ‘great confyndence’ in his ‘frendship’ and ‘vertu’.120 These compliments bore no fruit, however, and mutual suspicion remained the order of the day.

James’ failure to listen to his advice again led Walsingham to suggest drastic measures. As James could not ‘be recovered to stand so soundlie affected’ to Elizabeth as he ought, Walsingham thought it ‘expedient’ to try before his return to court to ‘lay som such plott that he may be bridled, & forced, whether he will or not, to depend vpon your majestes favo & goodnes’. He was clearly planning a rerun of the Ruthven raid.121 The violence of his language here is striking. Walsingham never spoke about Elizabeth in such terms, even to his colleagues. This clearly shows Walsingham’s estimation of the gravity of the situation, and he would have thought that he was acting in James’ best interests: he urgently needed detaching from Arran and his other unsuitable advisers or he would endanger himself through his own bad conduct. As Buchanan put it, ‘was not the bridle devised for the sake of the horse?’122

Walsingham’s relationship with James had become something of a vicious cycle: James favoured advisers (like Arran) who were seen as anti-English, confirming

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118 BL, Harley 290, fol. 84.
119 David Lyndesey to Bowes, 2 November 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 77.
120 Melville to Walsingham, 7 November 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 79.
121 Walsingham to Elizabeth, 15 September 1583, TNA, SP 52/33, fol. 58v.
Walsingham’s opinion of his ill-will, leading him to seek to impose tighter controls on James. His efforts to do this made it easy for James to see Walsingham as his enemy, which influenced him away from Walsingham’s allies in Scotland. Walsingham could have been a lot of help to James in his efforts to approach Elizabeth and extract concessions from her, but he was unlikely to do this while he thought James evilly-disposed to England’s interests. Similarly, good relations with James would have made Walsingham more optimistic about England’s position internationally and the future of Protestantism, but James was unlikely to help with this while he associated Walsingham with some of the drastic measures against his favourites. In 1585, Walsingham even refused to help smooth over Anglo-Scottish relations when amity was threatened by the death of Lord Russell in a border skirmish. Walsingham’s help was invoked in terms of his help in similar situations under Morton: James and his advisers hoped that Walsingham would ‘do guid officis at this tyme about hir majestie as in the lyk accident yower honor schew guid pruiff of befoire, in the Erle of Mortinis tyme’. However, the incident also offered an opportunity to undermine Arran, the patron of the principal culprit, so Walsingham instead exaggerated the incident in an effort to separate James from his favourite.123

Walsingham’s fears about James’ intentions and loyalties led him to cultivate relationships with key players in Scottish politics who could act as intermediaries with James to influence his actions and opinions about England and Walsingham himself and act as a counterweight to Arran’s influence. His ultimate objective was to secure James for English interests with a treaty, and with a pension.

One of the recipients of Walsingham’s overtures was the Secretary and Chancellor, Sir John Maitland. In 1585 Walsingham thanked Maitland for his ‘thanckfull accepation’ of his ‘poore goodwill’ and for his promise to do his best to increase ‘intelligenc’ and ‘frendshipp’ between England and Scotland. This was especially necessary, Walsingham wrote, because the ‘Antichristian league longe since proiected’ had been ‘latlie put in execution’ in France. A ‘Counterleague and vnion between the Princes and States that make profession of the Gosple’ was therefore required, and he hoped that the German princes who had so far been reluctant to join in such a league would be moved by the ‘apparent daunger’124.

123 Sir Lewis Bellenden, Justice Clerk, to Walsingham, 31 July 1585, TNA, SP 52/37, fol. 104;
Walsingham to Wotton, 5 August 1585, TNA, SP 52/38, fol. 8.
124 Walsingham to Maitland, 27 April 1585, TNA, SP 52/37 fol. 35.
In reply Maitland too used the idea of an ‘antechristian confederacie’ that was intent on undermining the unity of the ‘miccosme of Britannie’.\(^{125}\) Though short on practical measures and details, this exchange of sentiments of goodwill and commitment to the amity were nonetheless important. As with Morton, it enabled Maitland and Walsingham to demonstrate that they were pulling in the same direction, though such correspondence did not entirely remove suspicion and double-dealing. In 1586, Walsingham blamed Maitland’s ‘Coldnes’ for the delays in securing a treaty between the two countries.\(^{126}\)

The competing objectives and personalities of the major players of Scottish politics also made Walsingham’s strategy a difficult one. Two years earlier, Walsingham had been extremely suspicious of Patrick, Master of Gray, an envoy James sent to Elizabeth. He wrote that Gray was ‘a devote seruante’ of Mary Stuart and ‘altogether addicted to poperie’.\(^{127}\) However, this suspicion turned to cooperation once Walsingham realised that the personable and ambitious Gray could be used as a counterweight to the influence of Arran. On his return to Scotland, Gray professed himself ‘verie mitche obligit’ to Walsingham for his ‘courtaisie’ and help with James’ affairs. In return, he promised Elizabeth his service. He also wrote that James ‘hathe fully forgot his former wrothe he did bear’ to Walsingham, suggesting both that Gray had helped the king think well of Sir Francis, and that the protestations of James’ good will prior to this point had been far from genuine.\(^{128}\) Walsingham’s trust in Gray was demonstrated by his instructing the English envoy in Scotland, Edward Wotton, to rely on his advice, as well as that of other ‘well affected’ Scots.\(^{129}\)

Arran’s suspected complicity in the border affray that resulted in the death of Lord Russell looked a perfect opportunity to oust the favourite, and Walsingham expected Gray’s help in this. However, Gray accepted a bribe from Arran to mediate for his reinstatement. Walsingham was appalled ‘to see so suddeyn a chaynge in [Gray], espetyally the same proceeding of so base a cause as proffyty’.\(^{130}\) Walsingham subscribed to the contemporary commonplace that the Scots were an extremely mercenary nation, telling the

\(^{125}\) Maitland to [Walsingham], 26 June 1585, BL, Cotton Caligula C VIII, fol. 289.
\(^{126}\) Walsingham to Wotton, 24 September 1585, TNA, SP 52/38, fols 69-69v.
\(^{127}\) Walsingham to Sir Ralph Sadler, 17 October 1584, TNA, SP 53/14, fol. 10v.
\(^{128}\) Gray to Walsingham, 13 April 1585, TNA, SP 52/37 fol. 38.
\(^{129}\) See for example, Walsingham to Wotton, 28 May 1585, TNA, SP 52/37 fol. 47.
earl of Leicester ‘[m]oney will doe any thing with that Nation’.

Sir Francis so despaired of the ‘treachery’ of the Scots that he had ‘no desyre at all to have any extraordynarye dealyng with them’. As for James, he was ‘caryed away with ouer much affection in a pryvat mans case without respect […] of the publick cause’, a capital fault in a prince. Walsingham told Wotton ‘the best is to deal warily with them all, for they are all born under one climate’. Infighting and rivalries between counsellors continued to characterise James’ government, making it difficult to rely on individuals.

Another key contact was Thomas Fowler, a former servant of the countess of Lennox who had fled to Scotland to escape his creditors. He provided detailed information about the situation in Scotland and on James’ disposition. In 1589, for example, Fowler gave a lengthy analysis of the progress of James’ marriage and the views of his courtiers on the subject. Fowler seems to have been a good investment, who quickly worked his way into James’ favour. One of Walsingham’s correspondents in Scotland, James Hudson, praised Fowler as a man of ‘great’ credit who was ‘Inward with the king’ and therefore the best instrument Walsingham could use. Fowler may have been an attractive “instrument” because he was dependent on Walsingham’s efforts to protect him from powerful enemies in England – a fear Walsingham was careful to stoke. In April 1588, the Secretary assured him that he would ‘requyte’ Fowler’s affection ‘so far forthe as my poore credyt shall stretche’. This he did partly by removing Elizabeth’s ‘concept of practise on your part’.

Walsingham tried to use figures like Fowler to feed counsel to James. In 1588, he suggested to Archibald Douglas that:

nothinge can doe [James] so muche good, nether with hir Majestie nor with the whole Realme, as […] to make offer to hir Majestie in this common Cause, both of Relligion and the Liberty of this whole Island […] to be ready with his Person and Forces to doe what he may.
Walsingham wrote to Fowler that ‘the best advyce that can be given to the king is to advoyde all coorses that may breede jealousye’, i.e. to not do anything that might lead Elizabeth to suspect his intentions.\textsuperscript{140} What he really wanted from James was unequivocal evidence that he would remain loyal to England and uphold Protestantism in his realm.

It is likely that Walsingham’s strenuous efforts to influence James were partly occasioned by his place in the English succession, even while his mother was still alive. As the 1580s progressed, the succession seemed to weigh increasingly heavily in the calculations of English counsellors, so it is worth considering Walsingham’s views on this issue in detail. Though Walsingham’s opinions on the succession are sometimes elusive, it is clear that he did not want to see Mary Stuart on the English throne. He strongly supported the noblemen who had deposed her, and was extremely critical of her conduct as monarch. In 1571, as ambassador in France, Walsingham wrote of his efforts to persuade Charles IX to uphold the government of the infant James VI and not to ‘seeke to advavnce the Queen deposed whos monstrvovs doinges hathe made her vnworthye of so hye a callynge’.\textsuperscript{141} He also noted that in France Mary was ‘generally condemned (vnles yt be of her kindred) gyltye of dyvers indygnyties commyttted therby she hathe made her selfe vnworthye of governement’.\textsuperscript{142} Walsingham’s language here suggests that it was Mary’s disordered private life – the murder of her husband, her marrying Bothwell – that rendered her unfit to rule. Similarly, it was James’ inability to separate private and public in his relationships with Arran and Lennox that caused Walsingham so much anxiety. For Buchanan, too, ‘private self-control’ was essential in a prince, along with ‘publicly subjugating self-interest to the common good’. This was the difference between a ‘true king’ and a tyrant.\textsuperscript{143} And this was what, Walsingham thought, both James and Mary failed to do.

From Walsingham’s perspective, far from being the ideal candidate, Mary posed a direct threat to Elizabeth. In an oft-quoted comment, Walsingham averred that ‘so longe as that develysh woman lyvethe neyther her ma\textsuperscript{jestye} must make accompte to contynewene in quyet possessyon of her crowne nor her faythefvll servavntes assvre them selves of savety of ther lyves’.\textsuperscript{144} One of Walsingham’s primary concerns was that many of Elizabeth’s subjects ‘buyld [upon] the possybilitie of that dangerouse woman, whos liffe is a step vnto

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{140} Walsingham to Thomas Fowler, 4 February 1589, TNA, SP 52/43, fol. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Walsingham to Burghley, 27 July 1571, TNA, SP 70/119, fol. 45.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Walsingham to Burghley, 3 August 1571, TNA, SP 70/119, fol. 74\textsuperscript{v}.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Buchanan, \textit{De Iure Regni}, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Walsingham to Burghley, 31 January 1572, TNA, SP 70/122, fol. 148.
\end{itemize}
her Majestie’s deathe, for that they repute her for an undoubted successor or rather (Which is of more danger) for a ryght inheritor’. It was not just the reversionary interest in Mary that made her dangerous; it was the religious politics that led some to consider her claim to be better than Elizabeth’s. While Mary lived, there would be no stability in Scotland, where her party was still holding out against her son’s, no security for England, where she was causing so much trouble, and no sound friendship between England and France, where the crown was wary of her powerful relatives.

When Walsingham returned from France, however, he was not always so obviously aggressive in relation to Mary. Balancing her place in the succession with their duty to Elizabeth proved a tricky line to navigate for many of Elizabeth’s advisers and officials. In 1575, Walsingham complained to Leicester of Elizabeth’s reluctance to proceed against Englishmen who connived with Mary, while she was determined to punish a Scot who merely carried letters to her. Walsingham thought the man ‘maye thincke him selfe hardly dealt withall’ for delivering letters to ‘his naturall Q[ueen]’.

It is perhaps surprising that Walsingham could still see Mary as anybody’s natural queen in 1575, years after his contacts north of the border had deposed her. Later, the French ambassador, Mauvissière, relied on Walsingham’s help in Mary’s causes at court, though it is unlikely that Walsingham followed his advice to ‘[w]arm yourself […] up a little’ with Mary’s ‘beauty’. Mary also sometimes invoked Walsingham’s help directly, and she was well aware of his use as an ally at court. Though she also complained of his enmity, and suspected him of forging material against her and her allies.

Sometimes, Walsingham inclined to treat with Mary and gain her cooperation in calming the stormy climate in Scotland. In 1581, for example, he sketched out a proposed treaty with her, in which he noted that most of the plots in England ‘have growen from the Scots Queen[’s] mynisters and favorers not without her allowavnce and settyng on’, though foreign princes so far had been too preoccupied with their internal affairs to assist. This was likely to change, however, so it would be necessary to reach an agreement with Mary. 1581 was a year of anxiety about Scotland, where Walsingham believed that Mary was controlling the government of her son and his advisers, especially through James’ favourite,

145 Walsingham to Burghley, 4 March 1572, BL, Cotton, Caligula, C III, fol. 230.
146 Walsingham to Burghley, 28 June 1572, BL, Harley 260, fol. 257.
147 [Walsingham] to Leicester, 9 March 1575, TNA, SP 53/10, fol. 18.
149 Mary to Walsingham, 5 September 1579, BL, Cotton, Caligula C V, fol. 166; Mary to Mauvissière, [1580], BL, Cotton, Caligula C III, fol. 544; [anon] to Mary, 12 June 1583, HMC Hatfield, III, p. 3.
150 Mary to Beton, 22 August 1582, BL, Cotton, Caligula C VII, fol. 35.
151 ‘Reasons to indvce her Majestye to procead in the treatye’, [December 1581], TNA, SP 53/11, fol. 74.
the Frenchman and Guise ally, Lennox. He thought that James ‘doth submit to his mother’s direction, even yielding up of the government to her’, and as a result Walsingham was convinced that Catholicism would be reintroduced to Scotland ‘ere a year come about’.\footnote{Walsingham to Burghley, 3 September 1581, \textit{HMC Hatfield}, II, p. 424.} Three years later, Walsingham and Elizabeth were still convinced of Mary’s influence over her son.\footnote{Walsingham to Sir Ralph Sadler, [16] September 1584, TNA, SP 53/13, fol. 58.} Mary’s last attempt to capitalise on the English government’s belief in her influence over James came in 1584 when England sought to persuade James to receive back into his favour the anti-Arran nobles who had schemed against him, been discovered, and fled to England. This was a cause close to Walsingham’s heart, and he seems to have hoped that Mary’s influence might have resulted in a happy outcome.\footnote{Walsingham to Davison, 10 May 1584, TNA, SP 53/34, fol. 59; to Davison, 3 June 1584, SP 52/35, fol. 2.} Walsingham’s attitude to Mary was, therefore, highly contingent on the situations in England and Scotland, with a consideration of the likelihood of foreign assistance on her behalf.

Most of time, however, Walsingham favoured the harshest possible treatment of the Queen of Scots. As early as 1579, he contemplated excluding both Mary and her son from the English succession. Walsingham argued that the diversity in religion and inclination of some of Elizabeth’s subjects to Mary should be countered by the same solution: ‘in respect of the wronges offred vnto her majesty’, Parliament should ‘dysable’ Mary from succeeding. Seeing Mary’s accession hopeless, he hoped that they would return to their obedience to their current sovereign in religious as well as secular matters.\footnote{TNA, SP 12/133, fol. 50.} These ideas had been raised earlier in the 1570s, too, by an anonymous writer of a manuscript treatise on the succession, who recommended excluding Mary and settling the succession on James.\footnote{Doran and Kewes, ‘Earlier Elizabethan Succession Question’, p. 291.} In 1579, Walsingham thought that it should also, he thought, be ‘provyded that yf [James] shall eyther marrye without her majestys consent or shall goe abowt to doe any act to the dysquietyng of her H estate’ he would be ‘dysabled & cut of from the exspectatyon of this crowne’.\footnote{[untitled], TNA, SP 12/133, fol. 51.} Walsingham clearly accepted the English Parliament’s ability to alter the succession, and he probably expected its members to share his reluctance for Mary’s accession.

There is evidence that his antipathy to Mary and his efforts to uncover her plotting were appreciated by his own sovereign. At Fotheringhay in 1586, Walsingham declined to
be one of the commissioners deputed to attend on Mary to persuade her to appear at the trial. This may have been partly occasioned by a sensitivity to issues around the succession, but probably had more to do with his role in forcing Mary into the situation in which she now found herself. A letter from William Davison conveyed Elizabeth’s opinion of Walsingham’s decision. The queen, he wrote, ‘doth no whitt mislyke’ Walsingham’s decision, and, in fact, ‘could be content that all the rest of her servantes & subjectes stood in the same predicament of affection, & grace with her’.

Walsingham’s conviction that James was his mother’s son contributed to his extremely negative view of James, who might otherwise have seemed an obvious candidate to be Elizabeth’s successor. Walsingham was very aware of James’ expectations of his place in the English succession, and, by 1581, was using this as a stick with which to beat the king. Walsingham instructed Randolph to spread a rumour that ‘the people’ in England so disapproved of the proceedings against Morton that it was expected that ‘somewhat wilbe donn this parliament to the prejudice of the King’s title to this crowne vnlest he showe him self more thanckfull towardes her Majesty’.

These ideas of restricting the succession surfaced again during the mid-1580s, with the Instrument of Association (October 1584) and the Act for the Security of the Queen’s Most Royal Person (1585). By the Instrument, the Privy Council (and later signatories) promised that if any wicked attempt against [Elizabeth’s] Most Royall Person shalbe taken in hand, or procured, wherby any that have, may, or shall pretend title to cum to this Crown by the unymely Death of Her Majestie, so wickedly procured […] may be advanced We […] bynd ourselves, both jointly and severally, never to allowe, accept or favour any such pretended Successor, by whom or for whom any such detestable act shalbe attempted or committed […] as unworthy of all gouvernement in any Christian Realm, or civile Societie, [and…] to prosecute such person or persons to the death […] for their utter overthrowe and extirpation.

Clearly, the most likely subjects of such action would have been Mary Stuart and/or her son. The product of the pens of Walsingham and Burghley, the Instrument was a response to an especially tense few months, which had seen the death of Alençon and the assassination of the Prince of Orange. Given this evidence of the precariousness of the

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158 Davison to Walsingham, 15 October 1586, TNA, SP 12/194, fol. 70.
159 Walsingham to Randolph, 31 January 1581, TNA, SP 52/29, fol. 20.
lives of other princes, Elizabeth’s advisers could not afford to be complacent about her own prospects. Elizabeth’s death, natural or otherwise, would have precipitated not only a succession but also a constitutional crisis, something that Burghley tried to avert through his plans for a grand council.\footnote{Patrick Collinson, ‘The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I’, in Elizabethan Essays (London: Hambledon Press, 2003), pp. 31-56 (pp. 48-55).} Walsingham’s involvement in the production of the Instrument suggests the depth of his concern about the dangers facing Elizabeth, and also his continuing suspicion of the intentions of the two Stuarts.

The same day that the councillors signed the Instrument, Lord Hunsdon told Burghley that James would ‘by no meanes wryght nor deale with master secretary, for saythe he I know hym too be my grete enimy’.\footnote{Hunsdon to Burghley, 19 October 1584, BL, Cotton, Caligula C VIII, fol. 159.} In contrast, Walsingham believed that most of his colleagues “inclined” to James and his mother.\footnote{Walsingham to Davison, 13 August 1584, TNA, SP 52/36, fol. 15; [Walsingham] to Sadler, 17 October 1584, SP 53/14, fol. 10.} He told William Davison that ‘I fynde that men begyn to looke to the svnne rysyng: and therfor yt wyll behove her majesty to make myche of faythefull servavntes’.\footnote{Walsingham to Davison, 12 July 1584, TNA, SP 52/35, fol. 54.} The implied contrast here between the self-interest of those intent on ingratiating themselves with James, the rising sun, and Walsingham’s constant loyalty to Elizabeth became explicit in a letter to Hunsdon. Walsingham disclaimed all interest in the succession despite rumours that he was seeking to make James unpopular in England in order to curry favour with his favoured successor in England: ‘as I hope neuer to lyue to see a successor: so do I not meane by entringe into such proouident courses as by seeking to provyde for future tymes to hazarde the losse of the present benefyt I nowe enioye’ by Elizabeth’s favour.\footnote{Walsingham to Hunsdon, 7 November 1584, Cotton, Julius F VII, fol. 154.}

Though it seems unlikely, given his concerns about the future of Protestantism, that Walsingham really was not interested at all in the succession question, it certainly seems true that for much of his career he pursued a conscious policy of non-involvement by not indicating support for a particular candidate, realising no doubt what Elizabeth’s reaction to any meddling would be. Robert Beale, Walsingham’s brother in law, had made himself unpopular with Elizabeth as a result of his involvement in discussions about the Suffolk claim to the English throne in the 1560s. Beale was not even admitted to Elizabeth’s presence for the first four years of his service as a clerk of the council (1572-76) – evidence of Elizabeth’s extreme sensitivity on the matter.\footnote{Mark Taviner, ‘Robert Beale and the Elizabethan Polity’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, St Andrews University, 2000), pp. 56-60.}
Given the total absence of evidence of any positive statement from Walsingham about his preferred successor, an additional motivating factor may have been his lack of enthusiasm about any of the contenders. Neither Mary Stuart nor her son could be trusted. Arbella Stuart was too young, too inexperienced, and probably also too female. The Greys had effectively played themselves out of the game. Read thought Walsingham inclined to the earl of Huntingdon, who had a distant claim and who was unequivocally godly, though on what evidence he reached this conclusion is not clear. Walsingham and Huntingdon maintained a close relationship, but there is no evidence that Walsingham wanted to see his friend on the throne, and Elizabeth’s employment of Huntingdon in sensitive positions was due to his disavowal of any interest in the succession. All things considered, James VI was probably, from Walsingham’s perspective, the “least worst” option – if only he could be persuaded to rely on sound advisers and make a suitable marriage. This would explain the level of Walsingham’s concern about Scotland and his efforts to cajole and bully James into amity with England and a Protestant marriage. In 1583, Walsingham complained that Elizabeth was insufficiently concerned about the prospect of James making a dangerous match.

Through key figures at James’ court like Gray, Walsingham advised James and his government on how to maintain good relations with England, with one eye on the Scottish king’s eventual succession. For example, during the negotiations that culminated in the treaty of 1586, Walsingham urged the English envoy in Scotland, Edward Wotton, to pass on to the Scottish government the dangerous effects that would follow if James demanded, as he planned to, an English duchy and a promise that Elizabeth do nothing to prejudice his title to succeed her. Making these requests, Walsingham wrote, would ‘be very offensyuely taken by hir majesty and breede a jealously in hir (to the hinderaunce and utter throwe of the treaty) that all theis outward shewes and profession of sound frendship haue ben but cullrable to haue their turne’. He also told Wotton that it was ‘needles’ to desire Elizabeth not to prejudice James’ claim, because ‘so long as the king shall cary him self kindly and in good termes of amity and frendship with her majesty she will of hirself be very lothe to do any act that may any way hinder or preiudice him’. The advice was plausible and in the interests of continued good relations, but there was still a sting in the

168 Walsingham to Bowes, [27 February] 1583, TNA, SP 52/31, fol.45. See also, Walsingham to Bowes, 20 February 1583, SP 52/31, fol. 36.
169 Walsingham to Wotton, 28 July 1585, TNA, SP 52/37, fol. 101.
tail: James would have to conform to English expectations of what carrying himself "kindly" meant.

This was partly because Walsingham still had his concerns about James' religious disposition, telling Wotton that James 'doth but dissemble in point of relligion'.\footnote{170} James’ continued reliance on the hated Arran was also a sticking point. In another letter to Wotton, Walsingham wrote that '[n]ever king that had reigned in that land had either gotten more goodwill at home or reputation abroade than [James] if he had not ben misguided' by such unfortunate advisers.\footnote{177} Walsingham’s own inclinations are probably hinted at here: he wanted to like James, as the most plausible candidate as successor. He was male, Protestant and he had been brought up to be the ideal godly king. It was his bad advisers that led him to abuse these qualities.\footnote{172} For Walsingham, it was not James' “foreignness” that was the problem; it was his conduct as king which made him appear, in Walsingham’s eyes, untrustworthy, especially in his ‘susceptibility to favourites, his difficulties in asserting royal authority, his unreliability in religion and his tendency to be economical with the truth’.\footnote{173}

Despite such hiccoughs, the Treaty of Berwick between the two countries was signed on the 5th July 1586. The treaty was overtly concluded, largely 'on England's terms’, ‘for the maintenance and defence of the true religion’, and for mutual defence. James was not formally recognised as Elizabeth’s heir, nor granted an English peerage, though until the mid-1590s he seems to have been contented with Elizabeth’s private assurance that she would do nothing to prejudice his right to succeed her.\footnote{174} Through separate negotiations, James became a pensioner of England, though the amount he was to be paid annually was not specified, meaning that he had to depend on Elizabeth, and earn it by his behaviour.\footnote{175} Though in some ways the treaty was the culmination of the policies Walsingham had urged on Elizabeth since the early 1570s, it was far from completely satisfactory for either party. The assurance of James’ amity and aid in the event of an assault on England may, however, have formed the basis for the thawing of relations between Walsingham and the king.

\footnote{170} Walsingham to Wotton, 24 September 1585, TNA, SP 52/38, fol. 69.
\footnote{171} Walsingham to Wotton, September 1585, TNA, SP 52/38, fol. 72.
\footnote{172} Walsingham to Randolph, 9 February 1581, TNA, SP 52/29, fol. 32.
By August 1586, it seems an agreement had been reached between Walsingham and James. The king instructed his agent in London to give Walsingham most harty thanks for the favour declared in all our effayris but specially for his favorable meaning in such mater as we haif ressavit be your self which [James would] be glayde to requyt wyth all the gd offics that shall at ony tyme lye in our power to be performed.\(^{176}\)

One might guess that the ‘matter’ was James’ title to succeed Elizabeth. This is confirmed by further instructions for the agent to deal with Leicester, to whom he was to convey James’ thanks for all his favours ‘bot most specially for the dessir that he hath to sea our titil advancit to that crowne off Ingland’ after Elizabeth’s death.\(^{177}\) James could be sure of the goodwill of at least two English counsellors in his bid to be Elizabeth’s heir. This could not have happened without the assistance of men like Gray, Maitland, and Fowler.

The question was, could this new entente survive Walsingham’s involvement in the entrapment, trial and execution of James’ mother? In the summer of 1586 Walsingham had obtained control over Mary’s secret correspondence, and he used this to feed her letters from Anthony Babington, a Catholic gentleman with court connections, who offered the services of himself and his friends to secure her freedom and dethrone Elizabeth.\(^{178}\) Mary’s replies to Babington sealed her fate. Before Mary’s trial in October 1586 Walsingham used Gray to sound James’ feelings. Walsingham acknowledged that it might be considered ‘against bones mores, in respect of the bond of nature betwin them that he should make him self a spring against hir’, but insisted that Gray should try to persuade James to ‘make no mediacon for hir, or oppose him self’ to English proceedings, on grounds of her involvement in his father’s murder. Walsingham also wrote that he expected Mary would ‘challendge the pryvilege of hir soueragnety’ and contest the legitimacy of proceedings against her but was confident that that defence did not apply in this case ‘nether by the ciuill law nor by the lawes of this realm’.\(^{179}\)

In contrast to his centrality to events leading up to Mary’s trial, Walsingham was remarkably inconspicuous during the proceedings themselves (14\(^{th}\) – 15\(^{th}\) October 1586). He was involved, however, in one moment of high drama, when Mary accused him of

\(^{176}\) Instructions for Archibald Douglas from James VI for Walsingham, [14 August 1586], HMC Hatfield, XIII, p. 306.

\(^{177}\) Instructions for Archibald Douglas for Leicester, 14 August 1586, HMC Hatfield, XIII, p. 305.

\(^{178}\) For a more detailed summary of the Babington plot, see John Cooper, The Queen’s Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I (London: Faber and Faber, 2011), pp. 207-18.

\(^{179}\) Walsingham to Gray, 14 September 1586, TNA, SP 52/41, fol. 24.
practising against her and her son and he replied with a defence of his actions. Accounts of what Walsingham actually said at this point differ. According to one account, he responded to Mary’s challenge with the words:

Madame, I stand charged by you to haue Practised somthinge against you and against the Kinge your sonne I call god and all the worlde to witnes I haue not done anything as priuat vnworthy of an honest man nor as publique vnworthy of my calling.

The distinction Walsingham drew here between his private and public conduct echoes his opposition of these two concepts in order to bolster or undermine advice Elizabeth was given (chapter 2). He asserted that he had not only conducted himself appropriately for queen and country in his execution of office, but also his virtue in private life, and, importantly, that he had not allowed these two contexts to overlap. This helped justify his pursuit of Mary, though it did not address the substance of her accusation. As we have seen, Walsingham’s criticism of the conduct of Mary and James was often related to their private conduct leaching into their public lives.

When Mary was, inevitably, found guilty, Walsingham was disappointed by Elizabeth’s deferring the delivery of the sentence against her, lamenting to Leicester, ‘I see this wicked creature ordeyned of god to pvnishe vs for owre synnes and vnthankefvlnes. ffor her majestye hathe no power to procead ageynst her as her own savetye requireth’. Contrary to Walsingham’s advice, James sent agents to court to protest the proceedings against Mary. In a wry inversion of his usual views, Walsingham told another Scottish envoy that ‘there is no one thing [which] will do both England and Scotland more good than to have your […] colleagues returned home discontented’. Walsingham was surprised, he told Maitland, that ‘wise and relligious’ men in Scotland were ‘so earnest in pressing the king to importune her majesty’ on Mary’s behalf, ‘seeing all the papistes in Europe that affect the change of relligion in both realmes doe build altogether there hope

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180 [September] 1586, BL, Cotton Caligula C IX, fol. 634’. Mary’s trial actually began in October, so this seems a misdating on behalf of the editor of the calendar.
181 ‘The order of the proceedings at the arraignement of the late unfortunat lady Mary Queene of Scotts at Fothringhaye in the Countie of Northampton the xijth of October 1586’, BL, Cotton Caligula C IX, fols 471v-72.
182 Walsingham to Leicester, 15 October 1586, BL, Cotton, Caligula C IX, fol. 543.
184 Walsingham to Archibald Douglas, 1586, HMC Hatfield, XIII, p. 324. For opposite view see Walsingham to Hatton, 23 June 1578, Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, Memoirs of the Life and Times of Sir Christopher Hatton, K. G., Vice-Chamberlain and Lord Chancellor to Queen Elizabeth: Including his Correspondence with the Queen and other Distinguished Persons (London: R. Bentley, 1847), p. 66.
\[\ldots\] vpon the perrson of the said Queene’, who was such a fanatic that she had transferred her claim to the English throne to Philip of Spain.\(^{185}\) Walsingham could not or would not understand James’ feelings: Mary’s death would remove a serious threat to England, international Protestantism, and Elizabeth herself – how could any right-thinking Protestant oppose such a beneficial course of action?

Elizabeth herself long refused to do what her advisers thought was necessary and put her pen to Mary’s death warrant. Walsingham gathered the dangerous effects that failing to execute Mary would have in England and Scotland and weighed these against what would happen if she were allowed to live.\(^{186}\) To no avail. Ultimately, the Council dispatched the warrant on their own initiative. Walsingham was conveniently ill at home during the wrangling over the warrant, though he added his signature to that of his colleagues, and it was he who organised the executioner for the occasion.\(^{187}\) He therefore escaped the worst of Elizabeth’s wrath, though at his return to court he reported to Leicester that ‘behinde my backe her Majestie giveth out very hard speeches of myself […] and if her Majestie could be otherwyse served I knowe I shold not be used.’\(^{188}\) Walsingham was also unpopular with James VI, whose genuine anger at the English proceedings has often been underestimated by historians.\(^{189}\) When the sentence was pronounced, James, it was reported, had stormed that Walsingham had ‘neuer lovid hime nor his mouer’ and ‘did nocht advance his great cawssis’ as much as he could. However, Walsingham’s contacts assured him that this had been ‘in greiff spokin’ and that James was now ‘in a nouer mynd of your honor’.

Despite this, the extent to which Walsingham escaped censure from both Elizabeth and James for his involvement in the proceedings against Mary is remarkable. Compared to Burghley, who was forbidden the royal presence, Walsingham got off very lightly. James also blamed Burghley for his mother’s fate.\(^{191}\)

\(^{185}\) ‘The memoriall of Certeine heads to be Communicated to the lord Secretar[i]e of Scotland’, 8 December 1586, BL, Harley 292, fol. 37.
\(^{186}\) ‘The daungerowse alteratyon lykely to insve bothe in England and Scotelande in case the execvtyon of the Scot. Q. be stayed’, [January] 1587, TNA, SP 53/21, fol. 9.
\(^{187}\) Cooper, pp. 228-29.
\(^{188}\) Walsingham to Leicester, 3 April 1587, Thomas Wright, Queen Elizabeth and her Times: A Series of Original Letters, Selected from the Inedited Private Correspondence of the Lord Treasurer Burghley, the Earl of Leicester, the Secretaries Walsingham and Smith, Sir Christopher Hatton, and Most of the Distinguished Persons of the Period, 2 vols (London: H. Colburn, 1838), II, p. 335.
\(^{189}\) For a detailed discussion of James’ efforts to save his mother’s life, see Susan Doran, ‘Revenge’, pp. 589-612.
\(^{190}\) James Hudson to Walsingham, 12 December 1586, TNA, SP 52/41, fol. 83.
By late February 1587 Walsingham reported that Mary’s execution was ‘not so grievously taken as before it was doubted it would be’.\(^{192}\) He seems to have been, however, less complacent in private. In March, Walsingham wrote to Chancellor Maitland to persuade him to deter James from seeking military revenge for Mary’s execution. This letter was presumably ultimately intended for James’ eyes or ears.\(^{193}\) A detailed examination of this letter allows us to consider Walsingham’s views on controversial contemporary issues such as the role of parliaments in national political decisions, and on controversial political issues such as the English succession. This, together with his vocabulary and the way he constructed his argument, sheds light on his attitudes to the political culture in which he lived and worked.

In this long, intensely-argued, harshly realistic missive, Walsingham again presented the problem as one of counsel. Partly this was out of necessity – he could hardly blame James – but Walsingham probably genuinely thought that James was badly advised, due to what he saw as the king’s longstanding inability to choose well-qualified advisers. Though Walsingham was ‘sorey’ to hear that Maitland thought James and his subjects would be alienated ‘from the Ametye of thses Realme’, he hoped that the Chancellor and ‘others of wisdome and Experience’ around James, who depended on him, and ‘whos Aduise he will vse in a materie of so greate importance’ would see how ‘vnfite’ a course war was for James and Scotland. Anyway, Walsingham wrote, war would solve nothing ‘already done’ (i.e. it would not reanimate Mary) and would only turn to James’ ‘dishonore daunger and Certene preiudice’.\(^{194}\) Walsingham went on to offer his own advice.

James, Walsingham wrote, must consider ‘three things’ in deciding whether or not to take up arms against England. Firstly, how ‘Iuste’ and ‘honeste’ the conflict would ‘appeare in the eyes of the world’. Secondly, ‘what meanes he hath to goe throw with all’, and thirdly what the consequences would be, especially in terms of his hopes of the English succession. Sir Francis then proceeded to a consideration of each of these factors, his analysis always tending to prove that attacking England was certainly a bad idea.\(^{195}\)

Walsingham robustly asserted the ‘Honerable vprighte proceedinges’ of the English government against Mary. If James fought against such a legitimate and necessary decision, then he must be seen to oppose himself to justice, and to God’s judgement, as England

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192 Walsingham to Wilkes, 23 February 1587, TNA, SP 84/13, fol. 52.
194 Walsingham to [Chancellor of Scotland], March 1587, BL, Cotton Caligula D I, fol. 133. Multiple copies of this document survive in the BL: Additional MS 12520, fol. 62; Harley 787, fol. 52; Harley 2194, fol.46; Harley 4111, fol. 155; Stowe 143, fol. 107.
195 Walsingham to [Chancellor of Scotland], March 1587, BL, Cotton Caligula D I, fol. 133.
had acted as His ‘mynester’ in executing Mary. As England would be defending justice, she would be assisted by ‘the Arme of the Almyghty’ and so no attack on the country could succeed.\textsuperscript{196}

As far as James’ ‘meanes’ went, only a ‘symple’ man would think that Scotland by itself was in a position to ‘make heade agaynst Englande’. The latter was stronger and richer, while Scotland could no longer depend on the assistance of France. While France might have helped Scotland in the past in order to ‘annoy England’ because of the claim English kings made to the French throne, now that England no longer had a ‘footynge’ in France this was less likely. Any naval assault would be repulsed with the assistance of Holland and Zealand, Sir Francis claimed. This ‘coniunctyone’ had brought England ‘that strenghtye by Sea as by godes grace thoughbe all the princes of Europe weare banded againste the Realme wee should have no Iuste cause to feeare’. This bravado, evident throughout the letter, was intended to show Maitland the scale of the task they contemplated, and to shine a light on the realistic chances of success.

And what if James were captured or forced to leave the country? What would become of his claim to the English throne then? Given this, Walsingham argued, ‘men of Judgemente not transported witti passyone’ would see it was ‘every waye beste’ for the King to ‘forbear such a desperate course’. He should instead proceed moderately, as became a prince of his ‘pəfectyones & Educatione’. James would thus secure his own position in the present and by showing his goodwill also secure his future by winning to himself the ‘harty goodwilles’ of ‘the whole body of the Realme’.\textsuperscript{197} In contrast, if James decided to fight, reviving the ‘Auntyente Enmetye’ between England and Scotland, ‘the Englishe would never endure nor accept him for their prince’. Additionally, the ‘whol nobillety’, complicit in the sentencing of Mary, ‘should have good Cause to thinke it touched them neare’. They would therefore fight James, to prevent being called to account for their actions by the ‘vindicative’ king. They might also, having been so ‘[i]ustely incenced’ against him, ‘vtterly disable him from the Successyon’.\textsuperscript{198} Elsewhere in the letter, Walsingham emphasised the ‘offence’ James had caused ‘the nobyllytye and people of this lande’ by opposing himself to ‘their earneste desyres and ioynte pursuit beinge assembde in parleamente’.\textsuperscript{199} Walsingham held out the promise of a peaceful, welcomed succession against a fraught and difficult war, using the carrot of future loyalty to urge James to

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid, fols 133-33v.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid, fols 133v-34.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid, fol. 134.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid, fol. 136.
present forbearance. Again, Walsingham emphasised the necessity of subjects’ goodwill – almost their consent – for a prince, with that of the nobles being particularly important. Here, he emphasised Parliament’s role, and in his formulation (‘the nobility and people’) it seems to represent the whole realm. This is rhetorically useful in creating an impression of English unity in the face of James’ aggression, making an attack seem unappealing.

As Scotland on its own had no chance of defeating England, James might consider seeking foreign aid. Walsingham argued that obtaining this at all was unlikely as princes ‘are not ouer hastye in thses dayes to embarque them selues in dangers enterprises for other menes sakes’, as the example of Dom Antonio, the Portuguese pretender, showed. However, if James were to consider asking for foreign help there were only two princes to whom he could turn: the kings of France and Spain. Any of his advisers who urged this course of action on him would ‘in the oppinyons of men of beste vnderstandinge’ show only ‘great passyone’ or ‘playne want of ffydelyty’. No counsellor who cared about James and his country could possibly advise such a course, Walsingham claimed. This is very similar to the language he used of his opponents in England to bolster his advice.

Walsingham asserted that ‘firste in comone Reasone it is not safe for any prince to Repose his strenegthe & truste in them to whos desyres and dissignes his greatenes and good successe maye prooue ane impedymente and hindranc’. Neither monarch could sincerely wish James well as ‘his Religeone is odious to them’. This had even, Walsingham wrote, been an obstacle during Mary’s lifetime when she might have been able to induce James to convert. Now that she and her hypothetical influence were dead, there was even less reason for these Catholic potentates to assist the Protestant James to rule the whole island. He would be ‘every waye moste preiudisheall to the Romane Relygeone being a man and so muche moare myghty by the vnion of the Crownes’. Neither France nor Spain would help strengthen the British Isles by uniting them politically or by allowing them to maintain their religion.

In France’s case, there were additional incentives to avoid helping James, particularly because a James who ruled the whole island would be in a stronger position to pursue England’s claim to rule France. More importantly, Walsingham argued that ‘as the state of Fraunc presently stonde’ the king would not be ‘verye forwarde’ to involve himself in foreign campaigns. The debilitating civil war raging in France would leave Henri III with little energy or inclination to do much for James. Walsingham acknowledged that the

200 Ibid, fol. 134.
201 Ibid, fol. 134.
‘frenche polletyques’ might consider transferring the war away from France ‘for their owne ease and quiete’ but that in this James would be ‘but vsed as an Instryument for to serve aturne’. The French had previously used Scottish kings as tools to their own ends, ‘to the effusyone of muche Scottishe bloude’, and they would do the same with James. He could expect no disinterested aid from across the Channel. Lastly, Walsingham argued, ‘it weare noe good Counsaille to be gevene by thos that depend vppon the French Kinges fortune’ to help a king of Scots so closely related to the Guise reach the English throne, from where he could help their malicious designs against Henri. Walsingham used a combination of practical reasons derived from contemporary events and history to convince Maitland of the futility of asking for French help.

Walsingham then turned his attention to Spain. He wrote that Philip II’s ‘Age and vnsettled Estate’ should make him more willing to incline to peace than seek new quarrels. Even if Philip did listen to Scottish requests, it would ‘moste dangerouse’ for James considering the Spanish King’s ‘Ambyssyone, his practises his powere his Couller of Righte’. Philip would have no truck with James’ concerns; he would do all for himself. Walsingham wrote that it was ‘well knowe howe he [Philip] had figured him selfe an Empir ouere all thes partes of the world’, which he had put into practice while he was married to England’s Queen Mary. This language of Spanish ambition is strikingly similar to that used by the proponents of the continuance of the war with Spain in the 1590s. which, instead of arguments of religious solidarity with the Dutch, deployed arguments about Spanish tyranny and the threat this posed to Europe, while pro-peace treatises did not ‘conceptualise of the war as a cataclysmic struggle between the forces of tyranny and liberty’.

As well as his ambition, the Spanish king presented a threat to James as he ‘pretender himselfe to be the fyrst Catholick prince of the Bloud royalle of England beinge […] Reputed (thoughe falsly) heire of the house of Lankester’. Walsingham amplified this latent threat to James’ own claim by attesting that even during Mary Stuart’s lifetime the ‘Iesuites and divers gentlemen’ had planned to raise Philip II to the English throne by election as the best candidate to restore Catholicism in England and abroad. Even James’ mother had left her claim to Philip. Therefore, there was a distinct possibility that he,

202 Ibid, fols 134v-35.
204 Walsingham to [Chancellor of Scotland], fol. 135.
‘being the Strongeste’, would intervene on his own behalf, using James’ request as convenient cover. All these factors ‘layd together’, Walsingham concluded, demonstrated how dangerous relying on the Spanish or ‘anye suche kynde of ffrendes Assystance’ would be.

Having established that James’ religion was the main barrier to foreign aid, Walsingham proceeded to argue that conversion was not the answer. The same ‘private Respectes’ would apply; France and Spain still had their own secular reasons for not wishing to come to James’ aid. Returning to the example of Dom Antonio, Sir Francis set out how the king of Spain had usurped the kingdom of Portugal, which showed that ‘his Ambyssyone cannot be restrayned when he hathe the Aduaantage by any bondes of Relygeone, honore or Iustycye’. Even if James, like Dom Antonio, were a Catholic, Philip could use his pretended claim to the English throne to put him out of one or both kingdoms. On the other hand, Walsingham contended that James’ conversion would be ‘iudged a wante of relygeone rather then a Change’ and would alienate his faithful subjects and ‘welwillers’ abroad, while gaining him only ‘hollowe harted frendes’. It would be impossible to trust a man who would change his religion ‘vppon stomacke’; because it suited him.

Next, Walsingham addressed the issue of James’ ‘honore & Reputacone’, adding almost contemptuously ‘whearyppon you all seeme so muche so muche to stand’. He felt that the Scottish king had ‘suffycyentely’ done his duty, as ‘all the worlde can beare him witenes’, by pleading for clemency for his mother while she was still alive. Now, it would be more honourable for the king to show ‘howe he can moderate his passyone by Reasone’ and let the matter rest. ‘All good mene’ desired, for the ‘commone good of this Iland’ and James’ ‘owne greatenes’, that he be advised to this effect. Walsingham used arguments of common interest and future reward to persuade Maitland to see the benefits of proceeding temperately. It also indicates more strongly than anything else written by Walsingham that he assumed James was Elizabeth’s likely heir, and possibly that he desired this himself.

Also, he argued that Mary had posed a threat to James as well; she would have had him in thrall, ‘ostage’ to the Pope or Philip II whereas, free of her scheming, he could ‘abslutely and quietly Raigne’. This is in contrast to Walsingham’s disparagement of James’ “absoluteness” in 1583. Here, he emphasised the restrictions others had allegedly sought to

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205 Ibid, fol. 135v.
206 Ibid, fol. 135v.
207 Ibid, fol. 135v.
208 Ibid, fol. 136.
place on the king’s authority and freedom of action. In the penultimate section of his letter Walsingham even asserted that James ought to be grateful to England for executing his mother, because otherwise God would have expected James himself to avenge ‘his fathers bloode […] spylte by hir Consent & Priuetye’. Elizabeth and her government had removed this ‘burthen of Consyence’ from him. Although this seems grossly insensitive and hugely inflammatory, it serves as reminder to Maitland that Mary had not always been a Scottish poster-girl; in the late 1560s even her own relatives could hardly defend her conduct, which had shocked Europe. It also cut through the rhetoric of filial grief: James had no cause to be grateful to his mother. She had tried to undermine him and his realm, and had murdered his father. Would James really risk everything avenging this woman, who, anyway, was already dead?

This dose of harsh political reality was succeeded by a declaration in the final paragraph of Walsingham’s ‘care & desyre’ for ‘the Contynuance of Amytye’ between England and Scotland. Sir Francis told Maitland that ‘havinge collected theis & a nomber of Reasones moare concernyng the weale […] of bothe Realmes […] I thoughte good to write thus muche vnto your selfe’. This implies that Walsingham was actively acquiring justificatory material. He added that he knew the Chancellor would need no encouragement to ‘doe all the good offyces which one your part shalbe possyble’. Walsingham concluded that Maitland’s efforts in that behalf would serve God, James and Scotland, and allow the latter to ‘Reape the blessed fruite of peace’. These sentiments perhaps do not sit very comfortably with the rest of the letter, adding a conventional humanistic epistolary gloss to a radically different kind of political argument.

It is nonetheless a compelling document. The point by point refutation of the case for war is a powerful persuasive structure, accompanied by vivid language and a sophisticated conception of contemporary power politics. What is striking is how secular Walsingham’s arguments were. Even his treatment of James’ religion was couched in terms of practicality; he made no assertion of the truth of Protestantism, merely that abandoning it would rebound to the king’s discredit. This was probably because he did not trust James to act in any way other than in his own self-interest. Throughout, he presents his advice as for James’ benefit, not England’s. It is focused throughout on James’ interests – a key term for writers in the “reason of state” tradition – and how these clashed with those of other rulers. In Altera secretissima instructio, a propaganda tract written during the Thirty Years’ War

210 Ibid, fol. 136v.
analysed by Noel Malcolm, the author similarly casts doubt on the loyalty of the allies of the Elector Palatine and claims that each ‘will abandon him as soon as that ruler’s own interest diverges from his’. Though he did not explicitly recycle the arguments of “reason of state” writers, the approach Walsingham took in composing this document seems to owe much to practical considerations of political advantage and action, characteristic of the tradition.

Walsingham’s letter to Maitland is very closely related to a document dated April 1587 in the calendar, ‘Reasons for preferring amity with England’, in the hand of Walsingham’s cipher expert, Thomas Phelippes. It might have formed part of the “collection” of arguments against war with England that Sir Francis had mentioned to Maitland. ‘Reasons’ contains many of the same arguments as the letter, often in almost the same words. In fact, the structure of Walsingham’s letter follows ‘Reasons’ very closely from ‘firste in Comone Reasone’ on folio 134v to the end of the section on James’ religion, on folio 135v, elaborating on certain points. For example, Walsingham placed greater stress on James’ powers as king of the whole island as a deterrent for French aid, while Phelippes moved swiftly on to the contention that some French figures would be keen to move their war from France to Britain, though Phelippes blamed the Guisards, and Walsingham the politiques. Unlike Phelippes Walsingham emphasised the role of advisers, and his letter is more focused on a specific audience. It is not clear what Walsingham’s role in the production of ‘Reasons’ was. As there is no jarring difference in tone or style between the sections in Walsingham’s letter that appear in ‘Reasons’ and those that do not it is possible that ‘Reasons’ was composed based on Walsingham’s ideas or suggestions.

There are some differences in content. The first three and a quarter pages of Walsingham’s letter bear no relation to the ‘Reasons’. Phelippes’ document stressed England’s strength in different terms: England had long been prepared for an attack based on Mary Stuart’s practising; Elizabeth had many ‘secrett leagues and Pensioners in all places’; and the country was rich. The final folio saw Phelippes stressing the French civil war and Spanish problems in the Netherlands, which Elizabeth could exacerbate if she chose. By contrast, Walsingham emphasised England’s “public” strengths (especially the conjunction with Holland and Zeeland), as opposed to secret mechanisms. This is in-keeping with the bravado of his letter. In his advice to Elizabeth, as we have seen, he

213 ‘Reasons’ fol. 45v1.
usually stressed England’s weakness in order to induce her to act: his presentation of the situation depended on who he was advising.

Despite being dated a month later by the editor of the Calendar of State Papers relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, changes in the wording suggest Walsingham was writing based on ‘Reasons’. For example, Philippes claimed that the king of France would not assist James as he would present more of a threat to the ‘Catholike cawse then the Queen being a woman and commanding only over part of the Ilande only’, whereas Walsingham wrote that James was more threatening to the ‘Romane Relygeone being a man and so muche moare mighty by the vnione of the Crownes’. This changes an argument based on “negatives” (Elizabeth’s weakness) to “positives” (James’ strength). Walsingham’s rendering makes the Scottish king’s future strength even clearer and thereby justifies Henri’s reluctance to come to his aid, without undermining his earlier assertion of England’s strength. The change from ‘Catholike cawse’ to ‘Romane Relygeone’ highlights the foreignness of the shared enemies of England and Scotland. These changes and differences show how considered even this apparently tactless missive was, and confirms the need to be suspicious of Walsingham’s choices.

This robust and comprehensive letter to Maitland was, however, a draft. The version Walsingham actually sent is printed in John Spottiswood’s History of the Church of Scotland, and shares substantial sections with the draft. The section dealing with reasons why France should not be expected to hurry to James’ aid is almost exactly the same, for instance. However, some aspects have been reworked. In the sent version, for example, Walsingham emphasised Philip II’s danger to James by adding adjectives to the king’s attributes: ‘insatiable ambition, deep practices, and power, accompanied in this case with a colour of right’. Walsingham also gave specific examples of countries where Philip’s imperiousness could be seen: Navarre, Portugal and all his Italian possessions.

There was also some restructuring. The draft’s penultimate section on Walsingham’s gathering of reasons to refute arguments for war appears at the very beginning of the Spottiswood version, for example. The two versions both set out to demonstrate that Mary had done nothing to earn James’ gratitude. Both emphasise her

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214 ‘Reasons’, fol. 45; Walsingham to [Chancellor], fol. 134.
215 While the draft contains a blank space, awaiting a name, the “sent” version names Mr Douglas. Additionally, the latter document is dated to 4 March 1587, while the former lacks a date. John Spottiswood, History of the Church of Scotland, beginning the year of our Lord 203, and continuing to the end of the reign of King James VI, II, ed. by Mark Napier (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1851) pp. 365, 371.
“donation” of her claim to the English throne to the King of Spain, though the Spottiswood version, significantly, omits any reference to Mary’s complicity in the murder of Darnley as a reason to induce James to inaction. Even Walsingham thought better of deploying this potentially incendiary argument. The sent document, though, is explicit that Mary’s behaviour ‘ought to breed jealousy and suspicion in your sovereign’s head’, where the draft listed her actions against her son’s interest and left Maitland (and James) to draw the obvious conclusion.218

The sent version differs from the draft in its tone and in its almost constant reiteration of the key role of advisers. Still robust, the Spottiswood letter nonetheless diplomatically stressed James’ ‘singular judgement’ on multiple occasions, helping to give the whole document a more respectful and less lecturing tone. Walsingham’s repeated reference to those advising James to take up arms as moved by ‘lack of understanding’ or ‘private passions’ is understandable given the letter’s addressee. Additionally, should the letter come before James himself such comments might help dissuade him from harkening to such bad advisers and make the king think twice about where his real interests lay. The letter was obviously carefully considered and conscientiously reworked, giving the lie to Walsingham’s justificatory assertion that ‘the desire I have of the continuance of amity between the two crowns hath carried me unawares farther than I purposed [emphasis mine]’.219

Maybe Walsingham’s letter did the trick. By late March, Walsingham reported that James realised that his best interests lay in being friendly with Elizabeth and securing the goodwill of her subjects, who ‘are lykely hereafter to consider of his right’, with connotations of conditionality and election.220 James was pleased at Walsingham’s appointment as chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, and was ‘sufficiently persuaded of the good will of some of those counsellors towards him and the weal of both realms, namely of Lord Leicester and Sir Francis Walsingham’.221 Walsingham reciprocated with advice, which was mainly to avoid doing anything that would make Elizabeth suspect his intentions.222 Walsingham also praised James to Maitland, especially his ‘princely’ course in ‘favoring &

218 Ibid, p. 370.
220 Walsingham to Stafford, 22 March 1587, TNA, SP 78/17, fol. 81.
222 Walsingham to Fowler, 4 February 1589, TNA, SP 52/43, fol. 6.
countenancing such as are noted to be religiously affected’. This language (if not the reality) of friendship and affection allowed a more understanding relationship.

Walsingham’s interactions with James in 1588 and 1589 were characterised by a more conciliatory tone. This may have been partly occasioned by James’ inaction as the remnants of the Armada limped round Scotland’s coasts in later 1588, which may have persuaded Walsingham of his goodwill towards England. Additionally, Paul McGinnis and Arthur Williamson have argued that, post-1585, James’ writings and actions indicate that he consciously shifted away from his conservative political and religious opinions (embodied in the “Black Acts” of 1584) to a position of support for the movement for further reformation (embodied in the “Golden Act” of 1592). In the later 1580s, the beginnings of James’ reinvention of himself as staunch supporter of Protestantism, opponent of Spain, and as a ‘citizen-king’ may also have influenced Walsingham’s apparently-improved opinion of him. Concerns about James’ current behaviour as king and its implications for his hypothetical future conduct as king of England lingered, however. Especially worrying was James’ continued intimacy with some of his Catholic nobles, principally the earls of Huntly, Erroll and Crawford, despite their own close contact with Spain. A letter of advice Walsingham wrote to Thomas Fowler, still acting as one of his intermediaries with James, set out his opinions of Scottish politics. The letter was almost certainly intended for James, and a comparison with their audience in 1583 is instructive.

Having thanked Fowler for his insights into the situation at the Scottish court, Walsingham delivered a pious exhortation for James’ good government. He wrote, ‘God send that younge prince (being of him self [...] everie waie well inclined) good wise and faithfull Counsellours that may carie him in a constant course for the vpholding of religion, and the establi

shing of Iustice in that realme’. The lack of justice, Walsingham claimed, caused the weakening of the ‘Regall authority for that everie great personage [...] pretendeth to bee a king and therby take lybertye to commit straynge and great insolences and oppressyons on the weaker sorte’. The way to remedy these exactions, Sir Francis suggested, was to establish a Star Chamber to deal with such noble offenders and re-

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223 Walsingham to Maitland, 16 May 1589, SP 52/44, fol. 18.
225 For James as a ‘citizen-king’, see Ibid, p. 106.
227 [Walsingham] to Thomas Fowler, 22 December 1588, TNA, SP 52/42, fol. 129.
228 Ibid, fol. 129.
establish royal authority, because it was ‘almost impossyble for any prynce to be in svertye in a reame or Kyngdome where the regall awthorytye is not merely deryved from the k[ing]’. In addition, to reform his ‘dyseased state’ James should focus solely on government for a time, using ‘sooche as are not lyme w[i]t[f]h factyon but inclyned to iustycye’, and call a Parliament ‘compownded of persons that prefer the pvblycke befor ther partycvler’. The ‘travayle and votes’ of the Parliament members would remedy the ‘extraordynarye regalytyes the nobylytye of that realme doe challenge eyther by vsvrpatyon or otherwyse’, and keep these ‘w[i]t[f]h sooche lymyttes as the lawe may have ivst and dew coorse w[i]t[f]hout respecte of persons’. All of this would win James ‘svertye whoe nowe rvnne lyke hazard as the k[jings] his pr[e]decessers hathe don’ and in so doing he would ‘doe an act worthye of a Christyan prynce to his perpetvall fame and renowne for ever’. As in 1583 Walsingham stressed the duty of the monarch and their advisers to uphold religion and justice and to protect the lower orders from the incursions of their betters. Again, he emphasised the necessity of a strong, centralised monarchy, with the necessary legal mechanisms to bring its unruly subjects to heel, but assisted by well-qualified advisers. Importantly, however, Walsingham expressed himself more circumspectly and emphasised the active role of the king in reforming matters rather than insisting that he ought to be constrained by his parliament on pain of deposition. The key change was probably the 1586 treaty, after which the English in general and Walsingham in particular tended to emphasise the need to maintain James’ authority rather than encouraging his magnates to independent action.

The thawing of relations between James and Walsingham was the work of intermediaries like Maitland and Fowler. Walsingham restored ruptured communications with Maitland in the summer of 1588 ‘to entertayne mutuall good intelligence […] for the better seruice of both our soveraignes’. Maitland averred that the king was Walsingham’s ‘best affected freind efter your sovereyne, housoever it hes bene utherwayes geaven out’. The Chancellor declared that James ‘never had that hard consait of yow that hes bene reported’, then undermined this statement slightly by explaining that James’ bad opinon of Walsingham ‘did aryss upon some surmysed speaches’ but was ‘now upon knowledge of

230 Ibid, fol. 129v.
231 Ibid, fol. 129v
t.
the trueth fullye removed; so that he both luffis yow entirlye and estemis of yow as your
vertues merites, and dois rest assured he hes no better affected friend in that state.\(^{234}\)

Thomas Fowler was an especially key figure in this development. He claimed to have
described Walsingham in such terms as James now ‘accomptes of you vnfectedly to
be the onely cowncelor now in Ingland, your duty of alegeance to the Quenes majestate
Reserved, that wold forder his affaires and comodyte’. According to Fowler, James
takes you to be a faythefull servant to your mistris, which he wel alowe of and yet a well willer
to him in his Ranke. he thinkes you wold do for him that you cantt, becawse you have sum suche
In your contrary that you dare not.

Walsingham was apparently the ‘fyrst Inglishe man in [James’] accompt’.\(^{235}\) Although we
must make allowances for flattery as Fowler desired Walsingham’s continued goodwill, it
certainly seems that James was making a concerted effort to appear well-disposed to
Elizabeth’s secretary. He claimed to believe that Walsingham wanted to secure concessions
for him, especially, perhaps, regarding the statement of his title, but that he was prevented
from doing so by the machinations of others. It is significant that Leicester, one of James’
key correspondents, had died by this point: James was in need of friends at the English
court.

As the 1580s progressed, Walsingham seemed to adapt to James’ preferences; he no
longer harangued the king and threatened him with deposition, instead praising his
judgement and wishing good advisers on him. To write about a patron or superior in such
terms as they felt compelled to act in accordance with the writer’s desires was a recognised
part of epistolary rhetoric, and this may have been partly what Walsingham was trying to
do in these letters.\(^{236}\)

Walsingham’s warmer personal relationship with James through trusted
intermediaries was a positive development for both sides. Walsingham felt more secure
about the prospect of James’ succession and, in the present, that he would not facilitate an
invasion. James secured an ally in his long game and short term concerns. Whether
Elizabeth knew what Walsingham was up to is not clear. Walsingham’s contact with
important figures in Scotland, including the king, seems to parallel the situation in the later
1590s, when Elizabeth’s advisers communicated with James without her knowledge to

\(^{234}\) [Maitland to Walsingham], 19 September 1588, *Cal. Scotland*, IX, p. 615.
\(^{235}\) Thomas Fowler to Walsingham, 18 December 1588, TNA, SP 52/42, fol. 128.
secure his accession. In this way the succession was planned for, if not secured, by treaty, pension and influence, not by marriage to a French Catholic prince.

Early on, Sir Francis had forged strong, stable relationships with the regents in Scotland, especially Morton. Once James emerged from Morton’s tutelage, Walsingham and England could never have the same influence in Scotland. From about 1578 onwards, then, Walsingham’s Scottish policy can be seen as a frantic search for the same kind of security the Morton monopoly had given England. After 1580, James himself was the key figure to be influenced, and the Secretary did not trust him, or his favourites. This led him into risky schemes, which only undermined the amity further. It shows the difficulties of counsel in unusual circumstances, and the extent to which smooth advisory relationships were predicated upon shared assumptions and, most importantly, trust. Walsingham’s relationship with Elizabeth was always going to be more straightforward than that with James. He was, after all, one of her sworn counsellors, bound to advise her honestly and in good faith, though exactly what that entailed might be contested. In advising James, especially in the manner in which he chose to, Walsingham’s motivation was always likely to be suspect. He was, however, driven to intervene in Scottish politics by his view of the international situation, and his conception of his role as a lesser magistrate.

Walsingham was acutely aware of the dangers the northern country could pose to England. To Walsingham, Scotland was ‘the posterne gate’, a back door by which hostile foreign powers could invade England. He was anxious that England and Scotland cooperate, and that Scottish politics remain stable. He told Leicester in 1572 that the division in Scotland between queen’s and king’s parties ‘wilbe the cause both their owne and our ruine’, and that ‘[y]f England and Scotland be vnited, & sooche vnsounde membres cut of, as have ben the cause of inwarde corruption’, England’s enemies would be less likely to attack. Walsingham was also convinced that on the amity between the two countries depended the ‘welfare of the cause of Religion […] and of the Crowne and
Realme.\textsuperscript{240} England and her northern neighbour were united in the true religion; they faced the same threats, the same problems, the same enemies. They needed each other.

As a result, Walsingham tended to think that what was good for England was good for Scotland, and so he regularly emphasised the common good of both realms in his writing about Scotland. Often, this was in the context of his desire for international cooperation between all Protestants. In 1578, for example, he wrote of his concern about ‘theis civill and domestical broyles’ in Scotland at a time that ‘requyret an vnitie and perfect agrement’ in those that ‘make profession of that truth whic is elswhere impugned and hathe so mightie ennemyes’. Walsingham expressed his profound sense of fellow feeling with ‘oure fellowe membres abrode’. In an often-cited comment he remarked that:

our vnitie mighte be a strengthe to our selves, and an ayde vnto our neigbour but if wee shall like to fall at diuision among our selves, wee muste needes lye open to the common ennemie, and by our owne faulte hasten or rather call vppon our selves our owne ruyne.\textsuperscript{241}

Scotland occupied a very important place in Walsingham’s plans to protect Protestantism in Britain and elsewhere. This was partly for reasons of strategic geography, and partly because of James’ place in the English succession.

The strength of Walsingham’s identification of the two countries interests is apparent from the language of his writing about Scotland. His vocabulary is strikingly reminiscent of some of St Paul’s “prison epistles”, particularly Colossians, which deals with the importance of unity in Christ, and Ephesians, which deals with the new unity between Gentile and Jew wrought by knowledge of the truth of Christ (not an inappropriate metaphor for the newly religiously-allied England and Scotland). Ephesians had been the subject of a series of lectures by Martin Bucer in 1550-1 at Cambridge, at the end of Walsingham’s time at King’s College. In Ephesians, the members of the church are described as having been ‘coupled and knit together by euerie joynct’ by their shared belief.\textsuperscript{242} In his lectures, Bucer had similarly stressed ‘the unity of saints among themselves’.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[240] Walsingham to Randolph and Bowes, 16 March 1578, BL, Harley 6992, fol. 100.
\item[241] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
and the special requirement for the saints to love other saints, even more than others, describing fellow saints as ‘our flesh and members’.243

Walsingham regularly invoked images of knots and bonds to emphasise the religious ties between the two nations. This conception of ideal Anglo-Scottish relations had direct practical consequences. For example, in November 1575, Walsingham wrote that, though Regent Morton was uncertain that sending an envoy to Elizabeth would do any good, he and some of the Regent’s ‘friends, who wish some sound knot of friendship to be knit between the two realms’, encouraged Morton to go through with his plan, ‘not doubting but by the good direction he shall receive here from such as are affected to the said friendship touching the course of his negotiation, there will fall out such good effects’ that Morton would ‘have no cause to repent’.244 The language of bonds and knots could complement medical imagery, which, as we have seen, was Walsingham’s favoured political metaphor. In Thomas Starkey’s formulation, for example, the members of a commonwealth were ‘coupled together unite [sic] & knit as members of one body by love as by the common bande of all politic order & good civility’.245 Knots were, therefore, political as well as spiritual ties.

This conjunction of political and religious fellowship is even more obvious in a long letter which Walsingham wrote to the English envoys in Scotland in 1580, which saw him address the problem of piracy for Anglo-Scottish relations. He lamented the condition of the ‘bond, and knott, which ether doth, or should knit these two Realmes most firmely and soundly the one to the other’. This ‘bond’ was being undermined by the activities of the pirates, but Walsingham argued that if amity reigned between England and Scotland then the piracies would stop. He complained that ‘so smale and slender occasions […] bring forth so dangerous effectes as to cutt our mindes of an sunder, which are maid one, or should be’.

In this letter Walsingham laid out his belief in the necessity of close cooperation between England and Scotland. Sir Francis argued that a few bad men should not cause the friendship of a neighbour to be jettisoned: ‘the corne should not be cast awaye because of the chafe […] these outward partes being for the most parte vnsauerye to the tast, and sharp to the sence and feling, but the inward pleasant, good, and profitable’.247 He blamed ‘they that malice our religion’ for setting on the pirates to ‘breake vs asunder,

244 Walsingham to Morton, 22 November 1575, Cal. Scotland, V, p. 204.
245 Starkey, Dialogue, p. 39.
246 Walsingham to Bowes, 10 August 1580, TNA, SP 52/28, fol. 221v-22.
247 Walsingham to Bowes, 10 August 1580, TNA, SP 52/28, fol. 222.
that ar so soundly knitt together’, and asserted that ‘we’ should seek all means to punish the
offenders ‘and not open a gate to our enimies’. Building to a crescendo, he demanded,
‘shall the loosenes of a few pyrates cause the professors of the one selfe same God, after
one selfe sorte, and in one selfe peril to be devowred of ye enimies’? Walsingham’s answer
was emphatic: of course not. Instead, ‘we should remember that everye Kingdom devided
in yt selfe shall come to ruin: in the profession of the gospel we are one Kingdome’. Bucer had asserted that it was the responsibility of the saints to ‘seek out what was best for
one’s neighbour’ – exactly what Walsingham thought he was doing in this letter, and in his
interventions in Scottish politics more generally.

This letter was shown to James Lawson, an Edinburgh minister, who circulated it
among the ministers and burgesses of ‘Dundee St Johnstons and other places […] and […]
Edenbrough and Leeth’. Walsingham believed that the divines and merchants of
Scotland were England’s natural allies. The latter group were those most likely to be
affected by the piracies, and so it was logical for Walsingham to address this audience. He
reminded them of the spiritual imperative to cooperate in the face of their enemies,
using the language of shared religion – language they would recognise. The impassioned
spiritual rhetoric of this letter and the fact that it was circulated in Scotland shows
Walsingham’s success at choosing the right tone and argument for his audiences.

He even used different words to describe Anglo-Scottish relations compared to
other diplomatic relationships. While Walsingham wrote of the “amity” between England
and France, for example, and he also used this word of Anglo-Scottish relations, he only
used “union” in an Anglo-Scottish context. On one occasion, Walsingham did refer to
England’s relationship with the Low Countries in similar terms. Then, he described to
Burghley how the smoothing over of internal disputes and the developing relationship with
England contributed to the likelihood of the rebels’ success against the Spanish. As he put
it: ‘the frendeship and amytye betwen this contrye and the crowne of Englande knytt more
assvredly (no vnion carryeng so great an assvravnce as that whiche is grounded vppon
consent of relygyon’.

Generally, however, he used words like “conjunction” to describe
this relationship, indicating that “union” was not just about shared religion, it also had, for
Walsingham, a more significant meaning in the context of Anglo-Scottish relations. This

11:17 all contain versions of this line.
249 Amos, Bucer, p. 196.
250 Bowes to Walsingham, 22 August 1580, TNA, SP 52/28, fol. 135v.
251 Walsingham to Randolph and Bowes, 16 March 1578, BL, Harley 6992, fol. 100.
252 Walsingham to Burghley, 20 September 1578, TNA, SP 83/9, fol. 28.
was almost certainly the result of shared geography, and James’ place in the English succession. However, it also probably reveals some of Walsingham’s deep assumptions about these political alliances. Union, often a synonym for marriage, had connotations of a superior and an inferior party, much as England was, for him, superior to Scotland, whereas “conjunction” indicated an alliance of equals. There are echoes in Walsingham’s attitude to and language of Scotland of the efforts of the 1550s and 1560s (with the aid of one William Cecil) to orchestrate a unified, Protestant Britain, which resurfaced later in the century in which Walsingham was a key participant.\(^{253}\) Walsingham’s association with ‘a pan-British reform movement’ was celebrated in England by Edmund Spenser and in Scotland by David Hume of Godscroft.\(^ {254}\)

Walsingham’s identification of the interests of the two countries was such that he found it impossible to conceive that a Protestant Scot could not be an Anglophile; this was an obvious corollary of their religion, for Walsingham. In 1585, when an Anglo-Scottish treaty was under discussion, Walsingham complained of the recalcitrance of some Scottish counsellors, which he blamed on the ‘pryuat’ benefits they had received from the French crown: this was the only reason he could think of for their failure to get whole heartedly behind the alliance.\(^{255}\) Scottish venality was often the only way English observers could ‘explain the behaviour of people who claimed to be friends but who so persistently refused to see the world through English eyes’, whereas what the Scots really wanted, according to Keith Brown, was ‘to be able to pursue independent policies, free from English meddling, and have Queen Elizabeth pay them for doing so’.\(^ {256}\) There were real Anglophiles in Scotland, who wanted friendship with England, but even they sometimes had reservations about the nature of English involvement in Scotland.\(^ {257}\) Walsingham’s blind spot on the divergence of interests between the two countries was one of the things that made it so difficult for him to understand James.

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254 McGinnis and Williamson, p. 111.

255 Walsingham to Wotton, 11 June 1585, TNA, SP 52/37, fol. 62.


Nevertheless, Walsingham considered it no less his duty to advise James than Elizabeth, for all monarchs needed good advice and Walsingham, who saw himself as a political expert, never shied away from sharing the benefits of his experience. This was a manifestation of his conviction that he had a duty for the maintenance of religion in the whole island, though, inevitably, he was concerned primarily about securing an outcome that would be good for England. Sir Francis’ conception of the “unity” of England and Scotland also made James a natural recipient of such strictures.

The advice Walsingham gave James, and his comments on monarchy, Parliament, and the nature of political power were all highly contingent upon context. Therefore, just because some of this appears to contradict his view of English politics, this does not mean that they were not sincere. Walsingham’s activities in Scotland again suggest that he distinguished between counsel and political argument, using the expected humanist-classical tropes and ideas for one, and more avant-garde techniques for the other. Walsingham’s “real” political beliefs remain elusive, but his surviving written comments on these matters indicate a pragmatic flexibility in political life, based on what was best for England and the Protestant religion, as he saw it.
Conclusion

Walsingham’s counsel to Elizabeth, his political argument, his patronage in Ireland and in the Church of England, and his interventions in Scotland were all the product of a crisis mentality. This was shared by many of his colleagues, and was rooted in same vocabulary and concerns as William Cecil had used in the 1560s.¹ This perceived crisis led, perhaps especially for Walsingham, who was most exposed to alarming news and intelligence, to efforts to increase the number of friends of the regime, to regain and retain the loyalty of the discontented and to find outlets for the talents of the potentially turbulent. The fraught years of the 1570s and 1580s saw England fighting many of her battles again. The Queen of Scots posed new problems; again, it was necessary to keep French influence out of Scotland and secure a Protestant, Anglophone government there; again, the succession reared its head; and the question of intervention in continental Europe was raised more frequently and more urgently. The mentality of crisis also forged an environment where cooperation in defence of religion, queen, and country was the norm, and where disagreements were resolved using the language of friendship and frankness. Central in this were the shared educational experiences of many of Elizabeth’s counsellors – and the queen herself, who understood Walsingham’s frankness as a rhetorical device rather than an essential aspect of his character.

In many ways, then, Walsingham’s political life had much in common with the experiences of his colleagues in the 1560s. However, in his deployment of the vocabulary of reason of state he gestures to the 1590s, the decade of the vogue for Tacitus and dark depictions of court corruption. Though Walsingham tried to persuade and, occasionally, manipulate Elizabeth into doing what he thought necessary, he stopped short of the insistence of the earl of Essex, for example, that Elizabeth be made to follow the advice she was given.² Walsingham’s grasp of political reality was too strong for him to do this, and, though there may be overtones of Tacitus in his conceptions of the corruption of contemporary politics, Elizabeth was not, for Walsingham, Tacitus’ tyrant. His idea of what constituted tyranny had a religious dimension, and therefore, because Walsingham accepted the status quo in the Church of England, Elizabeth did not fit this criterion – she had not, for Walsingham, imposed a false religion. Like Justus Lipsius, expert on Tacitus and

Seneca, and unlike the Essexians, for Walsingham ‘the way lay open for rational statecraft and the prudential participation of the citizen as the servant of the [...] state’.

Additionally, unlike Essex, Walsingham could not trade on his charisma or martial aristocratic virtue to build a following. Instead, he tried to identify himself with the regime and, by securing the loyalty of individuals to the former, also secure it to the latter. Walsingham referred to himself as part of a community of men of judgement, whereas Essex’s focus on virtue was all about himself and his personal ‘indispensability’. This facilitated Walsingham’s conception of his opponents as self-serving and motivated by private concerns. He may also have drawn on his family tradition of personal royal service, though this idea is notable only by its absence in his own writings.

Like Burghley, Walsingham ‘spoke with [...] gravity and sense of self to Elizabeth’s office, to her duty and to her political body’, thinking of himself as a ‘public person’, which was characteristic of humanist-classical views. I would argue that Walsingham’s thought and behaviour was less influenced by the art of the republic and more by the art of the state. Their differences of approach are visible in their work in 1584 to construct a coherent plan in response to the event of Elizabeth’s assassination. The resulting Instrument of Association was designed to punish the perpetrators and beneficiaries of the queen’s unnatural end. Burghley also planned in more detail how government would carry on without a monarch, in Collinson’s example par excellence of the attitudes of monarchical republicanism in action. There is no evidence of Walsingham planning for this eventuality in this kind of detail. His contribution was limited to drafting the Instrument (at least one draft bears his corrections) and suggesting that the document be distributed as if without orders from above. Far from a ‘quasi-republican statement’, it instead, in-keeping with the art of the state, mobilised those who identified themselves as the regime’s friends. Later writers in the tradition distinguished between good and bad reason of state. Good reason of state was the ‘derogation of the law for the common good’.

7 Collinson, ‘Monarchical Republic’, p. 50.
sanctioning of the Instrument is perhaps less shocking. The limited intent of the Instrument is more characteristic of Walsingham’s sometimes narrow vision in that it sought to provide for one specific eventuality. When transformed into the Act for the Queen’s Safety, the initiative can be understood more as an effort to sustain the future of the Reformed religion in the event of Elizabeth’s unnatural death. Walsingham had one long-term priority: the future of Protestantism in the British Isles and Europe. In pursuit of this, he was prepared to sacrifice long-term success on other issues to secure short-term objectives. This is visible in his jettisoning of a fairly sophisticated effort to diffuse tensions in Connacht in favour of a straightforward military solution, which though it quieted an immediate crisis did nothing to resolve the longer-running tensions in the province. Walsingham’s blindness here was occasioned by his conviction that Bingham represented the interests of the queen and state, and he intervened, as we have seen, to assert the primacy of these interests. As espoused by its early proponents, the art of the state tended to concern itself with the life of the prince or their heirs, rather than building long-lasting political societies.\footnote{Viroli, p. 186.} Echoes of this remain in Walsingham’s dismissal of the future problems that intervention in the Low Countries might cause in similar terms.\footnote{See chapter 2.} However, elsewhere his actions reflect the shift in priorities by writers in this vein. By the later sixteenth century, writers on the art of the state were concerned with longer-term issues, especially the finances and military strength of states and princes and how to develop and maintain these.

It seems fair to conclude that, on the evidence of his political writings, Walsingham’s opinions and prescriptions were grounded much more in ‘his reactions to the political situation that confronted him’, rather than a particular theoretical approach to politics. His flexibility in the face of shifting circumstances suggests that, rather than specific abstract rules, he approached political problems from a practical perspective, applying general information from his reading – both classical and contemporary – to new contexts. In this, he probably owed a reasonably significant debt to Italian political theorists, like Guicciardini and Machiavelli, or those writing in the same vein.\footnote{Francesco Guicciardini, Maxims and Reflections of a Renaissance Statesman (Recordi), trans. Mario Domandi (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 12, 24.} This is reflective of his view of himself, and of the way he wanted to be perceived by his audience. Walsingham thought of himself as a “political expert” and these documents are designed to convince the audience on the basis of his detailed knowledge and understanding of political
events, which should make his conclusions/solutions plausible. The real-world, pragmatic language and focus of reason of state discourses permeates Walsingham’s longer political writings, tempered by more religious language in his correspondence with his colleagues – but not with Elizabeth, where he used the humanist-classical language of counsel, though echoes of reason of state discourses linger in his use of “policy” and “necessity”.

It is perhaps telling that the comments of scholars on Machiavelli’s style, especially in *The Prince*, could also be describing Walsingham. The style of this work has been described as ‘terse, epigrammatic […] particularly adaptable to quotation’, and Émile Gasquet was struck by the ‘tense prose’ with its ‘powerful impact of argument, the apparent truth of the political representation, the fervour of convictions, the passionate enthusiasm always present under the discipline of style’ – the latter describes the tone of Walsingham’s 1587 letter to Maitland perfectly.

Walsingham’s debt to the theorists of reason of state was not incompatible with his sincerely-held Calvinistic beliefs in which, after all, man was also seen as inherently corrupt. Those who later criticised reason of state from a radically Protestant perspective did not object to the theory *per se*, merely its deployment without reference to right religion. “Policy” was acceptable and, they recognised, sometimes necessary, when it was deployed in the service of God. What this meant in practice, of course, might be hotly contested. Walsingham clearly believed in the operation of providence, just as many of his colleagues and correspondents did, but he was also capable of discussing secondary causes of events, more or less taking providence for granted. Even Guicciardini ‘did not rule out the power of God’s providence in influencing events’. Instead, Walsingham used the pragmatic prescriptions and politic vocabulary of reason of state to argue for courses of action that would preserve the religion in which he passionately believed, just as other late sixteenth century writers combined Christian concerns with the demands of expediency. In many ways, this combination in Walsingham’s writing and that of others makes sense: in a time of corruption and danger, it was necessary to do all one could to protect the true religion. His language and actions represent a coherent and sophisticated response to the challenges

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faced by England. For Walsingham, there does not seem to have been any tensions between his urging Elizabeth to “depend on providence” and also to take action. The opportunities to improve the security of England and international Protestantism offered by, for instance, the Dutch revolt, were providential in nature, and therefore Elizabeth ought to seize these God-given opportunities.

There were some differences between Walsingham and his reason of state forebears. Unlike Guicciardini, but like Machiavelli, Walsingham does seem to have felt that the Roman past offered useful examples. Guicciardini was also suspicious of the applicability of exemplars to contemporary decisions at all, unless one could be sure that the situations were exactly the same, with the same causes. He instead stressed the importance of experience.16 On the other hand, unlike Machiavelli, Walsingham very rarely mentions ‘liberty’ of the people, which perhaps points to a more authoritarian conception of political power, but this was (in any case) less common in the political writings of French, German and English thinkers as this idea was often closely tied to the belief that a republic was the best form of government.17 In that he worked hard to defend England from what he saw as its potential destruction, Walsingham seems to have followed contemporaries like Castiglione who placed security above liberty as the ‘essential business of government’, something also associated with later sixteenth-century reason of state writers.18 Walsingham also believed, contrary to Machiavelli’s recommendation in *The Prince*, that he had a duty to advise Elizabeth even if she had not requested his advice.19 And, where Machiavelli saw fear as the best guarantee of security, Walsingham’s emphasis on the goodwill of the subjects seems to lean in the approved Ciceronian and Senecan direction.20

Walsingham saw himself as a ‘watchman’, appointed by God to preserve religion and peace within England, Scotland and Ireland. Although named to his place by Elizabeth, and aware that he served at her pleasure, Walsingham laid most of the credit (or blame) for his advancement at the Almighty’s door. Also influenced by his classical education in the *vita activa* and contact with contemporary reason of state, Walsingham saw himself as part of the state, of which Elizabeth was just the most important member. He

18 Skinner, I, p. 123.
20 Viroli, p. 150.
believed that she had a responsibility to rule in her subjects’ interests because of her God-appointed position within the state. Because it was a personal monarchy, he had a responsibility to preserve her state for the benefit of the realm. And, therefore, sometimes, in that Walsingham was prepared to act on his own initiative to secure what he considered the appropriate outcome, ‘the realm took precedence over the ruler’, though not necessarily in the classical-humanist language Collinson would have expected. For Walsingham, as for Botero, ‘the state ultimately is the prince; is still the state of the prince’, so preserving Elizabeth was the supreme goal – even if he attracted her ire for the ways in which he did this. It was Walsingham’s perception of himself as a public person, with his own responsibilities to preserve religion and the state that enabled him to justify his political action. Stephen Alford characterised Burghley’s political opinions as a combination of ‘radical and conservative: radical in implication but not in method’. Walsingham also combined these elements, though they were reversed: his use of the language of reason of state was unusual and showed a radical approach to politics, which tended to a conservative end: the preservation of Elizabethan England as a strong centralised Protestant monarchy.

There is nothing necessarily hypocritical about Walsingham accepting and using different parts of different traditions. These theories grew out of the same environment and the same pressures. People in the past are under no obligation to use texts in the same way as modern scholars, and always adhere to one tradition of thought, interpreting and expressing ideas in perfect accordance with modern scholars’ opinions of the “correct” way to do this. That Walsingham could move between political discourses testifies to the soundness of his rhetorical training and, almost certainly, the influence of his sojourn abroad. That he could fool most historians into seeing him merely as the dour, frank Puritan testifies to the strength and skill of his self-presentation. This reinforces Paulina Kewes’ warning ‘that we must listen carefully to what [early modern writers] had to say and not succumb to the lure of teleological readings’. The example of Walsingham highlights the flexibility and skill of early modern political actors, and this is revealed more clearly if we leave stereotypes behind us and lend them our ears.

22 Viroli, p. 253.
23 Alford, Early Elizabethan Polity, p. 181.
Shamelessly filching Patrick Collinson’s call for ‘history with the politics put back’, perhaps we can see Walsingham’s political language as reason of state with God put back, in line with the projects of contemporary thinkers to align the new political discourses with Christian religion. His outlook was narrow in that it focused almost exclusively on the near future, with other goals subsumed by the overarching aim of the future security of Protestantism, but broad in its geographical spread and grasp of contemporary political detail. It certainly seems to be the case that, as Walsingham told William Davison, “policy” was more important than “zeal” in succeeding in Elizabethan politics.²⁶

²⁶ Walsingham to Davison, 8 May 1578, TNA, SP 83/6, fol. 106v.
Appendix 1: Full Title List of Printed Books Dedicated to Walsingham

Printed books dedicated to Walsingham in alphabetical order by author/translator


- Anwick, I., *Anwick his meditations upon Gods monarchie and the deniil his kingdome And of the knowledge that man in this life may obtaine of the almighty, eternal, and most glorious godhed: with other things not only worth the reading but also the marking and the retayning* (London: [T. Marsh] for Gerred Dewes, 1587)

- Baker, John, *Lectures of I.B. vpon the xii. Articles of our Christian faith briefly set forth for the confort of the godly, and the better instruction of the simple and ignorant. Also hereunto is annexed a briefe and cleare confession of the Christian faith, containing an hundreth articles, according to the order of the Creede of the Apostles. Written by that learned [and] godly martyr I.H. sometime Bishop of Gloucester in his life time* (London: Christopher Barker, 1581)


- Baxter, Nathaniel, *The lectures or daily sermons, of that reverend divine, D. Iohn Caluine, pastor of the Church of God in Genena, vpon the prophet Ionas, by N.B. student in Divinitie. Whereunto is annexed an excellent exposalion of the two last epistles of S. Iohn, done in Latin by that worthy doctor, August. Marlorate, and englisshed by the same N.B.* (London: John Charlewood for Edward White, 1578)

- Becket, William, *A comentarie of M. Iohn Caluine vpon the Epistle to the Philippians wherein is set out the necessitie and profite of affliction unto the faithfull, the endite of God his word, the fruits, of vanitie and humilitie, free justification by faith in Iesus Christ without our owne merites, the assurance, ioy, and contented mindes of the godlie, and their persuervement in godlinesse unto the end. With many other comfortable and profitable pointes of religion. Translated out of Latine by W.B.* (London: [John Windet] for Nicholas Lyng, 1584)
- Bell, James, *A sermon preached at the christening of a certaine Iew at London by Iohn Foixe.*
  Containing an exposition of the xi. chapter of S. Paul to the Romanes. Translated out of Latine into
  English by James Bell (London: Christopher Barker, 1578)
- Bellot, James, *The booke of thrift, containing a perfite order, and right methode to profite lands, and
  other things belonging to busbandry.*; Newly Englished, and set out by I.B. gentleman of Caen in France
  (London: John Wolfe, 1589)
- Bright, Timothy, *An abridgement of the booke of acts and monumentes of the Church: written by
  that Renerend Father, Maister Iohn Focc: and now abridged by Timothe Bright, Doctour of Phisicke, for
  such as either through want of leysure, or abilitie have not the vse of so necessary an history* (London:
  John Windet at the assignment of Timothy Bright, 1589)
- Bulkley, Edward, *An answere to ten frivolous and foolish reasons, set downe by the
  Rheemish Iesuits and papists in their preface before the new Testament by them lately translated into
  English, which have mouned them to forsake the originall fountaine of the Greeke, wherein the Spirit of
  God did indite the Gospell, and the bolie Apostles did write it, to follow the streame of the Latin
  translation, translated we know not when nor by whom With a discoverie of many
  great corruptions and faultis in the said English translation set out at Rhemes* (London: George
  Bishop, 1588)
- Churchyard, Thomas, *A lamentable, and pitifull description, of the wofull warres in Flaunders, since
  the foure last yeares of the Emperor Charles the fift his raigne With a briefe reheasall of many
  things done since that season, untill this present yeare, and death of Don Iohn. Written by Thomas Churchyarde
  Gentleman* (London: Henry Bynneman for Ralph Newbury, 1578)
- Cosyn, John, *Musike of six, and fiue partes Made vpon the common tunes vsed in singing of the psalms
  (London: John Wolfe, 1585)
- [Day, Angel], *Vpon the life and death of the most worthy, and thrise renowned knight, Sir Phillip
  Sidney a commemoration of his worthines, contayning a briefe recapitulation, of his valiant vsage and death
  taken, in her Maiesties services of the warres in the Low-countries of Flaunders* (London: Robert
  Waldegrave, 1586)
- Foxe, John, *De oliua euangelica Concio, in baptismo Iudaei habita Londini, primo mens. April.
  Cum enarratione capitii undecimi D. Pauli ad Romanos. In qua, de principijs & fundamentis Christianae
  fidei, de vera & sincera ecclesia, de Christo Messia, eiusque regni aeterna amplitudine, atque infinita

1 Recorded as dedicated to Walsingham in Franklin B. Williams, *Index of Dedications and
Commendatory Verses in English Books before 1641* (London: Bibliographical Society, 1962), but the
version on Early English Books Online is missing this, Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery,
STC/543:01. Bright sheltered with Walsingham during the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre.
gloria, Disputatio cum Iudaeis ex Propheticae scripturae certissimis testimoniis instituitur (London: Christopher Barker, 1578)

- Garbrand, John, An exposition vpon the two epistles of the apostle Saint Paule to the Thessalonians, by the reverende Father Iohn Iewel, late Byshop of Sarisburie (London: Ralph Newbury and Henry Bynneman, 1583)

- Gentili, Alberico, Disputationum decas prima (London: John Wolfe, 1587)

- Gosson, Stephen, Player confuted in five actions proving that they are not to be suffred in a Christian common weale, by the waye both the cauls of Thomas Lodge, and the playe of playes, written in their defence, and other objections of playersfrendes, are truely set downe and directly answeared. By Steph. Gosson, stud. Oxon. (London: For Thomas Gosson, 1582)

- Hakluyt, Richard, The principall nauigations, voiages and discoueries of the English nation made by sea or over land, to the most remote and farthest distant quarters of the earth at any time within the compasse of these 1500. yeers: denided into three severall parts, according to the positions of the regions wherunto they were directed. ... Wbereunto is added the last most renowned English nauigation, round about the whole globe of the earth. By Richard Hakluyt Master of Artes, and student sometime of Christ-church in Oxford (London: George Bishop and Ralph Newbury, deputies to Christopher Barker, 1589)

- Howard, earl of Northampton, Henry, A defensatiue against the poyson of supposed propheisies not bitherto confuted by the penne of any man, which being grounded, eyther upon the warrant and authority of olde paynted bookes, expositions of dreames, oracles, revelations, invocations of damned spirites, indicialles of astrologie, or any other kinde of pretended knowledge whatsoever, de futuris contingentibus: haue beene causes of great disorder in the common wealth, chiefly among the simple and unlearned people: very needefull to be published at this time, considering the late offence which grew by most palpable and grosse errors in astrology (London: John Charlewood, printer to E of Arundel, 1583)


- Iue, Paul, Instructions for the warres Amply, learnedly, and politiquely, discoursing the method of militarie discipline. Originally written in French by that rare and worthy generall, Monsieur William de Belley, Lord of Langey, Knight of the order of Fraunce, and the Kings lietenant in Thurin. Translated by Paule Iue, Gent. (London: Thomas Orwin for Thomas Man and Toby Cooke, 1589)
- Keltridge, John, Two godlie and learned sermons appointed, and preached, before the Jesuites, seminaries, and other aduersaries to the gospell of Christ in the Tower of London. In which, were confuted to their faces, the moste principall and cheefe points of their Romish and vvhoarish religion: and all such articles as they defend, contrarie to the word of Cod [sic], vvere layed open and ripped vp vnto them. In Maye. 7 and 21. Anno. 1581. By John Keltridge, preacher of the wvorde of God, in London (London: [John Charlewood &] Richard Jones, [1581])

- Lively, Edward, Hebraearum literarum in Academia Cantabrigiensis professoris, annotationes in quinq[ue] priores ex minoribus prophetis cum Latina eorum interpretatione, eiusdem opera ac studio, ad normam Hebraicae veritatis diligenter examinata (London: George Bishop, 1587)

- Lupton, Thomas, The Christian against the Iesuite Wherein the secrete or namelesse writer of a pernicious booke, intituled A discouerie of I. Nicols minister &c. priuily printed, couertly cast abrod, and secretly solde, is not only justly reprooued: but also a booke, dedicaed to the Queenes Maiestie, called A persuasion from papistrie, therein derided and falsified, is defended by Thomas Lupton the authour thereof. Reade with advisement, and judge vprightly: and be affectioned only to truth. Seene and allowed (London: Thomas Dawson for Thomas Woodcock, 1582)

- Munday, Anthony, A briefe aunswer made vnto two seditious pamphlets, the one printed in French, and the other in English Contayning a defence of Edmund Campion and his complices, their moste horrible and vnnaturall treasons, against her Maiestie and the realme (London: [John Charlewood] for Edward White, 1582)

- Newton, Thomas, A direction for the health of magistrates and studentes Namely suche as bee in their consistent age, or neere thereunto: drawen aswell out of sundry good and commendable authours, as also vpon reason and faithfull experience otherwise certaynely grounded. Written in Latin by Guilielmus Gratarolus, and Englished, by T.N. (London: William How for Abraham Veale, 1574)

- Nicholls, Thomas, The pleasant historie of the conquest of the VVeast India, now called new Spayne atchieued by the vorthy prince Hernando Cortes Marques of the valley of Huaxacae, most delectable to reade: translated out of the Spanishe tongue, by T.N. Anno. 1578 (London: Henry Bynneman, 1578)

- Ocland, Christopher, Anglorum praelia ab anno Domini, 1327. anno nimirum primo inclytissimi principis Eduardi eius nominis tertii, vsque ad annu[m] Domini. 1558. Carmine summamini perstricta. Item, de pacatissimo Angliae statu, impereante Elizabetha, compendiosa narratio. Authore Christophoro Oclando, primò scholae Southwarkiensis propē Londinun, dein Cheltennamensis, quae sunt à serenissima sua maiestate fundatae, moderatore. Hae duo poëmata, tām ob argumenti granitatem, quàm carminis facilitatem, nobilissimi Regiae Maiestatis consiliarij in omnibus huius regni scholis praelegenda pueris

- Peckham, Sir George, A true reporte, of the late discoveries, and possession, taken in the right of the Crowne of Englonde, of the new-found landes: by that valiant and worthy gentleman, Sir Humphrey Gilbert Knight. Wherein is also brefely sette downe, her highnesse lawfull tytle therewnto, and the great and manifolde commodities, that is likely to grow thereby, to the whole realme in generall, and to the adventurers in particular. Together with the easiness and shortnes of the voyage. Seene and allowed (London: J[ohn] C[harlewood] for John Hinde, 1583)

- Prime, John, A short treatise of the sacraments generally, and in speciall of baptisme, and of the Supper. (London: Christopher Barker, 1582)

- Prime, John, A fruitefull and brieue discourse in two booke: the one of nature, the other of grace with convenient answer to the enemies of grace, upon incident occasions offered by the late Rhemish notes in their new translation of the new Testament, & others. Made by John Prime fellow of New Colledge in Oxford (London: Thomas Vautrollier for George Bishop, 1583)

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² Some versions contain a letter from the Privy Council (which is signed by Walsingham) to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners stipulating the “public receiving and teaching” of Ocland’s book in grammar and free schools.
England and Ireland. Compiled by John Rider, master of artes, and preacher of Gods word (Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1589)

- Rogers, John, An answeres vnto a wicked & infamous libell made by Christopher Vitel, one of the chiefe English elders of the pretended Family of Love maintaining their doctrine, & carpingly answeringe to certaine pointes of a boke called the displaing of the Fam. Answered by I. Rogers (London: John Day, 1579)

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- Tomson, Laurence, The New Testament of our Lord Iesus Christ translated out of Greeke by Theod. Beza: ; whereunto are adioyned brief summaries of doctrine vpon the Evangelistes and Actes of the Apostles, together with the methode of the epistles of the Apostles by the said Theod. Beza: and also short expositions on the phrases and hard places taken out of the large annotations of the foresaid authour and Ioach Camerarius, by P. Loseler Villerius. Englished by L. Tomson (London: Christopher Barker, 1576)

- Tomson, William, In canticum canticorum quod scriptit Schelomo explanation facilima, & colestis plena consolationis; authore Guilielmo Tomson verbi ministro (London: Robert Waldegrave, 1583)


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3 Recorded as dedicated to Walsingham in Williams, Index of Dedications, but the version on EEBO is missing this, Folger Shakespeare Library, STC/2087:05.

4 Series of dedicatory verses, naming most prominent figures at court.
Graeco à Theodoro Beza in Latinum versos, notisque itidem illustratos. Secunda cura Francisci Junii
(London: William N[orton], 1593)\(^3\)

- Twyne, Thomas, *The wonderfull woorkmanship of the world wherin is conteined an excellent discourse of Christian naturall philosophie, concerning the fourme, knowledge, and use of all things created: specially gathered out of the fountaines of holy Scripture, by Lambertus Danaeus: and now Englished, by T.T.* (London: John Kingston for Andrew Maunsell, 1578)

- Ubaldini, Petruccio, *Descrittione del regno di Scotia, et delle isole sue adiacenti di Petruccio Vbaldini cittadin Fiorentino. Nella quale si descrivono i confini di ciascuna provincia, & i luoghi che visono, & le cose piu degne di memoria, che visi trouano tanto naturali, quanto marauigliose* (London: John Wolfe, 1588)\(^6\)

- W[jilcox], T[homas], *Summarie and Short Meditations, touching sundry poyntes of Christian religion, gathered by T.W. and now published for the edification and profit of Gods Saints* (London: [T. Dawson] for George Bishop, 1580)

- Woolton, John, *The castell of Christians and fortresse of the faithfull besieged, and defended, now almost sixe thousand yeares. Witten by John VVolton, one of the Cathederal Church in Exeter* (London: John C[harlewood] for Thomas Sturrup, 1577)

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\(^3\) Recorded as dedicated to Walsingham in Williams, *Index of Dedications*, but the different editions and versions on EEBO are all dedicated to the Elector Palatine.

\(^6\) Joint dedication with the earl of Leicester and Sir Christopher Hatton.
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