The Papacy and the Eastern Mediterranean 1305 – 1362

James Anthony Nigel Hill

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

The papacy was actively involved in the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the fourteenth century, and evidence of much of its activity can be found in the registers preserved in the Vatican Archives. By using a source base of nearly 1,300 letters drawn from the registers directly relating to activity in the Eastern Mediterranean and supporting non-papal evidence, this thesis explores the aims, intentions, and outcomes of papal policy toward the East.

The Eastern Mediterranean during the Avignon period was a site of exchange, trade, and conflict, and the papacy was actively involved in controlling behaviour and propagating its own agenda. An analysis of these policies and interventions allows for an evaluation of the papacy’s ability to establish and maintain authority and exercise power. This thesis contextualises the reasons why the papacy was able to act, or was unable to act, alongside the intentions of the papacy, for a greater understanding of the popes’ influence and activity in the region.

The papacy clearly maintained a consistent interest in the East throughout the Avignon period and enacted a series of policies designed to control the behaviour of Catholics living and working in the East, increase its influence over other Christian Churches, and engage with non-Christian political powers. Most individuals, institutions, and polities accepted the authority of the papacy, but the power of the papacy was limited. It was largely unable to enforce its will even though most actors in the Eastern Mediterranean accepted its right to impose its agenda. Despite this lack of power, respect for the papacy’s authority led to some significant achievements, and the evidence base demonstrates a complicated series of policies aimed at securing Catholic interests.
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<tr>
<td>CVI:LSF</td>
<td>Clement VI: Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant a la France, ed. by Eugène Déprez, 3 vols (Paris: Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 1925)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JXXII:LC</td>
<td>John XXII, Jean XXII (1316–1334); Lettres communes analysées d’Après les registres dits d’Avignon et du Vatican, ed. by Guillaume Mollat, 16 vols (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1904–47)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reg. Vat.</td>
<td>Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registrum Vaticanum</td>
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Introduction

The period following the fall of Acre in 1291 has always been of interest to historians of the crusade, and while the ‘later crusades’ have been less studied than their more famous kindred in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, they certainly make up an established field. Similarly, economic historians have shown an interest in the economy of the Eastern Mediterranean in the fourteenth century, with a particular focus on Constantinople and Alexandria. Beyond these fields, however, the Eastern Mediterranean in the fourteenth century is substantially less studied than Europe, and is often only used relative to other time periods. Studies looking at interactions between the Mongol world and Europe tend to focus on the invasion of 1241–42 and less on the fourteenth century, while Byzantinist historiography tends to consider the fourteenth century in light of the events of the fifteenth. Scholarship on the Avignon papacy has largely excluded the East, focusing on France, the Holy Roman Empire, England, Spain, and Italy as a general rule, as well as on the practical workings of the papal court.¹

This comparative lack of scholarly interest in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Avignon period has left a space in papal history that this thesis will address. It will explore a range of themes in order to draw a more comprehensive understanding of papal activities and intentions in the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the Avignon period, charting how papal aims and policies, as well as actions, altered throughout. Rather than approaching the subject through the lens of a single discipline, the thesis takes a broad, inclusive approach, which draws on a range of fields to present as complete an account of the papacy’s relations with the Eastern Mediterranean as possible. In methodology, it is similar to Clara Maillard’s recently published Les papes et le Maghreb aux XIIIème siècle in that it is attempting a broader understanding of papal policy than a specifically military,

¹ For an overview of scholarship on the Avignon papacy, see Hélène Millet, ‘Qu’est-ce que la papauté avignonnaise?’, Lusitania sacra, ser. 2, 22 (2010), 17–24.
economic, religious, or social history could provide on its own. Both works use the papal registers as a primary evidence base, supported by external sources, and attempt to build up an understanding of papal policy and intentions outside of Europe. While Maillard’s focus was the Maghreb, this thesis explores the other end of the Mediterranean, taking into account the activities occurring along the Levant coast, Asia Minor, and the Aegean Sea, and consequently uses a correspondingly larger number of letters.

This geographical scope, encompassing the Byzantine Empire, the Catholic kingdoms of Armenian Cilicia (referred to throughout as Armenia, following the medieval papal usage) and Cyprus, the Mamlûk sultanate, and also the fringes of the Mongol Ilkhanate and Golden Horde, allows for the comparison of a great many different forms of interaction between the papacy and other groups. These groups were connected through trade, cultural, and political exchange. As examples, the Ilkans and Golden Horde connected to the Eastern Mediterranean via the Black Sea, as acceptable trading alternatives for the Mamlûk sultanate and as territorial rivals. The sultanate was viewed as an enemy of Christendom and an aggressor against Armenia. The Christian kingdoms of the Eastern Mediterranean were partners and prospective partners for the papacy. The region forms a single discrete area to compare and contrast policy between a disparate and varied, but interconnected, set of countries, and an equally diverse set of activities taking place within them. It is an area with significant regional variation in terms of religious and political affiliations, the different parts of which maintained diverse relations with the West. Yet these diverse locations are drawn together in papal policy through its interest in the Holy Land and the routes to it, and its ambitions to expand the Catholic world beyond Europe. By drawing together the huge amounts of information recorded about papal interests in the region, it is possible to recontextualise papal policy with the Eastern Mediterranean and to explore what the papacy was really trying to achieve there.

This thesis, with its focus on papal history outside of Europe, fits into a relatively recent trend in medieval scholarship, attempting to reassess the impact the Avignon papacy had on the wider world and understand its intentions. The works of

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Carr, Stantchev, Bueno, Maillard, and Housley come to a similar set of conclusions; that is, that the papacy was actively involved in the Eastern Mediterranean and the rest of the periphery of Europe throughout the fourteenth century, and that the aims and intentions of papal policy relating to the East were more complicated and less isolationist than was previously characterised by Mollat, Ashtor, or Nicol, for example. This project is thematically broader than many of the other recent publications, however, and explores a larger variety of issues over a relatively constricted time-frame, rather than exploring single issues over multiple centuries. Housley was concerned almost entirely with the crusade, Carr and Stantchev have explored economic policy and trade, while Bueno has been primarily interested in cultural and intellectual exchange. Maillard explored the actions and intentions of the papacy in regard to Spain and Morocco, and this thesis has taken a similar thematic approach to the Eastern Mediterranean, though with a substantially larger corpus of letters. Maillard’s recent findings on the scope of papal involvement in the Maghreb have been upheld by the findings of this research project, and it is likely that a similar analysis into papal interests along other frontiers would lead to comparable results.

This project has the potential to intervene in a number of ongoing debates about the role of the Avignon papacy, particularly in relation to the world outside Europe. While the characterisation of the Avignon papacy as a puppet of the French kings has been questioned for some time, it is only in much more recent scholarship that the role of the papacy towards the outside world has come under renewed scrutiny, and this project fits into this reformist arc. It seeks to reconceptualise the papacy’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean and its ability to influence events and to pursue its own agenda. It will highlight the active character of papal involvement in

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many aspects of social and political life in the East, and re-evaluate the papacy’s achievements as an independent institution.

The period 1305 to 1362 covers the pontificates of the first five ‘Avignon’ popes: Clement V, John XXII, Benedict XII, Clement VI, and Innocent VI. The following pope, Urban V, was the first to make a return, albeit temporarily, to Rome. This move came about due to increasing tension in Rome between the nobility and the papacy, and was initially intended to be a temporary measure. The papacy found itself drawn beyond the Alps to settle affairs further north regularly anyway, and ended up settling in Avignon, a papal enclave, for much of the fourteenth century. Urban V temporarily returned to Rome, and after his pontificate schism mired the papacy. Following the death of Gregory XI, Urban’s successor, a Neapolitan, Urban VI, was elected in 1378, who governed from Rome. Urban proved to be a divisive figure, and shortly after, the cardinals elected a second pope, Clement VII, who set up his administration in Avignon, where much of the curia was still stationed. The schism dominated interactions with both papacies, and this represented a period of substantially different priorities, downplaying interactions and interest in the East. The Avignon period is usually used for research projects focusing on Europe, as the Avignon papacy had different challenges and characters to the popes in Rome prior and after it. During the period, the papacy has been seen to be particularly concerned with Western Europe, and its policies have been seen as distinctive from the policies of the Rome-based pontiffs. It is also appropriate for this research project for the same reason as it used in European studies. The move to Avignon represented a shift in the operation of the papal court and, as such, is the most pertinent discreet period for a study of papal history. The event frequently used in crusade studies as period-dividing, the fall of Acre in 1291, was significant in the development of the crusade and the political make-up of the Eastern Mediterranean. It remains a useful point in crusade studies, but was not particularly important to economic or political activity beyond the Levant. The loss of Acre did not provoke the kind of reaction that the loss of Jerusalem had nearly a century earlier, and the reaction from European powers was vocal outrage but not military adventure. While Nicholas IV made some attempts to promote a reconquest, and several discussions were held on the subject, no progress was made after his death in 1292, and secular
partners were not especially forthcoming in the following decade. Byzantinists often use 1274, the council of Lyons, as an epoch-beginning point, and this makes sense within the context of Byzantine-papal relations. The death of Het'um II of Armenia in 1307 might be seen as another epoch-defining moment in papal-Armenian relations. As this project is not concerned with any single one of these areas but rather the papacy’s interactions with all of them, choosing the date range most relevant to the papacy is the most logical approach for this project.

Tyerman’s assertion that the dearth of documentation prior to the fourteenth century has prevented historians from judging the intentions of actors involved in the crusade implies that we can do so for actors from the fourteenth. This thesis certainly aims to do this, and it also considers the extent to which the papacy was able to wield power in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Avignon period. In terms of establishing the intentions of the papacy, there are some caveats that must be acknowledged. A single papal letter, regardless of its origins, cannot be seen to be an authoritative statement of policy. It may represent the intentions of the papacy in a single temporal snapshot, but a policy requires a certain amount of continuity. A direction must be evident, or absent, from both the actions and intentions of the papacy for a substantial part of the sub-period in order to be considered a policy; expressions which do not meet this criteria should not be seen as long-term ambitions of the papacy. This is not to say that the short-term goals of the papacy are irrelevant to policy, but that single examples should not be overemphasised in the larger scheme of the papacy’s political aims.


5 Due to the wide range of locations covered in this project, a consistent approach to naming has been taken across different transliteration systems. Where an English cognate exists, this has been used as a preferred option for person and place names, such as James for Jacques, or Rome for Roma, as is common in English scholarship. Where no such simple cognate exists, literal transliterations of names have been used, rather than Latinised versions. Andronikos is thus preferred to Andronicus, for example. Arabic names have been transcribed by the author as faithfully as possible using diacritics, and any mistakes are entirely my own.

6 Christopher Tyerman, How to Plan a Crusade: Reason and Religious War in the Middle Ages (London: Allen Lane, 2015), pp. 5–6.
An understanding of the papacy’s use of power also requires a certain amount of theoretical backing. The framework provided by Mann has been adapted in this thesis, as it provides a helpful intellectual tool with broad applications, which can be tailored to a number of different situations.7 Mann distinguishes several overlapping forms of social power which can be used to explore the reasons for action within a society: ideological, economic, military, and political. All of these factor into how the papacy interacted with other entities in the Eastern Mediterranean, to greater or lesser degrees. These help to explain why the papacy was acting in a certain way, and what factors influenced its policies over various areas, such as why the papacy acted the way it did toward economic activity with the Muslim world, for example. This conception of social power is useful in understanding the motivation of an institution such as the papacy, and is used implicitly throughout the study.

The papacy was a religious and a political institution, but in the way it exercised power toward the Eastern Mediterranean, it must be seen as primarily political. It funded activities, sent agents with specific agendas, controlled others, and coordinated military expeditions. As a result of this exercise of political power an evaluation based on how such power was both perceived, and complied with, by contemporaries with which the papacy interacted is useful. Much of the literature discussing the use of power is peculiar to more modern forms of government and economies, but certain principles can still be applied to the Middle Ages, particularly in terms of analytical tools. Several works have grappled with defining power, and a broad consensus comes through. Power, in its most general sense, is a means to achieving a desired output or control, through whatever means is necessary.8 This can be assessed in a variety of ways, but following Hart’s example, this study will use the observation of control over events and outcomes in preference

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to observation of more specific forms of control where possible, considering the results of power as an overall output and its broadest effects.  

In terms of how power is defined in this thesis, Parsons’ definition of power is particularly relevant, as it is free of context-specific caveats, and will be used as the basis for how the term is used in the context of the papacy:

Power then is the generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in the case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions – whatever the actual agency of that enforcement.

Power as a term is used in this study to refer to the practical output of a social output, as an enforceable action. It is the practical, direct, aspect of power, and should be viewed as the extent to which the papacy was able to enforce the terms of a command it had given, particularly in the face of a non-cooperative party. This does make a distinction between power, as a result, and the legitimacy and acceptance of the right of an institution to interfere in an event. This thesis uses the term ‘authority’ for the latter concept, and is broadly analogous to what Parsons refers to as ‘symbolic power’; it is the softer, social and legal power the papacy was able to exert over its interactions. The extent to which other actors in the Eastern Mediterranean acknowledged the right of the papacy to interfere with, control, and penalise activity establishes the level of papal authority over a given activity. Power, then, can be seen as a separate concept to authority; power is the ultimate output of a policy or action, while authority is the perceived legitimacy of the institution to be exercising power in the first place.

Both these concepts, to a certain extent, rely on the observation of outcomes to provide an evaluation of the level, particularly with regard to power. In this way, what this thesis is evaluating is the papacy’s ability to enact power, rather than power itself, in many ways. It is exploring the aims of the papacy and the extent to

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which those aims were enacted, as a method of establishing power. In order to provide an assessment of papal policy, its effectiveness, and how power and authority were used, the application of power and authority must be considered. Power cannot be directly observed, only the impact of power or the use of power can be. This requires an assessment of the will of the papacy, and how effective it was at implementing it, and this provides the basis for the outcomes of the use of power and authority in this study.

These two concepts, power and authority, are not always completely separate and, while there is some overlap in them, it is quite possible to have one without the other. Authority without power suggests an extremely ineffective enforcement system which could be prone to inaction and possible rebellion. Power without authority, on the other hand, would lead to rebellion which would need to be quelled or subdued in some fashion. Generally, however, it would be more normal to see a complex interplay between the power and authority of an institution. This conceptual separation helps create a more nuanced look at the papacy’s political aims and allows the intentions and achievements of papal policy to be scrutinised in an effective way. The papacy attempted to govern the actions of Catholics and coordinate Catholic expansion from the Canary Islands to Beijing in the fourteenth century and had little territory and military power of its own. It was dependent on the secular states for military power and required the cooperation of local clerics for large-scale fund raising. As an institution with an extremely wide area of interest, and a comparatively small amount of direct control, the papacy’s interactions with the diverse people and institutions in the Eastern Mediterranean makes for an excellent case study into the power dynamic between the papacy and the rest of the world.

The Papal Registers and Their Editions

The project uses papal evidence as its principal source of reference point for papal intentions and activity. This evidence has survived in the form of copies of papal letters, stored in registers currently housed in the Vatican Secret Archives, on a large variety of topics with which the papacy was interested or involved. The registers
currently exist in two series, the *Registra Vaticana* and *Registra Avenionensia*, both of which contain contemporary material for the Avignon popes, the *Vaticana* in parchment, and the *Avenionensia* in paper. These are extensive series, spanning almost 200 volumes for the Avignon popes alone in the *Registra Vaticana* series, and cover the whole Avignon period, providing a great deal of information about the activities of the papacy during this period. They currently contain an incomplete but extensive record of the issues concerning the papacy during the period, which regularly featured events in the Eastern Mediterranean. The letters cover a huge variety of topics, and can be used to inform intentions and outcomes of various events the papacy was involved in, as well as the mechanisms which supported them. There are, however, issues with the registers which must be acknowledged and taken into consideration in order to utilise them effectively, and avoid misusing them.\(^{11}\)

As a foremost consideration, it must be acknowledged that the papal registers that are currently in the possession of the Vatican Secret Archives are incomplete for a variety of reasons. The collection has moved several times, most notably in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries with the relocation from Avignon to Rome, resulting in a confusion of records, losses and re-collations. Other sections have suffered damage, rendering parts of or entire registers illegible. The current cataloguing system was not put in place until the eighteenth century, further obscuring our understanding of how the ancient registers were organised and stored. A further upheaval occurred when Napoleon had the entire archive moved to Paris in the nineteenth century. The archive was not returned for a protracted length of time, during which there was further damage and pilfering.\(^{12}\) Furthermore, not all

\(^{11}\) A recent survey of the editions of the papal archives, and the modern additions to the editing project, can be found in Laurent Vallière, ‘Les lettres pontificales du XI\(\text{e}\) siècle: histoire de leur édition et questionnements actuels’, *Lusitania Sacra*, ser. 2, 22 (2010), 25–43. See Barbara Bombi, ‘The Roman Rolls of Edward II as a Source of Administrative and Diplomatic Practice in the Early Fourteenth Century’, *Historical Research*, 85 (2012), 597–616 for a discussion on the uses of the registers to inform diplomacy and administration.

the letters were recorded on the same material, and records on both paper and parchment exist separately, sometimes duplicating information, sometimes not.

The transition of the registers through the ages is not a particularly well-documented process, and it is not even entirely clear when the physical volumes that now make up the collection were copied. There were two parallel registers being kept in the Avignon period – the parchment fine-copy registers that form the modern Registra Vaticana, and the paper copies which form the Registra Avenionensia. These sometimes duplicate each other’s records, but they sometimes contain unique letters potentially lost to the other register. It appears that the Registra Vaticana is a clean copy of the Registra Avenionensia, but in fact there are discrepancies between the two, both in the inclusion of materials and the wording of letters. There is a certain amount of evidence that suggests that there was substantial recopying of the Vaticana during the schism and afterwards, but there is little conclusive evidence to establish when each currently existing volume was created.\textsuperscript{13} The reorganisation of the archive into its modern form in the mid-eighteenth century also presents several issues.\textsuperscript{14} One major issue is that when the registers were rebound, potential evidence of missing documents was removed. It is now unclear how much information has been lost prior to this recompilation, and rubrics which could have indicated this information have an even worse survival rate. This can be mitigated to an extent by assuming that the loss rates for all registers from the Avignon are consistent, as they have all been through similar journeys around Europe and have all undergone the same editing process over the centuries. This is obviously an extremely general supposition, however, and while projects are in progress which attempt to compile letters that are not part of the registers, it must be accepted that the collection is fundamentally incomplete.\textsuperscript{15} The reorganisation process the archive has undergone has removed much evidence of this loss, however, and as a consequence all the


\textsuperscript{15} Boyle, A Survey of the Vatican Archives, p. 105.
registers must be treated with caution as there is no way of knowing for certain how much is missing.

The letters were also not always kept in sequence when they were recompiled. While the current register sequence is largely chronological, barring a handful of special registers, the individual letters contained within them were not always so. From John XXII, two parallel chronological series were created within the Registra Vaticana series: for John XXII, the sequence of common registers runs from registers 63–108 (1316–1334) and the sequence of secret registers 109–117. While these registers are distinctly labeled, the material in them is not always so obviously distinguished, and it would appear that mistakes may have been made. As above, due to the uncertainty over the composition and copying of the registers, how much material has migrated from one to another or been lost is unclear. In other examples, letters which belonged to one pontificate have moved into the registers of another.16

Physical damage to the registers represents another problem, including damage and loss both before the reorganisation and since. The move from Avignon to Rome and back, taken several times and in several stages over the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, resulted in substantial losses to the papal archive.17 Due to the reorganisation of the archive, there is no indication of the extent of that loss, but it is clear that the current Registra Vaticana and Registra Avenionensia series are not complete works and what exists today is only a part of the original records. Clement V appears to have had a register of secret letters which does not survive. Registers of supplications appear to have also existed for John XXII and Benedict XII, at least, but again, no registers survive. The entire penitentiary records for the fourteenth century have been lost.18 Arguments centring on omission from the registers are therefore problematic unless the evidence is corroborated or overwhelming. Records could have been omitted for a reason, or they may simply have been lost. Another

16 BXII:LC, I, pp. 219–20 are a collection of letters found in Benedict’s registers, but which belong to Clement V and John XXII, largely concerning the dissolution of the Templars. BXII:LC, II, n. 8378, pp. 1348–49 is another set of letters out of place in the sequence, and talks about Clement VI’s naval league against the Turks in 1344, not the 1334 naval league.
problem is that even the current registers are no longer completely intact. One of the
registers of John XXII, much of one of Clement VI’s, and the registers covering the
years 1358–61 for Innocent VI’s pontificate have all been severely damaged,
making them all but illegible.\textsuperscript{19} The amount of information still available is huge,
particularly by medieval standards, but it is not complete.

In addition to this physical loss, there are also difficulties in using the letters to
determine policy. Not all the letters recorded were created by the apostolic chamber,
and by far the most numerous type of letter found in the registers was created at the
behest of a petitioner, and known as a common letter, in either the chancery or the
penitentiary. Other types include curial and secret letters; the difference between
these letters is generally in who paid for the letter, who dictated the contents, and
who initiated it, rather than in content itself. There is some overlap between these
letters, however, and through misplacement, and as well as irregularities within the
papal bureaucracy, these distinctions should not be seen as absolute in the modern
registers.\textsuperscript{20}

Curial and secret letters were produced by chamber secretaries at the papacy’s
discretion and so are generally the least problematic of these categories in terms of
how we can use them. The cost for such letters was borne by the curia, and these
letters could be a response to a received letter or embassy, or sent on the initiative of
the curia. While it is unclear exactly who at any given moment could send these
letters, which were in the pope’s name, it was clear that only very senior figures in
the papacy had such authority. The function of these records could be quite diverse,

\textsuperscript{19} Germano Gualdo, \textit{Sussidi per la consultazione dell’Archivio Vaticano: lo Schedario
Garampi, i Registri Vaticani, i Registri Lateranensi, le “Rationes Camerae”, l’Archivio
\textsuperscript{20} Bombi, ‘The Roman Rolls’, pp. 597–603 helpfully gives a summary of the
historiography of European administrative bureaucracy in the fourteenth century. See
Patrick Zutshi, ‘The Personal Role of the Pope in the Production of Papal Letters in the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’, in \textit{Vom Nutzen des Schreibens: Soziales
Gedächtnis, Herrschaft und Besitz im Mittelalter}, ed. by Walter Pohl and Paul Herold
(Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2002), pp. 225–
36 (pp. 226–30) and Zutshi, ‘Changes in the Registration of Papal Letters under the
Avignon Popes’, pp. 237–62 for greater discussion on the production of letters in
Avignon.
including authorising unusual petitions, recording diplomatic correspondence, curial administrative matters, or other issues that the chamber was involved in.21

Common letters were quite different to curial and secret letters in their production, if not always their content. These were created by the chancery or penitentiary with oversight from senior figures at Avignon. They were primarily administrative in function, largely dealing with disputes on such issues as benefices, finance, land, and marriage. They were created after a petitioner presented the papacy with a correctly formatted request, paid the appropriate fees, and had his or her request approved. The content of the letter was largely phrased by the petitioner; the chancery had the authority to amend petitions but appears not to have done so regularly. This means that the language contained within common letters should be used with care when trying to extrapolate papal policy from a common letter’s content, as the wording was likely to be that of the petitioners put into the format required of the petition.22

Because of the production processes behind the issuing of letters, they are an inherently reactive form of media. Letters were generally responses to petitions or requests, even those of the chamber, and the issuing of a letter should not been as evidence of an active policy. It would also be a mistake to assume that because papal letters were a response, that they have no use in establishing policy. Letters, even as a direct response to a petition worded by the petitioner, were issued in accordance with papal practice and reveal the implementation of papal policy. Petitions were not granted if they did not conform in both style and substance to canon law and papal policy. The contents of chamber letters, it is reasonable to infer, can be used to directly inform the understanding of contemporary papal policy and intentions,


though even these should not be seen as necessarily authoritative. The hopes of a senior figure in the curia did not always translate to a longer-term strategy, and a repetition of aims over time should still be observed before accepting them as a policy. The contents of common letters may not have been written by a member of the curia, but must be seen to at least fit in the general policy framework established by the pope or the letter would not have been approved. While the letters themselves were reactive, the policy they were being evaluated on was not necessarily.

This distinction between curial and common is medieval in its origin. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say with certainty that the distinction has been consistently maintained into the current registers and editions. According to Marie Laurent, one of the editors for the French School of Rome’s editions of the registers, both were included in the original registers with no real indication as to which they were, which presents a further complication.23 The modern categorisation of the letters are to an extent editorial choices made on the content, recipient and style of the letter where they are not clearly demarked. In some registers, there is a clear distinction drawn, but it is unclear when this distinction was made, given the uncertain origins of the physical copies we currently have. The potential, therefore, exists for mislabelling and for misuse of the letters if they are evaluated exclusively on those assignments. There is an overlap of content between the two categories of letter, and it is possible that some letters may have been incorrectly assigned, particularly in regard to the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, it is important to judge each letter individually and to exercise caution when using all the papal letters, given the potentially ambiguity in their production.

Due to the volume of documents contained within the Vatican Secret Archives, this project has been dependent on the extensive and laudable French School in Rome’s editions, but there are limits to these which must be recognised. These are not exhaustive editions, and understanding how they are limited is crucial to using them. The mandate of the French School editions was to include letters which concerned France, and although this broadened significantly into a relatively comprehensive survey of the Registra Vaticana for some popes, the editions still did not cover all the material in the archives from the Avignon period. Physical damage

to the original registers has left gaps, and printing errors have obscured other sections. Nevertheless, with 192 volumes in the *Registra Vaticana* series alone for this period, the French School’s editions are an essential, if sometimes problematic, filter.

Perhaps the largest problem with the French School’s editions is that they do not cover the entire archive for the entire Avignon period. Clement V, John XXII, and Benedict XII have relatively comprehensive coverage of all the volumes of the series, but Clement VI and Innocent VI only have curial and secret letters edited. As a result, there is a gap of 71 registers for Clement VI, and 15 for Innocent VI that is not addressed at all. Further to this, even for those pontificates that are comprehensively edited, the editions do not include all material but only that which was pertinent to the editor. John XXII’s registers are almost entirely edited, except that the series for secret letters only covers those letters the editor felt pertained to France in some way. As another example, Benedict XII’s editions run to four volumes for common letters and two for secret, despite having ten volumes for common and seven for secret in the registers. Obviously, substantial amounts of the actual content of the letters have not been edited in that series, but it is unclear where the cuts have taken place. It is therefore extremely unclear how much material has been omitted from the existing editions, and while they are imperative for accessibility, they are also deceptive in being presented as relatively comprehensive works when they are, in fact, not.

A substantial issue when using the edited registers is their use of summaries. Many of the entries are heavily edited, in many cases not retaining any of the original letter, only offering a one- or two-sentence summary of the letter. The level of inclusion is based entirely on the discretion of the editor, so while some letters are included in full and run to several pages, others are almost completely omitted. In these cases, the edited registers function more as a catalogue for the originals than a source of information in itself, though in many cases letters concerning the Eastern Mediterranean caught the attention of the editors and substantial amounts of the

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24 The version of the letter sent to King George of the Georgians in 1321 found in the registers: JXXII:LC, V, n. 16093, p. 157 is 3 lines of summary. The full version in Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 5v–6v is three folios long, which obviously implies that a lot of information in the edition has been omitted in such a brief summary.
content of these letters were included. While the intended function of the editions may well be as a calendar, to a certain extent, it severely limits the amount of specific information that can be gained from some letters. In order to mitigate this issue, where possible, the manuscripts have been consulted in order to get the full text of a letter. Where this has not been possible, the use of metadata comparison of letters can still provide useful information, both for letters with and without full text. This comparison can demonstrate sustained activity; if several letters were sent on a single subject to the same people over several years, that suggests a high level of interest, even if the exact content is unknown.

Further issues come from the accessibility of the information contained in the registers and the methodology used in locating evidence in such a set of print editions. The French School editions encompass a variety of different series, which all cover material from different popes with apparently no clear editorial consistency. These volumes are not all indexed, and when they are, the indexes are unreliable. This presents a problem for a project looking specifically for letters concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, which is a minor subset of the total letters. To find these letters, a full survey of the editions was conducted, which reduced the total from 99,112 to a set of 1,274 letters which form the core evidence for this project. This total should not and cannot be seen as comprehensive even from the editions, and it is possible that further evidence has been overlooked in the survey.

Therefore, while providing a rich and detailed quantity of information, the papal registers have some limitations which cannot be overcome. This does not render them useless, but it is important that they are not treated as a complete collection, nor is any analysis of them able to be definitive. Despite all this, they are a huge resource to the historian researching the fourteenth century, and the evidence contained in them is the core of this project, even with its limitations. It is simply beyond the scope of this project to avoid being reliant on these editions, though this does necessarily impose limitations on the availability of evidence.

Non-Papal Sources
The majority of writings concerning the Eastern Mediterranean by Latins outside of the papal letters in the first half of the fourteenth century come from two traditions of literature: crusade treatises and pilgrim guides. Both of these kinds of works were popular in the thirteenth century, and the fourteenth-century versions build extensively on those earlier works. Nevertheless, each was updated to reflect the changing political climate of the time, making them a useful set of works to contextualise the papal material. Non-Latin Sources concerning Latin interactions with the Eastern Mediterranean are primarily chronicles. Surviving chronicle cover for the East in the fourteenth century is not as high as it is for events within Europe, reflecting the chaotic events going on in the area, as well as the high level of subsequent unrest in the Near-East which has been detrimental to document survival. Nevertheless, there are few Latin chronicles for this region and period, and so the non-Latin sources provide important narratives as well as acting as counterpoints to the Latin worldview expressed in the papal letters.

Building on the interest in works written by earlier authors such as Charles II of Anjou or Ramon Lull, the first half of the fourteenth century in particular saw the production of substantial numbers of advisory works devoted to the cause of recovering the Holy Land for Christendom. These can be divided into two categories: solicited and unsolicited treatises. The former, like those of Fulk of Villerat and James of Molay, the masters of the Hospital and Temple respectively in 1306, were requested by Clement V, while others were produced on the author’s own initiative and promoted by themselves.

Fulk and James disagreed in regard to how the future of Latin crusading in the East should proceed, with Fulk arguing for greater naval activity and a passagium particulare as necessary preconditions to a full crusade, while James argued for an immediate passagium generale to relieve Armenia and recapture the Holy Land.

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With regard to these two competing proposals, it appears that Clement V took the advice of Fulk of Villaret and proceeded with an expansion of the naval blockade against the Mamlūks and with a smaller campaign which led to the capture of Rhodes. Het’um’s *Flos historiarum terre Orientis* was also produced at Clement’s request and argued for greater international cooperation to support the kingdom of Armenia. They all appeared to have been taken under advisement, and subsequently at least some appeared to have had a meaningful impact on papal policy.

The impact of the second category can be more difficult to ascertain. Marino Sanudo Torsello, one of the most popular crusade writers, presented two copies of his greatest work, the *Secreta Fidelium Crucis*, in a complete form with accompanying maps to John XXII in 1321, and these were carefully scrutinised by several Cardinals and ambassadors. In that case, it is clear that the work was considered useful and was kept, and the wide manuscript distribution his work enjoyed suggests that it was held in high regard. Policies he suggested appeared to coincide with or shaped the direction of papal policy, and consequently seem to have had a meaningful impact on papal activity. Other writers, such as William Adam, who wrote a crusading work around 1317, the *Tractatus quomodo Sarraceni sunt expugnandi*, or the anonymous author of the *Directorium ad passagium faciendum*, finished in 1332, were not necessarily so popular. It appears that their work did not receive as much attention, and that the policies they suggested were not put into effect. Both these works were heavily anti-Byzantine, a position which

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33 William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, p. 11.
had found sympathy under Clement V but quickly lost support after his death in 1314 as subsequent popes took a pro-union stance.34

These sources can inform us about papal policy and the arguments surrounding different aspects of how to engage with the Eastern Mediterranean, but must be used carefully. In general, they can be used to show the spread of opinion amongst the educated in Europe on how best to recover the Holy Land, but only those in which the papacy took an interest can be used to infer papal opinion. Nevertheless, comparing which treatises are known to have been in papal possession, either through inventory or due to being solicited, and how the papacy actually proceeded can show how the papacy was influenced by wider opinions.

Another set of works which can provide insight into how the papacy and Europeans in general conceived of the Holy Land are pilgrim guides. While the quantity of these guides was not as prolific as in the thirteenth century, there were several written in the fourteenth, both by individuals who had spent significant time in the Holy Land and by armchair explorers who never left Europe. These kind of documents were meant for a general (educated) audience and so cannot be seen to represent any official attitudes. Nevertheless, they contain large amounts of incidental information which can be used to infer or evidence papal policy as well as the state of the Christian East.

The guides of interest for this project are those of Simon Semeonis, Ludolph von Suchem, Niccolò da Poggibonsi, and James of Verona.35 These were all men who travelled to the Holy Land on pilgrimage throughout the first half of the fourteenth century, and who wrote accounts of their experiences. They all describe the effects of papal policy and the state of religion in Egypt and the Holy Land, and can be used to show that Europeans were certainly not ignorant of the people and geography of the Near East. They are also helpful to show how the people and

34 See chapter four for further discussion on the relationship between Byzantium and the papacy.
geography of the Eastern Mediterranean was presented to the European public by those who had been there.

Pilgrim guides can be used to show popular understanding of the East, and can infer some aspects of papal policy, but should not be seen as a statement on official policy. The authors were not acting as ambassadors for the papacy, and the observations should be seen to be their own views. Despite this, the accounts provide useful qualitative information about the Holy Land and how Europeans, including members of the Church, treated it.

Both these sources have similar issues, in that they were not written by the curia and thus cannot be seen to be espousing papal policy. Nevertheless, both crusade treatises and pilgrim guides provide context to the papal documents, allowing insight into the assumptions that decisions in Avignon were being made under and what the extent of knowledge about the East in Europe was more generally. For these reasons, the information contained in them is pertinent to the formation of papal policy and cannot be ignored in the wider context of papal relations with the East.

Greek language chronicles cover important events in Byzantium, Latin Greece, and Cyprus, but are sparser than for previous centuries. Makhairas’ *Chronicle* is a fifteenth-century chronicle which extends back to the mid-fourteenth century and is principally concerned with the kingdom of Cyprus.36 Pachymeres’ *Historical Relations* is principally concerned with Byzantium in the late thirteenth century, but does include some material in the fourteenth.37 The only documents which cover the mid-fourteenth century were written by Nikephoros Gregoras, and John VI Kantakouzenos, both of whom were prominent political figures.38 Both authors’ works have the potential to be quite problematic, particularly in relation to his

discussion concerning Latins. Kantakouzenos was writing after being deposed and cloistered in 1354, when the victorious emperor, John V Palaiologos, had taken a strongly pro-Latin shift. Kantakouzenos’ account of his own negotiations and relations with the Latin West were written in this context, and did not always agree with what was said in papal sources or what he appeared to have said at the time. Gregoras unsuccessfully negotiated on behalf of Andronikos III in 1333 and had also been a favourite of the strongly anti-Latin Andronikos II. Thus, both men were directly involved in negotiations over union with the Latin Church, and their own agenda must be recognised in their works.

These chronicles provide a useful narrative for the Greek world, and discuss the relations between the Latin and Greek worlds. In this sense, they are very useful, but must be treated carefully. Sometimes the parts of a work covering the period are secondary to the main chronological interest of the work, using the events as a prologue or epilogue to the main body. The most chronologically useful works are extremely partisan, with the authors being active political figures and also directly responsible for negotiations with the Latin West over Church reunion. The relationship between Constantinople and the West was a contentious issue that divided the Byzantine Empire, and any author’s personal opinion on how the empire should have proceeded on this issue must be factored into a reading of their reporting.

Arabic records for the Mamlûk period have had an extremely poor survival rate, and little of use for papal interactions appears to remain. While there are chronicles which cover the time period, they are largely unconcerned with Europe. Mufaḍḍal ibn Abī l-Faḍā’īl made some comments on events concerning Latins, but extremely infrequently, and even major events such as the riots against the Latins in Alexandria were not given much attention. Ibn Baṭūṭa travelled to Catholic ports in the Crimea, and went to Constantinople, during his voyages, but made little comment on Western Christianity in general. These have some use as

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corroborating evidence but cannot be used extensively to inform the outcomes of papal policy, as they do not include much evidence for that.

The last chronicles concerning Armenia written by Armenians finish in the early part of the fourteenth century, and while there are sporadic and brief continuations to some, there is overall little local record for most of the period.\textsuperscript{41} The bulk of the narrative that covers the last days of the kingdom of Armenia comes from the problematic \textit{Chronicle} of John Dardel, a text written for European audiences by the scribe of Levon V, the king of Armenia, after the kingdom had been lost to the Mamlûks.\textsuperscript{42} The text attempts to make a case for European involvement in a recovery of the kingdom, and presents an interpretation of the history of the kingdom that seems intended to provoke the best reaction, rather than to accurately convey the events that transpired. Latin sources provide by far the largest corpus of evidence for the kingdom of Armenia in the fourteenth century, which has few surviving local sources to present a different perspective.

Non-Latin sources provide a necessary counterpoint to the Latin evidence of Papal–Eastern relations, but as predominantly literary sources, must be used with care. The authors of these works often had clear opinions and motivations which must be considered when using them to evidence contentious topics. Given the turmoil in the Mamlûk, Byzantine and Mongol worlds in the fourteenth century, however, these sources are our best, and in many cases only, sources of information on relations with Latins from a non-Latin perspective.

\textbf{Chapter Structure}

The thesis is divided into three sections, based on thematic groupings. Section one, which consists of chapters one to three, considers the relationship between the papacy and Latin Christians who operated in the Eastern Mediterranean. This

\textsuperscript{41} Samuel d’Ani, in \textit{RHC:DA}, I, pp. 445–68, and Constable Sempad, in \textit{RHC:DA}, I, pp. 605–80, both have continuations into the fourteenth century, though neither are very detailed after the assassination of Het’um II and Levon III, and are not particularly helpful beyond establishing an extremely basic chronology.

includes both the Latins living in the Eastern Mediterranean, largely in Cyprus and Latin Greece, and also non-resident Latins, such as merchants and travellers. This section largely explores social and economic themes, as the papacy had an established right to control these Latins already, and as such the strength of that political power can be observed through its successful control of the varied activities in which Latins were engaging. Section two explores the relationship between the Latin Church and the myriad of other non-Latin Christian Churches operating in the East, both those within and outside of union. This relationship was both social and political, as the papacy had to negotiate a high-level agreement of union politically, but also to enforce the terms of that union at a social level. Section three considers how the papacy interacted with non-Christian powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly the Mongols and the Mamlûks. This explores both the military and diplomatic interactions between these powers. These three divisions cover a substantial amount of the interactions the papacy had with other actors in the Eastern Mediterranean, and provides the opportunity for a comprehensive investigation of papal aims and achievements, and the reasons behind them.

Chapter one looks at the papacy’s efforts to control economic activity between Europe and the Muslim world. The papacy viewed the control of trade in certain military goods to be important for future crusading efforts, a sentiment echoed repeatedly in crusade treatises, and imposed rules and regulations on Latin merchants trading with the Muslim world. The extent of restriction within these rules, and the intended reach of the papacy, has been disputed, and this chapter explores the papacy’s intentions for the control of trade. It also considers how successful this policy was, looking at evidence of activity in the form of trade licences and absolutions for excommunications incurred by breaching the trade restrictions. It then considers what information the control of trade can provide in terms of understanding papal power and how much authority the papacy was able to command.

In a similar vein, chapter two considers how the papacy attempted to control travel to the Holy Land and Egypt, primarily undertaken in the form of pilgrimage. Pilgrimage, for the same reasons as trade, was also recognised as a potentially troublesome activity for the crusade, as pilgrims were heavily taxed both travelling throughout the Mamlûk sultanate and at the holy sites themselves. As there is little
surviving evidence from shipping manifests, evidence from pilgrimage licences issued by the papacy and pilgrim guides will be used to inform the amount of pilgrim traffic and the importance of pilgrimage as a political and economic activity. Papal licences have largely been overlooked in investigations into pilgrimage in the fourteenth century in the past, and this chapter considers the extent of pilgrim activity and papal control over it.

Chapter three centres on an issue more closely concerned with the inhabitants of the Eastern Mediterranean than those travelling through: marriage. It considers how the papacy was able to enforce its rules on incest and on inter-faith marriages so far from its powerbase, and the extent to which it was successful in doing so. These rules had been largely unchanged since the earliest days of the Church, though the rules on incest had been updated at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, and so their implementation provides an excellent snapshot of papal control over Christian society. It is worth noting that the papacy appeared to be relatively inconsistent with what it considered a mixed marriage, however, and that members of non-Latin Churches were not all considered equal candidates for marriage, even in union. The Greek Church, which was formally in union with the Latin Church in areas under Latin rule, appeared to be considered by the Latin Church to be schismatic for the purpose of marriage, and therefore Latins and Greeks should not marry. This stipulation was not held for other union Churches, such as the Armenian, where marriage between Latins and non-Latin Christians was considered by the papacy to be entirely acceptable. This prejudice against the Greek Church, which had majority populations in many of the Latin-ruled territories of the Eastern Mediterranean, provides a useful case study of papal power.

Chapter four, the first part of section two, analyses the efforts the papacy made toward bringing other Churches into union during the fourteenth century, focusing particularly on the Byzantine and Serbian Churches. Both these were Greek-rite Churches which considered themselves politically separate, and the Byzantine and Serb empires were bitter political enemies throughout the period. The papacy demonstrated that it was consistently interested in union, provided the union was on its terms, and was highly active when it believed there was a chance for success. Letters on the issue are relatively common in the papal archives, and a large number of delegations were sent in both directions between the papacy and the
Byzantine emperor on the subject. The way the negotiations played out suggests a reasonable amount about the contemporary perception of the papacy and its authority, and its ability to enact the material terms of union reveal much about the realities of papal power in the region.

In contrast to the papacy’s attempts to enter union, which were largely political negotiations with potential social implications, chapter five discusses how the papacy attempted to enforce the terms of union that Churches had agreed with it. These had strong political and social implications in that a political state of union did not necessarily automatically entail an acceptance by the partner Church’s congregations on the terms of union. If societies of non-Latin Christians could not be persuaded to adopt Catholic norms, then the union could not be said to have been entirely successful, even if it remained a formal reality. This chapter looks particularly at the Armenian Church as an example of a troubled union, and also considers the state of the Greek Church under Latin rule and the Maronites. The extent of the papacy’s involvement in these Churches allows for a complex evaluation of the authority it was able to wield over those outside its core constituency, but still under its jurisdiction, as well as how much it was able to force practices on those communities.

Chapter six is concerned with another group of Christian Churches and kingdoms: those with which the papacy had little contact. These Churches greatly varied in size and power, but all had in common the papacy’s apparent lack of interest in them. The chapter focuses on the Ethiopian, the Georgian, and the Coptic Churches, but this is by no means an exhaustive list, and there were many other Churches active in Asia. Certain patterns can be deduced from the Churches the papacy appeared more or less interested in, through missionary and limited political contact. As a general rule, the closer to Latin orthodoxy, and the more politically established a Church was, the more the papacy pursued it. Those that held practices and beliefs which were further from the Catholic norm, such as the Ethiopian Church, or which had little political power of their own, such as the Syrian or Coptic Churches, were largely ignored. It is reasonable to surmise that this lack of activity was not due to lack of interest, but rather offers a method of exploring the limits of papal reach and power, and what the Avignon popes’ priorities were for expansion.
As a major concern of the papacy in the East, the crusade and other military activity takes up the bulk of the material in the papal registers which concerns the Eastern Mediterranean. Chapter seven, the first part of section three, explores the military applications of papal policy toward the non-Christian parts of the Eastern Mediterranean. This generally falls into two categories in the fourteenth century: the Aegean and the Holy Land. While there was no military expedition to Egypt and the Holy Land until the very end of the period, with Peter I of Cyprus’ assault on Alexandria, there was substantial and sustained interest and logistical preparation throughout the period. There was similar interest in the Aegean theatre, and more military action, with a series of small-scale campaigns and naval leagues by various European powers against the Turks and the Byzantines. The direct nature of military activity allows for a clear evaluation of the limitations of papal power in particular, and the cooperative nature of the alliances the papacy needed for action provides some clarity for an exploration of its authority over its Catholic allies.

As a corollary to European military intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean, chapter eight explores the extent of diplomatic activity between the papacy and non-Christian powers. The Mamlûk sultanate dominated Egypt, Palestine and Syria, but the Ilkhan and the Golden Horde were also a regular papal concern in the region. The Mamlûks were the obvious target of a crusade, but relations with the Mongols was more cordial and also more complex. The papacy sought border security from the Horde, a military alliance with the Ilkhans, and stable trade and travel routes with the Mamlûks even though all these powers were Muslim and occasionally hostile during the fourteenth century. The extent to which the papacy was able to conduct diplomacy successfully with these powers, and the role it assumed on behalf of Europe, provides a useful counterpoint to the military activity with which scholarship on the crusade is usually concerned.

The analysis provided by this thesis promotes a new perspective on the Avignon papacy’s attitudes towards, and achievements in, the Eastern Mediterranean. It examines a broad spectrum of different groups, situations and kinds of interaction to establish the extent of papal power and authority, as well as providing a comprehensive evaluation of the intentions of the papacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, not just as a crusading institution or a Church in negotiation with other Churches, but as a political entity with its own wide-ranging agenda. This
thesis identifies and explores the wider aims of the papacy as an actor influencing a wide range of activities, its policies toward to the Eastern Mediterranean, and how effective it proved to be in enacting them. It also establishes the power dynamics behind those policies, explores the extent to which the papacy was able to make itself a legitimate authority over activity, and examines the extent to which it was able to enforce its will.
I. Papal Control over Catholic Activity in the Eastern Mediterranean

Through the application of canon law, the papacy maintained the right to govern sweeping parts of all peoples’ lives, though in practice, anyone who did not acknowledge the primacy of the pope did not acknowledge the right of the pope to dictate anything. Catholics, then, should have been the greatest supporters of papal authority and power in the Eastern Mediterranean and were generally expected to act as agents of the Catholic faith in upholding behavioural controls. Nevertheless, Catholics often acted in defiance of the Church on various issues, creating a power dynamic that must be explored in order to make any judgement on the effectiveness of papal control and its effective power.

The most effective way to explore this power dynamic is through case studies which showcase what areas of activity the papacy was actively involved in controlling, and how effective that control proved to be. The papacy’s efforts at controlling trade between Europe and the Muslim world are an excellent example; there was a strong desire amongst merchants to maintain widespread trade, which was worth a huge amount of money, and also a very strong military imperative highlighted by crusade theorists to end trade for the benefit of the crusade. Examining how papal policy attempted to bridge these two opposing ideals, and how much the popes were able to control the behaviour of Catholics when high profits were at stake, allows for an important exploration of the papacy’s authority and power. Another, related case study can be found in efforts to control pilgrim traffic from Europe to Egypt and the Holy Land, where the papacy had to balance the religious desire for pilgrimage to the Biblical holy places with its own political-military aims to recapture the land. Pilgrims contributed large amounts of wealth to the Mamlûk sultanate in the forms of taxes, tolls, and spending, but as in the case of trade, universal restrictions were neither practical nor desirable. To what extent pilgrims respected the measures the papacy took to balance these imperatives also informs the understanding of papal power in the period. A final case study will be on marriage, which explores the controls between Catholics and non-Catholics, as well
as how papal power and authority was exerted within the Catholic community, with respect to the prohibitions on incestuous marriage.

It should be acknowledged that the evidence used in section one in particular, in addition to the reasons outlined in the introduction, is even less complete than in other sections. Much of this material appears in common letter registers, which are less well edited than secret letters currently, and additionally many of these letters could also have been issued by the penitentiary.\(^1\) Unfortunately, penitentiary records for the fourteenth century have been lost, and as this was a cheaper and simpler department to petition, this could substantially impact the volume of records available, particularly for pilgrim licences and marriage licences.\(^2\) Chancery records are also not particularly complete, and the register of petitions only begins in 1342, which provides substantial additional material, at least for trade licences, suggesting that earlier periods could have been substantially busier.\(^3\) As a result, the quantitative analysis in this section should be seen as illustrative, and only applicable within specific datasets where the material survival is comparable. These cannot be generalised further than that due to the restrictions on surviving evidence.

In addition to these lost records, it should be noted that legates may have had some responsibility for these activities as well. Isolated examples of this show up and are discussed in relation to trade and marriage, but there is little evidence to suggest that this was a widespread practice. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the

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1 Emil Göller, *Die päpstliche Pönitentiarie von ihrem Ursprung bis zu ihrer Umgestaltung unter Pius V.* (Rome: Bibliothek des Königlich Preußischen Historischen Instituts in Rom, 1907), pp. 1–34. Additionally, work on the existing penitentiary records in the fifteenth century by Kirsi Salonen, ‘Unlicensed Pilgrims and Illegal Trade. Late Medieval Cultural Encounters in the Mediterranean according to the Archives of the Apostolic Penitentiary 1458–1464’, in *Cultural Encounters during the Crusades*, ed. by Kurt Villads Jensen, Kirsi Salonen, and Helle Vogt (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2013), pp. 165–98 has shown that at this later date examples of all these kinds of licences can be found being dealt with by the penitentiary.


papacy did devolve power over some of these activities down on occasion, and that the missing penitentiary records could contain further examples of this as well.

The results of these case studies highlight how the papacy and Catholics living and travelling in the Eastern Mediterranean interacted, and what the power dynamic between them was. Establishing how much power the papacy was able to exert over its subjects away from its established infrastructure, and how much authority it was able to claim over the issues discussed, allows for a useful comparison and evaluation of the overall level of influence the papacy was able to wield. Catholics should, in theory, have been the papacy’s strongest supporters in the area, and certainly those who were subject to its authority the most; therefore, it is useful to evaluate the extent to which they were in fact cooperating with papal policy.
1. Control of Trade with the Muslim World

The commercial situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in the fourteenth century has been described as a genuinely international market in a modern sense, which is to say that goods could move around the geographical area quite freely, while money could be exchanged into different currencies and credit could be easily obtained and exchanged.\(^4\) In the face of this commercial internationalism, the papacy’s attempts to control trade make it an ideal case study of the power and authority of the papacy over individual Christians operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. The papacy claimed control over trade with Muslims, establishing rules over what could be traded and eventually how much and when merchants could trade, which led to the popes issuing licences to merchants to legalise their activities. The establishment of trade restrictions, and the control over what goods fell under restriction, was a wide-reaching assumption of power by the papacy. In order to understand how papal authority was extended over this activity, and the extent to which licenced trade and unlicensed trade occurred, the reasons and motivations behind the actions of the papacy must be determined and examined. This chapter will examine the extent to which the papacy controlled trade, what its intentions were, and what theoretical justifications were used to implement such control. It will also consider how effective the papacy was at maintaining the embargo, what measures it took to enforce the embargo, and to what extent its efforts met its objectives.

The idea of a papal military blockade against the Muslim world was one that found its origins in the latter half of the twelfth century, gaining prominence in Innocent III’s pontificate after the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin in 1187. While the concept of restricting trade was much older, with the first controls on trade with Muslims placed by the Byzantines in 692, and individual city states across the Mediterranean restricting trade thereafter, the papacy was relatively slow to adopt this measure. It was unequivocally linked to the crusade at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, which reinforced the ban on trade in certain goods, and on

unnecessary travel, at least in the short term, into canon law. Throughout the thirteenth century, efforts at promoting and enforcing an embargo on military goods going to Egypt and the Levant continued, although with little effect or active promotion, and the general historical consensus remains that the blockade only became a ‘keystone’ of papal policy in the fourteenth century, when the cause was strongly taken up by crusade theorists. Even though the concept became entrenched as a staple of crusade treatises, the path to taking control over trade was not a

5 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. and trans by Norman Tanner, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum12-2.htm#71 [accessed 18/01/2018]: “Furthermore, since corsairs and pirates greatly impede help for the holy Land, by capturing and plundering those who are travelling to and from it, we bind with the bond of excommunication everyone who helps or supports them. We forbid anyone, under threat of anathema, knowingly to communicate with them by contracting to buy or to sell; and we order rulers of cities and their territories to restrain and curb such persons from this iniquity. Otherwise, since to be unwilling to disquiet evildoers is none other than to encourage them, and since he who fails to oppose a manifest crime is not without a touch of secret complicity, it is our wish and command that prelates of churches exercise ecclesiastical severity against their persons and lands. We excommunicate and anathematize, moreover, those false and impious Christians who, in opposition to Christ and the christian people, convey arms to the Saracens and iron and timber for their galleys. We decree that those who sell them galleys or ships, and those who act as pilots in pirate Saracen ships, or give them any advice or help by way of machines or anything else, to the detriment of the holy Land, are to be punished with deprivation of their possessions and are to become the slaves of those who capture them. We order this sentence to be renewed on Sundays and feast-days in all maritime towns; and the bosom of the church is not to be opened to such persons unless they send in aid of the holy Land the whole of the damnable wealth which they received and the same amount of their own, so that they are punished in proportion to their offence. If perchance they do not pay, they are to be punished in other ways in order that through their punishment others may be deterred from venturing upon similar rash actions. In addition, we prohibit and on pain of anathema forbid all Christians, for four years, to send or take their ships across to the lands of the Saracens who dwell in the east, so that by this a greater supply of shipping may be made ready for those wanting to cross over to help the holy Land, and so that the aforesaid Saracens may be deprived of the not inconsiderable help which they have been accustomed to receiving from this.”

smooth one, and the papacy appeared to be reluctant to take all the steps outlined by the theorists despite the obvious benefits to the crusade they would bring.

The papal prohibitions on trade were initially, at least, quite selective. They specified certain goods with military applications, which the papacy wanted to prevent the Mamlûks and other Muslims from obtaining in order to allow an easier campaign against them. The identification of what material was banned can be found in several letters in the papal registers, chiefly proclamations outlawing trade in certain commodities, licences allowing certain trade, and absolutions for those who had violated the trading prohibitions. The specific goods which were prohibited varied but could include any number of the following: arms, iron, timber, horses, or food supplies. Licences granted for trade usually included the phrase *et aliis de iure communi prohibitis,* or a variant of it, which presumably was included to prevent abuse of technicalities. This clause has caused some difficulties in interpretation, however, and its inclusion in documents concerning the embargo has led to the conclusion that the papacy was legislating for a full ban. These goods were all quite scarce in the sultanate, which was relatively mineral-poor, and Egypt needed to import many of these goods to supply its military forces. These trade controls were intended to make it harder for the sultan to equip his armies adequately, in theory making it easier for a Christian army to invade and reconquer the Holy Land.

This injunction was not only applied to Egypt the Holy Land, although this was the area of greatest interest and concern for the papacy. Alexandria appears named on almost all letters concerning trade, as this was the largest and most accessible port for Western merchants in Egypt. It was sheltered from difficult local sailing conditions elsewhere in the Nile, and was well serviced by road and canal with the overland route to Asia and with the sea-ports to Asia on the Red Sea coast. Trade licences were granted to other places, however, such as Asia Minor, Granada, and Morocco, which does show that the trade injunction on these goods was applied widely to Muslim powers across the Mediterranean. These areas appear less regularly in the registers than documents about Alexandria, but when they do

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7 Reg. Vat. 138, ff. 124v–125r.
8 Menache, ‘Papal Attempts at a Commercial Boycott’, pp. 245–46, is one example, but the assumption is rife amongst much of the literature on the subject.
appear, the language used in licences and grants of absolution is very similar to those for the Eastern Mediterranean. This suggests that the papacy was not trying to isolate the Mamlûk sultanate in particular, but rather it was attempting to establish controls for all trade outside the Christian world in order to better allow the expansion of Christendom.  

Several bulls were re-issued by nearly every Avignon pope which outlawed trading prohibited goods with Saracens, and they have been used as evidence for a complete embargo. One version, found in Clement V’s re-issue in 1308 of Nicholas IV’s ban reads: statuendum ut nullus arma, equos, ferrum, lignamina, uictualia, et alia quaecumque mercimonia in Alexandriam vel ad alia loca Saracenorum terre Egipti deferre mittere vel portubus eorum, ut eisdem deferantur, extrahere vel extrahi permittere aut eis alias auxilium vel favorem prestare quoquomodo presumat. Another of Clement V’s, issued at the same time, reads: ferrum, equos, et alia vetita necnon victualia et mercimonia in Alexandriam et ad alia loca Sarracenorum terre Egypti deferre presumunt. A similar condemnation can be found in the ban issued by Benedict XII in 1338: Excommunicamus et anathematizamus omnes illos qui equos, arma, ferrum, lignamina, vel alia prohibita deferunt Saracenis. In all these examples, the ‘and other goods’ clause at the end has been interpreted as a statement that the popes were banning all trade. In context, however, such a conclusion becomes deeply problematic; there is little reason for the papacy to take great pains in identifying specific goods which were illegal if the goal was to ban all trade. The lack of universal language used in any of these documents makes generalising these statements very difficult. This is not to say that there was no such concept as a full embargo and that calls for the implementation of a full trade embargo did not happen, merely that in the legal documents what was

10 JXXII:LC, XIII, n. 62515, p. 89, is a letter stating that all sanctions which apply to Alexandria also apply to trade with Granada. Certain letters of absolution also specify that the trade for which the individual was excommunicated occurred in Granada, while licences for Asia Minor were occasionally issued as well. See Maillard, Les papes et le Maghreb, pp. 211–55 for a detailed look at the trade restrictions and merchant activity on the Maghreb coast.
11 CV, III, n. 3088, p. 200; Reg. Vat. 55, f. 149r.
12 CV, III, n. 2994, p. 166.
being described was much more ambiguous, and decidedly less universal, than has previously been stated.

The idea of a full trade embargo apparently reached a peak in the pontificate of John XXII, when John appeared to prohibit Venice outright from trading with Alexandria in 1326. All the Avignon popes viewed trade with the Mamlūks as damaging to the crusade’s chances of successfully retaking land from Muslim powers, and they appeared determined to maintain control over the legalities of trade control. John ostensibly barred Venice from trading with the Muslim world because he did not accept or approve of the explicit distinctions made by Venice between Egypt and Syria, and between military and commercial goods. Curiously, however, these distinctions do appear to have been made by the papacy as well. Nevertheless, according to Ashtor and Menache, the concept of a complete commercial embargo was particularly championed by John, and they use this episode as evidence. The documentary evidence from his pontificate does not, however, support his rhetoric to Venice more widely. While he did forbid Venice from interpreting the embargo itself, and then forbade it from trading with the East entirely, he granted permission to Cyprus to trade that very same year, as well as to others over the following years. Thus it would appear that this dispute had more to do with John’s relations with Venice than it did to trade with the East in general, and the lack of activity against any other trading nation suggests this was a power struggle between the two. In every other respect, he took a similar approach to the other Avignon popes with regard to trade, seeking to control it, but not outright ban it for anyone except Venice. This should be seen against the background of John’s continuing struggles in North Italy, often against Venice, rather than his regular efforts to

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14 Menache, ‘Papal Attempts at a Commercial Boycott’, pp. 430–31 states that Venice maintained its distinction between res prohibita and permissa, and continued to treat Egypt and Syria as different places. This appeared to have led John to have his legate denounce a professor of Padua for supporting the Venetian position. Nevertheless, these distinctions appear in papal licences regularly, as they specify geography and goods which cannot be carried, in effect creating these exact same categories.

15 Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 44–45; Menache, ‘Papal Attempts at a Commercial Boycott’, pp. 430–31; See Stantchev, Spiritual Rationalism, pp. 133–45 for an overview of Venice’s relationship with the papacy over trade.

16 Sebastian Zanke, Johannes XXII., Avignon und Europa: Das politische Papsttum im Spiegel der kurialen Register (1316–1334) (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 75–199 gives a good overview of the politics of John XXII’s pontificate, which had concerns that other Avignon popes did not.
launch a French crusade to the Holy Land. Most of the popes attempted to launch a crusade to the Holy Land, and continued to allow non-military goods, and John was also happy to do this in most cases. John’s conflict with Venice, which was not repeated in other pontificates, should be viewed as the most important factor in this episode.

**Crusade propaganda**

Nowhere was the principle of economic warfare against the sultanate more overtly expressed than in the writings of crusade theorists in the fourteenth century. They were the most outspoken proponents of the need to damage the income and supply lines of the Mamlūks, and they were often quite detailed in how they thought the papacy should go about doing so. Not all these treatises were produced at the request of the papacy or achieved significant distribution. Some, however, did appear to be influential in Avignon and can be seen to have shaped the intentions behind what became papal policy. The popes solicited some treatises and copies of others have been recorded as being in the papacy’s possession since they were written.\(^\text{17}\) As advisory works, they explored the thinking behind an edict far more than the letters issued by the papacy did, and can be used to demonstrate at least the intellectual context of the papacy’s decisions.

Marino Sanudo, who wrote one of the most detailed of the crusade treatises, devoted the entire first book of his great work, the *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*, to the expansion of economic warfare against the Mamlūk Sultanate, and this represents the first and one of the most fundamental aspects of his strategy to reclaim the Holy Land. He advocated a comprehensive economic policy and made practical suggestions about enforcing it, including pointing out where alternative supplies could be found for goods that were essential to the European economy, such as sugar and cotton. To Sanudo’s mind, a properly enforced blockade would be

\(^\text{17}\) See the introduction for an overview of crusade treatises in this period.
catastrophic to the Mamlûk economy while Europe could provision itself without any great impact from the cessation of trade.\(^\text{18}\)

What is particularly relevant to the development of the trade embargo is the direction of Sanudo’s argument. He took for granted that the military embargo that was already in place would stay so and did not dwell on military restrictions, though he did quickly go through the categories of prohibited goods and explained why he thought they were necessary. His commentary on the lack of ship-building timber, iron, and horses in Egypt and the Holy Land are staples of similar literature, and also find themselves well represented in papal prohibitions on trade.\(^\text{19}\) The fact that he had to clarify where Europe could replace certain luxury goods, such as sugar and cotton, suggested that the primary supply, or at the very least, a substantial supply, of these items was from Mamlûk ports.\(^\text{20}\) He felt the need to argue for a total blockade and as replacing economic goods was an important part of his argument, we can infer that a complete trading ban was not part of official policy in the early 1320s. A ban on trading military goods, however, can be assumed to have been well known, if not well enforced, and did not require much discussion. William of Adam, writing between 1316 and 1318, also took great exception to merchants flouting the injunctions of the popes and bringing military goods to the Saracens, dedicating the first chapter of his *Tractatus quomodo Sarraceni sunt expugnandi* to it.\(^\text{21}\) Unlike Sanudo, he did not advocate a complete cessation of trade with the Islamic world. William argued that the military ban was sufficient, if people could be made to observe it, and that more should be done to prevent the Mamlûks gaining iron, timber, and slaves, which they could not source locally.\(^\text{22}\) For him, the money the sultanate generated through trade at Alexandria and other ports was not particularly important whereas limiting the supply of militarily usable goods was.


\(^{21}\) William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, p. 23: ‘First, therefore, the Catalan, Pisan, Venetian, and other maritime merchants, and above all the Genoese, supply the Saracens with necessary goods. For it should be known that the Saracens of Egypt do not have iron, wood, or naval pitch of their own, nor woollen materials to wear, nor oil, nor wine, nor at times grain to eat, nor enough men to populate the land. All of these are supplied by the aforesaid merchants, ministers of hell, false Christians, and in such abundance…’

Another important point to take from Sanudo’s plan for the embargo was his highlighting of the slave trade as a particular issue. Other contemporaries were also severely critical of the trade in people from the Black Sea to the Mamlūk sultanate, in which the Genoese were heavily involved. The slave trade was not particularly singled out in papal licences or absolutions, which seems curious given both the volume of traffic and the military importance of slaves to the sultan. Particularly prior to the normalising of relations between the Ilkhans and the Mamlūks in 1320, the Black Sea trade routes were the sultanate’s primary source of mamlūk slaves for its armies, the recruitment of which was vital to its military strength. Nevertheless, there was little observable action taken to limit this practice beyond the more general bans on military goods, which often did not mention human cargo despite at least some of those slaves being Christian.

It is not clear why the papacy seemed so unconcerned about the slave trade or appeared to take no action against it. Injunctions against the trafficking of Christian slaves, and slaves to non-Christian lands, dated back to Gregory I’s pontificate, and were often reformulated and reissued during the Middle Ages. Thus, it was strange that the Avignon papacy seemed so reluctant to take greater measures to combat this problem. One reason that those who trafficked slaves to Egypt did not appear in absolutions might be that the papacy was unwilling to absolve them of that crime, and so issued none to those excommunicated for it. Yet this does not explain why human cargo was often not included in lists of prohibited goods, nor why the papacy did not seem to take any kind of active interest in the trade. It certainly was not due to ignorance; many commentators raised the issue of slave trading and the problems it created. William of Adam, a Dominican and crusade theorist, accused a Genoese merchant, Segurano Salvaygo, of having personally sold the Mamlūks 10,000 slaves. While William may not have agreed with Sanudo on the necessary extent of economic restrictions, one point on which he agreed entirely with Sanudo was that the supply of slaves was a serious problem. He

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27 William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, p. 35.
devoted much of his section on trade to arguing the necessity, both morally and militarily, of depriving the Sultanate of its slaves:

Even greater than these sins is that the false Christians, to the irreverence of God, offense of the church, and disgrace of human nature, both strengthen the Babylonian empire and do harm by many and unheard-of crimes by selling to the Saracens men redeemed by the blood of Christ and regenerated by baptism. For they traverse the seas and travel through provinces, and from diverse parts of the world they buy boys and girls, that is, Greeks, Bulgars, Ruthenians, Alans and Hungarians from lesser Hungary, who all rejoice in the Christian name, or Tartars, Cumans, and any other pagans whom their impious parents have offered for sale, as is the custom of these pagans, or who have been defeated or subjugated by the Tartars, Turks or other impious foes.

These boys are offered for sale by enemies, when they are Christians, or by their fathers, when they are pagans, and are brought by our merchants, who by such transactions make money and acquire a deserved damnation, since they offer the boys to be devoured in the mouth of the dragon, and the Saracens buy them from the merchants, … and devote them not to some general use but to evil, nefarious, unclean, and damnable use. …This business is damnable to Christianity, since Egypt is a land that devours and consumes its inhabitants, because an untimely generation of vipers shall not take deep root, and it would therefore slowly decay without cultivation or inhabitants if the population were not increased by these purchased children. The Egyptian people are devoted to carnal pleasure and are not suited for military activity. They therefore eagerly buy the aforesaid boys so that after they have been fully trained in arms and military matters according to their custom they may go before the Babylonian army wherever it is needed against the Christians or any others.28

William’s complaint proved that the Christian world was well aware of the military arrangements of the Mamlûk sultanate and its reliance on slaves for its military power, as well as where the slaves came from. He identified the many practical

benefits the sultanate drew from the slave trade, and highlighted the difficulties that it would suffer if the trade were to end. He also made a moral argument that it was against the will of God to allow the slave trade, and particularly the trade of Christians, to continue. The depth of knowledge of the slave trade and its consequences reveals that this was not a particularly secretive trade and that cotemporaries were well aware of the sultanate’s dependency on it.

Regardless of the papacy’s action on individual aspects of their theories, the condemnation of trade with the Muslim world was a reoccurring theme in crusading treatises of the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries and formed the primary strategy in all of them. The majority, however, did not advocate a full commercial boycott but rather specified a military embargo. They, like William of Adam, were concerned with preventing the Mamlūks from acquiring military supplies rather than waging economic warfare as advised by Sanudo. Nevertheless, they all felt that an embargo of some kind was required as a precursor to a crusade in the East. In all cases, regardless of how comprehensive the authors believed the ban should be, they advocated the same measures: a naval squadron should be created to police the embargo and serious punishments should be imposed on those found breaking the ban, including excommunication, loss of property, and loss of liberty. While the papacy was already excommunicating people for this crime by the beginning of the fourteenth century and a loss of property and rights did appear to go together with this, crusade treatise writers certainly implied that such measures were not sufficiently enforced. Partly this was because only clerics would have been dispossessed by ecclesiastical courts; lay people would have been tried by regional secular courts, over which the papacy had little control, and so there may have been some validity in calls for tighter enforcement of this punishment across the board.


The importance given in all the crusading treatises to restricting trade prior to a potential crusade to recover the Holy Land shows how seriously the economic relationship between Europe and the Near East was viewed, particularly in intellectual circles concerned with the crusade. Trade was viewed as a significant problem, and merchants were seen to be directly enabling the Mamlūks to wage war against Christians. This clash between the economic profit to be made from trade and the intellectual and military imperative to limit the resources of the Sultanate formed the context for the approach to embargo taken by the papacy, as well as the criteria for the success of its policies. It was not in papal interests to damage Europe economically, but it was in the interest of the crusade to deprive the sultanate, and the extent to which the papacy was able to control compromise between these two ideals, and how much other parties complied with the papacy, can be used as an indicator of papal authority and power over this issue.

The Effectiveness of Papal Trade Controls

The tension between the papacy’s overall strategic interest in aiding a crusade against Islam and a more general interest in commercial profit by laypeople is the central theme when examining the effectiveness of papal authority over Catholic merchants operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Simply to evaluate how many times the embargo was broken and draw a conclusion on the general state of papal authority, however, is reductive and ignores the possibility that the papacy was aiming to achieve different things with different strategies, as well as the nuances of compliance from Catholics. The primary evidence for the effectiveness of trade control is drawn from licences and absolutions, which can be used to indicate levels of legal and illegal trade. These can be used to establish how effectively the papacy controlled trade, and how much the papacy itself was complicit in the undermining of its own stated intentions.

As the most consistent aspect of the embargo, the restriction on military supplies is a useful starting point for establishing the success of the embargo. As a principal aim of the embargo was to limit the military resources available to the Muslim world, establishing how successful the papacy was in enforcing the embargo
is vital. This can be contrasted with the desire for profit from Western merchants and their activity, and thus build up an understanding of the effectiveness of papal authority over Western Christians.

Much of the surviving information for cases where the embargo was broken comes from royal pardons and papal letters of absolution for trading illegal goods, yet there are some issues which must be acknowledged with this evidence. As mentioned in the section introduction, these grants were not limited to the chancery, and the records are limited.\textsuperscript{33} It is likely that the penitentiary, as it was primarily interested in excommunications, would have been highly involved in these transactions.\textsuperscript{34} Absolutions additionally only give evidence of people who were either caught or who had a crisis of conscience. A merchant who travelled and traded with the Muslim world and who was neither caught, nor later confessed, would not appear in this record at all. There are unfortunately no Mamlūk records surviving from Alexandria which could bridge this gap in our knowledge, although it is certain that some would have once existed. The customs practices of the Mamlūk officials described by Simon Semeonis would have produced complex and effective documentation, but none of the records which must have been produced survive.\textsuperscript{35} Nevertheless, to the spiritually minded Catholic merchant, the excommunication earned from trading required absolution, and the number of requests for absolution from this suggest that it was a relatively regular practice. Further legal sanctions on property and inheritance were imposed on merchants who were known to have traded illegal goods, referred to as ‘de Alexandrini’ in Aragon, which may have offered a more material reason to resolve their excommunication.\textsuperscript{36}

It may also be the case that suspicion of breaking the prohibition could result in ostracisation and other social sanctions for an individual. Evidence of this social pressure can be seen from the letter to Raoul, count of Eu, acquitting him of having

\textsuperscript{33} See pp. 29–30.
\textsuperscript{35} Simon Semeonis, \textit{Itinerarium}, pp. 46–49.
traded arms with the Saracens of Granada.\textsuperscript{37} He maintained that he had not traded with them, and the French king appeared to have interceded to get John XXII to issue a letter formally acknowledging that he had done no wrong. This strongly suggests that Raoul had experienced sufficient problems due to the rumours of his transgressions that he felt the need to appeal to higher authority to restore his status. Whatever the reasons for seeking them, the number of absolutions requested suggests that those accused of breaching the embargo took the excommunication seriously, though clearly they did not always let it stop them from profiting.

Letters allowing for the absolution of merchants who had traded prohibited goods were issued throughout the Avignon period, with the notable exception of the pontificate of Benedict XII.\textsuperscript{38} Aside from Benedict’s pontificate, letters were granted infrequently at first but with reasonable regularity; Clement V granted approximately one absolution for trade every three years, John XXII issued on average one a year, Clement VI issued just under one a year, and Innocent VI issued one approximately every three years, according to the French School editions, which should be seen as giving the lowest possible figure.\textsuperscript{39} Another factor to consider is that many of the letters of absolution issued were not for specific individuals, but rather to legates authorising them to absolve large numbers of merchants in

\textsuperscript{37} JXXII:LC, X, n. 54386, p. 276. This identification is based on the name ‘Radulphus comitis Augia’.

\textsuperscript{38} The single example of an absolution is BXII:LC, II, n. 6063, p. 78, dated 1 May, 1338, which absolves a man for his prior trade crimes due to his fifteen years of active combat service against the Saracens and his wish to go on pilgrimage. The editing of these volumes has not been comprehensive. Benedict’s registers span RV119–136 in the modern sequence, while Vidal’s edition of common letters is two volumes long, while the secret and curial letters are edited into another two volumes. There is thus a substantial amount of omitted information in the editions, which could include the expected other letters of absolution. Vidal’s selection criteria may have simply omitted all such letter types. Additionally, the penitentiary may have had exclusive control over these kinds of petition in Benedict’s pontificate. Unfortunately, without a definitive edition of the Reg. Vat. manuscripts, or substantial additional research in the Vatican Archives, this cannot be determined.

\textsuperscript{39} This calculation is extremely rough, and based on the editions of the French School of Rome. These editions do not cover the common letters of Clement VI or Innocent VI, which is where the majority of the letters of absolution granted by John XXII can be found. Nor do they cover any of the lost fourteenth century penitentiary records. Thus, these figures must be treated as illustrative only and also as a baseline. It is likely that there are more many more of these to be found in the common letter volumes, particularly for Benedict XII, Clement VI, and Innocent VI.
exchange for money on a case by case basis. While these letters obscure the individuals being absolved, it does still establish the importance of absolution and the resulting strength of authority the papacy held on this issue. Consequently, it is likely that the number of merchants being granted absolution would have been higher than this documentary record states, but this figure is sufficient to show that illegal trade was occurring, and that merchants were willing to resolve their estrangement from the Christian community.

The cost of being absolved from excommunication was quite variable. In many cases, the price was not strictly set and would cost the merchant part of the value of the profit they made. In other cases, specific amounts were set, but could be added to at the papacy’s discretion. One example saw a merchant receive a fine of 2500 gold florins to be absolved, but because he had waited thirty years before seeking reconciliation, additional penalties were imposed on him. These were clearly large amounts for any single individual to pay, though depending on the value of the cargo or the profit of the trip, the expected fine could be much higher. It was a demonstration of both the importance placed by contemporary Catholics on resolving their estrangement from the Church and the great profit available in trade with the Muslim world that these fines could be imposed and received.

The availability of absolution in this context has important implications for the authority and power of papal authority over trade with the Muslim world. On one hand, every single petition for absolution represents a failure of papal power. These were merchants who had defied the papal embargo, supplied prohibited goods to an enemy of the faith and almost certainly aided its military power, which was actively being used against Christians in Asia Minor. Every trader needing an

40 CV, IV, n. 4519, pp. 243–44; JXXII:LC, VIII, n. 45955, p. 345; CVI:LSF, II, n. 2897, pp. 260–61; IVI, IV, n. 2021, p. 48, are all examples of this. These were not, however, unrestricted licence to absolve, they were very specific in their conditions and were for specific moments in time. CV, IV, n. 4519, pp. 243–44, was sent in 1309 and allowed for funds gained from absolutions to be diverted to the Catalan efforts against Granada, but in practice, this had already been occurring throughout the decade before: Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 21–22.

41 Reg. Vat. 137, ff. 93r–94v; CVI:LSF, I, n. 578, p. 280; also Reg. Vat. 137, ff. 161r–161v, states amongst other things that the amount of the _lucrum_ should be paid to the _subsidiwm_ of the defence of the faith (_expensarum quas ecclesiam ipsam pro repressione hereticorum et scismaticorum ac fautorum inimicorum defensioneque fidei catholice_).

42 CVI:LSNF, n. 204, p. 29; Reg. Vat. 137, ff. 44v–45r.
absolution had undermined the entire principle of the embargo, which was to deprive materially the Mamlūk Sultanate and cripple it economically. In this respect, the volume of absolutions requested can be seen as a failure of papal policy and a lack of power. Merchants, in relatively large numbers, were ignoring the papal restrictions on controlled goods and trading them freely with the Muslim world in open defiance of spiritual and legal controls.

Conversely, the existence of these petitions for absolution shows that the authority of the popes was, in fact, well respected. The papacy was clearly unable to make itself absolutely powerful; still, although merchants were willing to defy it, they also remained sufficiently concerned about the impact of spiritual and legal censure that they would seek reconciliation. The costs for absolution were rarely made clear but they seem to have been large. Despite this heavy price for readmission to the Christian community, many merchants were willing to pay for it. It is clear that the majority of merchants accepted the right of the papacy to impose these sanctions and implicitly accepted papal authority by seeking reconciliation.

Twenty-seven individuals were named in letters granting absolution over the period, while a further fifteen instances of absolutions for groups of unspecified size were also issued. This number is almost certainly too low. Almost all the named individuals come from the common letters of John XXII, while the equivalent letters for Benedict XII, Clement VI, and Innocent VI have not yet been edited. This lack of edited common registers thus very likely underplays the number of petitions for absolution made later in the period, and renders this figure a minimum one. The group allowances were generally letters allowing a senior cleric to absolve unspecified numbers of merchants, with the funds generated from the absolutions being earmarked for a specific crusading endeavour. They could also be used as a measure to generate money for a specific purpose, as in the case of Pierre de la Palud, the patriarch of Jerusalem, who was granted the profits of twenty of the forty absolutions he had requested for merchants in Cyprus in 1329 in order to fund the entourage which accompanied him on his mission to Cairo.43 The individual absolutions usually recorded more information, including personal information, an overview of their crime, and any mitigating circumstances. Normally this last simply

meant stating that they were suitably penitent for what they had done, but in some cases specific actions which supported their petition were mentioned. One individual had cited his military service against Muslims, while another couple pleaded that their trip to Alexandria was necessary to avoid poverty. In other cases, powerful individuals, such as the king of France, intervened to secure the honour of their subjects, such as in the case of Raoul, count of Eu, discussed above. These all help to show that excommunication was taken seriously by the merchant community, and that they were willing to accept the papacy’s authority to impose rules over trade, and to forgive transgressions of those rules, even if they did not necessarily respect the power of the papacy enough to avoid breaking the rules.

The difficulty the papacy had imposing its will on merchants has important implications for the decision-making process behind papal policy toward the East. Despite their ineffectiveness in successfully enforcing a complete military embargo on Alexandria and other Muslim ports, the Avignon popes continued to promote the ban and impose trade controls on Catholic states and individuals. In this respect, it should be seen as a genuinely dynamic policy undertaken by the papacy against the popular mood of merchants. The embargo was first promoted by the papacy following the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 and continued to be promoted throughout the entire thirteenth century, long after it was associated with any particular event. While the embargo was promoted with greater urgency as a reaction to the fall of Acre in 1291, once the shock of the loss of Christian territories in the Holy Land had subsided the embargo continued to receive ever increasing attention and energy. This shows that the papacy, despite being unable completely to prevent even military goods from being traded with the Mamlūks, continued to promote the embargo well beyond the immediate aftermath of any event, and the embargo must be seen to have been a policy that the papacy was trying to impose on Western Christendom entirely on its own merit rather than as a reaction to any particular event.

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44 BXII:LC, II, n. 6063, p. 78.
46 JXXII:LC, X, n. 54386, p. 276.
47 Odena, ‘Les “Alexandrini”, pp. 176–77 states that Nicholas IV was reissuing controls on trade almost immediately after the fall of Acre.
It is important to note that all of the available recorded absolutions granted by the Avignon popes connected to the trade embargo were for specifically military or, more vaguely, ‘prohibited’ goods. The same ambiguity of wording can be found in these letters of absolution as can be found in the wording of the bans themselves, which gives rise to similar issues. Despite using specific terms, the documents have been used to provide evidence for a much more general embargo, in much the same way as the restrictions have been. Absolutions normally specified that the sentence of excommunication was incurred specifically for trading ‘prohibited’ goods, not just any kind of goods. While this is not an absolutely clear distinction, the lack of any language implying that there was a uniform ban on trading is significant, and suggests that the extreme punishment of excommunication was reserved for those specifically breaking the embargo on military goods.\footnote{See pages 31–36 for discussion on the intentions of the papacy regarding controls on trade.}

This implies that to both the papacy and European merchants, trade itself was not necessarily a crime despite the moral difficulties attached with all trade with the ‘enemies of Christ’. At least according to the evidence available from absolutions for trade, there seems to have been little legal sanctioning of merchants trading commercial goods, at least overtly. This interpretation runs contrary to many modern narratives on the papal trade embargo, which insist on its universal nature and economic character, and supports the most recent interpretations of the embargo given by Stantchev and Carr, who have argued for a more limited model of economic control.\footnote{Stantchev, \textit{Spiritual Rationality}, pp. 145–61; Carr, \textit{Merchant Crusaders}, pp. 120–43.}

The wording of absolution documents does not appear to support the existence of an attempt at full embargo.

The papacy’s stance on a complete trade embargo was therefore more complex than it appears and deserves consideration in its own right. While there was on occasion pressure for a complete termination of trading with the Muslim East, particularly from John XXII to Venice, this did not make its way into the bulls issued throughout by the Avignon popes, despite other clauses in bulls concerning trade being amended when they were reissued. The dispute between Venice and John XXII, which came to a head in 1326, was only partially about trade, and also
involved local politics and a power struggle over the interpretation of canon law.\textsuperscript{50} More crucially, this dispute did not seem to affect any other merchant cities, which continued their business undenounced. A full embargo was strongly advocated by the crusade theorists like Sanudo, but in practice, this was much harder to achieve.

The lack of evidence of punishment for breaking a total embargo can be contrasted with the evidence that trade did appear to occur throughout the period. While the Venetians claimed to have withdrawn from Alexandria from 1323 until 1345, an action which was confirmed by the Mamlûk sultan, there is no evidence that the Catalans or the Genoese suspended trade with Alexandria at all.\textsuperscript{51} While the papacy appeared to have attempted to pressure the merchant states into abandoning trade, there was no legal action taken to have them do so. Even the Venetians appeared to retain a presence in Alexandria after the cessation of trade, as Simon Semeonis had dinner with the Venetian consul when he returned to Alexandria in 1324.\textsuperscript{52} Further evidence that Alexandria was not abandoned by Latins after 1323 comes from the account of a riot in Alexandria in 1327, when the Muslims of Alexandria rioted against the Christian merchants and were suppressed by the city’s garrison.\textsuperscript{53} Thus, it is clear that trade continued throughout the period, though its extent is not particularly well documented.

**The Purpose of Papal Trade Controls**

The purpose of restricting trade was explicitly to bolster the efforts of Europeans seeking to reclaim the Holy Land, but in terms of power and authority, the scope of the papacy’s intentions are vital to understanding how effective it was at enforcing its policies. Control over trade was evidently not intended to be universal, and there

\textsuperscript{50} Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*, pp. 140–44, see page 35 for further details.


was no blanket ban on trade with the Muslim world for most of Europe, over most of the period. Consequently, establishing the extent to which Europeans complied with papal policy over trade depends entirely on establishing what that policy actually was.

The papal restriction of trade with the Muslim world had several goals. In a practical sense, it was an effort to limit the quantity of war materials available to potential targets of the crusade. It was also an economic measure designed to hurt the finances of the Muslim world, which garnered enormous tax profits from goods traded in Mamlûk ports. By controlling and limiting this profitable trade, the papacy sought to limit the resources of the sultanate. In an ideological sense, the embargo was seen as an extension of the crusade itself and featured heavily as an initial step to recapturing the Holy Land in crusade propagandists’ works. The underlying assumption which justified the limiting of trade was that Christians and Muslims were implacable enemies, and that conflict between the two was inevitable, thus necessitating measures to undermine the enemies of Christendom economically.

The embargo’s undeniable primary function was as a blockade on military goods and thus should been seen as principally a military measure. This point is reiterated in virtually every letter produced concerning trade with the east, listing in nearly every document key resources which must not be traded. These same prohibitions appear on almost every trading licence granted, in one form or another. Examples of these prohibitions include: *certos mercatores et merces non vetitas deferat, non tamen cum armis, ferro, lignaminibus et aliis vetitis a jure communi* (1317); *certos mercosquae sunt per constitutiones A. S. specialiter prohibitae, non tamen arma, ferrum, lignamina et alia vetita a jure communi deferat* (1328); *mercibus seu mercationibus oneratam, exceptis armis, ferro, lignaminibus, clavis, equis et aliis de jure communi prohibitis* (1344). All these examples were drawn from licences for sending ships to Alexandria for high-status individuals, who could afford to have their licences recorded, but the lists are typical of those drawn from

54 See 32 for more details of the papal trade ban in the late-twelfth and thirteenth centuries, particularly at Lateran IV.
55 See pages 36–41 for more details on the arguments contemporaries put forward for the embargo.
56 JXXII:LC, II, n. 5742, p. 22.
57 JXXII:LC, VIII, n. 43003, p. 33.
58 CVI:LSF, I:2, n. 909, pp. 52–53.
the registers of petitions. Prohibiting the travel of goods such as iron, timber, slaves and other such merchandise (and services) was a direct action against the Mamlūk military, aimed at impeding the military capabilities of the sultanate. The Mamlūks had limited access to these vital military goods and, by preventing western merchants from providing them, the papacy was attempting to undermine the military power of the Mamlūks and to make any future action against them easier, or limit their ability to strike at Christian kingdoms such as Armenia.

This military function is, however, very difficult to separate from the related economic one. The blockade also had the intention not only of depriving the sultanate of materials directly, but also of the money to obtain them elsewhere, by depriving it of customs fees and taxation revenue. This distinction is important because it had the corollary effect of depriving the Italian city states of money too, as their trade routes to the east were highly profitable, and limiting trade also disadvantaged Christian merchants. Most of the mercantile activity across the Mediterranean was undertaken by Europeans, not Arabs, and thus this economic aspect of the embargo was a particular issue for the Italian city-states. The same scarcity which made commodities such as arms, iron and timber viable targets for sanctions also made them tempting, high-profit commodities for merchants to trade. While it was not difficult to convince the merchant states that trading military goods with the Muslim world was morally unacceptable, it was much harder to convince them that they should accept a hit to the profits of their merchants. Consequently, some individual merchants were willing to break the military goods embargo in the name of profit despite the spiritual and temporal sanctions imposed by the papacy for doing so, as shown by the number of absolutions issued for merchants who had traded prohibited goods.

This economic tension was even more pronounced in arguments over a total trade embargo. While military cargo was particularly valuable, the bulk of trade was in less controversial merchandise which did not appear to have been forbidden. Raw cotton, textiles, spices and foodstuffs were common goods going between Europe

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60 One such example can be found in JXXII:LC, II, n. 7330, p. 171 allowing the archbishop of Compostello to absolve some merchants who had broken the trade restrictions in 1318. A similar example in IVI, V, n. 3248, pp. 228–29 allows the abbot of Cluny to absolve in the same circumstances in 1357.
and the East, and these trade routes were worth a vast amount of money to both the European merchants transporting goods along them and the cities along the trade routes, in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Thus a complete commercial boycott was even more controversial for the merchant cities which traded across the Mediterranean, as it would also heavily and unavoidably affect their own profits, as well as have a large knock-on effect on industries across Europe, and Venice in particular was vocal concerning the importance of this trade for the wellbeing of the state.

A full and a partial embargo were both predicated on crusade ideology, predominantly the desire to deprive the enemies of Christendom of material and financial assets, and so they had elements in common. Consequently, the observable extent of trade control also acted as an indicator of the purpose it was supposed to be fulfilling. Material deprivation was primarily a military tactic, aiming to prevent the Muslim armies from being able to fight effectively, while financial deprivation was an economic tactic, aimed at reducing the overall effectiveness of the Mamlūk state. While these two had sometimes overlapping functions, it is important to distinguish them. An embargo on purely military goods, which allowed commercial trade, was very much an effort to deprive the sultanate of materials, limiting its military abilities, but did little to restrict the amount of wealth the sultanate generated. This wealth could still be used for military purposes, and maintained the strength of the sultanate. A full embargo aimed to deprive the sultanate comprehensively of both materials and wealth, addressing both military and economic concerns.

None of the letters granting absolution issued by the Avignon popes mentioned trading in non-military goods, which has important implications for the implementation of a complete trading ban in that it probably was never considered policy. Those who petitioned to receive absolution for trade violations throughout the Avignon papacy did so because they had transported arms, iron, timber or other military goods, all of which were forbidden, rather than simply trading any goods with Muslims. This suggests that while the economic power of the Mamlūks was a well understood problem, and that economic solutions were presented to combat this

61 Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 15–17.
62 Ashtor, Levant Trade, p. 27.
problem, the papacy was only interested in limiting the quantity of particular materials available to, not the income of, the sultanate.\textsuperscript{63}

A final purpose of the trade embargo was as a financial measure for the papacy. There is no evidence to suggest that this was an intended result of the embargo when it was originally implemented; the cost of a licence does not often feature in the text, particularly in early examples, and there is often no correlating cameral entry for licences granted, which may imply that a fee was not always charged. While this does not mean that the papacy never intended to gain financially from this system, nothing surviving points to this as an overt motivation for its implementation. Nevertheless, the papacy discovered that it could charge heavily for absolutions for those who broke the embargo, and for licences to authorise merchants to engage in legal trade. As the Avignon papacy continued and its financial situation got worse, the revenues generated from this activity were a welcome source of income for the struggling administration. John XXII’s wars in Northern Italy during the 1320s were expensive, as were the naval leagues Benedict XII and Clement VI participated in in 1334 and 1344 respectively.\textsuperscript{64} It also found that it was able to use these funds for its administrative costs, as in the example of Pierre de la Palud, who was granted the right to administer absolution to 40 merchants in Cyprus and use half the profits to fund his mission to Egypt in 1329.\textsuperscript{65} The exact revenues generated from this activity are unclear, though some figures have been suggested and will be discussed further later in this section.\textsuperscript{66} It is clear from these that the licence and absolution fees represented a substantial income, whatever the exact totals were, and the Avignon papacy was famously short of money.

Thus, there was no clear single function of the papal trade embargo with the Muslim world, nor was it a single, consistent project. The scale of the embargo may have varied over time, and the expectations for it were unclear. It was, principally,

\textsuperscript{63} Sanudo, \textit{The Book of Secrets}, pp. 56–63.
\textsuperscript{66} See p. 60.
an ideologically-driven military strategy to limit the resources, both financial and physical, of an enemy that was considered beyond reconciliation. Pragmatically, it also served to bolster the papacy’s own finances, through the sale of licences for trade with the East and through absolutions sold to those who claimed to be repentant for their adventures. These two aims were, however, mutually exclusive.

In order for the embargo to be successful in reducing the military strength of the sultanate, it required Latin merchants to accept and abide by the terms the papacy set out and to avoid trade with the Mamlūks. If merchants did not abide by the regulations set out, the papacy could gain income from absolutions but the sultanate gained vital military supplies. If merchants cooperated with the papacy, the issue of licences still undermined the military rationale behind the embargo economically, allowing the sultanate to gain significant wealth from the activities of Christian traders. The weight placed on each side of this conflict between financial gain for the papacy in the form of licences and the strategic denial of financial resources to the sultanate varied from pope to pope, but remained an underlying tension throughout the Avignon period.

**Trade Licences**

The idea that the papacy had the authority to control access to the markets in the East appears to have been accepted quite quickly. Adherence to the papal ban on military goods, or at least acceptance that it existed and that breaking it had consequences, appeared to lead naturally into an understanding that trade with the Muslim world was under the authority of the papacy. This in turn led to the implementation of a licencing system for non-military goods, although the origins of this are difficult to ascertain. By the mid-fourteenth century, however, it was common for merchants to purchase a licence from the curia to transport non-military goods to Alexandria and other Muslim-held lands in the Levant.

The development of licences from a personalised grant into a standardised form took a relatively long period of time. Some of the earliest examples were letters sent to high-profile figures, not usually merchants, for specific reasons. Two were granted to James II of Aragon, in 1313 and 1317, granting him permission on
each occasion to send a single ship, which was not allowed to carry prohibited goods, containing ambassadors and merchants to go to Alexandria in order to negotiate benefits for ‘captive Christians’. Another example was granted to the Zacharia brothers, Benedict and Martin, in 1320, giving them permission to send ships, specifically not carrying military cargo, for two years to Alexandria to help recover the costs of defending Chios from the Turks. A further licence was granted to them in 1325, on similar, though slightly more generous, terms, allowing them to take more ships. An interesting licence was granted to Hugh IV of Cyprus, who requested permission in 1326 to trade with the Muslims in order to spy on them and learn more about what was going on in the Holy Land. His request was granted, again with the provision that military goods were not to be transported. Two brothers of the royal house of Aragon, Peter, the son of James II of Aragon, and Alfonso IV of Aragon, were both given separate licences to go to Alexandria in October 1328, under the same conditions as before and for similar reasons, while in 1329 Louis, duke of Bourbon, was given permission to take four galleys to the Holy Land, where he could trade but not in military goods. Two more licences were issued in the pontificate of John XXII, both for Catalans, under similar conditions as the others. These examples are all drawn from John XXII’s pontificate due to the availability of his common letters. No supplication or penitentiary records have survived from this period, and Benedict’s letters are not as well edited, but it is reasonable to infer that these licences were being regularly requested.

67 CV, VIII, n. 9893, pp. 379–80; JXXII:LC, II, n. 5742, p. 22. These captives were likely Latin soldiers captured during the loss of the Holy Land in this case, and one such person, Roger of Stanegrave, was ransomed in 1315. The implication was that he was not the last such prisoner, though evidence is scarce. See Julien Loiseau, ‘Frankish Captives in Mamlûk Cairo’, Al-Masaq 23 (2011), 37–52 for further details. This was not the only use for this term though, and this identification is not absolute. For a further discussion of the term ‘captive Christians’ and the issues surrounding its identification, see pp. 155–6 (especially footnote 156) and p. 232.

68 JXXII:LC, III, n. 11081, p. 72.
70 JXXII:LC, VI, n. 24541, p. 117.
72 JXXII:LC, X, no. 52553, p. 135; n. 54250, p. 264.
These early licences appear to lack the standardised form of the later, more regular ones issued under Clement VI,\textsuperscript{73} but they had all the component elements. One relatively representative example, to Peter of Aragon, in 1328, reads:

\begin{quote}
…quos idem comes pro certis negotiis fidei exaltationem Catholice concernentibus ad terris quas Soldanus Babilonie in ultramarinis partibus detinet certos habeas nuntios destinare transmittingi unam nauem que dictos nuntios ac certos mercatores et merces admissum easdem deferat tibi licentiam concedere dignaremur…\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

It continued on to specify the goods that could not be taken on the trip (iron, wood, and other prohibited goods, in this case), and reminded the recipient of the punishment for taking them. These elements were present in virtually all licences granted for access to Alexandria, either explicitly for trade or for other reasons. Permission was granted to engage in commercial, not military, trade with the Muslim world, under limited conditions, for limited times. The number of ships was specified, as was the cargo which was prohibited, and the punishments for breaching the terms of the licence.

The petitioner usually supplied reasons for the trips as well, indicating that this was not a standard bureaucratic service offered by the papacy. The Aragonese were concerned with the state of relics and Christians in Egypt, the Zacharias were attempting to recover the costs of their crusading activities, and Louis justified his trip as a pilgrimage. These early licences were nearly all granted to high-profile figures, rather than simple merchants, for what would seem to be non-standard activity. How these examples transitioned into the more formulaic licences issued later is less clear. The intervening period under Benedict XII is extremely poorly edited, meaning there are large gaps which appear to include trading licences. Additionally, it would appear that the lack of surviving Registra Supplicationum prior to Clement VI meant that many of potential licences would have been lost anyway, further limiting the record of trading licences issued by Benedict. It is clear,

\textsuperscript{73} Carr, ‘Crossing Boundaries in the Mediterranean’, p. 120–28. This is not to assume that a more standardised version did not exist earlier, just that there is no evidence for it. Surviving supplication evidence does not exist prior to 1342, and penitentiary evidence does not exist prior to 1410. The early registers of supplications after 1342 are also patchy, but do provide more data.
\textsuperscript{74} Reg. Vat. 89, f. 36v.
however, that this transition from one-off requests to a bureaucratic process must have occurred during Benedict’s pontificate.

It is difficult to know how essential the licences were for merchants and how widespread their uptake was. Numerous examples survive in the papal registers and there is reason to believe that many more were issued but have not survived into the documentary record. The Registra Supplicationum, begun in 1343 by Clement VI, record multiple instances of people applying for a trade licence which do not appear in the Registra Vaticana or Registra Avenionensia, which recorded letters leaving the papal offices. According to Carr, many more licences were granted by Clement VI than had previously been thought and can be found in the supplications registers, which are currently unedited. According to his figures, potentially as many as 80% of licences applied for were not copied into the other registers. There is evidence that a supplication register system dates back prior to Clement VI, but if that was the case the registers no longer survive, so trade records before 1343 are much scarcer. It would be reasonable, however, to infer that there would be similar omissions from the registers prior to Clement VI if such a supplication register had existed. The registers as they currently exist are fundamentally incomplete, though the fact that licences existed in relatively large number for a geographic area which otherwise appeared very infrequently in the papal registers suggests that they were taken seriously. Additionally, there is an account which states that the Mamlûk Sultan was paying 3,000 florins toward the licence fee of Christian merchants willing to arrive in Alexandria in 1335, and had been doing so for some time. All this, combined with the not insignificant number of licences which do survive, hint at the vibrant merchant activity going on and the papacy’s active involvement in authorising it.

It is reasonable, therefore, to suggest that a substantial number of merchants travelling to Alexandria did indeed have licences to do so, particularly as the bureaucratic systems governing Mediterranean trade developed. At least with Venetian trade, the issuing of licences and other sources map well onto each other.

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77 Ashtor, Levant Trade, p. 38.
Licences exist for the shipping convoy, the *mudae*, after 1345. This agrees with a reference in the treaty of 1345 between Venice and the new sultan which said that no Venetian ship had traded with Alexandria for twenty-two years, corroborating the licence record.\(^78\) It is less clear how much other cities felt the need to acquire licences. The king of Aragon controlled Catalan trade with the Holy Land, issuing his own licences and absolutions for trade, a privilege he was granted in 1309 to raise money for his wars against Granada.\(^79\) The papacy was also very active in issuing licences to merchants from all over the Mediterranean, particularly after 1343, but there is no independent information available on the volume of merchant traffic. It is therefore uncertain what percentage of the total trade with the Muslim world was licensed, though given the available data it would seem that a fair amount of it was.

Licences can be seen to represent a significant acceptance of the papal embargo on trade and the right of the papacy to enforce it. By purchasing licences and abiding by their terms, as many merchants did, the act of creating bureaucratic controls on trade allowed the papacy to impose its authority over the mercantile activity of the Eastern Mediterranean. Licences survive in relatively large numbers and were issued to a geographically diverse group of recipients, implying that there was a wide acceptance of the licencing system. Even the Mamlūk sultan appeared to see the necessity of acquiring them, or at the very least, understood that Christian merchants felt them necessary, and so offered to pay the cost of the licence for merchants willing to travel to Alexandria.\(^80\) In this regard, the licence system represents a strong acceptance of papal authority by Christian merchants operating in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This view does not always agree with the rhetoric of the time, however, and certainly undermines the economic principles of the embargo. The volume and value of goods being transported by Christian merchants to and from Alexandria was huge. Nor was it simply a case that merchants were transporting high-value luxury goods; vast quantities of cotton and raw textile materials came from the Silk Road.

\(^{78}\) Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, pp. 328–30 describes the return of Venetian trade to Alexandria at the expense of Cyprus.

\(^{79}\) CV, IV, n. 5090, p. 469.

\(^{80}\) Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, p. 38.
and North Africa to the great textile industries of Europe, without which they could not continue to operate. Processed textiles would then be transported back to the East, where they could be sold at a substantial profit. Spices and foodstuffs were also valuable commodities which were moved in substantial volume all around the Mediterranean depending on the local economic conditions. These were not military goods in a strict sense, but the profits generated by them must have been significant for the Mamlūk authorities and would certainly have helped fund the armies which fought in Armenia and elsewhere.\(^81\)

Crusade theorists argued strongly against allowing any trade to continue, for the obvious reason that the profits generated for the Mamlūks made a reconquest of the Holy Land much more difficult. Despite this, however, trade continued throughout the period with some notable local exceptions, such as the Venetians in Alexandria between 1323 and 1345.\(^82\) These examples cannot be seen as indicative of any sustained or systematic withdrawal from trade with the Islamic world. They were isolated events, both chronologically and geographically, by individual states with particular restrictions imposed by the papacy. These should be seen from the context of the relationship between the merchant state which had banned trade and the region with which they banned it. These episodes do not reflect a larger move toward an enforcement of a total trading ban or particularly act as a reflection of the relationship between the papacy and the Muslim world.

Given the difficulties the papacy had in enforcing restrictions on military goods, as shown by the letters of absolution issued, it is also possible to see the licencing system as an acknowledgement of defeat by the papacy. The interpretation given by many historians of the subject of the embargo suggests that the papacy was unable to enforce its wishes on the merchant sailors going to the Muslim world, nor convince traders of the necessity of the embargo.\(^83\) With this interpretation in mind, the creation of the licencing system can be seen as an alternative to complete failure. The difficulty with this view is that there is very little evidence for it. As there is little independent information on the volume of goods trafficked in the fourteenth

\(^81\) See chapter five for a larger discussion on the Armenia as a recipient of Western aid.
century, it is hard to know the quantities of goods moved around. Certainly, the potential losses to merchants would have been high; yet there is no definitive method to show that a total ban could not have been enacted and merchants have remained relatively unaffected. Venice survived a twenty-two year total ban with Alexandria whilst remaining competitive, despite its rivals maintaining trade links.\(^{84}\) It is certainly not beyond possibility that given alternative markets, such as the Mongols and the Far East through non-Mamlûk routes, greater European development of cotton and sugar, and sufficient ideological imperatives, a total ban could have been proclaimed and enforced with the cooperation of the merchant states, at least in the first third of the fourteenth century.\(^{85}\) As the Ilkhanate disintegrated, it is reasonable to assume that the quantity of goods coming from Asia along the Silk Road dwindled accordingly.

Additionally, concerns about being unable to enforce the ban on trading military goods had no effect on the continued reissuing of the ban, suggesting that the popes were remarkably stubborn in refusing to acknowledge defeat on the matter. Despite the fact that some merchants were ignoring the embargo, each pope formally denounced the trade of military goods with the Mamlûk sultanate. It would be difficult to see licences as an admission of the failure of a total ban when the papacy did not appear to have intended to implement a complete ban on trade, nor had it acknowledged any kind of policy failure. That the ban on military goods was not completely successful did not deter any of the Avignon popes, nor was there any suggestion that the embargo’s potential ineffectiveness meant they should stop promoting it. If the papacy was so unconcerned about its ability to enforce the partial blockade, it seems curious that it would be so much more concerned about the effectiveness of a complete blockade, to the point that it would not promote a blockade.

\(^{84}\) It should be noted that Venice did not cease trading with the Eastern Mediterranean, just with Alexandria. It appears to have shifted its operations to Cyprus and Armenia, and likely still handled large amounts of goods which originated in the sultanate, according to Frederic Lane, *Venice, A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1973), pp. 130–31. Nevertheless, from a papal perspective this was still preferable, as it still prevented taxes being paid in Alexandria, which would have reduced the financial power of the sultan to a certain extent. Additionally, there is no way of knowing how many Venetians traded under other cities’ colours.

\(^{85}\) At the very least, this was Marino Sanudo’s opinion, and Venice’s experience appears to bear this out: Sanudo, *Book of Secrets*, pp. 49–67.
As a complete ban on trading never formally materialised, the papacy clearly had some reasoning behind why it did not implement one. One possible reason for this was that it believed it could not convince merchants to accept a complete ban, and decided not to risk humiliation and loss of authority over an un-winnable issue. For the reasons discussed above, there are some problems with this reasoning and it is ultimately unprovable. It is, however, not the only possible reason. Another is that the papacy itself was also profiting from trade with the Muslim world. Through issuing both absolutions and licences, the papacy was making a substantial profit from the merchant activity of Christians operating in the Eastern Mediterranean, at a time when the curia was in financial difficulties.86

It is hard to establish exactly what income the papacy drew from effectively taxing trade in the East. As absolution letters generally did not specify any particular amount, but rather based the fee on a portion of the profits generated from the merchant’s trip, these do not, in most cases, provide any concrete figures and no totals can be reliably drawn from them. For licences, the situation is a little better but still highly speculative. Stantchev has calculated that the papacy may have generated up to 11% of its annual revenues from the sale of licences alone.87 Licences appear to have been available for anywhere between 200 and 5000 gold florins, and this allows for a very rough calculation of the papal incomes from these sources.88 While 11% is an absolute highest figure, even if it was lower it still represented a substantial amount for the papacy, and an income source that would have been hard to do without. When this is combined with any figure from absolutions, it is clear that these are not inconsequential streams of income.

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87 Stantchev, Spiritual Rationality, p. 153.

88 These figures should be treated with caution, for a number of reasons. As Carr, ‘Crossing Boundaries in the Mediterranean’, p. 115 points out, most licences do not state how much they cost. Camera payments corresponding to licences granted are largely absent, and there is no way to know how many licences were granted as favours rather than bought. The values that are given can be highly variable, and as such, any calculations based on these figures must be treated as very approximate.
Another reason the papacy may have been reluctant to attempt an all-encompassing trade ban was that the European economy as a whole, not just the merchant states, relied on the importation of raw cotton and silks from the East.\textsuperscript{89} Even if the papacy could have convinced a significant proportion of the merchant population to cease trading with the Mamlūk ports, there would have been a dramatic short-term resource shortfall in the European textile industry unless the Black Sea ports could have picked up the deficit from the Mongols. Whether this was a feasible option or not is hard to know, though as most imported cotton was grown in Syria and the Levant, it would seem unlikely that Europe would have been able to maintain its textile industry in the short term without Mamlūk goods. Italian ports moved hundreds of tonnes of raw materials for the textile industry per year, which was a volume that could not be replaced immediately.\textsuperscript{90} Particularly as the political situation in central Asia became more fragmented in the middle of the century, the quantity of goods travelling overland towards Europe would have been more limited and complete embargo of Alexandria was even less tenable, which does coincide with the Venetian return to Alexandria. The general economic wellbeing of a significant industry across Christendom should not be ignored as a motivating factor for the lack of a total trade ban.

There are, therefore, several potential reasons why the papacy did not try very hard to convert the theory and rhetoric of a complete ban on trade with the Muslim world to reality, despite this being the logical step toward the recovery of the Holy Land. On the one hand, the economic gains from the trade of non-military goods was making both European states and, more importantly, the Mamlūk sultanate substantially richer. The increased wealth of the sultanate was making the work of a crusade to the Holy Land harder, and thus the papacy should have been very much opposed to trade with the Muslim world. On the other hand, the popes may have felt that they would be unable to achieve a complete ban, even if they had


wanted to do so, and should not attempt to do so for fear of loss of status. Alternatively they may have felt that they needed the income they derived from licencing such trade, and so had to maintain the status quo. As a final consideration, they may have been unwilling to inflict economic hardship on Europe more generally by closing off such an important resource link. One or more of these reasons must have been a sufficient deterrent throughout the period to make the papacy fall short of declaring all trade with the Muslim world heresy.

In terms of papal authority and power, the large number of absolutions issued and the establishment of a licencing system reflected both Christian adherence to the will of the papacy and defiance of its power. That licences were widely taken up and appeared to be considered important in mercantile activities suggests that merchants were not deaf to the aims of the papacy and its authority over Catholic Christians. It is possible, though unlikely, that the fact that the papacy undermined the economic purpose of the trade embargo by issuing the licences calls into question its ability to impose activity which would have put merchants seriously out of pocket. While traders appeared to be willing to follow papal authority up to a point, and effectively pay the papacy a tax on trade with non-Christians, the failure to implement a full-scale ban on trade might suggest that merchants would have been unwilling to give up their livelihoods. Due to the way that the papacy did not appear to be daunted by failures in its embargo on military goods, however, it seems more likely that the papacy needed the funding it could draw from licencing trade more than it needed to harm the Mamlûk Sultanate economically, which was far away from the immediate struggles of the Avignon popes in Italy. Additionally, the restriction on military goods was more crucial to the aims of the papacy than an economic blockade, as this would have a direct impact on a prospective crusade’s success, rather than the more indirect difficulties with tax generated from trade. Thus, rather than being an admission of its own inability to enforce a complete trade ban, the lack of a pronouncement of one is better seen not as an issue of authority, but of inclination; the papacy appeared to not see the need for an extended ban, and it stood to lose badly needed funds by banning all trade and ending its licencing programme.

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A final aspect that must be considered when examining papal authority over the Christian merchants in the Eastern Mediterranean is the extent to which the papacy was able to police the actions of Catholics operating there. Absolution cannot be seen to be a mechanism of enforcement; it was a ‘voluntary’ action taken by the merchants after the fact, rather than a preventative move to stop infractions occurring. Sanudo advocated creating a naval squadron tasked with policing the embargo, which certainly suggests that at the point of his writing, no such force existed.\textsuperscript{92} In his opinion, any Christian merchants caught with goods intended to go to Alexandria or from it should be arrested and their cargo confiscated. In practice, however, this was difficult to do. The Knights of the Hospital and the kingdom of Cyprus were both active early in the fourteenth century in attempting to enforce the blockade of military goods, but the merchant cities were reluctant to allow others to interfere in their trade. Cyprus and the Hospital were active in volunteering to police the Eastern Mediterranean at the council of Vienne in 1311.\textsuperscript{93} The Genoese, in retribution for having one of their galleys seized by the Hospital, allegedly paid Turks to raid Rhodes in 1317.\textsuperscript{94} Cyprus faced regular clashes with the Genoese over the issue of policing the trade routes, which developed into armed conflict at several points in the first two decades of the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{95} In the face of such difficulties, both Cyprus and the Hospital appeared to lose interest, and there is little evidence that either continued to police the routes into the 1320s.

As well as being unwilling to court conflict between Catholic powers, the papacy may not have been entirely pleased with the role the Hospital and Cyprus played as trading powers. Neither the Hospital nor the kingdom of Cyprus was entirely unmotivated by economic gain either. In addition to their crusading zeal, both powers had a financial stake in the success of any action which limited trade

\textsuperscript{92} Sanudo, \textit{The Book of Secrets}, pp. 56–60.
\textsuperscript{95} Peter Edbury, \textit{The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 101–140.
with Alexandria, as goods which would ultimately end up in Mamlūk ports would often make their way there via Ayas, Famagusta, or Rhodes.\textsuperscript{96} As has been often noted, Cyprus and Armenia were both commercially buoyed by the mercantile activity routed through their ports by merchants avoiding taking goods directly to Alexandria and risking excommunication. This commercial activity appeared to fall as direct traffic with Alexandria became more common in the second half of the fourteenth century, but while this trade gave Cyprus motivation to assist the policing of military goods going to Alexandria, it did little to stop those goods ultimately ending up in Mamlūk hands.\textsuperscript{97}

As a consequence of the inability of the papacy to enforce the embargo directly, it was forced to rely on spiritual sanctions and the voluntary cooperation of Catholic merchants. In this regard, the spiritual sanctions appeared to have been more effective than the expectation of cooperation; merchants seemed to be willing to purchase their salvation once they had concluded their illicit business, and expressed regret about disobeying the papacy, but they were still willing to conduct the business in the first place. The number of merchants seeking absolution is evidence enough of this, as was the booming Genoese slave industry. Clearly merchants were concerned with their salvation, though not enough to avoid putting themselves at spiritual risk in the first place, while the papacy itself was relatively powerless to enforce its will directly.

The development of the papal controls on trade following the fall of Acre in 1291 to the end of the Avignon period offers a useful insight into the power and influence of the papacy over Christian merchants active in the Eastern Mediterranean. The difficulties the papacy had in achieving its aims in regard to mercantile activity with the Muslim world reveal an interesting dichotomy between general acceptance of its spiritual jurisdiction, and a regular failure of merchants to uphold the rules set down by the papacy. On one hand, there was an acceptance of the right of the papacy to control trade, as seen by the uptake of licences over the period and in the number of petitions for absolution. On the other hand, the number of petitions for absolutions demonstrates the number of merchants willing to break

\textsuperscript{96} Edbury, \textit{The Kingdom of Cyprus}, pp. 133–35; Ashtor, \textit{Levant Trade}, pp. 39–42.
the papal prohibition in order to profit materially from trade, suggesting that the
papacy’s authority was not strong enough to prevent such infractions.

Despite the assumptions of some modern scholars, the embargo does not appear
to have been intended to be universal in the Avignon period. While licences and
declarations forbidding trade all included some manner of ‘and other goods’ clause,
this always followed a list of specific forbidden goods and should be seen as
prohibiting other trade which aided Muslims militarily instead of being a universal
‘and all other goods’. Rather than acting as a clause forbidding all trade, the
language of licences and absolutions makes it clear that there was a distinction
between prohibited and non-prohibited goods. This point is important in explaining
the papacy’s policy toward trade, helping to understand what has been described as a
‘chronic inconsistency of papal policy’. While discussion of a complete economic
blockade was present in theoretical works, including crusade treatises, there is no
evidence that there was a serious attempt to implement a full trading ban with the
Muslim world.

The licencing system additionally appears to have been quite a success for the
papacy in generating funds on non-military goods and absolutions were only issued
for instances of trade in prohibited goods. The two systems both had the effect of
taxing mercantile activity, but it would appear that they were aiming at different
kinds of trade: licences were sold for legal trade while absolutions were available for
illegal trade. The creation of the licence system and its general acceptance amongst
the merchants of Europe, to the extent that the Mamlûk sultan appeared to be willing
to compensate merchants willing to obtain a licence for Alexandria, should be seen
as a great success of papal authority. That the popes, in only a few decades, were
able to establish their right to control Mediterranean commerce with non-Christians,
and to create a licence system to do so, was an exceptional expansion of their
authority and jurisdiction.

The papal policy of restricting trade with the East should be seen to have been a
genuinely active one, pursued doggedly for over a century before it gained greater
priority after the fall of Acre. While it received greater attention due to events in the
Holy Land, it was a long-standing policy, the promotion of which survived the

immediate reactions inspired by the fall of Acre or the preparations for a crusade. It continued to be declared and enforced regardless of opposition or lack of success, and it would appear that the popes took great steps to further their influence over commerce in this area. In this regard, the policy was a success, and was one which cannot be seen to be a measure reacting to any particular event or opportunity.
2. Pilgrim Licences

Like the papal efforts to control economic contact with the Islamic world, controls on pilgrim traffic to the Holy Land had their origins long before the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, it remained an enduring issue for crusade theorists who remained concerned about the income the Mamlûks could draw from it. The political readjustments following the fall of Acre allow for an interesting exploration on how the papacy was able to exert its authority over pilgrims and to what extent its procedures were respected by those travelling to the Eastern Mediterranean.

As an issue that was intrinsic to the Church’s rationalisation of its military involvement in the Holy Land, pilgrimage presented a unique challenge to establishing authority over policing travel and enforcing papal policy. From the very earliest days of the crusade, the rationale of protecting pilgrims and ensuring a secure environment for Christians to worship in biblical locations was a key part of the rhetoric justifying military action, yet by the fourteenth century, pilgrimage to the Holy Land was a controlled activity. Pilgrims were not, in theory, allowed to simply travel to the Holy Land without first having gained permission; anyone travelling outside of the Christian world without said permission found themselves under automatic excommunication. How effectively the papacy was able to restrict and control access to the Holy Land can give important insights into papal authority over Catholic travellers and how well respected the decrees of the popes were. The degree to which this policy was policed and enforced has important implications for the level of importance placed on the Holy Land and the extent to which wider papal

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policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean was reactive, particularly in regard to how the papacy attempted to control cross-cultural contact.

While the pilgrim guides of the fourteenth century, especially those of Ludolph von Suchem, Simon Semeonis, Niccolò da Poggibonsi, and John Mandeville, have been well discussed in scholarship, the licence record has been largely overlooked. In part, this is because the licences give very little general information or detail, and are extremely formulaic, but this is also largely because research on pilgrims has largely focused on the experience of the pilgrims and their journey. The pilgrim licence record, therefore, can provide a new, more general understanding of the flow of traffic and the expectations on pilgrims by the papacy. This section aims to look at the act of pilgrimage from a more administrative perspective, considering how the control of such a devotional act occurred, rather than what happened to pilgrims after they arrived.

Papal licences were first mandated in 1188 by Clement III as a response to Saladin’s capture of Jerusalem. Much like papal efforts to control trade with the Islamic world, the motivation behind this act was rooted in the crusade and efforts to deprive the sultanate materially. Pilgrims were generally allowed passage through Fātimid, and later Mamlūk territory by the local authorities, but were heavily taxed as they progressed. The devotion of Western pilgrims was quite a lucrative income for the Muslim rulers of the Holy Land. Consequently, the papacy sought to control the numbers of pilgrims, while still allowing the devout to participate in pilgrimage. As with trade, its response to this was to license pilgrimage and restrict the numbers of pilgrims able to go. Pilgrims, on their part, could have accepted licences for two reasons: failure to obtain one resulted in automatic excommunication, and they provided the practical purpose of acting as a letter of safe-passage, both within and


beyond Europe. Simon Semeonis was suspected of being a spy when he arrived at Alexandria in 1320, and the port officials had a complicated bureaucracy that could be better navigated with official documentation.\textsuperscript{102}

The requirement for licences remained in force throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, at least officially, though it is difficult to know the extent to which a licence was considered necessary. There were three instances in the thirteenth century when all travel to the Holy Land was banned excepting those going on crusade, in 1215–1219, 1245–1249, and 1274–1280, but these bans were clearly not enforced.\textsuperscript{103} Thietmar, a German pilgrim, travelled to the East during one of those periods in 1217 and wrote an account of it, which suggests that such controls were not particularly well respected. Thietmar himself makes no mention of them, though he also neglected to mention the crusade which was launched while he was in the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{104} As so few actual records survive for the thirteenth century, however, much of this is purely speculative. Very few licences still exist for that period, so it is impossible to say with any certainty how many were issued in relation to the number of pilgrims who travelled. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the papacy granted a licence to Thietmar to travel during a travel prohibition, but how representative he was as an example is impossible to know. Travelling unlicensed may have been the norm in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries; it may have been an unusual circumstance brought on because of the travel ban, or it may have been an uncommon and unusual event that has survived where more common examples have not.

By the fourteenth century, licences had been mandatory for over a century and it seems relatively clear that the requirement for them was, at least, well known. Despite this, however, the flow of pilgrims to the Holy Land was viewed as a serious problem by crusade theorists, who believed that pilgrims were directly aiding the Mamlūks through the taxes and fines they had to pay to access the holy sites and even the cities of the sultanate. William of Adam stated that:

The pilgrims who go to Jerusalem also greatly assist the prince of Babylon at the expense of the Holy Land. Just as they do not fear excommunication by

\textsuperscript{102} Simon Semeonis, \textit{Itinerarium}, pp. 46–49
\textsuperscript{103} Mylod, Latin Christian Pilgrimage, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{104} Thietmar, 'Pilgrimage', in \textit{Pilgrimage to Jerusalem and the Holy Land}, pp. 95–134.
their superior, they do not pay due attention to the mandate of the Church, nor consider how great harm they do to Christendom, nor realise how great an effect they have. For the Sultan exacts and receives about thirty-five pennies of Tours from each pilgrim, and since innumerable pilgrims flow to Jerusalem from various regions of the world, what I say will be clear when this tribute is multiplied.105

The papacy, however, was less inclined to prevent pilgrims going to the Holy Land than the crusade theorists had wanted, with the exception of the three injunctions in the thirteenth century. No such travel bans were issued in the first half of the fourteenth century, despite preparations for large-scale crusades being undertaken, which was the context surrounding the previous restrictions on travel. That these crusades never in fact materialised is irrelevant to the preparations for them, which previously had included a travel ban before any troops were mobilised; during the fourteenth century no such blocks on travel were placed even as part of the preliminary steps toward a crusade.106 Similarly, there appears to be little correlation between crusade planning in the fourteenth century and the number of licences issued. As shown in figure 1 (page 72), licences were issued periodically throughout the 1320s with no regard to the crusades being planned during that period, and the period of crusade organisation in 1332–33 was one of the highest years for issuing licences. Pilgrim traffic appears to have been held quite separate from military endeavours, and the two did not appear to impact one another much.

The Content of Pilgrim Licences

The content of pilgrim licences by the start of the fourteenth century was extremely formulaic, with most looking very similar and sharing many key phrases. One typical example was:

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106 See chapter seven, pages 180–84 for more information about the crusade to the Holy Land in the fourteenth century.
To our beloved son, the noble man Bertrand de Baux [Les Baux-en-Provence], lord of Cortodon, [in] the diocese of Avignon

We have been persuaded by your pleas regarding the Sepulchre and other places of worship above-mentioned. There is no obstacle of any prohibitions, promulgations or sentences of the Apostolic See against it, whether in effect or already held, and there are also no penalties spiritual or temporal regarding the above-mentioned question. You have therefore the permission to visit these places with twenty companions. However you must bring them along in such a fashion as also to show that you may thus accomplish this pilgrimage with them as you could not have done without them. You must not bring into those parts of the world anything else or suffer things to happen which may serve to strengthen the success or favour of the enemies of the Christian faith. On the authority of those present we grant this to you.¹⁰⁷

This letter, dated 1333, was for Bertrand de Baux, who was a Southern French lord with connections to Italy. It allowed him and twenty companions on a journey to the Holy Land and stipulated the conditions for his journey. It was sent along with other letters pertaining to his conduct on the trip. One specified that he was allowed to bring his own portable altar, but that he was not allowed to let any schismatic priest use it.¹⁰⁸ This was a fairly typical example of a licence, and it contains important information about the numbers of pilgrims and conditions under which they were allowed to travel.

In some cases the information normally found in several letters was combined, with only one letter sent to an individual containing all the privileges and

¹⁰⁷ Reg. Vat. 137, f. 66: Dilecto filio nobilis viro Bertrandode Baucio, domino Cortodoni, Auinionen dioc-

¹⁰⁸ Reg. Vat. 137, f. 66.
conditions attached to their licence. One common variation involved restrictions on the number and type of ships taken for the pilgrimage, which appeared to normalise the relationship between merchant and pilgrim.\footnote{One such example can be found in JXXII:LC, II, n. 5742, p.22.} This clause combined a trading licence and a pilgrimage licence, including restrictions on ships and restating the conditions of the trading embargo in addition to the pilgrim limitations stated in the licence above. The relationship is never made explicit in the licences, but the clear implication is that a pilgrimage was not necessarily a non-profit activity.

The papacy did not seem to have any difficulty with the idea of merchant pilgrims, or pilgrims trading goods in order to cover the expenses of their journey, but the popes did draw a distinction between the two activities. Being granted a pilgrim licence was not permission to trade, while being granted a trade licence was not a licence to travel beyond the ports. If one wanted to do both, one would have required a licence permitting both. As one of the main concerns of commentators was the amount of money pilgrims contributed to Mamlūk coffers, pilgrim licences specified that the purchase or sale of anything that was not strictly needed for survival invalidated their licence, clearly marking them as separate from trading licences.

In general, however, pilgrim licences were very similar to one another, and in contrast to trading licences, pilgrim licences appeared to have acquired a standard form prior to the Avignon papacy. Consequently, there was little development of them through the period, and these documents varied only with regard to specific details rather than general form or content. These were legal documents first and foremost, which were well recognised and understood throughout the Christian world and beyond. They were not intended to be records of the pilgrimage for posterity, and so did not contain information to that end. This is a potential benefit for their use as evidence, as they do not reflect the outcome of any visit; rather, they reflect only the intentions of the papacy in granting pilgrims access to enemy territory. What the papacy highlights in those documents was clearly what it considered to be the pertinent information to a pilgrim before they had left, and as such, reveals some of the priorities and thinking behind controlling pilgrimage.
Licence Acquisition and Necessity

The extent to which pilgrim licences were considered a necessity and acquired by all pilgrims heading to the Holy Land is very difficult to determine. Source limitations and losses play a role in this, as does the nature of the sources themselves.\(^\text{110}\) In order to establish how pilgrimage to the Holy Land can be used to provide evidence for papal authority over Catholics travelling to the Holy Land, the extent to which the pilgrim traffic described in licences can be seen to be representative of the whole must be explored.

The function of a pilgrim licence, for the recipient, was principally to provide official evidence of the status of the pilgrim to the Holy Land, in order to ease their passage both through the Christian and Islamic worlds, and as a consequence such licences did not need a huge amount of detailed information on them. They were primarily documents that travelled with the pilgrim, and as such did not need the full names of everyone covered by the licence, or other details about the party; bearing a licence was sufficient for its practical purpose. Thus, the records for issued licences are consequently limited in what they can reveal. Prosopographical information cannot be accurately extracted from these sources due to these limitations, and it is not the intention of this study to attempt to do so. More general information on traffic and the power of the papacy to influence pilgrims can still be obtained from these sources, and information on traffic can inform trends, if not give full itineraries or shipping inventories of the pilgrims. For the purposes of establishing papal authority and power, however, the information they do provide is sufficient.

On a more general level, licences can reveal a certain amount about the pilgrim traffic to the Holy Land. The licenced traffic should not be seen as necessarily representative, but the number of individuals and groups travelling under licence allows for a basic description of how many pilgrims were travelling with the blessing of the popes. Figure 1 illustrates the number of pilgrim licences granted

\(^{110}\) As the papal penitentiary was cheaper to apply to, it is quite likely that many pilgrim dispensations went through there instead of the chancery. These records sadly no longer exist, and we only have a limited number of the higher-status licences issued by the chancery in the pope’s name, rather than the cardinal penitentiary’s name.
1317–1348, though this should be seen as an absolute minimum number, and this does not include material that could be in Clement VI’s common letters, or some of John XXII’s secret letters. This obviously excludes all licences which were obtained through the penitentiary, or were not recorded in the registers for economic reasons. Consequently these figures are the high-profile examples who wanted their licences issued in the name of the pope, and who paid for a copy to be registered. Thus, while these figures must be used with caution, they are all that is currently available.

Throughout John XXII’s pontificate, where the source survival and editing is at least roughly consistent, one licence was granted approximately every other year until 1328. Following this, there was a flurry of activity until the end of his pontificate, with between two and five licences being issued per year, with the exception of 1332, when no licences appeared to have been issued. After John’s death, activity remained high until 1343, with occasional years when no pilgrims appeared to depart, when there was a period of sustained inactivity for three years, followed by a resumption of high intensity activity. These periods of activity are difficult to map onto events which one might expect to have had an impact on

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pilgrim traffic, such as crusading activity. While efforts to launch a passagium generale persisted throughout the first two decades of the fourteenth century, no formal travel bans were issued, and licences continued to be granted, just at a much lower rate than in the following decades. Curiously, in the run-up to the anti-Turkish naval leagues, which were also granted crusade status, pilgrim licences were issued in substantially higher numbers, further confusing the picture. While a lack of licences issued between 1344 and 1346 could be attributed to the work of the naval league which captured Smyrna in 1345, the distribution of licences granted does not appear to correlate well to other events with any kind of regularity.

One explanation for this gap in the records is that they simply have been lost over time. The penitentiary records are lost, supplication records do not exist prior to 1342, and pilgrimage was already an expensive endeavour; the additional fees imposed for registering a letter may not have been an option for many. While this is the simplest explanation for the missing records, it does little to illuminate how many licences were actually issued. This does not mean that loss can be dismissed though; it should be understood to be a possibility that confuses analysis. In terms of papal authority, the likely possibility of missing records means that the absence of evidence for licences for individuals who are known to have travelled on a pilgrimage does not necessarily mean an erosion of authority. The likeliness of an incomplete record set means that any currently existing absence cannot be used with any certainty as evidence that nothing was issued. While this is more generally true of the registers, it is of particular importance to remember when dealing with a discreet set of documents like pilgrim licences.

Another reason for this difficulty comes from initially incomplete sources in that, as a general rule, only successful petitions were recorded in the Vatican registers while failed petitions were not.\footnote{Zutshi, ‘Petitions to the Pope’, pp. 82–94.} The only surviving example of a refusal for a pilgrim licence comes from 1331, when John XXII refused to allow Gaston II, the count of Foix, to travel because of his inexperience at sea and the danger of pirates along the route.\footnote{JXXII:LS, V, n. 4630, pp. 81–82.} This refusal was collated with other letters to the count and, given its unique nature, it is quite possible that it would not have been recorded if the count had not had other business with the curia. Gaston was no stranger to the
papal courts, his succession had been litigated through the papal courts, and he was also an important political and military figure in south France. He played important roles in the War of Saint-Sardos of 1323–25 and the early campaigns of the Hundred Years War, and was not someone who could lightly be accused of lacking means or might.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, it is hard to know from the surviving evidence what the reasoning behind the issuing of licences over time was. This was also clearly not a blanket ban on travel either; the Knights of the Hospital were granted a licence to take six pilgrims to the Holy Land only a month before Gaston of Foix was refused.\textsuperscript{115} This example was therefore not an indication of a wider policy of blocking travel, and reflected the specific circumstances and experience of the count, though it does show papal concern for the increase of piracy along the route to the Holy Land.

Without further examples of rejected petitions for pilgrimage, it is hard to know how selective the papacy was being both in general or at any specific time, but the survival of this one example is important, particularly given that it was issued to such a powerful individual. It is improbable that even one such example has survived, and thus it is not unreasonable to assume that other rejections would have taken place on similar conditions, though there is no way of knowing how common this was.

Another possibility for the unclear picture of pilgrim traffic comes from people exempted from needing licences. Of the authors of travel guides who actually visited the Holy Land, very few were named in licences even though they were usually writing at the end of their lives. As these were travel guides intended for wide reception, however, it is reasonable to assume that the author had received all the proper authorisation necessary to avoid punishment. Ludolph von Suchem specified at the very beginning of his guide that ‘He that would go to the said Holy Land must beware lest he travel thither without leave from the Apostolic Father’.\textsuperscript{116} Despite this, there appears to be no record of Ludolph in any licences, regardless of his assurances of the necessity of petitioning for one. Ludolph also explained that


\textsuperscript{115} JXXII:LS, V, n. 4591, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{116} Ludolph von Suchem, \textit{Description of the Holy Land}, p. 3.
there were exceptions to those who needed a licence, including those ‘in religion’, a category into which he himself would fall, as a friar, which may explain why there was no record of him. Problematically, however, Ludolph states that he had only ‘heard’ of these exceptions, a phrase he usually employed when relaying second-hand information which could mean that he did petition and receive papal dispensation, as many other men ‘in religion’ did. Other, more secular writers, such as John Mandeville, also appeared to have had no licence to travel, assuming he did indeed visit the places he claimed. Nevertheless, as most of the authors who travelled to the Holy Land were members of religious orders in one way or another, their notable absence from the record is not necessarily indicative of loss, but could be attributed to not acquiring a licence at all.

A final explanation for the absence of known individuals in the pilgrim licence record is that licences often named only one individual on the journey, or none at all. Licences petitioned for by institutions would have been addressed to the head of the order, as in the case of the aforementioned licence granted to the Hospital in 1331. The letter was addressed to Hélion de Villeneuve, the master of the Hospital, not the pilgrims who were to undertake the journey, and it specified only that six men were allowed to go, although these six were not named. Other licences only mentioned the most prominent member of the group, leaving all their travelling companions unnamed, as in the case of Bertrand de Baux, who was licenced to visit the Holy Land with twenty companions, none of whose names were recorded.

It is therefore important to recognise that pilgrim licences, for several possible reasons, were not a full record of all pilgrims which went to the Holy Land. Through exceptions, probable loss, and lack of detail, the licence record can only give an indication of what the traffic going to the Holy Land during the first half of the fourteenth century was. Nevertheless, the number of people recorded as travelling under pilgrim licence represents a substantial amount of traffic, and this clearly

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117 See pages 78–80 for further discussion on the Ludolph’s statements on licences.
shows that the pilgrim route was regularly travelled throughout the entire period, even if it understates the volume of traffic.

**Pilgrim Licences as Markers of Papal Authority**

The use of licences as evidence has to be qualified, for all the reasons discussed in the previous section, but they are still useful. They show that pilgrim traffic certainly was occurring, and they show that at least some of it was officially sanctioned by the papacy. The relatively widespread survival of papal pilgrim licences highlights that they were regularly issued, and shows that many pilgrims were receiving papal blessing before setting off to the Holy Land.

Pilgrim traffic to the Holy Land was an important logistical preoccupation for the papacy, as travel had the practical effect of financially supporting the Mamlūk sultanate through taxes and fees imposed on Christian pilgrims. Crusade theorists and pilgrim guides all highlight the expense involved in travelling through Mamlūk lands, and either condemned it as supporting the enemies of Christ, or warned prospective travellers about coming unprepared. Nevertheless, pilgrimage was an important part of spiritual activity for Catholics in the Middle Ages, and the papacy found itself able to exert authority over travel in much the same way it could over trade in order to officiate and make such journeys acceptable, despite the obvious problems that it generated for the crusade.

Of the 81 surviving letters issued during John XXII’s pontificate which concerned Catholic Christian activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, 17 were for pilgrim licences to the Holy Land, or 21%. This shows that even in only the registered letters, pilgrims took up a significant proportion of the attention given by

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121 Niccolò da Poggibonsi has a particular dislike of the tolls he had to pay, and described the punishments for those who could not pay: Niccolò da Poggibonsi, *Libro d’oltramare*, I, pp. 294–323, II, 5–83. This is helpfully summarised in Jotischky, ‘The Mendicants as Missionaries and Travellers’, pp. 91–92.

122 John XXII’s pontificate has been used here as an example as it is the best edited and consequently the most comprehensive single dataset. The figure of 21% is illustrative, as mentioned previously, it is very likely that many more pilgrim licences were issued than currently survive.
the papacy to what Catholics were doing in the Eastern Mediterranean and should be seen as an important part of papal activity concerning the East, even if the overall numbers of letters registered were not huge compared to other kinds of letters relating to issues closer to Avignon.

Licences appear to have been seen by contemporaries as necessary, or at least important, preparations for going on pilgrimage. This is particularly clear in Ludolph’s guide to the Holy Land, as well as in the number of licences requested and issued. Ludolph was resident in the Holy Land for five years, and had a great deal of experience with pilgrims and the pilgrim routes. The fact that he began his guide to the Holy Land with a reminder about the need to obtain a licence before departure should be seen as a strong indication of the perceived authority of the papacy to control travel to the Holy Land:

He that would go to the said Holy Land must beware lest he travel thither without leave from the Apostolic Father, for as soon as he touches the shore of the Soldan’s country he falls under the sentence of the Pope, because since the Holy Land came into the hands of the Soldan, it was, and remains, excommunicate, as are likewise all who travel thither without the Pope’s leave, lest by receiving tribute from the Christians the Saracens should be brought to despise the Church. For the cause, when any traveller receives his licence to go thither from the Apostolic Father, besides the leave which is granted him, there is a clause in the Bull to the effect that he shall not buy or sell anything in the world, save only victuals and clothes and bodily necessaries, and if he contravenes this he is to know that he has fallen back again under sentence of excommunication.123

This passage is valuable as it is one of the only descriptions from outside the papal court of how licences were used in practice. To Ludolph, at least, it was clear that a licence was a necessary first step for a journey to see the holy places in the Levant in most cases, but he does specify that there was a perception that there were exceptions to the requirements for licence:

There are, however, I have heard, many grounds on which one may journey thither without leave; for example, if the traveller be in religion, if a man’s

father, mother, or friend be sick there, or held in captivity, then he may travel thither without leave, to seek for them or to ransom them, or when anyone is sent thither to make peace or to arrange and restore any other good thing.\textsuperscript{124}

This list of exceptions could explain why Ludolph himself did not have a licence, as he was a friar and thus ‘in religion’, and why licences were so formulaic. Assuming that Ludolph was not mistaken, the implication of this was that only lay pilgrims, monks, and secular clerics intending on visiting the holy places in the Levant, with no other motivations, were expected to obtain licences. In practice, however, members of religious orders and ambassadors were often recipients of licences as well, such as the French embassy in 1330 mentioned by Mufaḍḍal ibn Abī al-Faḍā’il.\textsuperscript{125}

In 1321, Jerome, the bishop of Caffa, was granted a licence to visit the Holy Land with four Franciscans and all their servants.\textsuperscript{126} In 1325, a Franciscan named Arnold of Fabricis was granted a licence to visit the Holy Sepulchre with four other members of his order, with their servants.\textsuperscript{127} These men were certainly members of religious orders, and consequently, were ‘in religion’. The Hospital received several licences which they should have been exempted from needing as well. In addition to these men, who certainly were ‘in religion’, there were plenty of high-ranking church officials who also went. In 1333, Nicholas of Trebis, the dean of Coron (Greece) was given a licence to go to the Holy Land on his own.\textsuperscript{128} Toward the end of the period, Paul, the bishop of Gurk (Austria) was granted a licence to visit with 50 men in 1357, and a month later Philip, the bishop of Cavaillon (France) was granted one for himself and ten others.\textsuperscript{129} This is far from an exhaustive list, and high-ranking church officials, as well as lesser ranking ones, were regularly granted licences throughout the entire first half of the fourteenth century despite apparently

\textsuperscript{124} Ludolph von Suchem, \textit{Description of the Holy Land}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{125} Mufaḍḍal ibn Abī al-Faḍā’il, \textit{Chronik}, p. 142; JXXII:LS, III, n. 2745, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{127} JXXII:LC, V, no. 22787, p. 417.
\textsuperscript{128} JXXII:LC, XII, no. 59260, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{129} IVI, V, n. 2723, p. 76; n. 2861, p. 119.
being exempted in many cases from actually requiring a licence to circumvent the sentence of excommunication placed on unauthorised visits to the Holy Land.

That people who appeared to have been exempted from the need for a licence to visit the Holy Land without sanction obtained licences anyway suggests that being granted a licence had practical functions. A licence may have acted as a form of safe passage. A pilgrim carrying a papal licence may have been less likely to receive trouble in potentially hostile parts of Europe, and would make negotiating the journey to Jerusalem substantially easier, particularly entering and once in Mamlūk territory. A traveller with a licence would have been able to prove that they were a genuine pilgrim, which had the potential to make their journey safer. Another possibility, particularly for the lay traveller, or a vain religious pilgrim, was that a licence could be seen as an item of privilege, which boosted the status of the individual who obtained it. Thus, licences could have had a social function as well; they displayed the piety of the pilgrim for all to see, and clearly broadcast their wealth and devotion in being able to go on pilgrimage.

Thus, for several reasons, it seems clear that the authority of the papacy to issue licences for travel was not in question in the minds of contemporaries. This understanding and acceptance of the right of the papacy to control pilgrim traffic is also demonstrated by the number of licences issued; substantial numbers were petitioned for and granted by the papacy throughout the fourteenth century despite the loss of sources, suggesting that this authority was widely acknowledged amongst those with the means to go on pilgrimage. At the very least, over 300 individuals registered their licenses in the thirty years between 1317 and 1347. Given the expense involved in a pilgrimage to the Holy Land and the limited references to other pilgrims in the travel accounts of the time, as well as the loss of so many other pertinent records, it would appear that most of the pilgrim traffic was probably licenced.

The papacy’s willingness to turn away pilgrims also shows a surprising level of power. It shows that the papacy was not merely issuing licences as a way of taxing pilgrims or only to claim authority over the institution of pilgrimage, as it would then be willing to issue one to whoever wanted one and could pay the fee. That the popes were willing to refuse to allow certain laymen licence to travel suggests that the financial benefit of issuing pilgrim licences was less important to
the papacy than maintaining control over access to the Holy Land. It also showed that the papacy was in a position to refuse powerful laymen and, presumably, be taken seriously. While there remains only an isolated example of rejection, the fact that it exists at all is significant, and given the many reasons against it being retained by the papacy, its very existence is surprising. The fact that it exists indicates that similar undocumented examples very probably arose, and it is reasonable to conclude that this was not as isolated an example as it appears now.

Pilgrim licences, therefore, appear to show a strong acceptance of papal authority over who was allowed to go on pilgrimage, and also evidence of power from the papacy’s right to sanction those who did not obtain one, or block them from going. This does not necessarily translate into the physical reality, though there is little evidence to show that lay pilgrims were visiting the Holy Land without licences. Regardless, the principle of papal authority over pilgrimage was unchallenged and appeared to be well accepted by contemporaries, as illustrated by their regular issue and their prominence in Ludolph’s guide.

In much the same way as trade licences, pilgrim licences represent a clear and direct policy toward the East which was not a reaction to any particular event, but rather was a sustained policy over a great deal of time with particular objectives in mind. Primarily, this was to limit the income which pilgrimage brought to the Muslim world, first after the fall of Jerusalem in 1187, and even more so after the fall of Acre in 1291 when all pilgrimage traffic had to enter Muslim territory via Muslim ports. The papacy also clearly saw itself as being in a position to make decisions based on the perceived competency of an applicant, and this duty of care is not unimportant. Maintaining the reputation of pilgrimage was important to its future viability, and at an extremely pragmatic level, allowing unprepared pilgrims to be abducted by pirates or to languish in an Egyptian jail only increased the problems for Christians in the area. Controlling pilgrim access to the Holy Land also had the side effect of bolstering papal authority, allowing the popes an unchallenged mandate to control and authorise activity concerning the Holy Land, increasing their prestige and allowing them access to funds generated from licencing these activities.
3. Marriage Licences

While marriage licences are discussed in the context of what they reveal about Catholic–Greek relations elsewhere, it is not the intention of this chapter to consider the effect of papal control over marriage on political relations or the social cohesion of mixed-religion areas. Rather, this chapter will explore papal efforts to control the marriages of Catholics as an aspect of papal authority, considering the extent to which controls on marriage were respected by the laity. As another area of cross-cultural interaction between the Catholic and non-Catholic worlds, marriage in multi-religious areas fell under the moral oversight of the papacy, or at least was an area over which the papacy claimed authority, and this allows for another example of how the papacy attempted to impose its will on Christians living on the fringes of the Catholic world.

There were two main aspects to the papal control of marriage which will be considered in this chapter: how much the papacy’s restrictions on marriages within the prohibited degrees of kinship were upheld, and to what extent the papal injunction against marrying non-Catholics was upheld. Furthermore, the application of these injunctions on differing social and religious groups will also be explored, with the intention of ascertaining the extent of authority and effective power the papacy achieved over marriage. To a certain extent, these two injunctions were closely related, as evidence for the former can be drawn from marriage requests for the latter, particularly in Latin Greece and Cyprus. At the furthest reaches of the Catholic world, however, the situation was more confused. Where the Catholic Church was attempting to expand into non-Christian or non-Catholic lands, the Church took a conciliatory approach to marriage, allowing marriages which would otherwise have been deemed illegal in canon law. How marriages functioned in Catholic-minority countries provides for an interesting case study in the effectiveness of papal authority over interactions in Christian civil society as well as how papal authority affected the personal lives of Catholics living outside of Christendom.

130 See chapter five for these aspects of inter-faith relations.
How the popes dealt with difficulties in enforcing their power over the issue of marriage also provides an important case study into the authority of the popes on the frontiers of the Catholic world. This issue carries particular relevance to papal efforts at converting non-Catholics who had different rules for marriage and for how those converts were expecting to adjust. Marriage was an important social, economic, and political institution, and the control of who was eligible for marriage, and what was a lawful marriage, represented political power. Therefore, in this case authority is being treated as the acceptance of the popes as having the right to control, limit, and administer marriage. If the papacy was able successfully to deny marriage, or to force conditions on marriages to legitimise them, the papacy could be considered to have exerted power in this area. Alternatively, if the papacy was making concessions on the periphery of the Catholic world that it would not in Europe in order to boost its authority, this can be seen as a reactive position which reflects a low level of power.

**The Injunction against Incest amongst Catholics**

Christian restrictions on marriage within close kin-groups were a relatively straightforward restriction on marriage and, due to the tendencies of noble families of the time, one of the most appealed against. Marriage law had influences from many places in the Catholic world, drawing on Roman, Jewish and early Christian traditions, and the restrictions on incestuous marriage reflected that. Initially established by the Council of Chalcedon in 325 forbidding marriage within seven degrees of kinship, the prohibition was relaxed at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 to four degrees of kinship. Prior to the Lateran Council, an incestuous marriage would be judged based on the remoteness of kinship as well as the length of time the marriage had been sustained, but after 1215, the rules were simplified. The length of the marriage was no longer considered a factor and the four degrees of kinship not open to negotiation. The papacy did reserve the right to issue dispensations in the
case of the more distant relations, in the third and fourth degree, which were produced as licences at the papal court.\textsuperscript{131}

The sacrament of marriage was untouchable, even for the papacy. As long as the marriage was contractually valid, it could not be annulled. That is not to say that any invalid marriage was annulled, and certain conditions of validity could be relaxed; the restriction of marriage within the limits of consanguinity was such a variable. Thirteenth-century theologians pointed to prior flexibility the Church had displayed on this issue, and canon law allowed for such circumstances.\textsuperscript{132} This was particularly important for the elites of the Latin world, as an invalid marriage meant that their children could not inherit, nor could political alliances in small populations be made without breaching incest restrictions. Legitimising their union was politically, socially, and economically important, and how these mechanisms were used reveals a certain amount about papal power in region.

It would appear that even on the periphery of the Catholic world, these controls on marriage by Latins were quite well regarded, as can be seen from the number of licences requested and issued to Catholics living in Catholic minority countries, such as Crete, Negroponte,\textsuperscript{133} and Cyprus. There were at least 70 dispensations for marriages within the prohibited degrees of kinship issued to Cyprus alone in the period between 1312 and 1360, for a variety of reasons.\textsuperscript{134} This were usually for those within the more distant degrees of relationship, the third and fourth, but high-profile examples exist of marriages within the second degree of kinship.\textsuperscript{135}


\textsuperscript{133} Modern Evia, in the Aegean.

\textsuperscript{134} As with most of the evidence used in section, this should be seen as representative of the highest-status examples of these licences. The penitentiary certainly had authority over this matter as well as the chancery, and was also cheaper. It is reasonable to assume that there were other such records which no longer exist.

\textsuperscript{135} Nicholas Coureas, \textit{The Latin Church in Cyprus 1313–1378} (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2010), pp. 44–60 gives a detailed look at the specifics of most of the marriage licences issued by the papacy during this period.
The most common reasons given for the necessity of these marriages were a lack of marriageable partners in Cyprus, to resolve disputes within the kingdom, or to prevent a scandal. During the Black Death period between 1348 and 1350, several requests cited the mass death from plague as a reason for an incestuous marriage. Regardless of the reason requested for their issue, the granting of so many dispensations for incestuous marriage demonstrates both the regularity of marriages of this kind, and the perceived legal need for validation. Individuals who lived far from Avignon and the European Catholic world still petitioned directly to the papacy for dispensation to legitimise illegal marriages under canon law.

Similar examples can be found across Latin Greece, though they are not as numerous as Cyprus. This is partly explicable by the close ties the Latin elites of Latin Greece maintained with Europe, which may have meant that many nobles would have imported spouses from Europe, or that they may have filed marriage petitions from their home cities, obscuring references to Latin Greece. These populations were also very small, meaning any loss in the record, such as the missing penitentiary records, could disproportionately distort our understanding. As a final consideration, the duchy of Athens was under interdict following the Catalan conquest in 1311, and it would appear that no successful petitions originated from there during this period, at least not for anyone claiming to be from there. Interdict did not necessarily restrict the clergy from conducting administrative tasks, but it would appear in this case that the papacy had very little contact with Athens during the period of interdict, at least until much later in the fourteenth century.

For the most part then, it appears that members of the Catholic minority of Cyprus and Latin Greece accepted the authority of the papacy to control their marriages directly. Rather than appeal to a local agent, such as a patriarch or archbishop, prominent nobles petitioned the papal court in Avignon directly for

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137 One such example is for the marriage of Mirin Gisi and Beatrice de la Gronda, of the city of Negroponte, who were related in the fourth degree of consanguinity: BXII:LC, I. n. 3654, pp. 326–27.

permission to marry within the prohibited degrees of kinship, with some regularity, particularly in Cyprus. There appears to be no evidence to suggest that the papacy was empowering legates in the Eastern Mediterranean to deal with marriage disputes, and the number of petitions reaching Avignon also suggests there was no more local authority deemed capable. This shows that these marriages were occurring relatively regularly, that papal approval was considered important to Catholics living in Catholic-minority countries, and that only the papal court was considered competent to legitimise the marriages, rather than a more local authority.

Even on the far frontier of the Catholic world, the exclusive right of the papacy to declare a marriage valid was respected. In Armenia, where the union of Churches was often a subject of dispute, examples can be found of petitions to Avignon requesting the legitimisation of illegal marriages. King Oshin had his own marriage endorsed by the papacy in addition to the catholicos of Armenia in 1311. Oshin of Korykos, the regent for the under-age King Levon IV between 1320 and 1329, requested papal permission for the marriage of his daughter to King Levon. Oshin has been widely regarded as an individual who was opposed to Western involvement in Armenia and the Armenian Church, yet he still secured papal blessing for his daughter’s marriage within the prohibited degree of kinship rather than appealing to the Catholicos of the Armenian Church. How marriage within prohibited degrees of kingship functioned outside of these elite groups is less clear, however, and there are no surviving records of appeals to the papacy from non-elites.

This level of effort to secure papal approval shows a clear acceptance of papal authority over marriage, as opposed to having these issues resolved at a local level, at least where the injunction against marriage within kinship groups was concerned. It also suggests that the power of the papacy over marriage was well respected, though direct evidence for this is harder to come by. There were no examples of the papacy rejecting marriage petitions from the Eastern Mediterranean, though this is potentially an issue of limited sources. Nevertheless, there is no real

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139 CV, II, n. 2413, p. 133; CV, VI, nn. 7199–7202, pp. 293–94.
140 JXXII:LC, III, n. 13974–78, pp. 337–38; VI, n. 25043, p. 165. See chapter five for a more detailed examination of Oshin of Korykos and the Armenian Church’s relationship with the papacy.
reason to think the papacy would have rejected any of these marriage petitions; they were presented in accordance with the legal framework which allowed the papacy to issue exceptions to the prohibition.\footnote{D’Avray, \textit{Papacy, Monarchy and Marriage}, pp. 94–112.}

While the situation in Europe was not the same as in the Eastern Mediterranean, there is a better rate of survival of supporting evidence in Europe, and a comparison could be made to support this idea of papal power over marriage. Similar marriage dispensations can be found throughout Europe, demonstrating but according to the work of Donahue, there were seemingly no non-high status annulments recorded which gave incest as their grounds for terminating the marriage.\footnote{Donahue, \textit{Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle Ages}, pp. 562–68.} If a marriage had been found to be in breach of the incest prohibition and was not granted a licence, annulment was the only other alternative, though clearly it was not one that was well exercised. The papacy clearly felt that issuing dispensations for incestuous marriages was preferable to annulment in most cases. There is no reason to think that a similar situation did not exist in Catholic-minority countries, and that those who breached the prohibition on incestuous marriage simply requested a dispensation. There certainly were a quite large number of requests for exceptions for incestuous marriages, which suggests that the number of people getting married without one was low. There were legal necessities for this, but it does also indicate that the papacy was well regarded and its authority on this matter unquestioned. It was not, however, able to prevent incestuous marriages taking place at all. The need for so many dispensations demonstrated that papal power was not absolute in the face of political, economic, or social factors, and that Catholics were entirely happy to enter into potentially illegitimate marriages, though they did seek to legitimise them.

\section*{The Injunction Controlling inter-Christian Marriages}

The prohibition against the intermarriage between Latins and Greeks in the fourteenth century was an extension of the early Church prohibitions against
marriage with non-Christians. While this ban had in the tenth century been explicitly specified to not cover Latins and Greeks, and there were high profile inter-marriages throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries, this appeared to have been rescinded due to the Fourth Crusade. Matthew Blastares, the influential fourteenth-century Byzantine canonist, cited canon 72 of the council of Trullo, which prohibited marriage between Christians and pagans, and appears to be including all non-Greek Christians in his definition. Latin canon law held similar distinctions, restricting marriage, property and many other behaviours with non-Catholics, presumably on the same legal basis. While earlier local legal codes had made possible allowances for marriage between a Catholic and non-Catholic, this appears to have been suppressed by the fourteenth century, and local legal codes do not contain the same distinctions.

It is generally accepted that during the fourteenth century the ban was well respected, particularly in Latin Greece, where many of the social historical studies of the period have been focused. Jacoby, Tsougarakis, and Thiriet all describe the situation as largely segregated, with a divided population and very little interaction between the two socially, though they do accept a commercial and political relationship. The archontes class in Morea, the highest level of Greek administrators, appeared to have assimilated culturally to the lowest orders of Frankish nobility, and the existence of a copy of the Chronicle of Morea in Greek, seemingly written for that class, shows that there was a shared cultural vision. Beyond the nobility, however, there appeared to have been virtually no interaction

between the nobles and the entirely Greek lower classes. Additionally, there were few examples of intermarriage, and where it did occur, it was amongst these two groups, rather than in the higher orders of Frankish nobility. Even this limited intermingling in Morea may have been an exception, and in other parts of Latin Greece, such as Crete and Athens, segregation was tightly enforced. Therefore, while there were occasional exceptions, the general relationship between the Greek and Latin communities in Greece and on Crete was one of segregation.

Another strand of scholarship has modelled a much more mixed society in Latin Greece, suggesting that as early as the fourteenth century, the Greek and Latin populations were relatively freely mingling. This is particularly championed by McKee, who emphasises the significance in divisions in class rather than divisions in ethnicity in Venetian Crete, though there are some flaws in her reasoning. Her primary source base is notarial records, and she disregards the narrative sources, which regularly describe the divisions between the two groups. She also cites what appear to be relatively isolated examples of assimilation as a common practice. While these examples certainly did happen, they do not necessarily indicate a wider desegregation beyond a few specific elites. The Latin populations of Latin Greece and Cyprus were primarily urban, and it is unlikely that they would have interacted with the population beyond the cities very much, if at all, while the urban elite of the Greek world may have been more divided than had been previously thought.

It seems then, that the case for greater integration is somewhat overstated in this history, and that society in Latin Greece was in fact a great deal more segregated than not in the fourteenth century. Power in Latin Greece was held by the Latin nobility, and excluding Greeks by marriage ensured that this remained so. This pro-segregation view was expressed in a request for a marriage licence from Negroponte in 1336, which pointed to the lack of suitable partners on the island as a reason for a marriage within the prohibited degrees of kinship, explicitly stating that Greeks were

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not suitable candidates for marriage for a variety of reasons.\textsuperscript{151} The Latins of Negroponte did not appear to be particularly interested in integration, and were willing to incur difficulties and expenses in obtaining marriage licences in order to preserve their ethnic exclusivity. That they willingly acknowledged the role of the papacy in legitimising marriages within kin-groups demonstrated their acceptance of papal authority over their marriages, and also an implicit acceptance of the religious injunction against intermarriage.

This acceptance and engagement with the papacy over marriage, as has been seen, was certainly not limited to Latin Greece, and Cyprus is an excellent example of a Greek majority country ruled by a Latin minority which appears to have rigidly upheld the intermarriage prohibition. Most of the requests for the endorsement of marriages from Cyprus cite the unsuitability of the Greek population and the limited size of the Latin one as a reason to allow the marriage, and on those conditions, most of the marriages described above were endorsed. The Latin population on the island was small, and after several generations it was difficult for local Latins to find partners of appropriate social status outside the prohibited degrees of kinship. Consequently, if two Cypriot Latins wished to get married they would likely be entering an illegal marriage under canon law without special dispensation. As the island’s elites, there were many socio-economic reasons for Latins to not want to marry outside their social class, including political or economic alliances, which led to this embrace of the restriction on interfaith marriage.

Regardless of the motivation, that so many endorsements of incestuous marriages were sought using the prohibition against intermarriage as a reason for their legitimacy shows that the ban was strong and well known, as well as well respected. In this sense, the prohibition was an effective and respected piece of policy over which both the power and authority of the papacy was upheld. Lots of individuals were willing to respect the ban on intermarriage, and also to petition the papacy to legitimise their incestuous marriages that stemmed from such limited marriage pools.

It seems likely that some intermarriage happened, particularly in families with close ties to trading with the East. In 1318, Jerome, the bishop of Caffa, was

\textsuperscript{151} BXII:LC, I, n. 3654, p. 326.
instructed to dissolve the marriages of any woman who had converted to the Latin faith, married a European, and then returned to her original faith, at the request of the rectors of the merchant communes in Italy.\textsuperscript{152} This suggests that such marriages were taking place and that the wife’s eventual lapse from the Latin Church was seen as a serious problem. This certainly supports the idea that the prohibition was being kept, at least in a technical sense. There is no indication as to whether these women had converted prior to being married, or as a condition of it, but certainly their status as a Latin Christian was important for the validity of the marriage in the eyes of the Church and of the citizens of the Italian states. Clearly, for the non-nobility, conversion in order to marry a Latin was not a technicality that needed to be observed, but rather it was an important part of the marriage. There appear to be no examples of marriage working the other way amongst the merchant classes of Caffa, however, and Latins converting to the Greek rite in order to marry was not commented on in papal sources.

While the prohibition on intermarriage was kept relatively strictly in favour of Latins amongst the Latin and Greek populations of Latin ruled areas, one area of Latin–Greek relations where the requirement for the couple to adopt the Latin rite appeared to be less important was high-status marriages, particularly those of the Palaiologan Byzantine emperors. Andronikos II married Anna of Hungary in 1273, then married Irene of Montferrat in 1284 after Anna’s death. A marriage between Michael IX and the titular Latin empress, Catherine, was considered, but never came to fruition. Andronikos III also had two Latin spouses, first Irene of Brunswick, and then Joanna of Savoy after Irene’s death. In all these cases, the Latin women converted to the Greek Church prior to the marriage.\textsuperscript{153}

While, technically, the inter-marriage of Latins and Greeks was not a violation of the prohibition due to the mandatory conversion of the bride or groom to the other Church, it amounted to apostasy from the Latin Church. Such conversions did not appear to be a sham either, even if Jerome of Caffa clearly felt that it was an issue for marriages in the Crimea. Empresses like Joanna of Savoy retained their political and religious authority in the Greek Church after the death of their

\textsuperscript{152} JXXII:LC, II, n. 8166, p. 255.
husbands, and retained their adopted faith. An earlier example had seen Margaret of Hungary join the Greek Church on her marriage to Isaac II Angelos in 1185, but when Isaac predeceased her in 1204, she married Boniface of Montferrat, a Latin. The wedding took place in 1204, but she refused to re-join the Latin Church, only doing so four years later in 1208, despite the urgings of Latin clerics.154 Nevertheless, the authenticity of the conversion was unimportant to the negotiations surrounding the marriage, which occurred on the behalf of members of the two different Churches, against the prohibition on intermarriage.

These marriages amount to a complete dismissal of the authority and power of the popes at an elite lay level, revealing that the priorities of Latin nobles involved with the Byzantine empire were focused on political harmony and opportunity, rather than on respecting the will of the papacy when it was inconvenient to do so. No papal approval appears to have been sought for these marriages; there is no evidence of communication between the papacy and the Savoy clan around 1326 at all, when Joanna was married to Andronikos III, though papal blessing was sought for some of the marriages mentioned above.155 While the papacy claimed control over marriages outside of the Catholic fold, it was not involved in these high-level political unions, and no papal blessing was requested or granted. As this marriage effectively involved apostasy, this is perhaps surprising.

There are several reasons why the papacy may have not have taken issue with this. The popes were, after all, attempting to restore the union of the Latin and Greek Churches, and high-level marriages potentially aided that cause. They may not have felt that they were able to stop the marriages and as they were technically legal, decided not get involved. Whatever its reasoning, the papacy appeared to be comfortable in allowing and using these marriages for its own ends, putting pressure on Joanna of Savoy to bring the Byzantine empire closer to the West during the regency following Andronikos III’s death. Meyendorff commented that ‘in most cases, Byzantine emperors and noblemen considered their daughters to be more expendable than their sons, and were ready for diplomatic reasons to give them as

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wives…’, a sentiment which clearly applied to Latin nobility as well. The nobility, and the papacy, appeared to be willing to break the spirit of the prohibition for political gain, and there appeared to be no consequence for this action.

The issue of papal authority over marriage between Greek and Latins thus appears to have been divided by convenience and motivation, more than anything else. In societies which seemed happy to enforce segregation, such as Cyprus and Latin Greece, the papal prohibition on intermarriage was well respected and was used to justify incestuous marriages amongst the Latin population. Conversely, when it was politically expedient to circumvent the prohibition, elites appeared to be happy to allow marriage between the two Churches, such as in the case of Byzantine emperors.

A general acceptance of the papal teachings on the validity of intermarriage, and a common type of appeal for marriage licences based on the ineligibility of the Greek population, suggests that papal authority and power were both well respected on this issue by the Latin population of the Eastern Mediterranean. In Crete only a handful of Greek nobles appeared on the council, all of whom appeared to have won their position through arms, not marriage. In terms of compliance, there appears to have been an extremely high level of cooperation between the Christian population living in the Eastern Mediterranean and the papacy. Where the ban does seem to have been circumvented by non-elites, such as in Caffa, it appeared to have been done so in the favour of the Latin Church, and the spouse’s commitment to her new faith was vital to the continuation of the marriage.

The segregated society formed under Latin rule in Greece and the islands of the Mediterranean thus encouraged marriage restrictions, and it seemed to be in the interests of the Latin nobility there to support the papal restrictions. When it was not so convenient, such as when the opportunity to marry into the imperial family presented itself, there was very little hesitation to allow Latin women to join the Greek Church and leave the Catholic world. In these examples, there was very little

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regard for the authority or the power of the papacy, and this could be seen as an indication that the authority of the popes was respected only when it suited the interests of the lay population, and would be ignored as soon as it did not. These were all valid marriages by virtue of conversion, but the willingness of Latin elites to allow their daughters to leave the Latin Church represented another issue for papal power, in that Catholics were not supposed to leave the Church, as well as undermining the prohibition on intermarriage. In these cases, it would appear that the power of the papacy over was relatively low; however, these are extremely high-status examples which do not appear to be emulated lower down the social order. The relatively small number of intermarriages out of the Latin Church may also reflect the very high level of reward needed to risk breaking the prohibition; as a consequence, if the potential reward had to be so great in order to be worth the risk of angering the papacy, then the injunction should be seen as quite robust.

Marriage with Regard to Converts

Outside Europe, the Catholic Church had interactions with several Eastern Churches, and made limited efforts to bring them into the Catholic fold.158 The price of union would have been that prospective Churches would have to accept Catholic norms, including Catholic restrictions on incestuous marriage, if they were to join. This problem became even more pronounced when the issue of conversion of Muslim and ‘pagan’ peoples was considered. In several parts of Asia a man could have multiple legal wives and societies could have different laws on acceptable levels of kinship for marriage. These marriage arrangements could be well outside the Christian norm, but were deeply held customs in lands into which the Catholic Church was attempting to expand. The extent to which the papacy attempted to ease its restrictions on marriage in order to entice other cultures toward Catholic Christianity can inform how absolute the papacy felt those restrictions were. If the papacy insisted that all new converts adhered to Catholic norms and laws instantly, and restructure their society and legal practices to fit Catholic law, it would

158 See chapter six for more details on the Latin Church’s relations with Eastern Churches.
represent a strong, predetermined, and ultimately uncompromising stance. If, however, the papacy eased restrictions and allowed marriages which would elsewhere be seen as illegitimate, the papacy’s stance must be seen as opportunist and reactive.

In this case, the dynamics of power centre around potential compromise between maintaining papal control over marriage, and softening rules to better allow conversion, as there were no large-scale conversions which were well documented. It is possible the Alans accepted Catholic practices in some numbers during the 1320s, and they sent several embassies to Avignon on the subject of adopting the Catholic rite, to which the papacy responded very positively. There is, however, no surviving evidence which can corroborate how this occurred, what it meant, or how complete it was. As a result, this compromise between ease of conversion and orthodoxy was somewhat speculative on the part of the papacy, and revolves around what the papacy was willing to accommodate, rather than what it actually put into practice. Nevertheless, it represents an important aspect of papal power dynamics, in that it was a comparison between the effective power the papacy could command, and what it was willing to compromise in order to increase its recognition. While an increase in recognition would equate to an increase in the papacy’s area of influence, and an increase in the prestige of the popes, if it came without any substantial local reform to Catholic practice, this recognition does not translate to an increase in power. Rather, it would suggest that the papacy was willing to accept an expansion of Catholicism in name only, and that the papacy had little actual influence over new converts, which was not the model it had imposed on other Churches it had relations with near Europe.

While the papacy only had limited success spreading its influence in Asia, how the papacy presented itself, and what it appeared to be willing to compromise on, can be inferred. During the fourteenth century in particular, there appeared to be

159 Responses to these embassies were recorded in Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 30v–32v, but evidence on the matter remains extremely scarce.
160 See section two for a detailed consideration of the papacy’s relationship with various non-Catholic Churches.
an understanding by theorists and intellectuals that greater concessions had to be made to local conditions in order to win any converts. Ramon Lull argued in the Council of Vienne that missionaries had to be able to speak the local language in order to be successful, and managed to get language schools set up in Europe to that end.162 John of Monte Corvino bought slave boys and raised them as assistants in order to help his conversion efforts, and made a point of stressing his proficiency with the Mongol language.163 Of particular interest to the subject of marriage and the expansion of Christendom was the proposal in Pierre Dubois’s *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte*, written between 1305 and 1307. Dubois, while presenting an otherwise uninspired crusading treatise,164 argued that marriage could and should be used as a means of converting non-Catholic Christians by exporting educated Catholic women to the East for adoption and marriage into the clergy and nobility:

Wives with such education, who hold the articles of faith and the sacraments according to Roman usage, would teach their children and husbands to adhere to the Roman faith and to believe and sacrifice in accordance with it. They would employ arguments and opportunities far more effective than those by which the wiles of his wives led Solomon, the wisest of men, into idolatry.165

Dubois was probably being somewhat optimistic in his hopes for success of his marriage programme when he suggested that Eastern Christian priests might marry the educated Catholic girls sent east and be persuaded to give up their teachings and practice the Roman faith. He also suggested that these women might marry into the families of ‘princes, prelates, and other wealthy easterners’,166 or even ‘Saracens’, somehow retaining their own faith and converting these lords to the Christian, Catholic, faith.167 There were few practical suggestions as to how this

162 JXXII:LC, VI, n. 26444, p. 305 shows that a language school set up because of Ramon in Paris was still in operation in at least 1326.
programme could be brought into effect, as the section primarily extols the benefits the success of the scheme would bring.

Evans firmly places the target of Dubois’ scheme around Byzantium and Latin Greece, though potentially this could have been further east as well, given the adherents of Christianity across Georgia, modern Armenia, and further East into the Russian Steppe.168 Regardless, there is little to suggest that anything happened as a result of this plan, and there is little reason to think it would have had any success even if it had been pursued. Political marriages between Christians and pagans were not particularly uncommon, especially in the Byzantine imperial family, and these marriages never resulted in the conversion of the spouse. The Greek Church maintained these marriages as illegal but tolerated them; they were ‘blessed’, but were not considered sanctified unions.169 Marriage simply did not appear to be a particularly effective form of missionary activity, and was not one the papacy endorsed.

One concession the papacy was willing to make was in the case of marriages in the fourth degree of kinship for new converts. This had earlier precedent, and Livonia in the thirteenth century was granted very generous terms for converts, particularly in terms of retaining their marriages, including some clauses about remaining married to non-converts and allowing marriages between a dead man’s brother and his spouse which were very much on the edge of canon law.170 In the fourteenth century, Jerome, the bishop of Caffa, was granted powers to dispense with the restriction on the fourth degree of kinship for ‘schismatic’ marriages, in order to encourage Eastern Christians in such marriages to convert in Crimea.171 This concession was not anywhere near as sweeping as the earlier one to Livonia, but it did represent an understanding of the difficult circumstances missionaries had at the edges of Catholic Christendom. Wider extensions of the authority to administer Church activity were also granted to friars in May 1318, and again in February 1330, largely concerning excommunication, marriage, and baptism.172

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171 JXXII:LC, II, n. 8169, p. 255.
These wider changes did not grant any extension of power, however, they merely extended the circumstances of existing ones.

Arguably, the relaxation of the most distant cases of the incest prohibition for converts was a very minor concession, given that such dispensations were regularly issued by the chancery in Avignon, for many reasons. It is significant that bishops on the edge of the Catholic world were being granted automatic power to issue dispensations under these circumstances. This does appear to be a relatively isolated incident, though the lack of documentation could obscure this activity happening more regularly. While the papacy made other devolutions of power, such as the grant to Pierre de la Palud to absolve excommunication from trade violations in 1328, these were limited grants of power for specific instances, not the permanent devolution that would appear to have been granted to Jerome.

This is important, in the sense that no other part of Christian society or Church had such automatic authority over legitimising otherwise illegitimate marriages. Anyone else entering a marriage within the fourth degree of kinship would require papal dispensation for it to be legitimised, but Jerome of Caffa and those friars working on the fringes of the Catholic world were able to consecrate such marriages without central authority. It was a small, but significant, devolution of power over marriage, aimed at easing the conversion of Christians in Asia to the Latin Church. This concession was exceptional in this regard and represented a significant deviation from normal practice. When dealing with deviations from Latin orthodoxy in the Armenian Church, the popes were extremely uncompromising, and the Armenian Church had to modify its position to conform to the Latin one. For potential converts, however, the papacy was willing to bend the rules to gain new members. The use of legates extended papal authority beyond its practical reach in Latin administered lands, but also represented a rare decentralisation of power in this period. It is perhaps a stretch to suggest that this weakened papal power, however, and there is no evidence of legates overstepping their bounds.

Overall, however, this concession was relatively minor. Relaxing the rules on the more distant degrees of incest in marriage was a small step toward bridging

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173 JXXII:LC, VIII, n. 45955, p. 345. See pages 231–32 for further discussion of this mission.
174 See Chapter five.
the cultural divide between marriage practice in the Catholic world and outside of it. The Church was unwilling to accommodate more exotic relationship forms, and continued to reject polygamy, as practiced in the Islamic and Mongol worlds, and systems including formal concubines, such as that practiced by the Great Khans of China, insisting that pagan converts from cultures which practiced non-monogamous marriages adopt monogamy and annul any additional marriages they had entered into.\textsuperscript{175} In this sense, the Church was very rigid and inflexible, refusing to sacrifice its orthodoxy in order to expand its influence.

This refusal to tolerate social deviation in relation to marriage, and the relatively minor flexibility the papacy demonstrated on the restrictions it placed on monogamous marriages, undoubtedly made it harder for missionaries in Asia to gain converts. Requiring major social adjustments along with a shift in religious practice could not have been a tempting prospect for a potential convert. This shows a clear priority of papal policy; the papacy was unwilling to compromise on social issues for Catholics. The conversion of the extra-European world had to be done while maintaining orthodoxy. The implications for the papacy’s intentions were that conversion could only occur on its terms, and that widespread conversion was less important than maintaining social control over society.

The intentional neglect of measures to boost conversion beyond Europe demonstrated a position of papal strength, in both authority and power. The papacy’s authority to set these social rules for Catholics was unquestioned, even outside of Europe, and its refusal to compromise significantly on the rules of marriage suggests that it was more important for the Latin Church to be able to retain its stance than it was to gain new members. As the numbers of Catholics beyond Europe was limited, the Church was able to maintain relatively strict control over the legal principles of the marital unions of its members, and while it devolved certain powers to its agents working in the East, the ultimate authority behind Catholic marriages remained centrally mandated and controlled.

This unwillingness to compromise the legitimacy of marriage can be compared with marriage between non-Catholic Christians, which were generally

\textsuperscript{175} Kedar, \textit{Crusade and Mission}, pp.81–82, 145–58. The issue of polygamy appeared to have been given much less thought than many other marriage scenarios.
considered legally the same as marriage with non-Christians. The papacy was unwilling to legitimise such marriages in either case in the fourteenth century, but was comfortable with allowing people to convert into the Latin Church for the purposes of marriage, though not all of which conversions appear to have been genuine.\textsuperscript{176} This general acceptance of papal authority can also be seen when examining the effectiveness of the ban on incestuous marriages. The volume of requests for exemption from the prohibition for the wide degrees of kinship demonstrates the acceptance of papal authority and the rules governing marriage by laypeople. The quantity of these requests, and particularly the number issued in retrospect to legitimise an action which had already happened, also demonstrates that the papacy was completely unable to prevent the prohibited actions from taking place despite the widespread recognition of the authority of the papacy.

In terms of controlling the marriage of Catholics living and working far from the centre of Catholic authority, the papacy was able to maintain a strong sense of authority over the lives of its subjects. The rules it propagated in relation to marriage were well known and understood, and generally, well followed. Intermarriage between Catholics and non-Catholics was relatively rare, and incestuous marriages were legitimised in Avignon. This acceptance of papal authority did not necessarily translate into power, however, and laypeople were willing to break papal restrictions if it suited them. The volume of incestuous marriage licences obtained by Eastern Mediterranean states demonstrated how common such marriages were, in violation of canon law on the subject, and there is little evidence the papacy was willing to deny any of them.\textsuperscript{177} It even dispensed entirely with the need to obtain a licence for converts if they were already in a marriage within the fourth degree of kinship. While the papacy refused to extend its tolerance any further than that to accommodate more exotic relationship arrangements, it appeared powerless to stop laypeople ignoring its rules if there was sufficient profit to be made.

\textsuperscript{176} See pages 90–91 for further details.
\textsuperscript{177} As d’Avray, \textit{Papacy, Monarchy and Marriage}, p. 216 points out, dispensation or annulment were the only options in these cases, and the papacy usually sided with the principle of indissolubility for marriage and made dispensations for marriages which would benefit social cohesion.
The Extent of Papal Control over Catholic Activity in the Eastern Mediterranean

Controlling the activities and interactions of Catholics with each other on the edges of Catholic territory and with non-Catholic powers was important to the papacy for several reasons. Primarily, such interactions could substantially benefit the ‘enemies of Christ’, and hamper crusading efforts in the Holy Land and elsewhere. The revenues generated from travel to and commerce with the Islamic world was a substantial income for the occupiers of the Holy Land, and the resource-poor Mamlūk sultanate would have been substantially bolstered by European trade in military materials. In addition to these pragmatic reasons to be able to enforce its will, controlling the activity of its subjects on the edge of its territory can also be seen as a test of papal power and authority. Far from Catholic majority countries, with little Church oversight, Catholics had much less social pressure on them to obey the edicts of the Church. Consequently, case studies can reveal the extent of papal authority and influence on the periphery of the Catholic world.

The papacy’s intentions for Catholics on the periphery of the Catholic world were not always clear. Obviously, the popes expected Catholics to obey the rules they set out, but the objectives they established were nuanced. Despite continuing hostility between Europe and the Mamlūks, the papacy did not expect the Christian world to remain isolated from them, and intended trade and travel to the Holy Land and Egypt to continue. This was not unqualified though, and the papacy expected Catholics to abide by restrictions aimed at minimising the benefits the enemies of the church gained from this activity. The papacy also sought to maintain the cohesion of the Church by preventing marriage outside the Catholic community, but also to expand their influence into areas without Catholic presence. This raised issues of how much the papacy was willing to sacrifice orthodoxy over marriage for the sake of easing conversion beyond Europe.

It would seem that as a general rule, papal authority over Catholics was not significantly challenged in the issues considered. For trade, the principle that the papacy was allowed to control trade did not appear to be questioned, though there were disputes over the extent and definitions of that control. Even when people
breached the trading injunctions, they reconciled with the Church, demonstrating further acceptance of the right of the papacy to impose sanctions on behaviour and acceptance of the consequences of disobedience. Similarly, pilgrim traffic was licenced, and the number of licences granted indicated that the right of the papacy to impose controls on travel outside of the Christian world was accepted. With marriage, the right of the papacy to restrict the choice of eligible marriage partners can be seen from the number of petitions lodged by Catholics in the Eastern Mediterranean appealing for exceptions, and the extremely limited number of intermarriages that occurred between Catholics and non-Catholics. While there were multiple reasons for the latter, the papal stance was happily upheld and used as a reason for needing to marry within a closely related community.

Respect for the power of the papacy by the Catholics living and travelling in the Eastern Mediterranean was much more complicated. While the principle of control was generally accepted, the reality was that such controls were routinely ignored. The number of absolutions issued by the Avignon popes highlights the problems the papacy had in enforcing their trade controls, and this represented only a small part of the illicit activity occurring, completely omitting the slave trade and any other more general infractions. The papacy did have some success in enforcing its will on trade, however. Venice was barred altogether from trading with Alexandria in 1326 and this ban appeared to have been upheld, at least formally. It is impossible to know how many Venetian merchants may have traded under the flag of a different nation during this period, but even if they did, the formal acknowledgement was a victory for the papacy. It is impossible to know how many pilgrims were travelling to the Holy Land without a licence, though gaining a licence would have made the journey easier. The papacy did appear to refuse pilgrims access to the Holy Land if the circumstances did not favour such a journey, which suggests that it was able to exert some power of this issue. While there was not much the papacy could do to prevent determined pilgrims from travelling on their own, such pilgrims would fall under excommunication for their actions, making the pilgrimage spiritually counterproductive. One area where the papacy did appear to maintain a relatively consistent level of control was marriage. The prohibitions against incest worked in exactly the same way on the edge of the Catholic world as it did in Europe, and the papacy was regularly petitioned for exceptions to its rules in exactly the same way. The papacy took a relatively
uncompromising approach to marriage outside of the Catholic community, and by and large, this appears to have been respected. The papacy had difficulties in ensuring that its edicts were followed, but it was not powerless and was able to establish and maintain control over certain aspects of behaviour and activity.

It is perhaps not surprising that the issues that the papacy had least difficulty in persuading Catholics to obey papal policy was in areas where local sentiment was in already in favour of that policy. The papal prohibitions against intermarriage can be seen to be successful not because the papacy forbade it, but because Latin communities had little interest in integrating with the Greek population they lived amongst, and were happy to work with the papacy to ensure their isolation. Where there was an alignment of local interests and papal rules, there was a high level of cooperation with papal policy, but where papal rules conflicted with lay interests, there was a much sharper divide between papal power and authority. This is not to say that papal wishes were entirely disregarded, but that they were less respected when there was profit to be made by breaking them. Far more people were willing to break the trade injunctions than were willing to break the marriage restrictions, for example. The marriage of policy and convenience strengthened papal power, which was otherwise not especially strong, though the understood right of the papacy to dictate limitations on the activities of Catholics in the Eastern Mediterranean was remarkably durable in all the case studies in this section.
II. The Papacy and non-Latin Christian Churches

The issue of union with the Latin Church was rarely absent in the papacy’s correspondence with and policies towards the eastern Churches. It was the primary point of dialogue between the popes and the various Churches that they sought to influence, and the ways in which union was striven for or maintained are invaluable for understanding papal policy toward non-Catholic Christians. Relations between the Latin Church and the various other Churches could include a wide range of issues, but all included, to a greater or lesser extent, dialogue over union. It is a single concept which can be compared and contrasted to establish how the papacy in the fourteenth century was approaching the non-Catholic Christian world. In this way, understanding how the popes attempted to achieve union with the non-Catholic Christian world forms a vital point for understanding papal policy toward eastern Christians, and establishing what power and authority the papacy was able to command.

The Latin Church maintained a strained relationship with many of the other Churches in the Eastern Mediterranean. This section considers how the popes interacted with these ‘schismatic’ Churches, and to what extent the Catholic Church attempted to enter into union with them. It also considers the role played by Churches which were already in union with the Latin Church, though not necessarily harmoniously. The popes held direct and active dialogues with the Byzantine, Serbian, and Georgian emperors or kings over union, and these can be observed through the contents of various papal letters. In addition, pilgrims, Franciscans, and Dominicans were in regular contact with non-Catholic Christians of a variety of Churches in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and further East. Furthermore, several distinctive, non-Catholic Churches were already in union with the Latin Church in the fourteenth century, including the Maronites, the Armenians, and the Greek Churches in former Byzantine territories.

The dialogue over union in this period was not so much an attempt to reach a compromise between Churches so much as it was an attempt to bring the non-Latin Church into acceptance of Latin practices and organisation. It should not be seen as
a consensus, but more like a submission to the papacy. This meant it was also implicitly political, as this was ultimately a negotiation over power. The extent to which other Churches were willing to hand over power to the Latin Church depended on what they were expecting to receive in return, which was usually military support, and how much of that aid they actually received. Circumstances that affected the balance of political power in the Eastern Mediterranean drove the negotiations with the papacy, but also could harm them if results were not forthcoming.

One of the great problems when considering papal relations with the non-Catholics of the Eastern Mediterranean is defining the concept of union, and even more problematically, assessing a successful union. As the bulk of scholarship concerning negotiations over union has been to do with Byzantium, it would appear that certain assumptions about union have been made. While it is rarely stated in these works, union is generally assumed to be a binary state between the Latin Church and another, in this case the Byzantine Greek Church, in which the other Church accepted certain Latin theological principles and considered itself in communion with the Latin Church.¹ This definition provides a reasonable framework to understand the negotiations surrounding the Latin and Byzantine Churches, but it is less useful when considering the variety of unions and negotiations over union that occurred more generally across the non-Catholic world. Other Churches existed in uneasy formal unions, which sit outside a binary state, and such a binary definition ignores the importance of political co-operation which did not result in union. Therefore, it is important to assess the effectiveness of the unions that were in effect, and the level of cooperation outside of union, in order to determine a more complex understanding of how the papacy related to other Christians. The binary definition supposed by union is insufficiently complicated to assess this issue; rather, union must be regarded as a desirable but not exclusive goal, which did not necessarily ensure a Church’s adherence to Catholic practice nor exclude the possibility of co-operation without union.

Another theme which permeates this topic is whether the papacy was acting as it did out of ideological fervour, or out of pragmatism, and what the implications

¹ See chapter four for further discussion on the efforts at union between the Byzantines and the papacy and the existing scholarship on it.
were for the power relationship between the Latin and non-Latin Churches. This clash of intentions took several forms in this context. The papacy had an ideological duty to spread the faith to all corners of the earth, as Christians were directed in the Bible. Yet, practical concerns prevented the popes from doing this, and the extent that this balance between pragmatism and ideology affected activities in the fourteenth century will be considered here. Additionally, there was a clash between the theological ideology of the Latin Church and the other Churches with which it sought union, and how much the Latin Church was willing to compromise its ideology for the sake of consensus must also be explored. The results of these clashes allow for an evaluation of the power relationship between the Churches, and the extent that papal authority was accepted and power exerted.

Papal relations with the Eastern Mediterranean over union can largely be classified into three categories: Churches which were actively pursuing union with the Latin Church, Churches which had already accepted union with the Latin Church, and Churches which did not seem to have much dialogue over union with the Latin Church. This categorisation can be helpful in establishing what the popes were intending to achieve and how they went about the process of union. By examining with whom the popes were in active dialogue, with whom they were in union and with whom they were not in dialogue, it is possible to extrapolate a model of papal policy with regard to union in the Eastern Mediterranean. This section will therefore explore the methods and apparent objectives the papacy held toward non-Catholic Churches in the area, and the how its relative successes inform the understanding of papal power.
4. Churches in negotiation over union with Avignon

By 1305, the Latin Church had a difficult relationship with the Greek-rite Churches around the Balkans. Nevertheless, these Churches existed as neighbours to the Catholic world and as important potential allies, and it is clear that the popes throughout this period were interested in the idea of union with the Byzantine and Serbian Churches. They were diplomatically active with these Churches and the political leaders who headed them, though seemingly in quite a reactive sense. The popes rarely initiated these exchanges, though they appeared willing to explore them when the opportunity arose. The extent to which Avignon and these Churches engaged in meaningful discussion over union and how close these discussions came to fruition is vital to establishing papal policy toward the Eastern Churches and understanding how that policy was enacted.

The Byzantine Church

The foremost Church with which the papacy was engaged in negotiations over union was the Byzantine Church, and this issue has dominated the scholarship on papal relations with eastern Christians in the fourteenth century, discussed below. There is a certain amount of contention in modern scholarship over the sincerity and the intentions of both parties, and of their ability to bring about union. Scholarship has generally categorised relations into one or two phases; the first is epitomised by Housley’s sentiment that there was a ‘deep rooted internal malaise’ in the papacy and the Byzantine empire over the issue of union, which ‘worsened in the reign of Andronikos II and III’, while the second suggests there was a shift in aspiration, but not achievement, during the reign of John V Palaiologos. In the first model, all negotiations on the subject of union throughout the fourteenth century were

characterised as insincere, and in the second, John V Palaiologos’s reign has been seen as a clean break with the policies of Andronikos III and John VI Kantakouzenos. John’s reign as emperor is sometimes characterised as a different phase in the relationship between Avignon and Constantinople, but not always. When it is, it is usually tempered by explanations that John V’s apparent enthusiasm for union could not be realised due to political limitations; that is, either John, the papacy, or both lacked the power to make a union happen. The assumption that neither pope nor emperor was in a position to make good on their demands is inherent in nearly all the scholarship on this period, though rarely voiced apart from to explain John’s lack of success. Otherwise, relations between the two powers were portrayed as sour, and lacking sincerity, implying that neither side accepted the authority of the other. The efforts at union have been seen as political ploys, not earnest desires, and progress made in negotiations has been dismissed in favour of the end result.

This view of the intentions of both papal and Byzantine parties has found a lot of traction in modern scholarship. Atiya’s narrative gives an overview of the process of negotiation, in a distinctly negative fashion, making no argument for an improvement in relations. According to this interpretation, the Greeks were the unwilling party and repeatedly refused to engage with papal emissaries. He does, however, only mention a fraction of the activity between the two parties and sometimes links unrelated events together. For example, he states that Barlaam, the emissary for the emperor in negotiations over union at Avignon in 1339, was condemned by a Greek synod over the failure in his mission when his condemnation came about as a result of his stance on Hesychasm, not his work on union. Renouard and Mollat, in their works on the Avignon papacy, say very little about its relations with non-European powers. Nicol framed his discussions of papal–Greek negotiations in very military and political terms and was extremely dismissive of

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any meaningful effort at ecclesiastical union on both the Greek and papal sides.\(^6\) He does, however, state that John VI Kantakouzenos at least wanted re-unification, even if he ‘had little sympathy for the Latin rite’\(^7\). John V Palaiologos’s efforts are dismissed as ‘at best naive’, though.\(^8\) Wood portrays the relations between Clement VI and John Kantakouzenos as very hostile, and also dismisses the negotiations between the two between 1347 and 1350 as unworkable.\(^9\) Setton’s coverage of negotiations for the same period was more sympathetic and implies that the Greeks were willing to compromise on some issues, but not with regard to a council.\(^10\) Leopold’s survey of contemporary crusading treatises highlights the aggressive stance many Europeans took toward the Byzantine empire and implies that this was a widely held view in the papal court.\(^11\) The balance of scholarship thus falls very heavily against there being any meaningful attempts at union during the period, though no-one overtly denies that some attempts were made, even if some historians remain silent on the issue in otherwise quite comprehensive works, suggesting how unimportant they thought papal policy outside of Europe was.

Compounding this negative perspective from largely western focused scholars, there remains a strong tradition amongst Byzantinists that places popular Greek opinion firmly in favour of Turkish rule over Latin, and that Byzantine rejection of the West was a conscious choice of preference for Islamic rule.\(^12\) There are some problems with this theory that make it difficult fully to accept. While it is clear that Christians were given gentle treatment under the early Turkish regimes, as demonstrated by Greek communications with Christians in Nicaea after its capture in 1330, or in papal letters to the citizens of Philadelphia, it is much more difficult to


\(^7\) Nicol, ‘Byzantine Requests’, p. 83.

\(^8\) Nicol, ‘Byzantine Requests’, p. 87.


show that a majority of Greek Christians would have preferred Islamic rule to an alliance with the Roman Church, or even have framed the discussion in such terms.\textsuperscript{13} There is no reason to think that such a binary choice existed as a general perception in the fourteenth century. The Turks, while very dangerous, were also occasional allies of the empire, and despite the declining strength of the Byzantine military there is little reason to suppose that anyone saw the end of the empire as inevitable. Even if such a contemporary understanding did exist, however, stating that there was majority support for Muslim rule simply mistakes being anti-Latin, for which there is evidence in abundance, with being pro-Turkish, for which there is no evidence.\textsuperscript{14} While Greek Christians were treated well in Asia Minor, they received similar treatment in Cyprus under direct Latin rule. Petitions to Avignon routinely upheld the rights of Greek-speaking Christians in Latin lands over the wishes of prominent Latin clerics.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, at no point was it suggested that Church union with the Latin Church would result in a loss of political control, which was the only option offered by the Islamic Turks. Therefore, while it is still a regular feature in Byzantine scholarship, this proposition can be seen to be quite unlikely.

The scholarship which viewed the negotiations as insincere rests on the idea that both the pope and the Byzantine emperor lacked authority in the eyes of the other in ecclesiastical terms, and that neither side really wanted re-union to occur, as that would undermine their own positions. Such a partnership would involve a degree of recognition of the authority of the other party which, so the argument goes, neither side was willing to make. Certainly, as the respective heads of different Churches, the mutual exclusivity of the ecclesiastical authority of pope and emperor caused difficulty for those attempting to negotiate union, and this issue played a part in the earlier period. How much it was a block throughout the whole period under discussion is, however, less certain. Those who suggest a change of tack by John V argue that at least after his consolidation of power, the emperor was willing to

\textsuperscript{13} Nicol, \textit{The Last Centuries of Byzantium}, p. 171; IVI, I:1, nn. 45–46, p. 16, n. 71, pp. 24–26.


\textsuperscript{15} See pages 147–51 for further discussion on this.
acknowledge the authority of the papacy, but that the papacy, or John, lacked the power to finalise a deal that was agreeable.\textsuperscript{16} These views might not be entirely fair, and rest on a certain number of assumptions about the motivations and the power of the popes and the emperors. In order, therefore, to establish the authority and the power of the papacy, and of the emperors, the aims of the negotiations over union also needs to be made clear. This power dynamic can then be properly explored through the motivations and the results of the negotiations.

While the secondary scholarship on the subject of Greco–Latin union is characteristically negative, implying or stating that negotiations were invariably ineffective and superficial, the chronology of events over the fourteenth century does not necessarily support such a reading. While there were no ecumenical councils in the fourteenth century that had representatives from both Churches present, councils were the end products of negotiation, not the process itself. The union of Lyons was not negotiated there; Michael VIII Palaiologos sent representatives who declared their support for Rome under pre-negotiated terms.\textsuperscript{17} During the fourteenth century, the sheer frequency of embassies back and forth, as well as the costs incurred in supporting them and other projects that resulted from negotiations from union suggest a rather different reading, which is much more sympathetic to both parties’ desire for union.

**The Process of Reaching for Union with Byzantium**

Negotiations between the popes and the Byzantine emperors were a regular feature of the mid-fourteenth century, but prior to the accession of Andronikos III Palaiologos in 1328, there was little discussion on the subject of union. The reign of Andronikos II Palaiologos from 1282 to 1328 was decidedly hostile toward the west and Catholicism, and there he made no discernible effort toward restoring the union

\textsuperscript{16} Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium*, pp. 258–62, as an example, holds these general conclusions, and is also highly dismissive of the sincerity of both parties.

of Lyons which he had broken after the death of Michael VIII. The first evidence from the papal registers of a resumption in negotiations over union is in 1316, in which two bishops and a prior were instructed to assist with negotiations in the Byzantine Empire. What is interesting is that these negotiations were not with Andronikos II, but with his son, Michael IX Palaiologos, the junior co-emperor. The letter does not mention where the negotiations were taking place, nor are they mentioned anywhere else in the documentary record, which makes the issue of negotiations more problematic. How widespread these possibly secret negotiations were cannot be known, given the lack of supporting detail. In addition, Michael was not a particularly successful figure, and this letter, and by extension, the negotiations, came only a few years before the end of his life, long after his many military failures had led him to retire to Thessaloniki. His father, Andronikos II, would have been a much more significant figure with whom to be negotiating, as he had a much more active role in government and was the senior authority in the empire. Andronikos, however, may have been viewed as an unsuitable candidate to facilitate a union. In addition to breaking the union established at Lyons in 1282, Andronikos II had been excommunicated by Clement V in 1307, prior to a Valois attempt to recapture Constantinople from him. It is possible that the popes were hoping to negotiate a union with his heir that could be realised after Andronikos’ death, a plan that became immaterial after Michael predeceased Andronikos in 1320.

A further round of negotiations was opened in secret with presumably, though not certainly, Andronikos II in 1327. The name of the emperor is not specified, and Andronikos III was crowned co-emperor in 1325, while Andronikos II did not die until 1328. The letter in question is to the king of France, describing a mission undertaken by a Benedict de Cumis, a Dominican, who was to negotiate with a man who is titled emperor of the Greeks (qui se intitulat imperatorem Grecorum) over union. The use of the formulation including qui se intitulat is unique, and given the papacy’s previous reluctance to negotiate with Andronikos II,

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19 Reg. Vat. 62, f. 4r; CV, II, n. 1759, p. 56.

20 JXXII:LS, III, n. 3354, p. 60.
could indicate that this correspondence was in fact with Andronikos III, the junior emperor. It is, at the very least, the only example of this addition to the usual formulation of the regular titles of moderator or imperator Grecorum. Housley suggests that these talks broke down due to their potential unpopularity with the public, but there is little clear about these efforts. If, however, it was the case that this letter was sent to the junior emperor Andronikos III, it could be reasonably surmised that it would have been opposed by the senior emperor, Andronikos II, and that his influence could have ended the negotiations. It does show, however, that the papacy was interested in negotiations over union, and that it was willing to negotiate with whoever it considered its best option.

The first negotiations after the death of Andronikos II, for which there is evidence for in the papal records, at least, were launched in 1333. Francis, the archbishop of Kerch (Vosprensis, a recently created Latin see following the Genoese occupation of the city in 1318) and Richard, the bishop of Sevastopol (Cersonensis), were sent to Constantinople bearing letters addressed to Andronikos III Palaiologos, the sole emperor since Andronikos II’s death in 1328. Their sees had been created that very year, and it is perhaps curious that the bishops’ first mission was as ambassadors, rather than ministers. Further exchanges on the subject which appear in the papal registers took place in 1337, 1339, 1343, 1346, 1348, 1350, 1353, and 1356. In addition, an unnamed ambassador sent by John Kantakouzenos appears in camera records for 1350 and 1351, though no details were recorded about him.

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26 CVI:LSF, III, n. 2588, p. 184; n. 2595, p. 185.
28 CVI:LSNF, nn. 2129–37, pp. 295–96; n. 2233, pp. 311–12.
The early embassies, such as the one in 1337, appear to have been sent largely aiming to capitalise on the influence of Joanna of Savoy, Andronikos III’s wife. She had formally converted to the Greek Church when she married Andronikos, but remained a pro-Latin force in the Byzantine court. In 1337 alone, two letters were sent by Benedict XII to her brother, Aymon, the count of Savoy, encouraging him to push a pro-union agenda, one to Robert of Sicily, urging him to use his influence to support the negotiations, one to Joanna of Savoy, and two to Andronikos III himself.\(^{32}\) One of the letters to Andronikos stands out, as it was the only one not related to the negotiations over union; it begged for the release of Martin Zacharia, a Genoese knight who had been imprisoned in Constantinople.\(^{33}\) The rest were very much about encouraging Andronikos toward union, urging Latin cooperation with him and for those around him to use their influence to this end. In this event, it would appear there was at least one concrete success to the mission, as Martin did get his freedom, and later became the captain of the naval league which captured Smyrna in 1344. The clear Latin promotion of union from within the empire as well as from without reveals a shift toward union at the very highest levels of imperial administration. Rather than the direct opposition of Andronikos II, Andronikos III appeared more interested in a deal with the west, as these tentative early negotiations show.

The character and nature of the negotiations over this period did not remain static and the attitudes and demands on both sides altered as the fourteenth century progressed. The earliest of these exchanges discussed union in a purely ecclesiastical context.\(^{34}\) They exhorted Andronikos III to accept union with the Latin Church and stressed the spiritual benefits that rejecting the errors of the Greek Church would

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\(^{33}\) BXII:LSF, n. 283, pp. 182–83: *Cum itaque dilectus filius nobilis vir Martinus Zacharie miles qui sicut accepiimus adversus Turcos et alios inimicos et blasfemos christiani nominis vires suas exercuit haecenus viriliter et constanter, in tuo detineatur dominio captivatus, tuam rogamus excellentiam et in Domino attentius exhortamus quatinus super liberatione prefati nobilis pro qua carissimus in Christo filius noster Philippus rex Francie illustris preces tibi efficace ut intelleximus porrigit*. See chapter seven for further details on this crusade activity.

\(^{34}\) JXXII:LC, XII, nn. 60898–60900, p. 191; JXXII:LS, VI, n. 5830, p. 145; n. 5404, pp. 151–52; n. 5410, p. 153; n. 5423, p. 158.
bring, but they did not mix spiritual and material benefits overtly. At this point, John XXII was careful to keep the issue of military involvement against the Turks, or any other enemy, separate from that of Church union. One letter, sent to the king of France, explicitly stated that if a legate was to be sent to Constantinople for the cause of union, he should be sent in secret and on that issue alone, while a public embassy would be sent to promote the crusade against the Turks separately. If the Greeks proved interested they could be offered union, a part in the crusade, or both. These negotiations don’t appear to have been taken particularly seriously. While both sides entertained them, there was no progress on either side, and no dynamic for progress. The Byzantine Church had no reason under these conditions to accept subordination to the Latin Church, and the West was not in a position to force it to. This issue of power was even more important to the Byzantine emperor than other kings of the Eastern Mediterranean, as the emperor was the head of the Byzantine Church. He personally stood to lose authority by agreeing to union, as did his Church. While various scholars have pointed to the potential military cooperation possible during the naval league of 1333–34, linking this to the negotiations over union is problematic. While it is clear that the papacy was concerned with the Turks in the Aegean, as shown by the formation of the naval league, there is no evidence that the Byzantines were actively involved in the league, though they were present for some of the negotiations. It would appear that the empire did not ultimately contribute to the league, though they did agree to. Possibly the confusion in modern scholarship over this comes from a misreading of a letter which states that the imperator Constantinopolis offered ships to the league, leaving him unnamed. This referred, however, to the titular emperor of Constantinople who at that time was Philip of Taranto, not the imperator Graecorum, the title usually used for the emperor of Byzantium.

35 JXXII:LS, VI, n. 5423, p. 158: Si ad imperatorem Grecorum intendat aliquem mittere super ejus reditu ad Romane Ecclesie unitatem regia celsitudo, expedit quod illa legatio sit secreta; alia vero esse poterit publica super passagio et facto Turcorum; et quantum ad legationem illam quod ad unitatem Ecclesie redeat, expediens videretur quod excellentia regia offeret illi quod iret per aquam, pro illa apud Ecclesiam offerentur [sic] interponere partes suas.

36 Housley, The Later Crusades, p. 58.


38 JXXII:LS, VI, n. 5485, pp. 175–6: sex [galleys] ad minus ab imperatore Constantinopolitano, qui tamen debet ponere decem.
The linking of the material and spiritual wellbeing of the Byzantine Empire is a development adopted on the papal side by Clement VI, mirroring his stance on the kingdom of Armenia.\(^{39}\) The suggestion that union and military aid should be linked, however, can first be seen during Benedict XII’s pontificate. In 1339, Barlaam, a Calabrian monk and emissary of Andronikos III, visited Avignon and argued that the Greek people would be more favourable to the idea of union if the west sent military help to the Greeks to fight their enemies.\(^{40}\) Benedict XII refused to consider military aid until after a union had been achieved, and then Clement VI and Innocent VI after him incorporated this argument into their embassies over union, explicitly linking military aid to union. While this development gave an opportunity to progress talks by giving the Byzantines some tangible in exchange for the surrender of their ecclesiastic power, neither side wished to be taken advantage of. This impasse over the link between union and military aid for Byzantium continued throughout the reign of Andronikos III and the regency under John VI Kantakouzenos, until John V Palaiologos accepted the papacy’s terms and proposed union with the promise of military aid in 1355. This is not to suggest that Clement VI’s interest in Byzantium was purely political, though he was quick to link political reconciliation with ecclesiastical union, stating in a letter in 1343 soon after his election addressed to all the bishops of the Greeks that military benefits would follow from spiritual ones.\(^{41}\) This military linking in his appeal for union was not reflected in all the letters he sent in 1343, however, and it was not mentioned in the appeals directed to all the noblemen and people of Greece, to the commune of Pera, to many of the nobles in Greece and Italy, nor to the monks of Mount Athos.\(^{42}\) Nevertheless, it is clear that to Clement VI, at the very least, providing the aid of the West’s military was contingent on the recognition of the authority of the papacy.
politically and religiously. Aid would not come before recognition, which remained the papal position in negotiations, though this was not a good enough offer at this point to entice the emperor to agree. That the papacy did not feel any need to move on this issue suggests the papacy understood well that the Byzantines needed military aid from it, and that it was comfortable waiting for them to give way. It also suggests that the papacy held the authority to negotiate on behalf of the European kingdoms, and the power to block any country from aiding the Byzantines militarily, or at the very least, that the Byzantines believed the papacy held this power.

It was very much on this understanding and on these terms that John V Palaiologos resumed negotiations in 1355, adopting a position which accepted all papal demands, on the condition that military aid was forthcoming. In a way, the linking of the material and spiritual in negotiations under Clement VI had paved the way for an acceptable compromise. There was little reason for a Byzantine emperor to agree to have his own authority undermined by accepting papal primacy for a purely theological union, and there was little reason for the papacy to provide material aid to a schismatic power, but both sides valued the outcome they wanted enough to compromise on the other side’s issue. The potential gains in authority from the recognition of the empire was sufficient motivation to encourage the papacy to promise military aid, while the promise of military support to bolster John’s weak position was enough for him to be willing to cede some of his authority to the Latin Church.

The Sincerity of Attempts at Union with Byzantium

This dramatic resumption of activity after 1333, compared to the period of relative inactivity before, sits neatly around the dates of Andronikos II’s rule of the Byzantine Empire. That the popes were so unwilling to negotiate with him but were so involved with his successors shows that Andronikos II’s reign was an exceptional period, not the diplomatic norm it is sometimes portrayed as in scholarship.43 It also

highlights the importance that the popes placed on conducting negotiations with the emperors rather than the Greek patriarch of Constantinople. While the discussions that occurred between the popes and emperors did deal with political and military matters, they were primarily concerned with a resumption of union. That the patriarch was absent from these communications shows where the popes considered ecclesiastical power in the empire to lie. When the patriarch was mentioned, it was only ever in general letters, which were addressed to all the clergy of the Greek Church, and not by name.44

While scholarship on this subject has consistently understated the volume of negotiations, it has also underestimated the impact. It is clear that there was no union in the period, but the developments which led to the union in Florence in the fifteenth century all find their genesis in the mid-fourteenth century. While there are no details known about the early attempts at negotiation with Michael IX in 1316, a reasonable amount was known about the later discussions, and these should be differentiated into a more nuanced model than has so far been done in modern scholarship. Simply declaring that John V Palaiologos’ reign marks a change in attitudes ignores the aspirations and work that went into negotiations between Andronikos II’s and John V’s reigns. The developments of this period should be highlighted as a necessary step towards the position John V ended up taking, and where many of the ideas that became entrenched in dialogue after 1354 were formed. In this three stage model, Andronikos II’s reign constitutes the first phase, where there appears to have been little dialogue. Discussions held between the papacy and Andronikos III and John VI Kantakouzenos, between 1328 and 1354, should be seen to represent a second, distinct, phase, where discussions were held, but both sides were reluctant to compromise on their key policies. The final phase in the period comprises the reign of John V Palaiologos, after 1354, in which the Byzantines expressed a willingness to make concessions toward the papal position. This model correctly gives more importance to the negotiations conducted under Andronikos III and John Kantakouzenos, and makes it harder to write off the

44 CVI:LSF, I:1, no. 468, p. 208 is the only example of a letter being addressed to the patriarch of the Greeks in the entire set sent out in 1343, and it is a general letter to the patriarch, all archbishops and bishops: Dilectis in Christo fratribus... patriarche et universis archiepiscopis et episcopis Grecorum, spiritum gratie salutaris....
achievements and aspirations of the popes and emperors involved in negotiations by highlighting the consistent developments and compromises taken during the process.

The papal position in these discussions on union remained theologically consistent throughout the period, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that its demands amounted to its policy toward the empire. The popes wanted the ‘schismatic’ Churches to adopt Catholic doctrine and practice on points where there was deviation, in the Greek case particularly with the creed and the omission of the *filioque* clause, the use of leavened bread in the mass, and the recognition of papal primacy. Under Andronicus III and John VI Kantakouzenos, the second identified phase in papal–Byzantine relations, the Byzantine position can be seen as an intermediary position between the other two phases. The emperors were willing to negotiate on theological disputes, and issues of papal primacy, but they were only willing to do so in the context of a full ecumenical council. The issue of a council was a major stumbling block between the two parties. When Barlaam, acting as an emissary for Andronicus III, proposed a new council to discuss union in 1339, Benedict XII responded by stating that all the theological disputes had been resolved at Lyons, and that nothing had changed since then. This differed greatly from the Byzantine perspective, which had held since the start of Andronicus II’s reign in 1282 that Lyons had been an invalid ecumenical council because it had not included all five patriarchs. This deadlock continued throughout the whole second phase of negotiations, with Avignon insisting on a complete submission of the Byzantine Church in accordance with the agreement made at Lyons in 1274, while the emperors insisted on holding a new council, which they would recognise as valid, to resolve their differences.

This lack of progress has sometimes been used to indicate the hostility of both parties, showing that neither was serious about Church union. This, however, overlooks that both sides appeared to believe that they were making progress. John Kantakouzenos, writing in his memoirs after he was deposed, stated that Clement VI was in favour of a council in 1350. While this does not seem very likely, and

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45 BXII:LSF, n. 634, p.383.
46 Geanakoplos, *Byzantine East and Latin West*, p. 68.
48 Nicol, ‘Byzantine Requests’, p. 84.
would represent a complete reversal of his position, Kantakouzenos’ perception of it is important. Similarly, letters by Clement VI to the Latin community of Constantinople in Pera were very optimistic. They encouraged acceptance of, and preferential treatment for, anyone who wished to follow the Catholic rite, and this presupposes that Clement had reason to think that this might happen. This perception of progress is important, as it goes against the historiographical narrative we have of complete political stalemate over union, and which supposes that neither side was particularly interested in achieving a union, or believed that one might occur. Additionally, despite the political divisions between Joanna and John Kantakouzenos, both courted the papacy over union, and in very similar terms.

Rather than categorising this phase in such a negative manner, it seems fairer to highlight the aspirational elements of this phase. Both sides, in Avignon and Constantinople, while working within extremely restrictive conditions, appear to have believed that they were close to the goal of union.

It is important to note, that despite the way that Empress Joanna is frequently portrayed as the solitary pro-Latin influence in the Byzantine Empire, she was not formally a practicing Latin Christian. Nor was she the only Latin influence in Constantinople. There were several pro-Latin Byzantine noblemen who were high-profile converts to the Latin rite, including John V Palaiologos’ grand uncle, Demetrios Palaiologos, Andronikos II’s youngest son. Demetrios was a rebel against Andronikos III, his nephew, for much of the 1330s, but reconciled with him sometime before Andronikos’ death in 1341. Demetrios formally converted to the Latin Church in 1343, and received a letter from Clement VI dated 15 November 1343 congratulating him on his conversion.

50 Nicol, Last Centuries of Byzantium, p. 198.

51 CVI:LSF, I:1, no. 522, p. 522: Magnifico viro Demetrio, despot Grecie, promereri gratiam in presenti que perducat ad gloriam in futuro. De tua devotione, quam grata litterarum tuarum lectione ac dilecti filii Conradi habitatoris ville de Peyra Constantinoplitate diocesis nutiti tui, verballi relatione, te ad sanctam Romanam matrem ecclesiam habere percepimus spirituali leticie rore perfusi, tuam magnificientiam exhortarum quantinus devotionem candum, per quam tibi pandi celestis regni aditus poterit, deducere studeas in effectum. Sciturus pro certo quod, si hec feceri, gratia tibi assistente divina, te, sicut eidem nutrio expressimus, paterne carttatis recipiemus amplexibus, ac gratii et oportunis favoribus prosequemur; n. 523, p. 523 is a similar letter, but to the commune of Pera, which declares Demetrios’ conversion and urges them to help him.
to John V Palaiologos, but he was still a direct relation of the ruling emperor, the uncle and the son of previous emperors, and a despot of the Empire. His conversion did not appear to have a huge impact, and after these letters, he drops out of the literary record entirely, but he was a noble of very high stature who converted to the Latin rite apparently voluntarily. Another prominent noble was Alexios, described as a great duke of the Roman Empire (megadux imperii Romanie) in Latin sources, who appears to have also converted by 1343, and he received several letters dated 27 October 1343 encouraging him to assist in the promotion of union. It is unclear how these individuals affected the outcomes of negotiations, but Clement VI’s decision to include them in the set of letters he wrote in October 1343 shows that the papacy was clearly aiming to build a strong pro-Latin lobby in the empire that spread beyond Joanna’s Latin entourage and that it was hopeful for the negotiations on union which occurred between 1328 and 1354.

While most scholars have recognised that the rule of John V Palaiologos represented a change in the dynamics of union negotiations, this has largely been described in terms of Byzantine attitudes and there is still little recognition of how relations with the papacy changed during his reign. Most historians make note of the letter John sent in late 1355, but as there were few tangible gains made in its wake the offer has been largely dismissed. John’s initial offer was essentially the capitulation of the Byzantine Church to the Latin rite in exchange for military aid, but importantly, he was willing to proceed without another ecumenical council. Initially, he proposed that he would personally convert to the Catholic Church and offered his son as a hostage for his good intentions. In exchange for this, he wanted a small number of soldiers and ships to help secure his empire, according to his letter, preserved in Reg. Vat. 62. He then proposed that he would convert the rest of the Byzantine Church in exchange for a passagium generale, a full-fledged crusade, against the enemies of the empire, which would presumably have been both

53 This attitude is perhaps epitomised by Nicol, ‘The Byzantine View’, p. 332, where he writes off John’s entire efforts at union as ‘naive’.
54 Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 126r–127v: Item dominus Innocentus papa sub celeritate qua poterit postquam filium meum habuerit in manibus suis mittet in vscheria quindecim cum equitis quadringentum et alios centum cum navibus equites et mille pedites ita per erit exercitus totus vscheria quindecum, Galee subtiles quinque, equites quingentum, pedites mille quin duos exercitus applicuerit in Constantinopolitam per dei gratiam erit.
the Orthodox Serbs and the Islamic Turks. He also offered several other incentives to pre-empt papal demands, including offering to have his sons tutored in Latin.\(^{55}\)

The letter showed that John had a flexible approach to gathering the assistance he needed to secure his throne, which was still threatened by civil war and external invasion. While Geanakoplos and Nicol have been dismissive of John’s ability to deliver on the promises he made in the letter, particularly his ability to bring the Greek Church and people into the Catholic fold, there is no reason to think that John could not have forced the Church at the very least into formal union.\(^{56}\) John Palaiologos’s internal position was relatively secure following the civil war that saw John Kantakouzenos deposed, and there is no reason to think that he would have had trouble restructuring the administration of the empire if he chose to. As sole emperor, he was able to appoint and dismiss the patriarch of Constantinople, and several emperors used this authority to force their will on the Church, including Michael VIII Palaiologos’ appointment of the pro-Latin John Bekkos prior to the union at Lyons.\(^{57}\) In this case, it does not appear to be the Byzantines which held up the process, but the papacy.

Innocent VI’s response to John’s offer was non-committal. He was clearly interested in the proposal, and encouraged John to convert the Greeks as much as he was able, as well as promising to send legates and nuncios to assist with the conversion.\(^{58}\) These nuncios, Peter Thomas, the bishop of Patti (Pactensis), in Sicily, and William, bishop of Sisopolitanum (of whom little is known), were given

\(^{55}\) Reg. Vat. 62, f. 126v: Item dabo filio unico Primogenito vnum magistrum latinum qui docebit eum literas et lingam latinam de consilio et voluntate predicti legati.


\(^{57}\) Geanakoplos, Byzantine East and Latin West, p. 66.

\(^{58}\) IVL, III, n. 2278, p. 141: quod tu ut letterarum ipsarum verbis utamur juraveras, tactis per te sacrosanctis scripturis, ad sancta Dei evangelia et per sanctam Trinitatem Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unim verum Deum et tres personas et per Jesum Christum Deum et Salvatorem nostrum et per Virginem Dei genitricem Mariam ac per sanctam et vivificatam crucem Christi ac per apostolos aliosque sanctos ac eodem insuper archiepiscopo nomine ac vice nostris recipienti promiseras quod absque dolo, fraude ac defectu, toto posse ac omnibus viribus tuis et cuncto conatu esses fidelis, obedienti, reverens et devotus nobis et successoribus nostris Romanis pontificibus et quod reciperes legatos et nuntios nostros et eorum cum omni reverentia et devotione ac faceres toto posse totoque conatu tuo quod omnes populi sub tuo imperio constituti et tue jurisdictioni subjecti, sive essent laici, sive clerici, cujuscumque conditionis et status aut dignitatis existerent, essent fideles, obientes, reverentes et devoti nobis et successoribus antefatis.
significant power and are explicitly mentioned in introductory letters as being invited by the emperor of Greece and seemingly the patriarch of Constantinople, for the purpose of unifying the Churches. While the letters announced the coming of these nuncios, however, it promised little of anything else. The only mention of the Turks came in a non-military sense, offering blessings on conflict against them rather than practical aid, despite active papal campaigns against the Turks throughout the mid-fourteenth century. Otherwise, John’s calls for military support went unacknowledged, at least overtly. The Byzantines did appear to gain some military aid from the papal naval leagues, though this did not seem to be included in surviving papal registers and fell short of what the Byzantines were demanding in exchange for union.

Peter Thomas, a French Carmelite, was sent as an envoy to Constantinople in the wake of John’s proposal, on a mission very similar to one to the court of the Serbian emperor, Stephen Dušan, from which he had just returned. He was a key figure in representing the papacy in Eastern Mediterranean, negotiating with the Serbs, the Byzantines, and finally acting as legate for the East, and the only Latin figure involved for which a biography exists. He was promoted to the bishopric of Patti in Sicily, near Messina, in 1354, though he does not appear to have ever been resident there. This promotion could indicate he had some familiarity with Greek, but it was more likely a reward for his work as an emissary for the papacy in Italy during 1353–54, and a means to bolster his status ahead of missions to non-Catholic powers. Some of the claims made in the hagiographic work *The Life of Peter Thomas* by Philip de Mézières are problematic, and may say more about Philip’s attitudes to non-Latins than about what happened, but it is the only record of the events in Constantinople from a western perspective. Consequently it is the only source which gives us any insight into the Latin party’s perspective on the negotiations in 1357. Specifically, the *Life* claims that Peter witnessed John V

60 IVI, III, n. 2278, p. 142: *panderemus paterne dulcedinis gremium et adversus insultus et impugnationes hostiles Turorum infidelis ac rebellium tuorum audaciam auxillii dexteram salutaris extendere dignaremur*.
61 For a greater discussion about Latin military activity in the Aegean, see pages 188–93.
Palaiologos’ conversion to the Catholic Church, an event which goes unremarked in the Greek sources. John certainly did personally convert, and confirmed his conversion when he visited Urban V in Rome in 1368. But there is some uncertainty over whether he did so in 1357 as the *Life* claims, and if this was the case, why contemporary Greek writers were so quiet on the issue. The claim in itself is not beyond the realm of possibility. John’s mother, Joanna, had formally converted to the Greek rite when she married Andronikos III, but courted papal support throughout the civil wars with John VI Kantakouzenos, and arranged for a Latin tutor for her son, and John’s eventual conversion certainly suggests he was not opposed to the idea in principle. The silence of the other writers is troubling, however, and reinforces that the *Life* must be used cautiously. Either contemporary Greek writers were improbably uninterested John’s conversion, John’s ‘public’ conversion was not publicised, or it did not in fact occur at this point.

Copies of the *Life* also contain the only surviving copies of John Palaiologos’ second letter to Innocent VI, which has not been preserved in any papal sources, and, if genuine, also offers insights into what happened after the negotiations. The letter argues that John has fulfilled his side of the initial agreement, and that Innocent should provide the *passagium particulare* that had been promised, and reiterated his offers of hostages. John apparently wrote his second letter with the assistance of Peter and sent it in late 1357, but there is no record of a reply, and it has been generally assumed that the negotiations collapsed due to a papal lack of interest in the project. Unfortunately, the survival of papal registers for 1358–61 is extremely poor, and there appears to be no evidence one way or another, but the assumption that negotiations collapsed following Peter Thomas’ embassy cannot explain the cooperation seen between the Byzantines and

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the naval league led by Peter between 1359 to at least 1362.\(^{68}\) Even the lack of a response is not conclusive. John’s second letter only survived attached to the *Life* of Peter Thomas, and the lack of a surviving copy of a response to that letter does not necessarily indicate that one did not exist. Peter returned as legate to the Eastern Mediterranean shortly after completing the negotiations and reporting back to Avignon, which would have given him plenty of opportunity to further this cause. John also was keen enough for European support that he visited Western Europe twice, even though his experiences there were not entirely positive. The absence of evidence for continuing relations after 1357 does not mean that they did not continue, particularly given Peter Thomas’ appointment as legate and the cooperation between the crusaders and Byzantines in 1359. It is clear that even though the overall results were not the full union that both sides appeared to want, John V Palaiologos’ reign represents a substantially closer phase of relations and a better prospect of union than can be seen in the previous two phases. John was willing to acknowledge the authority of the papacy, and the league of 1359 suggests that the papacy was able to exert some power over its allies in order to assist the Byzantines.

Thus, relations between the papacy and the Byzantine emperors, despite the generally negative view many scholars appear to have held on the subject, were complex and not nearly as antagonistic as has often been portrayed. After the death of Andronikos II, a clear warming of relations between the two can be observed. By the mid-fourteenth century and the reign of John V Palaiologos, once he was free of John VI Kantakouzenos, there are clear signs of growing cooperation between the two Churches and a strong move toward union. Similarly, the demands of the papacy did not remain completely static, and as the fourteenth century progressed, the popes increasingly tied military aid to spiritual reform. Rather than remaining unchanging and unbending, it is clear that relations between the Churches were much more dynamic than has usually been perceived, and a three-phase model gives a greater importance to the efforts at securing union under Andronikos III and John Kantakouzenos than the traditional one or two phase models seen in previous scholarship. This helps highlight the aspirational nature of relations between the

\(^{68}\) See chapter seven for more discussion on the Aegean naval leagues.
Byzantine and Latin Churches in this period and the progressive aspect they took on, and adds more nuance to what was an extremely complicated process. By singling John V out as a unique voice of reconciliation, previous models ignore the decades of work that went into forming his policies, and the almost immediate shift in the Byzantine position that occurred after the death of Andronikos II.

The intentions of the papacy for union with the Byzantine Church were not, therefore, particularly antagonistic for most of the period. The papacy was actively trying to achieve union, as were the Greeks. Both wanted the best deal they could get out of the union, but ultimately, the cause of the failure of union in this period was not the lack of desire of either party to achieve it. This sincerity has some important implications for the power dynamic of negotiations over union between the Churches. While the papacy may have held Andronikos II in disregard, and refused to acknowledge his legitimacy and authority, it did not appear to do so for the emperors who succeeded him. Similarly, Andronikos II did not appear to have considered the papacy a valid ecclesiastical authority over the Greek Church, but his successors were willing to acknowledge the authority of the papacy over Christianity more generally. Consequently, the struggle over union was not characterised by an issue with the authority of either party, at least after Andronikos II. Andronikos III, John Kantakouzenos and John Palaiologos were all willing to entertain the possibility of papal primacy and the authority of the popes over all Christendom, but they wanted aid in exchange for that recognition. Nor was it a problem of intention, as has been seen, both sides appeared to want the union to succeed; rather, the failure of union in this period appears to have resulted from a failure of power. The papacy was ultimately unable to mobilise sufficient military aid to meet the Byzantine conditions for union, even after John V had met all the papal conditions for union. The negotiations over union with the Byzantines in this period demonstrate that papal authority was well regarded, particularly by the emperors after Andronikos II, and that the Byzantines appeared to believe that the papacy was able to exert power over the Catholic states in Europe. The failure to provide sufficient military support, however, suggests that the papacy was unable to actually command that power, and that papal encouragement and the promise of union was insufficient to motivate the Catholic kingdoms to aid the empire in a meaningful way. While some aid did materialise, conceivably as a response to John V’s apparent conversion, this fell far short of the passagium generale he wanted in
exchange for the conversion of the empire. The papacy’s lack of actual power, particularly in comparison to its perceived power, resulted in the empire seeing little benefit in union, and prevented the process from going any further.

The Serbian Church

The Byzantine Church was not, however, the only Church which the papacy approached with offers of union. The Serbian Church, which was fiercely opposed to the Latin rite in the early part of this period, approached the Latin Church in 1354 on the subject of union, though this was not the beginning of efforts at union. Prior to this, the Serbian Church had shown no interest in working with the Latin Church, and considered the Latin rite a heresy, though the Latin Church had made efforts at reconciliation. Latin missionaries had been sent to the Balkans throughout the fourteenth century, to minister and lobby for the Latin Christians who lived within the Serbian empire. One such attempt to promote the Latin Church in the Balkans occurred in 1308, when missionaries were sent to entreat Stefan Uroš, the Serbian emperor, to accept Catholicism. There was little evident success, and the Latin population continued to be discriminated against throughout the first half of the fourteenth century. But early in 1354 Stefan Dušan, Stefan Uroš’s successor as emperor of the Serbs, sent envoys, including a Latin missionary, Bartholomew, the bishop of Trau, to Avignon, declaring his acceptance of papal primacy and detailing his progress toward restoring the Latin Church to Serbia. Dušan claimed he had restored previously Latin bishoprics to Latin bishops where he could, and had ended the practice of forcibly re-baptising Latins. He concluded with a request for many good men to assist with the task of restoring the Latin Church. Peter Thomas was sent to Dušan, along with Bartholomew, later that year to assess the sincerity of the offer, just as he was later sent to John V Palaiologos in Constantinople to assess a similar offer.

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70 Reg. Vat. 236, ff. 222v–224v.
Much of what is known of this mission comes from Philip de Mézières’s *Life of St. Peter Thomas*, and he implies that Dušan had not been entirely honest in his declaration of intent, providing several anecdotes to illustrate his opinion.\(^{71}\) Peter was forbidden from holding Latin mass, and all who attended were under threat of being blinded. Peter disobeyed the edict and held mass anyway, which was reportedly well attended, and Dušan did not have them all blinded, or martyred, but rather found Peter’s defiance inspiring. Peter remained at the Serbian court for nearly a year, leaving only after Dušan’s death to report his mission a failure, which suggests that he believed union could potentially have been reached prior to then, or at least, some form of political deal for the benefit of Latins was possible.\(^{72}\) As Smet notes, it is important not to overstate Dušan’s apparent anti-Catholic stance after the nuncios arrived in Serbia, as the anecdotes provided could well be isolated examples, exaggerations, or fabrications, and Peter was not in trouble for disobeying the royal edict against the Latin mass regardless.\(^{73}\)

There are several reasons Dušan may have wanted to bring his empire closer to the Latin Church, beyond his apparent change of heart and faith. Louis of Hungary had begun to campaign to regain the lands to the south of his kingdom which Dušan had taken earlier in his reign and succeeded in gaining crusading indulgences for his soldiers.\(^{74}\) Papal support could have helped protect the Serbian empire from Hungary, by stripping the campaign of its holy war status, as the union of Lyons had shielded the Byzantine empire. The Serbian empire under Dušan was relatively westward facing by the 1350s as well, and had encompassed a sizable part of northern and western Greece, giving his empire control of a long stretch of the Adriatic coast.\(^{75}\) Aligning further with Italy therefore made economic as well as military sense. He may also have been seeking western aid in his campaigns east, against the Byzantines and the Turks. He had been styling himself as ‘emperor of the Serbs and the Romans’ for some time,\(^{76}\) had had himself crowned emperor in

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\(^{71}\) For further information on Peter Thomas, see p. 123.

\(^{72}\) Philip de Mézières, *The Life of Saint Peter Thomas*, pp. 67–70.

\(^{73}\) Smet, *The Life of Saint Peter Thomas*, p. 196.


and clearly had ambitions to capture Constantinople for himself and secure his dynasty as Byzantine emperors. Regardless of his motivation for seeking closer ties with the West through union, however, the chance passed with his death and the disintegration of the Serbian empire into civil war.

The example of the Serbian Church under Dušan demonstrates a level of opportunism in papal policy; while the papacy had previously made attempts to approach the Serbs about joining the Latin Church, it was hardly a sustained policy. When Dušan began to make offers to the papacy in an effort to gain its support, however, Innocent VI was quick to take up the opportunity regardless of the potential to jeopardise relations with Byzantium. It also shows that the papacy was well regarded by the Christian powers on the edges of Europe, and that its authority as a political and religious institution was accepted by those outside of its jurisdiction, even this may have only been an opportunistic or pragmatic acceptance. The expectations of the Serbs also mirrored those of the Byzantines, in that they clearly believed the papacy had the power to help them militarily. In this case, the instability of the empire rendered the discussions moot before that power could be tested, but it shows that the perception of papal power was strong amongst its rivals in Greece and the Balkans.

Negotiations over union in general should therefore be seen as a fluid process, which ultimately failed to produce fruit, but which were not doomed from the start. The Byzantine Church progressed from being an enemy of the Latin West and the papacy at the start of the period to moving very close to union by the end. Instead of crusades directed against Constantinople, by the end of Innocent VI’s pontificate, crusaders in the papal naval league were fighting alongside Byzantine forces against the Turks. Similarly, the Serbian Church had a complicated relationship with the West, being openly hostile to the Latin Church until the 1350s, then approaching it for union and aid in 1354, before the whole process collapsed following the death of Stephen Dušan. At no point during these processes was it obvious that nothing would come of them, and the progressive nature of the negotiations and seriousness with which all sides took them demonstrates that union

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was not some unobtainable goal that was being used as political bait, but an outcome which all sides appeared to be believe to be achievable and desirable.

The papacy was able to position itself as both a religious and a political entity in the negotiations over Church union with both the Byzantine and Serbian Churches. This suggests an acceptance of the position of the papacy as a source of authority amongst those institutions, and no European powers challenged the right of the papacy to conduct those negotiations and make promises on their behalf. The power the papacy was able to exert was more complicated; the perceived power of the papacy, particularly by the Byzantines and Serbs, appeared to be more than what it was able to apply to the Catholic kingdoms it was speaking for. While the papacy was able to promise military support in exchange for union, it was unable to deliver to the Byzantines even the support John wanted in exchange for continuing the process, and that more than anything else resulted in the failure of union during the fourteenth century.
5. Churches in union with Avignon

In the fourteenth century, three Churches in the Eastern Mediterranean were already in communion with the Catholic Church: the Maronite Church, the Greek Church in Latin-rulled lands and the Armenian Church. The Maronites had a much more straightforward relationship with the Latin Church than the Armenians or the Greeks. The Maronite Church had entered union with Rome in 1181, abandoning its previous Monothelete stance, and had remained within the fold since then. The Armenian Church had a more complicated history with the Catholic Church. It originally adopted a Monophysite stance after the council of Chalcedon, but also had close relations with the Crusader states after 1099 and entered into a union with Rome in 1198, albeit one which has been viewed by historians as very problematic. While the Armenian Church appears to have accepted many points of Latin practice at that point, it remained highly independent and resisted political and theological domination. The Greek Christian community under Latin rule across the Mediterranean had maintained communion with Constantinople until the council of Lyons, when it entered communion with Rome. The sections of the Greek Church that were under Latin rule in Cyprus had accepted union in 1220 or been suppressed. The Cretan Greek bishops had fled the island in 1211, leaving the clergy under the authority of the Venetian administration, and the Greek Church in Rhodes had found itself accountable to the Hospital in 1309, which created a less defined union there, but certainly a union of sorts. This section will establish the

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78 The view that Christ had two natures (human and divine), but only one will.
80 The view that Christ had only one substance, which was human and divine, though the perfection of divinity dominated his nature.
82 The Greek Church was Chalcedonian in its Christology, as was the Latin Church, but maintained some differences, particularly with regard to the *filioque* clause in the creed, and the rituals of the sacraments.
validity of these unions as seen by contemporaries, which can be equated to the authority granted to the papacy, and examine the problems raised by the Latin Church over maintaining communion with Churches that had previously held different Christological, liturgical, or other theological traditions, and enforcing conformity with the Latin Church, demonstrating what power it was able to exercise.

The Armenian Church

The Armenian Church had a complicated relationship with the Latin Church throughout the thirteenth century. It entered union with Rome formally at the creation of the kingdom in 1198, with a papal legate crowning the first king in a ceremony witnessed by senior clerics of all the Churches present in Armenia, and thereafter was officially in communion with the Latin Church. This was not as simple as it first appears, however. While it is quite clear that while the union was never abandoned, it was also not as comprehensive as it was intended to be and the Armenian Church remained quite politically and theologically independent. The Armenian adherence to the Latin Church in the thirteenth century can be summed up by a statement made by the Armenian delegate, Mkhitar Skewrati, at the council of Acre in 1261:

Whence does the Church of Rome derive the power to pass judgment on the other Apostolic sees while she herself is not subject to their judgments? We ourselves [the Armenians] have indeed the authority to bring you [the Catholic Church] to trial, following the example of the Apostles, and you have no right to deny our competency.85

This episode came during the peak of Armenian power in the region, as the kingdom used its alliance with the Mongols to bolster its position and expand into Syria. This denial of papal primacy is a stark contradiction of the union which supposedly existed with the Latin Church, in which the Armenians were supposed to be following Latin teachings on papal authority. Accepting the primacy of the pope was

not a negotiable part of that union, though clearly a part that the Armenian delegate was unwilling to accept in 1261. Clearly, the Amenians felt at this stage that they did not need the West’s support. This denial did not, however, result in either party considering themselves out of union, or in papal censure of any kind, and while the two Churches disagreed on points and had points of conflict throughout the thirteenth century, the formal union remained in effect. As seen in the previous example of Byzantium, union with the Latin Church meant submission to the Latin Church and this was important to the maintenance of the union and the support of the Latin West that union supposedly included. Papal support appears not have been as important to the Armenian Church in the thirteenth century as its freedom to choose their own way, but the papacy seemed to have ignored this disregard for its authority, and did not impose any sanctions on the kingdom. Armenia was willing to profess a respect for papal authority, provided that the papacy did not try and dictate Armenian practice.

This was not a state of affairs that continued long into the fourteenth century. In 1307, the Armenian Church convened a council at Sis which decided to renew the union and to accept greater integration with, and by extension, greater control by, the Latin Church. The timing of the council has been linked to the succession of Oshin to the Armenian throne and his pro-Cypriot, pro-Latin, platform, but the issue is invariably more complicated than simply being related to Oshin’s sympathies. This move toward greater religious unity also came after the Mongol Ilkhanate formally converted to Islam in 1305, potentially weakening the long-standing alliance between the kingdom and the Ilkhanate, and the death of Ghazan, the Ilkhan, who was a long standing ally and supporter of the kingdom, in the same year. The murder of Het’um II and Levon III by Ilkhan vassals not long after Sis in 1308 should also not be overlooked as a factor in re-enforcing the decision to look west. Additionally, the Mamlûks had scored several important victories against the Mongols and the Armenians, pushing them completely out of Syria in 1304, and

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87 Richard, *La papauté et les missions d’Orient*, p. 201.
Western aid could easily have been seen to be a way to shore up the position of the kingdom. It is important to note, however, that the declaration of union made at Sis was not prompted by the papacy, but was an Armenian initiative. Only one year prior, in 1306, Clement V had encouraged European assistance for the kingdom without any kind of condition of ecclesiastical reform, nor even any mention of potential religious deviance.\(^90\) While ecclesiastical reform was a concern for the popes in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, it was not linked to the physical wellbeing of the kingdom of Armenia, and the status of the union into which the Armenian Church had entered in 1198 was never disputed, despite the obvious lack of adherence to catholic practice.

Even after the council of Sis in 1307 and its declaration of faith, the state of union between the Armenian and Catholic Churches remained complicated. Latin opinions on the Armenian Church remained polarised throughout the entire period after 1307, despite the official union which existed between the two Churches. Immediately following the council of Sis, commentators questioned the sincerity of the Armenian commitment to Catholic practices, and this accusatory theme remained strong throughout the remainder of the period.\(^91\) However, despite the protestations of these Latin commentators, the council at Sis was not meaningless, and groups of Armenian dissidents fled to Cyprus to escape what they viewed as persecution and heresy.\(^92\) The papacy itself appeared quite unconcerned about the rumoured lack of orthodoxy of the kingdom, and the earliest letters sent after Sis were congratulating the new king on his wedding in 1311, and make no mention of the orthodoxy of the Armenian faith.\(^93\) The next set of letters was sent in 1312 and concerned the dispatch of an inquisitor to Armenia to ensure that the terms of union were being implemented a full four years after the council of Sis.\(^94\) This should not

\(^{90}\) CV, I, nn. 748–53, pp. 132–35.
\(^{93}\) CV, VI, nn. 7199–202, pp. 293–94.
\(^{94}\) CV, VII, n. 8610, pp. 242–43.
be seen as anything extraordinary, as it would not be unreasonable nor unusual for the papacy to wish to establish the existing state of orthodoxy in Armenia. Unfortunately, there was no follow-up to this letter, nor does the inquisitor’s report appear to have survived, but it appears that there was no effort at enforcing reforms at that time. No follow-up letters were sent on the issue, and if the papacy was concerned about the state of the Armenian Church, it has not survived in the documentary evidence. Evidence from the registers indicates papal interest in this matter only re-occurred in 1341, late in the pontificate of Benedict XII, and continued to be an issue of interest to Clement VI, while John XXII does not appear to have taken any issue with the Armenians over their faith. Between the inquisition ordered by Clement V and Benedict XII’s corrections of the errors of the Armenian Church, the papacy appeared to pay little attention to the practices of kingdom. While Armenia does regularly appear in letters contained in John’s registers, it is very much in terms of Church administration and political support for the kingdom, not in terms of religious practice, and there was no call for reform surviving in his registers.

Theological disputes did not surface until the 1341 correction issued by Benedict, quite late in his pontificate. This is curious, as several crusading treatises that had been written in previous years which were extremely critical of the Armenian Church and their practices and very vocal in their calls for action against the Armenians. The anonymous author of the Directorium ad passagium faciendum, who presented his work to the king of France in 1332 and who claims to have been a member of an embassy to the Armenians in 1322, describes them as ‘the worst heretics in the Orient’ and ‘wrapped in errors’. Nevertheless, there

95 Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 100r–124v.
96 This work has been ascribed to William of Adam by Geanakoplos and Leopold, though this is a tentative attribution. There is no record of William of Adam going on the 1322 embassy, and as he would have been the senior member of the expedition, this is very unlikely. Constable suggests that the author of the Directorium probably had access to William of Adam’s earlier work, though was not the same man, and this is the view taken in this work. Deno Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the Crusades’, in A History of the Crusades: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. by Kenneth Setton and Harry Hazard (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975), p. 54; Leopold, How to Reclaim the Holy Land, pp. 43–44; William of Adam, How to Defeat the Saracens, p. 8.
appears to be no record of any such activity or papal censure on the issue taking place between 1312 and 1341. This suggests that despite the active lobbying against the Armenian Church by theorists, the papacy was largely uninterested in their advice and was pursuing its own policy toward the Armenians independent of the commentary on them.

In this context Benedict XII’s corrections to the Armenians are even more interesting. There are several different documents dated to 1 August 1341, addressed to various individuals in Armenia. The first was to King Levon IV, and is substantially longer than the next, which was addressed to the catholicos of the Armenians, but also copied to several other senior clerics in Armenia. The final addition to the package is a document titled *Fides Armenor*, a bull detailing point by point the errors of the Armenian Church. This bull is not associated with the letters in the registers of Benedict XII, but all three were brought together in Reg. Vat. 62 and had the same date, so it is reasonable to think that contemporaries viewed these documents as a package. Additionally, as all three documents concern the same subject matter and were created at the same time, it is reasonable to assume they were composed in conjunction with one another. The content of the letters and bull supports this conclusion, as they all talk explicitly about supposed errors of the Armenians. The letter to Levon recognised the difficulties the kingdom was facing first and foremost, and then discussed the errors of the Church and what Benedict proposed to do about them. Conversely, the letter to the catholicos and other clerics is much more concerned about the practicalities involved in the forthcoming inquisition than the kingdom’s political and military difficulties. *Fides Armenor* does not address the practicalities of the investigation at all, rather it concentrates exclusively on the errors supposedly committed by the Armenians, a subject touched on in the other letters, but not in nearly as much detail.

The errors described in *Fides Armenor* tended to cluster around issues such as language, particularly liturgical language and the formulation of liturgy in Armenian services, baptism, and ceremonial disputes, such as what kind of bread should be used during the Eucharist. Doctrinal disputes were also important, with several points being made about the Armenian rejection of purgatory, the nature of

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98 Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 34r–35v; 100r–124v.
hell, the role of original sin, and the role of angels and demons. It challenged the Armenian interpretation of the nature of Christ, as well as their views on the resurrection, while the final accusation claims, somewhat vaguely, that there was general blasphemy against the Latin Church. In all, there are 117 points contained within the document, subdivided into nineteen broader categories in the rubric as presented in Reg. Vat. 62. It appears to aim to be a comprehensive list of the ‘errors’ of the Armenian faith, rather than its ‘heresies’, a distinction that carries less condemnation. In contrast to commentaries as those of Guido Terreni and Pseudo-Brocardus, who considered the Armenians entirely heretical, there is limited use of the word ‘heresy’ in Fides Armenor, and while the charges raised against the Armenian Church were serious, there was no suggestion that it faced spiritual sanction for them. Even the accusations of blasphemy were not described as heretical, nor were any of the points which would usually be described in such language, such as disputes over the nature of Christ. Even in 1341, the Latin Church still appeared to be unwilling to impose sanctions on the Armenian Church, even though the Armenian Church had clearly come under much greater Latin influence than when it was overtly denying papal primacy in 1261.

There was no single event or trigger that can explain why this dispute surfaced when it did. It was one of the last set of letters which concerned the East that was issued during Benedict’s pontificate, and it is not altogether clear why he chose to raise the issue then. It would appear that little had changed in Avignon in relation to Armenia over the previous thirty years, and it was not due to the initiative of a newly elected pope with a fresh agenda. While there does not appear to be any particular event in Avignon that precipitated Benedict’s change in stance, however,

100 Reg. Vat. 62, f. 124v for the rubric summarising the document.
101 Pseudo-Brocardus, ‘Directorium’, pp. 487–90; Irene Bueno, ‘Guido Terrini at Avignon and the ‘Heresies’ of the Armenians’, Medieval Encounters, 21 (2015), 169–89, pp. 172–74; The only example in Fides Armenor appears to be in point 117, which states that the Armenians accuse the Latin Church of being heretics. Reg. Vat. 62, f. 120r: Item, quod Armeni non habent omnino veram fidem, quam tenet sancta Romana Ecclesia nec Sacramenta blasphemant sanctam Romanam Ecclesiam et papa et Cardinales, dicentes eos esse haereticos; et quod catholicon Minoris Armeniae dixit, quod papa et omnes Cardinales qualibet die plures quam ipse haberet capillos in capite faciunt homines occidere ... et paucissimi sunt homines in Minori Armenia, praeter regem et aliquos nobiles, qui tenent fidem Romanae Ecclesiae.
it is clear that the presence of several prominent Armenian unionists at Avignon in the period of 1338–1341 allowed for the discussion of the Armenian union. Nērses Palienc’, an Armenian priest, fled to Avignon in 1338 for protection against the Armenian catholicos, James, who had excommunicated and briefly imprisoned him. He is considered the primary influence and source of information for the creation of *Fides Armenor*, and his negative views dominate the document. These views were opposed in 1341 by the newly appointed Armenian legate, Daniel of Tabriz, in his *Responsio*, but to little effect – *Fides Armenor* was sent out that same year. Many works on Armenian heresy borrowed heavily from *Fides Armenor*, including later papal letters and commentators on heresy, such as Guido Terreni.

While the identities of delegates in Avignon can explain how *Fides Armenor* came to be written, it does not explain why reform of the Armenian Church was suddenly on the agenda in Avignon after such a long period of disinterest. Nērses was not the only arrival from Armenia in the previous three decades, and none of the others had sparked such interest. Similarly, authors with negative views of the Armenian Church were not a sudden development in Avignon, but they had been largely ignored by the curia prior to this. Therefore, the most likely reason for a renewal of interest was due to the circumstances in Armenia, not Avignon. As Bueno has pointed out, the reality of the dispute cannot be ascertained with any reliability, and as a result the substance of the debate should be considered secondary to its context. One possibility is suggested by the timing of the publication of the document. These corrections came during a period of great political instability in Armenia, and were in fact sent out a month after Levon’s murder at the hands of his own barons, despite still being addressed to Levon. This period of unrest may have seen like a good opportunity for the papacy, as the king was in no position to refuse any help the papacy offered, and would have been very likely to agree to sweeping ecclesiastical reforms if it meant ending the uprising against him.

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Additionally, as well as an opportunity, the build up to Levon’s death also represented a threat to papal authority. The violent deaths of several monarchs and influential noblemen has been linked to struggles over the influence of Latins and the Latin Church, and the death of the pro-Latin Leo, at the hands of his own barons, has been interpreted in this light.\textsuperscript{106} Levon’s settlement with the Mamlūks in 1335 had divided the Church and nobility into those pro-Latin, and those pro-separation, as the only viable methods of survival for the kingdom. Levon’s death at the hands of anti-Latin separatists gave significant power to the anti-Latin lobby in the Armenian Church, according to Ghazarian, though the same nobles who murdered Levon offered the crown to a Cypriot, suggesting that this may be an oversimplistic reading.\textsuperscript{107} This royal pro-Latin stance, and the tension it supposedly caused, was suggested by John Dardel,\textsuperscript{108} a contemporary chronicler, and the papal letters supports the view that the Armenian kings remained in firm support of union throughout the period. The continuing unrest in Armenia and the faltering of Levon IV’s rule could conceivably have encouraged Benedict to attempt widespread religious reform with the goal of assisting the Armenian kings to retain control, or at the least, re-enforcing connections between the two Churches in a time of crisis.

The origins of Benedict’s change of attitude toward the Armenian Church may have begun sometime earlier. Based on the interpretation of Boase, a conceivable reason for Benedict’s concern in 1341 may have been formed during the tumultuous minority of Levon IV between 1320 and 1329. During this period Armenia was ruled by a regent, Oshin, lord of Korykos, who was, according to Boase, a staunch separatist, and did his best to counter the pro-Latin work of the previous kings.\textsuperscript{109} While Levon had Oshin executed when he reached his majority in 1329 and took a strong pro-Latin stance himself, the rebellion in 1340 which led to his murder on 28 August 1341 demonstrated the great ideological division within the kingdom. Oshin was not alone in his opposition to Latin union, and Levon’s pro-Latin stance was one of the reasons for his deposition and execution. It seems quite plausible that the violent deaths of several pro-union kings would have prompted

\textsuperscript{106} Housley, \textit{The Later Crusades}, p. 181.
\textsuperscript{107} Jacob Ghazarian, \textit{The Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia during the Crusades} (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 72–75.
\textsuperscript{108} Dardel, ‘Chronique’, pp. 18–21.
Benedict to address what he saw as a growing heresy in the Armenian Church directed against Latin proponent, exemplified by Oshin of Korykos. This reading of events has largely come from Dardel’s *Chronique d’Armenie*, and has a certain amount of support from the papal letters. Three letters, which were sent on 20 December 1322 to the archbishops of Paris, Toulouse and Rheims, support this idea. They state that John XXII has heard disturbing rumours about the regent, Oshin, and that he was concerned about Armenia. Despite these concerns, however, the nature of these rumours was not expanded on, no action appears to have been taken, and Armenian ambassadors were a crucial party in discussions concerning a new crusade which took place in 1322, discussions that they were not always involved in. Whatever ideological concerns either side had, they were not enough to dampen either side’s interest in military aid.

There are additional problems with the explanation; in particular, it heavily overstates the pro-Latin and anti-Latin tendencies of certain individuals. The characterisation of Oshin of Korykos as the primary anti-Latin ruler prior to 1344 conflicts with much of the evidence which can be found in the papal registers. Oshin was very keen to seek papal approval for his actions, including the marriage of his daughter to the minor King Levon IV, which was within the forbidden degree of consanguinity, and he issued a personal request for two friars to come to minister in his lands. In addition to the requests in his name, pro-Latin grants and requests in the name of Levon, his ward, were regular, and included furthering negotiations with Cyprus, granting castles on the Mamlûk frontier to the Knights of the Hospital, and receiving relief money of 30,000 florins from the Latin Church. This shows a

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112 While the Armenian ambassadors’ cause was not particularly advanced in the advice of the archbishops of France, their advice provided a foundation for the discussions. One of the main reasons given by John XXII for the collapse of this round of discussions on the crusade to the Holy Land was that the Armenian nuncios had gone home to report the proceedings, the implication being that they were seen as imperative to the talks.
113 The dependence on John Dardel’s *Chronique* is problematic for a number of reasons, but his portrayal of pro- and anti-Latin sentiments amongst rulers is particularly difficult. He was in essence a propagandist for Levon V, who was basing his hopes of recovering the kingdom on Western aid, and the *Chronique* is littered with pro-Latin sentiment and narratives aimed at creating sympathy. How much it can be trusted as history is less certain.
regency which was every bit as involved and interested in the west as any other Armenian king whom Dardel categorised as ‘pro-Latin’, and casts serious doubt on Dardel’s reliability as a record of relations between the kingdom of Armenia and the papacy.

Thus, a political concern for anti-Latin sentiment in Armenia’s ruling class as an explanation does not appear to have been as substantial a concern as Dardel suggested, though it is difficult to know how much Benedict knew about the political atmosphere in Armenia. Nevertheless, it appears to be an inadequate reason to explain Benedict XII’s sudden interest in Armenia in 1341. Prior to this, almost the only record of Benedict’s interest in Armenia was in 1336 when the Latin Church arranged and paid for a famine relief effort, having grain from southern Italy shipped to Ayas, and granting crusade indulgences for those willing to assist the kingdom against the Mamlūks. There is no evidence which suggests that any of the Avignon popes prior to Benedict displayed any serious concern over the practices of the Armenians. Therefore, the timing of this intervention does seem opportunistic. It is possible Benedict was interested in Armenian reform as part of his wider trend toward combatting heresy, often attributed to his career as an inquisitor prior to his election. His concern over Armenia would have certain been in keeping with his characterisation as a reform pope. It is possible too that anti-Armenian voices found the sympathy in Benedict’s court that they appeared not to receive in John XXII’s. A letter dated 8 June 1338, the only one of its kind, gives papal dispensation for an Armenian named Peter to be re-baptised by the archbishop of Genoa seemingly because he was unhappy with his baptism in Armenia and believed it to be invalid. It is perhaps coincidence that the only instance of this kind of request being granted was three years before Fides Armenor was issued, but it can also be seen to be evidence of the changing attitudes toward Armenian faith in Avignon. Nevertheless, it would still appear that even if Armenian reform had Benedict’s sympathy, he still waited for the instability of Levon’s later reign to act.

While Benedict’s reasons for issuing Fides Armenor can only be guessed at, they do not appear to be exclusive to his papacy, as the issue of Armenian errors was

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118 BXII:LC, II, n. 6297, p. 102.
carried on after his death. Clement VI, after his election in 1342, initially maintained part of predecessor’s hostility to the Armenian Church, but that appears to have been quickly dispelled. 119 Armenian nuncios denied the charges brought in Benedict’s corrections, which Clement appeared to accept, and the issue was put aside. 120 However, throughout Clement’s pontificate, the caution against heresy was regularly made, particularly to Constantine V after his elevation to the throne in 1346. 121 In the surviving registers of Innocent VI, Armenia is very infrequently mentioned, though this is a small corpus of letters to begin with, so this absence should not be taken as conclusive. The registers do contain two letters to Nērses, the archbishop of Mantzikert (Manasguerdensis), which congratulate him on his continuing work. The earlier letter addressed a problem which appears to be endemic to papal missions outside of Europe, which was languages. 122 The letter pinned the failure of earlier missions to Armenia on the lack of available interpreters, which the presence of Nērses, fluent in Armenian and Latin, was supposed to resolve. However, while both letters were encouraging the increasing Latinisation of the Church, neither was overtly critical of local practice.

The resumption of interest in Armenian reform on the part of Benedict demonstrated a certain amount about the power dynamic that existed between the two Churches. The Armenian identification as Catholic, and the acceptance by both Armenian and Latin Churches of the union reveals a greater respect for the authority of the papacy than there had been previously, though certainly not an absolute one. While in the thirteenth century, the Armenian Church appeared to have reservations about the role of the pope, and of the Latin Church, by the Avignon period, the Armenian Church had decided firmly to accept its place as a subordinate in the union. The Armenian Church appeared genuinely to consider itself a part of the Catholic Church, and accepted the pope as its ultimate leader, as well as right of the pope to administer the Church.

Whatever respect for papal authority there was did not, however, appear to extend particularly far into ritual practice, and it is difficult to see the papacy

121 CVI:LSNF, nn. 1191–1200, pp. 151–52.
122 IVI, I, n. 573, pp. 187–88; III n. 1306, pp. 15–16.
exercising much power over disputes about practice. Papal positions on the Armenian Church appeared quite reactive for the entire period, responding to embassies or individuals, and was inconsistent in the approaches taken. While the ceremonial practices of the Armenians did not seem to be much of an issue for Clement V and John XXII, complaints about incorrect practice were rife during both their pontificates, and Benedict’s corrections were mainly about the same errors raised in crusader treatises that mentioned Armenia. These errors were disputed by the Armenian Church, and Clement VI appeared to have accepted the Armenian position, but deviancy continued to be commented upon. The same complaints were raised at the council of Florence in 1439, which meant that either these views had not been successfully altered, or that they had begun to reoccur.\footnote{Enchiridion Symbolorum, ed. by H. J. D. Denzinger-Schönmetzer (Freiburg: Herder, 1963), 1310–27.} As these were primarily still the liturgical issues which Benedict had brought up, such as the composition of wine and the type of bread used in the Eucharist, or who had the authority to perform certain sacraments, it is likely that these practices simply had not been altered. Thus, despite papal intervention, not very much had changed in the fourteenth century, and this suggests that the papacy did not have the ability to bring the Armenian Church fully into line with the Latin one despite its attempts to do so. It was not completely powerless, however, and was able to send inquisitors to assess the Armenian Church, who received its cooperation. The Armenian Church did not dispute the right of the papacy to manage the theological practices of the Church; it disputed that it was guilty of the errors of which it was accused and, at least partially, convinced Clement VI’s ambassadors of this. Clement did feel the need to link obedience to Catholic norms with material aid for the kingdom but, as with Byzantium, this ultimately revealed the limitations of papal power. The papacy was unable to provide substantial aid for the kingdom, particularly militarily, which undermined the effectiveness of this offer as a carrot to bring the Church into line. The papacy was unable to threaten to withdraw what it was unable to provide.

Armenia, therefore, cannot be said to have had an easy relationship with the Latin Church throughout the period, yet it is curious how little the regular claims by Latins of ‘heretical’ behaviour influenced papal policy toward the kingdom. The union formed in 1198 lasted, at least in name, beyond the fall of the kingdom,
despite the Armenians rejecting fundamental aspects of the Latin faith prior to 1308. Ultimately, the papacy appeared to be generally supportive of the state of union with Armenia, despite the increase in tension under Benedict XII and Clement VI, and the Armenian acceptance of papal authority appeared to be relatively consistent throughout. The papacy, however, found itself unable to assist the kingdom substantially, and unable to enforce the changes it wanted, demonstrating a lack of power to affect the situation in Armenia much.

The Maronite Church

In contrast to the very active presence of the Armenian Church in the papal archives, the Maronites do not feature at all. Conceivably this could be viewed as evidence that the Maronite Church had successfully integrated with the Latin Church and were no longer seen as a separate entity.\textsuperscript{124} Certainly, the Maronites had begun to conduct their rites according to the Latin tradition very early, observed by James of Vitry in the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{125} Yet, this is not necessarily borne out in contemporary sources. The Maronites are listed as comprising a separate Church in local documents, such as in Council of Nicosia in 1340.\textsuperscript{126} This council lists all the denominations present in the council, including representatives of the Nestorians, Armenians, Jacobites and Maronites. Contemporaries in the Latin Church in Cyprus, at least, did not view the Maronite Church as being fully integrated into and inseparable from the Latin Church.

\textsuperscript{124} Pierre Gasnault, ‘L’élaboration des lettres secrètes des papes d’Avignon: Chambre et Chancellerie’, \textit{Publications de l’École française de Rome}, 138 (1990), 209–222 suggests that secret letters were often a response to an embassy or petition. Common letters were exclusively issued as a response to petitions, and so if, as a group, these people were not sending petitions, they would be invisible in the papal records. The absence of any mention of Maronites as a group is still curious, however, and do not appear to have gotten in trouble or were petitioned against either.


Similarly, the Maronites were distinguished as separate from the Latin Church in lay accounts of Cyprus and pilgrimage accounts. James of Verona, a pilgrim passing through Cyprus to the Holy Land in 1335, recounted the liturgical practices of the various Churches present on the island.\(^\text{127}\) Since, however, he suggested the Maronites of Cyprus were giving their rites in Greek, which is improbable given they used Syriac and Arabic as their liturgical languages, his understanding of local theological practice may well have been limited.\(^\text{128}\) He also stated that the Georgians conducted their rites in Greek and that Nestorians rejected the divine nature of Christ, which suggests that he did not directly interact with any of these sects during his stay in Cyprus, or at the very least, asked few questions.\(^\text{129}\) Nevertheless, he, like other pilgrims, identified the Maronites as separate from the Latin Church. Philip de Mézières, while describing the good works Peter Thomas did for the non-Latin community while he was legate for East, also identified the Maronites as a distinctive Church: \textit{scilicet Graeci, Armeni, Georgiani, Iacobitae, Copti, Maroni, et alii divisi ab ecclesia Catholica}.\(^\text{130}\) However, in none of these accounts is there any suggestion that the Church was in any way deviant from the Latin rite. James of Verona describes the Maronites as performing the rites in Greek and being baptised in the Latin manner, presumably from second hand sources given the inaccuracies of his account, but he still places them within Latin orthodoxy. Philip de Mézières did not give any comment on the orthodoxy of the Maronites, but he did not denounce them as he was prone to do for other denominations. Ludolph von Suchem described the Maronites of Lebanon as ‘Christians according to the Latin rite, who daily long for the coming of the Christians [crusaders], and many of whose bishops I have seen consecrated after the Latin rite.’, while he generally avoids describing any other Christians native to the Holy Land.\(^\text{131}\)

While these sources do not tell us anything directly about what the papacy thought about the Maronites, this close adherence to the liturgy of the Latin Church

\(^{127}\) James of Verona, \textit{Liber peregrinationis}, pp. 175–78.
\(^{129}\) James of Verona, \textit{Liber peregrinationis}, p. 178: \textit{Item sunt ibi Machonite [sic], iste due secte baptizantur more Christianorum, sed faciunt officium Grecorum.}
\(^{130}\) Philip de Mézières, \textit{The Life of Saint Peter Thomas}, p. 156.
would explain why they avoided censure by the papacy in the way that the Armenian Church did not, but not their complete absence from the registers. To explain this absence, the production and nature of secret and curial letters must be considered. These were produced on the initiative of the papacy, and were often political in nature. This is very clear in the case of Armenia, where the defence of the kingdom as a political entity was frequently discussed, and its conflict with the Mamlûks. The Maronites, however, did not have a political unit with which to engage – they did not rule any land and had no political or military structure with which the papacy could communicate. Letters which may have concerned Maronites living in an area were not sent to them, rather, they were sent to their political lords, such as the Latin nobility of Cyprus.

The Maronite Church, therefore, can be seen to have had fewer issues relating to union with the Latin Church than the Armenian, and in this sense its relative invisibility is indicative of its close adherence to Catholic practices. When the state of the union between the Armenian and Latin Churches was brought up, it was always a negative association; the Armenian Church was never sent any letters praising its policies. Whenever letters were sent by the papacy on the subject of religious practice, they were always rebuking the Armenians for something. The fact that the Maronites did not receive any such letters should be seen as evidence that the papacy was satisfied with their practices and felt they did not need any additional instruction. This implies a strong level of papal authority and power, though this is somewhat speculative. The power of the papacy over the Maronites never appeared to be tested in this period, though the regular description of Maronites as Christians practicing by the Latin rite also suggests that this was because the papacy had no cause to exercise that power. The lack of conflict with the Latin Church and the acceptance of the Maronites by Latin commentators suggests a strong respect for the power and authority of the papacy by the community, and this has contributed to its invisibility in papal records.

The Greek Church in Latin Territories
The final Christian population in the East which existed in union with the Latin Church was the Greek Church in Latin-administered territories: Crete, Cyprus, Morea, Rhodes, and Negroponte. These territories lay along the naval route to the Holy Land and Egypt, and maintaining Latin control in them was a definite advantage for a prospective crusade, as well as to European interests in the Aegean and Black Sea. Consequently, the papacy took steps to consolidate its control over the non-Latin population of these territories, who were primarily Greek-rite Christians. Under agreements made in the thirteenth century, the Greek-rite Churches of these lands were allowed to maintain their language and customs as long as they agreed to the Latin Church’s formulation on the more important theological matters, such as the formulation of the creed, and adhered to the terms of the union established at Lyons.132 Like the Maronite Church, the Greek Church under Latin rule had no political voice, and was subject to the rule of Latin archbishops, where ecclesiastical authority ultimately lay. Unlike the Maronite Church, the Greek Church does appear quite often in the papal registers.

Latin complaints about schismatic practices in Crete were not uncommon but did not appear to be treated very seriously by the curia in Avignon. Latin clerics appeared to be complaining about deviations in rite which were sanctioned under the terms of union, and in 1335 Benedict XII informed them that the Greek population should not be interfered with unless they were in violation of those terms. This was not a free rein for the Greeks to do as they pleased, however, and he gave permission for the doge of Venice to expel or arrest Greek clergy who were committing acts of heresy.133 While the papacy appeared to be willing to tolerate some deviation, its leniency only extended so far.

The Greeks of Cyprus appear in several letters concerning rebellions throughout the fourteenth century against Latin clerics and laypeople who were perceived to be oppressing them. Several Greek priests were imprisoned, land belonging to the Greek Church was confiscated, and Latin practices were forced on Greek populations. In all these cases, the papacy sided with the Greek Church against the Latins who had imposed on them, protecting the interests of the

Greeks. One such event started in 1314, when the legate, Peter of Pleine Chassaigne, took issue with the Greek and Syrian veneration of the Host in Mass, and ordered the Greek clergy to reform their practice, and to attend regular meetings. Two Greek bishops went to protest against these measures, and as they proceeded to the archbishop’s palace, a mob began to form behind them. The bishops turned back, but a riot still occurred, and the bishops were arrested for it, while the administration of their diocese was taken into Latin hands without trial. An inquiry was ordered by John XXII, which ultimately exonerated the Greek bishops and reaffirmed their rights which the Latin clergy had been usurping from them. Another instance occurred in 1360 when Peter Thomas, in his role as papal legate, preached against, or possibly attempted forcefully to confirm, the Greek clergy after locking them into the cathedral of Nicosia. Philip de Mézières claims that Peter was preaching to the Greek clergy the error of their ways, and only closed the doors to prevent chaos, but this view was not shared by Greek chroniclers. Leontios Makhairas states that Peter tried to forcibly convert the Greek clergy after luring them into the church and locking the door, and that the population saved them. This event also triggered a riot, which had to be quelled by mounted knights under Prince John of Antioch, the king’s brother. Again, there were no papal sanctions against the Greek clergy for this; it was widely recognised that Peter Thomas had provoked the response.

That the papacy so consistently sided with the Greek clergy is interesting and reveals a surprising amount of power on the part of the papacy in the relationship between the Churches and the laity. The authority of the papacy to arbitrate between the lay nobility and the Greek clergy was not questioned by either side, much in keeping with the Armenian model, but in the case of the Greek Church, the papacy was able to enforce its will quite effectively. Siding against the local Latin Church did not affect the papacy’s ability to intercede, and the lay authorities complied with

**Footnotes**

134 JXXII:LC, III, nn. 12955–56, p. 243; also see XIII, n. 63962, p. 200 for a letter showing John siding with the monks of St Katherine’s in Sinai allowing some bodies to be exhumed and transported there for reburial from Catholic Churches on Cyprus; Coureas, The Latin Church in Cyprus 1313–1378, p. 146, 449.
the papal directives on the issue. The success of the papacy against its own Church demonstrates a strong level of control and power over the treatment of minority Churches, at least in the Greek case.

Despite this apparent papal support and approval of the Greek Church under Latin rule, the Greeks were singled out as a population prone to heresy and were mistrusted beyond other Christian sects by the Latin Church in a number of ways. One way which clearly delineated the Greek and Latin populations in occupied lands was how the populations were allowed to marry. There were rigid restrictions on how Latins and Greeks were allowed to intermarry, clearly marking the Greek Church as a separate, subordinate rite. These rules were applied exclusively to Greeks; Armenians were not subject to the same marriage restrictions and could marry Latins freely. Latin men, however, were forbidden from marrying Greek women, which led to difficulty finding suitable partners for the Latin nobles. Letters sent to Cyprus were frequently dispensations allowing for marriage between Latin nobles within the forbidden limits of consanguinity, usually citing the lack of acceptable options on the island as a reason for the request. That there were social motivations to promote this narrative of segregation is immaterial to the wider point about the suspicion levelled at the Greek Church. By accepting the rationale behind the marriage requests the papacy was implicitly accepting the status of the Greeks as lesser Christians unworthy of marriage with Latins. In some cases, these letters were not just complaining about the lack of acceptable marriage partners outside consanguinity barriers; they accused the Greek population of being inherently unsuitable as partners due to their schismatic ways. These descriptions appeared in petitions that were approved by the papacy, giving support to the wording of the petition as well as its request. The papacy could, and did, change the wording of petitions that it disliked, and it easily could have struck such descriptions off instead of endorsing them. That it did not amend these petitions showed that the Greek population of Cyprus, despite its theoretical equality through its communion with the Latin Church, was not considered equal in the eyes of the Church.

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138 See chapter three for more details on marriage restrictions between Greeks and Latins.
It is, therefore, not unfair to view the perception of Greek Church in Latin-ruled lands as a subordinate and even more of a junior partner than other Churches. The Greeks were notionally full members in communion with the Latin Church, but they were clearly not treated that way. Their rebellions were against perceived injustices inflicted on them by the Latin nobility and Church; in this sense, it is hard to see them as anything other a defence of their freedoms agreed under the union. Similarly, the injunction against marriage with the Greek population highlights the concern over assimilation that minority Latins felt, and the view that the Greek Church was fundamentally different from the Latin in a way that other Churches in union were not. On key issues, the papacy did usually side with the Greek Church against the local Latin clergy, but it is clear that these decisions had little impact on the general perception of the Church; Latins in the east had to be regularly reminded that the Greeks were not enemies, the Greeks continued to be given cause to rebel, and systematic controls on marriage were not relaxed. Nevertheless, this all appeared to be within what the Church found acceptable, and when events transgressed that tolerance, the Church was able to act effectively, even against itself.

Ultimately, all the Churches which were in union with the Latin Church in this period remained in union, but they did not have an identical experience throughout the fourteenth century. The Armenian Church was plagued by doubts over the sincerity of its union with the Latin Church by contemporary commentators, a cause which was eventually taken up by popes Benedict XII and Clement VI. The Maronite Church found itself under no such scrutiny and is almost completely absent from the historical record of the period in Latin sources. The Greek Church in Latin-ruled territories held an inferior position to either of the other two, finding itself socially and legally beneath the Latin minority rulers in regions which were Greek majorities. Nevertheless, the status of the union in all Churches remained intact, even during the later controversy with the Armenian Church. Regardless of what corrections were being sent, there was never a suggestion that the Church had fallen out of communion with the Latin Church, merely that errors had persisted in their practice. Similarly, despite the rebellions and complaints against the Greeks, they were very much considered a part of the Church under the authority of the papacy. Correspondence between Avignon and Armenia or concerning the Greeks are free of phrases such as *heretici et scismatici* which are so
commonly found in letters directed to the Byzantine Church. As such, it is fair to see the unions of the Armenian, Maronite, and Greek Churches with the Latin Church as accepted by the authorities of all concerned Churches, and none of the unions appeared to be seriously questioned in this period.

This consistency of union suggests a high level of respect for the authority of the papacy throughout the period, as the fundamental principles of papal control over the various Churches were not seriously questioned. Neither the Armenians, Maronites, nor Greeks under Latin rule questioned the popes’ right to interfere in their practice and to ensure orthodoxy in the fourteenth century. The papacy was not always able to ensure compliance with this orthodoxy, however, and appeared to be less successful in altering the practices of the Armenians. Partly this should be seen as an issue of motivation and control, and the papacy’s inability to provide sufficient material aid tie reform with aid. While the papacy attempted to tie military and economic support to reforms, in practice that aid was so limited that it was not an effective bargaining chip nor was the threat carried out. With the other Churches, however, the papacy appeared to hold a much more secure position, and was able to protect the Greeks successfully from Latin authorities in many instances. Therefore, the relationship between the papacy and the Churches with which it was already in union should be seen as relatively stable, in terms of both papal authority, and to a lesser extent, power.
6. ‘Eastern Christian’ Churches

As well as those Churches with which the Latin Church was in union, and those with which it was actively pursuing union, there were a number of Churches present in the Eastern Mediterranean with which the Latin Church did not appear to seek union with in any significant sense. The Latin Church was not ignorant of the existence of these Eastern Churches, many of which had members in Cyprus, and this section will examine what efforts the Latin Church did make to enter union with them. It will also consider why the prospect of union with these Churches was not more actively pursued in the fourteenth century.

There were many Churches present in the Eastern Mediterranean in the fourteenth century with which the Latin Church did not appear to pursue union. These included the Syrian Orthodox Church (often referred to as the Jacobite Church), the Melkite Church, the Coptic Church (which was regularly also referred to in medieval western sources as a Jacobite Church), the Georgian Church, the Ethiopian Church, and the Nestorian Church. Extending further east from the Mediterranean, it is clear that a wide variety of Nestorian Churches existed; however, it is very difficult to establish how many; papal sources seem to be unsure of what Christian Churches were active so far from Europe. Letters sent that way were often very general, addressed to the inhabitants of regions, rather than Churches, and frequently ended with a general address of ‘and other oriental nations’. One example is found in a letter by John XXII confirming the power of friars in non-Catholic lands to absolve Christians from excommunication. The letter lists both Churches and peoples of a region interchangeably, making no distinction between a people and the Church which inhabited it, and includes: Saracens, Pagans, Greeks, Bulgars, Cumans, Iberians, Alans, Gazari, Goths, Scythians, Ruthenians, Jacobites [Egyptians], Nubians, Nestorians, Georgians, Armenians, Indians, Motelita, and all other non-believing nations of the East and North [North Asia] in which the Dominicans operated.\(^\text{140}\) This particular list of Christians is peculiar to the

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\(^{140}\) JXXII:LC, IX, n. 46791, p. 30; *fratribus ord. Praedicatorum in terras Sarracenorum, Paganorum, Graecorum, Bulgarorum, Cumanorum, Yberorum, Alanorum, Gazarorum, Gotorum, Scitorum, Ruthenorum, Jacobitarum, Nubianorum, Nestorianorum,*
Dominicans, but even amongst similar lists the terminology is inconsistent, and often draws from older bulls concerning the East.

Despite this inconsistency as to what groups they were attempting to reach, it is clear that the papacy was not simply ignorant of these Churches. Latin travellers and missionaries regularly went to Egypt and the Holy Land, and further, with papal authorisation, and it is clearly stated that the papacy received news from these pilgrims, and from others, such as prisoners and merchants, on their return to Europe. It is not sufficient to explain the papacy’s apparent lack of interest in the Churches in the Near East by suggesting that the popes were unaware of them.

The Papal Perspective on ‘Eastern’ Churches

The Eastern Churches in the fourteenth century maintained a variety of diverse doctrinal differences to the Latin Church, yet from a papal perspective, the differences were downplayed. The Coptic and Syrian Orthodox Churches were almost never differentiated, nor were any Eastern Churches other than the Nestorian. Yet these lands were far from mono-religious, and the Christian populations in the Eastern Mediterranean that were not in union with the Latin Church were very different from both Islam and the Latin or Greek Churches. The chief theological difference between the Latin and Eastern Churches in general is usually considered to be on the nature of Christ. The Latin and Byzantine Churches accepted the Chalcedonian formation of nature of Christ, which described Jesus as ‘the same perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly God and truly man, of a rational soul and body; consubstantial with the Father as regards his divinity, and the same consubstantial with us as regards his humanity’. This formulation was

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141 Ludolph von Suchem, *Description of the Holy Land*, p. 118: Ludolph tells a story about captured Templars he met, who had subsequently been released and returned to Europe to report what had happened to them. JXXII:LC, VI, no. 24541, p. 117 is a letter allowing Cypriot merchants to trade with Syria, ostensibly for the reason of gathering information about the Holy Land.

widely rejected by Churches in the Eastern Mediterranean, though not entirely, and this issue was highlighted by those commentators that did talk about Eastern Churches.\footnote{143}

The Melkite and Georgian Churches adhered to the Byzantine rite and thus accepted the Council of Chalcedon as a valid ecumenical council, but the other Churches rejected it. The Chalcedonian understanding of the nature of Christ was that ‘two natures, each retaining its own properties, are united in one subsistence and one person’.\footnote{144} The Syrian Orthodox Church and the Coptic Churches were both perceived by the Chalcedonian Churches as monophysite,\footnote{145} meaning they held that Christ’s essence was both human and divine entirely, and that the divine, being so much greater than the human, almost obscured the human nature, and both Simon Semeonis and John Mandeville take pains to expound on the errors of the Coptic Church.\footnote{146} The Ethiopian Church was in communion with the Coptic Church, and held a theologically similar position, though its customs appeared to have deviated from the Coptic practice.\footnote{147} The Nestorian Churches have often been described as dyophysite,\footnote{148} as they emphasised that Christ’s nature was split, ascribing him both a divine and a human essence. James of Verona initially describes the Nestorians of Cyprus as rejecting the divinity of Christ, though this appears to be a statement made in ignorance, and he later describes them more accurately in his description of the Holy Land.\footnote{149}

\footnote{143} Simon Semeonis, Itinerarium, p. 57, as one example.
\footnote{144} Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 148.
\footnote{145} The use of monophysite has been replaced in more recent times in the West by the term miaphysite, which is how various non-Chalcedonian Churches describe themselves. See MacCulloch, A History of Christianity, p. 228 for a greater discussion of the term monophysite, which has always been rejected by the Coptic Church, but which was very much the understanding of some of the Eastern Churches by the Chalcedonian Churches.
\footnote{147} Kaufhold, ‘Sources of Canon Law in the Eastern Churches’, p. 289.
\footnote{148} MacCulloch, A History of Christianity, p. 245.
\footnote{149} James of Verona, Liber peregrinationis, p. 178: Item sunt Nestoriani a perfido heretico Nestore dicti, qui dicunt Cristum solum purum hominem fuisse, et faciunt officium in Greco, sed non sequuntur Grecos, sed habent officium per se; James of Verona, Liber peregrinationis, p. 217: Quidam dicuntur Nestoriani, qui habuerunt principium a Nestore hebraico et tamen non sequuntur ipsum in multis, sed magis viam Grecorum et videntur devoti homines, non circumciduntur.
From a papal perspective, it made sense for Latins to group these Churches together. They were all geographically remote ‘schismatic’ Churches, far from Avignon and the Catholic world. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that these were not necessarily a collection of Churches with a shared identity. The Melkite and Georgian Churches maintained a union with the Byzantine Church and were Chalcedonian Christians. The Coptic, Syrian Orthodox, and Nestorian Churches, while all rejecting the Chalcedonian formulation of the nature of Christ, maintained their own linguistic and theological traditions separate from one another. The individual Churches did not see themselves as the same as any others. An analysis of the sharing of canons by these Eastern churches, however, reveals that they had much more in common with each other than they did with the Latin Church.\(^{150}\) Thus, the apparent Western perception that the Eastern Churches, despite their differences, could be thought of as a single entity was not, from their perspective, entirely unfair. Kaufhold’s work identifying the spread of canons through Churches shows that even as late as the fourteenth century, and despite linguistic barriers, the Coptic, Jacobite, Melkite, and Ethiopian Churches were still actively translating each other’s religious rules and texts and incorporating them into their own religious tradition, while no such exchange with the Latin world can be seen.\(^{151}\)

This perception of a complete separation of the Latin and Eastern Churches was not, however, necessarily held by all Latins commenting on the Eastern Mediterranean. Pilgrim accounts, in particular, were mixed on the issue. Some could be very general in their approach to Eastern Christians, and often omitted any kind of identifying titles or traits which may indicate that they were talking about non-Catholics. This was particularly prevalent in Ludolph von Suchem’s *Description of the Holy Land*, where he frequently omitted any kind of identifying information when describing the general population. He referred to Christians of all denominations, including Latins, simply as Christians. The only instance of a qualification about a Christian population occurred when he described the Christians of Cairo; he referred to them as ‘numbering four thousand captured Christians’, a passage which given the atypical use of the phrase ‘captive’ could be confusing.\(^{152}\) It


\(^{152}\) Ludolph von Suchem, *Description of the Holy Land*, p. 71. This phrase is used in papal letters to describe the Christians of Egypt too. James of Aragon justifies some of his
does seem, however, given the general context, that he was talking about the local Coptic Christians; he went on to specify that the ‘captive Christians’ had ‘a patriarch, priests, churches, and many venerable relics of the saints’. Other than that instance, he was consistent in only identifying the affiliation of monastic houses, generally describing them as variously Greek, Georgian, Armenian, or Arabic, but passes little judgement on their schismatic beliefs. One of the only instances of him even using the word ‘schismatic’ is in an offhand comment about the number of churches in Jerusalem where he states that ‘In Jerusalem, moreover, there are many Churches of schismatics and heretics, and many other holy places and gracious oratories’. This is the only use of the phrase heretici et schismatici in the work, which is surprising given how regularly it can appear in papal letters discussing ‘schismatic’ Christians such as the Byzantines, who held much closer theological positions to the Latin Church than the Eastern Churches. As a friar, Ludolph was unlikely to have been ignorant of such descriptions. Similarly, John Mandeville, apart from in the single section which discusses the differences between Latins and the various Eastern Churches, very rarely identifies any Christian sects in his Travels, either for lay or monastic communities. Nor did Marco Polo appear particularly interested in the denominations of Christians he encountered. For some travellers, particularly but not exclusively lay travellers, therefore, it seems that the distinction between Latin and Eastern Christians was not as important as it was to the papacy. This suggests that for some, the distinctions between Christians was

visits as partially to assist the captured Christians in the lands of Sultan. JXIII:LC, II, n. 5742, p. 22 is a letter to James of Aragon, granting him permission in 1317 to send an embassy and merchants to Alexandria ‘pro liberatione quorumdam Christianorum’. John XXII, Lettres communes, III, n. 13699, p. 312 is another, sent in 1321 also to James of Aragon answering a similar request, ‘pro redemption christianorum in carceribus Soldani Babiloniae detentorum’. In this case it is possible that this meant captive Latin prisoners from the fall of Acre or before. One such individual, Roger of Stanegrave, was released in 1315, attesting the presence of these captives. Loiseau argues for a ‘Frankish’ population in Cairo up until the end of the fourteenth century (Loiseau, ‘Frankish Captives in Mamlûk Cairo’, 37–52), but his identifications are quite speculative in places. The Franciscans visited Egypt in the 1320s and also describe the local Christians, which they also referred to as Jacobite, and then also describe visiting captive Christians, who they gave confession to: Annales Minorum, VI, pp. 678–79. This term could therefore be used quite fluidly, and it is quite possible that multiple groups were identified by it in different contexts.

154 Ludolph von Suchem, Description of the Holy Land, p. 103.
relatively small, and that the separation of the Churches was more political than theological.

Other pilgrim accounts, however, were quick to point out the otherness of Christians in Egypt and the Holy Land and were consistent in their identification of them. Simon Semeonis, an Irish friar, was extremely interested in how different the local Christians were from Latins, in both custom and appearance, and regularly identifies the Coptic Christians of Egypt as Jacobites or ‘Christians of the girdle’, a term which he also uses in his brief description of the Christians of the Holy Land. Simon specifically related this title to Jacobite Christians, stating that they were ‘Greek or Jacobite’, but he was alone in doing this. John Mandeville mentions the ‘Christians of the girdle’, but identifies them as a separate group of Christians in the Eastern Mediterranean. Simon was the only contemporary travel writer who described apostates too, labelling them as renegati, but was quick to affirm that they still really held Jesus in their hearts despite their outward loss of faith. Despite this interest in the appearance of local Christians, however, Simon was very sparse in his discussion on their faith, very rarely passing comment on what made them schismatic.

Papal Interactions with Eastern Churches

One of the most significant difficulties when examining the relationship between the papacy and the Eastern Churches is the comparatively limited surviving evidence describing these relations. There were several reasons the Eastern Churches other than Greek and Armenian Churches are extremely infrequently mentioned in the registers of papal letters. Entirely understandably, Churches which did not acknowledge the pope did not petition the Apostolic See for anything, and so they

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156 The origin of this term is usually ascribed to a belt that Christians in the sultanate were expected to wear to identify themselves, though the usage of it by Western writers is highly inconsistent. See Jotischky, ‘The Mendicants as Missionaries and Travellers’, p. 93.


159 Simon Semeonis, Itinerarium, p. 49, p. 97.
did not appear in any of the common letters; since there were no petitions from these Churches the pope could not respond to them.\textsuperscript{160} With the exception of the Armenian Church (and potentially the Maronite Church), which were already in union with the Latin Church, and which do appear in the common letter registers, this issue applied to all Churches not in union with the Latin Church.

As another consideration, most of these Churches operated in countries which were not under Christian rule, and most of the Churches held little or no political authority on their own. When dealing with powers outside Catholic Europe, the popes consistently showed that they were only willing to engage with local political figures, not religious ones, even in ‘schismatic’ Christian nations. Therefore, it should not be unexpected that some of the few letters which directly address Churches which were not actively pursued for union were in fact sent to the kings of Christian nations, such as a letter to George, king of the Georgians in 1321.\textsuperscript{161} This does not mean that every Christian nation received such attention, however. The kings of Ethiopia remained conspicuously absent from the papal registers, despite being both Christian and natural allies against the Mamlūks.

A final consideration is that in many cases, the Christians of lands beyond Catholic Europe were extremely geographically distant to Avignon. While the evangelical mission of the Church was to bring Catholicism to all corners of the Earth, practical concerns frequently forced the papacy to focus their attention closer to Avignon. Like the crusade, meaningful missionary and diplomatic activity in the Eastern Mediterranean could only be pursued if conditions in Europe allowed for and supported it. Communications from one end of the Mediterranean to the other by sea could take a month or more in either direction and relied on the goodwill and cooperation of local authorities, who in some cases had little reason to assist Catholic messengers.\textsuperscript{162} Missions as far as China could only be maintained by the communication routes established and maintained by the Mongols; as those collapsed in the mid-fourteenth century, so did the Catholic presence in China.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{160} See the introduction for further discussion on the issuing of papal letters.
\textsuperscript{161} John XXII, Lettres communes, IV, n. 16093, p. 157; Reg. Vat. 62 ff. 5v–6v.
For nations beyond the Mamlûk sultanate, ambassadors had to negotiate their way past a potentially hostile power to get there, which made any kind of reliable communication virtually impossible. Beyond the periphery of the Mediterranean, a large number of conditions had to be favourable before diplomatic activity could take place, and these pragmatic concerns must be kept in mind while considering the apparently limited activity between the papacy and the Eastern Churches.

Despite these difficulties, interest in the Far East and missionary activity remained in evidence at least until the end of the Avignon period, though it was not well represented in the papal registers. This is likely due to the nature of the letters recorded in the registers, and the lack of overtly political correspondence with Eastern Churches directly. The Georgians received letters specifically addressed to them urging union with the Latin Church, and the Alans received a small amount of attention, but otherwise attention is largely focused around a spate of missionary work undertaken in 1329. Other notable mentions of Eastern Christians come in letters issuing or reissuing special privileges for friars who were working beyond the influence of established Catholic churches, allowing them powers to baptise, absolve from excommunication, and sanctify marriages between close blood relations without requiring special dispensation.164

The letter to George, king of the Georgians, in 1321 is in many respects very similar to ones sent to the Byzantine emperors or the Serbian kings.165 It suggests that the papacy was interested in forming a union with the Georgian Church, which was itself in union with the Byzantine Church at that time. If it was not for the rarity of such documents to the Georgian kingdom, it would be strong evidence that the papacy was pursuing a unilateral union with the Georgian Church at the expense of the Byzantine Church. The only other such document in this period, however, was in 1329, also in John XXII’s pontificate, addressed to a king Tefilicen of Georgia.166 It was part of a series of identical letters to rulers further East, mainly in central Asia, informing them that more friars were being sent to help them, and that Bernard of

165 Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 5v–6v for the full text, a very brief summary can be found in JXXII:LC, IV, n. 16093, p. 157.
166 JXXII:LC, IX, n. 47554, p. 108.
Gardiola, the bishop of Diagorganensis, would be visiting. Such a visit could be construed as evidence of Latin interest in central Asia, but there is no further evidence for this episode at all in Latin sources, and there was certainly no union as a result. No further communications are recorded with the Georgians until 1370, despite numerous expeditions going much further East being organised in that period. This lack of consistent interest can hardly be considered a sustained papal policy.

The letter sent in 1321, which invited king George of the Georgians to adopt the Latin rite and enter union with the Latin Church, used a variety of arguments. Initially John XXII argued that it is unnatural for a body to have two heads and that the Church is just the same: it should not have both a secular leader and a religious leader heading the Church. He also uses marriage as a similar metaphor, arguing that the Holy Church can only be wedded to one man. He then suggests that by Apostolic succession through Paul and Peter the pope should be that leader. Interestingly, the letter does not describe the faults of the Georgian Church in any great detail, and it does emphasise the similarities of the Georgians to the Latins in faith, stating that they were saved by a similar form of baptism. The letter does not state outright that the Georgians are doctrinally incorrect, and takes care not to insult the faith of the Georgians, arguing along logical lines that the Apostolic succession of the Latin Church makes it the orthodox leader of the Christian world. It invites further negotiation on the subject of union, and appears to be sincere in its sentiments. The lack of activity near or after this contact is important, however. While the letter may have been a cordial offer, it was an isolated event, unsupported by further interest. Part of this was due to the distances involved; embassies were expensive and relatively rare, even before the collapse of the Ilkhanate made the journey east much more perilous than it had been previously.

Comparatively, however, these two letters to Georgia represented more interest by the papacy than that shown to a potential military and political ally much closer to the Catholic world: Ethiopia. One reason for the marginalisation of the Ethiopian kingdom in particular would appear to be a deeply ingrained misunderstanding of where it actually was. While pilgrim accounts were keen to

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168 Reg. Vat. 62, f. 5v–6r.
point out that the south side of Egypt bordered on the kingdom, there was an understanding that Ethiopia continued around below the Red Sea to India, and that it existed in the East as well as the South. It was often identified with the kingdom of Prester John, the mythical Christian leader in the East. The papacy certainly did not seem entirely clear on where it was, as a mission sent to China in 1329, under Jordan Catalan of Severac, a Dominican who became a bishop in India, was also given a letter addressed to the imperator Aethiopium in addition to those addressed to the Mongol Khans and the Indian kings. Jordan had previously travelled to India, and presumably was aware that Ethiopia and India were not very close, though this was not a common European understanding of the geography of the area. It would seem that the geographic location of both Ethiopia and India was deeply misunderstood in Europe in the fourteenth century, and they were often collated together in maps and geographies. Weber has taken this to show that the papacy did not expect the letters to ever be delivered, but even if that was the case, their inclusion was important as a statement on papal authority. The papacy was intending to be universal, even if the chances of its nuncio reaching all the areas which were issued letters was small. It shows that the papacy was interested in negotiating with all the powers it perceived to be in an area, or contingencies would not have been made for them; it also suggests that Jordan’s itinerary was not particularly planned or known, presumably due to the uncertain nature of such a long journey.

This geographical uncertainty cannot, however, be seen as the only reason the lack of interest in Ethiopia in the registers. The potential for military support on a second front against the Mamlūks must have been appealing, and the Christian kingdoms to the south of Egypt had little love for their northern neighbour. Given the interest attached to (pagan) Mongol alliances, it is difficult to understand why

172 JXXII:LC, IX, n. 47570, p. 110.
more of an effort was not made toward cultivating a military alliance or greater coordination, either religiously or politically, with (Christian) Ethiopia. Such an alliance was suggested by theorists such as Marino Sanudo, so there is little chance the papacy was unaware of the potential benefits. Unlike with the Nestorian Churches of the Middle and Far East, this cannot be explained by pointing out the papacy’s proclivity toward only dealing with political leaders; Ethiopia was a Christian country with a Christian ruler. Contemporary commentators did not make much comment on this apparent lack of engagement with Ethiopia, and apart from Sanudo, were not very interested in it is a nation. Nevertheless, it is clear from pilgrim accounts that Ethiopia was widely known about and viewed as powerful. One of the only recorded possible instances of diplomatic activity between the papacy and Ethiopia was a fifteenth-century mention of an Ethiopian embassy in Avignon in 1306; however, this must be treated with caution. The event went completely unremarked in contemporary sources, and would seem to be a later misunderstanding or invention.

Any explanation ventured for this lack of activity must, therefore, be speculative. One such possible reason could be that the Ethiopian Church was considered too dependent on the schismatic Coptic Church in Alexandria. The Ethiopian Church drew a bishop from the Coptic Church as its leader, and considered itself in communion with Alexandria, and this relationship may have been seen to be too problematic while the Coptic Church remained out of union with the Latin Church. Historically, this link was not particularly emphasised, however, and when claiming union with the Coptic Church in the thirteenth century, the papacy did not extend this to include Ethiopia. This would suggest that the Ethiopian Church’s relationship with the Coptic Church was probably not a decisive factor, though it may have been an influence. It is also conceivable that certain practices of the Ethiopian and Nubian Churches observed by pilgrims, such as the

176 Weber, ‘An Incomplete Integration into the Orbis Christianus’, p. 239; Matteo Salvadore, ‘The Ethiopian Age of Exploration: Prester John’s Discovery of Europe, 1306–1458’, *Journal of World History*, 21 (2010), 593–627, pp. 600–2 accepts the embassy as genuine, though his treatment of sources is perhaps overly credulous. The evidence for this embassy is extremely limited and over a century removed from the event it describes. No contemporary corroboration for this event exists.
‘baptism of fire’ (branding), might have been seen to be too far outside of orthodoxy to be dealt with while so many issues closer to home needed attention. What is clear that while the country was known about, very little effort was made to interact with Ethiopia, despite missionaries and pilgrims seeming to have quite free access through Egypt for much of this period.

This apparent lack of interaction between the papacy and Ethiopia suggests that the papacy was unable, or unwilling, to conduct difficult and expensive negotiations with the kingdom. Partly, this must be seen as an issue of authority. The Ethiopian Church was extremely independent, and had virtually no ties to the Latin or Greek Churches, nor any tradition of dependence on them. The Ethiopian Church may have viewed the papacy in a correspondingly uninterested light; it had no reason to view the papacy with any more authority than its power as a political institution necessitated. It certainly had no particular reason to cede administrative control to the papacy and reform its traditions when there was very little chance of a political payoff in either military or financial terms. It was potentially also a question of power. The fourteenth-century papacy was constantly embroiled in crisis closer to Avignon, such as wars in North Italy, the outbreak of the Hundred Years War, or the outbreak of the Black Death. As can be seen with papal efforts to provide aid to Byzantium and Armenia, and with its efforts to get a crusade to the Holy Land off the ground, the effective power of the papacy was limited, and this could provide a reason that the papacy did not pursue an alliance or union with the Ethiopian Church much.

As with the Ethiopian Church, it is surprising that more communication with the Coptic Church was not made. The Catholic world was in regular contact with the Copts at Alexandria, despite the papal controls on trade with the Mamlûk world. There was a well-established trading community in Alexandria when Simon Semeonis travelled there in the mid-1320s, which clearly had a lot of interaction with the local Christians. There were claims that well connected western pilgrims used their status to intercede on behalf of the local Christians. One such story was

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179 See pages 41–48, for further analysis of this. See also pages 154–55 fn. 152 for further details about diplomatic missions to Egypt, which may have been justified as efforts to aid the Copts.
told by Simon, where he describes the efforts of William Bonemayn of Montpellier, who convinced the Sultan to refurnish a church in Babylon (near Cairo), which had been closed for three years following a recent persecution of Christians in the capital.\(^{181}\) It is clear that pilgrims and merchants were interested in Egypt and the Coptic Church, but this is not reflected in the papal registers or their approach to the East.

Letters concerning Egypt only occasionally mention the Copts. Usually these letters justified the negotiations European powers were conducting with the Mamluks in terms of securing relics or economic gains, and in only a few cases justify the need to send ships to Alexandria to assist the Christians there.\(^{182}\) While this appears to have been seen as a worthy goal, as long as those ships were not carrying any prohibited goods, there was no effort formally to integrate the Coptic Church into the Latin one in the same way that the Byzantine Church was pursued. This lack of interest in a formal union can be seen across the entire region and period. Pilgrims and merchants were welcome to interact with the Holy Land provided they had papal blessing,\(^{183}\) but the papacy did not appear to have any interest in high-level formal interactions. This can potentially be attributed to the way the Coptic Church had no Christian political leader. The Greek patriarch of Constantinople and the Armenian Catholicos, as has been seen, were similarly snubbed in the negotiations over union which took place between the pope and emperor, or king, and it is possible that the papacy was simply unwilling to engage with a ‘schismatic’ religious leader. Instead, the papacy appeared to be content to allow the Eastern Churches to enter union with the Latin Church of their own accord, and did not chase them.

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\(^{182}\) JXXII:LC, II, n. 5742, p. 22 is a letter to James of Aragon, granting him permission in 1317 to send an embassy and merchants to Alexandria *pro liberatione quorumdam Christianorum*. JXXII:LC, III, n. 13699, p. 312 is another, sent in 1321 also by James of Aragon with the same request, *pro redemptione christianorum in carceribus Soldani Babilonie detentorum*. JXXII:LC, VIII, n. 43004, p. 33 is to Alfonso of Aragon, who wanted to translate the relics of St Barbara: *pro reliquis corporis b. Barbarae virginis et martyris e terris infidelium ad regnum et terras sua*.

\(^{183}\) Ludolph von Suchem, *Description of the Holy Land*, pp. 3–4; also see chapter three.
Missionaries and the Eastern Churches

This is not to suggest that there was no religious contact at all with the ‘schismatic’ Eastern Churches in the Eastern Mediterranean, merely that there appears to be little record of high-level communication. Missionary work continued throughout the period in the Eastern Mediterranean, though specifics on this activity are very difficult to establish.\footnote{184} Little definitive evidence survives; there is no record of how many missionaries were working in the East, what they were doing specifically, where, or how successful, they were. Given the lack of high-level communication between the papacy and most of the Eastern Churches, however, this activity represents the only papal sanctioned effort at meaningfully engaging with communities in the Eastern Mediterranean under Muslim rule, though this should be treated carefully given the lack of specific detail or corroborating evidence that survives.

It is clear that at a level below the diplomatic activity of the papal court in Avignon, there was significant interest in the East. The Dominicans and the Franciscans were certainly active, and papal letters allude to their presence in the lands of ‘schismatic’ Christians.\footnote{185} Ramon Lull, the highly esteemed missionary and theorist, was a vocal supporter of this work.\footnote{186} He successfully argued for the creation of language schools in major European universities at the Council of Vienne, in order to produce more effective missionaries. In his view, missionaries were having to waste too much time learning Arabic and other local languages before they could be any use in converting the population, and as a result of this, language departments were set up and existed in Paris until at least 1326.\footnote{187} These

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\footnote{184}{See Richard, \textit{La papauté et les missions d’Orient}, for a general overview of this missionary activity.}

\footnote{185}{BXII:LSNF, I:1, n. 1867, p. 542 is a particularly interesting example, which talks of a Franciscan bishop in Armalech (Central Asia), who supposedly rebuilt a church in the town.}

\footnote{186}{See Erhard-Wolfram Platzeck, \textit{Raimund Lull: Sein Leben, Seine Werke, Die Grundlagen seines Denkens}, 2 vols (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1962–64) for Rammon’s extensive works.}

schools were primarily interested in converting Muslims and pagans, however, and it is not clear that converting local Christians to the Latin rite was a high priority. None of the pilgrims to the Holy Land describe missionaries playing any role there at all; the only mention of Catholic activity beyond pilgrims themselves was that Latin priests conducted mass at the Holy Sepulchre alongside the other denominations.\textsuperscript{188} Pilgrims appear not to have been concerned with any missionary work that was occurring in Egypt and the Holy Land, or it was not very evident to them. Even the extension of ecclesiastical powers for friars does not necessarily cover Eastern Christians. The documents are unclear – they refer to Christiani, but that could be intended to be limited to Latin Christians such as merchants as well as mean local Christians.\textsuperscript{189} It is unclear why friars would need to be able to absolve, baptise, or excommunicate Eastern Christians when they presumably had functioning churches in their own communities, but Latin Christians probably would have felt that sacraments administered by local priests were not valid.

This effort at conversion, particularly with regard to non-Catholic Christians, should be viewed in the same context as the efforts at union in chapter four in that there appears to have been no move toward compromise. Even at an individual level, converts were expected to fully accept and embrace the Catholic ideal, and that an act of conversion was also one of submission to the Latin Church. It was, therefore, a political act, and one that could result in extreme penalties, particularly amongst a Muslim population. Loyalty was expected to be given to the new Church, in a political as well as a religious sense, and converts were in a sense agents of the Church. Missionary and conversion work was therefore dangerous and difficult, for both missionaries and converts, and much of the activity has not been recorded well.

There is some evidence that the friars were active in major political centres outside the Christian world, though it is difficult to determine how much they interacted with the local non-Latin Christian communities. The friars were theoretically resident in Cairo, Jerusalem, Beijing, and Soltaniyeh (in modern Iran, near the Caspian Sea), though not always reliably.\textsuperscript{190} This establishment probably

\textsuperscript{188} Ludolph von Suchem, \textit{Description of the Holy Land}, pp. 94–95.
\textsuperscript{189} JXXII:LC, II, no. 8186, p. 257:...videlicet quod possint proponere verbum Dei, cum excommunicatis communicare et eos absolvere, baptizare…
did not extend far from those political centres, however. The papal letter to King George of the Georgians in 1321 requested that he receive friars to instruct the Georgians, which suggests that the friars did not already have a presence, and that they would be the missionaries sent if the proposal was accepted. It is not entirely clear what form this would work would take. It is possible that this did not refer to a continual residence of friars in Georgia, but to visiting itinerant friars operating throughout the East. East of the Mediterranean, there is evidence of both. The archbishoprics set up in Beijing (Cambaliensis) and Soltaniyeh (Soldinensis) were occupied by friars on a permanent basis, as were certain other seats in the Far East that are mentioned in letters. Expeditions to these far-flung regions took a great deal of time to return, and presumably the friars on those expeditions would have had a chance to travel and preach. Nevertheless, there is little evidence for their actions while they were abroad, other than that they did not return for a period of normally a decade. While this is tenuous evidence at best, it is still more than exists for the activities of the friars in the Near East, where there appears to be activity, but its nature is completely unknown. The extent to which friars were engaging with local Christians in the Near East is all but impossible to determine.

**Eastern Christians in Cyprus**

One place where there was very clear and regular contact between the Latin Church and the ‘schismatic’ Churches was in Cyprus. Eastern Christians were mentioned in a variety of local and travel sources, such as James of Verona’s description of the Christians of the island, local Church council records and chronicles. James lists ‘true’ Christians [Latins], Greeks, Jacobites, Armenians, Georgians, Maronites and Nestorians as sects that existed on the island of Cyprus, though his descriptions of

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191 Reg. Vat. 62, f. 6v.
them are fraught with difficulties, as has been discussed earlier.\(^{195}\) The provincial Council of Nicosia in 1340 lists Latins, Greeks, Armenians, Maronites, Jacobites, and Nestorians amongst its participants.\(^{196}\) The Council of Nicosia does not, however, record any bishops for the Jacobites or Nestorians, while the rest of the denominations present were listed with named bishops. Coureas interprets this as evidence that the communities of those Churches did not have bishoprics established on Cyprus,\(^{197}\) but another possible interpretation is that the Latin-dominated council did not recognise the authority of bishops from the two Churches present that were not in union with the Latin Church. Philip de Mézières identified Latins, ‘Greeks, Armenians, Nestorians, Jacobites, Georgians, Nubians, Indians, Ethiopians, and many other Christians’ at a procession in Famagusta that Peter Thomas organised to help battle plague.\(^{198}\) He also identified ‘Greeks, Armenians, Georgians, Jacobites, Copts, Maronites and others divided from the Catholic Church’ being present at the funeral of Peter Thomas in 1364.\(^{199}\) This passage is the only fourteenth-century reference to Copts and other African Churches on Cyprus. The usual practice amongst travellers and commentators was to refer to the Coptic Church in Egypt as Jacobite, making no distinction between the Syrian Jacobite Church and the Egyptian Coptic one, while no other commentators refers to Nubians or Ethiopians being present on the island. Despite these issues identifying Churches, it is clear that there was a well-recognised Christian population on Cyprus that was not in union with the Latin Church from a variety of different Churches.

Despite this clear evidence for the presence of these Churches on Cyprus, their activities, and how they interacted with others, remain unclear. The proceedings of the council of Nicosia state that the result of the council was full agreement of all parties to accept the Latin rite and the authority of the pope, a claim which has been shown to be untrue only twenty years after the council.\(^{200}\) Even if

\(^{195}\) See page 145.
\(^{197}\) Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus 1313–1378*, p. 482.
such a claim were true at the time it was made, there is no evidence to suggest what that may have meant in practice. Only Philip de Mézières offers any commentary on Eastern Christians in Cyprus in the decades following the council, and he is characteristically ambivalent over their role. He does not discuss their orthodoxy in any specific terms, nor does he meaningfully distinguish between Churches in union and Churches not in union. For Philip, even more so than the popes, non-Latin Churches were all united in their error of not being Latin Christians. With the exception of the council of Nicosia, there appears to have been no significant effort to engage with or include the Eastern Churches present on the island during the fourteenth century. They are addressed in only one papal letter, issued two years before the council of Nicosia, which encouraged Archbishop Helias de Nabinaux to continue in his work converting Eastern Christians. 201 The tone of the letter is laudatory, and presents Helias’ work as very important, but the council of Nicosia, organised by him and apparently successful in affecting a union between all the ‘schismatic’ Churches on the island and the Latin Church, went almost completely unremarked only two years later. Union with the Eastern Churches on Cyprus does not appear to have been a high priority for the Latin Church, despite the increase in power this should have brought. This lack of interest is explicable due to the lack of political control amongst these minority Churches; as Cyprus was firmly controlled by Latin Christians, and the majority of the population were Greeks in union with the Latin Church, the increase in power for the Latin Church by bringing more Christians under papal authority would have been negligible.

The overall approach of the Latin Church to the Eastern Churches can therefore be seen to be very restricted, even once limitations of evidence and circumstance are taken into account. While sporadic interest was shown to some kingdoms, such as Georgia and Ethiopia, there was no systematic policy towards them, nor was there any sustained interest in pursuing union. While Churches not in union with the Latin Church would understandably not have petitioned the papacy, and thus would not have appeared in public letters, they were also largely absent from diplomatic correspondance. Non-Latin Christians in Egypt and the Holy Land were well attested by travel writings, yet there is little evidence that the papacy

201 BXII:LSNF, I:1, n. 1834, p. 531.
appeared to have been interested in pursuing union with them. The role of friars toward Christians in Muslim-occupied lands also appears unclear; their primary task was the conversion of Muslims, and most of their preparation appeared to have revolved around that. What their expected or practical role in relation to local Christians was is unremarked on in contemporary sources, and suggests a certain degree of indifference from the papacy in engaging with these groups. Even in Cyprus, where there was a clear intersection of Eastern Christian presence and Latin authority, there was no obvious interest in bringing the Eastern Churches into union with the Latin Church apart from one instance at Nicosia in 1340, which is problematic in itself. It seems clear that the Eastern Churches, while well known to the papacy, were not considered a high priority despite the benefits that bringing them into union with the Latin Church may have brought for papal authority. Bringing these Churches into union would have strengthened the papal claim to leadership of all Christians, but as most of these Churches were not institutions with any political power, union could not advance other papal interests, such as crusade. As a result, the increase in authority from union with the Eastern Churches would have had little corresponding increase in power for the papacy, which probably placed the issue low down the papal agenda.
The Role of the Papacy and non-Latin Christians

It would seem, therefore, that the Latin Church had a complicated and nuanced approach to the Christian communities in the Eastern Mediterranean. The greatest proportion of academic interest in relations between the Latin Church and the Eastern Mediterranean has focused on the struggle over Church union between the papacy and the Byzantine emperors, which was an undeniably important relationship to the Avignon popes, but certainly not the only one they nurtured. The Latin Church maintained interest and contact with almost all the Eastern Churches throughout the first half of the fourteenth century.

The Latin and Byzantine Churches had a difficult, though developing, relationship during the fourteenth century. At the start of the period, relations were at a low point following Andronikos II Palaiologos’ rejection of the union announced at Lyons in 1274 by his father, Michael VIII Palaiologos. This led Clement V to support French efforts to recover Constantinople for the Latin empire with crusade privileges, a move which highlighted how far diplomatic ties between the papacy and the empire had broken down. Andronikos II appeared to have been deeply opposed to Latin influence in Constantinople and seems to have not negotiated with the papacy at all, but his successors were much more willing to do so. Increasingly under Andronikos III, Joanna of Savoy, John VI Kantakouzenos, and John V Palaiologos, embassies were sent on the issue of Church union. In the period 1328–1354, these embassies were at an impasse over the relationship between military aid against the Turks, and other enemies threatening the empire, and the need for an ecumenical council over the issue of union. The papacy maintained that military aid could only be sent after a union was agreed and that Lyons was a valid council which had resolved the theological issues in question, while the emperors argued that a union would not be acceptable to the people of the empire without the goodwill supplied by military assistance, and that Lyons was invalid. In the sole reign of John V Palaiologos, the demand for a new ecumenical council was dropped, and much more limited demands for military aid were made, which ushered a period of cooperation that resulted in Byzantine and crusader soldiers fighting on the same side against the Turks for the first time since the Fourth Crusade. Despite this, there was still no formal acknowledgement of union,
though negotiations did continue and John V Palaiologos appeared to retain his interest in closer ties with the west.

The Serbian Church had a similar, although less involved, relational arc with the Latin Church. For much of the fourteenth century, the Serbian Church rigidly maintained its Greek-rite origins, and persecuted Latin Christians in the Serbian empire. This included acts such as forcible rebaptism and replacing Latin-rite clergy with Greek-rite ones, according to Stefan Dušan, the emperor of Serbia from 1331 to his death in 1355. Dušan also styled himself the emperor of the Greeks from 1345, and his letter, delivered to the papacy in early 1354, promised to reverse these injustices. His offer was not the first negotiation, though interest in Serbia was infrequent. A large embassy had been sent in 1308 to the kingdom, with seemingly little effect. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that Dušan’s offer was met with some enthusiasm in Avignon, and several prominent emissaries were dispatched. After Dušan’s death, however, his empire crumbled, and combined with John V Palaiologos’ increased willingness to compromise, this limited the political appeal of a union with the Serbian empire, while no central authority capable of or interested in implementing such a union appeared to remain in Serbia.

The Armenian Church also had a complex relationship with the Latin Church. While the Armenian Church had formally been in union with the Latin Church since 1198, it was a union in little more than name, and the Armenian Church rejected essential parts of Latin teaching, such as papal primacy. This did not, however, have any noticeable effect on papal support for Armenia, as the popes still offered crusade privileges to anyone going to fight for Armenia and promoted its defence. By 1308, local concerns had pushed the Armenian Church into much closer ties with the Latin Church, and the Armenians began a reform movement to bring the Church in line with the Latin. By the 1340s, a reforming agenda had taken over in Avignon, as Benedict XII and then Clement VI pushed for closer adherence to Latin norms in Armenia, then linked Church reform with military aid. Despite this regular pattern of demands for reform, the state of the union between the Churches was not questioned. Armenian beliefs were never referred to in papal letters as heresies, instead they were described as errors, and despite pressure from anti-Armenian parties at Avignon, the popes all appeared to be relatively tolerant of the Armenian Church.
This treatment is in stark contrast to the other two Churches which were in union with the Latin Church throughout the period, the Maronite and the non-Byzantine Greek Churches. The Maronite Church had a very good relationship with the Latin Church, having entered union in 1181 and assimilating to the Latin rite quickly. The Maronites are virtually invisible in Church records, appearing only as a separate entity in pilgrim accounts and local records from Cyprus, but are consistently recorded as behaving according to the Latin rite. In this sense, their absence from the papal registers is indicative of their close adherence to Latin practices, as they were not being chastised for their errors. The Greek Church in Latin administered lands, however, was not viewed so favourably. Despite having formal equality, the Greek Churches in Latin Greece and Cyprus were regularly maligned, and abuses occasionally triggered riots and rebellion. While the papacy usually sided with the Greek Church in such disputes, their frequency reveals widespread local hostility between Greek and Latin Churches, though the papacy’s ability to successfully intercede on behalf of the Greeks demonstrated a surprisingly level of power over the Latin authorities.

The other Eastern Churches were also treated differently, with very little effort made to integrate them formally into the Latin Church. Occasional approaches were made to the Georgian kingdom, with little success, but the Ethiopian kingdom and various Churches in Muslim controlled territories received very little papal attention. These people were well documented and attested in travel writings to the Holy Land, and friars were certainly active in the Holy Land where they lived, but the papacy did not appear to show much, if any, interest in them, nor is it clear what the friars’ interactions with local Christians were. While Eastern Christians appeared in a very general sense in certain papal documents, such as calls for crusade to the Holy Land, or bulls extending the powers of friars where there was no Catholic Church infrastructure, the subject of union did not appear in these documents at all and the Christians were never overtly identified. Even on Cyprus, where there was a large population of a variety of Eastern Christians, interest in them was very limited. One letter in 1338 was written which encouraged their conversion, and the council of Nicosia in 1340 claimed success in this. No more was heard on the subject, either before or after. Despite the potential for the expansion of Catholicism, the papacy did not appear to hold much interest in these Churches in general, apart from during specific episodes.
The Latin Church’s relations with other Christian Churches in the Eastern Mediterranean must therefore be seen as a complicated and nuanced set of policies, which was often rooted in pragmatism. It is clear that the Latin Church did not view all non-Catholic Christians as the same, nor did it try to follow any single approach to them. It treated Churches that were in union with it differently to one another, and it treated Churches that were not in union differently to each other as well. This differing approach to the non-Catholic Churches of the Eastern Mediterranean calls into question the simple dichotomy to success so often taken in discussion on union between the Latin and Byzantine Churches. Simply agreeing to a union cannot be seen to be sufficient grounds for a ‘successful’ union, as shown in the cases of Armenia and the Greek Church in the Latin East. Both these Churches were in union with the Latin Church throughout the period, yet neither were fully accepted by the Latin Church. The Greek Church was actively treated as an inferior in many ways, despite the theoretical protection of union it was supposed to enjoy, while the Armenian Church was treated with suspicion and regularly accused of doctrinal and liturgical error. The only Church which appeared to have been accepted in the majority of western sources was the Maronite Church, which accepted the Latin rite and assimilated well. This suggests that a Latin understanding of an ideal union was one which completely adopted the Latin position, while an acceptable union was one which accepted papal primacy, but which had deviations in practice that were largely tolerated, if frowned upon. The term was sufficiently broad to encompass a range of different levels of submission to the Latin Church, and what was sufficient varied from pope to pope. The acceptance of papal authority was, in practice, more important than respecting papal power, and acknowledging the papacy was, in a general sense, all that was required for union, not a substantial shift in religious practice.

The dynamic between pragmatism and ideology presents an interesting compromise with regard to the Eastern Churches. On one hand, the papacy was morally obliged to spread its faith as far as possible, and would improve its authority and potentially its power by doing so, but this was not as easy to do in some places as others. The popes preferred to deal with political institutions, relying on existing central authority to promote their rite for them rather than trusting in a ground-up approach. Missionaries were sent out, and clearly considered important, but did not appear in most cases to have had a political function, and little missionary activity
was recorded in the papal registers. When missionaries did appear in the registers, it was as messengers carrying letters for political leaders in Asia. Similarly, reconciling the need for a flexible approach to established traditions in Churches in order to secure and maintain a union with the need to bring those Churches into the Latin rite was difficult. There was little the Latin Church could do in order to enforce Catholic practice on Eastern Churches, and as a general rule it would not even threaten spiritual sanctions, preferring the threat of withholding material aid instead. This tactic demonstrated the limits of papal power, as the papacy was in any case largely unable to provide the aid promised in these agreements, but it also showed a willingness to link recognition of authority with the provision of aid.

Ultimately, papal relations with the non-Catholic Christians of the Eastern Mediterranean hinged on this pragmatism more than on ideological concerns, which remained largely static. The desire of the papacy to bring in schismatic Churches remained constant, but the circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean did not, which severely limited the opportunity for union, linking it to the political climate of the area, and only really allowing Christian Churches with political power to act. Negotiations occurred when non-Latin parties were interested in tying themselves closer to the Latin Church and conditions favoured such an arrangement, rather than because the Latin Church changed its stance in any significant way.
III. War and Peace: The Papacy as a Political Force

A study of the power and authority of the popes in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be complete without considering the papacy’s interactions with the non-Christian powers on the periphery of Europe. Some of these interactions have already been explored when looking at the papacy’s authority over Catholic agents in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as the papacy’s role in controlling trade and travel to Egypt and the Holy Land.¹ The papacy’s role as a political actor, however, especially toward the world outside of Christendom, also needs to be explored. The value in establishing the papacy’s political power and authority, particularly with regard to the non-Christian empires of the Near East is that these states had no social or religious reason to cooperate with the papacy. This changes the dynamic of power somewhat, as spiritual sanctions, one of the papacy’s primary weapons against fellow Christians, were not an option. The impact that spiritual sanctions had on Christians is very difficult to measure, but should be seen as an ever-present threat that carried weight, and as long as the papacy had a reasonable level of authority, bolstered its power as a deterrent to misbehaving. For non-Christians, however, the papacy had to rely on alliances and diplomatic tools to further its efforts, and convince the outside world that it was a political entity of substance that they should take seriously.

While a whole manner of activities could fall under the bracket of political projects relating to non-Christians, these will be broadly divided into two parts for the purposes of this section: military, and non-military. Military activity does not only include military campaigns but also plans for military expeditions and administrative efforts toward creating one. Non-military activity, which could encompass a huge array of different policies, will be limited to looking at the diplomatic negotiations undertaken by the papacy, which is sufficient to establish its power as a political entity to non-Christian states. Trade is an activity strongly linked to diplomacy, and this has been discussed in greater detail in chapter one. It is

¹ See chapters one and two.
distinguished here from diplomatic actions because the papacy was not directly involved in trade negotiations with non-Catholic powers; rather, it sought to control Christian powers in their trade arrangements.

This section considers what the policies of the papacy toward the non-Christian powers of the East were, and how much it was able to further them. The issues of Christian division, Muslim hostility, and political convenience reoccur in this discussion. How the papacy was able to unite potentially hostile Christian states, and how much they could be convinced to direct their resources toward papal aims, was important to the credibility of the papacy, and consequently its authority over Europeans politically. The acceptance of the role of the papacy amongst its rivals outside of Europe can also be used as a measure of the authority of the papacy, though in order to establish how much power it was able to exert, the success of these interactions must be evaluated. How much of the papacy’s aims it was able to achieve, particularly when its interests and the parties with which it was interacting did not coincide perfectly, allows an observation of how dependent the papacy was on the power of others to advance its goals, and thus the power it was able to wield in its own right.
7. The Crusade and Papal Involvement in Armed Conflict

The crusade was the chief expression of military activity by the papacy in the East throughout much of the Middle Ages, and this remained the case in the fourteenth century. While the papacy was involved in direct conflict in northern Italy for much of the early- to mid-fourteenth century, its involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean was militarily less sustained. Nevertheless, it aimed to maintain its position as the arbiter of the crusade, as well as to position itself as the driving force behind efforts to recapture Jerusalem and battle the ‘enemies of Christ’, wherever they may have been.

Despite the papacy’s interest in the crusade and in the pursuit of conflict against non-Catholics, not a huge amount of military action took place in the Holy Land compared to the previous two centuries, though the Aegean received more attention. One major factor for this was the loss of Acre and Tyre in 1291, which logistically impeded any crusading activity in the Holy Land by removing convenient access points. After the loss of these footholds in the Levant, any crusade would need to go overland through Asia Minor, or to capture a port as a primary stage of the attack. This made military activity of any size around the Eastern Mediterranean substantially more difficult than had previously been the case.

Another consideration which limited the scale and quantity of events was the spiralling cost of military action, and the huge increase in the costs of campaigns over the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Consequently, in many ways this was the age of the crusade theorist. Intellectual activity around the crusade blossomed at the same time that the number of expeditions dwindled, a link which suggests that resources had to be spent wisely on a crusade, and that this was seen as a difficult task which needed careful thought. Potentially intellectual activity aimed to fill the vacuum left by the lack of action, replacing campaigning in the Holy Land with unfulfilled plans of fighting.

It is relatively clear that early in the development of the crusade, it was a single, universal, concept, aimed at providing military aid to the Holy Land and

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2 See page 182 for further details.
3 See pages 17–19 and 36–41 for a more detailed description of the crusade theorists.
supporting the crusader kingdoms. As the conceptual boundaries of crusading activity expanded geographically, and gained ever further complexity in its administrative and logistical systems within Europe, what the ‘crusade’ was became less obvious. It was no longer involved exclusively with the Levant and the protection of Jerusalem: military outlets of the crusade could be found in Spain against the Moors, in the Baltic against the Lithuanians, in Greece against the Byzantines, and within Europe against heretical sects. Crusade thinking started to be applied to ventures even further afield; the language attached to calls for an expedition to the Canary Islands was couched in crusade terminology, despite there being no clear military or religious plan for the adventure. Thus, by the fourteenth century, the crusade had lost much of its specificity, and could be applied to almost any conflict against non-Catholics, and even excommunicates. In the interests of not excluding any activity based on unclear definitions, this thesis will therefore consider anything which was military in nature or pertained to the prosecution of military activity, was sanctioned by the papacy, and was rewarded with spiritual or material benefits by the papacy, as potential crusading activity.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, there were two major areas of crusading activity: Egypt and the Holy Land, and Greece and the Aegean Sea. Both of these areas saw substantial interest from crusaders, quite independently. During the first quarter of the fourteenth century, much of the discussion on crusade in the papal registers centred on the Holy Land and the recovery of Jerusalem, while after the outbreak of the Hundred Years War in 1336 the Aegean theatre took up most of papal interest on the subject. This was not necessarily a reflection of the amount of conflict in either area, however, and activity in both theatres continued throughout the entire period.

Given that there was such diversity in what potentially could be considered crusading activity, it is also important to consider how the success of a crusade

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4 Christopher Tyerman, How to Plan a Crusade (London: Allen Lane, 2015), pp. 283–89; Andrew Jotischky, Crusading and the Crusader States (Harlow: Pearson, 2004), pp. 255–57 shows how this narrow focus was rejected by the fourteenth century.


could be measured in the fourteenth century. Discussion and fundraising represent one fundamental aspect of the crusade, and if there is no observable evidence of either, this indicates that there may have been no interest in crusading at all. Yet these activities on their own do not represent a particularly successful endeavour, and military action must have taken place for a crusade to really be said to have even occurred. This chapter is largely concerned with the extent to which the papacy was able to influence, motivate, and effectively administer both military and logistical crusading activity in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Many works have outlined the crusading activity which took place in the fourteenth century, and it is not the intention of this examination substantially to reiterate such work. There are, however, two issues which have particular importance to papal involvement and understanding of the crusading movement which deserve further investigation and discussion. The extent to which the Aegean and the Holy Land were a unified theatre should be explored, given that they are often discussed by historians within the same context. The extent to which the papacy was in control of the crusade should also be considered, and how much the impetus for prosecuting violence against non-Catholics had moved onto lay rulers who later gained papal backing.

Both of these issues have implications for papal authority and the prosecution of papal policy in the fourteenth century. How the military aspects of papal policy were implemented was an important part of the expression of papal power, and the way in which this was done can reveal a certain amount about how the papacy was able to act in the Eastern Mediterranean. If the papacy saw the crusade as a single movement, encompassing all military activity in the Eastern Mediterranean against non-Catholics, which had the same aims and objectives, then it implies that the papacy treated all non-Catholics as ideologically similar enemies. If, however, the papacy treated different polities and campaigns differently, this would suggest a more nuanced understanding of the political relations between the papacy and the Mediterranean powers. The extent to which the papacy was able to influence these

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7 The standard works on this subject remains: Housley, *The Later Crusades* and Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades*. While it is now getting a little dated, Atiya, *The Crusade* still has substantial value. Additional work on the fourteenth century crusade, particularly the Aegean campaigns, can be found in Carr, *Merchant Crusaders*. 
relations is also important, and if the papacy was no longer able to direct the crusade entirely, it was also unable to dictate its own policy entirely. How much the papacy was in charge of organising the crusade directly links to how much the papacy was able to enforce its policy militarily, or how much it was forced to react to circumstances in order to achieve its aims. Therefore, it has an influence on the papacy’s ability to prosecute its own agenda.

**Egypt and the Holy Land**

The Holy Land, lost completely with the fall of Acre in 1291, was the ultimate prize of the crusade, according to both theorists and the papacy. Much effort was put into attempts to raise a force to go to the Holy Land, albeit unsuccessfully, and the ultimate failure of crusading activity in this theatre was not due to a lack of interest. It was, however, accepted that Christian armies were not in a position simply to sail or march to the Holy Land and occupy it without some preparation. Consequently, a great deal of discussion and planning had to go into a major crusade aimed at Jerusalem or Egypt, which were regularly linked as military goals. Far more planning went into the crusade for the Holy Land than action in retaking it, however, and as a result, most of the activity surrounding it was fund raising and administrative rather than military.

The defence of the kingdom of Armenia was another high priority for any expedition intended for the Levant. Armenia had been hard pressed by the Mamluks, and it was only able to hold its borders with the aid of the Ilkhans. As the fourteenth century progressed, the kingdom found itself harder pressed and partially occupied, before eventually being completely destroyed in 1375. Relief for Armenia was an often repeated aim of crusading projects, and input from Armenia was often sought. Het’um, an Armenian historian, was asked to provide a crusade treatise for

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8 Malcolm Barber, ‘Why Did the West Fail to Recover the Holy Land between 1291 and 1320?’, in Crusading and Warfare in the Middle Ages, ed. Simon John and Nicholas Morton (Farnham, 2014), 191–205 provides a good overview of these efforts.

9 See pages 132–144 for further discussion on the link between Armenia and Church relations.
Clement V in 1307. Armenian ambassadors featured prominently in the plans for a crusade in 1322, which was chiefly concerned with relieving the kingdom by either coming to its defence or by attacking the Mamlûks elsewhere, forcing them to retreat. Militarily, nothing came of these talks, but financial aid was still delivered to Armenia after them. Indeed, this often occurred after a crusade fell through; funds which had been earmarked for crusade were often released to aid Armenia, and crusade indulgences were offered for those willing to go and fight there. Armenia’s increasing difficulties played a prominent role in crusade treatises and in the discussions on launching a crusade throughout the fourteenth century, frequently appearing in the registers in the contexts of promoting military or material aid for the embattled country.

This planning and preparation represented a great deal of the crusading activity concerning the Holy Land for the first third of the fourteenth century. The papacy wanted a full passagium generale to the Holy Land, a full-scale military invasion. This was what it felt was required to defeat the Mamlûks and re-establish a Christian kingdom in Jerusalem. In order to get the kind of military force that could have been considered a sufficiently large-scale expedition, the papacy needed the cooperation of the kings of France or England, or both. The support of either of these economically and militarily prominent kingdoms could have produced the core force the papacy needed to get its invasion under way. Initially, the response was promising, and the majority of the kings of England and France promised to crusade at various points. Edward I took the cross, as did Philip IV, Philip V, Charles IV and Philip VI, all swearing to lead a passagium generale to the Holy Land.

These promises of action never translated into actual expeditions, though, and the passagium generale envisioned by the papacy did not materialise. To what extent the kings of France and England had ever intended to actually go on crusade is difficult to know, but even if their intentions had been to honour their promises, the reality of domestic politics in England and France meant that this was difficult for them to achieve. Internal divisions and the threat of rebellion kept the English

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10 Leopold, How to Recover the Holy Land, p. 28.  
kings close to England, while rebellion in the Low Countries and the threat of England prevented France from fully committing to the crusade and eventually prevented it entirely.

Another consideration which cannot be ignored was the spiralling costs of military activity in the fourteenth century. Campaigns were increasing in both size and cost at a dramatic rate, as demonstrated by the increasing costs of warfare for England prior to and at the start of the Hundred Years War. Prestwich has convincingly demonstrated that costs for the English king to campaign rose dramatically, with both the size and expense of his armies rising steadily throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Edward III’s campaigns in the Low Countries between 1338 and 1340 cost, including subsidies to allies, in the region of £400,000, while the cost of war between 1369 and 1375 is estimated at £670,000. Given that the first Welsh war under Edward I probably cost no more than £20,000, it is clear that campaigning offensively increased dramatically in cost as the fourteenth century progressed, with kings forced to borrow huge sums to pay for their campaigns. Marino Sanudo costed a crusade at roughly 7,200,000 florins in the 1320s, which was less than others had estimated, but still an enormous amount of money.\(^\text{13}\) Thus campaigns of any size to the Eastern Mediterranean, so far from Europe, would have been extremely expensive, and would represent a very serious commitment from any nation maintaining soldiers so far from their own borders.\(^\text{14}\)

This insistence on a full expedition was potentially what doomed activity in the Levant and Egypt to failure and prevented any action from actually taking place. There was opportunity for smaller expeditions to have made a difference, as well as the necessity of smaller campaigns to facilitate a larger one. Unlike the loss of Jerusalem in 1187, which triggered the Third Crusade, the loss of Acre provoked no such response from Europe. While the popes pushed for a large scale reconquest, they did little to facilitate such an operation beyond calls for aid.\(^\text{15}\) Many of the theoretical works that were commissioned by the papacy stressed the importance of preliminary campaigns to establish footholds and assist logistically in transporting a

\(^{13}\) Sanudo, The Book of Secrets, pp. 131–32, 149–51.


\(^{15}\) Schein, Fideles Crucis, pp. 74–111; Housley, The Later Crusades, p. 22.
large force, but no such major campaigns came to fruition. The only campaign which occurred to the Holy Land in the first half of the fourteenth century was a short-lived conquest of the city of Tortosa and the island of Ruad in Syria by a small fleet made up of Cypriots and the Templars in 1301, aiming to capitalise on the Ilkhan capture of Damascus.\textsuperscript{16} No additional support from the west was mobilised to assist the crusaders, and no further expeditions were mounted. Without further support, even small-scale operations like this one could have had no long term effect.

Large campaigns were not expected to appear out of nothing, however, and plans for preliminary operations were made to facilitate larger campaigns. An expedition was attempted in 1319, ostensibly as a first stage to a crusade that Philip V was intending to launch. Any plans for Philip’s crusade were abandoned in 1321, following Philip’s deteriorating health and eventual death, as well as his continuing difficulties in Gascony with the English and with rebellion in the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, a naval expedition of ten ships had been commissioned and built.\textsuperscript{18} This expedition probably never made it to either the Holy Land or the Aegean, though it was intended to. As plans for Philip IV’s crusade unravelled after his death, and it seemed increasingly unlikely that Philip V would be able to crusade, the fleet was sent as aid to Robert of Sicily for his use against the enemies of Christ.\textsuperscript{19} What happened to them after being sent to Robert is unclear. Philip VI’s crusade in 1336 was intended to be proceeded by two expeditions: one naval operation to clear the way to the Holy Land, and a small invasion to establish a foothold. The 1334 naval league was intended to fulfil the role of the first, though its campaign in the Aegean was only indirectly related to the route to the Holy Land, while the second, intended to be carried out by Louis of Bourbon in 1335, was cancelled well before the outbreak of the Hundred Years War in favour of Louis leading the main crusade.\textsuperscript{20} The deprioritisation of smaller campaigns in preference for large campaigns made sense in theory, given the limited gains a small campaign

\textsuperscript{16} Edbury, \textit{The Kingdom of Cyprus}, pp. 104–6.
\textsuperscript{19} JXXII:LS, I, n. 983, pp. 848–50.
\textsuperscript{20} Housley, \textit{The Later Crusades}, pp. 34–35.
could make, but in practice, the difficulties in getting large campaigns to deploy meant that the rerouting of resources for small campaigns to the larger ones meant that nothing was achieved.

After the outbreak of the Hundred Years War and the collapse of Philip VI of France’s crusade, plans for a crusade to the Holy Land largely dropped out of the record. Benedict XII acknowledged Philip’s inability to continue with his crusade and released him from his commitments in 1336 due to the outbreak of war with the English, and there were no further plans for a large-scale military operation to the Holy Land until Peter I of Cyprus’ adventure to Alexandria in 1365. It did not, however, fade from Benedict’s thoughts, or those of his successors. Benedict called on both the English and French kings to set aside their war and fight the ‘enemies of Christ’, urging peace between Christians on several occasions. Clement VI raised the crusade to the Holy Land again in 1348, though the outbreak of the Black Death that year no doubt made that an unlikely prospect. Earlier in the century, the call to crusade featured in several proclamations aimed at reducing intra-Christian violence, including condemnations of chivalric tournaments, which were seen as a distraction for knights who would be better adventuring the in East for glory. Nothing appears to have come from these calls for Europeans to refocus on the crusade instead of fighting amongst themselves, but it is clear that the papacy maintained an active interest in a crusade throughout the fourteenth century, even after any formal planning was abandoned.

This lack of action was not necessarily due to lack of opportunity. According to travel writers, the Mamlûks destroyed the fortifications in previously Christian

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21 BXII:LSNF, II, n.786, pp. 197–201: juraverunt quod tu in kalendis augusti proxime venturi in anno domini milliesimo tricesimo sexto quas tam tibi quam ceteris crucesignatis et crucesignandis idem predecessor pro termino ad transfretandum in dicto passagio assignavit, arriperes iter ejusdem passagii, illudque prosequeris realiter et personaliter, justo ac legitimo impedimento cessante, prout in litteris predecessoris ejusdem super premissis confectis plenius continentur.

22 BXII:LSF, n. 763, pp. 473–76, was dated August 1340 and sent to Philip VI of France. CVI:LSF, I, n. 1462, pp. 398–40, dated February 1345 was sent to Edward III of England. These are no means the only examples, but are fairly representative of the content of letters sent to both monarchs on the subject.

23 CVI:LSNF, n. 1605, pp. 211–13; Bruce Campbell, The Great Transition: Climate, Disease and Society in the Late-Medieval World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 300–16 gives a good overview of the scale of social destruction caused by the plague.

24 CV, VIII, n. 10023, pp. 452–53; n. 10043, pp. 462–64.
held ports, but there were still several fortified port cities on the Mediterranean coast in the Levant that could have acted as a crusading base.\(^{25}\) Probably the greatest missed opportunity presented itself in 1300, when the Mongol Ilkhans pushed the Mamlûks temporarily out of Syria and occupied Damascus. Unwilling or unable to garrison Syria or the Holy Land themselves, the Ilkhans apparently offered land to any European Christians willing to occupy it and join their invasion. It is difficult to know how genuine this offer was, though given the good relationships between Christian allies of the Ilkhans such as the Armenians and the khanate, and the difficulties the Mongols appeared to have fighting in such arid conditions, there is reason to believe it was sincere. It has been suggested that the Ilkhan cavalry was difficult to provision in Palestine and beyond, and a mutually beneficial alliance and Christian buffer state may have been of use to the Ilkhans.\(^{26}\) While this was met with much celebration in Europe, few mobilised forces to take up this offer, and when the Ilkhans retreated completely in 1304, Mamlûk control was restored without any significant Christian gain.\(^{27}\) Either the papacy and other interested European powers were suspicious of the offer, or they were materially unable to capitalise on the situation, but the opportunity had existed. It was not simply the case that the crusading powers were unable to collect a large enough force to defeat a Mamlûk army, and so never tried, but rather that they had opportunities that they made virtually no effort to seize.

The European response to this episode was one of excitement, but ultimate inaction. The Mongols, and in particular Ghazan, who was actually a Muslim, were presented as Christians in some European sources, which also declared a complete victory for the Mongols. The coincidence with the jubilee year brought an

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25 Ludolph von Suchem, *Description of the Holy Land*, pp. 60–61, describes the state of Acre after its loss to the Mamlûks as well as in his own time in the Holy Land in the mid-fourteenth century.


ideological zeal amongst some commentators in Western Europe as well.  

There is, however, little to suggest that the political authorities of Europe were swept away on this tide of popular optimism, and only a small Cypriot and Hospital expedition emerged to capitalise on the situation. Aiming to join up with a second Mongol campaign in 1301, the Cypriots captured Tortosa in Syria, but were ultimately forced to retreat when the Mongols failed to arrive in sufficient numbers due to other concerns in the empire.  

The papacy encouraged the secular powers to engage with the opportunity, but did not make any moves toward crusade over the episode, nor did it attempt to organise any expeditions more directly.

It must, therefore, be assumed that the papacy’s refusal to engage with these opportunities for smaller effective action was based on an ideological as well as a practical basis. The papacy appeared to be pursuing a policy of ‘all or nothing’, in that it was pushing for a large expedition that would win a complete victory, recapture Jerusalem, and permanently occupy it. It appeared not to be interested in more limited goals, and this could to be reflected in the lack of action to recapture staging grounds in the Holy Land, or to pursue a more aggressive campaign against the Mamlūks. The failure to cooperate with the Ilkhans also suggests that the papacy had a vision of the Holy Land which did not include the support of pagans. Rather, the papacy, particularly at the beginning of the fourteenth century, wanted a purely European kingdom established by a large force, and they were not particularly inclined to support any ventures which did not completely fulfil this vision.

It is perhaps interesting that, apart from the raid on Ruad and Tortosa in 1301, the only other action that took place in the Eastern Mediterranean was in 1365, when Peter I of Cyprus led a crusade which briefly captured Alexandria. Prior to this adventure, the coasts of the Levant were relatively safe from western fleets, particularly after the Hundred Years War ended serious crusade planning in Avignon. While this was a major action, which caused repercussions on the Mediterranean economy for years in addition to the political fallout between Cyprus and Egypt, it consisted of roughly 165 ships, a far cry from the numbers expected of a passagium generale. Peter’s attack on Alexandria was organised with papal blessing, but little papal involvement, and his tour around Europe prior to the

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campaign was largely unsuccessful, making the operation a largely Cypriot project, lacking the wide support expected of a *passagium generale*. While the expedition ultimately had quite an international composition, it was very much a Cypriot-led affair, with others acting effectively as mercenaries. The entire project was in fact promoted as a *passagium particulare* for a larger crusade by the French which never materialised, but was not initially seen as an independent project.\(^{30}\)

Other than the Cypriot crusade in 1365, crusading activity involving the Holy Land was almost entirely intellectual or administrative and, in the case of a large crusade, never really extended beyond promises and planning. In this regard, it must be seen as largely unsuccessful, but as has been seen, was not abandoned. The papacy maintained an interest in promoting a crusade, though after 1336 it could not find a promising candidate to lead a large-scale expedition to the Holy Land, and largely appears to have retreated from the project.

**The Aegean Theatre**

Activity in Greece and the Aegean was more sustained than that directed toward the Holy Land. It was also quite diverse, including anti-Byzantine crusades, crusades against excommunicates, as well as crusades against the Turks, who came to be the dominant target of activity in the region later in the period. The region was politically more fragmented than the Levant as well, which was almost entirely controlled by the Mamluks, while the Aegean area was divided between the Byzantine Empire, various Latin powers in Greece and the Aegean islands, and the Turkish beyliks (emirates) of Mentshe, Karasi, Saruhan, and Aydin in Asia Minor.

Unlike the Holy Land, the Aegean theatre was active throughout the entire Avignon period, with Western fleets regularly setting out and campaigns being fought against numerous non-Catholic forces. There was no lack of activity in this theatre, though evidence from the papal documents can be misleading. When the papacy began to get seriously involved in campaigns in the Aegean in the 1340s, it began to devote substantial documentary attention to it which do not survive for

earlier campaigns. This creates the illusion of greater importance and even greater activity after 1340, but as will be shown in this chapter, this was not necessarily the case.

The majority of crusading activity in the Aegean in the first decade of the fourteenth century was an extension of the anti-Byzantine crusading strand begun by the Fourth Crusade, though this did not continue much beyond 1310. After 1282, when Andronikos II repudiated the union declared at the council of Lyons in 1274, relations with the Byzantine empire had been fraught, and the papacy supported the claimants of the Latin empire against the Greek emperor. In 1306, Charles of Valois, the titular emperor of Constantinople and the brother of Philip IV of France, attempted to press his claim to Constantinople, and Clement V undertook crusade fundraising on his behalf. This campaign did not come to much, and most of the financing for it was withheld in France by Philip IV, further undermining the campaign. Similarly, Walter of Brienne, the duke of Athens, undertook another campaign against the Byzantines in 1311 with the help of the Catalan Grand Company, with similarly poor success. While it had little effect on the Byzantine empire, it did result in the Catalan Grand Company seizing the duchy of Athens and ending Walter of Brienne’s life, further reducing the unity of the Latin powers in Greece and reducing the pressure on Byzantium. While the papacy continued to support the claims of successive Latin emperors after these disastrous campaigns, the popes were unwilling to get drawn into financing further conflict, and did not provide any further material support to anti-Byzantine causes, though they were willing to praise anti-Byzantine action as late as 1350 despite the thaw in relations between the empire and the papacy.31

This decline in action against the Byzantine empire was matched by an increase in aggression against the Turks. Following the rise of Turkish power on the west coast of Asia Minor, Turkish piracy in the Aegean became a serious concern for the Latin trading powers operating there. The Turks expanded into the Aegean as early as 1260, when Mentshe, a Turkish bey pushing into Byzantine territory,

captured some territory along the Aegean coast. It was not, however, until the early fourteenth century when further emirates had been established on land along the Aegean won from the Byzantines that they started to become a serious naval force. Venetian and Genoese trade routes to the Black Sea were particularly threatened, as were islands in the Aegean which Europeans were interested in capturing. This in turn prompted a response from the Christian naval powers in the Mediterranean.³²

The first major naval campaign against the Turks in the fourteenth century began in 1306, when the Hospital invaded Rhodes, which had possibly become a Turkish vassal, and the campaign was certainly justified for that reason. The campaign lasted until 1311, when a fleet of 26 or 27 ships part-funded by the papacy consolidated the conquest. This fleet was described as being for the defence of the Holy Land, though it did not get any further than Rhodes. This was the first in a series of naval campaigns against the Turks which could be attached to projects intended for the Holy Land.³³

At a similar time, throughout the first three decades of the fourteenth century, members of the Zacharia clan was actively opposing the Turks and Byzantines in the Aegean, for which they received indulgences and trade privileges for their conquest. From Chios, which the Zacharias had won in 1307, the Genoese and the Hospital appeared to work in collaboration to hinder Turkish activity, although their relationship was not always smooth. They fought several naval battles against the Turks around 1319–1320, destroying several fleets, and made assaults on Turkish holdings in Asia Minor.³⁴ For this continuing activity against the Turks, and the Byzantines to a lesser extent, the Zacharias were rewarded with regular trading licences to visit Alexandria in the 1320s and helped promote the effectiveness of naval leagues in the area.³⁵ The Genoese remained active from Chios until the

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³⁴ Mike Carr, ‘Trade or Crusade? The Zaccaria of Chios and the Crusades against the Turks’, in *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204–1453*, ed. by Mike Carr and Nikolaos G. Chrissis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 115–134;

Byzantines captured it in 1329, and used it as a base of operations to protect the trade routes to the Black Sea and curb the influence of Turkish pirates.

Another expedition was launched in 1334, this time consisting of ships from a large coalition of European nations which numbered, on paper, 40 ships. This league was initially organised by Venice with the Hospital and the Byzantines in 1332 as a move to counter the threat of Turkish piracy in the Aegean, where Umur Bey of Aydin in particular had begun in earnest to disrupt the trade routes to the Black Sea. The league picked up papal and French support in late 1333, casting the expedition as a preliminary expedition to the crusade planned by Philip VI. The league won a large naval battle in the summer of 1334, but was unable to capitalise on its victory and returned at the end of the year with no conclusive gains, while the crusade it was attached to was abandoned two years later when the Hundred Years War broke out.36

An additional league launched just over a decade later in 1344, consisting of the papacy, the Hospital, Venice, and Cyprus, on the initiative of Clement VI. This fleet was substantially smaller than the previous one, with the papacy and Cyprus providing four ships each, while Venice and the Hospital provided six each. Nevertheless, the league had a spectacular victory, and captured the town of Smyrna while Umur Bey was absent from the city. The citadel held out for some time, preventing the crusaders from consolidating their hold on the city and its hinterland, but it remained in Christian hands until Timur’s conquest of Asia Minor in 1402. Humbert of Vienne led a much less successful follow up campaign, which achieved very little, and then the outbreak of hostilities between Genoa and Venice ended efforts at maintaining the league until peace was restored.37

Once Venice and Genoa had ended their war, the papacy relaunched the naval league in 1359, under the direction of Peter Thomas, the newly appointed legate for the East, who had acted as Innocent VI’s ambassador to John V Palaiologos. This league is not well documented, perhaps due to a lack of edited material on Innocent VI’s later years, but the Life of Peter Thomas, written by Philip

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de Mézières, suggested that the league and the Byzantines cooperated against the Turks, and raided settlements along the Bosporus together. Nevertheless, the league does not appear to have made any permanent gains, and military action against the Turks in the Aegean seems to have ended when Innocent VI died in 1362.38

In addition to this activity against the Turks and the Byzantines, the papacy was also involved in supporting campaigns by the dispossessed Brienne family in the 1330s, attempting to wrest the duchy of Athens back from the Catalan Grand Company, which had been placed under interdict following its usurpation of the duchy in 1311. This support was largely financial and political, allowing crusade preaching for the Brienne campaign and promoting the claims of Walter II, though ultimately, despite campaigning for a year in Attica, little came of it. Walter was forced to retreat back to Italy, never to return to Greece, and the Catalans retained their hold on Athens. By the 1340s, the thinking in Avignon appeared to favour rapprochement, and tentative steps were taken to suspend the interdict, though no lasting deal was reached during the Avignon period.39

The abundance of crusading activity in the Aegean theatre stands in stark contrast to the Holy Land, where little action took place at all, but the Aegean is also notable for the lack of attention most crusade theorists paid to it. While some, such as William Adam, who were opposed to the independence of Byzantium and Armenia, advocated the conquest of both in order to facilitate a land route to the Holy Land, the papacy was relatively ambivalent toward them.40 Marino Sanudo simply omitted much discussion on Byzantium, directing the crusade to Egypt, and offered little hostility to the Greeks.41 In all these works, the Aegean theatre was at best a preliminary stage which needed to be set for the main event, but more usually a distraction. Despite being a much more active battleground, the Aegean was considered by theorists to be peripheral to any campaign to the Holy Land, and thus of less importance to the crusade in general. This certainly suggests that to theorists, the Aegean and the Holy Land were not closely related theatres, and that attempts to

40 William of Adam, How to Defeat the Saracens, pp. 41–45.
41 Sanudo, The Book of Secrets, pp. 69–75.
the Holy Land did not necessarily involve the Aegean at all, and if it did, it was only in a very tangential fashion.

The Aegean, therefore, was a much more active site for the crusade than the Holy Land, though these activities were all on a relatively small scale. In part this reflected the more fractured nature of the region, where smaller powers were competing with smaller armies. It also reflected a difference in the nature of the campaigns, which were generally coalitions between concerned parties aiming to stop relatively specific problems which threatened them politically or economically, rather than the more overtly expeditionary nature of a *passagium generale* to the Holy Land.

**Parallel Projects or Linear Progression**

The campaigns and proposed campaigns of the crusade in the fourteenth century are presented in modern history as a linear sequence of events, beginning with papal efforts to invade the Holy Land up until 1336, after which the focus of crusading activity was then passed to the Aegean, particularly in the 1344 naval league. This link between activities in the Mediterranean is only sometimes made explicitly by historians, though the assumption that the Aegean and the Holy Land were connected theatres with a shared set of objectives underpin the presentation of the crusade in the fourteenth century in modern works. The Aegean theatre was considered a dependent part of the crusade to the Holy Land until after the outbreak of the Hundred Years War, when it took centre stage. Perhaps more importantly, it was a subordinate battleground, attached to the conquest of the Holy Land, but not as valuable or important. It is a clear, neat narrative, that fits nicely with the chronology of the crusade and creates a unified, singular strand of crusade thought. The papacy, however, had been envisioning the crusade as a fractured, divided operation for at least a century, and this link is not as clear as the narrative supposes; rather, it would appear that the two theatres of operation were pursued quite independently.

Separating these two theatres, as well as clarifying the chronology of the period, helps us to answer one of the more pervasive issues of the later crusades,
which is why the first half of the fourteenth century appeared to have such little crusading action. As seen previously, the Holy Land was indeed quite sparse on military expeditions, but the Aegean was not. By only accepting the activity of the papal naval leagues and crusades after 1340, this narrative does appear convincing, but it omits the regular activity aimed at non-Catholics prior to this. If these theatres are separated, it becomes clear that the Aegean was active throughout the period, while the Holy Land remained relatively inactive throughout the period, though this requires a challenge to the current historiographical trend.

Despite dividing the Aegean and the Holy Land into two chapters in his monograph, Housley draws a direct link between the formation of the 1344 league and the failed crusading project of 1336, and also declares the league to be the foundation of autonomous crusading in the Aegean. Atiya draws a similar link, declaring the 1344 league to be a ‘new orientation in the course of the movement of holy war’, and as the first worthwhile undertaking against the ‘Mohammadans’ in the fourteenth century. Carr notes that Clement VI only once mentioned the Holy Land as a crusade target, in 1348, and that the 1344 naval league was probably not connected to that. Edbury explicitly links both naval leagues to the crusade, 1334 as a part of the 1336 crusade, and 1344 as its own event. The independence of the 1344 league from other projects is clearly not in doubt, but the importance and independence of the earlier activity in the Aegean has often been portrayed as a subsidiary of the continuing planning for the crusade to the Holy Land. The extent to which this was the case, and the extent to which the 1344 league was in fact a direct successor to the failed crusades of the first third of the fourteenth century has implications for papal motivation; if the 1344 league was a successor to the earlier crusades, the papacy could be seen to have given up on the Holy Land entirely and transferred its interest to the Aegean, while if both theatres had always been treated separately, then the promotion of the 1344 league cannot be used to demonstrate that the papacy was no longer interested in the Holy Land.

This connection between the Aegean and the Holy Land has, on the surface, a reasonable amount of evidence to support it. According to Housley, the papacy really only began to treat the naval leagues in the Aegean as serious enterprises in their own right after the end of crusade planning to the Holy Land. Prior to that, operations such as the 1334 league were shoehorned into the framework of larger proposed crusades. The 1334 league was attached to Philip VI’s general crusade, which was abandoned in 1336, and received ships from the papacy and France based on that status. It was not treated as a crusade in its own right, despite being launched to the Aegean rather than the Levant. Rather, it was considered the first stage of the crusade, which would proceed after the success of the naval league. The 1320 *primum passagium* attached to Philip V’s proposed crusade was very similar, as was the 1309 *passagium particulare* that the Hospital directed toward Rhodes. Given the orders and operations of these expeditions, it is unclear how they were intended to complement the larger crusade, but they were explicitly linked to them.

In contrast, the 1344 league which captured Smyrna, its successor expedition under Humbert of Vienne, and the 1359 league were not burdened by such associations. As no larger crusades were being planned at the time, the Aegean crusades could obviously not have been attached to the larger project; rather, they received the full attention of the papacy. The papacy was militarily involved in the naval leagues of the 1340s and 1350s from their beginnings, raised funds for them, and was active in organising and promoting them. Rather than being attached to the Holy Land, later action in the Aegean was the crusade in its entirety, and this would seem to have been a shift in perception by contemporaries.

The transfer of responsibility for the relief of Armenia from the general crusade to the 1344 naval league, however optimistic such a charge was, may also indicate a change in the way the leagues were viewed. As a response to a renewal of hostility between the kingdom of Armenia and the Mamlûks in the 1344, Henry d’Asti was instructed to assist the kingdom if possible:

> we ask you to defend without delay as the beloved in Christ, our son, Guy, illustrious king of Armenia and the faithful of his kingdom, struggle against
these Agarenes [Muslims], as much as you reasonably and suitably can with ships as much as with other help and suitable goodwill.\textsuperscript{46}

Whether the fleet was ever in a position to act on those instructions has been disputed, though if the papacy knew it would not be able to help Armenia it would suggest that those instructions were more of a political act than a military one.\textsuperscript{47}

Regardless of how plausible an option this was, the transferral of the responsibility for defending Armenia away from enterprises to the Holy Land to those aimed at the Aegean could suggest that this league was seen as the inheritor of the responsibilities that had been attached to the crusade to the Holy Land.

The number of letters issued about the Aegean also works in favour of this interpretation. Of the approximately 160 letters in the \textit{Registra Vaticana} which addressed the 1336 crusade, its organisation, and associated projects, only twenty were explicitly about the naval league, as shown in Table 1. Despite being the only part of the project that actually went anywhere, the league was only directly addressed in 13\% of the correspondence about the subject. Conversely, for the initial part of the 1344 crusade, going up to the death of Henry d’Asti at Smyrna in mid-1345, there were approximately 75 letters, all of which pertained to the league, and many more for the continuations of the campaign.\textsuperscript{48} This may suggest that the naval league in 1334 was very much the junior partner in the 1336 crusade, which merited substantially less attention than the main event, while the independent league in 1344 was seen as a full and major campaign in its own right. The degree of attention given to the later league was certainly substantially higher than that given to the earlier one.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[] \textsuperscript{46} CVI:LSF, 1:2, n. 1087, p. 164: \textit{volumus quatinus carissimo in Christo filio nostro Guidoni, regi Armenie illustri et fidelibus regni sui, contra ipsos Agarenos, tam navali quam aliis auxiliis et favoribus oportunis, quibus decenter et commode poteris, assistere non postponas.}
\item[] \textsuperscript{47} Housley, \textit{The Avignon Papacy and the Crusade}, p. 36.
\item[] \textsuperscript{48} The common letters for Clement VI are unedited, though for John XXII’s earlier league they contained the majority of the letters raising tenths to fund the crusade. It would be reasonable to assume that there would be a substantial number of letters pertaining to raising money to support the 1344 league in the common letters. This figure of 75 is therefore probably too low.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Table 1: Letters Concerning the 1334 Naval League in Papal Registers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categorisation of Letter</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Financial</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crusade to the Holy Land</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval League</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are some problems with this, and it is important to not overstate the relative importance of the various crusading projects based entirely on the number of folios they currently occupy in the registers. Despite only having twenty letters directly concerning the 1334 league, it was a substantially larger affair than the 1344 league. More countries and individuals were involved in the 1334 league, and there were, at least in theory, roughly twice as many ships involved in it at 40 ships. The results of the leagues were not particularly important to the number of letters involved, and similar numbers of letters were written for both leagues discussing their outcomes, but not their preparations. As the size and successes of the leagues do not appear to correlate to the number of letters sent about them, there must be other reasons for this substantially larger inclusion of material from the later league.

One reason for the relatively small percentage of letters about the 1334 naval league was the fact that much of the administrative material referred to the larger 1336 crusade, which substantially reduces the percentage of letters concerned with the league. Letters concerning the prosecution of Philip VI’s crusade and its logistics only accounted for 26% of the total, while the other 61% of letters were about financing and appointments, which were necessities for any expedition. Similar letters about raising money to finance the leagues and appointing captains, legates, and other functionaries for the projects can be found for all the leagues, but for the 1344 league, these all only concerned the Aegean fleet, instead of being combined with other projects. Once the administrative letters are factored out, as they pertain to both expeditions, the letters about the 1334 league represent 35.7% of the total letters, which still presents it as a junior partner to the expected passagium generale, but not by a particularly large margin. The 1334 league’s relative invisibility in the

papal registers should therefore not be seen as indicative of its importance to the papacy, but rather that the organisational apparatus supporting it had been attributed to the larger crusade, making the league appear less important in comparison. In terms of its operational organisation, the naval league was much more important to the papacy than it may initially appear, and received almost as much attention as the much larger, though ultimately unsuccessful, project to the Holy Land.

Another factor that must be considered is that the papacy was far more involved with the inception and organisation of the 1344 league than it was with the 1334 one. Most of the earlier letters concerning the 1344 league were sent to potential partners, soliciting support, and negotiating funding, appointments and military commitments from the partners they managed to get on-board.\textsuperscript{50} This activity did not occur for the earlier league, as this role was not occupied by the papacy; the Venetians had begun the 1334 league and had formed much of the organisational structure before the involvement of the papacy and France, which further minimised the league’s presence in papal works.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, much of the earlier material concerning the 1344 league should be seen to reflect the papacy’s greater involvement in the formation of that league, and the records of the administration involved in that, rather than a statement about the importance of the league to the papacy. Consequently, the greater quantity of material concerning the 1344 league does not necessarily mean that the league was more important, or that its greater representation reflects a transfer of status from the 1336 crusade in general to the 1344 league, despite the similar number of letters concerning them. It reflected the greater papal participation in the organisation of the second league, and obscured the importance of the earlier one with its administrative association with the crusade to the Holy Land.

The chronology of activity in the Aegean also disrupts the narrative linking the Aegean and the Holy Land as interdependent theatres. The naval leagues began quite early on, as a response to Turkish aggression in the Aegean, and expeditions against them were in full swing well before the end of crusade planning to the Holy Land in 1336. Wars against the enemies of the Church in Aegean were considered as

\textsuperscript{50} A small sample of these are: CVI:LSF, I, nn. 332–41, pp. 127–32; n. 368, pp. 150–52; nn. 404–10, pp. 171–73. This is by no means an exhaustive list.

\textsuperscript{51} Thiriet, \textit{La Romanie vénitienne}, pp. 165–67.
important as those being fought against non-Catholics all over the periphery of Europe, and received consistent spiritual indulgences and financial assistance throughout the fourteenth century. The expedition sent in 1320 went east to the Aegean to fight the Turks, despite being considered a primum passagium for the expected crusade of Philip V, which was being directed toward Armenia and the Holy Land. Similarly, despite the association of the 1334 league with Philip VI’s crusade to the Holy Land in 1336, the league went to the Aegean, with no implications that it was intended to directly support the Levant. Thus, the Aegean theatre was active and important, even in general crusading terms, before the spotlight of the crusade transferred there during the 1344 league.

The language used for the 1334 naval league is particularly interesting, as it was initially a Venetian initiative which was only co-opted into the crusade for the Holy Land later, when the papacy and France promised ships in the winter of 1333. Prior to that, it was an expedition in the same vein as the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes in 1306, or the Genoese assault on Chios in the early 1320s, neither of which were overtly described with the language of crusade, but both of which received spiritual dispensation for the campaigns. While the 1334 league was attached to Philip’s crusade, the justification for that attachment was only that the Turks could disrupt the passage of the crusade, and that Philip and John XXII should support Venice’s league to prevent that. The league itself was never described as a crusade, or in the emotive language usually used for crusade activities; rather, it linked to the crusade by being described as ‘drawn for the advantage of the general passage’. The letter which comes closest to the language usually associated with the crusade was one of the last issued before the league set off, which stated that the expedition was ‘for the defence of the Christians of Romanie [modern Greece] and Oriental parts [Asia Minor] facing the dire persecution of the Turkish infidels, who labour to trouble and cruelly attack the same Christians’. This is still less evocative than the more plain descriptions used in the letters which more generally justify Philip’s crusade, such as when

52 JXXII:LS, VI, n. 5442, p. 163: pro utilitate generalis passagii tractatum fuerit.
53 JXXII:LS, VI, n. 5486, p. 176: pro defensione christicolarum Romanie ac orientalium partium adversus diras persecutiones Turchorum infidelium, qui christicolas eosdem offendere ac persequi crudeler moluntur.
the places were entered in a hostile way and [the Turks] would return, being unafraid, and many places were destroyed, and the same inhabitants of the blood of Christ, those precious for ransom and others, were taken captive and the good were given in plunder, the places were deserted but the forsaken inhabitants.\footnote{JXXII:LS, n. 5207, p. 70: \textit{loca circumvicina invadere hostiliter ipsosque agredi non expavit, multique loca peremptis non nullis eorundem incolis sanguine Christi pretioso redemptis aliisque captivatis ac bonis in predam datis (loca) deserta et absque habitatoribus dereliquit.}}

Both these passages were referring to the plight of the Christians under the Turks, but the first was from a letter concerned with the league specifically, while the second came from a letter proclaiming Philip VI’s crusade, which mentioned the Turks as well. It is no surprise that the more overtly emotional and evocative passage was directly attached to crusading rhetoric, a distinction that remains consistent in the letters.

Logistically, apart from the argument that the campaign would secure the passage of the crusade, the two campaigns were kept completely separate. The 1334 naval league was not, at its heart, a crusade in the eyes of the papacy; it was a Venetian military campaign against Turks, and it was a quite separate event to the campaign to the Holy Land, without any of the later language of crusade with which the 1344 league was described, and with a completely different set of objectives to the \textit{passagium} to the Holy Land.

The aims of the naval leagues, at their core, were very specifically about the Aegean, which further undermines the concrete association of the earlier expeditions and the crusade to the Holy Land. All the Aegean leagues held some goals in common; they intended to secure the trade routes through the Aegean from Turkish piracy, and to encourage cooperation with the Byzantines. Despite being associated with the crusade to the Holy Land, there was seemingly no attempt to campaign there, nor was it suggested that they should have been. Consequently, it is reasonable to suggest that these were expeditions designed primarily to aid the Mamlûks or other potential targets of the crusade.
The Aegean expeditions were military expeditions, rather than intellectual exercises, and thus their geographical destination was important. An expedition that had not actually gone anywhere and was still being planned could have a very wide remit, but an active operation required specificity. All the naval leagues were directed against Turkish piracy, and the targets of the expeditions in all cases were Turkish fleets or territory in Asia Minor. The 1334 league sank a fleet of the Bey of Karasi (an emirate in north-west Asia Minor), the 1344 league captured Smyrna (in central Asia Minor, from Umur, the Aydinid bey), and the 1359 league fought along the Bosporus against the Ottomans. This suggests that in military terms, there was very little difference in the main aims and objectives of any of the leagues, regardless of how they were described by the papacy. Whether they were a crusade in their own right, or attached to a proposed passagium generale, their actions were very similar – travel to Asia Minor, fight Turks, and attempt to secure the trade lanes through the Bosporus and Aegean. This suggests that the label attached to the expedition was not particularly important to the purpose of it, and that the independence of the later crusades from larger projects did not substantially alter their function. Thus, the attachment of the earlier expeditions to larger crusades can be seen as largely superficial; they did not appear to advance the larger expedition in any particular way, were not even campaigning in the same part of the world, and when they were no longer attached to such projects, their aims did not substantially shift.

A feature common to nearly all of the Aegean expeditions was their associations with Byzantium. The Venetians included Byzantine ambassadors in the organisation of the 1334 league, and the Byzantines agreed to provide ships, though there is no evidence to suggest that these ever materialised. Henry d’Asti, the legate placed in charge of the 1344 naval league, was given instructions to further the negotiations with Byzantium over Church union, in addition to fighting the Turks, and to encourage cooperation between the Byzantines and the Latin powers around the Aegean. The 1359 league, according to the Life of Peter Thomas, involved direct cooperation between the league and the Byzantines, attacking Turkish positions along the Bosporus. Assisting the Byzantines was not suggested as a

56 Philip de Mézières, The Life of Saint Peter Thomas, pp. 84–85.
priority for the 1306 Hospitaller expedition, which fell prior to the thaw in relations under Andronikos III, and the Hospitallers were attempting to wrest the island off the Greeks, who may have been vassals of the Turks, but this was very much the exception. Other ventures, including the 1334 league attached to Philip VI’s proposed crusade, did involve improving relations with Byzantium as an aim. This again shows that the objectives of the leagues were similar, regardless of their relation to the crusade. It also suggests that an important objective of the leagues was to create trust between the Greeks and Latins, in order to facilitate closer cooperation, such as Church union.57

Caution should also be used with the language used in letters describing the expeditions. Even after being cast as a passagium primum for the expected crusade of Philip VI, the Venetian led league was not composed of crucesignati, or rather, the participants of the league were not described in such terms. The league was not referred to as a crusade directly, even though indulgences were offered for participants. Despite its direct association with the crusade, it was described in the same terms as any other activity against non-Catholics in Aegean. Thus, it is important not to place too much weight on the language used to describe various campaigns in the Holy Land and Aegean when attempting to ascertain how linked they were. The 1334 and 1344 leagues were described very differently; the 1334 league was not described using the language of holy war at all, as has already been pointed out, while the 1344 league was described explicitly as a crusade. The 1336 crusade, and the 1344 league, however, share a great deal in terms of linguistic description, despite being very different enterprises.58 The 1334 league and the 1344 league were very similar in terms of operation, which suggests that the linguistic dressing of the expeditions did not act as a link, rather that the similarity of language between the 1336 crusade and the 1344 league was due to both projects drawing on the same cultural understanding of holy war, rather than because of a direct link between them.

57 See 107–27 for discussion on the papacy and Byzantium.
58 JXXII:LS, VI, n. 5207, pp. 70–72; CVI:LSF, I, nn. 433–435, pp. 181–84. These examples show how much reuse of language there was in describing a crusade in the fourteenth century, all of which is absent from the letters describing the 1334 league.
Despite the surface appearance of a linear succession of crusades from the Holy Land to the Aegean, there is little to connect the two theatres beyond that both were the subject of crusade, though not one that should be linked as it has been. Both theatres operated independently, and even when links were made, as in the case of the 1334 league, these were extremely tenuous connections which did not impact on the aims or operation of the campaign, which had no real effect on the other theatre. The activity on the two theatres were completely different, and relatively consistent within each theatre over the period; the Aegean theatre consisted of small, often multinational, fleets and armies campaigning for short periods with fairly specific territorial goals, while activity with regard the Holy Land consisted mainly of large scale planning and fundraising, with very little military action occurring. While the 1344 league benefited from the increased attention brought about by papal organisation and crusading preaching, the earlier leagues should not be sidelined. The 1344 league may have been couched in the language of crusade, but operationally it was a smaller successor to the 1334 league, consisting of fewer ships and nations. The Aegean was an important theatre in its own right throughout the period, and had little to do with the Holy Land either in practical terms, or in contemporary intellectual linkages.

Papal Control of the Crusade

Another issue which deserves further consideration is the extent to which the papacy was the leading force in the crusading movement, and how much the popes were driving crusading activity or merely responding to the military initiatives of other actors. There were a variety of offensive campaigns and defensive wars which were granted crusade indulgences, and were supported by the papacy, but not always organised by it.

How effective the papacy was at maintaining its position as the instigator of the crusade has implications for the maintenance of papal authority and power during this period. The authority of the papacy over the crusade rested on its position as the only institution able to sanction one. There are few examples of campaigns against non-Christians not receiving crusade benefits, however, and the
explanation for this has implications for how the papacy was maintaining its authority, and by extension, its use of power. If the papacy was actively sponsoring, organising, and promoting crusades, it is reasonable to suggest that it was a key figure in the crusade and that its authority was well regarded by European powers engaging in warfare with non-Catholics. If, however, the papacy was involving itself in campaigns which had already been organised against targets it deemed worthy of crusade, or being included as an afterthought in such campaigns, the leadership role of the papacy was not particularly significant, and the power of the papacy over the crusade is questionable. The papacy, if it had such little agency over campaigns, may have been obliged to award any campaign against non-Catholics crusade status in order to maintain its authority, effectively reducing the papal role to a formality.

The accounts of the council of Clermont make it clear that the expedition now described as the First Crusade was an initiative of the Church, and not of the princes and lords who ended up taking the cross and going to Jerusalem. The urge to fight is placed in the mouths of a series of Churchmen, not lay figures, and while Alexios Komnenos may have been the instigator of the entire scheme by requesting aid, the response was undeniably a papal project. The extent to which this remained the case is more complicated. Once the framework of crusade had been established, including the intellectual justifications for fighting the infidel and spiritual rewards for doing so, the scope of the crusade increased dramatically, encompassing many additional theatres and circumstances, weakening the papal hold on the project.

By the thirteenth century, the initiative behind the crusade movement was no longer quite so simple. Papal blessing was vital to a project’s spiritual reward, but the papacy was no longer necessarily the driving force behind crusading projects. An example of this may be seen in Louis IX of France’s crusade in the mid-thirteenth century, in which he allegedly forced the bishop of Paris, William of Auvergne, to grant him the cross without papal authorisation to do so in 1247. This did not stop the papacy endorsing the project, but it seems relatively clear that it was not the most active force in promoting and organising it. Louis was a prolific crusader for the second half of his life, leaving for his first crusade in 1248, and dying in Tunisia in 1270, but his desire to win back the Holy Land did not appear to

have universal backing. The papacy seemed more interested in promoting crusade preaching against Frederick II than in continuing to support Louis’ efforts in Egypt. In many ways, this was quite an exceptional example, but it demonstrates how a powerful monarch, with sufficient security and resources, could lead the papacy in a project that would previously have been initiated by the papacy.\(^{60}\)

The situation had changed by the fourteenth century. After the loss of Acre in 1291, the Holy Land was more distant than ever, and convincing European monarchs to ignore their more immediate concerns in favour of the Eastern Mediterranean proved to be difficult. In order to secure the promise of cooperation, the papacy had to offer substantial concessions; the dissolution of the Templars could easily be seen in this light. Menache has demonstrated that Capetian propaganda surrounding the order was not particularly widely accepted, but Clement V still dissolved the order at Vienne regardless.\(^{61}\) While this was seen as the papacy conceding to French power, Clement was striking a deal, and he got Philip IV to take the cross, an action that certainly would not have occurred had Clement defended the order. In some ways, the French hostility to the Templars simplified Clement’s position with the military orders. Calls to merge the Temple and the Hospital had been a staple in many crusading treatises, and neither order was particularly popular in Europe after the final loss of the kingdom of Jerusalem.\(^{62}\) Philip’s aggression allowed Clement to consolidate the orders into the Hospital, aiming to strengthen the crusade movement, albeit with a terrible loss for the Templars themselves.

The papacy was also forced to offer financial support for any project aimed at the Holy Land in the fourteenth century, even though none of them actually got there. This added an extra layer of incentive for a power to begin to mount a crusade, but did not offer much incentive to follow through. Most money raised by crusade preaching simply returned to Church, was spent in administration, or was sequestered into largely French domestic projects. This was the pattern for all the


aborted French crusades of the early fourteenth century, which were regularly promised, but never got beyond the planning and fundraising stages, with the exception of Philip VI’s, which did get quite far along the planning process before being called off on account of the Hundred Years War. The power of the French king offered the papacy the best chance of a successful crusade in the early fourteenth century, but the lack of action on the part of the French exposed the powerlessness of the papacy to demand that the promises they were made were kept.

Unreliable partners in a crusade were no new feature of the fourteenth century, though it was perhaps the defining feature of the crusade to the Holy Land during the period, and the popes’ continued reliance on partners who failed to deliver suggests that they had little choice in the matter. While no crusades in the fourteenth century went as awry as the Fourth Crusade, which ended up being excommunicated for targeting Constantinople, less dramatic though equally disobedient examples can be found throughout the fourteenth century. Unstable alliances and empty crusade promises were endemic to crusade efforts in both the Holy Land and the Aegean, and often prevented action or the capitalisation of military success. The repeated failure of the French kings to produce the forces needed for a full-scale crusade, despite papal funding for them, effectively doomed Latin influence in the Levant. Funds raised for projects in the East were continuously misspent on domestic projects, yet also regularly issued in the hope that the next venture would turn out differently. Both Charles of Valois and Walter of Brienne suffered logistical difficulties because money promised to their campaigns was withheld in France, and had to cut their campaigns short without having achieved any kind of success.63 The French domination of the crusade to the Holy Land, despite their inability to fulfil their promises, suggests that the papacy was unable to find better support than the French court, even though it continuously failed to deliver action. The hope of French action is easy to explain: France was the most powerful kingdom in Europe at that time. What is less clear is why the papacy

continued to pursue this course even after it became clear that it was not profiting papal policy. It would appear that this meant that the papacy was unable to directly influence the course of the crusade and ensure the actualisation of a campaign, and was also unable to persuade any other sizable power to campaign to the Holy Land who may have proved more reliable.

Misappropriation of crusading resources was not a problem exclusive to the Holy Land, however, even within the Eastern Mediterranean. The Hospital fleet that sailed to the East in 1309 was financed as a passagium particulare to the Holy Land, intended to support Cyprus and Armenia, and it is generally thought that it was rerouted to consolidate the Hospital take-over of Rhodes without papal knowledge or permission.64 Humbert of Vienne’s follow-up to the 1344 naval league received substantial amounts of crusade funding, but failed to achieve anything of significance and ultimately returned to France having done nothing more than cost a lot. Other streams of revenue designated for crusade purposes across Europe were also funnelled into national campaigns and interests, rather than being spent on the crusade for which the funds had been raised.65

This reliance on unreliable and unsuccessful partners was a serious weakness in the ability of the papacy to pursue military objectives, or to prosecute a campaign entirely of its own choosing. This problem was obviously not new to the papacy and the crusade, and the movement had always depended on European powers cooperating with papal ambitions in order to advance the cause. By the fourteenth century, however, European domestic politics had left the papacy with few choices and it continued to pursue the crusading project with France, regardless of how unlikely such a crusade was.66 In this regard, the papacy appeared very reactionary, forced to rely on the enthusiasm of others due to its own lack of resources, and proved unable to motivate partners to actually embark to the Holy Land. While the

64 Carr, Merchant Crusaders, p. 67.
65 Housley, The Avignon Papacy and the Crusade, pp. 50–73.
66 Constantine Georgiou, ‘Ordinavi armatam sancta unionis: Clement VI’s Sermon on the Dauphin Humbert II of Viennois’s Leadership of the Christian Armada against the Turks, 1345’, Crusades, 15 (2016), 157–75, pp. 159–160 suggests that Clement VI’s acceptance of Humbert of Vienne as a crusade captain, despite his reservations, was at least partly motivated by frustration with France and England’s continued failure to provide help.
papacy raised funds for the crusade, and offered indulgences to those who donated and took part, this was insufficient to actually get a sizable crusade to depart.

It is perhaps because of the failure to launch a crusade to the Holy Land, as a result of being dependent on other powers, that the papacy began to become more directly involved in some of its campaigns. In the Eastern Mediterranean, this chiefly consisted of its active involvement in the Aegean naval leagues, which was a radical expansion of its administrative and financial roles in previous crusades. By committing forces to the campaigns, the papacy gained an operational input as well as an administrative one, which gave them a measure of control over how the campaign was directed. This is particularly evident in the 1344 league, which the papacy set up as well as participated in. Henry d’Asti, the legate, had a particularly prominent role in the leadership of the fleet, and the papacy also appointed the captain-general, the Genoese Martin Zacharia. While being a junior contributor to the league, the papacy’s participation in, and organisation of, it allowed the papacy to take a prominent position in what the fleet was doing. The papacy’s prominent role was probably coincidental to the success of the league, which took Smyrna in a surprise attack while Umur was out of the city, rather than because of any particular inherent advantage. Nevertheless, Henry and Martin’s continuing prominence in Smyrna after the league suggests that the papacy had established and maintained a level of control over the operation that they did not achieve in others.67

Given the success that the papacy found with direct participation in the Aegean, it is perhaps surprising that it appeared unwilling to actively involve itself in the Holy Land. This can be largely explained by the difference in the size of campaigns seen as necessary for each theatre. As has been discussed earlier, the Aegean was politically fractured, and the polities in it were not particularly large. As a consequence, the forces needed to effectively intervene in the region were not huge, particularly given the Turks’ large, but technologically unsophisticated, naval forces during this period.68 The 1334 league consisted of roughly 40 ships, but the wars between Venice and Genoa alone in the middle of the fourteenth century were

vastly larger. The Holy Land was generally stable and unified under the Mamlūks, and the size of an expedition that could make sizable gains would have been so large that the papacy could not have contributed meaningfully to it. While the papacy did attach legates to such expeditions, in practice the decisions were made by the leaders of the armies that comprised the crusade. Peter I of Cyprus’ attack on Alexandria in 1365 was a good example where the papacy reverted back to its prior pattern of indirect involvement when faced with a larger campaign.

The papacy’s efforts to steer campaigns directly was uncommon, and while it represented a radical departure from previous norms, it was not a permanent change in direction. The 1359 naval league also followed that pattern, but when Peter I of Cyprus was travelling around Europe in 1363 to raise support for a crusade to the Holy Land, the papacy granted him no direct military support. Instead, John II of France agreed to undertake a general crusade, in which Peter would be involved. Given John’s catastrophic financial circumstances following his defeat by the English at Poitiers, there was little practical chance of him being able to crusade anytime in the near future, and anyway he died the following year. Seeing little action, and receiving no firm commitments from the leaders of Europe, Peter argued for and received funding for a passagium particulare, which he used to hire mercenaries to bolster his own forces and attack Alexandria. This return to the familiar patterns of unsuccessful crusading either reveals the limitations of papal power, or shows a shift in policy under Urban V. The scale of the venture Peter proposed was probably beyond what the papacy could meaningfully contribute to, which would mean that large projects were always going to be entirely reliant on compliant allies, as well as run by them, to a certain extent cutting the papacy out of


71 Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War II: Trial by Fire (London: Faber and Faber, 1999), pp. 447–48, 497–98. John II was captured at Poitiers, and ransomed for three million écus, to be paid in 500,000 instalments per year. By 1362, he was already 500,000 écus behind his payment schedule, and there was very little chance that money raised for crusade was going to go anywhere but to pay off John’s debts.

the decision-making process. Alternatively, Urban's return to the previous model of crusading could have been an effort to distance the papacy from Peter’s crusade as a shift away from an outward-looking policy, focusing more on Europe. Whatever the motivation, it ended the period of direct influence the papacy had exerted on the Aegean naval leagues in favour of funding secular partners for larger campaigns.

Housley argues that Urban was probably aware of the target of the crusade, and supported it, or at least his legate, Peter Thomas, did. There is, however, very little material to suggest that Urban maintained an interest in the 1365 crusade, and he provided no meaningful support for follow-up action. The papacy could not really refuse to condone an action against the Holy Land, and so in theory had to support Peter, but given the relatively little practical assistance it did give him, Urban V either had little confidence in Peter’s abilities or was not particularly concerned with his success. The papacy was reacting to the situation, in this case, Peter’s push for crusade, instead of organising and controlling the situation, to the detriment of its power. While its authority over the crusade remained unquestioned, and Peter went to Europe, received authorisation, and promises of funding, this was not a project instigated by or organised by the papacy, and it had little control over the destination or make-up of Peter’s crusade. The authority Peter afforded the papacy by seeking its blessing for his expedition was somewhat undermined by the way the project stalled. Urban’s decision to involve John, and the subsequent collapse of French involvement, forced Peter to push again for his own mandate, which Urban only gave limited support to. The power Urban exerted over the entire operation seemed extremely limited, and he appeared to have virtually no involvement beyond authorising funding.

In terms of papal involvement, Peter’s crusade had more in common with the Hospital and Genoese actions in the Aegean at the beginning of the fourteenth century than it did with the planned French crusades or the naval leagues. It was an assault under the direction of a single organisation, albeit with allied reinforcements, looking to capture wealth and strategic territory. While Peter was forced to abandon Alexandria because his allies refused to stay and defend it, he was very

74 Tyerman, ‘The Holy Land and the Crusades’, p. 108 rightly highlights the international character of Peter’s force.
much in favour of attempting to hold the city, or even push for Cairo. Also like the
merchant crusaders in the Aegean, the impetus for Peter’s crusade was very much
from the side of the laity, rather than the clergy. Peter was pushing for the campaign,
ot Urban V, in the same way that the Zacharias had campaigned against the
Byzantines and Turks around Chios, or the Venetians in organising the first anti-
Turkish naval league in 1334. While those participants gained spiritual benefits for
their campaign, they were ultimately fighting for their own interests independent of
papal policy, which did little to boost papal influence.

The papacy’s clear drive at the start of the century for a crusade to the Holy
Land demonstrated a positive and determined desire for an expedition to the Holy
Land, and Clement V was willing to compromise on important issues to secure the
crusade he wanted from Philip IV. By the end of the period, however, the papacy
appeared to have lost its appetite for a crusade to the Holy Land, either for pragmatic
reasons or due to a shift in ideological priorities. Overall, it would appear that the
papacy still maintained the authority to preside over the crusade, but in practice, its
power was limited. The papacy was not in much of a position to refuse indulgences
to a power willing to battle the enemies of Christendom, nor was it in a position to
enforce cooperation or its own aims.

The papacy’s role in the crusade to the Holy Land was substantial, in the
sense that it was financing operations regardless of whether or not they actually
occurred. In this sense, it had a more active role than many of the supposed
participants, who did not ultimately do anything more than promise to go. The
Aegean, in contrast, was a much more active theatre of operations. Smaller
campaigns were fought against the Byzantines and the Turks throughout the period,
both with explicit papal blessing and with post-fact rewards. The scale of these
expeditions was substantially smaller than those proposed to the Holy Land, but the
volume of them and the divided nature of the Aegean theatre allowed them to
achieve limited successes against a variety of non-Catholic groups.

It is important to draw a distinction between these two theatres and treat
them as separate areas with different objectives, actors, resources, and strategies.
The chronology of papal attempts to crusade to the Holy Land gives a tempting
linearity to the narrative of crusading in the Aegean being a successor to the failed
crusade for the Holy Land, but that undermines the activity which had been
continuing in the Aegean, as well as the papacy’s continued interest in the Holy Land. The 1344 naval league was an expedition in the tradition of several which had had papal support going back to the Hospital’s conquest of Rhodes, and its crusade status should not be over-read. Conversely, the papacy retained its interest in the Holy Land, and Clement VI even pointed to it as an objective in 1348. Despite the neatness of the chronology, the only thing that linked the two theatres was the crusade status of the 1344 league, rather than because of any logistical or military objectives, and both should be treated separately, given that contemporary attitudes seemed to view them so.

The role of the papacy in these campaigns was largely limited to providing ideological authority and raising funds. The continued failure of the crusade for the Holy Land to launch highlights the weakness of the papacy in this regard, as despite the financial incentives, the spiritual rewards, and the promises made, the papacy was unable to push its partners beyond their own self-interests. Overall, the papacy held little power over the crusade, though it maintained its theoretical authority over it, and while the papacy was regularly unable to get those who were unwilling to embark on crusade to go, it still retained its power to authorise crusading activity.
8. Non-Violent Diplomacy with non-Christians

The papacy’s involvement in politics in the Eastern Mediterranean was not limited entirely to military enterprises, however, and how the papacy interacted diplomatically with the key powers in the Near East was also an important aspect of papal policy toward the region. Most obviously, the Mongol Ilkhanids were staunch opponents of the Mamlūks for most of the first two decades of the fourteenth century and potential allies in the struggle for the Holy Land. The Mamlūks, conversely, were an enemy power by default. They were Muslim, and in possession of the Holy Land, which placed them firmly in opposition to papal interests. As the prospect of crusade faded, however, the papacy found itself in an awkward position where rapprochement with the Mamlūks and attempted conversion may have seemed more likely than military conquest. The diplomatic measures the papacy attempted with these powers were another aspect of papal political policy, which complemented its military activities and provides another example to analyse its ability to enforce its will on the non-Christian world.

The papacy attempted to position itself as the central power in Europe with which non-Catholic powers could make deals, based on its authority as the leader of the Catholic world. The papacy received envoys from non-Catholic, and particularly non-Christian, powers and attempted to act on behalf of Catholic powers. While countries with relatively close contact with Europe, such as Armenia, sent delegations all around Europe looking for support, the more distant Mongols would send ambassadors, often European merchants and priests, directly to the papacy and the greatest European kingdoms only.75 The Mamlūks, who were relatively close geographically to Europe and had substantial contact through their mercantile activity, were much more suspicious of the papacy as an institution, and appeared to not interact directly with it. Nevertheless, the Mamlūks would interact with the secular Christian kingdoms on subjects in which the papacy was interested, and the Christian kings did involve the papacy on their end. This centralising authority provides opportunity to see how papal power and policy were implemented over the

Christian on whose behalf the papacy was negotiating, and also with the non-Christian powers with which it was in contact.

**The Mongols**

The Mongol world, in as much as it had ever been a united entity, had grown decidedly fractured by the start of the fourteenth century. Relations between the Ilkhans and the Golden Horde, the two Mongol powers closest to Europe, were almost entirely antagonistic, and both were in conflict with other Mongol powers further east. Additionally, the Ilkhans and the Mamlûks had maintained a hostile relationship, fuelled by Mamlûk alliances with the Horde, since the Mongol conquests into the Near East in the 1260’s, which ended in 1320. Due to this antagonism, the Ilkhans and Europe in general enjoyed a better relationship than the Golden Horde and Europe did, and diplomatic interactions with the Ilkhanate occurred several times in the late-thirteenth century with the hopes of securing military cooperation. This cooperation could already be seen in several Christian allies of the Ilkhans, such as Georgia and Armenia, where the Mongols assisted the local Christians in maintaining their relative independence against their powerful neighbours.76

These divisions presented opportunities for the papacy to promote the interests of Europeans and of the Christians living under the Mongol rulers across Asia, with the papacy attempting to position itself as the international leader of Christendom. The extent to which the papacy was able successfully to claim this role was significant in how it was able affect the world beyond its spiritual jurisdiction, both as a political force able to construct international agreements and as an institution able to intercede for the benefits of Christians, even those which did not accept the authority of the popes. As the two Mongol powers closest to Europe, the Golden Horde and the Ilkhans will be discussed in this chapter. All the Mongol empires are relevant to papal diplomatic policy in this regard, as they all were non-Christian nations with substantial Christian minorities, and in some cases, such as

the Alans, even some Christians who considered themselves Catholics. While the Great Khanate did have some contact with Europe, and had a Christian minority, the great distances involved prevented any particularly meaningful exchange on either side. Consequently, examining the influence of the papacy on the Mongols which were in constant contact with the Christian world allows for a comparable and useful evaluation of the relationships.

While the Golden Horde was not really a Mediterranean power, it still had a direct impact on the Eastern Mediterranean, and European interactions there. It represented a powerful and potentially dangerous entity on the shores of the Black Sea, bordering Europe and the Ilkhanate. It was also an important trading partner for the Venetians and Genoese in the Black Sea, and consequently had a direct economic, political, and military impact on Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, it will be considered here in addition to the powers more directly connected to the papacy’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the papacy did not always distinguish between the various Mongol powers in any systematic way, it is important to understand how it was approaching both the khans of the Horde and the khans of Persia in order to gain a sense of wider papal policy.

The Golden Horde

The Golden Horde, positioned in much of modern Russia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian states, had maintained a relatively antagonistic relationship with Europe. The Horde’s invasion of Poland and Hungary from north of the Black Sea in 1240 was the Europe’s first experience with the Mongols, and while the frontier settled after the Mongols withdrew, sporadic outbreaks of violence continued throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It was also the first of the Mongol factions to have a leader who adopted Islam, with Berke converting in the 1260s, though ‘official’ adoption by the court of the Horde did not occur until Özbeg converted after he took the throne in 1313, which limited the influence of Western Christians

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looking to expand east.\footnote{Devin DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tïkles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), pp. 17–158.} These factors put a strain on the relationship between Christian Europe and the Khans of the Horde, but there was still dialogue between the two.

Primarily, this communication took the form of letters sent along with emissaries going out East and on their way back, rather than as specific embassies to and from the Khanate. Notable examples of this can be found in 1321,\footnote{JXXII:LC, IV, nn. 16111–16119, pp. 159–160; Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 5v–8v.} 1323,\footnote{JXXII:LC, V, n. 18309, p. 12.} 1333,\footnote{JXXII:LC, XIII, nn. 63874–78, pp. 191–92; Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 27v–29r.} and 1338.\footnote{BXII:LSNF, I, nn. 1868–69, pp. 542–43; Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 33r–35v.} Additionally, an embassy sent in 1340 appeared to have been to Özbeg, the khan of the Golden Horde, exclusively, while another in 1343 appeared to have been to Jani Beg, the new khan of the Horde, with no other letters to anywhere further east apparently included.\footnote{The letters to Özbeg and his court can be found in BXII:LSNF, II, n. 2853–56, pp. 78–80. The letter to Jani Beg can be found in CVI:LSF, I, n. 298, pp. 109–10.} Further embassies were sent to China following this, but the survival of material surrounding them is limited, and it is unclear what route they took, so while communication between the papacy and the Golden Horde presumably continued after these missions, the specifics appear to be lost, or are in poorly edited parts of the registers.

The content of all these letters was relatively similar and generally non-committal. The letters were largely entreating the khan to treat his Christian subjects well, cease hostilities in Eastern Europe, and to consider converting to Christianity. The embassy from Benedict XII to Özbeg in 1340 was a good example of the kind of proposals the papacy presented to the Horde.\footnote{Annales Minorum, VII, II, pp. 269–70.} Benedict asked for churches in Aquilonia (the north) to be repaired and Christian sites restored due to the good behaviour of Christians in the empire, and promised Özbeg great spiritual benefits for allowing and directing his Christians to the Roman Church, and the loyalty of the Christians as reward for his favour. In exchange, he wanted preferential treatment for the Christians. In an example from the letters sent in 1340, Benedict asked Özbeg to:
give towards the same Christians your kindness, and great grace, and restore them as well, and construct churches and places belonging to the Church, and not to neglect [them], and grant permission to the ministers and Catholic religious … that they may travel to the church of God and act as instructors of the faithful.\textsuperscript{85}

He also asked in the same letter that the khan’s campaign against Eastern Europe cease, and that any injury be dealt with peacefully by the papacy instead of leading to war:

and additionally, as we understand, between your people, and the most beloved in Christ our brothers the illustrious officials of the kingdoms of Hungary and Poland, located adjoining your empire, whenever it happens [that] conflict and war is stirred, from which follows the massacre of men, loss of things, and bitter laments for the danger of souls, it is preferable your highness cease from the invasion of the foresaid kingdoms, and that if the foresaid kings cause you undue injury or offence to you, you should tell us, we pray to correct this to the kings themselves, so much as we, with God, are able within reason for you and yours.\textsuperscript{86}

These quotes demonstrate the priorities of the papacy when concerned with the Golden Horde. Benedict was looking to improve the conditions of Christians within the khanate, and to promote the Catholic cause there, and also to negotiate peace for the eastern borders of Europe.

The background to these letters was a state of semi-permanent war along the frontier in Hungary and Poland, where raids were frequent and the Golden Horde

\textsuperscript{85} Annales Minorum, VII, II, pp. 269–70: \textit{erga Christianos eosdem tuae Magnitudinis liberalitatem, et gratias ampliasti, eis reparandi nihilominus, et aedificandi Ecclesias et loca Ecclesiastica, nec non Antistibus, et Religiosis Catholicis, praedicandi verbum Dei, ... omnium fidelium, et magistrarum, ministrandu licentia liberali concessa.}

\textsuperscript{86} Annales Minorum, VII, II, pp. 269–70: \textit{et insuper cum, sicut intelleximus, inter tuos, et carissimorum in Christo filiorum nostrorum Hungariae, et Poloniae Regum illustrium officiales et subditos in confinis Imperii tu, et Regnorum Regum praedictorum quandoque suscitar contingat dissensiones et guerres, ex quibus strages hominum, lapsum rerum, et animarum amarius deploranda pericula subsequuntur, velit tua sublimitas ab invasione Regnorum praedictorum desistere, quia si Reges praedicti inferrent tibi vel tuis injurias inevitatas, vel offensas, et id nobis duixeris intandum, haec per Reges ipsos praecabimur facere, quantum cum Deo poterimus, tibi et tuis rationabiliter emendari.}
was a reoccurring threat.\textsuperscript{87} A letter was sent in 1328 to the bishops and archbishops of Hungary praising Charles of Hungary’s prowess in pushing back the Mongols, as well as instructing them to aid with the rebuilding and care for his people.\textsuperscript{88} Crusade financing and indulgences were also granted to the kingdom of Hungary and Poland in 1340 in response to another Mongol invasion.\textsuperscript{89} These suggest that the papacy had not experienced any great success in curbing the Horde’s enthusiasm for European expansion during the embassies to the khans during the 1320s and 1330s, though the volume of activity suggests they were serious about trying to do this. In terms of successfully negotiating with the Horde on the behalf of European Catholic kingdoms then, it would seem that the papacy did not achieve very much, and the Mongols of the Horde remained hostile to Europe. Despite the apparent failure of the diplomatic negotiations, however, it is interesting to note that the papacy was still conducting embassies, rather than these being undertaken by the kingdoms which were directly affected by the invasions. Even though the embassies were not particularly successful at preventing the outbreak of war, the papacy was trusted to negotiate on behalf of Christians, instead of such negotiations being conducted by a secular power. This phenomenon must, however, be treated with a certain amount of caution, as while there is no evidence of direct diplomacy between the Eastern European kingdoms and the Horde, there is also little surviving material that suggests the papacy was asked to adopt this role by those powers either. The crusade grants given to Hungary and Poland imply that these were requested by the kingdoms, but there is otherwise little detail mentioned in them. Nevertheless, it is not an unreasonable assumption that these negotiations were carried out with the backing of Eastern European Christian powers, and thus represented a certain amount of trust on the part of the European kingdoms which the papacy was representing. This was offset by the ineffectiveness of the negotiations, which must be seen as a failure of papal power, as the papacy was not able to influence the Horde meaningfully, but European recognition as a political force was an important acknowledgement of authority. The recognition of the papacy by the Mongols should also not be overlooked; they accepted that the papacy was an organisation

\textsuperscript{87} Jackson, \textit{The Mongols and the West}, pp. 212–13 contains a list of possible invasions.
\textsuperscript{88} JXII:LC, VII, n. 41127, p. 249.
\textsuperscript{89} BXII:LC, II, nn. 8123–24, p. 280.
with which to conduct diplomacy on behalf of all Europe, which further enhanced papal credibility as a political organisation acting on behalf of Catholic Europe.

Eastern Europe was not the only point of conflict between the Latin world and the Horde. The Genoese and Venetian outposts on the Black Sea were also under attack in the 1340s, and this also provoked concern in Avignon. Tana was besieged in 1343, and following the flight of merchants to Caffa by sea, it too was invested in 1343–44, and again in 1345–46. The Genoese successfully fought off the Horde from Caffa twice, though plague played a part in the second siege, forcing the Mongols to retreat, but not before catapulting plague victims into the city, according to a contemporary Italian chronicler, Gabriele de’ Mussi. The papacy was unable to do much about these conflicts at the end of the Black Sea trading routes, though they did acknowledge the problem. Humbert of Vienne, in his ill-fated crusade following from the capture of Smyrna, discussed the prospect of diverting his fleet to Caffa to lift the siege, though he clearly decided against doing so. There does not appear to have been any diplomatic intervention by the papacy in this case, and the Genoese settled the conflict directly on their own. Thus while the papacy was willing to involve itself with the Horde on behalf of Christian powers, it appeared to not do so automatically, and though it did encourage Humbert to intervene at Caffa, took little other action on behalf of Genoa. The conflict lasted for nearly three years, and the papacy was clearly aware of it, but did little to intervene. Therefore, the power of the papacy as a political negotiator with the Horde appeared to have been quite limited, as while the Horde and European powers both appeared willing to accept the papacy as a collective mediator, the papacy appeared unable to affect a lasting peace, nor was it able to provide significant support to nations threatened by the Horde.

In terms of representing and acting as an advocate for Christians living under the rule of the Horde, the papacy appeared to do reasonably well in shielding them. The Horde, however, despite having leaders converted to Islam relatively early, did not appear to have hardened its policy of toleration of other religions substantially.

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Toqtogha, khan from 1291 to 1312, possibly even converted to Christianity, though this does not appear to have resulted in any particular elevation of Christians. Even Özbeg, famed for his Islamic convictions, confirmed a Franciscan privilege in 1314, and Christian works continued during his reign, resulting in the creation of the *Codex Cumanicus*, a Turkic language manual. Consequently, it is difficult to establish the extent to which the continued relative freedom of Christians in the khanate was due to papal intervention, or due to pre-existing policies which had not greatly altered throughout the period. While these were not mutually exclusive, if it was only due to the latter, then the papacy had very little impact on the policies of the khanate, and certainly cannot be said to have exercised power. There appears to be little evidence of persecution at any point in the period, and a repeated theme in letters going to the khans of the Horde is that the Christians under them were such good subjects, and they served the khan so well, that they should be granted special privileges. The repetition suggests that the Christians did not receive any particular special treatment, though it could just as easily be a formulaic piece intended to endear the khan to Christianity. The only notable success the papacy appeared to gain with its efforts to evangelise the Horde after Özbeg’s accession can be seen in a letter from 1338, which thanked Özbeg for allowing the friars to build a new monastery near Tana and for continuing to allow the friars to preach in the khanate. Aside from this small concession, however, the khans of the Horde appeared relatively indifferent to Catholic requests for privilege, and relatively tolerant of the Christians under their rule.

Papal diplomacy with the Golden Horde was thus active and frequent, focusing on two objectives: securing peaceful relations between the Horde and Europe, and the good treatment of Christians under the Mongols. The diplomatic successes enjoyed by the papacy were, however, limited. The Horde, Poland, and Hungary all appeared to accept the authority of the papacy to act as a negotiator on behalf of Catholic Europe with outside powers, and this represented a strong validation for the papacy’s position as the legitimate voice of the Catholic world. The fact that Benedict XII authorised crusade funding for Hungary and Poland the
same year, 1340, however, suggests that while all parties were willing to accept the papacy as a negotiator, there was not a huge amount of optimism in the successful outcome of the embassy. When the Horde attacked Italian settlements on the edge of the Black Sea, the papacy found itself similarly powerless to help. Clement VI suggested that Humbert of Vienne could consider the Horde a target for his crusade, but no action resulted from this suggestion, and no diplomatic efforts appeared to be made by the papacy to resolve the situation. The papacy fared somewhat better in regard to their other priority with the Horde, the maintenance of the position of Christians within the khanate, though much of that was due to the tolerance shown by successive khans, rather than to the papacy’s intervention. While the papacy did have some success with earlier khans, by the 1310s, Islam had taken a firm hold on the Horde, and papal exhortations toward conversion to Catholicism fell on deaf ears. There was a clear gap between what the papacy was able to successfully claimed authority over and what it was actually able to deliver on, and while the authority of the popes to represent Europe was not questioned by either party, the popes’ ability to enforce their will was limited.

The Ilkhans

Unlike the hostile Golden Horde, the Ilkhanate had a relatively amiable relationship with Europe and the papacy. Hülegü’s conquests in Persia and the Levant in the 1260s and 1270s were beneficial to the Catholic cause, bringing about the destruction of the Caliphate in Baghdad and completely rearranging the balance of power in the Near East to the detriment of the Islamic powers. This reorganisation, however, pushed the Islamic principalities in Syria to look to the Mamlūks for protection, to the ultimate detriment of Armenia. Despite having enemies in common, such as the Golden Horde and the Mamlūks, the papacy and the Ilkhans never achieved any substantial level of cooperation. The various calls for closer ties from within Europe went unheeded and the potential for a military alliance to drive the Mamlūks out of the Holy Land did not appear to be pursued. The examples of Armenia and Georgia demonstrated the potential benefits of a strong alliance with the Mongols for Christian kingdoms in the East, and despite offers by the Ilkhans to
allow a reconquered Holy Land to be a Christian kingdom, this situation could not be replicated for the Holy Land.

Early relations between the Mongol Ilkhans and Western Christians were very positive. Abagha, the second khan of the Ilkhans, sent embassies to Europe repeatedly during the late 1260s and throughout the 1270s, courting an alliance with Christian powers against the Mamlûks, and in support of Michael VIII Palaiologos, who was Abagha’s father-in-law. While this dialogue did not produce much military action, friendly relations were maintained well into the fourteenth century, with potential for military cooperation against the Mamlûks remaining a tempting prospect for both sides.96

The papacy’s aims for negotiations with the Ilkhans during the Avignon period are not made explicit, and there appears to be little evidence of direct contact between the khan and pope in the fourteenth century. There was, however, substantial activity going on, particularly missionary work. The Franciscans carried messages into Persia regularly to bishops living there, urging them to continue their work converting the Muslims of the region.97 The missionaries appeared to be tolerated, and did not claim persecution. Crusade theorists pushed for military alliance with the Ilkhans, though there is little evidence of this being attempted by the papacy in the Avignon period. This could be an issue of evidence, as it is clear that ambassadors from the Ilkhans were regularly present in Europe, but there appears to be little surviving information on what was discussed. Consequently, the aims of the papacy itself must be largely inferred from other sources and actions; and this largely suggests that the papacy broadly supported limited cooperation with the Ilkhans. It appeared to promote trade with them in preference to the Mamlûks, encouraged Europeans to assist the Ilkhans in Syria in 1301, and established an archbishopric in Soltaniyeh in 1318. It did not, however, appear particularly keen on a military alliance, or at least, no such alliance emerged at any point, despite

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96 A letter dated to the summer of 1268 is preserved in Reg. Vat. 62, ff. 138r–139r, which was from Abagha to Clement IV and covers a wide range of topics, including military cooperation against the Mamlûks and the Horde to normalising relations with Byzantium. The earlier embassies are also covered quite well in Jackson, The Mongols and the West, pp. 165–70, and Schein, Fideles Crucis, pp. 71–89. Further detail on Western European interactions with the Mongols in particular can be found in Paviot, ‘England and the Mongols’, pp. 305–18.
negotiations over it.\textsuperscript{98} This suggests that the papacy was interested in promoting and supporting activity in Persia, and saw it as a place of opportunity of Christians, but was more hesitant to commit to political agreements.

The Ilkhans appeared to have preserved the Mongol tradition of official religious tolerance, even after Ghāzān ‘formally’ converted the khanate to Islam in 1295. There was no evidence of an increase in the persecution of Christians in the khanate after this event, nor was there any reconciliation with the khanate’s then co-religionists in the Mamlūk sultanate or the Golden Horde until the middle of the second decade of the fourteenth century. Relations between the Ilkhanate and Armenia remained strong after the conversion, only breaking down as the Ilkhanate began to collapse and its policy shifted away from the Mediterranean. Ghāzān encouraged western Christian participation in his campaigns in the Levant in the first years of the fourteenth century, though little was mobilised.\textsuperscript{99}

Instances of cooperation and dialogue between the papacy and the Ilkhans reduced as the thirteenth century progressed into the fourteenth, when opportunities for direct cooperation began to become less numerous following the loss of Acre in 1291, and the decrease in Ilkhan pressure against Syria after its withdrawal in 1304. Nevertheless, there are some mentions, particularly during Ghāzān’s campaign in Syria in 1300–1304, and oblique references to proposals for cooperation in some letters from Clement V, such as one to Charles, the titular king of Sicily (Naples), in 1306, which urged him to raise a force to attack the Holy Land and rule whatever he could take there.\textsuperscript{100} Clement suggested that the Mongols would respect his claims and assist him, reflecting earlier agreements made between the Ilkhans and the Sicilians in the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{101} While this was probably an effort to resolve the problems which were still being created by the presence of two Sicilian kingdoms, and the constant threat of war between them, by sending one of the kings off to the Holy Land to claim more prestigious land, the cooperation of the Mongols was seen as a valuable tool to recovering the Holy Land.

\textsuperscript{98} See pages 218–226.  
\textsuperscript{99} Schein, \textit{Fideles Crucis}, pp. 162–64.  
\textsuperscript{100} CV, II, no. 2270, pp. 168–69. The letter is not addressed to a particular person, but rather to the \textit{rex Sicilia}. This identification supposes that the king of the island of Sicily would have been referred to by the papacy as \textit{rex Trinacria}.  
\textsuperscript{101} Jackson, \textit{The Mongols and the West}, pp. 165–195.
The Ilkhans were entirely happy to facilitate the creation of a new Catholic archbishopric in their capital city of Soltaniyeh in 1318 as well, which had theoretical jurisdiction over much of southern Asia. Soltaniyeh was a new founding by the Mongols in west Persia, along the Silk Road near the Caspian, and was well positioned for trade and to control the Ilkhante. This see was a Dominican institution, and was occupied by friars from that order exclusively. The first archbishop was Francesco da Perugia, appointed in 1318. He was replaced in 1322 by William of Adam, the author of the *Tractatus quomodo Sarraceni sunt expugnandi*, previously the archbishop of Smyrna. William was promoted in 1324 after just two years to the archbishopric of Bar in modern Montenegro, and the following occupants of Soltiniyeh are named in many cases, but otherwise unknown. This seat remained occupied until 1450, and clearly held some kind of position of influence within the Ilkhan administration, or at least was perceived by other Christians as doing so. The Armenian catholicos and king both requested that the archbishop aid the Armenian people in getting support from Abū Saʿīd, the last khan of the Ilkhans, in 1323, suggesting that the archbishop of Soltaniyeh held more power than their own representatives. The presence of the archbishop and his dependent bishops also suggests that the papacy was able to maintain effective authority and power as a channel of communication with the Ilkhans, and as a result, the non-Christian world. This authority appeared to be able to, or at least perceived to be able to, act with some influence, suggesting that the archbishop was able to sustain real diplomatic power in a way that other Christian nations were not.

Despite this appearance of a relationship between the popes and the Ilkhans, the Ilkhans feature very rarely in the fourteenth-century registers. One possible reason for the relative invisibility in contact between the papacy and the Ilkhans may be due to the residence of the archbishop in Soltaniyeh, who could act as a local personal intermediary between the Latin West and the Ilkhans. Consequently, it is quite possible that much of the material carried by nuncios travelling to the Horde and to the Great Khan in China was unnecessary for relations with the Ilkhans. It is perhaps interesting that when the papal embassy of Jordan Catalan was sent through

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103 JXXII:LC, IV, nn. 17498 and 17524, pp. 286 and 288. Given that the archbishop of the time was William of Adam, who was sceptical of the worth of the Armenian Church, it is unclear how effective this petition was.
Persia to India and ultimately China, the ‘emperor of Persia’ did receive a letter introducing the ambassador, as did the king of India and the khan in China, but no letters of introduction were sent otherwise to the emperor for appointments to the see in Soltaniyeh, or for other diplomatic business.\footnote{JXXII:LC, IX, nn. 46549–46558, pp. 5–6.} Dialogue between the khans and the papacy, and other European powers, must have been taking place during this period, however, particularly if the example of the Armenian assistance requested in 1323 indicated an effective lobby, and the presence of the archbishop may account for the absence of this activity in the record.

While the political activity of the archbishop is unclear, his role in missionary work was more obvious. Given that Catholic activity in Muslim lands, as an action sponsored by a rival political and spiritual authority, was in a real sense a political action as well as a religious one, these functions may well be inseparable, but dialogue with foreign leaders was notably different to missionary work. Two letters issued by the papacy, one in 1318 shortly after the creation of the archbishopric of Soltaniyeh,\footnote{JXXII:LC, II, n. 8186, p. 257.} and one in 1330, granted the archbishop and his dependents, including itinerate friars, an increase in powers and flexibility to help them cope with the extra difficulties associated with working so far from the infrastructure of the Latin Church.\footnote{JXXII:LC IX, n. 48515, pp. 208–9.} These, and other letters praising the activities of the bishops working in the East,\footnote{One example praises the friars in ‘Semiscatensis’ who had constructed a church. See: JXXII:LC, VIII, n. 46013, p. 351.} show that conversion work continued to be important to the role of Catholics working in the East. It should be noted that the Latin population in the Ilkhanate was not large, and mainly transient, and while ministering the Latin population would have been part of the archbishop’s role, it would not have been a large part. The role of the archbishop was therefore certainly more than a diplomatic functionary, though his placement in the summer residence of the Ilkhan suggests that he was much more than simply a missionary too. It is important to state the versatility of the role of the archbishop, and that his function involved more than simply being a resident ambassador to a potentially friendly power, and his more obvious responsibilities were pastoral.
There is some benefit to be gained by comparing the role of the archbishop of Soltaniyeh with that of the bishop of Marrakesh, whose circumstances were similar. Both were sees created in infidel lands, Marrakesh in the early-thirteenth century, Soltaniyeh in the early-fourteenth, at the seats of power of non-Christian kings, in lands with small Christian populations. Both the Maghreb and Persia had Christian minorities, but the role of the mendicant bishops there did not appear to be to minister to them much, rather they appeared to exist to minister to the Latin merchants and adventurers in the region. Neither make a particularly large impact on the papal registers. Nevertheless, both appeared to have a political function. The bishop of Marrakesh appeared to play an ambassadorial role as an intermediary between the Aragonese and the Moroccans in the first half of the fourteenth century, and also may have had an information gathering role for the Iberian powers. This model would fit the Persian archbishop and his dependants as well, and it is perhaps best to see him as a facilitator rather than a diplomat. It is unclear how much either were used in this function, but it would appear to be a role that both were expected to play if needed.108

The benefits of cooperation with the Ilkhans for a crusade were well acknowledged and understood, even after their conversion to Islam, at least by crusade theorists. Het’um, an Armenian historian, strongly advocated an alliance with the Ilkhans and a combined assault on the Mamlūks. His crusade treatise included a history of the Ilkhans up to the time of his writing, explaining how they were favourable to the Christians and detailing their wars with the Mamlūks.109 He also included a detailed proposal for an alliance with the Mongols, suggesting that the Ilkhans could provide food and cavalry to support the crusaders, invoking the memory for the joint Armenian-Ilkhan campaign in Syria in 1299–1300.110 Similarly, Marino Sanudo called for an alliance not only with the Ilkhans, who would attack Syria and Palestine, but also with the Ethiopians and Namibians, who could attack Egypt from the south.111 Sanudo, who presented his Liber secretorum to the papacy in 1321, continued to believe that the Mongols would support Christian intervention against the Mamlūks, even though the Ilkhans and the Mamlūks had

ended their long-standing feud in 1320. He may have been unaware of Abū Sa’īd’s peace deal as he finalised the Liber secretorum, or he may have not seen it as a barrier to an alliance if the conditions were right. He did not directly address it, but he did not present Mongol aid as a guaranteed option either, insisting that an alliance would have to be earned. It is therefore clear that there was a widespread perception amongst crusade theorists that the Mongols would continue to be potential allies to the West against the Mamlūks, if the West could only organise itself. All these theorists were writing long after the conversion of the Ilkhanate to Islam, and they certainly saw no conflict in asking the then Muslim Mongols to ally again against other Muslims, nor did the Mongols appear to have any qualms about doing so.

This was particularly evident with the relationship between the Ilkhanate and the Armenians. The Ilkhanate was an important ally for the Armenians, and the alliance helped to maintain the southern border of the kingdom against the Mamlūks. The Armenians were actively campaigning with the Ilkhans against the Mamlūks in the thirteenth century, and also joined Ghazan’s campaign against Syria and the Levant in 1299. The importance of this alliance, and of maintaining a mutual enemy, can be seen from the collapse of Armenian security following the rapprochement of the Mamlūks and Mongols. Within a decade and a half, Mamlūk incursions had resulted in the sack of Ayas in 1334, and following the collapse of the Ilkhanate into civil war following the death of Abū Sa’īd in 1335, there were no checks at all on Mamlūk expansion northward. While the alliance stayed strong, however, Armenia enjoyed relative security. The crusade theorists who advocated joint operations with the Ilkhans were therefore not pushing some unobtainable hope; an alliance was both a reasonable prospect and an extremely valuable military asset for the crusade.

The presence, and influence, of the archbishop of Soltaniyeh as well as the durability of the Armenian alliance with the Ilkhans and the regular embassies between Europe and Persia demonstrate that cooperation was desirable and probably achieved to a certain extent, and that further cooperation, as advocated by theorists, was an achievable aim. Nevertheless, this cooperation was limited, and did not extend to the military operations expected of a crusade, or really to any substantial

112 Jackson, Mongols and the West, p. 172.
military cooperation between Europe and the Mongols. This can be seen as a reflection of the priorities of both the European powers that were approached as participants of a crusade, and of the Ilkhans themselves. As was seen in the previous chapter, France, England, and the Italian merchant states all had their own priorities, which rarely coincided with the call for crusade. The Ilkhans, for all their efforts at expanding into Syria and the Levant, also had serious concerns on their other frontiers. To the east, the Chagatai khanate proved to be regularly hostile throughout the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries, as was the Golden Horde to the north.\textsuperscript{114} For all the Ilkhans’ interest in expanding west, they were still obliged to defend their borders, which often resulted in aborted campaigns in Syria or divided resources. Both sides of the potential alliance therefore had compelling geopolitical reasons for failing to act on the opportunities presented by a combined campaign in the Holy Land, and clearly both put such a campaign on a lower priority than their immediate domestic concerns.

This limitations of papal ambitions with regard to the Mongols was compounded by the circumvention of the papacy as a central organising power, threatening its position as the voice of Christian Europe which it enjoyed with other powers such as the Golden Horde and the Great Khanate. Ilkhan embassies were sent, in addition to the papacy, to countries which were in a good position to go on crusade. This was a pragmatic approach by the Ilkhans, but also problematic for the papacy in terms of maintaining its authority over non-Catholic relations. Political relations between the Ilkhans and other European powers were in danger of circumventing the central position the papacy had claimed, which potentially could have placed it in difficulty if it wished to change negotiating stance. As with the papacy’s relationship with Byzantium, which developed over the fourteenth century, the autonomy of the Italian city states conducting their own campaigns and treaties with the Byzantine empire undermined the papal position by acting in their own interests, and this situation could easily have risen with the Ilkhans.\textsuperscript{115} The diplomatic aims of the papacy for cooperation with the Ilkhans could have been hugely complicated by these individual relationships fostered between secular


\textsuperscript{115} See chapter four for further detail on the relationship between the papacy and Byzantium.
kingdoms, though circumstances meant this did not happen. The papal position with the Ilkhans was always conciliatory, and it encouraged European powers to ally with the Mongols when opportune to do so, and European powers remained friendly toward the Ilkhans, or at the very least indifferent. This meant that the papal authority to act as an overarching Christian diplomatic power was not challenged; the papal ambitions regarding the Mongols of Persia fell in line with popular sentiment. European powers were interested in an alliance to secure the Holy Land and defeat the Mamlûks, and realistically any successful crusade would require the support of the Ilkhans after any initial conquests, and these hopes remained until the collapse of the khanate. Nevertheless, the direct relationship between the Ilkhans and various European powers could be seen as a threat to papal power and authority, potentially excluding the papacy from the proceedings.

The timing of the end of this direct contact is curious. The last known Ilkhan embassy to the West was to Edward II of England in 1313, after which there appeared to be no further attempts by the Ilkhans to solicit European cooperation.\(^{116}\) How much this can be attached to the presence of the archbishops of Soltaniyeh is difficult to establish. As peace between the Ilkhans and Mamlûks came in 1320, there would have been less for Europeans and the Ilkhans to discuss, simply because the Mongols and Mamlûks were no longer fighting. This did not, however, mean that the Mongols would not have been open to the idea of resuming the war. The presence of the archbishop may have made the need for embassies unnecessary, as Latins could convey requests and proposals to Europe and back. If this was the case, no such requests have survived, but that also does not prove that they did not exist. Alternatively, the seeming lack of communication could indicate an estrangement between the Ilkhans and the Christian kingdoms, though this does not explain the Armenian request for diplomatic aid in 1323, which implied an embassy to the khan, after the end of the Ilkhan-Mamlûk war. If the archbishopric was being used as a diplomatic channel in place of embassies, however, it represented a triumph of papal power. The papacy would have successfully replaced direct communication with its own channels, and taken control of the diplomatic process.

The papacy had a relatively amiable relationship with the Ilkhanate overall, despite the religious differences between the two. It appeared to maintain friendly relations with the Ilkhans, in contrast to its turbulent relationship with the Golden Horde, and positioned itself as a key point of contact with the khanate following the establishment of the archbishopric of Soltaniyeh in 1318. The close relations enjoyed before 1318 by other Christian powers with the Ilkhans, such as Armenia, France, Sicily, and England, however, endangered the papacy’s position as coordinator of the Catholic world by removing the papacy from the dialogue. The Ilkhans appeared, at least in the latter half of the thirteenth and early in the fourteenth centuries, to prefer direct communication with political leaders with whom they could enter alliances rather than trusting the papacy to organise such commitments. That such direct contact appeared to have ended after the establishment of the archbishopric could indicate that the papacy had asserted its control over communication, or it could simply have reflected a breakdown in relations between the Christian powers and Abū Saʿīd’s Ilkhanate. Regardless, the relationship appears to have collapsed entirely after the effective end of the khanate in 1335, and there is no mention of the successor states to the khanate in papal sources.

The Mamlūks

The Mamlūk sultanate put the papacy in a difficult position. While it was the logical target of crusade, being the occupier of the Holy Land, and all the related holy sites in Africa and the Near East, the fact that the papacy was unable to mobilise military forces against it meant the papacy was forced also to undertake peaceable negotiations with the sultanate. The sultanate was an important source of wealth for Europe, particularly the Italian city states, and controlled access to the pilgrimage sites in the Holy Land. The papacy attempted to limit Christian participation in these activities, and as cooperation with the ‘enemies of Christ’ was a requirement for them, diplomacy with the Mamlūks was inevitable. 117 Consequently, the extent to

117 See chapters one and two for further details on these topics.
which the papacy, and Europeans more widely, were willing to treat the sultanate as a partner should be examined, in addition to the analysis of the hostility between Europe and the Mamlūks.  

The fall of Acre in 1291 did little to energise the Christian world into crusade and, perhaps surprisingly, also had very little impact on trading agreements and negotiations by individual Christian states. The Venetians renewed agreements with the sultan several times in the last decade of the thirteenth century, as did other merchant states. Throughout the fourteenth century, a series of embassies were sent to the sultan, often at the same time as active crusade planning and promotion was in progress. The extent to which these negotiations were supported by the papacy has important implications for both the understanding of papal intentions toward the Mamlūks and the Eastern Mediterranean more generally, and also as a case study in papal authority. The Mamlūks, as one of the most prominent ‘enemies of Christ’ with which Europe actively engaged, how much the wishes of the papacy toward the Mamlūks were being respected by European powers was an important marker of the power the papacy was able to exert.

Relations between the papacy and the sultanate have been compartmentalised in scholarship to a large degree. Predominately, works on the topic have considered the military and economic interactions between the two separately, and have very rarely explored how the powers acting in the Eastern Mediterranean interacted outside of these contexts. This chapter aims to go some way to rectifying that, and discusses how Europe and the Mamlūks communicated, and what the issues they were concerned about with each other were. While this was obviously a largely antagonistic relationship, it was not exclusively so, and there were points of discussion and active diplomatic measures taken to attempt to interact with one another without violence.

Many of the embassies sent by European powers appeared to be predominantly interested in trade, and thus do not substantially illuminate any other interests of Europeans or the papacy, beyond simply that compromise for the pursuit of profit was considered acceptable, up to a point, and the licensing discussed in

118 See chapter seven for further detail on the crusade and the military efforts against the sultanate.
119 Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 3–102; Schein, Fideles Crucis, p. 179.
chapter one was an act aimed at controlling that aspect of policy. Some embassies, however, professed ulterior motives for visiting Alexandria or the Holy Land when requesting permission from the papacy. These could vary, from promoting the welfare of Catholic prisoners or non-Catholic Christians, or securing relics, to attempting to convert the sultan to Christianity or to negotiate a good deal for Armenia. At least eight separate missions to the sultan were mentioned in the papal registers across the period, though many of these are not corroborated by any other evidence. Significantly, these embassies gained the approval of the papacy before embarking, suggesting that the popes were able to maintain a relatively strong level of diplomatic control over the activities of the Christian kings, though this is a self-selecting group. Embassies which did not obtain papal approval would not have appeared in the registers, and consequently are much less visible. There is little independent corroboration for these embassies in both Latin or Arabic sources, and it would appear that chronicles were largely unconcerned about them; this means there could have been more that are no longer documented anywhere, the aims of which are no longer available. From the existing sources, however, it would appear that the papal agenda was similar to that which it was pursing with the Mongols; it was aiming to improve the lives of local Christians and also to conduct high level political negotiations benefitting the European community.

James II of Aragon requested permission to send ambassadors to an-Nāṣir Muḥammad, the Mamlūk sultan, permission for which was first granted in 1313, and then again in 1317, with another embassy granted in 1321. In each case, the Catalans were allowed to travel in one ship, with the usual restrictions on goods, which suggests that these expeditions may also have been trading ventures, although no mention of trade being a motivating factor was made in the letter. Rather, James wanted to intercede on behalf of the ‘captive Christians’ in Egypt, ‘who are worn down in the land of the sultan of Babylon by the enemies of the orthodox faith through wretched captivity in squalid prison’. James wanted to free these Christians, who were probably Latin prisoners from the fall of Acre or earlier. Ludolph von Suchem also used this phrase, though he appears to be talking about


\[121\] JXXII:LC, II, n. 5742, p. 22: *qui in terra Soldani Babiloniae ab hostibus fidei orthodoxae miserabiliter captivati gravibus carceris scaloribus macerantur.*
the Coptic community, which suggests the term was not particularly consistently used.\footnote{Ludolph von Suchem, \textit{Description of the Holy Land}, p. 71. See page 154–55 fn. 152 for further discussion on this term.} Either way, James’ embassies were ostensibly not trading missions. Their purpose was purported to be an embassy for humanitarian relief of an oppressed group, which Europeans had taken an interest in. That the embassies were so consistently on this theme is interesting, given that there appears to be little corresponding record of intercessions on the Mamlūk side.\footnote{Robert Irwin, \textit{The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate}, 1250–1382 (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p.117.} This can be explained by two possibilities: firstly, that the Catalan embassies were simply a justification for trading and that they were not actually interested in adjusting the status of local Christian populations or shrines, though this would seem to be an extraordinary amount of effort to go to for a single ship each time. Alternatively, it could mean that their efforts were relatively unsuccessful and/or underreported. The welfare of eastern Christians was not a particularly common reason for sending people to Alexandria, however, and not one that other powers tried to use; consequently it should probably be treated as a fair reflection of intent. There would have been simpler excuses to use if James felt the need for one, and anyway he had already gained the privilege to authorise trade missions to Egypt.\footnote{See chapter one for a greater discussion on trade privileges and papal control of trade.}

The 1323 embassy by James was the last sent in aid of captive Christians in the sultanate, but not the last sent by the Catalans. Another two, both authorised in 1328, allowed for two princes of Aragon to visit Egypt separately.\footnote{JXXII:LC, VIII, nn. 43003–4, p. 33.} Peter, count of Ribagorza, had a mission to promote Catholicism and secure privileges for Catholics, while his brother, Alfonso IV of Aragon, was intending to secure the relics of the blessed virgin Barbara and other Christian martyrs. Both of these tasks would have involved diplomatic negotiations with both the local Christian community and the Mamlūk authorities, either to secure an increase in the position and authority of Catholics or to approve the export of religious relics. There is little indication of the success of either of these missions, though the sustained nature of the Catalan embassies suggests that neither the Catalans nor the papacy thought they
were a waste of time and resources, even with the seemingly limited results they brought.

The fact that the Catalans always sought papal authorisation for these embassies reflected a consciousness of the need for a Catholic-wide policy toward the sultanate, and it accepted the pope as the arbiter of that policy. The embassies were not ostensibly negotiating the relationship between East and West directly, and these were not peace deals or offers of alliance; rather, they were attempting to negotiate on a relatively minor issue peripheral to the problems of crusade and politics. It would be difficult to view these embassies as an attempt to start any kind of rapprochement between Europe and the Mamlūks, though they were negotiating with a hostile power. The issues with which they appeared to be concerned were simply too specific and limited to constitute a papal endorsement of a wider move toward peace with the sultanate, particularly given that throughout this period the papacy was attempting to organise large-scale military expeditions to Egypt.

Another embassy was sent in 1327, this time by the papacy. Benedict of Cuneo, a Dominican, was chosen to go to the lands of the sultan as an emissary of Christian nations. The papacy included some justification for the expedition, and why one had not gone sooner: ‘We have withheld a nuncio for so long a time because by itself [the sultanate] was not offering a pleasing agreement, that we liked, but the nuncios of Armenia have made clear to us what was previously unclear.’ The reference to the Armenians is significant, as they had been heavily involved in the planning of the proposed crusade in the first half of the 1320s, and were beginning to suffer increased aggression from the Mamlūks following a loss of support from the Ilkhans. This increase in pressure on Christian states neighbouring the sultanate had clearly forced the papacy to become directly involved, and to attempt to promote the interests of Catholics to the sultanate itself through diplomatic channels. This suggests a level of direct influence in the diplomatic process as well as a constant involvement in it, and that the papacy was unwilling to allow the process to be completely conducted by others if that appeared to be ineffective.

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126 JXXII:LS, III, n. 2744, p. 117: *Nuntium autem tamdiu retinuimus quia se non offerebat grata responsio, ut vellemus, sed nuntiis Armenorum venientibus via nobis patuit que antea non patebat.*
Despite positioning itself as the voice Christian Europe, the papacy did not appear to maintain this position as a direct actor for long. Later the same year, at the ‘insistence’ of the king of France, William Bonasinas of Figiac, a layman, was sent to the sultan, though the purpose of his visit is unclear.\textsuperscript{127} He was obviously there as a representative of the king, though his mission was not very successful, and he blamed Catalan interference for its failure.\textsuperscript{128} The Arabic chronicler Mufaḍḍal ibn Abī l-Faḍā’il does not record either of these embassies, though he does note the arrival of a different embassy in 1330, stating that emissaries of the French king arrived. According to Mufaḍḍal, the Frankish embassy did not receive a particularly warm reception, and the sultan threatened the emissaries with death. He reported the sultan as having said ‘As God is my witness, if any king before me had killed emissaries, I would have you decapitated, but an emissary must not be killed’.\textsuperscript{129} Despite this rather stormy account of the meeting, Mufaḍḍal did not record anything else about it, and if there was any more constructive dialogue following this threat, it was not preserved. A letter dated 13 February 1331 to the king of France, from John XXII, records the return of his emissary, who was identified as Pierre de la Palud, the patriarch of Jerusalem. This letter also did not record the outcome of the meeting, though it implied a substantially longer conversation than Mufaḍḍal did. The letter states that ‘he has to present to the royal excellence, [as] the responses need to be looked at with the careful consideration of the king in further detail, and to deliberate how much trust is owed to these [responses], and what should be made from this’.\textsuperscript{130} While this does not imply a particularly positive outcome, it suggests that there was at least some substance to the talks the patriarch had with the sultan, even though neither source states what was actually under discussion. Dunbabin characterised Pierre’s disappointment and frustration with the process, but also admits than what was discussed remains unknown. Pierre did not send a letter back to France, instead he returned to Avignon in person the following year.\textsuperscript{131} Despite its

\textsuperscript{128} Dunbabin, \textit{A Hound of God}, pp. 169–70.
\textsuperscript{129} Mufaḍḍal ibn Abī al-Faḍā’il, Chronik, p. 142: \textit{Bei Gott, wenn ein König vor mir schon Gesandte getötet hätte, so würde ich euch die Köpfe abschlagen lassen. Doch ein Gesandter darf nicht getötet werden.}
\textsuperscript{130} JXXII:LS, V, n. 4435, pp. 38–39: \textit{habet excellentie regie presentare, in qua dicta responsa poterit circumspectio regia seriosius intueri et deliverare quanta fides illis exhiberi debeat et quid sit super his faciendum.}
\textsuperscript{131} Dunbabin, \textit{A Hound of God}, pp. 170–73.
apparent lack of success, Pierre’s embassy suggests that Philip VI of France and John XXII were working closely together as a diplomatic unit when dealing with the Mamlûks. Pierre was identified by both the Mamlûks and the papacy as a French emissary, but he was also a high-ranking member of the Church and was reporting to both John XXII and Philip VI of France, and so must be seen as a representative of both the papacy and the king of France. It would appear that the papacy’s direct role had diminished, and that by 1330 the kings of France were speaking as the voice of Catholic Europe with the papacy’s support, at least to the Mamlûks.

An-Nāṣir Muḥammad proved unreceptive to Western efforts at securing the safety of Armenia or the Copts within Egypt, and his death in 1341 provided an opportunity for an improvement in relations between the sultanate and Europe. Immediately following his death, there was a flurry of short-lived sultans, all sons of an-Nāṣir Muḥammad, who were murdered in a dramatic succession crisis. As-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl emerged as a stabilising force, taking the throne in 1342 and having both his rival elder brothers murdered. While his rule proved to be bad for Armenia, which was beset by additional attacks, he personally proved to be partial to the Western merchants in Alexandria, particularly the Venetians, who paid duties that supported his rule. He appeared to be more willing than his father to make concessions to Europe, and based on this the Venetians increased their activity to Alexandria, apparently attempting to woo him to Christianity. His reign was also quite short, however; he died in August 1345, heralding another wave of sultans with regnal periods of roughly a year.

The minority of an-Nāṣir Ḥasan, who was made sultan in 1347, also presented an opportunity for the West to attempt to influence the sultanate, and Hugh of Cyprus was encouraged by Clement VI to attempt to capitalise for the Christian cause. A further letter to Hugh warned of the dangers for local Christians in the sultanate due to the policies of the sultan, and encouraged him to help them as best he could. Given that anti-Christian sentiment within the sultanate spilled out into riots in 1354, which ultimately resulted in Christians being

132 Irwin, *The Early Mamluk Sultanate*, p. 130.
133 CVI:LSNF, n. 756, p. 95.
134 CVI:LSNF, n. 2015, p. 274.
barred from public office, Hugh evidently was unsuccessful in ensuring the protection of Christians. Nevertheless, is important that the papacy was still actively interested in the communities within the sultanate, and how to influence the political situation to the advantage of Christians, both Coptic and Catholic.

Despite the obvious hostility between the Catholic world and the Mamlūk sultanate over the Holy Land, there was a constant dialogue between them throughout the period. Particularly on issues where Europeans were unable to mobilise sufficient military strength to protect their interests, such as the defence of Armenia, the papacy showed no compunction in attempting to find a peaceful solution. It was not, however, the papacy that was the principal actor in these negotiations, and it was only directly involved in a handful of embassies. The majority of embassies were conducted by other powers, such as Aragon, France, Venice, or Cyprus. These embassies were conducted with the approval of the papacy, which implies that the authority of the popes was accepted on this issue, and that the kingdoms of Europe understood and largely agreed with the principle that the Catholic world should interact with the non-Catholic world as a single entity. The papacy was the logical choice to moderate that united diplomatic effort, and the regularity with which European powers acting in the Mediterranean consulted the papacy before launching an embassy suggests that this was the agreed relationship within the Catholic world. This placed the papacy at the heart of European policy toward the Mamlūks and in a position of real power to affect how relationships with the sultanate were managed.

The almost complete absence of references to the papacy from the Mamlūks’ side reveals a different power dynamic. The sultan appeared willing, if not keen, to negotiate with European kingdoms, but not so with the papacy. Pierre de la Palud was the patriarch of Jerusalem, yet he went to the sultanate as an ambassador of France. The Catalans negotiated on the papacy’s behalf over relics and the status of Christians. The papacy appeared to have not been recognised by the Mamlūks, or at least, the two appeared never to directly interact in an official capacity. This is a stark contrast to the role played by the papacy with the Mongol powers, where it was highly prominent. Rather, in almost every instance of contact between Europe and

136 Irwin, The Early Mamluk Sultanate, pp. 141–42.
the Mamlūk sultanate, the ambassadors were associated and identified with a secular power, even if they were members of the Church, and while the papacy appeared to be active in Europe coordinating policy against the Mamlūks, no such visibility is recorded in the Arabic world. This leads to the conclusion that the Mamlūks were not interested in treating the papacy as a political organisation with power, and they preferred to deal with secular states of Europe, even if the emissaries were churchmen. This possibly reflected the position of religion in Islam as an integrated aspect of political life, but it is interesting that the sultanate seemed unwilling to accommodate the papacy as a political force, and that the papacy appeared to accept its role as a silent partner in secular relations with the sultanate.

This difficulty in gaining recognition demonstrated the fundamental issue for papal diplomacy with an implacably hostile force. While the papacy was able to command the cooperation of European powers over this issue, it was unable to command the cooperation of the Mamlūks, and lacked the military or economic power to do anything about it. Against the simple indifference of a hostile non-Christian power, the papacy was virtually unable to act. Unlike both the Mongol nations bordering Europe, the Mamlūks appeared to refuse to accept the authority of the papacy to act as a mediator, and as a result, the papacy could not directly influence the sultanate, nor act independently of the secular Catholic kingdoms.

When dealing with the non-Christian nations on the periphery of the Christian world, the papacy appeared to maintain a fairly coherent set of priorities regardless of circumstance. First and foremost, it attempted to woo the leaders of these powers toward Christianity, or at the very least convince them of the usefulness of Christians as subjects. Another regular feature of papal priorities was the treatment of Christians in non-Christian nations, both Catholic and non-Catholic. The popes all pushed for additional privileges for Catholic organisations operating beyond the borders of Christian territory, but they also lobbied for the protection and freedoms of all Christians. Finally, the papacy attempted to solicit peaceful resolutions to conflicts between those non-Christian powers and Catholic powers with which they were in conflict. The aims of papal policy toward the wider world remained, therefore, relatively consistent: promote Christian interests, evangelise, and encourage political harmony where Christians were threatened.
The effectiveness of the papacy’s diplomatic efforts reflect the wider pattern of papal authority and power; the papacy was generally able to secure a notional acceptance of its authority, but was also unable to impose its will, particularly outside of the Catholic world. The papacy’s accomplishment of acting as a centralising power with the authority to speak for all Catholics politically should not be underestimated, however, simply because the papacy had difficulties in gaining recognition from its religious rivals. That the secular Catholic kingdoms accepted the authority of the popes to develop a collective policy towards the wider world, and encouraged the papacy to maintain this policy and intercede on their behalf was a remarkable legitimising act.

Nevertheless, the direct power the papacy was able to exert outside of Europe was quite limited, as it depended on the cooperation of both European and extra-European partners. Where there was little acknowledgement of the papacy’s role, such as with Mamlûk sultanate, the papacy found itself unable to act directly, while with the Mongols, the papacy was able to act as a mediator between them and Europe. Regardless of the acceptance of the authority of the popes by external powers, the papacy had limited success in achieving its aims, and much of its success, such as the good treatment of Christians in Mongol lands, could have been incidental to papal involvement. Certainly in terms of creating peaceful political relations, and creating alliances with non-Christian powers, the papacy found itself unable to enforce its authority. While the authority of the papacy was recognised by most of the parties involved in political negotiations in the Eastern Mediterranean, with the probable exception of the Mamlûks, its ability to influence events directly was too dependent on third parties to suggest that the papacy had much political power over non-Christian states.
How effective was the papacy when dealing with non-Christians?

The papacy certainly saw itself as a political entity, and interacted with other political organisations, both Catholic and non-Catholic, accordingly. Its relations with non-Christian powers were, however, a little more limited than those it held with European institutions and states and non-Catholic Christian states. As the non-Catholic powers in the Eastern Mediterranean were geographically distant from Avignon, and large, powerful empires in their own right, they had no social or political imperatives to recognise the papacy. The papacy was not a large territorial and military power itself, and relied on European partners to enact its policies where it could not do so itself. As a result, the papacy positioned itself as the organisational head of Catholic Christendom, intending to arbitrate and control military and diplomatic relations with the non-Christians. In some ways, this was a highly successful policy, but the papal position also highlighted the limits of the papacy’s reach, and when it was faced with a lack of cooperation by any party, there was little it could do to progress its aims.

Much of the military activity in the Eastern Mediterranean in the period was undertaken as part of the crusade, or at the very least framed in the intellectual justifications of crusade. This activity represented a substantial amount of the interest Europe displayed for the world outside of Christian territories, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, where the continuing struggle over the Holy Land continued to play a major role in motivating Catholic interest in the region. The crusade was not limited to the Holy Land, however, and played a role in several conflicts with non-Christians across the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the fourteenth century. Crusading activity focused on the Holy Land was largely concerned with launching a large-scale crusade to recapture the kingdom of Jerusalem, or Egypt, and the defence of Armenia against Mamlûk hostility. Conversely, crusading activity in the Aegean was initially directed against the Byzantines, but was refocused toward the Turks in Asia Minor, aiming to prevent their expansion into the Aegean and to protect the merchant shipping lanes there.

The control the papacy was able to exert over the administration of the crusade demonstrated a reasonable degree of authority over the institution, and this
appeared to be recognised by Catholic Europeans. The papacy’s dependence on the secular powers of Europe to provide the soldiers for crusade revealed its lack of reliable power, in that it could not effectively bring military projects to completion without secular cooperation, as was highlighted by the continued failure of a French crusade to embark. Despite huge sums of money being raised, and repeated grants of indulgences, the papacy was unable to motivate the French kings to keep their crusading oaths, and the outbreak of the Hundred Years War effectively ended French involvement in the crusading project in the Avignon period. Similar disappointments by the Briennes in the duchy of Athens led the papacy to take a more direct role in its naval leagues in the Aegean, providing direct military support for the ventures. These leagues were still heavily dependent on the cooperation of the other powers in the league, and were quite small-scale expeditions, but they were more effective than most crusade ventures in the fourteenth century. Crucially, the papacy was able to exert direct control over the leagues, directing the fleet at targets it wanted, rather than allowing it free reign. This was an exceptional set of expeditions though, and usually the papacy was unable to exert direct control over the ventures it funded, which did not always go where they were supposed to. The 1309 Hospital fleet was directed toward the Holy Land, but was diverted to aid the conquest of Rhodes instead, and Peter I of Cyprus appeared to be acting relatively independently in his assault on Alexandria in 1365. The papacy was able to maintain authority over the institution of crusade, and was able to fundraise for it effectively, but its reliance on third parties to conduct the campaigns left it unable to directly influence much of the crusading activity it had authorised, and powerless to enforce its aims if those third parties decided to change the plan.

The papacy was not exclusively involved with attempting to invade non-Christian powers, however, and it did have non-military interactions with its neighbours in the Eastern Mediterranean. The papacy, in its self-appointed position as the administrative and religious head of the Catholic world, sought to conduct diplomatic negotiations with non-Christian powers on behalf of the European powers, or at the very least influence the terms of them. It achieved this goal with a varying degree of success; on one hand, the secular powers of Europe seemed willing to work in partnership with the papacy when dealing with foreign powers, but on the other, those powers were not always willing to accept the papacy’s involvement.
With the Golden Horde, the kings of Poland and Hungary appeared willing to allow the papacy to mediate for them in the 1340s, and the Horde received the papacy’s ambassadors, though there appeared to be little resolution to the military crisis which resulted from the embassy. This suggests a level of acceptance of the authority and competence of the papacy in its role as arbiter on both the parts of Europe and the Horde, though the lack of success of the episode suggests that the papacy was unable to successfully influence the Horde. Additionally, when Genoa and the Horde came into conflict in the Black Sea, the papacy was completely absent from the diplomatic process, suggesting a low level of power, or perceived power. Genoa did not appeal to the papacy to assist in its negotiations with the Horde.

The Ilkhans had a more amiable relationship with Europe in general and a more cooperative approach to the papacy. The Ilkhans saw Europe, and the papacy as an important political actor in Europe, as potential allies against the Mamlūks, and pursued negotiations over military cooperation in the Levant, which were reciprocated by European powers. Despite the conversion of the khanate to Islam, the political position of the Mongol Ilkhans as enemies of the Mamlūks made them potential liberators of the Holy Land, and cooperation was promoted even after the rapprochement of the sultanate and the Ilkhans in the hopes of a renewal of conflict. The papacy saw a certain amount of success in promoting peaceful relations with the Ilkhans, though negotiations with them were largely conducted by the secular powers of Europe, rather than the papacy. The Ilkhans did acknowledge the papacy, however, and allowed an archbishopric to be established in their capital, Soltaniyeh, in 1318. While there was very little successful military cooperation between Europe and the Ilkhans, in the attempts to form one the authority of the papacy seemed well regarded. The power of the papacy with regard to the Ilkhans was greater than that demonstrated with other powers, and the papacy appeared to consolidate its diplomatic position as mediator with the Ilkhans successfully after the creation of the archbishopric, even gaining requests from the notional Mongol allies, the Armenians, to help with their embassy.

Against the Mamlūk sultanate, the papacy found itself particularly powerless diplomatically. The Mamlūks did not appear to be willing to engage with the papacy as a political force, and nearly all negotiations appeared to occur with secular
powers, albeit with Churchmen regularly taking prominent roles in them. European powers were quite willing to coordinate with the papacy on their diplomatic activity with the Mamlūks, but the sultanate itself appeared indifferent to the role of the papacy. The papacy was unable to do much about this challenge to its authority, demonstrating how powerless it was in the face of non-cooperative powers.

The papacy’s low levels of logistical, and military, force severely limited its own scope for both military and diplomatic activities. Instead, it placed itself as the coordinating power for both for Catholic kingdoms interacting with the non-Catholic world, which required willing cooperation with all partners. It would appear that within Europe the papacy commanded enough authority to make this position work. It was able to get various kingdoms to agree to crusade, at least in theory, and to participate in naval leagues against the Turks, but it was unable to ensure any large-scale action, and much of the money it generated for crusade was squandered into domestic politics. Similarly, European powers seemed happy to coordinate with the papacy and allow it to conduct diplomatic relations with the outside world, but the non-Christian powers beyond Europe were less willing. Both Mongol empires were, as a general rule, willing to accept the papacy as a centralising power, but did not appear to treat it as a particularly important power in its own right. At the very least, the papacy did not appear to have any particular visible diplomatic successes. The Mamlūk sultanate, on the other hand, had very little interest in the papacy as a political organisation, and did not appear to engage with it in any meaningful way.

This suggests that while the authority of the papacy to act as a coordinator for Europe to the outside world was well accepted, in practice it could only achieve results from this role with the cooperation of local and foreign partners. As a result, the power of the papacy was severely limited in both military and diplomatic projects, and the papacy seemed unable to influence events or get projects off the ground that did not closely align with the aims of the secular powers involved. This suggests that the papacy was powerless to advance its own aims if those aims were not directly shared by its allies, and the papacy appeared to be consistently unable to act in the face of indifference from its partners.
Conclusion: The Papacy and the Eastern Mediterranean

The Eastern Mediterranean may have been on the periphery of the Catholic world in the fourteenth century, but it was certainly not incidental to it. The papacy invested substantial time and resources pursuing projects pertaining to the East and sought to expand its authority over various groups there, as well as extend its power to shape events. The different ways in which the papacy attempted to control activity, negotiate agreements, and steer physical interventions in the Eastern Mediterranean show that issues relating to the East were important to the papacy; they were the basis for a series of coherent policies aimed at expanding Latin power eastwards.

The papacy pursued policies aimed at controlling the behaviour of Latins, such as limiting trade and travel to the Muslim world in order to aid a potential crusade to the Holy Land, expanding the Catholic world through Church union, and through military campaigns and diplomatic alliances. These policies had two goals: to shore up the frontier of Christendom against the Muslim world, and to expand the borders of Catholic power over new territories. The defence of the papacy’s Christian allies, such as Armenia, and later Byzantium, was necessary to prevent the expansion of Islam and to provide support for papal expansionist aims, particularly militarily. The papacy recognised that even if a large crusade could be launched to the Holy Land, a polity in the Levant could not be maintained without local support, in the form of an alliance with the Mongols, through support of neighbouring Christian powers, or both. The economic and social controls the papacy imposed on the Christian population of the Eastern Mediterranean were also to facilitate the aims of securing and expanding Christian power. The aims of the papacy were, therefore, clear and inexorably linked to the exercise of power and the expansion of authority in the region. Despite all the upheavals which occurred around Avignon during the period, the papacy never lost sight of its objectives in the East and maintained a consistent interest throughout the period, with varying degrees of success.

The prosecution of these policies reveals similar power dynamics between the papacy and almost all the groups with which it interacted. The authority of the
papacy was recognised by most institutions, and its claim to act on behalf of all Catholics was not questioned throughout the period; however, its successes were distinctly limited despite such widespread acceptance of papal authority. The papacy was unable to wield enough direct power to achieve all its aims, and when faced with a situation which required the use of power, such as the provision of military aid, or direct enforcement of a policy, it was usually unable to provide it. Nevertheless, this lack of actual power did not appear to particularly affect the perception of the papacy, which was able to maintain its position as the self-appointed head of the Catholic world throughout the period without any significant challenges to its authority.

This dynamic between power and authority was complex, as was the authority of the papacy over specific issues. The papacy was able to maintain its authority effectively in a variety of ways, including controlling the activity of Catholics in the Eastern Mediterranean, establishing its primacy within the overall Christian hierarchy of Churches, and acting as a centralising force in European politics, particularly to the non-Catholic world beyond Europe. In all these areas, the papacy was able to gain recognition of its right to be involved and, as a general rule, was able to at least gain the acceptance from other parties that cooperation should be granted. This authority was particularly visible amongst Catholics and Catholic institutions, none of which appeared to dispute the right of the papacy to be involved in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This does not mean that papal authority was absolute, even amongst groups that appeared to accept it, only that the papacy’s authority was well recognised. Christian merchants did not object to the papacy issuing controls on trade in principle, even if they may have disagreed with their own need to abide by them. Pilgrims and other travellers accepted the papacy’s right to make travel to the Holy Land without authorisation an excommunicable offence. The necessity of papal involvement in legitimising potentially illegitimate marriages, even on the very edges of Catholic territory, was accepted by Catholic Christians. These groups were not universal in abiding by the decrees of the popes, but they did all accept papal authority over activity in which they were engaged. Similarly, when discussing Church union, no other Christian Churches denied the right of the papacy to negotiate on behalf of the Catholics or denied the papacy the right to act as the head
of the Catholic Church. Even the Serbian Church, which had held for much of the fourteenth century that Catholics were heretics and that the Catholic Church was not a legitimate institution, was happy to negotiate with the papacy about reconciliation in 1354. Beyond the Christian world, however, the recognition of papal authority was less certain. The Mongol powers, the Ilkhans and the Golden Horde, generally recognised the papacy, and would negotiate with it, though both powers would also conduct negotiations with individual polities with which they were involved. The Mamlûks, however, were not particularly interested in the papacy as a political force, and did not appear to acknowledge it much at all. Almost all negotiations with the sultanate were carried out by secular institutions with papal support, rather than by the papacy directly, and even when Church functionaries were used as ambassadors, such as in Pierre de la Palud’s mission in 1329, they were identified by the Mamlûks as agents of a crown. In general, however, the papacy was recognised by most of the actors with whom it interacted, and this high level of recognition leads to an overall high level of authority, particularly amongst Christians.

This recognition did not always lead to compliance, however, or even imply the assumption that because the papacy should intervene in something it claimed authority over, or that such an intervention would be respected or deemed important. This enforcement of papal authority is very much an issue of power, which revealed limitations in the papacy’s exercise of power, but also a large amount of compliance with papal authority. At an individual level, this manifested itself in several ways. In the example of trade controls, many merchants chose to accept the authority of the popes, despite there being no policing action and little chance of being caught. Some merchants chose to ignore the papacy’s decrees on trade and transported illegal goods, which demonstrated a clear rejection of papal power on their part. They did not, however, appear to reject the authority of the popes to control that trade, accepted the spiritual consequences of their actions and then, in many cases, accepted the financial penalties attached to absolution. Similarly, travellers to the Holy Land appeared well aware of the political problems associated with travelling to the Holy Land and accepted the authority of the papacy to control travel. This is expressed by the use of a licence system as well as the accounts of pilgrims, but it is unclear, given the apparent number of exceptions and the poor survival of licences, how far the licence system could be considered universal. It is fairly clear that some
individuals did not feel bound by the papacy’s authority and were willing to disobey for their own purposes.

This demonstrates that the papacy’s power over individual Catholics was not absolute, though this probably should not be seen as surprising and certainly not always representative of the wider control the papacy enjoyed over the behaviour of individual Catholics. Many merchants were happy to respect both papal authority and power, acquired trade licences, and did not contravene the prohibition on illegal goods. The large numbers of surviving pilgrim licences and guides suggests that pilgrim activity in the fourteenth century was still quite substantial, and the mention of licences prominently in Ludolph von Suchem suggests that they were considered important. Additionally, the existence of a rejection of a petition to go on pilgrimage hints at a great deal of papal involvement and power in controlling pilgrims, allowing it to effectively limit pilgrim passage to the Holy Land if it chose. Marriages amongst Catholic populations maintained norms similar to Europe and remained dependent on the papal court despite the huge distances involved. Papal power may not always have been respected by individual Catholics, but the papacy’s right to legitimise those breaches was often respected, resulting in a high level of papal authority and power over the Catholic population of the Eastern Mediterranean in general terms.

At an institutional level, a disregard for papal power can be seen with regard to some political events, such as the crusade or Church union. Catholic kingdoms, particularly France, repeatedly heeded papal calls for military action in the East, then failed to deliver on their promises. Funds which had been raised to finance campaigns to the East were co-opted into domestic spending, and entire campaigns were re-directed toward local interests, such as the Hospital crusade, which never moved past Rhodes, in 1310. Churches in union with the Catholic Church were happy to accept the authority of the papacy in principle but were much less willing to change their practice accordingly. Despite repeated complaints about the Armenians, and assurances by the Armenian Church that it would enforce Catholic practice, there is no evidence for any change in practice. The papacy may have been seen as a legitimate authority for Mongol negotiations but, in practice, it appeared

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1 Ludolph von Suchem, Description of the Holy Land, pp. 2–3.
unable to bring about any changes as a result of these negotiations. No alliances with
the Ilkhans emerged, nor was the papacy able to curb the Horde’s ambitions in
Eastern Europe in the mid-fourteenth century. Institutions may have recognised the
authority of the popes but, in practice, the papacy had little leverage to enforce
action if other parties did not cooperate.

This is not to suggest that the papacy was entirely helpless; its authority was
sufficient in many cases to ensure action. When challenged over its trading
practices, Venice obeyed the papal edict and ceased trading with Alexandria in
1326. The papacy was able to encourage and direct substantial activity in the
Aegean, including taking the extra-ordinary step of directly contributing forces to
naval operations there. It was able to command the diplomatic cooperation of
European powers in extra-European negotiations and provided diplomats for secular
kingdoms. The funds it was able to raise for crusade financed several campaigns
around Europe during the period, including that of Peter I of Cyprus to Alexandria
in 1365, and provided some material relief to Catholic powers and allies in
Mediterranean. The financial infrastructure of the Church, the threat of spiritual
sanctions, and the widespread acceptance of papal authority bestowed a certain
degree of power on the papacy, and it was able to act on some of its ambitions.

The most substantial failing of papal power was largely unrelated to the
acceptance of its authority, and was tied to the papacy’s precarious political and
financial state in the fourteenth century. The papacy in Avignon, beset by financial
difficulties, conflict in Northern Italy, and unreliable allies, was unable to deliver on
the promises it made to foreign powers. This significantly hampered its efforts at
pursuing the crusade, Church union, and reform in union Churches. In negotiations
with the Armenian, the Byzantine, and the Serbian Churches, reform and recognition
to Latin standards carried the price of material aid from the Latins. The papacy was,
particularly in the Armenian and Byzantine cases, unable to provide that aid to the
satisfaction of the supplicant party, preventing union from going any further. The
papacy was unable to police the shipping routes to the Muslim world, preventing it
from enforcing its controls on trade, and could not provide enough of a military
contribution to all but the smallest crusades, effectively removing itself from the
strategic planning. The papacy’s reliance on others in place of its own direct power
was the single greatest factor in most examples of a failure of papal policy, and even
the substantial recognition of authority it had was insufficient to overcome this obstacle.

Overall then, the papacy demonstrated a sustained interest in the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the Avignon papacy and was actively involved in a number of ways. These interactions revealed a complicated interplay between the authority claimed by the papacy, which was largely recognised and respected by Christians, though less so by non-Christians, and the power the papacy was able to exert. The power of the papacy was insufficient to force its will on any group that was unwilling to cooperate and, consequently, there is a clear link between the respect afforded to papal authority and what it was able to achieve. Recognition of the papacy’s authority did not always directly lead to an increase of the papacy’s power, however, as the papacy lacked the mechanisms to enforce its will and often lacked the resources it needed to capitalise on the recognition of its authority. Thus, where the papacy exerted a high level of both power and authority, it was largely due to shared interests, where the papacy could rely on external support to ensure the success of the policy. Policies which fell into line with the interests of local partners were particularly successful, furthering this idea that the papacy was relatively powerless in practice but was still able to command authority and achieve a surprising amount in spite of its lack of ability to directly enforce its will.

This project has sought to break through the divisions between single disciplines to create a macro-scale understanding of the papacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, using a quantitative approach to inform its arguments, and it has been able to qualify existing arguments and suggest new models for other areas as a result. For example, analysing the number of letters pertaining to individual crusades has been used to reassess the importance of the Aegean campaigns to the papacy prior to the 1344, highlighting the independence of the theatre. Using many points of comparison allowed a comprehensive analysis of papal intentions and the papacy’s ability to act on those intentions. Rather than treating aspects of papal policy in isolation, this comparative approach has allowed the thesis to develop a broader understanding of how the papacy pursued policy, as well as its overall aims for the Eastern Mediterranean, in a way which is easily lost when only considering a smaller set of issues. It has shown a clear link between the ambitions of the papacy across all fields and similarities in its perception by others. The papacy maintained
very distinct policies relating to different geographical areas and interactions, and overstating the importance of these individually overemphasises the importance of specific events which were uncharacteristic in the wider scheme. This thesis has allowed more general conclusions to be drawn from papal activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, supported by multiple case studies and fields, about what the papacy wanted from the East, and what it was able to get. The papacy was consistently involved in securing and expanding its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, maintained widespread recognition of its authority over many issues, and was able to succeed in some of its projects despite its own lack of direct power.

This thesis is more than a survey of papal history in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, and has provided an assessment of the power/authority relationships between the papacy and the many different actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. This evaluation of power has demonstrated a nuanced interplay between the papacy and the contemporary actors with which it interacted, and what its place was in the diverse and dynamic social, political, and economic environments of the Mediterranean. By comparing the outcomes from multiple different activities over which the papacy claimed authority, its wider effectiveness can be evaluated in a more precise way. This study of power would not be possible without such a wide exploration of topics, which is possibly why power dynamics have only been tangentially mentioned in other scholarship.

The wide remit of this project also allowed for a large quantity of data to be consulted. Even in its incomplete state, the number of letters in the papal registers for the Avignon period pertaining to the Eastern Mediterranean is approximately 1,300 in the *Registra Vaticana* alone. Many of these letters were already known individually, but as a collection they have not been used to inform a study of policy. Individual letters cannot be used to prove papal intentions, and policy requires the use of large numbers of letters to establish aims over a sustained time period. In this respect, the thesis has added to the existing evidence base for papal activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, and explored a more holistic interpretation of policy using multiple themes.

Caution must be taken in using the papal archives as a dataset. The collection is fundamentally incomplete, and this means that any conclusions will always leave room for doubt. To an extent, this is true of all medieval archives; they are so far
removed temporally from the creation of the letters that physical damage, neglect, and trauma have destroyed parts of every medieval archive, and the Vatican collection is no different in this respect. The multiple recompilations of the archive make it extremely difficult to account for this loss and it is not even entirely clear when the registers we currently have were copied. Nevertheless, the volume of data available in the Vatican Archives is enormous and provides an extensive resource for the history of the Eastern Mediterranean.

This project has used the French School editions of the papal letters as its main source, and corroborated and expanded from the originals wherever possible. This involved surveying over 100,000 letter entries to establish those relevant to the Eastern Mediterranean. Many of these letters were already known, but the broad scope of the project and a fresh survey of the evidence has allowed new information to be used to inform the understanding of papal policy to the East. Unfortunately the manuscripts are not easily accessible, and the registers of some pontificates are better edited than others. John XXII’s registers are almost entirely edited, though the secret letters are still partially unedited, while for those of Clement VI or Innocent VI, for example, the entire set of registers of common letters has not been edited. While this information gap can be bridged to an extent with other equally, if not more, selective editions, such as the Franciscan archives published by Wadding, there is no way to establish systematically what is missing. This issue presents scope for further research to refine the available evidence, and without reliable, comprehensive editions, all studies involving papal evidence from the archives must remain, to an extent, limited.

As research progressed on this project, it became apparent that there were several avenues that could be explored further. One area which has been particularly neglected is the later years of Innocent VI’s pontificate, particularly his activities with the East. As his registers for the years 1358–60 have not had a good rate of survival, little is known about his period, which has led many scholars to simply assume that nothing happened. Based on the events leading up to those years, and the hints of activity in them found in other texts, however, it would seem that further investigation is warranted, including further study of the existing registers for that time period, and analysis of alternative sources.
Another avenue opened by this thesis is the potential to explore further how the papacy interacted with the wider world. The thematic scope of this project necessitated that it was quite geographically limited in comparison to the extent of activity occurring beyond Europe, and it would be a logical extension to consider how the papacy was exercising authority and power in the Baltic, the Maghreb, and deeper into Asia. Given the predominantly Eurocentric approach medieval studies has traditionally taken, this would be a valuable addition to the wider discussion about the extent to which the world outside Europe experienced a medieval period in the same way as Europe, as well as help relocate Catholic Europe, and the papacy as an international institution, in a global Middle Ages.

One other, quite different, call to further research that arises out of this project is the issue of incomplete editions of the registers. As long as the registers remain partially edited, all scholarship attempting to establish the papacy’s actions and intentions cannot utilise all the existing information. The current state of editing has taken a huge amount of effort over a century and still remains incomplete, yet support for a full editorial project is limited. The methodology this project has used has highlighted this as a particular issue for large-scale data comparison, and as technology makes it easier to make those comparisons, so too can it make it easier to edit the documents. A digital humanities project using high-resolution images of the archives and sophisticated palaeography software could conceivably produce relatively accurate, machine-searchable editions of the entire medieval holdings. Though it would need substantial work to ‘learn’ the hand used in the registers, the benefit for the wider scholarly community of such a project would be huge and would have a transformative effect on the availability of papal material to scholars.

Consequently, it is clear that there is further research to do, both to solidify the methodological grounding of future projects and to expand our understanding of the place of medieval Europe in global history. Nevertheless, this project has taken important steps towards expanding the tools available to medievalists and in contextualising European history in a larger setting. It has explored the papacy’s use of power on the edges of its influence and evaluated how this affected relations between Europe and the wider world. As modern discussion on the Middle Ages continues to largely circle around Western Europe, it is ever more important that the position of Europe in the world be contextualised to allow a fuller understanding of
global systems in the past. Narratives which privilege a non-dynamic view of the Middle Ages need to be challenged, and this project has shown that interaction and exchange between Catholics and non-Catholics, supported by the papacy, was the norm in the fourteenth century, not the exception.
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