Passions On Trial: Early Modern Passions and Affections in John Milton and Paradise Lost

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‘Language is but the Instrument conveying to us things usefull to be known. And though a Linguist should pride himself to have all the Tongues that Babel cleft the world into, yet, if he have not studied the solid things in them as well as the Words & Lexicons, he were nothing so much to be esteem’d a learned man, as any Yeoman or Tradesman competently wise in his Mother Dialect only’.

- John Milton, *Of Education*

‘La plupart des occasions des troubles du monde sont Grammairiennes’.

- Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*, 2.12
**ABSTRACT**

*Passions on Trial: Early Modern Passions and Affections in John Milton and Paradise Lost*

This dissertation is about Milton’s moral vision of the passions in a century that thought passions were the difference between a free body and a materially determined body, justified knowledge and error, paradise and hell – in short, the difference between a virtuous life and an enslaved soul. In what has been called an ‘affective turn’ within literary studies, *Passions on Trial* adds to the growing body of scholarship characterized by a fascination with early modern agency, passions, senses, humour, and the body, and proposes that the next turn points towards ethics. My dissertation contributes to the field of knowledge by providing the first full-length study of Milton’s thinking on the passions throughout his life. It argues that seventeenth-century passions help develop Milton’s concepts of matter and knowledge, agency, and ethics. It reveals the surprising semantic narrative of caution mixed with confidence: Milton’s life-long silence with the Latin term *passiones*, his hesitation to mention the moral miscreants until the start of his political career, and the all but final disappearance of affections in his later poetry.

Part I addresses two problems in secondary literature’s treatment of the early modern passions and body. The first problem is the ‘problem of dualism’, which assumes that early modern passion and reason after Descartes gradually became opposites and could be mapped out across the updated, modern emotion-reason model. Milton’s blended picture of passion and reason contradicts this assumption and indicates a Miltonic preference for animated monism. The second problem, or the ‘problem of materialism’, assumes that since the material body was a mixture of Galenic liquids, it lacked strong evaluative autonomy. Yet Milton’s portrait of the passions as agency-ridden, miniature ethical agents overturns this assumption and reveals that physiological discourses were part of what it means to make knowledge-claims. Part II examines the relationship between passion and reason in *Paradise Lost*. It examines the poem’s affective vocabulary and the importance of ‘desire’, observes the literary function of reason in Satan and Adam and Eve, analyses the political images for passion and reason exposing Milton’s anxiety towards certain models of self-governance, and explores what Milton’s rational passion of love means for human ethics.
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Russell Square, London
September 2016
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

I declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. Its presentation is original work and has not previously merited an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.

Sections of material in this dissertation’s ‘Introduction’ and ‘Chapter 1’ have been published under Review Article, Karis Riley, ‘Eating, Sensing, Feeling: Affective Studies and the Fall into Ethics’, Renaissance Studies (13 November, 2015).

Parts of ‘Chapter 4’ have also been presented as a conference paper at the University of Sussex ‘Literature and Philosophy, 1500-1700’, July 2015.

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For ease of reference, citations from the Bible will be from the King James Version; except where a scholarly point is affected, in which case I cite ancient and English versions as appropriate.

In advance of completion of the Oxford Milton, no complete edition of Milton’s Latin and English works exists apart from the Columbia edition. I have therefore used the Columbia edition where appropriate, but where the Oxford edition exists I have preferred it. In some cases, where a point of translation in the Columbia edition is misleading, I have preferred the Yale edition.


I have silently modernized the early modern ‘f’ with ‘s’.
INTRODUCTION

THE FIELD OF ‘AFFECTIVE STUDIES’

If the number of books on early modern passions, senses, embodiment, and the humoural body is a suitable way of measuring a ‘turn’ in literary criticism, then a turn has happened.¹ At the outset it may be useful to ask why the subject of early modern affect has attracted so many disciplines and fields for over two decades.² Renewed attention to the concept of emotion may in part belong to a reaction against New Historicism and cultural materialism that inevitably turned the self into a ‘necessary fiction’.³ While this methodology stressed the importance for understanding context and sought to persuade schools inclined to think that words and close-reading were sufficient processes, New Historicism generated a form of cultural determinism by embedding the self in inextricable networks of political, religious, and social power-structures, eliminating the possibility for the self to transcend, or to at least have some consciousness of the cultural matrix and do something about it. The possibility for Renaissance selfhood seems to have re-emerged with discussions of interiority: the picture of the leaky, humoural body and the emotions as bodily responses and evaluations to an external reality then readily supplied


² The question is timely. Smith, Watson, and Kenny, The Senses in Early Modern England, 219, attempt to answer why there has been an increased interest in the study of the passions in early modern studies. So do Cummings and Sierhuis, The Passions and Subjectivity, 5.

³ Goldstein, Eating and Ethics, 7.
advocates with ways of thinking about, and restoring self-determination (to some degree), to the early modern subject.  

Others have attributed the turn to lexical sensitivities that began to track the differences between passions and emotions. Though literary historians hold the assumption that a universal category of ‘emotion’ exists, shaped as it is by cultural practice, they remain divided as to whether different vocabulary gives rise to different phenomenology. The fascination with words as a way into the body is related to the ‘call for historicized accounts’; in this case, scholars under the sway of Wittgenstein’s theory of language examine how linguistic meaning develops in, and is particular to, culture and context. But this view of language also identifies a shift away from theories of meaning towards a concept of language that prizes how words do something as well as say something, and what actions agents intend to perform through them.  

Approaching the body through language has motivated other critics to investigate the relationship between literal and figurative language. This introduces questions of physical experience, the perceived limits of language, and the flexible status of sensory terms in the early modern period. The interest in words also appears linked to questions of Renaissance epistemology: whether language was believed to correspond to real externals, whether it was adequate in describing physical experience, and how early moderns reacted to the unstable boundaries between the literal and metaphorical. These questions are not new to studies in the history of the affect. Scholars such as Gail Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson in *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, as well as more recently in Katherine Craik and Tanya Pollard in *Shakespearean Sensations*, reveal that despite the decline in Galenic physiology and belief in the literal, humoural, liquid body, much contemporary vocabulary still uses humoural language metaphorically. Thomas Dixon’s *From Passions to Emotions* acknowledges the shift from a literal to figurative status in the term ‘passion’ – once viewed as a physical movement in the sensitive soul and now confined to an adjective or noun that describes violent, lustful moods or actions. He argues persuasively that these terms belong to different frameworks for understanding human personhood and agency.

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7 Paster, Rowe, and Floyd–Wilson, *Reading the Early Modern Passions*; Craik and Pollard, *Shakespearean Sensations*.
8 Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, 1–25.
Yet in reality, the ‘affective turn’ has been inaugurated by a plurality of motives, many of which share similar themes: the fascination with the concept of the human, what makes human experience distinctive and rich, and how cultural practices alter phenomenology from century to century. There is also an interest in the origins of modernity. Galenic physiology has become, for some, a marker in identifying historical shifts. For others, who are less enthused about our ability to identify ‘epochal shifts’ based exclusively on attitudes towards the body, passions or senses, the subject provides an opportunity to critique linear narratives by showing that later traditions did not abandon these sensory values. These differences exhibit conflicting attitudes towards history, interpretation, and whether an idea can be ‘transhistorical’ even as it is culturally specific.

But if it is no longer unusual to encounter a book on passion, sensation or physiology, the subject continues to carry distinctive problems. Thus to ask what the field is, exactly, is more difficult. The presence and diversity of such scholarship has left critics puzzled about how to describe the preoccupation that has spanned the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Literary historians have deployed a range of terms, such as the ‘bodily’, the ‘humoural’, and the ‘affective orientation’ in an effort to unite the various approaches into a single way of talking about this sub-category of literary studies. The noun itself is no less able to dispel the affair with philology. Is the contemporary concentration a ‘shift’, a ‘turn’, or a ‘reorientation’? Might this even be a ‘return’ to early modern affectivity? The fact that critics have wrestled to find language that is adequate to represent their own method and interests highlights the complications of the field, which has an appealing way of attracting what initially feels to be an eclectic grouping of disciplines and departments into a similar landscape. With such fluctuation, diffusion, and overlap of fields, the status and location of affective studies on the intellectual map remains an important conversation.

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9 See Moshenska discussion of this in Feeling Pleasures.
10 Moshenska, Feeling Pleasures, 1–9.
11 Goldstein, Eating and Ethics, 8.
12 For lack of a comprehensive term, I have chosen ‘affective’ and its variants to describe the sub–field that covers a range of subjects and disciplines.
13 Although this is beyond the scope of this introduction, the 1980s were marked by a rise in emotion studies in analytic philosophy. See Robert Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1976).
But at a broader level, the interdisciplinary nature of affectivity, as it sits uncomfortably at the crossroads of recognized specializations that we label comfortably as literature, philosophy, theology, politics, art history, or gender, has also made the discipline of literature itself an uneasy category: one that resists a naive concept of genre, and one that has the potential to destabilize the boundaries between theoretical and literary texts. In turning to both Renaissance poetry and natural philosophy for discourses on the body and its interaction with objects and other persons, affective studies and overlapping companion subjects have challenged literary critics to reconsider what they think is an appropriate or serious site for a discussion of affectivity. If early moderns explored human experience and passionate feeling in poetry, medical texts, culinary recipes, and philosophical treatises, why do literary historians tend to elevate one kind of text as more significant than another? This pattern of entitlement and disavowal of literature at the expense of philosophy is an old habit with a long history. Yet presuppositions have been challenged in related attempts to study literature and philosophy side by side. Stephen Fallon criticizes A.J. Lovejoy’s ‘unit-ideas’ framework for marginalizing literature as derivative or as a ‘dilution’ of philosophical texts.\(^\text{15}\) Christopher Tilmouth, rightly critiquing Quentin Skinner’s interaction with speech-act theory that has unconsciously compromised literature as the handmaiden of philosophy, suggests a ‘complementary’ alternative that would restore literary and theoretical texts to equal status through the partnership of ‘shared moral imagery’.\(^\text{16}\)

The study of the body and its passions thus draws and forces interactions between a number of disciplines, and therefore has the capacity to sharpen the way literary historians think about how language works upon a reader. In challenging how and what critics decide is ‘literary’, affective studies has been useful in revealing preferences for locating ‘objectivity’ outside of ornate, rhetorical, poetic language and within discourses considered to be more ‘rational’. Linked to this preference is the tendency to make distinctions between doctrine and poetry based on supposed contrasts between ‘rational, analytic thinking’ and ‘imaginative, poetic thinking’. Thus, this field has exposed many of literary criticism’s unspoken biases. In taking up affective studies as a subject that claims its home in history, theology, analytic philosophy and medicine, literary studies is compelled to articulate and clarify its distinctive approach and contribution to the subject.


THE IMPACT OF ‘AFFECTIVE STUDIES’ ON MILTON SCHOLARSHIP

Milton studies have also been swept up in the momentum of literature’s ‘affective turn’. This has led to the expansion of Milton scholarship in several directions: humouralism and embodiment, melancholy, the passions, cosmology and environment, grief, rhetoric, drama and tragedy, classical reception, politics, marriage and sexuality, humanness, sensation, and ethics. This dissertation is about Milton’s idea of the passions. It is therefore concerned only with certain aspects of early modern affect. As my title suggests, Passions on Trial is the story of the passions in Milton’s canon and context, and the story that is presented to us in secondary literature.

Miltonists have long recognized the importance of the passions to Milton’s imagination. John Leonard’s reception of Paradise Lost scholarship in his landmark Faithful Labourers records an interest in the passions as early as 1751 in Samuel Johnson’s Rambler, whose entry discusses the effects of sound and pronunciation of Miltonic words on the ‘passions of the mind’. The topic of passions resurfaces again in twentieth-century Paradise Lost criticism in questions concerning Adam and Eve’s internal motivation for the Fall and in gender differences; this reading however, typically thought of ‘passion’ as pre-Fallen ‘sexual desire’


and not as a subject in its own right.\textsuperscript{20} The subject of passions disappears underground for a time, but then reappears in Modern Philology (1972) in John Arthos’s exploration of the importance of passions for grasping the motivations and actions of human agents in Milton’s Samson Agonistes.\textsuperscript{21} Twentieth-century scholarship thus reflects how the term ‘passions’ can take on meanings of violent, impulsive, and sensual motions as well as maintain allusions to Renaissance faculty psychology. This reveals the word’s displacement, its capacity to straddle different conceptual frameworks, and its ability to muddy lexical waters for contemporary early modern scholars.

Early modern rhetorical studies that have been shaped by research into the passions have inadvertently paved the way for placing Milton’s rhetorical practices in historical context. Debora Shuger’s Sacred Rhetoric, for example, explains that the Renaissance’s innovation in rhetoric shows how the Christian ‘grand style’ gave a place for ‘passionate discourse’ as it was considered to be distinct from mere sophistry.\textsuperscript{22} Jameela Lares’ Milton and the Preaching Arts highlights Milton’s accommodation of seventeenth-century sermon discourse, noting that Milton’s angels in Paradise Lost Books 8, 11, and 12 use ‘homiletic discourse’ to ‘mov[e] the passions’.\textsuperscript{23} She reminds us that Milton speaks of passions in The Reason for Church Government (1641), An Apology Against a Pamphlet (1642) and in Of Education (1644), and observes that it was common practice in sermon manuals of Milton’s day to ‘stir the passions’. Margaret Olmsted’s The Imperfect Friend builds on Paster, Jacob Scodel, and Richard Strier who had argued that historical and cultural contexts produced distinct emotions.\textsuperscript{24} Her study reveals that Milton was aware of multiple frameworks available for persuasion (Aristotelianism, Humanism, Stoicism, Neoplatonism), that he was ‘deeply concerned’ about ‘how to move the will and emotions towards good without forcing them’, and how he often held these different


\textsuperscript{24} Olmsted, The Imperfect Friend: Emotion and Rhetoric in Sidney, Milton and Their Contexts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 6. She affirms that her work builds on Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, Reading the Early Modern Passions; Jacob Scodel, Excess and the Mean in Early Modern Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), and Richard Strier’s “Against the Rule of Reason: Praise of Passion from Petrarch to Luther to Shakespeare to Herbert” in Reading the Early Modern Passions, 23–43.
traditions in contradictory ways. Daniel Shore suggests in *Milton and the Art of Rhetoric* that, in contrast to Victoria Kahn, Milton did not approve of expelling all passions in *Samson Agonistes* by viewing them as ‘politically debilitating’. He instead remarks that some passions, like fear, may be useful for politics.

Milton’s political context, too, has been impacted by research on early modern attitudes towards the passions. Christopher Hill’s *Milton and the English Revolution* suggests that the Fall in *Paradise Lost* was Milton’s response to the English nation’s failure in the Revolution. He further suggests that Jesus in *Paradise Regained* was ‘subject to human passions and anxieties….His success where Adam failed was the triumph of reason over passion’. The statement is more of a casual remark, as he does not intend to develop this idea nor state whether Milton used the image of reason and the passions to critique political structures. Andrew Milner in *John Milton and the English Revolution* carries the allusion further to show that the Fall was caused by ‘passion’s triumph over reason’. He makes the Fall a broader moral category by teasing out the parallel Milton makes between the loss of internal freedom and the loss of external freedom. More generally, Victoria Kahn’s *Wayward Contracts* examines the discourses of contract and political obligation. Her work does much to connect discussions of passions, natural appetites, and faculty psychology to seventeenth-century anxieties for the conditions surrounding a subject’s ability to give proper ‘consent’.

But the study of the early modern passions has been deeply influenced, if not dominated by, the emphasis on the Galenic-humouralist paradigm. Several literary historians have argued that the early modern interest in Galenism emerged in connection with early modern court society and noble behaviour which developed increasing expectations for bodily control and emotional mastery. Gail Paster’s *The Body Embarrassed*, which encouraged a reading of the ‘leaky’, ‘uncontained’ pathological body, is one of a vast range of scholarship that examines the early modern body from the point of view of materialist psychology in Galenic medicine. At

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25 Daniel Shore, *The Imperfect Friend*, 16
30 For scholars who discuss the influence of Norbert Elias’ *The History of Manners* (1939) see Paster *The Body Embarrassed*, 16, and Olmsted, *The Imperfect Friend*, 6–7.
the outset of this dissertation, it is worth highlighting the polemics clearly dividing the early modern affective field. The writings of Gail Paster, Katherine Rowe, Mary Floyd-Wilson, and on occasion, Michael Schoenfeldt, are often seen as advocating staunch ‘psychological materialism’ that has shaped concepts of early modern emotion and selfhood in misleading and overly simplistic ways.\(^{32}\) This group faces a number of charges, but most complaints can be distilled into three basic concerns. The first concern is with their picture of passions as irrational, and therefore as distinct from reason. The second concern finds fault with their picture of the body and its passions as passive. Most importantly, the third concern proposes that their emphasis on ‘corporeality’ makes the body victim to the whim of its material environment, which is a contradiction to many thriving early modern traditions set on defending, explaining, and imagining uncompromising and vivid forms of agency. Critically, these concerns respond to implications of Paster’s account rather than to any direct or explicit articulations. In fact, Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson on several occasions defend themselves against such accusations by describing their position as the exact opposite.\(^{33}\) However, even ‘implications’ of their account have been enough to trigger volumes of scholarship.

This dissertation is situated inside the reaction to ‘psychological materialism’ and Paster’s vision of the body and its environment. Rather than arguing against explicit or direct assertions, this thesis challenges the attitude, tendency, or drift into material determinism set up by the false hope that early modern subjectivity is primarily explained in terms of humoral physiology. More specifically, it reacts to the fluid, liquid images bound up with the hydraulic, humoral model of the body, where the self is pictured as mechanical, organic, impersonal, pantheistic, and neatly absorbed into the matter of the universe. Instead this dissertation aims to impress a picture of the self that is distinct from its environment and other creatures, and in some ways, foreign to its natural surroundings. Early modern materialism, and the stuff of the body, was not only about proper liquid functioning and its correspondence to the natural world. For early moderns, conceiving of materialism and the material body was also to hope for proper living and to find ways of clarifying, and setting apart, one body from the next. Essentially, this hope was tied up in the search for what it means to be human rather than animal, or to be an agent rather than a stone.

\(^{32}\) For Schoenfeldt’s work, however, as an important exception to this trend, see below. See also Cummings and Sierhuis, *Passions and Subjectivity*, 1–5; Angus Gowland, ‘Melancholy, Passions and Identity in the Renaissance’, *Passions and Subjectivity*, 75–76.

\(^{33}\) In the first place, they argue that early modern passion and reason are not as opposed as moderns assume, 7, 12; they also contend that passions are active as well as passive, 12–15, 18, and that body parts are described with affective agency (see Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 1–22); to the third concern, they express that they uphold agency but want to show how the body inhabited an ontological network of relations, 116–117, 134. All cited in Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, *Reading the Early Modern Passions*.
Returning to the main argument, however, Galen has indeed been crucial to understanding the early modern body and its passions in the literary field, in so far as these explorations have identified the Renaissance fascination with the limits of bodily control in light of its passivity, recovered the importance of classical medicine, and renewed an appreciation for the body as a material object. But again, the emphasis has ushered in a rebellion against this unilateral perspective of passions. Scholars have noted how this reading of Galen implies material determinism, which sets up the material body to be a footprint in the sand, helpless against internal impulses and external impressions. Literary historians have also criticized this emphasis for neglecting other early modern frameworks for understanding the passions.

In this way, the first reaction to the Galenic medical emphasis in Milton studies has come, not by giving up Galen, but by reinterpreting Renaissance attitudes towards Galen and carving out some breathing room for ethics and agency. Michael Schoenfeldt’s *Bodies and Selves* operates within a humoral paradigm by analyzing how the humoral subject was related to the rest of the material world, but as one who could ‘remake’ herself through each meal. He thus explores the early modern ‘consuming subject’ and how the practices of eating and defecating were ethical exercises indicating the existence of early modern agency and selfhood. Food, according to Schoenfeldt, is central to Milton’s pre- and post-Fall vision of morality.

Schoenfeldt’s discussion of Adam’s ‘Commotion strange’ further softens the implications of Paster’s account of the passive body and initiates a specific discussion about Milton and the passions. He argues that prelapsarian ‘feelings’ are central to Milton’s vision of Edenic ethics. By highlighting theological visions of good passions in pre-fallen persons in Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Wright, Schoenfeldt reveals how Eve’s dream scene complicates prelapsarian innocence. He finds Milton exploring whether human beings could be predisposed to fall through their passions, which resurrects uncertainty for his poetic theodicy.

Douglas Trevor in *The Poetics of Melancholy*, Brian Cummings’s ‘Animal Passions and Human Sciences’, and Brian Cummings and Freya Sierhuis’s *Passions and Subjectivity* also suggest a broader understanding of Galen: one that shows Milton was aware of seventeenth-century opponents of free will who used Galen to support determinist-materialistic theories—and therefore placed

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34 Cummings and Sierhuis, *Passions and Subjectivity*; Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves*, 11, stresses ‘the empowerment that Galenic physiology and ethics bestowed upon the individual,’ in contrast to New Historicism that emphasises ‘the individual as a victim of power’.
36 Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves*, 159.
39 Schoenfeldt, “‘Commotion Strange’”, 56–57.
physiology in a moral context—and one that reads Galen as negotiating room for emotions in both body and cognition.40

But the second reaction to the Galenic emphasis within Milton studies and within literary history more generally, has been to look beyond humouralism. Christopher Tilmouth’s Passion’s Triumph Over Reason examines other models of self-governance available in seventeenth-century moral psychology. His chapter on Paradise Lost marks ‘two moral languages’ at work in the poem: the Augustinian ethic of governance (expressed by Adam and Eve’s moments of intuition in knowing the good) and the Thomist ethic (expressed by Milton’s soul faculty terminology, and the occasions when Adam and Eve think and weigh critically before the Fall). He carries forward Schoenfeldt’s discussion of Adam’s disturbing prelapsarian passion in Book 8. Where Schoenfeldt concluded that prelapsarian passions were necessary to Milton’s Eden, Tilmouth hesitates to assign either a positive or negative account of passions to Milton. More broadly, Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan’s The Renaissance of Emotion and David Goldstein’s Eating and Ethics have also looked to other early modern frameworks for constructing early modern passion theories.41

Thus in approaching the field of Milton studies after the ‘affective turn’, the reader may observe three important conclusions. First, agency or choice is central to understanding Milton. Second, Milton used a multiplicity of frameworks to explain this agency: Milton the animated monist countered Hobbesian attacks on free will, Milton the ‘neither-nor’ but ‘something-in-between’ monist-dualist found a way to preserve freedom, Milton the Galenic eater maintained self-assertion, Milton the ambivalent Augustinian and Thomist employed both frameworks for self-control, Milton the classical rhetorician adopted a range of persuasive frameworks to encourage free action, and Milton the political writer proclaimed the English nation would stand or fall by such agency. Third and finally, passions and the body are nearly always present in each expression of early modern agency.42

This dissertation builds on the seminal work already accomplished for Milton and the passions and looks to overturn three assumptions about early modern passions: first, that passions are similar to emotions; second, that passions are divorced from reason and therefore irrational; and third, that passions are passive. While these assumptions are slowly being overturned in literary studies, and in related disciplines they are often absent, these attitudes remain for debate in Milton. The two-part thesis thus observes two problems with secondary literature’s treatment of the passions and the early modern body and how an alternative understanding of the passions influences the reading of Paradise Lost. With this argument comes the observation that there is a growing recognition of the importance of early modern ethics inside the ‘affective turn’, and so anticipates an ‘ethical turn’ for literary studies.

Part I aims to challenge the three assumptions by highlighting two modern problems in current scholarship on the passions through a historical, contextualized analysis of Milton's prose and verse. Chapter 1 examines both problems in close detail. The first problem, or the ‘problem of dualism’, is the way in which scholarship has assumed that Descartes initiated the separation between body and mind, and therefore created rational and irrational mental sectors. This has consequences for the passions, such that passions are divorced from reason and therefore irrational. I argue that the misunderstanding about differences between emotion and passion has, for some literary historians, led them to see passions as earlier but similar objects to our current emotions, and has led them to read an emotion-reason separation narrative into accounts which does not always occur with passion and reason in the seventeenth century. The second problem, or the ‘problem of materialism’, is the assumption that the early modern humoural body is mostly a material residue. Stripped of strong self-activating agency, the medical-humoural approach tends to treat the body as passive and mindless. Chapter 2 therefore analyses how Milton’s blended account of passion and reason stands at odds with the ‘problem of dualism’ and how this can be explained by his materialist monism. But rather than argue that Milton is a pure materialist, I show how Milton’s monism is a material continuum between denser material substance and lighter spiritual substance, which gives the human subject some degree of free will against Hobbes’ materialism and inevitable determinism. It also examines how Milton’s classical and medieval sources for his vocabulary of the passions is fraught with
ontological positions on materialism and immaterialism and how this anxiety is marked in Milton by the strange, linguistic tale of appearance and silence regarding certain terms. The chapter finally discusses the passions’ status as literal or figurative language. This has been the litmus test for Miltonists who claim Milton was either dualist or monist: did early moderns use literal language to explain physical phenomena they saw and felt, but also turn to metaphorical language for describing how the body and its internal agents could mutiny against reason's command? Whether literal or metaphorical, I argue that Miltonic images show that he envisions a moral body, which is something more than a mere organization of passive, lifeless, material elements. Chapter 3 challenges the second modern problem, or the ‘problem of materialism’, that elevates the medical-humoural approach to the early modern body and thereby reduces the body to little more than a liquid, anatomical machine. But such a deterministic reading disconnects the period’s physiological discourses from the epistemological concerns that first motivated bodily explorations. Chapters 2–3 of Part I are thus deeply interrelated: by showing how reason and passion converge in some early modern theories of passions, I argue that early modern monism could reignite material substance with agency, cognition and morality. This, then, restores the cognitive body to its moral context and indicates that the material body was connected to questions about knowledge. Chapters 2 and 3 therefore look at how Milton's materialism and epistemology say something about his understanding of the passions and how Milton’s passions are integral to his concepts of matter and knowledge.

Part II looks specifically at passions, reason and materialism in *Paradise Lost*. Chapter 4 examines the affective vocabulary in Milton’s epic poem. His surprising use of the term ‘desire’ which outranks his use of ‘passion’ seems to affirm Susan James’ conclusion in *Passion and Action* that a philosophical-linguistic shift occurred mid-century through Descartes, Hobbes and Locke. Chapter 5 contributes to Milton studies by suggesting the need to study passion’s neglected partner, reason. It investigates the poetic unmaking of reason in Satan and in the human couple and analyses Milton’s political metaphors imagining the relationship between reason and the passions. Chapter 6 returns to Milton’s mixed affective theory blurring boundary lines between reason and passion and its outworking in the poem with his concept of love. The chapter also focuses on the startling absence of the term ‘affection’ in *Paradise Lost* and what this might indicate about the materiality of Miltonic passions in Eden and in the higher Paradise.

Such then are the contours of this thesis. It should be noted that I do not venture very far into the relationship between passions and politics. While I imply that Milton’s interest in reason and passion are connected to conversations about politics in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 and indeed even use Milton and Joseph Hall’s political pamphlets as primary evidence for the
argument in Chapter 3, I end there. The reason for this limitation is one of focus: treating passions and politics together explores how passions forge relationships; it is more concerned with how passions act as the mechanism relating individuals together in society and how these inter-social relations hang together in a delicate exchange of contracts. But this thesis focuses on the nature of the passions themselves and what they do and mean to an individual, rather than what they do to a collection of individuals globally. For similar purposes, I exclude the large and important category of work on early modern rhetoric and Milton’s ethical vision for poetry and sermonizing. This is because rhetoric is concerned with the relation between speaker and ‘other’, and the impact of words on hearer or reader. This thesis does not so much aim at developing interpersonal theories, as it does understanding how early modern passions were central to thinking about substance and knowing in individuals.

It is also true that the thesis makes no attempt to define what emotions are, nor whether passions correspond exactly to modern phenomenology or experiences. It goes without saying that this would require a different thesis, one hoping to bridge contemporary and historical research in order to establish conceptual continuities and divergences. This research, however, rarely departs from Milton’s own century and lifetime. But the flexible use of both ‘Renaissance’ and ‘Early Modern’ throughout shows that I acknowledge how this field is engaged in significant dialogue about historical shifts and the onset of modernity. I also defend this limitation by evidencing how secondary scholarship considers emotion to be irrational and thus opposite to reason, and by showing how this reading has influenced attitudes towards early modern passions.

Another noticeable omission is that the thesis does not address the importance of the passions to theological conversations in the period, and the central concerns with free will, the Fall, the role of grace in sanctifying inordinate affectivity, religious enthusiasm, and concepts of hypocrisy. Such theological questions, of course, are often seamlessly part of natural philosophical discourses and medical treatises. But this thesis does not involve major figures other than Aquinas and Augustine, such as Erasmus, Calvin or Luther, nor how these latter divines influenced Edward Reynold’s theory of the passions. Scholars often view Calvin as hostile and negative to passions, but important scholarship is at work in rehabilitating a more

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45 For the intersubjectivity of the passions, see Cummings and Sierhuis, Passions and Subjectivity, and Kahn, Wayward Contracts.
46 See Riley, ‘Eating, Sensing, Feeling’.
47 This is challenged by Dixon, From Passions to Emotions and Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994).
48 For Milton’s context in the enthusiast, anti-enthusiastic debate, see Jeffrey Shoulson, Fictions of Conversion: Jews, Christians, and Cultures of Change in Early Modern England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), esp. ch.5. For research on early modern thinking about widespread emotional disturbance and its origins in the Fall, see William Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 24, 183.
positive historical understanding of affections inside Puritanism. In a related way, this thesis side steps a comprehensive study of other important intellectual traditions on the passions on the Continent. At times it does, however, draw attention to Descartes, Coëffeteeau, Gassendi, and Senault, but these quotations are used without elaborating their historical, religious, philosophical, and political contexts.

Within theological Milton scholarship, passions have also opened the door to early modern prayer. In *Eikonoklastes*, Milton grounds his objections to liturgy by arguing that true prayer requires the presence of the affections. Recent work has investigated the distinctions between private and public prayer, bodily conditions required in the performance of prayer, and the conflict over medium—poetry or prose—as a site for devotional literature. Ramie Targoff in *Common Prayer* places Milton’s statements in the conflict between Puritans pushing for original, spontaneous prayers to replace the *Book of Common Prayer*, and Richard Hooker’s defense of liturgy in *Laws*. By exploring King Charles I’s self-representation of solitude in *Eikon Basilike*, Erica Longfellow’s chapter in *Private and Domestic Devotion* shows how Milton’s radical ‘individualist model’ of prayer opposed mainstream opinion that still valued public prayer for the cultivation of proper emotions. Most recently, Naya Tsentourou’s work has determined that sighs and groans in the praying body were understood as literal, descriptive phenomena in both natural philosophy and prayer manuals. Since groaning could be both the corporeal manifestation of passion, as well as the ‘cognitive’ expression of the will, her work has helped intellectual historians reconsider the boundaries between ‘mental’ and ‘physical.’

Her forthcoming *Bodies at Prayer: Milton and the Early Modern Devotional Culture* provides the first book contextualising Milton’s contributions to the prayer polemics.

Finally, this thesis does not try to solve the ambiguous boundary line between Renaissance literal and figurative language. While it remains deeply interested in assumptions

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50 One early study is Levi, *French Moralists*, who examines how the humanist Renaissance Florentine tradition influenced neo-stoic theories of passions from Guillaume du Vair to Descartes. For a more recent study that looks to recover the importance of the neglected Dutch vernacular literature during the Arminian controversy, see Freya Sierhuis, *The Literature of the Arminian Controversy: Religion, Politics, and the Stage in the Dutch Republic* (Oxford: OUP, 2015).


about language and how this shapes modern preconceptions of genre and the grouping of texts, it only aims to challenge ‘literal’ and ‘metaphorical’ contemporary readings as straightforward. It understands that there was no one way of talking about early modern passions and that perhaps this ambiguity over literal, material passions and figurative, immaterial, abstract passions provided some thinkers with relief from accusations of heresy while redeeming the vision of created moral matter.55

THE GREAT PARTNERSHIP: A METHODOLOGY FOR LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY

Milton’s passions are a concept standing at the intersection of philosophical, theological and literary modes of writing and thinking. It therefore requires an approach that accommodates dialogue between both theoretical and literary texts so that the passage of ideas may travel in both directions. Here then literature is not the by-product, decorative outcome, or repackaging of historically robust philosophical analysis, but is itself a contributor to, and influencer in, the realm of ideas where philosophers tread. In this view, literary texts and not only theoretical texts are themselves a form of language concerned with analysis, persuasion and the cultivation of beliefs. Such a method avoids what Tilmouth has called the ‘subordination’ of literature to philosophy, and Fallon, literature’s ‘derivation’ of philosophical ideas. The elevation of philosophy over literature is the result of a misplaced confidence in the capacities and achievements of philosophy as an intellectual process. N.K Sugimura’s immensely detailed research in Milton’s matter exemplifies this attitude when she asserts: ‘contradictions abound in…poetry, and this is to be expected since things happen in epic that do not occur in systematic philosophy’.56 It is the apprehension that prose and theoretical language is the primary stance of a thinker and that poetry is an afterthought, the belief that one version of verbal arrangement and grammar can sweep aside ambiguities and incoherencies, and the resignation that poetry is the mere ‘literary representation’ or painted face of philosophical ideas, which is perhaps responsible for seeing this form of language as secondary, diluted, and derivative.

The intellectual historians who have contributed to this understanding should not be seen as encouraging a systematic persecution of literature, however. Lovejoy’s ‘William James Lectures’ in the early twentieth century have deeply resonated with various fields in pursing the question, ‘from whence do ideas come’? His ‘history of ideas’ method has been helpful for

55 Donnelly suggests that Milton’s Paradise Lost could be read as dualist or Hebrew monist to keep up appearances with orthodox views while also giving clues to the subtle reader, “‘Matter” versus Body’, 81.
investigating why some mental habits and not others inhabit the human mind and exert influence over a generation, for asking why similar ideas appear stretched across different periods of time and location, for examining the genetic relation between ideas in order to think about what we mean when we say ideas ‘share’ something or are ‘similar’, and for attempting to set criteria to discern when an idea has sufficiently evolved enough from its parent to become a stranger.\footnote{A. J. Lovejoy, \textit{The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936), 1–27.} Yet his method has been criticized for ideological determinism that blows out the candle of creative, authorial originality, since every thinker must turn to the basic, barely altering stock of ‘unit ideas’ that cause later ideas.\footnote{Lovejoy, \textit{The Great Chain of Being}, 1–27; Fallon, \textit{Milton Among the Philosophers}, 16–17.} Likewise, Skinner’s approach put literary and philosophical texts into interdisciplinary conversation through the concept of ‘direct forms of address’.\footnote{Tilmouth, \textit{Passion’s Triumph}, 8, and Skinner, \textit{Visions of Politics}, 1: 2–3.} His appropriation of speech-act theory to the history of human writing is important for asserting the rationality of human agency in speaking and writing and for offering a way of securing authorial intentionality. This critically establishes that authors will write with purposes in mind, and with motives to shift and convince other agents from particular evaluative viewpoints. However, Skinner’s method has been challenged by literary historians for denying inconsistencies and contradictions even in the best of rational agents, for valuing tidiness over textual ambiguity and tension, and for prioritizing a theory that is better suited for dealing with aural utterances, visible body language, and emotional overtones infused in communicated speech, than with the written words and inaudible texts of dead authors.\footnote{I am grateful for Tilmouth’s paper ‘Early Modern Literature and Moral Thought’ for these insights.} Skinner’s method has also been challenged for (unintentionally) making literature a ‘respondent’ to philosophical texts in a one-way relationship, in virtue of its ability to only reflect or allude to philosophical positions instead of being able to initiate or construct serious and ambitious philosophical positions.\footnote{Tilmouth, \textit{Passion’s Triumph}, 7–9.}

Thus, diverse fields have been pulled by an implicit undertow into mounting conflict over what is considered ‘literary’ and ‘philosophical’ as each discipline acknowledges that early modern philosophy and poetry were simultaneous sites of early modern thinking about the body.\footnote{There are too many to list. An abbreviated version would include Cummings and Sierhuis, \textit{Passions and Subjectivity}, Moshenska, \textit{Feeling Pleasures}, Tilmouth, \textit{Passion’s Triumph}, and Goldstein, \textit{Eating and Ethics}.} As mentioned earlier in my introduction, there have been recent departures from the view catapulting the superiority of philosophy over literature. It could be said that philosophy is slowly being recast as ‘literary’, as it too is composed of language and imagery. This dialectical approach to reading and interpretation has been developed within literary studies, intellectual history, and the history of philosophy. Sugimura describes poetry and philosophy as two modes
of similar processes, thinking and writing; Tilmouth links literary and theoretical texts through ‘shared moral imagery’, where literature works indirectly through ‘pre-rational’ language or assumptions that change a society’s ‘imaginative context’, while philosophical texts influence explicitly through ‘rational argumentation’; Fallon supports poetry’s original contribution to early modern philosophical debates; and Tom Jones’ volume emphasizes the circular, mutual influence between poetry and philosophy in the Enlightenment since both mediums ‘share the same beliefs’ yet differ only in approach.63

This thesis adopts the methodology of circular exchange while also addressing some areas that need further clarification in the approach. In studying Milton’s concept of the passions, Milton’s poetry and prose naturally take up conversation with philosophical, theological, early modern scientific, and medical texts on the body and soul, matter and substance. This textual interaction happens in Parts I and II. The major divide between parts marks different emphasizes on temporality and text: Part I mainly investigates the influence of Milton’s context and contemporaries on his notion of passions across his lifetime; Part II is distinguished by close-reading and the impact of traditional classical and medieval philosophical theories of passions exclusively in Paradise Lost. In light of this structure, it might be argued that I undermine the very methodology I claim to support: using literature as a vehicle or expression of philosophical ideas. I respond, however, that I have chosen to examine only what Milton wrote about the passions in his prose and poetry, to discern sources and influences on his thought, and to point out similarities or allusions between phrases or language in Milton and previous writers on the passions. However, to avoid objections that would claim I subject Milton to historical, ideological determinism, I also point out moments where Milton seems to be revising or departing from so-called traditional theories. But the reason for moving only in one direction, where ideas from earlier thinkers show up in Milton’s work – and not in two directions, where ideas from previous theories leave imprints on Milton and where Milton’s thought also impacts contemporary and future philosophers – is again circumscribed by the need for concentration: to first grasp Milton’s thinking on passions before setting out to argue how Milton’s poetry influenced, say, Locke’s image of the passionate-rational human in his theoretical Two Treatises of Government (1689). This is inevitably the vice of a dissertation that must first be a thesis and not a book.

But in sympathizing with the two-way exchange between literature and philosophy, I end with some observations. The case for restoring literature and philosophy to equal status,

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63 Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph, 9; Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 16–17; Tom Jones and Rowan Boyson, eds., The Poetic Enlightenment: Poetry and Human Science, 1650–1820 (London: Chatto & Windus, 2013), 1–19, 64.
where both are seen as belief-triggering mediums that develop, sustain, and deliver ideas to their culture, has been adequately argued by a number of literary historians and philosophers. The grounds for connecting both texts has been to articulate what they both have in common: root-images of moral personhood, beliefs, or their nature as modes. Acknowledging how both forms work their effects differently has also not been overlooked: shared moral imagery in literature is pre-rational while theoretical works are rational, beliefs in literature differ from those same beliefs in philosophy because of approach or presentation, and the literary mode differs from the philosophical medium. But the difficulty with arguing that moral images found in literary texts are ‘pre-rational horizons’ and that those found in theoretical texts are ‘rational arguments’, seems to (unintentionally) make literature again something sub-rational, something less than, or prior to the stage of rationality that marks philosophical writing, supporting the myth that philosophical prose is the purity from which all other writing descends. This thesis unfolds from the premise that the difference between literary and philosophical texts is not one of varying degrees of rationality, since reason is actively involved in constructing the imagination and the imagination also plays a role in constructing reason. Both imaginative poetry and analytic prose are thus rational endeavors that aim at producing certain beliefs and strive towards a particular vision of the world. In this they both are teleological, and deeply concerned with ends. What divides them is the form they take to cultivate this vision and to arrive at those ends. Above all, they are specific forms of language set on moving their readers towards those visions. Thus, having made an argument for why the two should be kept in partnership, what is needed now, perhaps, is a study that explains distinctions and offers descriptions of how the two forms are unique linguistic bundles that contribute to the history of ideas.
PART I
1 Dividing Reason from Emotion, Denying the Knowing Body: Two Problems in ‘Affective Studies’

1 THE LITERARY EFFECTS OF ‘AFFECTIVITY’

In the past two decades of the ‘affective turn’, there have been two interrelated problems in critical explorations of early modern passions. The first problem can be called the ‘problem of dualism.’ The problem, on the one hand, is characterized by assumptions about a historical shift that happened in the mid-seventeenth century which created pre- and post-Cartesian halves of history and divided the mind into irrational and rational outposts. Pre-Cartesian life was the era of the humoral body, where passion and reason were materially embodied and intertwined; the post-Cartesian period saw the gradual and inconsistent separation of the material body and passions from higher, cognitive processes like judgment, willing, and reasoning and set a trajectory for modern dematerialization.1 This narrative of historical transition and the mental division between rationality and irrationality had good intentions. It can be seen as part of the attempt to explain our current situation with ‘emotion’, which is considered to be the antagonist of pure reason and therefore physical, non-cognitive, and involuntary.2 But this attempt failed to differentiate conceptually between ‘passions’, ‘affections’, and ‘emotions.’ By assuming that early modern talk of reason and passion is identical to the current reason-emotion dichotomy, this early attempt neglects how some versions of passions could be rational and voluntary.3 Thomas Dixon in From Passions to Emotions has shown that passion and reason carried on a lively relationship in the aftermath of Descartes, and that it was only nineteenth and twentieth-century discourses on the body and the evolution of distinct psychological terms like ‘emotion’ that began to recast all affectivity as irrational and involuntary.4

On the other hand, the ‘problem of dualism’ is characterized by assumptions about language. This follows from the historical shift model that argues the Cartesian turn divided mind from body and created immaterial and material outposts in the subject. In this view,

1 Paster, Reading the Early Modern Passion, 1-17; their source is Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self that claims to have identified a shift to modern cognitive life in the second half of the seventeenth century, when the mind became sealed off from environment and became accessed inwardly. For other examples of this view, see Sullivan, Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment, 6–7; Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, 8; Hillman and Mazzio, The Body in Parts, 99; Paster, The Body Embarrassed, 2–22; For Dixon’s assumptions about Descartes and his aftermath, see From Passions to Emotions, 78.
2 Solomon, The Passions, 1-11, 25-26, is one of the earliest reintroductions to emotion studies.
3 Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 1–9. This is Dixon’s point about the equation between emotion and passion in four of ‘the most interesting books on the subject’: James’ Passion and Action, Solomon’s The Passions, and Richard Sorabji’s Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: OUP, 2000). Dixon however acknowledges that James does not treat passions and emotions as synonyms.
4 Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 13. For his discussion of the problem of ‘presentism’ where historians of psychology and philosophy who have fallen into the trap of thinking all historical theories are treated as part of twentieth-century psychological discourse, see 13-18.
materially real passions of the body were, after Descartes, eventually seen to be immaterial and mental, and therefore metaphorical.\textsuperscript{5} Again, this assumption has been helpful in so far as it attempts to account for the way in which our language for mental concepts retains aspects of humourality and yet is considered to be metaphorical.\textsuperscript{6} Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson urge post-Cartesian readers to resist the impulse to read early modern passions figuratively and to instead ‘literalise’ them by upholding the ‘materiality of the passions’.\textsuperscript{7} But this quotation reveals the literary and historical preference for making literal language refer only to actual, material objects, and figurative language refer only to abstract, immaterial or fictional concepts.\textsuperscript{8} These deep tensions between literal and figurative language in secondary scholarship also plagued the seventeenth century: early moderns grappled with what they saw and felt, and used literal language to explain physical phenomena. But they could also turn to another kind of language to describe how the body could turn against reason’s command. While the passions were literal movements of the sense appetite and associated with liquid humours, they were also described as internal miscreants with an ethical life of their own.

The second, related problem can be called the ‘problem of materialism.’ As a consequence of the ‘problem of dualism’ that reads of a seismic divorce between passion and reason, body and mind, and literal and metaphorical language after Descartes, the second problem has been to reduce early modern descriptions of the body to little more than a humorally liquid salt-shaker.\textsuperscript{9} The dominance of the medical-humoral approach has read the body and its passions through the lens of Renaissance revivals of Galenic humorism.\textsuperscript{10} In doing so this reading has underestimated the degree to which physiological discourses grew out of, and were motivated by, moral concerns and epistemological anxieties that saw matter as cognitive and free.\textsuperscript{11} The body was not a mere material mass but an ethical agent inhabiting a

\textsuperscript{5} Schoenfeldt, \textit{Bodies and Selves}, 8; Hillman, \textit{The Body in Parts}, 99; Paster, \textit{The Body Embarrassed}, 7–12.

\textsuperscript{6} For the post-Cartesian movements ‘towards abstraction and dematerialisation’ see Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, \textit{Reading the Early Modern Passions}, 16-17, 116-117, 134-135.

\textsuperscript{7} Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, \textit{Reading the Early Modern Passions}, 16. They do not make it clear whether materializing the passions also materializes reason. But see Richard Strier’s chapter in the same volume, ‘Against the Rule of Reason: Praise of Passion from Petrarch to Luther to Shakespeare to Herbert’, 24. He argues that St. Paul’s understanding of ‘flesh’ and ‘spirit’ where not Platonic but monist. Even while encouraging a literal reading, Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson remain more nuanced than is sometimes reported: passions are ‘in between literal and metaphorical, internal and external, environmental non-naturals but also internal messengers or porters — vehicles that transverse the Cartesian division between physiology and psychology’, 18.

\textsuperscript{8} For examples of this tendency see Dixon, \textit{From Passions to Emotions}, 78.

\textsuperscript{9} This is implicit rather than explicit in Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, \textit{Reading the Early Modern Passions}, as their version of humouralism seems deterministic.

\textsuperscript{10} Paster, Rowe, Floyd-Mary Wilson, \textit{Reading the Early Modern Passions}. For more examples of humouralism, see my Introduction.

\textsuperscript{11} One exception is Rowe, who discusses passions and epistemology by arguing that Shakespeare’s plays were part of theatrical education in virtue, ‘Humoral Knowledge and Cognition in Davenant’s \textit{Macbeth},’ \textit{Reading the Early Modern Passions}, 169–191. Cummings and Sierhuis, \textit{Passions and Subjectivity}, aim to evidence that early modern passions belonged to explorations of self-knowledge and identity.
moral universe, itself a site of interacting miniature ethical agents. The activities of these internal agents were in some senses independent from, and potentially anarchist to, the whole.

Chapter 2 will respond to the ‘problem of dualism’ by showing how Milton’s blended picture of reason and passion conflicts with readings separating reason from passion along the lines of a rational-irrational schema. This reveals there were on-going, influential psychophysiological frameworks integrating passion and reason in the seventeenth century after Descartes. Chapter 2 also challenges the division between literal, therefore material, and metaphorical, therefore immaterial language in secondary literature. The status of metaphorical and literal language in Renaissance senses has recently been explored in Joe Moshenska’s scholarship on traditionally the lowest, and in many ways, most misunderstood sense of touch. Milton’s language for the passions and affections displays similar tensions found in early modern sensory language, and I point out this conflict to show how Milton’s monism complicates our understanding of figurative language. But the dependence on metaphor in secondary literature for deciding Milton’s dualism cannot make sense of Milton’s imagination about matter, where his picture for the passions as bodily, personal agents seem to be Milton’s way of explaining, and alleviating, the inevitability of moral error. Even if literary critics dismiss these images as purely metaphorical, that is ‘fictional’, Milton’s language for the passions does not seem to treat these bodily motions as mere representational pictures, but more like real and active components of the moral body. Chapter 3 will respond to the ‘problem of materialism’ by showing that Milton’s vision of matter is cognitive in order to evidence that even Galenic humoralism was connected to epistemology. Far from decrying the body as space neatly entrenched in, or strongly influenced by, the material environment, the passions present a picture of subjectivity that is less about humoural churning liquids, and more about a variety of agents at work inside the overall agent who is also the subject performing visible actions.

This introductory chapter steps back to lay the groundwork for Chapters 2 and 3 by highlighting these related problems in the secondary literature. I then acknowledge how some recent attempts redress these problems. I also offer selections from Milton’s prose and poetry to suggest why the study of materialism and epistemology is critical for responding to the ‘problem of dualism’ and the ‘problem of materialism’ and for expanding Milton studies within the ‘affective orientation’. The complexity and tensions in Milton’s canon also merits a timely discussion of the problems in historicising an author and whether ‘linear’ and ‘circular’

12 Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, 18, nuance their position by including essays that challenge post-Cartesian divisions: ‘the second group of essays invite us to imagine the early modern embodiment of emotion in terms that challenge post-Cartesian divisions between thought, soma and world’. Stephen Fallon’s classic work on Milton’s monism is about Milton’s ontology.
accounts are appropriate models for authorial agency. Finally, I suggest that Milton studies and early modern affectivity is on the precipice of a turn into ethics, as literary historians increasingly realise the morally-charged atmosphere behind the early modern impetus to write about the passions, the body, and matter.  

II  THE FIRST PROBLEM AND EMERGING RESPONSES

In many disciplines, scholarship on the early modern passions has tended to maintain sharp distinctions between passion and reason. Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson in *Reading the Early Modern Passions* contend that the integrated view of emotion and reason is a recent development when they write how a ‘time-honoured division of the mind into rational and emotional sectors…has been set aside by newer connectionist, cognitive models of the brain’, which relate to the history of a ‘binary of voluntary/involuntary’ views about the human will.  

In the same volume, Michael Schoenfeldt overturns the suspicion that Milton is a pure rationalist by acknowledging the central place he gives to ‘feelings’ and love in paradisal Eden. But he concludes that Milton’s terminology highlights a separation between reason and feelings, remarking that the latter were ‘both a product of and alien to the creature they inhabit…external influences on health and behaviour….involv[ing] any feeling by which the mind is powerfully affected or moved’.  

Historians of science and philosophy have suggested that the underlying assumption that contemporary terms like ‘emotion’ can be mapped onto accounts that deal exclusively with concepts like ‘passion’ is responsible for creating these distinctions in our thinking. Schoenfeldt writes this way by claiming

> Plato in the *Timaeus* was among the first to locate what we would call emotions in bodily organs. He lists what he terms ‘pathemata’ by name, ascribing the rational part of the soul to the head, the soul’s faculty of courage and anger to the part of the body near the heart ‘between the diaphragm and the neck’, and desire to the lower part of the body…But emotion, or what is called in the early modern lexicon ‘passion’ or ‘affection’, was frequently linked to disease…

Garrett Sullivan in *Sleep, Romance and Human Embodiment* also assigns the division between  

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13 Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, 18, writes that emotion ‘has tended to be defined in an amoral way as an autonomous physical or mental state characterized by vivid feeling and physical agitation, the latter [passions] ha[ve] been defined in more morally and theologically engaged ways as a disobedient and morally dangerous movement of the soul…’.  

14 Gail Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd–Wilson, *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, 8.  

15 Schoenfeldt, ‘“Commotion Strange”’, 50.  

16 Schoenfeldt, ‘“Commotion Strange”’, 43–67; Cefalu, *Moral Identity*; Paster, Rowe, Floyd–Wilson, *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, 3; for some notable exceptions to this trend, see Cummings and Sierhuis, *Passions and Subjectivity*; Tilmouth, *Passion’s Triumph*, and James, *Passion and Action*, 16.  

17 Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves*, 8, 16.
reason and bodily faculties to the Cartesian historical moment. ‘The essentialist view [of the human]’, he states came to the foreground with Descartes, and divorced reason from the intellect, or will. This ‘essentialist’ view

Isolate[d] the operations of reason from other bodily processes; it treat[ed] cognition as abstractable from somatic operations...consequently, the essentialist view fail[ed] to account for the ways in which humoural physiology sutures cognition to embodiment, and thus the rational to the sensitive and vegetative powers. In sum, the view is anachronistic and conditioned by Cartesian dualism, which posits a profound separation between mind and body.\(^{18}\)

Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson in \textit{Reading the Early Modern Passions} also exemplify the tendency to equate emotion with passion most clearly when they acknowledge the wide range of lexical variants for affective terminology, but conclude that ‘the Renaissance words that most closely approximated what we call emotion were ‘passion’ and ‘affection’.\(^{19}\) They cite Steven Mullaney who indicates that the word ‘emotion’ became a term for feeling in 1660.\(^{20}\) Wendy Olmsted in \textit{The Imperfect Friend} makes a similar identification, citing 1660 as the starting date for the use of the term ‘emotion’ from the Latin \textit{emoveo}, and using the \textit{OED} for her definition of ‘passion’: ‘any strong, controlling, or overpowering emotion, as desire, hate, fear, etc., an intense feeling or impulse’.\(^{21}\) This has since been contested by David Thorley who suggests ‘emotion’ began to take on meanings of internal, mental impulses nearly a century earlier.\(^{22}\)

Thomas Dixon expresses reserve about this modern tendency of historical ‘presentism’ that favours contemporary vocabulary over the language of the past:

The word ‘emotions’ is currently often used carelessly and anachronistically to refer to theories that were in fact about ‘passions’, ‘affections’ or ‘sentiments’. It should, instead, be restricted to those theories that are explicitly about ‘emotions’; there are important differences in nuance to all these terms that should not be effaced. The word ‘emotions’ is currently used too liberally…its reference needs to be narrowed.\(^{23}\)

The linguistic problem extends also to classical studies, in so far as translators struggle to transfer meaning from the Greek \textit{pathos} and Latin \textit{passio} into an English word that has the

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\(^{19}\) Paster, Rowe, Floyd–Wilson, \textit{Reading the Early Modern Passions}, 2. However, they acknowledge that passions had different intellectual maps.

\(^{20}\) Ibid. Steve Mullaney may be referring to Descartes’s \textit{Les Passions de L’Âme} published in both Amsterdam and Paris in 1649. In French the word \textit{émotions} had two senses, one being a synonym for passions. See Dixon, \textit{From Passions to Emotions}, 13, 20, 108–109. Dixon suggests that Hume may have picked up the term and carried it forwards into the English language. This has come under fire in the David Thorley, ‘Towards a History of Emotion, 1562–1660’, \textit{The Seventeenth Century} 28 (2013): 4; See alsoRuss Leo, ‘Affective Physics: Affectus in Spinoza’s \textit{Ethica}’, \textit{Passions and Subjectivity}, 37.

\(^{21}\) Olmsted, \textit{The Imperfect Friend}, 5–8, 12–13.

\(^{22}\) Thorley, ‘Towards a History of Emotion’, 4. He suggests ‘emotion’ with connotations close to mental states appeared as early as 1603 through an English translation of Montaigne’s \textit{Les Essais}.

\(^{23}\) Dixon, \textit{From Passions to Emotions}, 12.
capacity to convey an ‘ensouled’ and ‘embodied’ version of human nature. The status of ‘emotion’ in early modern England thus continues to generate controversy as to when it began to signify internal psychological states. Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan in *The Renaissance of Emotion* attempt to give reasons for the limited emergence of the term ‘emotion’ up until the late sixteenth century in England: ‘emotion’ implied something more like ‘upheaval’ than ‘passivity’, thus conflicting with historical terminology like the term *passiones* and connotations of passive responses instead of active assertors.

Although literary historians often write about passions and reason along the lines of a reason-emotion opposition, there is a growing recognition that the classical and early modern vocabulary of the passions and affections belonged to a different framework for understanding human personhood. Early modern passions were capable of bridging the mind-body gap between bodily, non-cognitive and non-bodily, cognitive features of an early modern subject in a way that the modern psychological category of ‘emotion’ does not. That is, while ‘emotions’ are perceived to be ‘disengaged, bodily, non-cognitive, involuntary feelings’, passions and affections could also be construed as voluntary and rational (though potentially rebellious) movements of the soul.

Dixon argues convincingly that ‘it [is] in fact the recent departure from traditional views about the passions…that led to the creation of a category of ‘emotions’ that was conceived in opposition to reason, intellect and will’. He notes further:

The reason-passion dichotomy was not so stark as…others sometimes suggest: within many traditional and Christian views there had been a place for ‘affections’ and ‘sentiments’, which in effect were potentially rational and virtuous passions….the reason-passion dichotomy was replaced in the nineteenth century by an even stronger intellect-emotion dichotomy….in the absence of categories such as ‘affections’ and ‘sentiments’ that bridged the gap between thinking and feeling, secular psychologies of emotions were left with a simple and sharp dichotomy between cognition and emotion.

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26 See Cummings and Sierhuis, *Passions and Subjectivity*, 5. However, Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, 1, show they are aware of this when they ask ‘are there early modern passions’? They discuss how Richard Strier, Michael Schoenfeldt, Birka Filipczak, and John Staines’ chapters demonstrate that the current tendency to separate reason from passion is inadequate, 7, 12, 18. As has already been mentioned in this dissertation’s introduction, Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson make these nuanced statements, and yet are blamed for cultivating an attitude of humoural determinism. That is because their chapters, highlighting ‘analogous material networks’ between the body and the environment, often depart from their original statements in the preface and later imply very limited notions of agency.

27 Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, 3.

28 Ibid.

29 Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, 17.
This indicates that the early modern mind-body structure did not always consider the cognitive and the bodily as separate substances but as potential allies, integral and necessary to the function of the other, intended to walk ‘hand in hand’. James in her magisterial *Passion and Action* concurs:

The standard opposition between reason and the passions…implies their irrationality…reinforced by descriptions which represent them as pathological, wayward, vicious, overpowering….there is, however, something ritualistic about these images since…the early-modern philosophers do not in fact regard the passions as relentlessly unreasonable. On the contrary, whether or not they classify passions as judgments, they agree that they are complex…

The recognition that early modern passions and reason do not coincide with our current model that splits reason and emotion has been helpful for rethinking the influence of Descartes, and the extent to which the mind-body separation immediately and permanently replaced all other models of the body. Joe Moshenska represents one recent defense of Descartes’s interest in the affective body by exploring early modern ‘tickling’:

It is difficult to turn around in the world of literary and cultural criticism without bumping into denunciation of Descartes as the villain in a story of emerging modernity, whose intervention led to the separation of mind and body, and the willful forgetting of corporeal experiences and pleasures.

But there are those who have ‘recently argued for a very different Descartes, “for whom suffering and desiring are also thinking”’. In what has been deemed a ‘cognitive turn’ in literary criticism, this nuanced understanding of affectivity negotiates room for emotions in both body and cognition. Passions are not disjointed from reason as purely material things of the body but are in some way part of reason itself. Likewise reason does not sit in a separate immaterial realm but is invested with a material nature. Other fields reveal the concern to end the feud between reason and passion. In philosophical studies Robert Solomon’s ‘Myth of the Passions’ seeks to correct the assumption of the antithesis between reason and the emotions, as does Anthony Damasio’s neuroscientific research in *Descartes Error*. Milton studies have increasingly begun to acknowledge reason and passion’s intrinsic relationship. James Turner’s

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30 James, *Passion and Action*, 160.
31 Cummings and Sierhuis, *Passions and Subjectivity*: Elizabeth Harvey, ‘Samson Agonistes and Milton’s Sensible Ethics’, *The Oxford Handbook of Milton*, eds. Nicholas McDowell and Nigel Smith, (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 656–658; Julie Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have a Soul: Understanding the Passions in Early Modern Culture’, *Rhetoric and Medicine in Early Modern Europe*, 195, places her article ‘hand-in-hand with cognitive theorists and neuroscientists that have ‘hammered away at post-Cartesian views concerning the separation of mind-body that have distorted our understanding of the contribution of bodies and passions in workings of the early modern mind’.
32 Moshenska, *Feeling Pleasures*, 177.
34 See Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, 52–53, for a discussion on the interaction between passions and reason in Thomas Aquinas.
**One Flesh** examines the Raphael-Adam scene in Book 4, arguing that Milton’s vision of ‘Wedded love’ derives from the Thomist vision of Paradise, one in which *passiones animae* could exist in ‘perfect harmony’ with reason.\(^{36}\) Earlier in his book Turner had inferred from Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei* that paradisal passions were not set against one’s will, but that the post-fall state created a ‘division between reason and emotion’ that characterizes the human struggle to live morally.\(^{37}\) Turner’s understanding of the fluidity between reason and passion in the prelapsarian state influences his reading of Book 5, where he argues ‘we recall that Adam “hung over [Eve] enamoured”’. This suggests, he thinks, that Milton crafted unfallen Adam to be

‘enamoured’ and ‘unlibidinous’ at the same time...glimps[ing] the possibility that in ‘right temper’ passion and love might be interfused rather than kept apart.\(^{38}\)

Turner argues that Milton wanted an innocent Adam to have an ability to maintain, simultaneously, both ‘passion’ (Turner’s word for sexual, bodily appetite) and love (Turner’s term for rational appetite). Tilmouth’s landmark *Passion’s Triumph Over Reason* also provides an excellent historical discussion of the various frameworks that shaped early modern concepts of self-control. He notes that the ‘familiar dualism’ of the late sixteenth century which was indebted to Platonism that gave rise to the psychomachic image of governance in Spenser’s *Fairie Queene*:

fallen man has ‘two natures’, mind and body, the one possessed of reason, the other of the passions which constantly ‘stryue to go before reason’, their rightful ruler.\(^{39}\)

Yet he also acknowledges a different, more integrated view of reason and the passions: the popular revival of Stoicism in the sixteenth century that divided the soul into rational and irrational parts, yet even allowed the passions to possess ‘reasoned or cognitive components’.\(^{40}\) Tilmouth considers the passions to be integral to Milton’s view of virtue in *Paradise Lost*, and observes the textual tensions as Milton explores Augustinian and Thomist explanations for the ways that reason communicates with the passions. He describes how

[Adam’s] own talk of ‘reason’ sometimes seems to presuppose an instinctive rather than a self-conscious mental faculty, one fluidly indistinguishable from the passions with which it interacts… yet…there is…another moral language at work in *Paradise Lost*, a much more Thomist one which distributes the responsibility for

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\(^{36}\) Turner, *One Flesh*, 277–78.

\(^{37}\) Turner, *One Flesh*, 51.

\(^{38}\) Turner, *One Flesh*, 280. See also John Leonard, *Faithful Labourers*, 685, who corrects the notion that ‘Love unlibidinous’ refers to ‘Sons of God’ and not to Adam and Eve.

\(^{39}\) Tilmouth, *Passion’s Triumph*, 16.

\(^{40}\) Tilmouth, *Passion’s Triumph*, 19.
self-determination equally amongst several mental faculties (the ‘passions’, ‘will’, ‘sensual appetite’, and ‘sovereign reason’).\textsuperscript{41}

Olmsted’s \textit{The Imperfect Friend} likewise argues that ‘emotions’ have cognitive dimensions in so far as they are considered forms of evaluation and appraisal.\textsuperscript{42} Milton’s ‘feeling’ of anger, as expressed by Satan and Abdiel, illuminates Olmsted’s definition: ‘when a person thinks he has been wronged, his spirit will ‘seethe and grow fierce’.\textsuperscript{43} Cummings and Sierhuis’s \textit{Passions and Subjectivity} has made important strides in recognizing the interconnectedness of reason and the passions by exposing the problem with secondary literature that assumes ‘bodily performances…are reducible and separate from the cognitive’.\textsuperscript{44}

Sensory studies have also been affected by the cognitive approach to the early modern body. In part, this is because the field of affectivity is interdisciplinary. Scholars who write about early modern passions invariably find themselves dealing with senses. But modern scholars owe their difficulty in finding ways to describe how ‘senses’ differ from ‘passions’ to early modern textual irresolution, where distinctions were also blurred. Although this thesis does not deal with the senses in Milton, it is worth noting that Milton can be frustratingly ambivalent in making distinctions between passions, affections, desires and senses. Indeed, sometimes he effaces distinctions altogether by using liquid imagery for both passions and senses. So we should not be surprised that sensory studies, as a sub-field within the broader field of affectivity, has also begun to contemplate how the senses are integrated with reason. Matthew Milner engagingly discusses the senses’ location in both the soul and bodily organs, observing how the pre-Cartesian mind ‘straddled our categories of the physical and psychological…[and] our modern models and terms tend to break down’.\textsuperscript{45} Craik and Pollard’s \textit{Shakespeare and Sensations} also challenges the alleged dualism that separates mind from body which locates ‘emotion’ only in the mental sphere.\textsuperscript{46} They write ‘our longstanding habit of separating bodily responses from intellectual reasoning has deterred critics from exploring their interdependence’.\textsuperscript{47} Most recently, Moshenska reflects this same concern in his chapter on Milton when he writes that ‘the human body and its senses…are not subordinate to reason but internal and intrinsic to it’.\textsuperscript{48}

Milton’s writings also resist the ‘low-level’ dualism of secondary literature by placing the passions and affections in both mind and body. Milton expresses the relationship between the affections and the body in \textit{An Apology}, where affections belong to our ‘frail mansion of

\textsuperscript{41} Tilmouth, \textit{Passion’s Triumph}, 192–3.
\textsuperscript{42} Olmsted, \textit{The Imperfect Friend}, 6.
\textsuperscript{43} Olmsted, \textit{The Imperfect Friend}, 129.
\textsuperscript{44} Cummings and Sierhuis, \textit{Passions and Subjectivity}, 3–5.
\textsuperscript{46} Craik and Pollard, \textit{Shakespearean Sensations}, 7.
\textsuperscript{47} Craik and Pollard, \textit{Shakespearean Sensations}, 4–5.
\textsuperscript{48} Moshenska, \textit{Feeling Pleasures}, 253.
flesh…ever unequally temper’d. But in his first prose tract, Of Reformation, the boundaries between the bodily and the mental are blurred:

…the body, with all the circumstances of time and place, were purifi’d by the affections of the regenerate Soule, and left nothing impure, but sinne; Faith needing not the weak, and fallible office of the Senses, either to be Ushers, or Interpreters, of heavenly Mysteries, save where our Lord himself in his Sacraments ordained.

If we assume dualism in this passage, the obvious dilemma is to explain how immaterial affections of the soul could interact with, and purify, a material body. ‘Affection’ in The Reason of Church Government also immediately resists simple demarcation into either lower/material or higher/immaterial parts of the soul. Milton writes, ‘…the church hath in her immediate cure those inner parts and affections of the mind where the seat of reason is…’ The picture thus grows more diluted as the site of these unruly affective movements is also ‘the seat of reason’. Here reason has an affective element to it, such that reason is not entirely separated from the lower realms of the soul but is an intimate participant. This also makes Milton’s description of the church’s task more complicated: if the connection between reason and the passions can be maintained, the implication is that even reason needs a cure and is not itself the antidote to unruly passions. Milton holds this blended paradigm in Paradise Lost, where he describes the appropriate version of the passion of love to be ‘founded in reason’ (4. 750–757) and later again to ‘hath his seat in reason’ (8. 585–591). But Milton’s rationalized passions also appear to remain intriguingly material, since touch first sets ‘passion’ in motion in both soul and body, which Adam describes as ‘Commotion strange’ (5. 858), and which makes even angelic cheek-substances blush.

Milton also frequently associates passions with humours in a way that he never does with affections. In The Reason of Church Government, the call for discipline requires self-knowledge that involves understanding the ‘hidden causes of all things’ and ‘the various effects

49 John Milton, An Apology against a Pamphlet call’d A Modest Confutation of the Animadversions upon the Remonstrant against Smectymnuus, CPWJM, 1: 909.
53 In the context, Adam reports that touch is superior to the other senses. The other senses ‘wor[k] in the mind no change’ (line 525), but the sense of touch also ignites this ‘Commotion strange’. Raphael describes that the proper kind of passion, love that ‘has his seat in reason’ still ‘the heart enlarges’ (8. 590). See Moshenska, Feeling Pleasures, 245–284, for a discussion on the interaction between passion and the senses.
that passion or complexion can worke in mans nature’. Yet for Milton it is also each ‘radicall humour and passion’ that, once corrected, is the ‘proper mould and foundation’ of individual gifts and virtues. By connecting passions and humours, and placing ethics within a physiological framework, Milton shows that virtue is not the absence of the passions nor the neglect of bodily motions, but rather a corrected material body. Milton also seems to imply that passions are somehow mental experiences, where the mind is something more than a biological register. In Paradise Lost ‘high Passions’ shake Adam and Eve’s ‘inward State of Mind’ (9. 1123–26). In Samson Agonistes Milton argues how Tragedy can ‘purge the mind of those and such like passions’. The poem closes with a brief glance at the aftermath, again suggesting the site of purging occurs in the mental realm: ‘With peace and consolation hath dismist / And calm of mind all passion spent’. However, John Sutton cautions against taking words like ‘mind’ and imposing modern concepts of the ‘mental’ onto them.

Milton’s canon thus threatens to leave the reader with irreducible complexity. Had he completed and published De Doctrina Christiana—or included a treatise of the passions in his section De Homine—our study could be more simple, or at least approached with greater clarity. But the fact that Milton never writes about passions and affections in a ‘theoretical’ account, or attempts any definitions like other affective writers, leaves literary historians with a vast array of English and Latin prose and poetry for exploring Milton’s thinking on the body, self-governance and ethics. As demonstrated above, what has been lacking in Milton scholarship is a serious attention to Milton’s own affective terminology: he never uses the word ‘emotion’. Intriguingly, Cyriack Skinner, writing after Milton’s death sometime before 1700, thinks ‘emotion’ an apt word to describe Milton’s final moments of life: ‘Hee dy’d in a fitt of the Gout, but with so little pain or Emotion, that the time of his expiring was not perceiv’d by those in the room’. So while some later seventeenth-century authors thought that the term was appropriate for human phenomenology—in this case, even for a culminating, democratic event like death—Milton did not. A linguistic study is thus critical to developing a picture of Milton’s moral imagination because the terms passio and affectus were themselves the loci of controversy. Very often these terms preserved historical ways of demarcating mainly physical responses of the body from higher, immaterial acts of the will.

Chapter 2 thus explores Milton’s terminology, set within the deeper historical context of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas and their reception in early modern England. It also explores Milton’s immediate, contemporary context as a poet and philosopher among affective writers both in England, such as Timothy Bright, Thomas Wright, Tobias Venner and Edward Reynolds, and on the continent, with Nicholas Coëffeteau. The vocabulary, entangled with linguistic ambiguities attempting to make sense of the early modern soul-body connection, also requires exploring how Milton’s position aligns with seventeenth-century philosophical debates concerning dualism and monism. Much work has already established Milton’s materialism and philosophical context among writers such as Hobbes, Descartes, and the Cambridge Platonists. Stephen Fallon’s seminal Milton Among the Philosophers introduced Milton as a poet-philosopher whose poetry and prose could also be viewed as a contribution to seventeenth-century debates on substance and matter. Fallon’s work is among the first to set Milton’s concept of substance in his contemporary context, and to argue for a movement from early dualism to later unambiguous materialism. Though he provides evidence from Milton’s 1640s prose to indicate his inclinations towards a monist soul, Fallon’s argument depends upon the transition from Platonism to hylomorphism to a clear, irreversible materialist monism by the late 1650s. The transition, Fallon thinks, was motivated by the political and ethical dangers of Hobbes’ mechanistic determinism. Milton’s response to the Hobbesian threat to free will was then to modify Galen in Paradise Lost and Aristotle in De Doctrina Christiana by making matter ‘tenuously corporeal’. In other words, even while accepting material foundations for all substances in relation to the ‘one first matter’, Miltonic matter differs from ‘spirit’ only by degree. In this way, Milton preserves human freedom. Noel Sugimura’s “Matter of Glorious Trial” revises critical assumptions alleging that Milton, the early Platonist, rejects dualism for Aristotelian hylomorphism and later materialism. This trend, she argues, thinks Milton relinquished immaterialism by the time of De Doctrina Christiana and Paradise Lost, reducing everything afterwards in Milton’s universe to material substance. Instead, exploring classical philosophy and Renaissance commentators, Sugimura shows how there are moments in Aristotle’s own thinking when the substance and matter of reason ‘shimme[r] with immateriality’ and that Milton would have read Aristotle in this way. Immaterial strands also appear in Milton’s linguistic practice and use of metaphor that undermine his drive towards materialization and consequential mortalism in De Doctrina Christiana. By arguing that Milton never fully commits himself to ‘monist materialism’, Sugimura thus charts non-monistic tendencies across Milton’s prose and poetry. Her research reminds us that the seventeenth-

59 I limit my study of non-English authors who worked in the area of the body and passions to Coëffeteau (and in other places briefly discuss Descartes), though there were other explorations taking place simultaneously in the Dutch seventeenth-century with Hugo Grotius, G.J. Vossius, and Samuel Van Hoogstraten. See Thijs Weststeijn, The Visible World: Samuel Van Hoogstraten’s Art Theory and the Legitimation of Painting in the Dutch Golden Age, trans. Beverly Jackson and Lynne Richards (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008).

60 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 100–105.

century camps were not straightforwardly either Hobbesian ‘materialist’ or Cartesian ‘dualist’. Milton’s materialism fluctuated between ‘poles of materiality and immateriality’. Therefore to make Milton either ‘dualist’ or ‘monist’ misreads his historical moment and the complexity of the subject.

Chapter 2 therefore continues the conversation, but uses Milton’s understanding of the passions and affections as a site for thinking about his materialism. In accepting a material mind and body, Milton’s writings introduce a number of textual tensions that come with this commitment to monism: there is an unresolved conflict in his thinking in how to explain free will in light of his thoroughly material picture of agency; in some sections in *De Doctrina Christiana* he asserts that God’s providence extends over the natural world and affections, while in other sections he claims that divine control cannot reach the affections. Examining Milton’s materialism also challenges historical thinking that villanizes Descartes for introducing a permanent philosophical change mid-century. Thus dualism was not the only explanatory framework as thinkers continued to turn to monism throughout the second half of the seventeenth century.

The chapter also questions underlying assumptions about metaphor, and the method that claims language is figurative when arguing for Miltonic dualism, but claims language is literal when supporting a materialist reading. This oversimplification fails to account for how pictorial language is sometimes the only way to describe or explain the physical object under consideration; the image is central to the meaning of the object, and not superadded as an afterthought. It neglects the idea that a metaphor could represent something materially real behind the image, but real in way that was not present to the senses or empirically verifiable by the speaker. The chapter also attempts to draw some conclusions about Milton’s intellectual trajectory: why he is silent about the passions and affections until 1641, why he never uses...

\[62\] Sugimura, “*Matter of Glorious Trial*”, xvii.

\[63\] In *DDC* 8.1: 320–322 (Chapter 8), Milton writes that God’s providence extends over ‘natural things, even things beyond nature, contingent or fortuitous events, and voluntary acts’. Under the section of natural things [*naturalia*], which includes water and wind, Milton argues that God changed the Egyptians’ attitude towards the Israelites (Exodus 3:21) ‘doubtless by changing their natural affections [*naturales nempe affectus eorum mutando*]’; later the disunity between Abimelech and the Shechemites (Judges 9:23) is also said to be caused by God sending an ‘evil mood’ [*affectum malum*] between them. But in *DDC* 8.1: 437 (Chapter 12), Milton limits God’s control only to ‘things natural, civil, indifferent, fortuitous – in a word, any things whatever – rather than in moral or religious ones. This is because the outcry against divine justice happens when God is said to ‘bend man’s will to moral good or moral evil’. There appears to be some conceptual conflict here. Milton located the affections in the ‘natural’ realm which remains within God’s sphere of influence in Chapter 8. Yet he also places the ‘will’ in a moral and religious category beyond the reach of divine influence in Chapter 12. There he writes that the will is involved in religious matters that are ‘under our control’ and ‘in some way in our power and choice [*potestate atque arbitrio*]’. There thus seems to be some affections in the ‘natural’ realm which God can sway, but other affections in the moral sphere which God cannot sway. It would take a fuller study to understand whether what Milton means by ‘natural’ is ‘material’. In any case, his attempt to distinguish between natural and moral affections seems motivated by a desire to locate agency in something other than the material, natural realm. Historical tradition had placed certain affections in the will and in reason itself.
Latin term *passiones* across his lifetime, and why ‘affection’ disappears in all but three instances of his final three poems.\(^{64}\)

While Milton’s moral vocabulary provides ways of mapping his ethical development as it intersects with seventeenth-century debates about materialism and self-governance, it also challenges current trends in critical attitudes towards historicising. In recent scholarship there has been a movement away from the commitment to ‘linear development’. The basic move is to look for a straight trajectory in the writing process, in which the early author discards embryo concepts and replaces them with later, better ones. But the process of belief acquisition, as some literary intellectual historians have observed, is much more gradual; it is also an inconsistent activity, since a person’s beliefs will never cohere perfectly with his or her other primary beliefs.\(^{65}\) In ‘*Matter of Glorious Trial*’, Sugimura espouses this position when she rejects Fallon’s idea of a ‘continuous intellectual genealogy’ in Milton’s concept of substance and matter. She instead uses an approach to capitalize on Milton’s ‘fluid intermediaries’ by combining intellectual history, or the ideas within Milton’s cultural moment, with literary criticism, or the way figurative language represents and expresses these ideas. In a similar method, the award-winning *The Young Milton: Emerging Author* opposes the ‘retrospective view’ of reading Milton’s later poetry as ‘mature’ and neglecting the earlier decades as ‘experimentation’. In Tilmouth’s phrase, the alternative to the stifling consequences of linear historicising is to search for ‘hidden continuities’.\(^{66}\)

Yet the inconsistencies and ambiguities in Milton’s thinking on the passions and affections present the literary field with tensions that challenge both linear and circular approaches to historical authorship. On the one hand, intellectual historians expecting continuities between the early and late Milton will be struck by the odd silence regarding the passions from his earliest compositions up until his public entry in prose with *Of Reformation* (1641).\(^{67}\) They will also find the all but total disappearance of ‘affection’ in his later poetry

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\(^{64}\) To my knowledge. He only uses *passio* twice in his discussion of common qualities in *Ars Logicae*, *WJM*, 11: 93. See this dissertation’s Appendix.

\(^{65}\) Christopher Tilmouth, ‘Early Poems and Prose: Some Hidden Continuities’, *Young Milton: Emerging Author 1620–1642*, ed. Edwards Jones (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 280–307, explains how ‘every human agent adopts the various political or theological beliefs…over time because he is able to map those opinions on to his more basic attitudinal perspectives, particular ways of seeing human nature and the world which are crystallized in that person’s habitual figurative language’, 281. His discussion is excellent as it identifies the underlying assumption shared by the three interpretive approaches to Milton’s early poetry and prose, and also provides a way of thinking about continuities between Milton’s pre-1637 poetry and his 1641–1642 prose. However, I am concerned about his attempt to distinguish ‘beliefs’ from ‘attitudinal perspectives’. How does a human agent acquire and access these ‘attitudinal perspectives’ that are more basic than others? It seems that attitudinal perspectives are a species of belief, but differ from other beliefs in virtue of being primary epistemic positions—beliefs of a certain kind that need to be held first in order to hold other secondary beliefs (i.e. the world is real and not an illusion, or ‘I’ exist act as foundational beliefs which enable other beliefs to be held). To clarify this there needs to be a distinction between first-order and second-order beliefs.


\(^{67}\) ‘Passion’ and ‘affection’ occur only twice each before 1641. Although dating is uncertain and cannot be securely placed before 1641, the term ‘passion’ also appears in Milton’s *Commonplace Book*, in *CPWJM*, 1: 364, in a full quotation from John Chrysostom, as well as in his *Trinity MS* ‘prepares Herod to some passion’, written sometime
disconcerting, which continues in Latin but slips out of his English vocabulary. The circular approach is thus troubled by the need to find concepts that are ‘shared’ or ‘similar’ between early and late. But the concept of ‘shared’ is problematic. An idea which intrigues an author early in life can reappear later, but in form and imagery so different that while it shares features with its earlier ideological self, it is in another sense entirely different. Further, the circular approach to historical authorship cannot completely abandon linear thinking. In other words, the circular approach is to some degree indebted to the idea of narrative, which is itself linked to the notion of progress and temporal structures that view time as a forward movement: the activity of human biography is to recount an ongoing story, with movement forwards between events. The sense that circular historicising cannot entirely forget the linear approach is also underlined by the literary philosophical question of what literature is and why we do it: what motivates human agents to write? Tilmouth, by suggesting that composition and thinking are intertwined activities which shape each other, states that literature is an attempt to make sense of the world. This seems true, in the sense that human authors do not bother with mapping out a coherent framework of beliefs through the process of writing only to convince themselves that they know nothing. And so literary historians’ discussion of belief acquisition is thus fundamentally attached to the concept of epistemic progress, the goal of arriving at coherent thought. Though a perfect web of beliefs is impossible for human agents with limited epistemological horizons, the presence of contradictions and inconsistencies across texts written by the same author seem to indicate, rather than dispel, the fundamental belief in epistemic progress. This fundamental literary assumption about epistemic progress seems to indicate that most human authors think that some epistemological clarity is possible, and that complete ‘ambiguity’ or ‘incoherence’ is neither permanent nor overly pervasive.

On the other hand, the linear approach looking for bold departures and movements cannot account for Milton’s startling consistency: he never uses the Latin term passiones. For a meticulous, word-coining, Latin-imitating writer such as Milton, the absence of passiones in a century that overflows with literature on the passions of the soul seems to tell the tale of caution, perhaps suggesting Milton’s recognition of his scholarly limits. Neither can linear historicising account for Milton’s textual irresolution by the end of his life. His hesitation in using certain affective terms rather than others in his final three poems intimates that his thinking on the passions remained in fluctuation, which could not be satisfactorily resolved in

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68 This section has attempted to challenge New Milton Critics like Peter C. Herman and Elizabeth Sauer, who resist the ‘gravitational pull toward unification in Milton studies’, or the ‘preference for certainty and stability in statements’. Instead they represent the deconstructionist perspective concerned to explore ‘textual moments of contradiction and ambivalence’ and ‘indeterminacy and inconclusiveness’. I accept the idea of multiple textual meanings, and that possessing contradictory beliefs is only inevitable, but I do not think this undermines the stability of a text nor epistemic certainty (to a level of reasonable certainty). See Peter Herman and Elizabeth Sauer, _The New Milton Criticism_ (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 9–12.
prose or poetry. I therefore suggest that both circular and linear ways of historicising are problematic, because these models are inadequate for explaining how ideas develop in the human project of writing and thinking. The literary field is bursting with such methodological questions about history, both on the larger scale, and in the life of a single human mind.

III THE SECOND PROBLEM AND REVISIONS

Having demonstrated how the first problem in modern literary studies presupposed a dualism in many early modern reason-passion accounts because of Descartes, a second, related problem has grown out of this assumption. In separating the body from cognition and examining the remains of a fleshly, leaky cadaver on the table for dissection, many literary historians have thus offered reductionistic accounts of the early modern body. This trend detaches early modern anatomical, medical and poetical texts on the passions and physiology from the ethical questions that first motivated these discourses. The devotion to Renaissance physiology has thus tended to portray a flat picture of agency by either reducing the early modern ethical body to a Galenic material leaky body—increasingly bound to the physical realm under the extending shadow of Hobbes’ mechanist materialism—or, as has been observed above, by assuming Descartes introduced a strict and permanent dualism between mind and body. But over the past decade, many literary historians have expressed dissatisfaction with the dominance of ‘psychological materialism’, or the medical-humoural approach that has hung over affective studies since the time of The Body Embarrassed.69

While Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson’s research on the humoural body has been helpful, increasingly the field has been marked by a different reading of the early modern body and its passions. This growing trend stresses that early moderns did not view the body as a collection of anatomically leaky physical parts, but rather as a mode of existence endowed with ethical commitments and moral concerns.70 One such corrective is Tilmouth’s Passion’s Triumph, which attempts to ‘overcome the homogenous view of the early modern passions and physiology’ by connecting the passions to models of ethical self-governance.71 Most recently, a similar approach has been developed for Shakespearean studies in Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan’s The Renaissance of Emotion. Describing it as the ‘further phase in early modern literary studies and emotion’, the editors build on the work of Galenic humouralism but also

69 Paster, The Body Embarrassed; see Goldstein’s reaction to Paster, Eating and Ethics, 13.
70 Schoenfeldt’s research is a noticeable exception to this tendency as he pervasively acknowledges the deeper issue of passions’ intrinsic connection to the Renaissance moral imagination. In Bodies and Selves, 11, for instance, he acknowledges how the body as a ‘consuming subject’ was a ‘facet of morality’. See also Schoenfeldt’s ‘Temperance and Temptation: The Alimental Vision in Paradise Lost’, Bodies and Selves; see also Schoenfeldt, “Commotion Strange”, 43–67.
71 Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph, 7.
assert its limitations: ‘questions bound up with emotion could not be answered solely through humoureal medical knowledge’. David Goldstein also reflects this rising concern in *Eating and Ethics*: ‘humourealism was only one among many available models of physiological embodiment, and…[this] study considers the eating body from a multiplicity of perspectives’. The field of sensory studies has also been moved to counter imbalances resulting from Galenic physiology’s dominance. Although some chapters from Simon Smith, Jacky Watson, and Amy Kenny’s *The Early Modern Senses* seem to reinforce the humoureal, liquid description of sense experience, these editors also recognize that early modern discourses stressed the ‘double nature’ of the senses: senses could ‘enlighten’ but also ‘deceive’. Moshenska echoes this understanding in his chapter on touch and Spenser, where he discusses how control of the senses was common to ethical traditions. Thus the senses remained central to the early modern moral project of taming the passions’ potential overthrow of reason.

Milton’s writings suggest that he views the passions as highly active forces that constantly throw epistemological clarification off course. In *The Reason of Church Government* (1641), Milton gives great power to the sensitive appetite (containing the ‘affections’ and ‘desires’), which seems to underline the understanding’s (‘Reason’s’) weakness in exposing deception. This was not an unfamiliar path for seventeenth-century writers on the passions. The section from *The Reason of Church Government* is worth quoting at length:

> For Truth, I know not how, hath this unhappinesse fatall to her, ere she can come to the triall and inspection of the Understanding, being to passe through many little wards and limits of the severall Affections and Desires, she cannot shift it, but must put on such colours and attire, as those Pathetick handmaids of the soul please to lead her in to their Queen. And if she find so much favour with them, they let her passe in her own likenesse; if not, they bring her into the presence habited and colour’d like a notorious Falshood.

The passions are not neutral material units of the body, but seem to be endowed with their own agency. But this agency-riddenness again raises tensions over the status of literal or metaphorical language. While affections and desires could be traditionally understood as literal movements of the sense appetite—and Milton at times refers to them as mere physical movements—these terms are also animated as irritable, internal miscreants with an ethical life of their own. I suggest this is a reflection of a broader conflict in the Renaissance to distinguish between figurative and literal language in explaining human experience.

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76 For another example, witness Aurelie Griffin, ‘Love Melancholy and the Senses in Mary Wroth’s works’, *The Senses in Early Modern England*, 151.
By responding to secondary literature’s privileging of early modern humoralism, recent scholarship has begun to restore the early modern body to its moral context. For Milton studies, the countering trend has exposed Milton’s ambivalence in either praising or denouncing the passions: they are the ‘very stuff of virtue’ but also ‘wily Arbitresses’ that misdirect reason. Tilmouth thus hesitates to assign Milton either a positive or negative account of the passions. He notes instead that Milton’s indecision to praise the passions was typically reversed by thinkers after Hobbes:

Milton’s account of man’s positive emotions does not amount to a vision of vibrant moral sentiments such as would be seen a few generations later. Rather, he offers a relatively muted sketch both of those affections which emanate from the spirit of charity and of a number of rationally conditioned passions (mostly associated with Christian sufferance).

Tilmouth argues that Milton falls in line with earlier seventeenth-century thinkers that questioned even the worth of passions moderated by reason. Richard DuRocher’s chapter in Louis Schwartz’s *Their Maker’s Image* resonates with Tilmouth’s research, and explores how Milton’s fascination with passions was shaped by questions of divine passibility and human responsibility for actions. Milton, he explains

represent[s]...the emotions as motives that need to be ‘rightly tempered’ or brought under the subject’s control...passions are not valuable in themselves, but valuable when redirected toward a worthy goal.

Acknowledging Milton’s ambivalence towards feeling has expanded Milton studies by contextualizing Milton’s concept of the passions. Critics who have exploited Miltonic moments of hesitation have brought to light Milton’s affective thinking in relation to other early modern moral frameworks; it has also exposed Milton’s debt to classical discourses, especially Virgil’s *Aeneid*, Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura*, and Lactantius’ *De Ira Dei*.

But early modern affective discourses are also often connected to questions of epistemology and skepticism. This area has been surprisingly overlooked in Miltonic affective studies. It is likely that the two problems in modern explorations of early modern passions—

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80 Tilmouth, *Passion’s Triumph*, 209.
81 DuRocher, ‘“Tears Such as Angels Weep,”’ 23–46.
82 For different frameworks, see Tilmouth, *Passion’s Triumph*, 1–15. For Milton’s reception of classical affect see also Moshenska, *Feeling Pleasures*, 245–253, who includes Lucretius in his discussion of touching bodies in Milton.
83 Self-knowledge has been the main subject of research. Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, 23–24,171,179; A.W. Fields, ‘Milton and Self-knowledge’ *PMLA* 84 (1968): 392–399; Sara Coodin, ‘“This was a way to thrive”: Christian and Jewish eudaimonism in The Merchant of Venice’, The *Renaissance of Emotion*, 70; Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves*, 12, 52; Cummings, ‘Donne’s Passions: Emotion, Agency and Language’, *Passions and Subjectivity*, 60–70; Fletcher, ‘Uncertain Knowing, Blind Vision and Active Passivity’; for how senses were instruments of knowledge in Bacon, Locke and Hobbes, but also able to lead astray
the projection of dualism across accounts blending reason and passion in the era after Descartes, and the dominance of Galenic humoralism that has reduced the affective body to an anatomical leaky machine in separation from the mind—are responsible for this absence. But to reverse these trends would allow the connection between early modern affectivity and epistemology to emerge. The very fact that reason and passion can be seen to converge in some early modern physiology accounts reveals how early modern monism also made the body a cognitive site, a mode of knowing. And restoring the cognitive body to its moral context would expose how the body was connected to questions about knowledge.

Indeed, Milton’s writing on the passions is scattered with epistemological anxieties surrounding the moral body. For instance, Milton reveals he thinks the affective body is a site for epistemic concerns by representing the relationship between the body and its affections through a visual metaphor. He writes in An Apology,

Yet this man beyond Stoick apathy sees truth as in a rapture, and cleaves to it. Not as through the dim glasse of his affections which in this frail mansion of flesh are ever unequally temper’d...

From this passage, we see the anxiety at work: whether blame is placed on the affections or on the body for dimming the mirror of knowledge; whether clarity is possible to achieve or deception inevitable; and where the self is located. Here the self is pictured within the lens of the affections which are located in the body and must look ‘through’ it. The self is thus deeply internalized in this passage, and embedded within an affective looking glass inhabiting a morally unstable body. In An Apology Milton also identifies the limits to self-knowledge and introduces the narrative of the Fall and a corrupted body in his articulation of the passions. Joseph Hall’s claim to have ‘affections so equally tempered, that they neither too hastily adhere to the truth, before it be fully examined, nor too lazily afterward’, Milton argues, places him beyond normative human experience: ‘he passes all the seven wise Masters of Greece attributing to himselfe that which on my life Salomon durst not’. Milton explains starkly that such perfection is impossible, unless a person ‘were exempted out of the corrupt masse of Adam, borne without sinne originall, and living without actuall’. Thus Milton connects harmful, disordered affections to the consequences of the Fall and the material nature of fallen humanity, such that ‘that temper of his affections…cannot any where be but in Paradise’. Indeed, Milton writes that a person with such assumptions must lack self-knowledge: ‘how farre this boaster is


84 Milton, An Apology, 1: 909, fn. 8. The editors suggest this is an ‘allusion to Hall’s professed following of the Stoics’.


86 Ibid.
from knowing himself…’ But what is significant here is that both Milton and Hall cite their passions’ equilibrium as evidence for their position, which seems to indicate that Renaissance discourses required first-person evaluations of the passions in making epistemic claims.

In *The Reason of Church Government* Book 2, the passions and knowledge are again bound up together. Milton assumes an external vantage point and suggests he can test his affections’ ‘loyalty’:

I shall likewise assay those wily Arbitresses ['pathetick handmaids of the soul’…. ‘Affections and Desires’] who in most men have, as was heard, the sole ushering of Truth and Falshood between the sense, and the soul, with what loyalty they will use me in conveying this Truth to my understanding; the rather for that by as much acquaintance as I can obtain with them, I doe not find them engag’d either one way or other.

But the fact that these desires ‘use’ him seems to imply a tension between a person’s ability to know his desires’ allegiances (‘as much acquaintance as I can obtain with them’) and a person’s ability to alter them. Milton’s report of his soul’s inner workings shows that he perceives his affections’ deception to be temporarily inactive. But his conclusion in finding his own affections neutral ironically gives his readers little confidence in his position on prelacy, given their deceptive powers. However, Milton’s appeal to his passions to justify his position shows that he thinks knowledge of personal passions is necessary; indeed, he seems to make the sensitive appetite’s neutrality a rhetorical device. Whether or not such neutrality is possible, and how someone arrives at such knowledge, Milton does not explain.

Chapter 3 thus examines the intersection of Miltonic passions and early modern epistemology. It presents the agency-riddenness of the passions in Milton’s canon to challenge the way the medical-humoural approach has represented early modern affectivity as a one-dimensional activity. Affective agency, however, also raises questions about the relationship between language and phenomenology. Previous critics have used this relationship as a way into the body, most recently in Smith, Watson, Kenny, and Moshenska. Their scholarship has critically examined how language shaped the experience of early modern embodiment, how early moderns perceived the limits of language, and the flexible status of affective terminology in the early modern period. Indebted to their scholarship, I also expose how Milton’s language for the passions offers a way into thinking about the knowing body, but argue that Miltonic monism creates an obstacle for readers who would make agency-ridden passions to be merely figurative. The high degree of efficacy Milton gives to the passions seems to leave the human

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87 For other references to self-knowledge in Milton, see *Defensio Secunda, CPWJM, 4.1: 587, 667–668*. In the first Milton entreats God to witness how he has examined himself; in the second, Milton states that Oliver Cromwell’s success was due to his ‘self-knowledge’. His practice is somehow linked to his ability to defeat the enemy within: ‘vain hopes, fears, desires’.

agent fully responsible for every moral error. But the idea of ‘double agency’, or the competition between the passions’ agency and the self’s agency, puts moral distance between the self and the body for misdemeanors. However, this move complicates Milton’s understanding of identity and seems to foster confusion in whether to locate the self—the ‘I’—inside or outside the material body that can in some way oppose itself. It also muddies the waters in determining who and how one takes responsibility for personal actions.

Milton’s association between knowledge and affectivity across his writings also requires contextualising his passions in seventeenth-century epistemology. His writing explores the possibility of the affective body’s responsibility for its own deception, the degree to which knowledge is possible in a fallen mind and body, the ethics of ignorance and self-knowledge, and the role that the body and its senses and passions play in the formation of beliefs. Peter Harrison has moved historical research in this direction in *The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science*, but many of these questions lie open for literary historians. Katherine Fletcher has inaugurated this kind of research in Milton literary studies by stating that Milton makes the body and passions central to both Edenic and fallen epistemology. She does so by investigating how Milton’s optimistic vision for fallen humanity’s return to Adamic knowledge in *Of Education* applies a method that combines intellectual/rational faculties with ‘bodily (sensuous and passionate) knowledge’; she also examines the integrated relationship between spiritual and bodily vision, and finds that Milton’s ‘heart’ was another source of knowledge which was both bodily and spiritual. Fletcher’s article brilliantly identifies Miltonic monism as the explanatory power linking epistemology and the material body. Chapter 3 carries on where she left off, by pursuing how assigning rational function to bodily matter permits a reading of the body and its material passions as a site of knowledge.

IV ANTICIPATING A ‘TURN’

Understanding Milton’s concept of the passions and affections is not an isolated endeavour: affectivity, as reflected in the diverse range of scholars and disciplines it appeals to in

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89 Harrison, *The Fall of Man.*
90 Fletcher, ‘Uncertain Knowing, Blind Vision and Active Passivity’, 118.
91 Fletcher, ‘Uncertain Knowing, Blind Vision and Active Passivity’, 117.
contemporary criticism, also has a historical precedent for standing at the centre of numerous conflicts, such as debates over prayer and liturgy, politics, allegory, early modern rhetoric and sermons, physiology, medical texts, the nature of the divine, music, and the purposes of reading literature. Chapters 2 and 3 therefore look only at how Milton’s materialism and epistemology say something about his understanding of the passions. In return, the passions are also able to clarify Milton’s monism and his thinking about thinking and knowing. Studying Miltonic passions and affections not only brings literary historians greater pleasure in surveying the depth and intensity of Milton’s poetic-philosophical imagination, but also modifies the two problems in contemporary criticism: assuming that passion and reason are separate after Descartes, and assuming that the body, in separation from the mind, was a lifeless, unconscious material organism. But Milton’s monism provided an alternative mind-body explanation to Neo-Platonism for escaping the growing appreciation of deterministic materialism: though the body was corporeal, it was also affective, and therefore free and ethically responsible. The intersection between Milton’s passions and epistemology also overturns the predominant sway of humoural theory in literary criticism that has disconnected the body and physiology from its early modern telos: virtuous living. I therefore suggest that by countering the two problems in modern scholarship, early modern literary studies is nearing an ‘ethical turn’.
In early modern affect there is an intrinsic connection between the passions of the soul and concepts of matter. The material or immaterial status of ‘passion’ and ‘affection’ immediately strikes the reader as an odd and flexible boundary, providing little resolution for navigating conceptual tensions within the century and various genres. The poet-preacher John Donne, for instance, remarks, ‘We consist of three parts, a Soul, and Body, and Minde: which I call those thoughts and affections and passions, which neither soul nor body hath alone, but have been begotten by their communication’.1 In A Treatise of the Affections (1642), the Puritan divine William Fenner’s ambiguous language points neither to immaterial nor to material origins: ‘Affectus sunt’, he writes, ‘perturbationes animae…the nayles of the soule, whereby it’s nayled to the things of the body’.2 His language seems to suggest the passions reside in the soul. Yet their capacity to seize their home-grown territory and pierce the tissue of the body refuses stable identity as either physical or ethereal soul-substance. Responding to natural philosophers like Descartes, whose mechanistic view of matter threatened to make material activity independent of God’s oversight, Henry More’s project in The Immortality of the Soul (1659) aimed to demonstrate that the Soul of man is a substance actually separable from the Body, and that all her operations & Functions are immediately performed, not by those parts of the Body that are of an earthly and gross consistency, but by what is more aeriall or atherall, the Vitall and Animall Spirits; which are very congenerous to the Vehicles of the Angels or Genii.3

More spells out his horror at Descartes’s ‘Mechanical Invention’ that pinned the Common Sense (Conarion) to a specific bodily organ, the Glandula Pinealis, and turned ‘the Passions and Properties of living Creatures…meer Corporeal motion’.4 But even with his reaction to the idea of turning passions into ‘meer Corporeal motion’, More eventually realized his irresolution if he did not embed his immaterial soul in the animal spirits, which are ‘so perfectly

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2 William Fenner, A Treatise of the Affections, (London: Printed by A.M. for J.Rothwell, 1642), 14. This phrase has Platonic undertones, see Plato his Apology of Socrates, and Phaedo or Dialogue concerning the Immortality of Mans Soul, and Manner of Socrates his Death, (1675), 156. See also Fenner, A Treatise of the Affections, 22, for how affections can glue the heart of a wicked man: ‘bound in and nayled in his affection, he is even nayled and glued to the things of the world’.  
4 More, The Immortality of the Soul, 2. 4–5.
liquid…[and] consist[t] of particles…playing and turning one by another, as busy as Atomes in the Sun. But realizing these refined liquid bodies would lend force to theories of a corporeal soul, he then tries to distinguish his version of animal spirits from previous, thinly disguised material accounts that made them ‘some subtile thin matter…either Aire, Fire, Light, or some such like Body’. However, Francis Bacon concludes breezily, ‘it is now known that [the sensible soul] is itself a corporeal and material substance (substantiam corpoream et materiatam)’; and yet he does not go all the way in materializing the soul, as the imagination and spirits that start or stop motion seem to be something other than ‘corporeal’ and ‘gross’ matter. William Harvey concurs:

…the blood does not seem to differ in any respect from the soul or the life itself (anima); at all events, it is to be regarded as the substance whose act is the soul or the life. Such, I say is the soul, which is neither wholly corporeal nor yet wholly incorporeal…

And yet Harvey is also able to record how this spirited blood has a ‘celestial nature’, ‘analogous to the essence of the stars’—a reference, perhaps, to Aristotle’s pneuma, which was itself to some degree composed of matter.

These excerpts reveal the vague line between material and immaterial aspects of the soul and its inhabitants, the passions, as well as the early modern impulse to either make the body the soul’s mode of dwelling or its underlying material source. Within an individual author, statements that at first glance appear to support a pure dualist reading are often diluted by other statements that retain a measure of deeper materialism. Often there is a perplexing commitment to hold some degree of corporeal and incorporeal categories simultaneously. Harrison’s The Fall of Man argues for a view of the passions supporting simple material and immaterial distinctions, although he gestures that they could be, to some degree, both:

The passions occupied a pivotal position between mind and body…passions could thus be described in two ways: in mental terms as promoting errors of judgment; or in physical terms as the convoluted motions of the animal spirits in the living body.

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5 More, The Immortality of the Soul, 2.7. Ironically, even a Platonist like More eventually decided the animal spirits gathered in the fourth ventricle of the brain, or the ‘acropolis of the soul’, in realizing that he needed to explain a body-soul connection. See Henry, ‘The matter of souls’, 104.

6 More, The Immortality of the Soul, 2.6.


10 Harrison, The Fall of Man, 160–161.
This ‘either-or’ method typified by Harrison betrays an assumption about what ‘physical’ means and what ‘mental’ means. But these early modern examples do not separate out the physical from the mental so easily as this, since supposed bodily components are pictured as making judgments, and acting and interacting with the soul in odd ways. These examples, I think, pose a problem for much early modern literary scholarship on the passions in seventeenth-century England, which tends to isolate the passions exclusively to the material, liquid body, but to elevate reason or intellect to a distinctly immaterial, almost a-spatial, realm. But by acknowledging accounts that refuse to project a straightforward dualism between the body and soul, the passions and reason, this makes sense of early modern accounts where reason and passions converge and appear ‘neither wholly corporeal nor yet wholly incorporeal’. Such accounts seem to affirm that a more intricate relationship between the corporeal and incorporeal existed along side seventeenth-century dualist paradigms.

Deciding Milton’s materialist or anti-materialist stance has broadly fallen into three camps: the monist, the dualist, and something in between. These scholarly accounts rightly intend to show that Milton belonged perhaps to two, but not to three, early modern positions – Neoplatonism, vitalist or animated materialism, and mechanist materialism. Material mechanism reduced agency to materially determined particles in the body and therefore clashes with Milton’s project to safeguard free will. But this does not necessarily mean that Milton rejects the materialist project altogether, as literary historians have discussed. This leaves the Milton critic fascinated by Milton’s unusual presentation of matter with vast shades of early modern dualism and material monism. But all three approaches work towards an explanation of how Milton preserves free will in something other than basic matter: for the dualist, free will is located outside of matter in the immaterial; for the monist, free will is encased inside living matter, or the agency that springs out of the material level; the ‘something in between’ stance acknowledges how animated monism implies a division between two kinds of operations to ensure freedom of the will survives. Nevertheless, Milton never calls himself a dualist, monist, vitalist, animist or materialist.

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11 Especially after Descartes. See my Ch.1.
12 For support of this idea see Sutton, ‘Soul and Body’, 5: there was often a ‘continuum rather than a sharp line between gross matter and pure incorporeal substance’ in the early modern period.
14 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 107, argues: ‘Milton’s diametric opposition to Hobbes is inadequate and misleading; Milton disagrees with Hobbes about the nature of material substances, which makes him a materialist’. See also Trevor, The Poetics of Melancholy.
15 OED suggests that Henry More’s Divine Dialogues (1668) is the earliest instance of the term: ‘Hybobaes, a young, witty and well-moralised materialist’. See entries ‘materialist’ and ‘materialism’ in OED 9: 345.
What has secondary literature understood by the terms ‘dualism’ and ‘monism’? Dualist proponents hold that Milton’s concept of the soul is ultimately traceable to what is immaterial. All matter is inherently passive and dependent on an external incorporeal principle for motion (form). This immaterial ‘something’ is external and divine, and combines with the material substrate of the body through a mediating third substance (Aristotle’s pneuma or the early modern ‘animal spirits’) to solve interaction problems. The dualist approach, of course, is plagued by the term ‘substance’. How can an immaterial substance still be called a ‘substance’? Additionally, those who lean towards asserting Milton’s dualism often neglect how monist materialism does not confine matter to the grisly, earthly, physical plane, but also deals with a range of material substances that look and feel nothing like human flesh. This could mean, inside the monist account, that the external and divine ‘X Factor’ is still material, albeit a different kind of material substance infused or encoded into earthly bodies. Further, the categories of those critics who write favouring Miltonic dualism conflict with Milton’s metaphysical linguistic oppositions. Sugimura often writes this way. She states, ‘Milton’s discussion emphasizes the fact that the soul, entering from the outside, is immaterial...’ Importantly, however Milton uses the word ‘immaterial’ only once in English, to mean something like ‘trivial’; ‘incorporeal’ appears only in Paradise Lost and then only three times, and there is always associated with non-human enmattered forms. Milton’s writing thus seems more concerned to contrast body with mind and spirit, than incorporeal with corporeal, and immaterial with material. A further trouble with the dualist reading grows out of assumptions about figurative language. Sugimura, the leading voice for Milton’s anti-materialist, fluctuation narrative, contends that Milton’s ‘inability to suppress figurative language shatters his material monism’. The assumption is that the presence of metaphor means an author abandons belief in a material object. Figurative language therefore represents what is either fictional (although inevitably part of language) or immaterial.

Those who favour Milton’s monist materialism tend to chart the journey from Milton’s early dualism to a later monism, while acknowledging ambivalences within each stage. However, the monist reading argues the Miltonic universe can be reduced to a single material substance, which contains a self-animating power that perceives and desires, and has the

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16 This could provide a response to Sugimura’s critique of Fallon, whom, she writes, argues Milton’s linguistic practice ‘fully’ and ‘wholly’ yields to monist materialism. See Sugimura, “Matter of Glorious Trial”, 119, 141. But if some Miltonic substances are different from the stuff of earthly bodies, then her accusations of ‘wholly’ and ‘fully’ would need to be further defined.

17 This could also act as a response to Sugimura who argues that ‘infus[ion]’ language implies part of the soul is ‘other than matter’, Sugimura, “Matter of Glorious Trial”, 129.


19 For Milton’s sole use of ‘immaterial’, see John Milton, Tetrachordon, CPWM, 2: 579. For ‘incorporeal’ see Milton, Paradise Lost 1. 789; 5. 410–415; 8. 35–40, henceforth abbreviated to PL in footnotes. Incorporeus, incorporeus, and immaterialis never appear in his Latin writings, to my knowledge. Aquinas, ST 1a.59, 1, however, uses this language: Angeli sunt...incorporei. See also ST 1a.50, 3 ad 4: ‘Angeli...sunt immateriales’.

capacity to organize and arrange matter in such a way as to produce consciousness. A weakness of this approach has been to overlook linguistic distinctions and make ‘matter’ or ‘material’ synonymous with ‘body’ or ‘corporeality’. Phillip Donnelly’s article qualifies Fallon’s argument by making the crucial ‘matter’ – ‘body’ distinction. But in doing so, he admits that Milton’s poetry permits both a ‘dualist orthodox reading’ as well as a ‘subtly monist’ interpretation akin to Hebrew monism. In this way, Donnelly shows how Milton reserves materia exclusively for prime matter, or in his poetry, ‘first matter’, that material stuff of the original creation sourced in God. Corpus on the other hand always refers to incorporeal or corporeal substances. Both incorporeal and corporeal substances are combinations of form plus prima materia, which are either sensible (corporeal and necessarily extended) or insensible (incorporeal or spiritual, and sometimes extended). This explains Fallon’s ‘degrees of matter’ in Milton’s monist continuum and Adam’s claim to go from the corporeal up to spirit. Stephen Dobranski in Milton’s Visual Imagination observes what Donnelly’s critique means for Fallon’s angelic substances. Fallon deems angelic substances to be ‘subtle material bodies’ (a highly rarefied version of matter) but never ‘incorporeal substances’, especially the fallen ones. But Donnelly’s revision, as Dobranski notes, means that even Milton’s bad angels remain incorporeal substances even as they gradually accumulate more matter. However Joad Raymond in Milton’s Angels concludes that Miltonic angels are material and substantial, but not corporeal.

The desire to avoid reductive materialism also brings literary historians of the monist bent to face questions about Milton’s lively descriptions of material particles, which act more like agents than inanimate episodes of a material network. Is this figurative language or something more? And so the monist position is also based around assumptions on metaphor, which seems to equate the term ‘literal’ with ‘materiality’. Fallon depicts this thinking when he says ‘Milton later literalizes Paul’s figurative economy…the soul becomes carnal and fleshy’. The problem is how to decide when figurative language has lost its metaphorical status, and whether an author intends for a literal reading to then ignore and disconnect meaning from the images that first expressed it.

Set in this literary context, Chapter 2 responds to the ‘problem of dualism’ in contemporary secondary literature that stages a widening separation between passion and reason in the early modern era by examining how Milton’s account blurs passion and reason, and

22 Donnelly, “‘Matter’ versus Body’, 81.
23 For the history of form and matter, actuality and passivity in Aristotle and Aquinas, see James, Passion and Action, chapts. 2–4.
24 Ibid. Joad Raymond, Milton’s Angels: The Early-Modern Imagination (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 286, 288, concludes that Miltonic angels are material and substantial, but not corporeal.
27 See Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 85; See also Donnelly, “‘Matter’ versus Body’, 82.
suggests that an animist materialism stands behind this mixed affectivity. In Part I, I approach Milton’s thinking on matter and substance through a contextualised analysis of his affective terminology across his writings, as the terms passio and affectus act as historical linguistic markers for distinguishing between material and immaterial parts of the body-soul composite. I begin by examining Milton’s own language for the passions and affections and discuss the historical vocabulary he would have been familiar with in Cicero, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. I also turn to the terminology of some of his English and French contemporaries who wrote major passion treatises: Tobias Venner, Timothy Bright, Thomas Wright, Edward Reynolds, and Nicholas Coëffeteau. In Part II, I suggest Milton’s vocabulary and images for the passions and affections indicates animist materialism, which rearranges the soul-body relationship according to the Stoic model but leaves a number of unresolved tensions. Having established Milton’s animist materialism, this gives rise to a number of problems discussed in the conclusion in Part III: what do we make of Milton’s metaphors for passions and reason? Are these material objects operating as substantial beings inside the body, or is this figurative language? I briefly discuss assumptions about the way metaphor works, and how questioning the role of figurative language complicates boundaries between prose and poetry. In Part IV, I attempt to answer why Milton refrains from mentioning passions and affections until 1641; why the Latin term passiones is strikingly absent from his entire canon; and why ‘affection’ seems to be suppressed in his final three poems.

I MILTON’S AFFECTIVE VOCABULARY

The history of the passions and affections is also a history of philosophical materialism. For some scholars, passions are invoked as explanations for movements in a physical body, originating in the motions of an immaterial soul. For others, the passions occupy a semi-material, semi-immaterial realm capable of traveling in either direction and bridging the gap between two different modes, mind and body. Yet both explanations realize the need to state the intersection between soul and body, and whether, in the end, the soul could ultimately be reduced to the material organization and pattern of the body. Some historians of philosophy such as Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro in Emotions and Cognitive Life, however, caution approaches that ‘emphasise’ sharp attention to ‘the terms involved’ since it is

28 In using this category, however, I follow Sugimura by supporting the contention that neither ‘dualist’ or ‘monist’ best explains Milton, since to choose sides underscores the complexity of his position.
30 Harrison, The Fall of Man; Cummings and Sierhuis, Passions and Subjectivity; Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have a Soul’, 220.
less clear whether the other terms used, for instance passion or affect, imply specific views about the emotions. Both terms allude to the idea that an emotion is experienced passively. But there is no standard use of both expressions.31

Though it is helpful to avoid thinking there were exacting, ‘standard use[s]’ for the terms, the words do in fact transfer a history, traceable to classical Greek and Latin antiquity, of thought about the body and the soul.32 The vocabulary of passions and affections reflect philosophical positions and tensions and act as miniature narratives in the history of matter and non-matter. Milton’s vocabulary, I argue, scattered across prose and poetry, Latin and English, reveals he is aware of linguistic pressures and how different words result in different frameworks for understanding body, matter, and soul.33

A. SYNONYMITY: THE COHESION OF PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS

Equivocating between passions and affections has a rich historical legacy, yet Milton never writes about ‘passions and affections’ in the same sentence by grouping them with a conjunction.34 In doing so, we can see Milton’s active engagement with, rather than his dismissal of, historical materials. In De Civitate Dei 9. 4, Augustine affirms an equivocation between a variety of terms extant in Latin literature: animi motus; Cicero’s preferred term perturbationes; affectiones, affectus; and finally, Apuleius’ favourite, passiones. However, he selects passiones as his generic Latin term because it remains closest to the Greek πάθος and to connotations of passivity.35 Aquinas also marks the equivocation between passions and affections by grounding his justification in Augustine’s De Civitate Dei 9. 4: ‘The emotions (passiones), therefore, being passions of the soul (passiones animae), are identical with the affections (affectiones)’ and lead to bodily alteration.36 Thus, in Augustine and Aquinas, both terms passiones and affectiones seem to denote a general category, depicting either good or bad

31 Pickavé and Shapiro, Emotion and Cognitive Life, 7.
32 See Pickavé and Shapiro, Emotion and Cognitive Life, 3, for a similar claim to historical distinctions between emotions in the sensitive soul and the intellective soul that can be traced back to Stoic eutheiai. They write: ‘Though authors from Augustine onwards rejected the details of the Stoic account of emotions as judgments, they nevertheless held on to the idea of a class of emotion that does not come with the usual corporeal disturbances characteristic of lower-level animal-like emotions. Both Descartes and Spinoza talk of intellectual emotions and one might think that their discussions find their source in this debate’.
33 This chapter builds on Thomas Dixon’s thorough analysis of the trajectory from the terminology ‘passions’ to the word ‘emotions’ in which he argues these terms carry linguistic, theological-philosophical histories. See Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 21–60, James, Passion and Action, chaps. 2–4, and Nicholas Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011).
34 Passions and affections are used in the same sentence directly by Milton only once, but they are never equated explicitly. See Milton, An Apology, 1: 939: ‘but will presently perceave this Liturgy all over in conception leane and dry, of affections empty and unmoving, of passion, or any heigh whereeto the soule might soar upon the wings of zeale, destitute and barren’.
35 Augustine, DCD, 9. 4. Also Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 39, 54.
movements of the soul.\textsuperscript{37} For Augustine, this depends on the direction of the will, while for Aquinas, their moral quality depends on their service or their hostility to reason’s rule.\textsuperscript{38} James summarises the popularity of this equivocation:

The view that these terms are all roughly synonymous quickly became fixed, and Augustine’s discussion continued to be widely invoked and reiterated. Aquinas cites it, and a range of English and French authors of the seventeenth century either replicate Augustine’s list or unselfconsciously employ the range of terms it contains.\textsuperscript{39}

Though these terms are never explicitly equated in Milton’s prose and poetry, there is evidence that Milton uses them interchangeably. In the Preface to \textit{Samson Agonistes} (1671), Milton translates παθηµατα\textsuperscript{40} from Aristotle’s \textit{Rhetoric} with the Latin affectuum. Here, however, he employs the English word ‘passions’. Passions and affections also seem synonymous with ‘desires’ throughout his writings.\textsuperscript{41} A quotation from an imperial law source in \textit{Tetrachordon} (1645) also shows, though Milton did not write this way himself, that both terms could be used to depict perverse motions of the soul: ‘whom passions and corrupt affections divorce’t not’.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition, the adjectives qualifying the terms suggest that Milton thought they were in some sense equivocal. Both passions and affections are described as ‘radical’ in \textit{An Apology Against a Pamphlet} (1642) and \textit{Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce} (1643–1644), movements that are ‘inner’, ‘within’ or ‘inward’ in \textit{The Reason of Church Government} (1641), \textit{An Apology, Areopagitica} (1644), \textit{Tenure of Kings and Magistrates} (1649), \textit{Paradise Regained} (1671), \textit{Paradise Lost} (1674), and \textit{Samson Agonistes}; things that are ‘innate’ or part of a person’s nature

\textsuperscript{37} For Augustine’s \textit{passiones}, see DCD, 9, 4; 9, 5. For \textit{affectiones, affectus, and motus} see DCD, 9, 5; 14, 9. However, these terms can also act as substitutes for other passions with negative associations, such as \textit{ira} and \textit{libido}. See affectus referring to ‘lust’ in Augustine, DCD, 14, 16 and affectiones referring to ‘anger’ and ‘other emotions’, DCD, 14, 19. For Aquinas’ equivocations between \textit{passiones} and \textit{affectiones}, see ST 1a.21.3, 1a.82.5, ad 1; ST 1a.2ae.1.5, 1.7, 29.2, 60.2, 62.4 obj.3, 68.4 ad5; ST 1a.2ae.22, 3 ad 3, 1a.2ae.31, 4, ad 2, 1a.2ae.59.5 ad 3; ST 2a.2ae.60.3, 162, 3; ST 3a.15.4: ‘It is the affections of the sense appetite that are most properly called passions of the soul’ \textit{[proprissime dicuntur passiones animae affectiones appetitus sensitivi]}. See also Lombardo, \textit{The Logic of Desire}, 75 and 76, n. 4: ‘Of the few who address this topic, scholars…unanimously interpret affection as a category that includes both the passions of the soul and movements of the will’.

\textsuperscript{38} To be discussed below.

\textsuperscript{39} James, \textit{Passion and Action}, 11.

\textsuperscript{40} See Milton’s paraphrase from the original in Aristotele’s \textit{Poetics}, ed. and trans. Stephen Halliwell (London: Harvard University Press, 1995), 47–49. See also \textit{The 1671 Poems}, in \textit{CWJM}, Vol.2, ed. Laura Knoppers, (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 143–44. Indeed, Milton takes even greater liberties when he translates καθαρσιος as \textit{lustratio} in Samson Agonistes’ preface. The other words available to him were \textit{purgatio, purificatio, curatio, or expiation}. Laura Knoppers suggest that using \textit{lustratio} ‘implies an ethical and religious sense that complements the medical sense (“to purge”) in the Preface’. Passions and Affections were associated with Aristotelian categories associated with activity and passivity. Milton is aware that these words can take on strict meanings of active and passive. See Milton, DDC, 8.1: 302–303: ‘Nor in the sacred books does the word Spirit denote anything else except either the breath of life which we take in, or the vital and sensitive or rational faculty, or some action \textit{[actum]} or affection \textit{[affectum]} belonging to them’.

\textsuperscript{41} See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of ‘desire’ in Milton. Affections are equated with desires in \textit{The Reason of Church Government}, 1: 830–831: ‘Affections and Desires’ are sensual handmaids and pathetick; John Milton, \textit{Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, CPWJM}, 2: 304: ‘wee know it the work of the Spirit to mortifie our corrupt desires and evil concupiscence; but not to root up our natural affections and disaffections moving to and fro ev’n in wisest men’; Passions are also equated with desires in Milton, \textit{Tetrachordon}, 2: 651; see also \textit{PL}, 12, 85–95, and \textit{Paradise Regained}, 2: 465–480.

\textsuperscript{42} Milton, \textit{Tetrachordon}, 2: 714.
in the *An Apology* and *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, and ‘natural’ in the sense of blameless, innocent or devout in *An Apology* and *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*. But both could also denote corruption. Affections are disturbances or perturbations of the mind needing a cure or tuning in *The Reason of Church Government* (1641), movements ‘unequally temper’d’ in *An Apology*, and ‘wild’, ‘violent’ and ‘inordinat’ in *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*; passions also need correction (*An Apology*) because they are ‘distemper’d’; as Milton explains in *Of Education* (1644). Both terms are pictured as capable of being changed or amended in *The Reason of Church Government*, *An Apology*, *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, *Of Education*, and *Areopagitica*; both are seen to be highly active and able to push a person towards error in *The Reason of Church Government*, *An Apology*, *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, *Areopagitica*, *Tetrachordon*, *Eikonoklastes*, *Paradise Lost*, *Paradise Regained*, and *Samson Agonistes*. In addition, the terms could also act categorically in representing a range of negative or good affective states. For instance, Milton used the word ‘passion’ to refer to two passions, ‘joy’ and ‘pity’, in *Of Reformation* (1641); in *Paradise Lost* Book 4 (The Argument), Milton uses the term passion to depict the ‘many passions’—‘fear, envy, despair’—that set ‘heavenly minds’ apart from fallen ones. In *De Doctrina Christiana* (1650–1660s?), Milton’s list of general virtues appear under the term Affectus: ‘Affectus sunt amor, odium; gaudium, tristitia; spes, metus; et ira’.44

The subject areas in which these terms appear also suggest that Milton thought they could act as synonyms. For example, both terms surface in Milton’s discussion of the Fall in *An Apology*, *Areopagitica*, and *Paradise Lost*, though he uses the term ‘affections’ to discuss the Fall in *An Apology*, but prefers ‘passions’ in *Areopagitica* and *Paradise Lost*. Both terms appear in the context of knowing oneself in *The Reason of Church Government* and *An Apology*; and they are always central to talk of virtue (*An Apology*, *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, *Of Education*, *Areopagitica*, *De Doctrina Christiana*).45 In *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, *Tetrachordon*, and *Samson Agonistes*, both terms mean something akin to sexual lust, concupiscence, or ‘inordinate desire’; passions and affections also appear in the context of Milton’s discussion of poetry, where he describes it in *Of Education* as ‘sensuous and passionat’; in *The Reason of Church Government* poetry can ‘allay perturbations of the mind’, ‘set the affections in right tune’, and ‘smoothe and paint out and describe whatever hath passion

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43 ‘Radical’ has different connotations however; in Milton, *An Apology*, 1: 900, it seems to mean something like ‘native’; in Milton, *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, 2: 345, it means something like ‘innocent’.
44 In Milton, *DDC*, 8.2: 1065, 1068, the editors state that the list comes from Wollebius’ *Compendium of Christian Theology*: ‘Wollebius terms them more specifically as the ‘chief’ affections (Affectus praeicipit). Also, since he does not pair them, he does not leave ira without an opposite, as Milton does’, 1072. Aquinas also keeps ira without an opposite. See ST 1a.2ae. 23, 3. For the dating of Milton’s *DDC*, see *Milton and the Manuscript of De Doctrina Christiana*, eds. Gordon Campbell, Thomas Corns, John Hale, Fiona Tweedie (Oxford: OUP, 2007).
45 This is only somewhat true of *The Reason of Church Government*, though affections and desires are the mediators between sense and reason. However Milton does not explicitly connect them to virtue here. But in light of his larger call for discipline, these have an ethical function.
or admiration. Likewise, music’s operation in Of Education sounds similar to poetry’s effects in The Reason of Church Government: there music can ‘smoothe’ ‘dispositions and manners’ that have been corrupted by ‘distemper’d passions’ and aid in digestion. Finally, the terms act as synonyms in the context of prayer and liturgy throughout An Apology and Eikonoklastes.

Textual evidence at the beginning of the seventeenth century suggests the traditional equivocation between passions and affections was still in place. Wright’s Passions of the Minde (1604) shares the common source noted by Aquinas: Augustine’s De Civitate Dei 9.4. Wright likewise shows that he is familiar with Cicero’s preferred term perturbations, the Greek term πάθος, and the other Latin terms in use such as ‘affections’, ‘affects’, and ‘passions’. The 1621 English translation of F.N. Coëffeteau’s Tableau Des Passions Humains maintains the equivocation between ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ throughout. Venner reveals that equivocating was still in practice even as late as 1660, where in Via Recta et Vitam Longam he renders ‘affections’ synonymous with ‘perturbations of the mind’, and elsewhere, with ‘passions’.

Milton’s conflation of terms thus seems deliberate. But passions and affections also held important historical distinctions that attempted to maintain clarity between body and mind. Yet Milton does not seem as compelled to systemically classify the passions and affections as were his distant and near predecessors. He accepts them as if they are ready-made terms. The fact that Milton’s canon contains no clear definitions for his affective terminology perhaps speaks of generic limitations and restraints. Poetry is not the place for definitions, at least not for Milton. Neither are his political prose tracts fit for these concerns. One could expect some definitions in his incomplete De Doctrina Christiana and Latin Thesaurus as well as in Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Tetrachordon, and Colasterion (1645), which show concentrated thinking about the body, humour, and temperament in directing agency. But readers shall never know, and matters are complicated by plaguing inconsistencies across his divorce tracts. As an example of how the lack of definitions for these words breeds

49 F.N. Coëffeteau, A Table of Humane Passions. With their causes and effects, trans. into English E. Grimeston, (London: Nicholas Oakes, 1621), 3, 56, 83, 89, 90, 95, 97, 128, 159, 219, 514, 553, 656. For other instances of ‘affection’ see pp. 86–7, 104, 106–9, 111, 117–18 119, 123, 125, 128, 147, 158, 162–3, 649. I am aware there are intellectual models for the passions on the Continent, but do not attend to them in this dissertation.
50 Tobias Venner, Via Recta ad Vitam Longam, (London: Abel Roper, 1660), 328–335. Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves; the equivocation is also noted in Schoenfeldt, “‘Commotion Strange’”, 51.
51 See John Milton’s statement in A Defence of the People of England by John Milton: In Answer to Salmassius Defence of the King: Translated by Joseph Washington, [London? 1692], 41: ‘But whatever he meant, the words of a Psalm are too full of Poetry, and this Psalm too full of Passion [prosecto verba psallentis, & sententiae affectibus plenae], to afford us any exact definitions of Right and Justice; nor is it proper to argue any thing of that nature from him’. For the Latin see Joannis Miltonii Angli Defensio Pro Populo Anglicano: Contra Claudii Anonimi, alias Salmassii, Defensionem Regiam (Londini: Typis Du Gardianis, 1651), 17.
inconsistency, Milton argues that the passions, affections and humours are not permissible grounds for divorce since these are, to a degree, governable and alterable. But then, in seemingly outright contradiction, Milton twice appeals to the affections as appropriate reasons for divorce in *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*. In one instance, affections are wild and lead to numerous partners before marriage; in another, reasons for divorce lay in the affections that are ‘radical and innocent’ parts of ‘nature’ which the Law should not interfere with. On the one hand, then, passions and affections are morally flexible things; they are sudden and impermanent and therefore subject to management. Milton often sets these terms in contrast to ‘nature’, which in the divorce tracts appears to be the rigid and immovable background that shapes a person’s overall disposition. This concept of a background, irreversible ‘nature’, becomes the stage on which the unique combination of humours, passions and desires act; they can be altered themselves but not alter the stage on which they stand. Milton’s motives for grounding divorce in ‘fixed nature’ give his argument great force: if no hope for change is possible, then separation is necessary or misery is sealed. But in so doing Milton binds himself to a kind of material determinism that haunts the rest of his prose. In associating the ‘affections’ as things operating out of, or within, an unalterable nature, it appears that Milton for the first time attaches a degree of fixity to the affections. Yet within the same tract, he acknowledges that the affections can be governed and altered over time, which is why he claims affections are impermissible causes for divorce. It is unclear why Milton here introduces the idea that the affections can be permanently resistant to change as they spring out of deep parts of a human nature. This is all the more so surprising as Milton consistently implies that he has not been moved to action by his humours.

52 This idea is implicit in all of Milton’s descriptions, and so a brief survey will suffice. In *The Reason of Church Government*, 1: 816–817, corrupt affections can be ‘retuned’ through poetry and lead to virtue; in *An Apology*, 1: 900, the passions and humours of the choleric and sanguine person able to undergo ‘correction’ to become the basis of virtue; in *Areopagitica*, CPWJM, 2: 152, passions are the very ingredients for virtue if rightly temper’d; in Milton, *Of Education*, 2: 396–397, the affections are ethically malleable. He describes them as ‘young and pliant’ which can be shaped and trained by the reading of moral philosophy. The idea that humours can be altered appears again when he advises training by reading ‘some not tedious Writer the Institution of Physick; that they may know the tempers, the humours, the seasons, and how to manage a crudity’, *Of Education*, 2: 392–393. 53 For evidence that Milton blames the affections for divorce, see *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, 2: 249, 345, 352. The contradiction perhaps can be alleviated by differentiating between ‘nature’ and ‘qualities.’ Bad marriages are caused by differences in nature, but natural qualities and dispositions (the affections) are themselves blameless. 54 I use this for lack of a better word; Milton uses ‘disposition’ to mean also ‘nature’ in *Colasterion*. Thus ‘nature’ seems to function as an irreversible background or basis, the colourful and unique canvas of dispensations, affections, and inclinations that a person is born into. 55 Kester Svendsen, ‘Science and Structure in Milton’s Doctrine of Divorce’, *PMLA*, 67: 4 (1952): 435–444, esp. 438. He discusses the importance of the word ‘nature’ in Milton: ‘if Empson were searching for significant words here, he would find them to be “law” and “nature”’. 56 Milton, *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, 2: 352, this is the work of the Gospel over young and violent affections. 57 He often does this by blaming his opponents for reasoning or acting on the impulse of the humours. See John Milton, *Eikonoklastes*, CPWJM, 3: 459: ‘but had his reason maistered him, as it ought, and not bin maistered long agoe by his sense and humour (as the breeding of most Kings hath bin ever sensual and most humour’d) perhaps he would have made no difficulty’. For other instances, see Milton, *Tetrachordon*, 2: 620–621, where he argues that God does not allow divorce just for any ‘humour’ but for ‘remediless greivances’; Milton, *The Reason of Church Government*, 1: 755, 806; Milton, *An Apology*, 1: 948; Milton, *Areopagitica*, 2: 533–534; Milton, *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, 2: 224, 267, 333.
B. PHILOSOPHICAL DISTINCTIONS: THE HISTORICAL FENCE BETWEEN PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS

The absence of definitions in Milton’s canon threatens to doom Miltonists to inexhaustible complexity and ambiguity. However, subtle distinctions remain between Miltonic passions and affections which suggests he is aware of earlier efforts made to distinguish the terms and bring resolution to questions orbiting the substance of the soul and body. Throughout his lifetime, Milton equates passions with humours and complexion in a way that he never does so for the affections. Instead, there are occasions when Milton’s chosen language for the affections is ocular, which he never uses for the passions.58

The Reason of Church Government highlights the connection between the passions and humours. Milton writes that self-knowledge understands the ‘hidden causes of all things’ and ‘the various effects that passion or complexion can worke in mans nature’.59 In Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton reveals more of his thinking on the connection between complexion and the humours as he writes that incompatible marriages lead some ‘inclined by complexion’ to melancholy. Melancholy includes some kind of physical sensation, as it is experienced as a ‘daily trouble and paine of losse in som degree like that which Reprobats feel’. Melancholy was associated with one of the four Galenic humours, and Milton’s writings show that he fell in line with traditional classification.60 But in ‘Il Penseroso’, Milton had also described the melancholic state as one ‘wrapt / in holy passion’. It is thus not clear how Milton distinguishes passions from humours, but at the very least he seems to think they occupy a shared material space and result in physiological responses. Passions, then, appear to be more closely bound to the material level.

The connection between passions and humours is strengthened by a sense of shared healing treatments. In the preface to Samson Agonistes, Milton takes his cue for curing the passions by observing Physick’s cure for melancholy and humours by matching like with like.

58 Milton, An Apology, 1: 909: ‘dim glasse of his affections’, and The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, CPWJM, 3: 190: ‘give up thir understanding to a double tyrannie, of Custom from without, and blind affections within’; see also Bruce Smith, ‘Hearing Green’, in Paster, Rowe, Floyd–Wilson, Reading the Early Modern Passions, 149, for a visual metaphor associated with the imagination in Wright’s treatise.
60 For example, Manoa tells Samson ‘not to believe suggestions that proceed from anguish of mind and humours black’, Samson Agonistes (lines 599–601). This is arguably a case of melancholy, or excessive black bile. For scholarly research on Milton and melancholy, see George Whiting, ‘Inclined to Melancholy’, in Milton’s Literary Milieu, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1939), Lawrence Babb, The Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 1580 to 1642 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1951) and Trevor, The Poetics of Melancholy. All three observe the influence of Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy. Published in 1621, it was likely that Milton read the treatise while still at school or in Cambridge. See (Whiting, ‘Inclined to Melancholy’, 136; Trevor, The Poetics of Melancholy, 116-149). Yet all three works interpret what Burton means to Milton differently. Trevor argues Milton outgrows his earlier Galenic melancholy to compensate for free will, but works towards ‘an idealized notion of spiritual solitariness’ between an individual and God; Babb focuses on Milton’s ‘L’Allegro’ and ‘Il Penseroso’, and wrongly claims that Milton only mentions melancholy four times outside these poems. Whiting’s chapter deals with a range of Milton’s works that bear similarities to Burton’s treatise.
In *Of Education*, Milton draws parallels between passions and other processes of the body. There Milton writes that music can both help nature’s ‘concoction’ and rescue manners from ‘distemper’d passions’. The fact that music’s reach extends to digestion and the passions indicates they perhaps share similar functions or occupy a similar realm. This suggests some kinship. In *An Apology*, passions and humours comprise Milton’s account of virtue: they exist within a divinely created ‘groundwork of nature’ and are the ‘proper mould and foundation of every mans peculiar guifts, and vertues’. By placing passions within a physiological framework, Milton shows that virtue is not the absence of the passions nor the neglect of bodily motions, but rather a corrected material body.

Passions and humours are also represented more often through liquid imagery than are the affections. In *The Reason of Church Government*, Milton relates ‘passion’ to admiration ‘in all the changes of that which is call’d fortune from without, or the wily suttleties and *refluxes* of mans thoughts from within’. Milton describes passion as a kind of ‘burst[ing]’ ‘heat’ in *Tetrachordon*. In *Paradise Lost*, Satan’s remorse before Eve’s temptation is captured with a similar phrase: ‘first from inward griefe / His bursting passion into plaints thus pour’d’.

Passion is excessive content, the excess of which overflows into recognizable affective states such as grief or joy. Before Satan’s tempting oration, Milton again describes passion as a state resulting in liquid readjustment:

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but with shew of Zeale and Love
To Man, and indignation at his wrong,
New part puts on, and as to passion mov’d,
Fluctuats disturbd
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(9. 665–668)

After the Fall, Adam’s internal turbulence is like life on high seas: ‘in a troubl’d Sea of passion

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61 See also their order in Milton’s list in *Eikonoklastes*:

> And should the Parlament, endu’d with Legislative power, make our Laws, and be after to dispute them peece meale with the reason, conscience, humour, passion, fansie, folly, obstinacy, or other ends of one man, whose sole word and will shall baffle and unmake what all the wisdom of a Parlament hath bin deliberately framing.


62 See *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*. Though the term passion never appears, and humour appears only once, the tract is filled with liquid imagery: ‘when as the mind from whence must flow the acts of peace and love, a far more preitious mixture then the quintessence of an excrement’, 2: 297; ‘As by Physick we learn in menstruous bodies, where natures current hath been stopt, that the suffocation and upward forcing of some lower part, affects the head and inward sense with dotage and idle fancies’, 2: 278–279; ‘draining of carnall rage’, 2: 355; ‘place more of mariage in the channell of concupiscence, then in the pure influence of peace and love, whereof the souls lawfull contentment is the onely fountain’, 2: 249. For an extended analysis see Svendsen, ‘Science and Structure’, 435–444.

63 Emphasis mine. This is the second and final occurrence of the term ‘passion’ in *The Reason of Church Government*. It appears in Book 2 at the end of Milton’s five ethical purposes of poetry. The usage is odd, for Milton appears to place the term outside of a person by contrasting it with a person’s internal thoughts. See *The Reason of Church Government*, 1: 753.

64 Milton, *PL* 9, 97–98.
tost’ (10. 718). Milton makes Comus comment on the Lady’s moral resistance as ‘but the lees / and settlings of a melancholy blood’ (808–810). Satan’s wound in the Battle of Heaven also flows out ‘sanguin’, but in this case it is a ‘Nectarous humour’ that stains his armour as if with bright paint. The four humours of course share this liquid imagery. Robert Burton’s definition summarizes the nature of humours within Galenic medicine in The Anatomy of Melancholy (1651): ‘A Humour is a liquid or fluent part of the Body’.

While the passions seem to be closely bound up with the humours and liquid motions inside and outside the body, Milton’s language for the affections is strikingly different. Miltonic affections are often conveyed exclusively through eye imagery. They are not so much part of the physical act of vision, and yet the language of sight is the chosen image to express knowledge, or the series of events described in the journey between the senses and the soul. In An Apology he describes affections as ‘dim’ because of humanity’s moral Fall. In The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, he calls them ‘blind’. Milton thus seems to describe affections with non-material images and agency (The Reason of Church Government, An Apology, Eikonoklastes), whereas the passions appear more with the bodily, the liquid. Intriguingly, affections also surpass the use of passions when Milton discusses prayer.

However slight these distinctions may be, they are significant because they show Milton wrestling with historical divisions between material and immaterial in the body and soul. The association of passions with liquid fluctuation and the humours, or something more ‘material’, has a long history. Julie Solomon argues that ‘in general, ancient and early moderns reserved the label ‘passion’ for occasions when the sensitive soul responded—with awareness—to temporary external or internal stimuli’. In Aristotle and Aquinas, the sensitive appetite is located between the vegetative, or nutritive, and the intellectual appetite which is reason or will. For Aquinas, ‘proper’ passions were literal movements of the sense appetite (as opposed to a quality or a metaphorical movement) that occurred when the appetitive power was acted upon by external sense objects that are imagined as good or evil through the apprehension, which produces physiological modifications. Although this definition emphasizes the passivity of the

65 I discuss this metaphor in Chapter 4.
67 The other instances of ‘humour’ in PL seem to imply that the Earth is a kind of ‘body’, 3. 610 and 7. 279–82.
69 See also Milton, DDC, 8.1: 366–67, where he describes lust as blind: perpetuae libidinem caeco impetus ferrentur.
70 Although there is no room to discuss this in this chapter, affections seem distinctly linguistic in Milton. That is, they seem to generate words spoken and can also respond to words. See Milton, Eikonoklastes, 3: 505.
71 Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have a Soul’, 200.
72 The idea that the motions are ‘literal’ is controversial in scholarship. See Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22–48, (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 39–41, who critiques Thomist scholarship for thinking that Aquinas thought of passions as literal ‘local motions’. For the passivity of passions see, Aquinas, ST, 1a.2ae.22.1–3, 1a.2ae.45, 2: 1a.81.2, and esp. 1a.2ae.41. 1. For sections that seem to imply the materiality of passions, see ST 1.2ae.22.1, 22.2 ad 3, 22.3, 77.1 obj 3, esp. 1a.2ae.41, 1. The corporeal nature of passions is
passions, Aquinas also considered them to be active movements in so far as they pursued and moved towards or away from a desired object. However, some boundary lines can be established (by implication) between passiones and other movements, or ‘acts of will’, sometimes signified by affectiones. In Aquinas’ *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, passions in the ‘strict sense’ occur in the sensitive appetite and must be accompanied by physical change in a bodily organ. He writes:

> Even among the appetite powers the operation of the intellective appetite is not properly called passion [*operatio appetitus intellectivi non proprie dicitur passio*]. It does not take place with a change of bodily organ, which is necessary to the nature of passion properly speaking. Also in the operation of the intellective appetite, which is the will, man is not the passive recipient, but rather he directs himself as the master of his action. It remains, therefore, that operations of the sensitive appetite, which are accompanied by a change of a bodily organ and which in a way draw a man, should be called passions in a strict sense [*passiones proprie dicantur operationes appetitus sensitivi*].

By implication therefore, Aquinas understands the intellectual appetite, or will, as something different to a ‘proper’ passion.

Wright’s understanding of the connection between passions and bodily responses follows a similar pattern in *Passions of the Minde*. In his discussion on the relationship between passions and humours, he asks whether passions generate humours, or whether humours generate passions in the soul. He decides that complexion, the humours, external senses, and

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73 The appetitive faculties’ tendency towards certain objects follows from it being in essence a disposition (*habitum*), see Aquinas, *ST* 1a.2ae.22, 2 ad 1 and 1a.2ae.51, 1. See also *ST* 1a.80, 2: ‘Appetite both moves and is moved.’ See James, *Passion and Action*, 52. See Lombardo’s discussion 38–46: ‘Aquinas’s account of the passions cannot be understood without reference to both their active dimension and their passive dimension, but their active dimension is primary and more central to his account….the primary function of the passions…[is] to incline us toward the perfection of our nature. Aquinas’s view that the passions are *movements*, rather than *qualities*, was a minority position in his lifetime.’

74 For the English, see Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. C.I. Litzinger, Aristotelian Commentary Series, (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993), 2.5, 292. For the full Latin translation, see *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Doctoris Angelici Quaestiones Disputatae Accedit Liber De Ente et Essentia, Cum Enarratione Cardinalis de Vio Cajetani*, 4 Vols. (Parisii: 1883), 4: 26.2, 26.3, 26.4 and 26.9. *Passiones animalis* are passions principally in the soul (like anger and fear, or motions aroused by apprehension and the soul’s appetite) that result in bodily transformation. *Passiones corporalis* are passions that begin in the body and end in the soul. I was made aware of these kinds of passions in Lombardo’s *helpful* *The Logic of Desire*, 45–46. He notes that Aquinas does not maintain the distinction between passiones corporalis and passiones animalis as much in the *Summa*, except when explaining the nature of Christ’s passions in *ST* 3a.15, 4 and *ST* 3a.46, 7. However, Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 16 –18, argues that we should be careful in assuming that passion always involves bodily change.

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Inter quas etiam operatio appetitus intellectivi non proprie dicitur passio, tum quia non est secundum transmutationem organi corporalis, quae requiritur ad rationem passionis proprie dictae; tum quia etiam secundum operationem appetitus intellectivi qui est voluntas, homo non agit tamquam patiens, sed potius seipsum agit tamquam dominus sui actus existens. Relinquitur ergo quod passiones proprie dicuntur operationes appetitus sensitivi, quae sunt secundum transmutationem organi corporalis, et quibus homo quodammodo dicitur.

See also Quaestiones Disputatae De Verite, 4: 26.3: ‘Is Passion Only in the Sense Appetitive Power’ [Utrum passio sit tantum in appetitiva sensitiva]? For the *Summa*, see *ST* 1a.81, 1 and *ST* 3a.15, 4: ‘nevertheless, the affections of the sensitive appetite are most properly called passions of the soul. Now these were in Christ…’.

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‘secret passage[s] of sensuall objects’ can raise passions in the soul. But more often, passions impel humours because the ‘spirites and humours wait upon the Passions, as their Lords and Maisters’. In an earlier work, *A Treatise of Melancholy* (1586), Bright had also rejected the idea that humours gave rise to passions. He states that too many philosophers have defined the passions by their physical effects. This, he thinks, is the mistake of confusing effects with causes. Anger, as a passion in the soul, is not itself ‘boyling of bloued about the hart’ – that is the physical effect. It is instead a cause (not primarily physical) that triggers the body to produce heat in the heart. Solomon explains that in normal circumstances the ‘passions move the humours, not the other way around. Only ill health allows the humours to affect the soul and its passions, and then only indirectly, by altering the bodily organs and the spirits’. By arguing against a materialist reduction of the passions, Bright was evidently concerned to locate passions inside the soul, as separate from, though not completely distinct from, the body. One can imagine this was to secure free agency outside of material causal origins. Exactly what substance Bright’s soul is composed of, enabling it to adjust liquid humours, remains unclear.

Erin Sullivan’s ‘The Passions in Thomas Wright’ explores how Wright also upholds ‘elements of dualism’ by allowing passion to occur in the intellective and disembodied soul, but also ‘embraced the centrality of the integrated and embodied soul’. Although her research aims to elicit a ‘more immaterial vision of emotion than has sometimes been acknowledged’, her work underscores the tension in Wright’s prose, which characterizes much seventeenth-century writing that eschews neat dualist or monist categories. For instance, William Ayloffe in *Government of the Passions* describes passions as ‘equally Daughters of the Soul and Body’. The word ‘equally’ is language filled with the hope of reconciliation, but is also fraught with a sense of nagging compromise. And yet Ayloffe’s bold ‘both-and’ solution to the ontological status of the passions perhaps points towards how James describes language

undermin[ing] the stereotypical image of early-modern philosophy as gripped by a thoroughgoing dualism between mind and body, and strengthen[ing] the revisionist historiography that has begun to replace it.

Burton in *Anatomy of Melancholy* also seems concerned to locate the passions within the mind. Yet still they are responsible for physical effects in some way: ‘the mind most effectually works upon the body, producing by his passions and perturbations miraculous alterations’, and alluding to Plato, ‘all mischiefs of the body proceed from the soul’. Coëffeteau’s English

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75 For the dual interaction between passions and humours, see Wright, *Passions of the Minde*, 4, 8, 35–45.
77 Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have A Soul’, 212.
80 James, *Passion and Action*, 16.
translation, *A Table of Humane Passions*, follows Aquinas in denoting the passions’ physicality. ‘Passions’, he writes, ‘properly speaking, reside only in the sensitive appetite, and…they are not fashioned but in the irrational part of the soul’. 82 Though he acknowledges there are also ‘motions of the understanding and will’, these are considered ‘passions’ only by figure of speech because they share some resemblance with ‘passions of the senses’. 83 Thus the fact that Milton’s language for the passions speaks of a unique partnership between the passions and humoral, bodily movements, suggests nothing unusual. Passions often appear as semi-material, semi-immaterial agents in the matrix of an embodied, quasi-material-immaterial soul that could access and influence both dimensions. 84

Likewise, Milton’s exclusive use of ocular language with the affections suggests he is familiar with classical and medieval attempts to demarcate material, humoral passions of the sense appetite from higher, purer affections of the mind or reason. 85 Although Augustine uses the familiar range of terms to show perverse passions, he uses only affectus, affectiones, and motus to describe proper, though what seem to be imperfect, kinds of passions. 86 But affectiones and affectus are also the terms used to depict Christ’s sinless experiences in human flesh. Augustine’s presentation of the passions thus contains subtle distinctions between passio, affectus, and their variants to depict various degrees of self-control in a disordered soul and body. Although the terms passiones and affectiones seem to cover all aspects of affectivity (both good and bad), he has demarcated certain kinds of passions that belong to a separate category with his favoured terms affectiones and affectus. Russ Leo suggests that Augustine uses affectus both to denote ‘a general disposition, [an] emotion in the broadest sense only as a movement or effect’, but also to mark out ‘a different category’ as it points to a ‘different “economy of activity and passivity”…distinct from passiones and perturbationes that are common to all men’. 87 Further, when Augustine is not equivocating between passio and affectus, he indicates that passiones are mere perversions and diseased forms of affectiones, and that affectiones are better versions of their diseased counterparts. 88 Therefore, all passions are affections, but not all affections are passions. Augustine’s concept of the will is crucial to these

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82 Coëffeteau, *A Table of Humane Passions*, 2–3.
83 Coëffeteau, *A Table of Humane Passions*, 2.
86 For Augustine’s use of terms to show corrupt passions see *DCD* 14. 9 and 9. 3–4. However, he did not think passiones was exclusively a category for perverse appetites. Augustine hinted that not all ‘these…passions [are said to be] vices’ in *DCD* 9. 5. Implicit, then, is the fact that some kinds of passions are virtuous. Further, these kinds of passions are often qualified by the adjectives ‘right’ (rectas) or ‘godly’ (deum). He begins to make the distinctions in *DCD*, 9. 5 and 14. 9
87 Leo, ‘Affective Physics’, 44–45.
distinctions, for it becomes clear that that passions which remain purely passions are ‘negative’, in the sense that the will moves in the wrong direction and submits to the non-rational faculty, or loves an object improperly. The will is therefore the final culprit. The kind of passions which Augustine calls affectiones, however, are ‘love-born passions’, described as being ‘right’ because the will is directed properly. Ultimately, Augustine reduces both passions and affections to ‘acts of will’, which seems to imply that even harmful actions motivated by sinful passions are performed voluntarily, and therefore exculpate the wrongdoer. Yet Augustine is attuned to the common experience that these passions (both good and bad) can also take one by surprise, and suddenly move a person against one’s better reason, and commit them to acting at odds with the very thing they want to do. This is seen uniquely in his passion of lust (libido).

Whereas Augustine reduced all passions (both affectiones and passiones) to acts of will (voluntates), determining Aquinas’s distinction – if indeed one can be made – is more complicated. The Thomist concept of affectiones has generated enormous amounts of scholarship. Most scholars agree that passio and affectus are overlapping categories in Aquinas. Most also think that affectus represents a separate category. But there is no consensus over how to interpret Thomist distinctions. The debate cannot be settled here, but there is a way forward even as we remember Nicholas Lombardo’s caution in The Logic of Desire:

89 Augustine, DCD, 9. 7; 14. 6. Gerald O’Daly agrees with this conclusion, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 47–9, as does Gaukroger, The Soft Underbelly of Reason, 6; Knuuttila, Emotions, 159, suggests that Augustine incorporates two notions of the will. The fact that Augustine may be using two distinct notions makes it possible for initial movements of the will (passions) to be spontaneous and involuntary, but that they are also voluntary acts in so far as the will can reject or consent to the passion. See Augustine, DCD, 14. 7–8; the chapter title of 14. 9 suggests that de perturbationis animi are affectus rectus in the lives of the righteous, whose ‘right love’ makes all their feelings right (omnes affectiones rectas). Knuuttila thinks these that good ‘emotions’ are not born in love, Emotions, 160. On the contrary, I think Augustine intends to argue that love is the ‘genus’ of all passions (both good and bad).

90 Augustine, DCD, 14. 9. But see 14. 19 for a puzzling remark: ‘Even emotions (moventur) checked by reason are not healthy’.

91 Lust is described as wholly involuntary, based on its ability to rouse certain body parts against the will, and indeed strangely, without the will. O’Daly also observes this exception, Augustine’s Philosophy, 53.


93 Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 21–60, thinks the passions are strictly movements of the lower appetite, bodily, unruly and involuntary, and take physical objects as their ends. But passions could be upgraded to affections or pure acts of will if they submitted to reason. Affection denotes a separate category distinguished by a lack of corporeality; affections are voluntary, higher and have immaterial objects such as God and truth as their objects; all Christians should aspire towards these. Scrutton, ‘Emotion in Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas’, 175–176, follows Dixon’s distinctions. James, Passion and Action, 61–62, also attempts a distinction by making affects, ‘volutiions’, which as intellectual emotions involve no bodily change and aim towards different objects. Passions, on the other hand, always involve bodily change. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 16 fn. 60, 75–76, helpfully critiques Dixon’s severe account of the passions as negative by arguing that Aquinas made the sensitive, physical appetite and its passions central to virtue. He also nuances Dixon’s account where passions take physical, worldly objects as their ends, and where affections take incorporeal, abstract objects as their ends, by evidencing that passions could be ‘shaped by rational considerations’, and that even affections or acts of will could sorrow or rejoice in sense objects (ST 1a.2ae. 31.3, 34.1, 34.4). Lombardo is shrewd to observe that while ‘every affection of the will is a movement of the will… it is unclear whether all movements of the will are affections.’ For that reason, Lombardo limits his study only to those phenomena that Aquinas directly labels ‘affections.’ He also evidences that Aquinas is more interested in affectus in the Secunda secundae based on statistical word-count study, 77, 148–149 fn. 3.
Aquinas says so little about the category of affection…he seems to use the term ‘affection’ only to describe movements of the will that are analogous to the passions in some way…Typically the term serves as a synonym for the passions of the soul, or else differentiates human passions from movements of the human will or the love and joy of God and the angels.94

Aquinas declares that passions and affections are not inherently bad themselves, but are good or bad depending on the ruling presence or absence of reason.95 As was discussed above, the Thomist term affectiones may act as a synonym for passiones and therefore represent a general category that encompasses all movements of the sensitive appetite and movements of the will.96 At times his attitude towards affections that are not passions (affectiones) is negative, as they feature in the language he uses to refute the Stoics.97 Yet affectiones and cognates also seems to distinguish a separate category characterised by the absence of passivity and corporeality, as when he writes

The phrase, a passion for the things of God [passio divinorum] means here a passionate desire for the things of God [ibi dicitur affectio ad divina], and union with them through love [amorem]; but this involves no physiological modification [transmutatione corporali].98

More differences surface in his discussion of whether love exists in God:

Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies [Unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est appetitus sensitivus]. Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite [Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivus concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis], and this change affects especially the heart….Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, in as much as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions [passiones]; whereas acts of the will are not so called [non autem actus voluntatis]. Love [Amor], therefore, and joy and delight [delectatio] are passions [passiones]; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite [actus appetitus intellectivus], they are not passions [non autem]. It is in this latter sense that they are in God….He loves without passion [sine passione amat].99

And in a passage about the will, Aquinas appears to contrast affectus most sharply with passio:

Love [amor], concupiscence [concupiscentia], and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions [passiones] –arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul [concitazione animi provenientes]. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite [et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivus]. They may, however be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of will [Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitazione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis]. And in this

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94 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 77.
95 Aquinas considers what makes passions morally good or evil in ST 1a.2ae.24, 2–4.
96 See fn. 164.
97 Witness Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.59, 2 ad 1 and 1a.2ae.59, 5 ad 1.
98 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.22, 3.
99 Aquinas, ST 1a.20, 1.
sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is called the will.\textsuperscript{100}

The category of affectus thus allows Aquinas to develop a notion of divine and angelic affectivity for incorporeal beings who have subjective experiences but who are not subject to the ‘strict’ corporeal aspect of passiones which requires undergoing physical change.\textsuperscript{101} Though Aquinas never defines affectus or affectio, surrounding context indicates that he considers passions of the soul to be movements of the sense appetite signified by both affectiones and passiones. Yet there are other occasions where he reserves the term affectiones for different kinds of movements belonging exclusively to the intellectual appetite, or the will, which are passionless (sine passione) as they are ‘acts of will’, but which also resemble passiones in critical ways.\textsuperscript{102} From this, we can conclude that passions, when they are motions of the sensitive appetite, are bodily and yet may still be virtuous; operations of the intellectual appetite, or acts of will, when they are affectiones and not passiones, are the versions of love and joy experienced by God and the angels. They are related by their effects, but different ontological forms of affects.

If Aquinas’ category of affectus remains unclear, later commentators adopted Thomist language and made divisions straightforward. Wright distinguishes passions from affections by placing affections in higher echelons of the soul. ‘Affections’, he explains in \textit{Passions of the Minde}

\ldots differ much in nature and quality from those that inhabit the inferior parts of the soul, because, these being bred and borne in the highest part of the soul are immaterial, spiritual, independent of any corporall subject; but those of the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[100]{Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.82, 5.}
\footnotetext[101]{Lombardo, \textit{The Logic of Desire}, 76, states that Aquinas defines affections in only two places. In \textit{Summa Contra Gentiles}, 1.89, 1–2 and 1.90, he calls them intellectiva affectio. In \textit{ST} 1a.82, 5 ad 1, he names them simplex affectus, which are ‘acts of will’ that denote simple ‘attraction’ [affectum] and occur without ‘passion or perturbation of soul’ [passione vel animae concitatione]. When this is the case, these affectionae apply to the angles and to God. For occasions where Aquinas uses passio and affectus with God, see \textit{ST} 1a.19.11, 20.1 ad 1; \textit{ST} 1a.21.3; For affectus, passio, appetitus and the angels, see \textit{ST} 1a.59, 4; 1a.60, and 1a.2ae.22, 3 (though here again the terms could be synonymous). For Aquinas’ discussion of the affective experiences of God and angels happening without passions because they lack the sensitive appetite and corporeal bodies, see \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.59, 5 ad 3, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22, 3; 1a.2ae.24, 4. On the metaphorically attribution of anger to God, see Augustine \textit{DCD} 9.5, which relates how the Church Fathers perceived God’s wrath to be allegorical rather than literal, and also Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.19, 11. For Aquinas’ use of affectus and passio with humans, see \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.30.1 ad 1; \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22.3 ad 1.}
\footnotetext[102]{By implication from statements in \textit{ST} 1a.20, 1 ad 1; 1a.2ae.22, 3; 1a.2ae.59, 2; 1a.2ae.59, 4, and \textit{De Veritate} 25.3: ‘Now the higher appetite has certain acts similar to those of the lower appetite, though without any passion. The operations of the higher appetite are accordingly sometimes given the names of passions. Thus the will for revenge is called “anger”… By the same process the will itself which produces these acts is sometimes called “irascible” or “concupiscible”, not properly but by figure of speech’ [\textit{appetitus vero superior [intellectus] habet aliquos actu similes inferiori appetitu, sed absque omni passione. Et sic operations superioris appetitus sortiuntur interdum nominata passionum; sicut voluntas vindicatam dicitur ira… et eadem ratione, ipsa voluntas, quae hos actus produceit, dicitur interdum irascibilis et cupixibilis, non tamen proprie, sed per quamdam similitudinem]. For the English translation of Aquinas’ \textit{De Veritate}, I have used \textit{Truth: St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated from the definitive Leontine Text}, trans. Robert W. Schmidt, 3 Vols, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954). Henceforth abbreviated to \textit{Truth} in the footnotes.}
\end{footnotes}
sensitive appetite are material, corporall, and dependent upon some bodily instruments.\footnote{69}

This passage provides a stunningly clear example of how an early modern author could use the affective terms to contrast immaterial and material, and differentiate higher, incorporeal motions of the soul from lower, material motions of the sensitive appetite. Coëffetateau likewise explains that ‘passions’ are not in the rational part because this part of the soul does not alter bodily organs. But there is an exception, he notes: the passion of love may also occur in the will because its end can be spiritual.\footnote{103 Wright, Passions of the Minde, 32. Tilmouth observes Wright’s distinction, Passion’s Triumph, 27 fn. 55, as does James, Passion and Action, 7.} Reynolds’ definition of ‘sensitive passions’ in \textit{A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties} (1640) arguably remains the same as Aquinas’, although Reynolds’ vocabulary reflects some change.\footnote{104 Wright, Passions of the Minde, 164–5. This is the only example I have been able to find that designates a kind of passion that takes place only in the will.} What Aquinas had referred to as ‘affections’ to sometimes distinguish immaterial acts of will from appetitive motions with physical effects, Reynolds terms ‘mental passions’. These mental passions are ‘the most simple actions of the Mind, wherein is the least intermixtion or commerce with inferior and earthly faculties’.\footnote{105 Edward Reynolds, \textit{A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man. With the several dignities and corruptions thereunto belonging}, (London: printed for Robert Bostock, 1656), 32, 37. For Reynolds’s equivocation between ‘affection’ and ‘passion’, see \textit{A Treatise of the Passions}, 43–44, 74, 162, 198–199, 201, 202, 258, 300.} Scholarship in literary and philosophical studies has often followed the early modern inclination to reserve \textit{affectus} for something intellective and unmixed with bodily baggage. Richard and Meek in \textit{Renaissance and Emotion}, approving of Dixon’s ‘historical specificity’ of affective terms, conclude ‘Renaissance “affection” in its most technical sense signified quite the opposite, that is, an immaterial, disembodied and explicitly rational state’.\footnote{106 Reynolds, \textit{A Treatise of the Passions}, 36.} \footnote{107 Meek and Sullivan, The Renaissance of Emotion, 12. See also Gowland, ‘Melancholy, Passions and Identity in the Renaissance’, 75–94.} Thus, linguistic distinctions between passions and affections offer a kind of historical frontier between material and immaterial realms, and reveal how philosophical thinking shaped and generated a vocabulary that had to cope with the fracture line between mind and body. In light of this, it would seem that Milton’s subtle manipulation of language – reserves passions more often with the liquid, the humoural, and the bodily, and reserving the affections more often with seeing – is no accident. But it is difficult to explain what Milton is doing when he uses visual language for the affections. Ocular imagery can suggest something epistemic, much in the same way that ‘seeing’ something can also mean ‘understanding’ something. In that sense, the metaphor seems to point towards what is non-material, perhaps implying that affections are endowed with a different kind of agency to the passions.\footnote{108 Miltonic passions are not something that always only ‘happen’ to someone; they also ‘do’ something to the person. Even so, Milton seems to hold people responsible for their actions despite the high level of agency he assigns to the passions and affections.} and yet the imagery itself seems troubled by what is, after all, a physiological object: the eye. This makes it difficult...
to shed the metaphor’s materiality and assume that affections have no material basis. I will argue later that this kind of example poses problems for assumptions about metaphor in Milton materialist studies. At the very least, however, Milton’s distinctions indicate that he is aware of the history of the body and how affective language bends under the pressure of philosophical positions on matter.

C. ‘SEEING THROUGH A GLASSE DIMLY’: INTIMATIONS OF MATERIAL AFFECTIONS

Having observed Milton’s distinctions between passions and affections, perhaps this analysis persuades that Milton’s terms occupy a spectrum between the wholly material and the wholly immaterial – reserving passions for what is material and in the body, and affections for what is immaterial and in reason. But Milton’s vocabulary also acts in odd ways. Subtle distinctions that appear to follow historical divisions also collapse along the blurred line between material and immaterial, the body and mind, passion and reason in Milton’s writing. The result is that passions and affections occur in both the body and the mind, in the sensitive appetite and in reason, and all locations retain a surprising degree of corporeality.

For example, in the introduction to his first public prose tract Of Reformation (1641), the term ‘affections’ makes its appearance for the first time in Milton’s prose and poetry. But though he assigns affections to the soul, the ontological gap between soul and body narrows after reading about the affections’ ability to intersect with the body:

Sad it is to think how that doctrine of the gospel, planted by teachers divinely inspired, and by them winnowed and sifted from the chaff of overdated ceremonies, and refined to such a spiritual height and temper of purity, and knowledge of the Creator, that the body, with all the circumstances of time and place, were purified by the affections of the regenerate soul, and nothing left impure but sin; faith needing not the weak and fallible office of the senses, to be either the ushers or interpreters of heavenly mysteries, save where our Lord himself in his sacraments ordained...

Does this imply that Milton’s material soul can be dated even as early as 1641? Perhaps it is not so clear as this, for earlier and later in this same wordy Miltonic sentence, Milton’s language frequently splits the body and the spirit into two separable parts, as when he writes: ‘...Christ, suffering to the lowest bent of weakness in the flesh, and presently triumphing to the highest pitch of glory in the spirit, which drew up his body also; till we in both be united to him in the

109 For exceptions, see fn. 189.
110 Milton, Of Reformation, 1: 519.
revelation of his kingdom…’. But the passage above concerning the affections seems to jar with Fallon’s understanding of the young Milton’s straightforward dualism, ‘that is to say…a relation of body and soul traceable to Plato and Renaissance Neoplatonists’, as well as Fallon’s theory of Milton’s ‘early’, ‘strict dualism’ and ‘late monism’. For what is arresting about this sentence, littered with dualist distinctions, is the ease with which Milton then relates soul and body. There is no hesitation about whether immaterial affections of the soul can penetrate and clean up the body. The veil between the body and the soul and its affections thus seems thin, if not of similar substance, which would allow traffic to pass both ways.

The affections in *The Reason of Church Government* also appear located in the realm of reason: ‘the Church hath in her immediate cure those inner parts and affections of the mind where the seat of reason is; having power to examine our spirituall knowledge…’ But in the same tract Milton also calls them ‘sensual mistresses’ that guide the epistemic process between the outer world with the object, and the inner world with the royal court room trial before the queen, Understanding. Milton says they ‘keep the ports and passages’ between ‘sense and the soul’. The affections thus seem to occupy a half-way house between external physical objects and acts of judgment in the mind. But we are again dealing with metaphorical language that cannot completely rid itself of the permanence of the physical, in part because Milton takes their mischief so seriously and makes knowing them central to his argument against prelacy:

I shall likewise assay those wily Arbitresses [Affections and Desires]…for that by as much acquaintance as I can obtain with them, I doe not find them engag’d either one way or other. Concerning therefore ecclesiastical jurisdiction…

The odd, self-explanatory, first-person pronouns used by Milton seems to question the metaphorical, immaterial status of these internal agents. A similar surprise occurs in his *An Apology*:

> Not as through the dim glasse of his affections which in this frail mansion of flesh are ever unequally temper’d, pushing forward to error, and keeping back from truth oft times the best of men….Something I thought it was that made him so quick-sighted to gather such strange things out of Animadversions….now I know it was this equall temper of his affections that gave him to see clearer then any fenell

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111 Italic mine. The passage has familiar overtones to lines in *Comus* and in *PL* where body will be ‘drawn up to spirit’. Fallon, *Milton Among the Philosophers*, 84. Fallon comments on the same sentence, but at a later part to argue that ‘Milton oscillates between Platonist and Pauline language’, and for ‘obvious polemical reasons, Milton zealously guards the Platonist division between matter and spirit that he will abandon later’. Fallon argues the same happens in the divorce tracts; ‘Milton writes dualism into his text, but he imputes it as a scandal to his opponents’, 91.

112 Fallon, *Milton Among the Philosophers*, 79–80 and 81–82. Fallon does however acknowledge that ‘seeds of change’ are present even in *Comus*, in which he finds Milton using Paul’s Hebraist monist conception of body and soul to track Milton’s shift from ‘Plato’s strict dualism’ to ‘monist tendencies’, 82. Fallon also discusses early examples of Milton’s monist soul in *Areopagitica* and Of Reformation.


Images of the body as a weak architectural structure appear numerous times in Milton’s early poetry, although most refer to Christ. ‘Il Penseroso’ portrays the ‘immortal mind…hath forsook / Her mansion in this fleshly nook’; in ‘Ode on the Morning of Christ’s Nativity’, Christ ‘Forsook the Courts of everlasting Day / and chose with us a darksom House of mortal Clay; in ‘The Passion’ Christ the ‘Poor fleshly tabernacle entered’; in ‘Upon Circumcision’, Christ is again said to have ‘for us frail dust / Emptyed his glory’.116 But what is intriguing in An Apology is the relationship between the body and affections, which Milton expresses as looking through an embodied glass.117 Milton’s source for this image is the Pauline epistle, 1 Corinthians 13:12: ‘For now we see through a glasse, darkly…’.118 Perhaps reading the 1611 King James Version, Milton follows the original Greek closely.119 In English this is best expressed in translations that represent δι as ‘through’, followed by the genitive noun ἐνσώπημα. The Great Bible of 1539 and the 1568 Bishop’s Bible, most likely owned by Milton’s father and known to the younger Milton, however, translate the passage ‘Nowe we see in a glasse, even in a darke…’.120 But this creates an entirely opposite reading. Looking ‘in’ a glass instead of ‘through’ it alters the meaning.121 The preposition ‘in’ signals mirror imagery and concepts of reflection; the second preposition ‘through’ suggests materials capable of mediating vision. Milton was aware of the prepositional difference.122 In An Apology, another reference to glasse occurs:

…my purpose is not, nor hath been formerly, to look on my adversary abroad, through the deceaving glass of other men’s great opinion of him, but at home,

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115 Milton, An Apology, 1: 909–910, fn. 11. The Yale editors, quoting Visiak, reveal that Pliny (Nat. Hist. 8, 99) had written that snakes shed their skins by fennel juice. The juice was prescribed from dim-sighted eyes in ‘old medical writers’.


117 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 85, here contends that ‘the Pauline [by which he means Hebraist monist] and Platonist perspectives merge’ since ‘the famous passage from 1 Corinthians 13 jostles…with the Platonist picture of the soul in the shell of the body’.

118 This is also cited by Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 85. The Columbia editors correctly identify Milton’s source in the Pauline Epistle, and go on to say that Milton referred to this passage again in The Reason of Church Government Book 1, where he enthuses: ‘because of the Gospel [the Church] shall see with open eyes, not under a vaile’. I think they mean 2 Corinthians 3:12–18.


120 Emphasis mine. The 1576 Geneva Bible translates passage with ‘through’. The 1592 Vulgate translates it as per speculum. Fletcher argues that 1599 Genevan and 1611 versions were Milton’s favourite English sources but that he preferred the 1611 in later life. This phrase appears twice again in the New Testament: 1 Corinthians 3:18 and James 1:23. Milton cites this verse again in this theory of accommodation, DDC, 8.1: 27.

121 For the difference between ‘glasse’ and ‘mirror’ see Herbert Grubes, The Mutable Glass: Mirror-Imagery in Titles and Texts of the Middle Ages and English Renaissance, trans. Gordon Collier (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), 11. His scope is limited to repetitions of the term ‘glasse’ which imply a ‘mirror-image’.

122 Several other references to glass and mirrors in Milton’s writing; ‘mirror’ occurs once in the Second Defense, three times in Eikonoklastes, four times in the A Defence of the People of England, once in History of Britain, and once in Samson Agonistes (line 156–165); ‘glasse’ occurs once in Areeopagitis; speculum twice in DDC For the rise to prominence of ‘mirror-titles’ over ‘glasse-titles’ in Renaissance England and the Continent in the late sixteenth century, but a return to ‘Looking glass’ as a title-metaphor in religious or political polemical writings distinctly in 1640–1660, see Grubes, The Mutable Glass, 29–34.
where I may find him in the proper light of his own worth.\textsuperscript{123}

That is, the function created by the preposition ‘through’ creates a passage between two corrupted substances distorting clear vision. Herbert Grabes in \textit{The Mutable Glass} cites the glass passage in Milton’s \textit{An Apology} as an example of a literary metaphor representing ‘emotions, reason, prescience, memory, [or] the moral sense’.\textsuperscript{124} He affirms

It is however, less the organ itself [the heart] which is meant than the soul or spirit of man as a special faculty diametrically opposed to the physical or, rather, superior to it. There seems little point in distinguishing with these mirrors between volutantive, emotional and rational domains of the soul, between will, ‘soul’, understanding and reason, as all the literary evidence points to a complex intertwining of these various areas.\textsuperscript{125}

The second reference that depicts Milton engaging with various bodily states caused by different prepositions occurs in \textit{Areopagitica} (1644). There the body is a kind of instrument reflecting, rather than transferring, information. Milton supplies reasons for Parliament’s repeal of the Licensing Order of 1643 and the consequences for prohibiting printing:

…but he who thinks we are to pitch our tent here, and have attained the utmost prospect of reformation, that the mortal glass wherein we contemplate can show us, till we come to beatific vision; that man by his very opinion declares, that he is yet far short of truth.\textsuperscript{126}

Here the whole person, body and mind, conducts his activity like a glass or single mirror capable of revealing knowledge. Thus the body-mind seems to act as a kind of glass that communicates by reflection.

However, in taking ‘through a glasse’ instead of ‘in a glasse’ when translating the Pauline sentence in \textit{An Apology} (and following the English 1599 Geneva and 1611 version), Milton reimagines the affections as a telescopic medium composed of a mixture of transparent and opaque minerals, rather than as a reflective device. But this relates the affections to the body in a complex way. Although the distinction between the body and the affections is maintained by the use of separate metaphors – ‘dim glasse’ expressing the affections, and ‘frail mansion’ standing for the body – the distinction, at the same time, refuses to remain lucid. For even while ‘dim glasse’ is possessive and refers to the affections, the glass is intricately associated with the ‘frail mansion’ of the fleshly body. Indeed, mentioning the quality of the glass would make little sense unless the body’s ‘flesh’ introduced a reason for the affections’ impairment. Understood this way, it is as if the body is an obstacle that clogs or muddles or

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{123} Emphasis mine. Milton, \textit{An Apology}, 1: 869. For evidence that mirror imagery was used exclusively with man, the human body, and mental faculties, but not to inanimate objects in England, see Grabes, \textit{The Mutable Glass}, 77–78.
\item\textsuperscript{124} Grabes, \textit{The Mutable Glass}, 337.
\item\textsuperscript{125} Grabes, \textit{The Mutable Glass}, 88. He also cites \textit{Areopagitica} as an example of how mirrors serve as metaphors for ‘thoughts’ or ‘the capacity to speak’, 89.
\item\textsuperscript{126} Milton, \textit{Areopagitica}, 2: 549.
\end{itemize}
‘dims’ the clarity of the glass. The stuff of the body is partly responsible for corrupted affections, and yet the stuff of the affections is simply part of the fallen materials persons are born out of in Adam. The affections, then, seem to look ‘through’ the body. The matrix of this affective-body acts like a window for the internal world to view the external world. Thus, even though Milton’s reservation of visual metaphors for the affections could imply he is attempting to distinguish between material and immaterial aspects of the soul, and therefore following the historical passions-affections divide, these examples leave the affections with surprising material connotations.

D. ‘THE SHADOW OF REASON’ AND ‘BEING DESTITUTE OF THE SUBSTANCE’:
INTIMATIONS OF MATERIAL PASSIONS IN REASON

So far the affections have been seen to occur in both mind or reason, as well as in the body, even in cases where Milton seems to be using ‘affections’ in the historically specific sense as intellectual acts of will. But to complicate matters, mind, reason, and the body in these instances maintain a striking degree of physicality. The passions in Milton’s canon also indicate permanent materiality. Earlier I acknowledged how medieval and early modern sources described a unique relationship between passions and material motions of the sensitive appetite, and reserved the term passiones for what generated bodily responses. Milton often exploits this unique partnership between humour and passions. However, Miltonic passions appear to remain thoroughly corporeal even at the level of reason. The unstable boundary between reason and the passions seem to indicate that ‘reason’ in Milton is, in some sense, material. The question regarding reason’s ontological status can be seen as one of the dividing features between dualist and monist readings in the secondary literature on Milton and matter. Sugimura’s immensely detailed research catches the ‘brilliant moments of opposition’ to Fallon’s verdict suggesting the Miltonic story is monist materialism, where ‘substance is

127 Milton does not indicate that the affections are finally materially determining for human action. Milton, An Apology, 1: 909

And if my dissentings at any time were (as some have suspected, and uncharitably avowed) out of error, opiniativenesse, weaknesse, or wilfullnesse, and what they call Obstinacy in me (which not true Judgement of things, but some vehement prejudice or passion hath fixed on my mind) yet can no man think it other then the Badge and Method of Slavery, by savage rudenesse, and importunate obtrusions of violence, to have the mist of His Errour and Passion dispelled, which is a shadow of Reason, and must serve those that are destitute of the substance.

129 Dobranski seems to understand this when he summarises the different positions in Milton and matter in Milton in Context (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), 19–22; Sugimura thinks Milton’s monist model is shattered by Milton’s reference to reason as the soul’s being, which implies dualism in being non-material, ‘Matter of Glorious Trial’, 133.
universally material in Milton’s cosmos’.\footnote{Sugimura, “Matter of Glorious Trial”, xxiv, esp. 119–195. There she argues that Milton’s reading of passages in Aristotle, his doctrine of traducianism, and his conception of soul in PL and DDC shows that Milton’s soul is immaterial because reason is its essence.} One of the ways Sugimura establishes her antimaterialist conclusion is to show how Milton’s metaphysical reading of Aristotle’s reason, or \textit{nous}, ‘protected [the rational soul] against a reduction to a ‘material form’.\footnote{Sugimura, “Matter of Glorious Trial”, 131.} She writes,

\begin{quote}
While recent interpretations of Aristotle claim the philosopher inclines to a hylomorphism that naturally lends itself to materialism, Aristotle, like Milton, holds this movement in check.
\end{quote}

She cites Aristotle’s \textit{Generation of Animals} 2.3, 736b30–34 and 2.3, 737a8–12 to argue that the words ‘reason’ and ‘divine’ used to describe the active substance carried by the semen – this ‘spiritus’ or the ‘principle of the soul’, composed of ‘astral elements’ – ‘jump off the page as unequivocally immaterial’.\footnote{Sugimura, “Matter of Glorious Trial”, 132.} Another Aristotelian passage, \textit{De Anima} 2.2, 413b26, is employed to reveal how the \textit{nous} (intellect or mind) is a type of soul capable of separation from the body ‘as that which is eternal from that which is perishable’.\footnote{Sugimura, “Matter of Glorious Trial”, 133.} Finally, in \textit{Paradise Lost} 5. 486–87 where the ‘Soule / Reason receives, and reason is her being’, Sugimura again argues that reason is pictured as ‘divine, entering as an immaterial, incorporeal substance from the outside’.

Milton, she contends, would have been aware of how Renaissance commentators of Aristotle distinguished intellectual spirits (material soul-vehicles) from the life principle or essence of the soul (immaterial reason), and how Aristotle used a material tissue, called \textit{pneuma} or spirit, to connect the immaterial soul to the material body. Thus Sugimura skilfully shows that although Milton’s writing seems to imply a monism, Milton followed Aristotle in carefully allowing ‘reason’ an escape exit from the material substance of the body. This allows her to revise scholarly thinking on Milton’s mortalism.

Fallon, on the other hand, argues in the opposite direction: Milton slides from Aristotle’s hylomorphism (which acknowledges the possibility of immaterial strands) into full-blown materialism. That is, Fallon argues that Milton departs from Aristotle’s caution about the rational part, in which he states that the soul principle (reason) is partly separable from physical matter in creatures ‘where some divine element is included, in what we call Reason’\footnote{See Fallon, \textit{Milton Among the Philosophers}, 100, and Aristotle: \textit{Generation of Animals}, trans. A.L. Peck (London: William Heinemann, 1943), 171, 173.} Further, Fallon deliberates that Milton even departs from Galen who remained open to the idea that the ‘substance of the soul’ could be something material – ‘natural heat’, the [corporeal] ‘pneuma’, the ‘form of the brain’, or something immaterial – ‘some incorporeal power beyond it’.\footnote{Fallon, \textit{Milton Among the Philosophers}, 104.} Fallon grounds Milton’s materialist turn in Raphael’s discourse on ‘one first matter’ to evidence how the entire universe is set against a monist hierarchy, covering the spectrum between more dense,
corporeal things to higher, more refined, spirituous beings. Fallon then states what this means for ‘reason’, which is considered to supply the dualist critic with monist-shattering ammunition:

…what we think of as matter [extends] to reason, the ‘being of the soul…. human discursive reason and angelic intuitive reason differ ‘but in degree, of kind the same’. 136

And so Fallon’s conclusion also hinges on Milton’s reading of Aristotelian and Galenic ‘reason’ and its consequences for the soul-body relation.

The passions in Milton help to determine a material picture of reason, and seem to point the field in the direction of Fallon’s findings. In Areopagitica, Milton makes the passions central to the difference between evil manners and true virtue to contest the effectiveness of Parliament’s 1643 Licensing Order. But when Milton underscores that virtue is merely the action of ‘reason’ and ‘choice’ – and then states that virtue is the very stuff of ‘rightly tempered’ passions – passions seem to enmesh with reason itself. Milton’s famous ‘reason is but choosing’ paraphrase from Nicomachean Ethics appears earlier in Of Education in an extended version. There he cites Aristotle’s technical term, Proairesis [decision or ‘moral choice’] to represent ‘that act of reason’ capable of discerning ‘moral good and evil’. 137 Even here Milton’s ethical programme does not cut off or isolate reason to an immaterial territory encased by ethereal soul-stuff. Instead Milton implies that the ‘act of reason’ or choice is a moral faculty, intimately part of the process of refashioning affective responses that will take place through reading moral philosophy: ‘their young and pliant affections are led through all the moral works of Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, Plutarch, Laertius, and those Locrian remnants’. 138 Although Milton’s chosen word in Of Education is ‘affections’, we can take it that he is using the term synonymously with ‘passions’ because he makes a similar statement about virtue in Areopagitaca: ‘Wherefore did he creat passions within us, pleasures round about us, but that these rightly temper’d are the very ingredients of vertu’? But in writing this way, Milton seems to add cognitive dimensions to these bodily impulses, and grants that reason participates in the life of the passions. Mixing the affective and cognitive to some degree was noted by Aquinas, who said the passions in the sense appetite [appetitus sensitivus] could be called ‘rational to the extent that there is in a sense in which they have some share in the life of reason’. 139

136 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 102, 105.
139 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.24, 1. See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary, trans. Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 1.13, 1102b13. See Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have a Soul’, 204, who argues that in Aristotle it is ‘hard to draw line between the cognitive functioning of sensitive soul and where intellective soul begins’.
Passions, humours and reason again appear united by a thread of materiality in *An Apology*. Milton shifts from an autobiographical response to the Remonstrant’s charges to defending the use of vehement language by citing Biblical authorities and practice in church history. This shift in subject seems to be backed by assumptions about a person’s temperament: ‘in the teaching of men diversly temper’d different ways are to be try’d’. And the purpose of different kinds of teaching is to leave the basis of humoural nature intact, but to correct the ‘radicall humours and passions’:

…no man being forc’t wholly to dissolve that groundwork of nature which God created in him, the sanguine to empty out all his sociable livelinesse, the choleric to expell quite the unsinning predominance of his anger; but that each radicall humour and passion wrought upon and corrected as it ought, might be made the proper mould and foundation of every mans peculiar gifts, and vertues.141

While Bright was outraged by materialists who would make ‘vertues themselves, yea religion, no other thing but as the body hath ben tempered’, Milton does not seem embarrassed to place the roots of virtue firmly in rhetorically healed material humours and passions.142 Wright could also say in *The Passions of the Minde* that passions are ‘not wholly to be extinguished…but…to be…stirred up for the service of virtue’.143 In connecting these passages in *Areopagitica* and *An Apology*, then, virtue appears in both to be an act of reason, but a kind of reason contingent upon trained humours, passions and affections.144 This conflation between the rational faculty and the sensitive faculty questions the status of reason as immaterial, or something beyond ‘substance’. But other instances in Milton’s canon also challenge this trend, again resulting from the unstable boundary between reason and passion. In *Paradise Lost*, Raphael encourages Adam to pursue the version of the passion, love, that ‘hath his seat / In Reason’ (8. 590–91), instead of the version set in motion by the rapturous ‘sense of touch’ (8. 579).145 There is a long history of passions participating in reason, and Chapter 6 examines the concept of rational passions and passionate reason in Milton’s poetry. But the fact that Raphael grounds both the

141 Milton, *An Apology*, 1: 900. The qualifying adjective ‘radicall’ is explained by Burton as synonymous with ‘inmate’, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, 14: ‘The Radicall or innate [humour], is dayly supplied by nourishment, which some call Cambium, and make those secondary Humours of Ros and Gluters to maintaine it…’
143 Wright, *Passions of the Minde*, 17. So does Aquinas, *ST*, 1a.2ae.24, 4: ‘God and the angels have neither sensory orexis [appetitus sensitivus] nor bodily members [membræ corporeæ], [so] goodness does not involve for them the due control of emotion [passionum] or physical behavior [aut corporeorum actuum] as it does for us.’ and Aquinas, *ST*, 1a.2ae.24, 4: ‘Emotion leads one towards sin in so far as it is uncontrolled by reason; but in so far as it is rationally controlled, it is part of the virtuous life’ [passiones animae inquantum sunt præter ordinem rationis inclinant ad peccatum; inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a ratione pertinent ad virtutem]. See James’s discussion of Aquinas’s ‘virtuous passions’ in *Passion and Action*, 17, fn. 61.
145 For difficulty in translating the word ‘anima’ see Moshenska, *Feeling Pleasures*, 64–65.
human ascent to Heaven, and a kind of bodily sex beyond human touch (limited by ‘obstacles’) in this passion-in-reason, ‘love’ – and physically reacts at the thought of it by blushing– seems to require that reason keep a material nature.\textsuperscript{146} This is not Plato’s heaven of immaterial souls set free from bodies but a heaven of souls indistinguishable from their bodies:

Total they mix, Union of Pure with Pure
Desiring; nor restrain’d conveyance need
As Flesh to mix with Flesh, or Soul with Soul.

(8. 627–629)

And further,

…from these corporal nutriments perhaps
Your bodies may at last turn all to Spirit,
Improv’d by tract of time, and wingd ascend
Ethereal, as wee, or may at choice
Here or in Heav’nly Paradises dwell.

(5. 496–500)

But turning ‘all to spirit’ does not imply an easy transfer from the material to the non-material, for if it did we then stumble across the word ‘Ethereal’ in line 499. The syntax does, however, give a sense of distance or space to relate the difference between corporeal and ethereal bodies. The reader has to wait for an explanation of what ‘all…Spirit’ is, by progressing through the middle verse starting at ‘Improv’d’. This middle verse delays Raphael’s point by imagery of a journey before we hear of the final vision, ‘Ethereal, as wee’, but which also involves a new kind of freedom of choice between bodily states: ‘Ethereal…or may at choice…’. ‘Ethereal’ elsewhere in \textit{Paradise Lost} describes the angelic tissue of Satan’s body, complete with its own version of heavenly humours that stain exterior objects.\textsuperscript{147} If this applies also to angelic humours, recalling that Milton reserves a degree of materialism for humours and passions, what then do we make of Milton’s reference to ‘reason’ as the ‘ethereall and fift essence’ in \textit{Areopagitica}? The reference comes at the end of Milton’s bizarre description locating books and human souls on a continuum, seemingly eliding the difference between objects and persons. Aristotle describes ‘ether’ as the ‘first of the elements in \textit{De Caelo} 298b6, which is the refined matter capable of uniting immaterial divine reason with a physical body.\textsuperscript{148} But it is material

\textsuperscript{146} See Donnelly, ‘“Matter” versus Body’, for a helpful reworking of Fallon’s terms.


\textsuperscript{148} For the Stoic concept of ‘ether’, see \textit{The History of Philosophy from the Earliest Periods: Drawn Up from Brucker’s Historica philosophia}, ed. William Enfield (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2001), 190–191. Ether is active matter, and distinguished from passive matter. For a more recent work, see Margaret Osler, \textit{Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought} (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 138–140. In both Enfield and Osler, ‘ether’ remains a substance, and even ‘corporeal’. But Sugimura, ‘“Matter of Glorious Trial”’, 131, states that ‘reason’ is instead the ethereal substance of the pneuma or something different from the ‘elements’. But it is unclear whether Aristotle does this. He seems to identify divine reason with the pneuma—which retains corporeality in being a refined substance. See Aristotle, \textit{Generation of Animals}, 2.3, 731b30–35.
nonetheless. Thus, Miltonic reason is not merely attached to what is material through mediating soul-stuff composed of rarefied matter. Milton pictures reason itself as a kind of ethereal material vortex in which right reason is collapsed and identified with right passions. Reason is not therefore entirely abstracted and separated from the lower realms of the soul, but an intimate participant with bodily motions. Further, reason does not remain purely cognitive in this sense of incorporeal, but is also home to proper affective, bodily responses, which is what will make Adam and Eve fully mature for a higher Paradise. Finally, reason is not immaterial but a substance, albeit a spiritual substance differentiating it from corporeal substances.

II THE MOLDING OF LANGUAGE: ANIMIST MATERIALISM

What accounts for this picture of mixed affectivity, where the borders between so-called immaterial reason and the material body, the affections and the passions, are blurred instead of distinct and separate? An underlying commitment to material monism best explains the odd features in Milton’s vocabulary so that, despite subtle distinctions and images for Miltonic passions and affections, both body and reason exist within the plane of Milton’s material continuum, and therefore make passions and affections occur in both body and mind, in the sensitive appetite and in reason.

This philosophical materialism offers a different framework for the soul-body union to that of dualism, and therefore alters the soul’s structure, its internal relations – and, as I have been arguing, the very vocabulary that goes towards deciding the regions of the soul and the qualitative differences (if any) between matter and non-matter. Tilmouth’s research on three historical movements and ‘literary constructions of the idea of self-control’ makes this point by examining how different models of self-governance, the Socratic and Stoic, the Aristotelian, and the Calvinist, offer different ‘pivotal images’ to explain the relation between reason and the passions. Dualist accounts like Socratic Platonism make psychomachia and a bipartite opposition…essential features of the soul. Right reason must rule the mind; the passions, in being associated with ‘the fifth of the bodie and contagion of the senses’, are still to be imagined as intruders within the gates; and that perception demands that man should continue to see himself as engaged in…fighting to expel invaders from his soul and to hold off akrasia.

This is a vast contrast to Milton’s generosity towards the passions expressed through his dominant images. The passions and affections travel as gentle (but potentially scheming) citizens between the country and the citadel. They also live in the palace as plotting female

See also Elena Carrera for how pneuma challenges ‘humoural inevitability’ and physical determinism because of its status as a ‘mental and rational phenomena’ – an entity she describes as approaching the substance of celestial beings – ‘played a larger role in the production of passion’, Carrera, Emotions and Health, 95–146, esp. 102–3, 107, 113. Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph, 36.
gatekeepers who are welcomed into the throne room, Reason, as royal heralds. Tilmouth depicts how this underlying ontological dualism then constructs Erasmus’ ethical ideal and perception of matter in *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*:

fallen man has ‘two natures’, mind and body, the one possessed of reason, the other of passions which constantly ‘stryue to go before reason’ their rightful ruler…Given this superiority of mind over body, Erasmus concludes that man should ‘withdrawe…as much as [he] can from…sensible thynges’ and the passionate appetites which they occasion, absenting his mind from the body through the ‘despysynge of thynges corporeall’ and ‘contemplacyon…of thynges spirytuall’.

The corporeal and sensible, belonging to the fallen dangerous world of flesh, standing in contrast to the pure, eternal world accessible only to reason, relates the familiar opposition between material passions and immaterial reason.

But alternative accounts available in the seventeenth century mapped out a different understanding of the soul-body. The revived work of Cicero’s *Tusculanae Disputationes*, arguably the most popular work on morality and the passions in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, renewed the appreciation of the Stoic outlook. Cicero’s theory of the passions did not set passions in opposition to reason, but instead made passions part of reason and judgment. However, while passions remained rational or cognitive, they were false moments in the life of reason. Aquinas explains the difference between Stoic and Aristotelian models of the soul – and its consequences for typical distinctions between passions and affections:

Since the Stoics did not distinguish between the intellectual appetite [*appetitum intellectivum*], which is the will [*qui est voluntas*], and the sense appetite [*appetitum sensitivum*], which is divided into irascible and concupiscible parts, they did not, as the Peripatetics did, make this distinction with regard to passions [*passiones animae*] and other impressions of the human soul [*affectio in humanis*], in point of passions being emotions of the sensitive appetite [*passiones animae sint motus appetitus sensitivi*], whereas the other affections of the soul [*affectiones*], which are not passions [*qua non sunt passiones animae*], are movements of the intellectual appetite or will [*sint motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur voluntas*].

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151 Tilmouth, *Passion’s Triumph*, 16.
152 Tilmouth, *Passion’s Triumph*, 19. See also Christopher Shields, *Ancient Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction*, 2nd ed. (NY: Routledge, 2012), 199–200. He provides a spectrum between rationalism (emotions oppose reason), mixed affectivity (emotions are both cognitive and affective) and stoicism (emotions are purely cognitive, though misguided reasons).
153 Aquinas, *ST* 1a.2ae.59, 2, and again in 1a.2ae.24, 3. For how Stoic doctrines were never simple unified positions, but came with variations, see Shadi Bartsch and David Wray, *Seneca and the Self: Culture, Philosophy, Literature* (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 20. See also Aristotle, *De Anima, The Works of Aristotle*, 12 Vols., trans. J.A. Smith and W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908–1952), 3.8, 432a20–432b1–9. Appetite cannot be broken up into rational or irrational because wish is found in the even in calculative sector, and thus passion is found in all three parts. What is also interesting is that Descartes makes a similar statement, and yet we call him a dualist: ‘there is a single soul in us, and this soul has within itself no diversity of parts; the very one that is sensitive is rational, and all its appetites are volitions’ in René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul: An English Translation*, trans. Stephen Voss (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 44–45 or Article 47.
Monism could thus erase lines between faculties, such that the hierarchy of ontological value associated with passions and affections in other accounts disappears in the Stoic construction. Monist explanations reduced the rational and sensitive faculties of the soul into a single whole. Philosophers and literary critics have noted how this ontological reductive materialism works itself out in the stoic Seneca’s canon:

In the Epicurean tradition, the individual is to be identified with the animate body. In the Platonic tradition, by contrast, body and soul are clearly distinguished… The Stoic position on the relationship between soul and body, however, is difficult to pin down. Within Stoic accounts, the soul is to some degree corporeal. But the psychic attributes of the individual are essentially rational [in the sense of incorporeal]… [But] the point of this dualism, weak as it is, is… ethical rather than ontological…

And so images of dualism do not necessarily imply dualism. As we have seen, the same is happening in Milton’s writing, and this has not been missed by Milton scholars. Fallon acknowledges the way Milton struggles with abandoning dualist language, opposing spirit and flesh, even as late as the 1650s. But he asserts how monism then reconfigures the Miltonic soul:

…unlike Thomas Aquinas, [Milton’s] rational soul is not different to the sensitive and vegetative soul; instead the semen contains the whole soul…the human soul is a kind of form produced by the power of matter.

Donnelly also contends that Raphael’s talk on the differences between discursive reason and intuitive reason in Book 5 does not indicate absolute differences: both ‘differ in degree’ but belong to the spectrum of Milton’s materiality. Human rational substances are corporeal, or sensible, and angelic rational substances are incorporeal – ‘potentially but not necessarily sensible in every respect’. Similarly, Sugimura states that Milton’s position ultimately contains a life-long, dramatic fluctuation between materialism and dualism and therefore encourages considerations to move away from the imposing a modern view of ‘either-or’. The literary historian Katherine Fletcher has made headway in acknowledging how Milton’s monism acts as the conceptual parent to his integrated account of reason and passion. She observes,

I see this integrated and spiritual version of the passions [the integrated account] as an extension of Milton’s monism, resolving tensions between body and mind by association with sensory and spiritual perception, bodily desire and inspired volition, and allowing the dignity of reason to bodily forms of knowledge.

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154 Bartsch and Wray, *Seneca and the Self*, 144 and 46, fn. 23: ‘Seneca’s writing tends to elide distinctions between the body itself and passions. This is in contrast to passages such as Cicero…’
156 Donnelly, “‘Matter’ versus Body”, 82.
157 Fletcher, ‘Uncertain Knowing, Blind Vision and Active Passivity’, 114. She builds on Tilmouth’s research on the passions, Fallon’s Miltonic monism and Poole’s research on the Fall.
Thus, the inconsistency between Milton’s linguistic practice and his ontology, in so far as Milton tries to juggle a number of commitments, leaves literary historians with several ironies. Milton remains deeply anti-Stoic regarding Stoicism’s negative appraisal of the passions: virtue, for Milton, is not pure rationality divorced from malfunctioning portions of reason, the passions.\textsuperscript{158} Corrected passions and humours are in fact the rational soil in which virtue first grows and then flourishes. In this way Milton aligns himself more with Aristotelian-Thomist accounts of the passions, which deem passions worthy if moderated by reason.\textsuperscript{159} Milton also maintains a consistent hostility towards Stoicism’s supreme optimism that reason could overcome unruly passions permanently in this life.\textsuperscript{160} But the fact that Milton’s concept of passion and reason, soul and body, renegotiates the borders between the physical and mental suggests an on-going interest in classical materialism offered by Epicureanism and Stoicism, as well as with his century’s attempts to reconcile Christian belief with atomistic causal explanations.\textsuperscript{161} Yet as critics have rightly observed, Milton continues to think of the soul in terms of Thomist-Aristotelian divisions that spread powers across a tripartite system, as well as in terms of the Augustinian construction which is more unified. The Augustinian images for the soul occur even within \textit{Paradise Lost}, where some scholars maintain Milton was then fully monist.\textsuperscript{162} But then, even when Milton’s language seems to collapse distinctions and portray monism, he departs from the neo-Stoic atomism that prized dead, passive, inert matter that gave rise to mechanistic conceptions of substance, and instead empowered matter with agency to self-move, perceive, and think.\textsuperscript{163} The revival of neo-Stoicism confirmed Christian anxieties that foresaw the rapid descent from materialism to determinism. ‘Reason was in, and bound up with, matter; fate ruled…history in [an] ineluctable…chain of causation’, and so Milton’s position might be considered an odd choice in the fight to reclaim human free will.\textsuperscript{164} Douglas Trevor in \textit{The Poetics of Melancholy} examines the ‘alarming rise’ of materialist accounts of the passions in the 1500s, and how Spenser’s Neoplatonic poetry served as his reaction to the materialization threatening native freedom. But rather than preserve this tradition to combat the consequences of

\textsuperscript{158} Schoenfeldt, \textit{Bodies and Selves}, 164–165, reaches the same conclusion.
\textsuperscript{159} Aquinas distances himself from the Stoic understanding of passions: ‘Passions are not diseases or disturbances of the soul, unless they are without the moderation of reason’, \textit{ST} Ia.2ae.24, 2. There he rejects the Stoic’s negative treatment of the passions in favour of ‘the more positive Aristotelian view of the passions as good or evil, depending on whether or not they are more guided by reason’. In Aquinas, \textit{Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics}, 93, he writes: ‘The Stoics took occasion of this to say that virtues are certain quiescent and passionless dispositions. The reason was that they saw men become evil through pleasures and sorrows, and consequently they thought that virtue consists in the total cessation of the changes of the passions. But in this they erred…Hence it is not the business of virtue to exclude all but only those inordinate passions’. Tilmouth supports this conclusion about Milton, \textit{Passion’s Triumph}, 204.
\textsuperscript{160} Milton, \textit{An Apology}, 1: 909.
\textsuperscript{161} Osler, \textit{Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquility}, 239–258, and Rogers, \textit{The Matter of Revolution}.
\textsuperscript{163} Rogers, \textit{The Matter of Revolution}, 1.
\textsuperscript{164} Osler, \textit{Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquility}, 6. See Fallon, \textit{Milton Among the Philosophers}, 107, for the argument that Milton’s materialism differs from Hobbseian materialism and is more like Anne Conway’s, 111–136. Fallon explains that ‘Free will was inseparable from debates over the nature of substance and the relation of mind and body’, 97.
material determinism, Milton accepts a material paradigm and departs from his ‘Greater teacher’. Trevor acknowledges that

[Milton is] a deeply material religious thinker, in a ways that are traceable to a Galenic [paradigm]…[but] Milton’s Arminian espousal of free will makes him view dispositions [humours] themselves as more changeable and governable than do some of his more fatalistic predecessors.  

The animist materialist view of matter was one attempt to reconcile the discoveries in natural science while also preserving moral responsibility. Milton’s affective vocabulary is arguably stretched according to these tensions.

III ‘SENSUAL MISTRESSES’, ‘TRANSPARENT BODIES’, AND ‘HANDMAIDS’: THE ROLE OF METAPHOR IN MATERIALISM

Having established Milton’s animist materialism, what can be said of Milton’s so-called metaphorical language? Are these internal agents literal, carnal bodies or does the figurative language express a set of abstract relations attempting to represent conscious matter – in Moshenska’s words, ‘giving (or returning) physical form to conceptual relationships that we unthinkingly describe in physical and tactile terms’? The question divides early modern scholars on the body. Schoenfeldt’s explorations of ‘embodiments of emotion’, he claims, are not ‘enactments of dead metaphors but rather investigations of the corporeal nature of self’. Paster situates this literal rending in the context of humoural Galenism:

the passions were liquid force of nature, because, in this cosmology, the stuff of the outside world and the stuff of the body were composed of the same elements….For the early moderns, emotions flood the body not metaphorically but literally, as the humours course through the bloodstream carrying choler, melancholy, blood and phlegm to the parts and as the animal spirits move like lightening from brain to muscle, from muscle to brain.

But Meek and Sullivan’s response to Paster signals caution:

While Paster and others have emphasized the literal significance of emotive


in discarding humouralism…physiology had not intention of setting mentalist theories in their place. In other words, even if the matter of the emotions turns out to be primarily the humours, this does not suggest that psychology now rests on immaterial foundations. On the contrary…this psychology of the passions is still profoundly material in its dependence on the work of animal spirits and the chemically reactive messengers between brain and prae cordia.

166 For the role of allegory and figurative language see Moshenska, Feeling Pleasures, 115.
167 Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, 8.
168 Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, Reading the Early Modern Passions, 4, 8.
language in early modern writings, situating its meaning within the framework of galenic humouralism, our contributors also attempt to reconsider the metaphorical, poetic and more generally unbounded potential of emotionally charged language in this period. As [Richard] Strier has helpfully reminded us, ‘The problem of what is literal and what is metaphoric in early modern humours discourse is extremely tricky...’.  

Angus Gowland in ‘Melancholy, Passions and Identity’ suggests, in another counter to Paster, that the motive for early modern ‘literalisation’, and the use of figures of speech that employed ‘corporeal references’, was to simplify complex philosophical debates for a popular audience. So, whether it is the desire to promote historical differences and repress the urge to import modern understandings of the body onto early modern texts, or whether it is the desire to explain away metaphor as mere ‘simplification’ because of the perceived widespread importance of the immaterial Platonic soul, the status of tactile, sensory, affective language seems to act as the gatekeeper to reading and comprehending natural philosophical, medical and poetic texts.

Answers to this question have decided Milton’s outcome as a dualist or monist or as a variation between. For Fallon, Milton’s materialism is the result of ‘literalised’ figurative metaphor. He exemplifies this view by claiming Milton’s physiological language for the mind and soul in the divorce tracts becomes ‘more than metaphorical in this new monistic world’. Dobranski in Milton in Context also writes that ‘radical monism unites body and spirit as same substance but offers an alternative to Hobbes…the botanical image [in Milton] is more than metaphorical. In both, there is an assumption that ‘literal’ means ‘actual’, and that metaphor or ‘symbolic’ language can harden into what is real. For Sugimura, Milton’s dualism is the consequence of Milton’s inability to remain within the scope of literal language in describing death in De Doctrina Christiana, which causes ‘problems for his conception of a wholly material soul-substance’. Citing Norman Burns, she shows how theological doctrine could turn on the question of the literal or figurative:

Psychopannychists ‘believed that the immortal substance called the soul literally slept until the resurrection of the body…thnetopsychists, denying that the soul was an immortal substance, believed that the soul slept after death only in a figurative

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170 Gowland, ‘Melancholy, Passions and Identity’, 91. He is responding specifically to Paster, Humoring the Body, 23–24.  
171 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 90.  
173 Sugimura discusses this in “Matter of Glorious Trial”, 143. She cites Augustine too: ‘For when what is said figuratively is taken just as if it were said properly [that is, literally], it is understood carnally…’, 208. Cf. Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 85.  
174 Sugimura, “Matter of Glorious Trial”, 141–143 for Milton’s mortalist argument ‘death is sleep and a journey’.
sense….the emergent distinction is that while the psychopannychists believe the metaphor of soul-sleep is literally true, the thnetopsychoists claim on the contrary that a metaphor, or figure of speech, is devoid of further meaning…metaphor [for them] is a simple (inert) substitution of terms’. 175

She takes Milton’s ‘death is sleep’ to mean the soul is completely annihilated at death because Milton ‘den[ies] that metaphor may convey a truth’. 176 Yet Sugimura claims at other points in De Doctrina Christiana that when he ‘slowly reverts to another protracted metaphor “death is a journey”’, there he cannot ‘suppress this tendency…to rein in the power of the figurative’. 177 The metaphor there, she argues, breaks his materialist drive because it forms images of reassimilation of substance rather than destruction of substance. Here then

by interpreting the metaphor of a journey ‘home’ in this way, Milton privileges the literal (not the figurative) meaning, thereby reinvigorating the so-called dead metaphor ‘sleep is death’….Milton’s language…refuses to consign the (immaterial) intellect to death. 178

She summarises her thinking most clearly when she grounds her reasons for rejecting Milton’s animism in the nature of language:

The animism in Milton’s prose writings as well as in his poetry is expressive of, but never reducible to, a literal (material) truth….As the literal in Milton’s treatise repeatedly veers into strangely metaphorical realms…Milton’s linguistic practice – in which language is shown to be inherently metaphorical – encounters the immaterialist tendencies implicit in even an Aristotelian account of the soul. 179

These examples from secondary sources expose fundamental assumptions about the way metaphor works. But the logic can work both ways: physiological language which Fallon takes to harden or fossilize the metaphor into literal materiality can also remain what it is – metaphorical, but inescapable tactile elements of language a speaker cannot do without.

Likewise, when Sugimura takes the presence of metaphorical language to indicate the soul is beyond matter – immaterial – the very image of a journey is plagued by embodied reality, making it difficult to see the soul detached from the physical world of time, space, and movement. The point is that figurative language does not automatically express immaterial, abstract concepts, and similarly, literal language does not easily slide into the concrete, material realm of objects. Further, even when figurative language acts by representing something that is not actually present, this does not immediately consign it to ‘fiction’. In the early modern world in a statement such as, ‘her face was a rose’, the absence of a material correspondent (a rose)

178 Sugimura, “Matter of Glorious Trial”, 146–147, 208–209, where she discusses the differences between the Augustinian and Thomist view of metaphor, concluding that the ‘Thomist interpretation of metaphor encourages a kind of literary monism in which spirit and letter are coextensive’.
would not necessarily mean that the image itself did not point to something materially real behind the face, even though it was not present. There is a line of thinking in contemporary studies on language that would argue nonliteral language, or metaphor, is not ornamentation, distraction, or an exercise for poets; it is an inescapable form of interacting with, seeing, and perceiving real things in the world and about the world.  

It is essential to cognition.

Early modern passions present this troubled status of figurative and literal language. Hobbes was evidently aware of the problem of metaphor surrounding the passions and appetites. In Leviathan (1651), he writes that schools which think orme or ‘Appetite’ is only a ‘metaphorical motion’ are absurd, because bodily motion cannot be but a material motion.

Hobbesian material motions also first generate the internal appetites: an object in the external world moves by rubbing or striking the eye (invisible to the spectator)—but Hobbes goes even further than suggesting materials ‘touch’ and create friction when he writes that material objects interpenetrate the body. He agrees with Aristotle’s teaching that reduces the ‘cause of vision’ to the ‘receiving [of] visible species in the eye’. That is, the object imparts a kind of body, and this small body ripples through the nerves, travels to the heart, and produces a motion called ‘Endeavour’ which is either ‘Appetite or Desire’ or ‘Aversion’ to or from the object causing the motion.

It is easy to decide an author’s position when they oppose metaphorical language so clearly, but how do we decide whether an author’s concept of the passions is metaphorical or literal without such clarity? Milton sometimes explicitly states when he is using metaphor, as in Colasterion:

The rest of this will run circuit with the union of one flesh, which was answer’d before. And that to divorce a relative and Metaphorical union of two bodies into one flesh, cannot bee likn’d in all things to the dividing of that natural union of soul and body into one person, is apparent of it self.

But how to read Milton’s images for the passions is another question, as he offers no help in deciding whether these are real animate bodies or mere vivid descriptions explaining the role of the passions in the body. Descartes’s theory of the passions holds similar tensions for dualist readers hoping to secure a primary immaterial source for the passions. Passions and perceptions belong to a particular, Cartesian species of soul-stuff called ‘thoughts’, which are of two orders:

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180. In Metaphor and Thought, Gentner and Jeziorski show that comparisons have happened for centuries in the history of Western science and the introduction of new theories. Moderns might experience the use of language as ‘inexact’ or ‘imprecise’, but the modern experience of imprecision in language is a relative one, since changing contexts alter what we deem acceptable and nonacceptable uses of analogies. See Metaphor and Thought, 2nd edition, ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 13, and 447–480.


volitions (actions of the soul which come only from soul), and passions and perceptions (some actions caused by soul and some actions caused by body). He distinguishes ‘passions of the soul’ from all other thoughts as

general perceptions or sensations or excitations of the soul which are referred to it [the soul] in particular and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the [animal] spirits.\textsuperscript{184}

Passions are referred to as ‘general perceptions’ to distinguish them from actions of the soul or volitions; they are ‘sensations’ because they are received into the soul in the same way that objects of external sense are received; and they are still better named ‘excitations of the soul’ because they represent a range of changes that take place in the soul and which shake the soul most violently. But passions also refer to the ‘soul in particular’ because they are distinct from ‘sensations’, which are excited when external objects stimulate sense organs and impart to the soul sensations of odour, sound, and colour by the brain via the nerves; they are distinct from ‘affections of the body’ which refer to natural appetites like hunger or thirst, or things felt in bodily members like pain or heat; finally, these kind of perceptions are distinct from volitions (actions of the soul occurring only in the soul) because they are ‘caused, strengthened and maintained’ by the animal spirits. Descartes strongly asserts again that the perceptions arising from the animal spirits are different to perceptions resulting from the nerves affected by external objects. His theory of sensation here is remarkably similar to Hobbes: objects of vision are mediated by ‘transparent bodies’.\textsuperscript{185} What is seen is absorbed in and through the eye along the ‘optic filaments’ to move the brain, to then make the soul create various sensations. The intensity with which Descartes makes ‘general-particular’ distinctions seems motivated by his understanding of how misunderstood passions could be: ‘passions are numbered among perceptions which the close bond between the soul and body renders confused and obscure’.\textsuperscript{186}

But even if Descartes at first wants to say that passions generally are like sensations in so far as they receive these ‘transparent bodies’ into the soul – and then seems to switch opinion when dealing with their ‘particular’ relation to the soul when he says they are not caused like sensations – the fact that animal spirits are integral to the passions seems to throw this distinct-yet-different ‘close bond’ into obscurity:

[Animal spirits] are the liveliest’ and ‘finest parts’ of blood that the heat has rarified to go the brain…only the most agitated and finest parts get into the cavities

\textsuperscript{184} Descartes, \textit{The Passions of the Soul}, 34.
\textsuperscript{185} For a similar theory of vision cf. with Donne: ‘No man knows so, as that strong arguments may not be brought on the other side, how he sees, whether by reception of species from without, or by emission of beams from within’ in John Donne, ‘Sermon No. 10: Preached upon Whitsunday [1630] on John 14.20, in \textit{Sermons}, ed. Evelyn M. Simpson and G.R. Potter, Vol. 9 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958), 4.83.
\textsuperscript{186} Descartes, \textit{The Passions of the Soul}, 34.
of the brain through narrow passages...[they are] corporeal components of the blood...[a] substance [that] goes into muscles.\textsuperscript{187}

It is intriguing to ask how critics have so optimistically established Descartes’ immateriality of the soul and concluded outright dualism.\textsuperscript{188} The body is pictured as a porous labyrinth crawling with animated, aspirated, bloody agents. Even the soul, although spread throughout the whole body, exercises special functions in its particular command centre, the pineal gland, as it ‘hangs over the duct where the [animal] spirits of the anterior cavities communicate with the posterior’.\textsuperscript{189} Is Descartes’ language figurative? Or is this an example of how figurative language could have a material basis supporting it? How can an unextended soul ‘hang’ in space in this way?

Literary scholars, then, should be cautious in determining Milton’s materialism or dualism on the basis of metaphor. In raising these problems with metaphor, and by recognising how figurative language can point both ways – to immaterial origins and to material ones – this presents the field with an opportunity to rethink the route to early modern positions on matter, as well as to reconsider Renaissance concepts of dualism and monism, which could entertain seemingly incompatible theories side-by-side. Milton’s dominant images for the passions focus on absolute monarchy in \textit{The Reason of Church Government}, \textit{Paradise Lost}, \textit{Paradise Regained}, and \textit{Samson Agonistes}. \textit{The Reason of Church Government} language for the affections as ‘sensual mistresses that keep the ports and passages’ between the outer world of the object inner courtroom of Reason sounds strikingly similar to Kenelm Digby’s language for the animal spirits. In \textit{Two Treatises} (1644) he refers to the animal spirits as ‘porters of all news’, and ‘subtle messengers of the outward world’ which are judged before the ‘tribunal of the brain’. Far from dismissing this language as figurative, John Sutton judges that ‘mediating’ material bodies are central to his atomistic ‘theory of perception’.\textsuperscript{190} The other image in Milton’s prose is the embodied ‘dim glasse’ of the affections, which I have argued implies material connotations by wrapping the affective glass in the body’s flesh.

But Milton’s figurative language also challenges the tidy opposition between prose, often considered the site of doctrine, and poetry, the so-called site of figurative language. In Milton studies, many complaints are directed at literary scholars who would cross this boundary and treat language identically – for instance, using \textit{De Doctrina Christiana} as the theoretical blueprint to explain Milton’s \textit{Paradise Lost}.\textsuperscript{191} Yet Milton’s prose complicates this separation as

\textsuperscript{187} Descartes, \textit{The Passions of the Soul}, 23–25.
\textsuperscript{188} Harrison, \textit{The Fall of Man}, 161. Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have a Soul’, 201, writes that in making passions arise from the body, Descartes ‘effectively separated out his notion of a rational immaterial soul from a non-rational, material body’.
\textsuperscript{189} Descartes, \textit{The Passions of the Soul}, 35–36.
\textsuperscript{190} Sutton, ‘Soul and Body’, 11.
poetic language and images happen there so naturally and frequently. The images for the passions, affections, and reason provide one example of the frustrating ‘poetic insurgency’ within Miltonic prose; and again these images resist easy explanation in both contexts as either metaphorical references or literal objects.192 Recent studies have attempted to restore the partnership between philosophy, or ‘theoretical texts’, and literature, or ‘imaginative texts’ through concepts of ‘shared imagery’ to show how both are central to understanding authorial ideas.193

IV FROM SENSES TO PASSIONS, MISSING PASSIONES, AND FADING ‘AFFECTIONS’: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

This chapter has avoided a ‘continuous intellectual genealogy’ in the story of Milton’s thinking on matter and passions and has instead approached the subject through a combination of intellectual history, linguistic analysis, and literary criticism to pursue what Sugimura has called ‘fluid intermediaries’. Although this avoids unresolved complexities posed by dating Milton’s material, this method does not entirely suit a study on Milton’s passions. The notion of ‘intermediaries’ however suggests some recycling middle stage, constantly oscillating between early and late. But Milton’s passions are marked by odd silence and sudden outburst, or by the shift from senses to passions.194 Milton mentions passions only three times between his Cambridge studies (1625), continental travels, and public entry with Of Reformation (1641).195 With the lack of moral terms such as passions, affections, desires, and motions, Milton seems more preoccupied with the senses, especially the dangers of hearing and seeing, in a way that he

192 Sugimura, “‘Matter of Glorious Trial’”, 142.
193 This is also beginning to happen in Senecan studies. See Bartsch and Wray, Seneca and the Self, 222.
194 The word ‘shift’ might not be so helpful as ‘incorporation’ of passions, because they enter into his continuous discussion of the senses.
195 Cf. Chapter 1, fn. 51. Milton’s early poetry rarely uses traditional terminology to express moral concerns. Only two references to ‘passion’ occur before 1641. One is in his Trinity MS and his Commonplace Book, though it is uncertain when both were written. The second is in ‘Il Penseroso’, which describes the goddess melancholy’s state as ‘wrapt in holy passion’. Three references to ‘affection’ occur before 1641. Dr. Sarah Knight, Leicester University, at work on a new translation of Milton’s Latin Prolusiones, has graciously confirmed this by word searching her online manuscripts. In the Prolusiones, Milton uses affectus and variants only twice. One is in ‘Prolusio 7’, in Joannis Miltonii Angli, Epistolatarum Familiarium, 276–277; the other is ‘Prolusio 3’, Joannis Miltonii Angli, Epistolatarum Familiarium, 162–165: there he compares the reading of history with the ‘useless controversys’ that in commovendis animi affectibus, certe nullum habent imperium [have no power to stir up the passions of the soul]. The third instance of affection is in ‘Letter to a Friend,’ (1631) in the first draft, but is omitted in the second draft: ‘...praerment ambition more winning praesentments of good, & more prone affections of nature to encline & dispose not counting outward causes...’, see ‘Letter to a Friend’, Joannis Miltonii Angli, Epistolatarum Familiarium, 320–323. Before his public engagement in 1641 with Of Reformation, Milton instead seems to focus on melancholy (‘Il Penseroso’, ‘L’Allegro’, ‘Comus’), and physiological terms such as humours (‘Comus’), spleen (‘Sonnet 9’), ‘warm vapour’ (‘Sonnet 5’), and Renaissance soul faculty such as the fancy and grief (‘On Shakespeare’). However, in the absence of general moral terms it is clear that Milton is mindful of the senses, particularly the moral problems and capacities associated with human hearing and seeing. For references to the senses, see ‘Ode on the Morning of Christ’s Nativity’: ‘Ring out ye Crystall spheres / Once bless our human ears / (If ye have power to touch the senses so)’, 125–127; ‘Sonnet 2’: ‘let every man guard his eyes and ears’; ‘Il Penseroso’: ‘Hail divinest Melancholy, / Whose Saintly visage is too bright / To hit the sense of human sight’, 125–127; ‘Arcades’: ‘After the heavenly tune, which none can hear / Of human mould with grosse unpurged care’, 71–73; all references taken from The Shorter Poems, CWJM.
will later make the passions take centre stage. This does not mean that Milton abandons the senses and replaces them with a more exact moral vocabulary after 1641. Indeed, the language of ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’, and the physical anatomy of body parts like eye and ear, remain important categories for distinguishing between the morally discerning and the morally fallen in his prose tracts, systematic theology, and 1660s poetry. He will even go on to attempt a distinction between the affections and the senses in *The Reason of Church Government*.

Titling this development a ‘shift’ then, in so far as this would imply a transition or change in thought, is misleading because the senses – hearing, seeing, touching – could tell a similar moral story but one of ‘senses’ triumph over reason’. This shift to the passions instead involves continuities, but it also marks an emerging interest in the life of the passions, and the centrality of passions to Milton’s hope for England. Milton’s delay then, if it can be called so, arguably demonstrates that Milton wrestled with the interaction between material and immaterial early on. I think this silence also shows that materialism, rather than ‘outright’ initial dualism, was important to the young Milton. But it is peculiar that his explicit interest in the passions begins in prose, and at the outset of his public political career.

What is further perplexing is the absence of the Latin word *passiones* across his lifetime. He uses the term liberally in English, and seems interested in the bodily, material composition of passions and their interaction with the humours. I have suggested that a possible reason for the absence of passions in *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce* and *Colasterion* could be that he wanted to avoid charges of material determinism. In the divorce tracts and other political pamphlets, he frequently denies that his spleen or liver or humours stand as motives for his writing. Avoiding the word would thus be to intentionally side-step critics who wished to pin his radical ideas on divorce on toxic, compelling humours. But the omission of the Latin *passiones* referring to movements of the soul perhaps signals Milton’s reserve for the greater, incomprehensible *passio* associated with Christ’s body. If he left the poem unfinished, perhaps the word itself signifies what is also ‘above the yeers he had’.

The absence of the term ‘affection’ in *Paradise Lost* is answered at length in Chapter 6. There I argue that the odd disappearance of ‘affections’ – typically used for higher, immaterial motions that take place in reason – in original paradise and in Raphael’s promise of a ‘higher Heaven’ could indicate that Milton wants to express a version of material monism for the first paradise and the next. But the rapid decline of the term across his final three poems is less easy to explain. Inside his poetry, ‘affection’ appears again only twice in *Samson Agonistes*, once in

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196 For instance, see Milton, *DDC*, 8.1: 547. Milton shows he is aware that metaphors in Scripture are framed in sensory language.

197 See the Appendix for the one exception with *passio* in the last year of Milton’s life.

198 See fn. 49 above.

a Latin translation of Aristotle’s Greek *Poetics*, and once in the singular in English. It is also missing in *Paradise Regained*. A wider study of ‘affection’ in the seventeenth century would be necessary for more certainty, but perhaps its gradual disappearance shows Milton’s confidence that material monism had a way of dealing with incorporeal substances. Hence ‘passions’ – traditionally reserved for material motions of the appetite – could stand as the overall category for those creaturely bodies even higher up on the chain of being, without needing to resort to ‘affections’—or those traditionally labeled immaterial motions of the sanctified soul.

200 See this dissertation’s Appendix.
When Princess Elisabeth wrote to Descartes in September 1645 requesting that he ‘define the passions’ so that she could ‘know them better’, she was referring to movements in the body and stirrings of the soul.¹ The context of her request reveals her interest over how passions could subdue reason to themselves, and how they could become ‘even more useful’ when they submit to reason.² These motions had an uncanny ability to sit at the crossroads between higher, so-called ‘immaterial’ operations of the soul (i.e. reason, judgment), and lower, so-called ‘physical’ motions occurring exclusively in the sensitive appetite (hunger, thirst and a range of affective states with physiological responses). Jean-François Senault in L’Usage des Passions (1643) could likewise connect knowing bodily motions to achieving the moral capacity of self-governance: ‘If knowledge of a disease be requisite to the cure, it is no less necessary to know the passions, that we may better govern them, and to know which of them does assail us’.³ Oddly conflicting with connotations associated with the classical terms passio and pathos, meaning ‘to undergo’, ‘to suffer’ or ‘to experience’ – all emphasizing the helpless passivity of the body encountering and responding to external stimuli – these descriptions represent passions rather as material forces or agents with a degree of unsettling cognitive power.⁴ Arguably, it is language and imagery like this that has provoked controversy in the Renaissance field of ‘psychological materialism’, and lent fervency to a shift in scholarship attempting to reverse the dominance of medical-humoural approaches to the body and passions in order to ‘reclaim agency’.⁵

Affective studies emphasizing the importance of Galenic humouralism and embodiment in the study of early modern passions have tended to offer reductionistic accounts of the body and physiology. Explanations for this tendency invoking parallels between the ‘new humouralism’ of the last decade and ‘new Historicism’ have not been overlooked by literary historians. As Richard Strier observes, both historical models strip the subject of agency and make the person the victim of social and political structures pressing in on her from without,

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2 Shapiro, *The Correspondence*, 111.
4 See James, *Passion and Action*, 29–37. See also Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have a Soul’, 203. Passions are not totally inert as they have a ‘responsive activity’. Thomas Gilby, in the preface to ST 1a.2ae.22–30, xxii, discusses how Aquinas often located the passiones animae in Aristotle’s tenth category, as aspects of passio or passivity, but also in the ninth category as human actions, or actus. Gilby sees no ‘inconsistency…[Aquinas] does not see [passiones animae] as pure inert passivity’.
and, with no internal resources to stand back from these contexts, entrap the individual in a social and physiological determinism. But while academic interest has focused on the material, passive, humoral body, there have been a number of reactions that hope to restore to the agent these internal resources, or the capacities to self-choose and self-govern against both materially determining bodily processes and external networks. In some senses, then, the contemporary project has intended to restore the centrality of ethics to Renaissance physiology, phenomenology, and natural philosophy. Virtue was not an afterthought for early modern anatomists and philosophers, but acted as the intellectual catalyst. Even Descartes makes physiological exploration a focus in the search for self-knowledge. In *Meditations*, he argues that psychological statements about self-existence are not sufficient proof, but that a person should add to this ‘carefully scrutin[y]’ to ‘conduct a kind of chemical investigation’ of oneself to explain one’s own ‘internal substance’. The atomist Pierre Gassendi also underlies such a perspective when he explains how natural philosophy could ‘fre[e] us from certain Errors and Mistakes in our Understanding’. The ancient moral philosophical dictum ‘know thyself’ was thus the impetus behind the empirical scientific enterprise concerned with anatomical dissections and corporeal investigations.

Reactions to the ‘new humoralism’ often belong to one of two distinct approaches. The first approach seeks to find alternative ways of thinking about the relationship between the material and immaterial to avoid reductionism. Contending that the portion of the individual responsible for willed actions, thinking, choices, and self-control is bound up with the ‘immaterial’ forms the possibility for securing agency against a mechanist-materialist view of action. Peter Holbrook summarises Meek and Sullivan’s *The Renaissance of Emotion* collection as well as elements of the first reaction:

…to the extent that the volume questions humoral psychology as a total explanatory framework for understanding early modern discourse about emotion, it might be seen as of a piece with recent, anti-materialist ways of conceiving human experience, by thinkers who are asking whether we are ultimately nothing more than material objects (in the same way that chairs or elementary particles are material) or whether human consciousness makes a fundamental difference, making us ontologically distinct from other natural phenomena. If we aren’t

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distinct, but simply subject to the same laws matter is (matter conceived as without mind or soul) it is hard to find a place for agency, freedom.\footnote{Peter Holbrook ‘Afterword’, in The Renaissance of Emotion, eds. Meek and Sullivan, 266; also Sullivan, ‘The Passions of Thomas Wright’, 25–44, for her comments on the importance of resurrecting the ‘immaterial’ in emotion studies.}

In addition to recovering the importance of the ‘immaterial’, the approach is often characterised as epitomizing early modern materialism as the demon of modern ‘reductive physicalism’ devaluing human autonomy.\footnote{Sullivan, ‘The Passions of Thomas Wright’, 270. Gowland, ‘Melancholy, Passions and Identity’, 88–91, also attempts to reverse the field’s belief that psychological materialism was the mainstream seventeenth-century position.} Nevertheless, the approach remains central to the philosophical, intellectual history strand that has been helpful in investigating different theories of matter and the connection between soul and body, reestablishing the value of anti-materialist traditions in mainstream scholarship, as well as in questioning whether Cartesian dualism and epistemology indeed precipitated the shift to modernity.

The second approach acknowledges how other early modern ‘systems of knowledge and representation’, ‘discourses’, and ‘frameworks’ for conceptualizing emotion were often held simultaneously with exacting Galenic humoural-liquid descriptions. Tilmouth exemplifies this approach in Passion’s Triumph Over Reason by introducing other ‘analytic frameworks’ grounded in shared, imaginative concepts for self-control in order to overturn the ‘homogenizing…view of early modern concepts of passions’.\footnote{Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph, 7.} Stephen Pender and Julie Solomon in Rhetoric and Medicine in Early Modern Europe respond to the field’s reductive humouralism by arguing for the importance of ‘political and rhetorical aspects of early modern embodiment’.\footnote{Stephen Pender and Julie Solomon, Rhetoric and Medicine in Early Modern Europe, 31–32.} Building on Anthony Levi’s work on rhetorical therapy of the passions, and other voluntarist accounts of the body, Solomon purports to counter the ‘deeply materialist paradigm’ of passion studies by revealing how the language of rhetoric and persuasion was a ‘cultural tool’ employed in a range of discourses, and therefore central to talk of the body, soul, passions and reason.\footnote{Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have a Soul’, 198.} Her emphasis on rhetorical views of the passions at times seems to suggest a possible connection between passions and narrative ethics, when she describes passions as ‘representations’, literally as ‘re-presentations’, or

\[\ldots\text{re-staging}[s]\text{ of the way things are to look to us from our view point…passions are in a sense mini-narratives, internal rhetorical plays or justificatory stories that we construct about our relations with other people and the world around as. As mini-narratives, they are temporal in character, taking place in, being and about, and surveying the range of past, present and future…if human beings are authors, then they are also agents, and talk of the passions of the soul will necessarily involve talk about human agency, will and decision-making.}\footnote{Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have a Soul’, 207. For narrative ethics in philosophy and theology, see Stanley Hauerwas, Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology (Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1997).} \]
Narrative ethics has provided philosophical and theological studies a way of thinking about texts and persons, and is beginning to offer literary studies another ‘alternative’ to humoral-Galenism. Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan’s *Renaissance of Emotion* point the field in this direction by discussing how classical narrative and literary models for emotional expression acted as points of reference for early modern women. In addition, Meek and Sullivan challenge the assumption that all questions bound up with emotion could be answered ‘solely through humoral-medical knowledge’, and instead offer a multiplicity of intellectual frameworks that appreciate more ‘active and willful experiences of emotion in the period’ through the lens of ‘religious and philosophical belief, political performance, or rhetorical and dramaturgical style’.

This chapter adds to existing research critiquing literary materialism by examining how passages portraying Milton’s passions as miniature agents endowed with self-activating, rational powers conflicts with the passive Galenic-medical approach to the body. In Chapter 1, I argued that the Galenic-humoural emphasis was responsible for developing two problems in secondary literature. The first problem was to assume a seventeenth-century split between reason and passion after Descartes, which segregated reason to the immaterial realm of cognition and placed passion solely in the material realm of bodily motions and affective states. The second problem was the natural consequence of the first: by projecting dualism between mind and body, reductionism followed by making the body a lifeless organism divorced from the mind. In the previous chapter, however, I made the case that Milton’s materialist monism could explain Milton’s blended picture of reason and passion to counter the ‘problem of dualism’, and argued that the secondary field has come to an impasse over literal or figurative language in deciding the material or immaterial fate of passions. But Milton’s animist monism in Chapter 2, in identifying matter intricately and inseparably with reason or mind, also suggests the body was, in this view, a rational substance; and if rational, then a cognitive site and mode of knowing. This chapter thus argues that revising assumptions about mind-body relations and restoring the kinship between passions and reason responds to the second ‘problem of materialism’ by showing how early modern physiological and natural philosophical descriptions remained central to ethical accounts and discussions about knowledge. It too offers a counter to literary humoural reductionism, but does so by arguing that alternative Renaissance versions of ‘reductive materialism’ – animist monism – could rely on matter as a total explanatory framework without descending into determinism. Some versions of early modern materialism thus had ways of talking about the active body and agency without resorting to the ‘immaterial’ or dreading the loss of freedom. More specifically, portraying passions as cognitive shows

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17 Cf. Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves*, 8, who proposes that materialism did not necessarily imply determinism.
how the rational material body is connected to epistemology, and overturns the view of the body as a material bundle that is inactive and unconscious.

In Part I, I will begin by considering passages that depict Miltonic passions as cognitive, intentional, and agency-ridden, and how this language for passions protects Miltonic materialism from receding into mechanism. In Part II, I will discuss how questions about epistemology emerge to indicate two pictures of the passions that, though dissimilar, retain a similar function and reframe the body as a mode of knowing comprised of ‘intelligent matter’. Such questions belong to the broader seventeenth-century scientific project to recover original Adamic knowledge. I end in Part III by highlighting some problems left by Milton’s account: how intentional passions complicate the notion of blame and moral responsibility in deception, and whether Milton and his opponents’ dependence on passions as evidence or justificatory information for epistemic statements constituted reliable knowledge in the period.

I ‘INCHANTRESSES’: MILTON AND NON-PASSIVE PASSIONS

When Milton begins using affective terminology with high frequency in his 1640s political tracts and later verse, his language for the passions consistently appears to be active and agency-ridden, responsible for both moral error and making truth visible. The first clear reference to affections and passions as entities, or processes, distinct from the senses occurs in Of Reformation (1641), where regenerate affections of the soul function as custodians to the body in the act of purification. This picture of the affections as moral purifiers is a far cry from passive accounts depicting bodily motions as respondents rather than as initiators. In The Reason of Church Government (1641), Milton’s argument critiquing Episcopalianism begins by settling a dispute over whether ‘discipline’ belongs to the ‘discretion of ‘man’ or to the church. For those who would take discipline to be ‘of mans making’, Milton describes the taxingly high standards this would mean for self-knowledge:

…we may see even in the guidance of a civill state to worldly happinesse, it is not for every learned, or every wise man, though many of them consult in common, to invent or frame a discipline, but if it be at all the worke of man, it must be of such a one as is a true knower of himselfe, and himselfe in whom contemplation and practice, wit, prudence, fortitude, and eloquence must be rarely met, both to comprehend the hidden causes of things, and span in his thoughts all the various effects that passion or complexion can worke in mans nature; and hereto must his hand be at defiance with gaine, and his heart in all vertues heroick.18

The syntax leaves the active subject ambiguous. It seems that the virtuous qualities themselves—‘contemplation and practice, wit, prudence, fortitude and eloquence’—are doing

the knowing and perceiving of ‘passion or complexion’, and not the person himself—the ‘true knower’. In light of this ambiguity, the sentence could be read as if the qualities ‘comprehend’ and ‘span in…thoughts’ knowledge of their person’s own habits. By endowing virtues with their own internal efficacy, Milton shows the futility of agency that operates independently of these guiding qualities, and thus he sets off the disciplined person from the uncontrolled. Recalling that Milton claims passions are the ‘very ingredients of vertue’ in Areopagitica (1644), and that every corrected ‘radicall passion and humour’ is ‘proper mould and foundation of every mans peculiar guifts, and vertues’ in An Apology Against a Pamphlet (1642), the sentence in The Reason of Church Government, perhaps, should not be understood as distinguishing the virtuous qualities from the passions. However, while it is helpful to read this passage in light of Milton’s later statements on the passions and thereby set the author in the context of himself, this approach is troubled by the attempt to match early ideas with later ideas and then identify exact categories of thought stretching across an entire canon. The Reason of Church Government passage revolts against this kind of reading, as Milton here does not explicitly collapse virtuous qualities with passion and humour; indeed, the virtues seem to be different from passion or complexion in so far as they seem to operate outside of them, but can know them from a distance. Yet the passage does suggest a subtle animated monism, as ‘passion or complexion’ is also endowed with activity that can ‘worke’ wily effects in the fabric of nature. Such agency-filled language adds a perplexing degree of independence and consciousness to humoural matter that becomes more explicit in Milton’s later works.

Towards the end of The Reason of Church Government, Milton states his third and final reason for opposing prelacy by establishing how ‘ecclesial jurisdiction’ leads to ‘tyranny’ or ‘censure’, and also conflicts with St Paul’s portrait of power in 1 Corinthians 1:25–29. But in arriving at this conclusion, Milton pauses to underscore the dangers in the epistemic journey between the external object and the internal courtroom where Reason encounters so-called Truth:

For Truth, I know not how, hath this unhappinesse fatall to her, ere she can come to the triall and inspection of the Understanding, being to passe through many little wards and limits of the severall Affections and Desires, she cannot shift it, but must put on such colours and attire, as those Pathetick handmaids of the soul please to lead her in to their Queen. And if she find so much favour with them, they let her passe in her own likenesse; if not, they bring her into the presence habited and colour’d like a notorious Falshood. And contrary when any Falshood comes that way, if they like the errand she brings, they are so artfull to counterfeit the very shape and visage of Truth, that the Understanding not being able to discern the fucus which these inchantresses with such cunning have laid upon the feature sometimes of Truth, sometimes of Falshood interchangeably, sentences for the most part one for the other at the first blush, according to the subtle imposture of

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19 For the debate about whether every passion corresponds to a specific word, see Cummings, ‘Donne’s Passions’, 67.
these sensual mistresses that keep the ports and passages between her and the object.²⁰

The affections and desires seem to be described as physical space, as when they are depicted as ‘many little wards and limits’, but they are also assigned personal agency: they dress Truth in a certain attire based on whether or not they ‘find favour’ or ‘like’ falsehood’s errand, they are ‘artfull to counterfeit truth’, they are ‘cunning’, ‘they keep the ports and passages between [the Understanding] and the object’ and they have the ‘sole [responsibility of] ushering Truth between the sense and the soul’.²¹ The switch between spatial, architectural imagery and personal agency perhaps indicates the tension between physical anatomy and autonomy: the affections remain essential to a person’s bodily structure as part of the physical material of the human body. And yet these material elements, as cognitive, can also operate independently from, and in rebellion to, the whole. The fact that architectural and human images compete for attention seems to express Milton’s thinking about the instability of material substance: what it is, how it behaves, and what it could do. It seems to caution readers who think of the body as merely material and therefore causally predictive. By rethinking matter as conscious and potentially anarchical to itself, Milton is able to maintain the importance of materialism while upholding the body as an ethical site.

Further, what is striking is that with the degree of power Milton assigns to the affections and desires, he seems to undermine the efficiency of persuasion. Truth ‘cannot shift’ her ‘unhappinesse fatall to her’. Likewise, the Understanding is ‘not able to discern the fucus’ and therefore often ‘sentences’ truth for falsehood and falsehood for truth. The repetition of the word ‘if’ signals the hypothetical, and yet the passage seems so set on emphasizing reason’s severe limitations in the presence of masterful opponents that moral error becomes more probable, if not inevitable. What is more, the entire epistemic transit, beginning with the object, carried by senses, interpreted by the affections, and finally presented to Queen reason, is portrayed by passive language – except, that is, the language for the affections and desires. The affections stand out as the only active parts, with active verbs: they ‘let [Truth] pass in her own likenesse’ or ‘they bring [Truth]’ disguised. But Truth is compromised by a linguistic structure that uses passive gerunds and a series of terms to indicate compulsion: ‘being to pass through’, ‘cannot shift it’, ‘must put on’, and something ‘habited’ and ‘colour’d’ or clothed by others. With such a picture, Truth is wholly at the mercy of these port keepers.

In Milton’s final anti-prelatical tract An Apology, he reacts vehemently to Hall’s assertion in A Modest Confutation to possess ‘affections so equally temper’d, that they neither

²¹ Do the affections and desires cause the ‘first blush’? The ‘according to’ seems to assign the cause of the blush to their imposition, or blockage. For the question of whether passions or humours cause bodily motions, see Solomon, ‘You’ve Got to Have a Soul’, 204–206.
too hastily adhere to the truth, before it be fully examin’d, nor too lazily afterward’.  

Milton rejects Hall’s version of ‘Stoic apathy’ for two reasons: the first is Milton’s serious estimation of the Fall, which makes moral clarity ‘impossible’ unless an individual ‘were exempted out of the corrupt masse of Adam, borne without sinne originall, and living without actuall’. Passions are thus to some degree permanently morally crooked, as they grow out of the ‘corrupt masse’ and set the current material conditions in which the human personality must operate. Does this then set the human agent up for permanent failure? How can the human agent be held morally responsible for error if they were ‘born into’ such a fallen environment? If Milton is perplexed by these implications, he does not attempt an answer. In the second reason, Milton’s rejection of Hall’s claim to affective neutrality is motivated by his understanding of affective agency. The ‘dim glasse of his affections’, he writes, ‘in this frail mansion of flesh are ever unequally temper’d, pushing forward to error, and keeping back from truth oft times the best of men’. Affections again remain integral to ‘flesh’, though this is not lifeless, unthinking flesh, but aspects of the body more like volatile agents, capable of pushing the collective agent into error and suppressing good judgment. In the previous chapter I cautioned against a reading that assumed this bodily ‘glasse’ was a straightforward metaphor, as Milton’s animated monism could indicate Milton thought the affective body behaved in a way that the image of an obscured telescope could express. This picture established that the self could investigate the world, however badly for blurred vision. But the idea of the transparent body, which permits spectating between the internal and the external world, is a very different picture to the opaque body, sealing off access between inner and outer and establishing neat boundaries between person and thing. Brian Cummings observes how the body of Donne in literary studies has removed the ‘possibility of agency’, and thus changed his metaphor of ‘interiority’:

‘interiority’…used to carry with it metaphors of transparency and translucency, as in a domestic interior viewed through a window or candid camera, [but has been] replaced with an opposite connotation, of bodily internal organs: material, opaque, impenetrable. The turn of the body is in direct opposition to the idea of the self; more, it has attempted to replace a view of the self as a space of subjective self-reflection with one of the self as pathological object.

Milton’s image of the body as an affective glass, however, retains at least a degree of ‘translucency’ for the self to peer out through its living, marred matter. But this ability does not

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24 See Fletcher’s discussion of scientific instruments in her chapter on Milton and epistemology, ‘Uncertain Knowing, Blind Vision and Active Passivity’, 123. She discusses how scientific instruments such as telescopes and microscopes were a source of anxiety as they were able to deceive the senses.

work both ways. The self can look out, but the fallen body seems to have lost enough translucency to enable others to look in, and so guarantee successful interpersonal communication. Yet the fact that Milton’s material passions are described in the language of scientific instruments demonstrates that matter is active in relation to the world, not passive.

Examining passages that point to affective agency, I argue that Milton commits himself simultaneously both to a version of materialism and to human freedom. Though Milton gives great power to the passions and material operations of the body, these biological functions are never seen as finally morally determining. Milton consistently dismisses accusations attempting to smear his reputation by charging his actions have sprung out of material origins, especially the humours. In the monist account, ‘reason’ does not need to be located in an immaterial mediating substance but could be diffused throughout the body, making the body a rational and free whole. As Stephen Fallon observes, ‘in the context of Milton’s monism, moral, ontological and epistemological conditions are inseparable aspects of an indivisible unity’. Thus, though Milton remains a materialist, in the sense that all things owe their essence to one substance, he does not think materialism consequentially removes agency. He shows how the material body is capable of governing itself through methods that are not described in anatomical or medical language. This does not mean, however, that non-medical language is therefore necessarily metaphorical or fictional. Milton’s animated concept of substance makes it possible for non-medical language of the body to remain, in some sense, materially present. It is interesting to ask whether Milton would have expected to see miniature bodily passions behaving as courtroom officials in a cut open body under a microscope. Charles I makes a fascinating remark to a youth named Hugh, later the Viscount Montgomery, reported to have lived with an exposed heart caused by a battle wound. During the king’s examination in 1641, conducted on show for the court under the direction of William Harvey to prove that the heart was ‘insensible’, and to allow the King to ‘see, and handle this strange and singular Accident with his own Senses’, Charles exclaimed, ‘Sir, I wish I could perceive the thoughts of some of my nobilities’ hearts as I have seen your heart’. His language contrasts the physical body, taken to be visible, with thoughts, taken to invisible. But ambiguity sets in when speculating over whether Charles would have assumed thoughts to be immaterial bodies because they were invisible, or whether they were material bodies even though invisible. Even in natural philosophical works like Descartes, where hydraulic anatomical language for the body was used over and against vivid, human images for the passions – even there the smallest particles, ‘animal spirits’, – seem to be materially present. Despite a clear solution to these questions, Milton’s picture of the material passions, described with a cognitive life and choices of their

26 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 243. Also quoted in Moshenska, Feeling Pleasures, 255.
own, suggest that Milton thinks matter behaves in a way that only these pictures imagine. To remove the picture is to remove his view of passions, and therefore agency.

II EPISTEMIC PASSIONS IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND: TWO IMAGES OF FEELING KNOWLEDGE

Milton’s depiction of the passions as cognitive, bodily agents indicates that at least some seventeenth-century accounts of the mind-body composite could refuse the kind of humoral passivity that implicated determinism even while upholding thorough materialism. It is Milton’s monism that makes rationality a property of material substance, effectively reconnecting the intrinsic union between reason and passion and showing the material body to be a mode of knowing and a thinking substance. In Passion and Action, James analyses the reason why scholarship has overlooked the passions as an early modern site of epistemological investigations:

…by neglecting the role of the passions both as obstacles to and prerequisites of knowledge, commentators have tended to misidentify the epistemological issues that exercised philosophers in the seventeenth century and the character of the knower, the subject capable of acquiring knowledge. By sharply splitting off reason from passion, they have generated a parodic interpretation of the process by which knowledge is attained, and have obscured from view a fruitful conception of the emotional character of learning and the role of passions in rational thought and action.28

But correcting the ‘problem of dualism’ that sets reason and passion in opposition by reasserting their connection through monism can explain the cognitive and rational character of the passions in Milton’s writings. Passions are not wholly ‘irrational’ things disconnected from reason: their ability to oppose reason is possible because they have reasons of their own. What emerges from this picture of cognitive passions is that the body and its material motions were central to questions of early modern epistemology: what was the cause of error and ignorance? How much certainty was possible in light of the passions’ power to distort the search for truth? What methods could best guarantee the prevention of error and harness unruly passions to become proper stewards of knowledge?29 The monist framework that realigns material, bodily passions with reason reveals two images of affectivity that are connected to two images of knowledge: the first, passions as causes of error, and therefore as obstacles to knowledge, more like entities distinct from reason and knowledge; and the second, passions as sources of

28 James, Passion and Action, 16–17.
29 James, Passion and Action, 161, devotes Part 3 of her volume to correct assumptions holding that ‘skepticism’ was the widespread early modern philosophical phenomenon. Instead she argues that knowledge was thought to be attainable, but that this happened by overcoming the ‘psychological obstacles’ to understanding, i.e. ‘the passions’. 
knowledge. But these images are not as polarised as they might first seem, since even error or delusion are not occurrences outside of knowledge, but forms of knowing.

Passions as active obstacles to knowledge found justification in theories of the Fall. Harrison in *The Fall of Man* investigates how underlying Augustinian theological anthropology shaped various ‘prescriptions’ concerning the severity and impact of the Fall, as well as the solutions offered to confront the problem of knowledge in the early modern period attempting to regain Adamic conditions for knowing:

If, for example, the Fall were understood as having resulted in the triumph of passions over reason, the restoration of Adamic knowledge would be accomplished through re-establishing control of the passions, thus enabling reason once again to discharge its proper function. If the Fall had dulled Adam’s senses, this deficiency might be overcome through the use of artificial instruments capable of restoring to weakened human senses some of their original acuity.

The passions, in this context, are seen as the usurping partners of reason. The Fall records the momentous mutiny that takes place between passions and reason, and early modern projects looking for a method to reacquire knowledge understood it was necessary to reverse their dominance. Nicolas Malebranche in *Recherche de la Vérité* (1674–1675) called for an approach that considered

De quelle manière on peut concevoir l’ordre qui se trouvoit dans les facultez, & dans les passions de notre premier Pere pendant la justice originelle, & les changemens & les désordres qui y font arrivez après son peché.

Wright in *Passions of the Minde* (1604) had described how ‘the inordinate motions of the Passions…the pruening of reason, their rebellion to vertue are thornie briars sprung from the infected roote of original sinne’. And Milton does not shy away from articulating a high impact view of the Fall. Milton explains starkly in *An Apology* that affective perfection is impossible, unless a person were born out of ‘masse’ substance other than Adam’s. Thus Milton connects harmful, disordered affections to the consequences of the Fall and the material nature of fallen humanity, so that the ‘temper of his affections…cannot any where be but in Paradise’.

In *De Doctrina Christiana* (1650s–1660s?), the appearance of passion is also a direct result of the Fall. Milton lists three degrees of spiritual death. The first is ‘the privation, or at least, the serious dulling, of right reason [obscuratione rectae rationis]—aimed at perceiving the supreme good’; the second is ‘the annihilation of righteousness and of freedom to act well’; the third is the fact of sin, which is ‘the death of the spiritual life’. Among a list of verses from the Vulgate

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31 Harrison, *The Fall of Man*, 7.
in the main body of text, Milton includes Romans 1:26. Perhaps he does this to insert a cause for what ‘dulls’ right reason: propteræa tradidit eos foedibus affectibus.\textsuperscript{34} Paradise Lost (1674) suggests that turbulent passions both resulted from the Fall but also led to it. Adam and Eve’s post-fallen experience of ‘high Passions’ suggests passions block the way to reason. But the poetry also insinuates the passions are active forms of error producing a slurred version of knowledge, as ‘sensual Appetite, who from beneathe / Usurping over sovran Reason claimd / Superior sway’ (9. 120–131), and

\begin{quote}
Reason in man obscur’d, or not obeyd,  
Immediately inordinate desires  
And upstart Passions catch the Government  
From Reason…
\end{quote}

(emphasis mine, 12. 83–89)

The word ‘Reason’ opens and closes the four lines. The linguistic structure almost acts as a visual representation of its underlying meaning: all activity conducted by the passions is circumscribed by reason. Even uncontrolled passions remain within rational territory. But ‘obscur’d’ jumps out in the verse as a lack of explanation rather than as an explanation for reason’s overthrow. What ‘obscure[s]’ the rational Government? The passions seem to be invoked only as a secondary cause since ‘immediately’ is placed in the next line, seemingly to signal a transition to the next phase of deception. But then perhaps Milton is indeed thinking of the passions’ ability to obscure right reason, in a similar way to the De Doctrina Christiana text which mentions Romans 1:26 in a list of authoritative Scriptural references. The language of ‘obscur[ing]’ would fall in line with a number of other seventeenth-century depictions of passions as obstacles to Truth, obstacles that deceive because of their solidity or that misconstrue through miscolouring. Bacon’s language implies the latter in Novum Organum (1620):

the human understanding is no dry light, but receives an infusion from the will and affections….Numberless, in short, are the ways, and sometimes imperceptible, in which the affections colour and infect the understanding.\textsuperscript{35}

Passages from The Reason of Church Government and An Apology portray the affections as inevitable roadblocks on the path to understanding. The picture in The Reason of Church Government of the spatial hallways monitored by the cunning affections and desires, and the

\textsuperscript{34} Milton, DDC, 8.1: 432–433. Hale translates these verses with ‘foul passions’. Notice the Vulgate’s other terms in Milton, DDC, 8.1: 328: Rom. 1:24; propter hoc tradidit eos cupiditatus immundis, and also Romans 7:5: ‘Ut pravitatem…cum essemus in carne, affectus peccatorum per legem existentes agebant in membris nostris ad fractum ferendum morti’. See also Milton, DDC 8.2: 680. Milton adopts Pauline language in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, 3: 684: ‘it happens that a nation which cannot rule and govern itself, but has delivered itself [tradidit] into slavery to its own lusts [libidinis], is enslaved also to other Masters whom it does not choose, and serves not only voluntarily but also against its will…’.

\textsuperscript{35} Francis Bacon, Translation of the Novum Organum, in Works of Francis Bacon, 7 Vols., trans. and ed. J. Spedding (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1857–1885), ‘Section 49’, 77–76. See Harrison, The Fall of Man, 178, fn. 18, for his comparison between this quotation and another in Advancement of Learning, 178, fn. 179, Harrison also discusses how the phrase ‘dry light’ is a corrupted maxim of Heraclitus.
image in *An Apology* of the marred, material glass-instrument of the affections suggest that the passions are the bodily medium or filter through which all information must inevitably pass.

Thus, rather than concluding that passions are merely forms of error and thus disconnected from knowledge, Milton depicts error as a form of passionate reasoning in the epistemic process. The ‘Pathetick handmaids’ assume an active role in holding truth back from the Understanding to alter truth’s appearance with various guises. They can also imitate truth’s face by putting on cosmetics and so ‘counterfeit the very shape and visage of Truth’. This is not a battle scene suggesting psychomachia, but a lesson in the art of deception. Error does not penetrate the citadel as a foreign invasion, but is more like civil war: falsehood is brought to reason by one of her own citizens. This seems to suggest that the body is not a passive victim to itself, but is active in construing even false forms of knowing. The muddled, affective ‘glasse’ in *An Apology*, through which the self must view the world, could be understood as something isolated from reason and thus become the scapegoat for epistemic error. But the passage’s implicit monism presents the passions and reason as a seamless package in the act of vision. Although pictured as an imposing barrier that distorts external reality and blocks reason’s otherwise clear eyesight, the image at the same time refuses to break apart into distinct rational and irrational activities. Instead ‘the dim glasse of the affections’ is the very medium through which all knowing and perceiving happens. Passions as causes of error, therefore, are often portrayed as obstacles to knowledge. While this could imply that passions inducing error mark the absence of reason or lack of knowledge, Milton depicts even these passions to be engaged in rational activity and to be forms of knowledge.36

If the first picture of passions as causes of error seems to set passions against reason, making knowledge the result of passions hierarchically reduced to the ends and service of reason, the second picture of the passions is the passions as sources of knowledge, making knowledge itself the experience of bodily passion.37 James’ *Passion and Action* has explored aspects of this second picture in examining how one early modern view of epistemology does not construe ‘knowledge [as] opposed to reason but [as] a kind of feeling…concepts of knowledge are pulled in different directions by these two ideals – knowledge as separation and as unification’.38 But the idea of passions as basic units of knowledge inevitably follows upon the logic of active, independent passions that are able to contest the reasons of sovereign Reason. Cummings observed these consequences in *Passions and Subjectivity* with the

36 It follows logically that if:
1) passions which cause error are still forms of knowledge,
2) then error is not the absence of rationality;
3) therefore error is not the opposite of reason;
4) therefore certain forms of error (i.e. madness) are not purely irrational, but still a kind of rational activity.
37 Cummings, ‘Donne’s Passions’, 63, wants to say ‘thinking is not the same as perceiving’ – but rational passions seem to challenge this antithesis.
38 James, *Passion and Action*, 161.
statement, ‘thinking of emotions as kinds of judgment or belief not only lends them agency, it also endows them with meaning’. He is right to note the connection between agency and meaning, as possessing ‘meaning’ is to have ‘intentions’ and therefore ‘content’. Passions are therefore not empty states but content-filled states of knowing. But further, as agents, the picture of passions as sources of knowledge reframes them not as impersonal material particles loaded with information, but as material knowers that can be known in return, fostering the potential for misunderstanding, betrayal, or agreement. Early modern claims to knowledge, then, often included assessments of the perceiver’s relationship to his or her active passions.

Early modern epistemology’s description of knowledge cast in the language of phenomenology is reflected in Milton and his contemporaries’ references to passions and affections in polemical political literature. In The Reason of Church Government, Milton’s forceful conclusion about episcopacy includes an aside to his affections who, he reminds us, are liable to ‘ushe[r]… Truth and Falshood between the sense, and the soul’. The lengthy soliloquy seems to indicate his argument is incomplete without offering an affective diagnosis:

I shall likewise assay those wily Arbitresses…with what loyalty they will use me in conovyng this Truth to my understanding; the rather for that by as much acquaintance as I can obtain with them, I doe not find them engag’d either one way or other. Having analysed general outcomes for truth in the hands of ‘those Pathetick handmaids’, he moves to consider specifically ‘this Truth’ – or prelacy – and whether in fashioning his thinking he is experiencing deception. His evaluation ‘I doe not find them engag’d either one way or other’ conveys neutrality or indifference, or what I call ‘affective neutrality’. The invocation of ‘affective neutrality’ features in the rhetorical style between the author of Eikon Basilike (1649) and Milton’s Eikonoklastes (1649). The former writer consistently justifies his position by including descriptions of affective impartiality and detachment:

My going to the House of Commons…It filled indifferent men with great jealousies and fears; yea, and many of My friends resented it as a motion rising rather from Passion than Reason, and not guided with such discretion, as the touchiness of those times required. But these men knew not the just motives, and pregnant grounds, with which I thought my self so furnished, that there needed nothing to such evidence…

This I write rather like a Divine, than a Prince that Posterity may see, (if ever these Papers be publick) that I had fair grounds both from scripture-Canons, & Ecclesiasticall examples, whereon My judgment was stated for Episcopall government. Nor was it any policy of State, or obstinacy of will, or partiality of affection, either to the men, or their Function which fixed Me…This for My

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41 Anonymous, Eikon Basilike, 58.
judgment touching Episcopacy; wherein (God knows) I do not gratifie any design
or passion with the least perverting of truth…It is most sure, that the purest
Primitive and best Churches flourished under Episcopacy; & may so still, if
ignorance, superstition, avarice, revenge, and other disorderly and disloyall
passions had not so blown up some mens minds against it, that what they want of
Reasons or primitive patterns…

The approach that acknowledges the play of passions in making an argument is used again in
Section 8 and 11:

…in this (I thank God) I had the better of Hotham, that no disdain, or emotion of
passion transported me, by the indignitie of his carriage, to do or say any thing,
unbeseeming my selfe, or unsutable to that temper…

Yet, by Gods help, I am resolved, That nothing of passion, or peevishnesse, or list
to contradict, or vanity to shew my negative power, shal have any byas upon my
judgement, to make me gratifie my will, by denying any thing, which my Reason
and Conscience commands me not…

This last quotation leans more toward the language of ‘affective absence’ than towards
‘affective neutrality’; the emphasis is on having ‘no passion’ instead of still passions. Yet the
absence of passion here should probably be taken to mean the lack of frenzied passions, rather
than the lack of passions altogether. Regardless, Milton’s mocking piecemeal response in
Eikonoklastes repeatedly attacks the author’s claim to affective purity. In both examples,
Milton first cites the author in italics, who had hoped the people would not find passion and
prejudice in the King:

He still fear’d passion and prejudice in other men; not in himself; and doubted not
by the weight of his own reason, to counterpoyse any Faction; it being so easie for
him, and so frequent, to call his obstinacy, Reason, and other mens reason, Faction.
Wee in the mean while must believe, that wisdom and all reason came to him by
Title, with his Crown; Passion, Prejudice, and Faction came to others by being
Subjects…

God knows he had no passion, designe or preparation, to imbroyle his Kingdom in
a civill Warr. True….but what passion and designe, what close and op’n

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42 Anonymous, Eikon Basilike, 131, 142–143.
43 Anonymous, Eikon Basilike, 77.
44 Anonymous, Eikon Basilike, 100. The number of times both authors invokes the passions is long. For Eikon
Basilike, see also 51, 61–62, 68, 71–73, 79, 86, 109, 111, 122, 141, 155 168, 189; for Milton, Eikonoklastes, see also
3: 287, 297.
45 Unless, of course, the author wants to set the picture of a stoic monarchy.
46 Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, 3: 238, ‘As for the party called Presbyterian…discover in
themselves either extreme passion or tyranny’; and John Milton, A Defence of the English People, CPWJM, 4:1,
329: ‘See how easily I can attack you: if the deed was fair and noble, those who performed it deserve the greater
praise in acting for the right alone, unmastered by passion; while if it was hard and painful, in moving not by blind
impulse but on careful deliberation’ [si pulchrum & decorum fuit, eo magis laundandi quod nullis affectibus
occupati, solius honestatis causa fecerint…]. For the Latin, see Ioannis Miltoni Angli Pro populo anglicano defensio
(1651), 27.
47 Milton, Eikonoklastes, 3: 356. See also Eikon Basilike, 231.
preparation he had made, to subdue us to both these by terror and preventive force, all the Nation knows.\footnote{Anonymous, \textit{Eikon Basilike}, 446.}

The use and defense of ‘affective neutrality’ in these tracts when making a knowledge statement could be seen as part of the first image (passions as causes of error) and therefore act as rhetorical attempts to avoid interpersonal scepticism that would dismiss a passion-filled argument as unsound. But I suggest the rhetoric of appeals to neutral passions also points to the concept of passions as sources of knowledge. Harrison’s contention that ‘understanding the rebellious nature of factious and fallen passions…was central to gaining insight into moral deliberation and rational decision-making’, nears this idea, in so far as it acknowledges the familiar role passions could play in contributing to knowledge acquisition.\footnote{Harrison, \textit{The Fall of Man}, 150.} But there is another sense in which the sentence affirms one early modern view of knowledge that makes knowledge identical with the passions themselves. In this view, knowledge is the experience of, or first-hand testimony of, the passions. Thus, repeated appeals to be in state of ‘affective neutrality’ is not exclusively a claim about detachment or indifference, but a first-person epistemic claim about bodily perception, and more specifically, the claim to have experienced such perception. Joseph Hall, the possible author of \textit{A Modest Confutation} set on responding to Milton’s \textit{Animadversions} (1641), writes this way when he argues:

\begin{quote}
God hath given me a soul, eager in the search of truth; and affections so equally tempered, that they neither too hastily adhere to the truth, before it be fully examined, nor too lazily afterward. Such excesses fills the world with furious, hot-brained Hereticks, Schismatics, &c. the defect, with cold speculative Atheists. I have always resolved that neither person nor cause shall improper me, further than they are good; and so far it is my duty to give evidence.\footnote{Hall, \textit{A Modest Confutation}, 6. For an overview of authorship attribution to Hall see Brooke Conti, \textit{Confessions of Faith in Early Modern England} (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 188, fn. 18.}
\end{quote}

Hall’s claim to perceive the inner workings of his active body to conclude they are ‘equally tempered’ is set in contrast to those whose affective imbalance leads to either hot or cold bodies. Hall’s experience of possessing ‘affections so equally tempered’ is the experience of the right degree of movement, a speed which neither operates ‘too hastily…nor too lazily’. In contrast, those experiencing ‘excesses’, are the ‘hot-brained’ and those lacking the right amount of passion, ‘the defect’, are the ‘cold speculative Atheists’. The intriguing use of the temperature belongs to Galenic terminology. But this language seems to tease out an intricate connection between concepts of knowledge and bodily states. The author’s claim to have the right position – the divine right of bishops – is a claim about knowledge. And yet the verdict of this knowledge-claim as either true or false oddly appears to depend on the experience of his affections and accurate bodily perception. The method for a person to justify holding a belief, in light of perceived criticism of that belief, is established by a kind of knowledge of the body.
Milton’s furious reaction, though his language for the affections switches from temperature and speed to vision as a blurred telescope, no less highlights the connection between knowledge-claims and phenomenology in his fifth and last anti-prelactical tract, *An Apology*:

…this man beyond a Stoick apathy sees truth as in a rapture, and cleaves to it. Not as through the dim glasse of his affections which in this frail mansion of flesh are ever unequally temper’d, pushing forward to error, and keeping back from truth oft times the best of men. But how farre this boaster is from knowing himselfe, let his Preface speake.\textsuperscript{51}

Milton argues that the experience and perception of equally temper’d affections is impossible since such perception takes place through the telescope of affective, fallen flesh that inevitably confusion truth with error. Yet Milton’s rejection of the ability to accurately perceive whether bodily affections are truth-telling does not dismiss what he considers knowledge to be: an experience of bodily passion. Error, itself a form of knowledge, is the experience of being ‘push[ed] forward’ and being ‘ke[pt] back from truth’ in the ‘frail mansion of flesh’. Again, Milton’s claim in *The Reason of Church Government* to hold the true position, namely that ‘Prelaticall jurisdiction opposeth the reason and end of the Gospel and of State’, is described in terms of the experience of his affections who, he tells us, are ‘not [found] engag’d either one way or other’.\textsuperscript{52}

These two images of the passions, as causes of error and as sources of knowledge, reveal the way the material body could be seen as a rational, thinking substance and therefore central to early modern epistemology. Passions, as causes of error, were often part of explanations that attributed moral error to the Fall. But though passions, as causes of error, were often pictured as roadblocks or obstacles that pilgrim Truth had to encounter on the path to Reason, these obstacles were not external forces that hit the body as ‘irrational’ blips of existence distinct from reason or knowledge. Error as a blocking passion was still rational, supplying reasons for why the self should follow it. Passionate error could thus be a form of knowledge and an aspect of reason itself. This meant that passions, even as causes of error, remained part of the rational activity of constructing knowledge. The implications for this image introduce questions about early modern deception, and reframe the material body as an active, rather than a passive, contributor to its own deceiving. The second image analysed how passions were sources of knowledge by examining the frequent appeals to ‘affective neutrality’ in Milton and his opponents in political pamphlets. ‘Affective neutrality’ was not necessarily a call to Stoic *apatheia* or total indifference, but rather a rhetorical device used to assert epistemic normativity. Such language seems to suggest that making a claim about knowledge was to make


\textsuperscript{52} Milton, *The Reason of Church Government*, 1: 831.
a claim about the experience of one’s bodily passions. In turn, this implies that the body, and the
experience of feeling, were part of constructing knowledge.

The fact that articulated perceptions of the body and the activity or inactivity of the
passions featured so centrally in knowledge-claim statements also exposes the connection
between early modern epistemology and physiology. Literary historians have pursued concepts
of the body and its relation to knowledge from the direction of self-knowledge.\textsuperscript{53} Schoenfeldt’s
\textit{Body and Selves} examines Burton’s \textit{Anatomy of Melancholy} and Spenser’s \textit{Fairie Queene}. He
begins with a quotation from Burton,

\begin{quote}
‘And what can be more ignominious and filthie…then for a man not to knowe the
structure and composition of his owne body (as Melancthon well inveighes),
especially since the knowledge of it, tends so much to the preservation of his
health, & information of his manners…. [Burton]’….Underpinning both Burton
and Spenser’s somatic explorations of the interior self is the assumption that
knowledge of physiology is knowledge of psychology, that knowing the body is
not just gaining information about the corporeal machine the self inhabits but
actually learning something about the self.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

Literary scholarship that has pursued the connection between the body and epistemology
through the lens of self-knowledge has made progress in redefining generic definitions that tend
to categorically divide medical, anatomical, physiological discourses from epistemological,
ethical discourses.\textsuperscript{55} If studies in self-knowledge have been a way of reasserting that early
moderns read physiological discourses with ethical motives, then studies in early modern
passions also provide a route to understanding the way in which theories of the body were
related to concepts of knowledge. This is especially the case as the renewed interest in
materialism has been seen to cope with the charges of determinism by considering animated
monism; recasting bodily matter as rational and agency-ridden has led to the reconsideration of
early modern passions as active agents rather than as passive receptors. Milton’s monism makes
the body and its passions rational, active entities, and therefore active knowers. This section has
shown that early modern concepts of knowing were thus shaped by thoughts about the body.
Knowledge was central to studies of the material body because the active body itself was
considered a site of knowledge. The two images of cognitive affectivity, therefore, construct
two images of early modern knowledge: knowledge as error, and knowledge as the experience
of bodily motion.

\textsuperscript{53} See Chapter 1, fn. 68. For a discussion on Melancthon and Heliah Crooke’s discussion of the role of body studies
for self-knowledge, see Harrison, \textit{The Fall of Man}, 151–152.
\textsuperscript{54} Schoenfeldt, \textit{Bodies and Selves}, 52. He leaves out the phrase ‘as Melancthon inveighes’ which I have added. The
literary consequences implying severe bodily passivity can be witnessed on occasions in Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-
Wilson, \textit{Reading the Early Modern Passions}. But see Gowland, ‘Melancholy, Passions and Identity’, 92, who argues
that early moderns distinguished between physiological from physical discourses.
III ‘AS MUCH AQUIANTANCE AS I CAN OBTAIN WITH THEM’: DECEPTION AND SUBJECTIVITY

Passive readings of the body and passions has come out of scholarship that understood Galenic materialism to limit agency and to create a deterministic nexus for the early modern subject. This chapter responds to the ‘problem of materialism’ that offers a medical-humoural approach to the body and passions by arguing that Milton’s debt to monism makes matter active, independent and conscious—and therefore, free. Responding to materialism in literary studies by arguing for the importance of materialism seems an ironic position to take, given that many contributors to the shift in affective scholarship have fought for the reestablishment of dualism. Angus Gowland represents this intellectual line when he argues

No early modern writer, to my knowledge, gave a fully elaborated account of the passions which reduced them to the status of purely physical effects of the humours and the spirits... It is an inescapable and important fact that the early modern intellectual world... was fundamentally dualistic. The soul was divided from the body, reason differed from passion, and the spirit was the enemy of the flesh.56

Gowland’s reaction to ‘early modern subjectivity and ontology [that has been] dominated by humours and physical substances and qualities’ is rooted in an underlying but unarticulated concern, namely, the fear that reducing passions to ‘purely physical effects’ would dilute agency. But this chapter has demonstrated how certain versions of materialism could provide a way out of mechanism, and therefore remedy the suspicion of materialist ontology. Building on the argument of Chapter 2 that demonstrates how monism reunites reason and passion, this chapter sets Miltonic monism in the context of early modern epistemology to evidence how physical yet rational bodies were part of ways of thinking about knowing. Concepts of knowledge were not abstract, theoretical principles ‘out there’ to be imagined and practiced, but in some senses located in the material stuff of the body which was itself a knower as well as the mode of knowing for the embodied subject. The chapter thus first explored Milton’s language for the passions as assertive, cognitive material bodies, which shows that it is possible to uphold a version of materialism and agency simultaneously. This maintained the importance of materialism in early modern pictures of subjectivity, in which concepts of the human could remain thoroughly material but not necessarily causally determined. The passions were material entities, but free agents. Secondly, Milton’s monism recasts the body as mode of knowing and shows that the body and its passions as miniature knowers were actively involved in the construction of knowledge and making knowledge-claims.

However brilliant Milton’s materialist imagination that attempts a solution to the existence of evil and individual freedom, his account is not entirely free from problems. The

56 Gowland, ‘Melancholy, Passions and Identity’, 89, 93. See also Sullivan’s ‘The Passions’ for Thomas Wright’s version of dualism, 25–44.
concept of active, cognitive passions complicates the notion of blame in deception. Who or which agent is responsible for moral error – the passions or ourselves? How do the passions put up defeaters to accessing the internal self, and who or what might be responsible for this kind of self-frustration? The passions are of course part of ourselves, but we do not want them to keep us from knowing ourselves. This throws a twist on the ancient dictum ‘know thyself’ that preoccupied the early modern imagination, for if Milton’s language postures them as two different agents – which it seems to – how does the moral self stand in relation to its passions? Schoenfeldt observes how

The affections…exist inside the self, but are imagined as something outside the self. Physiological double agents, these internal forces threaten fragile constructions of the self, both by direct assault and by a kind of sabotage.

And James also notes how texts often depict the ‘externality of the passions’ and ‘the implication that they come between us and truth’. The reality of early modern ‘double agency’, such that that selfhood is shared and split between a person’s overall disposition and her agency-filled passions, creates these tensions over moral responsibility, especially if we take Milton’s language about the passions to be literal instead of figurative. Figurative language would relieve the issue by asserting that it was still the self that chose moral error, and that the images of battles, road blockage, and blinding or misleading colour were merely pictorial representations of the mistake. But if we accept that passions are materially existing, active entities of the body, that are in some senses independent agents, separate from the speaking self doing the referencing to the internal passions – whose moral error it is, exactly, remains a critical question.

This kind of anxiety about active matter and the multiplicity of agents is precisely what seems to trigger Ralph Cudworth’s analysis of the atomic Atheist’s reasons for rejecting ‘hylozoic atheism’ in A True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678). Atomistic atheists, he says, rejected hylozoism on the grounds that:

If matter as such, had life perception and understanding belonging to it, then of necessity must every atom or smallest particle therefore, be a distinct percipient by itself; from whence it will follow, that there could not possibly be, any such men and animals as now are, compounded out of them, but every man and animal, would be a heap of innumerable percipients, and have innumerable perceptions and intellections; whereas it is plain, that there is but one life and understanding, one soul or mind, one perceiver or thinker in every one. And to say, that these innumerable particles of matter do all confederate together; that is, to make every man and animal to be a multitude or commonwealth of percipients, and persons, as it were, clubbing together, is a thing so absurd and ridiculous….

If original creation was made up of prime matter which itself came from God, then it was originally perfect. This kind of creation story stands in contrast to other Ancient Near Eastern creation accounts that suggest matter came from the rotting carcasses of defeated gods. See John Walton, Genesis 1 as Ancient Cosmology (Winton Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns: 2011). For a discussion on matter in Milton, see Donnelly, “‘Matter’ versus Body”, 79–85.

Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, 49.

James, Passion and Action, 162.
have been other arguments already suggested which do sufficiently evince…that life and understanding do not essentially belong to matter…and that they cannot be generated out of dead and senseless matter, [so] it is demonstratively certain, that there must be some other substance, besides body and matter.\(^\text{60}\)

Cudworth, of course, contends for the existence of ‘incorporeal substance’ as the real alternative to both atomism and hylozoism. Certain commentators have argued that Cudworth’s remarks here reveal that he did not understand Francis Glisson’s complex *Tractatus de Natura Substantiae Energetica* which posited animated matter, or hylozoism.\(^\text{61}\) On the contrary, I think this passage shows that Cudworth was reading Glisson seriously, and that he was affronted by the problem of the infinite reduction of multiple agents. Animated monism thus offered matter too much activity.

This sense of separation between the passions and the self as two distinct agents, and Milton’s attribution of moral transgress to his passions, perhaps can be explained by object-intentionality where objects in early modern culture were invested with moral significance.\(^\text{62}\) This would then make the passions responsible for moral error and relieve the self from a full and burdensome form of responsibility that comes with the inevitability of navigating a fallen world. In other words, blameworthy passions reveal that Milton acknowledges the complexity of deception as a concept, and how the individual is not always responsible for the way in which the active, knowing body can move beyond the limits of the self and act in contradiction to the self’s purposes. While this might be seen to leave open the door to soft material determinism inside Milton’s monist framework, Milton writes in the section on predestination within *De Doctrina Christiana* that, as if to pacify these tensions,

> In the end, all are sufficiently equipped with innate reason [*ratione insita satis instructi sunt*] to be able by themselves to resist depraved feelings [*pravis affectibus*], lest anyone too relentlessly plead the depravity of his own nature compared with other people’s, or complain.\(^\text{63}\)

This indicates there are indeed moral spaces in which the self is able to remove itself from its own darkened mode of operation and evaluate its affective impulses. And yet Milton’s portrait of these affections as powerful epistemic agents in other prose and poetry gives his readers little assurance that he is able to examine whether his passions are neutral or deceiving. Internal self-

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\(^\text{62}\) Andrew Zurcher, ‘The Guts of Gulo: Deciding Things in the Letters of Sir Thomas Browne’, Paper at York University CREMS Conference Epistolary Letters: Letters and Letter-Writing, UK, March 18–19, 2016, questions the epistemological status between persons and thing, material object and an idea. This happens in Milton, where an abstract quality like zeal is also given material shape and weight in *An Apology*, 1: 900: ‘then Zeale whose substance is ethereal…’.

exploration is possible, in Milton’s view, but it is also highly likely that a person will misread her own passions.64

In addition, the concept of knowledge as a kind of feeling, or bodily perception, places a premium on subjective experiences. However, would early moderns consider this form of knowledge to be reliable? The passions could be accessed and known with some degree of certainty, and were thus considered, in some sense, substantially real parts of the animate material person. Constant references to ‘affective neutrality’ in taking an epistemic stance either depict the passions as ‘absentee’ or ‘momentarily paused or unbiased’. The frequent inclusion of these appeals in political discourses suggest the passions act as a form of ‘evidence’, or as it were, the ‘proof’ of truth in an epistemic commitment. This seems to redefine the criteria for ‘evidence’ away from the world of objective, external, observable, visible, demonstrable, public facts, to the world of internal, subjective, invisible, private, inner phenomenology. But instead of shying away from first-person accounts of bodily movements when making knowledge-statements in order to avoid the complications and anxieties that the dependence on private experience would raise, early moderns attended to such bodily motions for material evidence, and considered analyzing the state of the passions to be a normative method for establishing correct belief. This privileging of reflexivity and self-opacity by looking to the passions as a form of evidence that would determine whether a knowledge-claim was false or true suggests a different way of thinking about subjectivity in the early modern period.65 Although the concept of knowledge as a kind of bodily feeling emphasizes the importance of private experience and therefore prizes subjectivity, such subjectivity did not seem to be disconnected from the realm of shared subjective experiences. Hobbes proposed ‘Nosce teipsum, Read thy self,

…to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, feare &c. And upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men…not the similitude of the objects of the Passions…for these the constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary and they are so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts.66

65 Cummings, ‘Donne’s Passions’, 60, discusses aspects of this by posing ‘what does it mean for one human being to interact with another’?
66 Hobbes, Hobbes’s Leviathan. 9. James, Passion and Action, 85, discusses how the transparency of the passions could lead to manipulation. She quotes Senault The Use of Passions [p.99]: “an ambitious man hath no fence against one who discovers his passions”’. For strikingly similar language to Hobbes’s ‘same passions’ see Wright, Passions of the Minde, 37.
The passage reveals that subjective experiences, such as the passions, were not isolated material events in a human life, but considered part of the experiential continuum that all humans shared in virtue of being human. This seems to imply that in some early modern pictures of the self, subjectivity did not view persons as isolated entities with vastly ‘other’ experiences but as interconnected beings. Bodily experiences, such as the passions, were therefore not purely individual, unique affairs differing widely between persons, but same or similar experiences, which enabled a person to feel, experience, and recognize what another person felt and experienced. The quotation from Hobbes captures this perspective well: the exercise and mastery in reading one’s own passions provided the map to understanding another person’s passions, because ‘[upon the like occasion] Passions...are the same in all men’. This kind of subjectivity, therefore, allows the subject to use private, bodily experiences as valid forms of evidence in making a knowledge-statement, since the interlocutor was seen to share these same bodily experiences of feeling. Literary historians have noted how shared passions were fundamental to the genre of letter-writing, which expressed a ‘relationship of feeling’:

What it is to share a feeling, what it is to guarantee that another person is feeling the same feeling as I am, what it is to know what I am feeling and what you are feeling: these questions...are ethically acute.

Perhaps this explains why Milton and his contemporaries appealed to internal affections in the fabric of political dialogue and dispute. The role of passions in epistemic conversations provided common ground: the expectation was that both parties could privately access passions in themselves, but also draw them into the discussion as participants in the debate. But, even as this version of subjectivity seems to unite individual experiences into a common human forum and seems to promise successful interpersonal communion, Milton’s passions continually disagree with, and misunderstand, the passions of other writers.

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67 This train of thought has been noted by Christopher Tilmouth, ‘Passion and Intersubjectivity in Early Modern Literature’, in Passions and Subjectivity, eds. Cummings and Sierhuis, 13–33.
68 Whether these experiences are identical or similar is unclear even in Hobbes. In the same line, he writes how it is possible to know the thoughts of others because of the similitude of the Passions, which are the same in all men’. Are ‘similitude’ and ‘same’ conceptually different?
70 Cummings, ‘Donne’s Passions’, 58.
I REMOVING EMOTIONS, RETURNING TO PASSIONS

The word ‘emotion’ never appears in Milton’s *Paradise Lost* (1674). Instead, the poem reflects the traditional language of ‘passions’ from classical and medieval discourses. Yet is an ‘emotion’ the same concept as a ‘passion’? The lack of shared vocabulary between Miltonists, intellectual historians, and classicists poses conceptual problems. The ambivalence over terminology seems to imply that ‘the objects of *current* psychological discourse are the real, natural objects and that past discourse necessarily referred to the same objects in its own quaint and scientific way’.¹ This lexical confusion stems from a misplaced assumption that a ‘passion’ can be easily discarded and replaced with the more up-to-date term ‘emotion’, and that this lack of cultural sensitivity regarding the early modern faculty of the soul has underestimated the degree to which early modern phenomenology differs from the modern. But linguistic ambiguities also make it useful to ask what might be missing if Milton’s vocabulary of the ‘passions’ is exchanged for ‘emotions’ or ‘feelings’ or ‘sentiments’. This chapter intends to demonstrate just how foreign the term ‘passion’ is, and the framework to which it belongs.²

Examining Milton’s paradisal and fallen vocabulary brings to the surface the intriguing absence of the term ‘affection’. This in turn raises important questions as to why Milton only uses the term passion if he was aware that traditional terms were synonymous, whether he has a way of offering distinctions between acts of the sensitive appetite and acts of the will in his poetry, whether passions are both voluntary and involuntary, and why the term ‘desire’ outnumbers appearances of the term ‘passions’. The aims of this chapter are therefore philosophical and historical. I am much indebted to Dixon’s re-shifting of categorical furniture. The chapter, however, does not attempt to cover Milton’s terminology for the passions across all his writings, nor many of the major classical and Renaissance sources critical to developing an understanding of the passions in Milton’s time. Here instead I focus primarily on *Paradise Lost*, though I observe some classical and medieval sources such as Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei*, and Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*. In examining Milton’s epic I avoid the category of ‘emotion’ entirely, nor attempt a definition, nor suggest that Milton’s terms correspond to the contemporary term. Pickavé and Shapiro helpfully capture this perspective in *Emotions and Cognitive Life*:

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² Dennis Danielson has a similar project with the terms ‘prevenient grace’, ‘deep’ and ‘the abyss’ in the seventeenth century, *Milton’s Good God: A Study in Literary Theodicy* (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), 15, 46.
one need not claim that all the terms in play in this broad swathe of history are equivalent [−] that the accounts are pinpointing the exact same thing [−] to pose that there is a relationship between them. This volume does presuppose that there is such a relation, and that there is a relation between the discussions of the past and our own contemporary discussion, but it does not presuppose what that relation is.3

Examining individual passions in Paradise Lost, such as joy or hate, is also beyond the scope of this paper. Part I analyses Milton’s generic terminology to show how, in Part II, Milton upholds the traditional classification while at the same reflecting a philosophical linguistic shift that occurred in the mid-seventeenth century.

II MILTON’S VOCABULARY IN PARADISE LOST

Instead of an epic filled with historical categorical terms like ‘passion’ or ‘affection’, Milton’s poetry seems more circumscribed, as if caught in the act of transition, by the leading terms ‘desire’ and ‘motion’. Indeed, the familiar Latin derivative ‘passion’ occurs only eleven times in the singular and five times in the plural; ‘appetite’ appears only twelve times; ‘commotion’ is mentioned only four times, acting once as a synonym to passions (8. 530) and twice to public discord in heaven (4. 992; 6. 310, 706).4 ‘Desire’ occurs twenty-four times, the majority of which are reserved for Milton’s human characters; ‘motion’ appears as the second most often used Latin derivative, appearing a total of twenty-three times. ‘Feel’ also stands out as an important verb for the poem that appears twenty-four times. Part I analyses these terms in the poem to bring to light the startling absence of the term ‘affection’, except in its verbal and participle form.5

A. PASSIONS

Although Milton seems to emphasise the ability to master the passions in his other writings, amounting to a positive vision of affectivity—as in Areopagitica (1644) where passions can be ‘rightly temper’d’ and become the ‘very ingredients of vertue’ – passions that seem wholly benevolent and pure appear only once in the prelapsarian human state (8. 530–1).6 It seems

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3 Pickavé and Shapiro, Emotion and Cognitive Life, 8.
4 See this dissertation’s Appendix. The word frequency differs between the 1667 and 1668 editions. ‘Passion’ appears six times for Adam and Eve, and nine times for Satan and his comrades. Schoenfeldt, “Commotion Strange”, 45 writes that ‘commotion’ is etymologically linked to the modern term ‘emotion’.
5 Both forms are used rarely (3. 206; 5. 96, 763; 6. 421; 10. 653, 12. 81); it more often describes demonic activity or the natural world’s order than human actions. See OED, ‘Affect’, 1: 212–13,which cites Milton’s Eikonoklastes for definitions of ‘affected’ to mean “‘sought after,’” and “‘assumed or displayed artificially, put on for effect; non-natural, artificial, stilted “got up”’.
unusual that his discussion of good passions is limited to this one occasion, especially as Milton emphasises the havoc that passions can play over reason in his discussion of the Fall’s origin.\footnote{Milton, \textit{PL} 12. 86–95.}

Even then, although the reader is introduced to a passion prior to the Fall (which is left ambiguous as ‘Commotion strange’, and not specifically referred to as ‘lust’ – though some literary historians jump to that conclusion) through the eyes of Adam, Adam’s naïve attitude towards the foreign and ‘strange’ passion that he first feels does little to allay suspicions questioning his innocence. Many scholars have seen the presence of this commotion as a sign of Adam’s vulnerability and lack of self-knowledge, which therefore sets him on the road to the final manifestation of his already internal corruption in Book 9.\footnote{See Chapter 5 for an extended discussion on this section. Millicent Bell, ‘The Fallacy of the Fall in \textit{Paradise Lost}’, \textit{PMLA} 68 (1953): 863–883; William Empson, \textit{Milton’s God} (NY: New Directions, 1961); Tilmouth, \textit{Passion’s Triumph}, 157. See also Leonard Faithful Labourers, for a thorough overview of this position in Milton criticism. In opposition, with the view of the passions as innocuous up until the Fall because of Milton’s Augustinian associations, see Peter Fiore, \textit{Milton and Augustine: Patterns of Augustinian Thought in Paradise Lost} (London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981), 32–33.}

Perhaps the ambiguity of this passage left by the signifier ‘Commotion strange’ could be clarified as either innocent or depraved if it could be worked out when ‘passions’ are considered virtuous states (\textit{passiones} that are also \textit{affectas rectas}) or negative, disordered states (\textit{passiones sive affectiones sive perturbationes}) in the overall poetic narrative. Milton uses the term ‘passion’ only once in a way that recalls Aquinas and Augustine’s positive treatment characterized by reformed \textit{passiones}. As noted in Chapter 2, Augustine’s right ‘acts of will’ could be referred to either as \textit{affectiones} or \textit{passiones}, but Augustine tends to reserve a special usage of \textit{affectiones} for those passions that are submitted to right reason; Aquinas, on the other hand, tended to reserve the term \textit{affectiones} for right movements of the will, (i.e. \textit{intellective affectiones} or \textit{simplex affectus}), especially for those affective experiences in God and the angels. But again, Milton seems to use the word ‘passion’ for proper movements of the soul only once. Oddly this appears during Satan’s initial signs of regret:

\begin{quote}
\begin{center}
cruel his eye, but cast \\
Signs of remorse and passion to behold \\
The fellows of this crime, the followers rather \\
(Far other once beheld in bliss) condemned…
\end{center}
\end{quote}

(1. 604–611)

Passions in \textit{Paradise Lost} seem to be, therefore, an overall negative term. It is used both categorically as a representative term for good and harmful affective states, but also narrowly as a disordered movement signaling the presence of actual corruption, or the trials initiating eventual corruption. But James Turner would argue that
we rescue passion and commotion from their Satanic associations by recalling that in *Areopagitica* ‘passions’ are the God-given seeds of virtue and ‘commotions’ are the marks of divine healing—and even ‘vehemence’ exists in Christ-like form.  

In addition, Peter Fiore goes so far as to say

Adam and Eve in the early books of *Paradise Lost* [are] pictured as calm, controlled individuals without any cause to exercise restraint. As long as they observe the command, they are immune from the tensions of concupiscence.  

Yet since Milton’s negative usage of the term ‘passion’ outweighs the positive, this seems to suggest that Milton’s position is closer to seventeenth-century thinkers who held a cautious view of the passions, rather than an outright celebratory one. Indeed, the Fall itself and those further along the fallen continuum are often pictured in the grasp of ‘passion’. ‘Passion’ only ever describes the nature of Adam and Eve and the fallen angels. This further affirms that ‘passions’ in *Paradise Lost* appear only with creatures able to undergo corruption. In the epic’s vocabulary, therefore, ‘passions’ is reserved for the morally vicious or those who have (or are foreseen to have) the potential for morally evil states.

This could offer a preliminary reason for why the term ‘passion’ never describes upright angels or God’s activity. If passions are reserved for beings who are actually fallen, or have the potential to fall, then avoiding the term for Milton’s good beings could be a linguistic way of setting them apart from an ontological mode capable of corruption. But if God and the angels are indeed incapable of corruption, this of course, clashes with the narrative that speaks of a pre-terrestrial heavenly rebellion that ends with an angelic exile and inaugurates another creation. Since Milton uses ‘passion’ only with fallen angels, this might indicate that divine ‘election’ extends to angels, where the fallen would have inevitably fallen and the upright would inevitably remain upright. Joad Raymond in *Milton’s Angels* argues backwards from the fact that since the fallen angels remain ‘morally fixed’ and have no opportunity for regeneration, this seems to indicate there are two classes of angels: the heavenly are ‘elect’ and the other are created for damnation. But theological doctrine hits the ground running in the question of angelic temptation. Did Abdiel experience real temptation to deviate or remain in league with the Father, or were his motives pre-determined?

Another reason why ‘passion’ might never be used in relation to God or the upright angels could be Milton’s association of ‘passion’ with physiological alteration, which seems to

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11 In contrast to Fiore, *Milton and Augustine*, 50.  
draw from Aquinas’ material connotation of material passiones. Historically, passiones were often linked with bodily change, while affectiones could be set apart as intellectual immaterial movements of the soul. In Paradise Lost, passion remains deeply physical. Satan’s experience of passion is also the experience of bodily alteration:

Thus while he spake, each passion dimm’d his face  
Thrice chang’d with pale, ire, envie and despair,  
Which marrd his borrow’d visage, and betrayd  
Him counterfeit.  
(4. 114, 571)

And shortly later, Gabriel ‘soon discernd his looks / Alien from Heav’n, with passions foul obscur’d’ (4. 570–571). Passion also alters the stuff of human bodies. ‘High passions’ work in Adam an ‘estrang’d look and alterd stile’ (9. 1123, 1132). The God of Paradise Lost, however, is never pictured in the grip of passion. Augustine and the early Church Fathers viewed God’s passion of ‘anger’ as metaphorical, since he could not be moved or altered, and similarly Aquinas acknowledged that divine or angelic affective experiences were different to human passions which required physiological alteration.14 Yet Milton’s angels seem to be different from Thomist angels since they show signs of physiological response by blushing (8. 619–20), lovemaking (8. 622–29), and eating (5. 630–40).15 But Milton outside of Paradise Lost resists the view that God is represented metaphorically in Scripture. In so doing, Milton challenged orthodox claims by asserting even God could experience ‘grief’ and ‘fear’ in De Doctrina Christiana (1650s?–1660s?):

Here, therefore, I think, Theologians have no need for anthropopathy (a term the Grammarians once thought up to justify poets’ nonsense about their god Jupiter)....It is therefore better to contemplate God and mentally imagine him not anthropopathetically [ἀνθρωποπαθῶϛ], that is, as mortals do, who never stop inventing nicer definitions of God, but as scripture does, that is, in the way he offers himself for contemplation; and we should consider that he would have said of himself, or wanted written down, nothing that he did not want us to ponder about him...For emotions in a good man are good; in God they are holy [Affectus enim in viro bono boni sunt et virtutibus pares, in Deo sancti]...Let us not believe that it is not beneath God to be grieved at what grieves him, to be refreshed by what refreshes him, to fear what he fears...if God attributes to himself again and again human shape and form, why should we be afraid of assigning to him what he assigns to himself, provided we believe that what is imperfect and weak in us is, when ascribed to God, utterly perfect and utterly beautiful?16

14 Witness also the physical change in Eve in PL 10. 1009. See Aquinas, De Veritate 26.8, 3. See also Augustine, DCD, 9. 5. See also Barbara Lewalski’s discussion of Milton’s God experiencing ‘emotion’, The Life of John Milton, 420. See fn. 67 in this dissertation.

15 Raymond’s chapter on Milton’s angelic physiology deals with Milton’s counter-cultural development, Milton’s Angels, 277–310.

16 Milton, DDC, 8.1: 134–6; For the translation that includes ‘passions’ see, John Milton, A Treatise on Christian Doctrine, Compiled by the Holy Scriptures Alone, trans. Charles Sumner (London, 1825), 21, Hathi Trust Digital Library, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.hwf1z1>: ‘It is better therefore to contemplate the Deity, and to conceive of him, not with reference to human passions, that is, after the manner of men’. For work on anthropopathos, see Jeffery
Having noted earlier that Milton strangely avoids the term ‘affection’ in *Paradise Lost*, which historically could refer to a rightly directed will (Augustine), and distinguish between acts of the immaterial will as opposed to movements of the material sense appetite (Aquinas), this poses troubles in evaluating the activity and passivity of Milton’s passions. Does Milton consider passions to be voluntary or involuntary movements of the soul? Examining the images associated with the passions and his arrangement of the soul’s faculties seems to indicate a strong picture of passivity. Milton uses the image of a stormy sea twice to depict the post-Fall state (9. 1123 and 10. 718), which suggests the involuntary nature of ‘high passions’ that are liable to carry a person away as if by ‘high winds’. According to C.A. Patrides, Milton’s image of a tempestuous sea originates with Augustine. However, Augustine uses the image of the sea in *De Civitate Dei*, 9. 3 to relate demonic passions, which is not quite the same experience as human passions. Demons seem to be beyond repair after submitting their whole rational faculty to the passions, whilst humans can experience this intrusion temporarily and learn to tame them over time.

The other image promoting the idea of involuntary passions is the metaphor of ‘transport’ (8. 530–1; 9. 473–75; 10. 627). Christopher Ricks does well to note that In Milton’s hands, indeed in any poet’s, [transport] often might seem to mean no more than ‘with one’s emotions out of control’. But Milton re-establishes the power of the original metaphor, by setting the word in a context which stresses the physical roots of the emotional meaning, so that we see a transport as something that does literally and powerfully move you…the powerful physical meaning reinforces the emotional one…the sequence insists on our taking ‘transported’ as very much more than a synonym for ‘out of control’.

The use of ‘transport’, or the image of being moved outside oneself, is also common to other early modern writers such as Coëffeteau, Wright, and Reynolds. It recalls what Tilmouth describes as ‘psychomachia’, or the fiendish warring in the soul depicting a regenerate person’s

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19 Christopher Ricks, *Milton’s Grand Style* (Oxford: OUP, 1963), 59–60; see also Flannagan, *The Riverside Milton*, 577, ‘Being transported is a potentially dangerous experience, since it suggests not only being rendered ecstatic but being put in exile’.
life-long moral struggle to keep destructive impulses at bay.\textsuperscript{21} As Tilmouth notes, Milton’s \textit{Paradise Lost} stands in a century that experienced the gradual decline of the psychomachic metaphor that viewed the passions as negative and harmful. This image was replaced with the ‘rehabilitation’ of passions articulated by Aristotelian account that viewed them to be morally valuable.\textsuperscript{22}

Because Milton’s language for the passions conveys near helpless passivity, a further trouble is how such strong passions can be brought under reason’s consent and be made voluntary. Milton’s structure of the soul helps clarify this question. Book 5. 100–108 presents familiar Thomist moral psychology. The senses are registered via the Apprehension, which the imagination represents to reason, which reason receives and then approves or disproves (discursively) before presenting it to the will and committing to the action (5. 486–488).\textsuperscript{23}

However, reason is not immune from making wrong judgments, which happens when the reason is mislead by the appearance of a good sense object and ‘misinforms the will’ (9. 351–362). Milton makes obedience to reason true ‘freedom’ (‘for what obeys / Reason, is free’, 9. 351–2) while service to the ‘passions’ renders man incomplete and ruined:

For understanding ruled not, and the will  
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now  
To \textit{sensual appetite}, who from beneath  
Usurping over sov’reign reason claimed  
Superior sway…

\textit{(emphasis mine, 9. 1127–1131)}

And,

Their Maker’s image…then  
Forsook them, when themselves they vilified  
To serve \textit{ungoverned appetite}…

\textit{(emphasis mine, 11. 516–517)}

‘Understanding’s’ inability to rule issues from pursuing a mistaken good. The term ‘appetite’ or ‘sensual appetite’ in these passages here can naturally be substituted for ‘passion’, following Aquinas’ most basic definition of ‘passion’, which is nothing other than the movement of the sense appetite.\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Passiones}, which belongs to the sensitive appetite, is both passive and active; it

\textsuperscript{22} Tilmouth, \textit{Passion’s Triumph}, 209.
\textsuperscript{23} Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22, 2–3; \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.41, 1.
\textsuperscript{24} Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22, 3; 1a.2ae.59, 1; 3a.15, 4; Aquinas, \textit{De Veritate}, 26.8.
is passive because it is acted upon by an external object and thus moved by what it apprehends, but it is also active because it is inclined to move towards its object.\textsuperscript{25}

Milton’s vocabulary of the passions in \textit{Paradise Lost} reveals that he often seems to be more in line with Aquinas than with Augustine because he represents passions as both involuntary movements and as active agents. Measuring Milton’s proximity to either Thomist or Augustinian positions has been considered by Tilmouth, who catches the intuitive moments of Milton’s humans in arriving instantly at a decision to be Augustinian, and who suggests the descriptions of various levels of soul organization to be Thomist.\textsuperscript{26} These two different ways of explaining moral error – Aquinas’ emphasis on reason, and Augustine’s emphasis on the will – unfold in the poem at different moments.\textsuperscript{27} I argue here that Milton’s representation of the passions as involuntary movements of the sense appetite that are liable to usurp reason and the will, the recognition that passions actively pursue desirable sense objects, and the fact that Milton makes reason supreme – meaning the will can move only according to the consent of reason – evidences a strongly Thomist strand in the poem. Augustine, however, makes the will an independent faculty that is capable of moving against reason’s better advice.\textsuperscript{28}

B. MOTION

The term ‘motion’ is used to describe Eve (9. 229) and Satan’s thought processes (6. 192). It has some kinship with the Latin \textit{motus}, translated by Lewis and Short as ‘movement, operation, impulse, emotion, affection, passion, agitation, and disturbance’.\textsuperscript{29} However, ‘motion’ more often occurs with the fallen angels and with planetary movements. Stephen Fallon acknowledges that Hobbes viewed thoughts as ‘motions of the mind’ or ‘corporeal motions’ in \textit{De Homine} and \textit{Leviathan}.\textsuperscript{30} Because ‘motion’ refers to Eve so near the human Fall, Milton may be foreshadowing Hobbesian mechanism as Eve imitates Satan’s loss of freedom that comes powerfully under the sway of predetermined matter. Indeed, Fallon contends that Milton’s devils are characterized by a ‘mechanistic descent’ as they progressively move towards greater corporeality:

\begin{quote}
Hell is as close as one gets in Milton’s universe to dead, Hobbesian matter….As Descartes and Hobbes illustrate, when one removes spirit from matter, matter is
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{25} Aquinas, \textit{De Veritate}, 26.8. For the interesting language of passion moving towards reason, see Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.59, 1; see also 1a.2ae.23, 1; see \textit{PL} 9. 739–743, for an example of active/passive connotations of passions.
\textsuperscript{26} Tilmouth, \textit{Passion’s Triumph}, 190–197.
\textsuperscript{27} When Adam, Eve and Raphael reflect on thinking and reflecting, the Thomist picture of the soul is strongly present (\textit{PL} 5. 95–121; 8. 521–559; 8. 561–594); when Adam and Eve are in action or making a decision, the Augustinian picture is present. See also, Fletcher, ‘Uncertain Knowing, Blind Vision and Active Passivity’.
\textsuperscript{28} For a passage with Augustinian overtones, see \textit{PL} 9. 1127–1131.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Motus}, Charlton Lewis and Charles Short, \textit{A Latin Dictionary} 4 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), 3: 1168. Coëffeteau also use the term to describe passions, see \textit{A Table of Human Passions}, 39, 40 47.
\textsuperscript{30} Fallon, \textit{Milton Among the Philosophers}, 35–6.
delivered to mechanism and determinism… and the consequent atrophy of their wills.\textsuperscript{31}

This could indicate that Milton reserves the term ‘motion’ for subjects who are mechanical (earth and time), or for beings who have lost such vital elements in their nature that they come to resemble inhuman, inanimate nature (fallen angels and fallen human beings).\textsuperscript{32}

C. PERTURBATION

‘Perturbation’ appears only twice in \textit{Paradise Lost}, recalling Cicero’s chosen term for πάθος.\textsuperscript{33} Milton seems to use perturbation traditionally as a term representing a broad range of affective states. But he also renders it narrowly as a specific passion. In the first instance, Milton uses the term to denote a category:

Thus while he spake, each passion dimmed his face
Thrice changed with pale, ire, envy and despair,
Which marred his borrowed visage….
Whereof he soon aware,
Each perturbation smoothed with outward calm,
Artificer of fraud.

(4. 114–121)

The parallel ‘each passion’ and ‘each perturbation’ suggests the terms are synonyms, as the ‘each’ before ‘perturbation’ implies that it also represents ‘pale’, ‘ire’, ‘envy’, and ‘despair’. But rather than using perturbation exclusively as a general term that covers a range of individual kinds of passions, Milton also uses it in a specific sense, as if perturbation were itself a passion in long list of other passions. The second reference appears with Adam and Eve in their post-Fall state:

Love was not in their looks…but apparent guilt,
And shame, and perturbation, and despair,
Anger, and obstinacy, and hate and guile.

(10. 111–114)

The conjunction ‘and’, repeated six times, implies that perturbation is also considered to be a certain state rather than an overarching category.

\textsuperscript{31} Fallon, \textit{Milton Among the Philosophers}, 103, 212.
\textsuperscript{32} Yet witness \textit{Pl.} 11. 90–1, where motions are described as God’s ‘motions in [man]’. This also appears in \textit{Samson Agonistes} lines 223 and 1382. Perhaps its use here reveals the separation that takes place after the Fall. The absence of arbitrary human freedom has severed direct communication between God and his creatures, and perhaps this infers that God must now work in man indirectly through mechanistic laws of nature.
\textsuperscript{33} Augustine, \textit{DCD}, 9. 4.
D. FEEL

The verb ‘to feel’ is another intriguing term used a total of twenty-four times. When pertaining to Adam and Eve, it is used only in Books 8, 9, 10, and 11. Yet for Satan and the demons it is used throughout the epic (Books 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10). It is only twice used positively for the human race, and this happens after the Fall when Adam and Eve experience regret: ‘So spake our father penitent, nor Eve / Felt less remorse’ (10. 1097) and, in contemplating Death Adam remarks, ‘Horrid to think, how horrible to feel!’ (11. 465). The presence of the verb more often signals danger, as this experience occurs ‘within’ a person and acts as the harbinger of the person’s own downfall (see 6. 157; 8. 608; 9. 120, 680, 1009; 10. 243, 811). Adam uses the verb nine times and Eve only once, after eating the fruit and persuading Adam that there has been no harm. ‘I feel far otherwise’ (9. 983), she says, but she has never been so gravely mistaken. ‘Feel’ also corresponds to the degrees of fallenness that tracks Adam and Eve’s descent to the base plane of existence inhabited by Satan and his fallen followers. Satan states that his demon crew ‘feel vigour divine within them’ (6. 157); Satan’s rhetoric to Eve at the foot of the Tree repeats this phrase but personalises it with ‘I feel thy power within me’ (9. 680); likewise Sin, the daughter of Satan, also voices ‘I feel new strength within me rise’ (10. 243). It is also used to narrate new and increasingly powerful kinds of states that evil nurtures into habits (9. 120; and ‘instinct’ in 10. 263). Pausing after the cumulative act of Adam and Eve’s rebellion in 9. 1009, the Miltonic narrator echoes the demonic line from Book 6: ‘they feel Divinity within them’. In making the verb closely associated with fallenness and fallen activity, Milton seems to imply that ‘to feel’ is part of human freedom, but that it also invokes misleading experiences that take a person into excess. For instance

here passion first I felt
Commotion strange…here only weak
Against the charm of beauty’s powerful glance.

(8. 530–1)

In responding to Raphael’s rebuke, Adam seems more confident in his ability to govern and discern (notice the hopeful ‘yet still free’) what he feels in perceiving sense objects.

What inward thence I feel, not therefore foiled,
Who meet with various objects, from the sense
Variously representing; yet still free
Approve the best, and follow what I approve.37

34 See the way Adam uses this phrase to encourage Eve to ‘feel’ a certain way, so that she would remain with him in garden work (9. 315–16).
35 The longer phrase is ‘taking wings’. This could stand in direct contrast to Raphael’s remark about ‘winged ascent’ in PL 5. 498.
36 See Ricks, Milton’s Grand Style, 82–3, for Hume’s notes on Adam’s ‘feeling’.
37 Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph, 197, argues that prelapsarian Adam’s ‘Commotion’ indicates that he has more trouble governing himself than Blackburn and Danielson imagine.
However, one should be wary of assuming that all instances of the verb ‘to feel’ imply that the characters themselves have ‘feelings’ in the noun sense, though scholars write as such. In classical studies, Charles Taylor’s translation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* renders the appetitive soul’s ‘passions’ for ‘feelings’. He argues that

In general, the English ‘feelings’ is the word which answers best the Greek conception of episodic psychological *pathe*, capturing their spontaneous quality, and also registering the fact that typically they are objects of immediate awareness, ‘things that one feels’. 38

Yet it is unclear whether a *pathos* as a movement of the lower part of the soul is a ‘psychic’ episode or whether it can be classified as a ‘mental state’ or ‘mental object’. Classifying ‘feelings’ as something ‘mental’ seems to divorce them from the realm of bodily responses. But the history of the passions argues otherwise: passions are inherently corporeal. 39 By using the word ‘feelings’, does Taylor mean to suggest that Aristotle’s *pathe* are located or generated only in the mind and not in the body? Moreover, is the ‘soul’ even the same ‘substance’ as Taylor’s ‘mind’?

Scholars of *Paradise Lost* also write as if Milton celebrates passionate, ‘feeling’ characters. Schoenfeldt, for example, states that Milton’s ‘epic heroism [is] recast in terms of the ability to “feel”’. 40 Yet ‘feeling’, strangely appears in the poem only twice; in the first it is used in the third person of Sin and Death who with ‘wondrous sympathy feeling the success of Satan’ (Arg.10. 8) decide to build the bridge over chaos connecting hell to earth. In the second place, ‘feeling’ is used by Adam to describe the evil his offspring will inherit: ‘feeling the evil brought by me will curse / My Head’ (10. 733). Thus ‘feeling’ is never used substantively, as if there were ‘content’ loaded up inside it; it is never a noun, or a state of being. The verb itself rather indicates the person experiencing the feeling is characterised by action. The use of the verb, rather than the noun, seems to make ‘to feel’ a mechanism by which the experience of a state like ‘sympathy’ takes place. 41 It is not so much a ‘thing’ itself, rather than the thing by which, and in which, an experience of passion takes place. ‘Feeling’ could be similar to the Latin *sentire*, meaning ‘to perceive mentally, become aware’. 42 The *OED* records the verb ‘to

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40 See Schoenfeldt, ‘“Commotion Strange”’, 45, 67.
feel’ is defined as ‘to be subject of, experience (a sensation, emotion)’. Adam does indeed refer to states like ‘happiness’, ‘wrath’ and ‘grief’ in connection to what he ‘feels’ (8. 282; 10. 951; 11. 775). At the very least, then, these experiences of passion are related to what he ‘feels’, as ‘wrath’ (ira), ‘happiness’ (related to chara, or ‘joy’), and ‘grief’ are listed as passions in both Augustine and Aquinas.

Milton’s Paradise Lost thus presents a challenging selection of terms for intellectual historians and philosophers. His vocabulary for the passions remains sensitive to the vast resources on the subject he inherits from classical and medieval sources, while at the same time reflecting the century’s distaste for traditional terminology. In particular, his term ‘desire’ supports what James observes as a ‘transformation’ in the seventeenth century whereby ‘the role of the passions in motivating or initiating action was replaced by the much narrower idea that it is desires, along with beliefs, that we should appeal to in explaining actions’.

III ‘DESIRE’: ‘PASSIONS’ OR ‘INTENTION STATES’?

Milton’s favoured term to describe human passion and appetite is ‘desire’. While the term ‘passion’ is used more for Satan than for either of his human characters, ‘desire’ is used for Adam and Eve nearly three times as much as for Satan. In The Reason of Church Government Book 2, Milton identifies ‘desires’ with ‘affections’ which are responsible as ‘pathetick handmaids of the soul’ for bringing sense impressions to the Understanding or Reason, pictured as ‘Queen’. The same equivocation takes place in 12. 87–88: ‘Immediately inordinate desires / and upstart Passions catch the Government / From Reason’.

Incorporating desires among the basic set of passions traces back at least to Cicero who identified four basic passions as distress and pleasure (aegritudo and laetitia), and fear and desire (metus and libido). Aristotle also includes ‘desire’ (epithumia) in his list of passions in Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b21–23 and in Eudemian Ethics 2.2, 1220b12–14, though it

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43 Ibid.
44 For an investigation on the relationship between ‘touch’ and ‘feel’, and how ‘to feel’ can explain a wide range of experiences, see Moshenska, Feeling Pleasures, 1-9. For Augustine’s tristitia, Cicero’s aegritudo and Virgil’s dolor, see DCD 14. 7; For Aquinas’ dolor, ST 1a.2ae.23, 4.
46 For Adam and Eve, see PL 4. 446, 523, 808; 5. 45, 518, 555; 7. 61, 119; Arg. 8. 8, 62, 252, 415, 451, 505, 526; Arg. 9. 9, 498, 741, 839, 1013, 1136; 10. 749, 837, 947, 948, 995, 997; 12. 87; For Satan and ‘desire’, see PL 2.295, Arg.3, 3. 177, 662, 694; 4. 509; 9. 584; For the angels, see PL 5. 631; 6. 201; 8. 628; for the ‘beasts’, see PL 9. 592. Satan compares Eve’s ‘desire’ with the beasts’ during the temptation.
48 See also Milton, Paradise Regained, 2. 466–68.
49 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, trans. J.E. King (Harvard Mass, 1927), Book 4, 43–47; cited in James, Passion and Action, 5. Virgil also keeps these categories, according to Augustine, but calls ‘desire’ cupitatem, DCD, 14. 3.
disappears from his list in Rhetoric 2.1, 1378a120. Stephen Leighton argues that Aristotle’s
criteria for defining a *pathē* includes the ‘pleasure/pain test’ in *Nicomachean Ethics and
Eudemian Ethics*, whereas in Rhetoric he adds that *pathē* are also able to alter judgments.
Elsewhere, Aristotle had argued that *epithumia*, in some cases referring to bodily desires, have
‘no share of reason’ (*Eudemian Ethics* 2.8, 1224b1–2), or oppose reason altogether (*Eudemian
Ethics* 2.8, 1224a24–29).

Augustine uses a range of terms for the passion of desire: *libido, cupiditas, consupiscencia, and desiderium*. He uses the term ‘lust’ (*libido*) when it affects the sex organs, which he also signifies by *affectiones*; when denoting a craving appetite for pleasure which the
flesh feels as desire, he uses *cupiditas*. The general term for any kind of desire is *cupiditas* or
*concupiscencia* (often these are not associated with the sexual realm), which can be taken
negatively if they do not mention the object desired. Aquinas also included desire in his canon
of eleven: love and hatred (*amor* and *odium*), desire and aversion (*desiderium* and *fuga*),
sadness and joy (*dolor* and *delectatio*), hope and despair (*spes* and *desperation*), fear and daring
(*timor* and *audacia*), and *ira*. However, in his commentary of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*,
Aquinas implies a distinction between ‘desire’ and ‘concupiscence’ in so far as he thinks
Aristotle uses ‘desire’ as a general term, and ‘concupiscence’ when pertaining to ‘bodily
pleasures’.

The practice of identifying desire as a passion or affection continued into the
seventeenth century, but was gradually overturned by the early modern Humean account that
separated desires from passions and treated them as the overall intentional states or antecedents
to action, rather than as one kind of passion among many. The obvious consequences of this

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50 Taylor, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 7; Thomas Hobbes ed., *Aristotle’s Treatise on Rhetoric, Literally Translated from
that Aristotle defines anger as a ‘desire (*orexis*) accompanied by pain of a revenge’; Leighton argues that Aristotle’s
silence regarding *epithumia* (desire in the non–rational part of the soul) in *Rhetoric* is because Aristotle’s project
there differs from his project in *Nicomachean Ethics*. For an illuminating discussion on the criteria of a passion in
Unfortunately, Leighton uses ‘emotion’ interchangeably with ‘passion’ and ‘affection’. See also Leighton, ‘Passions and

51 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.5, 1105b24; *Eudemian Ethics* 2.2, 1220b12–14; *Rhetoric* 2.1, 1378a120–121. See
also Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, 39, for the New Testament’s adaption and alteration of Plato’s *epithumia*.

52 Some variations are mentioned also in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1 1111b5–15; 7.2, 1147a35–1147b1–3; 7.6.
1149a25–1149b1–3. The broader discussion in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1 is whether ‘choice’ is voluntary. Aristotle
goes on to say that ‘desire’ (*epithumia*) is opposed to choice.

Century* (NY: New City Press, 2013), li, fn. 113. It is important to note that Augustine considers passions and desires
to belong to the same category, whereas Aristotle makes some important distinctions between *pathos* and *epithumia*.

54 For a negative use of *affectiones*, see Augustine, *DCD*, 14. 19.

55 Augustine, *DCD*, 14. 8. *Cupiditas* and *concupiscencia* take on good or bad connotations depending on the will,
*DCD*, 14 .7. See the term ‘lust’ in Strier ‘Against the Rule of Reason’, 30. According to Strier, Luther did not
consider *concupiscencia* to be primarily sexual; its meaning was converted by schoolmen; Fiore, *Milton and
Augustine*; for Milton’s use of *concupiscence* in *DCD*, 8.1: 49–51, 28.


57 Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, 100. See also Giles Pearson’s insightful discussion on
the concept of *epithumia* in *Aristotle on Desire* (Cambridge: CUP, 2012).

58 James, ‘Explaining the Passions’, 17–19.
shift were, firstly, the diminished role of the will, which was seen to be a redundant psychological category. If desires were the basic motivational drives moving people to action, the will was not required to direct or guide, or even stand as the arbitrator between conflicting passions. The second consequence was the disappearance of the variety of passions, as the spectrum was reduced to a single passion, desire, which was itself sufficient to move a person to action.\textsuperscript{59}

The text of \textit{Paradise Lost} does not reflect either of these consequences, although the fact that ‘desire’ appears more than ‘passion’ or ‘perturbation’ or ‘commotion’ suggests the growing recognition for desire to take on an explanatory role in action. In the epic, ‘desire’ often appears with a complementary infinitive, and is used as a noun nine times for Milton’s human couple, and five times for Satan. Unlike the range of Latin terms that can identify different kinds of desire, English is not so varied. ‘Desire’ in \textit{Paradise Lost} is thus often qualified by an adjective to preserve the Latin connotations: ‘exorbitant desires’, ‘vehement desire’, ‘carnal desire’, ‘strange desire’, ‘unspeakable desire’, ‘fierce desire’, ‘sharp desire’, ‘inordinate desire’.\textsuperscript{60} Milton seems to uphold the Augustinian reading of desire which takes ‘desire’ to be bad when generic or unattached to a specific object. For instance, Eve’s pool scene describes Eve pining with ‘vain desires’, which can mean either ‘empty’ (and therefore harmless) or ‘wandering’. The reader is meant to catch the word play in postlapsarian Eden, when Eve’s desires are again described as ‘errring’: ‘that strange / Desire of wand’ring’ (9. 1135–6).\textsuperscript{61}

Milton’s term ‘desire’ tends to represent three general kinds of appetite or longings: physical appetite (hunger and thirst), sexual appetite (lust), and intellectual appetite (knowledge).\textsuperscript{62} ‘Desire’ is linked to physical appetite in 9. 585 in Satan’s temptation of Eve, ‘Grateful to appetite….To satisfy sharp desire’; which Eve later rehearses with ‘eager appetite…with desire, / Inclinable now grown to touch or taste’ (9. 739–743). Adam and Eve’s Fall is thrice described as service to ungoverned appetite (9. 1127–1131; 11.470–476, 516–517) and their moral rehabilitation is captured in terms of training in ‘temperance…/ In what thou eat’st and drink’st’ (11. 531–32).\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{59} James, ‘Explaining the Passions’, 22–30, for her sections on Descartes, Locke, and Hobbes.

\textsuperscript{60} For instances of desire as a complementary infinitive with Satan (2. 295; 3. 662; 4. 543), with Adam and Eve (5. 555; 7. 61; 8. 252, 417; 10. 995–7) and with the angels (3. 694). For qualified desire, see \textit{PL} 3. 177, 662; 4. 509, 808; 6. 201; 8. 526; 9. 584, 1013, 1136.

\textsuperscript{61} Ricks, Milton’s \textit{Grand Style}, 110, suggests the word is a ‘reminder’ of the Fall, and before it when ‘there were no infected words because there were no infected actions’.

\textsuperscript{62} I am not certain whether all of these can be called ‘appetite’, since sexual appetite differs from physical appetite such as hunger since an individual (though not the human race corporately) can live without sex but not without food.

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{OED} 4: 114 also notes this usage of desire: ‘Desire’, (1495) Trevisa \textit{Barth. De P.R.} (1535) ‘the appetite of the stomak is callyd desire’; see Schoenfeldt, \textit{Bodies and Selves} for a discussion of Milton’s view of moral training linked to digestion.
‘Desire’ is also used in the sense of ‘lust’: ‘Carnal desire inflaming...in lust they burn’ (9.1013). This is hinted at earlier in Eve’s dream scene, when the gentle voice suggests to her that ‘heav’n wakes with all his eyes / Whom to behold but thee, Nature’s desire’ (5.44–45). This poses the question, ‘whose “desire”? ‘Whose “Nature” – Adam’s or Satan’s”? Such ambiguity occurs again in the narrator’s description of Eve (8.62–63): ‘from about her shot darts of desire / Into all eyes to wish her still in sight’. Ricks infers that the pause between the lines creates ‘potential danger...in potential syntax’. In the same book, Adam confesses that Eve’s beauty is more enjoyable than all things else...but such

As used or not, works in the mind no change
Nor vehement desire, these delicacies
I mean of taste, sight, smell, herbs, fruits and flow’rs.

(8.523–526)

The implication is that Eve’s beauty does indeed awake ‘vehement desire’, which is later identified as ‘touch’ (8.530, 579) and ‘carnal pleasure’ (8.593). Indeed the argument in Book 9 describes ‘vehement love’ as motivating Adam’s disobedience to perish with Eve. Yet perhaps Milton has the angel Raphael describe sanctified sexual desire in 8.628 as ‘union of pure with pure / Desiring’, so as to preserve an erotic connotation of ‘desire’ free from the intrusion of ‘lustful appetence’ in a material Heaven.

Desire as ‘intellectual appetite’ or the craving for knowledge often appears as a complementary infinitive with verbs of perception. Adam has ‘more desire to hear’ Raphael on his creation (5.555); Adam is described as ‘sinless, with desire to know’ (8.61), whose ‘Desire...to converse / Induced’ (5.252); Eve contemplates suicide as an alternative to an empty marriage bed which would lead to the ‘desire to languish without hope / Before the present object languishing / With like desire, which would be misery’ (10.995–997). Satan’s plans for the prelapsarian couple also involve moving the desire for knowledge beyond proper creaturely bounds: ‘I will excite their minds / With more desire to know’, but this strategy of course comes from his own excess: ‘Unspeakable desire to see, and know / All these wondrous works, but chiefly man’ (emphasis mine, 3.662–63). Indeed, Hell itself is described as a place of ‘fierce desire’ (4.509). Adam also describes Paradise as a place that activates ‘desire’: ‘Full to the utmost measure of what bliss / Human desires can seek or apprehend’? (5.515). Note, however, the dangerous liability inflected by the concept ‘full’. To be full to ‘utmost measure’

64 Note also the ambiguity in PL 8.505.
65 Ricks, Milton’s Grand Style, 82–3.
66 Turner argues that ‘vehemence’ in prose was praised throughout the 1640s. In PL, however, it seems that Milton uses ‘vehemence’ to portray an excess of desire. Turner, One Flesh, 276, fn. 54.
67 See Raymond, Milton’s Angels, 281–283, for his illuminating discussion on the heterodoxy of Milton’s angelic sex, enjoyed by the angels and denied to the fallen angels. See also PL 5.630–1 for Milton’s preservation of good connotations of physical appetite.
allows for the possibility of excess, to be overfilled—to spill. Human fullness is contrasted later with Heavenly fullness during Raphael’s discourse on ‘Desirous’ eating angels (5. 631); this is followed by an intriguing phrase, ‘secure / Of surfeit where full measure only bounds / Excess, before th’all bounteous King’ (5. 638–40). In Heaven, paradoxically, ‘full measure’ is itself the boundary line to ‘excess’. Perhaps the idea is that ‘full measure’ is the only boundary known to heavenly beings, as anything less would fall short of maximizing perfect enjoyment. Their safeguard, however, does not seem to be the result of any personal restraint, but by being in the presence of the ‘bounteous King’. Reflecting after the Fall, Adam further compares Eve’s wish to bear the punishment alone with her previous desire to work alone: ‘Unwary, and too desirous, as before’ (10. 947). Physical, sexual, and intellectual desires, then, are seen as intrinsically dangerous cravings that push against divinely proscribed bounds of prelapsarian Eden.

Paradise Lost thus contains a recognizable vocabulary of the passions in keeping with Augustinian and Thomist traditions. The noticeable lack of the term ‘affection’ in Milton’s entire work perhaps signals the constraints of narrative rather than Milton’s dismissal of the term. When Milton implies ‘right passions’ and ‘acts of will’, he prefers to use individual, specific passions such as ‘joy’, ‘hope’, and ‘love’ instead of the traditional term ‘affection’ or even the term ‘passion’. Therefore, in identifying historical rectas affectus by specific noble traits (love, joy, hope) Milton’s narrative is invested with a colourful array of historical varieties of human passions. Although historical precedent allowed passion to also encompass positive states, Milton’s use of the term ‘passion’ is distinctly and narrowly negative, as it appears in the unexpected places where passions are associated with the twisted and perverse.

Moreover, Milton’s use of the term ‘desire’ exceeds his use of ‘passion’ in both pre-Fall and post-Fall life. Is Milton using ‘desire’ to indicate a ‘passion’, or is he making ‘desire’ a separate category from ‘passion’? I suggest that Milton keeps ‘desire’ as a species of passions in so far as he identifies ‘desires’ with ‘passions’ (4. 509): ‘to Hell am thrust / Where neither joy nor love, but fierce desire’, and again (4. 808): ‘distempered, discontented thoughts, vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires’. Furthermore, he identifies ‘desires’ with ‘affections’ in The Reason of Church Government. And yet, oddly, Milton largely seems to treat ‘desire’ as something distinct from ‘passions’, as if they were impulses that precede and lead to full-blown passions, or those recognizable states such as hate, envy, despair, fear. It is as if ‘desire’ is the epic’s central passion. In both keeping desire as a passion, and detaching it from the list of passions as its main poetic function testifies, I would suggest that Paradise Lost reflects the seventeenth century’s growing preoccupation with the notion that ‘desire’ could sufficiently stand behind, and motivate, all human action.

68 See also PL Arg. 9. 8
5 ‘Wither’d’ Reason: The Poetic Unmaking of Reason in Paradise Lost

‘For then their minds did first in Passion see…. 
But then grew Reason darke….’

Although Milton scholarship is diffuse with early modern studies on the ‘emotions’ or ‘passions’, relatively few investigate Milton’s understanding of ‘reason’ in Paradise Lost (1674). One such study is Richard Arnold’s Logic of the Fall, which examines Milton’s historical support for ‘right reason’ over Aristotelian ‘pure reason’ in works such as Prolusions (1625–1632), Ars Logicae (1672), and Paradise Lost. He explores the poetic dimensions of ‘right reason’ by identifying Miltonic synonyms in the poem such as ‘prime wisdom’, ‘better knowledge’, and ‘umpire conscience’. Such terms, he argues, capture Milton’s vision that combined reason and morality – reason that is necessarily predisposed and inclined toward action; these are set in contrast to the Satanic terms ‘vain notions’ and ‘wand’ring Mazes Lost’, which betray Satan succumbing to a flawed kind of Aristotelian reasoning that is abstract and ‘pure[ly] syllogistical’. The Fall, he concludes,

is caused not by the usurping of passion over reason, or will over mind…but rather by a psychomachia of two concepts/traditions of logical and rhetorical activities or reasoning:….pure reason over right reason, [and] necessarily [im]pure reason over right reason.

Arnold is right to argue for the value of ‘reason’ in Milton, though his rejection of passion’s triumph over reason for a battle between two kinds of reason is perhaps superficial. As much scholarship has endeavoured to show, the seventeenth century maintained that reason and the passions inhabit the same landscape, and, though natural enemies, they could become allies. This chapter seeks to contribute an exploration of ‘reason’ in Paradise Lost, and thereby restore

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1 See Milton, Eikonoklastes, 3: 347: ‘and to seem now convinc’d with these wither’d arguments and reasons heer…’
3 See Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, Reading the Early Modern Passions; Paul Cefalu, Moral Identity in Early Modern English Literature (Cambridge: CUP, 2004); Cummings and Sierhuis, Passions and Subjectivity; Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph; Olmsted, The Imperfect Friend. For notable exceptions in intellectual historians and philosophers, see Frederick Beiser’s definition of ‘reason’ in the seventeenth century, The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), x; Charles Taylor’s exploration of different models of reason between Plato and Descartes and its influence on theories of self-control, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989), 116–151; For Peter Fiore’s study on Augustine’s version of reason, see Milton and Augustine, 52–57.
5 Arnold, Logic of the Fall, ix.
6 Arnold, Logic of the Fall, 38–39.
7 Arnold, Logic of the Fall, xii.
8 Wright discusses the senses and reason’s competition for friendship with the passions, Passions of the Minde, 9–11.
the balance to Milton studies on the early modern passions which has strangely neglected its ‘Sovereign ruler’. It also attempts to correct assumptions such as Arnold’s that, by emphasising the importance of reason, eliminates the role of passions entirely. In Part I, I examine the poetic function of ‘reason’ in Satan as well as in Milton’s human couple. In Part II, I identify chief metaphors for imagining the relationship between reason and the passions, metaphors which I suggest can be observed in classical and medieval sources. Milton’s exploitation of the medieval imagination reveals his caution towards accepting Stoic rationalism and the tenuous fragility of Augustinian governance.

I ‘MY PLEADED REASON’: THE LIFE OF ‘REASON’ IN THE LIFE OF EDEN

Milton’s terms for the faculties of the soul highlight the rational part more than the so-called non-rational. For instance, the ‘mind’ occurs forty-one times; ‘will’ occurs in fifty-four places, and ‘reason,’ fifty times in Paradise Lost. Terms for the rational dimensions of the soul exceed the terms for the lower sensitive faculties and its contents such as ‘appetite’ (thirteen times), ‘passion’ (thirteen times), and ‘perturbation’ (twice). The fact that the word ‘reason’ is used more often with Adam and Eve (thirty-one times), and less with Satan and his demon army (fifteen times), suggests parallels with Augustine’s De Civitate Dei 9.3, which argues that demonic reason has been entirely compromised as a result of the passions’ invasion. Such an idea is consistent in Paradise Lost, as Milton uses ‘reason’ ambiguously and almost mockingly by way of a different meaning in sections depicting demonic activity and speech. Belial’s speech in the fallen angel’s parliament, for example, evidences the dual meaning of ‘reason’: ‘his tongue / proposed manna, and could make the worse appear the better reason / to perplex and dash maturest counsels’ (emphasis mine, 2. 114). A few lines later, reason is again used in a similar fashion: ‘if what was urged / Main reason to persuade…’ (emphasis mine, 2. 121), and in Book 4, Satan challenges Gabriel’s evaluation with a play on words ‘to thee no reason; who knows’t only good / But evil hast not tried’ (emphasis mine, 4. 895). It is as if the soundness of Gabriel’s reason is put on trial for retaining ‘only good’ knowledge. In these passages, ‘reason’ can be taken in either the causal sense (‘reasons for’ an action), or as a substantival-noun (the higher faculty of the soul, ‘Reason’). Although context helps the reader know which is appropriate, the sound of these phrases purposefully leaves open both options in mind.

\[9\] For ‘reason’ with Adam and Eve, see PL 4. 755; 5. 102, 106, 487; 7. 508; 8. 25, 85, 374, 391, 443, 510, 554, 591, 635–7; Arg.9 22–3; 9. 113, 239, 243, 352, 379, 559, 654, 738, 765, 872, 1130; 12. 82–92, 98; for ‘reason’ used with Satan, see PL 1. 248; 2.114, 121, 431, 558; 4.389; for ‘reasonless:’ 516, 895; 5. 794; 6. 41–2, 120, 125–6; Book 9 Arg. 15; 9. 113, 600. For reason and the demons, see Augustine, DCD, 9. 3–4.
If the ambiguous function of ‘reason’ serves to expose the demonic lack of reason, other instances of the term clearly denote causation rather than an internal faculty. The irony is illuminating: though reason should be free to influence the other faculties with a kind of arbitrary freedom, demonic ‘reason’ is circumscribed by the language of compulsion, and produces a surprising cause-effect pattern. Satan’s speech in Book 2 illustrates this effectively: ‘With reason hath deep silence and demur seized us’ (2. 431–2).10 Though it is silence and demur that is said to have ‘seized’, it is not difficult to miss the alternative reading which infers ‘reason’ as part of the siege act, these things having been ‘seized’ ‘with’ – or along side, or by – ‘reason’. Such a violent picture of reason stands at odds against Aristotle and Aquinas’ image of reason’s persuasion of the non-rational part of the soul.11 Again in Book 4, Milton characterizes Satan with similar language:

And should I at your harmless innocence
Melt, as I do, yet public reason just,
Honour and empire with revenge enlarged,
By conquering this new world, compels me now
To do what else though damned I should abhor.

(emphasis mine, 4. 388–392)

The ‘yet’ introduces a response to Satan’s self-imposed, unfinished ‘ought’ question over whether he should relinquish seduction at the sight of Eve’s innocuous purity or engage her in dialogue; it also introduces the clauses linked with the verb ‘compel’. It is unclear what this ‘public reason’ that Satan appeals to as ‘just’, and whether public means ‘open’ or ‘popular’.12 If it is intended to have either of these connotations, then Satan seems to ground his motives in a kind of universal reason accessible to all. Further, the word ‘just’ hangs at the end of this phrase, and connects with ‘compels’ after two further clauses linked by ‘with’ and ‘by’.

Suspense over what this supposed ‘just’ and common reason produces is shattered by the use of ‘compel’. For reason to ‘compel’ suggests a tyranny of the rational faculty over the lower faculties. Perhaps, with the absence of reason in the fallen angels, reason is revealed to be an empty throne. Reason, as the ruler of the soul, was meant to command the non-rational parts (which are capable of rationality) to participate in reason through persuasion, reproach, and entreaty. Yet Milton’s demonic reason does not seem to act as a gracious sovereign, and thus

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10 Italics added.
11 Aristotle, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, 1.1102b13–1103a3; see also the passion of thumos in 7.6 1149a25–32, p. 197; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 79. But see Milton’s surprising, violent picture of reason in Eikonoklastes, 3: 459: ‘Som things he taxes them to have offer’d him, which, while he had the maistery of his Reason, he would never consent to’. Very likely; but had his reason maisterd him, as it ought, and not bin maisterd long agoe by his sense and humour…’.
12 For differences between public and private reason see Milton, Eikonoklastes, 3: 359–360: ‘and by the same Law to govern us: but Law in a Free Nation hath bin ever public reason, the enacted reason of a Parliament; which he denying to enact, denies to govern us by that which ought to be our Law; interposing his own privat reason, which to us is no Law…’
Satan’s lower appetites imitate the voice of reason but do so inaccurately, with harsher tones than Aristotle and Aquinas’ metaphor of reason’s persuasion like a ‘father’s guidance’ or like ‘friends offering advice’. As Aristotle had acknowledged, ‘persuasion is opposed to compulsion and force. It is towards what he has already been persuaded to do that the continent man proceeds, voluntarily, not under compulsion’. In his discussion of compulsion and the nature of the voluntary and involuntary, Aristotle writes that involuntary human actions resemble the actions of inanimate objects and animals:

…we say that under compulsion, and when forced, a stone travels upwards and fire downwards. When, however, they travel according to their nature and their essential impulse, they are not said to travel under compulsion though not voluntarily either….Similarly…we see [animals] doing and undergoing many things under compulsion, when something external moves them against their internal impulse.

In the same way, the continent and incontinent person act voluntarily when they act according to their own internal impulse [ὅρμη], but act involuntarily when an external force clashes with their rational boulesis and desire [Βούθλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν]. Milton’s Satan could thus be exemplifying the Aristotlian paradox of compulsion: both the incontinent and continent person could be said, in a sense, to act under compulsion because reason and desire [τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν] are distinct parts of the soul and oppose each other; but, since these motives are not external but internal, the uncontrolled person truly acts under compulsion only in part of the soul; overall the soul acts voluntarily. More likely, however, the Satanic language of compulsion associated with reason is meant to show the radical metamorphosis of a being caught in the downward trajectory into lifeless, unfree matter, where Satan does in fact become the ‘inanimate object’ that no longer possesses the capacity for reason. The obvious absence of the term ‘will’ with regard to Satan depicts even further degradation. Satanic agency has been reduced to a mechanistic object.

Other language also portrays the futility of demonic reason. In Book 9 Satan speaks of reason’s subjection to the whims of the lower faculty in his rhetorical address to Eve:

Sated at length, ere long I might perceive

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15 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, 2.8, 1224a15–23.
16 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, 2.8, 1224b4–14. He gives the example of a man A seizing the hand of man B and slapping man C.
18 See Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.10, 3; 1a.2ae.50, 3; 17.7 ad 2; Aquinas discusses that the lack of will in animals means that no ‘higher appetite’ is present to intervene in an action; they act directly from the sensitive appetite.
19 See Fallon’s discussion of Satan’s ‘mechanistic descent’, Milton Among the Philosophers, 194–222.
Strange alteration in me, to degree
Of reason in my inward powers, and speech
Wanted not long.

(9. 598–600)

The pun is subtle but sharp. Timothy Hampton, *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, evidences that the term ‘alteration’ was used in Milton and in Rousseau to denote the corruption and Fall of man. But

…at the most basic level…an alteration is simply a change, temporary or permanent, in the nature or character of something. Yet the word is also a technical term in Galenic medicine, and a key element both in Renaissance discourses on the body and in the literary representation of passion….It is important to stress that the process of alteration in Galen seems to be essentially neutral, neither a good thing nor a bad thing. However, in later writers, because it signals a troubling of equilibrium that is ideal in the body and soul it is understood to involve a negative movement, a process of corruption. The Latin term *alteratus*…comes to imply being out of oneself, between two states (as distinguished from the more excessive term *alienatus*, which means to be out of oneself altogether).20

The concept of ‘alteration’ can be traced to Aristotle and Aquinas’ discussion of change and motion.21 Aquinas writes that ‘passion is a kind of movement [*passio quidam motus est*]’.22 Aristotle also described passion and action in terms of motion [*ἡ κίνησισ*] in *Physics* 3.3, 202a21–25, and observes three different types of motions in *Physics* 3.1, 201a10–15, 5.1, 225b8, and 5.2, 225a34–5: motion in the sense of quality (alteration/mutation), motion in the sense of quantity (decrease or increase), and motion in the sense of place (locomotion).23

Aquinas uses the first kind of Aristotelian motion, alteration, in his account of the passions in *Summa Theologiae* 1a.2ae.22, 1. In this section, he observes that the verb *passio* describes the general receiving or acquiring of a quality, or the acquiring of a quality by losing another quality. This happens in two ways: by losing an inappropriate quality, like undergoing healing by loosing illness, or by acquiring an inappropriate quality, like a sick man loosing health and receiving illness.24 Thus, Aquinas’ motions of the sensitive appetite are ‘alterations’ in the Aristotelian sense of ‘change in quality’. Aquinas can therefore write that ‘taken strictly

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20 Timothy Hampton, ‘Strange Alteration: Physiology and Psychology from Galen to Rabelais’, *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, 292, 275, 278.
21 Whether and how *transmutatio* or *alteratus* are different concepts is beyond the scope of this dissertation but deserves exploration. Indeed, Aquinas seems to prefer the verb *transmutatio* which the English editors translate both as ‘modification’ or ‘alteration’. In this dissertation however I will not trace the linguistic use of the *alteratus*, as did Hampton, but rather the images of ‘change’, ‘motion’ and ‘alteration’. I owe this paragraph to Miner’s insights on Aristotle and Aquinas’s discussion of motions, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 39–46.
22 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.23, 2. See also ‘appetite’ as *motus*, ST 1a.5, 4.
23 Aristotle, *The Physics*, Or Physical Auscultation of Aristotle: with copious notes in which is given the substance of the in valuable Commentaries of Simplicius, 33 Vols., trans. Thomas Taylor (Somerst: The Prometheus Trust, 2000) 19: 23 For Aquinas, see ST 1a.2ae.22, 3: *passio proprie inventur ubi est transmutatio corporalis*.
24 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.22, 1.
passion is a certain motion in the line of alteration [Sed contra, passio motus quidam est secundum alterationem, ut dictum est, proprie accipendo passionem]. Satan however reverses the paradigm of the soul by claiming that reason has experienced such ‘alteration’. Thomistic passions ‘proper’ belonged only to the sensitive appetite (irascible and concupiscible); Satan’s characterization of altered reason, however, adopts the language that had been traditionally reserved only for movements of the lower appetites. Aquinas acknowledges the possibility of this state:

Now a man is completely transformed by emotions [affectus transmutatur] when they do not stay in the lower appetite but carry along the higher appetite as well [quando non sistunt in appetitu inferiori sunt]. When, however, they remain in the lower appetite alone, then the man is changed by them only as it were in part [quando vero in solo appetitu inferiori sunt, tunc homo immutatur eis quasi secundum partem]. In this case they are called ‘propassions’ while in the first case ‘passions’ [unde sic dicuntur propassiones, primo autem modo passiones].

There has indeed been a transformation of Satan’s reason, such that passions and reason are indiscriminate and indistinct from each other as linguistic categories overlap and blend to produce a creature unrecognizable and far removed from his celestial origins.

Adam and Eve’s reason seems to be the central facet of prelapsarian human existence. In contrast to the ambiguity of Satanic reason, it is clear that when Milton refers to human reason he means to discuss only the higher faculty of the soul; the context surrounding the uses of human reason prior to Eve’s Fall (9. 1130) also avoids language that would imply reason’s perversion. In these instances ‘reason’ often appears as its own subject without reference to lower and dangerous impulses. It is as if the passions are out of sight and out of mind for unfallen persons, and thus reason can sit comfortably without needing knowledge about its lower neighbours. Warnings about reason’s weakness which first come from Raphael (8. 635–7) and then from Adam (9. 352) thus appear as sudden excursions that wade deep into the more complicated interior of the human conscience. Yet it is only Raphael who describes what reason is in fact sovereign over, and who names the objects of the sensitive appetite for what they are –

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25 Aquinas, De Veritate, 26.2. See also De Veritate 26.8, 3: ‘passion (passio) implies an alteration (transmutationem) of the patient from its natural state to a contrary one [passio importat quamdam tranmutationem patientis a sua naturali disposition in contrariam dispositionem]’. For evidence that such language was familiar to early modern writers as well, see Coëffeteau, A Table of Humane Passions, 12, 18; Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 40–41, notes that when Aquinas speaks of passions as ‘motions’ this is not merely metaphorical. However, this does not reduce passions to literal local motions or physical movements either. Miner concedes that in some places he describes passion with ‘likeness of motion’ in ST 1a.3ae.1 ad 5.
26 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.22, 3.
27 Aquinas, De Veritate, 26.8, 3. For another use of the term propassio, see ST 3a.46, 7. Aquinas says this is Jerome’s term and explains that Christ’s passions as propassions were real but never disabled reason. Aquinas rejects this to say that Christ’s whole soul suffered in its lower powers, but his reason knew no suffering.
28 Interestingly, although this point cannot be developed here, Milton mixes the vocabulary of virtue and vice to describe the fallen angels, i.e. PL 4. 310, ‘peaceful sloth’.
29 See fn. 24.
‘passions’ – both in 8. 591 and again in 8. 635–7. Though Adam seems aware that reason is chief among many faculties even in 5. 100–103, he neglects to discuss what the senses actually arouse: passions. Indeed, W.M. Bundy asserts that Adam voices contemporary psychology to describe ‘sin’ as a process whereby

a false good allures the senses, the fancy retains the object as capable of inflaming the passions, the concupiscible appetite inclines to this illusion of an apparent good, and the will consents to the dictates of the sensual nature.\(^{30}\)

By mentioning ‘passions’, however, Bundy presupposes that Adam possesses mature awareness of his lower appetites. But in the poem ‘passion’ is absent from Adam’s lengthy explanation. Instead Adam attributes Eve’s troubled dream to fancy’s misinterpretations of the senses’ take on the external world:

Oft in her [reason’s] absence Fancy wakes
To imitate her; but misjoining shapes,
Wild work produces oft, and most in dreams,
Ill matching words and deeds long past or late.
Some such resemblances methinks I find
Of our last ev’ning’s talk, in this thy dream,
But with addition strange…

(5. 110–113)

Thus, although Adam perfectly recounts seventeenth-century faculty psychology on the interaction between reason and the senses, and the mediating role of the fancy or phantasy, he neglects to mention the ‘passions’.\(^{31}\) Yet Aquinas’ account of indirect demonic influence considers the ‘passions’ to be an essential part of temptation:

…the human will may be changed externally by the emotions [passiones] affecting the faculty of sensuous desire [appetitum sensitivum]…the devil is the kindler of thoughts in that he incites us to think, either by persuading us to desire the things we think of, or by arousing our emotions [passionem].\(^{32}\)

That Milton would be familiar with Aquinas’ discussion is likely, since Milton presents Satan contemplating both tactics available to the fallen angels in 4. 801–9: external influence by

\(^{30}\) M.W. Bundy, ‘Eve’s Dream and the Temptation in Paradise Lost’, *Research Studies, State College of Washington*, 10 (December 1942): 274, 277, 286. Bundy does not seem to think ‘passion’ was a key word in seventeenth-century dream psychology, since he does not include it in his list of the main vocabulary.

\(^{31}\) Bundy, ‘Eve’s Dream’, 286–89, finds Adam summary of seventeenth-century dreams to be accurate, but thinks Adam’s failure amounts mistaking the dream’s Satanic origins due to his ‘intellectual cocksureness’ and ‘uxoriousness’ manifesting later in Book 8, concluding that ‘Milton believed, not in complete innocence, but in potentially sinful thoughts before the consummation of the sin’, 290. My point is to show that Adam’s failure, or perhaps his weakness leading to failure, is not having sufficient awareness of his own ‘lower nature’.

\(^{32}\) Aquinas, *ST* 1.111. 2 ad 1–2.
presenting sense objects, or internal influence by moving the bodily humours.\textsuperscript{33} Manfred Weidhorn suggests that by attributing the evil to the fancy’s illusory imitation of evil, Adam ‘explains [the dream] away’ and rules out the ‘possibility of evil within Eve…[and] of evil without’.\textsuperscript{34} If dismissing the possibility of ‘evil without’ refers to the external influence of supernatural creatures, ‘evil within Eve’ would conjure a confession of wayward inward motions, or reason’s turbulent neighbours, the passions, which are liable to throw off reason’s mantle.\textsuperscript{35} Perhaps Adam’s silence is intended to expose the extent of his ignorance.

Further, Adam’s solace to Eve sounds almost Stoic: the dream’s evil is only the appearance of evil, not reality as it is.\textsuperscript{36} In Stoicism, evaluating whether or not a real good or real evil faced a person gave ‘reason’ the upper hand by allowing it to evaluate the first movement before it became a full-fledged passion. The Stoics had distinguished between beliefs, or value judgments, and mere appearances. In their view passions, as mistaken value judgments consented to by reason, were thus in some sense voluntary beliefs; but \textit{primus motus}, or ‘first movements’ of the mind accompanied by bodily effects such as blanching or crying, were not technically passions in their view since these could be experienced without reason’s consent.\textsuperscript{37} Thus, although the dream-scene reflects contemporary beliefs about the possibility of supernatural influence on the imagination and humoural balance, Adam’s curious neglect of ‘passion’ in a discussion of ‘many lesser Faculties’ might suggest Milton’s early Adam betrays a Stoic posture towards Eve’s ‘quickened appetite’ by equating the ‘wild worke’ of Eve’s dream with Stoic first movements; Stoicism first movements could easily but wrongly be taken as passions, but if reason ‘unapprov’d’ those desires, they were not considered intrinsically

\textsuperscript{33} William Hunter, \textit{The Descent of Urania: Studies in Milton, 1946–1988} (London: Associated University Presses, 1989), 51; Hunter records that the theory remained acceptable up to the seventeenth century. Bundy, ‘Eve’s Dream’, 278, also acknowledges these options: attacking the Fancy directly to produce illusions (externally), or stirring the humours of the body (internally). See also Aquinas, \textit{ST} I.111. 4. ad 1.
\textsuperscript{34} Manfred Weidhorn, \textit{Dreams in Seventeenth–Century English Literature} (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), 148. He further observes that Stoics such as Zeno thought that dreams could indicate a person’s growing virtue, and whether or not reason was indeed over passion, 20.
\textsuperscript{35} In PL 4. 677, Adam had told Eve that ‘millions of spiritual Creatures walk the Earth / unseen’.
\textsuperscript{36} Though he hints at something more with ‘addition strange’ in line 116. Noted also by Hunter, \textit{The Descent of Urania}, 50.
\textsuperscript{37} Aquinas, \textit{De Veritate}, 26. 8 ad 2, 3: recounts Augustine’s solution (\textit{DCD}, 9. 4) to the dispute between the Stoics and Peripatetics which seemed ‘to be more one of words than of facts.’ Stoics said passions were not found in the soul of a wise man; Peripatetics said these passions occur even in the soul of a wise man, but were under reason. But ‘Augustine proves from the admission of a certain Stoic that even the Stoics held that such emotions were in the soul of a wise man, but sudden and without being approved or consented to; and they did not call them passions but appearances or phantasies of the soul. From this it is clear that the Stoics really did not hold anything different from the Peripatetics, but there was disagreement only in words, because what the Peripatetics named passions the Stoics called by another name.’ It would be a longer discussion to determine whether Eve’s ‘appetite’ or ‘craving’ were considered first movements; see Richard Sorabji \textit{Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation} (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 40, 45. Sorabji acknowledges that this remained a controversial point even among the Greeks. See also Sorabji, \textit{Emotion and Peace of Mind}, 55, 375, for his criticism of Augustine’s mistaken reference to ‘first movement’ in \textit{DCD} 9. 5–6. I do not here reveal the fine points of disagreement among the ancient classical schools. For instance, Zeno did not make passions the mistake of reason, but the act of disobedience to one’s reason. See also Knuuttila, \textit{Emotions}, 57–59.
blameworthy or harmful. Adam could thus indeed say that Eve is left with ‘no spot or blame behind’ (5. 118) and that in ‘waking [she] wilt never consent to do’ what her reason permitted whilst sleeping.

Further, in the separation scene of Book 9, Adam’s warning to Eve should echo the revelation he received from his heavenly messenger. Curiously, again, Adam avoids the term ‘passion’:

Secure from outward force; within himself
The danger lies, yet lies within his power:
Against his will he can receive no harm.
But God left free the will, for what obeys
Reason, is free, and reason he made right,
But bid her well beware, and still erect,
Lest by some fair appearing good surprised
She dictate false, and misinform the will
To do what God expressly hath forbid.

(9. 348–356)

In lieu of what Raphael had identified three times as ‘passion’ (8. 585, 589, 635) which he set in contrast to ‘reason’ (8. 591, 636), Adam calls it, again in stoic-like fashion, ‘some fair appearing good’. This is, of course, also a Thomist concept: reason could mistake an object and misrepresent it to the will. However, in the overall context of pre-Fall Paradise, Adam’s prelapsarian picture of moral struggle continually omits a combined discussion of both passion and reason, and how the sensitive appetite’s passions are capable of influencing reason. From this passage, Milton makes the unfallen human ethic of governance a conversation between reason and will alone – and not between passions, the will, and reason. Aquinas observes this soul-portrait as ‘Stoic’ in *Summa Theologiae* 1a2ae24, 2. Since the Stoics made no distinction between sense and intellect, they also had no distinction between sensitive and intellectual appetite, and therefore had no *passiones animae* (which strictly belonged only to sensitive appetite) and no ‘acts of will’ (which strictly occurred in the intellectual appetite). Instead, Stoics named every movement of the sensitive appetitive within the control of reason ‘will’, while ‘passions’ referred to every movement that went beyond reason’s limits. The Stoics however, did not completely avoid talk about passion. Perhaps Milton’s literary technique to

38 For a discussion of appetite in temptation, see Manfred Weidhorn, *Dreams*, 138–151. He observes that in both temptations the ‘physical role’ of appetite is mentioned in *PL* 5. 83–86; 9. 739–43. Milton adheres to tradition whereby a supernatural agent can influence the senses and humours and thereby arouse passions, which in turn darken the understanding and mislead the will, 140. We can gather from the content of the dream that such passions (if actualized) would be intemperance in food and in her position as a creature below God. This fits with Satan’s own scheme to ‘ingend[r] pride’, *PL* 4. 801–9. Hunter, *Descent of Urania*, 48, names this directly as ‘the passion of “pride”’. Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 65, for the controversy and Christian development of pride in the medieval ages see, 179–181.

39 Aquinas, 1a2ae24.

impersonate the Stoic position was to have ‘silent’ characters. Or perhaps Milton’s intent is to reveal the folly of the Stoic position that considers passions to be, to a great extent, within a person’s control.\(^{41}\) Although Adam implies that reason can influence the will, he neglects the discussion of the sensitive appetite altogether, therefore overlooking the highway that passes between passions and reason, such that reason may influence passion and passion may colour reason.\(^{42}\)

Indeed, although in Book 8 Adam had discussed being ‘transported’ (8. 529–533) by passion, his discussion of his ‘first passion’ / ‘Commotion strange’ is isolated from the two considerations he makes about reason. Angelic discussions of passion, on the other hand, always referenced passion in relation to reason (8. 585, 589, 635; 12. 86–92). For example, in Adam’s talk about his ‘first passion’ at the sight of Eve he refers to his ‘reason’ in line 510: ‘and with ubiquitous Majestie approv’d / My pleaded reason’. This is indeed a strange way of speaking, since context does not indicate whether his reason ‘approv’d ‘honour’ (8. 508) or Eve’s qualities that make her ‘more desirable’ (8. 505); even less does the poem indicate whether reason must ‘plead’ – which would be strange behaviour for a sovereign ruler. It sounds as if these strong evaluations had pleaded so consistently as to win from reason her weary consent. The word ‘approve’ intriguingly appears twice again in Adam’s response to Raphael’s rebuke:

What inward thence I feel, not therefore foiled,  
Who meet with various objects, from the sense  
Variously representing; yet still free  
Approve the best, and follow what I approve.  

(8. 608–611)

Yet Adam does not mention ‘reason’ this time, though from the syntax we are lead to expect it after ‘free’. Instead, Adam’s ability to discern between ‘various objects’ unfolds from the ‘I’ of line 608, which holds its place as subject with the repetition of ‘I’ again in line 611. Adam places enormous confidence in his own abilities. He displaces the faculty of ‘reason’ from what seems to be a discussion of the sensory faculty (echoing 5. 104–106) and replaces it with ‘I’. Though I am aware that some scholars have suggested this portrays Milton’s Augustinian picture of reason, I suggest that the poetry intends to demonstrate the dangerous fragility of the Augustinian model of prelapsarian Eden.\(^{43}\)

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41 Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, 45, discusses which passions were considered to be within a person’s control.


43 Tilmouth, *Passion’s Triumph*, 192–93. Fiore, *Milton and Augustine*, 29–32. Fiore is referring to Adam’s ‘passion’ and not his ‘reason’, but as I deduce he means both since he discusses how Adam’s faculties derive from Augustine. Further, Fiore thinks that Adam here confesses deep sensuousness but not excess. He does well to note that Milton’s first love scene ‘has none of the “her hand he seiz’d”’, 31.
The second place Adam refers to reason in his discussion of ‘first passion’ occurs in line 544, but almost as an afterthought: ‘Authority and reason on her wait, as one intended first, not after made / Occasionally…’. Thus, Milton reveals the prelapsarian limits of self-understanding and the intricate relationship between reason and the passions. Adam mentions ‘passion’ only once in all three discussions of human reason (5. 100–113; 8. 500–560, 608–611; 9. 348–356), and even then he treats passion and reason in isolation from each other, suggesting only half-awareness of his own composition. In the other two discussions, Adam describes various faculties and purports to know reason’s role, but then overlooks the presence of passion altogether.

II ‘PASSIONS CATCH THE GOVERNMENT FROM REASON’: MILTON’S POLITICAL METAPHORS

The images of reason in the poem are political metaphors: ‘chief’, ‘law’, ‘authority’, ‘government’. Whereas the demons’ ‘reason for their law refuse / Right reason’ (spoken by the Father, 6. 41–2), Eve declares to the serpent in Book 9 that ‘Law to ourselves / our reason is our law’ (9. 654). Perhaps, like Adam’s self-conscious power illustrated by the repetition of ‘I’ in 8. 608–611, the fluidity between these clauses resonates with Tilmouth’s contention that Milton displays mechanisms of an Augustinian, intuitive kind of reason in his human characters. Yet this certainly makes Raphael’s report sound odd when he distinguishes ‘discursive reason’ as being ‘oftest’ human, and ‘intuitive reason’ as being angelic, which differ ‘by degree, but kind the same’ (5. 486–89). Milton’s angels show knowledge of the interplay between the passions and reason and warn of its danger often; Adam and Eve do not. They suppose natural and easy self-rule. Further, the context of Eve’s statement makes one question the integrity of an Augustinian model of ‘intuitive’ governance. Eve is, after all, in conversation with the serpent, whose words were soon to ring ‘persuasive’ and be ‘impregned with reason’ (9. 738). In addition, though Eve’s line echoes that of the Father’s from Book 6, she now puts the line ‘law to ourselves’ before the statement about reason being law. On the precipice of

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44 Tilmouth catches the word ‘fall’ in the context of this passage, and suggests Milton alludes to the prior fall within the will before the outward fall, *Passion’s Triumph*, 196.
45 ‘Chief’ (5. 102), ‘law’ (6. 41–2; 9. 654), ‘authority’, (8. 554), ‘government’ (12. 82–92), which is said to ‘rule’ as a sovereign in 9. 1130. Coëffeteau uses the political image of reason: ‘the passions…divert [man] many times from the Laws of Reason’, *A Table of Human Passions*, ‘To the Reader’, as does Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions*, 45: ‘so passions…if once they Ily out beyond their bounds, and become subject only to their own Laws, and encroach upon Reason’s right, there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrannical’.
46 Tilmouth, *Passion’s Triumph*, 192–3, or fn. 16.
47 There is a similarity with the syntax of Romans 2:14, or the passage contrasting Gentile and Jewish perceptions of moral right and wrong: ‘…these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves’.
eating the fruit, acting as ‘law to oneself’ sounds ominous, foreshadowing the consequences of shedding reason’s rule and truly becoming a law unto themselves.

The nature and intellectual background of the political metaphor also cautions the assumption that, at least in regard to reason and the appetites, Milton advocates the Augustinian model of reason for prelapsarian life. The metaphor of reason as a political ruler appears in Aristotle’s Politics 1.5, 1254b:

...we may observe in living creatures both a despotical and constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule.48

Aquinas cites Aristotle’s metaphor in six different places in the Summa Theologiae.49 In 1a.81, 3 ad 2, Aquinas observes:

the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason [intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis].50

The fact that Aristotle and Aquinas had distinguished a political relationship from a despotic one meant that the passions were governable as citizens under the rule of reason, but also liable to throw off reason’s mantle if it proved to be tyrannical or abusive. As Elisabeth Uffenheimer-Lippens explains,

Characteristic of this relationship is a recognition by the ruling party of the independence and the right of self-determination of the ruled party and therefore also the right to contradict. At the same time, the ruler remains ruler and will try to convince his subjects that it is worthwhile to live according to his prescriptions or commands.51

Thus, since the passions of the sensitive appetite have a life of their own, reason must be capable of governing its subjects with benevolent and responsible leadership. Such is the advice that we find offered by Milton’s Raphael and Michael. However, the Augustinian intuitive model that characterises Adam and Eve leaves them frighteningly unaware of reason’s role and

49 Aquinas, ST 1a.81, 3 ad 2; 1a.2ae.9, 2 ad 3; 1a.2ae.17, 7 ad 1; 1a.2ae.56; 1a.2ae.58, 2; 1a.2ae.74, 2 ad 3. I am indebted to Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 99, for these references.
50 Aquinas, ST 1a.81, 3.
the subjects it is intended to rule over. Indeed, we find the language of a ‘surprised fall’ in Michael’s conversation with Adam:

Reason in man obscured, or not obeyed
Immediately inordinate desires
And upstart Passions catch the Government
From Reason, and to servitude reduce
Man till then free. Therefore since he permits
Within himself unworthy powers to reign
Over free reason…

(12. 86–92)

The passions ‘catch’ ‘free’ reason’s government and assume its place as head. Though surprise is an element of the overthrow, Milton writes with a combination of passivity and activity in reason’s loosing stance. On the one hand, reason is ‘obscured’, removed from its position, reduced to slavery. On the other, reason’s consent was active: Adam and Eve did not obey (line 86) and permitted (line 90) the passions to dethrone their ruler. Such contrarieties need not force an either-or reading. However, the powerful potential of the passions to overthrow their king suggests the necessity of knowing reason’s dangerous citizens.52

Milton’s human couple thus fails to display a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between reason and passion. It is instead the angelic beings, Raphael and Gabriel, who offer an expanded picture of the relation between reason and the lower faculties it must interact with (including 5. 404–415). I would suggest that this indicates that Milton recognizes both Augustinian ‘intuitive reason’ and Stoicism to be a naïve and incredible models of self-governance that inevitably lead to human downfall. Rather than celebrating Stoicism’s dismissal of the passions, and the Augustinian confidence in the prelapsarian state, the curious silence of Adam and Eve regarding their lower sensitive appetites seems to suggest the danger of overlooking the appetitive powers.

52 Christopher Hill, Milton and the English Revolution (London: Faber & Faber, 1977), 348–352; 414. Hill discusses how ‘political failure was ultimately moral failure’, and lack of self-control, 351; though he does not offer insight regarding metaphors that describe the political relationship between reason and the passions, he shows he is aware Milton’s political language alluded to soul faculty: ‘the [English people] passively handed politics over to their leaders’.
6 Rational Passion or Reason’s Triumph over Passion? The Integration of Reason and Passion in the Seventeenth Century and Paradise Lost

‘Passion…a suffering, also an affection of the mind, also in Poems and Romances it is more peculiarly taken for the passion of love’.1

‘The more the love of charity in us is purified of carnal love [quanto amor caritatis in nobis est magis a carnali amore depuratus], the more praiseworthy it is; “for the affection [dilectio] among us should not be carnal but spiritual [carnalis, sed spiritualis],” as Augustine says. But as a passion love is to some extent carnal [quod passio amoris cum quadam carnalitate est]. Consequently an act of charity is more praiseworthy without the passion of love’ [actus caritatis sine passione amoris laudabilior]….REPLY: There is a question of the carnality of the spiritual affection [carnalitatem dilectionis] if the passion of love precedes the affection of the will, but not if it follows [si passio amoris dilectionem voluntatis praecedat, non autem sequatur].2

I ‘TO LOVE OR NOT’: THE RATIONAL PASSION OF ‘LOVE’ IN PARADISE LOST

That Milton refers to ‘love’ in Paradise Lost (1674) so frequently suggests his recognition of traditional discourses on the passions extending from classical sources such as Aristotle and Cicero to Christian thinkers such as Augustine and Aquinas. Yet Milton’s recurrent use of the term ‘reason’ and its appearance in critical locations so greatly exceeds his use of the term ‘passion’ that a reader of Milton might quickly assume the author intends to identify an impassable gulf between Reason’s realm and suspicious ‘emotions’ that lead a person astray. Raphael’s insistence in Book 8 to love what is ‘rational’ and ‘higher’, and not to love ‘in passion’, seems to support this division. And yet Milton’s vocabulary of the passions recalls that the term ‘love’ is a species of the passiones, which therefore makes the picture of reason and passion appear more integrated. The question then becomes, ‘is Raphael contrasting a rational passion (a love that is “in reason”) against a passion of the sensitive appetite (a love that is “in passion”)?’ Such a picture would highlight the intrinsic relationship between reason and the passions and suggest the possibility that passions could be transformed into rational entities. This would thus conflict with the severely divorced ‘reason-passion’ picture that assumes Milton’s staunch commitment to ‘reason’ over passion.

In identifying the interconnections between reason and the passions, Milton scholars have made helpful strides in identifying Milton’s faculty psychology, and its surrounding seventeenth-century intellectual landscape. However, perhaps largely because contemporary language presupposes a reason-emotion distinction, much less literary criticism has been devoted to understanding the integrated relations between reason and the passions. The problem

1 Edward Phillips, ‘Passion’, in The New World of English words, or, A General Dictionary containing the Interpretations of such Hard Words as are Derived from other Languages, their Proper Significations through out Artes & Sciences, whether Liberall or Mecanick (London: Printed by E. Tyler for Nath. Brooke at the Angell in Cornhill, 1658).
2 Aquinas, De Veritate, 26.7.
3 Milton, PL 5. 535
in secondary literature has thus assumed a strong separation between ‘reason’ and ‘passion’ (or what is called ‘emotion’), and yet the conversation between Raphael and Adam in Book 8 seems to point towards an example of reason reforming the passions to the point of what might be called ‘passionate rationality’. It is easy to use modern categorical distinctions between reason and emotion and thereby assume that they can also map out across the ‘reason-passion’ model prevalent in classical and early modern sources. In exploring Milton’s depicted relationship between the ruler, reason, and her handmaids, the passions, I will confine my terms to ‘reason’ and ‘passion’, without any reference to ‘feelings’, ‘emotion’, or ‘sentiments’, which never appear. Whether or not the term ‘emotion’ leads Milton scholars into the modern schism between cognition and feeling will not be discussed in this chapter, nor will I attempt to establish whether ‘passion’ is a more adequate term than ‘emotion’ for understanding the anatomy of human action.

In the remaining sections, I examine the two passages, 4. 728–743 and 8. 585–591, which describe the passion of love as taking place ‘in reason’. This is not the only ‘passion’ in Paradise Lost that Milton reveals has a rational nature, but is the only one which will be used for discussion. With this, it is necessary to consider the history of love as a passion. In Part III, I investigate historical reasons for determining the rational or irrational status of a passion. I will only consider Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas and the early modern thinkers that bear Thomist influences. In Part III, I consider whether Milton’s love ‘in reason’ is either a rationalized passion of the sensitive appetite, or an instance of affectiones, although the term itself never appears in Milton’s vocabulary of the passions. In Part IV, I offer conclusions that highlight Milton’s appreciation of the passions’ materiality, both in Eden and in the hope of a future and higher Paradise.

II IS ‘LOVE’ A PASSION IN PARADISE LOST?

In the poem, ‘love’ is distinctly human. The noun and verb occur 120 times in the epic, and appear most often in Books 8 and 9. The term is used with the demons on only ten occasions; the demons can ‘shew’ it (9. 665), or imitate it, or speak about it (4. 68–70, 363, 888; 9. 489–92), but it appears the possibility to love has been almost fully removed, as Satan himself laments by Book 4: ‘Be then his love accurst, since love or hate, / To me alike, it deals eternal

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4 See PL 8. 391, ‘rational delight’, and 9. 243, ‘delight to reason joined’. Aquinas also suggests that ‘delight’ is a passion (grounding his reasoning in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1.11); see Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.31, 1.
5 See James, Passion and Action, 6, fn. 25, and Adrian Streete, ‘Passions, Politics and Subjectivity in Philip Massinger’s The Emperor of the East’. Passions and Subjectivity, 220.
6 It is used with the angels six times, PL 5. 535–540, 593, 900; 6. 94; 11. 353; 12. 403, and with the Father and Son fifteen times, PL 3. 67, 104, 142, 213, 225, 267, 298, 312, 338, 410–411; 7. 195; 12. 403, 489, 550; with Adam and Eve it occurs approximately ninety times. Hence, I call it a distinctly human term.
woe’ (69–70) and ‘...I to Hell am thrust, / Where neither joy nor love, but fierce desire / Among our other torments not the least’ (508–511). Yet Milton hints at even shadowy remains of twisted forms of love in angelic fallen nature. Belial is said to ‘love / Vice for itself’ (1. 490–1), and Satan’s ‘stupidly good’ delight (9. 465–68) at his first sighting of Eve suggests he is momentarily jolted out of hate to remember ‘love’:

With what sweet
Compulsion thus transported to forget
What hither brought us hate, not love, nor hope
Of Paradise for Hell...

(9. 473–76)

‘Love’ is thus a missing note from demonic mouths in a world full of song, an obvious distortion that shows them to be unnatural and out of joint in poetry which pictures love to be the greatest expression of existence, the highway between man and God (12. 402–404, 561–62, 581–85), and the source of mysterious wedded rights (5. 502–515; 8. 591–92, 633–35).

To assume that ‘love’ is a ‘passion’ in Paradise Lost would place Milton’s epic in a long stream of classical and medieval literature that did likewise. In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b20–1106a13, love is listed among the passions of the soul: ‘desire, anger, fear, boldness, spite, joy, love, hatred, longing, envy, pity, in general what is attended by pleasure and distress’. Love is again given the status of passion in Nicomachean Ethics 8.5, 1157b28, Rhetoric 2.1 and in Topics 2.7, 113b2–4. Augustin assumes Cicero’s classification of the four basic perturbations of the mind, ‘desire and fear, joy and grief’, in a number of places throughout De Civitate Dei, but refers to them all as species of one passion, love, in turn made either morally good or bad by the orientation of the will. He writes:

…a rightly directed will is love in a good sense and a perverted will is love in a bad sense. Therefore a love which strains after the possession of the loved object is desire, and the love which possesses and enjoys the object is joy. The love that shuns what opposes it is fear, while the love that feels that opposition when it happens is grief. Consequently, these [passiones] are bad, if the love is bad, and good if the love is good.

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8 I cannot fully enter the debate here as to whether love is the same as desire in Augustine and Aquinas, whether Augustine makes love a ‘passion’ (see James, Passion and Action, 6) or a ‘relation’ (Aquinas, ST, 1a.65), and whether the Greek word φιλια means the same as the Latin amor. For a discussion of these issues see A.W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, (Oxford: OUP, 1989), Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 57–62. See also Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.26, 2 who takes a quotation from Augustine, De Trinitate 8.10.
9 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 7.
10 By way of implication from Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1.11.
12 Augustine, DCD, 14. 7.
In *Paradise Lost*, ‘love’ seems to take on Augustinian colours by acting as a unifying passion. In Michael’s conversation with postlapsarian Adam, the angels charges him to

\[
\text{Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add faith,}
\\text{Add virtue, patience, temperance, add love,}
\text{By name to come called ‘charity’, the soul}
\text{Of all the rest…}
\]

(12. 582–85)

Augustine had argued that Scripture did not distinguish between ‘charity’ (*caritas*), the Latin term for ‘love’ (*amor*), or ‘fondness’ (*dilectio*), and it is arguable that Milton is not introducing a new kind of love with ‘charity’, but love *qua* love, which acts as the genus for the individuated passions.\(^{13}\) It is questionable, however, whether the terms such as ‘knowledge’, ‘faith’, ‘virtue’, etc. qualify as ‘passions’. For ‘charity’ to act as the ‘soul of all the rest’ might indicate Milton’s liberty in extending love’s traditional archetypal capacity over both *passiones animae* and *affectiones* to covering other character states as well.

Citing Aristotle’s *Topics*, Aquinas’ love is listed as one of three pairs of passions seated in the concupiscent appetite: ‘love and hatred, desire and aversion, pleasure and sadness’\(^{14}\). Among early modern writers, love is given the same pedigree. Wright in his *Passions of the Minde* (1604) cites Aquinas’s eleven passions approvingly, and defines ‘love and desire’ as operations of the ‘croueting appetite’.\(^{15}\) Coëffeteau in *A Table of Human Passions* (1621) also refers to love as a passion in his discussion of the five different kinds of love (of natural things, creatures, men, angels and God):

Human love is a passion which should follow the motions of reason, and which, being guided by the light of the soul should only embrace the true good, to make it perfect: for containing himself within these bounds, it should no more be a violent and furious passion which fills the world daily with so many miseries by her exorbitant and strong disorders.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{13}\) Ibid. For the theological discussion of *caritas* in Augustine, see anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 2 Vols., trans. Philip S. Watson (London: S.P.C.K., 1939), 2: 258–344, and J. Burnaby, *Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938). It would appear Milton’s idea of charity as ‘the soul of all the rest’ comes from Aquinas. Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 163–164, states he is particularly interested in how charity influences the affections, but not the passions. Aquinas calls charity ‘the form of the other virtues’ and that ‘all the other virtues in some way depend on charity’. See *ST* 1a.2ae.62, 2 ad 3; *ST* 2a.2ae.23, 8; *ST* 2a.2ae.23, 8 ad 3.

\(^{14}\) Aquinas, *ST* 1a.2ae.26, 1.

\(^{15}\) In Wright, *Passions of the Minde*, 19, 22–23, the ‘concupiscent appetite’.

\(^{16}\) Coëffeteau, *A Table of Humane Passions*, 98–99. He also states that love ‘resides in the in the concupisbile appetite, which is a sensitive power, and depends of the body’, 90.
Reynolds in *A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man* (1656) further refers to love as a passion, in defining passion as ‘nothing else but those natural perfective and untrained motions of the Creatures unto the advancement of their Natures’.\(^{17}\)

Though the term ‘passion’ in *Paradise Lost* is used both categorically to indicate negative passions, and specifically, as if it were itself an individual passion, it is likely that Milton not only acknowledges love to be a passion, but that he thinks it is key to human existence. In Augustinian fashion, the passion of love in *Paradise Lost* is able to represent both morally good and potentially morally bad actions.\(^{18}\) For instance, ‘love’ in some cases is clearly distinct from lust (4. 753; 5. 448; 8. 594) and some kind of desire (5. 449). In other cases, ‘love’ indicates the beginnings of self-love (4. 465–5) and the possibility for lust or carnal pleasure (8. 588–593; 9. 1042). In two passages taken from different books, Milton relates the intriguing possibility for the passion of love to be located in one of two spaces:

Hail wedded love, mysterious law, true source  
Of human offsprin, sole propriety,  
In Paradise of all things common else.  
By thee adulterous lust was driv’n from men  
Among the bestial herds to range, by thee  
Founded in reason, loyal, just, and pure,  
Relations dear, and all the charities  
Of father, son, and brother first were known.  

(4. 750–757)

What higher society thou find’st  
Attractive, human, rational, love still;  
In loving thou dost well, in passion not,  
Wherein true love consists not; love refines  
The thoughts, and heart enlarges, hath his seat  
In reason, and is judicious, is the scale  
By which to heav’nly Love thou may’st ascend  
Not sunk in carnal pleasure, for which cause  
Among the beasts no mate for thee was found.  

(8. 585–591)

In both passages, ‘wedded love’ (Book 4) and ‘true love’ (Book 8) are set in contrast to ‘adulterous lust’ (Book 4) and ‘sense of touch’ / ‘carnal pleasure’ (Book 8). Further, both sections refer to this higher kind of love as being ‘founded in reason’ (Book 4) or ‘seat[ed] in reason’ (Book 8), which opposes a ‘common’ (4. 752, 8. 583) experience shared with the ‘beastial herds’ (4. 754) or ‘beasts’ (8. 594). To suggest that a passion could either occur in

\(^{17}\) Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions*, 31.  
\(^{18}\) I say ‘potential’ because I want to indicate that I think Milton does his best to keep Adam and Eve unfallen until at least Book 9, but I do not intend to defend this here.
lower, baser realms or to take place ‘in reason’ presents an intriguing opportunity for Miltonists to explore the early modern account of reason and the passions.

III WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR A PASSION TO BE ‘IN REASON’?

Aristotle found the Platonic tripartite model of the soul, which contrasted the rational part (intellect) with non-rational parts of soul (thumos and epithumia), to be inadequate since he did not think it was possible to isolate orexis (‘desire’) solely in the epithumetikon. Rather, according to Aristotle, orexis existed in all three parts. Perhaps Aristotle’s rejection of a Platonic three-part soul also resulted from the inherent weaknesses of Plato’s account, which, by asserting a wide gap between reason and the appetites, struggled to explain how the rational and non-rational parts were related and how reason could regulate the lower appetites. Aristotle’s bipartite division of the soul (logistikon and alogon) could thus allow orexis to ‘straddle the division’ and locate different kinds of orexis in both hemispheres (De Anima 432b5–7).

Aristotle’s logistikon and alogon division appears on numerous occasions (Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b13–1103a1–3; Politics 1.5, 6; 13.6; 7.14.9, 1333a9; 7.15, 1334b7–25; De Motu 6.700b37–701a1, 701a38–701b; De Anima 3.9, 432b5). This is most notable in Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, where Aristotle identifies something innate in both continent and incontinent persons other than reason since ‘[this something] desires what is pleasant to sense and at times opposes what reason judges absolutely good’. Aristotle’s connection between what is purely rational (reason or will) and what is purely non-rational (the vegetative faculty) is the sensitive faculty, which, though remaining non-rational by nature ‘participates’ or ‘shares’ in reason by listening and obeying reason’s persuasion or reproach like a father’s instruction or a friend’s advice. Though Aristotle qualifies the ways in which the sensitive faculty is made up of irrational and rational capacities, he eventually asserts that ‘it makes no difference in what way [the sensitive faculty] is distinct’. Although he does little to explain their interaction, the passions of Aristotle’s sensitive appetite are not inherently

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19 See Plato, Republic 434–441; 442C, 443D, 444B; 580D–581C; Timaeus 69C.
20 Pearson, Aristotle on Desire, 170. See James, Passion and Action, 56 fn. 28, for Aquinas’ consistent use of Aristotelian terms and division of the soul into rational and non-rational.
21 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 78–79.
22 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 80, and Aristotle, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, trans. by Joe Sachs (Mass.: Pullins Press, 2002), 21. In other places, thumos is said to mishear reason like ‘over-hasty’ servants who listened to only half the command from their master. See Nicomachean Ethics 7. 1149a25–1149b1–4.
23 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1. 13, 1102b29–1103a1–3; Sachs, Nicomachean Ethics, 21. The sensitive appetite ‘shares in reason in a sense, in so far as it listens to it and obeys it’; Pearson writes the ‘epithumetikon of the agent’ shares in reason by ‘harmonizing, or speaking on all matters of with the same voice of reason’, Pearson, Aristotle on Desire, 109.
irrational impulses, tone-deaf to reason’s call, but rather in some important sense naturally prone to reason’s influence and capable of persuasion.

What then determines whether a desire is rational or non-rational? Here Aristotle recognizes three kinds of orexis in the sensitive faculty (to orektikon), two of which are non-rational (epithumia and thumos), and one of which is rational (boulesis). The difference between these desires is that boulesis takes place en logistikon (Topics 4.5, 126a12–13; Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1111a34; 3.2, 1111b12–13; Eudemian Ethics 2.10, 1225b27; De Anima 432b5), whereas the non-rational desires occur devoid of reason:

Of actions that are due to orexis, some are due to rational orexis (dia logistikon), others to non-rational (dialogon) [orexis]. The first [rational orexis] is boulesis which is desire of the good (for no one has a boulesis [boulesthai] except for what he thinks good); Orge and epithumia are non-rational desires.

It is possible to hear Aristotelian overtones between the passages in Aristotle that depict rational desire en logistikon and those in Paradise Lost where Milton’s passion of love takes place ‘in reason’. And so it would seem that Raphael’s charge to Adam comes to mean pursuing goals that are more ‘reason-based’ than the pleasures of touch, or perhaps setting aside such lower desires altogether. Yet such a reading would be too simplistic. Aristotelian scholar Giles Pearson argues that Aristotle does not determine the rational or non-rational status of a desire by the faculty of the soul in which it originates, nor by the kind of object it pursues, nor by its content. On the one hand, boulesis, as a desire for the good, can have a specific end or a number of ends, but all these ends share something in common which group them as boulesis and which sets them apart from thumos/epithumia. The criteria of boulesis defined by Pearson are ‘objects of serious concern, distinctly human concerns’, or ‘substantial goals’. Epithumia are however, in the narrow definition, ‘pleasure-based’ desires. More broadly this included non-bodily pleasures such as health and education, but more narrowly they were tied specifically to bodily pleasures of touch, which belonged also to the beasts. Such ‘tactile pleasures, ‘ associated with food, drink, and sex, were ‘slavish and brutish’ because Aristotle thought they ‘attached us not as men but as beasts’ (Nicomachean Ethics 3.10, 1118a24–5–1118b1-5). The criteria for non-

24 Aristotle, De Motu Animalium 6.701a38–701b; for other instances of boulesis’ or the rational desire see Eudemian Ethics 2.7; 2.23a26–27, 2.10, 1225b24–26; 1227a3.5; Topics 4.5, 126a6–13; Magna Moralia 1.12, 1187b37; De Anima 2.414b2, 3.9, 432b5–6; 3.10. 433a22–26; 3.434a5–a22.

25 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.10, 1268b36–1369a1. Pearson, Aristotle on Desire, 181. I am indebted to chaps. 2–7 for his research on the criteria for rational desire. I am aware, however, that the question of whether certain passions or desires are even available to reason is subject to debate. For instance, see Pearson, Aristotle on Desire, 196, who argues that non-rational desires are not necessarily tied only to bodily pleasures. For further reading, see Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 2.8, 1224b1–2; Stephen Leighton discusses when epithumia are considered passions, and when they are considered ‘bodily desires’ that are opposed to reason, ‘Aristotle and the Emotions’.

26 Pearson, Aristotle on Desire, 96. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.12, 1153a31–32; Eudemian Ethics 2.10, 1225b27. See Also Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.35, 2 ad 3.
rational desires, or *epithumia*, are the basic ends that we share with the animals; rational desires, or *boulesis*, are basic ends that have ‘distinctly human concerns’.  

Perhaps, then, Milton’s ‘passion of love’ that takes place ‘in reason’ is intended to echo the Aristotelian phrase *en logistikon*. In Aristotle’s account, the passions are able to become rational by participation. Thus, one suggestion from this account is to argue that Raphael is urging Adam to cultivate his *boulesis*, his rational desire for the good. In this case, ‘rational’ would not mean that the passion ‘love’ originates ‘in reason’, but that it participates in it by pursuing a distinctly human end: the gradual ascent to ‘heav’nly Love’ by obedience and love towards God, whereby ‘men with angels may participate (5. 483–500)’. This telos is set in contrast to the common experience of ‘lust’ shared by the animals. Reynolds in his *A Treatise of the Passions* paints a similar contrast between true love and common lust:

> To love any Creature either *without God* or *above God* is Cupiditas, Lust (which is the formale of every sinne, whereby we turne from God to other things) but to *love* the Creatures *Under God* to their right order: and *for God*, to their right end…this is Charitas, true and regular Love.  

This is also echoed in Coëffeteau:

> So it is that prophane and unchaste Love seeks the union of bodies, which is found even among the beasts, and for this reason may be called brutish, if it not be sought with an honest intent by a lawful marriage. But chaste and honest love seeks the union of affections and wills and exceeds not that which is decent and virtuous…

Aquinas also acknowledges the concept of passions that could be made rational through participation in reason. Quoting Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13, 1102b13, Aquinas holds that *passiones animae* are ‘intrinsically…simply movements of the [irrationalis appetitus]’ but are also subject to the control of the reason and the will. Therefore ‘even the lower [appetitive] faculties may be called rational to the extent that there is a sense in which they have some share in the life of reason’ *[inferiores vires appetitivae dicitur rationales, secundum quod participant aliqualiter rationem]*. He writes ‘the sensory appetite [appetitus sensitivus]…is naturally subject [natus est] to the influence of the rational appetite [appetitus rationali]. Later in the *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas uses surprising language: It is natural to the sense appetite to be moved by the rational appetite *[appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetiti rationali]*. Although the Blackfriars translation often renders the Latin ‘natural’, the original meaning is

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27 I am indebted to Pearson, *Aristotle on Desire*, esp. chs. 2–7, for the content of this paragraph.  
28 Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions*, 82.  
29 Coëffeteau, *A Table of Human Passions*, 158.  
30 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.24, 1.  
31 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.25, 2. For other examples of ‘rational by participation,’ see ST 1a.2ae.56, 4 ad 1; 1a.2ae.56, 6, ad 2; 1a.2ae.60, 1. I am indebted to Lombardo for these references, *The Logic of Desire*, 95.  
32 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.50, 3.  
33 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.50, 3. See also ST 3a.18. 2, ad 1; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13, 1102b23–1103a1–4.
'born’, rendering it as ‘the sensitive appetite was born to obey reason’.34 But in other places, Aquinas uses the language of influence, inclination, or ability.35 Yet for Milton, perfect ‘wedded love’ or ‘true love’ is the result of a passion that occurs ‘in reason’. Such language suggests deviation from Aquinas’ ‘born to obey’, as Milton emphasises a transformative location rather than an intrinsic ability.

Further evidence of the Aristotelian tradition of placing some passions in reason occurs also in Reynolds’ A Treatise of the Passions. He divides passions into three categories: mental, sensitive, and rational. Reynolds refers to ‘rational passions’ as ‘middle passions’, which are in between the mental passions – or most simple actions of the nous – and the sensitive passions, which are motions also found in brute beasts. Perhaps they are also ‘middle’ in so far as they have the possibility of being governed by reason, even as they are not inherently rational:

Rational passions…are not formally [rational], as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason, or barely immaterial motions of the soul; but by way of participation and dependent by reason on their immediate subordination in man unto the government of the will and understanding….and for calling Passion thus governd Reasonable, I have warrant of Aristotle: who, though the Sensitive Appetite in man may be of itself unreasonable (and therefore by him contradivided to the Rational powers of the soule) yet by reason of that obedience which it owes to the Dictates of the Understanding, whereunto Nature hath ordaind it to be subject and confirmable (though Corruption have much slackened and unknit that Bond) he justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable Faculty, not intrinsically in itself, but by way of participation and the influence from Reason.36

Passions are thus intrinsically different to reason, but acquire rational traits through obedience to reason. Wright in Passions of the Minde also recognized the Aristotelian-Thomist relationship between reason and the passions. He writes that ‘certain internal acts or operations of the soul border upon reason and sense…causing therewithal some alteration in the body’; he defines these internal acts as ‘passions’.37 He observes,

Passions inhabit the confines both of sense and reason yet they keep not equal friendship with both, for passions and sense are like naughty neighbours, who oftentimes bear more love one to another, than they are obedient to their Master; and the reason of this amitie betwixt the passions and sense I take to be, the greater conformity and likeness betwixt them, there is between passions and reason; for passions are drowned in corporall organs…reason dependeth of no corporeal subject, but as a Princesse in her throne, considers the state of her kindgom…reason, once being entered into league with passions and sense becomes a better friend to sensualite than the passions were before.38

34 However, the translators do catch this connotation in some places. See Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.56, 4: ‘[The irascible and concupiscible powers], as sharing in the life of reason, which in man is what they are born to do.’
35 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae. 24, 3 and 1a.2ae.59, 1.
37 Wright, Passions of the Minde, 8.
38 Wright, Passions of the Minde, 8–9.
Coëffeteau holds a similar line that passions are motions of the sense appetite, which itself is not endowed with any reason, and which is common to us and the beasts [but] may also be considered as much as reason may subject them to her command and prescribe them a law...although the sense appetite be destitute of liberty, yet by reason the strict union that it hath with the intellectual and reasonable, if it doth participate as it were with a beame, and some kind of borrowed liberty.

Historical considerations for the exchange between reason and passions reveal that the classical, medieval, and early modern models were more fluid than secondary literature has construed. The possibility for rational passions in Milton’s intellectual background suggests that Milton’s passion of love ‘in reason’ is one such example of a passion submitting to reason’s rule. In this case we could say that Miltonic ‘love’ remains a passiones animae, albeit a rationalized one. However, Aquinas’ equivocation between the will and the rational or intellectual appetite also suggests that this could be an occasion when a passion undergoes transformation into something entirely different: an instance of affectiones.

IV A RATIONALIZED PASSION OF THE SENSE APPETITE, OR MILTON’S MISSING ‘AFFECTIONS’?

Although the phrase love ‘in reason’ in Books 4 and 8 could indicate Milton’s understanding of rational passions in the Aristotelian sense of ‘participation in reason’, there is another understanding which indicates these passions took place in the will. Aquinas had described the possibility of a ‘rational love’, resulting from his equivocation between the ‘rational or intellectual appetite’ and ‘the will’. The distinction was based upon his division between the sensitive appetite, as that which possessed freedom as far as it was subject to rational control, and the ‘rational or intellectual [appetite]’ that arises through ‘free choice’ and is ‘commonly called will’. Thus Aquinas could recognize that different kinds of love (or ‘that which produces the inclination to move towards the end’) could exist as a result of different kinds of appetite. The first kind is ‘natural love’, which produces a sense of affinity with the good object in all faculties of the soul; the next is ‘sensory love’, which produces a ‘feeling of attractiveness’ in the concupisible part of the sensitive appetite; the third he calls ‘intellectual or

39 Coëffeteau, A Table of Human Passions, 54 and, ‘To the Reader’, a5.
41 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.26, 1.
42 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.26, 1.
43 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.26, 1
rational love’ which results in the sense of ‘attachment, the sense of affinity with some good, the feeling of its attractiveness’ in the will.\(^{44}\)

Therefore in one sense, love was strictly a ‘passion’ of the sensitive appetite:

\[
\text{…the operation of the intellective appetite is not properly called passion. It does not take place with a change of a bodily organ, which is necessary to the nature of a passion properly speaking. It remains, therefore, that operations of the sensitive appetite, which are accompanied by a change of a bodily organ which in a way draw man, should be called passions in a strict sense.}\(^{45}\)
\]

As such, love as a \textit{passio} was considered to be a ‘movement of the [sensitive appetite] caused by our imagining sense-good or sense-evil...[passio] are movements of the non-rational part of the soul \textit{motus irrationalis animae} caused by the thought of something pleasant or unpleasant’ that always involved ‘physiological modification’.\(^{46}\) As a movement of the sensitive appetite, love’s objects were the ‘good things of the senses’.\(^{47}\) But in another sense, when the passion of love referred to the love of man, of angels, or of God, it was attributed to the intellectual appetite, which were cases of what Aquinas called ‘acts of will’ \textit{[actum voluntatis]}. These involved no physical change and pursued intellectual objects (or the ‘good in general’) such as things of God \textit{[divina]}.\(^{48}\) And therefore

\[
\text{since love consists in an effect produced in the [appetite] by the desirable object, love is clearly a passion: a passion in the strict sense when seated in the [concupiscent appetite], in an extended sense when seated in the will.}\(^{49}\)
\]

Coëffeteau had also acknowledged the possibility of ‘love’ occurring elsewhere:

\[
\text{Love hath her seate in the will (they do not consider it as a passion only, which rises in the senses, but also as a quality which in the end becomes spiritual)...}\(^{50}\)
\]

Aquinas had recognized Augustine’s equivocation between the terms \textit{passiones} and \textit{affectiones} to describe movements of the sense operation that included physiological modification.\(^{51}\) And yet Aquinas’ vocabulary of the \textit{passiones} and \textit{affectiones} make it clear that other actions, infrequently labeled as \textit{affectiones}, belonged only to the will.\(^{52}\) These ‘acts of will’ involved no

\(^{44}\text{Ibid.}\)
\(^{45}\text{Aquinas, \textit{Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics}, 100–101. For affections that are not passions, see Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.82, 5 ad 1.}\)
\(^{46}\text{Aquinas cites John of Damascus \textit{De Fide Orthodoxa} 2.22 in \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22, 3.}\)
\(^{47}\text{Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22, 3.}\)
\(^{48}\text{Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22, 3. Note that Aquinas calls these kinds of passions \textit{affectio}.}\)
\(^{49}\text{Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.26, 1. For other discussions of love in the \textit{Summa} see \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.23, 3–4; 1a.2ae.25, 2; 1a.2ae.26–28.}\)
\(^{50}\text{Coëffeteau, \textit{A Table of Human Passions}, 164–5.}\)
\(^{51}\text{Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22, 1–3.}\)
\(^{52}\text{For example, Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22, 3.}\)
passivity or corporeality but ‘produce the same sort of result as does action prompted by emotion’ \([\textit{cum similitudine effectus, absque passione}]\).

Other early modern writers also alluded to the presence of these different ‘passions’. Wright’s three-fold structure of the appetites follows the Thomist pattern: the natural appetite, manifested as the natural inclinations of plants and elements; the sensitive appetite, common to both beasts and men; and the reasonable appetite, belonging to both men and angels, which included ‘reasonable or voluntary affection’. Wright echoes Aquinas’ different conception of God’s and angels’ experience of certain affective states like love and joy when he writes that there are indeed ‘passions in the reasonable soul’. Since ‘God is ascribed love, hate, ire and zeal’ but is not subject to sensitive operations, ‘there are some affectio\[s\] in the highest part of the soul, not unlike the passions of the mind’ which take place ‘principally in the will’. He qualifies these kinds of affections that reside in the will as

\[
\text{[different] much in nature and quality from those that inhabit the inferior parts of the soul, because these being bred and borne in the highest part of the soul are immaterial, spiritual, independent of any corporeal subject; but those of the sensitive appetite are material, corporall, and depend upon some bodily instruments.}
\]

In \textit{A Table of Human Passions}, Coëffeteau also alludes to certain kinds of passions or motions in the will and understanding, which resemble the passions of the senses only by ‘improper and figurative speech’. These cause no physical alteration in the body. Likewise, Reynolds’ ‘mental passions’ perhaps best relate to what Aquinas and Wright had termed ‘affections’. ‘Mental Passions’ are described as ‘simple actions of the mind, wherein is the least intermixture or commerce with inferior and earthly faculties’; these produce the ‘spiritual passions’ or ‘motions in the conscience’ such as joy, love, peace, despair. Although Reynolds seems to make a further distinction between passion and affection in stating that ‘motions in beasts are not affections but….similar to passions in men’, his discussion in the chapter ‘The Affection of Love’ includes a surprising physical connotation: ‘Love then consists in a kind of expansion or egress of heart and spirits to the object’. Milton expresses a similar concept in Book 8’s passage on ‘true love’:

\[\text{Milton expresses a similar concept in Book 8’s passage on ‘true love’:}\]

53 Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae.22, 3 who writes these are \textit{actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, absque passione.}

54 Wright, \textit{Passions of the Minde}, 12.


57 Wright, \textit{Passions of the Minde}, 32.

58 Coëffeteau, \textit{A Table of Human Passions}, 2.

59 Reynolds, \textit{A Treatise of the Passions}, 37–38. These are ‘mental passions’ as opposed to ‘rational passions’ which are themselves not ‘acts of reason, or barely immaterial motions of the soul’.

60 Reynolds, \textit{A Treatise of the Passions}, 74. In Aristotle we read that ‘passions’ (translated as ‘affections’) produce alterations in the heart. See Aristotle’s \textit{De Motu Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary and Interpretive Essays}, trans. Martha Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) 42–43, 154; see also Aquinas, \textit{De Veritate}, 26.8, 1: ‘though in these \{passiones\} that have to do with the good, like love and joy} also the character of
The phrase is certainly troubling in evaluating whether Milton’s love ‘in reason’ is a rationalized passion of the sensitive appetite, or the exception immaterial passion (affectiones) of the will. Passions in the ‘strict sense’ were only motions of the sensitive appetite that physically moved the body to pursue an object. Hence, ‘heart enlarges’ could imply that Milton’s ‘true love’ does in fact belong to the sensitive appetite, and takes its ‘seat in reason’ only through rational participation. Indeed, had Milton wanted to write ‘in the will’ instead of ‘in reason’ he could have done so. ‘Reason’ and ‘will’ in Paradise Lost often appear as faculties that are distinct but capable of influencing each other (9. 350–55, 1127). Moreover, there is little evidence that Milton makes a Thomist equivocation between ‘reason’ and ‘will’. Yet ‘will’ in the poem seems to function in an even superior way to ‘reason’. Though Satan’s ‘will’ is never mentioned, Satan’s chosen term to describe the Father and Son is ‘will’; further, the Father’s own self-characterization is often construed in terms of ‘will’. It is probable that the emphasis on ‘will’ for divine characters is to avoid material implications that comes with the faculty of ‘reason’. After all, reason’s associates are the passions; such a relation would require God to have a sensitive appetite, and therefore a physical body.

It is thus arguable that Milton’s passion of love resembles a rationalized motion of the sensitive appetite more than an affectiones, or an immaterial ‘act of will’, since Milton’s location for the passion is ‘in reason’ instead of ‘in will’. But if the former were true, this would put Milton at odds with Platonic models of ascent to an immaterial world, whereby the soul is detached from bodily distractions. For Milton’s picture of ‘true love’ surprisingly retains the weight of corporeality. Refined bodily motions are in fact the ‘way and guide’ (8. 613) or ‘scale’ (8. 591) that lead up to ‘Heavenly love’ (8. 592). Far from immaterial angelic sex, Raphael indicates a kind of purified ‘mixing’ already takes places in Heaven. Indeed, his blush,

...love refines
The thoughts, and heart enlarges, hath his seat
In reason, and is judicious...

(8. 589–91)

passion [habent rationem passionis] is kept inasmuch as the heart is dilated or simulated by such things or is in any way modified from its ordinary state…’.

61 They are used only once together. See PL 3. 108: ‘will and reason (reason also is choice) useless and vain…made passive both’.

62 For Satan’s depiction of Father and Son, see PL 1. 106, 161; 2. 199, 351, 559, 560; 3. 656; 4. 66 (Satan ‘had’ free will in the past), 71, 897; 6. 427; 9. 728. For God the Father’s own self-characterisation, see PL 3. 184; 6. 728, 816; 7. 174; 10. 69 (Son to Father ‘to do thy will / Supreme’)

63 However, it is evident that Milton countered orthodox views by attributing a physical body as well as passions to God. See Danielson, Milton’s Good God; Lewalski, The Life of John Milton, 420 and Aquinas, De Veritate, 26.7, 3: ‘God and the angels are not susceptible of passions, and so in their case no passion follows upon a perfect act of will’; De Veritate, 26.8: ‘passions [passiones]…are not in the angels or in God at all, because in them there is no sense appetite, of which such passions [passiones] are movements.’

64 See Price, Love and Friendship, 64–72; Smith, The Metaphysics of Love, 129; Smith’s portrait of human and angelic faculties as ‘sense’ and ‘spirit’ sometimes nears contradiction; for Augustine’s developed view of love and the desiring subject before and after his rejection of Platonism, see Martha Nussbaum, ‘Augustine and Dante on the Ascent of Love’, in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth Matthews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
‘love’s proper hue’, suggests a physical aspect for ‘Heav’nly substances’. Such evidence suggests that Milton praises passions positioned in reason both in earthly life and in the Heavenly realm. Thus, embodied beings, even with all the dangers of the sense appetite that accompanies such corporeality, are valuable – and indeed the very means towards more ‘Heav’nly Paradises’ (5. 500).

Yet there are also indications that Milton’s passion of love ‘in reason’ is in fact a species of affectiones. It is not clear why the term affectiones is missing from Paradise Lost, since Milton shows that he was familiar with its traditional equivocation to passiones in his English prose. Yet I propose that Milton could be using the idea of love ‘in reason’ to allude to something more like the affections of the will, especially since the persons and activity of the Father and Son are described almost exclusively in terms of ‘will’. Human imitation of divine beings would certainly be a proper exercise for earthly image bearers in the poem. Further, in another passage, Milton refers to the ascent to ‘heav’nly Love’ as the participation with angels (5.493–94). What would it look like for men to imitate the angels? A few lines later Raphael states

freely we serve,  
Because we freely love, as in our will  
To love or not; in this we stand or fall.  
(5. 538–40)

Angelic love takes place in the will. Is it then odd for Milton to refer twice to human love as ‘in reason’? I suggest that a possible solution is found in Aquinas’ discussion of the love dilectio. Dilectio was the kind of love that included ‘electio or choice; it is therefore not seated in the affective orexis [concupiscibili] but in the will [voluntate], and so is confined to rational natures’. The love amor is seated in the concupiscent appetite and could lead people to commit evil actions; however, dilectio involved rational activity, and ironically was even less God-like than amor. Aquinas thus writes

for a man can make his way to God more swiftly and surely when he is drawn passively through amor by God himself, than through the activity of his own

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65 Turner, One Flesh, 54. Milton’s suggestion that the ‘higher state’ will involve erotic delight was heretical in Augustine’s day.  
66 Yet this raises the question of the angelic Fall. Their reason was not ‘perfect’ either, as Satan’s self-love grew so heavy as to surmount his reason and make him unfit for Heaven. Milton uses this concept in PL 4. 292, 472, 567; 5. 784.  
67 This exercised Aquinas. See Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.31, 4 ad 3, for a discussion on how human ‘pleasure’ has commonalities with brute animals, and the angels: ‘in us, therefore, there is not only pleasure in the sense appetite which we have in common with brute animals but also pleasure in the intellectual appetite which we have in common with angels’.  
68 Aquinas, ST 1a.2ae.26, 3.
reason; and that activity, as we have remarked, is the distinctive feature of 
dilectio.\textsuperscript{70}

But in \textit{Paradise Lost} it is precisely the opposite. Milton here seems to reverse the Thomist connection of passivity with perfection, and instead makes rational activity—with its rational kind of love—the ladder towards the heavenly realms. To conclude that Milton’s ‘love in reason’ is \textit{dilectio} would be to overstep the limitations of this chapter; however, Milton does equate ‘reason’ with ‘choice’ in 3. 108, the only passage that refers to will and reason together. Thus I suggest that Milton offers a handbag of mixed terms: on the one hand, ‘love in reason’ could be seen as a genuine passion of the sensitive appetite. This would be odd, however, since Milton makes the ascent towards heaven so utterly human—corporeal—and it seems that something corporeal also awaits Adam and Eve in the transition to a higher nature. Far from shedding passions and a corporeal nature, the passion of love in the Heavenly realms is not absent, but simply a ‘Heav’nly love’; and the surprising fact that Raphael refers to angelic love-making, and blushes at the thought of it, seems to assume that the passions of the sensitive appetite can alter the substances of heavenly bodies as well.

On the other hand, if Milton’s ‘love in reason’ is in fact a reference to an affection of the will, Milton’s idea of \textit{affectiones} seems to remain material rather than immaterial; these acts of will physically alter whatever substance the angels are made of, and, like Wright’s statement, they also expand the size of Adam’s heart.\textsuperscript{71} Yet far from concluding that Milton thus presents an unorthodox version of material \textit{affectiones}, it is helpful to point out that Aquinas also thought that even ‘spiritual affections’ or \textit{dilectio} must occur with physical movements in subjects that possessed sensitive appetites. Indeed, \textit{dilectio}, or the \textit{dilectionem voluntatis} [affection of will] ‘which is in the higher part’ can ‘alter the lower part’ of the soul in beings who cannot be free from those passions ‘consequent upon the will’.\textsuperscript{72} In some sense then, Aquinas’ passion of love could maintain a positive association with ‘carnality’ when it came after an act of will so powerful that it roused the lower appetite.\textsuperscript{73} And far from diminishing the praiseworthiness of these acts of will, passions that followed acts of will could ‘add to the praise of the good act’. The scholars who are at work in revising the Cartesian mind and body split could vouch for a less significant distinction between Descartes’ notion of immaterial and material.\textsuperscript{74} This in turn could also spell physical implications for early modern notions of the higher affections that are also ‘acts of will’. For it would be difficult to hold that acts of will are only immaterial, if one also permits these volitions to shape beliefs and lead to bodily actions. Such immaterial acts would eventually contribute to physical alterations. A number of Miltonists have acknowledged

\textsuperscript{70} Aquinas, \textit{ST} 1a.2ae 26. 3.

\textsuperscript{71} Milton seems to be unbothered by what this might mean for God’s impassibility.

\textsuperscript{72} The following quotations from Aquinas are taken from \textit{De Veritate}, 26.7, 3.

\textsuperscript{73} See the quotation at the beginning of the chapter from Aquinas, \textit{De Veritate}, 26.7.

\textsuperscript{74} See my Ch.1.
Milton’s unconventional views on matter: Fallon proposed that Milton’s impatience with the Cambridge Neoplatonic attack on Hobbesian mechanism by way of incorporeal substances led him to defend orthodox positions on the freedom of the soul through unorthodox means: monist materialism. This allowed him to

\[\text{circumvent} \] the mind-body problem that vexed Descartes…and the Platonists and that moved them to construct two-substance interaction….Milton’s materialist monism treats spirit and matter as manifestations, differing in degree and not qualitatively, of the one corporeal substance. Milton’s spirit does not coexist with an alien matter; it contains matter.\[75\]

Finally, if this ‘love in reason’ is in fact an affection of the will, Milton also seems to prize the perfection of rational activity and choice associated with \textit{dilectio} over and against the Thomist ideal of \textit{amor} and its passivity. In valuing rational activity, Milton emphasizes the dangerous privilege of self-election and absolute freedom to choose either the road towards Heavenly love or towards baser loves.

\section*{V \ NOT REASON’S TRIUMPH OVER PASSION, BUT PASSION’S PLACE IN REASON}

The passion of love in \textit{Paradise Lost} indicates that Milton could favour ‘rational passions’ in lieu of ‘reason’s triumph over passions’. Alternative readings have furnished positions in Miltonic secondary literature that depict Milton as either ‘suspicious’ of passions and ‘for’ reason, or ‘for’ a feeling-centred epic that seeks to soften claims for Milton’s rationalism. However, much scholarship does not acknowledge Milton’s sophistication of doing both: passions of the sensitive appetite can be rationalized through reason, or even become acts of reason if they take place in the will.

To make a case for this possibility, I examined two passages from Books 4 and 8 which indicate the presence of a rational passion in \textit{Paradise Lost}. Love as a passion has an extensive legacy both in classical, medieval, and early modern sources on the passions; ‘love in reason’ was suggested to be grounded in an Aristotelian account of reason and the passions. In this account, love ‘in reason’ could imply that the passion becomes rational by participating ‘in reason’, similar to Aristotle’s desire taking place \textit{en logistikon}. However, a closer look at the complexity of Aristotle’s three-fold notion of desire could also indicate that love ‘in reason’ would be a love (Adam’s desire for Eve) that is also a form of desire: a \textit{boulesis}. This is a desire for the good, which is rational because its rational ends are only those that can be pursued by rational creatures. Thus, although Aristotle dismisses sexual relations as proper rational ends,

\[75 \text{Fallon,} \textit{Milton Among the Philosophers,} 80–1, 102.\]
because he sees sexual desire to belong to lower-order tactile desires reserved for beasts, Milton instead upholds the value of sexual desires, but only such passions that have been purified in the clean waters of reason. Indeed, instead of outlawing love-making from Heaven, Milton seems to endorse an angelic version of it. The idea that Milton’s love ‘in reason’ is in fact only a passion of the sensitive appetite that has participated in reason is further evidenced by Aquinas’ and early modern accounts of the passions and reason.

Yet the Thomist equivocation of ‘rational / intellectual appetite’ with ‘will’ revealed that love ‘in reason’ could also be an example of Milton’s missing affectiones from among the epic’s vocabulary of the passions. Instead of maintaining the traditional definition of affectiones as immaterial acts of will, Milton revises the concept to encompass material connotations. This is again made possible by the existence of a heavenly form of angelic corporeality and sex, whereby the angels are even able to blush rosy red. Thus, instead of displacing ‘passions’ in higher natures by reserving them only for this life, Milton’s passion of love is so central that it provides the bliss of terrestrial existence, the heart of obedience to God, the means to transcendent life, the ‘happiness’ of angelic beings, and the passion that characterizes interactions between Father and Son. Rational passions, or perhaps physical affectiones, are thus critical to developing his concept of reason and the will. Without understanding the passions, we cannot understand Milton’s concept of reason, will, and choice, nor with it, his idea of agency and ethics. Without understanding the will, then we cannot make sense of the poem overall and its aim to understand the fall of mankind.
CONCLUSION

‘SOLID THINGS IN [WORDS]’: WHAT MILTONISTS CAN LEARN FROM PASSIONS

Early modern studies has come to an ‘affective turn’, but the complexity of this sub-field begins even at the signification ‘affect’; the interest in affect and the body is not recent but also expanding as it realises how affect featured in every aspect of early modern life; the reasons for the current trend grow out of a desire to talk reasonably about selfhood and agency, to explore the relationship between Renaissance language and phenomenology, and to discuss the origins of modernity through the lens of the senses, passions, humours and Galenic physiology. I have also argued that the sub-field has exposed literary studies’ inclination to make literature and philosophy hostile to each other, but that ‘affect’ pushes literature into interdisciplinary realms and methodologies.

The dissertation Passions on Trial aims to develop Milton’s concept of the passions. But his concept does not sit easily with literary models that assume the modern emotion-reason schema is similar to certain seventeenth-century discourses on passions and reason. His writing also contradicts the medical-anatomical approach in the secondary field implying that the early modern body was mainly a physical, passive object, because Miltonic passions reinstate agency in matter itself. Milton’s active passions therefore rework the material body as an active knower with different levels of agency. Chapter 1 analyses these two problems in the secondary literature and surveys what has been established so far. It points out areas that need further consideration in light of Milton’s thinking on the passions, such as his animated monism and epistemology. It also highlights how Milton’s idea of passions complicates circular and linear narratives of historical authorship. By arguing for the modification of the two problems, and by showing how the larger scholarly backdrop has also advanced these concerns, the chapter intimates that the field is nearing an ‘ethical turn’. There is an increasing appreciation within the discipline for thinking about the early modern self as an ethical agent inhabiting a moral landscape. Ordinary decisions lead either to a deeper descent into the body, or to the refashioning and remodeling of the self’s own material stuff by ethical norms. Thus, the field is increasingly characterized by an attraction to early modern debates on substance, epistemology, the praising of feeling and the dangers of pleasures, and why morality matters.

Having characterised two problems in the field as the ‘problem of dualism’ and the ‘problem of materialism’ and highlighted the major responses, Chapter 2 sets to argue against
the first problem. It evidences how Milton seems to present a blended picture of passion and reason, shows how both terms imply a degree of materialism across his writings, and confirms Fallon’s theory of animated monism. This chapter contributes another corrective to the growing area of scholarship that recognizes how even post-Cartesian accounts did not always separate passion and reason. Milton’s engagement with past terminology for the passions, the surprising overall decline of the English term ‘affection’ in his last three poems, and his lifelong avoidance of the Latin term passiones reveals a history of semantic selection and consciousness of the relation between language and phenomenology: how words, like vessels, could contain ontological positions on materialism and immaterialism. It also discusses how the field is troubled when it tries to decide Milton’s stance as either dualist or monist based on his use of metaphor or literal language, and how this problem with language features even into early modern accounts of the passions in Hobbes and Descartes. The chapter therefore cautions assumptions that take ‘figurative’ to mean ‘immaterial’ and ‘literal’ to mean ‘material’ or ‘actual’, and suggests the need to develop other routes to early modern thinking on material substance.

Chapter 3 argues against the second problem in secondary scholarship, the ‘problem of materialism’, that severs mind from body and therefore drains the material body of agency. But Chapter 3 builds on Chapter 2 by asserting that Milton’s connection between passion and reason reverses the picture of the passive, material body and depicts matter as rational, cognitive, and free. It therefore shows that at least some versions of early modern materialism were not considered to be ‘mechanistic’, and argues that early modern physiology was central to epistemology. It evidences how Miltonic passions are inscribed with the shocking language of agency and moral responsibility to overturn the portrait of ‘passive’, unconscious passions. The chapter also explores two pictures of passions in connection with knowledge: the image of passions as obstacles to knowledge, and the image of passions as sources as knowledge. Both images recast the material body as a knowing agent, but do so with some complications. Agency-ridden passions complicate a straightforward notion of agency, and seem to leave early moderns with the option of blaming their passions instead of themselves for deception. Frequent references to personal, internal passions in political discourses also suggests an unsettling degree of comfort with subjectivity in making knowledge-statements, but it is a version of subjectivity that seems far more public than private.

Chapter 4 analyses Milton’s affective vocabulary in Paradise Lost. By avoiding the assumption that passions in Paradise and Hell correspond to contemporary emotions, the chapter uncovers Milton’s own choice of words for narrating what his culture thought to be the
central event in human history. The study uncovers a vast array of historical affective
termiology, such as the nouns passion, perturbation, motion, commotion, appetite, and the verb
to feel. Passion, in Milton’s epic, is reserved only for Adam and Eve (on either side of the fall)
and for the fallen angels. This reveals that ‘passion’ never characterizes God (although Milton
suggests otherwise in De Doctrina Christiana) or the obedient angels. The chapter suggests
that, in contrast to his theological treatise De Doctrina Christiana, ‘passion’ inside Paradise
Lost is something distinctly human. It seems to mark those who are foreknown to fall, which
raises complications for his free-will theodicy. But the word study also reveals the surprising
absence of ‘affection’ and deliberates that this omission is intentional. It also shows how
‘desire’ outnumbers the use of ‘passion’ and is used more for Satan than the human couple. The
chapter suggests that Milton’s poetry is caught in the act of a linguistic isolation, where
‘desires’ were eventually detached from the traditional list of passions and considered to be a
new category for explaining human behavior.

Chapter 5 examines the relationship between reason and passion in the poem, and
argues that Milton’s political images for the relationship are drawn from the deeper
philosophical accounts of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. Specifically, it studies the poetic
function of reason in Satan and in Adam and Eve. The poem expresses the decay of reason in
Satan through linguistic ambiguity. Adam and Eve show proper awareness of reason’s role, but
then seem to forget reason’s lower neighbors, the passions. Only Raphael rehearses the
relationship between reason and passion. This curious neglect of passion by the human couple is
foreboding. The chapter argues that Adam and Eve’s ignorance suggests Milton’s critical
attitude towards the Augustinian model of ‘intuitive reason’ and Stoicism’s model that
dismisses passion because it leaves the human couple unaware and unprepared in ethical
practice.

Chapter 6 focuses on two passages in Paradise Lost Book 4 and Book 8 that
demonstrate the integration of passion and reason. These two occasions are moments where
Milton places the passion of love ‘in reason’. Examining classical sources and Milton’s own
contemporaries establishes the history of love as a passion in all passion-lists. The chapter also
evidences the historical practice of placing passions ‘in reason’ from Plato and Aristotle up to
seventeenth-century passion-treatises, and therefore makes the case that the two passages in the
poem identify passions of the sense appetite that have been rationalized by their participation ‘in
reason’. But there is another understanding of passion that takes place ‘in reason’ according to
Aquinas, as the ‘rational or intellectual appetite’ could also signify ‘will’. Recalling the
historicised context to Milton’s affective vocabulary in Chapter 2 reveals that Aquinas
sometimes reserved the term *affectiones* for immaterial movements exclusively in the will. But findings from Chapter 4 also highlight the strange suppression of the word ‘affection’ across the epic. The chapter thus concludes by arguing for an example of Miltonic inconsistency: is Milton’s love ‘in reason’ a rationalized passion of the bodily sense appetite, or an immaterial passion (*affectiones*) of the will? The case could be made that Milton uses the phrase ‘love in reason’ to allude to the unique action that only *affectiones* could perform, except that in *Paradise Lost*, he materializes a term that historically was set aside for special immaterial happenings. Once more, this reaffirms Milton’s on-going interest in materialism for human ethics. It also realises the body’s contribution to the Fall, which is not an Augustinian ‘fall into the body’ because the body is already a good itself – existing, active, and perplexing. Instead Milton comes to something like a ‘fall out of the body’ such that disharmony erupts between all levels of the material human condition.

So what can Miltonists learn from early modern passions? This dissertation has sought to convince Miltonists that passions belong to early modern narratives of morality and ethics. While the Galenic-humoural attitude towards early modern passions in the field was part of an initial thrust to reconsider the importance of the body and emotion, it consequently has tended to project dualism between passion and reason, and then diluted agency by seeing the material body as humourally determined. *Passions on Trial* has argued that this framework is inadequate for explaining Milton’s treatment of the soul’s movements, one that amounts to a moral vision of the material body that blends passion and reason and portrays passion as active in constructing knowledge of the world. In this view, passions are not identical to emotions; further, passions are saturated with reason and reason is deeply passionate; and finally, passions are active, assertive agents in the experience of daily life. In Eden, passions are essential to being human. They are the very spectacles through which the unfallen experience life but also the lenses through which the corrupt see the world. Adam and Eve learn that there are better ways of handling passions than others. That better way starts by acknowledging the presence of these agents and their inherent kinship with reason. Finally, the category of the immaterial, distinguished by the word ‘affection’, no longer seems necessary for Milton. Rather matter itself is alive, cognitive, and intimately enmeshed with the body that we recognize as ourselves. Miltonists should thus heed the poet’s own advice to take words seriously and ‘stud[y] the solid things in them’.¹

APPENDIX: LIST OF MILTON’S TERMS AND THEIR FREQUENCY, 1608 – 1674*

To avoid dating controversies which would throw a twist in an otherwise simple exercise and set an entirely different tone to this dissertation in its final pages, the chart below follows, where possible, scholarly consensus (in Lewalski, Gordon Campbell, Patterson, and Hale) regarding the chronology of Milton’s writing rather than publication dates.\(^1\) This method best catches the years or decades in which Milton is writing and thinking about the passions and affections since some material is published several decades after composition, if not posthumously.

By the category ‘Passiones and variants’, I mean only etymological connotations implying movements of the soul. Establishing these parameters reveals the shocking absence of *passiones* used in this exclusive sense in all his major Latin writings. The Latin term does appear infrequently and rarely, but either signals Christ’s divine atonement or Aristotelian categories of passion and action for material substance. For instance, *passivus* appears three times in different variants in ‘Prolusio 4’, but only ever in reference to material substance. *Passionis* and *passio* occur twice, and *passione* once in *De Doctrina Christiana* to refer to Christ’s passion. Further, *passio* occurs twice in *Ars Logicae* under a section on the common qualities of adjuncts. I include, however, the singular use of the noun ‘passion’ from ‘Il Penseroso’ because it is not clear whether this passion is an imitation of Christ’s ‘holy’ sacrifice or a passion of the soul. But in the overall word count I do not include the term from the poem ‘The Passion’, which is clearly an instance of the former and not the latter.

This chart does not present an exhaustive list of his Latin prose and poetry, however. I limit the study to the *Prolusiones*, some personal letters, three of his Latin polemical treatises, *De Doctrina Christiana* and *Ars Logicae*. A more comprehensive study would require a search of his Latin letters of state and all his Latin poetry and personal letters. But what becomes apparent even in this limited list is a linguistic pause concerning a word that classical Greek, Roman, and Christian thinkers were eager to accept, and which was central to almost every aspect of life and thought in seventeenth-century England.

*N/A – indicates the term is absent. Sometimes this is obvious because the language is English and not Latin, or vice versa. But there are many occasions where it is absent for no apparent reason. That is most interesting.

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ABBREVIATIONS


MP Modern Philology


Passions and Subjectivity Brian Cummings and Freya Sierhuis, The Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture (United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2013)

PMLA Modern Language Association of America


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Ettenhuber, Katrin. “‘Tears of Passion’ and ‘inordinate Lamentation’: Complicated Grief in Donne and Augustine”. In The Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture, edited by Brian Cummings and Freya Sierhuis, 201–216. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013.


