Making a Creative City with Chinese Characteristics: Perspectives from Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei

Kristina Karvelyte

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds
School of Media and Communication

January 2017
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

The right of Kristina Karvelyte to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

© 2017 The University of Leeds and Kristina Karvelyte
Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to express my deepest and sincere gratitude to my supervisors Professor Kate Oakley and Dr Giorgia Aiello. Dear Kate and Giorgia, without your help, encouragement and relentless support I would have never reached the end of this incredibly challenging and demanding journey. I am grateful for your patience, insights and all the knowledge that you have shared with me. You taught me a lot and I could not imagine myself having a better supervision team. I hope I managed to live up to your expectations.

I am also very grateful for my family and friends – those who understood (and those who tried to understand) – my struggles and frustrations; those who celebrated together every victory and achievement (however small and insignificant it may have seemed); and most importantly, those who continued to encourage me despite all my failures and numerous doubts. You made me believe that I can do it, and… well, I did it. My special thanks goes to my mom and dad – for always being here for me; for Fre – for your patience, contagious sense of calmness and the ability to make me laugh no matter what; for Luca, Michelle and Nela – sharing the hardships of this journey (as well as life in Leeds in general) with you made it somewhat easier; for Jen – you are a very good listener and a very good friend; and for Daniel – your advice and insights will always be greatly appreciated!

Lastly I would also like to thank all my interviewees – without you this thesis would have never been completed. Thank you so much for allocating time to meet and talk to me. Thank you for your openness and genuine desire to help.

Thank you all.

It is time for me to start writing a new chapter now.
Abstract
The global appeal of culture-led urban development is commonly attributed to the increased inter-city competition for foreign investment, talents and tourists. But this reason alone is insufficient in explaining the ‘cultural turn’ in East Asian cities, which do not fit into the framework of the post-industrial ‘entrepreneurial’ city. Urban cultural policies and the meanings attached to them transform as they move from one site to another, and it is therefore imperative to consider the historical, cultural and political specificities and complexities that shape and define them. This research aims to explore the context and continuous transformation of the creative city policy discourse in three Chinese cities. Specifically, it examines the understandings that urban policymakers attach to the ‘display’ (Williams, 1984) role of the creative city in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei, interrogating the reasons behind the adoption of ‘imported’ templates of large-scale cultural events and the decision to promote cities as creative. Drawing on thematic analysis of policy documents and semi-structured elite interviews, this study found that in all three cities, policies have been adopted primarily as a political rather than as an entrepreneurial strategy. The findings reveal mutation as a two-way process: the ‘imported’ cultural policies not only are transformed by the city, but they also transform the city’s approach to culture and the arts, which has both positive and negative implications. This research contributes to the developing field of policy mobility and the understanding of urban cultural policy in Chinese cities.
## Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ iii  
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... iv 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................. v 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... ix  
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... x 

### Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 1  
1.1 Research context and rationale .................................................................................... 1  
1.2 Clarification of key terms .............................................................................................. 7  
  1.2.1 Cultural turn ........................................................................................................... 7  
  1.2.2 Creative city .......................................................................................................... 8  
  1.2.3 International cultural events .................................................................................. 9  
1.3 Chapter outline ............................................................................................................ 10 

### Chapter 2 The Emergence and Transformation of Urban Cultural Policies as ‘Display’ ..................................................................................................................... 13 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 13 
2.2 Instrumentalisation, governance and display of urban cultural policies ......................... 15  
  2.2.1 Instrumentalisation of urban cultural policy ......................................................... 15  
  2.2.2 The city as a promoter of culture: governance models of the arts ...................... 20  
  2.2.3 Culture as promoter of a city: symbolic and entrepreneurial display .................. 25  
2.3 Displaying culture in the creative cities ....................................................................... 31  
  2.3.1 Entrepreneurial cities and the cultural turn ......................................................... 31  
  2.3.2 The ‘creative city’ as an entrepreneurial strategy ................................................ 33  
  2.3.3 Large-scale cultural events as ‘display’ practice of the creative city ....................... 38  
2.4 Policy transfer and travelling discourses of urban cultural policies ......................... 48  
  2.4.1 Policies in movement: from diffusion to mutation ................................................ 48  
  2.4.2 The mobility and transformation of the creative city policy discourse ..................... 56  
  2.4.3 The making of creative cities in East Asia ............................................................ 61  
2.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 66
Chapter 3 Research Methodology ........................................................................ 68

3.1 Research purpose and questions ................................................................. 68
3.2 Research approach and strategy ................................................................. 70
3.3 Selection of cases .......................................................................................... 72
3.4 Data collection methods ............................................................................... 76
   3.4.1 Documents ............................................................................................... 77
   3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews .................................................................... 81
3.5 Data analysis ................................................................................................ 86
3.6 Ethical issues and considerations ................................................................. 90

Chapter 4 Re-creating the Paris of the East: The State-led Cultural Turn in Shanghai ................................................................. 92

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 92
4.2 Contextual background: building the state-led creative city ....................... 94
   4.2.1 China’s opening-up: from the economy to culture .................................. 94
   4.2.2 The rise of globalising and creative Shanghai ..................................... 101
   4.2.3 The governance model for culture as display in Shanghai ............... 107
4.3 Contextualising culture as display: Shanghai’s perspective ...................... 110
   4.3.1 Display as city promotion ...................................................................... 110
   4.3.2 Display as symbolic power .................................................................... 113
   4.3.3 Display as global node .......................................................................... 116
   4.3.4 Display as platform .............................................................................. 118
4.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 121

Chapter 5 Present in Absence: Preserving the Global City Identity of Hong Kong ............................................................... 123

5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 123
5.2 Contextual background: from ‘cultural desert’ to global creative city? .......... 124
   5.2.1 Selective interventionism and other colonial legacies ......................... 124
   5.2.2 Political transition and the question of identity .................................... 127
   5.2.3 The role of culture in the ‘Asia’s world city’ ....................................... 130
   5.2.4 Shifting governance models of culture as display ............................ 136
5.3 Contextualising culture as display: Hong Kong’s perspective ................. 140
   5.3.1 Display as city promotion ...................................................................... 140
   5.3.2 Display as symbolic power .................................................................... 143
   5.3.3 Display as global node .......................................................................... 145
   5.3.4 Display as platform .............................................................................. 147
Chapter 6 Harvesting the Fruits of Sustained Cultural Development in Taipei: From Emulator to Educator? ................................. 153

6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 153
6.2 Contextual background: the capital of Chinese culture? ................................ 154
   6.2.1 Chinese Taipei .......................................................................................... 154
   6.2.2 State-led instrumentalisation of culture and identity politics ............... 155
   6.2.3 The politics of urban governance and development in Taipei ......... 159
   6.2.4 Building the Capital of Chinese Culture and Creativity .................. 163
6.3 Contextualising culture as display: Taipei’s perspective ....................... 169
   6.3.1 Display as promotion ............................................................................ 169
   6.3.2 Display as symbolic power .................................................................. 172
   6.3.3 Display as global node .......................................................................... 174
   6.3.4 Display as platform ................................................................................ 176
6.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 180

Chapter 7 Creative City with Chinese Characteristics ................................. 182

7.1 Motives for adoption: global city making .................................................. 182
7.2 Transformation patterns ............................................................................... 185
   7.2.1 Global and regional connections .......................................................... 185
   7.2.2 Ideological and political frameworks ............................................... 187
   7.2.3 Regulatory and funding mechanisms of urban cultural policy ....... 188
   7.2.4 ‘Traditional’ agenda of local cultural policy ..................................... 190
7.3 Integration patterns ......................................................................................... 191

Chapter 8 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 198

8.1 Thesis summary and contributions .............................................................. 198
8.2 Limitations and directions for future research ......................................... 201
8.3 Final reflections ............................................................................................... 204

Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 206

Appendix A Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei: Basic Facts ............................... 236

Appendix B Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei: Public Spending on Culture ............................................................................................... 238

B.1 Public expenditure on culture as % of total city spending ....................... 238
B.2 Public spending on culture (2001-2016) ..................................................... 238
Appendix C Original Titles of Key Policy Documents .............................. 239
Appendix D List of Interviewees ............................................................... 241
Appendix E Interview Questions ............................................................. 245
   D.1 Sample for Shanghai ................................................................. 245
   D.2 Sample for Hong Kong ............................................................. 246
   D.3 Sample for Taipei ................................................................. 247
Appendix F List of themes ................................................................. 248
Appendix G Consent Form ................................................................. 252
Appendix H Information Sheet ............................................................ 254
List of Tables

Table 1  Types of events ............................................................................................................. 75
Table 2  List of policy documents................................................................. 79
List of Abbreviations

ACT – Shanghai International Contemporary Theatre Festival
CCP – Chinese Communist Party
CEDB – Commerce and Economic Development Bureau (HKSAR)
CPU – Central Policy Unit (HKSAR)
DCA – Department of Cultural Affairs (Taipei)
DPP – Democratic Progressive Party
HAB – Home Affairs Bureau (HKSAR)
HK – Hong Kong
HKADC – Hong Kong Arts Development Council
HKAF – Hong Kong Arts Festival
HKIFF – Hong Kong International Film Festival
HKSAR – Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
HKYD 2012 – Hong Kong Year of Design 2012
KMT – Kuomintang (also known as Chinese Nationalist Party)
LCSD – Leisure and Cultural Services Department (HKSAR)
PRC – People’s Republic of China
ROC – Republic of China (also referred to as ‘Taiwan’)
SH – Shanghai
SIAF – China Shanghai International Arts Festival
SIFF – Shanghai International Film Festival
TAF – Taipei Arts Festival
TCC – Taipei City Council
TCF – Taipei Culture Foundation
TFF – Taipei Film Festival
TP – Taipei
WKCD – West Kowloon Cultural District
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Research context and rationale

More than three decades ago, Raymond Williams (1984) made a compelling argument regarding the roles allocated to culture by the state, noting that culture and the arts tend to be used as ‘display’ of “a particular social order” (p. 3). According to Williams, the nation-state both inadvertently and deliberately uses culture and the arts to promote, embellish, and ultimately, to make this ‘particular social order’ more effective. This, in turn, assists in strengthening the power and influence of the state. In this thesis, I apply Williams’ argument to cities, wherein the use of culture as ‘display’ has become increasingly pronounced over the last three decades following the so-called ‘cultural turn’ (Zukin, 1995) in urban development.

A good example illustrating the growing significance of display practices within urban cultural policy is the global circulation of the ‘creative city’ thesis (see Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002). Presented as an innovative way to promote the city and to rejuvenate its economy through cultural products and services, this policy programme has occupied a prominent position in the policy agenda of many cities across the globe.

In the Global North, creative city ‘making’ is largely linked with the market-driven agendas of the so-called ‘entrepreneurial cities’ (Harvey, 1989a). Since the late 1970s, the seemingly declining power of the nation-state, the growing inter-urban competition for capital and labour as well as the transition from industrial to service economies, have forced many cities in Europe and North America to adopt a new ‘entrepreneurial’ approach to urban development. Consequently, “making the urban core attractive” (Grodach and Silver, 2013: 4) has become one of the most crucial objectives attached to their cultural policy agendas. This, in turn, has contributed to

---

1 ‘Culture’ is very complex and highly contested term. In this thesis, I will refer to ‘culture’ primarily in its narrow ‘aesthetic’ sense, where it is perceived as a set of artistic practices and activities (Lewis and Miller, 2003). I recognise how problematic this understanding can be, considering that the scope of ‘culture’ that falls under the realm of cultural policy can be much broader. In this thesis, the term ‘culture’ is used in relation to the cultural turn in urban development, where it is closely attached to another very broad and contested term, that is, ‘creativity’. This further complicates the task of defining the term. Therefore, during my empirical study, I avoided setting any clear boundaries for both ‘culture’ and ‘creativity’, allowing the subjects of my research to define them for me in the context of creative city making.
the growing number of ‘creative cities’, all aspiring to “differentiate themselves, and to sell themselves as centres of culture” (Leslie, 2005: 403). In these cities, culture and the arts are used as display practices for capital accumulation and growth. Coupled with the broad notion of ‘creativity’, they are placed at the centre of the policy narratives for their supposedly wide-ranging contributions to the economy, urban regeneration, city promotion and ‘quality of life’ (Harvey, 1990; Zukin, 1991; McGuigan, 2004; Gray, 2007).

Creative city policy programmes have not been confined to the cities in the Global North. Since the late 1990s, a number of East Asian cities have also shown an increased interest in urban cultural policies. One after the other they have been pursuing titles like ‘creative city’, ‘cultural capital’, and ‘cultural and creative metropolis’ (Yeoh, 2005; Kong et al., 2006; Pang, 2012; Kim, 2015). This trend is particularly acute in the largest (or capital) cities in the region, such as Singapore, Osaka, Hong Kong, Taipei, Seoul, Beijing and Shanghai.

To a certain extent, the cultural turn in East Asia echoes that in Europe, North America and Australia. As with most entrepreneurial cities in the Global North, the creative city policy script in East Asia has also been approached as a ‘neoliberal policy experiment’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Local policymakers in Asia commonly present and promote western formats of urban cultural policies as a means of shifting from industrial to service economies, attracting foreign investment, skilled workers and tourists, and more generally, as tools for enhancing the comparative advantage of cities (Ooi, 1995; Yeoh, 2005; Kong, 2007; Lee and Lim, 2014; Kim, 2015).

It should be noted, however, that East Asian cities do not entirely fit into the conventional framework of the post-industrial entrepreneurial city. They have not experienced the same extent of deindustrialisation as their counterparts in Europe or North America (Gu, 2012; Hutton, 2012). Moreover, contrary to the Global North, where neoliberal capitalist economies have weakened “older gatekeeping functions” (Sassen, 2006: 46) of the nation-state, in many East Asian cities the state remains at the centre of all developments. Therefore, unlike other cities in Europe, North America or Australia, urban cultural policy strategies in most East Asian cities are still closely attached to the interests of the state (Kong, 2007; Lee and Lim, 2014; Kim, 2015).

---

2 ‘East Asia’ can be defined from various perspectives. In this thesis, I refer to East Asia as a geographical area comprising of countries and territories that historically have been exposed and influenced by Chinese cultural practices and traditions. Specifically, it includes China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea.
This indicates that East Asian cities are likely to diverge in noteworthy ways from the western script of the creative city. Indeed, upon its ‘arrival’ in Asia, the creative city policy model had acquired new meanings and roles. For instance, in many large East Asian cities, the adoption of the creative city thesis is linked with their aspirations for a ‘world city’ status (Lee, 2004; Yeoh, 2005; Kong, 2007; Kong, 2012; Pang, 2012). The creative city has hardly ever assumed such a role in Europe and North America, where urban growth is much slower and more settled than in Asia.

It is also important to stress that the ways in which the cultural turn in urban development is addressed by each city within East Asia also vary. As shown in the study by Kong et al (2006), the degree of engagement with the idea of culture-led urban development and the understanding of the key concepts related to this trend differ from place to place. These more nuanced divergences are determined by the specific historical and political settings of the city and its nation-state. For instance, considering that in China urban cultural policies are shaped predominantly by the central government in Beijing, they are more likely to reflect on the national interests rather than the policies followed in Hong Kong, where the government refrains from providing any specific guidance to the cultural sector (Ooi, 1995; White and Xu, 2012).

Overall, this indicates that while all creative cities in East Asia adopt very similar policy narratives and terminology, the meanings attached to the creative city policy discourse in different cities are reconstructed to accommodate the specific policy agenda and needs of the place. In other words, like any other travelling policy discourses, urban cultural policies transform and ‘mutate’ as they move in time and space from one policy-making site to another (Peck, 2011b; Peck, 2011a).

It should be noted that the literature on cultural policy mobility is still relatively scarce with a small number of authors contributing to the debate (see J. Wang, 2004; Pratt, 2009; Peck, 2009; Peck, 2011a; Prince, 2010a; Prince, 2012a). In those studies that did approach the mobility of cultural policies, little attempt was made to investigate the changes that occur within these policies as they follow particular routes determined by history and by the geopolitics of different places. Also, few authors addressed this phenomenon as a “multisited social process” (Peck and Theodore, 2012: 24). As a result, the prevailing policy transformation patterns across different policy-making sites are often left unexplored.

This comparative multisite study attempts to address these gaps in the literature. The main intention of my thesis is to understand how imported urban cultural policies are embedded, and hence transformed, within different historical, political and cultural settings. Drawing on semi-structured elite interviews and the analysis of policy
documents, I approach this question by interrogating the understanding of the creative city as ‘display’ in three global Chinese cities. Specifically, I examine and compare the rationales behind the adoption of this idea in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong and the meanings that urban policymakers in these three cities attach to one particular display practice of the creative city – imported templates of large-scale cultural events. In doing this, the study marks one of the first attempts to address cultural events as globalising policy discourses that travel and transform. Large-scale international cultural events, specifically arts festivals, film festivals and major design events, were chosen among other creative city policy strategies, because they are one of the most commonly used means of display in the cities (McGuigan, 2004).

As noted above, one major task of this study was to interrogate the reasons behind the adoption of the creative city policy script, as well as the influence of the particular historical and political conditions in shaping the understanding of the creative city policy script in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong. My first research question, therefore, was: What does it mean for these cities to be recognised as cultural/creative and what prompted their interest in the policy discourse of the creative city?

To gain an in-depth perspective of the display role attached to the policy script of the creative city, I then turned to the tasks ascribed to large-scale cultural events, posing the second research question: What meanings and rationales do urban policymakers attach to international large-scale cultural events, and why?

Another crucial step in this study was to compare the findings from all three cities and to identify the key differences and similarities in the cities’ understanding of the display role of the creative city. Addressing similar patterns as well as distinctive characteristics in the ‘de/reterritorialisation’ (Lowry and McCann, 2011) of the creative city policy discourse was imperative to disclose major factors that influence and shape the understanding of imported urban cultural policies. This objective prompted the third research question: How, if at all, does the approach to culture as city’s display practice differ in three Chinese cities? How is it similar? Why?

In the course of the research, it soon became apparent that in order to gain a fully rounded view of the transformations that occur as a result of the transfer of urban cultural policies, I must address not only the cities’ impact on these policies, but also the policies’ impact on these cities. My last research question, therefore, was: How, if at all, has the cultural turn affected the urban policymakers’ approach to culture and the arts?

The study was focused primarily on Chinese cities, because of the historical and the contemporary centrality of China in East Asia (see Kang, 2010). Over the last two
decades, following its rapid economic growth, the economic and political influence of the People’s Republic of China (henceforth, PRC) in the region and beyond has significantly increased. Being the second largest world economy and one of the major political players in the global arena, China is now a hot topic of discussion in both academic and popular press around the globe. Although research on China is expanding, there are still many study areas on this subject that need more focused attention and an in-depth analysis. Given my language skills and familiarity with the region, I aim to contribute analyses of urban cultural policies in China. 

By addressing creative city-making in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei, my study adds to the developing body of literature on this subject.

Taipei, Hong Kong and Shanghai have different types of relationship with mainland China. They are all deeply linked with the PRC, but with varying degrees of intensity. As a result, all three cities have developed different urban identities and adopted distinct approaches to governance models of cultural policy. Out of three, Shanghai is the only city that is situated in mainland China and the only one that falls directly under the jurisdiction of the central government of the PRC. Hong Kong’s integration with mainland China is still under way. In 1997, this former British colony was returned to China as the Special Administrative Region (SAR), which means that it is still largely, but by no means entirely, independent from the central government in Beijing. Out of three Chinese cities, Taipei has the weakest political connection with mainland China. All decisions in Taipei are enacted independently from the central government of the PRC and the question of whether Taiwan together with its capital city Taipei belongs to the PRC or not remains the subject of much debate.

Despite notable differences in governance and political system, it is generally agreed that since the 1980s, there has been an increase in economic interconnectivities between the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Copper, 2003; Chun, 2007). Chun (2007) coined the phrase ‘China Triangle’ to describe the phenomenon, noting that whilst initially the ‘miracle economies’ of Taiwan and Hong Kong constituted the nucleus of the Triangle, over the last two decades its centre has shifted to mainland China.

3 I hold a BA in Asian Studies (Sinology) from Vilnius University.
4 To date, the international status of Taiwan remains undecided. Therefore, although in the PRC, Taiwan, including its capital city Taipei, is officially considered to be an integral part of the PRC’s territory, this matter is still under dispute (see also Chapter 6).
5 It should be noted that since the 1980s, due to the growing interconnectivity between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, these territories have been commonly referred to as ‘Greater China’ (da zhongguo or da zhonghua). However, over the last decade, this term has been increasingly criticised for its ambiguity. Many scholars indicated the uncertainty regarding the actual sites constituting ‘Greater China’ and questioned their political interconnectivity and uneven nature of economic and cultural flows (Rawnsley and Rawnsley, 2003; Copper, 2003; Chun, 2007).
Consequently, as Chun (2007) further observes, “the rules of the game that define the system have been rewritten” (p. 40) resulting in Taiwan and Hong Kong’s growing dependence on China.

In addition to strong investment and trade ties, these three Chinese cities are also undoubtedly deeply interlinked culturally, because they all share “a common ethnicity, language, history, and world-view” (Tu, 1991: 14). In this respect, they all belong to one symbolic system that Tu (1991) famously referred to as ‘Cultural China’.

Altogether these interconnectivities among three cities provide a particularly instructive setting for exploring the transformation of imported urban cultural policies. The existing cultural roots and social practices that tie these Chinese cities together reduce the number of variables that can influence different understandings and interpretations of western urban cultural policies in a non-western context. At the same time, these three cities provide the context through which the relationship between imported urban cultural policies and other policy areas is (re)shaped and (re)articulated. In this respect, their cultural, economic and political interdependencies add a whole new dimension to the study of cultural policy transfer. Individually, each of these cities presents an excellent case for examining the influence of distinct historical and political settings on imported cultural policy discourses and vice versa. Combined together, they constitute a strong base for a comparative study. Different meanings behind the display practices of the creative city in Taipei, Hong Kong and Shanghai expose the full spectrum of rationales attached to the creative city policy script in Chinese cities. In addition to revealing the making of the creative city with Chinese characteristics, the comparative analysis also contributes to our understanding of the display role of urban cultural policies in China and East Asia more generally.

In the next section, I will define the key terms of this study, specifically ‘cultural turn’, ‘creative city’ and ‘cultural events’.

---

The shifting geographic centre of ‘Greater China’ from Taiwan and Hong Kong to mainland China over the last two decades has raised additional concerns about this contested term (see Chun, 2007).

6 Tu (1991) identified three overlapping symbolic universes that comprise Cultural China. The first includes the areas populated predominantly by ethnic Chinese, including mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The second symbolic universe comprises other Chinese communities, generally referred to as the Chinese diaspora scattered across the world. The third symbolic universe consists of Chinese and non-Chinese intellectuals that study China.
1.2 Clarification of key terms

1.2.1 Cultural turn

A ‘cultural turn’ is an ambiguous term. It was first introduced to refer to the epistemological and methodological shift in social sciences, particularly in the fields of sociology and economic geography (see Thrift and Olds, 1996; Barnes, 2001; Garnham, 2005). Here, since the late 1960s, the subject of ‘culture’ has been increasingly placed at the centre of attention following the general recognition among scholars that ‘culture’ is “somehow critical to understanding what is happening to (...) contemporary economic and organisational life” (Gay and Pryke, 2002: 1).

However, since the mid-1990s, the notion of the ‘cultural turn’ (also known as the ‘creative turn’) has also been increasingly applied to describe a widening use of symbolic and aesthetic practices in urban and regional development policies (Zukin, 1995; Gibson and Klocker, 2005; Pratt, 2009). The emergence and growing prominence of the domain of urban cultural policy that is “directed at supporting the arts, culture, and creative activity” (Grodach and Silver, 2013: 4) exemplifies this global trend. In my thesis, I use the term ‘cultural turn’ to refer to this particular phenomenon.

The cultural turn in urban development was prompted in the late 1980s, by shifting spatial power relations, growing inter-city competition, increased labour mobility, and a rapid decline in manufacturing industries (Sassen, 2006; Isar et al., 2012; Short, 2012; Grodach and Silver, 2013). It can be broadly characterised by the widening scope of the instrumentalisation of culture, where particular focus rests on those cultural policy strategies that are seen as ‘useful’ to the city’s promotion, regeneration and economic growth. Typically, these strategies revolve around the building of cultural landmarks and creative districts, the hosting of cultural events, and the development of the cultural and creative industries.

The idea of ‘creativity’ as human capital is a key theme in this “embrace of a particular version of ‘the cultural’” (Gibson and Klocker, 2005: 94, emphasis added). The word ‘creativity’ increasingly occurs in policy narratives following the rise of the discourses of information society and knowledge economy, which “assigned a central role to idea generation, creativity and knowledge” (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 170). The concept of ‘creativity’ is imbued with overly positive connotations. As Williams (2011 [1961]) observes, there is no word that “carries a more consistently positive reference than ‘creative’” (p. 19). The inherently positive nature of the word ‘creativity’ along with its broad meaning, which implies its wide-ranging applicability, “at times makes the word seem useless” (ibid.). At the same time, it is
precisely these two key features that make the word ‘creativity’ appear universally relevant and compatible with ‘culture’.

Culture and creativity have become increasingly linked together in the early 1990s. The attachment of creativity to culture signifies the reconciliation between the economy and culture, which ultimately underpins the cultural turn in urban development. The tensions that emerge from conjoining these two terms, specifically “the contradictions between a particular economic and a specific cultural logic” (Pratt, 2011: 124), indicate not only the market-driven rationale behind the cultural turn, but also the opportunistic rhetoric that tends to accompany urban cultural policies (see also Hesmondhalgh, 2008; Grodach and Silver, 2013). In this research, for the most part, both terms – ‘culture’ and ‘creativity’ – are used interchangeably (unless specified otherwise), because they both, despite a highly contested co-existence, are integral to the cultural turn in urban development.

Urban cultural turn will be further addressed in Section 2.3. Next, I will introduce another key term to our discussion – ‘creative city’.

1.2.2 Creative city

Much of the debate surrounding the concept of the ‘creative city’ revolves around its meaning (see Pratt, 2010; Comunian, 2011; Bell and Oakley, 2015). The ‘creative city’ is a multivalent term that can be used (and misused) in various contexts.

The term ‘creative city’ initially had a very broad meaning and generally referred to “problem-solving cities” (Pratt, 2011: 124). The idea was developed to highlight the need for more “creative responses to urban problems” (Landry and Bianchini, 1995: 10). Here ‘creative responses’ include the development of the cultural and creative sectors, and ‘urban problems’ reflect primarily on the economic growth of the city (see Subsection 2.3.2).

Today the term ‘creative city’ is considered one of the defining policy discourses of the cultural turn in urban development (Pratt, 2008; Mommaas, 2009; Comunian, 2011; Grodach and Silver, 2013). As Bell and Oakley (2015) accurately explain, the notion is now commonly used as “a shorthand term in policy discourse for contemporary ideas about culture and the city and in more critical discourse for the problems of urban cultural development” (p. 88).

Cultural production, which is largely linked with the development of cultural and creative industries, constitutes an important part of the creative city (Scott, 2006; Pratt, 2011). However, since the early 2000s, the creative city has been promoted as first and foremost a space of consumption (see Florida, 2002). In effect, the creative city policy model has been closely entangled not only with policy discourses of the cultural and creative industries and creative clusters, but also with culture-led city
branding, events and cultural landmarks (Evans, 2003; Pratt, 2010; Comunian, 2011). Many critics have found this trend unsustainable and “corrosive to production-based” cultural development (Pratt, 2008: 111; see also Peck, 2011a; Cunningham, 2012; Bell and Oakley, 2015). Nevertheless, the creative city today is defined primarily as a site of attraction and display wherein cultural and creative resources are perceived primarily as ‘generators of wealth’ (Zukin, 2001). Accordingly, they are deployed to attract investors, businesses, skilled workers and visitors and to boost the image of the city (see Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002; Cochrane, 2007; Mommaas, 2009). In other words, as noted earlier, the creative city has clearly become yet another ‘neoliberal policy experiment’ of entrepreneurial cities (see also Subsection 2.3.2).

In my work, I am focused on the creative city predominantly as an attraction or ‘display’, but I do not read it as merely an entrepreneurial strategy. Whilst recognising the impact of market-driven policy objectives that initially prompted the enthusiasm for the creative city building among urban policy makers, I am more interested in other rationales that are driving the adoption of this policy script. Therefore, in this research, the understanding of the creative city as display expands beyond its conventional association with entrepreneurial strategies. Consequently, here the creative city has a broader meaning and generally reflects on a global trend among cities to actively engage in the development and promotion of urban cultural policies in order to benefit other areas of public policy. Although, for ease of reading, I decided to hold on to the original terminology, it is important to note that in this sense, the term ‘creative city’ embodies not only the creative city as an entrepreneurial strategy, but also, more generally, the creative city as a device for display. In addition to the title of the ‘creative city’, it also entails ‘cultural capital’, ‘cultural and creative metropolis’, and other similar labels that derive from cities’ aspirations to promote their cultural assets and creative development.

Next, I will explain how I define large-scale cultural events in this thesis.

1.2.3 International cultural events

A growing trend for cities to launch their own ‘world-class’ film, arts and fringe festivals, design weeks, and arts biennales over the last few decades reflects the cultural turn in urban development and the integration of events discourse into the broader policy script of the creative city.

Generally, ‘events’ are understood as themed public occasions or celebrations of limited duration and scope (see Belghazi, 2006; Getz, 2010; Smith, 2015). As “temporary public displays” (Belghazi, 2006: 98) they take place within a limited time frame and have a certain spatial focus (Roche, 2000; Getz, 2010; van Aalst and van Melik, 2012; Smith, 2015). In other words, they are temporal and context-bound,
or borrowing from ‘mega-events’ literature, “localised in space as well as time” (Roche, 2000: 10).

This study is focused on the large-scale cultural events that receive official government support comprising at least 30 per cent of their annual budget. Fully (or partially) publicly funded events stand to represent the interests of the government that resonates with the main focus of this research.

Large-scale cultural events here are understood to be large-scale one-time occurrences or cyclical series of related occurrences that provide cultural experience to the public through the display of local and foreign cultural products. The term ‘large-scale’ event refers to those events wherein the number of audience members exceeds 10,000. Smaller-scale events (though not without exceptions) are less likely to play a significant role in the promotion of the city in the global arena. The term ‘cultural’ indicates that this type of event is perceived as cultural and/or creative by local policymakers. Specifically for this study, ‘cultural events’ include arts festivals, film festivals and large-scale design events.

It is important to note that this research is not concerned with large-scale cultural events as individual occurrences, but rather with events as a trend of the cultural turn in urban development. Subsequently, it is also concerned with events as integral elements of professional networks, because it is through these networks, or ‘festival circuits’ (Stringer, 2001), that cities are enabled to display themselves to the world.

This introductory chapter culminates with the Chapter Outline that provides a detailed overview of how the rest of the thesis is structured and organised.

1.3 Chapter outline

In addition to the introductory chapter, this thesis comprises seven other chapters.

The main goal of Chapter Two is to conceptualise the relationship between culture as display, the creative city policy discourse and events, and to explore the latter two concepts as mobile policy discourses. This chapter begins with the discussion of the instrumentalism in urban cultural policies and urban governance models of culture. It then addresses one of the key instrumental roles of culture – that of ‘display’. Drawing on the original notion of culture as display (Williams, 1984), I argue that in its more recent translations, the essential meaning of culture as ‘symbolic display’ has been lost by reducing it to ‘entrepreneurial display’ (see McGuigan, 2004). This argument is further developed in the next section of the chapter, which is focused on the reflection of display in the creative city policy discourse and cultural events. Here I argue that the rationale to adopt the global templates of urban cultural policies is often explained in broad terms of neoliberalisation and urban entrepreneurialism.
with little attempt to discuss more nuanced and context-specific reasons behind this process. The final section of the chapter demonstrates the limited scope of this approach by addressing the creative city and events as mobile and continuously transforming policy discourses. The specificities of the cultural turn in East Asian cities accurately illustrate this transformation. The main purpose of this last part of Chapter Two is to show that context matters, and that one singular model (as well one common rationale) of the creative city does not exist, which means that the creative city policies should be addressed as policies in continuous transformation.

Chapter Three is focused on discussing the methodological framework of the thesis. To begin with, I link the arguments posed in Chapter Two with the main objective of my research, which revolves around gaining an in-depth understanding of the transformation of imported urban cultural policies in Chinese cities. I then explain the purpose behind the four research questions that comprise this objective. In the remaining sections of the chapter, I describe and justify the chosen research methodology. Specifically, I discuss research approach and design, data collection methods and the process of data analysis. In the last section of the chapter, I also address the ethical issues and considerations pertaining to this study.

Chapters Four, Five and Six are empirical chapters each dedicated to a specific case (city). They report and examine the findings from the analysis of the policy documents and interview transcripts in Shanghai (Chapter Four), Hong Kong (Chapter Five) and Taipei (Chapter Six). Structurally, these chapters are very similar. The first section of each chapter is focused on exploring the specific context of the city, including the city’s historical development that relates to culture and the arts, the regulatory framework of cultural policy and the reasons that prompted the interest in the cultural turn and the creative city policies. The second part of each chapter is aimed at examining urban policymakers’ understanding of culture as display. My central focus here lies on the meanings ascribed to large-scale cultural events and the city’s aspiration for the creative city title. On their own, the chapters serve to illuminate the broader spectrum of rationales behind the creative city policy discourse that appear to expand beyond the scope of the entrepreneurial policy agenda. Furthermore, these three empirical chapters also reveal the impact of specific historical and political settings on imported urban cultural policies that determine these discrepancies.

In Chapter Four (Shanghai chapter), my main argument is that the creative city policy script in Shanghai is incorporated in a national policy agenda and employed as one of the cultural soft power instruments to strengthen China’s image and global influence abroad. As display practice it is also used to showcase a particular social order of ‘modern’ China wherein the market economy is interwoven with the
authoritarian political system and socialist ideology. The key argument in Chapter Five (Hong Kong chapter) is that although in Hong Kong the creative city policy script is applied primarily as entrepreneurial strategy, it is also used as a political device to establish and promote Hong Kong as a cultural global city and to differentiate Hong Kong’s identity from other Chinese cities. In Taipei (Chapter Six), the creative city policy discourse is used to display a well-established cultural ecosystem of the city, which in turn assists in strengthening the symbolic cultural superiority over other Chinese cities and in the building of a ‘new’ Taiwanese identity.

Chapter Seven compiles the findings from the three cities, and addresses major differences and similarities between them to draw the overarching conclusions. Combined with the findings from the literature, this allows us to see the continuous transformation of the creative city policy discourse and to identify some of the key factors that impact this transformation. In this chapter, I argue that the meanings behind the display role of the creative city indicate that in Chinese cities the creative city is used as an important political device that is (re)shaped and (re)defined by policy and ideological systems, institutional and regulatory structures of cultural policy, the already existing cultural policy agendas, and connections between cities. Therefore, I conclude that the creative city policy script cannot be viewed as merely a ‘neoliberal policy experiment’.

This study developed and evolved over the course of four years. The empirical findings expanded the scope of the research from that focused solely on transformation of imported urban cultural policies to transformation as a two-way process. At the time that urban cultural policies are merged and submerged into the already existing cultural landscapes of cities, they leave an inevitable imprint that has both positive and negative implications. These implications are also discussed in Chapter Seven.

Finally, Chapter Eight summarises the major conclusions of the study, particularly focusing on the study’s implications for policy and practice. This last chapter closes with suggestions for possible directions for future research.
Chapter 2
The Emergence and Transformation of Urban Cultural Policies as ‘Display’

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to conceptualise urban cultural policies as policies in continuous transformation. It links together different perspectives in literature that contribute to an understanding of the context within which urban cultural policies as ‘display’ of a particular social order emerge and, crucially to this research, move and transform. It also identifies additional lines of enquiry that need to be pursued and explains how this study can contribute to the gaps observed in the literature.

This conceptual review adopted an integrative approach to the literature (see Kennedy, 2007). As Torraco (2005) indicates, the integrative literature review presents, examines and critiques the “representative literature on a topic in an integrated way such that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated” (p. 356). The scope of this thesis spans across a number of academic disciplines, including cultural studies, political science, geography, and East Asian studies. I combined a number of perspectives from this broad knowledge base to produce an in-depth understanding of the roles attached to urban cultural policies as ‘display’ and their transformation in different urban contexts.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the instrumental roles and governance models of cultural policy (see Section 2.2). It first probes the instrumentalisation of cultural policy in the context of the nation-state and the city (see Subsection 2.2.1). Drawing on the national models of governance of culture and the arts, it then identifies four urban governance models of culture that convey who is responsible for defining the instrumental roles of urban cultural policy (see Subsection 2.2.2). Next, the chapter interrogates the ‘display’ role of culture and examines how it can be adopted in the context of urban cultural policies (see Subsection 2.2.3). Here I argue that in the Global North, the ‘display’ today is first and foremost associated with market-driven policy objectives. The examination of the rationales behind the adoptsions of the creative city policy discourse and cultural events accurately
illustrates this trend (see Section 2.3). At the same time, however, it also reveals that
the understanding attached to urban cultural policies as ‘display’ tends to transform
in space and time. In Section 2.4, I turn to policy transfer and mobility literature,
which assists in developing a better understanding of urban cultural policies as
policies in continuous transformation. This transformation, which involves not only
the transformation of policy formats, but also that of meanings and rationales
attached to them, is determined by the particular historical, social and political
settings of the place.

In this respect, the analysis of the adoption of the creative city policy discourse in
Chinese cities is particularly instructive. In addition to an entrepreneurial policy
agenda it also reveals the presence of other rationales underpinning the policymakers’
interest in imported urban cultural policies.

A large amount of literature provided me with more than a few possible pathways to
approach the subject of this research. This means that difficult choices had to be
made along the way about what literature should be used and how it should be
integrated. For example, the ‘global city’ literature, which I do not discuss in this
chapter, offered some valuable insights regarding the transformation of the global
city policy discourse. Originally, the concept was designed to critically assess the
impact of economic globalisation (see Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991). However, in
popular policy debates, it has been transformed into a buzzword that echoes and
supports (rather than challenges) “the neoliberal ideology of the entrepreneurial city”
(Smith, 2013: 2296; see also Robinson, 2011; Timberlake et al., 2014). This way of
using the term ‘global city’ largely corresponds to the use of the term ‘creative city’.
As will be shown in this chapter, the notion of the creative city is also commonly
used primarily as an entrepreneurial strategy (see Section 2.3). In this thesis, I
applied another route to pursue this argument in more detail. I addressed the market-
driven policy agenda behind the creative city policy script by probing the growing
role of urban cultural policies as ‘display’ (see Section 2.2).

In terms of the adoption process of imported urban cultural policies, I was primarily
focused on the meaning that urban policymakers attach to these policies rather than
the peculiarities of the transfer process per se (see Section 2.4). Therefore, in this
thesis I do not attend to the discussion concerning the role of policy intermediaries
(see, for example, Prince, 2012b; Prince, 2014a; O’Connor and Gu, 2015) and do not
analyse different stages of transfer (see, for example, Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

2.2 Instrumentalisation, governance and display of urban cultural policies

This section opens with a discussion of the tendency to render cultural policy ‘useful’. It briefly examines how the rationales behind ‘attaching’ (Gray, 2002) culture to other public policy areas has changed over the years, and what effect this had on the cultural realm. Next, the section examines the role of the city in setting up an instrumental agenda for the arts. Here I identify different governance models of culture that help to understand what groups of policy actors take part in setting the policy agenda for the arts in cities. In the last subsection, I interrogate the ‘display’ role of culture, which is one of the key concepts in this work.

2.2.1 Instrumentalisation of urban cultural policy

It has been firmly established that cultural policy – like any other public policy domain – is designed to be instrumental (Bennett, 1998; Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005; Bell and Oakley, 2015). However, there is an ongoing discussion among scholars about the relationship (and tensions) between ‘instrumental’ and ‘intrinsc’ (or ‘aesthetic’) roles of culture. This debate could generally be divided into two major camps – those ‘defending’ instrumental approach to culture (see Bennett, 1992; Bennett, 1998; Gibson, 2008) and those ‘condemning’ what they see as instrumentalisation of culture (see McGuigan, 2004; Gray, 2007).

The advocates of the former view rest their argument on the embeddedness of culture within the policy field (Bennett, 1998; Gibson, 2008). Here we need to take a moment to reflect on the fact that the instrumental approach to culture is not a new phenomenon. As Mirza (2012) argues, “culture – down to its very practice, display, and dissemination – has always been ‘useful’ to those in power” (p. 32, emphasis added).

From the mid-19th century until the 1970s, in most countries the state has traditionally assumed the guardian role of the cultural sector, taking the responsibility to protect and facilitate those forms of culture that were considered “worthy of support and incapable of surviving in the commercial climate” (Mirza, 2012: 31; see also Williams, 1984; Bennett, 1998; Miller and Yúdice, 2002). This approach reflects on the ‘aesthetic’ or ‘elitist’ understanding of culture, where the general focus lies on its ‘artistic’ output and value that is assessed “by aesthetic
criteria” (Lewis and Miller, 2003: 2) set by political elites. This means that the state was not only dictating what forms of culture should be facilitated and what should not, but also using culture to pursue its policy objectives. For example, many states have employed the arts to construct and promote nationhood and national identity and to maintain public order and social control (Williams, 1984; Miller and Yúdice, 2002; Mirza, 2012). Some large nations have also applied the ‘aesthetic’ notion of culture in a pursuit of their imperialistic ambitions to display their power and influence (Williams, 1984; Miller and Yúdice, 2002; McGuigan, 2004; see also Subsection 2.2.3).

Since the late 1970s, with the declining role of the nation-state and other economic, political and social transformations guided by the three interlinked processes of deindustrialisation, globalisation and neoliberalisation, the number of policy actors taking part in the decision-making process has increased. This is particularly evident in cities, where cultural policy and its purpose is now defined by a vast group of policy actors, including central government, local policymakers, business leaders, ‘cultural intermediaries’ (Prince, 2012b), arts administrators (Miller and Yúdice, 2002), and other selected groups of the public. One notable (though not exclusive) exception is China, where cultural policy, and hence the instrumental role of the arts, is still largely guided by the centralised state (Wang, 2011; Pang, 2012; see also Chapter 4).

The number of public policy areas that cultural policy now relates to has also significantly expanded. Today it is commonly attached to a myriad of public policies, such as education, urban planning, foreign policy, environmental, social, and economic development. Drawing on a number of different authors, Gray (2010) provides an extensive, though surely non-exhaustive list of the most common practices attached to urban cultural policy, including community cultural development, cultural diversity, cultural sustainability, cultural heritage, the cultural and creative industries (Craik 2007), lifestyle culture and eco-culture (Craik 2005), planning for the intercultural city (Bloomfield and Bianchini 2004), cultural planning per se (Evans 2001), support for national languages (Gray and Hugoson 2004), ‘currently controversial issues in the wider society’ (McGuigan 2006: 203), (...) ‘the production of cultural citizens’ (Lewis and Miller 2003), (…)

---

7 ‘Elite’ is an ambiguous term, which tends to be used inconsistently and selectively. In this thesis, I use the term ‘elites’ to refer to those individuals (as well as groups of individuals) that either exercise decision-making power over the field of cultural policy (e.g. politicians) or have a substantial influence on these decision-making processes (e.g. business leaders, civil servants, policy advisors, senior management of cultural institutions, and other leading voices from the arts and academia).
‘representation, meaning and interpretation’ (Scullion and Garcia 2005: 116) and
(...) a ‘transhistorical political function’ (Ahearne 2008: 2) (p. 218).

To an extent, this change reflects on the expanded definition of culture, from culture as ‘aesthetic practice’ to the anthropological view of culture as a ‘way of life’ (see Williams, 2002 [1958]; Lewis and Miller, 2003). The adoption of the anthropological approach has extended “the cultural reach of the arts of governing” (Bennett, 1998: 106) by promoting the inclusion of a much wider range of industries, practices and activities to the realm of culture.

However, the major reason behind the widening reach of cultural policies and the upsurge of interest in culture as an ‘instrument’ is related to the now commonly adopted tendency to think of culture “in terms of a return on public investment” (Hesmondhalgh, 2008: 556, original emphasis). This sort of thinking, which is observed not only among policymakers (see Gray, 2002; Gray, 2007; Vestheim, 1994) but also among cultural practitioners (see Nisbett, 2013) is strongly linked with neoliberalisation and its attributes, including economic restructuring, intense competition in the marketplace, and commodification of the arts. Neoliberalisation is generally aimed at imposing market rule and economic reasoning upon all sectors of social life (see Brenner and Theodore, 2002; McGuigan, 2004). As a result, today the value of culture and the arts is largely assessed in relation to their contribution to other policy sectors and policy objectives that, due to the impact of global capitalism, are predominantly market-driven. In this context, the term ‘instrumentalisation of culture’ embodies primarily “the economic ‘instrumentalisation’ of culture” (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 127, emphasis added). Again, this tendency is most evident in cities, where culture now seems to be perceived as first and foremost ‘a symbolic capital’ for “place marketing and branding and (...) local economic growth and employment” (Isar et al., 2012: 5). The incorporation of the cultural ‘world’ into the more general ‘creativity’ discourse in the mid-1990s also clearly reflects a market-driven focus (see Section 2.3).

Whilst recognising that the positioning of culture together with policy can be problematic, the proponents of instrumentalism urge focusing on how to adjust to the existing situation instead of simply condemning it (see Gibson, 2008). Bennett (1998) argues that it is time to accept that policy is central to the constitution of culture, and to treat culture as an industry, in which its ‘aesthetic disposition’ is merely one

---

8 For the purpose of this study, ‘neoliberalisation’ is defined as “a historically specific, ongoing, and internally contradictory process of market-driven sociospatial transformation” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 353). In other words, I see ‘neoliberalisation’ as a variegated process of neoliberal restructuring, which is broadly characterised by minimal government intervention, “strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005: 2).
“particular market segment” (p. 199). In Bennett’s (1998) view, placing culture amongst other public policies provides more opportunities for discussion and collaboration between cultural workers and government officials. Although this does not necessarily guarantee a more “democratic expansion” (Bennett, 1998: 90) of cultural policy, it can assist in bridging the divisions between different forms of culture, particularly of so-called ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture.

Although the supporters of the opposing approach agree that culture and policy have always been closely entangled together and that it is essential to engage more with cultural policy in cultural studies, they condemn Bennett’s (1998) idea of addressing cultural policy in the same way as any other public policy domain. Jim McGuigan, the key antagonist of this view, argues that cultural practices and experiences are simply “too complex and affective to be treated adequately in the effective terms of economic and bureaucratic models of policy” (McGuigan, 2003: 38; see also Gray, 2007).

The constant tension that exists between ‘instrumental’ and ‘intrinsic’ roles of culture and the arts is used to exemplify this argument (Belfiore, 2002; McGuigan, 2004; Gray, 2008). A particular concern is expressed about the widening scope of instrumentalisation of culture, where various forms of culture are used (and abused) “as a means or instrument to attain goals in other than cultural areas” (Vestheim, 1994: 65, emphasis added), and the impact this poses on the arts (Williams, 1984; Vestheim, 1994; McGuigan, 2004; Gray, 2007; Belfiore, 2012). On the one hand, a broader reach of cultural policies provides different forms of arts with more funding opportunities and is likely to lead to “the development of new forms of collaboration” (Bennett, 1998: 191) between cultural workers and policymakers (see also Gray, 2002). In addition, “as a set of resources for governing” (Bennett, 1998: 79), culture is also given more prominence within a wide range of policy discussions. On the other hand, however, considering that the function of serving other public policy areas is now increasingly ascribed as the primary role of cultural policy, many scholars raise valid concerns about culture becoming “the means to an end” rather than “an end itself” (Belfiore, 2002: 104; see also Williams, 1984; Gray, 2002; McGuigan, 2004).

Also, despite the widening reach of cultural policies and the expanding number of policy actors involved in the decision-making processes, they are not becoming “more democratic” (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 20), either in form or intention. First, the governments often fail to provide a platform for marginalised voices and different community groups – all major decisions are still made by the elites and for the benefit of elites, although in a more contested environment (Bennett, 1998; Waterman, 1998; Grodach and Silver, 2013). Second, notwithstanding the fact that
culture and the arts are now employed in a wide range of public policies and projects, including urban regeneration, tourism, social inclusion, community empowerment and urban image enhancement policies, generally they seem to follow a very similar agenda and orientation, which Gray (2007) describes as “firstly, economic and, secondly, social” (p. 206). Third, despite a broader understanding of what constitutes ‘culture’, cultural policies remain highly selective and somewhat elitist. The range of publicly funded cultural activities has been expanding over the last decade and cultural policies are no longer confined to the ‘elite’ artistic practices in their traditional sense as are those representing ‘high’ arts. However, at the same time, it is also evident that those forms of culture that do not coincide with the instrumental objectives of the decision-makers are unlikely to get any support from the government (Bell and Oakley, 2015).

This clearly indicates that regardless of what view of culture we take – the broader or the narrower one – only a selected group of cultural activities will be the subject of cultural policy (see Bell and Oakley, 2015). In addition, as cultural policy is increasingly guided by the anthropological understanding of culture, it becomes much harder to define “where ‘culture’ ends and ‘everything else’ begins” (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 17; see also McGuigan, 2004). As a result, it is now easier to re-engineer and manipulate the views of what role(s) cultural policies should perform and what activities they should be engaged in (see Wright, 1998; Bell and Oakley, 2015). In support of this argument, Wright (1998) observes that policymakers and policy advisers deploy the anthropological notion of culture as a “a political process of contestation over the power to define key concepts, including that of ‘culture’ itself” (p. 14).

Whilst largely accelerated by such global trends as globalisation and neoliberalisation, the instrumentalisation of culture in urban spaces always takes place within specific organisational structures, ideological frameworks and financial systems (Gray, 2007). This means that the process of instrumentalisation is likely to be guided by different emphases and priorities that depend upon the particular settings and conditions that each city “finds itself to be (or, more importantly, perceives itself to be) confronting” (Gray, 2007: 209, original emphasis). In other words, the particular cultural forms and activities are always chosen over others and there is always a certain political agenda attached to these choices, which ultimately are context bound and socially constructed. For instance, in many East Asian states, such as China, Korea or Japan, where urban cultural policies are still largely regulated by the state, the (re)construction and promotion of cultural identity remains among the core roles attached to culture and the arts in the cities (Miller and Yúdice, 2002; Kong, 2007).
In sum, this subsection sought to expose the instrumentalisation of culture as a highly contested, selective and unsettled process that is produced through a complex network of social and power relations. These relations are shaped by various endogenous and exogenous factors, which act as both cause and effect for instrumentalisation. Urban spaces are clearly the most noticeable and probably the most contested terrains of the active instrumentalisation of culture.

One of the major intentions of this thesis is to interrogate how the particular historical and political settings in Hong Kong, Taipei, and Shanghai shape and influence local policymakers’ approach to the instrumentalisation of culture. Specifically, it is focused on a ‘display’ role of culture and the understanding of this role among one specific group of policy actors – urban policymakers.

Before attending to the question of culture as ‘display’, it is first important to identify the role of the city in setting out the instrumental agenda for cultural policies. This matter will be addressed in the next subsection.

### 2.2.2 The city as a promoter of culture: governance models of the arts

This subsection examines the governance and funding structures of urban cultural policies. This will help in gaining a better understanding of whose interests they serve. After all, those who pay for the arts and those who manage the arts, are most likely to have more power to impose their agendas and influence (see Williams, 1984).

As discussed earlier, for many years the domain of cultural policy has been almost exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state (see Subsection 2.2.1). Therefore, learning about the ways in which nation-states ‘deal with’ culture can enhance our understanding of governance models of urban cultural policies.

Bell and Oakley (2015) distinguish three core roles of the state in relation to culture:

(i) control, censor, and prohibit forms of cultural expression, (ii) provide forms of protection for national culture, and (iii) promote national culture and enlist culture in broader national promotion (p. 126).

The first two roles relate to the regulation of culture, whereas the third one is focused on the promotion of culture (Bell and Oakley 2015). These roles, as will be shown here, underpin in varying degrees of intensity all types of governance models of both national and urban cultural policies.

A clear overlap between the state as regulator and the state as promoter of culture can be observed in Chartrand and McCaughey’s (1989) study. The authors identify four governance models of the arts support that include Facilitator State, Patron State, Architect State, and Engineer State.
In a *Facilitator State*, such as the USA, the arts are funded through tax deductions and donations. The state does not raise any specific standards or guidelines about what forms of arts should be supported and the entire ‘selection’ as well as the funding process is conducted by private sponsors and businesses (Chartrand and McCAughey, 1989). This means that the arts sector is utterly dependent on the changing tastes of private donors. A *Patron State*, such as the UK, funds the arts through arm’s length institutions. In this case, the state provides funds, whereas the decision about whom to support lies in the hands of the board of trustees that are “expected to fulfil their grant-giving duties independent of the day-to-day interests of the party in power” (Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989, no pagination). In an *Architect State*, such as France, arts funding is distributed directly by the Ministry of Culture or its equivalent. As a result, government officials and bureaucrats guide the selection process of what cultural forms deserve public funding and what do not. This means that choices are likely to be based on the government’s policy agenda and objectives (Chartrand and McCAughey, 1989). It is important to note, however, that in terms of artistic expression, in an Architect State most cultural establishments remain largely autonomous of government. This is the major distinction between the Architect State and the *Engineer State*. The later controls all means of artistic production and requires them to attain “official political goals” (Chartrand and McCAughey, 1989, no pagination). As Chartrand and McCAughey (1989) explain:

[The Engineer State] does not support the process of creativity. Funding decisions are made by political commissars and are indeed to further political education, not artistic excellence. The policy dynamic of the Engineer State tends to be revisionary; artistic decisions must be revised to reflect the changing official party line (no pagination).

In other words, in an Engineer State, the main role of the arts is to serve and conform to the dominant political and ideological interests of the central government. This inevitably imposes a number of limitations on creative freedom and restricts the development of the arts sector.

It is important to note that all these models can be separated only in theory, whereas “in practice most nations combine some or all of them” (Chartrand and McCAughey, 1989, no pagination). For instance, it may seem tempting at first to ascribe China’s governance model of culture to that of the Engineer State – after all, the central government owns and controls all major cultural establishments and its cultural policy is guided and shaped by the Party’s political and economic objectives (see Wang, 2011). Nevertheless, this assumption can be easily challenged. Following the opening of China to foreign trade and investment, private sponsorship of the artistic practices is now highly encouraged (Keane, 2000; see also Chapter 4). Thus, with
cultural policy being increasingly placed between the state and the market, the state also assumes the role of Facilitator.

Some important parallels can be traced between Chartrand and McCaughey’s (1989) study and Raymond Williams’ paper *State Culture and Beyond* (1984). Here Williams suggests five ‘senses’ of the state in relation to culture. The first two senses are concerned with the instrumental roles attached to culture for promotion and decoration of the state. They will be discussed in the next subsection. The other three senses, which include state as patron, state as promoter and a beyond state approach, reflect on different governance styles of the arts and address the varying degrees of authority that the nation-state exercises over culture.

The main concern of the *state as patron*, which largely resembles Chartrand and McCaughey’s (1989) Architect State, is to provide protection and funding for the arts. Considering that not a single country, regardless of its size, political structure or economic power, is able to offer equal or at least sufficient funding to all areas of the arts, in this case the funding tends to be distributed in accordance to the arts’ ‘aesthetic’ value and the perceived degree of their vulnerability in the marketplace (Williams, 1984). In effect, certain forms of culture (particularly, those associated with the so-called ‘popular’ culture) tend to be rejected as either unworthy of state support or in no need of “preservation from the cultural market” (Williams, 1984: 4).

The *state as promoter of an active cultural policy* is not only concerned with funding and protection of the arts, but is also actively involved in the facilitation and promotion of the arts sector. Here, the notion of culture is often perceived in broader, anthropological terms. As a result, cultural policy is no longer centred on ‘high’ arts alone, but involves more varied forms of cultural practices.

Williams (1984) identifies a ‘hard state’ and a ‘soft state’ version of this governance model. In the ‘hard state’, the government officials and a selected number of intellectual elites decide what forms of culture should be funded and promoted. The funds are then distributed directly through the dedicated government departments. This type of model is largely applied in France, China, Russia, Malaysia and other politically centralised nations. Depending on a degree of control that government assumes over cultural organisations the ‘hard state’ model can be compared with either Chartrand and McCaughey’s (1989) Architect State, or, in more radical cases, Engineer State.

In the ‘soft states’, the funding of the arts is administered on the basis of the arm’s length principle. This type of state strongly resonates with Chartrand and McCaughey’s (1989) Patron State. In both cases, funds are distributed through relatively autonomous public agencies, such as, for example, Arts Council England
or Hong Kong Arts Development Council. As a result, the planning and management of the arts sector (hence, the decision-making regarding the instrumental roles of culture) tends to be concentrated in the hands of cultural elites. In this case, the funds distribution process is confined to certain general selection criteria that in theory are supposed to ensure a fair and impartial selection process. However, Williams (1984) questions the credibility of this process, arguing that the selection criteria are “often disguised behind counters of argument which are very difficult to specify” (p. 4). For instance, the criteria can be designed in favour of either ‘high’ arts or those artistic practices that are perceived to have a particular instrumental value.

In Williams (1984) view, to avoid the limitations imposed by state-led cultural policy, the governance of culture should be decentralised. He argues that the state is “both too large and too small” (Williams, 1984: 5) to accommodate cultural policy. It is too small in terms of global processes that take place beyond its control, and too large in terms of managing cultural diversity at the regional and urban levels. Therefore, Williams suggests to “move beyond state cultural policy” (p. 5, emphasis added) by granting more decision-making power to arts organisations and local governments, with the government agencies acting more like watchdogs rather than active promoters or regulators of culture. Although some of Williams’ statements regarding this alternative model, particularly the part about ‘self-managing’ arts enterprises, require further clarification, the significance of the ‘beyond state’ approach lies in the degree of importance that he has attached to transnational and urban cultural dimensions. In this respect, Williams was among the first authors to recognise the central role of cities in the development of cultural policy.

To a certain extent, Williams’ (1984) idea of decentralised “future policy” (p. 5) has now become a reality. Following the declining centrality of the nation-state, today most cities, particularly large cities, possess much greater decision-making power over their cultural policy. However, considering the widening scope of instrumentalisation and growing commercialisation of culture in cities, it is arguable that this change has led to the more democratic and more community-oriented approach to cultural policy that Williams originally envisioned. As noted earlier, cultural policy in cities still largely serves the interests of elites rather than the whole community (see Subsection 2.2.1).

Although the cities’ approach to the governance of culture in many respects echoes the ‘traditional’ governance and funding models of the state, there are some notable features that are exclusive to cities. First, cities act primarily as promoters of culture. They might assume some regulatory functions, such as the preservation of cultural heritage or cultural memory, but even then their primary focus is on promoting culture – and hence the city – for tourists and businesses (McGuigan, 2004; Barber,
Second, the degree of decision-making power among city governments varies. Depending on the political system of the state as well as the size and position of the city, cities have different levels of autonomy from the central government. For instance, in China, urban cultural policy is still under the jurisdiction of the nation-state, whereas in Taiwan since the late 1980s the largest cities have been granted a high degree of autonomy and decision-making power (Chu, 2011; K. Lai, 2012). This, in turn, affects what roles are attached to culture and whose interests they represent. Third, the cities are more susceptible to global trends and influences, particularly to those imposed by the leading cities in the global city network (Massey, 2004; Sassen, 2006; Robinson, 2011). Unlike nation-states, global cities are “globally constructed” (Massey, 2004: 6). This means that their cultural policies are also inevitably affected and often defined by global processes and pressures.

In accordance with similarities and differences between cities and states, I propose four types of urban governance models of culture.

The first model, which I refer to as City as Architect, draws on Williams’ (1984) ‘hard’ version of the ‘state as promoter’ and Charrand and McCaughey’s (1989) Architect State. Here the city government is directly or through designated bodies managing the development and funding process of culture and the arts. In this case, government officials are those guiding planning, promotion, assessment, and funding of the arts. Although artistic expression is not restricted, the public support is focused on those areas and groups within the field of culture and the arts that are rendered ‘useful’ to the governments’ political agenda.

The second governance model of culture – City as Promoter – largely resembles the ‘soft version’ of the ‘state as promoter’ (Williams, 1984). Here the management of already established projects as well as distribution of the public funds is conducted by a relatively ‘neutral’ semi-public body. This public body generally operates on the basis of the arm’s length principle. The chief members and associates of the body can be referred to as cultural ‘elites’ as they are the ones responsible for the distribution of funds. In this case, the city government serves more as a visionary leader that provides responsible agencies with very broad and flexible directions. Although the government’s objectives here are clearly pronounced, semi-public organisations enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy and their actions and selection process are generally not bound to the government’s preferences.

The third type is what I refer to as City as Trustee. Here, city government has very limited decision-making power. The city’s interests are generally not taken into account – it simply follows national guidelines and its cultural policy is subject to national policy objectives. These guidelines define what areas of culture should
obtain more attention (hence, funding) and what cultural forms should be more actively promoted.

The last type of governance model – *City as Global Player* – refers to the city that (re)defines its cultural policies in accordance with global trends. In other words, its cultural policy development and directions are largely influenced by the leading cities in the region or those at the top of the global city network. These imported urban cultural policies can also reach cities through international organisations or cultural consultants and intermediaries (Prince, 2014b).

As with the politics of cultural policy at the national level, in practice, all these governance models of culture are closely entangled with each other. The empirical findings of this thesis indicate that some traces of all these models can be found in nearly every city: what differs, is the extent and the intensity of their impact (see Chapters 4, 5, 6). Identifying what governance approaches *prevail* in the city is crucial to a better understanding of how power relations are distributed. Subsequently, this also assists in explaining different rationales behind particular roles and functions that are attached to culture and the arts.

In the next subsection, the focus will shift to the analysis of a particular instrumental role of culture. Here I will examine the notion of ‘display’. It represents one of the core roles that nation-states and, more recently, cities increasingly attach to culture and the arts.

2.2.3 *Culture as promoter of a city: symbolic and entrepreneurial display*

The promotion of culture works both ways: by promoting culture, the state (or the city) seeks to promote itself. This corresponds with Williams’ (1984) observation that the state is not only the central agency of *power*, but also the central agency of *display*. In this respect, culture serves to promote, and ultimately to strengthen “a particular social order” (Williams, 1984: 3) of the state. In the previous section, I have addressed regulatory and promotional roles that both the state and the city assumes in relation to the development of the arts. Here, I will look at culture as a tool for promotion or, in Williams’ (1984) terms, ‘display’. Williams (1984) identifies two senses of state-culture relations in regard to culture as ‘display’ – a *stately sense of cultural policy* and *embellishment of contemporary public power*. Both senses expose the interdependence between the state as promoter of culture and culture as promoter of the state.

The *stately sense of cultural policy* reflects on the “actual display” or “public performance” of the state’s power and influence (Williams, 1984: 3). Some examples of ‘display’ as “the ritual symbolisation of nationhood and state power”
include the Queen’s Coronation in the UK, Presidential Inauguration Day in the USA or the Emperor’s Birthday in Japan (see also Williams, 1984). Although such public performances of power contain a number of cultural and artistic elements, they tend to be excluded from the domain of cultural policy, because the use of culture for display of the state’s power is so deeply ingrained within our society that “we can hardly recognise it as cultural policy at all” (Williams, 1984: 3; see also Mirza, 2012).

This sense can be linked with Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of ‘symbolic power’. Bourdieu (1977) describes ‘symbolic power’ as a “power to impose the principles of construction of reality – in particular, social reality” (p. 164), and recognises it as “a major dimension of political power” (ibid.). Elsewhere, Bourdieu (1989) argues that symbolic power is “the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition” (p. 23). Although Bourdieu coined this term to conceptualise social class relations in the ‘social world’, Harvey (1990) observes that the application of the concept in the “built environments” (p. 264) of ‘social world’ can be equally instructive. States and cities are integral elements of the social world: by interacting, competing and engaging in power struggles with each other they function as “social institutions” (Taylor, 2013: 56). In this sense, the ‘display’ of power is one of the means to garner a greater level of respect and recognition, which constitutes a ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu, 1989).

Whereas the stately sense of cultural policy reflects on a somewhat instinctive use of culture for public display of a certain kind of social order, the second sense – *embellishment of contemporary public power* – sees ‘display’ as an “organised spectacle” (Harvey, 1990: 257), where the arts are strategically applied in embellishing, representing and making this ‘particular social order’ more effective. The ‘contemporary public power’ here exemplifies

> a nation-state, which has business and tourism, which has commercial interests, which has international interests in exchanges of visits with other nation-states and their representatives (Williams, 1984: 3).

This resonates with the common depiction of most nation-states (and cities) today. As they become increasingly dependent on the global capitalist economy and market forces, their primary concern now is often how to “convert symbolic into money capital” (Harvey, 1990: 263). As a result, various forms of culture are commonly employed in place promotion and marketing, and used as strategic tool for achieving market-centred policy objectives, including the attraction of foreign investment and tourists or facilitation of certain consumption patterns (Williams, 1984; Gray, 2007).
Contrary to the first sense, such use of display of culture is clearly recognised as an essential element of cultural policy. In effect, cultural policies are increasingly integrated with a much broader range of public policies, and ultimately, become defined by them, raising concerns about cultural policy being not “primarily a policy for the arts” (Williams, 1984: 3, original emphasis; see also Subsection 2.2.1).

Today Williams’ proposition of display, which I see as a combination of both senses of culture discussed above, is more relevant than ever before. McGuigan (2004) made a significant contribution to this argument by applying the concept of ‘display’ to explain transformations that take place within contemporary cultural policy under capitalism. He argues that cultural policy can be divided into two broad categories – cultural policy ‘proper’ and cultural policy as ‘display’. The primary concern of the cultural policy ‘proper’ lies in support and promotion of the arts and cultural sector ‘for the arts sake’, whereas the cultural policy as ‘display’ is focused on benefiting other areas of public policy.

In McGuigan’s (2004) view, cultural policy ‘proper’ addresses public patronage of the arts, media regulation and the promotion of cultural identity. In other words, it reflects on the regulatory and promotional roles that the state has traditionally assumed in relation to culture (see Subsection 2.2.2). The main purpose of cultural policies as ‘display’, on the other hand, is to use the promotion of culture for promotion of a particular social order. As McGuigan (2004) explains, here various forms of culture are employed “to embellish the prevailing social order” (p. 64) through the means of ‘national aggrandisement’ and ‘economic reductionism’.

McGuigan’s (2004) concept of ‘national aggrandisement’ derives from Williams’ (1984) ‘stately sense of cultural policy’. In the contemporary world, it is embodied by various flagship projects and hallmark events (McGuigan, 2004). The notion of ‘economic reductionism’, on the other hand, reflects on Williams’ sense of ‘embellishment of contemporary public power’. It is concerned with the application of culture as a resource in economic, technological and social projects (McGuigan, 2004). Evans (2003) refers to this use of culture as a form of ‘hard branding’ of the place, where the central focus of artistic practices lies in the promotion of commercial activities and provision of entertainment. This, in turn, assists policymakers and cultural organisations “in rationalising public cultural investment” (McGuigan, 2004: 63).

Both categories – national aggrandisement and economic reductionism – are undoubtedly intertwined. For instance, although the primary function of hallmark

---

9 Although McGuigan ascribes the division between ‘proper’ and ‘display’ to Williams in his article, Williams has not used it himself.
events, such as World Fairs or Olympics, may seem to be display of the state’s (or the city’s) power and influence, for the host city, it is also a great opportunity to facilitate tourism and other service industries, to strengthen the city’s economy and to attract foreign investors and businesses (see Roche, 2000; Dicks, 2004; Cunningham, 2012). This again pinpoints a twofold role of ‘display’. On the one hand, national government and local municipalities use various business propositions to promote and ‘sell’ culture. On the other hand, culture is used to promote and ‘sell’ these business propositions as well as the state and/or the city itself (see Bell and Oakley, 2015).

McGuigan (2004) accurately observes that the role of cultural policy ‘proper’ is now increasingly undermined by cultural policy as ‘display’.

One major reason for the broadening scope and influence of cultural policy as ‘display’ is the growing significance of display for cities. Cities are now commonly considered to be the primary drivers of economic growth and key nodes of global control (see Sassen, 1991; Massey, 2005; Taylor, 2013). Cultural policy as display appeals to cities because it echoes their market-driven policy objectives that prompt them “to appear as (...) innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place[s] to live or to visit, to play and consume in” (Harvey, 1989a: 9; see also Subsection 2.3.1). The promotion of culture and the arts here is considered crucial in achieving this goal with various cultural flagships and events now widely recognised as indispensable ‘display’ tools for embellishing the image of the city (Ashworth and Voogd, 1994; Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2006; Pang, 2012).

Also, through the display of culture, urban policymakers are better equipped to justify their support and funding of the arts in times of an increasingly ‘evidence-based’ policymaking (see Belfiore, 2004; Peck and Theodore, 2010). Various display practices, including events and cultural landmarks, render culture more tangible, which, in effect, makes it appear more ‘useful’. This is not the case with cultural policy ‘proper’ that is not designed to prove the usefulness of culture. Here culture is perceived as intrinsically valuable. However, today this reason alone is no longer sufficient to ensure a consistent flow of funds. As McGuigan (2004) explains,

there is endemic uncertainty about the value of cultural policy 'proper' everywhere. Hence, much effort is put into mapping its contours and, also, in evaluating its usefulness to interested parties. This in itself is frequently an exercise in cultural policy as display, demonstrating symbolically that something worthwhile is actually happening (p. 65).

Regardless of what rationales are underpinning the growing interest in culture as display, it is important to note that the desired outcome can only be achieved if
display is a relatively accurate reflection of reality. Neither cultural events nor cultural landmarks will be able to deliver on the image of a ‘culturally vibrant city’ if the cultural ecosystem of the city is not robust. In support of this argument, Ponzini (2012) questions the impact of events on the enhancement of the image of the place. He rightly argues that the actual hierarchies of cities derive “from long-term accumulation of cultural and reputational capitals, (...) [that are] difficult to alter (...) despite massive investments in cultural and specialised services” (Ponzini, 2012: 106). In other words, it takes years of commitment and coordinated efforts to earn symbolic capital for the place. Many cities choose to neglect this important aspect before throwing themselves into zero-sum competition for ‘up for grabs’ titles of ‘festival city’, ‘cultural city’ or ‘creative city’.

Jim McGuigan was one of a few authors to use Williams’ idea of ‘display’, and his work marks the most significant attempt to readopt this concept to more recent times. However, one major problem with McGuigan’s approach is that he fails to take into account the interdependence between cultural policy ‘proper’ and ‘display’. In his work, McGuigan (2004) is overly focused on the increasing polarisation between the two, whilst completely neglecting a number of connection points that link them both together. For instance, national aggrandisement practices (cultural policy as display) can involve certain identity building agendas (cultural policy ‘proper’), whereas media regulation and arts patronage (‘proper’) can be affected by economic reductionism. In a similar vein, Ahearne (2009) observes that display functions are in-built into ‘proper’ cultural policy institutions:

think of the very appellations of ‘flagships’ like the Royal Shakespeare Company, the English National Opera, the Royal Ballet and the rationales adduced in cases for their funding (‘showcasing’ national talent, etc.) (p. 145).

This suggests that cultural policy as ‘display’ and ‘proper’ are clearly deeply ingrained within each other. Thus, instead of viewing them as two distinct and somewhat conflicting poles it is perhaps more useful to focus on how they overlap and affect each other.

Furthermore, there are limits to how far McGuigan’s approach to ‘display’ can be taken. His view of ‘display’ as a means of economic reductionism and national aggrandisement is undoubtedly instructive in the context of most capitalist economies in the Global North. However, it is by no means universally applicable. McGuigan seems to neglect various nuances and complexities that may underpin the actual meanings attached to ‘display’ in different political settings. Clearly, the meanings attached to the role of display in ‘national aggrandisement’ and ‘economic reductionism’ projects varies from one country to another. For instance, whereas in Milan EXPO 2015 and London 2012 Summer Olympics the primary focus of display
rested on economic reductionism and regeneration, in Shanghai EXPO 2010 and Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics it served as first and foremost a tool for national aggrandisement and public pomp of the hosting state (Poynter, 2009; Müller and Pickles, 2015; Costa et al., 2016).

It should also be noted that both Williams and McGuigan fail to distinguish between ‘display’ as an outward- and inward-oriented practice. For instance, large-scale cultural events and such mega-events as an Olympics or Expo are designed to not only promote the nation/city to the world, but are also aimed at strengthening the sense of belonging and pride among local populaces (Roche, 2000; Quinn, 2010). Likewise, the ‘Cool Britannia’ concept introduced by the Labour government in the late 1990s was also targeting both the British people and the rest of the world (Bell and Oakley, 2015). In certain cases, the internal focus might even prevail over the externally directed objectives (see Chapter 6).

Drawing on the different approaches and arguments discussed in this section, two overlapping roles of urban cultural policy as ‘display’ can be identified: symbolic display and entrepreneurial display. Both of these instrumental roles can be further subdivided into outward- and inward-oriented categories. Symbolic display is focused on increasing the reputation of the city (and the state) both at local and transnational levels. As external symbolic display, the arts are used to enhance the international recognition of the city and/or the state and raise its global position and influence, whereas as internal symbolic display, cultural practices are applied to enhance a sense of belonging and pride within the local populace. In the case of culture being used as entrepreneurial display, the government sees the cultural sector as a means to promote, embellish and make more effective other public policies, such as tourism, foreign policy, trade, urban planning, social policies and the like.

Today, both roles, in one form or another, can be located in most cities. Likewise, all governance models of culture discussed in the previous section are inevitably affected by these roles. However, their adoption patterns, rationales and meanings vary from place to place depending on the different political, historical and cultural settings of the cities.

One of the main goals of this thesis is to compare the uses of cultural policy as ‘display’ in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong. The nuances of this use will be examined through two overlapping practices of culture as ‘display’ that include the adoption of the ‘creative city’ policy script and large-scale international cultural events.
2.3 Displaying culture in the creative cities

This section examines the ‘display’ role in cities. The number and scope of such practices has increased significantly over the last three decades following a so-called ‘cultural turn’ in urban development. In this section, I will address the main reasons that prompted the growing interest in the promotion of culture and the arts among urban policymakers, and discuss what impact this is having on the arts sector and cities. I will then probe into two specific practices of cultural policy as ‘display’ that are commonly attributed to the cultural turn: the making of the ‘creative city’ and large-scale cultural events. Whereas the concept of the creative city emerged alongside culture-led urban development, the events discourse has a much longer history. In the last part of this section, I will demonstrate how this discourse has been absorbed and integrated into the creative city policy model.

2.3.1 Entrepreneurial cities and the cultural turn

Peter Hall (1999) describes a city as a ‘cultural crucible’, arguing that ever since the first cities came into existence, the role of culture and creativity “in finding solutions to the city’s own problems of order and organisation” (p. 6) has been immense. And yet, until the late 1970s, in most countries the arts sector used to receive far less attention than other areas of the public sector and was generally known as having “a minor status within the political system” (Gray, 2002: 78).

In Europe and North America, things started to change in the early 1980s when cultural and artistic practices became increasingly noticed, widely promoted, and subsequently, placed within the centre of policy debate.

This change is commonly linked with: the rise of cities as global players in their own right; deindustrialisation followed by the rise of service industries; globalising capitalist economy; pervasive economic uncertainty; and uneven spatial development (Harvey, 1989a; Harvey, 1990; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Pacione, 2009; Peck, 2011a). Altogether these interconnected trends and developments contributed to cities being forced to compete with each other for investment, a skilled workforce, and other means of capital accumulation. David Harvey (1989a) critically addressed such cities as ‘entrepreneurial cities’, arguing that their competition is a zero-sum game that benefits only transnational corporations and investors. He also observed that the intensified inter-urban competition leads to the proliferation of various short-termist ‘civic boosterism’ practices that are aimed at producing “all sorts of lures to bring capital into town” (Harvey, 1989a: 11; see also Harvey, 1990). In this sense, as Harvey (2008) comments, entrepreneurial cities largely resemble ‘commodities’ “for those with money” (p. 8), where the main focus lies on promoting only certain forms of urban experiences that conform with the interests of the capital accumulation.
Brenner and Theodore (2002) attribute this trend to the neoliberalisation process and argue that cities have become central ‘spaces of neoliberalisation’. Echoing Harvey, they read cities as a primary “arena both for market-oriented economic growth and for elite consumption practices” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 368).

Entrepreneurial strategies and objectives may vary from city to city depending on their political and historical settings (Jessop and Sum, 2000). Nevertheless, the common agenda of entrepreneurial cities generally revolves around pursuing those strategies that could help to fill the gap left by the decline or relocation of traditional manufacturing industries, boost consumer-oriented economic growth, push the revitalisation of urban spaces, and enhance their image and economic competitiveness in the global marketplace (Harvey, 1989a; Harvey, 1990; Zukin, 1991; Jessop and Sum, 2000; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck et al., 2009).

Culture and the arts coupled with the broad notion of ‘creativity’ seemed to offer workable solutions to all of those problems at a relatively low cost and with little or no need for any major structural changes (Peck, 2007). Thus it did not take long for them to become one of the most widely prescribed remedies for entrepreneurial cities (see Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002; Howkins, 2002). As part of ‘symbolic economy’ (Zukin, 1991), artistic practices and cultural activities are now recognised and valued by urban policymakers across the world for their allegedly wide-ranging contributions to the city’s economy, promotion, and general quality of life.

There are several major objectives commonly assigned to this ‘cultural turn’ (Zukin, 1991). First, it is perceived as a means to boost and sustain cultural production and, particularly, consumption within the city (Zukin, 1991; Landry, 2000; Pratt, 2009; Cunningham, 2012; Cole, 2012). Second, it is argued that it helps in the attraction and retention of a talented and skilled workforce (Florida, 2002; Sassen, 2006). Third, it is employed to lure in foreign investment and businesses (Zukin, 1995; Mommaas, 2009). Fourth, the cultural turn is also commonly linked with urban regeneration (Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Landry, 2000; Florida, 2005). Fifth, it is also addressed as an important contributor to social policies of the place, particularly in relation to social disempowerment, exclusion and inequality (Pratt, 2009; Comunian, 2011; Grodach and Silver, 2013). Sixth, various cultural strategies are applied to differentiate the city in a global marketplace (Landry, 2000; Florida, 2005; Leslie, 2005). An overarching role attached to the culture-led urban development that encapsulates all six objectives stated above is the use of cultural and creative strategies to enhance the image and reputation of the city (Zukin, 1995; Yeoh, 2005; Scott, 2006; Kong, 2007; Mommaas, 2009; Pang, 2012; Grodach and Silver, 2013).
In order to pursue one or more of these goals, many cities have adopted a number of very similar urban cultural policies, turning a deaf ear to those critics that question the sustainability of the cultural turn and its actual contribution to the city’s economy, society and culture *per se* (see, for example, Harvey, 1990; Zukin, 1991; McGuigan, 2004; Peck, 2011a; Comunian, 2011). The attachment of culture to the economy has been one of the focal points of concern (Zukin, 1991; McGuigan, 2004; Gray, 2007; see also Subsection 2.2.1). As Zukin (2001) rightly observes, until the 1980s, culture was viewed as “a by-product of wealth”, whereas today it is seen predominantly as “a generator of wealth” (no pagination). In effect, all traditional cultural policy themes and goals, such as artistic excellence, cultural diversity or arts education “have been remade and reprioritised alongside urban economic revitalisation objectives” (Grodach and Silver, 2013: 2).

The establishment of the strong link between culture and the economy has changed policymakers’ approaches to cultural policy. On the one hand, local governments now are more rigorous, more ambitious and more generous in terms of arts funding and support (see Appendix B). On the other hand, they are more selective, more controlling and more protective of their agenda, which leaves little room for those forms of arts that lack the elements of spectacle, international impact or commercial appeal (Harvey, 1990; Zukin, 1995; Quinn, 2010). As a result, there is increasingly more emphasis placed on culture as ‘display’ practices as opposed to cultural policy ‘proper’ in cities (see Subsection 2.2.3).

It should be noted that the cultural turn in urban development has not been confined to the borders of entrepreneurial cities in the Global North. Since the late 1980s, it has become a ‘fashionable trend’ (Kong, 2009) in East Asia. First adopted by the largest cities in the region, such as Hong Kong, Seoul, Taipei, Singapore, Beijing and Shanghai, it then gradually expanded towards smaller cities and towns (Yeoh, 2005). A wide reach of urban cultural policies and the specific characteristics of the cultural turn in East Asian cities will be discussed in the last section of this chapter (see Section 2.4).

Next, I will discuss the policy discourse of the ‘creative city’ that is not only one of the defining discourses of the cultural turn in urban development, but also one of the most instructive examples of culture as ‘entrepreneurial display’.

### 2.3.2 The ‘creative city’ as an entrepreneurial strategy

The creative city thesis has fuelled the cultural turn in urban development ‘legitimating’ “the ascendancy of many urban cultural policy efforts” (Grodach and Silver, 2013: 4).
The term ‘creative city’ was originally presented as a workable solution for coping with deindustrialisation and growing inter-urban competition in Europe. Its authors, Charles Landry and Franco Bianchini, saw the ‘creative city’ as an innovative policy approach to urban regeneration with the specific focus on “people’s lived experience of cities” (Landry and Bianchini, 1995: 13). They critically addressed “the instrumental rationality” (Landry and Bianchini, 1995: 20) of entrepreneurial strategies, arguing that urban policymakers often fail to consider “a ‘softer’ set of skills” (p. 18) in dealing with urban regeneration. Drawing on the ideas of such prominent geographers as Jane Jacobs (1961) and Peter Hall (1999), Landry and Bianchini suggested that cities should be viewed as sites of creativity and innovation, where nearly everything can be seen as potential resources for urban development. Creativity, including creative practices within the arts, was argued to be a powerful resource in reshaping the physical environment of post-industrial cities, and an effective tool for addressing social fragmentation and the weakening sense of belonging within the post-industrial society (Landry and Bianchini, 1995).

Although the idea of the creative city was originally introduced as a new and innovative solution for urban regeneration, it did not take long for it to be subsumed under the market-centred policy agenda of entrepreneurial cities, where it is seen more as an ‘upgrade’ for entrepreneurial strategies rather than an alternative policy model. In other words, it has become one of many ‘neoliberal policy experiments’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) centred on capital accumulation and elite consumption.

Today the primary goal ascribed to the notion of the creative city is to make the city more attractive for investors, businesses, skilled workers and visitors (see Landry, 2000; Cochrane, 2007; Mommaas, 2009; Florida, 2012). These developments indicate the increasing instrumentalisation of culture and proliferation of urban cultural policy as ‘entrepreneurial display’ (see Subsection 2.2.3). Two of the most prominent advocates of creative city ‘making’ – Charles Landry and Richard Florida – played a significant role in accelerating this shift.

Charles Landry, a policy consultant and the founder of a cultural planning consultancy agency based in the UK, was one of the authors behind the notion of the ‘creative city’ (see Landry and Bianchini, 1995). In his book, entitled The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators, Landry (2000) largely drew on the original ideas behind the term, promoting the creative city as an efficient tool for urban regeneration and place marketing. However, today his understanding of the creative city is somewhat different from that in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Initially, he regarded culture and the arts as defining elements of the creative city, arguing that culture, in both its senses – aesthetic as well as anthropological – is “the prism
through which urban development should be seen” (Landry, 2000: 9). This is no longer the case. As Landry (2015) explains in one of his recent interviews, whereas “initially there was more focus on the arts, (…) now (…) [the definition] is broader” (no pagination). In his view, today culture no longer plays a central role in urban development, but rather serves as one of many elements constituting what Landry (2015) calls a ‘creative ecology’ of the creative city.

Richard Florida is an American academic. Like Charles Landry, he is also involved in consultancy. Richard Florida’s book entitled The Rise of the Creative Class (2002; 2012) is probably one of the most widely cited works on the positive impact of creativity on the economic growth of cities. In Florida’s (2002) view, our economy is “powered by human creativity” (p. 4) that “is now the decisive source of competitive advantage” (p. 5). He argues that for every city the attraction of talented and creative people, whom Florida calls ‘creative workers’ or ‘the creative class’, is central to boosting the economy of the city. According to Florida, creativity contributes to the economic development of cities through cultivation and support of the so-called ‘3Ts’, which include tolerance, talent and technology. He sees the arts sector primarily as a means for developing attractive and ‘progressive environments’ (Florida, 2005: 151) within cities and a source of leisure activities for the creative class. Overall, Florida’s approach clearly exemplifies economic reductionism in the field of cultural policy (see Subsection 2.2.3).

Richard Florida’s (2002; 2005; 2008; 2012) view of the creative city further expanded the already broad scope of the concept from the policy strategy concerned primarily with urban regeneration to a market-centred strategy aimed at economic growth and capital accumulation of entrepreneurial cities. As a result, rather than being linked only with urban regeneration and social policies, the creative city policy model now also commonly incorporates a much broader scope of discourses, including cultural and creative industries, cultural events, cultural/creative districts, place marketing and creative class (Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002; Pratt, 2010; Comunian, 2011; Florida, 2012). The original community-centred intentions behind the notion of the creative city, on the other hand, have either been drastically scaled down or re-adapted to fit the market-centred policy objectives.

This reinvented and expanded understanding of the creative city complements the politics of urban entrepreneurialism in many different ways (Peck, 2005; Pratt, 2008; Peck, 2011a). Peck (2007) accurately depicts some of the major crossing points between urban entrepreneurialism and the creative cities:

whereas the entrepreneurial cities chased jobs, the creative cities pursue talent workers; the entrepreneurial cities craved investment, now the creative cities yearn
for buzz; while entrepreneurial cities boasted of their postfordist flexibility, the creative cities trade on the cultural distinction of cool (par. 28).

This quote suggests that creative city making can be viewed as an entrepreneurial strategy *per se*, because ultimately, it aims to contribute to the market-centred policy agenda of the cities.

Similar to entrepreneurial cities, creative cities are also focused on sustaining the power of capital and serving the interests of the middle-class and elites. Furthermore, in a pursuit of displaying the attractive side of the urban core, they also tend to neglect vulnerable social groups “that do not fit this narrative of economic development” (Grodach and Silver, 2013: 4), such as migrant populations, the urban poor and, ironically, artists whose work does conform to the envisioned format of the creative city. As a result, the creative city in the urban development agenda is more frequently seen as an exclusive ‘landscape’ rather than a ‘public space’ (Leslie, 2005). Instead of ‘tolerance’ (see Florida, 2002), this policy model further facilitates and deepens social divisions between the haves and have-nots (Yeoh, 2005; Peck, 2005; Scott, 2006; Pratt, 2009; Cole, 2012; Grodach and Silver, 2013).

Furthermore, like other ‘entrepreneurial’ strategies, creative city policies foster “even more aggressive, anxious and ultimately futile competitive behaviour” (Peck, 2005: 761) that locks cities into a zero-sum competition with one another (see also Harvey, 1989a; Pratt, 2008; Peck, 2011a). Both Charles Landry and Richard Florida seem to perceive inter-urban competition as a necessary, and in some sense, ‘healthy’ process that ‘triggers creativity’ (Landry, 2000). Clearly, cities were competing with each other and trying to make themselves attractive long before the concept of the creative city was first introduced. What changed with the arrival of policy consultants, such as Charles Landry, Richard Florida and the like, was that urban branding activities have become somewhat ‘professionalised’ and ‘standardised’ (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009; Peck and Theodore, 2010). This point is accurately illustrated by various ranking systems of the creative cities that are now considered “an important part of the process of urban branding and place competition” (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009: 66). Prince (2012b) observes that quantitative material in the form of statistical data, diagrams, tables or graphs not only lends the aura of credibility to the produced knowledge, but also enables comparison, contrast and ranking of distant objects and places, thus universalising this knowledge. The ability to compare and contrast allows cities to see where they stand in terms of ‘cultural advancement’ and ‘creativity’ in relation to other cities, ultimately forcing them into more intense competition for the title of “the coolest on earth: the most creative city” (Pratt, 2008: 109).
Charles Landry and Richard Florida both seem to imply that culture and particularly creativity can solve nearly all problems in cities and towns. This often unaccounted optimism about the wide-reaching benefits of culture and creativity has been met with a great degree of scepticism in academic circles (see Stevenson, 2004; Gibson and Klocker, 2004; Atkinson and Easthope, 2009). Atkinson and Easthope (2009) argue that today the term ‘creative city’ encompasses “so many aspects of economic development and urban governance”, to the extent it ends up being used “rather pointlessly” (p. 76). In a similar vein, Stevenson (2004) asks whether it is possible for cultural policies to actually achieve so many “social, creative, urban and economic objectives”, particularly considering that they can often be “quite contradictory” (p. 122) and in tension with each other. For instance, there are some obvious contradictions between cultural production- and consumption-centric policies in the creative cities (Cunningham, 2012). Whereas cultural and creative industries are primarily aimed at cultural production (Comunian, 2011), events and other ‘display’ practices tend to be consumption-oriented (Harvey, 1989a; Zukin, 1991). Albeit they appear interdependent (events provide a platform, whereas industries provide events with content), they are also in direct competition with each other, particularly for government funding and skilled professionals. Cunningham (2012) notes that addressing and balancing tensions between production- and consumption-centric policies remains a great challenge for all creative cities.

The creative city policy discourse is widely exploited in city marketing and branding. As noted before, cities aspire for the title of the creative city to portray themselves as attractive destinations for investment, talents and tourists. A number of scholars have argued that this provides only short-term benefits to cities (Harvey, 1989a; Evans, 2003; Comunian, 2011). As Cole (2012) observes, in the long run, the promotion of the city as a ‘creative city’ may result in urban congestion and investment bubbles, ultimately leaving cities “with unrewarded longer-term public investment in assets and new social burdens” (p. 1234). This shows that like any other ‘neoliberal experiments’, the creative city does not necessarily deliver the intended or promoted results and might, in fact, have a destructive effect (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).

Many scholars have also questioned the actual contribution of the creative city policy model to the cultural development of cities (Evans, 2003; Cochrane, 2007; Comunian, 2011). Instead of engaging with the development of culture and creativity for the sake of community or the arts per se, creative cities are interested only in those initiatives that can attract investment and talents to the city. As a result, only a selected number of cultural forms and creative practices that are perceived useful either to economic development or urban regeneration of the city tend to be
supported by the government, which has an inevitable impact on the cultural ecosystem of the city (G. Evans, 2009; Grodach and Silver, 2013).

In addition, the creative city policy model fails to take into account the complexities of different cultures and communities. Its most prominent advocates tend to offer “singular ‘recipes’ for success” (Gibson and Klocker, 2004: 552) that by no means suit the interests, abilities and genuine needs of every city and town (see also Oakley, 2009; O’Connor, 2009; Chiu and Lin, 2014). In a similar vein, Scott (2006) asserts that creativity

is not something that can be simply imported into the city (…) [It] must be organically developed through the complex interweaving of relations of production, work, and social life in specific urban contexts (p. 15).

However, looking at the growing number of ‘cultural capitals’, ‘creative cities’, and ‘hubs of culture and creativity’, it is evident that the main focus of urban policymakers now seems to rest on the growing inter-urban competition and not the ‘organic development’ of creativity, culture and the arts.

Notwithstanding a severe academic criticism, the works of Charles Landry and Richard Florida have become incredibly popular among policymakers and urban planners, with their authors, in effect, successfully establishing and rendering “an industry out of their own work” (Gibson and Klocker, 2004: 551, original emphasis; see Prince, 2010a). A large number of municipal governments have eagerly turned to them for help and advice in building and constructing “an overarching urban identity” (Leslie, 2005: 403) for the creative city. Both Charles Landry and Richard Florida have visited East Asia on numerous occasions. Here they have not only presented their work, but also have provided their consultancy services to local governments. Charles Landry is a particularly well-known name in the region. He has worked with cities from China, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan (Landry, 2016).

The transfer process of what Gibson and Waitt (2013) term the “conventional creative city policy script” (p. 125), and the reasons behind its global appeal will be examined in the last section of this chapter (see Section 2.4).

Before that, I will address one of the most evident ‘display’ practices in the creative cities – cultural events.

2.3.3 Large-scale cultural events as ‘display’ practice of the creative city

As noted earlier, creative city policies are comprised of a variety of recurrent programmes and initiatives. Research in this area is therefore commonly focused on different elements of the creative city, including creative clusters and cultural districts (Montgomery, 2003; Mommaas, 2009; Evans, 2009), creative industries
So far, however, there has been little discussion about the role of cultural events in the context of the creative city. Events are not usually considered to be part of the creative city policy in their own right, but rather as supplements to these policies. In large part this can be explained by the fact that, contrary to creative districts or cultural and creative industries’ policy discourse, events have not emerged from the cultural turn in urban development. Cultural festivals and celebrations have long historical roots and their role in place promotion and identity building politics is by no means a recent invention (Waitt, 2008). As long-established remnants of ‘traditional’ cultural policy they seem to go against the idea of the creative city, which has been presented by its advocates as ‘new’ and somewhat ‘revolutionary’ – a policy of the future.

Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, both Landry (2000) and Florida (2002) condemn the ‘traditional’ formats of large-scale cultural events that take place in closed spaces and are aimed only at selected members of the public. Landry (2000) argues that these events fail in terms of promoting the local distinctiveness of the place. Along with Florida (2002), he calls for a more innovative approach to events and their programming. In addition, he also outlines the need for large-scale events to focus on legacy, and the need to “develop processes that continue” (Landry, 2015, no pagination).

Indeed, at first glance, ‘traditional’ formats of arts or film festivals may appear incompatible with the popular narratives of the creative city. However, my intention is to show that they have, in fact, become not only one of the most commonly used display practices of the creative city, but also one of its defining components.

Although the creative city entails the elements of cultural production as well as consumption, since the early 2000s it has been considered primarily as a consumption-based strategy (see Florida 2002, Pratt 2008). In a city where consumption matters more than the growth of cultural production, cultural policies are seen as policies of attraction. As Bell and Oakley (2015) put it, they are “used as spectacle to attract inward investment, cultural tourism or skilled workers” (p. 90). It is in this context that large-scale cultural events – as important means of attraction and display – have become particularly relevant. After all, they are often intended for multiple audiences and participants ranging from members of the local public to foreign media, artists and tourists. In other words, they can function as a tool of both inward and outward display. This differentiates them from other creative city
strategies such as creative clusters or cultural and creative industries that tend to be more limited in terms of their scope of display.

The fact that cultural events had a longer history than the idea of the creative city per se did not preclude the possibility of events becoming an intrinsic element of the creative city and “the longest running type of ‘creative city’ initiative” (Pratt, 2010: 16). Below I will address the ways in which ‘traditional’ formats of cultural events, such as arts and film festivals, have been transformed and rendered to serve the market-driven policy agenda of the creative city.

As systematic and ‘rigorously planned’ (Belghazi, 2006: 108) display efforts, events started to slowly emerge in the post-First World War period in the form of arts festivals, film festivals and the like. The major goal behind the first regular film festival launched in 1932 in Venice was to promote fascist ideology and to disseminate propaganda for Mussolini’s government (de Valck, 2007). After the Second World War, in the years of massive reconstruction and growth, there was an upsurge in large-scale cultural events in Europe (Harvie, 2003; Prentice and Andersen, 2003; Quinn, 2005a; de Valck, 2007). The unveiling of the Cannes Film Festival in 1946, was followed by the launch of the Edinburgh International Festival (1947), the Edinburgh Festival Fringe (1947), and the Berlin International Film Festival (1951).

The major role ascribed to the festivals at that time was to display and articulate the unity of Europe and to re-build its cultural identity (Harvie, 2003; Quinn, 2005a). Considering that events were bringing additional financial capital to the cities, they were also seen as contributors to economic growth. At the same time, perhaps even more importantly, by embodying this growth they served as symbols of stability and prosperity in post-war Europe. The case of the Edinburgh International Festival is often used to exemplify this argument (see Waterman, 1998; Harvie, 2003; Prentice and Andersen, 2003).

Since the early 1950s, the templates of the film festival, the arts festival and the fringe have started to circulate beyond European borders. In East Asia, Taiwan was the first to follow suit with the Golden Horse Film Festival in 1962. The festival was established by the central Kuomintang government as part of the island’s re-sinicisation campaign, and was therefore focused on the promotion of Chinese identity and Chinese-language films (see Chun, 1994; see also Chapter 6). The global format of the Arts festival in East Asia was first adopted by Hong Kong in 1973. As it was launched and administered by the private sector, the primary objectives of the festival differed greatly from its predecessors in Europe (see Chapter 5). These two examples suggest that the primary roles of the festivals tend to be shifted in accordance with local policy agenda.
In Europe, the major objectives attached to cultural events have also changed over time. Initially introduced as symbols of European unity and post-war reconstruction, from the early 1960s through the late 1970s, they were assigned a much broader range of roles that seemed to be linked more with the needs and interests of their host cities rather than the state (Quinn, 2010). Cities started to use large-scale cultural events to boost tourism, to promote local artistic practices, and to stimulate community engagement and inclusion. In order to revitalise cultural life and to attract more audience members to the event sites, both ‘high’ and ‘low’ arts were increasingly incorporated into the events’ programmes (Waterman, 1998; Dicks, 2004). These developments reflected on the emerging tensions between the economic and social functions of the events. As Waterman (1998) explains,

 “[T]here were obvious tensions between the aims of economic regeneration, with growth and property development, and cultural regeneration, more concerned with themes such as community self-development and self-expression (p. 64, original emphasis).”

In the early 1980s, these tensions further intensified. Following the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies in Europe and North America, festivals and events have become viewed as primarily a “marketable economic resource” (Waitt, 2008: 517). For cities that were rapidly transforming into the ‘landscapes of consumption’ (Zukin, 1991), they offered a chance to be noted and talked about, and in a sense helped to facilitate the move from the production-oriented economy into the consumption-oriented one (Richards and Wilson, 2004; Gotham, 2005; Quinn, 2010).

Subsequently, over the last three decades, they have been placed “within a broader array of neoliberal, culture-led urban regeneration strategies” (Quinn, 2010: 266). This development was marked by events turning into “an industry of very sizeable proportions” (Quinn, 2010: 267; see also Waterman, 1998; Richards and Wilson, 2004; Dicks, 2004). In many cities around the globe, there has been a significant upsurge in arts festivals and film festivals, as well new forms of events, particularly those related to design. As Peranson (2008) accurately describes, “festivals are popping up like Starbucks franchises, in terms of numbers – every major city now has one” (p. 23).

The expanding number of festivals reflects on the market-driven policy agenda of the creative cities. Accordingly, ‘traditional’ large scale cultural events, such as film and arts festivals, have been transformed into what is presented to be as more accessible and more engaging formats. Today their programmes include a much broader scope of projects that range from different forms of popular culture to avant-garde. Furthermore, many of the artistic performances or screenings take place in
unconventional sites (e.g. parks or city squares). A large number of public outreach programmes that have been introduced in the past decade to attract a wider group of audiences also indicate a significant transformation of events.

Overall, from the late 1980s onwards, the main policy objectives attached to the arts festivals, film festivals and other large-scale cultural events in the Global North have been strongly underpinned by leisure, consumption, entertainment and tourism, and other market-driven considerations (Waterman, 1998; Richards and Wilson, 2004; García, 2004; Quinn, 2010). Their contribution to the city’s ‘cultural imagineering’ (Yeoh, 2005) is now perceived primarily in terms of how much investment and how many jobs and tourists they can attract. A closer look at the events literature clearly reveals this trend. Here, the promotional role of events is considered primarily in relation to building a ‘tourism destination’ image of the place (see Richards and Wilson, 2004; Gotham, 2002; Quinn, 2010). In addition, the events are also discussed as a means to promote cultural and creative industries, urban regeneration, the general economic growth of the city, as well as certain social policies that help to either justify or to further stimulate the neoliberalisation process in the cities (Waterman, 1998; Hitters, 2000; García, 2004; Quinn, 2005a; Waitt, 2008; van Aalst and van Melik, 2012). Consequently, unlike mega-events, such as the Olympics, World Cup and World Expo, which are more commonly addressed as *symbolic* display practices of the nation’s power and influence (see Roche, 2000; Roche, 2001; McGuigan, 2004; Dicks, 2004), the rest of the cultural and sports events in most of the critical accounts tend to be viewed predominantly as exemplifiers of *entrepreneurial* display (see Harvey, 1990; McGuigan, 2004).

The tendency for the events to be increasingly attached to a market-oriented urban policy agenda has raised a number of concerns among scholars, particularly, in relation to the growing tensions between what Waterman (1998) described as ‘economic regeneration’ and ‘cultural regeneration’ of the city.

First, there seems to be a lack of interest among policymakers and urban planners in the ‘intrinsic’ value of the artistic practices. As Quinn (2010) comments,

> it is now not unusual for city planning documents and tourism strategies to refer to arts festival activity without any real reference to the underpinning art form, or to the identification or measurement of anticipated artistic outcomes (p. 272).

In a similar vein, Garcia (2004) also argues that now most large-scale events are focused on either sports or technological showcases whereas artistic practices are delegated “a secondary role” (p. 104). It has also been observed that cultural festivals “with less potential for spectacle” (Quinn, 2010: 274) have fewer chances of receiving public funding (see also Chapter 3).
A number of scholars have also commented on the increasing homogeneity both within the cities and the cultural events pointing to the “absence of experimenting with or aspiring to new formats” (Richards and Wilson, 2004: 1933; see also Harvey, 1989a; Waitt, 2008; Finkel, 2009; Ponzini, 2012). Subsequently, the questions of how to outperform others whilst avoiding the reproduction of ‘sameness’, and how to maintain artistic freedom whilst remaining competitive have been raised over and over again (Quinn, 2005a; Gotham, 2002; Quinn, 2010).

Another common critique that links to the tensions noted above is a weakening connection between the cultural events, particularly the ‘imported’ ones, and local community (van Aalst and van Melik, 2012; see also Eisinger, 2000; Gotham, 2002; Quinn, 2005a). Today large-scale cultural events are commonly aimed at visitors and tourists, whereas the interests of the local public seem to be neglected (Eisinger, 2000; Gotham, 2002). Also, it is evident that different groups within a city have different access to festivals. As Waterman (1998) indicates, public cultural events only appear to reach a broad audience, whereas for the most part they are “reserved for a ‘select’ group” (p. 68).

This observation relates to another major critique of cultural events that revolves around the question of whose interests events actually serve. A number of scholars have expressed their concern that large-scale cultural events are increasingly used as “instruments of hegemonic power, to uphold the dominant political system” (van Aalst and van Melik, 2012: 197; see also Harvey, 1989b; Waterman, 1998; Gotham, 2005; Belghazi, 2006). David Harvey, in his book The Urban Experience (1989b) critically addressed them as ‘carnival masks’, arguing that policy elites use events to hide social inequalities and other negative impacts of capitalism.

These considerations clearly expose the destructive side of market-centred policy objectives, which currently underpin large-scale cultural events. Therefore, as Quinn (2010) rightly comments, “while arts festivals are proliferating, it remains unclear as to whether they are also flourishing” (p. 271).

Above I explained how large-scale cultural events were transformed into one of the creative city practices of entrepreneurial display and what impact this had on the cultural regeneration of cities. In the remaining part of this subsection, I will focus on events as the means of symbolic display.

A large number of studies addressed cultural events as part of broader neoliberal discourse, thus recognising their proliferation as a global trend (see Quinn, 2005a; MacLeod, 2006; Waitt, 2008; Evans, 2003; Gibson et al., 2010; Quinn, 2010; Müller and Pickles, 2015). Nevertheless, to date there have been only a few attempts to actually interrogate cultural events as global “circulating capital” (Yeoh, 2005: 945;
see also Stringer, 2001; Ma, 2012). Consequently, due to a relatively small scale and ‘local’ scope, the role of cultural events in the display and production of symbolic power is often overlooked in the literature. Below I will explain why large-scale cultural events should be considered not only as exemplifiers of entrepreneurial display, but also as important practices of symbolic display.

Firstly, such events as arts festivals, film festivals and design weeks constitute global networks of events, or borrowing from Stringer (2001), international ‘festival circuits’ that operate “through the transfer of value between and within distinct geographic localities” (p. 138). The term ‘festival circuit’, in this respect, represents not simply a network of interrelated festivals, but also a socially produced space of mediation, “a unique cultural arena that acts as a contact zone for the working-through of unevenly differentiated power relationships” (Stringer, 2001: 138). This means that by adopting a global template of the film festival, arts festival or other major cultural event, the city gains access to the network of other cities that have their own replicas. Provided the event is successful and well received by the professionals, media and the public, it can then generate a symbolic power for the city in this ‘festival circuit’ and possibly beyond. Even if the event appears to be not as prominent and successful as other events in the network, for the city that feels marginalised or excluded from the global arena, the sense of belonging that is created by merely being a part of the network of global events is already perceived as one step further towards international endorsement and recognition (see Yeoh, 2005).

Secondly, if we are to consider large-scale cultural events as a singular set rather than as isolated individual occurrences within one city, they then come to represent both the cultural and economic advancement of the city. In support of this argument, Cunningham (2012) suggests that the events and festivals are place-marking activities that cities hold to announce “their status as culturally savvy” (p. 117). The single fact that the city is capable of hosting a series of large-scale cultural events on a regular basis, points at its “status as culturally savvy” (Cunningham, 2012: 117), and its economic and political soundness, thus positioning the city as a ‘repository’ “of stability, continuity, uniqueness and harmony” (Urry, 2000: 151). Altogether this enhances the city’s reputation and image at a ‘global public stage’ (Urry, 2000; Urry, 2007). As Urry (2007) explains:

It seems that ‘spectacle-isation’ is necessary in order for places (…) to somehow be ‘recognised’ as places to enter the ‘global stage’. Such cities can only be taken seriously in the new world dis/order if they are partly at least places of distinct spectacle, through events, museums, ancient remains, festivals, galleries, meetings, sport events, (…) and (…) new and refurbished iconic buildings (p. 134).
In part, the pursuit for recognition on the international stage captures “market desire to acquire symbolic capital” (Harvey, 1990: 264; see also Zukin, 1991). However, in addition to ‘market desire’, this pursuit can also be driven by political ambitions of the state.

At this point, it is particularly instructive to consider the process of ‘festivalisation’ in East Asian cities. The number of ‘imported’ cultural events in East Asia started rising in the early 1990s with Tokyo, Taipei, Singapore, Shanghai and Beijing launching their own film and arts festivals. However, contrary to Europe and North America, large-scale cultural events here are commonly perceived as first and foremost tools for international prestige and national identity building, whilst urban regeneration and economic growth seem to be among minor factors affecting their rapid proliferation in the region (Abbas, 2000; Kong, 2000; Lee, 2004; Yeoh, 2005; Kong, 2007; see also Chapters 4, 5, 6). This could be attributed to the state-led, as opposed to entirely market-led, development model, which has been exercised by many nations in East Asia. Although in part this model undoubtedly is subject to market interests, it is also consistently focused on the interests of the state, specifically, “world-aspirations of the state” (Ong, 2011a: 224; see also Kong, 2007).

This means that in many East Asian countries, display practices often derive from the pursuit for symbolic power, which is aimed at asserting the national ambitions of the state. Therefore, ‘urban spectacle’ here is not only a spectacle of a global capital, but also that of sovereign power (Ong, 2011a; see also Subsection 2.4.3).

Roche (2001) indicates that large-scale cultural events “have long contributed and continue to contribute, to the cultural structuring of social space, time, generational identities and intergenerational relationships” (p. 494). In other words, large-scale cultural events not only promote certain aspects of the city (and the state) to the global community, but also promote the city (and the state) to the local public. This links to the last point, concerning the special role events play as symbolic display practices and identity building tools. There is a clear historical link between national identity building and cultural events. As noted before, many cultural events in Europe in the post-war era were involved in the politics of national identity as well as in fostering a sense of local pride (see Waterman, 1998; Harvie, 2003; Quinn, 2005a; Waitt, 2008). Drawing upon his analysis of the Festival of Britain held in 1951, Hewison (1997) further contributes to this argument, noting that “the celebration of national identity” (p. 60) and the strengthening of ‘Britishness’ were amongst the major themes of the Festival. This indicates that, historically, events have been actively used in the nation building process.

Although since the 1980s in most European cities these objectives have been undermined by market-centred concerns, in many East Asian cities the process of
building ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 2006) is still under way. All three territories that are central to this thesis are currently in the course of (re)establishing their identities. China has been prompted to redefine its national identity in the light of its transformation from a socialist revolutionary state to a capitalist state ‘with Chinese characteristics’ (Harvey, 2005; Friedman, 1994; Wang, 2011; see also Chapter 4). From the late 1980s onwards, Taiwan’s government has been engaged in democratisation of the island, which involves the transition from what is perceived to be a Chinese identity to Taiwanese identity (Chun, 1994; Chu and Lin, 2001; see also Chapter 6). Lastly, Hong Kong, since its handover in 1997, has also been facing a great deal of uncertainty regarding its identity, and its place in the region (Abbas, 1997; Lau, 1997; see also Chapter 5). This suggests that ‘imported’ formats of large-scale cultural events here are more likely to be actively used in the politics of national identity than in the already ‘fully’ established nations in Europe or North America. Similarly, their adoption may require certain adjustments in order for these events to suit this particular purpose. In fact, both the literature and empirical findings indicate that this is indeed the case (Kong, 2007; Ong, 2011a; see also Chapters 4, 5, 6).

As shown in this section, the understandings and roles that policymakers ascribe to the term ‘creative city’ and large-scale cultural events now overlap, clearly exposing cultural events as one of the intrinsic components of the creative city. And yet, as discussed in the beginning of this subsection, research on events with regards to the creative city is still largely absent from the creative city literature. In this study, I attempt to address this gap by using events to understand the creative city as display. The longer history of events in this context serves as a major advantage over other creative city initiatives. As an integral element of both the ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ cultural policy, events allow us to see in which ways, if any, the creative city policy discourse (i.e. ‘new’ cultural policy) has altered the understanding of culture as display.

Moreover, large-scale cultural events, better than any other creative city policy strategies, can reflect on a full spectrum of rationales attached to the creative city as a site of an attraction and display. As shown in this subsection, events can be seen as contributors to the city’s economy, a practice of entrepreneurial display. In this context, their role largely resembles that of cultural and creative industries, creative clusters and cultural quarters (Mommaas, 2009; Pratt, 2010; Cunningham, 2012). Cities use events for city promotion and the attraction of tourists, ‘creative class’ and foreign direct investment more generally. Facilitation and promotion of other creative city initiatives, such as cultural and creative industries and signature
constructions, is another common role attached to events as practices of entrepreneurial display.

At the same time, as display practices, large-scale cultural events can also be used to accumulate symbolic cultural capital for the city and the state (Williams, 1984; McGuigan, 2004; Urry, 2007). These rationales, which are not necessarily driven by the pursuit of economic development, correspond particularly well to the rationales attached to the creative city policy discourse outside the Global North (see Kong, 2007). As discussed earlier, arts and film festivals have originated primarily as a means of identity building and symbols of stability and prosperity. Whereas in many places these particular goals are no longer relevant, in Chinese cities they seem to be among key priorities driving the adoption of large-scale cultural events and the cultural turn more generally (Kong 2007, also see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Contrary to the Global North, where urban cultural policies are tailored to serve the needs and interests of cities, in Chinese cities urban cultural policies are still largely defined by the interest of the nation-state (see Subsection 2.4.3). Consequently, as will be shown in the empirical chapters of this thesis, it is a common practice for events to be focused on identity building, pursuit of cultural superiority over other cities (nations), and other national ambitions.

Overall, it seems that in Chinese cities the cultural turn is primarily about attraction and display – both entrepreneurial and symbolic – rather than cultural production-based economic growth. After all, neither of the cities explored in this thesis have experienced the same degree of deindustrialisation as their counterparts in the Global North, nor have they been facing the same degree of economic decline. Instead, they appear to perceive the title of the creative city as a necessity to strengthen their global city status and to raise international prestige and recognition of their nation-states (see Chapter 7).

Considering that events, unlike other creative city strategies, can reflect on those rationales that go beyond the entrepreneurial agenda of the creative city they are critical for understanding the nuanced nature of the creative city as display. Moreover, they are particularly valuable in understanding creative cities in the Chinese-speaking world, where the primary role of large-scale cultural events (as well as that of the creative city) is not only to serve as a ‘marketable economic resource’, but also, and perhaps more crucially, to serve as a marketable policy device.

Another major reason for selecting events over other creative city initiatives was to address the gap in the existing body of events literature regarding the mobility of cultural events. Besides a few notable exceptions (see Stringer, 2001; Quinn, 2005b), to date there has been little attempt to read events as mobile and mutating policies.
In the next section, I will explore the transfer and mutation process of ‘imported’ urban cultural policies in more detail.

2.4 Policy transfer and travelling discourses of urban cultural policies

The last section of this chapter aims to examine the mobility and transformation process of urban cultural policies. The section opens with an overview of the policy transfer literature. Here I discuss two dominant approaches in the field – normative and social-constructivist – that shape and divide it. Drawing on a social-constructivist perspective, I then address the mobility and mutations of two imported cultural policy strategies that are central to this thesis – the creative city thesis and large-scale cultural events – and identify the existing gaps in literature on this subject. Lastly, in the remaining part of this section, I interrogate the emerging literature on the reach, influence and mutation of these two policy discourses in East Asian cities.

2.4.1 Policies in movement: from diffusion to mutation

As noted in the previous section, the cultural turn in urban development is a global trend. Widespread adoption of imported urban cultural policies, including the creative city policy script and large-scale cultural events, clearly reflects on this trend. In this thesis, I am interested in the ways these urban cultural policies, or rather the roles and meanings attached to them, change as a result of their continuous dissemination, absorption and translation beyond the borders of the Global North.

Over the last sixty years, a number of terms have been developed to address the exchange of knowledge and ideas in the public policy sector. Although not entirely interchangeable, generally these terms can be classified according to the two disciplines they are rooted in, namely political science and geography.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, policy movement was first addressed in the political science literature that introduced the notions of ‘policy diffusion’ (Walker, 1969), ‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose, 1991), and ‘policy transfer’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) define ‘policy transfer’ as

a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system (p. 5).

This definition is widely applied in the literature as a common point of departure for discussion of policy movement and change (Benson and Jordan, 2011). However, in the field of geography it has been increasingly criticised for an oversimplified view
of the ways policies are mobilised and translated (Peck, 2011b). Instead, geographers suggest to address policy transfer as ‘policy mobility’ (McCann, 2008; McCann and Ward, 2011), ‘policy mobility-mutation’ (Peck, 2011b), or ‘policy assemblage’ (Prince, 2010b; McCann, 2011b; McCann and Ward, 2012).\(^{10}\)

The difference in terminology across the two disciplines marks two distinct and somewhat complementary approaches to the role, processes and implications of policy transfer. Whereas the political science literature advocates ‘traditional’ or ‘normative’ views to policy flow, the research in the fields of human geography and urban studies addresses the new sociospatial dimension of policy transfer. Geographers used relational geography (see Massey, 2004; Kong et al., 2006; McCann and Ward, 2010) and social constructivism (see Peck, 2011b; Peck and Theodore, 2012) to conceptualise the process of policy transfer. Considering that in regard to this particular subject these two theoretical stances are deeply intertwined with each other, I ascribe them both to the social-constructivist tradition.

The social-constructivism approach to policy transfer has been developing for over a decade now (see, for example, Ward, 2006; McCann, 2008; Prince, 2010b; Peck and Theodore, 2010). However, it was thoroughly introduced and defined only a few years ago by renowned political geographer Jamie Peck (Peck, 2011b; see also Peck and Theodore, 2012).

The normative tradition has laid a strong foundation for understanding the aims and traits of policy transfer. However, it is now increasingly recognised as insufficient in explaining the complex structure of the entire process and social interactions that shape it (McCann and Ward, 2011; Peck, 2011b).

One serious weakness of the normative approach lies within the state-centric view of policy transfer. Whilst recognising the presence of different settings for policy transfer to occur, such as cities and international organisations, normative accounts are focused predominantly on policy transactions that occur at the international or transnational levels (Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). As a result, regardless of what policy actors are involved and what policy programmes are transferred, it is the nation-state that always tends to be placed at both (or at least one) of the sending and receiving ends of the policy transmission line (see Wolman, 1992; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

Another major issue with the normative tradition rests on the supposed rationality of policy transfer. Here, the process is generally perceived as a “conscious imitation of the policies” (Wolman, 1992: 28, emphasis added) in which carefully selected

---

\(^{10}\) Although in this thesis I will be drawing primarily on a geographer’s perspective, I will be using the term ‘policy mobility’ interchangeably with ‘policy transfer’.
policies are transported from one political institution to another (see also Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Regardless of whether their transfer is seen as ‘voluntary’ or ‘coerced’, in both cases, the need for some sort of rational justification is implied (Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). The social-constructivist approach to policy transfer, which will be addressed shortly, challenges this perspective, arguing that all supposedly ‘perfectly-rational’ decisions are not made by policymakers, but are, in fact, imposed on them by a wide range of sociospatial processes that normative accounts fail to consider (see, for example, McCann, 2011a; Peck, 2011b).

It should also be noted that contrary to the claims made in the policy science literature, policy transfer can be neither entirely voluntary nor entirely coercive (see Rose, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Policy makers do not choose to go through all this often long, painstaking and costly process because they want to try something new (‘voluntary’ transfer), but because they are pushed by the need to do something. In those cases, where certain policies are enforced on others (‘coercive’ transfer), they also need to be rearranged and readopted in accordance with the local context and local realities (see Brusis, 2005; Gorton et al., 2009).

Lastly, whilst focusing primarily on the issues related to the structure and *modus operandi* of transfer, normative studies seem to neglect the post-transfer stage of the process (see Evans, 2009b). In other words, they largely omit the impact and implications of policy transfer on both the policies that are being moved as well as on the policy-making sites that adopt them. As a result, the normative approach to transfer fails to notice that, in fact, it is common for ‘lesson-drawing’ to take place through policy transfer failures and extended alterations (see Offe, 1996; Peck, 2011b).

In my thesis I examine policy transfer at a city level and my primary interest lies in the post-transfer stage of urban cultural policies. Considering the above limitations of the normative tradition, it is evident that the political science literature fails to shed much light on this particular subject. Therefore, in this thesis I choose to read policy transfer through the lenses of geography.

In recent years in the field of urban studies there has been a growing interest in cities as policy transfer sites. Cities, which are now increasingly perceived as both key nodes in global networks (Sassen, 2005) and as networks themselves (Jacobs, 2012), have been the focus of attention for geographers interested in policy transfer (see, for example, Ward, 2006; McCann, 2011b; Peck and Theodore, 2015). Consequently, in recent years a number of studies have been produced interrogating the whys and hows of policy transfer in cities: why policies are imported (Peck, 2011a), how they
are transformed in different cities and at different times (Ward, 2006; Peck, 2011a), and how they affect the politics of cities (McCann, 2008).

In contrast to normative accounts that address policy transfer as a rationally-designed mechanism, the social-constructivist perspective refers to it as a *sociospatial* process that is deeply embedded in, and hence dependent on, the existing social relations and power structures (Peck and Theodore, 2010; McCann and Ward, 2011; Peck, 2011b; Peck and Theodore, 2012).

This does not imply, however, that the advocates of the social-constructivist approach deny the purposive character of policy transfer. Rather, they argue that all choices that are made before, during or after transfer, are influenced by a wide range of exogenous and endogenous factors that also should be taken into account (see McCann, 2011b; Prince, 2012b). In other words, policies “do not simply drop from the sky” (Peck and Theodore, 2012: 23), but are constructed through increasingly complex and interdependent policy networks that Prince (2012b) accurately describes as a “boundary-crossing web of influences that shape political and policy decisions” (p. 189). These networks comprise a wide range of state and non-state actors, including policymakers, policy advisors, private sector experts and international organisations that play an important role in the transfer process of urban cultural policies.

As “official multilateral policy-making forums” (Kong et al., 2006: 175), organisations such as UNESCO tend to have a high level of credibility and respect amongst policymakers. In fact, the UNESCO *Creative Economy Report 2008* is recognised as one of the most influential publications on the cultural turn in urban development (Prince, 2010a). Through the research reports and papers of UNESCO, different policy concepts and ideas are not only formally recognised and instated, but also “made mobile” (Freeman, 2012: 14), because in written form they are easily accessible in other realms of time and space (see also McCann, 2008). A large number of the research studies commissioned by the governments in many cities, including Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei, make references to the UNESCO definitions, data and research methodologies in relation to cultural development, creative economy, cultural and creative industries, cultural diversity and heritage. At the same time, written materials and documentation, like any other source of policies ‘on the move’, are repeatedly interpreted and re-interpreted “in action” (Freeman, 2012: 15) with a new message being produced each time as these materials circulate through different policy-making sites and organisations (see also Prince, 2010a).

The growing body of literature on the influential role of policy consultants and intermediaries in the process of policy transfer is particularly instructive in exemplifying the complexity of policy transfer (McCann, 2008; Peck, 2011b; Prince,
In the last two decades, policy intermediaries, as ‘experts of truth’ (McCann, 2008), have attained a significant degree of power and influence in the policy-making process (Prince, 2012b). Their main job is to pitch and ‘sell’ the ideas, actions plans or, at times, entire models of policies. McCann (2008) indicates that by doing this, policy consultants facilitate and transmit “relational knowledge, in and through which policy actors understand themselves and their cities’ policies to be tied up in wider circuits of knowledge” (p. 6, emphasis added). Richard Florida and Charles Landry, whose work was discussed in the previous section, are probably the two most famous cultural intermediaries whose celebrity status contributed to the popularity of the creative city policy script (Gibson and Klocker, 2004; Atkinson and Easthope, 2009; Prince, 2012b; see also Section 2.3.2). In East Asia, they are often perceived as ‘major leading academic voices’ in the fields of cultural economy and creative urbanism (Hui, 2006; Kong, 2009; Lin, 2015).

A significant role that policy consultants and international organisations play in shaping and defining the policy transfer of urban cultural policies indicates that it is a socially and politically embedded process (see also Offe, 1996). This shows that although policy transfer in most cases appears to be introduced purposively, policymakers, who are only one of many constitutive elements in the globalising policy networks, possess limited power and control over its outcome (see also Peck, 2011b). Prince’s (2010b) study of the introduction of creative industries policies to New Zealand seems to support this assertion. He argues that in New Zealand, the adoption of the cultural and creative industries discourse has never been ‘a self-evident choice’ for local policy-makers, but rather the outcome of “expedient politicking, attempts at aligning divergent motivations, expert interventions, translation, innovation, invention, and failure” (p. 176).

Consequently, in this thesis, where my primary focus lies on assessing urban policymakers’ approaches to imported cultural policies, I do not address their decisions as ‘perfectly-rational’, but rather read them as complex social and political constructs. I am particularly interested in the ways in which urban cultural policies are attached and adopted to the specific needs and context of the place. In other words, I explore how they are institutionally embedded in the local ideological discourses and practices, institutional policy frameworks, and hierarchical structures (Peck, 2011b). Examining how local policymakers negotiate the policy transfer of urban cultural policies sheds light on the interdependencies between these policies and their adoption sites.

It is particularly important to talk about changes that occur as a result of these interdependencies between ‘mobile’ policies, various groups of policy actors and policy-making sites. According to the advocates of the social-constructivist view, the
adopted policies are “often a far cry from the mere replication of rules that have been in operation at other places or times” (Offe, 1996: 213). In other words, policies transform, or in Peck’s (2011b) terms, *mutate* as they travel across different policymaking sites. As Peck and Theodore (2012) explain, different policy programmes and models

> do not simply travel, intact, from sites of invention to sites of emulation, like some superior export product. Instead, through their very movement they (re)make connections between these sites, evolving in form and effect as they go (p. 23).

This quote indicates that mutation is, in fact, a two-way process. On the one hand, policy transfer enacts the transformation of the mobilised policies. On the other hand, it also affects and reshapes the sites of transfer (see McCann and Ward, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2012). As Peck (2011b) notes, ‘context matters’ because policy regimes and landscapes are more than empty spaces across which borrowing and learning take place; they are dynamically remade through the traffic in policy norms and practices, the flows of which *reflect* (and remake) particular policy regimes (p. 775, original emphasis).

This clearly demonstrates that just as policies are affected and transformed by the policy-making sites at both borrowing and lending ends, these sites, in turn, are also altered in a deeply cross-referential manner with “new policy world-views” (Peck, 2011b: 794, original emphasis) being introduced over and over again.

This means that in order to gain a better understanding of the contextualisation of imported cultural policies, I will have to approach this process from two directions. In addition to examining the change in meanings that urban policymakers attach to the creative city policy discourse and large-scale cultural events, I will also have to address the implications of these imported policy discourses on the local cultural landscape and cultural policy agenda.

Considering that policy-making sites do not exist in splendid isolation from each other, but are instead deeply interconnected, it is essential to conduct more comparative studies for a better understanding of policy transfer and transformations. However, to date only a few research studies have addressed the interdependencies between cities and their impact on policy transfer (for notable exceptions, see Ward, 2006; Lowry and McCann, 2011). Simmons et al.’s (2008) comparative study, which examines how different mechanisms of interconnectivity between different countries around the globe are involved in the transfer of economic and political liberalisation, is one of the most notable attempts to fill this void.

In their book, entitled *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy* (2008), Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett identify four causal mechanisms of *interdependent*
decision-making, including *coercion*, *learning*, *competition* and *emulation*. These mechanisms are then empirically tested against different facets of liberalisation in various countries.

In their study, *coercion* and *learning* echo the divide between coercive and voluntary policy transfer in the normative tradition and represents a hierarchical as opposed to relational power structure. ‘Coercion’ refers to a forceful type of policy diffusion, where powerful nations or intergovernmental organisations impose their policy preferences on other, less influential countries (see Simmons et al., 2008; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). ‘Learning’ mechanisms address rational and voluntary “learning from experiences, either direct or vicarious” (Garrett et al., 2008: 351; see also Rose, 1991).

The other two mechanisms of interdependent decision-making – *competition* and *emulation* – largely correspond with the social-constructivist approach to policy transfer. The authors of this study argue that policy transfer by *competition* occurs when countries adopt certain policy models and programmes in order “to compete with each other for international market share and global investment” (Garrett et al., 2008: 349). This process is underpinned primarily by economic considerations. However, as Simmons et al (2008) observe, “a competitive dynamic is plausibly at work with respect to both market and political” (p. 17, emphasis added) liberalisation. The other mechanism of policy transfer, that is, *emulation*, reflects on the process of making public policies “socially accepted” (Simmons et al., 2008: 34). Garrett et al (2008) terms this “a process of socially-informed mimicry” (p. 353). In other words, emulation occurs through various socially-constructed channels, where policies are ‘sold’ to policymakers as the most appropriate, ‘best practices’. Simmons and her colleagues indicate the four following ways for enacting the ‘social acceptance’ of policies:

1. leading countries serve as exemplars (‘follow the leader’); 2. expert groups theorize the effects of a new policy, and thereby give policymakers rationales for adopting it; 3. specialists make contingent arguments about a policy’s appropriateness, defining it as right under certain circumstances; and 4. policies go through different stages of institutionalization, typically spreading beyond the countries for which they were invented in a second phase of diffusion (Simmons et al., 2008: 34).

Borrowing from the social-constructivist approach to policy transfer, this list can be further supplemented by adding (5) those countries with which emulators have strong historical, political or cultural affinities (see Ward, 2006; Peck, 2011b; Jacobs, 2012). Ward’s (2006) study of the Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) transfer exemplifies this point. Although the BIDs were originally launched in Canada, the
British government has adopted this policy programme from the United States. Ward (2006) argues that the major reason behind this rests on closer connections and “a great deal of policy exchange between these two countries” (p. 60). The case of postcolonial Hong Kong, where British influence is deeply rooted in the local cultural policy models (see Ooi, 1995), serves as another prominent example of the influential role that historical and political connections between policy-making sites can play in the process of policy transfer.

The Simmons et al (2008) study findings reveal that although all four mechanisms have been used to accommodate the expansion of political and economic liberalism, economic (and to a certain extent political) competition, and social emulation appear to be two major driving forces behind the circulation of (neo)liberal policies. This clearly indicates that policy transfer is a socially constructed process.

Their study links to my research in two major ways.

First, it identified social emulation as one of the most common mechanisms responsible for prompting and navigating the transfer of economic and political (neo)liberalisation among policy-making sites. As explained previously, both the creative city policy script and large-scale cultural events can be seen as neoliberal policies and the growing inter-city competition was stated as one of the major factors for their dissemination (see Section 2.3). Social emulation or ‘social acceptance’ between cities, on the other hand, has not been considered as an important factor in stimulating and negotiating the transfer of urban cultural policies.

Second, the Simmons et al (2008) study exposed the significance of comparative studies that include more than two policy-making sites. In this respect, the existing literature on policy transfer in the field of geography seems to follow the trajectory of the normative studies. To date, most empirical studies have been either unidirectional or bidirectional. In other words, they were largely confined to the maximum of two policy-making sites – the ‘lending’ and the ‘borrowing’ one (see, for example, Ward, 2006; Prince, 2010b). These studies are very helpful in terms of assessing the adoption and transformation process of policies in different policy-making sites. They are, however, limited in terms of exposing consistent transformation patterns of policies, because they fail to consider policy formation and mutation as “a continuous, multisite process” (Peck and Theodore, 2012: 27).

My study attempts to fill this gap in the literature, by examining how ‘western scripts’ of urban cultural policies are translated and transformed in three Chinese cities. In

11 A notable exception is Lowry and McCann’s (2011) work on the transfer of corporate design projects between Hong Kong, Vancouver and Dubai.
this respect, a multiple-site case study will not only help to establish certain patterns in policy ‘de/reterritorialisation’ (Lowry and McCann, 2011), but will also provide insights into those aspects of ‘mobile’ policies that are more likely to transform, and those that are more likely to remain consistent and unchanged (see Chapter 7).

The next section probes into the existing literature on the transfer of urban cultural policies, and examines the reasons for a global reach of the creative city policy script and its display practices.

2.4.2 The mobility and transformation of the creative city policy discourse

Over the last decade, there have been some notable attempts to address the mobility of cultural and creative industries (J. Wang, 2004; O’Connor and Gu, 2006; Cunningham, 2007; Pratt, 2009; Prince, 2010a) and, more recently, the creative city policy discourse per se (G. Evans, 2009; Pratt, 2010; Peck, 2011a; Kim, 2015). Also, as discussed earlier (see Subsection 2.4.1), some scholars have examined the role of policy intermediaries and consultants in the process of transfer of urban cultural policies (Peck, 2005; Peck, 2011a; Gibson and Klockor, 2004; Prince, 2012b; Prince, 2014a; Prince, 2014b; O’Connor and Gu, 2015). Nevertheless, there are still a number of gaps to be filled, particularly in relation to the actual reasons for the adoption of imported cultural policies beyond the North Atlantic bloc, and the transformations that occur as a result of this process both within imported cultural policies and the adopting policy-making sites.

This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of these issues. It is focused on examining the roles attached to the creative city policy script, specifically to its display practices in three Chinese cities: Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong. By tracing the variations in meanings ascribed to culture as display across these cities, I seek to interrogate the transformation process of the creative city policy discourse and to identify major factors that shape and define it.

In order to address these questions in a more specific context, it is necessary to first establish the reasons behind the global appeal of the creative city. As noted in the previous sections, since the 1990s there has been a “viral spread” (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 171) of creative cities across the globe. Considering that there is a vast number of other concepts and ideas continuously circulating through different policy networks and policy-making sites (Prince, 2010a), it is important to understand what made the policy model of the creative city stand out over the others.

One of the major reasons why the creative city policy model has travelled so far is its compatibility with the broader “contemporary neoliberalisation processes” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 354). As discussed earlier, the ‘conventional creative city
policy script’ seems to promise everything that many cities today are craving – regeneration, the attraction of a skilled workforce, economic growth, facilitation of service sectors – all with a ‘creative’ twist that implies a potential comparative advantage in the global marketplace (see Section 2.3). Echoing this argument, Peck (2005) rightly observes that these urban cultural policies may have been adopted so quickly and so widely precisely “because they are so modest” (p. 760), and not at all ‘revolutionary’ as their authors seem to suggest. Similarly, the creative city policy model appeals to so many cities because it can be easily integrated into their largely market-driven policy agendas, and ultimately is designed to complement rather than to challenge entrepreneurial approaches to urban planning and development (Peck, 2005; Peck, 2007; see also Section 2.3.2).

The assertion that a positive impact of culture on the city’s economy and quality of life can be proved in numbers also enhances the global appeal of the creative city. The advocates of this policy model commonly use statistical data and ‘best practice’ case studies to support their claims. Despite the dubious nature of some of this ‘evidence’ (see Subsection 2.3.2), it seems to be very effective in persuading urban policymakers that the creative city policy model really works. The fact that this data can be used to justify certain policy choices and actions to voters, makes the idea of the creative city even more appealing to the policymakers.

The globalising trend to overly rely on what is perceived to be ‘solid’ quantitative data has emerged as a result of an ‘evidence-based’ policymaking, which is also commonly attached to the processes of neoliberalisation (Belfiore, 2004; Peck and Theodore, 2010; Prince, 2014b). Prince (2014b) argues that the use of quantitative measures helps policymakers and policy consultants to “translate a messy social world into a set of ordered, rationalised representations that can be compared to similarly produced representations from elsewhere” (p. 90). As noted before, this allows cities to see where they stand in terms of their ‘creativity’ in relation to other cities (see Subsection 2.3.2). Various city ranking systems and models, such as Florida’s Global Creativity Index (2002) and Landry and Hyams’ Creative City Index (2012), designed to measure culture and creativity in cities serve this purpose whilst simultaneously rendering the creative city policy script as a somewhat ‘universal’ policy model that is “true and applicable, virtually everywhere” (Prince, 2014b: 91).

Peer pressure that is linked with both regional and global inter-urban competition also strengthens the aspirations for the title of the creative city. With the globalising format of the creative city continuing to travel and impact the policymaking processes across the globe, those cities that refuse to inject some cultural and creative ‘vibes’ into their policy agendas are immediately seen (or see themselves) as
lagging behind. As stated in the Policy Recommendation Report issued by the Hong Kong Culture and Heritage Commission in 2003, should Hong Kong “neglect creative thinking and cultural education, it will lose its competitive edge, let alone become an international cultural metropolis” (p. 1; see also Chapter 5). This kind of thinking is common among urban policymakers in other cities in East Asia (Yeoh, 2005; Kong, 2007). In order to outperform each other, they relentlessly compete for who will build a greater cultural landmark, who will establish a larger number of cultural and creative districts, or who will launch more spectacular events. All ranking systems designed to measure the level of cultural advancement and creativity in cities also contribute to this trend. By offering the cities specific lists of measurable criteria that encourage them to compare themselves against each other, these ranking systems and creativity indexes only throw them deeper into a more aggressive, demanding, and ultimately, zero-sum competition (Peck, 2005; Peck, 2007; see also Subsection 2.3.2).

Despite nearly identical urban cultural policies and policy narratives, the cultural turn in urban development by no means serves the same purpose in every city where it is adopted. There are two major reasons for this. First, it is worth noting that one single template (as well as definition) of the ‘creative city’ simply does not exist. The specific components that constitute the creative city have never been clearly defined with different authors attributing different and often ambiguous meanings to the term ‘creative city’. Take for example, Richard Florida and Charles Landry’s approaches to the creative city, which despite some connections are quite different. It should also be noted that both Florida and Landry introduced their own ranking systems that are designed to compare the so-called ‘creative cities’ against each other. Florida’s Creativity Index (2002), the Creative City Index developed by Landry and Hyams (2012), and other ranking models, such as the criteria laid out for the UNESCO Creative Cities Network, all have their own criteria and methodologies.

---

12 There are some notable differences between Richard Florida and Charles Landry’s ideas. Whereas Landry (2000) tends to link creative city with urban regeneration and city promotion, Florida (2002) is more focused on the creative city as a policy strategy for capital accumulation. Subsequently, both authors attach different level of significance to the role of culture in creative city making. Florida (2002) reads culture as first and foremost a means of economic growth. Landry (2000), on the other hand, sees culture and various cultural practices as a vital component for both social and economic development of the city. In other words, whereas to Florida (2002) culture is somewhat a flavour enhancer of creativity, to Landry (2000) culture, particularly cultural planning, is an important tool to express creativity (see also Landry, 2015). Another key difference between the two authors is how they address the populace of the creative city. Florida’s (2002) attention is focused predominantly on the interests and expectations of a so-called ‘creative class’, whereas Landry (2000; 2015) adopts a much broader perspective. Dwelling on Florida’s work, Landry (2015) indicates that for him “it is not about a class, a grouping that is creative. I am always looking [for ways] how [to make] (...) everybody give more of what they have got” (Landry, 2015, 34:27-34:38).
This again indicates the absence of a singular framework of the creative city and implies that each city can adopt somewhat different canons of what for them counts as the ‘creative city’.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that, contrary to the cultural and creative industries policy discourse that is generally addressed as the product of the UK (see Prince, 2010a), the policy term ‘creative city’ does not have its ‘place of origin’, and has never been attached to one particular country. Although originally the concept has been introduced by British authors (see Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Landry, 2000), a single conventional policy model of the creative city here does not exist (Pratt, 2010). In East Asia, the creative city policies are generally tagged as ‘western discourses’ that in this context ascribes them a greater power and influence (Yeoh, 2005; Pratt, 2009; Kong et al., 2006; Kim, 2015; see also Subsection 2.3.2).

These examples clearly demonstrate that the term ‘creative city’ does not have a fixed meaning (see Pratt, 2010). In fact, similar to the notion of ‘cultural economy’, which Gibson and Kong (2005) describe as “a multivalent term deployed within divergent geographical imaginations” (p. 542), the concept of the creative city has also acquired many meanings to a point where, at times, it seems nearly meaningless. This makes it easier for the creative city policy script to move as a “selective discourse” (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 170).

Another major reason why there is more than one template of the creative city relates to the changes that occur during the course of transfer and even after transfer is completed. Like any other mobile policies, the creative city policy script is socially constructed and contextualised (Peck and Theodore, 2010; Peck, 2011b; Peck, 2011a). This means that it continuously transforms as it travels, or borrowing from Peck and Theodore (2010), it is always a policy “already-in-transformation” (p. 170; see also Subsection 2.4.1). As noted earlier, there is a variety of policy actors involved in the process of transfer that altogether contribute to the (re)construction of policies. Three significant (if not the most significant) groups of policy actors that generally take part in the transfer of urban cultural policies include urban policymakers, policy intermediaries, and UNESCO (see Subsection 2.4.1). Urban policymakers, whom this study is focused on, constantly reinvent the meaning, roles and focal points of the ‘mobilised’ discourse of the creative city according to their policy goals and objectives. As a result, different cities have different understandings of what the ‘creative city’ is, and what constitutes the creative city.

The transformations that occur within the ‘western script’ of the creative city are most evident in the cities beyond the borders of Europe, North America and Australia. In those places where the political system, cultural background and the pace (as well as the scale) of urban development differs greatly from that in the
Global North, certain adjustments always “need to be made in order for it to work” (McCann and Ward, 2010: 176; see also Peck, 2011a). As a result, the creative city policy script, along with a variety of policy strategies that commonly accompany it, including the development and promotion of the cultural/creative industries, cultural/creative districts, cultural landmarks and events, is reformulated and de/reterritorialised over and over again with different cities producing their own versions of the creative city.

This thesis uses one of the key initiatives of the creative city – cultural events – to interrogate the ways in which different historical and political settings affect and influence the understanding of the creative city as display practice.

Following the cultural turn in urban development, cultural events, particularly large-scale cultural events have been mobilised together with other urban cultural policies (Waitt, 2008). However, to date the issues of mobility and the mutation of large-scale cultural events has received little attention in the literature.

A notable exception is Stringer’s (2001) article, where the author addresses the globalising format of film festivals, conceptualising this trend as the “international film festival circuit” (p. 138). Müller and Pickles’ (2015) study of regional differences and post-socialist transformations of mega-sport events is another attempt to examine the social and political embeddedness and mutations of the events. Quinn (2005b) has also addressed the geography of arts festivals in her study of the Galway Arts Festival. Although this study was not related to the mobility of festivals, it was very insightful in terms of mutations that occur within the festival due to its attachment to the place (see also Massey, 2005). More specifically, Quinn (2005b) examined how “a combination of both internally derived traits and a diverse series of interactions with other places” (p. 237) shape and transform this Festival.

Other than the studies mentioned, the events literature is overly preoccupied with impact studies. There are a number of empirical studies on the economic (see O’Sullivan and Jackson, 2002; Herrero, 2006; Gibson et al., 2010; Sun and Ye, 2010; Chang and Mahadevan, 2014) and social impact (see García, 2004; Richards and Wilson, 2004; Quinn, 2005a; Arcodia and Whitford, 2006) of events. The role of festivals in city promotion is also widely explored, but predominantly in relation to the tourism industry and urban regeneration (see Waterman, 1998; Prentice and Andersen, 2003; Richards and Wilson, 2004; García, 2004; Quinn, 2005a). ‘Festival tourism’ as a particular form of cultural tourism is another common discourse in the festival literature (see Britton, 1991; O’Sullivan and Jackson, 2002; Prentice and Andersen, 2003; Quinn, 2005b; Quinn, 2010; Liu, 2014). Although none of these studies directly addresses the mobility of festivals, they all imply, in one way or
another, that cultural events both influence and are influenced by local political, economic and social factors.

In the final part of this chapter, I will address the mobility of the creative city policy script and its display practices in East Asian cities, and identify some of the specific reasons behind their transformation.

2.4.3 The making of creative cities in East Asia

The global expansion of the cultural turn in urban development prompted the emergence of a new body of research that interrogates the creative city policies in East Asian cities. It should be noted, however, that there is an evident lack of comparative, multisite research on this subject. Some scholars addressed the cultural turn as a generally applicable and ‘fashionable’ trend in East Asia (Yeoh, 2005; Kong et al., 2006; Kong, 2007; Hutton, 2012; Lee and Lim, 2014; Kim, 2015). Others examined it in the context of specific cities. Particularly relevant to this thesis is the research conducted on Shanghai (Abbas, 2000; Wu, 2004; O’Connor, 2004; Kong, 2007; Gu, 2012; O’Connor, 2012; Gu, 2012; O’Connor and Gu, 2015), Hong Kong (Abbas, 2000; Kong, 2007; Ku and Tsui, 2008a; Lui, 2008; Raco and Gilliam, 2012), and Taipei (Wang, 2010; Lin and Han, 2012; Chung, 2014; Chiu and Lin, 2014; Lin, 2015). This thesis marks one of the first attempts to compare local policymakers’ approach to urban cultural policies across those three Chinese cities.

Like their counterparts in Europe and North America, all major East Asian cities have also been faced with economic globalisation, deindustrialisation and growing inter-urban competition (Lee and Lim, 2014). These challenges coupled with the economic slowdown after the late 1990s Asian Financial Crisis prompted them to adopt a number of ‘neoliberal policy experiments’ from the Global North, including various place marketing strategies, public-private partnerships, and property redevelopment schemes (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). As noted earlier, the creative city policy model can also be read as one of these neoliberal policy experiments (see Section 2.3). It has been introduced as a means to ease the shift from industrial to service economies, to enhance the comparative advantage of cities and to attract foreign investment, skilled workers and tourists (Ooi, 1995; Yeoh, 2005; Kong, 2007; Kim, 2015; see also Chapters 4, 5, 6).

In addition to inter-urban competition, social emulation is another mechanism driving the circulation of neoliberal policy experiments (see Subsection 2.4.1). Geographical and cultural proximity between East Asian cities increases the possibility of policy diffusion, because those cities that have close connections with each other tend to observe, study and emulate each other (Simmons et al., 2008; Jacobs, 2012; Bell and Oakley, 2015). Therefore, if one of the leading cities in the
region adopts a policy strategy that is generally perceived as providing the city with a unique comparative advantage, it is very likely that others might follow suit. Large-scale design events in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei could be seen as an instructive instance of social emulation in action. Shanghai’s bid for the UNESCO City of Design in 2008 and subsequent nomination in 2010 was followed by Taiwan’s announcement to designate 2011 as Taiwan’s Year of Design. In addition, in 2011, Taipei also declared its plans to bid for the title of World Design Capital 2016 (nominated in 2013). Hong Kong ‘responded’ to all this by hosting the Hong Kong Design Year 2012.

A market-driven agenda, or more broadly, neoliberalisation, has undoubtedly played a significant role in prompting a widespread adoption of the creative city policies in East Asia. However, the main intention of this thesis is to demonstrate that this reason alone is insufficient in explaining the appeal of these policies in the region.

While most East Asian cities are facing similar problems to those of their counterparts in the Global North, there are several distinctive features that set them apart from the entrepreneurial cities in Europe and North America.

First, East Asian cities have never experienced the same extent of deindustrialisation (Gu, 2012; Hutton, 2012). In fact, although most manufacturing sites have been relocated to the outskirts of cities, manufacturing industries here still remain vital to urban economies (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2006; Ho, 2012). Therefore, as Hutton (2012) rightly observes, economic and social transformation in East Asian cities can be characterised as “the coincidental development of advanced services and industrial production complexes” (p. 35). This indicates that contrary to Europe and North America, the cultural turn in East Asian cities, in most cases, has not been aimed at regeneration of post-industrial cities.

Second, whereas in the Global North, the neoliberal capitalist economy has severely weakened the “older gatekeeping functions” (Sassen, 2006: 46) of the nation-state, in most East Asian countries, including Korea, China, Japan, and to a large extent, Taiwan, the state has remained at the centre of all developments (Hill and Kim, 2000; Kong, 2007; Ong, 2007; Ong, 2011a; Lee and Lim, 2014; Kim, 2015). This means that most East Asian cities perform not only as central ‘spaces of neoliberalisation’, but also as vital sites for articulating national aspirations and rationales (Ong, 2007). Similarly, global cities here by no means function as ‘decentralised key nodes of command and control’ (Sassen, 2006), but rather as “the most important socio-political scale for effecting state power” (Ong, 2007: 83; see also Hill and Kim, 2000). Considering that their economic development has largely been state-led, these cities, which include Taipei and Shanghai, are less susceptible to the pressures exerted by the growing inter-urban competition in the global marketplace.
Furthermore, it is also important to remember that in many East Asian countries national identity building is still a work in progress (see Subsection 2.3.3). For many years, this region has been negotiating complex political and ideological tensions resulting from the history of colonialism, ideological rivalries and military conflicts, including those between Taiwan and China, China and Japan, and the two Koreas. These tensions have not only left an indelible mark in the history of many East Asian countries, but to date continue to affect their relations and policies (Lee and Lim, 2014). As a result, until the late 1980s, the primary role of the state-led cultural policies in Singapore, Taiwan, China, and many other East Asian countries was focused primarily on the (re)construction of cultural and national identities (Kong, 2000; Chun, 2000; Lee and Lim, 2014; Kim, 2015). Although over the last three decades the cultural policy agenda, particularly in urban contexts, has been expanded to include market-centred policy objectives, it is still largely shaped by the concerns of nation building and cultural identity formation and promotion (Kong, 2007; Lee and Lim, 2014).

Lastly, in many cities, particularly in China, the middle- and upper- class that commonly constitutes the main consumer market for cultural products, is still emerging, and it is considerably more vulnerable and unsettled than that in the Global North (Ravallion, 2010). Therefore, if we are to argue that the creative city policies serve the interests of middle-class and elites, we are yet to determine who constitutes this group of people in the context of East Asian cities.

These notable distinctions suggest that the cultural turn in East Asian cities is ascribed different meanings from those in Europe and North America. In other words, the reason for the origin of the cultural turn does not necessarily correspond with the reason for its adoption. Clearly, in East Asian cities, the creative city policy model is seen more than just as an entrepreneurial strategy, but also as a national strategy aimed at the state’s pursuit for symbolic capital and power (see also Subsection 2.2.3).

A number of studies indicate that the leading cities in the region use the title of the creative city in voicing their aspirations for ‘global city’ status (see Lee, 2004; Yeoh, 2005; Kong, 2007; Ku and Tsui, 2008a; Ong, 2011a; Kong, 2012; Pang, 2012; Oakes and Wang, 2015). Some may link this back to entrepreneurial strategies, which is in part what this ambition is about. It is also, however, in a large part a national strategy, designed to assist the East Asian nations (and cities) to move away from what they perceive to be a disadvantaged and marginalised periphery to the core. As Scott (2006) asserts, many East Asian cities, including Hong Kong, which is an archetypical example of the entrepreneurial city, see the cultural turn in urban development not only as a means to generate more income and to increase the
general ‘quality of life’ in the city, but also “as a way of expanding their global influence” (p. 11; see also Jessop and Sum, 2000; Chapter 5).

King (1989) rightly observes that in order to understand the development of Asian cities as ‘directly linked to the world economy’, “the study of cities as ‘directly linked to colonialism’ is the immediate and necessary prerequisite” (p. 3). Clearly, many problems that the creative city policies as national strategy attempt to address are deeply rooted in the colonial or semi-colonial past of a large number of countries in East Asia. In this context, the ‘western origin’ of the script appears to offer a possibility for “cutting history off at the pass” (Anderson, 2006: 157; see also Subsection 2.4.2). Elsewhere, King (1996) notes that signature buildings and high-rise towers are used by some Asian countries as a magic wand, stuck metaphorically into the terrestrial globe, to transform what used to be known (in the increasingly obsolescent categories of the 1950s), as the Third World into the First World (p. 105).

Like signature buildings, the creative city policy model can also be seen as a means of achieving this objective. Consequently, the creative city as display practice here is likely to be used not only for the creation of an entertaining ‘spectacle’ for economic capital accumulation, but also for the production of symbolic capital and, ultimately, symbolic power for the state (see Subsection 2.2.3). As Ong (2011b) explains:

Major cities in the developing world have become centres of enormous political investment, economic growth, and cultural vitality, and thus have become sites for instantiating their countries’ claims to global significance (p. 2, emphasis added).

At the same time, the creative city policies are also used to generate symbolic power for the city. For instance, large cities adopt policies to strengthen both their economic and political ‘urban primacy’ in the region (Hutton, 2012).

Furthermore, the notions ‘cultural turn’ and ‘creative city’ seem to offer a solution to the dilemma faced by many cities beyond the Global North, of how to belong to ‘the West’ without actually being, becoming or appearing Western (Yeoh, 2005). According to Yeoh (2005), this dilemma emerges from the friction between the need to promote cultural self-determination and “the need to signify global connections” (p. 947; see also Vale, 2008). In a similar vein, Ong (2007) states that there are tensions “between deterritorialised markets and territorialised nationalisms” (p. 88). Whilst promoting the need for maintaining the distinctiveness of the place, the notion of the creative city simultaneously provides a sense of “belonging to a particular type of global city” (Pang, 2012: 136). In other words, for large cities in East Asia that seek to enhance their global status and to establish themselves as
global cities, the adoption of the term ‘creative city’ provides an opportunity to embrace one of the “circulating global values” (Ong, 2007: 83). The empirical chapters of this thesis demonstrate that in Taipei, Hong Kong and Shanghai, the creative city narratives are adopted primarily for “a spectacle of globality” (Ong, 2007: 90), and ultimately serve as a means of convergence rather than divergence and uniqueness (see Chapter 7).

Overall, it seems that creative city making in Asia reflects on the interplay between market-led and state-led urban development that is increasingly observed in the discussions on urban policies in the region (see Hill and Kim, 2000; Hill, 2007; Ong, 2011b; Kim, 2015). Nevertheless, we should adopt these categorisations with a great deal of caution, because they inevitably generalise the cultural turn in East Asia, neglecting specific characteristics ascribed to the cultural turn in different cities in the region. In other words, it is important to acknowledge that all imported urban cultural policies are historically and politically embedded. Thus market-centred and state-centred policy objectives can be applied to urban cultural policies at different intensities and for different reasons. Drawing on the cultural and creative industries, Lee and Lim (2014) accurately observe that while these policy discourses undoubtedly introduced to East Asian countries a new policy area with economic- and market-orientation, the way policies are made resembles the way culture and cultural policy used to be organised in the country in question (p. 10).

In other words, they are affected and transformed according to the ‘traditional’ cultural policy agenda of the place. This thesis will attempt to expose these transformations through the analysis of the understanding attached to creative city as display and compare them across three Chinese cities.

Despite a growing body of literature on the creative cities in East Asia, there are still very few studies addressing the issues related to the transfer and transformations of urban cultural policies in the region (for notable exceptions, see Kong, 2007; Kong, 2009; Lowry and McCann, 2011; Kim, 2015; Oakes and Wang, 2015). A recently published edited volume entitled Making Cultural Cities in Asia: Mobility, Assemblage and the Politics of Aspirational Urbanism (2015) is one of the first significant attempts to contribute to the existing gap on the subject. This book is focused specifically on the mobility of urban cultural policies and creative city making in Asia. Collectively, it argues that imported cultural policies in Asian cities should not be perceived as solely the products of the Global North. Drawing on the

---

13 In some accounts, these categories are broadly interpreted as capitalism and postcolonialism (Ong, 2011b) or neoliberalism and developmentalism (Hill and Kim, 2000; Hill, 2007; Kim, 2015).
social-constructivist approach to policy transfer, the authors of the book recognise the complexity of this process stating that urban cultural policies are transformed as they circulate within Asia. Therefore, every Asian city should be interrogated as “a (cultural) policy generator, not just (cultural) policy recipient” (Oakes and Wang, 2015: 5). In this respect, the book clearly confronts the normative view to policy transfer that largely reads this process as a unidirectional movement of ‘packaged’ policies from the ‘lending’ to the ‘receiving’ sites and neglects the complexity of “the networks of connection, exchange, and circulation within which such ‘packages’ travel and transform” (Oakes and Wang, 2015: 6).

It is therefore important to remember that although certain elements or strategies of policies can indeed be copied, the outcome will never be the same due to policy mutation and transformation (Peck, 2011b; McCann and Ward, 2011). As Wang (2004) rightly observes, “the ‘cookie-cutter approach’ is applicable only to places that do not have a history and human geography” (p. 12). In other words, whilst there might be some elements that will be similar or even identical, there will also always be some sort of “transitory uniqueness” (Roche, 2000: 7) about any cultural policy or strategy that has been transferred (see also Oakes and Wang, 2015). For instance, due to the massive replication of different formats of major cultural events, the structure, programming and objectives of the events that emerge from the ‘model’ arts festivals and film festivals indeed appear the same. Even the titles of prototype events seem to conform to a particular formula that generally includes the name of the host city, the word ‘international’ and the title of event: Hong Kong International Film Festival, Singapore International Festival of Arts, Shanghai China International Arts Festival, Shanghai International Film Festival, Taipei Arts Festival, and so on. However, a closer look at these events reveals a number of differences in programming, organisational structure and core objectives (see Chapters 4, 5, 6) in different space and time. These differences, however, are rarely noticed beyond the networks of professionals. In fact, they are not meant to be noticed, because one of the major goals behind the adoption of global models of international events is to make them to appear related.

### 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the context in which urban cultural policies operate, move and transform.

It demonstrated that since the 1980s the domain of cultural policy has undergone some serious transformations, including the broadening scope of instrumental roles attached to culture and the growing number of different policy actors (hence,
different interests) involved in the decision-making process. Cities were identified as the most contested policy-making sites. Here cultural policies are ascribed a vast number of instrumental roles produced through complex policy networks of social and power relations. This chapter was interested in one specific instrumental role – that of ‘display’. This particular role is quite unique, in a sense that it seems to work two ways. On the one hand, it is one of the roles assumed by the city in relation to cultural policy (promotion of culture). On the other hand, it is also the role attached to culture by the city, that is, culture is used as a tool for promotion. In this chapter, I argued that as a tool for promotion it can be generally divided into two overlapping categories – culture as symbolic display and culture as entrepreneurial display.

Two closely interwoven urban cultural policy strategies – the policy script of the creative city and large-scale cultural events – are designed as display practices. This chapter demonstrated that in the Global North they are seen as entrepreneurial strategies, and are therefore perceived primarily as tools for entrepreneurial display.

However, as argued in the last section of this chapter, these cultural policies move, and are continuously constructed and reconstructed through, the relationship between and within cities. This not only means that a different version of ‘imported’ policy script or programme is produced every time, but also indicates that the ‘display’ role that is attached to these policies might also acquire different meanings and connotations. As this chapter has shown, in East Asian cities the creative city policy script, together with its display practices, is not perceived solely as entrepreneurial strategy, but also as a national strategy. In other words, in this context, the script operates as both symbolic and entrepreneurial display. It is evident that the understanding of culture as display varies across different cities in East Asia depending on their historical, political and cultural settings. This thesis will examine the understanding attached to the ‘display’ role of the creative city in three Chinese cities – Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei – that share similar cultural roots, and yet are deeply divided by different political and historical conditions. This will assist in identifying some major patterns affecting the transformation of urban cultural policies as display.
Chapter 3
Research Methodology

As explained in the previous chapters, the central focus of this comparative study was to gain an in-depth understanding of the path-dependency of the creative city policy programme. To assess the theoretical propositions that emerged in Chapter 2, I conducted a comparative multiple-case study of the ‘display’ role of the creative city in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei. The empirical data across these three cities was collected using qualitative research techniques, such as document analysis and semi-structured interviews with local policymakers, senior management of large-scale cultural events, policy advisors and academics.

This chapter aims to provide a narrative account of the research approach and methods applied to this project. It details the major purpose and questions guiding the project (Section 3.1), and reflects on the research approach and multiple-case study research strategy (Section 3.2), selection criteria of case sites and events (Section 3.3), data collection methods (Section 3.4), and data analysis (Section 3.5). The last section of this chapter addresses ethical issues in study design (Section 3.6).

3.1 Research purpose and questions

As discussed in Chapter 2, to date most studies that examined the mobility of imported urban cultural policies in East Asia addressed it primarily as a unidirectional process in which ‘original’ policies from the Global North are transported to the ‘borrowing’ sites in East Asia. In order to approach policy transfer as a multidirectional process, this comparative study explores the adoption and contextualisation of imported urban cultural policies across three ‘borrowing’ sites in the region.

Specifically, the main intention of this thesis was to examine how different historical and political settings shape the understanding of creative city making in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong. These three Chinese cities were chosen because of their cultural interdependencies, distinct political systems and strong (though uneven) connection to China, a country that now plays a major economic and political role in East Asia and beyond.

As shown in Chapter 2, whereas creative city making in the Global North is seen primarily as an entrepreneurial strategy, in East Asian cities it is also viewed as an important political device. My research interrogates this mutation of the creative city
policy discourse through the transformation of the specific (‘display’) role of the creative city. As discussed in Chapter 2, ‘display’ works two-ways: to put simply, the city promotes culture and the arts, while, in turn, promoting itself. Whether this practice facilitates or hinders cultural advancement remains a question of much debate (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, it is evident that an in-depth examination of the ‘display’ role of the creative city can expose the path-dependency and political embeddedness of this imported policy model.

In order to maintain the research focus on creative city making in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong and its display practices, specifically large-scale cultural events, this thesis addressed four research questions:

1. **What does it mean for these cities to be recognised as cultural/creative and what prompted their interest in the policy discourse of the creative city?**

The primary concern of this question was to interrogate the specific historical, social and political settings of the cities that triggered the cultural turn in urban development. This question was also concerned with the governance and funding models of culture.

2. **What meanings and rationales do urban policymakers attach to international large-scale cultural events, and why?**

By posing this question, I sought to determine what expectations are attached to large-scale cultural events, and what level of control local policymakers tend to exercise over them and creative city making at large. More generally, this question was aimed at examining the meanings behind the ‘display’ role of culture and the nuances regarding its ‘attachment’ (Gray, 2002) to other public policy areas in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong.

3. **How, if at all, does the approach to culture as city’s display practice differ in three Chinese cities? How is it similar? Why?**

This question was addressed by compiling the findings from all three cities. It sought to determine the key differences and similarities in the cities’ approach to the creative city as display. This, in turn, assisted in establishing the actual patterns in the ‘de/reterritorialisation’ (Lowry and McCann, 2011) of the creative city policy discourse and helped in unfolding the general traits and meanings attached to the creative city ‘with Chinese characteristics’.

4. **How, if at all, has the cultural turn affected the urban policymakers’ approach to culture and the arts?**
During the data collection process, it became evident that imported cultural policies are closely entangled with the already existing cultural policy agenda and that their transfer entails a two-way mutation (see Peck, 2011b). Although conducting an in-depth impact study was never my intention, by posing this question I sought to gain a better understanding about the extent of influence that the adoption of these policies have on the governance mechanisms of culture and on the cultural arena of cities more generally.

The next section will discuss the research approach and strategy adopted in this thesis.

3.2 Research approach and strategy

This thesis can be characterised as comparative qualitative research in that it aims to capture how the notion of the creative city as display is understood, interpreted and experienced across three East Asian cities.

As noted earlier, the transformation of the creative city policy discourse is a “multisited social process” (Peck and Theodore, 2012: 24). This implies that it can only be assessed by comparison. The comparative design entails the use of the same research methods and analytic techniques to study “two or more meaningfully contrasting cases or situations” (Bryman, 2008: 58). The similarities and differences that emerge in the course of the cross-site research as well as the identification of reasons for them to occur, can advance our understanding of social phenomena (Bryman, 2008).

Comparative design allowed me to conduct the cross-site comparison without “sacrificing within-site understanding” (Herriott and Firestone, 1983: 14). Considering the relatively small body of research on the creative city policies in East Asian cities, three Chinese cities that were selected for this study, namely Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong, first were intensively examined as three separate cases.

Although this study is on policy, it should not be read as policy-oriented research. Policy-oriented research generally is “interested in the process by which policies are adopted as well as the effects of those policies once adopted” (Majchrzak, 1984: 13; see also Mintrom, 2012). By examining the transfer of the creative city policy discourse I consider the policymaking process. However, my aim here is not to interrogate the process per se, but rather to address the product created in the course of this process. Furthermore, contrary to policy-oriented studies, this thesis is not designed to provide “policymakers with pragmatic, action-oriented recommendations for alleviating the problem” (Majchrzak, 1984: 12; see also Johnston and Plummer, 2005; Mintrom, 2012). In other words, albeit the results of this study might be useful
in policy-decision making, this work is not action-oriented. First and foremost, I sought to explore the policymakers’ approach to imported cultural strategies. Therefore, whilst my study is adjacent to policy-oriented research it does not represent this type of research.

In this study, I adopted a multiple-case study research strategy (Yin, 2014). Although not without its limitations, this research strategy is generally applied to address little explored areas with the aim of describing and examining certain phenomena, developing theory in relation to this phenomena, or testing theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Darke et al., 1998).

It should be noted, however, that there might be more than one objective attached to the multiple-case study research, because, as Robson (2011) observes, “case studies and their outcomes are likely to be multi-faceted” (p. 140). For this study, the multiple-case study research strategy was adopted to gain a better understanding of why particular cities in East Asia seek to be recognised as cultural and creative, how ‘imported’ cultural policy strategies transform the approach to culture and the arts in the cities, and how they are contextualised and transformed (see also Yin, 2014). The research pursued the proposition that the creative city as display in all three cities is employed as an important policy device rather than an entrepreneurial strategy. In this sense, cases can be considered to be ‘literal replications’ (Yin, 2014). On the other hand, given the different political and social settings of the cities, I anticipated policy mutation with varied and possibly contrasting uses of culture as display, which reflects on each case also serving as ‘theoretical replication’ (Yin, 2014).

Eisenhardt (1989) reads ‘case study’ as “a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings” (p. 534). In a similar vein, Merriam and Tisdell (2016) maintain that the ‘case study’ is “an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded system” (p. 37). In both instances, the central defining characteristic of the case study research strategy seems to be its focus on a particular “unit of analysis” (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016: 38) or ‘case’ that is situated in the specific social and physical setting (see also Robson, 2011). The selection of the unit of analysis is generally guided by research questions (Yin, 2014). In this study, the unit of analysis was the ‘display’ role attached to the creative city policy model, which was addressed in three case sites, that is, Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong.

---

14 According to Yin (2014), “each case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)” (p. 57).
In the next section, I will detail the selection process of these three case sites and explain the reason behind choosing specific large-scale cultural events for exploring the ‘display’ role of the creative city.

3.3 Selection of cases

To retain a manageable scope for this study, I limited my research to three cities – Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong. The cities were selected in accordance with four major criteria.

First, I was interested specifically in Chinese cities. For the purpose of this study, the term ‘Chinese’ represents cultural and ethnic ties that are shared among cities situated in the territories of mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. According to Tu (1991), these territories constitute a symbolic universe that he refers to as ‘Cultural China’. All three cities – Shanghai, Taipei and Hong Kong – are predominantly Chinese. They all share “a common ethnicity, language, history, and world-view” (Tu, 1991: 14). This significantly reduces the possibility of ‘cultural differences’ potentially affecting their understanding of imported urban cultural policies. Another reason for focusing on Chinese cities was their economic interconnectivity with and dependence on mainland China, which now is one of the major economic and political powers in East Asia and the rest of the world.

The second criterion for selecting case sites was the size and significance of the city. As noted in Chapter 2, historically, in East Asia cultural policy initiatives tended to be concentrated in the largest or capital cities (Yeoh 2005). Although in the last decade, a vast number of smaller cities have also embraced the idea of the creative city, they tend to be concentrated on one particular aspect or role of culture, such as its contribution to the tourism industry or urban regeneration. In large cities, particularly, the so-called ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 2006), the roles allocated to culture are more diverse and complex, because these cities pursue or seek to strengthen a number of different identities, including that of the ‘business node’, ‘political centre’ and ‘cultural capital’. These manifold intentions combined with their greater experience in creative city making renders them particularly interesting sites for investigation. All three cities selected for this study occupy leading positions in their territories and beyond. Taipei is the capital of Taiwan. Hong Kong is a city-state with its own government, judiciary and laws. Shanghai is one of the major cities in mainland China. Although in terms of political significance Shanghai has always

15 See Appendix A for a brief overview of the cities.
been placed behind Beijing, the city played a crucial role in the economic growth of China. Being the largest city by population in the world and the pre-eminent hub for international trade and finance, Shanghai is often placed next to Beijing and termed “a city of national strategic importance” (K. Lai, 2012: 1282). According to data collected by the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network that assesses cities’ integration into a world city network, all three cities can be classified as alpha world cities.\textsuperscript{16}

Another major selection criterion was the city’s interest in the adoption of the creative city policies. Among the leading cities in the region, the municipal governments of Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei are probably the most active in terms of promoting culture-led approach to urban development. Since the late 1990s, all three cities have declared their aspirations to be recognised as cultural and creative centres in the region, and subsequently dedicated a great deal of effort to develop and promote their cultural standing (Florida, 2008; Kong, 2009; Chiu and Lin, 2014). Over the last 15 years, the expenditure on cultural affairs has increased in all three cities, with Taipei experiencing the most dramatic rise of more than 160 per cent from 2001 to 2015 (Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 2016).\textsuperscript{17} Shanghai’s public spending on culture has increased more than twofold from 2009 to 2015 (Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 2016),\textsuperscript{18} whereas Hong Kong’s expenditure on culture and the arts has been raised by 54 per cent from 2000 to 2015 (HKSAR Government, 2016).\textsuperscript{19} Appendix B details the spending on culture in all three cities.

Lastly, I sought cities with different governance models of culture. This helped to ensure that all three cases are “meaningfully contrasting” (Bryman, 2008: 58). Although Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China share strong cultural and economic ties, there are some significant differences in their political system and historical legacies. Shanghai is under the direct jurisdiction of the communist

\textsuperscript{16} The Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network assesses cities’ integration into a world city network, classifying them into alpha (alpha++, alpha+, alpha, and alpha-, respectively), beta and gamma world cities. Shanghai and Hong Kong are ranked as ‘alpha+’ cities, which are defined by GaWC as “highly integrated cities that complement London and New York, largely filling in advanced service needs for the Pacific Asia” (GaWC, 2012, no pagination). Taipei is ranked as ‘alpha-’ city, that is ascribed to “very important world cities that link major economic regions and states into the world economy” (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{17} Taipei’s public spending on culture increased from around £66 million in 2001 to £172 million in 2015.

\textsuperscript{18} Shanghai’s public spending on culture increased from around £200 million in 2009 to £490 million in 2015. Until 2009, Shanghai’s public culture expenditure was calculated together with sports.

\textsuperscript{19} Hong Kong’s public spending on culture increased from around £203 million in 2001 to £346 million in 2015.
government of the PRC. The policy model of China has been famously characterised as “fragmented authoritarianism” (Lieberthal, 1992). A former British colony, Hong Kong was returned to the PRC in 1997. However, under the ‘one country two system’ rule, the city is allowed to retain its multi-party system and autonomy in internal affairs until 2047. Formally, it is now subject to the PRC government only in relation to national defence and foreign affairs. The official position of the PRC, and the majority of other countries around the globe, is that Taiwan together with its capital city Taipei is also part of the PRC. However, Taiwan has refused to accept this position for more than sixty years now. Until this issue is resolved, Taipei remains the capital of Taiwan. Since the late 1980s, the city has obtained a great degree of autonomy from the central government and is the only city out of three wherein the city mayor is directly elected. These and other historical and political differences not only determine different types of relationship with mainland China, but also result in distinct regulatory systems and governance models of urban cultural policies (see empirical chapters for more detail).

Whereas Taipei and Hong Kong were evident choices for selection, choosing a case site in mainland China called for more careful consideration, because of two equally compelling options: Beijing and Shanghai. In terms of political significance and the richness of traditional cultural expressions, Shanghai “plays second fiddle to Beijing” (Kong, 2009: 3), which is not only the political centre of the PRC, but is also regarded as the capital of Chinese traditional culture (see also K. Lai, 2012). However, Shanghai has always demonstrated a greater flexibility and openness to foreign cultural policy programmes and strategies. The city was the first to adopt the creative industries policy discourse, and if compared to other Chinese cities, has “the most ambitious creative industries programme” (O’Connor and Gu, 2006: 281). The global formats of the large-scale cultural events, specifically those of the arts and film festivals, also first reached China through Shanghai. Finally, Shanghai was among the first Chinese cities to submit its bid for the UNESCO Creative Cities network and was awarded UNESCO City of Design in February 2010. Beijing officially joined the network as another UNESCO City of Design two years later, in 2012. An active approach to the cultural turn in urban development determined my decision to choose Shanghai.

In this study, the global templates of international cultural events, specifically, arts festivals, film festivals and large-scale design events are employed as key reference points for tracing the meanings attached to the ‘display’ role of the creative city policy model in these three case sites. It has been established already that cultural events are among the most widely used display practices (see Chapter 2). They are perceived to contribute to the promotion of the city and to attract more tourists,
investment and skilled workers. At the same time, they are employed for the accumulation of symbolic cultural capital that has a potential of generating recognition (hence, more political power and influence) for the city and the state (Williams, 1984; McGuigan, 2004; Urry, 2007). Owing to their multi-functionality, cultural events, better than any other creative city policy strategies, can reflect on a full spectrum of rationales attached to creative city making. Another reason for choosing events among other creative city policies was to address a large gap in the existing body of events literature regarding the mobility and transformation of cultural events. Besides a few notable exceptions (see Stringer, 2001; Quinn, 2005b), to date there has been little attempt to read events as mobile and mutating policies.

To ensure the comparability across three case sites, I selected three types of events that are held (or were held) in all three cities, specifically arts festivals, film festivals and a major design-driven event (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of event</th>
<th>Title of the event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arts festivals</strong></td>
<td>• Hong Kong Arts Festival (since 1973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Taipei Arts Festival (since 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• China Shanghai International Arts Festival (since 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Film festivals</strong></td>
<td>• Hong Kong International Film Festival (since 1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shanghai International Film Festival (since 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Taipei Film Festival (since 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major design-driven events</strong></td>
<td>• Shanghai UNESCO City of Design (since 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hong Kong Design Year 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• World Design Capital Taipei 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 Other creative city policy strategies, such as cultural landmarks or cultural and creative industries, have more defined roles. For instance, the cultural and creative industries are used predominantly as production-based economic strategies.
All cultural events addressed in this study are emulated from their ‘mobilised’ global templates, that is, their prototypes have been produced and reproduced elsewhere. This was an important criterion for selecting events, because the purpose of the research was to assess imported cultural policies and their transformations. Another essential selection criterion was the funding structure of the event. I have considered only those events that are fully (or partially) funded by the local government (as opposed to privately run events), because they inevitably represent the nature and degree of the government’s interest in culture and the arts.

The next section details data collection methods and techniques.

### 3.4 Data collection methods

For data collection, I used policy documents and semi-structured interviews. Documents and interviews both complement each other in giving the information in different ways but vary in accuracy, complexity and reliability. As “expressions of political purpose” (Codd, 1988: 237), policy documents present the official written narrative of what is going on. They are useful in terms of describing policies and providing the official justification for their adoption. However, considering that documents are not produced specifically for the purpose of the research, the information that they convey may not necessarily “be in a form that is useful (or understandable) to the investigator” (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016: 181; see also Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2014). In the context of this particular study, document analysis alone sheds little light on the underlying reasons for policy decisions and fails to reflect on the actual process and implications of policy transfer.

Interviews can help to fill these voids by providing rich and informative insights. For instance, they reveal more details and nuances about policy adoption and implementation process, as well as about tensions that arise between different groups of policy actors. This information could not be obtained through the analysis of policy documents. However, due to a high degree of flexibility in their design and the lack of standardisation, biases are particularly “difficult to rule out” (Robson, 2011: 281) in interviews, and there is always a possibility of getting inaccurate or unreliable information (see also Yin, 2014).

Clearly, both methods have their strengths and weaknesses. Combined together, they can provide a more comprehensive view of the issue at hand. The practice of using two (or more) data collection methods to enhance the rigour of the research process is commonly referred to as ‘data triangulation’ (see Huberman and Miles, 2002; Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2011).
Next, I will explain the reasons for choosing these two data sources, discuss their sampling techniques and reflect on validity and reliability of data collection process.

### 3.4.1 Documents

In case study research, document review – which Bowen (2009) defines as “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents” (p. 27) – is most commonly applied for collecting the detailed and extensive information on the unit of analysis of a case study, including “background information as well as historical insight” (p. 29; see also Yin, 2014; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). This procedure can then assist the researcher in tracking changes, developments and transformations. In addition, document review can also be useful for gathering supplementary evidence and for identifying additional problems and questions for research (see Yin, 2014; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016).

This study was primarily concerned with *policy documents* that Codd (1988) once accurately called “statements of the courses of action that policy-makers and administrators intend to follow” (p. 237). Considering that the main purpose of this project is to address the urban policymakers’ approach to the creative city policy model, policy documents were critical in obtaining first-hand information on this issue. In this study, the document review served three major purposes. First, it helped to identify the major agencies that are involved in creative city making in Shanghai, Taipei and Hong Kong. Second, documents were employed to gather corroborating evidence to demonstrate the growing policymakers’ interest in culture and the arts. Third, as official statements of ‘political purpose’ (Codd, 1988), policy documents were also used to establish a preliminary set of rationales and expectations attached to the display practices of the creative city, specifically, large-scale cultural events.

Policy documents tend to be ‘non-reactive’ (Robson, 2011) and “grounded in the context under study” (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016: 189). Although the researcher and his or her biases generally have zero influence on the production of policy documents, the accuracy and credibility of this data source might be affected by the so-called ‘built-in biases’ that lead to ‘purposeful’ and/or ‘nonpurposeful deception’ (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). Therefore, documents should never be treated as “objective accounts of a state of affairs” (Bryman, 2008: 522). In this study, the ‘in-built biases’ of policy documents that reflected the official stance on urban cultural policies was what turned them into a valuable source of data. In other words, they were “interesting precisely because of the biases they reveal” (Bryman, 2008: 521).

In the early stages of research, I identified a diverse range of policy documents from all three cities, including annual policy statements and guidelines, policy reports, laws, meeting minutes, white papers, and research papers commissioned by the
government that deal with urban cultural policy, cultural/creative city making and events. These documents revealed the major agencies and organisations involved in making Shanghai, Taipei and Hong Kong into creative cities.

Then a purposive sampling was used to sample the documents in a strategic way (Bryman, 2008). For each city, I selected up to two sets of periodic policy documents that represented the role of culture and the arts in the context of the general policy agenda of the city, and up to three supplementary documents that were more specifically directed at addressing the cultural turn in urban development (see Table 2). The documents were selected on the basis of the following criteria: relevance (how relevant is the document to the scope of this research?); political context (who initiated this document and with what intention and how does it reflect the general tone of government at the time?); influence (how influential/important is this document in political agenda?); and accuracy (is the document genuine and accurate?) (see Bryman, 2008; Bowen, 2009; Robson, 2011; Yin, 2014; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016).

Periodic documents “provide a means of tracking change and development” (Bowen, 2009: 30). In this study, they were used to detect the shifting attitudes to culture and the arts over a long span of time. It is important to note, however, that the purpose of this review was not to gain an in-depth understanding of how policymakers’ approach to culture and the arts has (or has not) changed over the years, but rather to establish whether or not their interest in culture and the arts has increased and to determine the major reasons behind this. In other words, I aimed only for a preliminary interrogation of how policymakers feel about culture and the arts.

The Policy Address was selected as a periodic policy document for Hong Kong. It is a key reference document for following the changing position of culture and the arts in the public policy agenda. Since 1997, the Policy Address has been annually delivered by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong to the Legislative Council and serves as an outline for the government’s work, containing both “a review of current progress and an indication of future directions” (Scott, 2010: 167). It is compiled from various policy proposals of different government departments and institutions. These proposals are collected and selected by the Central Policy Unit (henceforth, CPU). If the proposal is included in the Policy Address, this signifies that it “has received de facto recognition (…) [and] that its implementation is to be taken seriously” (Scott, 2010: 166). The Policy Address is easily accessible online via the official Hong Kong Government website, and is available in both English and Chinese. For this study, I have reviewed all volumes of the Policy Address available to 2016, starting from the first one issued in 1997 and ending with the 2015 Policy Address published on January 14, 2015.
Table 2  List of policy documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Core documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Periodic document(s):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Policy Address</em> (1997-2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other core documents:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Periodic document(s):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Shanghai’s Five-Year Plans</em> (2001-2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other core documents:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Outline of the Cultural Development during the Period of the National Eleventh Five-Year Plan</em> (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Outline of the Cultural Reform and Development during the Period of the National Twelfth Five-Year Plan</em> (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>Periodic document(s):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Taipei Yearbook</em> (2004-2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other core documents:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Taipei City Long-Term Development Programme for 2010-2020</em> (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Policy Outline of the Department of Cultural Affairs</em> (2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 See Appendix C for original titles in Chinese.
Two types of periodic documents were selected for the case study of Shanghai. For short-term policies, I used the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government Work Report (Shanghai shi zhengfu gongzuo baogao). In terms of its purpose and intention, this document largely resembles the Policy Address in Hong Kong. It is produced annually by the city government and traditionally delivered by the city mayor at the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress. The purpose of this document is to account for the government’s work for the previous year as well as to introduce the plans for the next year. The Shanghai Government Reports (Chinese version only) are available electronically from the official websites of the Central People’s Government of the P.R.C. and the Office of Shanghai Chronicles. For this study, I have reviewed the reports from the year 2000 to 2015. Another set of the periodic documents was the outlines of Shanghai’s three latest Five-Year Plans, issued every five years by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government. These documents set out the fundamental guidelines for the city’s economic and social development. They are in line with the state’s policy agenda and ambitions and originate directly from the national five-year plans issued at the top-level of the state for the same period of time. In China, the national five-year plans are considered to be the “roadmaps for top policy goals” (Shapiro, 2016: 63), and the “key indicators of the directions and changes” (Fan, 2006: 708) in the country’s development philosophy. Shanghai’s Five-Year Plans (Chinese version only) were obtained from the official website of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government.

For Taipei, I chose the Taipei Yearbook. This periodic policy document provides an overview of policy strategies adopted in Taipei. From 2004 onwards, Chinese and English editions of the Taipei Yearbook are annually published by the Taipei City Government. The contents of each chapter of the book, which is available online, are provided by different departments of the city government. Similar to the Policy Address in Hong Kong and the Shanghai Government Report, the Taipei Yearbook is also focused on discussing the major policy direction of the city, including important projects undertaken by the Taipei City Government, plans and policies of the city government, concrete achievements, related strategies and systems, major events and activities for the public, and the direction of the city’s future development and innovations (Taipei City Government, 2011: vi).

For the purpose of this study, I included all current editions of the Taipei Yearbook, with the latest being the Taipei Yearbook 2015.

In order to understand what rationales and expectations are attached to urban cultural policies in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Taipei, I also reviewed other key documents that explicitly address cultural policy direction and cultural development. In this
respect, interviews were particularly useful in terms of directing me toward important policy documents.

In Hong Kong, a major document that defined the long-term cultural development in the city was the Policy Recommendation Report commissioned by the government and prepared by the Culture and Heritage Commission in 2003. In Shanghai, where the cultural policy agenda is regulated by the state, in the last decade its development has been largely guided by two major documents, issued by the State Council along with the national five-year plans. These include the Outline of the Cultural Development during the National Eleventh Five-Year Plan Period (2006) and the Outline of the Cultural Reform and Development during the National Twelfth Five-Year Plan Period (2012). In Taipei, Taipei City Long-Term Development Programme for 2010-2020 (2010) has extensively addressed the role of culture in the city. Another core document in Taipei was the Policy Outline (Shizheng yaoling) published by the Taipei City Department of Cultural Affairs in 2011, which is focused on the current goals and rationales attached to culture and the arts. In addition, the study has also reviewed Challenge 2008: National Development Plan for 2002-2007 (2002), a significant document issued at the state-level that signalled the cultural turn in Taiwan’s economic development. In addition to these core documents, the study has also referred to other documentation, including budget estimates, white papers, laws and meeting minutes.

Thematic analysis and a supplementary qualitative content analysis were used for document examination. The data analysis process will be discussed in-depth in Section 3.5.

### 3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews

The primary data collection method used in this research was semi-structured elite interviews.

Interviews are one of the most widely applied methods in case study research (Yin, 2014). Well-informed interviewees can provide deep and rich insights into “human affairs and actions” (Yin, 2014: 113), which are difficult to interrogate using other research methods (see also Bryman, 2008). Robson (2011) indicates that interviews are generally employed to determine what people know (‘facts’), do (‘behaviour’), and think or feel (‘beliefs or attitudes’). Although in this study the interviews have covered all of these aspects, the central focus was on the ways in which research participants think and feel about the adoption of imported cultural policies.

I saw interviews primarily as an interpretive resource for gathering corroboratory evidence to support (or deny) those findings, facts and arguments that have already been identified from the literature and document review. Crucially, I used them to
obtain an in-depth understanding of the urban policymakers’ approach to the adoption of the cultural turn in urban development and their intentions behind large-scale cultural events: what they think about them, and what they use them for. Reaching this objective required a particular attention to the ways in which my interviewees addressed and operated the key terms, such as ‘creative city’, ‘city promotion’, ‘cultural events’, as well as ‘culture’ and ‘creativity’ more generally. In this sense, I also treated the interview as topic (for the discussion of topic/resource dilemma see Sarangi, 2003). Lastly, I referred to interviews as both resource and topic for establishing whether urban policymakers and cultural practitioners, who are essentially the ‘recipients’ of the creative city policies, share similar views about the role of culture as display in their cities.

Bryman (2008) indicates that in multiple-case study research a certain degree of structure in interviews should always be imposed in order “to ensure cross-case comparability” (p. 440). This prompted me to choose a semi-structured format for the interviews. Semi-structured interviews are defined as interviews “with open-ended questions where unexpected and relevant issues are followed up with further questions or probing” (Mikkelsen, 2005: 169). Here the conversation is typically guided by the list of interview questions (‘interview guide’) that allows the interviewer to maintain a degree of consistency and coherence (Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2011). At the same time, the researcher retains much flexibility for navigating the direction of the interview. The possibility to change the wording or sequence of questions, to allocate different amount of time for each question, and to follow-up interesting responses, ensures that the researcher remains open and receptive to new ideas and different approaches raised in the course of the interview.

Semi-structured interviewing is widely applied in dealing with ‘elite’ respondents, because this type of interview provides the researcher with a level of control without imposing any significant restrictions on an open-ended conversation. As Aberbach and Rockman (2002) note, close-ended questions are unlikely to work with the ‘elites’, because they always prefer to have a chance to explain “why they think what they think” (p. 674). Elite interviews typically target government officials who are directly involved in the policymaking process (Berry, 2002; Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Beamer, 2002). However, they can also involve people outside the government, particularly, those holding senior management and leadership positions within non-governmental and business organisations (Harvey, 2011).

The overarching research questions of this study demanded inside knowledge that could be acquired only through elite interviewing. It was evident that getting access to urban policymakers, officials, policy advisors and senior management of relevant cultural organisations is essential for obtaining first-hand information into policy
decisions and underlying motives regarding the adoption of the creative city policy discourse. In other words, I needed to speak to people that are involved, directly or indirectly, in the process of creative city making. The way in which they see and understand the role of the creative city as display reflects on the transformation of this imported policy discourse in three Chinese cities.

Similar to document review, for semi-structured elite interviews I first adopted a purposive sampling technique with samples being identified “on the basis of wanting to interview people who are relevant to the research questions” (Bryman, 2008: 458). Broadly, sampling was guided by three major criteria: relevance (how relevant is this person to this study?), influence (how influential/important is this person in the adoption of the creative city policies or/and its display practices?), and accessibility (can this person be accessed for the interview?).

Document review, media accounts and academic literature assisted in identifying some potentially ‘relevant’ respondents. They also pinpointed the major government departments and agencies that deal with urban cultural policies in Shanghai, Taipei, and Hong Kong. Accordingly, the officials representing these organisations were also included in the initial sampling frame. In addition, I also sought to interview representatives from those cultural organisations that are responsible for the management and administration of display practices of the creative city, specifically, arts festivals, film festivals and major design-driven events. All respondents outside the government that I recruited for this study deal with local government and its agencies on a regular basis. They not only know the needs of cultural groups and artists, but also can critically reflect on the policymakers’ approach to culture and the arts. Yin (2014) argues that one way of testing the genuineness of the interviewee’s views is a deliberate “checking with persons known to hold different perspectives” (p. 111). The interviews with cultural practitioners were essential in ensuring the reliability of this study, because policymakers’ accounts alone could not provide an objective basis for assessing the meaning of the creative city as display. To ensure a greater degree of representativeness, I also interviewed the members of the political opposition (applicable for Taipei only), policy advisors, academics, former officials and senior management of other cultural organisations that were involved in creative city making and/or promotion.

The ‘influence’ of the potential respondents was assessed in accordance to their position and status as well as the degree of decision-making power within and outside the organisation. In government departments and agencies, I was aiming primarily at senior civil servants that were responsible for management of large-scale cultural events and were directly involved in policy decision-making. In cultural organisations, I sought to interview senior management and executive-level
personnel. Job titles do not necessarily reflect the extent of one’s influence (see Harvey, 2011). Therefore, I also recruited the middle level civil servants and middle managers with many years of experience and strong social networks. Policy advisors and academics were also selected on the basis of their expertise and connections they have with both the government and cultural ‘world’.

From the beginning it was evident that not all potential respondents might be available or willing to participate. Getting access to busy officials and senior personnel is a common problem in elite interviews (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Therefore, after securing my first interviews, I largely relied on a snowball sampling technique to locate other interviewees. Some interviewees assisted me in reaching out to people that I had struggled to get access to on my own. For instance, in Shanghai, where securing interviews with government officials and semi-government officials was particularly problematic, one participant assumed the role of ‘key informant’ (Yin, 2014) by providing me with access to several other interviewees.

In total, I conducted 32 interviews: eleven in Taipei, twelve in Hong Kong and nine in Shanghai. Although my original plan was to conduct ten interviews in each location, I struggled meeting this goal in Shanghai. Even my key informant was unable to help me in locating additional respondents from the local government. The interviews were carried out over a seven-month period between July 2014 and January 2015. The list of all anonymised interviewees, including the exact interview date, interview type, site, the position of interviewee and their workplace/institution is provided in Appendix D. In each city, the interviewees comprise of two major groups of people – officials and practitioners. The first group represents the ‘authors’ of the policies, such as senior and middle level civil servants and council members (if applicable). The second group contains the ‘recipients’ of those policies and relevant funding. It is comprised primarily of cultural practitioners that were involved in the administration, organisation and planning of large-scale cultural events. There is also an additional, third group, of participants that includes policy advisors and local academics working in a field of urban cultural policies. In empirical chapters, I indicated the respondents’ city by the use of initials TP (for Taipei), HK (for Hong Kong), and SH (for Shanghai).

The most common limitations of interviews are linked to possible response biases, memory lapses, and poor or inaccurate articulation of the issue at hand (see Yin, 2014; Robson, 2011). Interviews, particularly long interviews, also tend to be subject to reflexivity, a mutual influence that is generated between interviewee and interviewer as a result of the relationship that is formed during their conversation. Yin (2014) argues that this may lead to “an undesirable colouring of the interview
material” (p. 112), and ultimately, affect the reliability of the research. Limited standardisation of semi-structured interviews raises some additional concerns about their reliability (Robson 2011).

In addition to data triangulation, which is considered to be one of the most effective measures in coping with these pitfalls (see Yin, 2014), I adopted a number of other strategies that helped to enhance the reliability and validity of this study. First, as noted earlier, by interviewing both the ‘authors’ and the ‘recipients’ of policies I was able to cross-check their accounts against each other. Also, before each interview I carefully examined all available information about the respondent and their organisation. The ways in which different interviewees relate to the interview depends on their personal and professional interests, experience and “their assessment of the interview activity itself” (Sarangi, 2003: 64). Background information about participants not only served to ensure that their field of expertise was relevant to the subject of my study, but also helped to detect potential sensitivities, biases and underlying intentions. During the interviews, I attempted to adopt a neutral and non-judgmental approach and often probed for elaboration to ensure that the respondent’s views were clearly communicated (Robson, 2011). In this study, establishing a set of nearly identical questions helped to ensure that all interviews were conducted in a similar manner and covered similar sets of topics.

Whilst following similar lines, some interview questions had to be adjusted in accordance with the interviewee’s role, position and context within which they operated. In retrospect, as my fieldwork advanced further, my interview questions evolved and became more focused and refined. On average, the interview sheet included 8 to 12 questions. Samples of three different interview guides can be found in Appendix E.

The interviews were conducted either in Mandarin or in English, depending on the respondent’s preference. The length of the interviews ranged between 30 minutes and 2 hours 30 minutes, with a mean length of approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. Although most of the interviews were face-to-face, one interview was carried out via Skype due to the interviewee’s absence at the research site at the time of my visit. Five other interviews were conducted via email at the request of the respondents. It should be noted, however, that all five respondents agreed for their responses to be followed up by supplementary questions, which allowed maintaining a semi-structured format to the email interview. During the coding process, these interviews were treated the same way as other interview transcripts. All interviews (except for email interviews) were taped using voice recorder, transcribed and analysed using NVivo, a qualitative research software.
To enhance the readability of interview accounts, I rendered them “in a more fluent written style” (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008: 117). This involved adjusting the structure of the translated quotes (including those from the documents), paraphrasing their literal translation and adding some missing fragments to make them more easily understood for the readers of this thesis (see Filep, 2009). As noted earlier, some interviews were conducted in English with non-native English speakers. In order to increase the readability of these texts, I corrected their grammar, style and other inconsistencies. According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2008), all interview quotes used in the final report should be edited not only for readability, but also for ethics of reporting. The researcher has to make sure they do justice to their respondents’ accounts. If not rendered into a readable written form, “oral language transcribed verbatim may appear as incoherent and confused speech, even as indicating a lower level of intellectual functioning” (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008: 117).

In the course of data analysis, documents provided a better understanding of the context by enabling me to ‘follow’ the adoption of the creative city policy model and to determine some important rationales attached to large-scale cultural events in each city. They also assisted in the construction of the initial codes and categories. Interview transcripts, on the other hand, filled the remaining knowledge gaps by offering a more in-depth understanding of what was going on and why.

In the next section, I will explain the analysis process of the collected data.

3.5 Data analysis

In this study, I used thematic analysis to categorise and analyse the collected data.

Braun and Clarke (2006) define thematic analysis as “a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (p. 6). Thematic analysis is commonly used in reference to other analytic traditions, such as grounded theory, discourse analysis or analytic induction (see Bryman, 2008). However, this study supports Braun and Clarke’s (2006) argument that thematic analysis “should be considered a method in its own right” (p. 4). Some scholars argue that a high degree of flexibility in thematic analysis is its major limitation (see Bryman, 2008). Braun and Clarke (2006) condemn this approach, arguing that flexibility is, in fact, the major asset of thematic analysis. If treated as an analytic method ‘in its own right’, thematic analysis is not attached to a particular analytic tradition for one particular purpose, such as developing theory from data (grounded theory) or verifying the hypothesis derived from theory (analytic induction). This provides the researcher with ‘theoretical freedom’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006) to incorporate different elements from different analytic traditions within qualitative research.
The main purpose behind all analytic techniques is to categorise and structure the collected data. This procedure not only helps to manage the volume of the collected material, but is also crucial in attaching a theoretical significance to data (Ryan and Bernard, 2003; Huberman and Miles, 2002; Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2011; Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2014). This study draws on fairly standard ‘analytic moves’, identified by Miles et al. (2014), that are widely used across different qualitative studies (see also Robson, 2011). These ‘analytic moves’, which are described below, constitute a whole procedure for thematic coding analysis (Robson, 2011). This procedure should be read as an iterative process – as it requires the researcher to go back and forth from one step to another (see Bryman, 2008).

I started my analysis with the document review. Bowen (2009) indicates that document analysis in qualitative research is generally comprised of three iterative procedures of “skimming (superficial examination), reading (thorough examination), and interpretation” (p. 32). In this study, qualitative content analysis was used as a supplementary method for ‘a first-pass document review’ to identify “meaningful and relevant passages of text” (Bowen, 2009: 32). Although content analysis is traditionally associated with quantitative studies, in recent years an increasing number of scholars have noted the use of qualitative content analysis, particularly, in relation to document review (see Bowen, 2009; Bryman, 2008; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). Due to the large amount of documents and time limitations I was unable to carry out a close reading of all texts. In order to simplify the task of data reduction I used a keyword search (such as ‘culture’, ‘creative city’, ‘arts’, ‘event’, ‘festival’ and their Chinese equivalents) that helped to identify the most relevant parts of the document. I then closely examined these selected parts, taking into account the key points of the text, the ‘producers’ of the text, the context in which the key terms were used, and the roles ascribed to cultural policy in the city.

Thematic analysis of the documents was employed after the relevant parts of the text had been identified. It involved coding and code aggregation into more specific themes and propositions (see Miles et al., 2014). Coding plays a central role in qualitative data analysis. This term reflects on the procedure of ascribing the name (code) to those parts of ‘raw’ data that are linked by or “exemplify the same theoretical or descriptive idea” (Gibbs, 2007: 38). The ultimate goal of coding is to detect certain patterns within texts and to group them into broader categories (themes) (Robson, 2011; Miles et al., 2014). Initially, data from periodic policy documents were coded in Excel. However, in the later stages of fieldwork, I switched to NVivo software. NVivo eliminated much of the manual labour, thus aiding me to categorise data more efficiently.
In the course of the document coding process, most keywords that were used to locate relevant parts of the text were ascribed as initial codes with some additional codes added during the process. All preliminary propositions and generalisations that emerged from document analysis were taken “out to the field in the next wave of data collection” (Miles et al., 2014: 10), that is, interviews. In other words, I was, in a way, analysing data (both consciously and subconsciously) whilst still collecting it, with the propositions derived from this analysis, in turn, influencing the trajectory of my data collection.

Whilst ensuring that the initial ideas and arguments are continuously questioned and reformulated (if needed), I felt it was also very important to maintain an open-minded approach towards data collection in pursuing new and possibly unexpected directions, particularly considering that my fieldwork was taking place in three different sites. Therefore, I preserved most of my initial interview questions even if some of them seemed increasingly irrelevant. I also refrained from establishing any clearly defined patterns or themes in the course of my fieldwork and started the systematic coding and analysis of interview data only after it was completed.

I chose to transcribe the interviews myself to gain a deeper understanding of data (Robson, 2011). Although this task was incredibly time consuming (particularly for interviews conducted in Chinese) this strategy yielded good results, because during the transcription process I started developing some key ideas, which I noted in analytic memos and referred back to during the ‘formal’ coding process of the interviews.

I chose not to translate the Chinese language interview transcripts into English. First, this would have required a considerable time commitment. Second, I was worried about altering the original meaning of the text. Considering that, in empirical research, words are “the primary symbol system through which meaning is conveyed and constructed” (Marshall and Rossman, 2016: 113), possible errors of data translation threatens research validity. Therefore, it is recommended to use the same language during data collection and analysis (Barnes, 1996). Consequently, for this project, only those excerpts and quotes that were selected for publication were translated to English.

After the transcription of all interviews was completed, it was time to launch the ‘formal’ stage of data analysis. The large volume of transcript material and memos was overwhelming at first. Echoing this, Bryman (2008) observes that in the early stages of analysis many researchers feel baffled by the richness of the data collected and are often faced with “the difficulty of finding analytic paths through that richness” (p. 538). At this stage, I exported all data to NVivo 10, created three case nodes for Taipei, Hong Kong and Shanghai (later other case nodes, such as
‘Comparison’ and ‘Good quotes’ were added) and began coding. I first coded all interview data from Taipei, then moved to Hong Kong interviews, and lastly to those of Shanghai. As noted earlier, a number of initial codes had already been established during my reading of the research literature, document analysis, interviews and interview transcribing process. However, at this stage of analysis, the number of codes had increased significantly and many predetermined codes had been revised and updated. During coding, the ideas of how different codes could be collated into potential themes started to emerge.

Developing themes is the backbone of qualitative data analysis. As Ryan and Bernard (2003) put it, “without thematic categories, investigators have nothing to describe, nothing to compare, and nothing to explain” (p. 86). Robson (2011) suggests coding “for as many potential themes as you can come up with” (p. 478). For each city, I ascribed more than 200 codes, which were later categorised into 22 to 25 themes (see Appendix F for a comprehensive list of themes). Considering that this is a cross-case study, I wanted to maintain a certain level of consistency and standardisation across three sites. Therefore, all codes and categories established during the coding process of Taipei interviews were exported as a template to Hong Kong and Shanghai nodes. This template was modified and adjusted in the course of coding - all three cities had a number of their own unique codes, such as ‘freedom’ in Taipei, ‘open city’ in Shanghai or ‘arts education’ in Hong Kong.

Ryan and Bernard (2003) indicate that in thematic analysis themes can emerge both “from the data (an inductive approach) and from the investigator’s prior theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study (an a priori approach)” (p. 33). Accordingly, in this study, ‘large-scale cultural events’, ‘culture as symbolic power’ or ‘city as global player’ were predetermined themes, whereas such themes as ‘culture as a platform’, ‘city as ecosystem’ or ‘focus on regional recognition’ emerged from empirical data.

I used several techniques to identify themes, including repetitions (recurring topics), indigenous typologies (local terms), metaphors and analogies, and the search for similarities and differences (see Ryan and Bernard, 2003; Robson, 2011). The recurring narrative of ‘freedom’ in Taipei prompted the analogous theme. In Shanghai, the Chinese term ‘yingxiangli’ (influence) was broadly used to define the rationale for the global and economic power of the city. I identified this indigenous typology as a subtheme. The analogy of Hong Kong as the place where “East meets West” was also developed into a theme. In terms of similarities and differences, making “systematic comparisons” (Ryan and Bernard, 2003: 92) across different units of data occupied an important part of data analysis in this multiple-case study research. All peculiarities of the cities as well as all references or comparisons made
by the interviewees in one city regarding the other two were coded and placed in the same folder to identify what links and what divides all three cities.

At the final stage of analysis, I formalised “the ‘fitting together’ of the themes” (Robson, 2011: 483) by developing thematic networks for each city comprised of two overarching themes and their sub-themes. The overarching or ‘main’ theme is “the core, principal metaphor encapsulating the main point in the data set” (Robson, 2011: 483). The first main theme identified in this study is ‘City to culture’, which is concerned with the governance and funding of culture (i.e. what the city gives to culture). The second main theme is ‘Culture to city’, which is focused on the expectations and roles attached to culture as display (i.e. what the city expects back).

I developed a thematic network for cross-case comparison that addressed the similarities among cities in relation to their approach to culture, and three separate thematic networks for each city representing distinctive characteristics of their approach to culture and the arts. The findings of the study will be discussed in the empirical chapters.

The last section of this chapter will briefly introduce some ethical considerations related to this study.

### 3.6 Ethical issues and considerations

A number of ethical considerations need to be taken into account when conducting “real world research involving people” (Robson, 2011: 194). The ethical issues related to possible conflict of interest, deception, and lack of informed consent should always be carefully considered and assessed. The researcher also has to ensure that the study poses no harm to participants and that their rights to privacy and anonymity are not violated.

Before commencing my fieldwork, I obtained the approval from the Faculty’s Research Ethics Committee (ethics reference: PVAR 13-052). This approval is an official confirmation that the researcher is prepared to conduct their study in accordance with ethical guidelines and norms.

In the interviews, ethics were involved in ensuring the informed consent from all research participants as well as in protecting their confidentiality. A copy of a consent form (see Appendix G) together with an information sheet (see Appendix H) and questions (see Appendix E) was forwarded to all interviewees along with the recruitment email to allow sufficient time for review and consideration. The consent form was signed at the end of each interview. I always made sure that respondents understood what they were consenting to by going through each point in the consent form together with them.
Providing anonymity to research participants is considered to be a good practice. The researcher is responsible for ensuring that the participant’s identity is not revealed and confidentially is fully maintained (Robson, 2011). This point was clearly stated in my consent form and reiterated before commencing each interview. However, in the course of my fieldwork, it soon became apparent that in elite interviews anonymity might not necessarily be desired. A large number of respondents stood firmly by their views stating that they did not mind their real names being used. This prompted me to review my consent form and to add an additional question asking the interviewees to state whether they agree or disagree for their names to be disclosed. In retrospect, I should have included this question at the very beginning of my fieldwork. Considering that most interviews by then were completed and most of the consent forms were already signed, ultimately, I decided to maintain the confidentiality of all participants.

This chapter has described the chosen methodology for the study, explaining the research approach and the process of data collection and analysis. The empirical findings from the data analysis are revealed in the following chapters of this thesis.
Chapter 4

Re-creating the Paris of the East: The State-led Cultural Turn in Shanghai

4.1 Introduction

The next three chapters discuss the empirical findings from case study research in Shanghai (Chapter Four), Hong Kong (Chapter Five), and Taipei (Chapter Six). All three chapters are structured in a similar way with each chapter being divided into two major sections.

The first section sets out the contextual background for each city and examines specific conditions that influenced their cultural turn. Specifically, it addresses relevant historical moments in the economic, political and cultural development of cities, discusses the governance mechanisms of their cultural policies, and identifies major reasons behind the adoption of the creative city policy discourse and its display practices. The primary purpose of this section is to show that transfer and transformation of imported cultural policies occurs as a result of a complex set of inherited pressures and influences accurately described by Jacobs (2012) as “sticky, history-laden contexts that shape what goes where and how” (p. 414). This supports the idea of policy transfer as a socially constructed process, deeply entangled with the past and the present of the city (McCann, 2011b; Peck and Theodore, 2010; Peck, 2011b).

The second section interrogates local policymakers’ understanding of culture as display. Here the main focus rests on the roles that are ascribed to large-scale cultural events and their use for the display of the city. This section is divided according to four major themes that emerged in the course of data analysis. These themes reflect on the primary roles attached to culture as display: display as city promotion, display as symbolic power, display as global node, and display as platform. All these themes, in varying degrees of intensity, come to represent two broader categories of culture as display, namely, culture as entrepreneurial display and culture as symbolic display, as identified in Chapter 2 (see Subsection 2.2.3).

Display as city promotion represents the use of display practices for construction of a certain image of the city, such as the creative city, international city, or global city. This objective is linked primarily with market-driven policy objectives, specifically, growing inter-urban competition for foreign investment, jobs or tourist flows (i.e.
entrepreneurial display). However, as will be shown in the following chapters, it can also be tied in with political and ideological rivalries and political marginalisation of places.

*Display as symbolic power* reflects on the application of culture for enhancing the influence of the city or the state (i.e. symbolic display). Through the use of display practices, both the city and the state seek to obtain more respect and recognition at the global stage that, ultimately, are expected to generate a greater degree of cultural influence. The pursuit for influence can also be inward focused – that is, the government employs display practices to maintain and increase the support of the local population.

*Display as global node* manifests the role of the interlocked global networks of events in shaping the image and influence of the city. The position of the event in these professional networks is generally based on the event’s reputation, credibility and competence. This, in turn, affects its host city’s cultural profile and influence on the global stage.

*Display as platform* embodies the use of display practices to facilitate and promote cultural production in the city. It is aimed primarily at showcasing local talents and providing them with an opportunity to reach out to wider audiences. As will be shown in the following chapters, the events can also be used as platforms for arts education and community engagement.

Although all of these roles appear to be attached to display practices, in each of the three cities their scope, understanding and significance varies. By unveiling a wide array of different types of ‘display’ roles attached to large scale cultural events and the idea of the creative city more generally, these three empirical chapters serve to support the study’s proposition that imported cultural policies are transformed and adopted to the specific historical and political settings of the place.

This chapter argues that in Shanghai, the creative city thesis and its display practices yield to *national* policy interests. Specifically, as a means of cultural soft power, they are used to enhance China’s image and global influence and to promote a particular social order of ‘modern’ China wherein the market economy is deeply interwoven with the authoritarian political system and socialist ideology.

I start this chapter by examining some major historical moments in China’s economic, political and cultural development that show how the cultural turn in Shanghai has been formulated in line with the policy objectives of the state. The examination of regulatory mechanisms and governance structure of cultural policy in Shanghai also reasserts that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and its interests play the primary role in shaping the agenda of urban cultural policies. These
interests, as will be shown in the second part of this chapter, largely shape the meaning behind the adopted display practices in Shanghai.

4.2 Contextual background: building the state-led creative city

4.2.1 China’s opening-up: from the economy to culture

Being a state-centred world city, Shanghai does not fit into the conventional template of the ‘global city’, where the city is seen as a key node of command and control (Hill and Kim, 2000). In order to understand the impetus behind the adoption of ‘creative urbanism’ (Peck, 2011a) practices in Shanghai, it is thus essential to first consider the interests and ambitions of the state that are largely driving these processes.

Today we know China as the second largest economy in the world. The nation’s export-led economic growth started in the late 1970s, following the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy. The Open Door Policy instigated a series of important economic liberalisation reforms, including the opening of local markets to direct foreign investment, partial marketisation of China’s economic system and fiscal decentralisation (see Sung, 1991; Wei, 1995).

It is generally agreed that the Open Door Policy was prompted by China’s quest for foreign investment, knowledge and technologies (see Sung, 1991; Zou, 1996; Taylor, 2013). However in a broader sense, the Open Door Policy also represented China’s attempt to reunite with the global community after three decades of economic decline and political isolation under Mao Zedong. The new Chinese leadership that took over the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (henceforth, CCP) after Mao’s death, saw China’s entrance into the global market as a necessary measure for ensuring its growth and development (see Ding, 2010; Wang, 2011). This marked a significant shift in the traditional Chinese perception of a unipolar ‘China-centric’ world order (see Fairbank, 1968). As Wang and Zheng (2008) explain:

China learned from the Soviet Union that it cannot afford to try to build a China-centred world order. The leadership decided to join the existing international order, or, in Chinese conceptual terms, to gear itself (jiegui) to this order first. (…) For years, whilst making increasingly greater efforts to join the international order, the Chinese leadership also called for the establishment of a new international order; China believes that it can play a role in changing the existing one, and moving towards a new order (p. 6).

This comment indicates that while the first step for China was to join the existing international order, a China-centric perspective had not been entirely dismantled, in
that the ultimate aim for China was to establish superiority in the global arena. The same aim, as will be shown later, is largely guiding the cultural turn of Shanghai (see Subsection 4.2.2).

Until the mid-1990s, China was focused on accumulating its global influence through economic growth and industrial development. In Deng Xiaoping’s words, it was “biding one’s time while building up capability” (taoguang yanghui) (cited in Wang, 2011: 8). To a large extent, this strategy was successful. China had not only achieved a leading position in the world’s economy, but had also been recognised as the most likely world power to challenge the hegemony of the United States (Layne, 2009). However, by the late 1990s, it became increasingly apparent that such economic leadership does not guarantee the global recognition and respect (i.e. ‘symbolic power’) that is essential in forging closer ties with other nations and crucial for obtaining a greater influence over others. Despite a growing economic might, China’s image in the Global North has remained largely negative (Wang, 2011). To date, human rights violations, environmental issues, corruption and censorship continue to hamper its reputation (Ding, 2007; Wang, 2011; Creemers, 2015).

In its quest for additional sources of power, the Chinese government discovered Joseph Nye’s (2004) idea of ‘soft power’, defined by its author as “the ability to shape the preferences of others” (p. 5) through the power of attraction. Nye’s (2004) book, entitled *Soft power: the means to success in world politics*, was translated into Chinese within one year of its original publication, with a large number of Chinese scholars engaging in the analysis of his ideas and discussing their adoption in China (see Li, 2008; Ding, 2010; H. Lai, 2012).

The concept of soft power appealed to the Chinese leadership because it did not threaten the authoritarian social order of the state and did not create a need for any major political reforms. Also, the main principle behind the notion of soft power conformed to the rhetoric of a ‘peaceful rise’ of China in that it manifested the idea of “getting what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004: x; see also Ding, 2010). Another reason behind the appeal of this particular concept is likely to be linked with its place of origin: the United States. Nye (2004) introduced the idea of soft power through the case study of the United States, examining its strengths and weaknesses in utilising soft power measures to maintain a hegemonic position in the world. China considers the United States not only its most important strategic partner, but also its major adversary. Consequently, the development of soft power in China has been perceived as one of the critical measures for challenging the primacy of the United States, and ultimately
manifesting the alleged superiority of China’s socialist system (Wang and Lu, 2008; Nye, 2011; Tong and Hung, 2012).

Peck and Theodore (2010) observe that policies and policy programmes tend to travel as ‘selective discourses’ rather than as ‘complete packages’ (p. 170). The notion of soft power also reached China as a ‘selective discourse’ and was greatly altered in line with political realities and imaginaries of the state. Some argue that for the Chinese, the term ‘soft power’ now “means anything outside of the military and security realm” (Kurlantzick, 2007: 6), but a closer look reveals a strategic repositioning of Nye’s original concept in conjunction with the political goals of the ruling elite.

According to Nye (2004), soft power is not interchangeable with influence. Whereas soft power is bound to the ability to attract, influence can also be generated through “the hard power of threats and payments” (Nye, 2004: 6). However, in mainland China, the understanding of soft power seems to rest predominantly on the pursuit of global influence, a pursuit of “‘power over’ rather than ‘power with’ others” (Nye, 2011: 90, emphasis added). The word ‘influence’ (yingxiangli) is reiterated again and again in the policy narratives of the CCP (Creemers, 2015). As will be shown in the next section, display practices in Shanghai also reflect the aspiration for global influence and power (see Section 4.3). Moreover, in addition to Nye’s (2004) three major sources of soft power, which comprise ‘culture’, ‘political values’ and ‘foreign policy’, Chinese soft power accommodates a number of other deeply politicised practices that include global propaganda-oriented media production, membership of multilateral organisations, and even state-sponsored overseas aid programmes (Kurlantzick, 2007; Li, 2008; Creemers, 2015). These examples indicate that in some ways the Chinese understanding of soft power clearly departs from Nye’s idea of what soft power should entail and what it should aim for.

In China, culture is commonly singled out as the core element of soft power (Li, 2008; Creemers, 2015). 22 In 2007, the Chinese government formally introduced the development of ‘national cultural soft power’ (guojia wenhua ruanshili) as one of the key national initiatives. This reflects the government’s attempt to increase the cultural influence of China. As noted in the Outline of the Cultural Development during the National Eleventh Five-Year Plan Period (henceforth, the Five-Year Development Plan for Culture (2006-2010)):

22 Indeed, China’s case is not unique. In many other countries, including Britain, Russia and Japan, the notion of soft power has also been linked primarily with cultural influence.
In order to win in the global competition, it is not enough to enhance the nation’s economic, technological and military strength. It is also necessary to increase its cultural strength. To obtain the leading position and to seize the initiative in the global competition, we must (…) [therefore] rapidly develop public cultural institutions (wenhua shiye) and cultural industries (wenhua chanye), to cultivate the vitality of our nation, to strengthen national cohesion, and to increase national creativity (trans. from Chinese, State Council, 2006: 4).

The use of culture, and particularly traditional Chinese culture, to enhance the global influence of China represents a significant shift in the state’s approach to culture that has occurred since the early 1980s.

Here it is worth taking a step back to briefly reflect on the cultural policy in China before the Open Door Reform. Under Mao, between 1949 and 1976, China experienced not only economic, but also cultural decline. In an attempt to build a new socialist culture and to channel socialist ideology, Mao denounced everything that was created before the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Consequently, traditional Chinese customs, arts and philosophy were largely condemned for being inconsistent with socialist values. These fields suffered particularly great losses during ten years of the Cultural Revolution.23

Mao saw culture as an instrument for building political and ideological hegemony of the central core of the CCP (Tong, 1994; Keane, 2000; Shan, 2014). The Party’s control over culture was secured by a complete nationalisation of the cultural sector. Until the early 1980s, all cultural organisations were state-owned. Their funding was distributed according to the number of employees, and not according to the type or significance of cultural organisations (Tong, 1994). The work of individual artists, writers and actors, who were considered state employees, was monitored and controlled through dedicated associations. All criteria and quotas for their creative outputs were set from the top down, with ‘political correctness’ being the primary “criterion by which the achievements of artists and writers were judged” (Tong, 1994: 116; see also Shan, 2014). Such a way to assess artistic excellence led to the uniformity and insipidity of cultural production in China (Shan, 2014).

23 The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was a political movement that marked Mao Zedong’s attempt to completely eliminate the ‘four olds’ (si jiu) from the Chinese society, which were regarded as the remnants of bourgeois culture. The ‘four olds’ included ‘old ideology’ (jia sixiang), ‘old culture’ (jia wenhua), ‘old habits’ (jia xiguan), and ‘old customs’ (jia fengsu). Consequently, during the Cultural Revolution, a large number of artists and intellectuals were persecuted, forcibly displaced or killed; many cultural and historical artifacts were destroyed, including temples, ancient buildings, art paintings, books, and other important works. The Cultural Revolution significantly weakened China’s economy and delayed its urban development.
Unlike Mao, the new Chinese leadership that came to power after his death in 1976 addressed culture and the arts not only as ideological instruments, but also as commodities. As Tong and Hung (2012) explain, the new Chinese leadership adopted a different view to cultural policies compared with Mao, in that it defined them not only as ‘a political mandate’ that is based on the desire to control, but also “as strategies or plans that endeavour to direct, guide and influence cultural activity or to provide support for cultural production” (p. 269, emphasis added). This marked a major shift in policy thinking in China: the state was no longer focused solely on the control and maintenance of artistic practices, but also became the promoter and facilitator of the arts.

At the same time, for the first time in modern China’s history, culture has become viewed as an instrument for outward-oriented display. In the wake of China’s growing ambition for global influence and power, it has been employed to promote the nation’s growth and development. Subsequently, all projects that could deliver in terms of international impact have been highly encouraged and supported. For local authorities in Shanghai, which were completely excluded from policymaking during Mao’s era, this shift has provided an opportunity to impact on the decision-making process. The adoption of global formats of arts and film festivals in Shanghai in the late 1990s could be seen as one of these attempts. Notably, among Chinese cities, Shanghai was the first to host its own international film and arts festivals. In the 1990s Shanghai experienced a rapid rise. Thus, the adoption of these two major international events was significant for both the city and the state, with regards to making a statement for their entrance to the global cultural stage.

Broadly speaking, the post-1976 shift in the government’s approach to culture and the arts can be characterised by two complementary themes: relaxation and restriction.

Relaxation has been manifested through decentralised funding of a large number of cultural institutions and the admission of private investment, both local and foreign, into the field. In the wake of decentralisation, local governments became directly responsible for managing local cultural infrastructures. This, in turn, has brought some degree of autonomy to local authorities in Shanghai and “allowed more innovative use of these infrastructures” (Gu, 2014: 176). However, despite some signs of the loosening grip, the cultural trajectory of the city’s cultural policy remains largely guided by the state (see Subsection 4.2.3).

Financial decentralisation of the cultural sector has also allowed the government to reduce state subsidies for culture and to become more selective (and hence, more strategic) in what organisations or initiatives it should and should not support (Tong and Hung, 2012). Naturally, for many cultural organisations, the transition from a
fully publicly funded to a partially funded and semi-privatised model has not been easy. After many decades of functioning as public institutions, they are not used to the pressures of the market economy (Tong and Hung, 2012; Shan, 2014). The fact that they still lack flexibility in terms of artistic freedom and expression adds even more complexity to the whole situation (see Subsection 4.3.4).

This brings us to another key theme underpinning the changing approach to cultural policies in China: restriction. Despite most cultural organisations being run as commercial enterprises, their ownership still belongs to the state (Keane, 2000). In addition, the access of private capital is generally restricted to those cultural and creative sectors that are considered ‘safe’, such as fashion, design, or animation (O’Connor and Gu, 2012). Television, publishing, and other ‘sensitive’ industries that are seen as representing the interests of the state have remained under the jurisdiction of the CCP (O’Connor and Gu, 2012; Shan, 2014).

Overall, it seems that the Open Door Policy did not bring any substantial changes in terms of reducing the degree of state control over cultural practices in China. This reflects on the continuity of the PRC’s cultural policy. As Keane (2000) rightly observes, despite the state’s involvement in culture appearing to be ‘less intrusive’ now, the CCP continues to use culture “to mould and construct a distinctive Chinese socialist identity” (p. 255; see also Tong and Hung, 2012).

This ‘distinctive Chinese socialist identity’, however, differs from the socialist identity originally envisioned by Mao, as it incorporates elements of traditional Chinese culture. Subsequently, socialist ideology has become somewhat less pronounced than before. As one academic from Shanghai explains:

Our government always seeks to accentuate the distinguishing qualities of China, (…) [as well as] our cultural ideology. However, this is no longer about accentuating (…) socialist ideology, but rather about accentuating China’s element (Zhongguo yuansu), (…) about accentuating China’s culture, [namely], traditional culture (trans. from Chinese, Academic C, SH, 2014).

The objectives attached to cultural soft power clearly demonstrate that in China culture is still largely viewed and used as a political device. Tong and Hung (2012) indicate that in fact it can be regarded as an ‘ideological remnant’ within China’s market-driven cultural policy. According to Tong and Hung (2012), cultural soft power represents the attempt to maintain, consolidate and expand “the role and scope of the state ideology, without disrupting the economic reforms” (Tong and Hung, 2012: 266). Generally, it is aimed at making China
more influential politically (yìnxìanglì), more competitive economically (jìngzhènglì), more appealing in its image (qínghèlì), and more inspiring morally (gánzhāolì) (Wang, 2011: 8, original emphasis).

Such perception of cultural soft power, where culture is seen as a means of international influence, economic growth, and ideological control, accurately characterises the general approach to cultural policies in China.

The CCP’s attempt to increase the global appeal of Chinese culture represents the pursuit of all three objectives. In the last decade, the state has introduced a series of policy strategies aimed at promoting Chinese culture and the arts to a non-Chinese audience, including cultural exchange, international trade of cultural goods and services, and Confucius Institutes. These policies – altogether referred to as the Chinese culture ‘going out’ (wénhuà zǒuchúqu) policy strategy – serve to promote China’s cultural market whilst simultaneously strengthening its cultural influence. As stated in the *Five-Year Development Plan for Culture (2006-2010)*, they are aimed at “expanding the coverage of the nation’s culture and its international influence” (trans. from Chinese, State Council, 2006: 36).

The Chinese leadership views cultural soft power not only as a tool for enhancing China’s influence and competitiveness abroad, but also as an instrument for ideological control of its citizens (see Li, 2008). According to the former president of the PRC, Hu Jintao, cultural soft power contributes to the establishment of a socialist core value system and national cohesion (Hu, 2007). Again, this not only shows that Chinese understanding of soft power clearly departs from the original meaning of the concept, but also indicates the significant role of the state in attaching a particular agenda to culture and the arts in China.

In sum, it is evident that although today cultural policies in China are deeply saturated by market-driven policy objectives, they continue to represent the interests of the state and are aimed at nurturing a particular type of socialist ideology (Keane, 2000; Tong and Hung, 2012; Shan, 2014). More importantly, in case of any tensions between the two (that indeed do exist), the interests of the state are likely to always prevail over those of the market.

Next I will discuss this constant interplay of the state and market interests in the context of Shanghai’s urban cultural policies.

---

24 Confucius Institutes (est. since 2004) are state sponsored non-profit educational organisations tasked with boosting interest among foreigners in Chinese language and culture. Currently there are 500 Institutes established in 134 countries (Hanban, 2016). By 2020, China aims to double this number (Zhou and Luk, 2016).
4.2.2 The rise of globalising and creative Shanghai

Shanghai is not just any Chinese city. In order to understand the purpose behind the cultural turn of Shanghai, we first need to take some time to reflect on the history of the city that shaped its unique identity and culture.

From the late 1920s to the early 1940s, when the state was in turmoil, Shanghai experienced years of prosperity. Due to booming international trade, rapid economic growth, and affluent cosmopolitan culture, this period now is commonly referred to as Shanghai’s ‘golden age’. At the same time, the semi-colonial status of Shanghai resulted in its long-term detachment from the rest of China. Back then, both the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) and the CCP condemned the city for being too ‘foreign’ (Bergère, 1981).

In 1949, after Mao took over the rule of China, the affluent cosmopolitan cultural life of the city that communists perceived as “bourgeois and decadent” (Abbas, 2000: 776) was almost entirely discarded. In a few years, from a thriving international metropolis Shanghai was turned into the centre of domestic industrial production, where its main role was to “finance the modernisation of the rest of the country” (Abbas, 2000: 776; see also Gamble, 2003; Wu, 2000).

The Open Door Policy and its measures brought a much-needed boost to urban areas (Zou, 1996; Taylor, 2013). A particularly significant role here was played by fiscal decentralisation, in policy documents also commonly referred to as the ‘cooking in separate kitchens’ (fenzao chifan) policy (Tsui and Wang, 2004). Launched in 1980, it provided a historically unprecedented degree of fiscal autonomy to provincial governments in China, granting them authority to plan and structure their budgets and to determine their expenditures. Crucially, local governments were also allowed to keep a certain share of their tax revenues.

However, contrary to other port cities in southeast China, which experienced a rapid growth following economic liberalisation in the 1980s, Shanghai’s economic restructuring was put on hold until the early 1990s. The city was supplying around a sixth of the national revenue, thus the CCP was hesitant to cut off its major source of income (Zhang, 2002). The delay in economic restructuring substantially hindered

---

25 After their defeat in the First Opium War (1839-1842), the Qing dynasty was forced to open Shanghai (along with four other treaty ports) to foreign merchants. Soon a number of foreign concessions, predominantly British, American, Italian and French were established in Shanghai, which altogether comprised the so-called Shanghai International Settlement. The International Settlement was a self-governing entity that exercised a significant degree of political autonomy within its borders (Bergère, 1981). The Chinese ruled other parts of Shanghai, which did not belong to the territories of the International Settlement. The International Settlement was returned to the Chinese in 1943. For more detailed discussion regarding the International Settlement in Shanghai see Howe (1981) and Bergère (2009).
Shanghai’s growth and weakened its position in China, where the inter-urban competition for foreign investment was rapidly increasing (Wu, 2000; Gamble, 2003; O’Connor, 2012).

Shanghai’s infrastructure and its economy’s upgrading needs were recognised only as late as 1992, when the central government finally decided to transform the city’s domestic demand-led economy. The Shanghai Municipal Government was granted authority to directly approve foreign investment, to issue and trade stocks, and to establish foreign stores in Pudong New Area (Gamble, 2003). In addition, the central government introduced a tax-sharing system that allowed 25 per cent of tax revenue to be allocated to Shanghai (Zhang, 2002). In line with these incentives, Shanghai announced its aspiration to become a ‘Socialist modern international metropolis’ (Shehuizhuyi xiandaihua guoji chengshi, Office of Shanghai Chronicles, 2004) and an ‘International centre of economy, finance and trade’ (Guoji jingji, jinrong, maoyi zhongxin, Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 1992).

With the narratives of ‘modernisation’ (xiandaihua) and ‘internationalisation’ (guojihua) largely shaping the policy discourse of China, it seems that the main reason for the city’s economic liberalisation was its potential to compete with other cities outside China. In order to restore and strengthen its position in the world, and to become a major global player, China had to reposition its major cities as key nodes of control and agglomeration for global services and firms (see Sassen, 2006).

This completely changed the way in which Shanghai’s past was presented and used. In the late 1990s, the ‘golden age’ narratives started to widely circulate in local media and policy documents. They came to be used as a cornerstone for re-establishing the brand of the modern, cultural and cosmopolitan global city. As one of my respondents explains,

> Shanghai is somewhat attracted by nostalgia, constantly longing for the 1930-1940s Shanghai [when it was] a major city in the Far East, (...) a global city, Paris of the East. (...) It was a centre of modern Chinese culture. (...) Now, we seek to embrace this glorious history, embrace this as a resource (...) we dream of revoking the glory of those years (trans. from Chinese, advisor/academic B, SH, November 17, 2014).

This quote indicates that Shanghai pursues its ‘glorious past’ to build new imaginaries of the future. Ironically, the ultimate goal here is not to evoke the past, but rather to accommodate the ‘past’ in justifying the present actions of the state. In other words, the ‘past’ is reconstructed in line with the current objectives and goals of the CCP.

Justin O’Connor (2012), in his article entitled *Shanghai Modern: Replaying Futures Past*, provides an accurate analysis of Shanghai’s modernisation, arguing that it goes
beyond a mere assimilation of 1930s Chinese cosmopolitanism and Western capitalist modernity. Drawing on Abbas’ (2000) insights of Shanghai as a “city of remake” (p. 778), O’Connor maintains that Shanghai’s rapid modernisation is based on a selective and simultaneous “demolition and preservation” (p. 25) of the past. Indeed, the government chooses to retain only those elements that conform to the regime’s narratives, including global fame and recognition of Shanghai, cosmopolitanism, economic prosperity, and cultural maturity. At the same time, the Party conveniently dismisses numerous problems related to its semi-colonial past, such as opium addiction, gambling and prostitution. In addition, it also neglects the presence of politically active middle class and somewhat revolutionary ideas that circulated among local “intellectuals on the loose” (Bergère, 1981: 3) in 1930s Shanghai. Such a selective ‘modernisation’ devalues the actual modernity of Shanghai’s past (O’Connor, 2012).

Overall, the government’s attempt to claim the title of the global city from Shanghai’s ‘golden past’ demonstrates the absence of an in-depth understanding of what the global city is and what it contains. Following Smith (2013a), in this context, the terms ‘global city’ and/or the ‘world city’ are used as ‘empty phrases’, “stripped of their epistemological substance and critical intent” (p. 2296). In other words, as with other popular slogans, such as ‘green city’, ‘smart city’ or ‘creative city’, their primary function here is to foster neoliberal economic restructuring of the city, which has marked Shanghai’s transition to a ‘modern’ international city.

In order to strengthen its place in the global city network, Shanghai adopted a series of entrepreneurial strategies that were “in line with international practice” (Wu, 2000: 1365). Along with other globalising Chinese cities it invested in infrastructure, local amenities and city branding campaigns (Zou, 1996; Wu, 2000).

In this sense, the adoption of imported cultural policy discourses in Shanghai largely echoed the entrepreneurial agenda that underpins creative city policy strategies in the Global North. Following the adoption of the cultural and creative industries discourse that reached Shanghai in 2005, the city launched “the most ambitious creative industries programme [in China]” (O’Connor and Gu, 2006: 281). By the end of 2010, there were 15 cultural quarters and 80 creative clusters established in Shanghai (Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 2011b). In the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, issued in January 2011, a series of other ‘creativity fixes’ (Peck, 2007), including the promotion and development of cultural facilities, creative environment and events were presented as a means for making the city more competitive and more attractive for businesses and tourists (Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 2011a). Subsequently, Shanghai’s aspiration to become an ‘International cultural metropolis’ (Guoji wenhua da dushi) has been consistently
placed together with Shanghai’s overarching vision to be recognised as an ‘International centre of finance, trade and shipping’ (Guoji jingji, jinrong, maoyi, hangyun zhongxin, Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 2011a).

The establishment of the Shanghai International Film Festival (henceforth, SIFF) in 1993 was also largely prompted by market-oriented reforms. The festival was launched in conjunction with a series of other policies aimed at the facilitation of China’s film industry (Ma, 2012). It should be noted, however, that the promotion of the city as an ‘international metropolis’ also played a significant part in this decision. As one senior staff member of the SIFF noted in interview:

[We] wanted Shanghai to be the place that gives rise to China’s films, a cradle for China’s film [industry]. As an international city, Shanghai had to be the first in China to host an international film festival (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner B, SH, 2014).

At first glance, Shanghai’s cultural turn undoubtedly resembles the cultural turn in European or American cities. But a closer look reveals some notable discrepancies between the culture-led urban development in Shanghai and the Global North, which indicate its transformation.

For instance, whereas in the Global North urban re-industrialisation was among the major factors driving the development of culture and the arts, a decline in manufacturing industries was never the main reason for Shanghai’s cultural turn (O’Connor, 2012; Gu, 2012). As Gu (2012) argues, a “cultural economy was never intended to be part of the plan for the new economy of the inner city” (p. 195). Being an emerging global metropolis, Shanghai sought to speed up the processes of deindustrialisation, seeing them as an opportunity for the expansion of the service industries and real estate development (Zhang, 2003). Empty industrial sites in the city and its outskirts were quickly demolished and replaced with modern office and apartment buildings and there was no need to boost this process with creative districts or other cultural amenities and attractions. In other words, deindustrialisation was clearly not a primary reason for the creative city initiatives to unfold in Shanghai.

My intention here is to argue that in addition to inter-urban competition for foreign investment and tourists, the adoption of creative urbanism practices in Shanghai is also tied up with national policy goals. In other words, Shanghai’s urban development, including the development of its cultural policies, is both state-led and state-centred. The role of the state in the governance of cultural policies of Shanghai will be discussed in the next subsection (see also Subsection 4.2.3). In the meantime,
it is important to show how exactly national interests are represented in the cultural turn of Shanghai.

The beginning of the cultural turn in Shanghai largely coincided with the growing determination of China to strengthen its cultural influence in the world. The case of the China Shanghai International Arts Festival (henceforth, SIAF) that was established in 1999 is particularly instructive in this regard. Unlike the SIFF, which had a clear economic agenda attached to it, the SIAF has always been about the display. This is how the former Minister of Culture of the PRC, Sun Jiazheng, described the role of the SIAF:

> By hosting the SIAF, we seek to absorb the excellent culture of the world, to promote cultural exchange, to broaden the dissemination and influence of Chinese arts in the world, and to establish a good image of China’s culture and the arts (trans. from Chinese, Sun, 1999 cited in People’s Daily, 1999).

Generally festivals and events are the products of cities rather than nation-states (Quinn, 2010; Cunningham, 2012). However, the SIAF is clearly an exception to the rule. Although based in Shanghai, the SIAF is a state-level event hosted directly by the Ministry of Culture of the PRC. In China, it is the only arts festival to have such a status. This also indicates that the festival is designed primarily to represent the state’s interests.

The link between the cultural turn in Shanghai and China’s ambition for cultural influence can also be detected by looking at its timing. After the former president Hu Jintao declared the need to enhance national cultural soft power in 2007 (Hu, 2007), Shanghai, along with other Chinese cities, responded by taking a greater interest in their cultural policies. The first statements indicating the growing aspiration for the title of the creative city can be found in the 2008 Government Work Report, where Shanghai unveiled its ambition to turn the city into an ‘Innovative and lively cultural metropolis’ (Chuangxin huoyue wenhua da dushi, Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 2008). In 2008, the city also submitted its bid to the UNESCO Creative Cities Network, and after two years was awarded the title of UNESCO City of Design. The original descriptor ‘Innovative and lively cultural metropolis’ was soon replaced by the narrative of ‘International cultural metropolis’ that continues to be used to this day. In the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the need for strengthening the ‘overall’ international influence and the cultural soft power of the city were stated among the major reasons for the city’s aspiration to facilitate and promote its culture and the arts (Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 2011a). In this sense the policy script of the creative city seems to be understood as one of the national cultural soft power and culture ‘going out’ strategies, where an ultimate goal is China’s political and cultural influence rather than merely its economic success.
In order to position itself as an international cultural metropolis and, more broadly, as a global city, Shanghai feels impelled to imitate the most integrated cities in the global city network. The government is very open and somewhat proud about the fact that many concepts in the field of culture that they consider ‘the best cultural policy practices’ (Official A, SH, 2014) are emulated from other global and mostly western cities. During the interview with the official from the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, my respondent accurately explained the rationale behind these endeavours:

We aim to become one of the front-ranking cities in the world. World-class city. In particular, [we seek to become one] in the field of culture. (...) We are now learning from some other foreign… certain international world-class cultural metropolises serve as… as models [for us]. For instance, now our focus lies on researching London, New York. In Asia, it’s Tokyo. These [cities] serve as certain benchmarks for us (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014).

This suggests that the leading global cities and their models of cultural policy serve as ‘exemplars’ (Simmons et al., 2008) for Shanghai. Moreover, the adoption of these models seem to be regarded as a necessary step towards increasing Shanghai’s position in the global city network. This reflects back on the social-constructivist approach to policy transfer, where policies are argued to be embedded in ‘power-soaked’ policy networks (Peck, 2011a: 788; see also Subsection 2.4.1).

It is evident that through the adoption of imported cultural policies, the CCP seeks to place Shanghai at the top of the global city network, next to the ‘model’ global cities, specifically London and New York. Referring to London, the official from the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government admits:

We cannot claim that Shanghai and England’s London are the same now, that Shanghai has reached those standards yet. We have not reached those high standards yet. We have not reached that level yet. However, we are working hard to learn from the UK, to learn from London, [we] strive to turn Shanghai into the ‘creative city’ (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014).

Clearly, in Shanghai, the emulation of the creative city policies is seen as one of the ways to the top for both the city and the state. By reaching ‘those high standards’ set by the model global cities, Shanghai anticipates not only becoming one of these cities, but also strengthening the global influence of China more generally (see Section 4.3).

Although in this case the interests of the state happen to coincide with those of the city, it is evident that the priority always lies with the former rather than the latter. The examination of the regulatory and funding mechanisms of cultural policy in
Shanghai, which completes the first section of this chapter, shows that local authorities indeed have little influence on cultural policy-making in the city.

4.2.3 The governance model for culture as display in Shanghai

As noted earlier, economic liberalisation provided a great degree of fiscal autonomy to cities. However, fiscal decentralisation should by no means be seen as an indicator of political decentralisation in China. To date, the decision-making power concerning all major policies and policy directions remains with the central government. Although local regulatory agencies that enforce and implement these policies may have a certain degree of flexibility to interpret them in accordance with local needs and interests, a number of studies indicate that local authorities still have very limited decision-making power and are unable “to effect structural transformation in its true sense” (Zhang, 2003: 1569; see also Tsui and Wang, 2004; K. Lai, 2012).

Correspondingly, urban cultural policies are also largely engineered, monitored and guided by the state. As noted earlier, despite the entrance of private capital in the cultural sector and the growing number of private cultural groups and initiatives, the cultural market in China “has not replaced the institution of centralised cultural policy” (Tong and Hung, 2012: 274). This raises a broader question of whether an urban cultural policy in its own right actually exists in China, or whether it is merely a reflection of the national cultural policy agenda.

The empirical findings of my study seem to indicate the latter. The data shows that those cultural policies in Shanghai that are aimed at the display and promotion of the city are closely supervised and controlled by the Central Publicity Department of the CCP26 and the Ministry of Culture because, similarly to other ‘sensitive’ areas, they are also considered to represent the interests of the state (see also Subsection 4.2.1). By enacting the guidelines issued from the top, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government therefore serves merely as an operator or Trustee to the central government (see Subsection 2.2.2). As one of my respondents explains:

> If the central government says, “we want to boost the cultural industry, we want to revitalise culture and give the cultural offering, cultural arise to the citizens” (…) – that’s the central government’s statement, and then province, and city, and district will have to follow. It is as simple as that. So that’s why each city wants to build their own cultural identity, each city wants to have some political achievement by boosting their cultural events (Practitioner D, SH, 2014).

---

26 This official English name has been used since 1998. Before that the department was known as the Propaganda Department of the CCP. Notably, the Chinese name of the department (Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuan bu) has remained unchanged.
Accordingly, the main vision and direction of culture as display practices in Chinese cities is generally set up at the state-level. In Shanghai, the Ministry of Culture allocates funds and supervises the entire organisation process of events through the Shanghai Municipal Culture, Radio Broadcasting, Film and Television Administration (Shanghai shi wenhua guangbo yingshi guanli ju, henceforth, Shanghai Administration of Culture). The Shanghai Administration of Culture acts as a mediator between the Ministry and cultural organisations that plan and organise different events.27 As noted in my interview with the senior government official from the Shanghai Administration of Culture:

> Our management of the large-scale cultural events is also subject to the central government’s decrees. Therefore, such events like Film Festival or TV Festival, they all are organised directly by the central government. Directly guided by the central government. [Our department] in Shanghai is more like… like an operational department (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014).

The degree of influence that the central government exercises over local authorities in Shanghai suggests that the meanings that are attached to the display practices in the city are likely to be contextualised by national policy imperatives rather than local (city-level) policy objectives.

Study findings demonstrate that highly centralised decision-making leaves the events’ planning teams with little or no flexibility. They do not have direct access to those at the top who make the decisions. Their concerns, needs and suggestions can only be communicated through the Shanghai Administration of Culture. In addition, their work is closely monitored by the government, which deprives them of any means to control the planning and programme of the events. The fact that the artistic director of the SIAF, Liu Wenguo, also serves as a vice-director of the Shanghai Administration of Culture vividly demonstrates the degree of influence and control that the government officials hold over the organisation of large-scale cultural events. This situation raises two rhetorical questions. First, how can a cultural event retain a high level of creative freedom if a senior ranking government official guides its artistic direction? Second, considering that the artistic director already holds one full-time position, how can he ensure the high artistic quality of the event?

Clearly, a tight control over the format and content of cultural events suppresses the creative output of the team. As one academic from Shanghai accurately notes,

---

27 There are different organisations established specifically for the organisation of the China Shanghai International Arts Festival, the Shanghai International Film Festival, and the UNESCO City of Design projects.
In China, a large number of events overly rely on the government’s assistance. (…)[Event organisation teams] are only focused on the process of copying, and do not take their job too seriously, do not even attempt to see a bigger picture (trans. from Chinese, Academic C, 2014).

A lack of individual initiative and rigid adherence to rules are deeply rooted in the mentality of many state-owned cultural organisations in China (Tong, 1994; Shan, 2014). Although this by no means indicates that publicly funded large-scale cultural events in Shanghai lack innovative sparkle or creativity, their passive attitude to work undoubtedly serves as a socio-political constraint in the events’ management system and is likely to affect their quality, format and functions (see also Subsection 4.3.3).

At first glance, a strict top-down approach to decision-making in China seems to leave little room for manoeuvre at a city level. However, study findings reveal that social relations and networks that are formed between the policymakers at the state and local levels make this seemingly rigid system of regulation a bit more flexible. Social networks and ties (in the Chinese context more commonly referred to as guanxi) are commonly placed at the heart of China’s social order, and its economic and institutional transformations (Gold et al., 2002). The research findings suggest that in Beijing, where the municipal government has ‘direct links’ with the Ministry of Culture, local authorities exercise more flexibility over the format and organisation of their cultural initiatives and activities than in Shanghai (Practitioner C, SH, 2014).

Compared to Beijing, guanxi between the municipal government in Shanghai and the central core of the CCP is much weaker. As a result, the Shanghai Administration of Culture tends to be more meticulous about adhering to the top-down expectations, guidelines and censorship rules. During this study, my interviewers indicated that some of the performances found at cultural events that were allowed in Beijing were actually banned in Shanghai. The censorship and exclusion of content that is considered sexually inappropriate or politically sensitive limits the selection of international artists and performers for large-scale cultural events in Shanghai (see also Subsection 4.3.3).

As noted in Chapter 2, different types of funding mechanisms and regulatory frameworks of culture tend to be integrated and entangled with each other (see Subsection 2.2.2). Correspondingly, the decision-making process regarding cultural policies in Shanghai is based on a combination of several different types of governance models. In addition to acting as trustee to the central government, the Shanghai Municipal People's Government also assumes the role of promoter (see Subsection 2.2.2).
As *promoter*, the government provides funding to some semi-public and private cultural organisations that host their own cultural events, such as the Shanghai International Contemporary Theatre Festival (henceforth, ACT) and Shanghai Dance. Although these events are smaller in scale than those supervised directly by the city government, they have already established an international reputation among industry professional and artists. In that, their achievements correspond with the national culture ‘going out’ policy. It should be noted, however, that if compared to the substantial funding provided to the Chinese prototypes of international large-scale cultural events, the financial support to this group of events is very low and accounts for 10 per cent (or less) of their total budget (Practitioner A, SH, 2014). This again indicates that the government’s priorities lie within those events that can guarantee international visibility and media exposure. Echoing this, the senior government official representing the Shanghai Administration of Culture maintains that the primary interest of the government lies in increasing “the quality and the international impact of events” (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014).

By adhering to global trends, Shanghai can also be regarded as a *Global Player* (see Subsection 2.2.2). As previously noted, the city has not only adopted various international festival formats, but is also actively pursuing the ambition to turn Shanghai into the creative city. This aspiration is clearly manifested through the narrative of ‘international cultural metropolis’ and the pursuit for the title of the UNESCO ‘City of Design’ that Shanghai achieved in 2010 (see Subsection 4.2.2).

Although today Shanghai’s cultural policy is largely shaped by global trends and imported policy strategies, their objectives and formats are determined primarily by the state. As shown in this section, the re-emergence of ‘modern’, ‘international’ and ‘cultural’ Shanghai is set out to not only facilitate and support its neoliberal economic restructuring, but also to enhance China’s cultural influence and to strengthen its cultural nationalism. The analysis of display practices in Shanghai seems to support this argument.

### 4.3 Contextualising culture as display: Shanghai’s perspective

#### 4.3.1 Display as city promotion

Global city networks and the relationships within and across them are not static, they change all the time (Castells, 2000). This contributes to a zero-sum competition for capital and jobs among cities, particularly those that feel marginalised and less integrated within the global city network (Robinson, 2002).

In Shanghai, there is an evident concern about the city’s position in the global city network and growing inter-urban competition. As a senior government official from
the Shanghai Administration of Culture asserts, “we must continue to forge ahead, if we do not forge ahead, others will, and as a result, we will immediately fall behind” (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014). One of the ways to ‘forge ahead’ is city promotion, which is widely recognised as a necessary tool for cities to distinguish themselves and to raise their competitiveness (Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2006).

My empirical data suggests that in Shanghai, large-scale cultural events are commonly perceived as a means of building an attractive image of the city:

We are relentlessly working towards establishing the image of Shanghai as a cultural city (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner E, SH, 2015).

Large-scale cultural events (...) serve as (...) a cultural name-card or (...) cultural landmark [of the city]. (...) [They] are recognisable cultural brands of the city, (...) [particularly] important for such cities as Shanghai with the ambition to be a world city (Practitioner D, SH, 2014).

In Shanghai, global formats of large-scale cultural events are used to promote the city as an international and modern metropolis, which largely resonates with the objectives attached to China’s culture ‘going out’ policy (see Subsection 4.2.1).

As with the culture ‘going out’ policy, one of the major objectives attached to the events is the promotion of Chinese culture to a foreign audience. Interview data indicates an increasing ‘internationalisation’ of local cultural production. There seems to be a clear tendency among large-scale cultural events to not only display the work of predominantly foreign artists, but also to adapt local cultural production to what is perceived to be a foreign audience taste. As a staff member from the SIAF indicates,

Currently, the major challenge for the SIAF is to showcase those Chinese works that could interact with the world and that could reach the world. This is very important. Chinese elements need to be expressed using the world’s language (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner E, SH, 2015).

This ‘staged authenticity’ (MacCannell, 1973) assists in maintaining the ‘global’ identity of the events and conforms to the image of international, cosmopolitan and global Shanghai. In a sense, here we witness a particular moment of local culture, or more specifically, Chineseness, being “inscribed into the global regime of capitalism” (de Kloet, 2010: 442).

As my interview with the senior government official shows, state-sponsored cultural events are particularly interested in “displaying the original works created in China (Zhongguo yuanchuan)” (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014). On the one
hand, such a manifestation of ‘Chineseness’ indicates the pursuit of a comparative advantage in the global marketplace. On the other hand, the display of ‘China’s element’ (Zhonguo yuansu) is also likely to be used to strengthen Chinese nationalism, which has been invoked following the rise of the PRC (Tong and Hung, 2012).

The narrative of Shanghai’s internationalisation tends to be supported with the notion of ‘openness’ (kaifang xing) that is designed to position Shanghai as a free and open global city (as opposed to a restricted socialist city). The theme of ‘open’ Shanghai has repeatedly surfaced during my interviews in Shanghai:

> We are an open international cultural metropolis. International [city] must be open. If you are confined, it won’t work! Absolutely, won’t work. Thus, first and foremost we have to be open (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014).

> I believe this city contains some kind of ‘openness’ towards western culture, a natural affinity [with western culture] (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner A, SH, 2014).

> More open, more international your city is, easier it gets to do cultural exchange. I think this is the major advantage of our city and the major difference from other [Chinese] cities (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner B, SH, 2014).

The ‘open city’ narrative undoubtedly reflects the government’s attempt to ‘replay futures past’ (O’Connor, 2012) by re-establishing Shanghai as the ‘Paris of the East’. However, as the last quote shows, it is also used to differentiate Shanghai from other Chinese cities. Historically, Shanghai has always been considered the most cosmopolitan city in China (see Subsection 4.2.2). In this sense, its ‘openness’ to foreign culture represents a major competitive advantage within China. Many interviewees noted that the ‘openness’ and ‘international’ character of Shanghai is what distinguishes the city from its main rival – Beijing (see also Kong et al., 2015).

Although the narrative of ‘openness’ was commonly brought up in the interviews in relation to the promotion of Shanghai as the creative city, the degree of the city’s actual ‘openness’ could be debated. Considering the number of constraints placed on local and foreign artists that limit their artistic expression and creative output, it is evident that in many respects Shanghai still cannot be called an ‘open’ city. Ma (2012) calls this type of ‘openness’ “the forced-upon or appropriated cosmopolitanism” (p. 162). Provided that the narratives of ‘international’, ‘modern’ and ‘open’ Shanghai often do not correspond with reality, their actual contribution to the city’s image remains to be seen (see also Pacione, 2009).

All in all, these results are in agreement with previous studies that also addressed the discourses of cosmopolitanism, diversity and authenticity with regards to city/place
promotion (see Dávila, 2003; Georgiou, 2008; Aiello, 2013). However, whereas in other studies city promotion was linked primarily with a market-driven policy agenda and urban entrepreneurialism, in Shanghai economic considerations seem to play a minor role.

In fact, despite some indications of such events’ contributions to the tourism industry and the economy more generally, there was no actual evidence that the government would be attaching a significant market value to large-scale cultural events or using them to build a ‘tourism destination’ image for Shanghai (see Richards and Wilson, 2004; Quinn, 2010). During my interviews with representatives of the SIFF and the SIAF, contrary to those conducted with their counterparts in Taipei and Hong Kong, the pursuit of financial gains or the issue of money never came up. Drawing on the SIFF, Ma (2012) also observes that here “profitability is not actually prioritised” (p. 149). Furthermore, empirical data shows that a large number of event tickets never reach the box office, but instead are given out to government agencies and government-affiliated sponsors (see also Ma, 2012). As one Shanghai-based foreign practitioner notes, the success of these events is never measured according to the ‘number of tickets sold’ (Practitioner C, SH, 2014). This clearly suggests that the main goal of state-sponsored cultural events in Shanghai is not the prospect of financial gains.

I argue that in Shanghai large-scale cultural events are used primarily for symbolic rather than entrepreneurial display. This argument will be further addressed in the next subsection of this chapter.

4.3.2 Display as symbolic power

As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the introduction of ‘cultural soft power’ and the attachment of the cultural dimension to the global city narratives reflect a broader change in the policy thinking of the Chinese leadership. Specifically, this marks the recognition that economic growth is not a sufficient means for maintaining and strengthening the global influence of China.

Consequently, in China imported cultural policies are used to enhance cultural influence and the symbolic power of the state (Gu, 2015). Previous studies have shown that cities and nation-states pursue symbolic power through a variety of city promotion strategies, including the urban built environment (Harvey, 1990; Aiello, 2013), iconic architecture (Sklair, 2006; Ong, 2011a), and even national airline branding (Thurlow and Aiello, 2007). This study demonstrates that large-scale cultural events are also widely employed in the production of symbolic capital for a place. In other words, they are yet another important element constituting the generic ‘checklists’, which are created to cater to a city’s global image and profile.
The pursuit of symbolic power overlaps with the use of culture for city promotion and entrepreneurial display in that they are both driven by the same concern of raising the city’s profile and reputation, or in Chinese terms, ‘reputational influence’ (zhiming yingxiangli). However, their ultimate aim is different, and thus it is important to differentiate between these two categories. As entrepreneurial strategy, large-scale cultural events are used to put a city on the map and to outline the brand of the city; as symbolic display, they are anticipated to enhance the city’s (and the state’s) influence. In a sense, the former, which is focused on being noted, serves as a fundamental layer for the latter, which is concerned with being able to influence.

The narrative of ‘influence’ commonly occurs in China’s policy speeches and documents. As previously noted, it has now become an integral part of Chinese soft power policy discourse. In the context of large-scale cultural events, ‘influence’, encompassed by both ‘international influence’ (guoji yingxiangli) and ‘reputational influence’, seem to be a crucial criterion in assessing the value and significance of the event. As one policy advisor maintains, the major defining characteristic of large-scale cultural events in China is namely “whether their influence is acknowledged internationally” (trans. from Chinese, Advisor/Academic A, SH, 2014). In a similar vein, another participant also observes that large-scale cultural events are always expected to hold ‘international influence’ (trans. from Chinese, Advisor/Academic B, SH, 2014).

As a result, imported formats of cultural events in Shanghai are first and foremost focused on their international impact. Several respondents have noted that the government always opts for the ‘best’, ‘the greatest’, ‘world-class’ performers:

Normally, a Chinese understanding of a large, mega cultural event [is that the event] should be the best of the best (Practitioner D, SH, 2014).

This is so important for Shanghai to make a statement. The outer appearance, the surface is very important to Shanghai. (….) What is important to them? The number of performances that they have, the number of high-level artists that are in. (…) This is how they are judged, this is how they are evaluated. (…) It [all depends on] how many [international] artists (…) [were] presented, [and] what kind of artists [they were] (Practitioner C, SH, 2014).

In addition, events are constantly compared with their well-known counterparts, such as the Cannes Film Festival in the case of SIFF or the Edinburgh Arts Festival in case of SIAF. As a senior government official from the Shanghai Administration of Culture explains:

[Referring to Cannes, Berlin and Venice film festivals:] We carefully analysed their numbers, their state of affairs. We understand them very well. Because now… Now
everything is online, very convenient. Then, according to their… But we are not trying to turn the SIFF into the best in the world, it’s not our goal. We are trying to turn it into the best [film festival] in Asia. (…) That is our goal (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014).

This quote echoes two major mechanisms directing the process of policy transfer, which include policy diffusion by competition, and policy diffusion by social emulation that were identified by Simmons and her colleagues (Simmons et al., 2008; see also Subsection 2.4.1).

The indication that the major goal behind the adoption of global formats of cultural events is to enhance Shanghai’s influence and position in the region hints at the competition within the regional networks of power. However, contrary to Simmons and her colleagues, whose focus was predominantly on economic competition, in this case, the meaning of ‘competition’ also entails the competition for cultural influence and symbolic capital (see also Ong, 2011a).

Research data shows that at the local level this type of competition revolves primarily around Shanghai’s rivalry with Beijing for state attention and support (Kong et al., 2015). As previously noted, the ‘international’ character of Shanghai is considered to be its major strength in this uneven competition with the capital city of the PRC. One senior academic, who also serves as a policy advisor to the local government, commented on the existing division between the two cities:

In terms of culture, Shanghai and Beijing’s positions are very clear. Shanghai is an international cultural metropolis. Of course, we now have other cities in China who also claim to be ‘international cultural metropolises’, but no one acknowledges them as such. Everyone knows they are only talking big, that’s it. However, everyone recognises Shanghai as the international cultural metropolis. So does Beijing. And Beijing… (…) it operates as our nation’s centre of culture. It is the centre of Chinese culture (trans. from Chinese, Advisor/Academic A, SH, 2014).

This comment clearly shows that the title of the ‘international cultural metropolis’ has become Shanghai’s ‘symbolic currency’ (Aiello, 2013) that differentiates the city from Beijing and other cities in the PRC. Consequently, this demonstrates the importance of imported (i.e. ‘international’) cultural policies in generating the symbolic power for the city within China.

Policy transfer by social emulation commonly occurs with the leading country or city serving as an ‘exemplar’ (Simmons et al., 2008; see also Subsection 2.4.1). As noted earlier, Shanghai also tends to emulate policies from the leading cities in the global city network (see Subsection 4.2.3). However, in this particular case, the ‘exemplar’ is the event per se, because in the global festival circuits the reputation and fame of
the event matters more than its place of origin (see Stringer, 2001). The role of the events as global nodes will be further explored in the next subsection.

### 4.3.3 Display as global node

Urban sociologist Saskia Sassen (2006) argues that “there is no such entity as a single global city” (p. 7). Global cities are interlocked into a worldwide network of production and exchange, and are integrally linked by complex competitive and collaborative relationships. With culture now recognised as ‘symbolic capital’ (Gu, 2015) in Shanghai, its display practices are increasingly utilised to gain respect, recognition, and, ultimately, influence in these networks.

The emulation of a ‘standard’ set of large-scale cultural events, which typically includes arts festivals, film festivals, fringe festivals and major design events, can be seen as one of the ways to claim the city’s position in the global city network. In this sense, as a ‘singular set’ they come to signify the city’s economic and cultural advancement (see Subsection 2.3.3).

However, these cultural events can also contribute to the display of the city individually. As discussed earlier, large cultural events not only take place in interconnected cities, they are also interlocked in their own global circuits of film, arts or fringe festivals (Stringer, 2001; Ma, 2012; see also Subsection 2.3.3). These networks accommodate and serve the global community of industry professionals and experts. As with global city networks, they also have ‘hierarchical tendencies’ (Taylor, 2013). The Shanghai government seems to recognise the value of occupying the leading position in these networks to Shanghai’s image and influence. As stated by a senior official from the Shanghai Administration of Culture:

> We invite industry professionals from around the world. This year for the SIAF we invited the chairmen of all major arts festivals in the world. Most of these honoured guests came and participated. With the aid of these guests as well as with the aid of media we expand the profile of Shanghai (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014).

The enormous size and potential of China’s market provides large-scale cultural events in Shanghai with a significant comparative advantage. As one industry professional from Shanghai explains, a large number of professionals and experts attend the events in Shanghai namely because they “want to focus on China’s market” (Practitioner D, SH, 2014). However, the restrictions imposed on this market, such as quotas on foreign films, diminish their appeal. Furthermore, as will be shown later, the events here are focused predominantly on attracting world-class artists and performers (see Subsection 4.3.4). Although this aspect undoubtedly contributes to
raising the reputation of the event, it is by no means sufficient, as it does not guarantee the overall quality of the event.

Overall, Shanghai seems to fail to recognise that the event’s position in the global circuits of events does not depend much on its size, but rather on reputation, performance and connections (see Prentice and Andersen, 2003).

In the course of the interviews, the organisation, structure and programme of the events in Shanghai was heavily criticised not only by their counterparts in Taipei and Hong Kong, but also by local cultural practitioners.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most commonly raised concern was in regard to the censorship that restricts freedom of artistic expression. A number of foreign and local directors and artists have reportedly been banned from showcasing their works in China. There have also been some artists who refused to perform if prompted to alter their programme. Echoing this problem, the senior management from the Taipei Arts Festival recalls their personal experience in dealing with the SIAF:

[Referring to cultural troupes from Taipei that are invited to perform in the SIAF:] Our performance must not only be good, we also have to make sure that it passes their censorship. Thus, we are now usually just sending dance troupes to perform, because sending a theatre troupe would be (…) too problematic. (…) There are no words in dance numbers (…), therefore they are less likely to cause problems (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner A, TP, 2014).

Clearly, censorship has a significant impact on the reputation of all events in Shanghai and its position as an international cultural metropolis more generally. As a senior staff member of the HKIFF comments:

If there were no restrictions in China, with all the power and all the money that mainland China has, they would have a really major film festival. (…) Very ironically, Hong Kong Film Festival can survive and prosper because of these restrictions in China. (…) Nobody cares about Shanghai Film Festival, because of a terrible programme (Practitioner A, HK, 2014).

Another common critique of cultural events in Shanghai concerns their audience. Most respondents agreed that the audience in mainland China often lacks understanding of how to behave in a theatre and how to show respect to artists as well as other audience members. Ticket give-away practice contributes to this problem and also affects the reputation of events. It is common knowledge that a large number of tickets in China are not sold but given out to various sponsors and government agencies (Ma, 2012). As a result, they often end up in the hands of people who attend the event because of a free ticket, not because of a genuine interest in the programme or the event. As one respondent recalls,
I have seen performances where the audience came with lunch packages and started chatting, having snacks, and… which means they got the ticket as a gift, they did not value it (Practitioner C, SH, 2014).

In this case, ticket give-away practice is a symptom rather than a cause of the problem. Most practitioners that I interviewed in Shanghai agreed that some significant reforms in arts education programmes are needed to tackle this issue. Their main argument was that by being overly focused on international impact, the government fails to see the connection between audience development and global reputation of events. The combination of these two objectives leaves the paradox of how to pursue local audience development in Shanghai in a way that fits ‘global’ standards, whilst maintaining the distinctiveness of local culture of the place.

### 4.3.4 Display as platform

Large-scale cultural events generally play an important role in facilitation of local culture and serve as a platform for local artists and industries to showcase and promote themselves to the international community of industry professionals (Waterman, 1998; Quinn, 2005a). As one respondent argues,

> Mega-cultural events, like the SIFF, the SIAF, [and] Shanghai Design Week are of fundamental importance, because they build identity and offer an international platform for people who work in the cultural sector (…) to meet their counterparts and to showcase their work (Practitioner D, SH, 2014).

Simultaneously, building relationships with local artists and audiences is critical to the effective performance of events (Quinn, 2005a). Local cultural production differentiates the event from other formats of global events and affects its quality, programme structure, and identity (García, 2004).

In policy documents, the facilitation of the emerging artists and talents is stated among the key priorities for turning Shanghai into an international cultural metropolis (Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 2011a). The senior government official from the Shanghai Administration of Culture also outlined this objective as one of the major aims ascribed to large-scale cultural events in Shanghai (Official A, SH, 2014).

However, study evidence seems to indicate the opposite trend. As noted before, in Shanghai culture as display practices are focused predominantly on international impact. As a result, they are almost exclusively ‘outwardly focused’ (Oakley, 2009) and somewhat disconnected from the cultural ecosystem of the city. Gaining ‘local influence’ (difangxing yingxiangli) here is deemed of little value for the international image of the city. Therefore, local artists as well as audiences are largely discounted from the sites of cultural display.
As previously noted, a number of respondents indicated that augmenting and educating the local audience has never been a top priority for large-scale cultural events in Shanghai (see also Huang, 2015). Some local practitioners complained about the lack of interest and support of projects related to community engagement and participation. One respondent recalls a community dance project that was part of the SIAF programme a few years ago, maintaining that except for media coverage, the festival did not provide any support: “I had to raise everything by myself, to make this project happen” (Practitioner C, SH, 2014). There also seems to be little effort in granting easier access for the public. The tickets to the SIAF start from around £9 and go up to £190. In Shanghai, where a current minimum wage is merely RMB 1,820 (£210) per month, a vast majority of people simply cannot afford tickets. In other words, it seems that most large-scale cultural events in Shanghai are turned into luxury cultural goods for local elites, used as ‘carnival masks’ to conceal social inequalities in the city (see Harvey, 1989b).

Local artists also have little to gain from large-scale cultural events. In order to get on the stage at these events, their work not only needs to comply with censorship laws, but is also expected to meet a ‘world-class’ benchmark set by the government. Often this condition is accompanied by the anticipation of ethnic difference, referred by de Kloet (2010) as “the burden inscribed in the adjective Chinese” (p. 446). In other words, Chinese artists and performers are expected to be creative whilst being restricted, and internationally appealing whilst ensuring they preserve their ‘Chineseness’.

Naturally, many local artists find it quite challenging to meet all these demands and expectations. As noted earlier, between the 1950s and 1980s cultural policies were centred on control rather than facilitation of culture and the arts (see Subsection 4.2.1). Subsequently, for many years Chinese artists were largely discouraged from taking the initiative or being innovative. In addition, they also lack facilities, funding, and most importantly, freedom of artistic expression (Practitioner C, SH, 2014). It is also worth remembering that the cultural and creative industries in China have been actively promoted and developed for less than a decade now. Therefore, at this stage, many local artists are still relying on foreign knowledge and expertise. Some respondents also noted that the majority of local prominent artists were historically concentrated in Beijing, which has been considered the cultural capital of China since the 1950s. As a result, despite the fact that Shanghai was among the first cities in China to adopt the discourse of the cultural and creative industries, its cultural growth has been hampered by the shortage of local talent. Several respondents have raised the issue of talent shortage and the need for local artists to aspire to ‘world-class’ standards:
The number of talents working in the film industry in China is not sufficient. In terms of quality they are also not sufficient… Both, the quality and the quantity have not yet met the criteria and have not yet met the industry requirements (Practitioner D, SH, 2014).

If we want to look for creativity, for ideas, where can we find them? In Taiwan. If we want to look for channels, marketing channels, where can we find them? In Hong Kong. It is international, (...) and it is more open and diverse [than us]. If we are looking for a place to make things, where can we find it? In mainland China (trans. from Chinese, Academic C, SH, 2014).

[Referring to newly built cultural facilities in Shanghai:] There is no content, there is no art available, or (...) the management has no contacts with artists who could fill that. I know that some joint ventures have been established between local art centre management companies and international agencies, like, I know from Finland, they were in joint venture to provide content (Practitioner C, SH, 2014).

The last two quotes, along with the comments from other participants, seem to suggest that foreign performers now constitute a significant part of Shanghai’s cultural arena. In large-scale cultural events, the number of foreign artists-led cultural projects also often outweighs the number of local production. For instance, in the Shanghai International Contemporary Theatre Festival (ACT), foreign production typically accounts for around 70 to 90 per cent of the festival’s program (ACT, 2014).

In other words, it seems that large-scale cultural events serve as a platform for imported cultural production to enter China’s market rather than a platform for the promotion of local artists. Echoing this argument, a senior staff member of the ACT also indicated that the primary goal of the event is to provide foreign artists with a platform to enter China (Practitioner A, SH, 2014).

In terms of local artists, the ACT sees itself more as an educator rather than facilitator. As noted by the ACT management team, “we seek to enhance the understanding of local artists about international modern theatre and [to promote cultural] exchange” (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner A, SH, 2014). Other events also assume a similar role. Whilst largely excluding local artists from festival programmes, they highly encourage their presence in forums, workshops or other activities (Ma, 2012). In the last few years, most large-scale cultural events have also introduced special outreach programmes or awards that include local artists, such as the SIAF’s Rising Artists’ Works (R.A.W.!) or the SIFF’s Asia New Talent Award. It should be noted, however, that neither of these programmes is aimed specifically at supporting and nurturing aspiring artists from mainland China. In fact, their
primary concern often seems to lie on attracting young talents from abroad (see Raw Land, 2014).

It is evident that the presence of foreign artists caters to the major purpose of the government, that is, to establish the image of Shanghai as an international cultural metropolis. However, considering that display practices in Shanghai largely fail to provide a platform for local artists, it could be questioned whether the city is actually turning into one.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter sought to analyse the understanding of culture as display in Shanghai. It argued that whereas under the “state-manipulated market economy” (Harvey, 2005: 122) Shanghai was granted a relatively high degree of fiscal autonomy, the city remains largely dependent on the central government. As a result, imported cultural policies in Shanghai are largely directed at pursuing the ambitions of the state.

To a certain extent, these ambitions revolve around China’s position in the world economy. Since China entered the global marketplace in the late 1970s, it was compelled to face the global competition for foreign investment. Subsequently, it was forced to adopt a number of entrepreneurial strategies that are widely employed to deal with this competition. The idea of remaking Shanghai and other Chinese cities into sites of attraction – creative cities – was one of the means attempted to raise China’s global economic profile. Clearly, this objective coincides not only with the interests of the state, but also with those of local policymakers in Shanghai. This study shows that in the wake of growing inter-urban competition for foreign capital and skilled labour, they seek to transform the city into a more attractive destination for businesses and tourists, and, in turn, to raise its profile at both the global and local stage.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that China’s interest in imported cultural policies is not limited to solely economic considerations, but also reflects its hegemonic ambitions. From the outset, the aspiration for remaking Shanghai into the ‘international cultural metropolis’ has been underpinned by China’s desire for global prestige and cultural influence. In this sense, cultural policies as display are seen more as signifiers of China’s growing power rather than as generators of wealth.

There were some indications that imported cultural policies, particularly with regards to their ‘international’ character, are also used in Shanghai’s rivalry with Beijing. This rivalry is based not only on competition for foreign capital and state resources, but also on the pursuit of respect and recognition, that is, symbolic capital (see Kong et al., 2015). This further reasserts that the cultural turn in Shanghai should not be
seen as merely an entrepreneurial strategy. Additionally, this also shows that it is not only the state’s interests that are at play here. Although the decision-making power of local authorities in Shanghai is limited, decentralisation of cultural infrastructure has brought some sense of autonomy and flexibility (Gu, 2014). Also, considering a strong *guanxi* culture in China, it is likely that local policymakers might have the means to influence the policymaking process.

Research data suggests that opting for ‘the best’, ‘world-class’ performances and ‘international impact’ are the major objectives attached to large-scale cultural events in Shanghai. Local artists as well as audiences, on the other hand, tend to be largely neglected, because gaining ‘local influence’ is deemed to provide little value for the ‘internationalisation’ of the city. This uncovers some contradictions between the perception of ‘what we should do to become the international cultural metropolis’, and the reality – ‘what we are actually doing’. Although it is generally agreed that local artists do not meet ‘world-class’ standards, the government does little to encourage the development of young artists and talents. Likewise, it has been recognised that more audience development programmes are needed in order to ‘train’ the audience how to behave (presumably, in accordance with ‘global’ standards). However, yet again the government does little to support this initiative. Moreover, the perceptions themselves appear to contradict each other, raising the following questions: How can a city expect to become a leading city in the field of culture and the arts by merely doing what others do and emulating ‘global’ standards and practices? Also, how can the moulding of local artists into ‘world-class’ standards actually contribute to the culture of the city?
Chapter 5
Present in Absence: Preserving the Global City Identity of Hong Kong

5.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to explore cultural policies in Hong Kong. It argues that although the creative city and its display practices in this city are understood as first and foremost entrepreneurial strategies, their format and key objectives differ from most other cities in the Global North. In Hong Kong, the cultural turn is focused on attracting tourists, rather than the attraction of the creative class, and is more concerned with city promotion than urban regeneration. Specifically, Hong Kong uses imported cultural policies to differentiate itself from other globalising Chinese cities. This particular objective is underpinned by two major concerns. The first concern reflects back on urban entrepreneurialism and a market-driven policy agenda. It revolves around the growing inter-urban competition in the region that is perceived to threaten Hong Kong’s position in the global city network. The second concern links with the anxieties of the possible ‘disappearance’ (Abbas, 1997) of Hong Kong and tensions emerging from the rise of local Hong Kong identity. In this context, display practices are used to promote the idea of the city’s global identity. This serves as both a symbolic protest against homogenisation with China and a self-declared homogeneity with other global cities. The urban image of Hong Kong as a city that is unique in its ability to adapt and absorb different influences and cultures is also used in the discursive construction of its civic identity.28

The first section of this chapter interrogates specific historical, political and socio-economic contexts that shaped and defined the cultural turn of Hong Kong, showing that similar objectives (though in varying degrees of intensity) have already been attached to cultural and artistic practices since as early as the late 1960s. In the second section, in line with Peck’s (2011b) argument on policy mobilities and mutations, I demonstrate how complex relationship with China and the local government’s approach to culture has shaped the understanding of imported cultural policy strategies in Hong Kong. My main argument here is that the meaning of

28 Drawing on Bruter (2003), in this thesis I read ‘civic identity’ as citizens’ “identification with their political system as an institutional frame, that is, their state” (p. 1155).
display practices in the city is always created, negotiated, and contested through close interactions between political, cultural and corporate elites.

5.2 Contextual background: from ‘cultural desert’ to global creative city?

5.2.1 Selective interventionism and other colonial legacies

Abbas (2000) indicates that Hong Kong has always been “politically ambivalent about both Britain and China (…) and confident only about capital” (p. 777). Capital accumulation and growth have been central to policy making in Hong Kong since the first British settlement on the island in the 1830s. During the 156 years of British rule, the primary, if not sole, function attached to this port-city was to conduct, coordinate and facilitate East Asian trade (Ngo, 1999).

Historically, Hong Kong’s model was referred to as a ‘success story’ and “an excellent current example” (Friedman and Friedman, 1980: 55) of laissez-faire capitalism (see also Rabushka, 1979). Subsequently, the ‘non-interventionist’ colonial government of Hong Kong was commonly presented as a unique case in the region where the economic growth of other cities, including those in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China, was largely state-led (Cheung, 2000; Lee and Yue, 2001). The idea of limited state intervention is central to neoliberal ideology (Harvey, 2005). However, as Harvey (2005) notes, there is a clear contradiction “between the theory of neoliberalism and the actual pragmatics of neoliberalisation” (p. 21). In practice, neoliberalisation processes demand state intervention in all market-oriented restructuring projects (see Peck, 2004; Peck, 2009).

In this regard, Hong Kong is not an exception. The city’s government has always been at the centre of all key developments guiding the trade-oriented economy of Hong Kong (Lee and Yue, 2001; Ku and Tsui, 2008b). A number of studies demonstrate the government’s involvement through the hidden subsidies provided to workers (Castells et al., 1990), rent and food price control (Castells et al., 1990; Youngson, 1982), and import measures on China to protect local vegetable and meat suppliers (Chiu and Hung, 1999). A long history of urban entrepreneurialism in Hong Kong further exemplifies this point.²⁹ Hong Kong was among the first (if not the first) cities in East Asia to adopt the concept of public private partnerships and to actively promote its territorial competitiveness (Jessop and Sum, 2000).

²⁹ For a detailed discussion of urban entrepreneurialism in Hong Kong, see Jessop and Sum (2000).
Purcell (2009) notes that the state can assist capital “by both retreating and intervening” (p. 142, original emphasis). Similarly, the political rhetoric of ‘non-interventionism’ in Hong Kong served as a legitimate justification for selective interventionism, which enabled the colonial government to neglect those public policy fields and areas that were deemed unprofitable or incompatible with its interests. For instance, for many years it purposively refrained from intervening in the development of an industrial sector in Hong Kong, which was seen as a potential threat to the interests of British manufacturers (Ngo, 1999; Lee and Yue, 2001; Ngok, 2007).

The case of the cultural sector in Hong Kong exemplifies the colonial government’s reluctance to support those public sectors that are considered a poor fit to its market-driven policy agenda. Placed alongside other non-trade related public services, until the early 1970s culture and the arts were largely neglected by the government in terms of funding and infrastructure (Ooi, 1995). As with the delayed industrial development of Hong Kong, we could also read the absence of an overarching long-term cultural policy as a purposive strategy. The government refrained from formulating a comprehensive policy strategy for consistent development of culture to prevent the mobilisation of nationalistic (as well as anti-colonial) sentiments and to ensure the political stability of the colonial regime (see Ma, 2007; Ku and Tsui, 2008b; Lee et al., 2013). The government’s absence from the cultural arena was severely criticised by Chinese intellectuals who visited Hong Kong between the 1920s and 1930s. Referring to its underdeveloped cultural infrastructure, limited funding, and particularly the absence of traditional Chinese culture, they described Hong Kong as a ‘cultural desert’ (wenhua shamo, Lu, 1985, cited in Luk, 1991: 660). The term ‘cultural desert’ is very problematic and, indeed, misleading, because it completely dismisses the contribution of the private sector in the city’s cultural life and the richness of popular culture, particularly in such areas as film, comics, and popular music (Fonoroff, 1988; Lilley, 1998; Wong, 2002; Ku and Tsui, 2008b). It should also be noted that over the years the notion of the cultural desert has largely lost its original intent, which created even more ambiguity about the meaning of the term. Whereas for Chinese intellectuals, it was largely about the ‘absence’ of the Chinese culture, since the

---

30 Since the 1970s, the Hong Kong government has partially recognised its involvement by adopting the principle of ‘positive non-interventionism’. According to this principle, the government should intervene in the economic policy areas if this intervention is deemed necessary for the sake of markets. However, in practice, the government has been actively involved (or purposively not involved) in all public policy areas (Lee and Yue, 2001).
1970s the cultural desert has come to represent the absence of the Western ‘high’ arts
(see Lilley, 1998; Cartier, 2008).

This change, along with the growing public investment in cultural infrastructure,
reflected the increasing involvement of the government in the cultural sector. In the
early 1970s, a consistent public patronage of the arts was first introduced to Hong
Kong with the Urban Council officially undertaking the role of the major “sponsor of
government’s growing interest in culture was in line with public sector reforms
implemented after the leftist riots in the late 1960s. Threatened by the social unrest
of the working class in Hong Kong, the colonial government was forced to recognize
the need for social reforms (Ngok, 2007; Yep and Lui, 2010). Consequently, it
significantly raised public spending on social subsidies, health, and education.
Although the cultural sector was among the last to feel these changes, the amount of
money it received was seen as substantial if compared to previous years (Ooi, 1995).

The primary function of all these social reforms was to restore the political stability
of the city and to strengthen the “authority of the non-elected colonial regime”
(Cheung, 1992: 117; see also Yep and Lui, 2010). As a result, the main focus of
culture and its display practices was to provide entertainment and promote the sense
of stability and prosperity, which, in turn, helped to “to divert the people’s attention
from political issues” (Ng, 2009: 71; see also Lilley, 1998; Ku and Tsui, 2008b).
Similar objectives largely guided the launch of the publicly funded Hong Kong
International Film Festival (henceforth, HKIFF) in 1976 (see Wong, 2011; Cheung,
2016).

Under the colonial government, public arts patronage was directed predominantly at
supporting the Western high arts. Consequently, all large-scale display practices,
particularly the Hong Kong Arts Festival (est. in 1973, henceforth, HKAF),31 were
focused on “a celebration of distinctly Western aesthetics” (Ku and Tsui, 2008b:
349-350). On the one hand, this orientation served to impose the cultural hegemony
of the colonial regime (Ooi, 1995; Lilley, 1998; Ku and Tsui, 2008b). On the other
hand, it also reflected on the emerging economic instrumentalisation of cultural
policies.

Considering the long history of urban entrepreneurialism in Hong Kong, it is perhaps
not surprising that the local government recognised culture as an entrepreneurial
display much earlier than other cities in the region. Faced by the growing
competition from rapidly industrialising and developing economies in Asia and

31 Although the HKAF is a private sector initiative, since its launch in 1973 it has been consistently
supported by the city government.
elsewhere, the city has started to slowly embrace culture as a city promotion strategy since the 1970s (Ooi, 1995; Lilley, 1998). In this context, the adopted formats of large-scale cultural events were used to project the city as an advanced international metropolis with a ‘civilised’ community (Ooi, 1995; Lilley, 1998; Ku and Tsui, 2008b). This idea was further reinforced in the first consultancy study relating to cultural policy in Hong Kong conducted by Peter Brinson, a British writer and dance educator in the late 1980s. In his consultancy report, Brinson argues that one of the main reasons why Hong Kong needs classical ballet as well as other forms of high Western art, is that they are a “possession of most mature industrial societies” (Brinson, 1990, cited in Lilley, 1998: 54, emphasis added). In a similar vein, Ooi (1995) observes that

Superficially all this spending on the arts was part of Hong Kong living up to its reputation as a sophisticated international commercial centre. The arts was primed up as an index of local prosperity as well as an attraction for transnationals who would only work in congenial cultural environment. Thus if London and Sydney had orchestras and ballet companies, Hong Kong had to have these too to be able to attract top level expatriates (p. 278).

With this quote, Ooi (1995) inadvertently points to the onset of the cultural turn in Hong Kong and the growing significance of culture as display in countering inter-urban competition for foreign talents and investment.

It could be concluded that the pursuit of political stability and global competition were two major reasons behind the cultural turn in colonial Hong Kong. In fact, to date, these objectives remain closely attached to display practices in Hong Kong (see Subsection 5.2.3). Nonetheless, they have been readopted to meet new concerns and challenges that emerged following Hong Kong’s handover to China in 1997, which will be discussed next.

5.2.2 Political transition and the question of identity

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was officially returned to China. After the handover (also referred to as the ‘return’), under the One Country, Two Systems principle, the city has retained a full autonomy in its internal affairs, including its legal system, which is largely based on English common law. Officially, Hong Kong is subject to the PRC State Council’s approval only in matters of national defence and foreign policy.

In a Policy Address in 1997, Tung Chee-hwa, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, presented the handover as a necessary step for ensuring the city’s economic growth, arguing that “Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability are closely linked with those of the Mainland” (HKSAR Government, 1997: par. 7). The city’s economic
dependence on China has started to grow in the wake of the 1970s Open Door Policy reforms. The opening-up of China provided Hong Kong businesses with more investment opportunities and helped to boost its trade (Guo, 2007). At the same time, however, this also meant that Hong Kong lost its somewhat privileged ‘gatekeeper’ position between China and the rest of the world. Also, the opening-up of China prompted a massive relocation of Hong Kong’s manufacturing industry to the Mainland, which also affected the city’s economic growth (Ngo, 1999).

All in all, the handover provided the city with a new set of challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, it helped to ensure the ease of access to China’s market for local investors. To date, this remains one of the major economic policy objectives for the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (henceforth, HKSAR). On the other hand, the exposure to new political liabilities after the handover threatened Hong Kong’s global status. The city was considered to be at risk of gradually losing its significance when placed alongside other growing Chinese metropolises, and possibly in danger of ‘disappearing’ from the map as a global financial node (see Abbas, 1997; Yeung, 2002; Chu, 2012). This placed Hong Kong in an ambiguous and uncertain position, scaling down its confidence about everything, even (if not for the most part) about the economic capital.

In response to these concerns, in 2001 the HKSAR government established the Brand Hong Kong (BrandHK) office, a strategic communication agency responsible for promoting Hong Kong as ‘Asia’s world city’. As stated on the BrandHK website, the city’s branding strategy was prompted primarily by the growing concerns about Hong Kong’s marginalisation after the handover:

> The idea of ‘branding’ Hong Kong first emerged in 1997. At that time, much attention was focused on the return of Hong Kong to China, and there was concern in some quarters that Hong Kong might vanish from the international stage after reunification (BrandHK, 2015b).

The ‘Asia’s world city’ branding campaign has been underpinned by a vast number of other policy slogans, including ‘events capital of Asia’ (HKSAR Government, 1999), ‘international cultural metropolis’ (Culture and Heritage Commission, 2003), and ‘Asia’s creative hub’ (HKSAR Government, 2011). Altogether they have epitomised the growing importance attached to city promotion and display. As Ku and Tsui (2008b) observe, one of the major differences between the pre- and post-handover Hong Kong is namely “a much more insistent search for a ‘cultural spectacle’ for a global gaze” (p. 356).

In this context, the production of ‘cultural spectacle’ serves two major purposes. First, it could be read as a major civic boosterism strategy that feeds into the
accelerated pace of urban entrepreneurialism and neoliberalisation in the post-handover Hong Kong (see Ngok, 2011; Chu, 2012). Specifically, it reflects on the government’s attempt to strengthen the city’s competitiveness in the region and to revive its tourism industry and the economy more generally. Second, the pursuit of city display practices could also be seen as an attempt to differentiate Hong Kong from other Chinese cities and to preserve it from being “merged and submerged into the national” (Abbas, 2000: 779; see also Yeung, 2002; Chu, 2012). As stated in the Policy Address of 2005-06, “under ‘One Country, Two Systems’, Hong Kong has developed into Asia’s world city - not just ‘another Chinese city’” (HKSAR Government, 2005: par. 74, emphasis added). In part, the attempt to differentiate Hong Kong from other Chinese cities can undoubtedly be linked back to inter-urban competition for investment, jobs and tourists. However, it also marks the deliberative effort to promote the colonial narrative of the city’s global identity, in order to shy away from more serious discussion regarding the emerging local identity of Hong Kong. This last point deserves further elaboration.

Abbas (2000) observes that under the British rule, “there was no possibility of – and hence little interest in – nationalism” (p. 777). Ma (2007) notes that the colonial government ‘de-nationalised’ the local identity of Hong Kong by imposing the narrative of Hong Kong as a globalised cosmopolitan city. It should also be noted that a vast majority of the local residents at that time were immigrants from mainland China, who did not share a strong connection with the place. However, by the time of the handover, a new demographic of local citizens who were born, raised and educated in Hong Kong had emerged who felt a stronger connection with their native territory. Although these people never saw themselves as British, they also found it difficult to identify with Chinese from the Mainland (Yahuda, 1996; Fung, 2001). Therefore, since the handover they have struggled to redefine themselves from ‘Hong Kong Chinese’ to ‘Chinese Hongkongese’ (Lau, 1997: 1). Instead, a growing number of people have “discovered, invented, and rallied behind what they called ‘Hong Kong culture’” (Abbas, 2000: 777).

The post-1997 government’s official stance on the question of identity is that Hong Kong’s identity is merely a sub-group of a national (Chinese) identity. As stated in the 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education, “[p]olitically speaking, one’s civic identity is defined by one’s national identity” (Curriculum Development Council, 1996). Despite the government’s efforts to construct an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006), where Hong Kong’s civic identity is interlocked with the national Chinese identity, to date, most Hong Kong residents are still reluctant to relate to China as a political entity (see Ma, 2007; Ping and Kinming, 2014; Ku, 2015). Over the past two decades, a vast number of scholars have reported the rising sense of the local
Hong Kong identity, arguing that it came to represent a collective resistance to the political identification with China (see Yahuda, 1996; Ma, 1998; Fung, 2001; Degolyer, 2001; Ping and Kinming, 2014). Accordingly, this quest for identity has been accompanied by strong pro-democracy sentiments and growing public distrust of local government and business elites (see Lui, 2008; Ku, 2015).

In this context, the role of the ‘Asia’s World City’ branding campaign is to establish the sense of what Ang (2003) calls ‘togetherness in difference’. By promoting the idea of de-nationalised (i.e. global) and ‘free-floating’ (Hall, 1996) identity, the government differentiates Hong Kong from China. In this sense, local identity is constructed through its relation to China, or borrowing from Stuart Hall, “through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not” (2000: 17). At the same time, however, and somewhat paradoxically, the sense of global identity connects Hong Kong and China together. Hong Kong as ‘Asia’s World City’, in this sense, becomes a social space where different forms of Chineseness interact and intersect.

In the next section, I will show that the creative city narrative is largely adopted as a subtheme for the ‘Asia’s world city’ campaign. As a result, it is also aimed not only at generating the competitive advantage for the city, but also at promoting Hong Kong’s identity as global and ‘free-floating’.

5.2.3 The role of culture in the ‘Asia’s world city’

In post-handover Hong Kong, the government’s interest in culture has been closely linked with the attempt to facilitate the service economy in the city. In this sense, Hong Kong shares similar features with the creative cities in Europe and North America. Although manufacturing industries have never played a primary role in shaping Hong Kong’s economy, a massive relocation of factories and industrial plants to China in the 1980s forced the government to reassess its development strategies (Yeung, 2002; Lee et al., 2013). The decision to concentrate on the expansion of the most advanced service sectors in Hong Kong, specifically financial services, trade, logistics and tourism, required an increase in public spending on education, social services, and culture (Yeung, 2002; Ngok, 2007). Culture, in this context, has come to be seen as an integral element of the symbolic economy, ‘a generator of wealth’ (Zukin, 2001).

As an economic measure, culture has been discussed primarily in relation to Hong Kong’s tourism industry. Tourism accounts for 5 per cent of the total GDP and is considered one of the four pillar industries of the city (Census and Statistics Department, 2013). Despite its rapid development in the 1980s, the industry experienced a significant decline in the late 1990s, after the Asian financial crisis hit the city in 1997 (Song et al., 2003). In this context, culture as display was seen as a
means to rejuvenate the industry. The link between tourism and the cultural sector was clearly established in the 1998 Policy Address that addressed the need for a more consistent and a more strategic use of culture as display practices for promotion of Hong Kong as a tourist destination:

In order to enhance our appeal as a tourist destination, we will promote new attractions, which will complement our unique flavour and provide for a wider range of events in Hong Kong. Our broader vision is to cultivate Hong Kong’s image as the Asian centre of arts and culture, and of entertainment and sporting events (HKSAR Government, 1998: par. 45, emphasis added).

To date, tourism-driven growth remains one of the central objectives attached to the economic instrumentalisation of culture in Hong Kong. However, since the 2000s the scope of this type of instrumentalism has increasingly broadened due to growing territorial competition, capital/labour mobility, and other “contemporary neoliberalisation tendencies” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 367). This greatly extended the roles attached to culture as entrepreneurial display.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis and Hong Kong’s political transitions followed by the SARS outbreak in 2003 threatened the economic stability of Hong Kong. The HKSAR government was forced to recognise that the position of this global node of finance and trade does not depend solely on the advancement of banking, finance and trade, but also increasingly relies upon the general image and reputation of the city. In this context, establishing Hong Kong as an ‘international cultural metropolis’ (Culture and Heritage Commission, 2003) and a ‘creative capital’ (HKSAR Government, 2007) have come to be perceived as crucial strategies for strengthening the city’s position in the global city network (Lui, 2008; Ku and Tsui, 2008b; Chu, 2012).

In policy discourse, the years after the handover are commonly presented as “a new era of cultural development in Hong Kong” (Culture and Heritage Commission, 2003: 31, emphasis added). The notion of ‘cultural desert’ in this context has proved to be particularly useful. As an “unfortunate epithet” (Culture and Heritage Commission, 2003: 4) it has been widely applied to juxtapose the city’s past against the present. Although it is not always clear where exactly the past ends and the present begins, today this notion is most commonly used to differentiate colonial ‘non-cultural’ Hong Kong from what is presented as new ‘cultural’ Hong Kong (Raco and Gilliam, 2012).\(^{32}\)

---

\(^{32}\) In the 1970s, the term ‘cultural desert’ was used to refer to Hong Kong prior its 1960s social reforms. After the handover, in policy documents it is more commonly applied to set apart the colonial past from the post-handover present.
The supposed ‘newness’ of the cultural turn in Hong Kong is highly problematic, because, as argued above, Hong Kong never was a ‘cultural desert’ in the first place. As Chu (2012) notes, long before the discourse of the creative industries was officially introduced to Hong Kong, its television, film and music industries had already “set cultural trends among Chinese communities worldwide” (p. 54). If we are to view the cultural turn solely as an indicator of increased government involvement in the arts sector, its ‘newness’ could still be brought into question. As previously discussed, the colonial government used the display of Western high arts for city promotion – both as an entrepreneurial strategy directed at strengthening Hong Kong’s international reputation and as “an ornament to colonial rule” (Ku and Tsui, 2008b: 348; see also Subsection 5.2.1).

The adoption of the creative city policies in the late 1990s thus represents policy continuity rather than radical transformation, whereas the political rhetoric of ‘a new era’ merely signifies (as well as justifies) the more strategic and more consistent involvement of the government.

Consequently, the first half of the 2000s saw a surge in the government commissioned studies on the city’s cultural turn. The Policy Recommendation Report issued by the Culture and Heritage Commission in 2003 dedicated a whole section to policy strategies that could assist in (re)making Hong Kong into the ‘international cultural metropolis’. Another notable document, A Study on Creativity Index (2004a), drew on Florida’s (2002) methodology to measure Hong Kong’s creativity. In both cases, inter-urban competition was indicated as the main reason behind the cultural turn in Hong Kong:

The Creativity Index (…) will be used to assess and monitor Hong Kong’s competitiveness in the creative age over time as well as for the purpose of comparing its creative vitality with its neighbours (Home Affairs Bureau, 2004a: 14).

For Hong Kong to maintain its competitive edge, it must further encourage creative thinking and put greater emphasis on culture (Culture and Heritage Commission, 2003: 2).

In these documents, as well as in many others, we encounter very similar ideas and narratives to those expressed in the works of Richard Florida and Charles Landry, including the need to nurture and attract creative talents, to ensure quality of life and to establish a “vibrant cultural scene” (Culture and Heritage Commission, 2003: 9). Although these strategies look good on paper, their application in practice appears to be problematic, because the central focus of the city’s cultural turn seems to lie in establishing itself as a site of consumption and display. The needs of local residents and artists, on the other hand, are often overlooked.
The case of Hong Kong’s most ambitious cultural landmark – West Kowloon Cultural District (henceforth, WKCD) – is particularly instructive in this regard.\textsuperscript{33} A handful of studies conducted on the WKCD suggest that contrary to the government’s claims, community engagement has never been among the driving forces of this project (see Lui, 2008; Ku and Tsui, 2008b; Raco and Gilliam, 2012). As Lui (2008) explains, the WKCD has always been about inter-urban competition and display:

\[\text{[T]he emphasis was placed on competing with other global cities on the basis of building equally competitive infrastructure, rather than on a shared vision of Hong Kong’s future cultural development. (…)} \text{\textit{It was simply an attempt to be strategic in global competition}} \text{(p. 222, emphasis added).}\]

The WKCD project represents the prevailing approach to cultural policy at large. Selective interventionism has enabled the government to focus its support on those cultural initiatives that are perceived as a good fit to the format of the ‘international cultural metropolis’ and that are considered capable of standing out and competing in the global and regional arena. As a result, whilst the largest and the most reputable cultural events in the city, such as the HKAF and the HKIFF receive regular funding from the government, small cultural groups and organisations are forced to compete with each other for one-off grants from the Arts Development Council (see also Lee et al., 2013). This suggests that the increased involvement of the government in the promotion of culture and the arts in Hong Kong largely benefits only privileged cultural groups and organisations (see also Section 5.3). Considering that the central focus of these organisations rests on Western high culture the extent to which the adoption of the creative city policy script actually contributes to the facilitation of local Hong Kong culture also remains open to debate.

Thus far, I have addressed creative city making in post-handover Hong Kong primarily as an entrepreneurial project, which conforms to the common understanding of the creative city in the Global North (Harvey, 1989a; Peck, 2011a; Lawton et al., 2014; see also Subsection 2.3.2). However, in addition to this, Hong Kong is also using culture to deal with the consequences of the 1997 political transition.

\textsuperscript{33} West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD) is not only the largest, but also the most controversial cultural initiative in Hong Kong. The government first announced its plans to develop the WKCD in 1998, presenting it as a large performance venue and an international hub for culture and arts. However, this programme was widely criticised for using culture and the arts merely as ‘a cover-up’ for real estate property development (Lui, 2008). High construction costs also came under a lot of public scrutiny. Public discontent and cost overruns caused unprecedented delays, forcing the government to repeatedly reassess its initial plans and ambitions. To date, the WKCD project has still not been completed.
As noted earlier, an exposure to new political liabilities and a perspective of being placed alongside other Chinese cities not only threatened Hong Kong’s global and regional position, but also prompted the emergence of a local Hong Kong identity discourse that represented the resistance to national assimilation with China (Abbas, 2000; Yeung, 2002; Chu, 2012; see also Subsection 5.2.2). In this context, the increased interest in culture and city promotional practices can be seen as the government’s attempt to negotiate the emerging tensions.

More specifically, the government uses the idea of the creative city to produce its own version of a local Hong Kong identity that is directed at outlining ‘togetherness in difference’ (Ang, 2003). The HKSAR government envisions Hong Kong as an international cultural metropolis with a distinct identity grounded in Chinese traditions and enriched by different cultures, where life is celebrated through cultural pursuit (Home Affairs Bureau, 2016).

Some notable tensions emerge from this vision of Hong Kong, where elements of Chinese and Western culture are presented as coexisting in harmony with each other, because in practice they more often contradict rather than complement each other. To a large extent, this contradiction results from an ‘elitist’ understanding of culture, with ‘high’ culture being associated primarily with Western rather than Chinese ‘high’ culture. As one senior government official comments:

> We are definitely much more westernised. The high society will definitely go to operas and classical music concerts. (…) And the style of the citizens is quite modern. But yet we will tell people that our culture is traditionally Chinese. Our local culture and our indigenous culture is Chinese. We will not say that we are British or American, although we know that we are much influenced by them, and our taste, and our appreciation of the art is very much westernised. But if you ask what is the culture of Hong Kong, we will definitely say we are rooted in Chinese culture and influenced by the Western culture. This is what we will definitely tell people (Official D, HK, 2014).

This quote is important for a number of other reasons too. First, it demonstrates that the government is actively involved in the construction of the ‘judgement of taste’ within the Hong Kong society (see Bourdieu, 1984). Second, it reveals that the government’s intention to promote national Chinese identity as ‘indigenous’ neglects the presence of a local Hong Kong identity. Finally, this quote also indicates that the sense of identity that the government attempts to construct is deeply rooted in continuity with the colonial past (see Hall, 1990). Indeed, despite the political rhetoric of Hong Kong being ‘grounded in Chinese culture’, the Western culture,
particularly high arts, continues to dominate the cultural policy discourse of Hong Kong.

All nine major publicly funded cultural groups in Hong Kong are focused predominantly on the Western high arts, such as ballet, classical music, theatre or contemporary dance.\textsuperscript{34} Similarly, the government continues to support the HKAF, which particularly prides itself in presenting “top international artists and ensembles” (HKAF, 2015a). Considering that the HKAF has been initiated and hosted by the private sector, the provision of consistent funding for this event clearly indicates that its formats and aims correspond with the key priorities of the government.

Clearly, one of the central goals attached to the display of the Western high culture is Hong Kong’s “desire to court international prestige” (Ku and Tsui, 2008b: 355). Perceived as “symbol[s] of high civilization” (Ku and Tsui, 2008b: 355), they are expected to raise the global profile of the city. As Raco and Gilliam (2012) explain:

The end of British rule in 1997 brought about a growing awareness within policy circles of the capacity of high culture to help create a new post-industrial image for Hong Kong that, in turn, would help to generate new forms of economic growth and, potentially, new forms of cultural identity and social cohesion (p. 1431).

The government insists on calling its version of Hong Kong identity ‘distinct’ and ‘unique’ (see BrandHK, 2015a; Home Affairs Bureau, 2016). This ‘distinct’ identity is defined through its relation to the Mainland (‘the Other’), “the relation to what it is not” (Hall, 2000: 17). As one senior government official explains:

We still have to maintain our sort of separate cultural identity. (...) We are different from the Mainland in some aspects, despite being within one country. (...) As a global city, you need now to have your sort of cultural identity. (...) If we say we are a world city, then we certainly have to have something distinct, something to be proud of, in terms of culture...in the cultural sense (Official A, HK, 2014, emphasis added).

As with other cities, Hong Kong’s need for a ‘distinct’ identity largely stems from inter-urban competition for investment, jobs, and tourists. However, at the same time, the pursuit of a ‘distinct’ identity also reflects the anxieties within Hong Kong’s society regarding political assimilation with China (Abbas, 2000: 779; see also Chu, 2012). In this sense, the narrative of a ‘distinct’ global identity is used as a reassertion that “we are not the same’ and that China will always remain ‘the Other’.

\textsuperscript{34} The nine publicly funded Hong Kong arts groups include: the Chung Ying Theatre Company, the City Contemporary Dance Company, the Hong Kong Ballet, the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra, the Hong Kong Dance Company, the Hong Kong Philharmonic Society, the Hong Kong Repertory Theatre, the Hong Kong Sinfonietta, and the Zuni Icosahedron Theatre Company.
While the sense of hybrid identity that the government attempts to project might be ‘distinct’ in relation to other Chinese cities, it is not unique in relation to other cities in the global city network. In this sense, the adoption of globalising cultural policy strategies seem to represent what Abbas (1997) calls “a culture of disappearance” (p.7). Here, ‘disappearance’ does not indicate the absence of culture, but rather misrecognition of culture (Abbas, 1997). This misrecognition results from familiar representations of Hong Kong (e.g. presenting Hong Kong as the city ‘where East meets West’) that render “a one-dimensional image” (Abbas, 1997: 72) of the city. A portrayal of Hong Kong as the ‘international cultural metropolis’ could also be viewed as one of many representations of that sort. The ultimate intention behind the adoption of this narrative is not to create a distinct identity for the city, but rather to advance the assimilation of Hong Kong into the network of global cities. In this sense, the creative city policy model and its display practices are directed at facilitating Hong Kong’s ‘disappearance’ rather than its ‘(re)appearance’.

5.2.4 Shifting governance models of culture as display

Under the British colonial rule, the city’s cultural policy was guided through the Urban and Regional Councils. With a statutory authority to establish and finance cultural venues and activities in Hong Kong, they performed a major role in navigating the direction of cultural policy in the city (see Ooi, 1995). As independently elected organisations, both councils were known for having stronger affiliations with local business groups rather than those with the colonial government (Lilley, 1998; Ngok, 2007; Lee et al., 2013). In the early 1980s, in order to gain more direct control over culture, the government established its own agency that was responsible for the formulation and coordination of culture and the arts – the Recreation and Culture Branch under the Government Secretariat (henceforth, Branch), subsequently dividing the regulation of cultural policies between three major institutions (see Ooi, 1995). The Branch was focused primarily on the facilitation of Western high culture in the city, particularly performing arts. In this sense, the government’s role in relation to culture can be described as that of promoter (see Subsection 2.2.2).

After the handover, the original model of regulatory and funding mechanisms for culture underwent some significant changes. The Branch and both municipal councils were dissolved in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Instead, the cultural administration functions were brought under the jurisdiction of a newly established

---

35 The Urban Council (est. in 1883) was responsible for municipal services in Hong Kong island, whereas the Regional Council (est. in 1886) was responsible for the New Territories. Both Councils were disbanded in 1999.
agency: the Leisure and Cultural Services Department (henceforth, LCSD). By disbanding both municipal councils, the HKSAR government gained more control over the general trajectory of cultural policy (see Wong, 2011). However, considering that this trajectory was shaped primarily by market-driven concerns, the centralisation of decision-making power has been intertwined with neoliberal urban restructuring strategies, and used, somewhat paradoxically, “to ‘outsource’ governance” (Purcell, 2009: 145). The corporatisation of all major cultural groups in Hong Kong, including the HKIFF, which followed soon after the re-organisation, illustrates this point.36

On the one hand, the decision to detach major cultural groups from the government can be viewed as a political strategy. Specifically, it might be read as the government’s attempt to ‘scale down’ its role and responsibilities to avoid political turbulence with the central Chinese government (see Cheung, 1996). As one of my interviewees from the HKIFF observes, the corporatisation allowed the government to justify their lack of involvement in potentially ‘troublesome’ art sectors (Practitioner A, HK, 2014). At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, the corporatisation allowed the government to save a lot of time, manpower and money. As another respondent from the HKIFF explains, the government saw these cultural groups as “a financial burden” (Practitioner B, HK, 2014). In a similar vein, a senior official from the LSCD asserts that the government was hoping that, after the corporatisation, all cultural groups would eventually become self-dependent and would no longer require any financial support from the government (Official D, HK, 2014). In this sense, the corporatisation process has never been completed. More than ten years after the re-organisation took off, all cultural groups still remain largely reliant on public funding, because they are not able to fully sustain themselves.

On average, public subsidies cover around 30 to 40 per cent of the HKIFF and the HKAF’s total expenditure (HKIFF Society, 2015; HKAF, 2015b). However, due to the government’s reluctance to raise the subsidies, their funding has not increased consistently with inflation, thus reducing over the years. For instance, from 2008 until 2014, the HKIFF received a fixed amount of HK$10.9 million (£1.12 million) each year. While the HKIFF’s financial reports in 2008 show that this amount of money covered around 34 per cent of total spending, by 2012 it subsidised only 27 per cent of the festival’s total expenditure (HKIFF Society, 2015).

36 Besides the HKIFF, by the mid-2000s, the government also corporatised the Hong Kong Repertory Theatre, the Hong Kong Dance Company and the Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra.
Therefore in order to sustain themselves, all cultural groups and events are forced to readjust their programmes to make themselves more appealing to a broader range of investors and audiences. Maintaining the quality of artistic merit, while ensuring a commercial appeal is a common struggle in Hong Kong and elsewhere, where “culture takes on a ‘trade’ or ‘industrial’ character” (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 127). For instance, the HKIFF, which was long considered a ‘niche’ event, is under increasing pressure to be “culturally entertaining” (Wong, 2011: 218; see also Cheung, 2016). Consequently, since the 2000s, the Festival has introduced a number of new ‘highlights’ to its programme, including the Asian Film Award, Young Cinema Competition, and Short Film Competition. If compared to the HKIFF, the HKAF has more experience in dealing with market pressures, because it has been administered by the private sector since its launch in 1973. Nevertheless, as my respondent from the HKAF indicates, the pursuit of sponsorship for this event is also a continuous struggle, because funding sources change every year (Practitioner D, HK, 2014).

It is important to acknowledge that both events addressed in this study – the HKIFF and the HAF, could be considered as having a privileged status in Hong Kong, because contrary to other cultural events they receive regular support from the government. Given an economic landscape in which supposedly privileged cultural groups face increasing pressure to sustain themselves, those cultural groups that are less likely to be funded on a regular basis withstand even more competition when fighting for one-off grants from the Hong Kong Arts Development Council (henceforth, HKADC), let alone everyday operational costs. This shows that the government clearly fails to protect the most vulnerable groups in the sector that feel increasingly threatened by local, regional and global competition.

Cartier (2008) observes that the HKADC largely “relies on the government’s policy standpoint on culture and creative industries” (p. 69). This indicates that although the government is not directly responsible for distribution of funds or events management, it exercises a certain degree of power and influence in shaping the...
cultural arena of the city. In this respect, it serves more as an architect rather than just a promoter (see Subsection 2.2.2).

The case of the Hong Kong Year of Design 2012 (henceforth, HKYD 2012) exemplifies this argument. Although the government provided a high degree of decision-making power for the organisers of the HKYD 2012, and, according to one of its key organisers, did not have “a detailed design policy” (Practitioner C, HK, 2014), it had a “strong directional strategy” (ibid.). The HKYD 2012, which was fully funded by the government, represented its attempt to facilitate and promote the growth of design in Hong Kong, which has become one of the flagship creative industries of the city. As the same respondent further notes, this event was in line with “the government’s commitment to developing creative and design industry” in Hong Kong (Practitioner C, HK, 2014). This example clearly shows how the government can guide and influence the direction of the cultural turn in the city through selective interventionism and flexible funding mechanisms.

In terms of infrastructure, all cultural groups and artists are also largely dependent on the government, because it is the chief landlord of most cultural venues and facilities in the city.

An attempt to impose an institutional division between the cultural and creative sectors further reasserts the government’s presence in the cultural arena of Hong Kong. Whereas the HKADC and the LCSD (under the jurisdiction of the Home Affairs Bureau) are responsible for the promotion and development of culture and the arts, the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau (henceforth, CEDB) and its Create Hong Kong Office (henceforth, CreateHK) oversees the development of the creative sector. As Gregory So, the Secretary for the CEDB explains:

[The CEDB] is responsible for promoting the development of creative industries. Creative industries cover advertising, architecture, design, digital entertainment, film, music, publishing and printing, television, etc. The Home Affairs Bureau (HAB) supports the development of the art and culture in Hong Kong, covering performing arts, visual arts, literary arts and intangible cultural heritage (So, 2014: par. 6).

Clearly, some of the industries that now are within the purview of the CEDB, including film, music, and design, can be treated as both art and industry and are situated “at the intersection of trade policy and cultural policy” (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 127). In this context, the attempt to draw a distinct line between the arts and industry points to a specific moment of transformation of the creative city policy script in Hong Kong. Although the presence of both fields is recognised as essential to creative city making, there is no interest in converging them because each of them is ascribed a different role. Whereas the arts continue to be used primarily for social
cohesion, identity politics and symbolic display of cultural advancement, the creative industries are valued primarily for their contribution to the city’s economy and economic growth (see Section 5.3).

To conclude, it is evident that behind the façade of the ‘non-interventionist’ policy there is a wide range of practices involved that allow the government to impose an indirect control on the format, programme, and functions of large-scale cultural events. At the same time, considering the degree of autonomy that cultural groups have from the government and a long history of public-private partnerships in Hong Kong, the objectives that the government is attaching to the creative city and its display practices can be pursued only if they are compatible with the objectives of the industry. This issue will be further addressed in relation to large-scale cultural events in Hong Kong.

5.3 Contextualising culture as display: Hong Kong’s perspective

5.3.1 Display as city promotion

As previously noted, although such large-scale cultural events as the HKIFF and the HKAF receive public subsidies, they are planned, managed and administrated independently from the government. This means that the industry professionals play an important role in setting the agenda and goals for culture as display practices in the city. These goals appear to be guided primarily by the pressures of the market, specifically a growing competition between events for investment and talents. Meeting the needs of the city per se in this context is not a priority. As the senior member of the HKAF explains:

We happen to carry the Hong Kong name, and we are very proud of it, but it’s not about promoting Hong Kong, you know? (…) We carry the Hong Kong name, that’s part of our DNA, that’s part of our personality and identity, but nobody says to us, “Be Hong Kong!” (Practitioner D, HK, 2014).

Nevertheless, the events’ contribution to city promotion, either actual or perceived, is undoubtedly one of the major reasons behind the on-going support of the government. Very few cultural groups and organisations receive the same level of public subsidies as the HKAF and HKIFF. Meanwhile, the one-off event – the HKYD 2012 – has even secured a full funding of around £1 million (HK$8.9 million) from the government (Hong Kong Design Centre, 2014). Amid the growing inter-urban competition from other Chinese cities and elsewhere, these events are used to attract tourists, industry professionals and investment to the city.
Specifically, the government employs events in the creation of a vibrant city brand. The ‘vibrancy’ of the city is a popular narrative in the creative city policy discourse (see Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002). For Hong Kong, which is commonly perceived as first and foremost the global centre of finance and trade, the sense of cultural vibrancy “adds warmth to the city’s image” (Official I, HK, 2014). The theme of ‘vibrant culture’ was commonly invoked during my interviews:

While the role of Hong Kong in providing financial services has been widely recognised, we would also like to promote our vibrant arts and cultural scene to the world (Official F, HK, 2014).

We have a very vibrant cultural scene. You will not feel lonely if you are a cultural enthusiast. You can go to museums, you can just go to a cultural performance, because we almost have things happening every night (Official D, HK, 2014).

We started from the stage where when you used to talk about culture, design, art, [everyone would be]: “Are you kidding me? Hong Kong is a financial centre!”. Ten years ago people referred to Hong Kong as an art desert, there was nothing there! But now, have you ever heard any people talking about this? Zero. (…) If you are well connected, I guarantee you, every week, every night you could have a reception, you could have a party, you could have a lot of things that would keep you going. So the vibe is very much developing (Practitioner C, HK, 2014).

These quotes clearly demonstrate how culture is used as a spectacle to remake the city into the site of attraction (Bell and Oakley, 2015). In this particular context, vibrant cultural life is seen as a necessary means for projecting Hong Kong as a ‘complete package’, a leading city not only in finance and trade, but also in culture and the arts. At the same time, these quotes, particularly the last one, also make it very clear that this ‘vibrant creative Hong Kong’ is not for everyone. As discussed in Chapter 2, the policy model of the creative city can be read as elitist in a sense that it tends to exclude vulnerable social groups by favouring those with higher income and more spare money to spend (McCann, 2007; Grodach and Silver, 2013). A distinguishing characteristic of Hong Kong in this respect is that its ‘cultural vibrancy’ is directed first and foremost at attracting larger flows of tourists to Hong Kong, whereas meeting the needs of the so-called ‘creative class’ seems to be of secondary importance.

Tourism is generally closely linked with culture as display practices (see Prentice and Andersen, 2003; Dicks, 2004; Quinn, 2005a). However, as noted earlier, the tourism industry occupies a particularly significant position in Hong Kong (see Subsection 5.2.3). As one civil servant from the LCSD admits, all large-scale cultural events are expected to contribute to the tourism sector, because local
government “really cares about tourism, tourism is a very important industry in Hong Kong” (trans. from Chinese, Official C, HK, 2014). In a similar vein, the written response from the Home Affairs Bureau (henceforth, HAB) also states that large-scale cultural events “attract visitors from all around the world and help to strengthen our role as one of the most prominent hubs of cultural exchanges in the region” (Official F, HK, 2014).

This official intention does not seem to correspond with the views of the practitioners. All respondents from the HKIFF, the HKAF and the HKDY 2012 recognise the contribution to the tourism industry as an important, but not decisive, objective and indicate that tourists account for only a small section of the audience. They tend to see tourist attraction as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. As a senior staff member of the HKIFF puts it:

[Referring to the HKIFF:] The reason for its existence is to show films to the local audience. Of course, the recent changes in ecology of film festival… they put… There are more efforts to make a film festival more visible… even to people outside Hong Kong. Because that is necessary for us to survive, for us to be able to carry on this work, which is to show films to the local people (Practitioner A, HK, 2014).

One thing that all respondents – officials as well as industry practitioners – seem to agree on is the promotional value of the events in terms of attracting the attention of the international community of industry professionals and experts. The professionalization discourse first emerged within the industry in the early 1970s (see Lilley, 1998). Today we can see how the government has incorporated it in the their narratives of the creative city. In the written response, the official from CreateHK notes that

CreateHK has been working closely with our stakeholders in the creative industries to develop major creative events with a view to attracting enterprises, talent and academics in creative industries from around the world to visit Hong Kong, thereby consolidating Hong Kong’s status as Asia’s creative capital (Official G, HK, 2014).

This demonstrates how the meanings behind the creative city and its display practices are constructed through the interactions and relationships between the government and the industry. Therefore, a key to understanding the actual objectives that urban policymakers attach to large-scale cultural events in Hong Kong rests on the recognition that these objectives are never produced in isolation from the industry and cultural elites. Echoing this argument, the senior staff member from the HKIFF indicates a significant role for the industry professionals in setting the agenda for the events:
[Referring to the HKIFF:] The government kind of incidentally bumped into this idea and beyond its expectations it was a huge success. So they decided to keep doing it. But then, the so-called ‘aims’, such as, for example, educational [function] or filling the gap [for the local film industry], these were not determined originally. These are actually proposed and promoted by the professionals who work for the festival, including me (Practitioner B, HK, 2014).

It is not only that policy makers speak the language of the industry professionals, but also vice versa (see Nisbett, 2013). Interview data revealed that in Hong Kong, the latter group has adopted a political rhetoric of city branding, inter-urban competition and the creative city to strengthen their case for funding:

The funding from the government to us is quite substantive. But we have to deliver. Yeah, impact is very important. One impact, of course, must be the outreach, and the media. (…) [Hong Kong] used the HKDY 2012 to tell the world, (…) to tell other economies around them, that we care about this. We want to develop the creative [economy], we see a value of design and creativity. They are sending the world a message that we cherish the creative economy (Practitioner C, HK, 2014).

If compared to other major cities in the world, the Hong Kong government is late to push this [type of] branding of Hong Kong. Compare it with other major metropolises, like New York, Paris, London… or with other major cities in East Asia. (…) The government has been under-subsidising the arts and culture for so long. I would say, if they want to catch up… at least partially… but it is just expecting [for something to happen] and doing nothing (Practitioner B, HK, 2014).

These quotes suggest that as with the narratives of tourism promotion, the discourses of the creative economy, inter-urban competition and city branding tend to be employed by the industry as the means to an end rather than the end in itself. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, this also indicates that by being a major funding source of the events, the government does exert a certain degree of influence on their agenda.

5.3.2 Display as symbolic power

As noted earlier, one reason behind the adoption of the cultural turn in Hong Kong was anxiety about the handover. In this sense, it has been perceived as an important means for maintaining the city’s position in the global city network as well as recognition of the global community.

Accordingly, in policy discourse global templates of international events are seen as one of the city’s ‘upgrading’ strategies that supposedly enhance the influence of Hong Kong in the global city network and differentiate it from other globalising Chinese cities. For instance, the HKDY 2012 served this purpose by projecting Hong
Kong as “a centre of design excellence in Asia” and by outlining “Hong Kong’s growing influence as the design city on the global platform” (Hong Kong Design Centre, 2014: 10). The most commonly used reference points for differentiation are Hong Kong’s global identity, accompanied by the emphasis on the abundance of Western high arts. A vast majority of respondents have brought up the narrative of global identity of Hong Kong when comparing this city to other cities in China. However, whereas the government officials and policy documents outlined a seemingly inclusive co-existence of Chinese and Western culture (see Subsection 5.2.3), the practitioners focused primarily on the idea of an international rather than Chinese Hong Kong:

Hong Kong is very international. (...) This is our lifeblood. This is in our DNA. Hong Kong will not be Hong Kong without that international horizon and network (Practitioner C, HK, 2014).

In addition, some large-scale cultural events also seem to perceive themselves as facilitators of a local Hong Kong identity. The respondents from the HKIFF noted the significance of the festival in developing a ‘sense of belonging’ and ‘togetherness’ among local audiences who gather together to watch local Hong Kong films (Practitioner B, HK, 2014). In this sense, large-scale cultural events do not generate symbolic capital for the government. However, within the international community their contribution to the formation of a local Hong Kong identity is likely to serve as the symbolic capital of the city.

Regularly held large-scale cultural events serve as indicators of the city’s economic stability and prosperity, which also aids in gaining the respect and trust of the global community (see Yeoh, 2005; Urry, 2007). Not all cities can afford to run one or more large-scale cultural events on an annual basis. Hong Kong has been consistently supporting the HKIFF and the HKAF for more than 40 years now, which is far longer than any other city in the region. This affirms the city’s economic stability, sustainability and wellbeing. As one government official from the LCSD accurately observes:

For the city, the Arts Festival also serves as an acknowledgment that “I am capable of this, I have already reached a certain level [of development], thus I am able to hold the Arts Festival”. This indicates whether the place is well-developed or not, whether it is stable or not, and also whether it’s level [of development] is high enough (trans. from Chinese, Official C, HK, 2014, emphasis added).

In this sense, well-established display practices could be seen as ‘symbolic currency’ (Aiello, 2013) that are mobilised not only to attract tourists and investors, but also to foster a sense of economic stability regardless of the political transition and change.
The use of large-scale cultural events in maintaining the city’s global profile was repeatedly stated in both policy documents as well as interviews with the government officials. However, the industry practitioners seem to dismiss this objective as mere political rhetoric, arguing that it does not represent the actual purpose of the events.

[Referring to the HKIFF:] People from government can state this as a very important film festival, and since we have this important film festival then we are a very important city. We are the hub of culture in Asia or whatever that they want to call themselves. So it’s an easy prey for the government and an opportunity to advertise itself. (...) I think those things are irrelevant, but that’s [how] the government [thinks] (Practitioner A, HK, 2014).

[Referring to the HKAF:] We do the work, and we deliver something for the people in Hong Kong (...), for Hong Kong’s reputation, for… you know, all these things. But all these things are ‘by the way’. First, we deliver a great programme. And then we deliver… I hope, a great festival (Practitioner D, HK, 2014).

It is evident that for them the reputation of the event is of primary importance. This does not mean, however, that this objective is incompatible with the government’s aims. In the next subsection, I will show how the global reputation of events can feed into the reputation of the city.

**5.3.3 Display as global node**

The international community of industry professionals is comprised of an interlocked global network. As a senior staff member of the HKAF explains,

> I personally think that the idea of a hub is a little bit dated. I think we are more like nodes. (...) I do not see (...) [our event] as [being situated] at the centre, I see (...) [it] as one of many players that link up in different ways at different times, work independently in different ways in different times and, you know, [this] actually gives us more scope than being a hub. Because (...) if you are a node, you can link up in many different ways (Practitioner D, HK, 2014).

This quote illuminates the significance of international festival formats as ‘festival circuits’ – because they are all connected into global networks the reputation they build within these networks is crucial for their success (Stringer, 2001; Ma, 2012).

The interplay between cooperation and competition that shapes these “virtual global cultural network[s]” (Abbas, 2000: 782) sheds some light on the ways in which the position of events is determined. The senior staff member of the HKIFF indicates that competition is a relatively new trend, prompted by the expanding number of festivals in the region:
Times have changed. Competition is being forced on different festivals. We are forced to compete. (…) Busan (…) is set out to be competitive. It is set out to be ambitious. It wants to be the most important Asian film festival. So when one of your neighbours is very aggressive, then in order to be able to continue to do what you have been doing, you have to change your course and move forward with the times a little bit (Practitioner A, HK, 2014).

This quote indicates the accelerating pace of competition in the ‘festival circuits’, which largely echoes inter-urban competition, because in both cases it is based on a pursuit of the investment, talents and visitors. According to neoliberal logic, the competition is not only necessary, but also good (see Harvey, 2005; Purcell, 2009). During the interviews, it was evident that this idea has been adopted within the policy networks and the industry. Several respondents noted that competition is essentially ‘healthy’, ‘natural’ and ‘cool’, because it takes place along with cooperation:

I think, ‘coopetition’ is cool (…), which is the combination of ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’. (…) It does not matter, Taipei, Shenzhen or… we all are collaborating, but we all are also competing. This is the way forward (Practitioner C, HK, 2014, emphasis added).

Our competition is natural competition. (…) We never try to actively compete with other festivals. By ‘natural’ I mean that there are so many festivals taking place at the same time. Overlapping with each other. (…) We usually solve our problems by actually cooperating instead of competing. (…) We have a good communication among ourselves (Practitioner B, HK, 2014).

In the global networks of events, cooperation is always placed next to competition. At first glance, this seems to counter the logic of neoliberalism where competition “is held to be a primary virtue” (Harvey, 2005: 65). However, in the wake of increasingly rising public discontent over the market-driven policy agenda in Hong Kong and elsewhere, cooperation that has more positive connotations than competition co-opts an equally (if not more) important role in sustaining capital accumulation and economic globalisation (see Gough, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). On the one hand, cooperation within the ‘festival circuits’ allows large-scale cultural events to learn from each other’s experience and to exchange their expertise. On the other hand, however, considering that all networks have ‘hierarchical tendencies’, the leading and most prestigious events are those setting the agenda as well as the format for other events in the network. A senior staff member from the HKIFF refers to this type of event as a ‘festival of festivals’ (Practitioner B, HK, 2014), arguing that in terms of Asian films, the HKIFF could also be considered one of them.
Hong Kong was one of the first cities in the region to adopt global templates of film and arts festivals. Over more than four decades of existence, both the HKIFF and the HKAF earned a deep respect and admiration within the international community of industry professionals. With growing respect and experience, the influence has followed. Referring to the HKIFF, Wong (2011) explains:

> As the HKIFF gained an international reputation and became integrated into an international festival circuit, it also gained more power to attract films and even take a stance with regard to thematic screenings, including Chinese nonofficial films. (…) Meanwhile, the very success of this event made the festival an event to be imitated in other cities across the region (p. 221).

This trend of copying and imitating clearly reflects “a damning indictment of the neoliberal project” (Peck, 2011b: 790) as it points at the constant urge and pressure among the cities (as well as their events) to outperform each other. Nevertheless we can recognise certain advantages to the HKIFF and the HKAF’s experiences in dealing with market-driven competition. In these particular cases, the intensity and frequency of competition has, in fact, generated the positive result. Wong’s (2011) quote above not only points at symbolic capital accumulated by the festival for itself, but also shows that those events that are recognised as ‘best practices’ play a significant role in the display of the city. With other cities replicating the HKIFF’s ‘success model’, this event not only generates cultural, social, and ultimately, symbolic capital for itself, but also, somewhat unwittingly, for the city. As the ‘festival of festivals’, the HKIFF served to put Hong Kong on the map, marking it as an important global node for film production and distribution.

### 5.3.4 Display as platform

Large-scale cultural events have been commonly used to maintain social order and to construct the hierarchies of taste from the top down (see Harvey, 1989b; Waterman, 1998; Belghazi, 2006). In this sense, as Waterman (1998) indicates, cultural events often “represent the hegemonic values of an élite” (p. 60, see also Subsection 2.3.3). Hong Kong’s case accurately illustrates this assertion. As previously explained, initially culture as display practices in Hong Kong were aimed at neutralising social conflict and enhancing the authority of the colonial regime through the development and facilitation of almost exclusively Western high arts (see Subsection 5.2.1). Display practices in this context served as terrains for construction of the hierarchies of taste and class distinction.

After the handover, the HKSAR government continues to promote the Western high culture, because it corresponds with their version of Hong Kong’s identity that is officially presented as the supposedly inclusive combination of Western and Chinese
cultures (see Subsection 5.2.3). This overly simplified version of local identity neglects the tensions between national Chinese identity and local Hong Kong identity that have emerged since the 1990s.

The programmes of large-scale cultural events only partially conform to the identity politics of the government. Although their central focus still lies on the Western culture and performers, they now incorporate the elements of both high and popular culture. In addition, certain forms of traditional Chinese culture as well as local Hong Kong culture are also increasingly promoted and integrated into events’ programmes (Practitioner B, HK, 2014). This confirms my earlier argument that display practices are not only responding to the existing tensions, but also showing their support to Hong Kong (as opposed to Chinese) culture.

With the expanding scope and number of cultural initiatives and activities in Hong Kong, the cultural turn has posed one unforeseen challenge – a lack of interest from the local audience. Borrowing from Abbas’ (2000) reflections on Shanghai, “what we find here is an example of transnationalism without a corresponding transnational subject” (p. 783). Considering the upsurge in cultural events and activities as well as the launch of new cultural venues (particularly the WKCD), it was crucial for Hong Kong to ensure that these events and venues have a sufficient number of audiences and a sufficient number of art consumers:

For Hong Kong to become a real cultural metropolis, you need to educate the young, to make them appreciate [the] art and to have… to heighten their appreciation and exposure to the arts (…) if [a] whole society has that aspiration in mind and more people [are] aware of this, then… that is the only way to make us become a real world-class cultural metropolis (Official D, HK, 2014).

It takes time to establish a genuine innovation culture. (…) [It is] how the place actually absorbs innovation, how it cultivates it from young [age]. (…) This requires a long time and a lot of committed efforts. It is almost like an investment in education (Practitioner C, HK, 2014).

A large number of interviewees indicated their concern about the lack of interest within the local community in the arts, blaming it on the education system of Hong Kong. The connection between education and arts consumption was established long ago (see Dimaggio and Useem, 1978; Bourdieu, 1984). It has been firmly asserted that people with more years of education are more prone to high-arts exposure (Dimaggio and Useem, 1978). Hong Kong prides itself on having one of the most highly educated populations in the world (Pearson, 2014). However, for many years arts education was largely absent from the city’s public schools. In this sense, the
highly praised education system failed the new policy direction of making Hong Kong more ‘cultural’.

The growing realisation that supply exceeds demand prompted the government to reconsider its approach to arts education. In 2000, following the publication of the policy consultation document *Learning to Learn – The Way Forward in Curriculum* (Curriculum Development Council, 2000), the HKSAR government adopted a new curriculum framework for elementary and high school education, which addressed arts as one of the key learning areas. In order to nurture “creativity, openness, flexibility and aesthetic sensitivity” (Curriculum Development Council, 2000: 56) among students, the scope of arts education in schools has been expanded from music and visual arts to media arts, dance, and drama. The intention behind this strategy clearly corresponds with the key objectives of the creative city. Whether we are to view the creative city as an entrepreneurial or a political strategy, in both cases for it to work it needs to ensure the interest and engagement of a number of local citizens. The link between the creative city and ‘cultured’ public was clearly established in some of my interviews with local officials and practitioners:

I think, cultural events are important for the spiritual life of Hong Kong people. I think if people are more cultured, they will enable the city to be more elegant and… educated (Official D, HK, 2014).

[Referring to the HKIFF:] Without our festival (…) there would be a loss in terms of the cultural and film literacy of the public. (…) Indirectly, this would make the city less creative [as people would] (…) not be exposed to more creative stimulus (Practitioner B, HK, 2014).

In addition to the school curriculum, since 2000, the government has been actively involved in supporting various outreach programmes and activities. In 2014, the LCSD’s Audience Building Office held a total of 1,067 arts education and audience-building activities (Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2015). This is a 47 per cent increase since 2002 (Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2003). The growing number of audience building programmes and the establishment of the dedicated agency responsible for their planning and administration further confirms that the government is increasingly concerned about audience development. The private sector is also getting involved. Take for instance the outreach programme Young Friends, by the HKAF. This programme was established in 1992, and is designated to cultivate the youths’ interest in arts. Every year it provides children

---

38 In 2002, the Audience Building Office hosted a total of 724 arts education and audience building activities.
with an opportunity to attend two Festival programmes or rehearsals of their choice, various workshops, talks and backstage tours.

At times, however, a very thin line exists between conveying to the public the value of arts and creativity and manipulating them in the service of continued economic growth. The HKDY 2012 could be considered an instructive example of the latter.

The design industry is not new to Hong Kong. However, in the last decade the notion of design has been absorbed in the policy framework of the creative city, and in turn, has been widely promoted and celebrated (see Hong Kong Design Centre, 2014). A similar trend can be observed in the whole region, including Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, China and Japan (Kong et al., 2006; Kim, 2015; see also Chapters 4 and 6).

According to Evans (2009), the placement of non-cultural sectors, such as design or tourism, at the centre of the cultural turn represents “a reversal of the relationship which traditionally located the arts at the core” (p. 1008). This ‘reversal’ requires the subsequent reversal of public attitudes towards design products and services. First, people need to be convinced about the usefulness of design in enhancing the quality of their lives. Second, they need to be willing (and capable) to pay for it.

In this context, the HKDY 2012 served as an educational-manipulative platform for promotion of the design industry. One official purpose of this event was to “engage the entire community in realising the vision ‘A City Driven by Design’” (Hong Kong Design Centre, 2014: 74). During the interviews, one of the senior organisers of the event repeatedly outlined this objective, which at some point started to sound more like an attempt to indoctrinate rather than to educate the public:

Our role is to inject the creative mind-set, design mindfulness into the community. (…) Of course, it takes time to get design deep tucked into people’s mind-set, but that’s why we have to continue to do it, to advocate, to educate, to communicate (…) [The Design Year 2012 was] an opportunity [for us] to communicate with the public, so that they would appreciate, wow, Hong Kong design… at least, they would get into [this] mind-set (Practitioner C, HK, 2014).

This quote clearly exposes the HKDY 2012 as an attempt to pique the interest of potential consumers. At the same time, whilst this event appears to be reaching out to everyone, it actually targets only selected groups within the society. Indeed, in one form or another we all encounter design in our daily lives. However, how many of us could actually afford the designer-made products displayed in this events is another question. Similarly, the HKAF’s outreach programme Young Friends is also open only to those children who can pay the annual membership fee of HK$80 (£8.50). Considering that this amount equals nearly three hours of minimum wage, it is likely
that children from deprived families cannot afford this fee. In this sense, these events could be considered as yet another example of a ‘creativity fix’, where the public money, instead of being used to support the poor and deprived members of the community, are spent to facilitate “a favoured-bundle of middle-class lifestyles” (Peck, 2007).

Overall, it is evident that despite the overwhelming number of outreach programs, a genuine ‘community engagement’ remains solely political rhetoric. The community is not included in the decision-making process – the participation of the local residents at this stage is neither welcomed nor encouraged. The public is addressed only after the decisions are made, when they are pitched to the public as the best and the only direction for the city to move forward. These decisions, on the other hand, do not depend on the city government alone, but are constructed together with the industry professionals and cultural elites, who often seem to take a lead in shaping the meaning of imported display practices in Hong Kong.

5.4 Conclusion

Hong Kong provides us with a very interesting yet challenging case, where the creative city policy script is embedded in a complex interplay of colonial legacies, political transition, identity (re)construction and economic globalisation processes. In these uncertain times, Hong Kong seeks to maintain the only certain thing that it has, that is, its reputation as an important regional and global hub of trade and finance. This particular role is deeply ingrained in the policymaking of Hong Kong. It affects and encapsulates all areas of public policy in the city, including culture and the arts. With the growing pressure to compete for investment, talents and tourists that was further exacerbated by the political transition in 1997, the HKSAR government was forced to assume a more active position in cultural policy-making to ensure the maximum contribution of the field to the market-driven policy agenda of the city.

In this thesis, I read Hong Kong as a locus of continuous presence in absence. There are three major moments that represent this trend in the process of creative city making.

The first moment relates to local government and governance models of culture. Whilst officially assuming a ‘non-interventionist’ policy approach, the HKSAR government has always been involved in culture, both through its presence and absence. Since the 1970s it has increasingly used culture as display practices to

39 The current minimum hourly wage in Hong Kong is HK$32.5 (£3.40) (Labour Department, 2016).
stimulate Hong Kong’s economy, to justify neoliberalisation, to sustain the city’s position in the global city network, and to maintain civic cohesion (see Ooi, 1995; Lilley, 1998; Ku and Tsui, 2008b; Ngok, 2011). In the wake of the handover to China in 1997, the city was confronted with a series of additional challenges, including the growing competition with other globalising Chinese cities, a fear of possible marginalisation and the emerging contradiction between the national identity and local Hong Kong identity (see Abbas, 1997; Ma, 1998; Abbas, 2000; Jessop and Sum, 2000; Cartier, 2008). In response, the government adopted a more interventionist approach to culture that is exercised through the centralisation of institutional power, venue ownership, selective funding distribution and close partnerships with cultural elites and local business leaders.

Since the late 1990s, the globalising policy model of the creative city has been integrated into Hong Kong’s policy discourse. Although in Hong Kong, the creative city policy script is perceived primarily as an entrepreneurial strategy, the key objectives attached to this policy model do not entirely correspond with those linked to creative city making in Europe and North America. On the one hand, the cultural turn in Hong Kong is largely driven by inter-urban competition and the economic slowdown. This reflects on urban entrepreneurialism and the market-driven policy agenda of the city. On the other hand, however, the cultural turn is also linked with the anxieties about the possible marginalisation of Hong Kong. In this context, display practices are used to promote the city’s hybrid identity and cultural advancement that altogether assist in securing its global city status and differentiating Hong Kong from China. This indicates another moment of ‘presence in absence’: to distance itself from other Chinese cities, Hong Kong assumes its presence by blending in to the global city network.

After the handover, the HKSAR government has also been under increased pressure to get involved in the debates about the identity of Hong Kong (Cartier, 2008). Here the government’s strategy again rests on being present in absence. It abstains from involving in the debate declaring that “one’s civic identity is defined by one’s national identity” (Curriculum Development Council, 1996: 23). At the same time, however, it promotes and consistently supports those cultural initiatives and display practices that supposedly can speak to its version of ‘local’ Hong Kong identity, specifically, its cosmopolitanism and diversity. This seems to suggest an attempt to foreclose more aggressive forms of protest that could threaten the stability of the state.
Chapter 6
Harvesting the Fruits of Sustained Cultural Development in Taipei: From Emulator to Educator?

6.1 Introduction

The government of Taiwan had consistently nurtured culture and the arts long before the idea of the creative city was adopted in Taipei. This chapter argues that the creative city policy model is used to display the results of this long-term policy project in a way that presents Taipei as a ‘best practice’ creative city in its own right, rather than as an emulator of imported cultural policies. This, in turn, assists in generating a symbolic cultural superiority for Taiwan in the Chinese-speaking world.

Due to the unresolved political status of Taiwan, Taipei, as a capital city, has always assumed a significant role in the foreign policy of this island. Consequently, the city-led cultural policy in Taipei is closely linked with the interests of its unrecognised state. The major role attached to imported cultural policies in Taipei is protecting, maintaining and boosting the international position of Taiwan. Specifically, this entails assisting the central government in building a national Taiwanese identity, enhancing Taiwan’s relationship with the global community and strengthening its position in the political rivalry with China.

Indeed, the interests of the state largely shape urban cultural policy trajectories in Taipei. However, these interests are now also closely interwoven with the interests of the city government. After the democratisation reforms, local policymakers in Taipei have not only obtained a greater degree of autonomy and decision-making power, but also became more dependent on their voters. As a result, imported cultural policies in Taipei also serve as internal display, both showcasing political achievements of local politicians and their parties as well as satisfying their electorate.

In the first part of this chapter, I will address the unique political status of Taiwan and the ways in which this status has affected the position of Taipei and shaped the direction of cultural policy. I will also examine the impact of the democratisation movement on the rise of urban cultural policy. In the second part of this chapter, I will explore how the role of large-scale cultural events is understood and transformed in light of these contextual characteristics.
6.2 Contextual background: the capital of Chinese culture?

6.2.1 Chinese Taipei

In 1949, following a major defeat by the communists in the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese Nationalist Party, also referred to as Kuomintang (henceforth, KMT), retreated to Taiwan, declaring itself the only legitimate ruler of ‘one China’. To date, the issue of ‘one China’ remains unresolved with Taiwan retaining the former official name of mainland China, that is, the Republic of China (henceforth, ROC). The government of Taiwan refuses to recognise the PRC, because in accordance with the One-China principle, this would equal a renouncement of its sovereignty. The PRC, on the other hand, maintains that Taiwan is a province of China.

Until the 1970s, the international community supported Taiwan’s political stance, recognising the KMT government as the only legitimate government of China. Between 1945 and 1971, Taiwan was even representing ‘China’ in the United Nations Security Council. However, the growing global power and influence of the PRC, particularly after the adoption of the Open Door Policy, has deprived the island of many diplomatic and political achievements. In the 1970s, Taiwan lost many of its diplomatic allies to China and was denied a membership in all major international organisations.

This led the ROC to “an increasingly unfavourable asymmetric relationship” (Chu, 2011: 117) with the PRC. Currently Taiwan maintains official diplomatic relations with only 22 countries. A vast majority of these relations are sustained through the so-called ‘dollar diplomacy’ that relies on generous financial aid to impoverished countries (see Taylor, 2002). Such strategy often fails to produce strong long-term allies.

Taiwan is in an inferior position to the Mainland not only in terms of military capabilities and international relations, but also in terms of economic strength. In fact, the rapid rise of China’s economy has not only pushed Taiwan away from the global community but also pulled it closer to China. As Ngo and Wang (2011) observe, “the once number-one enemy has become the most important trade partner for Taiwan and the most desired destination for Taiwanese investment” (p. 6).

---

40 In this thesis, the names ‘Taiwan’, the ‘Republic of China’ and the ‘ROC’ will be used interchangeably.

41 The case of Gambia accurately illustrates this point. In 2013, after reportedly being declined additional financial assistance from Taiwan, the Gambian president decided to cut diplomatic ties between the two countries (see Atkinson, 2013).
According to the report from the Executive Yuan,\textsuperscript{42} today China is the main trading partner of the island, accounting for over 22 per cent of Taiwan’s total foreign trade (Executive Yuan, 2015). The strong economic dependence on China is a widely disputed issue in Taiwan. A number of local scholars observe that whilst benefiting the economy of the island, the growing reliance on the Mainland potentially threatens its sovereignty (J.H. Wang, 2004; Ngo and Wang, 2011; Chu, 2011).

Today in all major mega-events and international organisations, the ROC delegation participates under the name of ‘Chinese Taipei’ (Zhonghua Taibei). This term does not challenge the status quo of ‘one China’, therefore it has been accepted by the international community and the PRC (Huang and Wang, 2013).

At the local level, the use of ‘Chinese Taipei’ manifests the significance of Taipei in relation to its unrecognised state. As the capital city, Taipei plays a particularly important role in Taiwan’s foreign policy and public diplomacy. Contrary to the nation-state, which is generally considered as first and foremost a political entity, cities are commonly regarded as “primary economic organs” (Jacobs, 1984: 6). Therefore, they are less likely to create additional political tensions even in light of extremely sensitive state-to-state relations (Taylor, 2013). According to Chu (2011), they are perceived as “seemingly less offensive, intrusive, and threatening” (p. 121) than the state-level actors. Consequently, in the complex cross-strait relations, Taipei along with other local-level actors, including governmental and non-governmental organisations, academics, media and businessmen, often serves as the primary agent of Taiwan’s foreign policy (Chu, 2011). This means that the city’s policy agenda is inevitably influenced and shaped by state interests, which revolve around the pursuit of international recognition and the on-going political rivalry with China.

In Taiwan’s asymmetrical relationship with China, there are only a handful of areas in which the island can compete with the Mainland: namely, high-tech industry, health-care system, environmental policies, quality education, and culture (see Chu, 2011; Wang and Lu, 2008). As will be shown next, the role of culture has been particularly significant in Taiwan’s rivalry with China.

\subsection*{6.2.2 State-led instrumentalisation of culture and identity politics}

Cultural policies were employed in the political rivalry with China decades before Chinese nationalists moved to the island. In an attempt to portray China as weak and underdeveloped, the Japanese colonial regime, which ruled Taiwan for fifty years

\textsuperscript{42} Executive Yuan is the executive branch of the ROC government. Headed by the president, it is made up of the senior members of the government, including a vice-president, twelve cabinet ministers, chief representatives from various commissions and councils, and ministers without portfolio.
(1985-1945), implemented a number of de-sinicisation campaigns. These campaigns particularly intensified in the wake of the Second Sino-Japanese War (Chu and Lin, 2001).43

After the KMT took over the power over the island, the state-led cultural policy was redirected at condemning the political system of the PRC, not China as a whole. Until the 1970s, anti-communism propaganda and re-sinicisation were two distinctive characteristics shaping cultural policies of the ROC. Through re-sinicisation campaigns and active promotion of traditional Chinese culture, the KMT sought to impose a sense of cultural unity between the mainlanders (‘the ruler’) and local Taiwanese (‘the ruled’) (Chun, 1994; Chu and Lin, 2001).44 This was necessary not only for strengthening the power and authority of the KMT, but also for preparing the island for a potential reunification of the two Chinas (Chun, 1994; Chu and Lin, 2001).

At the same time, the promotion of traditional Chinese culture also became a means to forge a symbolic superiority over the communist regime in China (see Chun, 1994; Chang, 2004). In the late 1960s, the ROC government launched the Cultural Renaissance Movement (wenhua fuxing yundong) that had “an explicitly political agenda” (Chun, 1994: 53). Specifically, it was aimed at condemning Mao’s policy toward culture and the arts during the Cultural Revolution in the PRC. In contrast to the Cultural Revolution, the KMT’s Cultural Renaissance was directed at revoking and preserving traditional Chinese culture.

It should be noted, however, that with the KMT leadership being the one to decide what should be included in as well as excluded from the notion of ‘traditional Chinese culture’, the understanding of what this culture should entail has been (re)invented according to their preferences. As Chun (1994) explains:

By invoking ‘tradition’, the authorities appeared to resuscitate elements of the past, but they were clearly inventing tradition (…). The government in effect played an active role (as author) in writing culture (by constructing discourses on tradition, ethnicity, ethical philosophy and moral psychology) (p. 54).

43 Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937 - September 9, 1945) was fought between the Republic of China (current PRC) and Japan. Although during the war, Japan managed to occupy most of the eastern coastal areas of China, Japan was forced to surrender following its capitulation in World War Two.

44 The term ‘local Taiwanese’ (benshengren) commonly refers to three ethnic groups in Taiwan, including indigenous Taiwanese, the Hakka and the Hoklo. The last two groups moved to Taiwan from mainland China centuries ago. The term ‘mainlanders’ or ‘outsiders’ (waishengren) is used to describe the ethnic Chinese who moved to Taiwan after 1945.
This means that when we talk about Chinese culture in Taiwan, we actually talk about the KMT’s version of Chinese culture, which they used to create the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006) of their own.

Although the Cultural Renaissance Movement had never been revoked, in the late 1970s it was integrated in the new cultural policy strategy entitled ‘Cultural Construction’ (wenhua jianshe). This policy programme marked the broadening scope of instrumental roles attached to culture. The major focus of cultural policies was no longer only on political rivalry with the PRC, but also on the growing economic competition with China and other East Asian states, as well as on social and ethnic divisions within the Taiwanese society.

Subsequently, for the first time in the ROC’s history, culture and the arts were addressed in relation to tourism, trade and economic progress (Chun, 1994). Although in this respect, the Cultural Construction policy programme clearly resonated with the market-driven cultural turn in the Global North, in terms of primary focus it was firstly social and only secondly economic. More specifically, it was directed at addressing the social exclusion of ethnic minorities in Taiwan and recognition of ‘multicultural Taiwan’ (L.J. Wang, 2004).

In order to make culture and the arts more approachable to all members of society, cultural policies were ‘liberalised’ from a firm grip of the central government, passing over the responsibility for cultural initiatives to local authorities and community groups. This reform marked the beginning of the democratisation movement and paved the way for the rise of urban cultural policies in Taiwan.

Although Taiwan had been proclaimed a democratic republic for more than a century, the actual democratisation of the island did not take off until the late 1980s. Between 1949 and 1987, under martial law, the KMT retained a full control over the policy-making process in all levels of the government (Cheng, 1989; Rigger, 1996; Chu and Lin, 2001). However, in the late 1970s, the party started to lose its grip on power. The political monopoly of the KMT was causing increasing discontent within Taiwanese society (Cheng, 1989; Chu, 1996). Considering that the mainlanders accounted for only 15 per cent of Taiwan’s population, there was a growing public demand for someone to represent the voice of the rest of the population (Rigger, 1996). This political void was filled by the Democratic Progressive Party (henceforth, DPP), which was established in 1986. The same year, the KMT acceded

45 This struggle made for what Ngo and Wang (2011) term “the most contentious issue in Taiwan society”: “the problem of Mainlander versus islander identities” (p. 2). It should be noted, however, that one cannot separate ‘mainlanders’ from ‘locals’ so easily, as these ‘mainlanders’ have increasingly assimilated with other ethnic groups over the years (Corcuff, 2011).
to growing pressure from the public and approved direct election at both local and national levels of government. The first two-party public election in 1986 and the abolition of martial law in 1987 are considered to mark the actual democratisation and political liberalisation of Taiwan (Rigger, 1996; Cheng, 1989; Chu and Lin, 2001; Ngo and Wang, 2011).

In this context, the Cultural Construction policy assisted the KMT in securing the support of a large number of the Taiwanese electorate: by acknowledging cultural pluralism in Taiwan the party manifested its willingness and ability to change (Rigger, 1996).

It should be noted, however, that the recognition of ‘multicultural Taiwan’, was not meant initially to counter the dominance of Chinese culture. On the contrary, by reaching out to other ethnic groups, the KMT sought to strengthen the sense of cultural Chinese identity within Taiwanese society (see Chun, 1994; L.J. Wang, 2004; Chang, 2004). However, the democratisation movement has exposed a growing discontent with this situation. The opposition party – the DPP – objected to the supposed “unchanging ‘oneness’” (Hall, 2000: 17) of a Chinese cultural identity, demanding instead de-sinicisation (qu zhongguo hua) and ‘Taiwanisation’ (Taiwan hua). The KMT rejected the idea of de-sinicisation, but agreed with the need for Taiwanisation. This movement has been accelerated by the Community Building (Shequ zongti yingzao) policy programme in 1993. The goal of the programme was to encourage all people of Taiwan to participate in the construction of a ‘new homeland’ (xin guxiang) and to enhance their sense of belonging to their land (Chang, 2004).

This policy programme marked the KMT’s conversion “from a cultural agent of Chinese nationalism into an incubator of a ‘re-imagined community’ based on a new Taiwanese identity” (Chu and Lin, 2001: 103). It should be noted that at that point, the KMT no longer maintained any realistic hope of reasserting control over the Mainland. With Taiwan becoming increasingly viewed by the international community as ‘the same’ as China, there was an evident need for a new ‘unique’ identity that could provide “stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning” (Hall, 1990: 223). So instead of emphasising commonalities between Taiwan and China, the KMT has shifted its focus to underlining its differences. Indeed, this exemplifies Hall’s (1990) argument that identity is “a ‘production’, which is never complete” (p. 222).

---

46 Despite the rising popularity of the opposition movement, the KMT managed to retain the majority in multi-party elections until as late as 2001. For detailed discussion regarding the KMT’s ability to transform in accordance with the changing political environment, see Rigger (1996).
What role has been ascribed to Chinese culture in the Taiwanisation process? Whilst Chinese identity in Taiwan has been rejected as a national identity, it is still at the root of Taiwan’s cultural identity. Considering that the indigenous Taiwanese, who constitute around 2 to 3 per cent of Taiwan’s population, is the only group that does not have any ethnic ties with China, it is evident that the construct which is now presented as ‘Taiwanese’ culture is closely interwoven with Chinese culture (L.J. Wang, 2004; Chang, 2004).

As will be shown later, preservation of Chinese culture is crucial in establishing symbolic cultural supremacy over China. This objective along with identity politics remains at the heart of city-led cultural policy-making in Taipei.

6.2.3 The politics of urban governance and development in Taipei

Following the Cultural Construction policy reform and democratisation, since the late 1980s the responsibility for cultural policy-making in Taipei has been gradually passed over to the hands of the local government.

Today the distribution of public funds for culture rests in the hands of two major organisations – the Department of Cultural Affairs (henceforth, DCA) and the Taipei Culture Foundation (henceforth, TCF).

The establishment of the DCA in 1999 marked the institutionalisation of urban cultural policy in Taiwan and rendered Taipei the first municipal government in the island to form a dedicated government unit responsible solely for culture and the arts (Wang, 2007). Initially, two major large-scale cultural events – the Taipei Film Festival (henceforth, TFF) and the Taipei Arts Festival (henceforth, TAF) – both launched in 1998, were administrated by the DCA. However, under the Government Procurement Act (Zhengfu caigou fa), the DCA was obliged to procure all services for large-scale cultural events on an annual basis. This meant that every year there were different groups of people responsible for their administration, planning, and marketing. This practice not only hindered the development of events, but also proved to be time-consuming and costly.

Consequently, in 2008 the curator and patron function of regular large-scale cultural events was transferred to the TCF (est. in 1985) – a semi-public body responsible for promotion of cultural development in Taipei. Both the TFF and the TAF now receive public funding through the TCF. During the study’s interviews, the organisers of these events have noted that this change brought more stability to their organisational structure, raised the level of professionalism, and provided a greater degree of flexibility and decision-making power to the planning teams of the events. At the same time, this means that it is now always the same group of industry professionals that determines the programme, content and format of the events (see also Williams,
1984). This ties in with the comment from one of my respondents, who argued that the cultural sector in Taipei is now largely guided by a selective group of ‘cultural elites’:

[Cultural sector] is controlled by a very few elite [individuals]. If you go to the Charles Landry book issue party, you will see (...) the same faces. (...) Sometimes they might change a little bit. They let new people in, some people [are] out, but [they] always belong to... if I may say, the cultural elite in Taipei. And this cultural elite... they get lots of benefits from the government (Advisor/Academic A, TP, 2015).

In this context, the city government assumes the role of promotor: it operates as a major patron of events and gets involved in their supervision only in cases of suspected mismanagement of funds or public complaints (see Subsection 2.2.2).

The evidence from my research indicates that in some cases, the city government can also undertake the role of an architect (see Subsection 2.2.2). The World Design Capital 2016 (henceforth, WDC 2016) could be considered an instructive example in this regard. This large event was held and hosted by the DCA. The Deputy Mayor of Taipei led the commission designated for overseeing the planning process of the event. The event lasted for a whole year and had a record budget of NT$1.1 billion (£28 million) that was almost twice as large as Helsinki’s budget for the same event in 2012 (£15 million) (City of Helsinki, 2013; Taipei City Council, 2015).

The scale and international significance of the event were among major reasons for attaching such a huge importance to WDC 2016. The event was also considered a platform for the display of the local design industry. The government saw WDC 2016 as an opportunity to promote its industrial, visual and fashion design industries, which are currently among the most rapidly developing industries in the country (Ministry of Culture, 2016). However, another major reason for attaching such great importance to this particular event relates to the political ambitions of the mayor himself. A large number of interview respondents indicated that Hau Lung-Pin, the then Mayor of Taipei, saw this and other large-scale international events as part of his political legacy. This ties in with Roche’s (2000) argument that large-scale events tend to “project the image and status of the local power elite” (p. 10).

Indeed, local political rivalries have shaped the course of cultural policies since Taipei held its first direct mayoral election in 1994.⁴⁷ This, along with the increased

⁴⁷ It should be noted that it was not the first direct election in the history of Taipei. Before 1994, the last direct election in Taipei took place in 1964. Between 1964 and 1994, the mayors of the two largest cities on the island – Taipei and Kaohsiung – were directly appointed by the Executive Yuan (see Copper, 1998).
authority of the Taipei City Council (henceforth, TCC),\textsuperscript{48} led to significant changes in the politics of urban development in Taipei. Whereas before the primary concern of the local policymakers was satisfying their leadership at the state level, now their focus of attention has shifted to the needs of their electorate.

It is in this context that the idea of ‘community-led’ governance has emerged with local citizens becoming “both the subjects and objects of policy programmes” (Raco et al., 2011: 281). They are encouraged to get involved in the decision-making processes through various workshops, community meetings, public forums, the elected representatives in the TCC, and the 1999 Citizen Hotline. A vast number of community organisations also receive regular funding from the government, which they can use to address the needs of their members. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the level of actual community engagement.\textsuperscript{49} However, there are three important points at which ‘community-led’ policy programmes overlap with cultural policy-making in Taipei that need to be addressed here.

First, the community-centred approach to policy-making has inevitably affected the agenda of urban cultural policies. As will be shown in the next section, contrary to Hong Kong and Shanghai, large-scale cultural events in Taipei are predominantly inward-focused. The promotion of local artists and the satisfaction of local audiences lie at the heart of their raison d’être (see Section 6.3). Second, it is also important to consider the impact of this trend on the governance structure of cultural policy. To an extent, the cultural policy-making process in Taipei could now also be seen as ‘community-led’, in a sense that the DCA is accountable to the TCC. Research data shows that in order to ensure the support of their voters in the next election, directly elected councilmen in the TCC take a majority of public complaints very seriously.\textsuperscript{50} Political rivalries between local politicians, which were noted in reference to WDC 2016, also could be considered a product of ‘community-led’ governance.

As previously noted, electoral reforms and the broader democratisation movement have not only changed the relations between the city and the community, but also between the city and the state, providing Taipei with greater autonomy in making

\textsuperscript{48} The TCC is directly elected by the citizens of Taipei. It approves or vetoes the plans put forth by the city government.

\textsuperscript{49} For more detailed discussion on 'community-led' governance in Taipei, see Raco et al. (2011).

\textsuperscript{50} For instance, the senior staff member of the Taipei Film Festival recalled an incident from a few years ago, when the TCC received one complaint regarding the practice of signing the form for R and NC-17 rated films. One member of the audience complained that because the film did not seem consistent with an R-rating, there was no need to sign the form. This complaint was eventually dropped because the Ministry of Culture, not the TFF, had assigned the film’s rating. However, this example clearly shows the TCC’s willingness to consider all complaints, even the most absurd.
decisions. In turn, this autonomy has transformed the city into a political battlefield between the two national parties – the DPP and the KMT – a competition which also affects the politics of urban development.

The DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian’s win in the first direct mayoral election landed a significant victory for the opposition. In order to undermine the dominance of the KMT, Chen Shui-bian was determined to reduce the city’s dependence on the central government by establishing it as an international financial centre (C.H. Wang, 2003; J.H. Wang, 2004). In essence, the prospect of strengthening the international position of Taipei also corresponded with the political agenda of the DPP that was grounded in the pursuit of national sovereignty for Taiwan and de-sinicisation. In other words, this represented an attempt to not only strengthen the city’s autonomy in relation to the central government, but also to enhance Taiwan’s position on the global stage.

However, positioning Taipei as an international financial centre has proved to be more difficult than expected. All in all, the city has overestimated its potential. With other major Chinese cities, such as Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore already operating as global nodes of finance and trade, securing the position of yet another financial centre in the region required much more than Taipei could offer. Due to the unresolved political status of Taiwan, many international firms have been hesitant to set up their headquarter offices in Taipei (J.H. Wang, 2004). Also despite economic liberalisation, the central government has maintained its control over capital flows “in the name of national security” (J.H. Wang, 2004: 387) and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises has been slow. This has imposed a number of limitations on foreign investors.

In the late 1990s, the focus from finance and business has shifted to other service sectors, specifically high-tech, environment and culture. These areas are not only the major strengths of Taipei, but also, and perhaps more importantly, are considered some of the major weaknesses of the Mainland. Consequently, Mayor Chen’s successor, this time the KMT candidate Ma Ying-Jeou, who took the mayor’s office in 1998, abolished the idea of ‘international financial centre’, instead envisioning the city as an “international metropolis with pluralistic orientation” (Ma, 2005, cited in Wang, 2007: 387).

However, similar to Chen, Ma also struggled to gain the central government’s support, because for the first time in the ROC history, his party was pushed to the opposition. The DPP not only won the presidential election, but also secured the

---

51 On the high-tech sector in China, see Chen (2004) and Xing (2014); on environmental issues, see Zhang et al. (2012); on the arts and cultural sector, see Wang (2011) and Creemers (2015).
majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan\textsuperscript{52} in 2000 and 2001, respectively. The central government was reluctant to assist in Taipei’s efforts in raising its global profile, even when this meant missing out on opportunities to enhance the international recognition of Taiwan. Subsequently, in order to reduce the political authority and influence of mayor Ma, it cut funding for the city and even moved some large-scale events to other cities in Taiwan (J.H. Wang, 2004).

The DPP suffered a major defeat in 2008, when Ma was elected president of Taiwan and the KMT managed to secure 86 of the 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan. With the mayor of Taipei at that time, Hau Lung-pin, also being the member of the KMT, the years of power struggle between the opposition in Taipei and the ruling party in the national government have come to the end. This has not only led to more efficient and more consistent policy-making, but also landed Taipei a greater level of financial support for key development areas, such as high-tech, environmental protection and culture (for culture, see Appendix B). Taipei’s experience and skills in these sectors are used to obtain respect and recognition from China, or going back to Bourdieu’s (1989) terminology, to generate a symbolic capital for the place.

In many respects, Hau Lung-pin’s vision of Taipei resembles Ma’s, for both are grounded in the fulfilment of plural trajectories. In the *Taipei City Long-Term Development Program for 2010-2020*, Taipei is seen as a “unique world-class city endowed with ecological, cultural and technological properties” (trans. from Chinese, Taipei City Government, 2010: 3). However, one notable change was the evident shift in the spatial scope of the city’s ambitions. Instead of ‘international metropolis’, the city set out to become the “Best Chinese city in the world” (*Quanqiu huaren shoushan zhi du*, Taipei City Government, 2010: 3). This important shift can be read in two ways. On the one hand, it serves to acknowledge the city’s limitations at the global stage and declare its increasingly regional orientation. On the other hand, it reasserts that the major focus of the city has always been and still is (perhaps more than ever) grounded in Taiwan’s competition with China.

As will be shown in the next subsection, for Taiwan, Chinese culture remains an important instrument for asserting cultural superiority over China.

6.2.4 Building the Capital of Chinese Culture and Creativity

The subject of the creative economy in Taiwan was first officially addressed in 2002 in the six-year national development plan *Challenge 2008* (Tiaozhan 2008). The title of the document reflected on the concerns over the challenges posed by economic

\textsuperscript{52} Legislative Yuan, sometimes also referred to as ‘parliament’, is the legislative branch of the ROC government.
globalisation and growing regional competition. Since the late 1980s, the ROC government has struggled to sustain the economic growth of the island. In the 1990s, due to cheap labour and lower production costs, a large number of Taiwanese high-tech producers and other manufacturers relocated or outsourced their production sites to the Mainland and other developing Southeast Asian countries (Chen, 2004). Through Taiwanese investment, skills and expertise, a number of Chinese firms, particularly in the areas of high-tech industry, have subsequently emerged as serious competitors for Taiwan (Berger and Lester, 2015). Also, an immense demand for skilled R&D personnel first in the US, and more recently in China, has led to increased rates of ‘brain drain’ on the island (Leng, 2002). Altogether, this forced the Taiwanese government to review its development strategies. The expansion of the cultural sector was adopted as one of the policy measures to tackle these challenges.

In Challenge 2008, the cultural and creative industries were included among 10 key development areas that had to be addressed to strengthen the economic competitiveness of Taiwan. All key development areas were argued to be critical in enabling Taiwan to not only “compete with other countries, but also to compete with time” (trans. from Chinese, Executive Yuan, 2002: 3).

In the Global North, culture-led urban development is commonly perceived as a means to revitalize the economy of deindustrialising cities (see Zukin, 1998; Markusen et al., 2008). In a similar vein, Challenge 2008 also refers to the decline of the manufacturing industry and the need to establish new forms of production models that are “more suited to the ‘postfordist’ age” (trans. from Chinese, Executive Yuan, 2002: 37). Although deindustrialisation could be one of the factors that contributed to the adoption of the cultural turn in Taipei, it certainly was not the most important one. First, the process of deindustrialisation has never been as intense as in the Global North. In fact, to date, manufacturing industries in Taiwan still account for a high proportion of national economic output. In 2012, they contributed to around 30 per cent of Taiwan’s GDP (Industrial Development Bureau, 2013). It is also important to note that since the onset of industrial development, all major manufacturers were based in rural areas (Buck, 2000). This means that all large cities in Taiwan, and particularly Taipei, were never heavily industrialised in the first place (see Selya, 1994; J.H. Wang, 2004). Since the 1970s onwards, their growth has relied on the high-tech industry and service sectors such as wholesale and

---

53 The other nine key development areas included: internationalisation, R&D, tourism, industry sector, digitisation, logistics, transportation systems, environment, and community rejuvenation (Executive Yuan, 2002).

54 To compare, the national economic output of the UK’s manufacturing industry was only 10 per cent in 2013 (Rhodes, 2015).
retail, finance, insurance, banking, real estate, and recreation (Selya, 1994). This clearly indicates that the declining impact of the manufacturing industry could not be the major driving force behind the adoption of the cultural turn in Taipei.

It is also important to acknowledge that despite talent outflow and growing competition with China, Taiwan’s economy has remained relatively stable over the last five decades. One reason for this rests on its industrial sector model, which is unusual in the region. Contrary to other state-led economies in East Asia that heavily relied on large state-owned companies, Taiwan’s industrialisation was based primarily on small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) that proved to be more resilient (and more adaptable) to the changing economic environment (Rigger, 1996; Berger and Lester, 2015). Ranis (2002) argues that the state-led economic development combined with the state’s ability to rapidly adapt to the changing economic climate and a relatively low reliance on foreign capital were essential in preparing the island for the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. As a result, as opposed to Hong Kong, Taiwan did not experience severe economic turmoil in the late 1990s. This also suggests that economic considerations were unlikely to be among the key objectives attached to the rise of urban cultural policies in Taipei.

And yet, since the DCA was established – in particular, since the KMT secured a controlling majority in both levels of the government in 2008 – the city’s cultural sector has experienced significant growth. In the last ten years alone, the city’s annual budget for culture and the arts has increased nearly threefold, from around £67 million in 2005 to £175 million in 2015 (Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 2016). In 2015, public spending on culture and the arts (including sports) accounted for 5.12 per cent of total city spending, which is significantly higher than the budget allocations for culture in Shanghai and Hong Kong (see Appendix B).

The first Chief of the DCA was a prominent Taiwanese writer and cultural critic, Lung Ying-tai. Drawing on her experience from 13 years spent studying and living in the United States and Germany, Lung was determined to rejuvenate the cultural landscape of the city through the Western model of culture-led urban development. Her primary focus was on cultural preservation, utilisation of the unused spaces for cultural activities, facilitation of cultural events, talent cultivation and cultural exchange (Wei, 2011). Over the past decade, in order to plan, improve and assess Taipei’s cultural development strategies, the city government has funded a number of research studies (see, for example, Liu 2002, Xin et al. 2001, Liu et al. 2003). These studies typically include ‘success’ stories from large cities in the Global North.

---

55 Between 2012 and 2014, Lung Ying-tai also served as the first minister of the ROC Ministry of Culture.
and elsewhere. Such cities as London, Manchester, Tokyo, Paris, and New York are commonly proposed as leading exemplars of the cultural turn.

None of the cultural strategies adopted by Lung and her successors were innovative or unique, in a sense that they had all been applied before in many cities across the globe. Also, as previously noted, since as early as the late 1940s cultural development has already been among the key priorities in the “politics of national survival” (Chun, 1994: 58). This means that Taipei had already had a relatively well-established cultural sector long before the late 1990s. In this respect, the emulation of these imported strategies did not bring any radical or ‘revolutionary’ changes in the cultural policies of Taipei.

What marks the cultural turn in Taipei as different and perhaps in some ways ‘revolutionary’ (at least in relation to the cities in the Global North) are the objectives attached to these imported strategies.

The sense of exclusion from the global community was one of the major reasons that prompted the city to adopt cultural policies from the Global North. Growing inter-urban competition for investment and jobs undoubtedly contributed to this concern (J.H. Wang, 2004). However, the unresolved political status of Taiwan and political isolation seem to be at the root of this problem. Accordingly, as one senior government official notes, “our primary concern is how we can make Taipei more visible” (trans. from Chinese, Official C, TP, 2014).

The use of Charles Landry to promote Taipei as the creative city reflects on the city’s pursuit for international recognition. Landry has been a significant figure in Taipei’s creative city making. Between 2012 and 2014 he worked for the Taipei City Urban Regeneration Office as the policy consultant assisting the government in the “development of the creative city strategy” (Taipei City Council, 2012: 3659). During his time in Taipei, he published three books on creativity in Taipei (all fully sponsored by the Taipei City Government) and participated in a number of workshops and forums.

Given Landry’s celebrity status and connections with a vast number of urban policymakers in the Global North and beyond, it is perhaps not surprising that the city government used him to promote Taipei to the world. As Lin Chung-Chieh, a former director of the Urban Regeneration Office comments:

> Mr. Charles Landry is an international expert. He provided his guidance to a number of creative cities around the world. We have openly selected one project, which he analyses and consults us on. (...) After his three visits to Taiwan, Mr. Landry also promotes Taipei at the international level. City promotion generates an additional

The city’s pursuit of international recognition links to another important factor that prompted the adoption of the creative city policy model in Taipei: political rivalries between local politicians and the two leading parties – the KMT and the DPP. As previously noted, former mayor Chen Shui-bian’s aspiration for establishing a global brand for Taipei was largely grounded on his attempt to reduce the city’s dependence on the central KMT government. At that time, the central focus was on cultural landmarks and signature constructions. However, under the KMT’s mayor Ma, all “image building projects” (xingxiang gongcheng, Lung, 2005: 64) were condemned as an empty display of political arrogance. The Chief of the DCA, Lung Ying-tai, set out a new agenda for cultural policy that was directed at historical preservation, restoration, and rehabilitation of old buildings and cultural landmarks.

This shift in the city’s cultural policy directory enhanced the image of Mayor Ma (and subsequently his party) over his political rivals, positioning him as the leader who cares about the preservation of culture.\(^{56}\) Additionally, it also enabled the Taipei City Government to reclaim some important historical and cultural sites from the possession of the central government. As a result, the city secured more funds and a greater autonomy from the Legislative Yuan that was in the hands of the DPP (see Lung, 2005). In this sense, the adoption of imported cultural policy strategies has proved to be particularly useful in the local government’s pursuit for the greater decision-making authority.

The focus on the preservation of culture remains at the core of Taipei’s ‘creative urbanism’ (Peck, 2011a) strategies. In light of the growing power and influence of China, evoking the past has become seen as particularly important measure for the ‘imagined community’ building in Taiwan. Lung (2005) refers to this process as an “uninterrupted continuation of tradition” (chuancheng buduan) (p. 64). As Lung (2005) further explains:

[Today Taipei is] in a quest for social consciousness, it urgently needs to establish the cultural identity of the city. What can better evoke a collective memory for people than old buildings, streets, trees or landmarks, what can better stir up a shared sense of belonging? (Trans. from Chinese, p. 64).

Considering that Chinese culture has been consistently facilitated and promoted since the late 1940s, it inevitably occupies a significant part in the city’s past and

\(^{56}\) Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected for a second term in 2002. In 1998, he was elected President of the ROC.
present. In fact, research data analysis suggests, that after two decades of ‘Taiwanisation’, the traditional culture is still commonly referred to as *Chinese (huaren)*\(^7\) as opposed to *Taiwanese*.

It could be argued that one major reason for this rests on the symbolic superiority that *Chinese* culture provides for Taiwan over China. The consistent support for preservation of traditional Chinese culture and cultural development at large, has set Taipei apart from other Chinese cities, where until recently local authorities have largely neglected culture and the arts. Today Taipei’s cultural advancement is commonly acknowledged in the region. The respect and recognition that Taipei generates through its culture and the arts provides the city with a degree of symbolic superiority and ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu, 1989) over other Chinese cities and China itself.

A handful of respondents from Hong Kong and Shanghai have indicated that among Chinese cities, Taipei currently holds a leading position in the field of culture. As one government official from Hong Kong puts it, Taipei has “deeper cultural roots” (Official A, HK, 2014). In a similar vein, the senior official from Shanghai indicates that Taipei “has managed to integrate traditional Chinese culture and Western culture better than any other city”, adding that “we all want to learn from Taipei” (trans. from Chinese, Official A, SH, 2014). Research findings suggest that in Taipei, the sense of cultural superiority over other Chinese cities is also very strong:

> Chinese culture is the base for our originality. In this respect, in the Chinese-speaking world, nobody can compare with us. At this point in time, we are still leaders. (…) I can proudly, very proudly say that this is the main reason for us being recognised as the capital of culture and creativity in the Chinese society. Not economy, not investment, not industry, not something else, but our originality (trans. from Chinese, Official F, TP, 2014).

Taipei possesses the most diverse cultural elements and creative vitality in all of Taiwan and indeed ethnic Chinese society as a whole (TCG 2009: 200).

In cultural terms, in the Chinese-speaking world we currently play a leading role, particularly, in terms of Chinese culture (trans. from Chinese, Official B, TP, 2014).

The notion of *Chinese* culture dominates the creative city policy discourse in Taipei.

---\(^7\) There is a notable difference between the term *huaren wenhua* (華人文化) and *zhongguo wenhua* (中國文化). Although both of these terms are commonly translated as ‘Chinese culture’, *huaren wenhua* is an ethnic concept that represents the sense of Chinese cultural identity shared among all people of han ethnicity around the world; *zhongguo wenhua*, on the other hand, is directed at creating the sense of the place-bound identity, as it is used to refer to Chinese culture and traditions within the PRC.
In the *Taipei City Long-Term Development Program for 2010-2020*, the city was proclaimed to become the ‘Best Chinese city in the world’ (*Quanqiu huaren shoushan zhidu*) (Taipei City Government, 2010). This vision was soon followed by a number of corresponding narratives, such as the “Creative capital in the Chinese-speaking world” (Taipei City Government, 2011: 257), the “Centre of Chinese culture and tourism” (Taipei City Government, 2012b: 215), and the “Chinese capital of culture and creativity” (*Huaren wenchuang shoudu*) (Hau, 2011: 14). This seems to suggest that the concept of the creative city in Taipei is used to both *display* the advancement of the cultural sector and to turn it into a symbolic comparative advantage against mainland China. In this sense, the popularity and growing interest in culture-led urban development provides an opportunity for Taipei to not only get noticed in the global community, but also to be cast as an ‘educator’ rather than just an ‘emulator’ of cultural policies (see McCann and Ward, 2012).

All in all, it is evident that contrary to many cities in the Global North, deindustrialisation and inter-urban competition for investment, jobs or tourists have played only minor roles in driving the adoption of imported cultural policies in Taipei. Instead, the rationale behind the creative city policy model and its display practices seem to rest primarily on political and ideological gains. On the one hand, imported cultural policies serve the interests of the state and operate in line with the ‘traditional’ agenda of cultural policy. Specifically, they are used in the building of international recognition for Taiwan, identity politics and political rivalry with China. On the other hand, they serve the interests of the city. In addition to city promotion, they are also applied to combat local political rivalries among politicians and their parties and to ensure the support of the local electorate. As will be shown in the next section, it is namely these objectives that shape and influence the meanings attached to display practices in Taipei.

### 6.3 Contextualising culture as display: Taipei’s perspective

#### 6.3.1 Display as promotion

Taipei is commonly considered to be a ‘second-tier’ world city (see J.H. Wang, 2004). Zukin (2012) observes that due to the uneven reward system of a ‘winner-take-all’ economy, the second-tier cities have fewer chances to succeed in their ‘entrepreneurial’ efforts if placed alongside first-tier cities. These cities are viewed as lacking the capability to “produce global control” (Sassen, 1991: 6), which determines the city’s influence and mobilisation of power in the global city network.

Taipei’s capacity to generate ‘global control’ has been limited by political isolation and the uncertain international status of Taiwan. As a result, the city has failed to
keep up with the pace of other global Chinese cities, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Hong Kong (see GaWC, 2012). Due to political isolation and growing inter-urban competition, it thus feels increasingly marginalised not only in the global city network but also in the network of other Chinese cities, to the extent it sometimes does not even perceive itself as a global city (see J.H. Wang, 2004; Taipei City Government, 2006). During the interviews, a number of respondents expressed their concern about the marginalisation of Taipei, noting that culture is one of a few areas in which Taipei could still be considered a ‘global city’.

This explains why in Taipei the creative city and its display practices are commonly viewed as critical means for raising the global profile of the city and the state. In this context, international formats of large-scale cultural events are adopted to strengthen both Taipei’s and Taiwan’s presence in the global community:

We need large-scale cultural events for [international] recognition. Recognition is important. In the network of world cities, Taipei actually counts as a second-tier city. (…) These large-scale cultural events, and not only cultural events, allow us to enhance the city’s influence, (…) let everyone know that such places [like Taiwan] do exist (trans. from Chinese, Official C, TP, 2014).

[Referring to WDC 2016:] You know, we are a very isolated island. (…) We cannot do much in our foreign policy. We cannot establish diplomatic relations. Therefore, Taipei’s foreign relations are very important to us. Very important. Because of this, we must host large-scale events in Taipei. They are necessary for us (trans. from Chinese, Official B, TP, 2014).

Large-scale cultural events can also be used in city promotion as “symbol[s] of collective wealth” (Zukin, 2012: 19). Altogether, as a singular set, they assist in the display of social and economic advancement of a city (see Subsection 2.3.3). Research findings support this argument by showing that local policymakers in Taipei not only use regular large-scale events to raise the global profile of the city, but also recognise them as important indicators of the city’s advancement and development:

By hosting large-scale cultural events the city demonstrates that it has money, that it has capability. If the city does not have [these] events, (…) [this indicates] that it is not a global city, not an international city (trans. from Chinese, Official A, TP, 2014).

[Events allow] the city to gradually turn into a [global] node. However, to become the node, you need to rely on many events. (…) Therefore, we always seek to host as many international events as possible, because we want everyone in the world to know about the existence of Taipei, about the life in Taipei (trans. from Chinese,
All in all, it seems that city promotion in Taipei is shaped primarily by political considerations. Although the narrative of ‘inter-urban competition’ is often used in relation to the creative city policy discourse, there was little evidence to suggest that display practices in Taipei are employed as entrepreneurial strategies (see Taipei City Government, 2012a). This indicates that market-driven policy objectives in Taipei do not play such significant roles in creative city making as they do in most other cities in the Global North and elsewhere.

Thus far I have addressed display as an outward-directed city promotion. However, display practices can also be used for inward promotion (see Subsection 2.3.3). As will be shown below, Taipei provides us with a particularly instructive case for the analysis of this type of city promotion.

Contrary to Hong Kong and Shanghai, in Taipei, imported cultural initiatives have a strong focus on local artists and audiences. This links with the general patterns of the politics of urban development in Taipei, which “are inextricably tied to community development” (Raco et al., 2011: 291; see also Subsection 6.2.3). During my interviews, a major objective attached to all events by most respondents was not only generating international impact and increasing the global reputation of the city, but also maintaining and enhancing the appeal of the events for the local citizens. In this sense, Taipei’s understanding of culture and the arts largely echoes local community-centred ideas behind the original notion of the creative city, which was aimed at improving “people’s lived experience of cities” (Landry and Bianchini, 1995: 13).

As stated by the representative from the TCC, the main purpose behind cultural events in Taipei is “to satisfy our citizens, to satisfy their needs” (trans. from Chinese, Official A, TP, 2014). Many respondents – officials as well as industry practitioners – supported this claim during the interviews.

The policymakers’ interest in engaging with the public is strongly linked with their dependence on people’s votes (see Subsection 6.2.3). As one former senior government official observes, since the first direct mayoral election in 1994, “keeping people happy” (Official F, TP, 2014) has become a top priority for the city government. In a similar vein, another government official admits, that “consistent response to people’s demands reflects on the consistent need for votes” (trans. from Chinese, Official C, TP, 2014).

As ‘internal’ display practices, imported formats of cultural events – specifically, the ‘international’ cachet attached to them – are employed to bolster the pride of local citizens. Policymakers use the fact that Taipei is counted amongst the other cities across the globe hosting annual arts festivals, film festivals, and major design-
oriented events, such as WDC 2016 or World Design Expo 2011, to convince their electorate that despite political isolation, Taipei is an important international city:

For Taiwanese, [cultural events] enhance the sense of belonging and self-esteem. If we host a large-scale international event, for Taiwanese, particularly for Taipei citizens, this gives a sense of pride: “we also have a chance to attend this type of event!” (trans. from Chinese, Official G, TP, 2014).

[Large-scale cultural events] makes us feel like… wow… we are increasingly integrated with the global community. (…) This contributes to raising our self-esteem (trans. from Chinese, Official F, TP, 2014).

Both quotes clearly betray the fact that the four decades of Taiwan’s political isolation have created a feeling of marginalisation amongst its citizens. Thus to policymakers the projection of Taipei’s image as an international city that is integrated amongst other leading cities in the world seems to be as important as actually achieving that level of integration and recognition.

6.3.2 Display as symbolic power

Policy transfer communicates the recognition of a symbolic comparative advantage of the ‘lending’ party over the ‘borrowing’ one. By adopting different policy models and ‘best’ policy practices from elsewhere, the ‘borrowing’ site acknowledges not only its own weaknesses, but also the strengths of the policy-lending site. However, considering that policy transfer is a multidirectional process, it is evident that some cities may find themselves at both the sending and receiving ends (see Subsection 2.4.1).

Taipei’s case is particularly instructive in this regard. It adopted the creative city policy model and its display practices from the Global North. In this sense, Taipei can be firmly placed among other ‘borrowing’ sites in East Asia. At the same time, some East Asian cities, particularly, Chinese cities now also recognise Taipei as a ‘lending’ site of cultural policy strategies. In the wake of the cultural turn in the region, the sustained cultural preservation and cultural development of Taiwan has been widely acknowledged in the Chinese-speaking world. As one former senior official notes:

If you go to other Chinese cities and ask them what is the most innovative, most creative city in the Chinese-speaking world, they will all say it is Taipei. (…) Every time the officials from the Mainland visit us, (…) they always tell me: “there is creativity everywhere!” (trans. from Chinese, Official F, TP, 2014).

This trend has been recognised not only by local officials, but also by respondents in other cities. As previously noted, Taipei has now become one of the ‘lesson-drawing’
(Rose, 1991) locations for Hong Kong and Shanghai (see Subsection 6.2.4). This recognition, in turn, provides the city with a sense of symbolic cultural superiority over other Chinese cities:

Our main focus lies on artistic quality and local talents. (…) But we are not confined just to Taipei. We go to Shanghai and Hong Kong and operate in their markets. We introduce them to our strengths and capabilities, and… well, influence them (trans. from Chinese, Official G, TP, 2014).

The quote above indicates two distinctive characteristics that are used in asserting the symbolic superiority China: professionalism and local talents.

Taipei has a particularly strong base of local talents that emerged as a result of a sustained cultural growth, and it is using the display of these talents as a comparative advantage over other Chinese cities (see Subsection 6.3.4 for more detailed discussion on the promotion of local artists). Since their establishment in the late 1990s, both the TAF and the TFF have placed a particular emphasis on supporting new talents and facilitating cooperation between local and foreign artists. In the discussions with local policymakers and practitioners, these two specific characteristics were used to pose Taipei as an ‘exemplar’ (Simmons et al., 2008), a city that is actually setting trends, instead of merely following them. Referring to Shanghai’s decision to launch the SHIFF’s Asian New Talent Award, the respondent from the TFF noted that the SHIFF seemed to be “adapting to the TFF’s strategy” (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner B, TP, 2014). Speculations like this clearly assert the feeling of symbolic cultural superiority over China.

The quality of work and professionalism of large-scale cultural events is another indicator used to address the cultural primacy of Taiwan. Several respondents have suggested that Taipei’s approach to large-scale cultural events is grounded in the principle ‘small but beautiful’ (xiao er mei). The city cannot afford to host events of the same size and scale as those in China. Instead, the focus is placed on the quality of the work. In this respect, large-scale cultural events see themselves as very serious contenders to their counterparts in the Mainland. As the official from the TCC puts it, “being ‘small but beautiful’ is our main power and advantage” (trans. from Chinese, Official B, TP, 2014).

The narratives of certain democratic values, such as freedom of expression and freedom of speech, are also often employed to accentuate the differences between Taiwan and China, between ‘us’ and ‘the other’. More specifically, it is used to further reinforce Taiwan’s cultural superiority over China. During the interviews, the

58 The TFF’s International New Talent Competition has been held for more than a decade to date.
narrative of ‘freedom’ was commonly attached to the general understanding of the creative city in Taipei:

The major difference [between mainland China and Taiwan] is freedom of expression. The first thing that every culturally advanced, creative place should possess is freedom of expression. In my opinion, in Taiwan this aspect is particularly highly valued (trans. from Chinese Practitioner B, TP, 2014).

It does not matter what you say about the greatness of your creativity: if you do not have a 100 per cent freedom of speech, it will be constrained. (…) [Taipei’s] creative city brand (…) rests on ensuring the most diverse and the most independent creative space in the Chinese-speaking world (trans. from Chinese, Official F, TP, 2014).

[Chinese artists] do not dare to criticise the current government. But in Taiwan, we have much more freedom to criticise government (Academic/Advisor A, TP, 2015).

Clearly, in this context, both discourses – that of ‘freedom’ and that of the ‘creative city’ – feed into each other. Whereas ‘freedom’ is used to defend Taipei as the most advanced creative city in the Chinese-speaking world, the notion of the creative city is employed to display the degree of democratic advancements of that city. This not only echoes several earlier studies, which observed the presumed synergy between culture/creativity and core democratic values (Scott, 2006; Pratt, 2011), but also reflects on the continuous transformation of the creative city policy model. The recurrent placement of these two narratives alludes to Taiwan’s pursuit of distancing itself from China and becoming closer with the West. Although the actual degree of artistic freedom can of course be debated (see Subsection 6.2.3), the action of claiming such freedom in the context of the creative city clearly demonstrates how understanding of what the creative city is and what it signifies can be renegotiated in accordance with the specific needs and conditions of the place.

6.3.3 Display as global node

In the global networks of events, Taipei is by far less visible than Hong Kong and Shanghai, due to the relatively small scale of events, ‘local’ orientation and the political isolation of Taiwan.

My interview data shows that in Taipei, a facilitation of partnerships and cultural exchange between local and foreign artists seems to be one of the most commonly applied measures for enhancing the events’ recognition and reputation in the global professional networks:
In recent years, we facilitated cooperation and partnerships with a number of different artists from all over the world, so they could see that our level of professionalism is quite high (Trans. from Chinese, Practitioner A, TP, 2014).

[The participants] of the cultural events do not come here as tourists. They are integrated in the local industry. This helps to establish stronger ties [with the city]. (…) These ties with [foreign] industry professionals are then extended through further cooperation. The final outcome produced by such cooperation, surely strengthens the brand of the city (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner B, TP, 2014).

In this context, large-scale cultural events can be viewed as important platforms for connecting Taipei with other cities through the global networks of industry professionals. Considering that for Taipei the primary goal is to establish and maintain its presence in the global community, then just belonging to these networks is already considered an achievement in its own right.

In the interviews with local policymakers, large-scale cultural events were commonly seen as ‘nodes’ that help to connect Taipei with the rest of the world and make it visible:

We know that global cities are interlocked in one network. We always wanted to be a node in this network. We hope that if we could only become one of the nodes, our influence would increase. Therefore, a decade ago (…) we decided to pursue the title of the Financial Centre of Asia-Pacific (…) but, of course, were not successful. (…) Nowadays we are trying to take part in all sorts of international communities and initiatives, such as, for example, the WDC 2016 project. (…) [We are keen on joining] any international organisation that is willing to accept Taiwan (trans. from Chinese, Official C, TP, 2014).

[Referring to the decision to host the Festival Fringe in Taipei:] Edinburgh had it, Avignon had it… All the world… even Seoul had it. Thus we also decided to launch it, so we could join the world’s Fringe community (…) [We aspire] to join the global, large community. Taipei wants to become the city that the world talks about, (…) the city that has a role to play (trans. from Chinese, Official F, TP, 2014).

The emulation of ‘model’ cultural practices resonates with the global trend that Peck and Theodore (2015) describe as the ‘flattening’ of policymaking worlds. However, whereas for Peck and Theodore this trend is closely linked with neoliberalisation, in this instance, it refers to a different kind of politics. In Taipei, international cultural events are adopted not necessarily for their contribution to the economy and tourism, but primarily because of that important sense of belonging that they provide.

Whereas in the global networks of events, it is the presence of the event that seems to matter most, at the regional level the presence alone is not sufficient. It was
evident from my interviews that large-scale cultural events aspire to be recognised as leading regional nodes. The representative from the TCF accurately summarised these ambitions:

[Referring to the Taipei Festival Fringe:] Of course, our festival cannot be compared with Edinburgh [Festival Fringe] (…) [which] for us is a model [festival]. We aspire to gradually establish our Fringe festival as a model festival in the Chinese-speaking world. Then, subsequently, perhaps even to make it into the model Fringe festival in Asia, who knows (trans. from Chinese, Official G, TP, 2014).

Taiwan’s connection with China is increasingly exploited in building the reputation of events as important regional nodes. As one senior staff member from the TAF explains:

In recent years, at the global stage [the TAF] has already started to establish its reputation and brand. For those artists and cultural groups who wish to step into the Asian market, we are actually quite an important starting point. (…) Many of those who want to enter China’s market first come to Taiwan. We speak the same language and… They think that our response might be similar [to theirs] (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner A, TP, 2014).

This comment resonates with the ‘educator’ (McCann and Ward, 2012) position that Taipei seems to assume in relation to culture-led urban development. At the same time, it also exposes the ambivalent position of display practices in Taiwan in regard to those of China. Although they perpetually detach themselves from the Mainland by underlining their differences such as freedom of expression and a high level of professionalism, they also use their connections with China to promote themselves as important regional nodes.

6.3.4 Display as platform

Imported display practices in Taipei seem to have an ambivalent character: on the one hand, policymakers use them to strengthen Taipei’s connection to other creative cities and thus achieve worldwide recognition; on the other hand, they also use them to preserve, nurture and promote local culture and local creative industries. As a representative from the Taiwan Design Centre indicates, the primary role of WDC 2016 is namely

To serve as a platform for Taiwan designers by providing them with more opportunities to showcase their work; as well as by creating more opportunities for them to be noticed both abroad and in Taiwan (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner C, TP, 2014).
One reason behind the focus on the display of local production is the relatively small scale and the limited budget of the events, which does not allow their organisers to invite as many foreign artists and world-class performers as their counterparts in Shanghai and Hong Kong do. However, there is also another arguably more important reason behind the ‘local’ orientation of events. As already discussed in this section, the emphasis on ‘local’ (tu) is used to differentiate Taipei from other Chinese cities and to enhance the sense of belonging and pride among local citizens (see also Lung, 2005).

As previously explained, in Taipei, the city government generally assumes the role of promoter: event organisers are granted a great degree of autonomy, they receive their funding through a ‘neutral’ semi-public body – the TCF – and are not officially bound to follow the preferences of the government (see Subsection 6.2.3). Nevertheless, in practice, their decisions are largely guided by the government’s aspirations. My interview with the senior staff member of the TAF clearly demonstrates how government’s expectations for ‘local’ orientation are attached to events:

The DCA only provides us with general directions. For instance, they may say that they hope we could increase the number of local audiences, that we should include more young local talents in our programme, or that we should support local performing arts groups. (…) These are some of the major directions. Thus, they do not really intervene in our work. (…) [For example], they do not say: “The number of local cultural performances must exceed the number of international performances!”… But we have to be able to explain how we help local arts groups, and what our contribution is to the field of performing arts in Taiwan (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner A, TP, 2014).

One important question needs to be addressed here: what exactly does the term ‘local culture’ include? What exactly is being promoted here? The popular narratives of multiculturalism and cultural diversity seem to suggest a very wide scope of ‘local culture’. Nevertheless, a closer look at the annual programmes of events reveals that in this instance, the term ‘local culture’ represents primarily Chinese culture. By ‘Chinese’, I mean the Taiwanese version of Chinese culture (see Subsection 6.2.2).

Although indigenous culture now appears to be widely promoted and supported by the government, in large-scale cultural events the representation of ethnic minorities remains highly fragmented with a few main artists featured time and again. Generally, there seems to be a limited number of indigenous artists that are perceived as good enough to perform on the stage of international events. During the interview with a senior staff member of the TFF, the following point was raised in regard to indigenous culture:
This year we had a documentary that was [produced by indigenous director], but we did not select it because of Hakka culture, or some other culture… The Film Festival is about the art of filmmaking. If we would establish an award specifically for indigenous people, this would make me somewhat uneasy. I mean, if we had such an award, this would mean that regardless of what you do, whether you are good or bad, you still could get it. This does not correspond with our standards (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner B, TP, 2014).

The significance of this quote does not rest on the discussion of whether the award for directors of indigenous origin is needed or not, but rather on the high degree of scepticism regarding the ability of most of these directors to reach the standards that are applied to other Taiwanese films. This example indicates that regardless of the political rhetoric of ethnic equality and multiculturalism, the cultural scene of Taipei is still predominantly Chinese.

Research findings suggest that the interaction between large-scale cultural events and the industry is not one-sided, because events are as much dependent on the industry as the industry is dependent on events. A strong reliance on local artists means that every year the reputation and success of cultural events is largely determined by the performance of local cultural and creative industries. As the official from the TCF explains:

[Referring to the TFF:] Every year, its status is highly uncertain, because the success of the festival depends on the success of the [film] industry. For instance, last year the local film industry performed exceptionally well. Subsequently, the TFF’s box office also did well, and the quality of awarded films was very good. However, a year before that was not as good… Thus, every year the degree of success varies, depending on the situation within the industry. The TAF, the Children Arts Festival or the Fringe, they all face similar challenges. (…) Our success depends on the local artists and what they produce (trans. from Chinese, Official G, TP, 2014).

Besides the promotion of local artists, the ‘local’ focus of the city government also includes the attraction of a local audience. This largely corresponds with the government’s efforts to please its electorate (see Subsection 6.2.3). As stated by a senior staff member of the TFF,

[We need] to keep the city government and councilmen happy. (…) When they attend the opening ceremony (…) and see that the theatre is full, [when they see] that people come and leave happy, no one is complaining, no one is protesting… [this makes them] very happy (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner B, TP, 2014).

Subsequently, large-scale cultural events in Taipei are commonly presented as highly inclusive and open to all members of the public. In reality, of course, this is not the
case, because the actual focus of the events is limited to members of the middle class (Chiu and Lin, 2014). During interviews, a typical attendee of the events was described as young (up to 35 years old), well-educated, open-minded and relatively wealthy Taiwanese. Any initiatives to broaden the demographic of audience and to attract more groups of the community indicate a great degree of selectivity that seems to be determined primarily by social status. While attempts to include the LGBT community and elderly people were accentuated over and over again, the issues related to the inclusion of migrant workers or people coming from less-educated and poorer backgrounds were completely neglected during the interviews with policymakers and practitioners. In this respect, Taipei is exposed as an archetypical example of an entrepreneurial creative city: whilst claiming to serve the interests of everyone, the city, in fact, only serves the interests of “those with money” (Harvey, 2008: 8).

It should be noted that a strong reliance on public funding and government-sponsored projects imposes a number of constraints on local artists. The city government is the main contractor and employer of local cultural and creative industries in Taipei (J.J. Wang, 2003). According to Chiu and Lin (2014), it increasingly exploits local artists as “symbolic instruments” (trans. from Chinese, p.72) to achieve its goals and objectives. This covert exploitation takes place through the imposition of certain standards and ‘general directions’ that their work is expected to meet. As a result, local industry practitioners are not necessary free to create what they want to create. For instance, local artists in Taipei similar to those in other Chinese cities are also under pressure to conform to ‘international’ standards. As one government official notes,

We recognise that the work of many local designers is not ‘international’ enough. Therefore, we send them abroad. For example, next year we will go to Milan and other places. This is how we address the lack of ‘internationalisation’ (trans. from Chinese, Official C, TP, 2014).

The pursuit of ‘internationalisation’ (guojihua) exerts a certain pressure on the industry and artists to become more ‘international’, which can be read as a limitation of their freedom of expression.

59 The active support for the LGBT community could be seen as a strategic political move. It assists in outlining the difference between democratic and ‘free’ Taiwan and the authoritarian communist regime in China. It also corresponds with Florida’s (2002) criterion of ‘tolerance’, which Florida considers to be one of the key characteristics of the creative city. In this respect, a growing number of cultural programmes and activities focused on raising awareness about the LGBT community serve to suggest the city’s ‘readiness’ to join the creative city network.
All in all, the ‘local’ orientation of imported display practices, which conforms to the agenda of the city as well as the state, is indeed one of the most distinctive features of Taipei, which clearly exemplifies the transformation of the creative city policy discourse.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have aimed to show that creative city making in Taipei has been guided by a different kind of politics than that evident within the Global North.

First, the creative city policy model is employed not only as an entrepreneurial strategy, but also as a political strategy directed at addressing local struggles of power and influence. As shown in this chapter, political rivalries between the two leading parties and electoral reforms have played an important role in shaping the urban cultural policy agenda in Taipei. As a result, the creative city and its display practices have been widely used to build a political legacy for local politicians and their parties, as well as to ensure the support and satisfaction of local voters.

Second, the city-led cultural turn in Taipei is not a product of the interests of the city alone, but also largely directed at assisting the central government in its foreign policy and public diplomacy. Therefore the primary aim of making Taipei the ‘Capital of Chinese culture and creativity’ has been to assert symbolic cultural superiority over China and to enhance the international recognition of Taiwan, not necessarily to boost urban regeneration and economic growth. Although the narratives of inter-urban competition for investment and skilled labour widely circulate within the local policy discourse of the creative city, these narratives emerge primarily from Taiwan’s long-standing political rivalry with China. Similarly, the role of the creative city as a promotional practice not only attracts more tourists and business, but also, and perhaps more importantly, enhances the international recognition and presence of Taipei and Taiwan within the global community. By joining the virtual global network of creative cities, Taipei seeks to ensure that neither the city nor its unrecognised state is forgotten.

Third, the central focus of creative city making in Taipei rests on the preservation and promotion of local culture. On the one hand, this resonates with the identity politics of the state and contributes to the building of a national Taiwanese identity. On the other hand, this contributes to establishing the reputation of Taipei as the model creative city in the Chinese-speaking world. A strong reliance on local cultural production is a key difference that sets the display practices of Taipei apart from those of Hong Kong and Shanghai. In this sense, the display of local culture –
predominantly Chinese culture – demonstrates that Taipei’s experience and achievements in the field of culture and the arts exceeds that of other Chinese cities.

The last two points indicate that although the cultural turn in Taipei represents the rise of urban cultural policies, it should not be perceived as ‘a turn’, but rather as an extension of state-led cultural policy. Since the establishment of the ROC in 1949, Taiwan’s cultural policy has been formulated in light of the political rivalry with China, the pursuit of international recognition, and identity politics. In this context, economic considerations are overshadowed by other considerations such as connecting with the global community, appealing to local audiences, and generating awareness of Taipei as the model creative city. As shown in this chapter, although the government shields local artists from industrialisation and commercial pressures, other limitations constrain their autonomy, as these artists are forced to adjust their work to the expectations of their main employer – the government.

This chapter completes the discussion of empirical findings from all three sites. Thus far I have focused on each city as an individual case. Drawing on Peck’s (2011b) proposition that “context matters” (p. 775), I have sought to identify the meanings attached to imported display practices in each city and the ways in which specific political and historical settings shape these meanings. A strong connection between the role of display and the context, specifically historical legacies, political system, inter-city relations, regulatory mechanisms of culture, and the ‘traditional’ cultural policy agenda, has been established in all three cities. This clearly confirms that “policy regimes and landscapes are more than empty spaces across which borrowing and learning take place” (Peck, 2011b: 775).

Although all three cities share some similarities with entrepreneurial cities in the Global North, in the sense that they all now use culture and the arts to counter the growing inter-urban competition for investment, skilled workers and tourists, there are also some distinctive characteristics that separate them from those cities as well as from each other. Study findings clearly revealed a different kind of politics behind the display of the creative city: whereas Shanghai’s cultural policy as display practices are driven by state-led ambition to increase global power and influence, Hong Kong uses them to maintain its current competitive position in the global city network; Taipei, on the other hand, is focused on political rivalry with China and the pursuit of international recognition.

Indeed, a number of other notable differences and similarities have surfaced in the course of the discussion of different roles attached to culture as display, exposing the mutation of imported cultural policies. The next chapter will cross-examine the findings from all three cities to identify some general patterns that shape these mutations.
Chapter 7
Creative City with Chinese Characteristics

The creative city could be read as a *floating signifier*, because of its tendency to absorb rather than to emit meanings. The empirical chapters have revealed that the rationales and functions of the creative city are continually re-adjusted in line with historical, economic and political developments of a specific place. This means that the term ‘creative city’ has a variety of discursive uses. It is these uses that define the term in a particular place and time.

In this comparative chapter, drawing on the empirical findings of my study I address the major patterns that shape the adoption and transformation of the creative city policies in Chinese cities. Four major factors that determine the trajectories of imported cultural policies are identified, including global and regional connections, inherited ideological and political frameworks, regulatory and funding mechanisms of cultural policy, and the ‘traditional’ agenda of national cultural policy. To demonstrate that imported cultural policies are not only *transformed by the city*, but they also *transform the city*, in this chapter I also address the ways in which these policies have an impact on cultural policy-making and local culture more generally.

### 7.1 Motives for adoption: global city *making*

Previous research has established that many East Asian cities share a common aspiration for ‘global attention’ and ‘global city’ status (Yeoh, 2005; Kong, 2007; Ku and Tsui, 2008b; Ong, 2011a; Kong, 2012). My study findings suggest that this particular aspiration is the main driving force behind the emulation of the creative city policy script in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei.

It is important to acknowledge that in this context, the term ‘global city’ has little to do with the original concept of the global/world city, which was introduced to critically address the changes in the global spatial order and to assess large cities as products of economic globalisation (see Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991; Knox, 1995; Smith and Timberlake, 2002; Taylor, 2013). Instead, it reflects on the politics of global city *making* that has emerged as somewhat an unintended consequence of the original ‘global city’ thesis (see Robinson, 2002; Robinson, 2005; Olds and Yeung, 2004; Smith, 2013a; Timberlake et al., 2014).

The research on global cities that sees them as key nodes of command and control has undoubtedly expanded our knowledge and understanding of transnational
networks of cities and their significance in the world economy. At the same time, however, by dividing the cities into global cities and the rest as well as by producing various ranking tables to compare global cities against each other, this body of literature has inadvertently facilitated inter-urban competition and exposed the divergence between the global periphery and the global core. In effect, as Robinson (2002) accurately explains,

[The] understandings of city-ness have come to rest on the (usually unstated) experiences of a relatively small group of (mostly western) cities, and cities outside of the West are assessed in terms of this pre-given standard of (world) city-ness, or urban economic dynamism (pp. 531-532).

Such situations have prompted many cities, particularly those ‘outside of the West’, to pursue a global city status – to make their cities ‘global’. As a result, many cities today are not only globalising, but also are being globalised (Olds and Yeung, 2004). The original global city thesis de-territorialised the global city, stating that the world city network formation has been “more an outcome of global corporate decisions than the collective works of urban policy makers” (Taylor, 2001: 182; see also Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991). The global city making, on the other hand, is an intentional urban growth strategy.

It is in this context that a new, cultural/creative dimension has been attached to the concept of the global city. Consequently, in addition to being perceived as “centres of finance and as centres for global servicing and management” (Sassen, 1991: 324, original emphasis), global cities are now also increasingly seen as hubs of creativity and global nodes of arts and culture (Yeoh, 2005; Ong, 2011a; Kong, 2012).

This trend, like global city making at large, can undoubtedly be linked with the market-driven policy agenda and urban entrepreneurialism. As Smith (2013a) accurately observes, “the neoliberal ideology of the entrepreneurial city has inverted the ‘world city’ and ‘global city’ to its own conception and ends” (p. 2296; see also Jessop and Sum, 2000). Kong and her colleagues (2015) use a similar argument to explain the emergence of ‘global cultural cities’ in their recently published book entitled Arts, Culture and the Making of Global Cities:

With multiple and recurrent global flows of people, goods, services, ideas and images, the quest for global city status also increasingly rests on the production and consumption of culture and the arts, so that global cities might well be characterised as ‘global cultural cities’ (p. 1).

Nevertheless, outside of the West, global city making can also be viewed as an attempt to remake core-periphery geographies – a postcolonial experience grounded
in “the ongoing process of ‘catching up’” (Ong, 2011b: 8; see also King, 1996; Robinson, 2011).

My study findings show that an entanglement of both of these concerns shape creative city making within Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei.

As demonstrated in the empirical chapters, all three Chinese cities read the creative city policy script as a ‘must-have’ for achieving, maintaining and strengthening their position on the global stage. The perception that in order to become and remain a global city, cities have no choice but to establish themselves as hubs of culture and creativity clearly involves the element of passive coercion. This echoes the socio-constructivist approach to policy transfer in that it shows that the adoption of the creative city policy is not a ‘perfectly-rational’ decision made by policymakers alone, but rather a consequence of a wide range of political and sociospatial processes (McCann, 2011a; Peck, 2011b; see also Subsection 2.4.1).

In the past, the lack of public support for culture was never considered an obstacle for Hong Kong’s growth and recognition at the global stage of finance and trade. Nevertheless, an increasing pressure to compete for investment, talents and tourists coupled with uncertainties about the future prospects of the city after the 1997 handover have forced Hong Kong to comply with the globalising cultural turn in urban development. Similarly, as a re-emerging global city, Shanghai also finds itself under pressure to secure its place next to the most integrated world-cities – London and New York (see Sassen, 1991; Massey, 2005; Taylor, 2013). In order to assimilate with these two and other leading cities in the global city network, and ultimately to enhance the global power and influence of its state, Shanghai attempts to emulate their ‘model’ strategies and adopts their narratives of culture-led urban development. For Taiwan, the greater position and recognition of Taipei at the international stage signifies an important step forward towards maintaining its de facto sovereignty from China. In this context, the adoption of the creative city policy script not only provides a rare opportunity to raise Taipei’s global profile in the global city network, but also assists this marginalised island in securing its place in the international community.

My study also found that in all three Chinese cities a sense of uniqueness that has been widely used to promise a competitive advantage for creative cities by its advocates in the Global North is replaced with a sense of inclusion, where the appeal of the creative city rests namely on its commonality rather than distinctiveness. All three Chinese cities feel marginalised either due to their size, geopolitical location or political status. This sense of marginalisation goes beyond economic competition in the global city network. It is also deeply rooted in their complex colonial or semi-colonial histories. In this context, for all three cities, the ‘western script’ of the
creative city provides a much-needed assertion that ‘we’ can be like ‘them’ (see Anderson, 2006). Consequently, like signature constructions, the term ‘creative city’ is also used as a ‘magic wand’ to mark the transition from developing to developed cities and to establish “their countries’ claims to global significance” (Ong, 2011b: 2; see also King, 1996; Robinson, 2011).

All in all, it is evident that global cultural city making is closely linked with national-policy contexts. These contexts not only affect the adoption process of imported cultural policies, but also, as will be shown next, shape their transformation.

7.2 Transformation patterns

Imported cultural policies are transformed both as they move between cities and as they are integrated within cities. This study found four major conditions that contribute to this process that include global and regional connections, inherited ideological and political frameworks, regulatory and funding mechanisms of urban cultural policy, and a ‘traditional’ agenda of local cultural policy.

7.2.1 Global and regional connections

Global city making and competition for a place in the actually existing global city network animate two interlocked mechanisms of policy transfer: policy transfer by social emulation and policy transfer by competition (Simmons et al., 2008; see also Subsection 2.4.1). In both cases, ‘hierarchical tendencies’ (Taylor, 2013) within the network of global cities play an important role in shaping the agenda of policy transfer. Policy documents and interview data demonstrate that the most integrated cities within the network, specifically, London and New York, are typically perceived and used as exemplars or model cities.

My study revealed that other types of global networks – those that accommodate the global community of industry professionals and experts – also assume a significant role in the transfer process of cultural policy strategies (see Stringer, 2001; Ma, 2012). This thesis addressed global networks of selected events showing how the ‘hierarchical tendencies’ of these networks are guiding the policy transfer process. In this case it is the most prestigious and most reputable events – ‘best practices’ – that are setting the agenda for other events and cities that adopt them (see Subsection 5.3.3).

In addition, this study found that the relationship between the three Chinese cities also influences the adoption and transformation process of imported cultural policies. In fact, within the global city networks, Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong, together with other global or globalising Chinese cities seem to form their own sub-network
As with the global city network, the relationship between these cities is largely shaped by the global economy and inter-urban competition for capital and talent. This competition locks cities into the imminent cycle of relentless monitoring, assessment, comparison, and, at times, imitation of their counterparts, and is commonly argued to lead to a zero-sum game (Harvey, 1989a; Peck, 2007). In this context, the decision to import the creative city policy discourse and policies is largely driven by a market-driven policy agenda of ‘catching-up’ with other rival cities.

However, the historical and cultural affinities between Taipei, Hong Kong and Shanghai means that besides their common interest in economic growth, these cities are also interconnected on a number of other levels. Their ‘hierarchical tendencies’ in this respect are largely determined by historically established political tensions and rivalries that have initially emerged at the inter-state level and were inherited by the cities. The most relevant examples for this study include political tensions between Taiwan and China, China and the United States, and the complex triangular relationship between the United Kingdom, China and Hong Kong. In this context, the creative city policy script operates as a political device – a symbolic currency of the state (city-state) in its pursuit for recognition and/or influence. As shown in the empirical chapters, Hong Kong employs imported cultural strategies to prevent assimilation with other Chinese cities and defend its global city status; Taipei is using them to enhance symbolic cultural supremacy over China; whereas in Shanghai these strategies are merged into the cultural soft power policy agenda that is directed at strengthening the global power and influence of China.

The study found that ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties between cities, which are often promoted as central to the facilitation of the mutual exchange of views and ideas, are employed in addressing political rivalries between cities. Taipei provides a particularly instructive example in this regard. In this city, the generation of symbolic cultural superiority over China and influence seems to be the underlying objective behind the narratives of cooperation and partnerships between local cultural groups and the Mainland (see Subsection 6.3.2).

Overall, these results are in agreement with previous studies, which indicated the significance of historical, political and cultural affinities between ‘borrowing’ and ‘lending’ sites in directing and regulating the flows of ideas (see Kong et al., 2006; Ward, 2006; Peck, 2011b; Jacobs, 2012). All three Chinese cities are undoubtedly ‘borrowing’ sites because they all adopt the ‘western script’ of the creative city and its policies. At the same time, however, they are all also ‘lending’ sites because their cultural, economic and political interconnectivities influence and shape these policies.
It could be concluded that global and regional interconnectivities are both the cause and the effect of the cultural turn in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei. In addition to provoking the transfer process of cultural policies, they also shape it.

7.2.2 **Ideological and political frameworks**

The analysis of historical and political context in Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong shows that inherited ideological and political frameworks also play a major role in setting the agenda for imported urban cultural policies.

As previously discussed, Shanghai’s cultural turn is primarily directed at fulfilling the ambitions of its authoritarian state, rather than the city per se. Since China entered the global marketplace in the late 1970s, it was compelled to face the pressures of global competition. Although the creative city policy script was partly adopted as one of the ‘global’ solutions to counter these pressures, the impetus for its adoption goes beyond economic competition and reflects on China’s ambition for global leadership and a new international order. As shown in Chapter 4, creative city making in Shanghai is closely linked with the national policy strategy for the building and developing of Chinese soft power. In this context, the creative city and its display practices are seen as a means to demonstrate China’s global influence and power. Such understanding of ‘display’ clearly echoes Williams’ (1984) idea of the state as “not only the central organ of power, but of display” (p. 3).

This study found that in accordance with these ambitions, in Shanghai all publicly funded display practices are almost exclusively outward-oriented. In other words, their primary focus rests on the generation of international impact. The government expects to achieve this impact through the spectacle of grandeur: the emphasis is placed on the scale and magnitude of events, world-class performers and international media coverage. The interests and needs of local artists, on the other hand, are not taken into consideration (see Subsection 5.3.4).

Taipei adopts a different approach to imported cultural policies. Since the democratic movement took off in the late 1980s, Taiwan’s political system has undergone some important reforms that led to political decentralisation and the transfer of power from the centre to the local authorities and the local electorate (see Subsection 6.2.3). This resulted in the satisfaction of local citizens being placed at the centre of the policy agenda in Taipei (see Chung, 2014).

Predominantly ‘local’ orientation of display practices was a recurrent theme in the interviews that I conducted in Taipei. Contrary to Shanghai and Hong Kong, in Taipei large-scale cultural events are directed primarily at the promotion of local artists and the attraction of local audiences. Although this may partly be explained by the smaller scale and budget of the events, research data suggests that
community-centred cultural policy-making derives primarily from the attempt to ‘sell democracy’ (Rawnsley, 2003). Since the late 1990s, Taiwan has actively employed ‘democratisation’ narratives in its foreign policy to distinguish itself from the PRC and to raise its profile on the international stage (see Rawnsley, 2003).

Hong Kong’s policy system is grounded in *laissez-faire* capitalism and selective interventionism. Subsequently, the HKSAR government reads imported cultural policies primarily as entrepreneurial strategy, a means to attract tourists and investment. In this context, the main objective attached to display practices is to create the image of a vibrant global city (see Subsection 5.3.1). The analysis of my data revealed that the government’s interest and support is directed predominantly on the creative rather than the cultural sector, which also resonates with the market-centred policy agenda of the city. Although in practice both sectors are closely entangled together, the common approach holds that creativity and creative initiatives are more directly involved in the economic development of cities than culture and the arts (Pratt, 2009; Bell and Oakley, 2015). Altogether this suggests that converting symbolic capital into money seems to be one of the key objectives of the cultural turn in Hong Kong.

As shown in Chapter 5, the cultural turn in Hong Kong has also been shaped by the 1997 political transition, which prompted anxieties about the city’s future and identity. Consequently, the creative city and its display practices are used to send a message to the international community that despite these changes Hong Kong continues to remain an important global node.

### 7.2.3 Regulatory and funding mechanisms of urban cultural policy

In all three Chinese cities, there are different variations of funding mechanisms and governance models of culture and the arts, which also play a crucial role in changing and defining the trajectories of imported cultural policies.

The study data shows that the Shanghai municipal government possesses very limited decision-making authority. Considering that it is the CCP leadership that regulates and guides cultural policy-making in Shanghai, the city’s cultural policy agenda is merely a replica of national cultural policy objectives. All large-scale international cultural events in Shanghai are launched and funded by the state and their ultimate task is to generate international impact for the state, not just for the city.

Such regulatory and funding mechanisms yield a stark divide between those making all decisions and the cultural groups and organisations that implement them. This divide between the central government in Beijing and Shanghai-based cultural practitioners is one of both physical distance and power. Cultural groups and organisations in Shanghai possess few (if any) opportunities for dialogue with
decision-makers and find their creativity and freedom of expression more constrained than those in Beijing. Interview data suggests that the absence of flexibility decreases the motivation of events’ organising teams to pursue new ideas and directions (see Subsection 4.2.3). In addition, their programming choices are limited due to strict censorship laws. As shown in this study, altogether this has had a negative impact on Shanghai’s position within the global professional networks of events (see Subsection 4.3.3).

The ‘non-interventionist’ government of Hong Kong adopts a different approach to the administration of culture. Using the arm’s length principle, the government grants all major cultural organisations and events a relatively high degree of decision-making autonomy and freedom. This study found that although local government does exert a degree of power over the cultural sector in Hong Kong, industry professionals appear to play a key role in shaping the direction of display practices in the city.

In contrast to Shanghai, events in Hong Kong irrespective of their scale and funding source, are less concerned with the ‘display’ of the city and more with the ‘display’ of themselves. Specifically, they seek recognition in global professional networks, where the highest value is placed not on the location or size of the event, but rather on its history, quality and reputation (see Subsection 5.3.3). Although such recognition contributes to the image of a city, city promotion is not the primary intention. The primary intention in this context is to counter the growing competition for investment, talents, and audiences within the global ‘festival circuits’ (Stringer, 2001). I found that although neither city branding nor tourist attraction are considered to be key priorities for events in Hong Kong, the narratives of city promotion, tourism, inter-urban competition and the creative economy are widely employed in industry discourse to justify their case for public funding (see Subsection 5.3.1).

A vast array of interests are shaping imported cultural policies in Taipei, including those of local and national-level policymakers, cultural elites, industry professionals and the local community. Indeed, the voice of the public seems to be of great importance for the directly elected government of Taipei, which suggests an intention to make the decision-making process more democratic (see Subsection 6.2.3). However, an in-depth impact study is needed to show how community-led governance actually plays out in practice.

In some ways, Taipei’s funding mechanism for display practices resembles that of Hong Kong: funding is distributed by the TCF, which operates under the arm’s length principle. This means that, as in Hong Kong, the city government is not directly involved in their administration and management. Nevertheless, there are
two distinctive characteristics that distinguish Taipei from Hong Kong. First, the amount of public funding received by both cities differs greatly. Research data shows that whilst in Hong Kong, public subsidies comprise just around 30 per cent of the total expenditure of events, in Taipei they cover around 90 per cent of events’ expenses (see Subsections 5.2.4 and 6.2.3). This means that display practices in Taipei are less prone to commercial pressures than their counterparts in Hong Kong. My interviews revealed that instead, they are under a different kind of pressure: meeting the expectations of the government. This point links to the second major distinction between Taipei and Hong Kong: the key objectives of the cultural turn. Whereas in Hong Kong industry professionals play the primary role in determining the roles of imported display practices, in Taipei they appear to be set by the government. Consequently, the study found that the major goals attached to large-scale cultural events revolve around city promotion, international recognition, and political rivalries with China, as well as the ‘display’ of local culture and democratisation.

7.2.4 ‘Traditional’ agenda of local cultural policy

Although the creative city policy discourse has altered the content of urban cultural policy by adding the promise of economic development and urban regeneration, in all cities it has been bound to change in accordance with the ‘traditional’ agenda of cultural policy. Referring to the creative city policy script in the UK, Pratt (2010) observes that “there is no ‘creative cities policy’ in the UK”; instead, there is “a long history of urban policy and of cultural policy” (p. 15). In a similar vein, discussing cultural and creative industries policy discourse in East Asia, Lee and Lim (2014) argue that while these policies have increased economic instrumentalisation of culture, “the way policies are made resembles the way culture and cultural policy used to be organised” (p. 10). The findings of my study confirm that the adoption and transformation of the creative city policy model is indeed embedded in the already existing models of cultural policy.

As shown in the empirical chapters, imported cultural policies tend to be absorbed into the ‘traditional’ cultural policies. In the past, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong perceived culture primarily as an ideological instrument and used it to strengthen the political and ideological power of ‘the ruler’ over ‘the ruled’ (see Tong, 1994; Chu and Lin, 2001; Ku and Tsui, 2008b). In the PRC, the major focus was on ensuring public support of and loyalty to Mao’s socialist ideology and the CCP; in the ROC, culture was employed to strengthen the position of the KMT in the island and to establish the sense of cultural unity; in Hong Kong, the British colonial government used it to maintain social cohesion and political stability (see Chapters 4, 5, 6). This study demonstrates that although the scope of instrumental roles attached to culture
has expanded in the wake of China’s Open-Door Policy, Taiwan’s democratisation and Hong Kong’s handover, cultural policies (including imported cultural policies) continue to be used to counter political rivalries and to establish a political authority at local, national and global levels.

Historically, cultural policies have played a central role in identity politics contributing to the building of ‘a distinctive socialist identity’ of Shanghai, the global identity of Hong Kong and both the national and cultural identity of Taiwan. As shown in the empirical chapters, in all three Chinese cities the creative city policy model and its display practices have also been employed in these identity building projects.

Furthermore, the overall condition of the local cultural arena also impacts the trajectory of the cultural turn in the city. In Taipei, a city that has a strong and well-established cultural sector, the creative city policy discourse is adopted to display the city’s achievements in the field. Accordingly, large-scale cultural events in Taipei are seen as platforms to promote local artists and local cultural and creative industries (see also Subsection 6.3.4). In Hong Kong and Shanghai, where cultural development was obstructed either due to the lack of government support or decision-making autonomy, the adoption of the creative city provided more opportunities for foreign artists and performers rather than for locals. The case of Shanghai was particularly instructive in this regard. As my interviews with local industry practitioners demonstrate, the government is interested in promoting only those local artists who have already established a certain status and reputation at the international stage (see Subsection 4.3.4).

Altogether these examples not only expose the embeddedness of imported cultural policies, but also show that in all three Chinese cities they are perceived as more than just entrepreneurial strategies for tourists, investment and jobs. This confirms that a singular model of the creative city does not exist: its meaning is continuously reconstructed through multiple relational exchanges between and within cities (see also Pratt, 2010; Prince, 2010b). As a floating signifier, the notion of the creative city is important primarily for its ability to absorb rather than to emit meanings.

This does not mean, however, that creative city policies cannot generate any impact on the city. In the last section, I will discuss a number of changes as well as challenges that they have brought to these Chinese cities.

### 7.3 Integration patterns

As shown in this chapter, the global appeal and hypermobility of the creative city policy discourse rests on its conformity rather than on its deviance, on the political
rhetoric rather than evidence, and on its seemingly broad applicability rather than accountability. This does not mean, however, that upon adoption imported cultural policies just passively absorb new roles and meanings that get ascribed to them. This study found that they are, in fact, also transforming and even, in some ways, challenging cultural policy-making in all three Chinese cities. This means that their adoption is a two-way process.

As previously explained, a growing focus on culture as display in the Global North largely stems from the market-driven approach to urban development, where cultural policies are increasingly perceived as generators of wealth and magnets for capital inflows (see Subsection 2.3.1). The adoption of these policies in East Asian cities has marked the emergence of a new policy approach to culture. This approach acknowledged an enlarged scope of instrumentalisation of culture – in particular, privileging the economic contributions of culture and the arts (see also Lee and Lim, 2014).

Indeed, the economic instrumentalisation of culture is a relatively new trend in cultural policies of Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei. As shown in the empirical chapters, until the late 1990s, in all three cities policymakers saw culture and the arts primarily as tools for ideological and social control, and generally did not attach them to the economy (see Chapters 4, 5, 6). The growing recognition that culture as display could be used to generate economic impact has brought both new tensions and new possibilities into the local cultural arenas of Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei.

The emergence of a more productive and intense dialogue between politicians and industry professionals could be seen as one outcome of the increased economic instrumentalisation of culture. As my interviews with the design industry professionals in Taipei and Hong Kong show, in recent years they have been provided with more opportunities to voice their ideas and concerns, and in turn feel more involved in the decision-making process. Although this in no way means that local policymakers are now equally interested in hearing what all industries and all cultural groups have to say, the emergence of discussions between the government and the industry indicate some important changes in the cultural policy-making process. Of course, in light of the economic instrumentalisation of culture, we should also ask who benefits from these discussions? It is likely that stronger partnerships between the municipal governments and private stakeholders might result in the interests of capital displacing the interests of the public.

Although during my interviews, rising expectations for economic contributions from display practices have been observed in all three Chinese cities, it is only in Hong Kong that the value of culture is assessed primarily in these terms. Here all cultural
organisations, including those that receive regular public subsidies from the government, are forced to operate as commercial enterprises. This means that they have little room to accommodate experimental art or other creative but potentially unprofitable projects, which ultimately hinders cultural growth and development of the city (see also Lee et al., 2013). Additionally, this also imposes a certain degree of pressure on local cultural practitioners and artists, who are increasingly finding themselves caught up in a tug of war between artistic expression and commercial appeal (see Subsection 5.2.4).

The broadening scope of instrumental roles attached to culture as well as the adoption of a wider range of cultural practices and initiatives have also led to an increase in public spending on culture and the arts. Since the early 2000s, public expenditure for culture has been raised in all three cities, with Taipei experiencing the most dramatic growth of around 162 per cent from 2001 to 2015 (see Appendix B). It should be noted, however, that this surge in public funding commonly benefits only selected or ‘privileged’ cultural groups (see also Lee et al., 2013). In order for their cities to be recognised as creative cities, municipal governments throw large amounts of money into the development of the cultural and creative industries as well as in the facilitation and promotion of various display practices, including cultural landmarks and large-scale cultural events. As discussed in the empirical chapters, world-renowned artists and organisations and commercially more appealing projects tend to get more support from local governments, whereas those of smaller scale and impact often remain neglected.

All three cities exhibit this tendency at varying degrees of intensity. However, when we look at Shanghai we see a most instructive and potentially most alarming phenomenon. Although Shanghai has been increasingly promoted as the ‘international cultural metropolis’, the government’s commitment to the actual ‘cultural turn’ of the city still remains to be seen. As shown in Chapter 4, the primary, if not exclusive, focus of the city authorities lies on supporting either large-scale cultural projects that can generate coverage in the international media or those cultural initiatives that have already achieved international recognition. More vulnerable groups, on the other hand, such as small-scale cultural projects and young artists that cannot deliver an immediate ‘international’ impact remain largely neglected (see Subsection 4.3.4). Moreover, the city government also shows little concern for involving the local community. As opposed to Hong Kong and Taipei, community engagement and participation programmes are largely absent from culture-led urban development in Shanghai (see Subsection 4.3.4). In this context, display practices in Shanghai emerge primarily as staged spectacles of China’s growing power and wealth.
It is important to acknowledge that the rise in public expenditure on culture in these three Chinese cities not only reflects the growing support of the government, but also manifests its right to intervene. As shown in the empirical chapters, funding from the government always comes with strings attached. My interviews with the organisers of large-scale cultural events in Taipei, Hong Kong and Shanghai revealed that there are always certain ‘expectations’ that they all need to meet in order to secure regular inflows of funding, such as generating wide-reaching and positive publicity, ensuring the international presence and impact of the event, and achieving high attendance rates.

These and similar ‘expectations’ suggest that whilst the increased public spending for culture may provide more development opportunities for local cultural practices and initiatives, the growing dependence on the government’s support can also bring about certain limitations on creativity and freedom of artists. The study found that the government’s expectations are directly (or indirectly) passed on to the individual artists and performers, which then inevitably affects the direction and focus of their work. For example, in all three cities the artists find themselves under pressure to produce cultural products that meet ‘international’ quality standards and have an ‘international’ appeal (see Subsections 4.3.4, 5.3.4 and 6.3.4).

Additionally, these ‘expectations’ expose a growing tendency for arts value to be justified and rationalised through tangible and preferably quantitative measures, which is commonly associated with evidence-based policymaking (see Belfiore, 2004; Oakley, 2009; Prince, 2014a). In all three cities, event organisers are required to provide the city government with quantitative data that typically includes the number of performance venues, participants and visitors, local and foreign media coverage and box office sales. Considering that these numbers serve as major evidence of success (or failure) of display practices, the organisers are very careful about how they describe and present their event in quantitative terms. At times, they need to learn how to rework data, how to make it fit different purposes and expectations, and how “to produce numbers out of the numbers” (Prince, 2014b: 96). As one of my respondents from the HKIFF explained:

[Policymakers] do not know how to assess the quality of events. (…) All they understand is figures. Quantitative [data]. So we have to be very careful in presenting good figures to them. That means that sometimes we… and it’s easy… I mean, we manoeuvre with the percentage, or… We all know how to do it. And they understand [that we are doing that]. (…) As long as we are doing everything all right, they are all right. (…) So everybody is happy (Practitioner B, HK, 2014).

The creative city policy model and its display practices are ‘fast policies’ (Peck and Theodore, 2015) in a sense that their adoption process typically takes place in a short
period of time, “often overriding traditional and more circumspect policy processes” (Prince, 2012b: 192; see also Peck and Theodore, 2012). This means that they are often adopted without proper assessment and preparation. Drawing on Taipei’s case, Wang (2010) refers to this tendency as ‘nalai zhuyi [borrowism]’ arguing that local policy makers often overlook the need for careful evaluation of the actual benefits and values (if any) that these policies could bring to the city (see also Chiu and Lin, 2014).

The creative city policies can also be seen as ‘fast policies’ in terms of the imminent results that they promise – an immediate cultural renaissance for the city. The expanding number of cultural events, landmarks and venues, the facilitation of local talents and the development of cultural and creative industries, which altogether comprise the core of the creative city, are claimed to enrich, stimulate and reinvigorate the city and its cultural life (see Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002).

However, it appears that the road towards this cultural ‘enlightenment’ is not as easy and clear-cut as it is often presented to be. Here I defer to my interviewee from Shanghai, who noted that turning the city into an economic centre is much easier than making it into a cultural centre:

“You need to spend much more time, a lot more years on culture. In addition, its development is also strongly linked with the place per se: has it any traditions? Has it any [cultural] resources? Cultural growth [of the city] is tied in with many different things (trans. from Chinese, Practitioner A, SH, 2014).

Indeed, creative city making depends upon all of the local conditions that affect culture and the arts within the given city. Empirical findings revealed that imported cultural policies in this context prove to be of little use, because they do not yield any imminent solutions for already existing deficiencies. In fact, they impose an additional set of demands and pressures on local cultural policies, because as ‘fast policies’ they expect fast results. In amidst accelerated cultural development, these demands can become somewhat disruptive in addressing more pressing issues. As will be shown below, cities are often forced to apply quick fixes that only treat the symptoms, but not the problem.

Take, for example, a relatively small and underdeveloped base of local talents in Shanghai and Hong Kong. In Shanghai, the development of a strong and independent artistic community has been relentlessly obstructed by severe restraints on artistic expression and freedom (see Subsection 4.2.3), whereas in Hong Kong, where public support for the arts has always been very limited and fragmented, commercially unviable projects have few opportunities to emerge and sustain themselves (see Subsection 5.2.4). Study data shows that while the cultural turn in
urban development has undoubtedly exposed this problem, it placed the central focus on facilitation of those artists who are capable of meeting the desired ‘international’ standards, rather than on supporting local artists at large. Moreover, to compensate for the lack of local talents who supposedly meet ‘world-class’ standards both cities are impelled to choose a faster, though arguably less beneficial, route by employing foreign talents to display the supposed cultural advancement and growth. With display practices in Hong Kong and Shanghai serving as primary platforms for foreign performers, events fail to contribute to the actual development and promotion of local culture (see Subsections 4.3.4 and 5.3.4).

Culture-led urban development has also generated the growing demand for local audiences. Creative cities are essentially consumption hubs – they rely heavily on people who are willing, capable and interested in consuming cultural goods and services (see Pratt, 2011). The advocates of the creative city policy narratives seem to assume that the demand for cultural products is already there (see Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002). Nevertheless, the findings of this study suggest that in many cases this demand for cultural consumers needs to be created. Take, for example, the design industry. As shown in the empirical chapters, in the last decade, the design industry has experienced a rapid growth, occupying one of the leading positions among the cultural and creative industries in all three cities. Study findings clearly indicate that in order to ensure a successful leap forward for the design industry, all cities have invested and continue to invest a lot of time, effort and money in developing, or rather, constructing the demand for design products. The launch of large-scale events directed at celebrating the design industry, such as the Design Year 2012 in Hong Kong, the WDC 2016 in Taipei, as well as Shanghai’s bid for the UNESCO City of Design, represent just one kind of the many strategies used to stimulate the interest of the public.

However, the creation of demand can be a very long and challenging process that may require reforms and interventions in educational and other public policy sectors, provided the government is willing to go all the way. The need for audience development and arts education has been repeatedly underlined during the interviews with government officials and industry professionals in all three cities. The degree of interest in this problem, particularly in Hong Kong, where local government historically showed little interest in arts education, was one of the most interesting and unanticipated findings of my research. While display practices in Shanghai use a quick fix approach to address this issue by giving away a large number of tickets to sponsors and government officials, which helps to ensure high attendance rates, Hong Kong has responded to this problem with a long-term strategy. The government has expanded the scope of arts education in schools from music and
visual arts to media arts, dance, and drama (see Subsection 5.3.4). In addition, as shown in the Hong Kong chapter, in recent years both the government and the industry have also been investing in various outreach programmes and activities. Compared to 2002, the number of publicly sponsored arts education and audience-building activities has increased two-fold (Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2015; see also Subsection 5.3.4). This example demonstrates that globalising cultural policies can indeed bring about some good changes in local cultural policy-making.

The list of different challenges, opportunities and implications posed by imported cultural policies on the local ‘traditional’ cultural policies is not exhaustive and varies from city to city. All in all, the main purpose of this section, and my thesis at large, was to show that these policies are not only transformed by the city, but also transform the city.
Chapter 8
Conclusion

8.1 Thesis summary and contributions

This comparative study set out to investigate the mobility and transformation of the creative city policies, with Chinese cities serving as examples of this global trend. The central focus of this research was on probing urban policymakers’ approach to the ‘display’ role of the creative city in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei. The global templates of international cultural events, such as arts festivals, film festivals and large-scale design events, were used as key reference points for exploring a wide range of rationales and meanings attached to the creative city as display. Through an analysis of policy documents and elite interviews with local policymakers, policy advisors and organisers of large-scale cultural events I was able to capture the ways in which the ‘western script’ of the creative city is understood and interpreted across three cities outside the West.

Three particular cities – Shanghai, Taipei and Hong Kong – were selected because of their notable differences in historical legacies and political systems, which led to the formation of different urban identities and distinct approaches to governance models of cultural policy. Combined with their economic, ethnic and cultural interconnectivities, this provided a particularly instructive setting for exploring the transformation and embeddedness of imported display practices.

The study’s findings exposed a significant change in the discourse surrounding the creative city. It is evident that these cities that are traditionally viewed as ‘borrowing’ sites are not silent, they do in fact ‘talk back’, and they do so in ways that underline the importance of considering local contextual needs in adopting the creative city policy script. My study has demonstrated that the meaning of the creative city as display in three Chinese cities is reshaped by the existing regional and global connections between cities, their political and ideological frameworks, the regulatory and funding mechanisms of cultural policy, and the ‘traditional’ agenda behind culture and the arts.

In the Global North, cities adopt the creative city policy script primarily as an entrepreneurial strategy, to pursue their market-centred agendas. In this context, creative city policies are used as display practices to attract investment, jobs and tourists. However, as shown in this study, the creative city policy model in Chinese cities is also deployed as a political device to achieve a broad set of policy goals
ranging from identity building to global and cultural influence. In this context, imported cultural policies serve as a means to strengthen the sense of belonging, to combat political rivalries and to generate symbolic capital for local and national governments. This finding not only unveils the creative city as a floating signifier, which is significant precisely for its ability to absorb rather than to emit meanings, but also indicates a significant role for the nation-state in creative city making.

Clearly, the ambitions of the nation-state and identity politics play a crucial role in shaping the urban cultural policies of all three cities. This finding accords with other studies that have addressed the importance of the state in all areas of public policy in a number of East Asian countries (Hill and Kim, 2000; Kong, 2007; Ong, 2007; Ong, 2011; Hutton, 2012; Lee, 2014; Kim, 2015). The recurrent theme of local/national identity not only reflects on the presence of the state in the creative city making process, but also confirms that in many East Asian countries national identity building is still at the centre of the cultural policy agenda (Kong, 2000; Chun, 2000; Lee and Lim, 2014; Kim, 2015; see also Subsection 2.3.3).

The study has also established that all three cities see the creative city policy script as a means to strengthen their position in the global city network. For them the appeal of the creative city rests on a sense of belonging that it offers as opposed to the sense of distinction that has been attached to the original concept of the creative city by its authors and advocates in the Global North. In this context, the title of the creative city provides Chinese cities with an opportunity to join a global network of other creative cities, and makes them appear more globalised.

Additionally, this thesis makes an important theoretical contribution to the understanding of cultural policy as display. Specifically, it complements the work of Raymond Williams and Jim McGuigan by addressing this phenomenon in an urban context and by acknowledging the possibility of different meanings and nuanced understandings attached to ‘display’ outside of the capitalist economies in the Global North. In this work, I read urban cultural policy as a combination of two interwoven strands of display, namely symbolic and entrepreneurial display, which can be further subdivided into outward- and inward-oriented categories. Whereas both Williams (1984) and McGuigan (2004) failed to distinguish between ‘display’ as an outward- and inward-oriented practice, this distinction is essential in assessing the different roles and meanings of ‘display’ and urban cultural policy at large. Taipei provided us with a particularly instructive case for the analysis of the inward-oriented ‘display’ (see Section 6.3).

With regards to large-scale cultural events, which were chosen as important agents of the creative city as display, the results of this study support the idea of events as the “the longest running type of ‘creative city’ initiative” (Pratt, 2010: 16). A wide
array of ‘display’ roles attached to events represent better than any other initiative the different layers of expectations underpinning the adoption of the creative city outside the Global North. As discussed in Chapter 2, to date a surprisingly small number of studies have attempted to address cultural events as global “circulating capital” (Yeoh, 2005: 945; see also Stringer, 2001; Ma, 2012). This study contributes to events literature by approaching large-scale cultural events as global networks rather than individual occurrences, thus unveiling the somewhat overlooked role of large-scale cultural events in the display and production of symbolic power. Additionally, this research has found that the global networks that events form are crucial in guiding and shaping their adoption and transformation process. It has been shown that the format and objectives of events are largely influenced not only by the ‘hierarchical tendencies’ of professional networks of events, but also by competition and collaboration within these networks. This suggests that policy transfer is indeed a multidimensional process. It is constructed through multiple interactions that occur between and across the ‘borrowing’ and ‘lending’ sites.

Additionally, this research has exposed policy transfer as a two-way mutation process: imported urban cultural policies are not only transformed by the city, but they also transform the city’s approach to culture and the arts. This seems to have both positive and negative implications on policymaking and practice in cities. On the one hand, there are more funds allocated to culture, and the dialogue between cultural practitioners and policymakers seems to be more open, more intense and more productive. Furthermore, considering the growing number of cultural activities and projects, generally the local public has more opportunities to engage with culture and the arts. On the other hand, however, the entrepreneurial approach that imported urban cultural policies have brought to Chinese cities facilitates deeper segregation between large and well-established cultural organisations and smaller groups, puts more pressure on artists to produce internationally appealing products, and (in some cases) leads to the prioritisation of the interests of capital over the interests of the public. Altogether this shows that imported cultural policies undoubtedly exercise a certain degree of influence on the city’s ‘cultural public sphere’ (McGuigan, 1996).

This interdisciplinary study makes several noteworthy contributions to the fields of urban studies, East Asia studies and cultural policy studies, specifically with regards to the transfer of cultural policies and cultural policy-making in Chinese cities.

As discussed in Chapter 2, despite a rapidly growing body of research on policy transfer, to date there have been few attempts to probe the transfer process of urban cultural policies. Large-scale cultural events in particular have received little attention with regard to their global mobility and transformation. As shown in this thesis, events constitute their own global networks with hierarchical tendencies. The
connections that they form with each other within these networks suggest a whole new dimension that needs to be addressed in policy transfer analysis.

Additionally, by addressing policy transfer as a multisite process, this study was also able to identify certain transformation and integration patterns of mobile cultural policies that would have been impossible to detect if working in just one or two cities. Many previous studies, which assessed policy formation and mutation primarily with regards to the existing connections between two sites – the ‘borrowing’ and the ‘lending’ one – failed to address the patterns of policy transfer, neglecting that this process is “effectively constituted across multiscalar and multisite fields” (Peck and Theodore, 2015: 37, original emphasis).

Lastly, by exploring the adoption and contextualisation of the creative city policy discourse in three Chinese cities – Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong – this study also has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of urban cultural policies in the Chinese speaking-world, and East Asia more generally. As noted in Chapter 2, this thesis marks one of the first attempts to compare the ways in which local policymakers from three different Chinese cities deal with and think about the cultural turn in urban development.

8.2 Limitations and directions for future research

The broad scope of this comparative study can be seen as both its strength and weakness. On the one hand, it enabled me to trace transformation and integration patterns of imported cultural policies in Chinese cities, which in turn enhanced the generalisability of the study. On the other hand, however, considering the cultural, historical and geopolitical complexities of each city explored, it was impossible to measure every dimension involved in or responsible for the making of the creative city in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei. As a result, in some instances, the depth of the study inevitably had to be sacrificed for breadth. This means that plenty of avenues for further research remain.

My study was focused on the understandings that urban policymakers attach to the ‘display’ practices of the creative city and variations of these understandings in different political settings. Consequently, in my thesis, arts festivals, film festivals and major design events were addressed as a singular element of the creative city rather than as isolated individual occurrences. To put it simply, I sought to explore what roles urban policymakers tend to attach to large-scale cultural events as a whole and to compare how (and why) these roles differ in different cities. This means that it was never my intention to assess the actual transformations that occur within the specific events as they are adopted by different cities. Although some of these
transformations have inevitably emerged following the discussions on the governance structure of the events, their funding mechanisms, programming and agenda, this particular aspect was not explored in detail. A comparative study of one event, such as an arts festival or film festival, is needed to assess the ways in which specific cultural events themselves are transformed to conform with different political, cultural and historical settings of the place.

The changing meaning of ‘display’ is indeed an important moment in the transformation of the creative city. However, there are also other moments that can inform us about transformation – for instance, changes in policy formats, changes in policy priorities, or changes in the presentation of the creative city. Further studies of this sort could contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive, multidimensional conceptual framework to be used for future analysis of the transformation of the creative city policy discourse.

Furthermore, as this project was focused on examining large-scale cultural events, its remit did not allow for addressing the role of other policies and strategies that comprise the creative city. Hence, in an effort to get a comprehensive, multidimensional glimpse of creative city making, future study could assess the reasons underlying the adoption of other imported cultural policies, such as different types of cultural events, cultural and creative industries, cultural districts and cultural landmarks. Although most roles attached to these practices would likely overlap with those already discussed in this thesis, the analysis of a wider range of the creative city policies would undoubtedly supplement my discussion. In particular it would be worth studying the growing role of the design industry in cultural policies of Chinese cities. Data reveals that local policymakers’ interest in the design industry has increased considerably over the last few years in all three cities. The reasons, effects and implications of this trend undoubtedly need further investigation.

Another possible limitation of this study was lack of access to government officials and policymakers. This problem was particularly acute in Shanghai. Conducting fieldwork in the PRC is generally both an exciting and “deeply frustrating experience” (Heimer and Thøgersen, 2006: 1). Although it can provide a number of eye-opening revelations, it also tends to be very demanding in terms of preparation, and highly problematic in terms of access. For instance, having local contacts/informants is a necessary prerequisite for conducting fieldwork in China (Heimer and Thøgersen, 2006). However, even with contacts, gaining access to local officials can be very problematic, particularly when such officials are not used to receiving foreign researchers (Hansen, 2006). Also, for interviews with government officials a special written permission is often needed. As Solinger (2006) explains, some city officials in the PRC refuse to take part in formal interviews “in which policy issues are
discussed unless the city foreign office has arranged it” (p. 166).

A limited number of contacts hindered my efforts to gain access to government officials in Shanghai. Also, my informant with connections in the city government repeatedly stated that requests from foreign scholars seeking to interview the government official from the Shanghai Administration of Culture are highly unusual. The fact that I did not have an official permission to conduct my research, because I was not affiliated with any research institution in China, also did not help. Considering these limitations I am very grateful for my key informant who helped to arrange an interview with the representative from the Shanghai Administration of Culture. I was granted official permission for this interview during an arranged phone call where I was asked about the purpose and funding source of my research. This person was particularly relevant to my study because they have been supervising the division responsible for large-scale cultural events. However, it soon became obvious that the interview with the senior government official somewhat deprived me of any chance of gaining access to his subordinates. Despite my best efforts to find more respondents, I continued to receive negative replies followed by the same question: “what else could anyone else add to what this person has already told you?”

I recognise that interviews with more officials could have potentially provided more nuanced information about the roles attached to large-scale cultural events in Shanghai. Nevertheless, I do think that the combination of the insights I have obtained from the encounter with the government official, along with policy documents analysis and the interviews with cultural practitioners and two academics who serve as policy advisors to the city government provided me with a rather comprehensive understanding of the government approach to the creative city and its ‘display’ practices.

As shown in this study, the creative city policy discourse is continuously transformed by local policy actors, institutions and conditions both inside and outside of the city government. Given that my central focus was on the ways in which local policymakers read the creative city and its display practices, I aimed primarily to interview city government officials, policy advisors and senior staff members of large-scale cultural events. Future research could examine the views of other stakeholders in the creative city making process, specifically policy intermediaries and consultants, state-level government officials, and a broader range of the so-called ‘cultural elites’.

Different patterns of adoption and contextualized objectives attached to the creative city policy script in Taipei, Hong Kong and Shanghai demonstrate that my findings cannot be generalised to all Chinese cities. Therefore, future research might
investigate the rationales for the cultural turn in other Chinese cities, particularly Beijing, which was omitted from this study to ensure a manageable scope for the research. Such studies would help to refine and further elaborate on the findings of this research.

Lastly, although I addressed some of the major tensions that emerged between ‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches to instrumental roles of culture, this study was never intended as an in-depth research of the outcomes and implications of the cultural turn in Chinese cities. A future study investigating the reception of the creative city policies within the local communities of these cities would be very interesting. Building upon findings of my work, a number of questions could be asked, such as how local citizens and artists feel about all cultural changes that have been taking place in recent years? Do they feel included in this process? What opportunities and challenges, if any, does the cultural turn bring to them? The answers to these questions would help to link the context with the actual experience and shed more light on the implications and ramifications of the cultural turn.

8.3 Final reflections

This study reveals several important insights concerning the evolution of the creative city policy discourse.

In particular the case of Chinese cities highlights an important shift in discursive terms: as the reach of creative city policies widens, emphasis no longer rests on the promise of uniqueness, but rather of belonging. As a result, the promotion of cultural practices (particularly, those of ‘display’) has become a necessary item on the ‘checklist’ of cities seeking global recognition and acknowledgement within the global city network.

The experience of three Chinese cities also demonstrates that in certain contexts the state must be considered an important actor in shaping the creative city. Clearly, in the Chinese-speaking world, and elsewhere in East Asia, the creative city policy discourse has been employed not only to address city problems, but also those of their nation-states.

Although the term ‘creative city’ is still widely used within the policy narratives of Hong Kong, Taipei, and Shanghai, the resilience of the term is debatable. After all, there is no longer anything ‘special’ about being a creative city, so cities are forced to search for new ways to stand out. For instance, in Taipei the notion of ‘smart city’ now seems to appear within its city narrative more often than ‘creative city’ does. This does not mean, however, that creative city making should been seen as passé just yet. In recent years, a number of smaller and economically weaker cities in
China, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea have adopted the creative city policy script in order to attract tourists and spur economic growth. This indicates that the creative city policy discourse could employ a hierarchical pattern as it circulates.

Regardless of the continuous mutation of the creative city policy discourse, one thing remains evident: manifold uses of culture as display will continue to shape urban policies of tomorrow.
Bibliography


policies in East Asia: dynamics between the state, arts and creative industries. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.193-209.


Gu, X. 2014. Creative industries, creative clusters and cultural policy in Shanghai. In: Lee, H.K. and Lim, L. eds. Cultural policies in East Asia: dynamics between


Hong Kong Design Centre. 2014. *A city driven by design: 2012-2013 annual report*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Design Centre.


Lung, Y. 2005. Bu yao rang shangye bangjia wenhua [Don’t allow business to kidnap culture]. Qiye Wenhua [Culture Corporate]. 8, pp.63-64.


de Valck, M. 2007. *Film festivals: from European geopolitics to global cinephilia*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.


Appendix A

Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei: Basic Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shanghai</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Taipei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GaWC (2012) classification</strong></td>
<td>alpha+ city</td>
<td>alpha+ city</td>
<td>alpha− city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total area</strong></td>
<td>6340.5 km²</td>
<td>1105 km²</td>
<td>271.8 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resident population (2015)</strong></td>
<td>24.15 million</td>
<td>7.3 million</td>
<td>2.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population density</strong></td>
<td>3808 people per square km</td>
<td>6760 people per square km</td>
<td>9942 people per square km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official language</strong></td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Chinese and English</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political system</strong></td>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>Limited democracy</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government type</strong></td>
<td>Municipality (directly under the central government)</td>
<td>Special Administrative Region of the PRC</td>
<td>A self-governing municipality under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Head of the city government</strong></td>
<td>Mayor (elected by the State Council)</td>
<td>Chief Executive (elected by the Election Committee)</td>
<td>Mayor (directly elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita (PPP) (The Brookings Institution data, 2014)</strong></td>
<td>US$ 24,065</td>
<td>US$ 57,244</td>
<td>US$ 46,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service sector contribution to the city’s GDP</strong></td>
<td>67.8 per cent (2015)</td>
<td>93 per cent (2015)</td>
<td>74.04 per cent (2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

60 The Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network assesses cities’ integration into a world city network in terms of their advanced producer services. On a basis of the level of their interconnectivity, cities are classified into alpha (alpha++, alpha+, alpha, and alpha−), beta and gamma world cities.
Sources:


Appendix B
Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei: Public Spending on Culture

B.1 Public expenditure on culture as % of total city spending\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{B.2 Public spending on culture (2001-2016)}

\textsuperscript{61} Except for the 2006-2008 data for Shanghai, this data excludes the expenditure on sports. The funding provided by the central government in China and Taiwan to support national cultural objects, programmes and activities is also not included. The budget data was obtained from the Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics of the Taipei City Government (dbas.gov.taipei), the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) (http://www.budget.gov.hk/), and the Shanghai Municipal Finance Bureau (http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/). The data for Shanghai until 2009 is not available.
## Appendix C

### Original Titles of Key Policy Documents

### Hong Kong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Address</th>
<th>施政報告</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Heritage Commission Policy Recommendation Report</td>
<td>文化委員會政策建議報告</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Shanghai

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shanghai Government Report</th>
<th>上海市政府工作报告</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Outline of the Shanghai’s Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development</td>
<td>上海市国民经济和社会发展第十个五年计划纲要</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Outline of the Shanghai’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development</td>
<td>上海市国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Outline of the Shanghai’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development</td>
<td>上海市国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Outline of the Cultural Development during the Period of the National Eleventh Five-Year Plan</td>
<td>国家“十一五”时期文化发展规划纲要</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Outline of the Cultural Reform and Development during the Period of the</td>
<td>国家“十二五”时期文化改革发展规划纲要</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Chinese Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Twelfth Five-Year Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei Yearbook</td>
<td>臺北市年鑑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei City Long-Term Development Programme for 2010-2020</td>
<td>臺北市長期發展綱領(2010 - 2020 年)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Outline of the Department of Cultural Affairs</td>
<td>施政要領 (台北市政府文化局)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D
List of Interviewees

**SITE: TAIPEI, Taiwan (ROC)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Identifier, site</th>
<th>Interview date, type</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Official A, TP</td>
<td>31/07/2014</td>
<td>Taipei City Council</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Official B, TP</td>
<td>05/08/2014</td>
<td>Taipei City Council</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Official C, TP</td>
<td>30/07/2014</td>
<td>Department of Cultural Affairs</td>
<td>Senior civil servant (WDC 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Official D, TP</td>
<td>30/07/2014</td>
<td>Department of Cultural Affairs</td>
<td>Middle level civil servant (WDC 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Official E, TP</td>
<td>15/08/2014</td>
<td>Department of Information and Tourism</td>
<td>Senior civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Official F, TP</td>
<td>19/08/2014</td>
<td>Taiwan Cultural and Creative Industry Association</td>
<td>Former senior civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Official G, TP</td>
<td>25/07/2014</td>
<td>Taipei Culture Foundation</td>
<td>Senior civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Practitioner A, TP</td>
<td>18/08/2014</td>
<td>Taipei Arts Festival</td>
<td>Senior management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Practitioner B, TP</td>
<td>12/08/2014</td>
<td>Taipei Film Festival</td>
<td>Senior management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Practitioner C, TP</td>
<td>22/08/2014</td>
<td>Taiwan Design Centre</td>
<td>Middle management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SITE: HONG KONG, Hong Kong SAR of the PRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Identifier, site</th>
<th>Interview date, type</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Advisor/Academic A, TP</td>
<td>12/01/2015</td>
<td>National Taipei University</td>
<td>Policy advisor and academic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**12. Official A, HK**
- 05/09/2014
- Face-to-face
- Hong Kong Economic, Trade and Cultural Office
- Senior civil servant

**13. Official B, HK**
- 05/09/2014
- Face-to-face
- Hong Kong Economic, Trade and Cultural Office
- Senior civil servant

**14. Official C, HK**
- 14/10/2014
- Face-to-face
- Leisure and Cultural Services Department
- Senior civil servant

**15. Official D, HK**
- 14/10/2014
- Face-to-face
- Leisure and Cultural Services Department
- Senior civil servant

**16. Official E, HK**
- 26/09/2014
- Written response
- Mega Events Fund (MEF), Tourism Commission
- Follow-up: 17/11/2014
- Middle level civil servant

**17. Official F, HK**
- 13/10/2014
- Written response
- Home Affairs Bureau Culture Branch
- Follow-up: 23/10/2014
- Middle level civil servant

**18. Official G, HK**
- 10/10/2014
- Written response
- CreateHK, Commerce and Economic Development Bureau
- Follow-up: 10/11/2014
- Middle level civil servant

**19. Official I, HK**
- 17/10/2014
- Written response
- BrandHK, Information Services Department
- Follow-up: 3/11/2014
- Senior civil servant
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Identifier, site</th>
<th>Interview date, type</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Practitioner A, HK</td>
<td>04/09/2014 Phone interview</td>
<td>Hong Kong International Film Festival Society</td>
<td>Senior management (HKIFF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Practitioner B, HK</td>
<td>13/10/2014 Face-to-face</td>
<td>The Hong Kong International Film Festival Society</td>
<td>Senior management (HKIFF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Practitioner C, HK</td>
<td>15/10/2014 Face-to-face</td>
<td>Hong Kong Design Centre</td>
<td>Senior management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Practitioner D, HK</td>
<td>31/10/2014 Face-to-face</td>
<td>Hong Kong Arts Festival</td>
<td>Senior management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SITE: SHANGHAI, PRC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Identifier, site</th>
<th>Interview date, type</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Official A, SH</td>
<td>19/11/2014 Face-to-face</td>
<td>Shanghai Municipal Administration of Culture, Radio, Film &amp; TV</td>
<td>Senior civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Practitioner A, SH</td>
<td>14/11/2014 Face-to-face</td>
<td>Shanghai Dramatic Arts Centre (DAC)</td>
<td>Senior management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Practitioner B, SH</td>
<td>14/11/2014 Face-to-face</td>
<td>Shanghai International Film Festival</td>
<td>Senior management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Practitioner C, SH</td>
<td>17/11/2014 Face-to-face</td>
<td>Purple Star Culture and Communication Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>Senior management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Practitioner D, SH</td>
<td>18/11/2014 Face-to-face</td>
<td>Shanghai Theatre Academy</td>
<td>Middle management, academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Practitioner E, SH</td>
<td>23/01/2015 Written response</td>
<td>China Shanghai International Arts Festival</td>
<td>Middle management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Advisor/Academic A, SH</td>
<td>19/11/2014 Face-to-face</td>
<td>Shanghai Theatre Academy</td>
<td>Policy advisor and academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Advisor/Academic B, SH</td>
<td>17/11/2014</td>
<td>Shanghai Jiao Tong University</td>
<td>Policy advisor and academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Academic C, SH</td>
<td>17/11/2014</td>
<td>Shanghai Jiao Tong University</td>
<td>Academic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E

Interview Questions

D.1 Sample for Shanghai

These questions were designed for interviews with government officials in Shanghai.

1. Could you describe Shanghai city as a brand?  Does it differentiate your city from other large Chinese cities? How?

2. Your city’s vision is to turn Shanghai into ‘Socialist International Cultural Metropolis’. Why is it important to be recognized as ‘cultural city’? How does your city distinguish itself from other cultural and creative cities in the region?

3. In last few years, Shanghai has demonstrated an increased interest in hosting large-scale events. In your opinion, what has prompted the interest in events?

4. What major criteria determine Shanghai’s decision to host a certain large-scale cultural event? What are you expecting from the event?

5. Shanghai EXPO 2010 has undoubtedly brought lots benefits to China at the national level. However, what has Shanghai, as global city, gained from this event?

6. How would you define a large-scale cultural event? In your opinion, what were the most significant large-scale cultural events held in Shanghai? Why?

7. In your opinion, does your city need large-scale cultural events? Why? What are the key benefits of large-scale cultural events? Are there any drawbacks?

8. Do you assess the impact of cultural events? How?

9. Do large-scale cultural events contribute to your city’s brand? How?

10. Looking back at large-scale cultural events that you organized, were the predicted benefits realized?

11. What institution is responsible for supervising your work?

12. Are you getting any support or guidance from the central government in regard to the selection and organization of large-scale events?
D.2 Sample for Hong Kong

These questions were designed for interviews with cultural practitioners in Hong Kong.

1. In policy documents, Hong Kong is sometimes referred to as ‘Asia’s creative hub’ or ‘International cultural metropolis’. Is it important for Hong Kong to be recognized as cultural and creative city? Why?

2. How would you define a large-scale cultural event? Is Hong Kong International Film Festival a large-scale cultural event? Why?

3. How, if at all, Hong Kong International Film Festival differs from other international film festivals in Shanghai or Taipei?

4. Hong Kong International Film Festival has been held since 1977. What prompted its establishment? Have the major aims of the Festival changed since?

5. Does your city need this festival? Why? What are the key benefits of Hong Kong International Film Festival? Are there any disadvantages or anything that still needs to be improved?

6. In your opinion, does Hong Kong International Film Festival contribute to your city’s brand? How?

7. How do you select the films for the festival’s programme? Is there any special quota or selection criteria for Hong Kong films?

8. What is the target audience of Hong Kong International Film Festival? What is the actual audience of the Festival?

9. Do you assess the impact of Hong Kong International Film Festival? How?

10. Looking back at previously held festivals, were the predicted benefits realized?

11. How, if at all, is your work supervised? Does Commerce and Economic Development Bureau has any voice in the organization of the festival?
D.3 Sample for Taipei

These questions were designed for interviews with policy advisors/academics in Taipei.

1. Could you describe Taipei city as a brand? Does it differentiate your city from other large cities in the region? How?
2. Would you call your city global? Why? What does it take to be recognized as the global city?
3. Your city’s long-term vision is to turn Taipei into ‘Cultural and creative capital’. Is it important for Taipei to be recognized as cultural and creative city? Why? Could you describe ‘cultural and creative city’?
4. In last few years, your city has demonstrated an increased interest in hosting large-scale events. In your opinion, what has prompted the interest in events?
5. What major criteria determine city government’s decision to host a certain large-scale event? What are they expecting from the event?
6. Is Taipei City Government getting any support or guidance from the central government in regard to the selection and organization of large-scale events?
7. In your opinion, what were the most significant large-scale cultural events held in Taipei? Why?
8. In your opinion, does your city need large-scale cultural events? Why? What are the key benefits of large-scale cultural events? Are there any disadvantages?
9. Do cultural events contribute to your city’s brand? How?
10. It seems that in recent years Taipei has been engaging in some sort of large-scale events ‘race’ with Mainland China. Do you agree with this? What are the major reasons behind such competition?
## Appendix F

**List of themes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core themes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| CITY TO CULTURE | 1. City as Architect  
2. City as Promoter  
3. City as Trustee  
4. City as Global Player/Node |
| CULTURE TO CITY | 5. Display as city promotion  
6. Display as symbolic power  
7. Display as global node  
8. Display as platform |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other major themes</th>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 9. Large-scale cultural events | Definition  
As a global trend  
Government’s expectations  
Organizers’ expectations  
Challenges  
Supervision |
| 10. Significance: local level | Locals as main consumers  
Development of local cultural industries (CI)  
Transforming policymaking |
| **Taipei** | Bottom-up narrative  
Local focus as a distinguishing characteristic |
| **Hong Kong** | Events provide a sense of community  
Development of cultural ecosystem needed |
| **Shanghai** | Shanghai and Beijing relationship |
| 11. Significance: global level | Why we should be considered a global city |
| **12. Focus on regional recognition** | Regional recognition |
| | Regional competition |
| | Regional cooperation |
| **13. Hong Kong/Taipei relationship with Mainland** | Collaboration with Mainland |
| | Distinguishes itself from Mainland |
| | Assimilates with Mainland |
| | Sense of superiority over Mainland |
| | Sense of inferiority |

| **Hong Kong** | Hong Kong as mediator |

| **14. Comparison** | Differences from other two cities |
| | Similarities |
| | Peculiarities of Taipei |
| | Peculiarities of Hong Kong |
| | Peculiarities of Shanghai |

| **15. Audience** | Predominantly middle class |

| **Taipei** | Demanding & active | Open & receptive | Well-educated | Mainly young |
| | | | |
| **Hong Kong** | No loyal audience |
| **Shanghai** | Not receptive to modern art | Low *suzhi* | Ticket ‘give away’ practice |

| **16. Society** |

<p>| <strong>Taipei</strong> | Lack of self esteem | Politically active &amp; engaged | Creative | Well-educated |
| | | | |
| <strong>Hong Kong</strong> | Low demand | Pragmatic &amp; | Diverse &amp; | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>for culture/arts</th>
<th>indifferent</th>
<th>multicultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shanghai</strong></td>
<td>Enterprising &amp; business oriented</td>
<td>Segregated</td>
<td>Low suzhi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. **Chineseness**

Local identity

華人 Chinese (in terms of ethnicity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Desinicisation 去中國化</th>
<th>Polarised identity</th>
<th>Cultural roots with Mainland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taipei</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hong Kong</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shanghai</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A strong sense of national identity

18. **City brand**

International city

Diverse & multi-layered city

Creative city

Modern city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chinese capital of culture and creativity</th>
<th>Vibrant and versatile</th>
<th>Open &amp; friendly</th>
<th>Developed city</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taipei</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hong Kong</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asia’s World City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shanghai</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial city</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. **Why design (is getting increasingly popular)**

Competitive advantage

Useful, serves society

New trend & a global trend

Design is part of culture

Popular among youth

Sign of advancement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very versatile, it’s everywhere</th>
<th>Contributes to the economy</th>
<th>Stimulates creativity</th>
<th>Profitable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**City-specific themes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Taipei</strong></th>
<th><strong>Hong Kong</strong></th>
<th><strong>Shanghai</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20. Inferiority complex, lack of self-esteem</td>
<td>20. Large-scale sports events</td>
<td>20. China’s restrictions on CI development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. City as advocate/arbiter</td>
<td>22. The city between East &amp; West</td>
<td>22. Open-city (開放都市) narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Display as part of political campaign</td>
<td>23. The need to preserve local culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Freedom narrative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. City as ecosystem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G

Consent Form

This consent form (in traditional Chinese characters) was used in Taipei and Hong Kong.

| **CONSENT FORM** |  
| **參與研究同意書** |  
| **STAGING A GLOBAL CREATIVE CITY IN GREATER CHINA: A CASE STUDY OF SHANGHAI, HONG KONG AND TAIPEI** |  
| 大中華區之全球城市的文化實力展示：以上海、香港及台北為例 |  

| I confirm that I have read and understand the Information Sheet dated June 18, 2014 explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project. |  
| 我確認我已詳細閱讀及了解附頁日期為 2014 年 6 月 18 日之「研究資料表」。我已有機會對此研究項目提出疑問。 |  

| I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. |  
| 我理解我的參與是自願的。我有權隨時退出此項研究，且不會有任何損失或權益受到影響。並且，假若我無意願，我可拒絕回答任何一個問題。 |  

| Lead researcher contact information: |  
| 研究負責人員之聯絡資訊： |  
| Phone: +886 963840677 | 手機：+886 963840677 |  
| Email: cskk@leeds.ac.uk | 電子郵件：cskk@leeds.ac.uk |  

| As a lead researcher of this study, I, Kristina Karvelyte, confirm that in case the participant decides to withdraw from the study, all information that was provided by the participant will be erased and not used in this study. |  
| 此研究經研究負責人 Kristina Karvelyte 確認，在參與者決定退出此項研究之情況下，本研究者將刪除參與者提供的所有資料且不會再使用。 |  

| I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research. |  
| 我同意我所提供的資料會被嚴格保密。我允許研究團隊的成員獲取我所提供的匿名資料。我知道我的名字不會和任何研究材料聯繫在一起。我身份也絕對不會被公開。 |  

| I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant future research in an anonymised form. |  
| 我同意我所提供的資料可以匿名方式使用於在其他有關的研究中。 |
I agree to take part in this research project and will inform the lead researcher should my contact details change.

我同意參加此项研究，如果我的聯絡資訊有任何變化，我會通知此研究負責人員。

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of participant</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>參與者姓名</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant’s signature</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>參與者簽名</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>日期</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of lead researcher</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>研究負責人</td>
<td>Kristina Karvelyte</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>簽名</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date*</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>日期</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant

必需在參與者的作證下簽署。

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants.

雙方簽署後，參與者得取得一份簽署的「參與研究同意書」，一份「研究資料表」，並且其他有關的資料。
Appendix H

Information Sheet

This information sheet (in traditional Chinese characters) was used in Taipei and Hong Kong.

INFORMATION SHEET

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

您被邀請參加一項調研，在您決定是否參與此研究之前，請您詳細理解此項研究的目的、內容，請抽點時間仔細閱讀以下的資訊。若有需要，您可以與其他人討論本資料表的內容。若您有任何問題或者需要更多信息，請與研究者提出，敬請給自己留點時間決定您是否願意參加此項研究。

Study title: STAGING A GLOBAL CREATIVE CITY IN GREATER CHINA: A CASE STUDY OF SHANGHAI, HONG KONG AND TAIPEI

研究項目名稱：大中華區之全球城市的實力展示：以上海，香港及台北為例

Study overview

In this study, I seek to explore the role that cultural policies, and particularly large-scale cultural events, play in building the brand of the global city in Greater China region. In other words, the research is primarily focused on the significance and value of large-scale cultural events in building the brand of global creative cities. Three global cities were chosen for this research, including Taipei, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Considering that those cities culturally are very similar, but politically quite different, this study also seeks to understand what impact different political contexts may have on the development of cultural policies.

Why have I been chosen?

In order to get a more comprehensive understanding on the role of large-scale cultural events in branding of global cities in Greater China, I need to talk to urban policymakers and local government representatives in each of the selected cities. As government official involved in the development of cultural sector you were chosen as one of the candidates for the interview.
What do I have to do?

If you were willing to take part in this research, please state what date and time would be the most convenient for the interview. Interview should not take more than one hour of your time and it will be mostly focused on the development of cultural policies and cultural events in Taipei. The list of interview questions will be provided in advance. The audio recordings of our interview will be used only for data analysis for PhD dissertation, conference papers and journal publications. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings. Before the interview in addition to the copy of this information sheet, you will also be given a signed consent form to keep.

Do I have to take part and what are the possible benefits of taking part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. Your decision to participate in this research is voluntary and completely up to you. You are entitled to withdraw from this research at any time and all data collected from you will be discarded. You will not have to give a reason for discontinuing your participation in this research project. However, taking part in this study could be a good opportunity for city government to publicize your city. Also study findings could be used to compare where your city is standing in terms of the development of creative city brand in regard to Shanghai and Hong Kong.

Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

All the information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. You will not be able to be identified in any reports or publications.

Thank you so much for taking your time to read through the information. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.

Contact information 聯絡資訊:
Kristina Karvelyte
手機：+886 963840677
電子郵件：cskk@leeds.ac.uk

果我參 加這項研究，研究過程是甚麼？

若您決定參與這項調查，請您提供您較方便的訪談日期及時間。此訪談不會超過一個小時。訪談內容主要集中於臺北文化政策發展及大型文化活動。我們會將訪談問題清單預先提供給您。訪談錄音檔將使用於博士論文資料分析，並且會使用於討論會論文及期刊論文中。未經您的書面許可，此訪談錄音檔絕不會有任何其他用途；此外，非研究團隊人員皆不允許應用訪談錄音檔。訪談之前，除了一份「研究資料表」，您還會取得一份雙方簽署的「參與研究同意書」。

我是否需要參與此項調查？參加的話，可獲得的好處是甚麼？

您可自由決定是否參與此研究，參與此項研究是自願的。另外，研究過程中您可隨時撤銷同意，退出此研究。屆時您所提供的資料將被刪除，且您不需要向我們提出任何理由。不過，若您參與此項研究，這將是一個良好的機會能進一步宣傳臺北市。並且，此項研究成果將能具體比較及呈現臺北與上海及香港，在創意城市之品牌發展上的差異。

我參與此調研的資料是否會被嚴加保密？
您所提供的資料及個人信息將會被嚴格保密。您所提供的資料將會以匿名方式使用於研究報告或期刊中。

感謝您撥冗詳閱此資料表，如果您對此項研究有任何疑問，請您儘管和我聯絡。