Election Campaigns and Collective Identities:

The Cases of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ana Stojiljkovic

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Abstract

Election campaigns are usually discussed in terms of a strategy designed to win elections, but, as this thesis argues, they also communicate the meaning of the collective identities they appeal to and therefore contribute to the (re)construction of these identities. In constructionist tradition, the argument in this thesis is that they do so by providing a narrative for these identities.

My research looks at the 2008 and 2012 campaigns in Serbia and 2006 and 2010 campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina and examines the process of the (re)construction of targeted identities. The methodology used for this research is threefold. It includes the textual analysis of selected campaign materials (manifestos, slogans, TV debates, speeches at campaign rallies), interviews with campaign managers, consultants, candidates and pollsters, and focus groups and interviews with voters.

The findings reveal that appeals to national and ethnic identities are the most common identity appeals in election campaigns in the two countries. They also suggest that Serbian campaigns typically direct their appeals at the majority of citizens and call for unity, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina they target ethnic communities composing the country, thereby reinforcing the links of in-group trust while discouraging bridging links between different groups. In the end, this study reveals that election campaigns shape the narratives of national and ethnic identities. They do so by 1. framing the present political and social context, retelling the past, and suggesting a vision for the future; 2. reimagining the borders of the political community, and 3. promoting cultural values of these political communities.
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List of Abbreviations

AISD – Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata (Alience of Independent Social
CDU 1990 – Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990 (Croatian Democratic Union 1990)
CDU – Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
DP – Demokratska Stranka (Democratic Party)
DSS – Demokratska Stranka Srbije (Democratic Party of Serbia ) Democrats
LDP – Liberalno Demokratska Partija (Liberal Democratic Party)
P-BH – Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina)
PDA – Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action)
SDP – Socijaldemokratska Partija (Social Democratic Party)
SEE – Southeast Europe
SPP - Srpska Napredna Stranka (Serbian Progressive Party)
SPS – Socijalisticka Partija Srbije (Socialist Party of Serbia)
SRP – Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Serbian Radical Party)
UBF – Savez za Bolju Buducnost (Union for Better Future)
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Introduction

Election campaigns are very rarely studied beyond their role as strategic communication processes that enable the selection of the leadership of a country. For the most part, the existing literature on campaigning focuses on the effects of campaigning, the role of campaigns in agenda setting, increasing the turn out, personalisation of politics, and party identification (which focuses on the party rather than on the group, the identity). The literature that does focus on identities, acknowledges that party identification or voting has a social base (class or ethnicity, for example), but the processes of identity construction are regularly not explored further. Elsewhere in the campaigning literature, there are considerations closer to this research, such as for instance the considerations of campaigns’ ability to renew loyalties and unite people in pieties (Swanson and Mancini, 1996), or to disturb the achieved reconciliations among collectives in conflicted societies (Lijphart, 2008). This research aims to take these considerations further. It has its focus specifically on the identity constructing capacities of campaigns. It is interested in the identity appeals campaigns make, what makes the narration of these collective identities strategic for the campaigns, and why voters respond better to some identity appeals and not others. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for numerous reasons, offer an excellent opportunity for investigating the relation between election campaigns and collective identities. Both countries have a long history of persuasive communication that promotes certain collective identities, but different political and social contexts that shape their public (and electoral) discourses. They provide for an opportunity to examine the practice of campaign appeals to different identities in different political and social settings.
This introduction first explores the general idea and concepts related to campaigns and identity appeals. It then focuses its attention on the two countries under study, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, their political and social context, and especially the communication patterns during the countries’ modern history, as well as the factors that influenced those patterns. It then introduces the detailed questions and the expected contributions of this study (theoretical, empirical, political and methodological). Finally, it lays out the organisation of this study across its seven chapters.

Campaigns and Identity Appeals

‘100% Bosnia and Herzegovina’1. ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina before all’2. ‘Srpska Forever’3. ‘For Serbia, you know why’4. ‘State for a Man’5. ‘For a European Serbia’6. ‘Let’s conquer Europe together’7. ‘[We] think that the integration of gender equality policy has not been done satisfactorily, although the Law on Gender Equality offers good opportunities for establishing institutional mechanisms’. ‘The protection of mothers on maternity leaves through adequate pay and child benefits, increasing the percentage of women in politics and public life, are part of our strategy’8. ‘Young people are an important partner and participant in shaping the society and future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We will ensure they are represented in all government structures’9. ‘Voting for [our] party means that young people can plan to live in a better Serbia’10.

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1 Election Slogan, Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006.
2 Election Slogan, Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010.
3 Election Slogan, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, 2010.
7 Election Slogan, Democratic Party, 2008.
8 Manifesto, CDU BH, 2010.
All these slogans and messages from previous election campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were designed and chosen to mobilise a certain group of voters targeted by these campaigns. At least some of these messages were most likely approved by the representatives of various voter demographics in the campaigns’ focus groups prior to being publicised. Following the rules of campaign communications, and specifically political marketing, campaigns segment voters into groups in order to reach them. They divide voters according to various factors: geography, demography, lifestyle, political views; and further into smaller groups, that they then profile and try to attract with their messages (Lees-Marshment, 2011). Most of the messages are then tested in focus groups made up by the representatives of various voter demographics prior to being publicised.

The literature on political marketing that has dominated the study of election campaigns focuses on the process of political marketing that includes ‘the party (or candidate) organisation, the environment which conditions its development, the strategic mix it deploys, and ultimately the market it must operate in’ (Wring, 1997: 654). Political parties and candidates that do not rely on political marketing still rely on canvassing their party members and constituencies, local party sections and only sometimes on the ideas of the campaign leadership alone. These campaign messages designed to appeal to a certain group sometimes also relate to identities people share, identities with power to motivate people into action. However, the study of the ‘enduring effects’ (Evans et al, 2014) that campaigns may have has not focused on the role of campaigns in identity (re)construction, but instead on learning, information, political knowledge, turn out and participation.

This study aims to broaden the existing research as it observes a number of identity appeals in these campaigns. It seems that campaigns frequently choose to not only present their policies that concern the targeted group, but also to engage in descriptions, framing, and narrations of the meaning of these identities. These identity ap-
peals include persuasive stories, narratives about the collective identities shared by the groups that they target. This study sets out to investigate the nature of these identity appeals, the background and the intent with which they were produced, the reaction they enticed and the bases they relied upon. It is especially interested in this practice of campaign mobilisation in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In looking at the mobilisation attempts campaigns uptake, this study borrows from Charland’s concept of ‘constitutive rhetoric’, which argues that a successful persuasive attempt has to engage with identification first, it has to imagine and construct the identity while addressing it as it already existed (Charland, 1987). In a similar manner, I investigate the power of campaigns to politicise and make salient dormant identities, to narrate the meanings of identities while appealing to them, urging these identities to be reimagined and renegotiated in the public arena.

**Communication patterns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina**

This section of the Introduction focuses on the two country cases, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to provide the necessary background for understanding the specific contexts of these studies. The two countries in question offer an excellent opportunity to study the role of election campaigns in identity (re)construction as they share a joint past but are now different polities undergoing transition in different contexts and conditions, negotiating identities and searching for new loyalties to be offered to citizens during the elections.

The two countries were once part of a larger polity for a long time. Until 1991, both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia came about after the Second World War, out of the efforts of ‘partisans’, the wartime resistance movement dominated by the communists. It succeeded the country that was previously known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenians after the First World War and was only later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia started out as ‘a multi-ethnic state, underdeveloped economically and in terms of democratic traditions’ (Luthar and Pusnik, 2010: 5). Its multi-ethnicity was confirmed by the establishment of a federal state comprising of six republics, and two provinces (in Serbia), and three official languages, Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian. The new elites’ communicative efforts were an important segment of the strategy to promote and maintain the new state, society and the Yugoslav identity. As with all regime changes (including the processes of democratisation that are of great significance for this study and will be discussed below) the aim of these efforts was to make the new type of society legitimate. At this time, the new elites had to popularise the new system, its principles and values while demonstrating legitimate authority (Malesevic, 2002). The particularity of this process in Yugoslavia was that the newly established state was unique in comparison to other communist societies in Europe. Being a mostly self-liberated country and, hence, more independent from the Soviet Union from the beginning, it based its legitimisation on the narrative of ‘Yugoslavness’, a narrative that continues to influence the discourses of the countries (and as such it will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6 on the uses of the past in campaigns). This narrative was intended to nurture ‘a generation of people with new values, beliefs and standards of behaviour’ (Lilly, 1994: 395) and had roots in both the ‘partisan’ pan-Yugoslav resistance movement and the paternalistic leadership figure of Tito (Ibid). According to Lilly (1994), in addition to economic incentives and coercion, communist leaders also relied on persuasion, or ‘agitation and propaganda (agitprop)’, as a tool for securing legitimacy, public acceptance and normalisation. They relied on regional party organisations and mass organisations with their persuasive efforts, including disseminating directives to the press, the radio service, film production companies, state publishing agencies and the ministries of education (Ibid).
Following the war, the new leaders designed a narrative of victory, brotherhood and unity, and collectivism, introducing a Soviet-type administrative socialism, and fostering a cult of physical work that was intended to inspire massive voluntary work (Luthar and Pusnik, 2010). In the first few years after the war, Yugoslavia became one of the world’s fastest growing economies, admittedly due to its low starting point (Luthar and Pusnik, 2010). By that time, most of the country had electricity, and heavy industrialisation had been undertaken, parallel to the nationalisation of private property and the reduction of private enterprise (Ibid). After 1948, Yugoslavia became even more exceptional in the communist world, when the Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled from the Communist Information Bureau, the official body of the international communist movement. Already having an independent foreign policy, this development encouraged the communist leadership to open up the country towards the West and explore new forms of socialism. As a result, Yugoslavia received economic help from the Western countries, regular cultural exchanges and easy travel for Yugoslav citizens. The ‘unimaginable’ position of the Yugoslav state in the world, in between the East and the West, advanced the construction of a special, specific ‘national’ identity (Volcic, 2007), being neither in the West nor the East, not capitalist but not fully communist either. In 1961 Yugoslavia became one of the founding countries of the Non-aligned movement that complemented Yugoslavia’s international position.

The new narrative about the new society could not be designed as completely new and alien to the members of its society; it had to resonate with them. It had to be compatible with the ‘already existing essential values of the society in order to justify their dominance’ (Malesevic, 2002: 115). The symbols, the rituals, and the newly established traditions were often modelled after previously existing traditions. For example, the tradition of songs in honour of the lifelong honorary president and father of all the nation, Tito, which relied on old folk songs about previous national heroes (Ibid). It was though
that Tito was the central point of the propaganda efforts, which were vital for the maintenance of the society, and that his death in 1980 decisively advanced the disintegration of the country. However, there were many different factors; the literature regularly focuses on the deepening economic crisis fostered by the increasing foreign debt; processes of decentralisation (boosted by the Constitution of 1974); disintegration of ideology; competing elites; rise of ethnic movements and protests; and conflicts between the party leaderships about decentralisation and liberalisation of the country (Gordy, 2014, Ramet, 2002).

Alongside the numerous structural factors that brought about the end of Yugoslavia, the political system suffered a crisis of legitimacy (Ramet, 2002). In spite of launching and maintaining strong pro-Yugoslav propaganda, echoed in education, but also in media, music, film, and sports (Volcic, 2007), in the end the narrative failed to solve the problem of legitimation (Ramet, 2002). Political elites failed ‘to devise a political formula that would impress the majority of the country’s citizens’ (Ramet, 2002: 4). The processes of disintegration were parallel to the rise of within-republics’ nationalist sentiments, and national identities gained importance. The rise of nationalism and the incitement of wars along ethnic lines were promoted by the conflicting narratives of ethnic elites. On the one side, Slovenian and Croatian elites (Bosnian followed later) presented the actions and policies of the Serbian leadership as a plan for the expansion of the Greater Serbia. On the other side, the Serbian elite exposed the economic and political reforms proposed by Slovenians and Croats as anti-Serbian, and claimed that ethnic Serbs living in other republics were endangered (Woodward, 1995, Lampe, 2000, Ramet, 2006, Bieber, 2002). In addition to these conflicting narratives, the disintegration of the country was also aided by the institutional arrangement of the republics in Yugoslavia. Republics were suitably arranged to serve as homelands to ethnic majorities of citizens. Although Serbia and Croatia had concentrated minorities on their territories (Al-
banians in Kosovo in Serbia, and Serbs in parts of Croatia), Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only true exception to this institutional arrangement (Hayden, 2012). Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have a clear ethnic majority, it consisted of three peoples, Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks (at the time only known by their religious identity as Muslims).

The end of the Cold War saw ‘the most open society in eastern Europe being replaced by repressive regimes, and the most prosperous economy in socialist Europe disintegrating into a handful of dysfunctional smaller ones, ridden with corruption’ (Hayden, 2012: ix). This disintegration was also marked by powerful persuasive communication. In fact, it was fuelled by elections. Reportedly, elections had a significant role in the dissolution of Yugoslavia but, according to Linz and Stepan (1992), the federal-level elections were not relevant, rather the important elections were held at the level of the constitutive republics. The elections held in 1990 in the republics contributed to the ‘interrelated and compounding state-disintegrating dynamics’ (Linz and Stepan, 1992: 134). In the elections in 1990 nationalists won in all the republics. In Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and partly in Macedonia, nationalists ran on the program of anti-communism, and in Serbia and Montenegro socialists that transformed themselves into nationalists were victorious (Hayden, 1992). Hayden (1992) argues that although the results of these elections were not overwhelming, they did prepare the polities in question for an era of nationalism and set the stage for civil war. Hayden’s argument is that, although they proclaimed their democratic nature in leaving eastern Europe for Europe (1992: 655), the new governments ran campaigns based on chauvinism. They promised to ‘discriminate against minorities and favour majorities’ (Ibid) and then had to deliver on their promise by justifying discrimination and providing the legal frames for it. They produced the systems Hayden labels as ‘constitutional nationalism’, that ‘privilege[d] the members
of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state’ (Ibid).

By late 1991 and early 1992, the former Yugoslav republics fell into ‘a set of wars that lasted until 1995, with a brief encore in 1999’ (Hayden, 2012: ix), when NATO intervened in Kosovo and Yugoslavia (at this point Serbia and Montenegro). The wars in the former Yugoslavia (briefly in Slovenia in 1991, followed by Croatia 1991-1995, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995) were recorded as a series of brutal civil wars denoted by horrific atrocities, population transfers, and systemic rape. Hayden notes that these wars brought the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ into the international discourse to identify forcing non-member populations to permanently leave the regions where they lived in order to secure the national territory of the dominant group. But then it was turned into a larger discourse on genocide in part because of a ‘sophisticated public relations campaign’ by the Bosniaks (Hayden, 2012). Furthermore, the devised campaigns had a major part in the spread of fear, mobilising nationalist support, waking ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ (Jovic, 2001: 103), and decrying atrocities. Examples of discourse meant to mobilise different groups for war include broadcasts of previously unseen films from Croatian concentration camps from World War II, and even citing of made-up verse from the Quran in which Muslims are called to kill Christians (Gagnon, 1994), but widespread uses of nationalist symbols in political communication were also documented during these times (Naumovic, 1999, 2005, Popov and Gojkovic, 2000). Throughout the execution of these conflicting campaigns by political elites the media were supporting their respective nation’s elite’s communications efforts and hence have ‘played a crucial role in causing the Balkan bloodbath in the 1990s’ (Kurspahic, 2003: XIV).

After the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had ended with peace agreements and gradual mutual recognitions of the newly independent states, other republics were starting their paths towards
recovery and reconciliation, but Serbia (at the time part of a union with Montenegro) still had international economic sanctions imposed, and was involved in the re-emerging ethnic crisis with the Albanian population in Kosovo. The crisis ended in a new escalation of violence; NATO undertook air strikes against Serbia and Montenegro in 1999 that lasted for three months. The intervention then ended with an agreement commanding the withdrawal of Serbian governance and military forces from Kosovo. The following year, Milosevic was overthrown from power by popular protests organised by the opposition and various social actors. And while Bosnia and Herzegovina started their democratisation processes as an independent country dealing with post-conflict recovery issues such as the return of the refugees and the displaced and under the supervision of international overseeing bodies, Serbia started these processes in 2000 as part of the union with Montenegro (until the independence referendum in Montenegro in 2006).

Democratisation meant a great deal of changes that for the most part were different in the two countries. Serbia eventually became a semi-presidential political system with a popularly elected president and a unicameral parliament (elected through a proportional system of voting). Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a very complicated, even disputed political entity that came about as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Bosnia and Herzegovina is described as a ‘hybrid regime’ mixing democratic and non-democratic institutions and mechanisms (Bojkov, 2003), or a controlled democracy, where control is exerted through the Office of High Representative (an ad hoc international institution with exceptional power).

What also differs is the ethnic composition of the two states. Serbia is ‘a state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it’ (according to its Constitution) with 83.32% of the majority Serbian population. On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina was established as a new state consisting of two entities with approximately one half of the
population belonging to the Federation of Bosniaks and Croats and the other to the Serbian entity (Republic of Srpska), and although the divisions between Croats and Bosniaks were not officially recognised by the Dayton Agreement, they have ‘concrete expression on the ground’ (Robinson and Pobric, 2006). This ‘apartheid logic’ of partition (Campbell, 1999) has moulded all other features of the polity: government, media system, electoral system and party system. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a bicameral parliament: the House of People is comprised of representatives of the two formal ethnic entities; and the House of Representatives is elected by popular vote. The head of State in Bosnia is the collective presidency consisting of representatives of all three ethnic groups and a rotating chairmanship. The executive branch is represented by the Council of Ministers (agreed among the entities). Each of the entities has its own government and parliament as well. Its electoral system is equally complex, combining all known (electoral) solutions at various levels, majoritarian, proportional and preferential, and some of the institutions consist of ethnically delegated rather than elected candidates.

Democratisation brought pluralism to most aspects of social lives in the countries’ politics, media, and economy. For instance, in both countries political parties were established during and after the war, following a one-party communist rule in the former Yugoslavia. Even now, some of the (ruling) parties are haunted by their nationalistic origins. In Serbia, the division between modernisation (cosmopolitanism) and traditionalism (nationalism) is regarded as the greatest social divide, and the dominant divide in Western democracies, an economic or class-based gap, appears to be non-existent (Jou, 2010). Political parties honour this divide as well, and could be classified into two major groups: the ‘nation-oriented conservative’ group and the ‘state-oriented modernist’ group (Stojiljkovic, 2011). Similarly, the literature on Bosnian political parties distinguishes the division between ethnic and multi-ethnic parties (Jukic, 2009), ethnic being those that appeal only to one of the three constitutive ethnic groups,
while multi-ethnic political parties address all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina regardless of their ethnic origin. The media system in Bosnia has also been influenced by the ethnic division. While Serbia has five national TV broadcasters (one of them being a Public Service Broadcaster [PSB]), five radio broadcasters and eight daily papers on a national level, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a state-wide national PSB and both of the entities have an additional one. The Bosnian print market includes 12 dailies, some of them being entity-focused, including two from neighbouring countries (Serbia and Croatia) that have Bosnian editions (Dzihana, 2009).

In sum, after the end of the conflicts of the 1990s, the two countries found themselves facing a situation similar to the one described earlier, describing the changes after World War II. The two countries faced a new series of major structural changes, going through another regime change. This time, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina independently started their paths towards democracy, parallel to the processes of state-building (Zakosek, 2008). During the transition commonly referred to as democratisation, the ‘process of regime change from authoritarian or totalitarian rule to the rooting of a new liberal democracy’ (Pridham, 2000: 16), the countries undergoing the regime change go through a deep and fundamental series of transformations. These changes are not always linear and progressive (Ibid) and met without resistance\(^\text{11}\). Although the study of democratisation regularly focuses on the political realm of the transformations (institutional, procedural, at the level of rules and regulations, new laws and policies implemented), the countries in transition also change in the economic and social realms. The political culture of the countries changes during transition, especially the values held, given their importance for the proceedings of the transition (Harrison and Hun-

\(^{11}\) The resistance of certain social groups can be so forceful, it can lead to violence and cause national traumas. This was the case with the early democratisation phase in Serbia, when the first democratically elected Prime Minster was assassinated in 2003. The groups related to the former special forces were later sentenced for his association.
tington, 2000, Inglehart, 2000), as well as the trust nurtured (Sztompka, 1996). As Pridham (2000) suggests, given the multidimensionality of liberal democracy, democratisation also needs to be multidimensional, but it also influences more than the different dimensions, levels or realms of social life. In addition, it also affects the intermediary links, but especially the relations between the elite and the citizens (Pridham, 2000). During democratisation, the links between the representatives and the represented are renegotiated and reconstructed, reimagined on the basis of new affections, affiliations and loyalties.

As argued earlier, new systems require legitimisation strategies (Malesevic, 2002) that in part rely on communication efforts. The two countries under study chose different approaches to legitimisation on their paths to state building and democracy. The post-Milosevic coalition in Serbia focussed on the idea of progress and reforms (Djerić, 2012). They constructed a narrative about a ‘better tomorrow’ that would come through reforming the system, democratising the society and Europeanisation. Their attempt at legitimisation was a story of a different, more progressive community. On the other side, post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to construct a joint narrative in order to legitimise the new system. Instead, the ethnic leaderships launched conflicting narratives legitimising their respective entities, borders and visions of the country. Admittedly, Bosniak leadership did embark on ‘forging a Bosnian nation’ (Robinson et al, 2001: 976), but not without conflicting with the other two ethnic narratives. This emerging and changing context of the two countries provides a good site of research to study how the relations between leaders and their constituencies are rebuilt, how collective identities are constructed in an unstable environment and which ones are called upon during elections and how they are targeted. This research particularly investigates how these campaign appeals affect the identities they invoke.
Contribution

This research looks at the two most recent election campaigns in both countries at the time this research began (2006 and 2010 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 2008 and 2012 in Serbia). It analyses a wide set of campaign texts in order to investigate the identity targeting practices and the nature of these identity appeals. It also considers the intended aims of the appeals and the ways that they were produced, complemented with voters’ apprehension of the appeals. That is, the analysis of the materials is complemented with interviews with campaign professionals on the one side and voters on the other. The design of this research should contribute to the study of election campaigns in several aspects.

First, it will contribute a new aspect to the existing theory on elections and campaigns that commonly considers only the effects of election campaigns on voting behaviour, turn out, knowledge and attitudes. This research observes the capacity of election campaigns to appeal to certain collective identities while reconstructing their meanings. The argument in this research is that election campaigns should not be dismissed as solely strategic communications aimed at winning citizens’ votes for a party or a candidate, but should also be studied as communication events that constitute and negotiate identities within a society.

Second, this research captures a unique historical moment in the development of two polities in transition. It offers insight into campaigning practices and the factors that influence them in transitioning societies. These two cases, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, provide complex examples of different social and political circumstances and developments. This study should also give insight into the evolution and transition of electoral institutions and the emergence of social, political and media pluralisms in two different social settings and institutional arrangements. Furthermore, it will also ex-
amine the consequences of post-conflict and post-nationalist recovery processes and their influences on communication practices. In these conditions, elections are especially turbulent and significant occurrences that add to the deliberation and negotiation of meanings and customs.

Thirdly, this research has a political contribution as well, as it will take into account the role played by communication professionals in (re)constructing the meanings, habits, memories, traditions and identities of a community through communication practices. These powers of political communicators are not commonly discussed in relation to campaigns.

Fourth, this study has a methodological contribution. The different methods applied to this study attempt to incorporate different aspects of the campaign communication process, the message itself, its production processes, as well as reception processes. The methodological design offers insight into the whole communicative process, from the creation of the message to its reception.

The research aims to answer the following questions:

- **What is the role of election campaigns in constructing collective identities?**
- **Which collective identities are targeted in election campaigns most commonly and why?**
- **To what extent are these identity appeals used strategically in campaigns and why do they motivate people to vote?**
- **What role do different contexts and arrangements in societies play in the communicative construction of collective identities?**

The reflections on these questions are organised across different chapters in this thesis. But for the most part, the first question, on the influence of election campaigns on the reimagining and retelling of the identities during elections is discussed in the second empirical
chapter, Chapter 6. The same chapter also considers the types of collective identities that have been targets of campaign appeals on most occasions during these campaigns (the second question), and it also describes the voters’ reactions to these identity appeals. The third question, on strategy and mobilisation, is the focus of the first empirical chapter, Chapter 5, on mobilisation and the role of emotions and emotive states. The fourth question spreads through the findings in this study, but the findings of Chapter 7, on the uses of the past and collective memories, are especially relevant for this question.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapters 1 to 4 introduce the theoretical background and methodological approach to this research. The following chapters, 5 to 7, review the empirical analysis of the data.

Chapter 1 offers a theoretical discussion on collective identities and their construction, with a focus on the relation to election campaigns. Based in the constructionist tradition, it reviews the idea that communication processes influence the construction and renegotiation of identities in particular. Following this tradition, the chapter examines the role of election campaigns in negotiating the meanings of collective identities, but also their role in rearranging the hierarchy and influencing the salience of an individual’s collective identities. The argument in this chapter is that, given the individual’s multiple identities, persuasive campaign communication enhances the salience of some collective identities but not the others. Campaigns do this by framing the current context and possible choices for the future. In addition to the meaning and salience of collective identities, this chapter also reviews the role of election campaigns in framing the collective memories of a society.
Chapter 2 discusses the existing knowledge on the communicative practices of political parties, and their relationship to their constituencies. This chapter also reviews the arguments that posit the parties as principal, most influential actors of public communication. Further, it reviews campaigning practices, techniques and trends in campaigning. The ‘affective turn’ and the use of emotions in political communication and campaigning is of special interest in this chapter. It further focuses on the practices and emergence of political parties in post-communist and transitioning societies, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, in order to argue that political parties in societies in transition target certain identities during electoral periods due in part to the nature of social divisions and emergence patterns of political parties.

Chapter 3 examines the role of citizens in campaign communication, the practices of their organisation, and articulation of their political demands. The expression of these demands would be valuable input for campaigns when designing their electoral offer and setting the electoral agenda. However, as this chapter argues, societies in transition lack the cultural and political features that would encourage the articulation and expression of interests, and furthermore, these societies are crippled by the grave levels of voters’ distrust in the system, administration, elites, and other citizens who also impede the constitution of voters’ demands. This chapter argues that campaigns use a more indirect input from the voters in this situation, but more importantly that campaigns exert even more influence on the demand side of the political market.

Chapter 4 introduces the methodological approach to this study. It first examines the selection of campaigns and materials chosen for this research, and then the methods of the textual analysis undertaken to investigate campaign materials from the four campaigns. Further, this section explains the design of semi-structured interviews relying on the reconstruction method (Reich, 2006) used to investi-
gate the strategies and intentions of the message producers when designing them. Next, this chapter looks at focus groups with voters as a way of studying the reception of campaign messages. It ends with a reflection on the methodological approach and experience with the fieldwork done for this study.

Chapter 5 analyses the findings of this study about the campaigning practices in the two countries, with a special focus on the analysis of their mobilisation attempts. It analyses the campaigns’ strategies and techniques, but also the ways in which voters process the messages in the elections, and what they would have wanted from the campaigns. The chapter also examines how the two countries’ heritage, past and transitions have influenced today’s voting and campaigning practices in these two countries. Further, this chapter tries to assess why some identity appeals seem to reach their targets and are deemed efficient by the voters while others are not. Similarly, it questions why campaigns produce some identity appeals as passionate and elaborate narrations and others seem to be simple messages in the form of short policy proposals.

Chapter 6 examines the findings about the identity appeals during campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It focuses on the types of collective identities campaigns that were appealed to in the two countries and their relation to prominent social divisions in the country in an attempt to question the role of election campaigns in mobilising and politicising certain divisions and identities. It asks if campaigns rely on techniques of political marketing (segmenting voters into groups and then using persuasion to mobilise them to vote) and how these identity appeals narrate the meanings of the identities they target in the process.

Chapter 7 analyses the findings on the strategic capacity of memory appeals in campaigns and the role of campaigns in retelling the past and renegotiating collective memories in Serbia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. This chapter asks why campaigns rely on collective memories, why they retell episodes from the past, and how these past episodes relate to the electoral present. On the other hand, this chapter examines whether these renegotiations of the memory influence the meaning voters assign to collectives that that particular memory is ascribed to. It also looks specifically at the two eras (in both countries) that seem to be a prominent part of the electoral discourse.
Chapter 1: Collective Identities, Narratives and Collective Memory

1.1 Introduction

Election campaigns are not usually discussed for their ability to influence the construction of identities. The nature, construction and negotiations of the meaning of collective identities are mainly the topic of sociological studies, but this chapter looks to tie up the studies that are not regularly linked. First, this chapter reviews the existing literature on collective identities, their construction and features. Special attention will be given to the literature examining the relationship between the individual and the collective identities that they incorporate as part of the Self, and how these collective identities mobilise individuals. Following Snow’s (2001) distinction between different identities, the argument of this research is that identities are most effective for the campaigns because they have the ability to inspire individuals cognitively and emotionally. In other words, in comparison to personal, group, and social identities, collective identities are better suited to move people. Additionally, while attempting to mobilise voters’ collective identities, campaigns retell the stories of these identities, highlight collective past episodes of the collective in order to contextualise the present (electoral) moment in such a way as to present themselves as the best option for the common future.

This chapter also reviews the literature on different types of collective identities that have been selected according to relevance for the cases under study, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These include national, ethnic and religious identities. The argument in this study is that campaigns politicise and appeal to existing, already constructed identities that are part of the social bases of societies, including those that might be dormant, or not particularly relevant for citizens. In
addition, the concepts of citizenship and Europeanisation are discussed alongside these identities as both influence the processes relevant for development of loyalties in the two countries in past decades. The chapter especially focuses on the constructionist argument about the role of communication in the construction of collective identities, and particularly looks at framing and narration as discursive tools that campaigns use to influence the reconstitution of the identities that they target. Because this study argues that campaigns reconstruct identity narratives by framing the common past, this chapter also reviews the existing literature on collective memory and its place in strategic, persuasive communication.

1.2 Primordiality and the Construction of Identity

Individuals are regularly believed to have one distinct identity with clear boundaries, which ‘naturally’ excludes other identities. However, this view overlooks that every individual belongs to more than one social group and carries multiple social and collective identities, or at least some of their fragments, around with them (Smith, 1991, Wodak, 2009). Everyone is therefore a hybrid of identities, that is, they have multiple identities. They encounter various sources of identification that, depending on context and situation, add to the construction of their one, multiple, complex identity (Wodak, 2009). If we evaluate identities from the point of their effectiveness and persuasion, among different types of identities, collective identities are argued to be the most powerful when it comes to mobilisation of actors and social agency. Snow’s (2001) distinction between personal identities (ascribed to oneself by the actor themselves), social identities (ascribed by others), and collective identities (distinguishable by the shared sense of we-ness and agency arising from it) will be used in this research to distinguish between individual’s different identities. Snow posits that some collective identities become more salient and important than others at times when they are mobilised. This mobilisation and politicisation of the ‘shared awareness of oneness’
motivates people emotionally and morally to act in the name of the collective (Snow, 2001).

But what exactly are collective identities? Collective identities are usually considered a wide category denoting many different types of identities. The term ‘collective identity’ has been used in relation to different forms of collectivities, corporate enterprises, sports clubs, social classes, age groups, genders, civilisations, nation states, ethnic groups, and social movements (Malesevic and Haugaard, 2002, Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995, Melucci, 1995). But, we do not consider them ‘things’ that drive individual actions (Jenkins, 2002). Although most collective identities have a quality of appearing stable and permanent, collective identity is not a static concept but a dynamic, changing one; a ‘process’ (Triandafyllidou and Wodak, 2003) that, depending on social context, gets negotiated and transformed (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). These processes of identification involve ‘cognitive definitions’ and ‘emotional investment’ (Melucci, 1995). What collective identities do is generate a sense of agency and function as orientational identities (Snow, 2001). It has been argued that, for an individual, ‘collective identity’ serves the purpose of reproducing the sense of membership that influences the ‘meaning of self’ (Malesevic, 2002) and constructs worldviews (Triandafyllidou, 2003). The reproduction of membership, meaning and worldviews provided by collective identities makes these identities especially advantageous for targeting by campaigns.

The literature suggests that, out of all the different values of ‘collective identities’, the ideal attribute a collective identity can have is primordiality (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995). Primordiality is assigned to bonds, attachments that are seen as natural, given, objective and essential since they could not be changed by voluntary action. These attachments persist alongside secular, civic ties even in industrial societies (Smith, 2001). Haugard and Malesevic find that larger, less well defined collectivities aspire to have a quasi-sacred
bond as the essence of their collective identity and claim primordiality (Haugaard and Malesevic, 2002). Still, this research considers that primordial collective identities do not emerge naturally out of givenness, but are in fact social constructions that need rituals and communicative efforts to emerge and to last while being continually reconstructed (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995, Eisenstadt, 2002). These bonds would be particularly relevant for identities such as ethnic and national. In addition to primordial bonds that operate as ‘codes of distinction’, the literature also distinguishes civic bonds and sacral or transcendent bonds that can serve as connective links of collective identities. Civic bonds are those that are based in civic routines and institutions. They perform their connective function by setting boundaries between those familiar with civic rules and practices and those who are not. In the case of sacred or transcendent bonds, the distinction between Us and Them is determined by the organisational hierarchy towards the sacred. Of course, all three forms of collective bonds are ideal types and can vary significantly in their concretisations (Eisenstadt, 2002).

But how do collective identities come about? This research takes the constructionist approach to the study of identities and assesses the role of campaigns in the identification processes. Hence, this research will not consider identity as innate, but socially constructed, ‘intersubjective’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1991), ‘brought into being by historically and culturally located groups of people’ (Gergen and Gergen, 2003). We cannot assume identity to be natural and unchanging, ‘primordial’, but constructed through recurrent patterns of human interaction. According to this school of thought, identity does not precede reality, but is constructed in and through social relationships. And these relationships ‘stand prior to all that is intelligible; nothing exists for us – as an intelligible world of objects and persons until there are relationships’ (Gergen, 1999). Everything is to be seen in terms of its function within those relationships. In the world defined by social reality, we can address identities as social reputations
(Gergen, 1999), that are not defined solely from within but are affected by definitions of others, culture and society. These ‘social identifications’ on both the individual and social levels assume internalising social representations shared by the group (Paez, et al, 1997). Social structure then becomes a sum of these reputations and ‘typifications’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1991) that shapes our reality. Following the constructionist logic, in this research collective identities are considered intentional or non-intentional consequences of socially patterned and structured interactions (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995), as they refer to networks of relationships and are relational in their nature.

What is also important to consider now is the construction of the Other, as the narrative of the Self always involves an Other. When election campaigns engage in renegotiating the meaning of collective identities, at the same time they engage in imagining the Other. That narrative operation of collective identities involves a dialogical relationship to the Other and the Other ‘is not outside, but also inside the Self, the identity’ (Hall, 1989: 16). In such a way for instance, while describing the construction of an identity and the introduction of the independent Highland tradition and its imposition on an entire Scottish nation, Trevor-Roper presents the identity construction in opposition to an Other’s and sets the ‘cultural revolt against Ireland’ as the very first step of this process (fabrication of history and adoption being the following steps) (Trevor-Roper, 2005).

For the most part, social constructionists assign key roles as agents of construction to culture, language and discourse, media, and narratives, but they also consider social and economic processes or ‘macro-historical forces’ such as print-capitalism and an instrumentalist concept of individual actors seeking various ends (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). In this research, the role of communication processes will be approached as the most significant role, but other factors will be accounted for as well.
1.2.1 Types of Collective Identities

Collective identities are discussed in various forms (associations, social movements, organisations, corporations) but three types of collective identities are of particular significance for the cases under study: national, ethnic and religious identities. In the cases of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, national, ethnic and religious identities appear as the most salient identities and the ones most resonant with the voters. In addition, processes of acquiring citizenship and Europeanisation will also be discussed in this section.

1.2.1.1 National Identity

Among collective identities, national identity is regarded as the most unproblematic and primordial. In a multinational world, it becomes important to most individuals (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 595). National identity has become ‘the cultural and political norm, transcending other loyalties’ (Smith, 1994: 58). On the other hand, in the existing literature, the discussion of the concept of national identity is accompanied by conceptual disagreements. The concept is discussed under different labels: nation, nationalism, nationality, nationhood, national consciousness, national character, nation-state and others. The study of national identity is scattered and inconclusive. The concept has even been rejected for its ‘nonchalant use’ as ‘theoretically vapid while also lacking clear empirical referents’ (Malesevic, 2011: 273).

However, when studying collective identities, the discussion most frequently turns into a discussion about the construction of national identity. Presumably for the reason that national identities integrate most of the dimensions and features attributed to the concept of collective identities (although constructed, they appear inborn and pri-
mordial, cultivate mysterious origins, reconceptualise the past, and offer a definition of self and a sense of membership) and because ‘nation states are possibly the most clearly defined form of collectivity’ (Jenkins, 2002). Still, the debate on features and dimensions of national identity as a theoretical concept remains vibrant. It is developed in dichotomous debates; are its origins ethnic and cultural or political, is it a deeply rooted identity or a superficial ideology, a mass or elite phenomenon, is it a modern or antique notion?

National identities remain vigorous and relevant for the study of campaign appeals for their ability to unite a large group of people and mobilise them to act in a certain way. In an age of the emergence of communication channels that can reach diverse and fragmented arrays of identities, national identities appear to preserve their power to the level of being able to transcend other loyalties (Smith, 1992), even override other loyalties (Triandafyllidou, 1998) or to merge other differences under the political roof of a nation (Gellner, 1983). All of these features seem to suit the campaigns goal of efficiently reaching greater numbers of people.

Sources of National Identity

The debate on the meaning and sources of national identity lead to two approaches: the so-called Western approach, and the Eastern approach (Smith, 1992). The Western model assumes the central role of a national territory or homeland, common legal system and state institutions, the legal equality of citizens, and a mass, civic culture that upholds a sense of belonging to a national identity. Meanwhile, the Eastern concept is based on common ethnic descent and cultural ties; it emphasises ‘the popular or folk element, the role of vernacular mobilisation (...), languages, customs, religions and rituals – rediscovered by urban intellectuals’ (Smith, 1992: 61). The two approaches could be regarded as nation state-centric and ethnic culture-centric approaches to national identity.
Smith distinguishes between four kinds of ‘sacred foundations’ as of the utmost importance:

1. A myth of ethnic election, the conviction of being chosen for a covenant or mission, or both, by a deity;
2. A long standing attachment to particular terrains regarded as sacred and as belonging to the community, and it to them;
3. A yearning to recover and realise the spirit of or more golden ages, epochs of communal heroism and creativity;
4. A belief in the regenerative power of mass and individual sacrifice to ensure a glorious destiny, and the importance of commemorating and celebrating the community and its heroes (Smith, 2003: 255).

On the other side of this argument is the position that national identity is the product of membership/citizenship in a nation-state, and a shared culture institutionalised by mass education, in a shared language. This homogeneity produces a familiarity among its members, recognition of belonging to the same nation, and having mutual rights and duties (Gellner, 1983). Notably, media is also seen as one of the sources. One of the most influential studies of the sources of national identity is Anderson’s study on the imagining of community. There, Anderson lucidly asserted that print-languages were the basis for national consciousness (Anderson, 1983) since it was the print media that made people aware of their fellow-readers who belonged to the same ‘imagined community’.

In addition to the previously reviewed macro-level, on the micro-level, at the level of personal identities, studies have highlighted the perception of the Other as incremental for a person to associate identity with a nation. David Miller claimed it to be essential for people who shared national identity to believe that they share ‘certain traits
that mark them off from other peoples’ (Miller, 2000:30) and that those distinctions ‘mark them off from other nations over and above the fact of sharing common institutions’ (Ibid). Most of the studies, especially studies on nationalism, in fact equate the Other with the enemy, or at least a perceived threat. Triandafyllidou ponders not only a significant Other, a realistic enemy, as a necessary Other but also a potential significant Other that can become the actual significant Other in times of crises (Triandafyllidou, 1998).

Mechanisms of Preservation of National Identity

Existing literature also debates the triggers and mechanisms of preserving national identities. Many authors discuss language and media as ways to preserve national identity (Anderson, 1983, Billig, 1995, Katz and Dayan, 1992), but there are other notions as well, such as ‘daily plebiscites’ (referenda) on what we are prepared to sacrifice for the nation (Renan, 1882), as well as reproducing national identities through myths and symbols (so called ‘mythomoteurs’, Armstrong, 1982). Hobsbawm’s notion of ‘invention of tradition’, ‘a process of formalisation and ritualisation, characterised by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition’ (Hobsbawm, 1992: 4) could also be considered a way to preserve national identities. In this sense, Hall also asserted that national culture constructs identities ‘by producing meanings about “the nation” with which we can identify’ (Hall, 1996) while national narratives are the means by which national identity is conveyed. He claimed that the narrative of the nation could be found in national histories, literature, media and popular culture. Therefore, all the stories about who we are as a nation are told in history books, novels, news, movies, songs, and theatre plays.
1.2.1.1 Ethnic Identity

Across the literature, the notion of ethnic identity is often used interchangeably with the notion of national identity, as if the two terms point to the same form of collective identity. Yet, ethnic identity is differentiated from national identity in some instances. An ethnic group is considered to consist of personal relationships, kinship. It is a sort of a ‘super-family’ (Smith, 2003) that shares a subjective belief in their common descent due to common physical appearances or customs (Weber, 1922), and its empirical references include dress, language, rituals, taboos, special medical and economic practices, physical features and a shared tradition with a future dimension (Nash, 1989). Ethnic identities are constructed out of materials of culture, language, religion, ancestry and regionality (Nagel, 1994). Ethnic boundaries are constantly undergoing revisions, by ethnic group members as well as the outsiders, and also in relation to them. Part of the literature argues that there is an element of agency to ethnic identity. The argument is that, while national identity can be imposed on an individual, ethnic identities are voluntary, even chosen out of the interests of the individual member or the entire group (Nagel, 1994). Joseph (2004) offers the example of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Albanians in Italy describing the switch of the ‘old’ Albanians to the national loyalty (Italian) when the ‘new’ Albanians became widely associated with crime. In a similar manner, Nagel describes the changing identifications among Native Indians in the US. They reportedly can choose from a range of identities within their ethnic group (tribal and sub-tribal identities) or regional, pan-Indian or supra-Indian identities when interacting with outsiders’ identities (Nagel, 1994).

The explanations presented here appear to be rational, interest-based choices of groups and individuals. However, on the other side are arguments that ethnic identity is not just a result of voluntary action. Modern practices, including those described in this study in the cases of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, oppose the view that a sub-
ject’s agency determines ethnic identity. Communication processes, persuasion, and constant flagging of ethnicity can very well be the sources of identification with an ethnic group. In addition, the literature claims that ethnicity is a particularly powerful source of self-identification due to shared historical practice, but also because Others constantly remind people that they themselves are Others in today’s multicultural world (Castels, 2010). Furthermore, Hall connects ethnicity with the very notion of the Self, stating that one needs to understand one’s roots/past in order to be in a position to talk (Hall, 1991). One can only begin to reflect on their own experiences if ‘they come from some place, they come from some history, they inherit certain cultural traditions’ (Hall, 1991: 18).

Another source of ethnic identification discussed across different literature is immigration (Chong, 1998, Peek 2005, Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012, Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2007). And while researchers have tried to understand the complicated and often incongruent affiliations of immigrants towards their religions, ethnicities, homelands and countries of residence, the literature also suggests that ethnicity can be ‘politically constructed’, i.e. the ethnic boundaries can be negotiated through political policies and institutions (immigration policies can outline future ethnic groups; census taking policies; or parliamentary and civil service representation; but also discrimination and repression by the states can advance ethnic identification) (Nagel, 1994). Furthermore, political and regional autonomy can foster ethnic identification processes, according to the existing literature.

1.2.1.2 National and Ethnic Identities

Most of the literature on national and ethnic identities does not offer conceptual clarification between the concepts of national and ethnic identity. However, several authors do establish a delineation between the two, and all of them agree that the distinction is that national
identity presupposes an existence of a state with borders, culture, education, division of labour, and its own laws. Nation is distinguishable by the political demand; it ‘demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group’ and can be imposed on an individual by processes such as the issuing of passports (Eriksen, 1991). Ethnic identity on the other hand does not have to be shared between members that are resident in a specific state (Robinson et al, 2001). Hobsbawm (1992) declares national identity to be the subject of political science; it is associated with a political programme and a territorial state. On the other hand, Hobsbawm declares ethnic identities to be not a political concept, but notes that they still often provide ‘the historical pedigree’ for a nation (Hobsbawm, 1992: 4). Ethnic identities would be subjects of sociology. Moreover, socio-cultural elements dominate other considerations of ethnic identity, as well. Eriksen (1991) for instance establishes a difference in the cultural aspect of the two concepts: while ethnicity provides social statuses and cultural identities, nations tend to promote cultural similarity and overall integration of all members regardless of ethnicity. He concludes that the difference is one of degree and not of kind.

National and Ethnic Identity in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The two countries under study here are marked by very different contexts in relation to national and ethnic identities. On the one hand, in Serbia with its 83% Serbian ethnic majority, existing literature does not put a lot of emphasis on distinguishing between national and ethnic identity. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, with three constituent peoples of different ethnicities and religions and two political entities with borders, the lines between ethnic and national identities are more complex. Both in the literature and in (political) life the two terms are regularly used interchangeably in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Still, it is possible to make a distinction between them. Since the state is shared among ethnic groups, but ethnic identities remain vibrant due to constant ‘flagging’ (Billig, 1995) in everyday life and communi-
cation, it would be easy to label all three groups as ethnic groups. However, their relations with the state that they share further complicates the definition. The majority of Bosnian Serbs and Croats have been referring to their national identity in relation to their ‘homelands’, the neighbouring Serbia and Croatia, while it is only the majority of Bosniaks that build loyalties to the territory of the entire state where they would be the dominant group (Robinson et al, 2001, Neskovic, 2013). From this perspective it is to be understood that all three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina refer to themselves as nations and have different imagined communities in mind when they do so.

Literature on ethnic and national identities in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is not vast and the details on the concepts are only discussed in relation to different processes, such as democratisation or conflict and peace building. For instance, Serbian national identity is discussed in relation to reforms in the state after the fall of Milosevic and the nature of the constitution of the new polity. Examining the political identity of the emerging democracy, Jovanovic (2011) discusses the borders of the nation as set by the constitution, while Podunavac (2011) argues that a collective identity is another label for a wide consensus within a society on who we are and why we are together, and concludes that this consensus is found in a ‘pre-political sphere’. According to Podunavac, the founding myth, the ethnicised nation, is the widest consensus in Serbia (and the region) because the ethnic form of nationalism is the strongest and most expansive power in the region (Podunavac, 2012). In a similar manner, Beljinac (2012) questions the decision to invoke national identity and belonging as the basis for a constitution drawn together for a community with national minorities, but again emphasises that the national identity is the most overarching form of collective identity and its ‘function is to engrain the modern individual in a newly formed community, offer emotional content and cultural framework for political action’ (Beljinac, 2012: 52). The significance of national identity in Serbia is also
the topic of Vasovic and Gligorijevic's (2011) empirical study. The authors argue that the observed identification with the nation in Serbia is advanced by three factors - the traditional heritage, patriarchic society and certain circumstances surrounding the reimagining of the country during the 1990s (nationalism, dissolution of the previous country and ethnic conflict in the neighbouring countries, among others).

1.2.1.3 Religious Identity

The existing literature on religious identities discusses how religion supports, reinforces and offers a source for constructing a group identity, and maintaining a group identity and culture (Chong, 1998). The review of the literature suggests that the construction of religious identities does not differ much from the identification processes of ethnic or national identities. Majority ethnic groups, different contexts and crises all impel a particular (religious) identity to become central to an individual’s conception of self (Peek, 2005). Religious identity is thought to differ from the other types of collective identities by a feature not possessed by national or ethnic identities, and that is a belief system so powerful that it uniquely shapes psychological and social processes (Ysseldyk et al, 2010). But these views clearly underestimate the power of tradition, customs and national or ethnic culture and their ability to inform everyday life of a group. Additionally, it has been argued that a religious identity is distinguishable for its appeals to a supra-human or supra-empirical authority to give explanations or set goals (Enloe, 1980) and offers a sense of mental well-being and behavioural guidance (Ysseldyk et al, 2010).

The two countries under research present an interesting study in religious identities and its power to construct loyalties and influence societies. First of all, the two countries are of very different religious
compositions. In Serbia, the majority population is Orthodox Christian, with ethnic minorities being, for the most part, Catholics and Muslims. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the religious divide matches ethnic divisions. The three constituent ethnicities are all of different religions: Muslim (Bosniak), Orthodox (Serbian) and Catholic (Croats). But what makes the comparison between the two cases even more insightful is their shared communist and socialist past, which was marked by anti-religion propaganda. After that, during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, religion soon became part of the process of the construction of new political identities (Ivekovic, 2002). The re-birth of religious beliefs after the communist era, complemented by the re-introduction of religious institutions into public life, offered the construction of new loyalties and frameworks in times of crisis. Religious identities quickly became part of the ‘new ethno-national projects, to which they have brought a feeling of historical continuity with the pre-communist past’ (Ivekovic, 2002:534).

1.2.1.3 Citizenship as Collective Identity

The notion of citizenship is regularly discussed as a three-dimensional notion (Leydet, 2011, Kymlicka and Norman 2000): firstly as a legal status; secondly as a form of political participation; and thirdly, as an identity. Citizenship as a legal status assumes that citizens in a community have their share of legal rights and responsibilities. Citizenship seen as political participation presupposes an active role for a citizen within a community, a sort of Aristotelian idea of citizens participating in the decision making processes in a community. These first two dimensions of the notion of citizenship point to differences between the two concepts of citizenship – liberal and republican – and the referral to the notion of citizenship as part of the public or private sphere. The main difference between the two approaches is the question of whether being a citizen suggests the protection of freedoms from the state and others in the private sphere
(liberal view), or whether it involves political agency in the public sphere (republican view) (Leydet, 2011).

The third dimension of citizenship is the dimension of interest for this study. This dimension considers citizenship as an identity; it invokes a sense of membership and belonging. Of particular importance here is to note that in both countries, citizenship practices and regulations in fact refer to ethnic identities. The concept of citizenship as identity then extends to further debates on the nature of contemporary citizenship and its relation to social differentiation and pluralism, as well as nation-states and ‘postnational constellations’ (Habermas and Pensky, 2001).

In the cases under research, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the concept of citizenship is a valuable criteria for investigating laws, regulations and administrative practices that define the body of citizens (who is included and who is excluded) and the practice of exercising political, socio-economic and civil rights of citizens (Shaw and Stiks, 2012). The literature on citizenship in the two countries regularly points to the ethnocentric practices, serving the purpose of the core ethnic group ‘owning’ a state (Shaw and Stiks, 2012). As mentioned before, the literature does note that differences between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina exist, in the sense that Serbia has a more liberal approach towards the acquisition of citizenship, while Bosnia and Herzegovina enforces restrictive policies in order to defend fragile ethnic balances. Furthermore, Serbia changed its Constitution in 2006 and in the process changed the wording of the citizenship clause to confirm its ethnocentric nature, while Bosnia has been ‘gifted’ a multi-ethnic citizenship regime by international supervision, but its political practices continue to be ethnocentric (Sarajlic, 2012).
1.2.1.4 Europeanisation

The search for the meaning of collective identities and loyalties in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is also influenced by the processes of Europeanisation that are underway within these countries. The existing literature considers Europeanisation in two different meanings: the impact of ‘the transfer of Europe to other jurisdictions’ and the building of European capacities (Bulmer et al, 2007). It covers various aspects of the process of Europeanisation: historical processes, institutional adaptation, policy adaptation, cultural influence. This study in part relies on the stream of the existing Europeanisation literature that is concerned with the impacts of EU rules and policies on domestic polities, especially through construction of shared beliefs. This literature suggests that, in addition to conditionality, and benefits and rewards mechanisms imposed by the EU, one of the possible modes of adoption of European rules can be enforcement by the elites. In these cases, though they are not the general rule, elites in the adopting countries deem them to be appropriate and legitimate (Checkel, 2001) and enforce them through socialisation and/or persuasion.

However, a major part of the literature discusses the success stories of Europeanisation, and the cases of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are not typically among them. Furthermore, the processes of Europeanisation in the Balkans have been described as externally driven, coercive and increasingly demanding, even one-way and patronising, and a test for the European identity itself (Anastasakis, 2005).

Concluding the review of relevant identities and processes, we must note that these identities are reviewed as potential targets of campaigns and not all of the presented debates are equally important and relevant for this research. Furthermore, the debates dominating the
field of national identity (whether it is a deeply rooted identity or a superficial ideology, even whether it is a modern or an ancient notion) are inconsistent with the constructionist tradition that this research is based on. In this research, national and ethnic identities are considered to be highly resonant with citizens in the two countries. They seem to resonate well not only due to the context of the countries going through transitions, after an era of nationalism and wars, but also due to the emotive and mobilising capacities of identity appeals based on them. National and ethnic identity appeals are able to engage large groups of people due to their primordiality and naturalness, the feeling of warmth and dedication, the sense of familiarity and kinship, and an offer of common history and future. This approach positions this study in line with the ethnic (Eastern) approach to national identity (Smith, 1991).

1.2.2 The Construction of Collective Identities through Communication

This study examines election campaigns as processes of communication between the representatives and the represented, and constructionism considers the processes of communication, as well as narratives and stories people tell about themselves to make up for an important element of identity construction. According to this tradition, the construction of identities starts with use of language and communicating who we are. By speaking and trying to make reality intelligible, engaging in actions such as describing or explaining, communicating actors set boundaries between identities, delineating them in the process, through the ‘performative function’ of language. Our perception of the world is influenced by our language; our conceptions and meanings are associated with discourse. Identities also spring up through the use of language, ‘inside a system of languages that partly speak us’ (Hall, 1991:12). Identity is born through discursive constitution and by ‘being called, named, interpellated’ (Butler, 1999:18). In playing the game of language (Gergen, 1999) we are at
the same time engaging in a cultural ritual. What is also important for the construction of collective identities is that grammar and style are not politically neutral (Butler, 1999: 10).

1.2.2.1 Language, media and Identity

Language is assumed to be the core mechanism for transmitting beliefs, values, ideologies, and collective memories, for maintaining social order and hierarchy, and for constructing identities. Constructionists take language to be more than the system of signs and rules used for communication; it is 'seen as a type of social practice' (Fairclough 1992: 28), part of society, a ‘socially conditioned process’ (Fairclough, 2001:19), shaped by non-linguistic parts of society, reproducing social order and influencing individuals' interactions (Jaworski and Coupland, 2006). Language is taken to be 'pre-structured' in terms of what is 'normal' or 'appropriate' (Ibid).

This research will rely heavily on the constructionist conceptions of discourse. The term discourse is commonly used by constructionists to indicate that language produces culturally and historically defined meanings. This study is based on the conception that the text is a product, and the discourse is a whole process of social interaction. Texts, processes of production and processes of interpretation are all segments of the social process that is discourse. In this discussion on the relevance of interpretation of texts Fairclough also introduces the concept of 'members' resources' to indicate resources 'people have in their heads and draw upon' (Fairclough, 2001:20) when they produce and interpret text. These include language, social and natural representations, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on. Consequently, discourse and language have social constraints but are still essential for reproducing social structures – they have 'long-term effects on the knowledge and beliefs, social relationships, and social identities' (Fairclough, 2001:62).
Following this argumentation on the role of language and communication in the formation of identities, the role of the media in this process has also been assessed. It is argued in literature that media serves as a catalyst for (re)construction of identities (Morley, 2003). Whether it is the initial idea of print media providing the grounds for national consciousness (Anderson, 1983), followed by the analysis of the consequences of identities being flagged daily by the press through the use of ‘we’, ‘this’, ‘here’ to signify belonging to identity and territory (Billig, 1995) or broadcasting of major events that foster national unity (Dayan and Katz, 1992), the role of public communication in identity formation is underscored.

More recently, the discipline has focused on the impact of new media and social networks on the construction of (new) identities. This previous research might also have implications for my research, as many campaigns are now paying more attention to online communication due the ability to deliver customised messages to fragmentised audience. It is agreed that new technologies have changed the ways we use media and that they have a severe impact on culture and society, but the consequences on identities still remain unresolved and unpredictable. As we enter simultaneous processes of homogenisation and fragmentation, globalisation and localisation (Morley, 2003), national and international communities and identities are being combined. As the popular press of the nineteenth century gave birth to a mass reading, political public, later television produced ‘new forms of citizenship based on affinity, culture, affect, identity’ (Fiske and Hartley, 2005:xv), and the post-broadcast era brought about “do-it-yourself” or “DIY” citizenship’ (Ibid), which suggests that participation in web-forums, interactive television, citizen journalism and posting videos and writing blogs and tweets have changed the very notion of the impact media have on identity creation.
1.2.2.2 Framing and Narration

Framing and narration are the two discursive tools of great importance for the study of identity construction and strategic communication used in campaigns. Given that some of the existing literature does not even distinguish between the two concepts beyond identifying framing to be a larger notion and incorporating narration. For instance, Gamson et al (1992) do not consider framing to be a static process, but a dynamic one that involves storytelling, a narration of events. Despite the conceptual confusion, in this study, we stipulate that framing and narration are two distinctive discursive tools.

Framing is a long-term trending topic in communication studies. Its prominence and endurance in the field also ensures a multiplicity of definitions and disagreements around the concept, leaving it without a consensual accepted meaning. Different definitions of framing include considering frames analogous to schema; Scheufele (2004) for instance discusses the cognitive frame as ‘a consistent complex of expectations’; Reese (2003) assumes frames to be ‘organising principles that are socially shared and persistent over time’; while Iyengar (1990) considers circumstantial cues used to present choices or decision options. ‘Decision frame’ is also referred by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) when they examine the decision makers’ conception of the acts and outcomes that are part of a decision choice. The confusion partly stems from the term and the process being studied by different fields such as communication, psychology, and voting behaviour, to name a few. The dissonance of definitions grows even wider when related concepts are discussed, such as agenda setting or priming. In these cases, authors draw different lines and hierarchies between them.

Referring to this discursive tool, framing in this study will imply the practice of attempting to influence the interpretation and meaning of information (Rhee, 1997) by contextualising (Hallahan, 1999) the
provided information. Here, framing is considered a dynamic process (Gamson et al, 1992). Frame strategists (Hallahan, 1999) who represent different social, institutional and ideological actors (Gamson et al, 1992) highlight certain aspects of reality and ignore others, while promoting ‘a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 1993: 52). The understanding here is that frames ‘work’ by influencing cognitively and/or culturally. That is, frames organise meanings by influencing cognition, usually by appealing to basic psychological biases, and/or ‘more deeply’ by invoking cultural understandings beyond immediate information (Reese, 2001). These ‘deeper’ working frames involve the reception and interpretation of frames themselves.

The acceptance of this understanding of frames in this research comes from the belief that frames are not isolated in social reality but are received by audiences, and while some might accept the intended frame, others will reject it or negotiate it (Gamson et al, 1992). The most effective frames are those that correspond to the widely and popularly accepted cultural principles. The frame ‘readers’ (i.e. the recipients) are active participants in assigning meanings, and frames have more chances of being accepted if the ‘readers’ are familiar with them. Framing strategists use headlines, audio-visual elements, metaphors, symbols, iconic phrases, and different stylistic conventions to influence the audiences’ readings of the reality but in doing so they have to account for audiences’ previous knowledge of these conventions as well as objects of framing (Rhee, 1997). ‘Cultural resonance’ (Kubal, 1998) of a frame with the targeted cultural environment increases the chances of a frame being accepted. In other words, if a frame is familiar to the targeted audience in style, form and content, chances are it will be more effective.

The second discursive tool of interest, narration, is also sometimes used to put information in perspective and influence the reception of the audience, but it necessarily includes a story with an element of temporality. In this research, narration is also considered in relation
to identities. Identity is a development, an evolving, on-going process of becoming (Peek, 2005), that, when looked at in one point in time, presents a meeting point of practices and narratives that ‘interpellate’ it and, on the other side, practices that construct it (Hall, 2000). This study particularly looks at the practice of campaigns to narrate the identities that they target. It considers narratives as accounts of events occurring over time (Bruner, 1991: 6). In this research a particular emphasis is put on temporality, a sequenced durativity of narratives (Ibid). Narratives include a recounting of past, present and future. One of the functions of narratives is this ordering of temporality (Wodak et al, 2009). They integrate ‘the changeable and dynamic elements in a temporal permanence’ (Ibid: 14). What narratives do for identities is ‘arrange and interpret, rearrange and reinterpret’ and integrate ‘conflicting elements of constancy and transformation into harmony with each other’ (Wodak et al, 2009: 14-15). Narratives of identities include this transformation when identities need to adjust to shifts of different kinds. Price documents that these shifts can come from changing global values, economic pressure, ideological challenges from inside or out, dissent, or ‘from improbable moments of mass conversion’ (2012: 11). Therefore, narratives, in this study influenced by campaigns, perform the function of adjusting the meaning of identities in accordance with surrounding environments. According to Price (2012), among the three elements temporality narratives include, it is the orientation to the future that sets narratives apart from stories, spin and propaganda. However, it is the (re)interpretation of the past that plays a vital role for construction of identities.
1.2.2 Collective Memory

Not all elements of the narratives’ durativity are given the same significance and consideration in the literature. It is suggested that having a common past, a historical memory is ‘an indispensable prerequisite’ in constructing identities (Wodak et al, 2009, citing Kolakowski, 1995), in fact collective identities (national identities in particular) are constructed by ‘a certain pathos performed by selectively historiographic means’ (Burger, 1994: 168, cited in Wodak et al, 2009: 20). Common memory of the past plays a significant role as an element of Hall’s discursive strategies for narrating national cultures. According to Hall, narration of the nation creates ‘a connection between stories, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and national rituals which represent shared experiences and concerns, triumphs and destructive defeats’ (Hall, 1996: 615). Discursive strategies that narrate the nation also include past stories of origins, tradition, timelessness, and foundational myth (Ibid).

This study does not engage in a discussion to determine if the stories of the past that campaigns tell are historically accurate. These stories serve the purpose of imagining a collective identity but can be false or only partially true. In fact, authors emphasise that it is irrelevant whether the memory is true or legendary (Wodak et al, 2009), and suggest other qualities that add to the constructionist capacity of the past. Wodak et al. claimed that it was antiquity of the memory or the legend that made a difference – the further into the past the better (Wodak et al, 2009). On the other hand, Hobsbawm highlighted the fallaciousness and novelty of the past, especially for modern societies. According to Hobsbawm, invented traditions, ‘responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 2), serve the purpose of structuring social life and
offering some sense of stability and sameness by providing a common past for a collective.

Given the importance of the past for narrating an identity, the study of collective memory provides valuable revelations on how collective memory is constituted, shaped and manipulated. Collective memory, also referred to as public memory, cultural memory, or social memory, comprises of ‘recollections that are determined and shaped by the group’ (Zelizer, 1995: 214). Collective memory is not only widely held memory (in which case it would be a shared or collected memory), but a deeply meaningful memory for the group, thus it must impact on the group’s identity by definition (Hirst and Manier, 2008). It is also different from history. History is a representation of the past while memory is affective and magical (Nora, 1989); it has an emotional significance that is constantly renegotiated (Barnier and Sutton, 2008). Collective memories are usually studied in relation to their material representations (monuments, celebrations, clothes, artefacts), but can also be communicative memories (Assmann, 1995), i.e. memories that are communicated between people.

The term collective memory itself is credited to Maurice Halbwachs, whose contribution to the field is celebrated for establishing a relationship between collective memory and collective identity, for underscoring the social, collective nature of memory. Halbwachs posited that memory was socially constructed, and that it was in the society, in certain contexts, where people acquired memory. In fact, people ‘recall, recognize, and localize their memories’ (Halbwachs, 1992:38) in society. According to Halbwachs, memory is limited by a group membership, specific to a space and time and culture, and is then perceived as different from other groups with their own shared memories and identities.

Collective memory is born in society, originating from social mnemonic resources. Discussing the patterns that construct collective
memories, authors point to mechanisms of internalisation, through primary and secondary socialisation (Berger and Luckmann), but also emphasise the importance of language and discourse (Gergen and Gergen) in remembering and forgetting. However, its social nature is somewhat challenged by the discussion on place and the storage of collective memory. Is collective memory property of the individual or the group, is it ‘in the head’ or ‘out in the world’ (Hirst and Manier, 2008)? Wang (2008) describes the individualistic approach to collective memory, seeing it as ‘aggregation of socially framed individual memories’, and the collectivist understanding of collective memory that views collective memories as ‘collective phenomena sui generis’ (2008: 314). But collective memory in the end spreads across a group through societal memory practices and resources, and also by individual cognitive efforts; it is born in the interaction between the two poles (Hirst and Manier, 2008).

However, this study considers the role of strategic communication and election campaigns in particular in spreading the meaning, understanding or invention of memories shared by a community. Collective memory has a quality that election campaigns can profit from, and it is not a finite phenomenon. Its changes and transformations are key aspects of its significance for the group. While being spread between members of the group, collective memory is simultaneously transformed ‘by activities of sharing, discussion, negotiation and often contestation’ (Zelizer, 1995: 214). Remembering is a process of constant change performed by both the group and the individual. Therefore, collective memory undergoes constant change and always continues to be ‘open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting’ but is also ‘vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation’ (Nora, 1989: 8). ‘Memory entrepreneurs’ – political and social stakeholders such as governmental structures, political parties, interest groups and intellectuals (Moll, p.911) – might engage in such manipulations to pursue their own interests. Therefore, memory can serve as an effective mobilisation tool for campaigning efforts.
The existing literature offers even more evidence about what types of memory can be influenced. Olick and Robins (1998) argue that not all memories are the same; some are more susceptible to change and manipulation, while others are more resistant. They list six ideal types of mnemonic malleability and persistence: 1. instrumental persistence, when actors intentionally seek to maintain a particular version of the past; 2. cultural persistence, when a past remains relevant for later cultural formations; 3. inertial persistence, when a version of the past is reproduced out of habit; 4. instrumental change, when a memory changes for particular reasons in the present; 5. cultural change happens when a particular past becomes irrelevant for the present; and 6. inertial change happens when a memory is somehow simply forgotten (Olick and Robins, 1998: 129 - 130).

Moreover, memory is different for every individual. Individual memories are not independent from collective memory, and individual members of a collective remember different aspects of events. This makes the meaning of collective memory not necessarily the same for every member (Zelizer, 1995). Given its changing nature and vagueness in meaning for members, collective memory becomes susceptible to framing attempts – the past becomes ‘usable past’ (Ibid). Framing attempts are directed at influencing which memories are activated to interpret a present day message (Hallahan, 1999). Collective memory is in fact a ‘perpetually actual phenomenon’ (Nora, 1989: 8). The sociological study of the past is marked by a powerful line of ‘presentism’ (Olick and Robins, 1998) that treats the past as a product of the present. Being a product of the present, where it gets ‘rearranged, transformed, recontextualised, substituted, mystified or totally changed’ (Martin and Wodak, 2003: 11), this study argues that the past memory can be an effective tool for campaigns to influencing the future of a collective it helps constitute.
In Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the study of collective memory is for the most part occupied with the memories of the last wars in the region and the ways in which the two societies are managing the collective traumas that they endured. The past and memories of the two countries are discussed in the context of transitional justice, and acknowledging the events of the past traumas.

The existing literature examines the denial of the role Serbia played in the events, war crimes especially, during the wars in the 1990s. For instance, authors identify the practice of denial through silence about the legacy of the evil past (Dimitrijevic, 2009). They also discuss the processes of rationalisation and minimisation of war crimes in the Serbian public discourse (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2009). Ramet (2013) also discusses the use of language, labels in particular, as a tool in building new memory narratives, alongside commemorations, exhibits, nationally oriented music, monuments and art. She also recognises the Serbian denial syndrome that comprises of numerous denial practices in Serbia – reinterpretation of past events in a negative way, perceptions of conspiracy and attribution of sinister intentions to others (Ramet, 2007). Most of the studies on the practices of denial also engage in assessing the moral and normative aspects of the denial. These studies argue for acknowledging the moral collective responsibility and express the need of the members of society ‘to take a moral stance towards the crime that was committed in their name’ (Dimitrijevic, 2009: 141).

The literature on collective memory in Bosnia and Herzegovina also discusses the practices of denial, but largely discusses the practice of instrumentalisation of memories in political discourse. Lasic (2015) examines the practices of nurturing ‘selective memory’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina and all-round denials by all sides about the crimes. Moll (2013) establishes the parallelism of fragmented memory narratives constructed by each ethnic elite and the policies that accompany them. The existing literature also considers the use of memories and
narratives from World War II in present day Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the interpretation of the events and causes of the war in the 1990s (Bougarel et al, 2007, Moll, 2013, Karacic et al, 2012).

Overall, the review of literature on collective memory suggests various aspects of the nature of collective memory that makes it relevant for persuasive efforts. As previously discussed, in the first place, collective memory has the power to inspire affection, to engage, and to mobilise people. Second, the literature suggests that memory is malleable, it can be changed, reconstructed, negotiated, and manipulated in correspondence with the present day needs of political actors. In the end, collective memory constitutes the base of the narrative identity by communicating its most vital part.

1.2.3 Conclusion

This study is interested in the role election campaigns play in constructing the meaning of collective identities. The concepts reviewed in this chapter will help assess this role by revealing the practice of identity construction through social relations and in a great deal through communication processes. In this study, election campaigns are considered to be intense and important communication processes with a role in constructing identities at both individual and collective level. This chapter argued that campaigns appeal to certain segment- ed groups of voters during the process of persuasive communication, helping to construct the understanding of collective identities that these groups share. These identities may be of differing importance for the electorate. They might be deemed highly relevant and important, but campaigns can also engage in politicising and mobilising collective identities that are of no particular relevance for the voters, that are dormant and only become critical during the elections. Not all identities are equally suitable and strategic for campaigns to appeal to. As seen in this chapter, collective identities are especially suitable for mobilising voters because the collective shared sense of
we-ness offers a solid motivation (Snow, 2000). Therefore, this study has a particular focus on collective identities. However, not all collective identities offer the same capacity for mobilisation of voters. This chapter’s argument is that the identities that are powerful when motivating people are normally those that are resonant with the voters they are trying to reach. This chapter informed the research by reviewing national, ethnic and religious identities as the most relevant for the cases of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, given their recent contexts.

When campaigns engage in appealing to collective identities, they do so, among other methods, by framing the current circumstances before and within the society, as well as framing the choices before the voters in the elections. By framing the current context, campaigns make some features of reality more visible than others. Given that identities are a development, a continuous process of becoming (Peek, 2005), framing of the exact situation surrounding the identity development is paramount for the identity at that point and might influence individuals’ decision making. Furthermore, given that this research starts with the idea that, as individuals we all have different roles in the society and hence share various collective identities as part of the Self, the framing of the current context is of extreme importance for the individual. The concepts reviewed here will guide this research through examining the ways circumstances of elections are framed to deem some collective identities more relevant than others at the moment of the elections, while at the same time making those identities the basis for voters’ voting decisions.

The second discursive tool covered in this chapter is narration. As a tool, narration is vital for the (re)construction of identities as it helps tell the story of an identity, to connect different episodes into a storyline. This study sets out to investigate the ways campaigns use identity narratives to mobilise the collective identities people share by elaborating the storyline of an identity and framing it in a way that
helps them frame the electoral moment to benefit their electoral chances. On the other hand, identity narratives construct the meanings of identities by providing the common past, shared present, and also the future of the identity. According to the literature reviewed in this chapter, reconstructing collective memories that tell the story of a joint past is particularly important for the meaning of the identity. Furthermore, given that collective memories are often subject to contestation (Zelizer, 1995), they can also be useful for party positioning during the election. In the process, the collective memories might get changed and retold. Given their recent turbulent pasts, these considerations will be particularly helpful with the examination of the power of memories in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and political uses given to these memories by political actors.
Chapter 2: Campaign Communication: The Role of Political Parties

2.1 Introduction

Political parties are the principal actors of political communication, they represent various parts of society but at the same time, they help renew loyalties to the community by communicating and aggregating various interests. This chapter reviews the existing literature on political parties and their role as agents of public communication. The most relevant debate about political parties that informs this research is the debate on the origin of political parties and its dependence on the parties’ constituencies. That is, are the parties only representing their social base or are they mobilising constituencies they themselves construct? The knowledge on political parties is divided between these approaches, between the authors who consider parties to have social origins, to have emerged out of divisions in society, and those who believe parties to be the creators of these constructed divisions. The literature on parties in post-communist societies claims that parties emerge from parliamentary elites in these societies, and generally attempts to establish overreaching patterns that would cover processes of democratisation in each of these countries. However, the developments in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina defy this argument as political parties there have emerged in very different ways, as results of elite action but also out of social movements and organisations. Regardless of their origin, this study argues that political parties hold the power in the process of communication and are the instigators of public discussions in both observed societies.

The processes of communication are the next topic of this chapter, as it continues to consider the functions of political parties and argues
that communication is the vital function of political parties, following Sartori’s argument that, in addition to ‘placing, through elections, candidates for public office (Sartori, 2005: 57), political parties provide a network of communications in a society. This chapter also reviews the existing literature on the communication practices of political parties during elections in particular. Special consideration is given to the deficiencies of the literature that considers voting to be interest-based and to the literature on the ‘affective turn’ in election campaigning. The argument put forward in this study is that (especially in the less developed democracies) mobilising affections and emotions is essential for electoral success, more so than appealing to the interests of targeted voters.

2.2. Political Parties: Agents of Conflict, Unity and Communication

Political parties stand out as one of the most important elements of both political life and the study of politics. Political parties are the critical link to democratic government (Katz and Crotty, 2006). They represent the idea of factions, parts of a society, group interest and its mobilisation. To start with, seminal literature on political parties discusses the idea of a party as a part of society (Sartori, 2005) suggesting divisions in a society. It is ‘an agent of conflict’ (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 3), that helps ‘crystallize and make explicit the conflicting interests’ (Ibid: 5). Indeed, many of the definitions of political parties have this notion of parties in mind, that a political party is considered to be: ‘a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed’ (Burke, 1770); also ‘a coalition of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal means (Downs, 1957); or ‘any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect government officeholders under a given label’ (Epstein, 1980); and a coalition of elites, ‘an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, and procedures’ (Aldrich, 1995).
Regardless of whether the definition emphasises the parties’ ideological roots, organisational capacities, or mediating role towards the voters (White, 2006), the definitions listed above point to the particularity and divisiveness of political parties. However, this research posits that political parties add to renewing and reinforcing loyalties to the national community, especially during the electoral processes when they participate in invoking memories of the joint past, and setting out plans and policies for the future, promoting in this way allegiances to the community in question. According to the existing literature, political parties play an integrative part in the society by linking local communities into a nation or federation, and setting a national system of government above any particular set of officeholders (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). This position holds that parties invite support for the endurance of a community by aggregating different interests, but does not specifically consider separatist parties. Separatist interests of parties might be expected in cases under study here, and some parties might represent interests that encourage the termination of the community in its current form. However, the argument in this study is that, by engaging in public discourse and participating, political parties still serve the function of reinforcing loyalties to the system as a whole.

How do parties emerge? The debate on the origins of political parties considers the relationship political parties have with their constituencies and what comes first, the party or the constituency. The bottom up approach considers a party to be born out of a social interest, as its representative. The top-down approach posits party elites that imagine and then mobilise their constituency, constructing political identities. In other words, parties only represent their social base, according to the bottom-up approach or politicise identities that they themselves construct, according to the top-down approach.

Initially, the study of the history of political parties in developed democracies argues that in organisational terms parties were developed
top-down, out of parliamentary groups in modern national assemblies in the US, UK, France, Belgium and Switzerland during the late 18th and 19th centuries (Boix, 2007). These parties came into being by stabilising a coordination within a parliamentary group and also with electoral committees. Establishing permanent links between parliamentary groups and many existing electoral committees usually leads to setting up an administrative centre different to the parliamentary group that then became an organisation of a political party (Duverger, 1964). In contrast to the electoral and parliamentary origin of old parties, Duverger (1964) also acknowledged the extra-parliamentary origins of parties that were characteristic of modern types of parties. The genesis of these parties is closely connected to different organisations such as trade unions, philosophical societies, clubs etc. These parties are therefore also established through elite agency, top-down, but on the other pole of the origins debate lie the theories on the social origins of political parties, the cleavage theories.

These studies claim that the emergence of the first political parties was closely connected to the concept of political representation/reflection\(^{12}\) of different collective identities. Initially, the studies on political parties and cleavages focused primarily on class divides, but also on religious, cultural, regional and other divides. Social divides are sometimes translated into partisan divides, sometimes partially translated and sometimes not at all (Mair, 2006). Analysing Western democracies\(^{13}\), Lipset and Rokkan (1967) observed a relation between the emergence of cleavages and constellations of political parties, and drew conclusions about the emergence of party systems after the broadening of suffrage. The authors concluded that the national and industrial revolutions in the Western countries incited so-

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\(^{12}\) Sartori (1969) does not consider representation of collectivities to be possible, that we can only talk about reflection. According to Sartori, leaders and voters can only be linked by socio-psychological empathy, and not by representational links.

\(^{13}\) Together with Brazil and Japan.
ocial divides against four axes: 1) the central nation-building culture and the opposition of regional, peripheral populations; 2) the nation-building state and the Church; 3) the landed interests and then industrialists; and 4) owners and employers, and workers (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). These conflicts helped institutionalise party systems and remained relevant for partisan identification, so much so that the authors hypothesised the freezing of the cleavages, claiming that the party systems of the 1960s reflected the cleavages of the 1920s (Lispet and Rokkan, 1967). Lispet and Rokkan confirm that the translation of social cleavages into constellations of parties did not flow automatically and that strategies, payoffs, organisational efforts and narrowing of the ‘mobilisation market’ had to be considered (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 26).

Sartori (1969) on his part reconciles these two approaches, the top-down and the social cleavages approach. Sartori claimed that conflicts were in fact the base of political activity, but still assigned agency to elites, arguing that these conflicts had to be translated into politics by political translators. That is, a party system is an independent variable, intervening in this political process, according to Sartori. In this, the political entrepreneur exerts more influence on the voter than the economic entrepreneur on the buyer, and the political system is ‘not only a response to consumer’s demands, but is equally a feedback of producer’s options’ (Sartori, 1969: 211). By advocating that the political entrepreneurs have a decisive role in politicising cleavages and identities, Sartori rejected the idea of frozen cleavages positing that divides are manipulated and used as resources by the governing elites.

More recently, the literature on the links between social cleavages and political parties has focused on the emergence of new parties as well as new divisive issues and the resulting voters’ electoral volatility (Siavelis, 2006). Further, contemporary politics is associated with the ‘emergence of more volatile individualized or particularized sets of
preferences’ (Mair, 2006: 374). On the one side, voters’ new fragmented preferences lead to cross-cutting cleavages and multiple loyalties that cannot be reinforced (Siavelis, 2006). And on the other side, political parties reacted by changing their electoral strategies in such ways that they were no longer inspired by the traditional cleavages in the society due to the erosion of the political relevance of the traditional social divisions. In this situation, political agents still play a decisive role in choosing which issues and divisions will be politicised, constructing cleavages, oppositions and interests in the process.

2.3 Social Basis of Political Parties in Post-Communist Countries

The origins debate is also taken up by the studies of post-communist development that try to offer a general theory of how parties emerged in these settings. The assumption that these studies start with is that post-communist societies are not cut across with cleavages that could be politicised and mobilised. What these studies imply is that the communist regimes in these countries impeded the establishment of Western-style social classes with ‘egalitarian economic policies and the disaggregation of social resources – such as property, education, status, occupation and wealth’ (Evans and Whitefield, 1993: 528) that resulted in ‘social amorphousness and homogenisation’ (Ibid: 529). Consequently, as a result of classless social bases in these countries, these studies suggested nationalism would be chosen as an appropriate and effective ideology by most of the parties in the region. The conclusion was based on recording ‘a pattern of interest articulation at the level of mass collectivism – nation or society’ (Ibid). However, the reality of post-communist democratisation showed that generalisations of the countries’ experiences failed to offer a valid overarching argument as these countries went through very different experiences, and some of these countries’ experiences were not relevant for others. Also, in cases of the two countries studied in this research, a
single argument about the origins of political parties could not be formed as their paths seem to be very different.

The literature on the development of post-communist party systems also offers a discussion on agency in structuring political systems. These studies postulate elite and parliamentary agency in the emergence of party systems after the fall of communism. Worth acknowledging are the observations of the long history of elites’ autonomy in the region accompanied by very few policy choices available in light of stark democratisation reforms (Innes, 2001). The limited policy choices available to the elites in these countries imply limited opportunities to politicise and mobilise cleavages and corresponding identities. On the other side, there were studies that advocated that there were ‘more divergent sources’ involved in the development of party systems in post-communist countries (Von Beyme, 1996). The assumption of the non-existence of cleavages in post-communist countries was also proven to be not entirely correct. The existing literature does acknowledge the first divide in emerging democracies to be the one between those who supported communism and those who opposed it (Hagopian, 2007). But in fact this initial cleavage only became more complex with the beginning of the processes of democratisation. The divisions among citizens became more operable with time and included division along religious, ideological, and ethnic lines, before others.

Aside from cleavages and elites, party systems in post-communist countries were categorically shaped by their historical experiences of the previous regime. Voltmer (2008) argues that transitioning societies do not start from Stunde Null or ‘Zero Hour’, but are instead influenced by existing institutions, persistent value systems and in the end the urgency of the dramatic moment of the collapse of the previous system. These trajectories of the past account for the differences of the systems (Voltmer, 2006). The ‘path-dependency’ approach is shared by many, but in the case of Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries it was especially instituted by Kitschelt. Although Kitschelt initially observed the divide between the winners and the losers of transition (Kitschelt, 1992), he then broadened the study to include the consideration of the variation of the communist system the country experienced. Kitschelt (1995) later accounted for differences in the communist systems that developed in the CEE region during the previous era. He differentiated between patrimonial communism, which relied on ‘hierarchical chains of personal dependence’ (1995: 453) within the elites and administration of the state, as well as extensive patronage and clientelistic relations; bureaucratic-authoritarian communism, with high levels of rational-bureaucratic institutionalisation that caused the implosion of the system at the time of collapse; and national communism, which allowed for a certain level of interest articulation and promoted national autonomy against the dominance of the Soviet Union.

Additionally, political systems that developed in former communist countries are marred by a corrupt system of voting, extreme electoral volatility and overall fragile relationships between parties and their constituencies that show no loyalty to their electoral representatives (Hagopian, 2007). Parties in the newly established democracies regularly have fewer members than those in Western democracies, lower levels of organisation, stronger links to the state and weaker links to society, and less developed policy platforms (Burnell and Gerrits, 2010). The articulation of their political ideas is becoming increasingly vague and popularity is consistently going down, while voters become more and more alienated to the point of not voting (Burnell and Gerrits, 2010). Kitschelt (1995) argued that three types of parties had emerged in post-communist systems: programmatic, charismatic and clientelistic. Programmatic parties involved great organisational costs for the party and its supporters and great cognitive skills and information for their voters; charismatic parties assumed a charismatic leader that attracts an unstructured mass of people to rally around them; and clientelistic parties are associated
with patronage and a constant flow of goods for their supporters and members which involves high investment (Kitschelt, 1995). Kitschelt’s observations of corrupt electoral relations and patronage, as well charismatic, populist leaders gaining support, were popular and widely accepted in the literature, but authors also came to the conclusion that the observed political behaviour did not have capacities to endure in light of the processes of privatisation of state-owned systems and service providers, deregulation, and fiscal reforms imposing constraints on the state administration (Hagopian, 2007). These processes limited the opportunities for the parties to buy electoral support, but only to an extent.

According to the existing literature, political parties could choose for themselves different strategies of development: communists could reform, change the name and distance themselves from communism or remain the same, and the opposition to communism could split into smaller parties with different programmes, ideologies and targets, or continue as a broad coalition (Evans and Whitelield, 1993). In different countries, parties chose different paths.

2.3.1. The Cleavages politicised in Post-Communist Countries

The considerations of the historical experience during communism, which impose constraints and shapes the emerging societies, are of great importance for this study. The two chosen countries share a joint past and the similar starting point of their transitions towards democracy and this historical experience is argued to have influenced the electoral offers of the political parties of today as well as the political identities of citizens. Therefore, this study will consider the possibilities of mobilising the collective identities that are expected to arise from post-communist social divisions. To sum up, the authors concerned with post-communist transition observe and expect post-communist societies to be a ground for development of political iden-
tities based on ideological sources surrounding concepts of citizenship, economic distribution, social values (modern and traditional before else) but also considers identities such as national, ethnic and religious to be relevant for electoral mobilisation.

For instance, Kitschelt (1995) distinguishes between three basic programmatic cleavages that might yield political parties. The first political division is concerned with the inclusivity of citizenship of the new system. The division here is between the universalist, individual rights approach to citizenship and the particularist approach that promotes collectivist rights to a particular ethnic or cultural group. The second division of importance for political parties is constituted around the type of governance, participatory or authoritarian. The third division concerns economic distribution, and covers a range between free-market economic liberalism and state-led resource distribution (Kitschelt, 1995: 458). Within this model, Kitschelt assumed systems that had developed out of bureaucratic-authoritarian communist societies would produce programmatic parties based on the division between economic populism and market liberalism; systems developed out of the national type of communism would include a social and a liberal camp divided around economics, and also a Christian-national-authoritarian camp distinguishable by its traditionalism. In the end, the patrimonial communism is believed to produce blurred programmatic differences between parties and a personalised party system. Similarly, Evans and Whitfield (2000) posit historical experience as an important source of ideological divisions, alongside the economy and distribution, social and political values – more traditional or progressive options – and divisions about identity, especially ethnic and national identities (Evans and Whitefield, 2000).

However, this study also has to acknowledge particular circumstances recorded in post-communist societies that are for the most part ignored in the previously discussed studies. These circumstances concern the costs of transition and consolidation of new democracies
that are reflected in reforms and policies that governments impose on these societies. The economic reforms that shape the distribution of resources are especially significant for reinforcing political identities. Innes (2001) confirms that transition governments have no choice but to embark on austere reforms, and that puts significant constraints on their electoral strategies. In practice, this suggests that political parties in transitioning societies cannot afford to have left-wing mobilisation strategies.

2.3.2 Party positions in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

The existing literature on the relationship between political actors and their social base in Western democracies, but also in post-communist countries, offers some insight into the development of this relationship in the two countries studied in this research, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the circumstances of the institution of political parties in the countries that once constituted Yugoslavia have to be taken into account and considered separately. Indeed, these studies on party systems that developed after 1989 mostly cover systems of the CEE region and exclude countries of the former Yugoslavia for good reason. Following the eras of communism and socialism, the processes of democratisation and establishing a multi-party system in the two countries were parallel to the ethnic war and raging conflicting nationalisms. The two countries did not only have to manage the processes of building the necessary institutions and undergoing changes, but also had to ‘to overcome the trauma of the past and the divisions that [had] triggered the conflict’ (Voltmer, 2013).

The literature on party positioning and social cleavages in both countries acknowledges ‘the values of the wartime-nationalistic transition’ (Komsic et al, 2003: 164, describing the Serbian transition) and the historical experience that shaped the party system after the fall of
communism. In such circumstances, it is even harder to express the origins debate, whether parties were a top-down project of the elites or a bottom-up expression of social divisions, in a single overarching argument. Political parties as well as their corresponding constituencies and mobilised political identities came into being through very different paths.

Whether political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a top-down or a bottom-up projects is difficult to entangle. The literature on the party system in Bosnia and Herzegovina considers political parties to be a result of the mobilisation of ethnic identities, which became the most prominent division in the country during the ethnic war in the 1990s. They are also products of the political system, electoral rules and administration that was envisioned by the peace agreement between the three ethnic groups, which was also based on ethnic identities. Although it appears as though the ethnic cleavage brought about political parties, the authors still acknowledge the role played by ‘political entrepreneurs’ that did not have much political experience or ideological background (Zlokapa, 2008) and therefore chose ethnicity as their mobilisation strategy. Mujkic (2007) goes as far as to label the parties not as parties but as ‘movements that pretend to represent one of the three constituent peoples’ (2007: 113). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, political parties still continue to be run by ‘ethnic oligarchies’ (Mujkic, 2007) and mostly campaign on one agenda: which party would be perceived as more nationally driven (Zlokapa, 2008).

The parties’ nationalistic agenda seemed to reflect the electoral demand well, as voters seemed to be responsive only to appeals of patriotism, nationalism and religious fervour (Zlokapa, 2008). Not even the intervening factor in the country – the representatives of the international community – were able to curb the party competition away from its nationalistic direction, and all their attempts to help produce non-nationalistic political actors have failed (Hulsey, 2010).
The Serbian literature offers a somewhat more complex insight into the emergence of political parties and relevant collective identities after the collapse of the one party rule in the country. The operable identities in Serbia seem to be more ideologically nuanced compared to those of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Researchers of the Serbian party system draw conclusions of similarities with other post-communist countries but also point to country specific distinctions. Authors conclude that Serbia is also a classless society not just as a result of communist and socialist policies, but as a consequence of the economic and social devastation that accompanied the support for ethnic Serbs in neighbouring countries during the wars of the 1990s (Stojiljkovic, 2011). This resulted in increased poverty and an impediment of social mobility (Ibid), therefore the dominant cleavages in the society were not based on class interests, but on the ideological predispositions of voters.

Although the existing literature acknowledges the burden of the previous nationalistic era, authors claim the social divisions that are politicised by parties in Serbia are more varied. Komsic et al (2003) argue that the cleavages were constituted (by being politicised) around four types of divisions: 1) social and economic (mostly related to the Kitschelt’s division between winners and losers of transition); 2) historical and ethnic (dominantly represented by the division between the principles of ethnicity and citizenship, but also in the relation towards ethnic minorities and neighbouring ethnicities); 3) cultural values (traditional – modern in general); and 4) ideological and political divisions (left wing, centre, right wing positioning).

With the beginning of transition, during the 1990s, political actors on their part were only grouped around the ruling party and the opposition. The strategy of the ruling party was to promote ideas of patriotism and national belonging, the official patriotic ideology of a sort, while the opposing parties promoted a wide range of ideological positions (Stojiljkovic, 2011). The opposing ideologies at the time were largely unsuccessful and ineffective in offering an alternative to the
dominant nationalistic discourse of the ruling party. The literature further posits that it was after the fall of Milosevic in 2000 that the country started its transition in full, but was ‘marred by widespread corruption, politicised crime and criminalised politics’ (Stojiljkovic, 2011). It was only then that the political parties started to abandon the formula of ‘ethno-national identity and public interest’ (Komsic et al, 2003).

Today, the most politically exploitable cleavages in Serbia continue to be the division between the affinity for the modern and the traditional, and the national and non-national citizen identity. These lines of division have substantial overlap; the population who identifies with ideas of traditionalism also identifies with national identity, and the population that identifies with ideas of modernism also identifies with the principle of citizenship. However, studies report an unexpected finding: both the voters and the parties of the traditional/national orientation can be found on the left-wing pole of the ideological spectrum and the modern/citizenship oriented actors and voters are positioned on the centre/right-wing end (Komsic et al, 2003, Stojiljkovic, 2011, 2012). However, Stojiljkovic (2011) recorded a weakening of both the ‘(neo)liberal and the socially responsible’ orientation among the voters with the rise of the global economic down-fall of 2008.

Similarly, as in the group of the post-communist countries in CEE, the two countries studied here escape the possibility of a single, unified argument about the emergence of political parties and their relationship with their constituencies. The question of agency in these processes seems to be inconclusive as well. While most of the parties did emerge as a result of elite action in the parliament after the first multiparty elections in the 1990, other parties rose out of social (ethnic) movements during the war. The paths of the political parties in these countries seem to be the results of different circumstances.
2.4 The History of Political Parties is also the History of Political Communication

The title of this section paraphrases Rommele (2003) and serves to underline the importance of communication for the functioning of political parties and their relationship with their constituencies. This relationship between political parties and voters is communicative in nature. Political parties are key agents of communication in a society and public communication is one of the key functions of political parties. This research argues that political parties are vital in channelling their constituencies’ preferences, communicating the values, principles and features of the identities that they target.

Political parties are communication networks (citing Barnes, Sartori, 1976: 56) that provide a channelling system for society. Sartori considers expression and channelling to be the key functions of parties, but the third, communication, is at the core of the first two. However, party communication is not a one-way process, it is a dialogue between parties and citizens. Sartori further observes the question of power in the relationship between parties and citizens. He asserts that the dialogue that is party communication includes the agency of citizens and voters as well, but this dialogue is ‘not a dialogue among equal partners’ but one in which political parties hold the power in the relationship (1976: 57). In fact, expression of interests performed by political parties involves an element of repression. While expressing social interests, political parties do so in a way that transmits coercions, orders, authoritative allocations (1976: 58). It is through communication that political parties assume their role of authority in aggregating interests and preferences for a polity.

Engaging in a dialogue presumes knowledge and assumptions about identities of participating actors. The dialogue between voters and political parties therefore must include information regarding the identity of the party and the identity of the constituencies it address-
Party (and especially electoral) communication consists of sending out signals to voters about the party’s identity, policies and positions on issues. Party communication takes the form of a ‘signalling game’, through which voters and parties learn about each other’s type, building reputations based on which they then act (Kitschelt, 1995). The longer the voters and parties play the game, the more beneficial the game is for the polity because it helps establish the parties’ programmatic profiles. The signals parties send to their voters are also described as party images that the parties use (Blondel, 1969; Sartori, 1976) to communicate with voters. These images blend issues and identifications; they are vague policy packages condensed into a word or a slogan (Sartori, 1976: 300), a flag or a myth (Blondel, 1969), that helps voters link issues to political parties. These images also lead to a certain reaction among voters; they reinforce identifications and party loyalty (Blondel, 1969). Here, Sartori returns to his idea that citizens have a creative role in party communication by differentiating position-perception and position-image. The concept of position-perception implies voters’ agency in positioning themselves and the parties in relation to an issue, while position-images imply parties’ manoeuvring to convey positions to voters (1976: 302).

2.4.1 Campaigning and professionalisation

The dominance of political parties assumed in this study is not a widely accepted idea, especially with the modernisation of campaigning. Political parties were at the focus of political communication studies during the first age of political communication (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999), but the focus of the researchers shifted to the role of the media and processes of mediatisation during the second age. The later developments have even inspired authors to claim that the importance of political parties has diminished and to proclaim the decline of the political party (Everson, 1982). The idea of the decline of the party was proven to be an exaggeration, but still captured the
notion of the end of the mass membership party with tight relationships with stable interests such as class. The changes political communication went through in this era of mediatisation and modernisation of election campaigning were parallel to the changes in the structure and organisation of political parties. The overall changes provoked by the modernisation of political communication and the ways that relationships with voters are maintained through communication, but especially modern campaigning, assumed substantial professionalisation of the campaigning process, that had ‘organizational consequences’ for political parties (Farrell and Webb, 2000: 102).

The recorded changes in campaigning of greatest importance for political parties were technical, resource and thematic developments. The change that led from party press and mass rallies to TV and internet required new technicians and hiring of professionals. This change had an impact on parties’ bank balances, but also on their organisation, initiating centralisation of parties, primarily around the leader and the parliamentarians. Farrell and Webb (2002) conclude that changes in campaigning that lead to parties becoming groups of centralised elites rather than mass organisations also influenced the growth in funding. This further affected changes in relationships with the state on the one side and the citizens on the other. The rise in necessary funds propelled parties’ links with the state, which now provides most of the funds for the functioning of parties in most existing democracies (Dalton et al, 2011). This has given rise to what Katz and Mair (1995) label the ‘cartel party’, the party with links to the state rather than society. On the other side, parties also lost the capacity to reach citizens, prompting their loyalties to switch from ideologies to leaders. That is, voters stopped relying on group solidarities for electoral orientation and started basing it on opinions (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) of the government, party, or leader.

Means to shape public opinion became crucial for parties in this situation. Campaigning transformed from being an art into a science
(Farrell and Webb, 2002) concerned with manipulating preferences and techniques for studying opinions (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). At this time, the efforts of candidates and their staff turned to using marketing intelligence in campaign communication, relying on opinion polls and research in order to design carefully targeted messages to be placed via appropriate channels that would reach very skilfully and scientifically chosen audiences. Campaigns would segment the voters according to the emerging complex social cleavages and target them with electoral messages after understanding their demands (Lees-Marshment 2009, O'Shaughnessy and Hanneberg, 2002). They would also research their opposition in order to select their policies and position themselves accordingly. The parties started seeing the voter as a more critical ‘political consumer’ (Lees-Marshment, 2009), while the key relationship became the one between the buyer and the seller (Wring, 1997).

The marketing approach to politics and campaigning is concerned with voters’ interests and matching them with promoted policies. It observes the business-like strategy practices of political parties and candidates that market themselves as products on the marketplace that is politics and develops various models of market-oriented party behaviour (Newman, 1994, Lees-Marshment, 2001, Lilleker and Lees-Mashment, 2005). The origins of the approach are regularly linked to Downs’ economic theory of democracy (1957) and seeing actors as rational individuals, that minimise the efforts and maximise the gains (1957: 5) and ‘act purposively to secure their particular individual ends’ (Brennan and Buchanan, 1984: 185). There are two problems with the rational, marketing approach. First, it falsely exaggerates the centrality of the voter in this approach, and secondly, it fails to fully appreciate the emotive, affective component of voters’ motivation.

14 Savigny and Wring (2009) link the rise of political marketing practice in campaigning with ‘the ideals and principles underpinned by a commitment to the primacy of the market’ (2009: 255) and the neoliberal ideology.
Although researchers of political marketing argue that relying on polling and researching the citizens is vitally democratic since it is effective in incorporating the voice of the citizens and allows for its participation, the fact remains that political parties using marketing intelligence promote their leadership, image and positions. They rely on citizens’ input for the purpose of advancing their electoral chances and not for the purpose of responding to voters’ demands. Wring (1997) writes that the ‘consumer focus’ plays a strategic role in the process of campaigning ‘but not to the exclusion of organisational needs’ (1997: 652). In other words, political parties continue to advance their own (electoral) interests and not those of the voters.

The other note, about the affective mobilisation during campaigning, is especially important for the study of both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Transitioning societies are societies with few loyalties, low party identification and little recognition of organised interests and therefore interests might not be sufficient to mobilise voters’ support. Furthermore, not just in emerging democracies, but in all of them, the study of political marketing as well as public focus on the practice of using it has provoked public cynicism about the techniques employed by political parties. The growing public disillusionment has weakened the power of political marketing (Richards, 2007: 172), but political marketing research offers new insights and possibilities for managing voters’ cynicism and designing winning electoral strategies.

The sequencing of scholarship as well as the practice is interesting here. Political marketing research originated with observed weakening of ideologies, class, and party identifications and other previously dominant cleavages and identities, but then it opened a new path for looking at political communication. It broadened the scope of the field to accommodate for the practice of appealing to voters’ emotions and responding to their needs and attitudes, and acknowledged
that during the gathering of market intelligence, candidates get a sense of voters’ deeper emotional needs (Brader, 2005). With the rise of the practice of emotive appeals, and the affective and performative turn in politics, the study of political marketing has made way for a study on the political psychology of emotions (Richards, 2007).

2.5 Strategic use of emotions

2.5.1 Political Emotions

The practice of using marketing techniques in political communication brought about voter cynicism, awareness of spin and a belief that leaders were less than truthful. It also contributed to democratic deficit. Richards (2004) argues that democratic deficit is a function of the emotional deficit in political communication and that political marketing should address the ‘emotionality of the consumer’ in the same way that economic marketing has been addressing it. Traditionally, emotions were studied by psychology and neuroscience, but this research focuses on emotions because of their ability to influence human, but also voting, behaviour. The explanatory power of emotions in social sciences comes from their role as part of the human condition, the base material of society. Emotions are considered to be a more appropriate micro-foundation for explaining political processes than self-interested materialistic individuals that are micro-foundation for rational choice explanations (Jasper, 2006). Excluding emotions from political and social research would diminish the explanation of political and social phenomena, as emotions are essential for the meaning people ascribe to these aspects of their lives (Barbalet, 2006). Furthermore, emotions are shaped by, but also shape, the objects they relate to. The sociality of emotions comes from ‘reading the contact we have with the objects’ (Ahmed, 2004: 6) of one’s emotions. Also, emotions are characteristics of an age, an epoch; an enduring experience of a social group, they are ‘strategical-
ly organised responses to political predicaments’ (Clarke et al, 2006:11).

Not all emotions are equally significant for political communication and voting behaviour. Psychology and neuroscience discuss emotions in terms of basic/non-basic, or primary/secondary divisions that have limited use for political research (Barbalet, 2006). Instead, the studies of Barbalet (2006) and Jasper (2006) offer a more fitting framework for distinguishing emotions, while Markus et al. (2000, 2011) and Brader (2005) provide a theoretical insight into how emotional states might influence voting behaviour. Jasper (2006) proposes sorting emotions into categories that move from a psychological end towards a more cultural end and distinguishes between urges, reflex emotions, affects, moods and moral emotions. Barbalet (2006) considers the distinction of relational, iterated and programmatic emotions to be more suitable for social and political research. Programmatic emotions are more suitable for manipulation. They include emotions such as love, fear, jealousy, and ambition; the emotions Barbalet considers to give direction, and force those who experience them to act in ways that could not be explained without consideration of the emotion. On the other hand, relational emotions arise as result of relations with others, while iterated emotions are ‘emotional reactions to relational emotions’ (Barbalet, 2006: 36).

These types of emotions differ, among other things, with regard to their power to mobilise. For instance, urges are physical impulses and only under extreme conditions do they influence political behaviour; reflex emotions are also close to the psychological end of the spectrum and are quick in appearance (forms of fear, disgust, joy, surprise, etc.); affects last longer and are related to cognitions, and influence our orientations to the world (respect, trust, solidarity, for example); moods last longer and filter perceptions; and moral emotions, which are closest to the cultural end of the spectrum, include compassion, outrage and more cognitively processed forms of fear or
anger (Jasper, 2006). For this research, emotional states of fear, pride and hatred are expected to be of particular significance given the countries under study here. Given the countries’ experiences, we consider that these states would have the power to serve political ends and mobilise voters during elections. As Jasper suggests, in the process of political communication, emotional states can be goals for voters but means for political leaders that manipulate and provoke for their own purposes.

But how do emotional states influence political behaviour? Emotions and emotional states we experience have the power to influence the way we process information (Marcus et al, 2000, 2011). Furthermore, different emotions influence people differently. Marcus et al’s ‘affective intelligence theory’ posits that people have two distinct emotional systems: a dispositional system that drives their normal feelings; and a surveillance system that manages their attention. The former is guided by enthusiasm and aversion and the latter by anxiety, fear or uncertainty. The implication of ‘affective intelligence’ is that enthusiasm drives participation, aversion pushes avoidance and anxiety triggers attention and learning (Marcus et al, 2011). Brader (2005) on his part finds very little proof for motivational capacity of fear appeals, but still considers the way fear appeals feature content and imagery presenting a threat, and enthusiasm appeals on the other hand consist of content that springs from ideas of success and good times (Brader, 2005).

The observations about the effects of certain emotional appeals prove relevant particularly for the study (and practice) of negative campaigning. The literature on negative campaigning does not offer consensus on questions of whether negative campaigns have positive or negative impact on voter turnout and decision-making, but it offers a suggestion that negative messages attract more attention from voters that then seek more information (Grossmann et al, 2010). Furthermore, voters seem to process negative messages longer and tend to remember information they learned from them (Ibid). The existing
literature on negative campaigning seems to consider negative campaigns as directed towards only political opponents, but in this study negative messages directed at other groups and nations will also be considered.

In Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, we expect fear and hatred on the one side and pride on the other to inspire voters to process the provided information quite differently, with fear driving isolation and inquisition and pride inspiring participation and unity. Consequently, they would have far reaching implications for the electoral behaviour. Furthermore, considering Ahmed’s (2004) relational understanding of the way emotions work, the idea that emotions are shaped by and shape the objects that inspire them, the use of emotive identity appeals in campaigns could shape those identities as well as voters’ relationships towards them.

2.5.2 Emotion work in electoral campaigns

The argument in this research, concerning the use of emotions in electoral communication, is that under the circumstances of underdeveloped institutions, less organised interests, and transitioning political culture, emotional motivation and mobilisation of voters’ emotions are of even greater importance than in the more developed democracies. They should also have greater impact for the polities, identities reconstructed through electoral communication and relationships towards other (targeted) groups. As we have established, the relevance of emotions for political (and strategic) communication research lies primarily with the power of emotions to mobilise people. In this respect Brader (2005) considers the notion of emotional appeals as particularly strategic for campaigns. Emotional appeals are ‘emotions intended to elicit an emotional response from some or all who receive them’ (Brader, 2005). Ahmed (2004) reminds us that the word emotion comes from Latin ‘emovere’, referring to the verb ‘to move’. She continues to argue that emotions are not only about
movement, they are also about forming attachments; they are intentional and involve a direction (Ahmed, 2004).

But how do campaigns utilise emotions? For the purposes of mobilising voters in elections, candidates need to engage in emotional labour and perform emotion work (Pugliesi, 1999, Hochschild, 1979, 1983). Emotion work is the act of changing an emotion, in degree or quality (Hochschild, 1983). Emotional labour is the performance of emotion work (Pugliesi, 1999). In practice, including political practice, messages and performances are normally a combination of techniques attempting to provoke desired emotional states.

First, campaigns use marketing intelligence to read public mood and emotional states (Richards, 2004) and then dramatise these states on the political stage (Richards, 2004, 2007, Kiss and Szabo, 2012) or design messages with intentions to change them. The reason for this is that some emotions need to be transformed into other emotions or moods because they are more effective in mobilising voters. Jasper (2006) argues that the goal of political mobilisation is to transform ‘debilitating moods into assertive ones’ (2006: 20). He points to nationalism, a combination of moods and affects, as being ‘developed in large part when political elites needed to mobilise populations for war without wishing to share decision making with them’ (Jasper, 2006:20). He concludes that in that case ‘a belligerent mood of pride, combined with hatred for others, was sufficient’ (Ibid). Emotion work here suggests the transformation of emotional states into more motivational ones.

But managing the emotions of the voters is not the only work campaigns and candidates do during elections. Candidates must for their part engage in emotional labour themselves and present themselves as being able to manage the emotions of the society. According to Richards (2004), in the age of increased personalisation of political communication, candidates must present themselves as ‘emotional and expressive’ as well as ‘task-oriented’ (Richards, 2004). They have
to be seen ‘to offer some containment of the emotions of their public’, they must engage in ‘containing the feelings circulating in the public domain’ (Richards, 2004: 349).

2.6 Conclusion

Political parties are important actors of public communication, but are particularly vital in the societies under study, with political institutions and social organisations going through transitional changes. In these societies they are the main actors of public communication. This chapter reviewed the literature on political parties and their practice of communication. The relationship between parties and their constituencies is particularly relevant for the study of collective identities appealed to during elections. The relationship is most notably studied as part of the debate on the patterns of the emergence of political parties. The ‘origins debate’ develops around two opposing views, one that argues that political parties represent their social base and reflect social groups, and the other, arguing that political parties construct their own constituencies. It is argued in this chapter that neither the bottom-up nor the top-down approach to the emergence of political parties is sufficient to explain all the ways that parties emerge. The different ways in which the parties came into being are more varied and complex than the two approaches envisage. For instance, Sartori combines the two approaches and claims parties emerge as a response to their social base, but also as a construct of party elites (Sartori, 1969). This view is closer to the position taken in this research, and is expected to offer more insight to the question of identity construction through campaign communication.

The similar argument about the different and complex ways parties come into being stands for the post-communist societies as well. The attempts made by researchers to bring different experiences of all of these countries under one rule seems somewhat limiting, as these countries have different starting points, histories and cultures that
drive their transitions, including their roads to multiparty systems. Furthermore, political parties that emerged in post-communist countries faced obstacles when mobilising their constituencies due to the reforms that the elites had to make. The elites in these countries have limited opportunities to mobilise voters since their policy choices are limited when making the necessary reforms. In the countries under investigation, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, the process of constitution of political parties and their electorates were further influenced by the contexts of nationalisms, isolationism, ethnic conflict and war. These developments have also shaped the processes of both party and constituency emergence.

The next argument in this chapter was that mobilising affects and emotions seem to be crucial for electoral success, even more so than appealing to the interests of targeted voters, especially in the less developed democracies. Therefore, the last part of this chapter considered the role of emotions and emotional appeals in election campaigns. With the affective turn in both campaigning practice all over the world and in the study of political communication, the question of the role emotions play in electoral behaviour and the ways and reasons campaigns rely on emotions merit even more investigation. As the reviewed literature suggests, campaigns design emotional appeals with the intention of eliciting emotional responses from the voters (Brader, 2005). Also, campaigns intend to perform ‘emotion work’, attempting to change the emotions of the targeted electorate (Hochschild, 1983), normally from a debilitating one to a mobilising one. This chapter considers emotions to play a great role in the elections in the two selected countries. The emotions and emotional states of fear, hatred and pride are especially expected to be able to offer more insights about the campaigns in the countries under study. Therefore, fear, hate and pride appeals are expected to be effective in campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Chapter 3: Campaign Communication: The Role of Citizens

3.1 Introduction

Usually citizens are seen as passive receivers of campaign messages, as targets of persuasion or even manipulation. However, citizens are not silent recipients, they actively shape the campaign by providing input to campaigns and influencing the very design of electoral messages. This chapter examines this process, the engagement of citizens and voters in campaign processes and how they give their input to campaigns, but also studies other ways in which campaigns rely on voters in a bid to gain their support. The chapter begins with an overview of the literature on citizenship, its role in articulating and expressing interests in society, and the practice of exercising citizenship rights and responsibilities in post-socialist countries like Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It explores how citizens feel about the process of voting and its meaning for them, what it means for voters to have a voice in a polity, particularly during elections. A major part of the chapter is dedicated to the problem of trust and the role it plays in citizen participation, including voting. Trust, especially the lack of it, is also a major obstacle for campaigns gathering input during the process of polling and canvassing before the elections. In Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina it is not just the post-communist heritage that hinders the expression of interests, organisation and association of citizens, it is also the lack of trust in the operation of the system, elites and other citizens and groups.

The argument in this chapter is that the communist heritage, war, post-conflict recovery, and processes of democratisation have fuelled high levels of distrust among citizens. The significant distrust that
voters express then influences the way campaigns are conducted. It also influences the way voters are polled and interviewed for the purposes of campaigns. The main consequence for campaigns is that they cannot rely on voters’ interests because voters might not be expressing such interests. However, citizens still have an active role in the design of campaign messages. Instead of getting input directly from the citizens, through polling, canvassing, or engaging with interests groups, associations and organisations of various types, in such cases campaigns have to rely on different sorts of inputs. Election messages continue to resonate with the voice of the citizens, in a different, more indirect way. Further, this chapter considers the role of campaigns in the processes of building links of trust and distrust in societies, and argues that campaigns can play a significant role in healing distrusting societies (including post-conflict societies) but can also rely on enticing distrust, depending on their strategies.

3.2 Being a citizen

Being a citizen is a concept derived from the notion of citizenship. Citizenship is the political, economic and civic relationship between a member of public and their community, wherein they spend their democratic life (Coleman, 2001). As discussed in the previous chapter, citizenship is regularly discussed as a legal status; a form of political participation; and as an identity (Leydet, 2011; Kymlicka and Norman 2000). It suggests legal rights and responsibilities, but also the active role of a citizen. In other words, we can distinguish between the view that assumes citizenship to be a concept that secures freedoms (the individualistic, liberal view) and the view that citizenship assumes an active, participative role in the society (the republican view) (Leydet, 2011). A citizen that has an active role in the community is considered to be the ideal of democracy as it speaks to the concept of democratic citizenship and is one of the central elements of the study of democracy. In order for democracy to work, it has to rest not on a subject, but on a citizen who is active, participating and
influential (Almond and Verba, 1963). A citizen that is aware, informed and knowledgeable would be more likely to: adhere to democratic values; participate in the elections and election campaigns and regard them as important; and engage with the affairs of the community even after the elections. In sum, they would be interested not only in the output of the political system that s/he is a part of, but also in the input (Ibid). Active citizenship assumes being a communicative agent, because citizenship ‘derives its significance from communicative acts between individuals and their civic, political, economic and moral environments’ (Coleman, 2001: 111).

This concept of citizenship follows the tradition of De Tocqueville in the argument that democratic citizens would participate in the life of the community through associations and partnerships with other members of the community, i.e. other citizens. The idea of association with other citizens in the public sphere corresponds to the idea of civil society, an intermediary entity standing between the state and the general society (Diamond, 1994), considered especially important for the processes of democratisation in countries in transition, such as Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the study of democratisation views civil society as normatively positive for its beneficial role in the consolidation of democracy (Putnam, 2000, Pavlovic, 2004), this approach is not without its critics.

This research builds on the idea of civil society as an idea of communicative network, a system of communication. It is informed by the concept of civil society as the space for citizens to join civil organisations, non-governmental organisations, social movements, trade unions, foundations, initiatives, and humanitarian organisations, and offers people an opportunity to express their interests. We consider civil society to be the space for collective action in the public sphere (Diamond, 1994), the ‘third sector’, alongside government and business. It is an associative practice that brings together the private aspects of citizens’ lives, their associations with others, and the public
(Pavlovic, 2004). This research is interested in associations of citizens of any sort, civic, economic, and cultural, just as long as they might contribute to the expression of interests and demands towards the government. The argument here is that when people ‘bowl alone’ (Putnam), they diminish their ability to be heard.

On the other side, joining forces with others that share the same interests or goals advances the articulation and expression of social interests. Through collective action, organisation and association with others, citizens amplify their voices. Having a voice in a society enables citizens’ views and interests to be accounted for. It allows for an account of oneself, an expression of opinion, a view of the world (Couldry, 2010). According to Couldry (2010), the hegemonic neoliberal discourse actively denies the value of voice and to deny one’s voice is to deny a basic dimension of human life (2010: 7). Citizens’ voice is most obviously accounted for during elections. Whether national, local, or any other, elections give people the opportunity to express their voice and be counted. On many occasions, governments and politicians speak to voters as if they were mere audiences in the communication processes (Coleman, 2013) and this silences citizens’ voices and deteriorates the potentials of democratic citizenship. If voters are treated as an audience, they cannot be a demos (Ibid: 216), and that hinders the consolidation of democracy in countries in transition.

The literature suggests that voters have an active and affective relationship towards participating in elections. They are not only interested in the outcome of the elections and their own interests (instrumental approach to voting) but are also motivated by the very act of voting (expressive approach). According to the expressive approach, voters choose to participate in the election because voting allows them to “express” some aspect of the [their] beliefs, values, ideology, identity or personality’ (Hamlin and Jenkins, 2011: 646). In other words, voting grants voters a voice. In his study on voters’ considera-
tions of the act of voting, Coleman (2013) witnessed that voters valued ‘the sense of feeling counted’, being present, and a part of something (2013: 19). They value the feeling they get from the act of voting and participating in elections. While the rational, instrumental approach to voting argues that individual voters have very limited impact on the result of the elections with their one vote, Coleman’s study exposes that in fact voters ‘harbour a lingering belief in the interruptive potential’ (2013: 194) of their voice recorded through their vote. They actually believe in the power of their voices and votes and value the opportunity to exercise their power.

3.3 What do Citizens Want?

Coleman’s study about how voters feel about participating in the elections complements what is regularly assumed about voters and participation. We normatively assume that citizens want to be participating, communicating, democratic citizens. We believe that citizens want to be included in, and informed about, governance, policies and overall decision-making in a democracy. Deliberation and dialogue are considered vital for the proceedings of democracy. On the opposing side to this assumption about citizens’ ideals of civic life is the possibility that they do not in fact want to be involved in the political life of their society. This position relies on the insights of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) who argue that, even in developed democracies (the US in their study), it is not participatory democracy that citizens want but a ‘stealth democracy’, a democracy that is not seen. By this they envision a democracy in which the processes of decision making are not in the public eye, that does not care about being involved because it trusts its ‘neutral decision makers who do not require sustained input from people’ (2002: 7). The authors believe the voters are not the least interested in being involved, giving input or even knowing the details of decision-making but wish to trust their representatives to do their job in the public interest.
According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, citizens dislike the negativity in politics and proceedings of the government; they are repulsed by the conflicts in government and by politicians who accrue benefits for themselves (2002: 2). In sum, voters would prefer not being involved if only they could trust their leaders. Clearly, this idea is not a feasible notion of democracy. As the authors themselves acknowledge, no collective solution is possible without some level of disagreement. The public interest voters assume and wish to see achieved cannot be agreed without participative expression of interests and deliberation. Inevitably, the interest articulation leads to negotiations, disagreements and even conflict in society and government. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse decided to limit their investigation to what the voters want and not what was actually possible.

However, the thesis that people actually want to be involved as little as possible in political processes has been assessed in relation to political communication and election campaigns in a study by Lipsitz et al. (2005). The authors observed what people want out of campaigns. They too start with the assumption the voters want campaigns that would be more informative and inclusive, that they want candidates to involve them and engage in dialogue with them during campaigns. But they also contrast it to a possible assumption that voters actually only want simple cues and undemanding campaigns. In this case, they posit voters that are put off by conflicting politicians would not be interested in knowing more about policies but require information about candidates’ personalities and qualifications. They would seek information that helps them assess the trustworthiness of candidates. Lipsitz et al. came to the conclusion that it was only a fraction of voters that wanted participation and deliberation, and that many wanted cues from candidates they could trust, and this came down to such criteria as education, knowledge about politics, partisanship, gender, and age.
Although Coleman’s study (2013) focuses on voters’ feelings about the act of voting, and Lipsitz et al. (2005) consider voters’ feelings about campaigns and what they want from them, the two studies are referenced here because they both provide valuable insights about voters’ feelings and their preferences, respectively. In the end, indirectly, both Coleman’s (2013) and the study by Lipsitz et al. (2005) provide their own, different insights about the willingness of voters to participate in campaign communication. In one case, voters would value the opportunity to participate in the elections and to be heard and influence the public. In the other case, the larger part of the electorate would be more interested in examining if they could trust the candidates than turning over their preferences and demands to campaigns. Notably, both studies were conducted in Western, established democracies (UK and California respectively). This study is interested in different contexts, and this might prove to be vital in determining the ways voters in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina feel about and respond to campaigns. In the cases of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, voters do not always express their interests or demands for the policy-makers and sometimes seem not to be interested in expressing them. In addition, similar to other post-communist countries, trust might play an even bigger role in campaign communication than in developed democracies. This possibility will be discussed further in this chapter.

3.4 Citizen participation in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The literature on citizenship in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina relies mostly on the third view of citizenship, the one concerning citizenship as an identity. This literature uses the concept to investigate laws, regulations and administrative practices that determine who is included and who is excluded and the civil rights of citizens (Shaw and Stiks, 2012). As previously discussed, the literature establishes that the ethnocentric practices are set in place in both countries, to serve the core ethnic group in dominating the processes (Ibid). While
the concept of citizenship remains regulated by ethnic rules and legislation, the idea of citizens’ association and civil society in both countries continues to be dominated by the normative ideal for the role of civil society in post-communist transitions. According to this ideal, civil society offers a space for resistance to the state to emerge (Herbert, 2012, following Gramsci). It is also beneficial for its cultural dimension, nurturing civility, tolerance and participation, as well as teaching how to oversee and control the state (Pavlovic, 2004, Dmitrovic, 2011). Pavlovic (2004) further argues that absolutism, war, poverty and corruption were enemies to the development of a proper civil society in former Yugoslavia, and its development was halted at a very basic level.

Although most of the literature on civil society in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina follows the argument that the role of civil society in transition is to foster democratisation of the society in general, that view also has its critics. Herbert (2012) argues that networks identified as civil society play ‘significant yet contested roles’ (2012: 253) in various stages of democratisation, but also adds that not all civil organisations are in fact agents of democratisation. Looking at the Serbian case specifically, Kostovicova (2006) concludes that post-communist societies can in fact breed liberal (good) civil society organisations, but they also breed the illiberal organisations that impede development. She further argues that this development is not only due to the communist heritage, as most authors believe, but is also the product of the very process of democratisation (Kostovicova, 2006).

Although the literature on civil society in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina regularly focuses solely on the ideal that civil society benefits democratisation and consolidation, it still offers several significant insights for our consideration of civil society as the practices of people coming together to articulate and express their common interests and exert pressure on governments, as a catalyst of ‘associa-
tional life in general and the habits of association in particular’ (Foley and Edwards, 1996: 39). The first important insight to consider is that organisations and associations that did emerge do not have ‘a corresponding social anchor’ (Stojiljkovic, 2016), meaning that civil actors operating in the two countries lack social bases and links to society. In fact, they function as an alternative political elite (Stoiljkovic, 2016), writing up alternative regulation and policy proposals and then lobbying the political sphere. By functioning as alternative political actors, they rarely invest in fostering and empowering citizens themselves to express their interests and demands but act as professional organisations.

A second valuable insight to keep in mind is that both countries are missing the tradition of activism among citizens (Dmitrovic, 2011). It appears that the practices of authoritarian socialism that lasted for decades diminished the already weak tradition of political association among citizens (Stojiljkovic, 2016). The lack of a tradition of citizen participation and articulating demands towards government surely influences campaign communication. Before the elections, campaigns set out to canvass the citizens’ positions and attitudes, either through surveys, focus groups, voter base, and party members, or through consultations with some of the few existing associations and organisations, businesses and unions. Given that both the tradition and processes of democratisation negatively influence the ways in which people express their interests and demands, this process of gathering input might prove difficult for campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This lack of tradition of articulating and then expressing preferences and demands impedes the gathering of information that political marketing and other forms of campaign designing require. In such situations, the canvassing, interviews, focus groups, and various consultations might not be effective in providing sufficient demands from the voters.
3.5 Trust

As the previous overview of studies about voters’ demands showed, one of the key issues for citizen participation is trust. These studies point to an existing group of voters that would prefer not to participate in campaigns (or even politics) if only they could trust the politicians to act selflessly in the public interest. The relationship between voters and their representatives, which is meant to be validated through elections, is dependent upon voters’ trust in the candidates they choose to represent them. As Lipsitz et al. (2005) show in their study on what voters want from campaigns, election campaigns serve the function of offering the citizens the opportunity to make a decision about whom to trust. But in doing that, campaigns prove to have a role in reinforcing trust in the entire system. For a political community to persist, ‘some minimal level of loyalty and allegiance on the part of its citizens’ (Craig and Magioto, 1981: 514) must exist. In some cases, campaigns can have their part in ensuring the societies’ persistence. They can symbolically legitimise not just current candidates, but also governments and leaders, while ‘uniting voters and candidates in displays of civic piety and rituals of national renewal’ (Mancini and Swanson, 1996: 1). In other cases, campaigns can also highlight and politicise divisions and conflicts, bringing them to the top of a country’s agenda.

In general, citizens show support for more than one level of society: their political authorities (the people holding offices), the political regime, the existing institutional arrangement in a country; and to the political community (the members of a community joined together) (Easton, 1965). Norris (2011) lists levels of trust and support from the most diffuse to the most specific. She argues that citizens can show support for the national community (the most diffused), and that they can also support the general regime’s principles and values,
which is different from expressing support for the performance of the regime, which she lists as the third level of support. Citizens can also have confidence in state institutions and, at the most specific level, they can trust elected and appointed officials (Norris, 2011). Trust is also considered relational (‘an individual making herself vulnerable to another individual, group or institution’ (Levi and Stoker, 2000: 476)) and conditional, ‘given to specific individuals or institutions over specific domains’ (ibid), and the support citizens express is not of the same quality. Specific support is directed towards the political authorities and institutions, and diffuse support is more generalised, abstract support for the political system and order (Easton, 1975). Diffuse support is expressed in trust (and not cynicism) and the belief in the legitimacy of the political objects (Easton, 1975).

What is also relevant, especially for Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the direction of citizens’ trust. Putnam distinguishes between horizontal (social) and vertical (political) trust. However, social and political trust are believed to be related. Not solely because interpersonal trust spills over (Putnam et al, 1993) to influence the trust in a political system, but then trustworthy systems facilitate social trust (Levi and Stoker, 2000), and trust in others presumes trust in systems. While designing their messages and choosing strategies, campaigns simultaneously make choices about which kind of trust is reinforced and in which direction. For campaigns the main concern is to inspire the trust in a candidate or party, but in ways polities benefit from campaigns fortifying different levels of trust. Relying on Putnam’s concepts of thick and thin trust, we can assume that citizens nurture thick trust naturally, by maintaining confidence in personal, frequent relations. Thin trust is of greater significance for the community as a whole: it is the trust put in a generalised other, such as acquaintances. Thin trust transmits the benefit of the doubt to people we do not personally know; it ‘extends the radius of trust’ (Putnam, 2000). Campaigns can play a great role in spreading thin trust among citizens that benefits the society or can hinder the spread of trust
among different groups of citizens if their strategies command it. Alternatively, campaigns can also manipulate the trust citizens put in certain others, or the community itself in an attempt to transfer it onto candidates for the purpose of their election.

3.5.1 The decline of trust and the role of campaigns

For a while now, even in Western democracies, support and trust in practices of political systems seem to have been declining (Norris, 2011, Putnam, 2000). Putnam (1995, 2000) registered numerous signs of this decline in the US: in voter turnout, political participation, trust in government, church, and membership in labour unions and various other organisations, including bowling leagues, although Americans were bowling alone more often. What is also interesting in Putnam’s seminal study is his observation of the rising loyalty to what he labels ‘tertiary organisations’, mass membership organisations that do not actually meet, but maintain ties to common symbols, leaders, and ideals, but not to one another. Putnam lists Environmental Defence Fund and Honda owners as examples. Membership in these organisations includes writing a check and reading a newsletter. The significance of this rise in membership is perhaps to point out the change in types of loyalty expressed by voters and citizens, more readily belonging to symbolic and value-inspired groups than to those that actually invite participation. Election campaigns can also invoke precisely those kinds of loyalties in voters. These loyalties to symbolic and more abstract concepts than parties and organisations are invoked in an attempt to transfer these loyalties into votes for specific candidates and parties that claim to represent those concepts.

For the fields of political communication and persuasion, it is also important to note that both the presence of links of trust as well as their absence can inspire courses of action and mobilise voters (Levi and Stoker, 2000, Easton, 1965). Norris (2011) further argues that
the lack of trust among voters does not necessarily result in abstinence from political and social life. She uses the concept of ‘critical citizens’ to explain that citizens’ dissatisfaction can spark citizen activism and joining of movements and protests, which strengthen the processes of democratisation. She postulates that the tension between the prevailing support for the democratic principles and values on the one side and the negative assessment of the performances of the system on the other gives rise to the critical citizens who are in fact participating and communicating citizens.

The decline of trust was discussed by Swanson and Mancini (1996) in relation to modern campaigning; they argued that the way democracies conduct elections had led to significant changes in political institutions but also possibly to ‘inefffectual political parties, unresponsive government, failure to address serious national problems and other ills’ (Swanson and Mancini, 1996: 2), all the elements that lead to citizens’ distrust and cynicism towards campaigns and politics in general. Notably, Swanson and Mancini pointed to election campaigns as the instigator of voters’ distrust and cynicism, the very issue campaigns must bypass today in order to mobilise support. Furthermore, trust and distrust may differ a great deal, according to research in commercial marketing, with distrust tapping into stronger emotions than trust. Distrust seems to reflect ‘the emotion-charged human survival instinct’, while trust seems to be more calm and collected (McKnight and Chervany, 2001).

Aside from the campaigns, on a more general level information flows were marked out as important for the levels of social and political trust in a society, as ‘trust and cooperation depend on reliable information about the past behaviour and present interests of potential partners’ (Putnam, 1993: 74). Therefore, both the modern campaigning (especially the negative messages) and media logic of chasing scandals and frauds aid distrust that societies cannot mend. In sum, in relation to trust, election cycles present an opportunity either to
catalyse distrust between citizens and states, governments or other citizens, or they can have therapeutic roles (Richards, 2004) and help heal distrustful societies. The choice between the two types of campaigning, promoting trust or influencing distrust among citizens and towards authorities, proves vital considering the alternatives to trusting, cooperative societies. Putnam considers distrust and hindering of collective actions to be at the opposing end; Easton (1975) views alienation as opposite to support; Sztompka (1996) lists a set of consequences of distrust, from regression to providentialism (a discourse of fate), corruption, vigilance (taking matters into one’s own hands), ghettoization, paternalisation (desire for a father figure), and externalisation of trust (foreign societies and leaders). Giddens (1990) goes further by arguing that the lack of basic trust produces persistent existential anxiety, or in most severe cases existential angst and dread. Given that states’ efforts to enforce trust and cooperation remain less efficient, costly and unpleasant (Putnam, 1993), political communication, and election campaigns as the most intense periods of political communication, offers a set of means to elevate levels of trust, fix broken links, and to heal social conflicts and divisions among citizens. But in many cases, the possibility of strategic advantage trumps the question of ethics in election campaigning and hinders their possible therapeutic use.

3.5.2 Trust and Distrust in post-communist societies

In post-communist societies, the issue of trust is deemed especially significant. The lack of trust in new emerging democracies is endemic, pervasive; it is considered to be one of the barriers on the road to a democratic society. In circumstances where the institutions of trust and cooperation are not yet established and the culture of trust (Sztompka, 1998) is non-existent, the deficiency of trust becomes critical in social life. From the perspective of societies cultivating the culture of distrust and cynicism, trust is considered a resource, for dealing with the future, for viable agency, including the agency for self-
transformation of a society (Sztompka, 1996). Aside from the lack of agency and inclination to participate in public and political life, voters in post-communist societies express numerous signs of distrust: a will to emigrate, withdrawal to private lives, protests, decisions on (the currency of) savings, choice of private over public services, low appraisal of reforms, glorification of the socio-economic situation in the past, and suspicion of politicians, as well as the media, but high levels of trust in international actors. All of these symptoms of distrust Sztompka (1996) observed as having high significance to voters’ decision to participate in elections.

Distrust in post-communist societies seems to come from the unwelcome surprise of the ‘prolonged pains of transition’ (Sztompka, 1996), also relevant for satisfaction with institutional performance (Mishler and Rose, 2001, 2004), the political and economic performance of new democracies (Mishler and Rose, 2001: 55), and early-life socialisation (Ibid). Furthermore, during the communist repression, people seem to have developed interpersonal trust within family and friends’ circles particularly because of the repression of the state. However, these studies consider political, economic and sociological reasons for the dominance of distrust, but for the examining the practice of campaigning and designing campaign messages in these countries, the role that communication processes have in establishing the culture of distrust seems highly significant. The liberalisation of the media market, pluralism of information, and new styles of reporting (scandal chasing and negativity before all else) might influence the processes of democratisation in many ways, including the levels of trust during transition.

In their study examining the role of the media in facilitating the emergence of a political culture conducive to consolidation in ‘third-wave democracies’ (Huntington, 1991), Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer acknowledged the significance of media in times of the ‘erosion of old values, beliefs and ideologies’ while the ‘key channels of information
in the intermediary system – political parties, interest groups’ are still weak (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2007: 93). Media become the only source of information and guidance during transition when other institutions are lacking. With regard to the media undermining the popular trust in the new institutional arrangement, Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer’s findings show that media exposure is important, contributing to the support for democratic institutions and facilitating active citizenship. Although this study finds the same general patterns regardless of country-specific circumstances, one has to keep in mind for the purposes of analysing Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina that the post-communist era in the former Yugoslavia was marked by vicious ethnic conflict and war. In the region, media systems as well as political systems were transforming parallel to raging conflicted nationalisms and the devastating consequences of war.

War and conflict also have devastating consequences for levels of trust. Literature on post-conflict recovery treats trust from the perspective of conflict resolution and reconciliation. Trust is considered to be ‘a central requirement for the peaceful management of relationships’ (Kelman, 2005); it is discussed from a very pragmatic aspect, as necessary for agreements and negotiations. Kelvin argues that trust between elite leadership during resolution translates into an attitude that then generates public support for reconciliation. Elections and campaigns are for their part regarded as potentially dangerous due to their interest being based on competitiveness in post-conflict contexts. Consociation/consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1977, 2008) is the most widely discussed model for post-conflict recoveries in the literature. Lijphart’s model of power-sharing in broad coalitions and the balance of power through formalised practices was believed to be a more efficient option for managing conflicts in society, compared to liberal or interest-based democracy. In deeply divided societies (plural societies marked by ethnic divisions; Guelke 2004, Norris, 2005) ‘passions aroused by elections’ can upset ‘the carefully constructed, and possibly fragile, system of cooperation’ (Lijphart, 2008: 30). Fur-
thermore, Sartori’s suggestions for constitutional engineering (Sartori, 1994, 1997) by combining majoritarian and PR systems to accommodate different needs of societies at different times were made with an intent to give elections a more reconciliatory power.

Both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina seem to confirm the expectations set out for post-socialist, post-conflict countries. Citizens of both countries seem to have developed only the thick form of trust. They trust their families and friends, but do not extend that beyond the boundaries of the familiar and known. The thin version of trust, trust in generalised others, community and in the system appears to be very low in both countries. Gordy (2004) sees lack of trust in all public institutions, past, present, domestic or international. Stojiljkovic (2016) associates the observed disconnection between the represented and their representatives with the ‘bitterness of transitional medicine’, seeing practices that foster endemic distrust on both sides. He blames political actors for causing financial scandals, corruptive behaviour and mutual accusations that never get addressed in courts, but also observes the citizens as not being aware of the opportunities to influence government and therefore rarely using them. The consequences remain the lack of citizens’ trust in the media, NGOs, associations, trade unions, government and administration at times, but always and particularly in political parties (Ibid). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, low levels of trust are reinforced by ethnic heterogeneity (Hakansson and Sjoholm, 2007). Hakansson and Sjoholm (2007) find that ethnic diversity negatively impacts individual’s levels of trust. Their study suggests that in ethnically diverse areas people are less trusting towards those unknown and unfamiliar.

Considering this review of levels of trust in post-communist and post-conflict societies, and especially Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, what can we say about the role of campaigns in these processes? Although most conflict resolution literature and practice focus on issues of security, political reconstruction, constitutional arrangements, rule
of law, reconciliation efforts, humanitarian aid, Heupel (2010) points to the constructivists’ approach whose starting position is that ethnic identities are constructed, which is why more effort should be put into addressing the symbolic and emotional roots of ethnic conflicts. She argues that other approaches ‘institutionalise ethnic divisions in post conflict societies’, but instead ‘steps should be taken to reduce the salience of such divisions’ (Heupel, 2010: 216) and help reconstruct conflicted identities. Considering the role of communication in (re)construction of identities, political communication appears to be quite essential for the reconciliation in deeply divided societies. Election campaigns can also exercise their therapeutic role (Richards, 2004) in post-conflict societies by appealing to emotions that heal divisions and advance the bridging links (Putnam, 2007) among conflicted groups. On the other hand, they can also promote fear of the other and memories of the conflict and strengthen bonding ties, in-group solidarity and out-group division (Putnam, 2007), depending on the chosen strategy.

3.6 Election Campaigns and the Voice of Citizens

Are citizens voices actually included in campaign messages? This question is especially critical in societies like Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina where citizens often choose to remain silent and not join groups and organisations that would ensure their voices are heard. Certainly, the use of opinion polls and focus groups to capture the mood, positions, interests and values of citizens before and during campaigns help the acknowledgment of voters’ demands in campaign messages. Even political parties and candidates that do not rely on political marketing but on gathering opinions of party members and supporters, various associations and organisations, or even on the media for familiarising themselves about the demands of the electorate, still do all that to capture the mood or interests of their voters. They only manage to do it with less precision than those that rely on more scientific methods of canvassing.
But the question here is what happens if all these techniques capture mostly disinterest, apathy and distrust among the voters? Even in those societies where the voice of citizens is not secured by the use of any of these techniques, campaigns still use the gathered information on their voters to ensure the efficiency of the appeals. In order for an appeal to be successful, it has to reach the intended audiences, resonate with their beliefs, values or interests, and motivate them to vote. An appeal can only perform its persuasive work if it is comprehended by its target audience in the first place. Therefore, every appeal made to voters has to be comprehensible for the audiences they target. According to the literature on information processing, the comprehension of a story, as well as the telling of a story for that matter, depends ‘on the human capacity to process knowledge in an interpretive way’ (Bruner, 1991: 8). The interpretative work on a message relies on voters using their ‘schemata of interpretation’ (Goffman, 1986), meaning that audiences interpret messages by attributing intention and relying on their background knowledge (Bruner, 1991). It is exactly the consideration of audiences’ background knowledge that is the first way in which citizens’ voices are heard and counted in campaigns. According to Bruner (1991), both the message creators and the audiences engage in assessing each other’s knowledge of the other. This assessment influences how something is told (Ibid), as well as how something is received. By considering the background knowledge of the voters they target, campaign messages become more resonant with voters, but at the same time they emit what voters consider to be true and known.

The next way citizens’ voices are heard in campaign messages is through the process of ensuring an appeal resonates with target audiences by aligning its ideas and frames with the cultural environment of the audience. Studying persuasive attempts of social movements, Kubal (1998) differentiates between ‘frame resonance’ and ‘cultural resonance’. According to Kubal, movements align their ideology with
the ideas and beliefs of adherents and constituents (frame resonance), but also with the symbols of the cultural environment (cultural resonance), and reflect their moral order. The persuasive appeals therefore match, in style, form or content (Ibid), the culture, ideas, values, beliefs and morals of their targets. Similarly, campaigns obtain a deeper understanding of the community they target and then manage to make their appeals resonate with the targeted group. The resonance increases the reach and efficiency of the appeal by making it appear natural and familiar (Gamson, 1989) to the group that was targeted. Simultaneously, campaign messages reproduce their voters’ culture, ideas, beliefs, and their voice.

Besides accounting for the background knowledge and resonance with the culture of the audience, the literature suggests that an efficient appeal needs to be interpreted in the expected way. Since resonance remains the principle in both construction and comprehension (Bruner, 1991), campaigns also have to ensure their intended voters reach the right interpretation of the message. According to Bruner (1991), there are three ways a message becomes successful. First, it can seem ‘is as it is’, as if it needs no interpretation, which Bruner refers to as ‘narrative seduction’. Second, it may seem as though there is only one possible interpretation, that is, ‘narrative necessity’. The third possibility for assuring a certain interpretation is to make a message socially conventional and known, so that the interpretation would be automatic; Bruner labels this ‘narrative banalisation’ (Bruner, 1991: 9). Campaigns on their part not only manipulate and anticipate a certain interpretation but also test their messages on representatives of targeted audiences (focus groups) before making them a part of campaign communication in order to assure the interpretation they want (for more on this aspect of focus groups’ uses see: Wring, 2007). In order to ensure the right interpretation campaign messages include cues pertaining to voters’ interpretation processes.
Naturally, the practice of resonating appeals suggests only that voters are invited to accept an interpretation or a meaning, or a message for that matter. In fact, they remain free to negotiate it, or reject it, or accept it (Gamson et al., 1992: 388). However, this is precisely the reason campaigns undertake the selection of targets and fragmentation of the electorate, so they can produce the most efficient resonances. Furthermore, following Kubal (1998), designing a message that resonates with a group of voters does not automatically imply that they would be mobilised to vote. Voter mobilisation is achieved through different means (e.g. stirring peoples’ emotions and inciting passionate responses).

The argument here is that the voice of the citizens can also be, and often is, accounted for at least indirectly in campaign messages. Through techniques of an ‘indirect seduction’ and attempting to achieve resonance, the voice of citizens is still heard during the elections. However, this argument falls far from that of the advocates of the marketing approach, especially the ones advocating the instrumental approach to political marketing (Henneberg et al., 2009)\textsuperscript{15}, politics and elections who have argued that relying on the techniques of political marketing can in fact advance democracy by including citizens and their demands in the process of (campaign) communication (see for instance, Lees-Marchment, 2005, 2011, 2015). The argument here is that the citizens’ voice is manipulated in order to secure the right interpretation of campaign messages. The goal here is not the empowerment of citizens’ voices in the process of campaign communication, but enabling campaigns’ own interpretations.

\textsuperscript{15} Henneberg et al. (2009) discuss the differences between selling-oriented, instrumental and relational marketing. Selling-oriented is marketing focused on promoting the party and ideology; instrumental considers the voters and their positions and needs centrally; while relational considers the exchange between all the stakeholders, and not just those directly involved.
3.7 Conclusion

Are citizens passive recipients of electoral messages or active participants in the campaign communication process? This chapter considered the role citizens play in designing campaign messages. It argued that citizens provide input to campaigns through polls and focus groups which then influence the design of campaign appeals and messages. However, this process of informing campaigns is not so straightforward. The process of providing input and influencing campaigns faces difficulties in societies where expression of social interests and demands is not the norm. As the literature reviewed in this chapter suggests, post-conflict and post-communist societies are societies where organisation of citizens and expression of demands are rare due to recent experiences and a lingering culture of low participation. The cases of this study, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, fit these descriptions of low trust societies.

Trust is one of the central concepts in this chapter and one that greatly informs the questions on the nature of the appeals, the identities that resonate with voters and the role of social and political context in designing campaign strategy. From the perspective of campaigning, trust is important as a starting point with getting voters to participate in the process and offer input for the campaigns, but also as a motivational resource to get the support and votes for a party or a candidate. For the most part, the literature reviewed in this chapter considers trust a beneficial resource from a normative standpoint. According to this literature, mobilisation of citizens and their electoral support reproduces the trust in the process, political actors, and the system as a whole. However, as recent developments in the practice of campaigning all over the world show, campaigns do not need to inspire trust among their voters, but can also benefit from inspiring divisions and distrust, both horizontally and vertically, both towards the other citizens of a polity or towards the elites, governments and the system.
Consequently, the argument in this chapter is that campaign communication can play a role in building up loyalties or breaking up the links of trust in a society, depending on the strategy they choose.

At the end, this chapter also considered other possibilities and ways citizens are in fact included in the design of electoral messages and strategies. Even in contexts of low participation and trust, and the accompanying lack of electoral demands, the argument in this chapter is that citizens still participate in the campaign processes, even if only indirectly. This is achieved through campaigns’ attempts at resonance. As the literature stresses, political actors try to design messages that resonate with voters by considering their knowledge and background, or by attempting to achieve resonance with the culture of their voters, and campaigns also try to influence the reception of their messages by pre-testing their understanding in focus groups. The argument in this chapter is that by accounting for the knowledge, background, culture and understanding of voters, citizens’ voices find their way and are represented to an extent in campaign messages, even if only indirectly. However this chapter argues that by doing that, campaigns only engage in further manipulation and exert even more influence over the electoral process.
4.1 Introduction

The research design used in this study was put together in an attempt to observe the campaign communication process in its entirety. The idea was to capture different aspects of the communication process. First, the aim is to look at the message itself and analyse the campaign discourse. The next step is to examine the production process of the message, especially the intent of the message producers. The third step is to investigate the process of reception of the message and the interpretation of the audiences. The research instrument designed for this task comprises of the three main elements that are linked to the key research questions. As stated in the Introduction, the main research questions of this study are:

- What is the role of election campaigns in constructing collective identities?
- Which collective identities are targeted in election campaigns most commonly and why?
- To what extent are these identity appeals used strategically in campaigns and why do they motivate people to vote?
- What role do different contexts and arrangements in societies play in the communicative construction of collective identities?

In addition to capturing the entire communication process, this methodological approach was chosen as to be best suited to examine the ‘work’ of identity appeals in election campaigns.

This chapter starts with a brief overview of the rationale behind the three part method design and the concepts and models that inform it. Next the chapter reviews how the method was implemented; introducing the details of the design, the selection of country cases and sites, the process of choosing and approaching the participants for
this study as well as the process of selecting the data to be analysed. It also describes the following processes of gathering and analysing data. The chapter ends with a reflection section, considering the limitations and obstacles of the research, as well as the overall value and justification of the chosen overall approach.

4.2 Studying collective identities and campaign narratives

The very first question posed before this study was the question of how to approach examining the relationship between collective identities and election campaigns. The (re)construction of collective identities and the role electoral discourse has in these communicative processes proved difficult to capture. The decision for this study was to examine the relationship but also to account for different contexts, and hence this study builds on a comparison between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina that share both similarities and differences already discussed in the introduction and further again later in this section. The chosen methodological instrument is three-part. It involves the analysis of varied data, consisting of campaign materials first, but also of semi-structured interviews with campaign professionals and focus groups and interviews with citizens / voters. This multilayered method was chosen to provide the understandings of the entire process of campaign communication. It is intended to examine the campaign messages themselves, and the production side alongside the reception side of the processes. This approach was informed by a similar approach, proposed by Crigler and Just (2012) for researching affect, emotion and mood in political communication. Crigler and Just recommend the study to be conducted in relation to the sender, the message itself, and the receiver. According to them, research methods relating to the sender (production side) are designed to assess intention, appraisal and behaviour and tend to be more qualitative than quantitative. Second element of their model, the message, is analysed through content analysis. The third component, the receiver side, is also most frequently researched by using
qualitative methods (Crigler and Just, 2012). This ‘holistic’ model of examining the production and reception processes, in addition to the message itself, also speaks to Hall’s encoding/decoding circuit of the communicative process as a whole (Hall, 1973). Hall put an emphasis on the symmetry of codes, understanding and misunderstanding between the encoder (producer) and the decoder (receiver). In Hall’s model of TV discourse, distinctive moments – production, circulation, distribution/consumption, and reproduction are all interlinked, but the moments of encoding and decoding are determinate moments for an effective communicative process. Therefore, the research explores the (re)construction of collective identities through electoral discourse in relation to all three elements - production, content and reception of campaign messages.

4.3 Research Design

This section starts with the rationale for the selection of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for the comparative approach to studying collective identities in relation to election campaigns. Then, it turns to examining the reasons for the selection of the sites of research, specific campaigns, and materials selected.

4.3.1 Comparison: Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The two countries selected for this research were chosen based on the fact that they are both relatively new democracies and new nations still constructing their identities. Further, as discussed in the introductory chapter, they share common history and institutional arrangement from when they were part of the same country but diverged since becoming two independent nations. The two countries had identical starting points after the breakup of Yugoslavia; they are post-socialist, post-conflict; both went through periods of collectivising propaganda (first, communist and socialist and then nationalist) and then started transitions towards democracy with very different
arrangements. Their common starting point is relevant because their transitions do not start from *Stunde Null* or ‘Zero Hour’ (Voltmer, 2008), but are derived from their past; their past institutional structures and belief systems are designed as a response to the regime change and not as a vision of a democratic future. Still, what remains the major difference between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is the ethnic composition of their populations that further influenced the political and electoral systems, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The approach adopted in this research, comparative analysis, aims to provide an understanding of how different contexts (political systems and institutions, cultural developments, media systems, levels of democratisation) affect political communication systems (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2004). Given a small number of cases (2 countries) the goal of this comparison is to offer an in-depth analysis of the cases in question (Norris, 2009) identifying elements/themes of importance for the relation between collective identities and election campaigns and, eventually provoke a theoretical debate on the role of election campaigns in construing these identities.

### 4.3.2 Selection of election campaigns

As previously discussed in the Introduction, election campaigns are only rarely studied in relation to other concepts beyond their strategy and short term effects. Furthermore, the literature does not agree on the importance of campaigning. On the one side, it discusses campaigns as ‘noisy rhetorical interludes preceding election day’, but on the other, campaigning is considered to be ‘one of the biggest movers in the political process’ (Schmitt-Beck and Farrel, 2004: 184). The latter side, argues campaigns are thought to be important for the health of democracy (Swanson and Mancini, 1996), or that they play a role in processes of representation and communication, and they are learning processes for citizens (Norris and Sanders, 2003). Alt-
hough this study does argue implicitly that campaigns are of great importance, they were not chosen as a site for this research solely because of their importance. For the purpose of this research, election campaigns were chosen as the most intense periods of public communication. Election campaigns include numerous different types of communication and attract close attention of large audiences and different publics. This makes them a good focus for research examining the role of public communication in (re)constructing collective identities. This is not meant to say electoral communication is more effective than political or public communication during periods of normal politics in shaping narratives and identities. The assumption for the selection of election campaigns for the site of research is only that they are condensed and limited periods of political communication and therefore, very suitable for studying.

The existing literature does not offer much knowledge on the content of election campaigns (electoral messages, policies) in the two selected countries. Most of the studies contain analyses on the media coverage of the elections.

However, this research focuses on two election cycles (per country) - the 2006 and 2010 election in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 2008 and 2012 election in Serbia. The elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were held at all levels of government in 2006 and 2010. In Serbia the presidential and parliamentary election were held within a few months apart in 2008 and parallel in 2012 (all are included in the research). The two cycles were selected as most suitable for investigating what types of identities were appealed to and offered during the election period for several reasons. First, at the time when this research started these election cycles were the most recent campaigns in the two countries. Additionally, initial analyses showed that these election cycles might prove productive sites for looking into identity appeals. For instance, the 2008 Serbian elections were especially significant for their strict portrayal of the widening gap in Serbia among the modernists and the traditionalists embodied by the two biggest
parties (Mihailovic, 2008, Jovanovic, 2008). The gap was further implemented through the labels on Kosovo-centrism and EU-centrism, rejecting the membership talks with EU due to EU’s intent to help establish the Serbian southern province of Kosovo as an independent state or furthering the Europeanisation efforts in spite of the Kosovo obstacle (Mihailovic, 2008).

On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina presented a unique case due to the constitutional design, which requires election campaigns to reach across ethnic borders. However, in the election campaign in 2010 the campaign of Social Democratic Party tried just that. Their main message suggested the abandonment of ethnic loyalties and identities, to focus on the problems that matter to all citizens, implying unity of all ethnic groups within the country. The campaign was considered effective, as it won the party an increase of more than 7% of votes in comparison to previous elections (the highest increase among all the parties since the previous elections).

This leads to another criterion used in this study – political actors included in the study. Political actors are included based on the significance of their electoral result. In this case, the number of mandates won in parliaments had to be more than two. Using this criteria, 8 parties or coalitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 6 coalitions in Serbia (see Table 1 below) or their presidential candidates (when they had separate materials) are included in this study.
### Table 1: Political actors included in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For a European Serbia</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>Union for a Better Future of BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia – New Serbia</td>
<td>Party for BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia – Party of United Pensioners – United Serbia</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union of BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Radical Party</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Progressive Party</td>
<td>Party of Independent Social Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of BH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.3.3 Selection of Campaign Materials**

As already asserted, the campaign message itself is one of the three key foci in this study. The message is examined through the analysis of various types of campaign materials. The selection of type of materials to be analysed was made in relation to significance given to them by campaigns, and includes the analysis of PSB televised debates and specialised election talk shows, election programs and policy proposals of competing parties, and leaders’ speeches at campaign closing rallies. In addition, party slogans were collected and analysed as texts together with the listed materials.

First, campaign slogans are significant and distinct from the campaign materials selected for this study for their enduring presence during campaigns, their persuasiveness and power. Although their primary purpose is to simplify an idea, a program or an ideology, slogans are also dynamic, they provoke an emotional response, suggest loyalty, and serve the function of organisation, identification, rein-
forcement and solidarity (Denton, 1980). (For the full list of slogans examined in this study see Table 2 below)

Second, TV debates were chosen as a unique form of campaign communication. They stand out from other election events for their ability to combine various elements of campaign communication, as well as for the element of spectacularisation. They draw great attention and are accompanied by intense dramatisation. Hosting TV stations tend to advertise the debates well in advance adding to the perception of importance. And after the event, political actors, media and voters continue to discuss debates prolonging the effects. In Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2010, TV debates were influenced by the constitutional arrangement through the media system. The intention of the organisers (National Democratic Institute office in Bosnia and Herzegovina) was to have three debates broadcast at three Public Service Broadcasters. Due to the fact that the media system was established in accordance with ethnic divisions in the country after the war, the three Public Service Broadcasters provide service from the centres of the three ethnic communities, Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka. In Serbia in 2008, election debates were broadcast by the Public Service Broadcaster and a national commercial TV station as well. The analysed debates were conducted with the two major parties’ leaders debating and not in the form of a wider debate with all the party leaders present. The debate on the PSB was a conventional debate with candidates in the studio at the same time, engaging in a conversation on different topics, with rules agreed to in advance, while the debates on the commercial TV network took a somewhat unconventional form; the candidates came into the studio one after the other and engaged in separate interviews with the journalist. During the campaign in 2012, only one debate with two presidential leaders was put together on PSB TV (see Table 3 below for a full list of TV debates used in this study).

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16 The election debates in 2010 were the first and only debates held in this country.
The next form of campaign materials, election manifestos, differ from the others as they typically offer more space to discuss different party policies in greater detail; on the other hand, they receive less attention than the other forms of promoting election promises. Probably due to the latter, lack of attention from the voters, but also for fears of inability to deliver their often grand and/or generic promises to the voters, election platforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are not detailed, precise or concrete as they tend to be in other, more developed democracies. The 2008 campaigns in Serbia do not provide a plentitude of manifestos. In addition to not being perceived as strategic, political parties tend to remove their past promises from the public eye, especially in cases when parties change their positions significantly after the elections as was the case after the 2008 campaign. In 2012 again, not all coalitions put forward their joint programs, and some even considered their electoral documents ‘internal’. In comparison, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the campaign in 2006 only 4 manifestos remain available, while in 2010 parties prepared election platforms that remain available after the elections.

Speeches at campaign closing rallies were chosen for analysis because campaign put emphasis on campaign rallies for their motivational potential. Campaign rallies carry a lot of energy and offer expression of affect during the campaign. In the first instance, they are directed towards the party members, volunteers and supporters, but are regularly broadcast to more diverse, larger audiences during the final days of campaigning. Speeches at campaign rallies offer great possibilities for energetic and powerful sound bites and images of exhilarated audiences, to be used by the media as well as official campaigns. For this reason the campaigns give a lot of thought to the speeches, making them significant for this analysis. In Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the closing rallies were held at capitals and administrative centres in the days before the elections were held.

In the end, analysis included 29 slogans, 17 manifestos, 7 TV debates, and 30 rally speeches.
**Table 2: Slogans analysed in the study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'For a European Serbia', 'A job can’t wait', Coalition For a European Serbia (Za Evropsku Srbiju, Posao ne more da ceka)</td>
<td>Jobs, Investments, Security; Choice for a Better Life, Choice for a Better Life Coalition (Posao, Investicije, Sigurnost; Izbor za bolji zivot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Spread further’, Liberal Democratic Party, (Siri dalje)</td>
<td>Let’s move Serbia! Let’s move Serbia Coalition (Pokrenimo Srbiju!)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Forward Serbia’, Serbian Radical Party, (Napred Srbija)</td>
<td>For Serbia, you know why! Democratic Party of Serbia ( Za Srbiju znas zasto)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Stand up Serbia’, Socialist Party of Serbia, (Ustani Srbijo)</td>
<td>Upturn! Upturn Coalition (Preokret!)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>'Choose Serbia’, Velimir Ilic, (Izaberi Srbiju)</td>
<td>For a Safe Future, Boris Tadic ( Za sigurnu buducnost)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>'For a strong and stable Serbia/Let’s conquer Europe together’, Boris Tadic, ( Za jaku i stabilnu Srbiju/Da osvojimo Evropu zajedno)</td>
<td>Decent and Successful Serbia, President of Citizens not Parties, Tomislav Nikolic (Postena i uspesna Srbija, Predsednik gradjana a ne politickie partije)</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Life is the law’, Cedomir Jovanovic, (Zivot je zakon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Acts speak/Our friend’, Milutin Mrkonjic, (Dela govore/Nas drug)</td>
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<tr>
<td>'With all heart’, Tomislav Nikolic, (Svim srcem)</td>
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Table 2a: Slogans analysed in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the victory ahead Srpska (<em>Pob-jednicki napred Srpska</em>), Alliance of the Independent Social Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ten hardest years with you, Party of Democratic Action, (<em>Deset najtezih godina sa vama</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% B-H, Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>With the Force of Love, Croatian Democratic Union (<em>Snagom ljubavi</em>)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Debate, RTRS, 16 September 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Debate, FTV, 23 September 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Debate, BHTV, 30 September 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Serbia without borders', Liberal Democratic Party (<em>Srbija bez grani-ca</em>)</td>
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*Table 4: Election manifestos examined in the study*
4.3.3.1 Gathering of campaign materials

The materials selected for this study, slogans, party manifestos, TV debates, and speeches at rallies, are not regularly and easily available in the two countries selected in this research as one might expect. The practice of making electoral documents available to the public by the parties themselves or watchdog organisations is not maintained. Part of the selected materials, namely slogans, were in most cases easily recoverable from the media or the memory of the parties’ press secretaries (apart from a few slogans used in Bosnian elections in 2006). Next, TV debates were easily recovered although were already taken down from the TV networks online archive. TV journalists and producers were ready to provide copies of the TV shows from their archives. Speeches delivered at rallies were mostly available online. Those that were not available online were retrieved from the media or obtained from press offices or speechwriters themselves. One of the parties even provided a forthcoming publication of all the speeches ever given by its leadership. Election manifestos proved to be the most difficult type of material to be found. For obvious reasons, parties do not provide their past electoral promises openly to the public. This holds especially for the parties that were in power during the studied period. But the practice of hiding manifestos and other materials is not limited to the governing parties. For instance, an opposition party in Serbia (Serbian Radical Party) split in two after the elections in 2008. The larger part of the membership formed a new party (Serbian Progressive Party) with significantly different policies, proposals and orientations than previously held. When approached by the researcher to obtain the materials promoted during the elections in 2008, both parties declined, in an attempt to avoid discussing the joint past.

It should be noted that not all the materials were gathered at the same time. The majority of the materials were obtained during the
first phase of the research and serve the purpose of preparing for the interviews and focus groups, but a number of materials were also obtained from interviews and by snowballing technique. Hence, the full, comprehensive analysis of the materials was performed after the entire fieldwork was finished.

4.3.4 Interviews

To better understand the process of designing campaigns and identity appeals, but also to examine the practices, perceptions, motives and intentions of candidates, campaign managers, communication consultants and pollsters in doing that, this study relies on semi-structured interviews with campaign producers. Semi-structured interviews were chosen for their ability to allow some flexibility in conducting the interview, and to enable a conversation between the interviewer and interviewee and not just the simple truth of the interviewee (Hammond and Wellington, 2013). They normally allow more freedom for the interviewer to adjust the questions or add new questions or dimensions in response to the interviewee’s reactions and answers, or new topics and considerations introduced during the interview. They also permit further discussion on processes informants might not be aware of.

The interviewees - candidates, campaign managers, local campaign managers, consultants, strategists and pollsters - were asked a set of questions from a pre-prepared interview guide (Appendix 1). The interviewees were asked core questions about

- the processes of creating the campaign communications in question (related to the chosen materials),
- the processes of designing a campaign strategy, the actors and data involved,
targeted appeals, the process of the selection of targets, and activities chosen to mobilise them,

and an additional set of questions about campaign/party specific topics.\(^{17}\)

Not all interviewees were asked the same questions in the same order, and were also given the opportunity to present the impressions and memories of the campaigns. At this point during interviews, direct questions on collective identities were not asked to avoid influencing interviewees’ responses. However, collective identities and identity appeals continued to be brought up by interviewees themselves.

It should also be noted that interviews were conducted relying on materials from the campaigns under study (photos of billboards containing slogans and pictures, pictures from rallies) that were used to jog the memory of interviewees, given that elections they were asked to discuss occurred several years before the interview. In addition, the majority of interviewees were presented with a piece of their own work. This piece of work was selected among the materials previously studied during the initial analysis, its authorship was then researched and the author was contacted about the interview. They were then asked about the particular piece of work be it a speech, media statement, a specific section of the manifesto, a slogan. They were asked to describe the process of creating it, what purpose it had, what was the intention, who was involved. This part of the interviewing process was similar to the reconstructive method Reich (2006) used to provoke journalists to talk about details of the process of writing articles, but also to delve into the general practice of a newsroom. Similarly, in this study, the work of the interviewee in question was discussed to learn not only about the exact piece of campaign

\(^{17}\) A pilot interview was conducted to test the appropriateness of the interview manual, its ability to be understood by the interviewees, and conducted in timely manner, but especially to check the use of the print and video materials during the interview.
communication (which proved useful in itself), but also about the practice and culture of campaigning. Interestingly, the use of this method (as well as the photos and other materials brought to refresh the interviewee’s memory) also revealed that some of the message producers did not want to look at or watch the materials they produced or even other materials from the campaign. From time to time, they were uneasy with the reproduction of their work and claimed to remember it and know it by heart. They were willing to discuss it, but not to review it in present moment.

For the purpose of this study 23 interviews were conducted in the two countries (for the full list of interviewees see table 5 bellow). In Serbia, the interviews were conducted in Belgrade and one in Sid, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, six interviews were conducted in Banja Luka, four in Sarajevo and two in Mostar. The interviews were conducted in the cities where political parties identified for the sample have the centres of their operations, and these are the cities that are the centres of the three ethnic groups in the country as well. The interviews lasted between 20 minutes and an hour and half. The interviews, as well as the focus groups, were conducted in the period between May and August 2014.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 5: List of Interviewees</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interviewee, Place</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant 1, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollster 1, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Manager 1, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategist, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant 2, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive/Field Manager, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Campaign Manager, Sid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Manager 3, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Manager 4, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollster 2, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant 3, Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.5 Focus Groups

For the study of the campaign communication process to be complete, the reception side of the process needed to be included. Qualitative interviews were selected as the appropriate method for researching the audience, as well as serving as ‘a discursive generator for obtaining an insight into the interpretative repertoires at the disposal of the informants’ as they make sense of the content they have been exposed to (Schroder, Drotner, Kline and Murray, 2003, cited in Livingston, 2010: 568). Group interviews are techniques for eliciting public experience and knowledge (Coleman, 2013). They consist of semi-structured discussions by a group of people, led by a moderator (Berger, 2000). Focus groups were chosen as a method for this study as an appropriate way to research identity appeals promoted in campaign messages, because people may feel more comfortable in a group and jog each other’s’ memories or ignite a discussion themselves (Hammond and Wellington, 2013). Furthermore, focus groups are distinctive as a method for its interactivity (Morgan, 1996) and collective character, which corresponds to the collective character of the electorate. Participants in focus groups are representatives of different groups of the collective that is the electorate.

For the purpose of this research, six focus groups in the two countries were organised. They consisted of four to seven participants. The decision about the number of focus groups was made based on the ethnic and regional divisions and demographic differences in the two countries. The focus groups were organised in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Nis (Serbia), and in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The selection criteria for the participants in focus groups were that they were eligible voters that had voted in at least one of the election cycles under study. The focus groups needed to be diverse and include representatives of various social groups of voters. The participants were solicited with the help of various organisations,
NGOs, community groups, universities and polling agencies. The constitution of the group also allowed for additional one-on-one interviews with any of the participants when they were underrepresented in the group, but of particular interest for the study. The separate interviews happened twice during fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, when the underrepresentation of the nationalist voters was estimated in the focus groups conducted in Banja Luka. Two additional interviews were organised to reach a balance of representation in the analysis. And the second time, in Sarajevo, one of the participants held back in the focus group, and was occasionally talked over in the discussion. This participant agreed to an additional interview after the group discussion ended. (For the list of focus groups and their structure see Table 6 below).

All the group interviews relied on the use of aids - campaign materials selected during the first phase of the research and the initial document analysis. The selected materials were the same ones previously used in interviews with campaign producers (or a selection of those materials). The materials helped with memories and experiences of identity appeals and also with recording reactions, feelings, perceptions and opinions from voters. Focus groups interviews were conducted based on the pre-prepared guide (Appendix 2) that included questions on:

- Memories and sentiments of campaign appeals to collective identities
- Interpretations of specific identity appeals
- Considerations of participants of how they should be appealed to in campaigns
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 6: Structure of Focus Groups</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus Group: Belgrade</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 participants, 2 female, 3 male (student and employed woman; unemployed man, employed man, retired man)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length: 01:25:18</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Focus Group: Novi Sad</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 participants, 3 female, 2 male (employed woman, retired, unemployed woman; student, employed man)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length: 01:25:18</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Focus Group: Nis</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 participants, 3 male, 2 female (Student, employee, retired man; employed young woman, employed woman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length: 01:35:17</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus Group: Banja Luka (Serbian majority)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 participants, 2 male, 2 female, (student, activist; student, employed woman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length: 01:32:46</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Focus Group: Sarajevo (Bosniak majority)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 participants, 4 male, 1 female (2 students, professional, retired; retired woman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length: 01:25:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus Group: Mostar (Croatian Majority)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 participants, 3 female, 2 male, (employed, academic and student, activist and student)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length: 01:37:15</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Focus Group: Eastern Sarajevo (Serbian Majority)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 participants, male (Blogger and DJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Length: 01:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interview Sarajevo</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee: Retired Woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length: 00:25:00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4 The Analysis and Presentation of the Data

The analysis of the data gathered for this research was conducted in three stages. First, upon gathering the majority of the campaign materials to be studied here, the exploratory analysis was performed. The purpose of this stage of analysis was to identify the main topics, issues, and discursive practices employed in campaign materials under investigation. This analysis was done manually, using very basic coding. This initial phase of the analysis also served the purpose of providing guidance for the designing of the interview guides for interviews and focus groups that would rely on these topics, issues, and discourses. During this phase, the materials to be shown and referenced in interviews and focus groups were also chosen. Therefore, this stage of the data analysis was not only a preparatory phase but an actual exploratory, introductory phase during which the focus of this research was for the large part designed, as it revealed the customs, patterns and practices of communication later studied in further detail.

An additional, second level of analysis was conducted after the interviews and focus groups were conducted. It involved analysing the relationship between the data gathered through interviews with message producers and message recipients/audiences. This phase helped relate the production and reception side of the campaign communication process during the examined campaigns in the two countries. This phase was significant for examining the interpretations of the messages, as intended by the producers and meanings given to them by the receivers, and the (a)symmetry of codes between the encoders and decoders (Hall, 1973). This particular analytical stage also served the function of the initial examination of the roles the groups of participants play in the entire process. This part of the analysis was done manually, as well, without relying on any software.
Lastly, the two stages of analysis were integrated into the detailed, focused, qualitative textual analysis using the NVIVO software. The coding sheet was designed in advance of the analysis. It was designed to reflect the theoretical basis of the research. The selected analytic categories mainly reflected the ideas of the literature on identity construction and knowledge on election campaigns, such as ‘National Identity, ‘Ethnic Identity’, ‘The Other’, ‘Campaign Targets’, ‘Regional Relations’ ‘Strategy’, ‘Yugoslav identity’, ‘mobilisation’, etc. During the analysis, a great number of additional categories were added because many significant topics were identified during this phase. Interestingly, some of the topics added to the coding at this stage include such categories as ‘emotions expressed in campaign discourse’ and ‘memories that construct meanings of identities’. These analytical categories then grew to become topics that for the most part fill two individual chapters in this thesis (Chapter 5 on mobilisation and Chapter 7 on the use of collective memories).

The last stage of the analysis was conceived as an integrated analysis of the three types of data gathered: campaign materials, data obtained through interviews with campaign professionals, and data obtained from focus groups and interviews with voters. Following the integrated analysis, results and possible conclusions are presented as integrated and in relation to concepts that seem to be most relevant for the study of the relationship between campaign appeals and collective identities in the two countries. The empirical chapters of this study also respond to the research questions posed for this study. The empirical chapters that follow are chapter on mobilisation of voters, chapter on identities, and chapter on collective memories. The first empirical chapter answers the questions of how and why identity and memory appeals are strategic for political actors during elections and how they motivate voters. The second chapter of that section discusses the question of the practice of appealing to certain types of collective identities in different social contexts of the two countries. The third chapter in the empirical part examines the use of collective
memories in election campaigns and how memory appeals advance the reconstruction of collective identities in the two cases.

4.5 Ethics, Storing and Managing the Data

The ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Arts and PVAC (PVAR) Faculty Research Ethics Committee on the 29th November 2013 under the ethics reference PVAR 13-040. All the comments from the Ethical Committee:

1. Interview location should not be selected purely by the interviewees. Appropriateness and H&S should be considered;
2. Given there is no concrete arrangement for the recruitment of the interviewees and focus group participants, there is an uncertainty of whether there will be sufficient responses. It would be useful to make some contacts before the fieldwork to increase the likelihood of obtaining sufficient responses before travelling;
3. Fieldwork taking place abroad – risk assessment is necessary.

were considered and implemented during the fieldwork. Therefore, health and safety were considered when scheduling interviews and focus groups, potential interviewees were contacted before the start of the fieldwork, and risk assessment was discussed with supervisors and Health and Safety Services at the University of Leeds.

All interviewees and participants in focus groups were granted anonymity and were presented with an Information Sheet and asked to sign the Consent Form (Appendices 4 and 5). Although anonymity of the interviewees and participants was chosen as default and other options were not even offered to them, some of them objected to being anonymised and had to be persuaded to accept it. In the case of campaign professionals, the anonymity of research participants was granted by not only expunging their names but also affiliations and positions within the campaign in question from being obvious in quotations. Special consideration was given to hiding the parties and candidates they were campaigning for which was difficult at times given that the interviewees regularly mentioned parties, candidates,
and slogans in particular. The parts of the interviews relying on reconstruction were particularly carefully transcribed with intention not to reveal the identity of the interviewee. Quotes and direct mentions from the campaign materials used for the reconstruction were not used in quotations in the thesis for the same reason.

The ethical and privacy guidelines were also followed in relation to storing and managing the audio recordings and transcription and translation of the interviews and focus groups. The recordings were transferred to the researcher’s laptop at the sites of fieldwork and deleted from the recording devices. The laptop was password protected and encrypted, and was brought back with the recordings to the University of Leeds and all the recordings were uploaded to the University’s server and deleted from the laptop. At no point were any of the recordings or transcripts made available to any person other than the researcher.

Both the interviews with campaign professionals and focus groups interviews were transcribed entirely. During the transcription, all the grammar mistakes were corrected, pauses were recorded with ellipses [...], as well as laughs [laughs] and similar reactions and actions. Not all actions and mimics were recorded given that the transcription lasted for a month after the fieldwork was completed. Therefore, some of the non-verbal data was unavoidably lost. All the interviews and focus groups were conducted in Serbian/Bosnian/Bosniak/Croatian and were transcribed in the original languages of which the researcher is a native speaker. The languages in question have some differences, and special effort was made by the researcher to transcribe all the nuances of the languages. The analysis was performed on the transcribed data in original languages and only the quotations used in the thesis were translated into English by the researcher. In doing so, the researcher made the decision to value the context and meaning of the original quote over the grammar and customs of the practice of the English language.
4.6 Concluding Reflections on Methodology and Research Design

The research design developed for this study started with the idea of studying identity appeals in the most recent election cycles of the two selected countries. The design was intended to reveal the practices of identity construction and the role of election campaigns in the process in two different contexts in the countries facing somewhat different circumstances of democratic transitions. The particular cycles were chosen solely based on the criterion of being the most recent cycles when the study started. However, both countries went through additional elections during the course of this research and that posed questions about the design. Bosnia and Herzegovina held elections in October 2014, while Serbia held snap elections in March 2014 and again in May 2016. The question before the researcher was whether to include the additional campaigns in the examined sample. The decision not to include them was made solely based on the constraints of time and resources for this study, given that most of the materials were already collected and the design was set in place. Also, to have waited for the additional campaigns to end would have prolonged the study beyond the expected duration. In retrospect, to have been able to include the new elections, and the new messages and appeals, into the sample might have broadened the insight and perhaps even challenged the conclusions. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the campaign in 2014 was run after the first successful cross-ethnic appeal in 2012 and the campaigns in Serbia were influenced by the shifted party landscape and altered party narratives. These campaigns seem to have addressed new target groups and appealed to different identities. They also seem to have responded to new voting trends and demands that quite possibly could have said more about the contexts of the two countries and different trajectories of democratic transitions.
For similar reasons (based on time and limited resources for this research), several additional foci of analysis were eliminated from the research design. For example, the initial design at the start of the study included the analysis of the media discourse during the elections. It was designed to include media reports of the activities of parties and candidates during the elections. Given that the media is not seen as a completely independent player in the two countries, but more importantly, given that it would require an analysis of a scope that would go beyond the limits of this study, the media discourse during the elections was not analysed in the end. Similar decision was made in relation to the visual analysis of the campaign materials. Although the analysis of the visual aspects of the campaign logos, pamphlets, ads, printed versions of manifestos would add a rich new element to the study, it would also require a different set of skills and understanding of the materials and take additional time not allowed by the duration of the PhD study. As for the online communication and social media, these were not among the widely used forms of campaigning during the studied election campaigns. Hence, digital campaigning and social media were not considered as part of this research. It should be noted that, as expected, these forms of campaign communication have become more important during the more recent election cycles. The new developments in communication technologies and the campaigning associated with them should also be expected to have altered targeting practices of campaigns, their mobilisation attempts and the design of identity appeals. Examining the new forms of communication in the future would certainly offer new insights into the practice of identity construction during election campaigns.

4.6.1 Limitations and Obstacles

Upon the completion of the fieldwork conducted for this study and following a long period of analysis and reflection on the research done and the data gathered, it seems possible that the research
design and methods chosen could have been different at several instances. For instance, being a member of a studied political community, affected by the local political culture, I made a choice not to insist on questions of identity, especially national and ethnic identity, when designing the guidelines for the interviews with campaign professionals. The guiding idea for the interviews was to conduct the interviews as if the main focus of the research was campaign strategy, targeting practices and designing of the messages. I envisioned that the identity focus would naturally come up when campaign practices and reconstruction materials were discussed with professionals. This hypothesis proved true during the fieldwork, but in retrospect, my fears about the professionals’ probable defensive attitudes towards questions of national and ethnic identities, and inciting nationalism and nationalist feelings turned out to be somewhat exaggerated. Surely, given both countries’ recent histories, these questions are quite loaded for communication professionals and my fears very well might have been justified, but having gone through the process of data analysis and the opportunity of distance it offers, it is easy to conclude that any attitude of the interviewees could have been accounted for and seen through. Following this research experience, the conclusion is that more direct questions about identity, nationalist feelings and ethnic mobilisation during election campaigns could have been asked, especially after the initial phase of the analysis showed the importance of these issues and their connectedness to strategic choices of election campaigns.

On the other hand, the focus groups were imagined as a less structured interviews from the beginning. Focus groups relied for the most part on video and print materials from the previous campaigns that were used to initiate discussion. Therefore, focus groups were more open to input from the participants from the beginning and identity questions were discussed freely and came on the agenda quickly, unlike during the interviews where these issues had to be probed and approached from a distance. With the focus groups, what could have been done differently is the actual design and scheduling.
As already mentioned, focus groups in both countries were organised following a geographic logic as well as demographic logic that is connected to it, and of course the ethnic division in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given more time and resources a more complex design for focus groups would have been planned for this research. It would surely include more focus groups and more varied principles of bringing them together. The focus groups could have been organised following the criteria of age groups, different professions, education levels, political identities, social groups, in order to get deeper insights into the narratives of participants, their understandings of the campaign appeals and the meanings they give to identities.

Still, even having concluded all that after conducting this research, it seems that the methodological instrument used here served the research well and provided valuable, multidirectional insights into the process of campaign messaging. The method proved to be a valuable tool for studying the entire process of campaign communication and the interplay between the actors involved and the message itself.

The very last possible limitation that needs to be noted in this section is my own involvement in the campaigns under study here (the Serbian campaigns of 2008 and 2012). On the one hand, being a member of the team of consultants that helped design and execute the campaign for one of the political actors provided a valuable insiders’ perspective on the workings of the two campaigns, access to campaign materials and easier recruitment of participants (at times), as well as snowballing to other potential participants. However, the experience could be thought to influence the process of enquiry, the premises of the research and its conclusions. Admittedly, the personal involvement did provide for the initial motivation for the study, but interestingly, the process of the research made the topic and the cases more distant, new and fresh. Throughout the initial analysis of materials and the fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(that was a completely new case for me), a fresh new outlook provided by the meticulously objective methods put in place took away all the preconceived notions and hypothesis and ensured the unbiased examination of the collected data. Although inspired by the professional experience with campaigns, the questions posed received different and broader answers and lead to different conclusions than previously expected or anticipated. In conclusion, my own previous personal involvement in the campaigns and experience with the practices described here have not influenced either the process of the research nor the conclusions drawn in this study.
Chapter 5: ‘Economy is always the number one issue, but it never wins the election’: Strategies for motivating voters

5.1 Introduction

How do parties and candidates motivate voters? This is one of the most crucial questions about election campaigns and the topic of this chapter. In addition, this first empirical chapter examines what is specific about voter mobilisation in these two countries, how are campaign strategies designed, what do citizens respond to, what makes an appeal strategic? Answering these questions, this chapter reviews the techniques used by political actors in two countries, and discusses voters’ sentiments towards election campaigns. Inevitably, this chapter reviews the context of the two countries in which the strategies are designed and which largely determines which messages are effective in mobilising the electorate.

Findings from the campaigns in 2008 and 2012 in Serbia and 2006 and 2010 in Bosnia and Herzegovina show that the major obstacle for mobilising voters in the contexts of these two countries is the fact that voters nurture great amounts of cynicism and distrust towards the candidates and political actors in general. In this context, for a message to reach its goal of motivating voters’ support, it would have to overcome the distrust among citizens. Therefore, faced with voters’ distrust, which debilitates their motivation to participate in elections, campaigns develop different strategies to provoke and inspire an emotional state that has mobilisation capabilities. As argued earlier
in the theoretical part of the thesis, campaigns frequently attempt to perform emotion work, that is, change an emotion in degree or quality.

This chapter suggests that in this situation of ‘endemic distrust’, common in post-communist societies, and further burdened by nationalism and ethnic war, campaigns launch ‘enthusiasm appeals’ (Brader, 2005) and appeals of fear and cohesion in order to transform the emotional state that inhibits voting into states that motivate voting. According to Brader (2005), enthusiasm appeals rely on imagery of success, and they are meant to increase the will to participate and reinforce the salience of prior beliefs in the candidate or the party, while fear appeals use imagery related to threat, motivate a search for further information and reconsideration, and decrease the salience of prior beliefs (Brader, 2005: 391). When utilising appeals that inspire different emotions, campaigns in our two countries, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, show significant differences.

This chapter starts with a review of campaigning practices, strategy development, and techniques used to gather input from voters. Then it explores voters’ responses to campaigns, candidates, and voting in general. In the end, it explores campaigns’ solutions to the question posed here, about voters’ mobilisation and strategic appeals. It reviews what issues were promoted and the nature of appeals campaigns designed to manage voters’ emotional states. The findings are organised by country. Serbian data are first presented, concluding with a country discussion, and then the data and practices encountered in Bosnia and Herzegovina are presented in the same manner.
5.2 Election campaign strategies in Serbia

The chosen elections in Serbia in 2008 and 2012 were held during especially turbulent times in a country that was already undergoing transitional changes. With every election cycle, post-communist and emerging democracies are faced with low levels of support by citizens. In these countries, this normally refers both to specific and diffuse support (Easton, 1975) and vertical and horizontal, social relations of trust (Almond and Verba, 1963, Putnam, 1993, 2000). And Serbia is not an exception. All types of support and trust in the system and its representatives have been declining parallel to the processes of democratisation. Citizens’ distrust has reached levels so high that it ‘opens the issue of the very survival of the state, and the society’ (Stojiljkovic, 2016). Reinventing the relationship between the representatives and the represented (the voters) and building trust is a major task before political actors and institutions in emerging democracies, but it becomes particularly vital for political elites during election times. The task before candidates running in the elections is to mobilise and direct the support of citizens who are distrustful and cynical towards the system, politics and everything political. In such a situation, the strategy of campaigns is to ignite voters’ emotions and passions by framing their messages as enthusiasm appeals (Brader, 2005).

5.2.1 Choosing the right strategy: ‘It is not about economy. Trust is built on other issues’

Faced with voters’ distrust and aversion towards politicians and parties, election campaigns have to manage these sentiments and provoke different, more positive and motivating attitudes and feelings.

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18 This is especially true of the elections in 2008 that saw the proclamation of independence of Kosovo, what used to be the southern province of Serbia, which sparked the debate about the nature of the polity and Europeanisation, and caused further social division in the country.
In the elections of 2008 and 2012 in Serbia, the parties had different visions of how to go about convincing voters to support them. Before the elections in 2008, campaign strategies were designed based on previous experiences and with little reliance on modern campaigning techniques, mostly by ‘using gut feelings and personal beliefs’ (Campaign Manager 2). Therefore, the elections in 2008 and 2012 saw the beginning of professionalisation of electoral communication in Serbia. For instance, all of the political parties did in fact commission tests of public sentiments, but not all of them decided to use their findings to specify their electoral messages.

The two biggest parties (and the coalitions led by them) – the Democratic Party (DP) and the Serbian Radical Party19 – relied substantially on political marketing techniques in these election cycles. Both hired professional agencies and international consultants to help them read the voters’ opinions, intents and dispositions. Both of the main parties were relatively committed and disciplined in implementing marketing ideas into their internal strategies and public communication pieces:

In that period, we got the main input of information used for formulating messages from the marketing agencies, that is, from the opinion polls, that were not only quantitative. And that was good and that was useful. But in our party, ever since the elections in 2008 that was all there was. What it said in the opinion polls, that was it (Consultant 2).

The data from the interviews shows the two parties’ intentions were to use the data gathered on the voters and adjust electoral messages to be as efficient and quick in winning as many votes as possible. Smaller parties, on the other hand, had different ideas. The third most popular party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Communist Party successor that was previously led by Milosevic, chose to continue to run campaigns based on the ideology and identity of the party:

19 The Serbian Radical Party split into two parties in 2008. The larger fraction took the name Serbian Progressive Party and entered the elections in 2012 with this new name.
Strategy has to presume all that is the identity of the party. Considering that we are a left wing party, we stand for the rights of people who work for a living, who lost their jobs. The socialist, the left wing and the national has to be dominant and then it is very complex finding a message that expresses the idea of our party (Campaign Manager 1).

Other participants in the elections chose to respond to the immediate context in the country. For instance, current events surrounding the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo in 2008 came to determine the strategy of the then incumbent party, Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS). The party decided to frame their communication exclusively around this issue to highlight the importance of the context and the historic moment facing the country. They asked voters for support on only this one issue:

In both campaigns, in 2008 and 2012, there was only one message, one political idea and it was directed towards external audiences, and it was related to Kosovo–EU relations, that is, defending Kosovo and opposing everything that Brussels said about Kosovo. Why was there only one message? So that the one important message would not get clouded, everything else was set aside (Executive manager).

And finally, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had different election strategies, largely independent from the electoral context or voters’ demands. Their long term strategy focused on developing their brand, being the newest party in the Serbian political system. The idea driving their campaign strategies was to expand the demographic support, beyond the younger urban population:

We tried to step out of the image of a cult, a guerrilla of whatever volume, that is inflexible, principled, criticising. It was an attempt to flirt a little with people who found our politics a bit too much. We wanted to awake Serbia a little (...) and to leave the 5.1% threshold behind us (Strategist).

However, even if a party chose to run a modern, professionalised campaign based on voters’ positions and preferences, it had to design the messages by being intuitive about what the voters wanted, due to the lack of political demands. In focus groups and interviews conducted for this study, but also in focus groups conducted by the cam-
campaigns, voters avoided discussing their personal interests, problems, or issues facing their social, economic or any other group. They did not offer any precise goals that they wished to achieve or wants they wished to fulfil. When asked if there was anything they would ask leaders to do, fix or offer, voters remained imprecise and general, and commonly resorted to demands such as ‘for all of us to live better’, ‘to have jobs’, or ‘more opportunities for young people’. They even claimed to only want health and happiness.

It seems that both the supply and demand sides of the processes of campaign communication are determined by democratisation. As has already been asserted in the theoretical section of this study, one of the consequences of post-communist transitions is the inability and unwillingness of citizens to express political demands. This lack of political demands in a post-communist, post-socialist country comes as a result of the heritage of the prolonged ideological and practical repression of individualism during communism, as well as continuing practices in communications and education, but also as a result of the processes of fragmentation during democratisation (Kostovicova, 2006). On the other side, political leaders seem to be bound by the limited policy choices put before them by the democratisation reforms and find it hard to deliver on any relevant, practical promises in transitioning countries in particular. Hence, when already missing voters’ demands, political actors refrain from concreteness and disseminate rather abstract messages.

However, it is not only democratisation that influences the vagueness of messages in election campaigns in Serbia. The imprecision and lack of focus of electoral messages comes also as a result of a division of labour within a campaign, or rather of the selection of spokespeople. For all of the Serbian political parties in these elections, the main spokesperson was commonly the president of the party, with the addition of a few higher officials in some cases. This choice of spokesperson also speaks to the need that is common in distrusting socie-
ties, the need for paternalistic leadership, ‘when people start to dream about a father figure, a strong autocratic leader’ (Sztompka, 1996: 46). But it is also a result of a lower level of professionalism in campaigning.

The President [of the party] had a message that he changed every day but not to a great extent. He knows very well where, when, to whom and what to say, there were no precise rules what the others would say. There were no specific messages at one place and the others at the next (...) He did not fall into that trap of saying specific things at every place, he talked on broad topics, as a President (Executive manager).

This level of abstraction in electoral messages is uncommon in developed democracies due to public scrutiny of electoral debates (Kitschelt, 1999), but it is the dominant practice in Serbia. Abstract campaign messages are not just the practice at the national, parliamentary or presidential level as the practice of not promoting programmatic messages is preserved even at the local level. Campaign leaders at local levels struggle to translate the strategic messages into local stories that they could use to persuade people on the ground. In interviews, they testified that the materials and instructions were disseminated from the party headquarters to local branches, but such materials remained general and were adapted for the national level only. Local campaign managers normally decided to add their local issues on to the national instructions they received. This practice of propagating messages that are not community-specific makes the messages and stories local campaigns tell their voters more general, broad and related to highly political, national level topics and fairly abstract concepts.

5.2.2 Voters’ distrust: ‘What difference does it make what they say?’

‘Endemic distrust, appearing at all levels and in all regions of social life’ (Sztompka, 1996: 47) is the common diagnosis for post-communist, emerging democracies. The culture of distrust spreads across the political and the social. However, with regard to the campaigns of 2008 and 2012, focus groups and interviews with voters
conducted for this research show a focused and precise aversion and distrust directed towards the political elites rather than an overarching and pervasive distrust towards the institutions, political actors, fellow citizens, and to the system as a whole. Furthermore, interviewed voters do not show signs of disengagement or alienation. Most of them are well informed and interested in politics, they do not find it overly complex – most of the participants reported voting in previous elections, and did not dismiss voting in future. Some of the participants even revealed that they were political and community activists at times. Instead, their cynicism and distrust was targeted very specifically at politicians and political parties, those in government as well as those in the opposition, and even more precisely, they were irritated by election campaigns. Participants in focus groups barely even wanted to discuss the previous campaigns, dismissing them cynically as periods when their mailboxes get filled with party leaflets, buildings get covered with election posters, there is nothing to watch on TV but political ads, and politicians are jumping out at every step.

I do not mind campaigns because I always get a lot of pens and writing pads, enough to last me until the next elections (Student, Belgrade).

When describing their sentiments towards campaigns, voters most commonly mention campaign finance, the repetitiveness of campaign messages and the questionable truthfulness of the candidates. The practice and regulation of financing campaigns from the state budget (for the most part), leaves the voters feeling that this money could be better spent. Second, given that transitioning countries continue to undergo reforms and substantial changes to the country’s economy, society, and even borders, the constant debates on unfinished reforms and the same old issues, especially the missing economic recovery, dominate the campaign agenda with every election. The very similar campaign agendas leave voters irritated with the fact that the campaigns are repetitive and alike each election cycle.
All these campaigns have been the same for the last 20 or so years. I do not see any change. They play us with the same words, slogans, like nothing has happened in the meantime, like we are now seeing them for the first time (Young man, Novi Sad).

Continuous and repetitive promises in election campaigns that fail to be delivered and remain very general in character cause further distrust but also spark stronger negative feelings towards politicians themselves. Political actors irrelevant of their position in relation to the government have been the most distrusted actors in Serbia ever since the fall of communism. After the dissolution of the old regime, political institutions were never able to reach the level of trust communist institutions previously enjoyed, and political parties rank lowest (Stojiljkovic, 2016). Therefore, the enraged feelings expressed in focus groups when voters see, hear or talk about political leaders come as no surprise. The common reaction to them was always that politicians lie whenever they speak:

All of them have already lied to us. That is the only notable thing about campaigns. None of the parties has ever delivered what they promised. None (Pensioner, Belgrade).

We are no longer motivated by words, words do not move us. They have spent them all (Young woman, Belgrade).

Regularly, the first reaction in focus groups was to dismiss the messages of all sorts, on economy, international relations, unemployment, and standard of living, as unbelievable and unconvincing. Discussing if there was something they would believe and want to hear in the campaign, voters demonstrate a level of distrust that borders on hopelessness:

Maybe if someone completely new were to appear. But, even if someone new did, we would not believe them, because we have been played by everybody (Pensioner, Novi Sad).

And where would that new person come from? It would have to be from some of the existing parties! (Young woman, Novi Sad).

Interestingly enough, interviews with voters reveal that they do not necessarily distrust the messages themselves, irrelevant of their con-
tent, but that the voters have strong feelings about the politicians delivering the messages. In addition to repetitiveness, another reason for distrust seems to be the highly personalised style of campaigns, and after the very personalised governance during the communist and socialist times, under Tito and then Milosevic, the political parties that emerged with the beginning of pluralism continued such practice. Voters continue to express frustration at this and testify that they would be happy with the same messages if they were conveyed by someone else, someone new, who they do not have a reason to distrust.

Oh, they can say the same thing, but it is perceived differently. We have experience with all of these leaders and all of these parties. It matters who said it, as well, it has to be a message with some integrity (Young man, Novi Sad).

The lack of integrity of the all too familiar political leaders seems to be another source of distrust. In such a situation of overwhelming distrust and aversion towards politics, political parties and their candidates enter the elections with strategies that aim to tackle this distrust, in order to motivate the voters to overcome it and vote for them. This strategy seems to include changing the emotional state of cynicism and distrust into a different affective state, a more active state that would motivate them to vote.

5.2.3 Trust and campaign agendas: ‘It is more of a matter what we cannot not have’

After several election cycles in Serbia following the fall of Milosevic in 2000, campaigns became a particular source of voters’ cynicism. At first, political parties ran campaigns on mostly economic policies and promises of improving living standards, increasing social fairness and access to opportunities, but then had to revert to ‘imperatives of market liberalisation’ and ‘indispensable reform trajectories after the elections’ (Kitschelt, 1999: 397), which led to failing the voters’ expectations. Parallel to the growth of Serbian voters’ general distrust and
disappointment with democracy, Serbian political communication was influenced by the global trend of emotionalisation of political communication (Richards, 2004, 2007). Opinion polls still suggest that issues that voters were interested in have not changed in years. Voters still care the most about the same issues: standard of living; improving the economy; employment opportunities; fair and corruption-free administration. However, these topics were only a (minor) part of the campaign agenda for all of the parties in the sample.

There is no economy there. Despite the fact that the economy is the number one problem, unemployment is the number one problem... What can you say to that, but 'I swear I will try'? You do not have a stronger argument than that. Trust is built on other topics (Pollster 2).

Indeed, analysis of campaign messages shows that the campaign agendas in the two elections were not aligned with voters’ proclaimed preferences. For example, party manifestos covered many areas but were dominated by EU integration, decentralisation, foreign policy, education, the fight against corruption, and regional politics20. Campaigners claim that issues and policies raised in the elections were the result of political decisions made by the highest political actors within parties, formal bodies or informal groups in charge of campaigns. They are thought of as political declarations on what parties believe and promise to do about the challenges facing society.

It is more a matter of what we cannot NOT have. We cannot afford not to offer an answer on the future of the young people; we cannot afford not to offer a solution on how to reform the pensions system (Strategist).

However, when presented with materials from the previous campaigns, campaign professionals started recalling the attempts of fulfilling voters’ needs, deeper than expressed in opinion polls and focus

20 The prearranged and agreed upon questions in TV debates on PSB also included the topics of European integration, the issue of Kosovo, crime and corruption, economy and social welfare, opportunities for young people, foreign policy, the position of women, visions of Serbia, job opportunities, army and security, and regional policy. Similar issues were raised by the candidates in the debates on commercial TV as well.
groups prior to the elections. Through the use of opinion polls, ‘parties come to share a basic sense of what emotional preoccupations of the public are’ (Richards, 2004: 347). For instance, a good example of this discrepancy between voters’ and parties’ choices is the prominence of regional and foreign policy on the campaign agenda. Findings indicate that campaign managers and pollsters are aware that their targeted voters do not care a great deal for the candidates’ foreign and regional policies, but still decide to run a great deal of messages about it.

People do not really understand what foreign policy implies, but they have a need for Serbia to rank better, to be respected. That is one of the strongest feelings of our target group but also of other target groups – for Serbia to be respected (...) They want someone who will represent them well (Campaign Manager 2).

The need of citizens for Serbia to rank better and to be represented well, and the motivating power of this outcome, also speaks about the need for the renegotiation of authority, leadership and answering the demands of voters on the qualities the new leadership should have, but it also has a therapeutic function (Richards, 2007). Following the decade of conflict in the region and the portrayal of Serbia as the aggressor in international public opinion, voters in Serbia expressed a deeper need for a different representation. The parties’ numerous messages on Serbia’s foreign policy and its new openness to the world, both old and new international partners and former foes, is meant to perform emotion work by provoking a sense of enthusiasm and pride to replace the imposed sense of shame21.

In fact, many of the topics selected by the parties in these elections were designed to ignite feelings among voters: feelings of hope, belonging, fear, hate, and pride. Even the messages on economic recovery, infrastructure, and attracting investments were designed as enthusiastic appeals for new job opportunities, devised to project a

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21 Hogett (2009) discusses the alternation between pairs of emotions, shame and pride in particular, drawing on the work of Deborah Gould around AIDS activism.
sense of progress, advancement, and hope for a better life. Next, messages on decentralisation were crafted to invoke feelings related to identity and self-governance; questions of army and security were discussed in ways that speak of pride, and satisfy needs of stability and safety.

I think every campaign has its rules, one of the most important ones is grabbing people’s attention, engaging people, playing with, trying to trigger certain emotions (Consultant 2).

The logic behind the emotionalisation of campaigns was to bring candidates closer to voters, make them appear more familiar and trustworthy, and eventually more desirable as leaders. For instance, fighting against corruption proved to be a prolific topic as not only did voters find it to be the greatest problem for the country, but interviews also show that voters valued honesty and modesty as the most desirable virtues (Pollster 1). Furthermore, other prominent messages also seem to be designed to spark feelings of familiarity and community (such as the future of young people and welfare) or hope for a better life (European integration). The attempt to appear trustworthy, familiar and known is also visible in the analysis of the ways in which candidates addressed their voters in speeches at rallies and public appearances. The most common way of addressing them was as ‘Dear friends’. Candidates decided not to invoke more precise and targeted forms of address, but this sign of closeness was employed to get voters to see the candidates as someone friendly and familiar, someone they can trust.

This emotionalisation of appeals runs across other elements of electoral communication. Enthusiasm appeals (Brader, 2005) are also used to create campaign slogans that normally simplify and summarise ideas and traits. Looking at the slogans in the two election cycles, voters favoured those that conveyed energy, change, movement, but also signalled unity and collectiveness. It appears they are especially
moved by patriotic slogans and revert to cynicism when discussing energetic but general slogans.

My favourite is Stand Up Serbia, because I really think it is high time we woke up and did something (Young woman, Belgrade).

Forward Serbia is the best among them. I only like that one. It sounds like a cheer (Woman, Nis).

In addition to slogans, messages and campaign agendas, the emotionalisation of political communication has also propelled the use of celebrities in election campaigns. Drawing on popular culture and commercial marketing, campaign have relied on celebrities to engage voters everywhere. Politicians seek broader public appeal by referring to popular sentiments, using celebrities as ‘cultural intermediaries’ (Bourdieu, 1984), drawing on their ‘media’ and ‘symbolic capital’ (Davies, 2010). Celebrities perform in both the political and popular sphere (Corner, 2003) and they are in touch with popular sentiment (Street, 2004), so candidates try to use their popularity and the sense of intimacy they share with their audiences and voters in general. The purpose of their involvement is to help link the represented with the representatives (Wheeler, 2013). However, in Serbia the issue of trust influences the choice of celebrities employed in campaigns. Although campaigners believe that celebrity endorsements attract attention, ‘awake certain emotions among voters that can entice them to vote’ (Consultant 3), and serve as ‘sort of a reference’ (Consultant 3), this is only relevant if these celebrities exude trustworthiness (Pollster 1).

Usually, these celebrities cover only small sections of the population, or they are controversial so would win you some votes, but also cause you to lose some (Pollster 2).

This suggests the main criteria for the selection of celebrities to be employed by campaigns was their ability to paint candidates as trustworthy. Campaigners agree that the only celebrity whose endorsement could be an appeal of enthusiasm is tennis player Novak Djokovic, as a reference for national pride and achievement, and a point of identification (Evans, 2009). He chose not to get involved in
campaigns in Serbia, but was mentioned in many campaign messages, and campaigners claimed that his personifications of success, potential and hope inspired and motivated voters.

However, findings suggest there is a difference between the approaches of incumbent parties and opposition parties. It is the incumbent parties that actually get to choose the endorsements strategically; opposition parties either promote endorsements from celebrities that share their ideologies (DSS), or promote anybody who offers help (LDP). Voters in Serbia on the other hand barely remember the celebrities, their endorsements, and mentions by campaigns, suggesting that their appeal transcends their involvement in campaigns.

This theme – the link between the campaign agenda and its ability to excite voters – stands out in interviews with campaign professionals but also with voters who are quick to recognise that their responses to electoral messages are in fact emotional. When exposed to messages from previous campaigns, voters recognise the politicians’ intent to stir their emotions:

These all seem to me like very shallow words, very basic, that are meant to awake the lowest, most basic instincts in a man (Young man, Novi Sad).

I think the point is to motivate the voters, they know all our sour spots and pray on them to get people to vote (Young woman, Novi Sad).

They just know what moves people, how to animate them. But just for a little while, until the ballot is filled in (Student, Belgrade).

In spite of voters being aware of the management of their emotions done by political parties in campaigns, political leaders continue to use the imagery and messages that tap into massive national reserves of feelings (Richards, 2004) to perform emotional labour (Hochschild, 1983) with the goal of establishing themselves as objects of trust.
5.2.4 Country Discussion: Renegotiating Trust

During the campaigns in 2008 and 2012 in Serbia, election campaign strategies seem to have had the initial goal of surmounting the distrust that voters harbour towards everything political. In order to mobilise their voters, campaigns in Serbia first have to change the voters’ emotional state of distrust into another that would encourage them to vote. Therefore, it is the issue of voters’ distrust that is dominating the electoral process in Serbia. This study identifies several sources of this distrust: the inherited culture of not formulating or expressing political demands (particularly individual demands), and intense changes resulting from the processes of democratisation causing interest fragmentation. Voters also list the repetitiveness of campaigns, being lied to by politicians, and the money being spent on electoral communication as reasons for their distrust towards political actors. The sources voters name are magnified by the nature of campaign communications in societies in transition. The very personalised, generic and repetitive campaigns are designed to override the lack of messages based on policy proposals. Governments in transitioning countries are bound by necessary reforms (Kitschelt, 1995, Innes, 2002) that limit the range and scope of electoral promises, resulting in campaigns that promote personalised content and generic, abstract messages.

The issue of trust that is heavily influencing strategy design during elections in Serbia differs from other post-communist countries in transition in as much as the country is experiencing a second wave of renegotiation of trust in authorities. This process, which started with the fall of communism, was followed by a decade that saw the rise of nationalism, nationalistic propaganda and the new personalisation of politics calling the voters to put their trust in a new national leader. After putting their trust in that new national leader, voters again witnessed and participated in the events that led to the collapse of that system in 2000. The feeling of hope and trust in democracy was shat-
tered during the first several election cycles when leaders (and democracy, for that matter) failed to deliver on their promises. The following election campaigns were opportunities for political leaders to initiate the reconstruction of trust. Voters in Serbia in all focus groups reacted to materials from previous campaigns by shrugging their shoulders and expressing disinterest, no matter the topic or issue, from unemployment to the Constitution, refusing to discuss them and claiming that they were irrelevant and insignificant not only for their lives but also for political processes. This state of distrust is also encountered by campaigns when they canvass the electorate prior to elections. For the last few election cycles major parties in Serbia have hired campaign specialists to advise them on how to overcome growing voter distrust and mobilise their voters enough to vote.

In response, the studied campaigns in Serbia in 2008 and 2012 particularly promoted messages and issues that solicited emotional states of hope, belonging and pride, and in some cases inspired fear and hate. Campaign strategies seem to have calculated that these emotional states are, in contrast to distrust and cynicism, capable of securing votes. The issues they chose to promote to elicit those emotional states vary. For instance, campaigns in Serbia very commonly designed messages on foreign policy and the position of Serbia in the world and the region, framing them as success stories in changing the perception of the country and inspiring a sense of pride among the electorate. As described in previous sections, campaigns relied on the deeper inner needs of the electorate, for representation and perspective for instance, and provoked feelings among voters intended to lift the enthusiasm of the cynical electorate and mobilise them.
5.3 Election Campaign Strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina

As stated in the introduction, this chapter tries to answer questions about the design of campaign messages and how they are made effective in mobilising voters. The process of designing and the goals of these messages are largely determined by the context of the society in question. To start with, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, election campaigns are influenced by its political system and electoral rules, dividing the country among two ethnic entities and three ethnic groups, with ethnically divided constituencies on most electoral levels. The political system that directed the division of voting districts/entities was a result of the peace agreement ending the ethnic war in 1995. After the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina continued its transition towards democracy while recovering from conflict, the situation that still haunts the political and social life of the country today. The combination of developments – recovering from a collective trauma left after the war, advancing the post-war system and institutions, and reforming the system and society towards democracy – continues to mark the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina to present day. This set of conditions challenges the loyalties, allegiances and trust among citizens.

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, being a transitioning, post-conflict, multi-ethnic, multi-religious polity, the distrust is both ‘specific and diffuse’ (Easton, 1975), both ‘vertical and horizontal’ (Almond and Verba, 1963, Almond, 1990, Putnam, 1993, 2000). Following the ethnic conflict, with ethnic groups divided into two entities, election campaigns continued to strategically use the distrust between groups, encouraging fear and distance, and in some cases furthering in-group cohesion. In Putnam’s terms, in Bosnia, campaigns tend to respond to the electoral rules and the nature of constituencies by fostering bonding capital that is ‘inward looking’ and reinforces ‘exclusive identities and homogenous groups’ (Putnam, 2000: 22). Campaign messages designed around bridging, inclusive relation-
ships are still rare in campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, in addition to tackling vertical loyalties and relationships towards institutions and representatives during democratising reforms, Bosnian and Herzegovian campaigns manage the horizontal, social relationships.

5.3.1 Choosing the right strategy: Following the Leader

Campaigning in Bosnia and Herzegovina is heavily influenced by low levels of professionalisation of communications, which complements the more general obstacles preventing the reforms of emerging democracies. The campaigns of 2006 and 2010 in Bosnia and Herzegovina were, for the most part, not informed by research, opinion polls and focus groups, but instead relied on political instincts and the previous experiences of the candidates and their teams. The concept of political marketing, using polling techniques to understand voters’ preferences and incorporate them into the design of electoral messages, has still not become the dominant approach in Bosnian campaigning. Campaign strategies and messages are predominantly decided by party leadership and informed by the input from local party organisations.

It is only the biggest parties that hire strategists and consultants to help them devise a strategy. The other parties rely on previous experience or they simply improvise (Consultant).

The leaders of the party still fail to understand the significance of polling or they simply find them expensive; they would rather invest their money in billboards than opinion polls (Pollster 2).

Findings further reveal that information conveyed by the local party organisations replaces the input not obtained through opinion polls.

Local committees have their says. That is the practice, and with time it became a serious practice. It is one of the methods of getting to the voters’ demands. And it became usual and legitimate (Campaign Manager).
In addition to the local organisations, political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina on occasion consult partner organisations – associations of former soldiers, farmers, the unemployed, unions – and through these organisations they attain ‘wider views, demands that later get fitted into a larger political frame’ (Strategist 2) that shapes campaign messages. Again, in the end, it is the party leader who decides on the final messages.

Their [leaders’] egos directly influence the way of thinking. A dominant person or a group in the organisation imposes their views, they do not care about opinion polls, strategies. They can be influenced on occasions by the media and in direct contact with voters (Campaign Manager).

The reliance of campaigns on the opinions of politicians, high officials and their advisors, and not on polling techniques and research, assures that strategy will be based on obvious needs, such as, for instance, the need for stability and cohesion, and then dramatized on the electoral stage (Richards, 2004), but it also assures the themes of the campaigns will remain the same in continuing election cycles, as they are chosen by the same group of people over and over again.

Although the main electoral messages that get promoted are still decided by ‘an assembly of wise heads’ (Strategist 3), a slow turn to polling has been documented, moving from the 2006 to the 2010 campaign. However, most of the polling in Bosnia and Herzegovina is actually commissioned by international aid organisations deployed to assist and direct the development of democratic institutions, political parties and elections included. Internationals aid organisations\(^\text{22}\) prearrange the research and polls, inclusive of all the methodology, and then share their findings with the political parties they work with. The intention is to then help them formulate their electoral

\(^{22}\) For instance, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has been working with political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina the longest. However, all of these organisations are bound by their home countries’ or organisational interests and ideologies. This fact always bears influence over the choice of parties they work with, the policies they help promote, and even the questions they insert into polling questionnaires.
messages, set their targets and goals, and make these available. Never-
theless, even when they do get the reports on voters’ preferences in
opinion polls and focus groups, Bosnian political parties tend to ig-
nore them.

None of the parties had analysed those data, they do not determine if
[their target] is a male between 30 and 40, urban or rural; not one
party we worked with in the last 15 years had made use of the data giv-
en to them (International Pollster).

While most parties claim that gathering voters’ positions and opin-
ions on their own would be too expensive, two parties in Bosnia and
Herzegovina have modernised their methods of canvassing informa-
tion. The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats has stood out
as the leading party in this aspect, attempting to align their campaign
messages with voters’ positions. Reportedly, they started gathering
information in a two-fold manner, through party infrastructure and
by canvassing.

We have a thousand local organisations that can reach thousand vot-
ers, so we can go with their observations or we can go with the sys-
tem of canvassing, surveys where all the local organisations fill in
questionnaires, dressed up as NGO members or even in our party
colours, gathering information who our voters are, who are our sup-
porters, who are the undecided, and what are their biggest con-
cerns... (Candidate).

Still, even with these attempts at modernising the input process, the
key decisions are still made by the party’s leadership with little con-
sideration for the data.

The other party that made a significant change in the 2010 campaign
with respect to designing the main messages is the Social Democratic
Party. With the idea of engaging as many party members, voters and
those leaning towards voting for the party as possible, they set out to
discuss the issues and incorporate members, voters and aficionados’
positions into the party manifesto. These consultations with their
voters started two years before the elections and proved to be suc-
cessful in motivating voters as it helped the party join the govern-
ment after the elections. The central topics for the campaign came from voters themselves.

After the initial survey that mapped the major issues citizens cared about, the campaign formed a working group of 5 people that were supposed to put together a document that would later be promoted. They analysed the practices in the region, talked to the civil organisations. We then organised public hearings and debates with voters about the solutions we proposed. We used our local organisations in cantons, regions and at municipality level to reach NGOs, associations, members and citizens, local media were invited. We covered the whole country with these debates in the next six months (Strategist).

Although it did not presume the complete modernisation of the polling process, SDP messages did include input from selected groups of the population, and that was still a novelty in Bosnian campaigning. However, the experience of achieving this success in 2010 has only confirmed that the campaigns that attempt to promise too many transitional changes and a broad reformatory agenda lead to delivery problems and popular disappointment. In cases of electoral success with the broad set of promises, those parties normally face a drop in ratings for their failure to deliver on all of them. After experiencing the difficulties of reforming the transitioning systems, all parties tend to shy away from electoral messages that are concrete, precise and meaningful for the lives of the voters.

5.3.2 Fear appeals: 'It is a question of feeling the fear in our bones'

Following the communist pre-war era when loyalties and support for the leaders were not actually decided or debated in elections, and following a conflict that destroyed the fabrics of trust among citizens, the most common strategy in Bosnian elections is issuing fear and blame appeals, stirring passions that cultivate distrust across groups, promoting only 'bonding' (Putnam, 2000), exclusive ties within group and pointing to decades long injustices done by the Others. Re-
search of emotions remains uncertain about the power of fear appeals in strategic communication. Fear is believed to cause interest and inspire the gathering of more information on the subject (Marcus et al, 2000), but its motivational capacity is still to be determined (Brader, 2005). In an atmosphere of endemic distrust, characteristic of all societies undergoing post-communist transitions, it is not surprising that voters express cynicism towards political candidates. Commonly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, voters in focus groups discuss their awareness of the strategy to blame the other entity, its leaders or inefficiency of joint institutions for the shortcomings of governance or the lack of transitioning reforms. Voters across ethnic lines believe in an imagined agreement among political leaders to entice ethnic passions and boost their electoral chances. Supposedly, candidates attack each other on national issues across ethnic groups in order to secure voting homogeneity of their respective ethnic groups/constituencies.

Mustafa Ceric and Dodik actually work together very well. Mustafa Ceric will say it there, Dodik will say it here... and they all win votes (Unemployed woman, Banja Luka)
And they have coffee together then (Young man, Banja Luka)
You say this and I will say that... (Student, Banja Luka)
... But no hard feelings! (Unemployed woman, Banja Luka).

As in the case above, voters act out imagined dialogues between prominent leaders. Here they invented and dramatized a dialogue between a religious Muslim leader and a Bosnian-Serbian politician to demonstrate their belief that all politicians are in on this game of blaming the other (entity and its leadership) in order to gain votes. Candidates themselves do not shy away from admitting to the efficiency of the blaming strategy.

The parties in the government have created the atmosphere that the criterion for how good a politician is in Republika Srpska is how much they hate him in Sarajevo, and vice versa. The parties in government in both entities did that (Dragan Cavic, TV RTRS, 2010).

The attribution of blame is a crucial element (Hoggett, 2009) in performing emotion work, turning sentiments of fear into stimuli for ac-
tion – in this case, electoral support. Similar processes are in place with the promotion of experiences of injustices. Feelings and attitudes that accompany this experience are a common part of campaign appeals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of the voters of all ethnic groups across Bosnia and Herzegovina perceive themselves and their group as the actual damaged party. The most widespread perception is that the citizens’ interests are harmed by the high level of corruption or the consequences of war and the way it ended. Campaigns have widely accepted this perception, held by the voters, and are incorporating it into their communications, with candidates seeking to address these injustices. However, in order for the perceptions of injustice and grievances to serve as motivating stimuli, these sentiments need to be focused and dispersed (Hoggett, 2009, Snow and Bedford, 1988). For this reason, campaigns assign blame to different actors and processes, against which voters can rally. Even in their election manifestos, campaigns cast blame at other ethnic groups and call for the rectification of injustices done to their own ethnic groups/constituencies.

Before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 105 Serbs were indicted, 26 Bosniaks and 24 Croats. Still, the verdicts are even more interesting: Serbs were convicted to 660 years of prison combined, Bosniaks to 69 and Croats to 64 (...) The volume of the injustice is obvious here (AISD, Election Manifesto, 2010).

The unjust constitutional position Croats were put in with opportunistic solutions of the Dayton Accord and its revisions is the source of the growing defeatism among Croats (CDU 1990, Election Manifesto, 2010).

In these examples from election manifestos, campaigns highlighted and used injustices to aggravate and motivate voters into showing their support for the candidates and parties that offer to rectify their grievances.

Looking at the practice of fear appeals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is clear that campaigners believe in the potential of fear appeals, unlike scholars of fear appeals, who are uncertain of their influence (Brader, 2005).
It is still possible to win people over based on fear, on this ethnic, national division. It is fear; you have to stick with me, because if the opposing party wins, it is going to be trouble, Republika Srpska will be abolished, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be no longer, or Croats will be marginalised (Strategist 2).

In this quote, a strategist explains how political actors of all ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina strategically influence voters’ fears to win the elections. However, as Hoggett (2009) suggests, as well as the practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the key to transforming fear, provoking anger against the source of grievances, and restoring hope in efficacy of action lies in the interpretation and framing of fear and perceptions of injustice. In their endeavour to motivate voters, campaigns offer a plethora of interpretations of injustices, their sources and remedies, to manage the emotions of voters. This process also changes the voters’ emotional state, which leads to a change in position, from an object of injustice to an active subject (Hoggett, 2009), providing voters with the motivation to vote.

Managing the experience of different emotions is not an uncommon campaign tactic in different forms of campaign communications. Especially interesting in Bosnian campaigns is the use of celebrities to bring attention to campaigns and candidates. As previously stated, celebrities also serve as channels to tap into the public admiration and familiarity they share with their audiences. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was particularly notable that voters across ethnic and political lines, without being prompted by videos of the rallies, repeatedly brought up the appearance of Svetlana Raznatovic Ceca at the closing rally of the Party of Independent Social Democrats in Banja Luka, at the end of the election campaign of 2010. This performance was significant to voters for the fact that the singer in question was married to a leader of Serbian paramilitary forces during the war, Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan. Calling her ‘the Serbian mother’ or ‘the Serbian widow’, participants in focus groups reacted to her in different ways, but the most extreme reaction came from an older Bosniak woman in Sarajevo who started to cry, remembering the fear Bos-
niaks felt at the mention of the paramilitary leader’s name. In the Serbian entity voters reacted with anger or approval, depending on the party affiliation:

This is the centre of Banja Luka, a street that has an Orthodox church, a mosque, and a Catholic Cathedral and you stand there with Ceca Raznatovic (in anger, Unemployed women, Banja Luka).

Dodik plays that card, good for him. I will vote for him (with satisfaction, Middle-aged man, Eastern Sarajevo).

Therefore, campaigns invite celebrities who can provoke the intense emotions that candidates cannot. The idea of campaigns is to use celebrities to tackle missing links of vertical trust - those between voters and political leaders. Voters in focus groups talked about not trusting politicians, political parties, and Bosnian institutions. They were very cynical about their electoral messages and promises. A common topic appears in their response to electoral messages, that they are a waste of (citizens’) money, which could have been spent on something better and more worthwhile. When asked about what they would want to hear from politicians before voting for them, voters speculated about detailed manifestos, 5 year plans, practical issues, employment, or living standards, but still admitted that they would not trust politicians even if they promised to work on these exact issues.

If somebody would win and then I saw that they are doing a good job, only then I would vote, for their re-election (Student, Mostar).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, both vertical and horizontal trust, trust in representatives, and trust in fellow society members, remain the burning issue before campaigns. In circumstances of endemic distrust, campaigns strategically divert the focus of distrust towards the other entity, other ethnic groups, joint political institutions, local representatives of the international community or the international community as a whole, and that significantly boosts social distrust (among citizens, or groups of citizens) but enables candidates to argue that they are themselves trustworthy representatives of the group and win the elections.
5.3.3 Trust and Campaign Agendas: Negotiating the Constitution

Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered to be a deeply divided society (Guelke, 2004, Norris, 2005) or a severely divided society (Horowitz, 1993), recovering from the consequences of ethnic war. For deeply divided societies, electoral competition presents a danger for the stability of the polity (Lijphart, 2008). Despite the idea of institutionalising Bosnia and Herzegovina as a consociational democracy with sophisticated rules of power sharing and electing officials, election times continue to be a danger for fragile inter-group/constituency relations (Lijphart, 1977, 2008, Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). Following the conflict of the 1990s, the very social fabric of the polity is threaded with explosive emotional relations that provide for a powerful strategic tool in election campaigns. On the other side, after the war ended and the transition began, it could have been expected that the prolonged democratisation processes, slow reforms of institutions and legislations, policy failures and numerous deadlocks in politics would have left voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina disappointed, cynical and disillusioned. However, these sentiments, influenced by disappointment and disillusion, did not lead to disengagement and boredom in focus groups and interviews discussing elections and campaigns. On the contrary, voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of entity and ethnic group, showed not only interest in discussing electoral communication but passionately engaged in the conversations and expressed a wide array of emotional states when discussing the dominant messages in previous elections.

Campaigns respond to the lack of trust by putting emotion-provoking issues on the campaign agenda. And the most prominent issues in the 2006 and 2010 campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina were largely affected by the process of reforming the country and restoring the joint lives of three ethnic and religious groups. The constitutional design of Bosnia and Herzegovina and ongoing negotiations of constitu-
tional changes seen to be necessary for furthering the reforms in the country were such issues in these campaigns. Discussions and positions on constitutional change were translated into calls for a centralised government and the abolishment of the system of entities (Bosniak national parties), corresponding demand for the protection of the Serbian entity (Serbian national parties) or the creation of a Croatian entity, or the enhanced jurisdiction of the federal institutions (somewhat moderate parties). According to testimonies by campaign professionals, these issues are put on the agenda of all political actors in the country:

So far, these topics have always implied intensification of international issues. Not all parties and not always... those parties with national symbols Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian, they do it, but lately it has been done by all, no matter the symbol (Pollster 1).

These issues dominate the narrative in the entities during election times, but do not appear to be relevant for the voters outside the election period:

In polls, people always list unemployment, corruption and economy. Not a single other topic appeared in our polls since 1998. In focus groups people talk about the unemployment, economy, corruption, nepotism, but on Election Day, people vote according to that national rhetoric. Apparently, people care about those national indicators, but it just does not show in the polls (International pollster).

This discrepancy between voters’ preferred agenda and the actual campaign agendas in 2006 and 2010 elections, which this campaign professional describes, is apparent (see also Marko, 2010), but in fact voters also exhibit a level of confusion about what is actually important to them. Indeed, voters in all the regions of the country repeat the demand for topics related to their everyday lives, and they claim to want to see programs and reforms. However, focus groups paint a more complex picture, which does not rule out the question of loyalties and institutional relations in the country as an important topic. For example, when exposed to slogans from previous campaigns, voters in the focus group in the Croatian region of the country responded with cynicism and irony: ‘Beautiful’, ‘So promising’; and disapproval: ‘This is all ridiculous!’, ‘What a waste of money’, ‘They
are all the same’. At first, participants in the focus group dismissed those slogans that relied on the questions of statehood:

“The power of Croats’, it makes no sense to me. I would understand if I lived in Croatia. I am Croatian... but I am not in Croatia. Why would this be in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First, we put on the Power of Croats, and then somebody will say the Power of Bosniaks and then the Power of Serbs... What kind of a slogan... I should vote for that? (Student, Mostar).

You say you will plead for us, for Croats, and we will immediately vote for you... That is so stupid... (NGO activist, Mostar).

However, after initially rejecting ethnic appeals, they also admit that these specific topics were very important to them. In the case of this focus group, with a Croatian majority, they all testified to caring a great deal about the possibility of an additional Croatian entity in the country, ‘because it is only fair, either we should all have an entity or nobody should (Unemployed woman, Mostar).

In addition to the discussion on the future nature of the state and the system of entities, other topics on the campaign agendas in 2006 and 2010 Bosnian campaigns included plans for the economy, unemployment, agriculture, EU integration, social welfare, and fighting corruption. Still, voters dismiss these appeals in campaigns and remain cynical about them, regularly raising the question of the credibility of the sources of these appeals.

5.3.4 Country Discussion: Fear and Social Cohesion in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The electorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to react very differently to campaign messages in comparison to the Serbian electorate. Their reactions to messages from the previous elections exposed the strong emotions of voters towards all levels of political life and electoral messages. Voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina talk about campaigns and politics very willingly, even passionately, lingering after the interviews and discussing the conversations further. The emo-
tional base of voting practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be related to the traumatic events of the war of the 1990s. Citizens were involved in a brutal war among themselves and then started to rebuild the new state jointly after the war. The war and the new institutional arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to influence the development of a social base that is charged with emotions and memories, and that makes it easier to provoke voters into action or discussion. Following the ethnic conflict, with ethnic groups divided in two entities, election campaigns continued to strategically use the distrust between groups, encouraging fear, hate and distance, and in some cases furthering in-group cohesion.

In Putnam’s terms, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, campaigns tend to respond to the electoral rules and the nature of constituencies by fostering bonding capital, which is ‘inward looking’ and reinforces ‘exclusive identities and homogenous groups’ (Putnam, 2000: 22). Campaign messages designed around bridging, inclusive relationships are still rare in campaigning in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, in addition to tackling vertical loyalties and relationships towards institutions and representatives during democratising reforms, Bosnian campaigns manage the horizontal, social relationships.

5.4 Campaigning practices in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

5.4.1 Strategy Design

Findings in this chapter about the ways campaigns mobilise voters in the two countries reveal that campaigns chose to design their election messages in accordance with social contexts, and in response to the deeper needs and sentiments of the electorate. Campaigns under study here seem to base the effectiveness of messages on understanding these needs and sentiments, and provoking the appropriate, mobilising responses. In the process of gathering and understanding
these needs and designing such messages, campaigns in question used different approaches, but faced similar issues at the beginning. The dominant issue before the campaigns in 2008 and 2012 in Serbia and 2006 and 2010 in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a spreading distrust. The problem of social and political distrust is a common problem for post-communist, emerging democracies. During the communist era, trust in authorities was irrelevant, as there were no multiple choices, and the existing regime used coercion, fear, and inertia (Rose, 1994), but also heavy propaganda and ritualisation to establish its legitimacy. Then trust in leaders became relevant with the rise of multiparty politics in the 1990s for all the countries in the region. The start of multiparty politics coincided with the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ethnic war in the region, a war that continues to challenge the social and political relations in both countries.

As a result of post-conflict recovery and democratic reforms, in Serbia voters today express cynicism and aversion towards politicians and political institutions, and especially towards election campaigns and promises; they express signs of vertical distrust (Almond and Verba, 1963, Putnam 1993, 2000). On the other hand, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society still managing its post conflict development as a consociational emerging democracy, with electoral rules that in most cases exclude the possibility of voting across ethnic and religious lines, campaigns face a situation of voters’ endemic distrust both in politicians, political institutions and the system as well as the other (groups of) voters. That is, in Bosnia and Herzegovina voters show signs of both vertical and social distrust. Their social distrust is directed towards the other entity and groups of voters and their leadership and institutions. In addition to the lack of specific support for leaders and parties, interviewed voters also show a lack of diffuse support for the system, authorities, regime (Easton, 1975).
The vital task at hand for campaigners in both countries in these campaigns was to address these voters’ sentiments and attitudes, the cynicism, distrust and aversion that they harbour towards politicians, and to motivate them into taking action and voting.

5.4.2 Professionalisation of Campaigning

Another way the context of the two countries influences election campaign strategies is the observed level of professionalisation of campaigning, especially the ways campaigns gather information about their voters and their preferences. Also related to that is the other side of the process: the ability and willingness of the electorate to form and express political demands before the political leaders. When it comes to the first finding, the level of professionalisation of electoral communication, there seems to be a difference between the two country cases under study. The election practice in Serbia appears to have modernised further than the practice of political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The campaign strategies in Serbia in 2008 and 2012 were among the first to implement modern techniques of gathering input from voters through polling, researching, and interviewing. Most of the political parties in Serbia, especially the big ones, hired a wide array of professionals, international consultants, strategists, pollsters, analysts, journalists, editors, cameramen, directors, etc. Still, although they all had access to their polling results, not all parties decided to rely on them and some had ideas different to the principles of political marketing. Instead, different political parties apply very different strategies and set different goals for themselves in elections. This diversity of strategies and electoral goals is not seen in Bosnian campaigning.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, campaigns appear to be less professionalised. Most political decisions are based on the acquired knowledge and feelings of party leaders, and messages are rarely tested in ad-
vance, while very few parties commission opinion polls independently or hire professionals. Instead they use broad messages targeted at their (ethnic) constituencies, and rely on already tested forms of communication, mostly outdoor advertising and public gatherings and rallies. Polls are operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of informing political parties’ strategies and targeting only by international aid organisations. The results are made available to selected parties and candidates, but in most cases the parties do not base their strategies on these polls. They still choose to design their campaigns according to their ‘gut feelings’.

However, when it comes to the other observation – that the customs of formulating political demands and expressing them during elections greatly influences election campaign strategy design – the two country cases seem to tell a similar story. The interviews and focus groups with voters in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted for this study showed that voters in both countries do not put demands forward. Following decades of communist and socialist eras and lingering practices in communications and education that promoted collectivities and not individualism, voters refrain from articulating their individual demands. They did not wish to offer any precise goals they wanted to achieve or wants they hoped to fulfil. When asked if there was anything they would ask leaders to do, fix or offer, voters remained imprecise and general and commonly resorted to demands such as ‘for all of us to live better’, ‘to have jobs’, and ‘more opportunities for young people’. They even claimed to only want health and happiness.

Furthermore, after several election cycles as emerging democracies that left their hopes unfulfilled, voters now react with cynicism to messages that are precise and policy related, claiming not to trust them anymore. For this reason, polled for or not, campaigns continue to be encouraged by these findings to search elsewhere for strategies to overcome voters’ cynicism and distrust and they usually turn to
producing messages that are abstract and aimed at voters’ emotions and not rational interests and practical needs.

5.4.3 Emotionalisation of Campaigns

The findings in this chapter on the mobilisation of voters show that the campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008 and 2012, and 2006 and 2010 respectively, did not base their messages on arguing for the interests of the groups whose support they were expecting but were trying to provoke their emotions. In this respect, the campaigns under study complied with the global trend of emotionalising their messages. Globally, the observed emotional deficit in political communication is being filled by emotional labour and management of public feeling by politicians (Richards, 2004). Political leaders engage in theatrical ‘political performances’ and dramatise those emotional needs on stage (Richards, 2004) in order to awake sensations in their audiences (Szabo and Kiss, 2012). Campaigns employ messages and imagery that ‘tap personal experiences or deeply ingrained symbols that can unleash the desired emotional response in an audience’ (Brader, 2005). In other words, candidates rely on market intelligence to observe the voters’ dominant feelings rather than their interests, positions and opinions. However, in the process of provoking and dramatising these emotions, to be able to translate them into electoral support, political actors also make them salient, direct them and construct the desired responses to these emotional states. During election campaigns, they manage to exert relevant influence on the type of emotions and attitudes citizens experience towards the topics raised by the campaigns.

In Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as post-communist, post-conflict, transitioning countries, the endemic nature of distrust, apathy and cynicism seeks most powerful emotions invoked in order to motivate the voters. Consistent with existing studies on the emotionalisation of campaigns, the campaigns chose to pursue emotions
powerful enough to motivate action (Brader, 2005); on most occasions they issued fear appeals (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and enthusiasm appeals (in Serbia). According to the theory of affective intelligence, the aversion voters feel towards politicians pushes avoidance, but the emotions invoked in campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina encourage actions; enthusiasm drives participation, and anxiety triggers attention and learning (Marcus et al, 2011). Still, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, fear appeals seem to do more than trigger attention and learning: they build on the power of feelings and memories of war and hate between conflicted groups and perform ‘emotion work’, turning fear and grief into anger, a successful catalyst of motivation and action (Hoggett, 2009); and they manage to inspire a change in subject position, from an object into an agent (Hoggett, 2009).

In these cases, both positive and negative appeals in campaigns manage to engage people, overturn voter apathy to an extent, and motivate people enough to support a party in the elections. However, some emotional appeals in campaigns might inspire actions beyond the vote (Brader, 2005). Experiences of societies being provoked into feeling pride and hope or fear and injustice are quite different. The important difference here is that the dominant feelings in campaigns in Serbia invite an idea of a community and inspire an awareness of a unified group, a collective with certain characteristics, virtues and a joint future. On the other hand, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provoking negative emotions among voters, fear of the other entity and the other ethnicities, offering defence against them, and suggesting injustice being done against the group, constructs solidarity among the in-group, but furthers divisions within the society as a whole. In this case, campaigns reinforce the administrative, political and ethnic divisions in the country by intensifying feelings that support them, and solely advance the in-group cohesion and loyalty (Salaj, 2009). Furthermore, the management of public emotions in political communications, and election campaigns in particular as they attract a lot of
attention, can have a therapeutic role (Richards, 2007) and heal societies after traumas such as the collapsing of a regime, system of values or customs brought about by democratisation or war. Or they can further promote the existing state of distrust, anger, fear and division. In comparison, campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina seem to offer their citizens opposite ends of this opportunity. Campaigns in Serbia offer hope, enthusiasm and unity, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, political actors endorse fear, divisions and continued anger in the society.

In the end, notably, campaigns do not just manage emotional states and public emotions through this emotionalisation of messages, they also construct emotional attachments (Ahmed, 2004). That is, through the means of electoral discourse, election campaigns participate in constituting attachments to the identities they appeal to. The following chapters will look at the practice of appealing to collective identities, renegotiating their meanings, and attempting to forge emotional responses and attachments to these identities in further detail.
Chapter 6: Identity Appeals and Election Campaigns

6.1 Introduction

During the course of elections, campaigns engage with different identities continuously by addressing them. When targeting voters, campaigns segment them into groups and then continue to appeal to their shared identities. These collective identities, marked by a shared sense of we-ness (Snow, 2001), are particularly advantageous for mobilising purposes because the shared awareness of the ‘we’ engages and mobilises its members, cognitively, emotionally and sometimes morally (Snow, 2001). However, data in this research suggests some types of collective identities seem to resonate better with voters than others. Certain appeals achieve ‘resonance’ with groups of voters, while others do not. Introduced by the framing literature, ‘cultural resonance’ suggests that certain narratives carry more weight with its audiences because ‘their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes’ (Gamson, 1989: 5), and those who respond to large cultural themes will respond better to appeals that correspond to them.

This chapter looks at identity appeals in campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the way that these appeals are designed in order to engage the voters more efficiently. It reviews the practice of aligning some appeals in style, form and content with the cultural environment (Kubal, 1998), while creating others as simple addresses with listings of problem diagnosis and policy prescriptions. Further, it examines voters’ responses and why voters react to some identity appeals with approval and understanding, while discarding others. This chapter also discusses the ways campaigns’ spirited appeals to some collective identities result in an offering of a reconstructed nar-
rative for these identities, while those less developed appeals remain policy proposals and ideas in manifestos and speeches.

In sum, this chapter is structured to first examine campaign appeals to voters in Serbia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who they were addressed to and to what effect. It then also looks at the implications of the campaign appeals in influencing the understanding of the meaning of these identities.

6.2 Campaign appeals in Serbia

Political parties in Serbia, especially the big ones, as well as in many other post-communist countries, position themselves and mobilise voters in a way similar to Western democracies’ catch-all parties (Innes, 2001). Political parties in Serbia lack the ‘baggage’ of classic Western ideologies, and ‘the history of mass membership and a class or denominational clientele’ (Innes, 2001:10), but are bounded by past collective ideologies, socialism and nationalism and they often position themselves in relation to these ideologies. In addition, most of the existing parties in Serbia were developed top down by the elites at the beginning of the multiparty era that followed the era of one party rule in the former country. This development of political parties and their detachment from any social interest base have made it easy for political parties to appeal to their voters in a fully strategic way without consideration of loyalty to their base. This lack of ideological loyalties, but also the lack of social interests organised into coordinated collective actions, put the parties themselves in the situation of having to ‘constantly open old, and impose new issues, problematise, highlight and create differences around questions, including those questions on which most citizens do not have a position or are not even interested in’ (Stojiljkovic, 2011: 72). Meaning that they are free to act completely in line with their strategies and set their own agendas that would help them win the elections without considering the voters’ positions. In this situation, parties in Serbia rarely choose to
have precisely defined target groups, but instead try to win all they
can win, or disregard targeting strategies in order to promote ideas
they find important (DSS) or brand their new party (LDP), or pro-
mote their party program and ideology (SPS).

As shown in the previous chapter on mobilisation of voters, campaign
professionals in Serbia confirm that they comply with the principles
of political marketing. They usually divide voters into groups of hard-
core loyal voters, those leaning towards the party; undecideds;
‘reachables’, leaning toward other parties; and ‘unwinnables’. Then
they design messages to appeal to these groups of voters. In doing so,
you also target voters as members of social groups with varying lev-
els of collective awareness and belonging. Groups that were targeted
during the campaigns in 2008 and 2012 include unemployed people,
new mothers, young people, retired people, employees, national mi-
orities living in Serbia, unemployed people, people who lost their
jobs, and farmers.

The messages that address these groups tend to appear mostly in the
least popular forms of campaign communication, such as manifestos,
and are delivered in a way that fails to excite and mobilise voters. In
addition, these messages do not seem to resonate with voters. Voters
in focus groups dismiss them on grounds of credibility or irrelevant
content. For example, the leader of SPS made an appeal to working
class voters at the party’s closing rally in 2008 by proclaiming:

Our people in Serbia was left humiliated, impoverished, working
class was left unprotected without regulations on labour legislation.
Tycoons and businessmen think their time has come; that it is for-
bidden to mention the workers’ rights, that unions cannot go on
strike. In the whole world, everything trembles in state when work-
ners go on strike, the workers here... severance pay has become the
only thing our economic experts know (Dacic, I., closing rally, 2008).

The voters reject these messages without even responding to them.
They dismiss the speaker as well as the relevance of the message.
Well, he was in power ever since the 1990’s, when did he realise it...
He can't hurt me anymore, but this is humiliating (Unemployed woman, Novi Sad).

He says that, we all know it... Who is he talking to? (Young man, Novi Sad).

One of the reasons these tailored messages fail to inspire voters is that belonging to a social or professional group or a class does not seem to influence voters’ choices as it does in Western democracies. These identities were ‘suppressed for a long time and covered by not very closely related national and cultural cleavages’ (Stojiljkovic, 2011: 94). On the other side, the strategy that offers better reception is the one highlighting long-time dominant ethno-historical and cultural (values-based) differences in society. In order to make campaign messages appealing for voters, campaigners exploit references that are already rooted in the society and exploit ingrained divisions in it. In that way, campaigns align their messages with larger cultural themes (Gamson, 1989).

In the case of campaigns in 2008 and 2012, the appeals were designed to take advantage of a prominent cultural theme depicting a modern and a traditional vision of the country. Campaign messages supported the divide between the traditionalists and modernists (Mihailovic, 2008, Jovanovic, 2008), ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia (Omaljev, 2013). This strategically opportune theme of a social divide between citizens oriented ‘towards the past or at least status quo, traditionalism, conservatism, authoritarianism, intolerance, resistance to reforms’ (Komsic et al, 2003: 169), on the one side, and citizens oriented towards ‘change and future, modernism, liberalism, tolerance, and preference for economic reforms, on the other side’ (Ibid) is complemented by another axis of division in post-communist societies, originally introduced by Kitschelt (1992), that places the gap between the losers and winners of transitional economic processes. Stojiljkovic (2011) builds on these politically relevant identities to distinguish the groups that fall into winners and losers of transition. Ac-
cording to him, the winners of Serbian transition include the Milosevic era oligarchs, oligarchs of the transitional era, the new political elite, employees of the new private sector, employees and management of the public sector, civil society, and foreign investors (Stojiljkovic, 2011: 88-90). The other group, the losers of transition, is constituted by the less educated, long-term unemployed, pensioners, and employees of traditional industries (Stojiljkovic, 2011: 90-91). Most of these groups (apart from foreign investors) could easily be targeted by various programmatic messages, but were in fact targeted as larger groups in campaigns in 2008 and 2012. In fact, voters labelled as modernists (that coincides with winners of the transition) were the targets of messages about further reforms, development, openness, Europeanisation, and the traditionalists (that includes losers of the transition as well) were appealed to with messages of uniqueness, integrity, tradition and memories of the past\textsuperscript{23}. In the end, both camps with different strategies and different targets told (different) stories about who ‘we’ are.

Therefore, two ideas are confronted here. The idea of Serbia from the 1990s and the idea of Serbia from the 21st century. And my message is very clear symbolically - I am in favour of Serbia deciding in 2008 to move forward to 2009, and not to decide to go back to 1999 when that (opposing) party was in power (Tadic, TV B92, 2008a).

Additionally, considering Serbia’s clear ethnic majority (over 80% being Serbian) and the absence of the campaigns’ programmatic targeting strategies, when parties attempt to target as many voters as they can they are consequently left with the strategy of targeting the nation.

Opting out of addressing voters in accordance to their rational and interest-based goals can be identified, for instance, in the way candi-

\textsuperscript{23} It is worth noting that the cleavage modernists-traditionalists proved to be dominant (and more efficient) in the campaign in 2008, while the other one, winners-losers of the transition, was more prominent in the campaign in 2012. In 2012, the challenging (and winning) coalition ran the entire campaign with one single target, made up mostly of the losers of transition. They appealed to the unsatisfied and disappointed, colouring their messages with anger and resentment in order to motivate them.
dates address their voters. Normally, candidates would use a simple ‘Dear friends’, whether it is a speech in a rally or addressing the viewers of a TV debate. The only exceptions are the occasional ‘Citizens of Serbia’, ‘Young’, ‘Ladies and gentlemen’, even ‘Dear comrades’, but also more traditional, religious forms of greeting someone, such as ‘Brothers and Sisters, may God help you’, that invokes history and tradition and has an ethnic appeal. The way in which voters are greeted may not be as important and effective as the electoral promises that follow them (Rodriguez, 2012), but they serve the purpose of grabbing attention and engaging the addressed group. Furthermore, omitting to directly address the targeted group implies that the group is not an equal part of the public discussion. Greeting a group directly ensures that its members are being involved in the discussion as equal citizens and not objects of the debate (Young, 2002). Observed greetings from the candidates in Serbian elections indicate that they favour ambiguous salutes and in line with that abstain from programmatic, interest-based messages. ‘Dear Youth’ may be the only targeted salute, as it is normally followed by electoral promises to young people. The salute ‘Dear comrades’ also suggests ideological targeting, and it was used to address older generations. However, even those, to an extent targeted salutes, were rare in comparison to the most frequent, general ones, such as ‘Dear friends’, and ‘Citizens of Serbia’.

6.3 National Narrative in Election Campaigns

Irrelevant of where a party finds itself along the lines of social divisions, in an attempt to motivate their constituencies the majority of messages of all the competing parties tell a story of a national ‘we’. And election campaigns, alongside the primary intention of mobilising voters’ support, serve the purpose of informing citizens and supplying information on political actors, their attributes, their solutions to different social problems, and their consequences (Slavujevic, 2007). In providing this information, in order to be strategic and win
the support of voters, campaigns also provide the context ‘within which information is presented and processed’ (Hallahan, 1999). Campaigns do not only engage in agenda setting, but also in situational framing and priming. They not only place emphasis on issues and objects that are discussed (McCombs and Shaw, 1972)24, but also influence the interpretation of the provided information (Rhee, 1999) and the criteria on which people make decisions (Iyengar, 1991). Studies have also shown that voters learn during campaigns, especially those less informed, which gives campaigns a civic engagement effect and is another element that makes campaigns a democratic asset (Norris et al, 1999, Freedman et al, 2004). This capacity of campaigns makes them instrumental in negotiating the meanings of the nation to be identified with.

The reconstruction of the meaning of the national collective identity is performed through promoting messages that frame the present political and social context, retelling the national past and imagining a national future, but it is also performed by discussing national territories and borders, and promoting national values. Analysis also shows that during campaigns, messages were designed to have different effects, some to reinforce the existing perception of the nation, others to present it differently, and some were designed through transformation of the current understanding.

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24 Most of the studies of agenda setting, priming and framing examine these processes within the realm of the media, especially news coverage of campaigns (see: McCombs and Shaw, 1972, McCombs, Lopez-Escobar and Llamas, 2007, Kiouis et al, 2006, Stromback and Aalberg, 2008, Rhee, 1997, Roberts and McCombs, Scheufe and Tewksbury, 2007). However in post-communist settings, where the media are not as independent as they are expected to be, frames in campaigns and election coverage are in fact ‘shaped by the desires of election campaigners’ (Toka and Popescu, 2003). This study addresses similar circumstances of campaigners’ frames being presented to the public with little intervention from the media.
6.3.1 Continuity of the Nation

Findings from campaigns in 2008 and 2012 in Serbia reveal that political actors often attempted to sway voters by reinterpreting current circumstances in order to guide decision-making (Hallahan, 1999), by highlighting certain historical references, as well as imagining a common future for the electorate. Political actors engage in framing the current situation and describing problems facing the society in a way that suggests themselves, their policies and proposals as solutions to problems. However, the analysis of campaign communication shows that by retelling the common past, reframing the current moment, and suggesting a shared future, campaigns in fact help ‘synthesise heterogeneous elements by combining heterogeneous factors in linked plots and events’ (Wodak, 2009: 14) to shape a (new) narrative.

To start with, the Serbian campaigns in 2008 and 2012 often invoked the theme embedded in the Serbian post-transition culture and political discourse of the two different pictures of the nation: the so-called ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia. The theme of the division between the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia is based on the practice from the 1990s, the Milosevic era, of constructing the difference between Self and an internal Other by using Europe as a ‘structuring discourse’ (Omaljev, 2013). The ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia were two contesting discourses of the national Self. The ‘First’ Serbian Self is considered ‘incapable by nature of assimilating itself’ (Omaljev, 2013: 214), willingly deciding to ‘stay outside and ‘free’ from European hypocrisy’ (Ibid). The ‘Other’ Serbia was positioned as the national Other, anti-Milosevic and cosmopolitan (Omaljev, 2016). The studied campaigns in 2008 and 2012 made a strategic choice of not ‘othering’ part of the voters but still built heavily on this widely and popularly embraced theme. Actors spread the two competing images of the nation: one of a modern, dynamic and pro-European nation, which appealed to modernists and winners of transition; and the other, traditional, preserving
cherished values, appealing to traditionalists and losers of the transition.

Relying on the two competing visions for the nation was only one way candidates used to mobilise their targets while in fact describing the nation. The constructions of who ‘we’ are constituted by the campaigns influenced the presentation of their policies and programmes but also contextualised the country’s present position accordingly. For instance, campaigns repeatedly described Serbia as a small nation throughout the electoral period. The difference in candidates’ narratives can be found with regard to their interpretation of the implications of being a small country. Among the two major presidential candidates and the coalitions behind them, one placed importance of Serbia’s size on economy, security and diplomacy, while the other insisted on questions of security. In their messages, Serbia is ‘a small country, and not the most powerful force in the world, it does not have the most powerful economy’ but is ‘a country with a [good] reputation in the world’ (Tadic, TV RTS, 2008), but, on the other side, ‘[w]e are small, and being as big as we are, we cannot defend ourselves from everybody, we will just cause you some harm if you decide to attack us’ (Nikolic, TV RTS, 2008).

What these different interpretations have in common is that both imply a small country’s need to connect to larger entities. Parties participating in the elections offered different answers as to which entities the country should be associated with, and therefore framed the choice of voters as a decision towards a foreign policy preference. This choice of framing is interesting as neither the producers of campaign messages nor the voters in focus groups assign importance to foreign policy positions in motivating the electorate. Hence, the delineation between parties was more effective in telling a story of a nation and its character than motivating voters based on foreign policy choices.
Findings suggest that campaigns not only tell the story of the national identity by framing the choices related to the present but also by framing the past. For instance, studied campaigns used historical figures as points of reference. A prominent example is found in the campaign in 2008 that invoked international successes of celebrated scientists of Serbian origin, Nikola Tesla and Milutin Milankovic to assert that ‘we are not some European fools, we are cool people who will be dignified there and from whom others can learn some things’ (Campaign Manager 2). Or, for instance, in an attempt to frame elections as a battle against a more powerful enemy, a candidate compared himself to historical figure Tzar Lazar in a TV debate, invoking the memory of the most powerful Serbian legend and the myth of the Battle of Kosovo.

These references and comparisons with notable and heroic figures from the past advance the construction of the ‘social capital upon which the national idea rests’ (Renan, 1882) and between these narratives, one relied an image of innovation, science and progress, while the other looked back at more conservative vision of warriors, battles and sacrifices.

In addition to serving as points of reference and comparisons with actual persons, campaigns also used episodes from the past and shared memories to mobilise voters. As discussed in the chapter on collective memories, campaigns frequently provoked memories of communist and socialist times, the nationalist era, reframeing them or exploiting them to benefit their electoral goals. At times, candidates even offered new images from national history, performing an ‘invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) of a sort.

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25 Tzar Lazar is Serbian ruler Lazar Hrebeljanovic who unified the Serbian state in the 14th century and also led the army against the invasion of the Ottoman Empire in 1389. The Battle of Kosovo ended in a stalemate but became the topic of legendary interpretations and the founding myth of the Serbian state, linking medieval Serbia and Serbia of today, creating vast material for political instrumentalisation (Bieber, 2002).
At the beginning of this century, we were a country that had a very interesting and dynamic technological development. We were not the largest economy (...), but we were, for example, a nation that had the courage to start an aviation industry (Tadic, TV B92, 2008a).

By provoking the shared memories of a joint (heroic) past, campaigns spread the awareness of the long history of a common ‘past of endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion’, the outcome of which is a nation (Renan, 1882: 19). Given that the memory of the joint past is of great importance for identity narratives, and the construction of identities (Wodak et al, 2009), the next chapter will examine the use of collective memories in election campaigns in further detail.

Aside from framing the current moment shared by the community and invoking the shared past and memories, campaigns in 2008 and 2012 also discussed the future of the polity as well. They presented some of the policies aimed at regulating the social life of the community: they promote candidates as the future leadership to lead the development of the polity, and they even talk about their visions for the meaning of the community in question. Care for future generations and children is common for this ‘future’ aspect of campaigns.

We love and respect our ancestors, and we know well what they did. But our idea about Serbia in the future is dedicated to those who are yet to be born with our name. That is why our politics is dedicated to life and future (Tadic, B, closing rally in Belgrade, 2012).

As a rule, campaigns propose the future of the polity, most often a mandate-long future but also a more long-term future. And the ‘[a]nticipation and future orientation’ (Wodak, 2009: 25) negotiated during the campaigns is equally ‘a necessary aspect of national identity’ (Ibid). By constructing the present, selecting and sharing past stories and imagining a common future, the studied campaigns offered a full temporal narration of the nation. In terms of Wodak et al (2009), campaigns offer the three temporal axes, the past, the present and the future that the discursive construction of national identity revolves around (Wodak et al, 2009: 26).
6.3.2 Borders of the Nation

Campaigns in 2008 and 2012 in Serbia also engaged in delineating the borders of the electoral space. The question of borders was discussed most often within the context of regional relations. During the electoral period all political parties widely discussed the relations with the countries in the region that once formed the joint state of Yugoslavia. The discussion about the region in campaigns revolved around the themes of reconciliation/prolonged hostility and cooperation/demanding rectification of injustices, but there were examples where boundaries were discussed, in both a very physical sense and a more symbolical sense.

The most obvious border discussed was Serbia’s southern border with its (former) province, that is, the issue of the independence of Kosovo. Strategists claim that the question of the southern border, or the status of Kosovo, was externally imposed on the electoral agenda because the border and status were constantly negotiated. But, more interestingly, the discussion was not only about the ongoing border negotiation, but also included positioning of candidates on issues of borders that were resolved years ago. For instance, quite controversially and provokingly, one candidate discussed the Serbian border with Montenegro that was resolved two years before the campaign.

I cannot imagine that Serbia and Montenegro will survive as independent countries. Looking at each other as neighbours... Two brotherly countries... (Nikolic, T, TV B92, 2008a).

The candidate cited here expresses doubt the independence of Montenegro, awakening hopes of interested ethnic Serbs in both countries about revoking the results of the referendum in Montenegro and

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26 Kosovo proclaimed independence unilaterally on 17 March 2008, between two election cycles in Serbia, after the Presidential elections and before the Parliamentary elections.
changing the relations between the previously joined states. Doing so, the candidates can trigger the renegotiation of the borders of the electoral space in the mind of the electorate.

Discussing the country’s borders during campaign periods can shape ideas about the national body. National body ‘is linked to national identity and it manifests itself in discussions of national territories and landscapes’ (Wodak et al, 2009). Therefore, in addition to being strategic for campaigns by mobilising parts of the electorate, and invoking memories of the joint past or the ethnic conflict in order to prime the electoral choice of voters, questions of territory are an integral element of the narrative that (re)constructs national identity. Consciousness of being part of the group that shares the same territory plays an important part in constructing national identities (together with shared history and culture, Guibernau, 2013). From this perspective, campaigns contribute to individuals’ imagining their own nations in similar ways that print and other forms of media do (Anderson, 1983), by raising the awareness of the shared identity with members that are not familiar or even known to us. Territorial borders as part of the electoral discourse signal the limits of the homeland (Guibernau, 2013) to the electorate. And this was particularly interesting in cases when the nation was imagined as wider than its actual, internationally recognised borders. Such is the case with campaign narratives that introduced the topics of Serbia as the protector of ethnic Serbs living in the other countries in the region.

Today we have to take care of those Serbs, because they have the right to preserve our identity and we need to help them to survive in those western parts (Tadic, B, TV RTS, 2008).

Combined with the prominence of the topic of regional relations in election manifestos of every political actor, the consistency of politi-
Political actors to pursue this narrative\(^{27}\), and the emotive capacity of collective memories of the relations in the region, the symbolical claim of stake in the neighbouring countries might have the ability to restructure the conception of national borders in the minds of voters\(^{28}\) and inspire them to imagine the national body as a space wider than the actual state, spreading into the territories of former republics. Campaigns do not just talk about the region. Political parties and candidates often visit neighbouring countries during election times, meet with their state or political counter-parts in the region, making the region even more salient in voters’ minds. In this way, this aspect of campaign discourses delves into the realm of nationalism, as they reconstruct and offer a new vision of the myths of national identity based on territory (Smith, 1991).

### 6.3.3 Cultural Dimension of the Nation

National identity is also attributed with the cultural aspect. The cultural dimension of the national identity is constituted of values, myths, symbols, rituals (Smith, 1986). These aspects are regularly negotiated in campaigns, particularly when it comes to framing values. Shah et al. (2001) argue that candidates engage in value-framing to be able to influence the values used to assess the issues in order to ‘build support for the perspectives they endorse’ (Shah et al, 2001: 228). Political actors try to sway the value criteria used to shape voters’ judgmental processes when making a choice. They regularly try to prime the deeply held values of voters because deeply held values influence voting behaviour (Ibid). The practice of value-framing surfaces in campaigns in Serbia in 2008 and 2012. The campaigns tried

\(^{27}\) Only one party (LDP) rejected this portrayal to an extent, but still discussed the region widely and frequently. This ensured a consistent narrative of a wider electoral polity, larger than the actual borders.

\(^{28}\) It should be added that under the current electoral rule, citizens of Serbia living in the neighbouring countries have the right to vote in Serbian elections and therefore present a legitimate target for campaigns. However, campaign professionals and pollsters claim that these voters are not considered targets for campaigns.
to influence voters by promoting certain values and qualities, especially in slogans rather than other forms of campaign communication. As is the case with framing in general, some value frames may be accepted, some rejected and some negotiated by audiences (Gamson et al, 1992). In order to make their value frames effective, campaigns rely on knowledge about voters’ values, positions and attitudes gathered by canvassing voters using market intelligence techniques. Interviewed pollsters in Serbia confirm that campaigns indeed use opinion polls and reports from focus groups to gather knowledge on citizens’ values and those they would like the people who represent them to possess. But in addition to making their value frames resonant with those of voters, they promote the values that are favourable to their own strategies.

Looking at the electoral messages, and slogans in particular, it can be inferred that campaigns at times reinforce voters’ needs and what they see as desired quality of the country. In the two studied campaigns different actors promoted safety, honesty or family values during the campaign. For example, ‘For a Strong and Stable Serbia’ from 2008, as well as ‘Jobs, Investments, Safety’ and ‘For a safe future’ from the 2012 campaign, responds to the voters’ needs for stability after decades of conflict and change. All of these slogans promote candidates as figures to provide that safety for the country, while also promoting safety as both the criteria for the electoral choice and a value to hold.

Further, with the slogan ‘For an Honest and Successful Serbia’ the challenger tried to offer a promise of change from the current corrupt state to a new, different, more honest one. And in doing that they promoted honesty as a judgment based on which to assess candidates and policies, while at the same time, honesty was already seen as the most desirable social virtue by voters (Pollster 2). In addition to honesty, a campaign manager for the challenger pointed to family values
as the criterion used for another purpose, making the contrast between candidates:

The voters wanted a family man, an honest man from Serbia. [Our] candidate had the advantage of being from Serbia, from Sumadija [central Serbia], and the other candidate wasn’t. He had a happy marriage, both of his sons were here, working... [The other candidate’s] family life was kept secret and we had the advantage and we had to make a point. I insisted during the campaign on promoting this contrast. In this story, he was the honest candidate (Executive Manager).

All the discussed values were promoted in campaigns in relation to the national identity. On top of promoting national values, campaigns in Serbia also relied on national symbols and colours at rallies, in video ads, logos, billboards, and all of the visual communication forms. Some of the campaigns even promoted prominent historical figures and present day celebrities of Serbian origin, reinforcing the support and belonging to a nation while framing the voters’ electoral choice.

[W]e contributed to Europe with our potentials, our artists, our scientists. Think of Vuk Karadzic, his journey to Europe; think of Nikola Tesla and his achievements, Milutin Milankovic. Let us think of all our scientists, people from sports, Janko, Jelena, Novak (Tadic, RTS, 2008).

Aside from provoking the sense of belonging to the nation, identification with prominent (historic) figures provokes ‘identification with values which make us place a "cause" above our own survival’ (Ricoeur, 1995: 121). Interestingly, the majority of slogans in the observed Serbian campaigns also helped elevate the country to the level of a sacred value, through the power of repetition during campaigns.29

The two campaigns under study seem to have offered both the temporal and spatial dimension of the Serbian national identity, but also the ‘spiritual principle’ (Renan, 1882), the cultural dimension, values, and the meaning-related aspect of the national identity. According to Renan, this spiritual principle, ‘a moral conscience, that calls itself a

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national’ needs to be reinforced all the time. It needs to prove itself by the strength of sacrifices that require subordination, for as long as the nation exists (Renan, 1882: 20). Election campaigns seem to play a part in advancing the cause of national promotion.

6.4 Country Discussion: Social bases and Cultural Resonance of the appeals in Serbia

The most prominent and best received appeals in both campaigns in Serbia seem to be aligned with the cleavages that were developed with the beginning of the multiparty system. Both the party positions and their leading campaign appeals were designed in line with the dominant social affiliation: to the national collective (Komsic, 2003). Nationalised messages seem to resonate with the Serbian electorate, while at the same time reconstructing the national narrative – re-framing the temporal, spatial and cultural dimension of it. Interestingly, the strategies designed for mobilising voters during campaigns are not the only influences shaping the national narrative. At times, even very personal interpretations from candidates manage to become a part of electoral discourse discussing the nation. Strategists confirm that some of the narrations during campaigns were spontaneous reactions, improvisations or results of previous experiences.

Somebody chose to say this [laughter], it seems to me. You cannot forget that politicians are compilers, they need a message box, somewhere, but then they add their own stories on top of it (Consultant 3, about the story on Serbian aviation industry at the beginning of the last century).

Not every story or anecdote is tested, but when a person has a concept, an idea what is the story they need to follow, within that frame they create their own themes, sub themes, stories, anecdotes, to make the topic more interesting. I guess he knew something about it, read something... But it fit the concept (Campaign Manager 2, about the story on Serbian aviation industry at the beginning of the last century).

On the reception side, the voters confirm the resonance of national appeals. When asked what kind of appeals they prefer, the precisely designed ones, targeted at specific groups of voters or the ones invok-
ing glorious past, national heroes or national awareness, participants
in focus groups repeatedly chose the latter.

I think those stories on heroism and patriotism do better, because we
all live with problems and are just getting by, but then they tell these
stories and we get some sort of energy. In order not to disappoint our
ancestors, we get a will to fight (Unemployed woman).
Yes, because they all promise, but do not deliver. And the history is
always there (Employed young woman).
I think we are spent and broken as people and these messages on
past heroism lift the moral and awareness (Unemployed young man)
(Nis Focus Group).

Listen, whenever you hit the nation, it hurts. If you say something
bad about my mother, it will go this way or that way, but if you insult
Serbia, you will hurt every person that lives here (Employed man,
Belgrade).

6.5 Electoral messages in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Electoral messages in 2006 and 2010 in Bosnia and Herzegovina ap-
pealed to voters in accordance with the existing social divisions and
the political system set out after the war. The most powerful cleav-
ages ‘since the first multiparty elections are based on ethnicity, and the
violence that followed the first multiparty elections in 1990 indicates
the depth of ethnicity-based cleavages while reinforcing those same
cleavages’ (Hulsey, 2012). The political system designed to stop the
war imposes electoral rules that foster group-based features of the
ethnically divided system (Belloni, 2004), prompting the abundance
of ethnic platforms and voter targeting influenced by ethnicity. Ever
since the first multiparty elections, all who intend to participate in
the elections are aware that success in the elections ‘depends solely
on voters perception of whether their electoral offer is national
enough or not’ (Zlokapa, 2008: 47). The post-war development of the
system ensured the dominance of the national rhetoric and national
parties, as all the parties that persevered had to be nationalistic in
order motivate the electorate to be politically active (Zlokapa, 2008:
51).
However, in Bosnia and Herzegovina social divisions are not only dominantly ethnic, but also religious. The three ethnic groups belong to different religions (Serbs are Orthodox, Croats are Catholic and Bosniaks are Muslim) and that intensifies the divisions between them. In everyday life, it is usually the religious differences that are noticed. For instance, the supply of pork is limited in the country due to Muslims’ religious restrictions to eating pork, in spite of the other two ethnic and religious groups not sharing the same restrictions; and the Muslim call to prayer chants spreading from mosques are both examples of instant and spontaneous recognitions of differences that are internalised\textsuperscript{30}. The ethnic and religious divisions between the three constituent peoples continue to be a large cultural theme (Gams-\textsuperscript{son}, 1989) exploited by the campaigns.

In campaigns in 2006 and 2012 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, messages that would be aimed at groups other than ethnic groups were rare and fairly inefficient. On the other side, messages that discuss more precise or programmatically designed targets are, in style and number, incomparable to ethnic messages\textsuperscript{31}. The main obstacle to targeting different groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the embeddedness of the cultural rights of ethnic groups built into the basis of the political system ‘that stand in the way of acknowledging individual identities’ (Sitnic and Zdralovic, 2013: 52). Still, data shows that campaigns made some appeals below the ethnic division. That is, they attempt to

\textsuperscript{30} Surprisingly however, religious identities appear in campaign materials only sporadical-ly. Furthermore, interviewees confirm that religious identities are indeed not part of the official campaign communication by political actors, but are communicated through direct channels by religious institutions and dignitaries who use them to encourage the vote choices of their congregation. It is only PDA, the biggest ethnic Bosniak party, which uses religious appeals during campaigns.

\textsuperscript{31} For example, even the words political leaders use to address and greet their voters at rallies and in TV debates reflect the targeting practice of political parties. Apart from the aforementioned ‘Salaam Alaikum’, in other cases candidates salute their voters with local identities, such as ‘citizens’ of the towns where rallies are held, or regional identities (for example, Herzegovians), party members and voters, occasional ‘brothers and sisters’, very commonly plainly ‘dear citizens’ (of an unspecified polity). The candidates’ reluctance to address their voters according to a specific loyalty and identity further confirms that other identities and qualities voters might respond to remain outside the public and electoral debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina and are not as desirable as ethnic and national identities.
design messages tailored for the groups within this broader group. The manifestos presented to the public by the parties consider various social groups as targets for electoral promises: unemployed, retired, war veterans, displaced, farmers, workers, women (especially mothers), youth, and students. Still, those target groups are not as frequently invoked in other, more popular forms of campaign communication. Furthermore, voters do not recall these messages and simply dismiss them as unconvincing, even when they themselves are members of the group.

I do not recall any parties saying anything special about pensioners... (Pensioner, Sarajevo).
And even if they did, I do not believe pensioners would believe any of it. We have been cheated so many times (Pensioner 2, Sarajevo).
They all say, as a manner of propaganda, pensioners’ lives are hard, pensions need to be higher... but that’s all talk (Pensioner, Sarajevo).

6.6 Inclusive Civic Identity

Due to the post war development of society and constitutional arrangements most of the appeals in Bosnian campaigning are of an ethnic character. Political competition in Bosnia and Herzegovina rarely crosses ethnic lines (Hulsey, 2010), however, there have been exceptions to this practice. Every attempt at appealing to a more inclusive group other than ethnic was usually dismissed as such, if it came from those perceived to be national or ethnic actors. For example, the appeals promoted by the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina during the election campaign in 2006 appear to be civic and inclusive when assessed analytically, as they argued for a Bosnia and Herzegovina that would ‘in all parts of its territory equally belong to all its citizens, enjoying equal status, rights, freedoms, interests and obligations, irrelevant of their ethnic and religious belonging’. The civic character of the appeal was denied and the context was read instead. As opposed to the dominant ethnic appeals, the campaign of

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32 The (Bosniak) Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina ran the campaign under the slogan ‘100% Bosnia and Herzegovina’ calling for abandoning of the system of entities and ethnic arrangement of the state. However, the reading of the other ethnic actors was that reverting to the rights of individual citizens rather than the rights of constituent groups would be in
2010 was marked by the success of an unorthodox campaign that targeted voters across ethnic borders. The multi-ethnic party designed a multi-ethnic campaign targeting all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina regardless of their ethnicity, defying the divisive ethnic character of politics, and appealing to an identity based on an inclusive notion of citizenship. The campaign helped the party secure positions in government at different levels and was considered very successful. The campaign was ran under the slogan ‘A State for a Man’ indicating reforms intended to unlock the ethnic stalemate the country finds itself in. The slogan contained the main message of the campaign, that other issues such as jobs, education, and social security are more important than ethnicity, the current organising principle of the state. Voters in focus groups recognised the message that won the elections for the SDP:

They addressed a man concretely, no matter where they live, which entity, regardless of their wealth and ethnicity (Employed man, Sarajevo).
To say that the state would think only about a Man (Student, Sarajevo).

The strategy of appealing beyond and across ethnic lines was particularly promoted throughout the campaign.

This campaign is different from all the other campaigns that we ran, and all the others have run, for the messages we have been sending to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to all of them, at that. We are different for the story we tell everybody in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because we do not see enemies in others, except the enemies of this state. All the good people of this country, Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, Jews, Roma, others, Bosnians, Herzegovians, they are all ours! (Presidential Candidate, closing rally, Sarajevo, October 2010).

Although the campaign won the party the most votes, voters now, with the passage of time, see the strategy of targeting above ethnic

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33 The alternative translation for the slogan could have been ‘A State for a Human’ and it would have described the intent behind it, suggesting a human of unknown (and irrelevant) ethnicity. However, the actual, direct translation from the local language also suggests the male gender (normally used as an alternative to ‘human’), so I decided to use exact translation, although it might seem confusing in English.
lines only as a strategy for securing votes and not as a credible attempt to overcome divisions and solve the issues discussed.

He was just trying to get more votes (Student, Sarajevo). He is trying to say that he is not interested if they are Bosniaks, Croats... He is trying to say he is not Croat, or Muslim, he is always highlighting that he is married to a Muslim... (Employed man, Sarajevo). When you look at the number of votes they won, it seems logical (Student, Sarajevo)

The disillusion expressed by voters in the focus group is motivated by the party’s inability to fulfil its election promises. The campaign ‘State for a Man’ was informed by extensive research and discussions with party members, experts and supporters from across the country. That process led to a sizeable set of election promises that tackled the issues voters and experts saw as solutions to the majority of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s problems. After a mandate in the government, the party faced one of the major obstacles influencing campaigning in emerging democracies. In transitioning societies, parties become additionally wary of basing their promises on the interests of voters, fearing being accountable for these promises. In these societies delivering a comprehensive set of promises is particularly difficult as elected officials are then ‘harnessed to an agenda of necessary reforms’ (Innes, 2001: 2), transforming the society from socialist legacies after the elections, and reforms and the direction of these reforms are not up for debate (Hulsey, 2010) or electoral approval. In case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the circumstances are further burdened by the necessary post-conflict recovery, an ‘unwieldy and complex constitutional structure’ (Hulsey, 2010: 1138), and complicated decision-making, set up to assure decision-making rights of all ethnic groups.

As much as that was an excellent slogan for the campaign, it is a burden for the Social Democratic Party today, because it was an idea that promised a lot. It was not possible for us to deliver in this system as it is now, with this system of decision-making. No one could have had turned this country around in four years (Executive Manager).
The multi-ethnic appeals and the extensive programme helped the party achieve relative success and join the government, but raised problems with delivery after the elections, causing the Social Democrats’ ratings to plummet after the election. The success of the appeal for a civic identity in the campaign of 2010 may have crippled the possibility of a future one leaving ethnicity to be the single dominant political dimension in the country.

6.7 Narrative of the Ethnic Community in Election Campaigns

Following the post-war electoral rules of the political system, but also relying on the power of mobilisation of underlying social bonds, findings reveal that the majority of electoral messages in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2006 and 2010 were appealing to the members of a specific ethnic group. Through different forms of campaign communication, parties and candidates in Bosnia and Herzegovina appealed to members of their respective ethnic groups, but findings show that at the same time, they engaged in reconstructing the narratives of ethnic communities, positioning the Other, discussing the borders of electoral spaces, framing the present and the past and discussing the cultural dimension of the identities in question. In addition to promoting policies and slogans, appealing at rallies and through the media, political parties and candidates (especially the big ethnic parties) also used colours specific to an ethnic or religious groups, or to a national flag, and hired particular celebrities to take part in campaign activities, in order to reaffirm the existing meaning of ethnic identities, or to modify or completely transform it.

6.7.1 Continuity of the Ethnic Identity

Campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina also engaged in framing the present context in a way that ‘affects the bases on which people decide their vote’ by making some considerations more salient than others’ (Gidengil et al, 2002: 87). They advertised the frames of the
messages that enable them to present a solution to issues in line with their own strategic goals. During campaigns in 2006 and 2010, participating actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina contextualised the current state of affairs in the country in accordance with voters’ perceptions, but also in such a way that made it possible for them to offer a solution in line with their own tactics, strategic goals or policy positions. Most commonly, for example, political instability was framed as the undesirable situation that needs to be remedied, by most of the actors that participated in the elections.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a place where confrontations, outvoting, tardiness and inefficiency take place (Raguz, FTV, 2010).

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country that lacks political stability (Cavic, TV RTRS, 2010).

The instability and conflict were then related to their roots, to the ethnic conflict and questions of security and peace, as these ‘confrontations had a major cost for Bosnia and Herzegovina in history’ (Raguz, TV FTV, 2010). Political actors promote different solutions to this framing by either proposing dialogue, tolerance and cooperation, or offering protection against perceived threats from other groups. Still, the frame of an unstable polity continued its dominance throughout the elections. Furthermore, political actors even labelled the polity as both ‘questionable’ and ‘unquestionable’ depending on their positions on the results of the peace agreement and the constitution that was produced as part of it. For instance, Bosnian (and Bosniak) parties labelled the whole country ‘unquestionable’ in their goal to promote the nation in its wholeness and integrity, while the Serbian-Bosnian parties labelled the Serbian entity ‘unquestionable’ in order to ‘defend’ their ethnic entity from the ‘integration forces’ from the Bosniak parties. On their part, the Croatian-Bosnian campaigns called the country ‘questionable’ in their bid to argue for a new Croatian entity for themselves. The narrative of instability and questioning the order of the polity corresponded to positions of voters irrelevant of party/ethnic loyalties.
As this excerpt from the focus groups with Bosniak voters shows, Bosniak voters do indeed care about the unity of the country as a whole and share the sense of instability that campaigns promote.

Aside from contextualising the present, campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina designed ethnic appeals by contextualising the past as well. Messages about facts and episodes from the targeted group’s past were designed to provoke voters’ awareness of the groups’ oneness. Normally the messages about the past in the studied campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also designed to appeal to the ethnic group or the nation. For example, Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina were called to take more charge and responsibility for the future of the country by voting for one of their ethnic parties starting with the claims of ownership to the land and country.

Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina are autochthonous people – its roots are deepest here, and the mark we made through science, art and spirit is inerasable. Croats are the oldest and autochthonous people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Manifesto HDZ 1990, 2010).

The strategy behind these attempts is to transform the sense of belonging to their motherland Croatia and the Croatian ethnic group into a sense of belonging to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Still, in Bosnia and Herzegovina most of the appeals about the past evoke memories of war and promote ethnic divisions. Parties targeting their respective ethnic groups invoke memories of the conflict by claiming that a specific group had most casualties, or was particularly victimised by the other groups. Focus groups with voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina confirm the entrenchment of the theme of victimhood following the war in the 1990s on all sides, in all focus groups. Messages about victimhood seem to have great resonance (Gamson, 1989, Kubal, 1989) with their targeted audiences, but also spread the aware-
ness of belonging to the in-group. According to Renan, invoking joint suffering is more powerful than invoking shared joy, because having suffered together ‘impose[s] duties, and require[s] a common effort’ (Renan, 1882: 19). The next chapter especially focuses on the memory appeals about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, discussing this aspect in further detail.

The third element that constitutes the temporal dimension of identity, the future, was less present in messages in campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in those in Serbia, but can still be identified in the visions and policy proposals of parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The future aspect of national identity is especially present in different proposals for the constitutional arrangement of the country that are regularly framed as ethnic appeals, calling for the promotion of rights and jurisdictions of the respective ethnic group.

In the future AISD sees Bosnia and Herzegovina as a complex federal union where no one can impose solutions on others. In such B-H, Republic of Srpska is a federal unit with powerful jurisdictions (AISD Manifesto, 2006).

We will argue for a new constitution that offers long-term solutions that will secure a fair and equal position for the Croatian people with the other peoples (CDU Manifesto, 2010).

By telling stories from the common past, interpreting the shared present moment and suggesting ideas for the joint future of the electorate, campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina told the continuing story of a common identity. They indicated an ‘uninterrupted continuity between the first and the last stage in the development’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 117) of the identity in question. By encircling a narrative of the identity of the ethnic group or the nation, campaigns actually give the identity a character, ‘a set of distinctive marks which permit the reidentification’ of the identity across time and change (Ricoeur, 2002: 119).
6.7.2 Borders of the Nation

After the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina was left with electoral rules that ensure that the ethnic electorate elects ethnic representatives. For that reason, campaigns target the ethnic electorate. By doing so, Bosnian campaigns have also set the limits of the ‘national body’ (Wodak, 2009), negotiating the limits of national identities by discussing national territories. Campaign appeals included appealing to cities within ethnic entities, organising campaign rallies in cities within ethnic borders and promoting policies limited to ethnic entities. Furthermore, the division of jurisdictions among the levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the overall complexity of appealing to voters in this complicated political system, frequently causes confusion when addressing the electoral space. Examples of confusion appear as part of very different topics during electoral debates, not just the constitutional arrangement debate, but also the economy, Europeanisation, investments, etc.

We need to make a serious strategy for foreign investments for this country. Not the country, the entities as well… (Cavic, TV RTRS, 2010)

We have to send a message that the Bosniak… Bosnian, that all the peoples need speedy access to the EU (Latic, FTV, 2010)

In addition, ethnic parties used the colours and emblems of the Serbian and Croatian flags for the visual designs for their campaign materials and party logos, or the colour green to establish the religious quality of the Bosniak identity. Then they used celebrities to invoke the ethnic nature of their targeted appeals. Selected celebrities, representatives of their ethnic groups, normally appear at rallies before the voters. Furthermore, for example, the leading Croatian party hosted a singer/composer of their campaign song with clear links to

34 These appeals show the confusion among even political actors when discussing electoral promises, jurisdictions and constituencies. The first example illustrates the confusion between a state level appeal and an entity level appeal, while the second suggests a confusion between an ethnic identity ‘Bosniak’ and civic identity ‘Bosnian’.
the neighbouring Croatia (Ivan Mikulic appeared as a Croatian representative at Eurosong); Party for Democratic Action invited Bosniak singers Hari Veresanovic and Halid Muslimovic; Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina entertained their voters with singers of traditional Bosnian songs, most notably Hanka Paldum; while the Serbian governing party acquired the performance of the biggest regional celebrity Svetlana Raznatovic, a controversial singer from Serbia. All of these figures were intended to bring attention to the campaign, but they also had the capacity to supply audiences with a point of identification (Evans and Hesmondhalgh, 2005) by acting as role models for being an individual, but also showing us how to be a part of a collective identity (Hesmondhalgh, 2005).

Together with geography that certainly plays ‘a considerable part in the division of nations’ (Renan, 1882: 18), celebrities played a similar role in triggering the constitution of distinctions between the in-group and out-groups (of fans) (Fiske, 1991). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, campaigns used these appeals that signal ethnic borders and celebrities to target their constituencies, but at the same time, they functioned as points of identification and attachment and had ‘the capacity to exclude’ (Hall, 1996b) an ethnic Other. By targeting only ethnic Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats, highlighting administrative and ethnic borders, and pointing to the other ethnic groups as the Other, campaigns further inspired and encouraged divisions, animosities, hatred and a sense of endangerment.

Republic of Srpska was at its end 5 years ago. We kept hearing from Sarajevo every day that [Republic of Srpska] needed to be dissolved, that it was genocidal, dirty, evil (Dodik, M, closing rally in Banja Luka, 2010).

Serbian politics has tricked Croats too many times. The Croatian coalition will never let it happen again. If you vote for CDU B-H this time you will be voting for the Greater Serbia (Jurisuc, closing rally of CDU 1990 in Mostar; 2010).

The last example from the Croatian electoral narrative points to an overwhelming technique in all the parties’ campaigns of negative
messages that accuse the opponents within the same entity of collaboration with the established Other, the other entity or ethnicities. Unconventionally, the targets of negative messages are not just leaders of other parties, their records and private lives. These attacks are especially designed around the idea of national/ethnic betrayal. Opposing candidates are portrayed to be less willing or less able to protect the interest of the group in the process of inter-ethnic decision-making in the country.

These days the Islamic community wishes to thank Mladen [Ivanic] for not talking about secession of the Republic of Srpska but pretends to talk about crime, corruption, economy, not to inspire people to wish for independence. He is helping the international community and the Islamic community. And the Islamic community is instructing those Bosniaks returning to Republic of Srpska to vote for Mladen. Ok, Bosniaks, Muslims for Mladen and Serbs for Nebojsa (Spiric, closing rally in Banja Luka, 2010)

However, suggesting that the opposing candidate (of the same constituency/ethnic group) has the support of the other ethnic group and conspires with them also positions the ethnic Other as the enemy. And having a common enemy is the endmost, and most powerful, level of differentiation (from members and strangers, to the rest, the different and the enemy) as part of constructing a national identity (Guibernau, 2007). At the same time, it is considered to be an efficient mobilisation strategy by both the voters and the campaign professionals.

He talks of the Islamic community as if they are shit (Student, Banja Luka).
He is throwing him onto the Muslim side (Activist, Banja Luka).
What does that mean for the voters? (Moderator).
That you should keep away from him (Activist, Banja Luka).
The best option to stop someone from voting for him is to link him to the Islamic community (Unemployed woman, Banja Luka).

If the Bosniaks are voting for him, you should automatically say...
(DJ, Eastern Sarajevo).
...by vocation, you are against him. Doesn’t matter if he is better than them, you can’t... This is more efficient than anything else (Blogger, Eastern Sarajevo).

The bordering and differentiation among groups in campaign discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina are somewhat imposed by the elec-
toral system but also have mobilising capacity. In addition, the sense of territory, interaction with boundaries and the sense of boundness, of exclusion and inclusion, are both vital for constructing a sense of an ethnic identity or a nation (Smith, 1986).

6.7.3 Cultural Dimension of the Nation

National and ethnic identities have cultural dimensions as well, and these include values, myths, symbols, rituals, customs, and practices (Guibernau, 2007, Smith, 1986). This aspect of the national narrative was also discussed during campaigns, especially by value-framing during elections in 2006 and 2010. The campaigns attempted to use values to justify their political positions (Shah et al, 2001) and influence voters’ ‘interpretations of issues, encourage voters to make attributions about candidate character, apply social cognitions to policy evaluations, and modify their decision-making processes’ (Shah et al, 2001: 228). However, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the ethnic conflict and prolonged instrumentalisation of memories and feelings about it, the choice of values held by the electorate and used by campaigners is limited. Therefore, in 2006 and 2010 the campaigns’ value-framing efforts were concentrated on promoting safety, security and protection before anything else. More precisely, campaigns discussed the protection of their ethnic communities, particularly against the other communities (at least in legal and constitutional terms). Valuing ethnicity before anything else is not only a consequence of memories and fears about the past conflict, but it is related to the initial political identities constructed during the beginning of party pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those identities were based on values of anti-communism, social democracy and nationalism, but the national issue soon became the most important one (Zlokapa, 2008). The defence of the ethnic entity (Serbian ethnic group), the establishment of the third entity (Croatian ethnic group) or the preservation and advancement of federal jurisdictions (Bosni-
ak parties) are the themes constituted as the ultimate values, and principles of political action.

These values were translated into slogans used by the campaigns. The majority of the slogans used ethnicities as their central idea, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina before all’, ‘Srpska forever’, ‘Together for Srpska’, ‘Power of Croats’, ‘This is our country’ \(^{35}\), ‘To the victory ahead Srpska’, and ‘100% Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Ethnic communities were lifted to the level of sacred values in these slogans. Sacred rhetoric (Marietta, 2009) used in these campaigns and for the creation of these slogans serves the purpose of producing absolute reasoning that secures protected status for the value and moral outrage at the violation of it. Sacred rhetoric, the use of the language that invokes absolutist as opposed to negotiable and consequentialist rhetoric, also has an activation effect. It influences audiences to think about sacred things differently and to care more (Marrietta, 2009). The ideas of ethnic preservation and valorisation of protection in slogans are further developed in other communication forms to appeal to ethnic identities.

We will continue to promote the Bosnian-Herzegovian identity as a common denominator of all its citizens (PDA Manifesto, 2010).

Republic of Srpska is unquestionable (Borenovic, TV RTRS, 2010).
Republic of Srpska is an eternal category (Cavic, TV RTRS, 2010).

We need to find models to protect national and cultural identities, especially the Croatian that is the smallest and does not have institutional mechanisms of protection as the other two (CDU Manifesto, 2010).

Constructing ethnicity as a value was supported by religious values in the electoral discourse of some parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the studied campaigns.

\(^{35}\) ‘This is our country’, the slogan of the CDU 1990, proves to be somewhat controversial as it is usually perceived as forcefully claiming the country, but the authors explain that the message behind it is that Bosnia and Herzegovina is the country of Croats living in it and they should take more part in running it.
Put expertise, quality, ethics, morals and values religion taught us on a scale and decide your vote based on what that scale tells you (Zelenika, closing rally in Mostar, 2010).

As discussed before, religious differences in the Bosnian context only serve to support ethnic divisions in the country. Mujkic claimed that it was the marriage of politics with religious communities that made new, ethnic values salient (Mujkic, 2006). Culturally resonant (Gamson, 1989) with the electorate, the new ethnic values were then elevated into the realm of politics, making them appear natural. Therefore, the intent of discussing religious values seem to be the same as promoting ethnicity as a value - provoking awareness of difference and division. Furthermore, value-framing influences voters’ frames of reference and becomes ‘a means for individuals to validate core aspects of their self-conception’ (Shah et al, 2001).

As in Serbia, campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2006 and 2010 offered both temporal and spatial narratives of the ethnic identity, but also narrated a spiritual aspect (Renan, 1882), suggesting a meaning for the identity.

6.8 Country Discussion: Social Bases and Cultural Resonance of the Appeals in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Contrary to the Serbian case, electoral messages in Bosnia and Herzegovina were not pre-tested by pollsters in opinion research and in focus groups due to the lower level of campaigning professionalisation. The practice of checking the efficacy of the largely ethnic appeals could then serve the assessment that appeals were immersed in the electorate, but still both the campaign professionals and pollsters and the existing knowledge on the political identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina speak to the entrenchment of the predominantly ethnic messages. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of the relevant political parties emerged as associations of citizens organised around ethnicity (Neskovic, 2013). Political divisions depend on ethnic belonging, but
also on the corresponding interpretation of the war and preferred solutions to the deadlock influenced by the constitutional arrangement and decision making (Kivimaki et al., 2012).

Kivimaki et al. (2012) devised a typology of cleavages distinguishing between the unitarists and secessionists (supporting the power of institutions of the nation-state and those in favour of powerful entities), and internationalists and localists (those supporting the international presence and those opposing it). However, all of these positions continue to be mobilised by provoking support through ethnic (and populist) appeals. As for the voters’ processing and responding to the dominant type of appeals, in focus groups they appear to reject them at first, but end up confirming their significance and relevance. For example, in focus groups voters reacted to the ethnic/national slogans ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina before all’, ‘Srpska forever’, ‘Together for Srpska’, ‘Power of Croats’, ‘This is our country, ‘To the victory ahead Srpska’, and ‘100% Bosnia and Herzegovina’, with expressions of cynicism and boredom, and even called them stupid. But when asked about the value of the ideas they represent, voters in fact confirmed that they shared the views expressed in these slogans. For instance, the focus group with the Croatian majority was asked about the importance of the constitution of their own entity and voters agreed it was in fact very important to them.

It matters to me. It’s important to me to have my own language, Croatian. It’s important to me to have a television in my own language, it’s important to me when I sign some official documents that there are the official Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian, because that’s who I am, that is what fulfils me. I respect everybody, I wouldn’t like it if there were no Serbian and Bosniak. If there are entities, then we should all have our own (Student, Mostar).

The forceful assertion of the importance of one’s own entity speaks to the powerful underlying positions that continue to motivate voters and confirm the social roots of ethnic appeal. In other words, there seems to be a framing alignment between ethnic appeals and campaign messages promoting ethnicity and voters’ perception of im-
portance of the ethnic principle. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there appears to be a ‘cognitive alignment’ (Kubal, 1998) between the dominant issues on the political agenda and the beliefs of the constituents.

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter covered findings and answers to several research questions posed before this study, most notably which collective identities are targeted in election campaigns most commonly and what role different contexts and arrangements in societies play in the communicative construction of collective identities. It looked at ways campaigns in Serbia in 2008 and 2012 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2006 and 2010 communicated collective identities that were part of their strategy. Findings show the dominance of the national/ethnic groups as targets of campaigns, that is, the analysis of campaign messages indicates that most messages engage voters as members of a national or ethnic group. Interviews with campaign professionals and the responses of voters in focus groups suggest the dominant appeals draw their efficacy and high resonance with voters from being deeply rooted in the electorate.

The success of national/ethnic appeals should be analysed with several points in mind. First, as in most post-communist countries, traditional social cleavages that lead to articulation of political interests and orientations do not play a great part in segmenting voters into targeted groups for campaigns. In fact, without long standing allegiances to political parties, the voters are ‘up for grabs’ and parties are expected to have electoral success by appealing to easily identifiable social groups (Evans and Whitefield, 2000) such as national and ethnic groups in these two countries. Furthermore, the culture of limited capacity of intermediary organisations and civil society organisations that normally fosters the coordination of interests and participation leads to the observed lack of demands from voters and low
participation. Second, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina should not just be considered as post-communist countries, as they have undergone socialist and nationalist eras, which are also marked by collectivist ideologies. Additionally, for both these countries, transitions towards democracies have started in times of ethnic conflict and war among different ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia. Memories of war, the past and nationalised sentiments only advance the current global trends in campaigns – the use of emotive, populist, nationalist appeals for mobilising voters, especially the silent majorities.

The power of national and ethnic appeals to mobilise voters stems from their emotive and passionate nature and ability to engage a great number of voters. In the examined campaigns, there were examples of additional identities being targeted. Mostly in manifestos and in debates political parties offered a wider range of identity appeals. They appeal to young voters, women (including various sub-identities and groups: pregnant women, mothers, unemployed mothers) and retired people. However, analysis of these appeals shows that messages that target these groups listed policies and problems but did not include narratives that inspire the shared sense of we-ness (Snow, 2001) that could mobilise (voting) activity.

Further, the two countries in question point to an important difference in practice of appealing to national and ethnic identities in election campaigns. The major differences between the two countries are their political arrangement and electoral rules as well as the ethnic composition of the population. These differences influence the differences in appeals. In Serbia, most common national appeals are directed at the majority of citizens; they call for unity and common action, point to national uniqueness and raise awareness of belonging to a shared identity. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, most common appeals are targeted at ethnic communities composing the country, building links of bonding, in-group trust (Putnam, 2007) and not building bridges among the ethnic groups. The differences
between the two states also decisively influence the construction of the Other. As one would expect, campaigns in both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina do criticise their opponents for the purpose of comparison, but also position the other nations and countries and ethnic groups in this role. The major difference, however, is that in Bosnia and Herzegovina other constituent ethnicities are discussed in this sense, while the Serbian campaigns only discuss the outside of the country’s borders, the neighbouring countries.

Given the attention campaigns are able to draw and their ability to reach large numbers of voters, the discussed practice of communicating national/ethnic narratives during elections in both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also their powerful dramatic, intense and symbolic nature, it is important to consider the campaigns’ influence on the retelling of national narratives of the two countries over time. Findings from the examined campaigns show that they did in fact communicate aspects of national/ethnic identities: they influenced the contextualisation of the present and past times, planned for the joint future and therefore narrated the temporal unity of the nation; Campaigns have also discussed the borders of ethnic/national space that advanced the imagining of the ethnic/national group; and finally, they attempted to frame national values. Having that in mind, the campaigns’ ability to influence the (re)construction of collective identities merits further consideration. By telling the story of an identity, describing the past, present and future of the nation or ethnic group, setting boundaries between different groups and different identities, delineating them, and explaining the meanings and values, campaigns influence the very (re)construction of the identities they try to win over.
Chapter 7: Strategic Uses of the Past

7.1 Introduction

During the course of this research, the memories of the past became obviously prominent in both voters’ narratives about voting, and in the analysed campaign materials. Acknowledging that, this chapter examines the role of campaigns in renegotiating collective memories as part of the process that leads to the (re)construction of collective identities. Being the most intense periods of political discourse, campaigns can offer an effective arena to debate and renegotiate the memory of societies, with many of the actors participating in the debate before a numerous and interested audience. Given the form and scope of campaign communication, the references to the past cannot be expected to provide a comprehensive overview of the past events one would find in more formal carriers of history such as written stories, schoolbooks or institutionalised rituals or commemorations. Campaigns are more likely to invoke memories in a less organised way. In both countries, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the campaigns were able to count on the affective, emotional capacities of memories and their ability to reach people and mobilise voters.

This chapter examines the role of collective memory in framing electoral choices but also the role of election campaigns in reimagining the past; the main argument is that on the one hand campaigns rely on episodes from the past to help them frame the understanding of the present social and political context in order to influence voters, but on the other hand by highlighting different episodes from the past, transforming them, and commemorating them, campaigns influence the memory narratives of the identities they choose to appeal to.
Referring to the past seems to be strategic in an additional way, other than helping campaigns contextualise the present (electoral) moment. Testimonies of the past are a means of social sharing of emotions (Rime and Christophe, 1997) and, as already discussed in the chapter on mobilisation of voters, campaigns try to incite voters’ emotions with the goal of motivating them to vote. However, social sharing of emotions related to collective memory also has a significant impact on the construction of emotional attachments to the identities that this memory belongs to (Ehala, 2014).

A large part of the literature on collective memory (but especially the literature on collective trauma and confronting traumatic pasts such as dictatorships, wars, and economic hardships) bears a normative aspect, a position on whether the traumatic past should be faced and in which way, and assuming accountability for it (see, for instance: Dimitrijevic, 2009, Audergon, 2004). However, this chapter will not engage in evaluating the normative validity of the memory practices and policies of the political elites in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but only the memory strategies used in election campaigns to mobilise voters.

Therefore this chapter analyses references to different pasts and emphasises on historical episodes that were used by the campaigns in Serbia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It starts with a review of the competing references to the era following the fall of socialism and the dissolution of the former country. The chapter then continues to discuss the common practice of referencing the then-common communist and socialist pasts.

7.2 Serbian Usable Pasts

A past becomes usable when a collective memory is a means for a goal other than remembering (Zelizer, 1995). By ‘usable past’ Zelizer (1995) refers to a common past that serves as a basis for the constitu-
tion or reconstitution of groups. In addition to social (group-constituting) and cultural (meaning-making) functions, memory serves political functions as well, mobilising political identities (Ibid). An interesting finding from the campaigns in Serbia in 2008 and 2012 is that the competing parties did not compete to win over different targets/collective identities, but instead competed over the same identity, the national identity. However, the data rather suggests that the parties purposefully chose different strategies when it came to presenting narratives about the recent national past. The past seems to be the most contested and competitive field of the Serbian campaign discourse.

7.2.1 ‘It wasn’t just Milosevic that destroyed this culture’: The Dissonance between Voters and Campaigns

In Serbia, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was preceded by the rise of Slobodan Milosevic, who would become president of Serbia and stay in power until the popular uprising on 5th October 2000. He came to power by ‘mobilising the national discontent and economic grievances’ of ethnic Serbs (Cohen, 2001) and popularising the ‘Serbian national question’ in Yugoslavia (Dimitrijevic, 2009). His rule in Serbia was marked by ethnic wars in the neighbouring countries, economic sanctions and impoverishment of Serbian citizens, and ended with NATO bombing the country, and popular demonstrations that brought his regime to an end. Milosevic himself was accused of genocide and crimes against humanity before the International Tribunal in The Hague, where he died during his trial. After his fall, Serbia started its transition towards democracy with an image of ‘the initiator and loser of the last wars’ (Djeric, 2012). The new political elites decided not to engage in assessment or acknowledgment of the past decade, but to focus on institutional reforms and democratisation processes. As a rule, when dealing with traumatic events, especially from the recent past, avoidance and silence are not unusual ways of assimilating the traumatic events, both affectively and cognitively
(Paez et al., 1997). The common way of dealing with the past was to condemn Milosevic and to blame the previous regime for all the mistakes of the past but also all the failures of the new government. Aside from offering the new elites a convenient escape, the choice not to engage with assessments of the past decade was also strategic for the new elites because, as evidence shows (Paez et al., 1997), dealing with collective traumas and negative memories causes citizens to harbour negative emotions towards the entire polity. This might cause the turnout to plummet. Instead, the new governing actors initiated a narrative of a new beginning and a complete break with the past, ignoring the past decade, motivating voters with stories of the bright future, the late start of reforms and the need to speed up democratisation (Djeric, 2012).

However, the need to assess and reappraise collective memory changes with time. Traumas in particular seem to be too painful to forget (Ramet, 2013). Pennebaker et al. have described the cyclic pattern of observing and commemorating the past every 20 to 30 years, with the maturing of new generations (Pennebaker et al., 1997). Similarly, discussing the fact that both the Holocaust and World War I became known by these names decades after they happened, Zelizer also argues that memory has a cyclical relationship to time (Zelizer, 1995). This temporal benchmark of a couple of decades after the Milosevic era coincides with the studied electoral cycles. Parallel to the passage of time from the painful memories, the electoral offer in Serbia changed. After the dominance of the anti-Milosevic coalition and later different fragments of this coalition, the Milosevic’s former party, the Socialists, managed to regain voters’ trust and political relevance36. During the campaigns in 2008 and 2012, the Socialists offered a new narrative of Milosevic’s legacy and repackaged it as the narrative of Serbian independence, fighting for liberty and dignity.

36 During the examined period, the party even became a part of the government.
The Socialists’ narrative about the 1990s is based on ‘the Kosovo myth’ (Bieber, 2002, Zirojevic, 2000) and then built up with stories of past heroes and glory. The electoral strategy revives the myth of the parties’ strategy during the Milosevic’s era, but now calls for revision and preservation of his legacy.

[Our] freedom fighters are humiliated, according to them, they are not freedom fighters but war criminals. Before our coalition, I wish to declare them not war criminals, but war heroes who gave everything for this people and this country. (...) All of the parties today speak the language of national politics spoken by the Socialist Party and Slobodan Milosevic before 2000. The fight for Kosovo did not start these days, but with Slobodan Milosevic and the Socialist party (Dacic, closing rally, 2008).

Talking about the Serbian nationals accused of war crimes before the International Crime Tribunal, the leader of the Socialists tried to offer an alternative assessment of their own and Serbia’s role in the wars. But the electoral offer of the Socialist party went on further to daringly call on the post-2000 parties ‘to at least preserve what [they] have won’ (Dacic, closing rally, 2012). Voters on the other hand refused to engage with the (new) narrative of the past and preferred to talk about the present moment.

It’s like he’s talking all the time about Slobodan Milosevic... (Student, Belgrade).
I am prejudiced when Dacic is speaking (Employed man, Belgrade).
He is talking nonsense about the dead. I would have asked him ‘what about the living?’ (Unemployed man, Belgrade).

Parallel to the memory revision offered by Milosevic’s former party, the Liberal Democratic Party entered the election cycle with opposite positions and memory narratives. They countered the memory of the nationalist fighting for freedom with the more general principle of continuous reforms and progress by referring to the memory of the short era of great hope for the future in the country that followed the overthrow of the Milosevic regime in 2000 and lasted until the assassination of then Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in 2003. They posi-
tioned the late Djindjic\textsuperscript{37} as the symbol of the national progress of this time.

We want Zoran Djindjic’s Serbia. (...) I am not fighting for the entire Serbia, because that it is the name of Milosevic’s Serbia; I am fighting for Serbia that never had the chance to show its face but it exists among us, beautiful, brave, young, lusting for life (Jovanovic, closing rally, 2008).

The party insisted on preserving the post-Milosevic narrative by offering a narrative conflicted to that of the Socialist Party and was determined to continue to condemn the nationalist era and resume accountability for the role of Serbia in the wars of the 1990s.

It’s not enough to reach agreement that the past is behind us (...) We need to take that sin off of us, nobody can live under it. 1,600 kids were killed in Sarajevo (...) and I will never agree to politics that supports that or fails to condemn it (Jovanovic, closing rally, 2012).

The competition between conflicted memory narratives was, however, contained among the smaller parties. When promoting the conflicting narratives on the decade of the 1990s, the smaller parties relied on the cultural resonance (Kubal, 1989) of the overly familiar theme of the First and Other Serbia, a concept that signifies the construction of opposing political identities developed around the decade. The concept of the First Serbia relies on the Milosevic regime, propagating the myth of Serbian victimhood, resistance to the West, the EU, and the international community, and considering only the positive aspects of Serbian identity and history, while the Other Serbia describes a different Serbia propagated by a group of intellectuals as an opposition to the First Serbia. The Other Serbia was protesting against the war in the former Yugoslavia and against Milosevic, and was cosmopolitan (Omaljev, 2016). Reviving the conflicting narratives in election discourse helps build identities that are hotter (Eha-

\textsuperscript{37} The late Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was one of the leaders of the opposition during the Milosevic era and the first Prime Minister of the Serbian Government after the overthrow of Milosevic. He was assassinated in 2003. Members of the Serbian special forces unit were convicted for the assassination.
la, 2014), thicker identities, which encourage mobilisation and participation, and, in the end, voting.

On the other hand, the strategies of the bigger, more dominant parties included the avoidance of assessing the recent national past, as part of a strategy to win as many votes as possible, regardless of their positions towards the recent past. This was especially the case with the Radical/Progressive\textsuperscript{38} Party, which was part of Milosevic’s last government. The other dominant coalition, grouped around the Democratic Party, avoided the assessment of the Serbian role in the dissolution of the former country, mostly reminding the voters of the poor economic conditions during the era of wars, conflicts and bombing.

In an attempt to avoid negative emotions and perceptions (Paez et al, 1997) that might arise from facing up to responsibility for the past, the dominant parties’ narrative at times also included relativisation and justification of Serbia’s role in the ethnic conflicts during the 1990s.

\begin{quote}
Serbia was not to blame for everything, Serbian people were not to blame for everything. There are some legitimate, historic rights of the Serbian people in the former republics, as there are some legitimate rights of the former republics in Serbia (Tadic, TV B92, 2008a).
\end{quote}

The memory narrative of the dominant parties seems to be designed according to both campaigns’ strategies and memory politics. Political decisions on chosen memory narratives are surely greater than decisions on electoral strategy. When asked about messages that invoke identities, creators of campaign messages testify to the importance of the ideological positions of parties and even candidates. According to them, it is the ideology and politics of candidates that

\textsuperscript{38} The Radical Party that was the second most successful party in the 2008 was divided in two. The breakaway party, the Progressive Party, became more dominant and won the elections in 2012.
drive the meaning-making constructions in campaigns. Still, one cannot underestimate either the importance of strategic decisions not to halve the target group(s) by engaging in assessing the recent past and labelling it a shameful or proud moment in the national history, or those strategic decisions to inspire positive emotions towards history, society and community. In sum, in addition to being dependent on the elites’ ideological positions, the Serbian campaigns in 2008 and 2012 seem to have made a strategic choice to adopt a version of history that resonated with the targeted groups’ preferences or blurred the evaluation of that past in order not to damage their electoral competitiveness.

For their part, voters in focus groups avoided discussing the events of the infamous decade of the 1990s and any consequences for their electoral choices, and continued to express cynicism towards the present day politics.

> It wasn’t just Milosevic that destroyed this culture. Those who came afterwards had a lot to do with it, too! (Student, Novi Sad).

 Voters’ insistence on talking only about the present day elites and their legacy might be a sign that invoking memories from the Milosevic era is not resonant with the voters or a sign that voters are treating the recent traumatic past as a silent event, an event so powerful and inconvenient that affected people refuse to talk about it (Pannebaker et al, 1997). Even so, silent events are also most potent in driving collective memory (Ibid) making them ‘usable’ for mobilising political identities and inspiring emotional attachments with these identities (Ehala, 2014).

### 7.2.2 Once, We were Great... The Memories of the Communist Past

Unlike the recollection of the events in the 1990s that voters seem to want to ignore when reviewing electoral discourse, the memories of the communist era get read into the texts of the campaigns even
when the reference is not obvious or even intended. For instance, when candidates talk about their policies regarding regional relations:

When you vote on 20 January, know that you vote for me who am also an Albanian, a Croat, a Bosniak, a Hungarian, because that is the only way I can be human (Jovanovic, closing rally, 2008).

While the leader of the Liberal Democrats tries to invoke ethnic identities from the region as part of his own identity, voters were reminded of the memories of the joint past:

Why is he saying that? We all lived together once, what does he know... (Pensioner, Nis). He didn’t even live in that country, he doesn’t know... Well, maybe as a kid... But he doesn’t know what it means to live in a country like that (Employed woman, Nis).

The reactions in focus groups, namely the quickness to relate campaign materials with memories from the communist and socialist era and to defend them against tainting, speak of a great emotional attachment to the period. Similar to other post-communist countries, what can be noted among voters in Serbia has been coined ‘post-communist nostalgia’ (Todorova and Gille, 2010; Ekman and Linde, 2005). The term suggests that the citizens of post-communist countries resort to nostalgia in their search for a better state or quality of life (Boyer, 2010). They use it as a ‘psychological or emotional prop, a coping behaviour’ (Ibid, 18 - 19) when dealing with the consequences of the liberalisation of the economy, the setbacks of deindustrialisation, and overall change that accompanies democratisation processes.

The emotional appeal of such nostalgia comes from retrieving senses of security and autonomy invoked from memories of the past (Boyer, 2010), and pride in products of their labour and being a part of a project that was modern and dedicated to a greater, general good (Todorova, 2010), the evidence of which was recorded in focus groups with voters.

We produced everything in the 1970s, x-rays, dishwashers, TVs... The train had to go twice to collect all the workers to and from the
factory, and the buses too, that’s how many people were working there. We had a whole market installed in front of our factory, that’s how many people were employed... and now nothing... (Pensioner, Nis).

The sentiments in question are always about criticising the present moment (Todorova, 2010) and falling back on memory to a time of ‘warmer, more human, safer, more moral’ but also fantasied aspects of the past (Boyer, 2010: 18). Serbian voters also recall moments of greater security and joy when campaign materials provoke memories of the socialist past.

Before, you used to have people who were in the middle, and now only the rich and the poor. Back in the day, we used to go to the seaside and weekends away. I never spent a weekend at home, and my husband was the only one that worked... Those were the standards. (Pensioner, Novi Sad).

This sense of nostalgia among voters in post-communist societies is not only about a memory, but also a powerful tool of persuasion. As such, collective memory of a joint distant past is used in Serbian campaigns for another purpose, to provoke a secondary reaction (Todorova, 2010) and mobilise a present or future project, identification and sense of belonging (Boyer, 2010). These attempts at persuasion are regularly ‘less about memory, and more about cultivating intimacy’ (Boyer, 2010: 20) between the voters and those who seek to represent them. The uses of the communist and socialist past in Serbian campaigns are mostly found in the campaign practices of the Socialist Party that descended from the Communist party, but can also be found across the party spectrum. It is customarily used in a non-ideological manner, but only to rely on its affective capacity. Often, memory is also provoked by very short references. For example, the leader of the Socialists addressed the pensioners with ‘comrades’ when talking about the low pensions.

My dear comrades, you can only afford to pay a second of a commercial on national TV (Dacic, closing rally, 2008).
In focus groups as well, the memories of the communist past seem to resonate better with older voters. These memories inspire them to talk about ‘the old glory days’, especially about the social security, and job security. But the sentiment continues to resonate with young voters, too. In focus groups, they would nod their heads in agreement when the past era was discussed, and would carry on to compare their beliefs about it with the present day problems.

Regularly, in this process of provoking a certain closeness with voters by sharing a memory of the past, this memory gets reinvented and transformed; it loses the form it had (Halbwachs, 1992). As posited by Paez et al. (1997), the memory is transformed in such ways that accommodate both the nostalgic function of past, that is, making the past a Golden age of sorts, but also the present needs of the society in question. In the studied Serbian campaigns, the socialist era is represented by two alleged aspects of it: the aspect of greater social security and better living standards; and the foreign policy aspect.

For the purpose of reviving the memory of a better economic and social life, the leader of the Socialist Party, for instance, highlighted the issues of the present day – low pensions, bad legal protection of workers, high unemployment and scarce health insurance – all the while addressing his audience with ‘dear comrades’. And voters in focus groups recognised his appeal as related to the ‘communist era’, comparing it to ‘a story of Tito’s, partially renewed’ (Unemployed woman, Novi Sad). While this memory appeal is designed to address the issue of present day economic hardships, campaign references about the foreign policy positions are meant to address the needs of Serbian voters for international recognition and overcoming the national image of the 1990s. ‘Memory entrepreneurs’ (Moll, 2013) in Serbian campaigns attempted to influence voters by making associations with the cultural topic of ‘the passport that was good for any-
where’[^39] and a country (former Yugoslavia) that was respected internationally.

Tito (...) was actually a genius in these things. They were fighting over Yugoslavia, both the East and the West. And they should fight for us again. (Nikolic, TV B92, 2008a).

Although there were some voters in focus groups who expressed ideological rejection of the communist references, most of them reacted without ideological considerations, but only by accepting the sentiment of security or recognition and relating it to the present day community.

People know that this can happen again. (Pensioner, Nis)
It would mean that we are a capable nation. (Employed man, Nis).

### 7.3 Country Discussion: Campaigns and Memory Narrative in Serbia

Campaigns in Serbia in 2008 and 2012 offered plenty of references to episodes from the past, most of all to the period of the 1990s under Milosevic’s rule and the era before that, during communist rule. It also has to be noted that political actors in Serbia, in addition to historical narratives about the recent past, also used historical episodes and figures to initiate a memory narrative not related to the periods of recent history, but only arising from the present needs of the political actors. This memory narrative discusses ideas of progress and especially technological progress and calls upon historical figures of Serbian origin that were famous for their scientific discoveries, most

[^39]: The theme of ‘the red Yugoslav passport’, which guaranteed visa-free travel around the globe, was a popular reference in Serbian public discourse, especially before visa-free travel was granted for Serbian citizens to most EU countries in 2008, but even at times after that had happened.
notably Nikola Tesla and Milutin Milankovic. The actors relying on this memory narrative attempted to present themselves as leaders of future progress by reminding people of great successes from the past. Voters in focus groups, however, claimed not to remember these memory appeals and responded to them with cynicism and irony while comparing the historical figures to the present-day candidates.

Campaign appeals that were related to periods of common history, the 1990s and the communist era, were inconsistent in value across actors during the campaigns of 2008 and 2012, especially when the 1990s are in question. With the communist rule, memory narrative seems to be simpler for the competing parties. All the parties that referenced that past, chose only to reference the sentiment that resonates with voters’ nostalgia for the times of greater stability, security, solidarity and higher living standards (Todorova, 2010). By soliciting these sentiments in voters’ memories, political actors were strategically contextualising the choices before the voters and positioning themselves as the option that promised to bring these sentiments back to the present reality, to the future following the elections. Political parties positioned the sentiments associated with the communist era as a sort of a Golden Age that provides a positive and stable image (Paez et al, 1997), a sentiment that resonates with those expressed in focus groups, but also ignores the memories of the communist times of some voters. Notably, several voters in focus groups did refer to the unfair system of benefits under the communist rule. Political actors for their part referenced only the memories of the positive valence regarding the communist memory. Where political actors (some of them at least) contest and present conflicted memory narratives is in the memory of the Milosevic era and the accountability of Serbia for the ethnic wars that accompanied the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. These issues and these memories are also the

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40 Tesla was a Serbian scientist and inventor credited with the design of the alternating current electrical system, and Milankovic was a mathematician and geophysicist, known for his work on climate change.
events voters chose not to speak about in focus groups. They seem to be silent events that are not talked about but remain the most potent points of history for memory-making purposes (Pennebaker and Basik, 1997). By offering conflicting assessments and memories of the Milosevic era, the parties engage in dividing and polarising the electorate, which can help them mobilise voters by making these identities ‘hotter’ (Ehala, 2014).

7.4 Usable Pasts in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The use of collective memory in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina is somewhat different to the Serbian practice. Given that memories have an ability to make connections among members of a group and exclude non-members (Zelizer, 1995), Bosnian parties strategically use this ability to reach and mobilise their target groups. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the targets are ethnic groups and therefore the parties invoke memories of their respective ethnicities. Similar to the Serbian case, parties invoke memories from the 1990s and the ethnic war, and the previous communist era, but in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, campaign discourses fit into larger (ethnic) communication strategies (and memory policies). Political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina engage in memory work that results in a fragmented and contested memory landscape, dominated by three official nationalist memory narratives (Moll, 2013). Campaign narratives support the constructed historical narratives and commemorate episodes from the past that foster interethnic tensions and fear and stretch back across eras, to World War II. At the same time, the memories and sentiments expressed by voters in focus groups that invoke peace, community and multi-ethnic cooperation from the communist/socialist era remain largely ignored (with the exception of the appeals made by the Social Democrats, to an extent).
7.4.1 War of Memories

The ethnic war in Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted for three years between 1992 and 1995 and is now remembered as the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II. During these 3 years, over 100,000 people were killed and over 2,000,000 were displaced, internally and externally. The conflict was also marked by genocide, horrendous atrocities, systemic rape, and the establishment of notorious detention centres by all sides in the conflict. When it ended, the peace agreement instituted a political system that endorsed the territorialisation, the constituent ethnic groups, and therefore also the results of war and ethnic cleansing (Bougarel et al, 2007). A collective experience of this magnitude and power constitutes a collective trauma, a past that has a living influence upon the present (Nytagodien and Neal, 2004). According to Bougarel et al (2007), all of the divides and political identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are shaped by the experience of the war. Hence, as expected, the memory of the ethnic war that was part of the dissolution of the former country has a powerful influence over the electoral discourse as well. In line with larger ethnic narratives and commemoration politics, political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina regularly invoke memories of the recent violent past, in pursuance of ethnic mobilisation and ethnic voting.

The experience of war shaped the electoral narrative in multiple ways. First and foremost, the war constituted several new constituencies to be targeted: displaced persons, refugees, people returning to their homes after the war, people who left the country during the war, war veterans, and families of those who died and of those still missing. All of the parties targeted the groups that came into being as a consequence of the war, and this has been the practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the war ended. It involves campaign appeals about

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41 Out of a pre-war population of 4.4 million.
the health and social welfare of the groups in question, judicial persecution of war crimes, return of lost property, further education of the war veterans, and even advancing the post-war reconciliation. For the most part, these appeals are repetitive and dry lists of electoral promises that resemble each other across the electoral spectrum. These appeals are regularly disregarded as ‘pitiful phrases’ (Pollster 2) that do not engage with voters effectively. Only at times is a detail offered in these appeals that might spark memories. For example, an almost bureaucratic statement from the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina reads:

Any legal obligations or statements concerning property that were given under threat shall be treated void (Party for B-H, Manifesto, 2006).

can still stimulate a memory from the war, of the refugees fleeing their houses and having to legally sign over their houses under threat to the enemy that is taking over the neighbourhood.

In addition to the appealing to target groups created by war, campaigns in 2006 and 2010 tried to mobilise their (ethnic) targeted voters by invoking memories of the war. Most of these appeals were designed with the goal of framing a party’s own ethnic group as the prime victim of the war, while other war-related appeals were designed to commemorate Srebrenica in election manifestos, speeches and other materials.

Consider for instance these three appeals from three different ethnic parties:

The previous war injured all the peoples and most of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina in different ways. But especially catastrophic cataclysm was experienced by the Croatian people (CDU 1990, Manifesto, 2010).

The number of victims among the Serbian people in the last war was around 30,000, out of 98,000 in the entire B-H. (...) Unfortunately, a great number of crimes against Serbian civilians and prisoners has not been prosecuted (AISD, Manifesto, 2010).
In these extremely hard conditions, we managed to win our independence, defend ourselves from the aggression, repair our country, and lead forceful reforms (PDA, closing rally, 2010).

The first two engage in representing their own ethnic group as the greatest victim of the war in the 1990s, while the third is an example of another common practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As per the last example, the representatives of all three ethnic groups also commonly present different versions of the nature, causes and proceedings of the conflict. In this statement, the Bosniak party attempted to frame the conflict in line with the official Bosniak memory narrative.

The stories of victimhood are in fact the most powerful influence on the narratives of the past, as they offer strong moral judgments of the war and differentiation between the victims and the perpetrators (Bougare et al, 2007). Campaigns engage in structuring rival narratives that retell the story of war in the country in line with ethnic narratives, all the while constructing the difference between who ‘we’ (the victims) are and who the Other (the perpetrator) is. Furthermore, by linking identities’ histories to social values, campaigns increase voters’ emotional attachments to these identities (Ehala, 2014). The last example also points to what Ramet noted as the use of the opposing vocabulary. Rival narratives in Bosnia and Herzegovina use opposite terminology: Bosniaks use the term aggression that is rejected by Bosnian Serbs, who again use the term secession to describe Bosniaks’ and Croats’ actions in dissolving Yugoslavia, while Bosniaks use the same term to describe Serbs’ actions towards independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ramet, 2013). Strategically, campaigns benefit from the polarising narratives of the war, as memories of the recent traumatic past continue to sensitise and mobilise voters.

It was war, and it wasn’t that long ago... A lot of people were here during the war, and it was like that... Croats went one way, Serbs the other, Bosniaks the third... And I understand that, unfortunately, things remain the same, and the constant reminding of it remains... And people can’t forget all that easy... (Student, Mostar).

Some deep wounds are still alive (Pensioner, Sarajevo).
We still live, we remain in 1992, maybe 1993. We dwell in our ditches and bunkers... I don’t mind working in the Federation [Bosniak/Croat part], and then coming here on Fridays to our club, but still... we fear them, they fear us... (Blogger, Eastern Sarajevo).

As these examples from focus group members from different ethnic groups testify, as part of their stories about elections and voting, voters regularly include accounts of the war and wounds that the members of all three ethnic groups associate with both inter-ethnic relations and elections. This suggests the great power of these sentiments to motivate the electoral behaviour of voters.

As previously mentioned, the memories of war, but also rival memory narratives, are also invoked in election campaigns by references to Srebrenica. Srebrenica remains the symbol of the Bosniak suffering and the entire war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosniak parties emphasise their own ethnic group as the main victim of the war by commemorating Srebrenica[^42] in their campaign communications. Srebrenica was commemorated in the manifestos of the Bosniak parties (PDA, UBF) by calling for a special status for the municipality, suggesting economic reforms that would liven up the region, and taking credit for the establishment of the commemorative memorial centre on the site. Without doubt, the reference point of Srebrenica is a powerful one for Bosniaks, although Bosniak voters did not specifically talk about it in focus groups. However, invoking Srebrenica is not only effective in reminding Bosniaks of past suffering and mobilising Bosniak ethnic and religious identity, but also in imploring the opposing narrative among the Bosnian Serbs and their ‘memory entrepreneurs’ of Bosniak killings of Serbs in the villages of Kravica and Zalazje. According to the Serbian memory narrative, the killings in Srebrenica were done in retaliation for the Bosniaks’ killings of Serbs. In this way, rival memories not only persevere but fuel each other. By

[^42]: Srebrenica is a town in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Serbian part), the site of what is considered to be the worst atrocity since World War II. In July 1995, the military forces of the Bosnian Serbs entered the ‘Safe Zone’ protected by the UN and killed around 8,000 Bosniak men and boys.
telling very different stories in similar styles, commemorating only one’s own victims but ignoring the Other’s, the narratives nourish the survival of deeply divided memory (Dujizings, 2007) within a society.

The strategy of political parties to rely heavily on traumatic pasts in Bosnia and Herzegovina counts on the common sufferings in the past to be able to bring communities together most effectively (Re-nan, 1882), and to mobilise targets/identities in the present. Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina exercise bringing the past into the present during the campaigns in order to mobilise their constituencies. One way they did this was by equating the war-time leaderships of the other ethnic groups with their political leaders of today:

They could not do it in 1992, they won’t be able to do it now (Tihic, closing rally, 2006).

If you head down the road of your teacher, the war-criminal Biljana Plavsic43, PDA will stop you, like we knew how to stop her (Masovic, closing rally, 2006).

By referring to the past, to the war, the political actors are actually using the past to contextualise the present and pose themselves as continuous protectors of their ethnic groups during its perpetual endangerment.

7.4.2 Memories of the War before and the Dissonance between Voters and Campaigns

Contrary to what the literature on post-communist nostalgia (Ekman and Linde, 2005; Todorova and Gillie, 2010) would suggest as an effective memory-invoking strategy, political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina very rarely include memories of the era between 1945

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43 This statement, used to illustrate the practice of making a clear connection between the political leaders of today and their war-time predecessors, was used by a Bosniak party leader to address the Head of the Serbian entity, and to equate him with “his teacher” Biljana Plavsic, who was a war-time Serbian leader and later pleaded guilty at the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague to the charges of the persecution of Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war.
and 1990 in their electoral narratives. When they do, they refer to the economic stability and living standards of the socialist age.

Before the imposed war, Yugoslavia was mid-developed and industrialised country that was competitive and exported its products all over the world (AISD, Manifesto, 2010).

Notably, Social Democrats do rely on communist and socialist memorabilia, but during the observed campaigns, the references mostly included using the colour red for their visual promotions, targeting the working class in their messages, promoting unity that overlooks ethnic divides, and addressing the voters with ‘comrades’. Messages that would offer vivid memories were not recorded in the party’s discourse during the campaigns in 2006 and 2010. Voters in focus groups, on the other hand, talked about their memories of the socialist era. The pre-war era was especially brought up by the older population, but by the young as well. These memories were expressed through warm narratives of close neighbours who once lived side by side, in peace, cooperating with each other regardless of ethnicity. They invoked the humane sentiments of the time before the rupture of the system they knew (Todorova, 2010).

It is not like it was before the war. (...) It’s not as intimate as it used to be, from the soul, we used to care more about each other, and we loved and cared for each other, worked at same table. Now, everything is different (Pensioner, Sarajevo).

And while the older generations speak of warmer, safer and morally different past times, the young also refer to the communist times, but their communist nostalgia consists of a ‘fantasied aspect’ (Boyer, 2010) of order, dedication and community, all imagined to be a feature of the communist era.

Give me something concrete, like we had during Tito; they would provide this five year plan and we would all need to be patient. They say – in five years we will have three factories and we would all remain patient in those five years... (Blogger, East Sarajevo).
Although memories of the communist era can be detected in the voters’ narratives, political memory narratives remain unresponsive to the voters’ dispositions. Apart from the memory references of the Social Democratic Party, the memories of communism challenge the official (and campaign) memory narratives and policies of all the other political actors. Voters’ memories of the pre-1989 era acknowledge the ideas of unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and equality among its peoples, and imagined disregard of ethnicity and religion. If politicised and mobilised in campaigns, the principle of unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina that voters maintain in their memory would challenge the current ethnic structures in the country, as well as the politics that mobilise support by promoting ethnic structures and loyalties.

The historical episode that offers greater mobilising and explanatory possibility for the memory entrepreneurs of today’s deeply divided Bosnia and Herzegovina is the period of World War II and the birth of the communist movement in the country. Bosniak and Serbian memory narratives especially rely on this particular historical episode. The legacy of World War II resonates with the contemporary political discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina for its ability to reconstruct, but foremost to reinforce the fragmented memory narratives propagated by the political elites. The story of World War II is told differently by different ethnic groups and helps construct rival narratives, but also constitutes relationships with the war of the 1990s, recreating one common, consistent narrative connecting the two wars as two events of the same narrative (Bougarel et al, 2007, Redzic, 2005). These narratives are designed in opposition to the communist propaganda that ‘obscured the internecine dimensions of the conflict’ (Redzic, 2005: 3) between the fascist organisations of Croatian Ustashi and Serbian Chetniks, which took place during World War II.44

44 Following the fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the newly formed Independent State of Croatia that was led by the Croatian extreme nationalist Ustashi movement. Their racist policies meant the eradic-
The communist propaganda after the war actively hid the inter-ethnic fighting that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina during World War II with the goal of de-ethnicising the story of the war (Bougarel, 2007). On the other hand, the current narratives, as well as the campaigns of 2006 and 2010, re-nationalised the memory narratives of World War II.

For instance, the current Bosnian-Serbian memory narrative directly appropriates the memories of the Partisans’ legacy and extends the narrative of the Serbian fight for liberation and freedom from occupiers and the preservation of the country (Redzic, 2005) from one war to the other. The narrative assumes the Serbian role in an attempt to preserve Yugoslavia against the secessionist attempts of Bosniaks and Croats in the 1990s (Ramat 2013) as a continuation of their great sacrifice to enable the liberation of the common country in 1940s. Invoking the memories of World War II during campaigns in 2006 and 2010 served the purpose of politicising ethnic identity by framing the Serbian ethnic group as both the victim and the hero.

By taking part in the anti-fascist fight, the peoples of Yugoslavia gave an enormous contribution to ending World War II. The Serbian people suffered the greatest losses thereby, which are described in the wartime stories on [the battles of] Kozara, Neretva, Sutjeska, and the killings in Jasenovac-Gradina (AISD, Manifesto, 2010).

45Partisans were the guerrilla forces under the supreme command of Tito; in Bosnia and Herzegovina they were predominantly Serbian especially at the beginning of the movement (Hoare, 2014).

46The symbol of Jasenovac remains one of the most powerful symbols of the Serbian suffering; Jasenovac was an infamous concentration camp set up by the fascist forces of the Independent State of Croatia. It was mostly Serbs, but also Jews and Roma that were killed in the camp. It is commonly referred to as the Serbian Holocaust, but also as the justification for the Serbian crimes in the war of the 1990s, which were, according to popular justification, done in an attempt to prevent ‘another Jasenovac’.
The memory narrative that remobilises the ethnic struggles from World War II in Bosnia and Herzegovina seem to be resonant with the electoral narratives of the voters. They too invoke the sufferings of World War II in reaction to the campaign materials of the campaigns in 2006 and 2010.

The number of people killed in the Second World War was a catastrophe, and it was based on these ethnic and religious differences. It wasn’t like that in Serbia, where you only had the Germans, Partisans and Chetniks. Here, we were with all of them [Bosniaks and Croats], and it was such great hatred, repressed for 50 years. My grandmother went to jail for harbouring Chetniks, and she was afraid for 50 years (Blogger, Eastern Sarajevo).

On their part, Bosniak ethnic parties also appropriated the legacy of World War II in their campaign narratives in order to establish a connection between the war of the 1990s and World War II with the goal of presenting the leaders of today as the successors who continue the struggle for liberation. Among the Bosniak parties this strategy is particularly evident in the campaign discourse of the PDA, which even uses the wording and rhetoric characteristic of World War II, even to describe the war of the 1990s directly:

PDA will work consistently and permanently to safeguard the legacy of the liberating and anti-fascist fight of 1992-1995 to protect the free and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina (PDA Manifesto, 2006).

The Bosniak memory narrative references World War II to commemorate the initial establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniak-Croatian part of the country, the Federation, even commemorates the day of the 1943 resolution which declared the intention to establish Bosnia and Herzegovina as a republic within former Yugoslavia. During campaigns and otherwise, the Bosniak parties continue to construct a narrative for the ethnic group that promotes the story of the inauguration of the independent Bosnia and Herzegovina as a republic during World War II, the defence and advancement of that independence through the war of the 1990s, and then contextualises the present electoral moment as the next point in time that seeks to
defend that independence. At the same time, the elites are promoting themselves as the right people to defend Bosnian independence in the future.

Many of the Bosniak voters in focus groups, however, do not follow this ordering of temporality (Wodak et al, 2009), the linearity of the narrative and the sameness of its purpose, and understand the war of the 1990s as a rupture of the previous era and previous identity. Voters remember the unity during socialism and the war of the 1990s that interrupted it.

I found that incomprehensible. The concept of war. That we could... That they could be against us. (...) Many of us could not dream, we weren’t nationalists, I lived together with Serbs and Croats, there were mixed marriages in my family. That’s hard for a person... A person can’t explain that, get that into their head, that that war can be so dirty (Pensioner, Sarajevo).

While the parties of two ethnic groups, Serbs and Bosniaks, used the campaigns’ discourses to support their rival accounts of World War II, Croatian parties on their side do not reference the events of this war. Their ethnic memory narrative remains anti-communist and anti-Yugoslav (Moll, 2013) and excludes the memory of this period, but it also strategically excludes the memory of the fascist organisation of the Independent State of Croatia.

7.5 Country Discussion: Campaigns and Memory in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Memory narratives are especially powerful after such collective traumas as the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the country, memories of the war are so readily available in the memory of voters that they get read into seemingly unrelated messages. For instance, one of the slogans of the examined campaigns was ‘The people know’, and when voters were asked about it, they evoked the party’s (PDA) role in organising the initial defence for the Bosniaks when the war broke out
in 1992. The first thing that comes to voters’ minds by association is that ‘they were the first to organise the resistance’ (Professional, Sarajevo) of the Bosniak population. Reportedly, one of the designers of the slogan explained that the idea behind the slogan was to remind the voters of the economic stability during the times when the party was in power (post-war), but references to the war were also plenty in their campaign narrative nonetheless.

The reliance on the memories of the war extends to the other forms of campaign communication as well, such as the choice of speakers at rallies. For instance, PB-H chose to invite Atif Dudakovic, a Bosniak wartime general as a speaker. The same general is mentioned as a part of the ‘rival narrative’ (Ramet, 2013) in the manifesto of the Bosnian-Serbian party AISD as the man who was ‘filmed ordering crimes and setting Serbian houses on fire’ (AISD Manifesto, 2010). Memories of war provided numerous opportunities in campaigns for reinforcing the opposing accounts of events on all three sides. Naturally, the aligning of World War II with the ethnic memory narratives of the war of the 1990s further fuels the fear of the Other and reproduces imagined borders between ethnic groups. The power of war memories in campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina comes from the everyday meeting and influencing of the political narratives and strategies, and the personal experiences and needs in the society (Bougarel et al, 2007)47.

However, the resistance to political narratives of the war was recorded among the voters in focus groups. For instance, some of the participants in the Serbian focus group rejected the official Bosnian-Serbian memory narrative of the war, especially the part that ignores the victims of the other groups and exclusively commemorates the

47 Admittedly, the media play a role in the constant flagging of the memories of war and although it was not the focus of this research, it has been argued during the course of interviews that ‘the media report on ethnic and war related issues, especially issues related to war crimes in a sensationalistic manner because it sells papers’ (Pollster 3).
victimhood of the Serbian side. The voters acknowledged that the others sides ‘weren’t killing themselves’ and that ‘nobody had accepted what had happened here’ (Activist, Banja Luka). Bougarel et al. (2007) captured the similar existence of alternative memory narratives with regard to the socialist era. They noticed that civic forces guarded the image of a pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina and the principles of Brotherhood and Unity of the time. The rejection of most of the political actors of ‘the hidden memory narrative’ (Ibid) of a peaceful and stable pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina speaks of the existing divide between memory narratives, the official, political memory narratives that are put to a strategic use during the campaigns and the opposing memory narratives that persevere among the electorate but are ignored by the political elites. That is, the pervasiveness and intimacy of war memories and their political usability seem to encourage political candidates to nurture the confronted memory narratives that strengthen the ‘hotness’ (Ehala, 2014) of the ethnic identities they appeal to.

7.6 Conclusion: Campaigns and Collective Memory in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The importance of the past and the memories of it, and their significance for campaign strategies, can be observed in interviews with campaign professionals and with voters. Both the campaign makers and the voters (even more than the campaign makers) infallibly invoked the past in their narratives about the elections, suggesting the importance of a common past for the present and future of the com-

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48 The intensity of the strategic use of the memories of war during campaigns was not equal among all political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those most nationalist and those that were in power during the war are leading the narrative, but they form the majority of the political scene in the country. As previously noted, the Social Democrats are the only party that relies on the civic narratives that oppose the leading political memory narratives, but mostly through visual elements, targeting strategies and chosen issues, but these were not reflected in message content and rhetoric.
munity. Predictably, the communist past and the nationalist era of ethnic wars and conflicts come out on top of the pasts referenced in both studied countries. At times, these references were relied on to reproduce the larger political narratives imposed by the political elites. In the two countries, these references to the past and the practice of relying on collective memory to mobilise voters during election campaigns had many similarities, but also showed significant differences as well. For instance, campaigns in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia invoked memories of national/ethnic communities that they targeted. Given the context of the two countries, this should not be surprising. However, the use of national/ethnic memory is not solely contextual, not even in these two cases.

National and ethnic memory is especially usable (Zelizer, 1995) and strategic because these collective identities offer the longest historical materials and the richest emotional attachments deriving from them (Ehala, 2014). Secondly, in both countries the renegotiation of the official content of collective memory and the assessment of the past is elite driven (Ramet, 2013), on the one side. Interested political elites, supported by certain intellectuals and other influencers (memory entrepreneurs), lead the renegotiation of memory in both countries while using the affective power of memories to mobilise voters during campaigns. By doing so, they advance the role of campaigns as discursive mechanisms that discuss and reinterpret the past. And they do it in a way that boosts their current interests by framing the past in a way that assures their position as the guardians of past principles, values or desired states in the future. However, the elites are not the only social group interested in discussing the past. The memories of the two historical periods were most commonly discussed in the focus groups with voters as well, on the other side. Interestingly, voters in focus groups did relate the past to their electoral stories without ever being prompted. Their narratives flowed spontaneously but consistently towards the past. However, the voters’ memory narratives were not very elaborate. But there was still a very observable,
powerful shared understanding of the importance of the past within groups.

The Chosen Pasts

Furthermore, out of ‘the infinity of what is remembered or capable of being remembered’ (Hobsbawm, 1972: 3) by the national/ethnic communities in question, the campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008 and 2012 and 2006 and 2010 most commonly referenced the decade of the dissolution of the former country, Yugoslavia, and the joint past during the communist/socialist times in Yugoslavia. However, strategies for referencing the pasts chosen by the campaigns in the two countries also point to differences between the memory invoking practices.

It is not a surprise that most of the references to the past in both countries evoke memories of the 1990s and the dissolution of the country. Both countries’ campaigns chose the highly traumatic period in the countries’ histories to mobilise voters by politicising the social divisions constructed or enforced in relation to this historical period. In Serbia, campaigns used the memory of Milosevic, his dictatorship, economic hardships and Serbia’s role in ethnic conflicts in the neighbouring countries during his rule to construct and mobilise political identities around Milosevic’s legacy. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, campaigns most often referenced the ethnic war when mobilising ethnic identities for today’s voting purposes. The memories of war in the Bosnian context have a particularly divisive capacity, which can provoke memories of traumatic experiences (both personal and collective) and ethnic animosities in the country.

Although the findings show that both countries’ campaigns relied on the same historical period for mobilisation of voters, the difference is that the polarisations reinforced or constructed by these communication processes help construct political identities in Serbia by using
different assessments of Milosevic’s legacy as a source of identification. Different views and positions on Milosevic as a source of identities suggest the construction and mobilisation of identities that are political and ideological in character. The references to the same period in Bosnia in Herzegovina fortify ethnic borders and identities by using rival memory appeals.

Still, this particular difference between the two memory invoking practices in the two countries is not as great as it might seem. Although the narratives about the nature of the Milosevic regime and its role in the region are political and ideological, they also provide a narrative about the national identity, implying who ‘we’ were during the historical period in a similar manner to ethnic and national narratives in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Referring to the past seems to be strategic in an additional way, other than helping campaigns contextualise the present (electoral) moment. Testimonies of the past are a means of social sharing of emotions (Rime and Christophe, 1997) and, as already discussed, campaigns try to incite voters’ emotions with the goal of motivating them to vote. However, social sharing of emotions related to collective memory also has a significant impact on the construction of emotional attachments to identities this memory belongs to (Ehala, 2014). Therefore, by retelling and contextualising memories, prompting affective attachments to corresponding identities, and narrating the meaning of the joint past, the most important episode, ‘an indispensable prerequisite’ (Wodak et al, 2009) of an identity narrative, election campaigns in the two countries in fact discursively constituted the meanings of national/ethnic identities.

Next, in the case of the further (communist and socialist) history referenced in election campaigns, the campaigns in the two countries appeal to slightly different periods of joint history. In Serbia, campaigns strategically chose to remain resonant with voters’ sentiments and promoted ‘fantasied aspects’ (Boyer, 2010) of the warmth and
achievements of the socialist era in Serbia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the campaigns chose to ignore the voters’ memories of peaceful coexistence of different ethnicities and religions in the same country, but chose to focus on fear fostered by the memories of World War II to complement the rival narratives and parallel constructions of reality already being promoted by political elites.

Findings about the politicisation of collective memory in campaigns also reveal the roles of elites and voters in constructing memory narratives in the countries. For instance, if we look at the examples of campaigns in Serbia that chose to rely on voters’ feelings about the socialist times in Serbia, and campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina that chose to ignore them, we come to a significant conclusion about the elites’ reliance on knowledge about the voters. Although the elites in the two countries pursue the practice of relying on voters’ insights for purely tactical reasons during campaigns, they do not rely on voters’ preferences in cases when an official memory narrative already set by the elites offers a more productive long-term strategy. Political elites in Serbia do not seem to have a structured political memory narrative that would restrict their tactical choices. There appears not to be an official narrative of Milosevic’s legacy or in relation to the socialist time of the joint country. On the other hand, there are three official memory narratives already set in Bosnia and Herzegovina that exert heavy influence on campaign strategies and party positions. And the existence of official memory narratives in one country and not the other seems to exert the crucial influence on campaigns’ choices of memory narratives.
Conclusion

When this research started in 2012, the main objective was to answer questions about collective identities and persuasive communication in very specific contexts of the two countries. The motivation for the study came from the wish to explain the role election campaigns play in constructing or awakening certain collective identities in two different post-communist, post-conflict countries. The different compositions of the constituencies and constitutional arrangements were supposed to offer a good ground for comparing identity appeals in election campaigns. However, during the course of the research, the topics that once seem relevant for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (as well as the entire region) became globally relevant. Up until 2017 when this thesis was completed, we saw appeals to national identities, ethnicity, fear appeals, populist appeals and speaking for the oppressed peoples, calls for exclusions and divisions, come on the electoral agenda in Western democracies, in the US and UK most notably. We also saw voters’ emotions and affects become electoral forces and take the place of rational interests when discussing voters’ motivation. The study of the circumstances for these appeals and issues to become strategically used in election campaigns now seems more important and appropriate more widely than at the beginning of this process.

Similar to practice, the study of election campaigns has been largely focusing on voters as rational, interest-oriented actors and saw election campaigns as communication acts aimed at electing representatives, but also with the power to unite people and express civic duty and loyalty (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). As the campaigns in 2006 and 2010 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 2008 and 2012 in Serbia clearly show, as now do many successful campaigns across the globe, campaigns can also be successful while being divisive or exclusive in
their appeals. However, in addition to this unexpected contribution to the understanding of current trends in campaigning and voting behaviour, this study was designed with the goal of answering different questions and offering different contributions to the existing knowledge. This study attempts to answer or at least give insights to the questions about the role of election campaigns in (re)constructing identities; which collective identities are most commonly appealed to in campaigns; what makes identity appeals strategic for the campaigns and how do different social contexts influence the practice of appealing to identities. This study contributes to the current knowledge on election campaigns in several aspects including conceptually, practically, and contextually. Conceptually, it contributes by considering election campaigns beyond their strategic character. In practical aspects, by reviewing the issues of the practical, ethical and political consequences of election campaigns. The contextual contribution of the thesis is in offering an overview of the two countries in specific moments with a special focus on communication practices and their role in the countries’ developments. In the end, its methodological contribution lies in providing an integrated multi-method approach to studying campaign communication. The concluding remarks in this thesis are organised around these suggested contributions.

**Contribution to knowledge**

**Identity Construction during Campaigns**

One of the starting questions of this research asks about the role of election campaigns in the construction and renegotiation of collective identities to which they appeal. Very few existing studies on election campaigning even consider the question about such role of election campaigns. Most of these studies regularly consider them as pre-election strategic communication processes. They focus on the relation between strategic attempts of campaigns and voter turn out, party identification, choice preferences, knowledge of politics, or attitudes. However, Swanson and Mancini (1996) have considered a
greater role for election campaigns in societies. They have argued that campaigns play a role in granting legitimacy to not just governments and administrations, but entire systems and nation states (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). This study too set out to look at the more enduring results of campaigns. As described at the beginning, this research is interested in campaigns’ identity appeals in the 2006 and 2010 campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 2008 and 2012 campaigns in Serbia. It started with the observation that campaigns not only design messages that signal their policy proposals aimed at a segment of a society. They also design messages that are more rhetorically advanced, that are designed to inspire awareness of a collective identity and mobilise voters to act (vote) as holders of this specific collective identity and get emotionally invested in those identities. Here, campaigns appeal to certain collective identities, making them more salient and important among the multiple identities a person holds. Strategically, campaigns hope the voting decision will be made based on their own contextualisation of the collective identity. But what they simultaneously do is apply ‘constitutive rhetoric’ (Charland, 1987). They first imagine the identity they appeal to as if they already existed. That is, campaigns actually constitute the meanings of collective identities they try to engage in their appeals and only then they appeal to them.

According to the constructionist argument, identities are results of social practice at a point in time, they are changing, dynamic processes of becoming (Peek, 2005). Their constructions start with language and the stories about these identities. In case of the two countries under research here, data point to national and ethnic identities being the most frequent targets of election campaigns. It should also be noted that campaigns do not choose the groups they target randomly. Findings from focus groups in this research show that the strategies behind the design of campaign identity appeals rely on the affections and attachments of voters. Voters in focus groups expressed deep emotional attachments to national and ethnic identities and loyalty to the nations and ethnic groups. For this reason, election
campaigns based their strategies on appealing to these identities. They relied on politicising the existing divisions in the society, and raising their awareness of groups’ identities and the identity of the Other. In Serbia, on one side, the campaigns relied on the division between the First and the Other Serbia (Omaljev, 2016), a popular cultural reference to the opposing visions of the Serbian national identity. One being traditional, nationalistic and conservative, and the Other being modern, intellectual and cosmopolitan. Still, the campaigns rarely politicised animosity between the concepts. Interestingly, a slight shift in identities that were appealed to was documented in the campaign in 2012, when the winning coalition changed the strategy to appeal to groups of certain social and economic character, the unemployed, poor, disadvantaged etc, suggesting transformations and changes of the electorate, its experiences and feelings. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other side, such changes were not recorded, and in both campaigns the main targets for the appeals of most of the parties were members of ethnic groups and identities.

How do campaigns appeal to national and ethnic identities? Findings from these country cases show, that during their course, campaigns have told the story of national and ethnic identities they tried to engage. The campaigns provided the voters, and holders of the identities in question, with an identity narrative as part of their persuasive and motivating efforts. Election campaigns under study provided their voters with national narratives (Serbia) or narratives for ethnic groups (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Campaigns told stories that accounted for changes the identity went through across time and in an orderly manner (Wodak et al, 2009). They contextualised the current moment by describing the circumstances surrounding the elections; they reshaped collective memories by highlighting certain historical episodes (accurate or false) and not the others, and imagined the joint future by offering their policies and visions of the group for the upcoming time.
However, the findings show that the campaigns go further than the temporality of the narrative. They also provide their voters with the sense of space, delimiting the collective identity. In Serbia identity narratives of political actors assumed territories larger than the state. They included the territories of the neighbouring countries where the Serbian ethnic groups still live, reviving dangerous, nationalistic rhetoric in doing so. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, candidates referred to administrative, electoral borders of their ethnic groups most of the time, but also expressed confusion on occasion by switching between the territorial jurisdiction of the post they are running for and their electoral/ethnic group, blurring the borders of the electoral space. Thus, in both countries, during the selected campaigns, borders of the electoral space were re-drawn and were different from the territory of the state where the elections were taking place.

Furthermore, during the elections of 2006 and 2010 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 2008 and 2012 in Serbia, the campaigns also narrated the cultural dimensions of identity narratives. In addition to referring to myths, relying on symbols and rituals, campaigns also promoted the values to be cherished as part of their narratives. On the one side, campaigns tried to set values as criteria for judging the candidates and parties, but on the other, the promotion of specific values as desirable helps construct the value-system of the electorate as well. Interestingly, the campaigns in both countries promoted and relied on conservative and nationalist values. In the first place, in both countries campaigns promoted safety and security as a value, and protecting the state or ethnic group becomes one of the valued electoral promises. Findings suggest traditional family values, patriotism and honesty to be the values promoted in Serbian campaigns, while in the campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnicity and religious values and ethnicities were promoted as socially desirable goals. What is also an interesting finding in this study is that slogans out of all materials were most likely to promote these values.
Therefore, one of the contributions of this research to the study of election campaigns is that campaigns do much more than mobilise voters to vote for one option rather than the other in an election. They do more than influence voters’ turn out and party identification. They do more than manipulate choice preferences and voters’ attitudes. Or increase the voters’ election related knowledge. The findings in this research show that election campaigns, responding to voters’ dispositions, influence their sense of Self, the salience and prominence of particular collective identities that individuals hold against the other identities they too hold. This study documents these particular collective identities campaigns attempted to make prominent were national and ethnic identities. They provided voters with a national or ethnic narrative that lent meaning to that identity and directed the feelings and attachments of voters. In that respect, election campaigns prove to be more important and worth of studying than both the researchers and practitioners consider them to be.

The power of election campaigns

Current knowledge on the effects of election campaigns for the most part considers campaigns to have limited effects on the voters’ participation, decision-making, individual preferences and knowledge of issues. Ever since the introduction of the minimal effects hypothesis which argues campaigns can only play a small role in changing the outcome of elections, the discipline continued to debate about the consequences of campaigns and how long these effects last. There have been studies recently about the influence of campaigns on the voters’ knowledge and understanding, and attitudes and behaviour that offer evidence that campaign effects might last well beyond the ending of a campaign (Evans et al, 2014). This study as well argues that campaigns have enduring effects on the societies and systems, and voters’ perceptions. Their previously discussed role in identity construction is just a fraction of the lasting consequences. In fact, the
findings of this study show that campaigns help construct the reality of these societies and systems where they take place.

To start with, information learned during campaigns help construct realities of the society, and campaign messages and appeals become prominent and salient and direct the attention of voters. Campaigns not only provide information on the candidates and parties, and their policies, but also inform the members of the society about the current context, the positions of the society in larger contexts and surroundings, and the alternatives before them. They influence the awareness of different details, issues, identities, belonging, inclusion and exclusion, possible choices. They prime and influence the agenda, make certain issues more important to the voters. Voters on their part, as the data from the focus group shows, do indeed review, discuss and remember the information they obtain during campaigns.

However, it is not only the cognitive aspect of voters’ behaviour, their knowledge and understanding that are affected by campaigns. The study of political communication increasingly acknowledges the role of emotions in persuasion and political communication. This study adds to the observation of how persuasive communication efforts provoke emotions. One of the interesting realisation on the relation between emotions and campaign communication in this study came during the transcription of interviews and focus groups. The data revealed a stunning dominance of words, especially verbs, used by both the professionals and voters that signified emotions or emotional states of voters, already suggesting that the voters’ emotions were the intended targets of campaign messages. From there, this study learned that campaigns in the two countries engaged in managing public sentiments. Based on their knowledge of their constituencies, campaigns appeal to emotions that inspire voters and encourage them to vote. In these two country cases for example, most frequently campaigns issued fear appeals and pride appeals, in an attempt to change the emotive state of the electorate and mobilise it. For good or bad, these emotional changes leave behind emotive charges within societies. However, as the voters that participated in this research no-
tice themselves, campaigns tend to appeal to most basic needs and emotive states of the citizens. In the process, campaigns do emotion work, changing the public emotion in direction or quality or nature, and manipulating it while producing responses to these emotions and needs in forms of electoral proposals.

For instance, a good example to illustrate the way campaigns shape the realities of the societies by managing the sentiments of voters is the renegotiation of representation and links between citizens and their representatives in the two countries. The main purpose of elections is to elect a new leadership for the country, but that process is additionally significant for the transitioning countries where the path to a new leadership can also mean a complete reimagining of the relationship between the representatives and the represented. With the crisis of representation in the two countries after the start of democratisation that is continuous, renegotiating the basis of representation during election campaign can be vital for the future of the community. Furthermore, when renegotiating the relationship between representatives and the electorate, the issue inevitably turns to trust or distrust. The majority of voters that participated in this study expressed distrust towards the representatives and political actors, and beyond that, towards entire systems and arrangements. As previously argued at the beginning of this chapter, recent campaigns around the world mobilised their constituencies effectively by inspiring both the distrust and trust within a society. They proved that inspiring either trust or distrust can be a winning strategy. In the two country cases before us as well, we saw how different campaigns faced with voters’ distrust chose different strategies. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, campaigns regularly designed messages and appeals that would provoke the sense of exclusion and division among the different ethnic groups that constitute the electorate. In Serbia on the other hand, in the elections of 2008 and 2012 campaigns promoted their visions of the nation and tried to inspire enthusiasm about the joint future and pride of belonging. However, the changes in voters’ sentiments inspired during the campaigns should not be expected to pass after the Elec-
The links of distrust among different groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the affection towards the nation in Serbia could be expected to last after the election cycle was over. Therefore, this study contributes to the knowledge of election campaigns by providing evidence that campaigns in fact do more than influence the voters’ participation, decision-making, individual preferences and knowledge of issues in a limited capacity. It offers findings and arguments that election campaigns have the power to influence societies in more significant ways. In addition to reconstructing meanings of identities, campaigns in these two studies also shape the political realities of these countries, renegotiate the basis of political representation, but also change the emotional states of the electorate.

The relevance of contextual factors

The studies of election campaigning in general and especially the studies on political marketing mostly focus on the techniques of campaigning and processes of professionalisation of politics which are equated with the processes of modernisation and Americanisation of campaigning. Concentrating on the methods, and the role played by communication professionals and international consultants initiated studies about the spread of the uniformed campaigning solutions across different systems and cultures (Plasser, 2000). On the other side, this study focused on the questions closely related to the context of the two countries. To start with, the study was interested in what made certain identity appeals strategic and effective and why voters responded better to some appeals rather than the others. The answers to these questions speak of the importance of the countries’ distinctive contexts in both the production and the reception of election campaigns. Further, the answers to these questions reveal that campaigns not only adjust their message to the institutional arrangements in which they operate, but they also rely on the recent
past and collective memories when designing their messages and trying to mobilise the electorate.

In trying to answer these questions, this study needed to engage with various aspects of social developments of the two societies and the ways these developments influenced communication patterns. This influence of the social context is recorded in campaign outputs as well, as the social contexts and developments seem to be intimately intertwined with communication patterns and the effectiveness of persuasion. The social contexts perhaps have an even larger influence on the role of the voters in the campaign communication processes, both on the ways voters’ demands get integrated in the production of campaign messages and the ways voters understand and receive them. First, findings show that campaign messages typically need to have enough context to make sense and appeal to their intended audiences. They respond to issues and affective states that move and mobilise voters. As argued, campaign appeals need to be resonant with the targeted group. The idea of resonance implies that campaigns try to design their messages with their targeted voters’ background knowledge and understanding in mind, so that the reasoning of the appeals would seem natural and familiar to the voters. An appeal that resonates with voters is the one that is aligned with the cultural environment of the group (Kubal, 1998, Gamson, 1989), it corresponds to the culture and context in style, form and content, but also with its ideas, values and beliefs.

What this study observes about the contexts of these countries is that in the campaigns in 2006/2010 and 2008/2012 the experiences of regime change, transition and ethnic conflicts and war have powerfully influenced the design of campaign messages and communication processes. In order to review these patterns of campaign communication, the study had to acknowledge the post-communist transitions and post-conflict recoveries in these two countries as exceptionally dramatic changes that left distinct impressions on the citizens, national systems, political actors, and practices. The data from the interviews and focus groups with voters shows that the experi-
ences of regime changes, ethnic conflicts, and wars influenced the voters so intensely that they continue to shape the ways the voters can be moved and motivated. First of all, the dissolution of the former country marred by wars, the processes of recovery, followed with the collapse of the previous regime (in Serbia) and the transitional reforms changing all aspects of social life that followed it, have all turned both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina into low trust societies. As data from the two countries show, the citizens of the two countries express high levels of distrust. This research found that voters in Serbia expressed disinterest in talking about elections and politics, and their cynicism and distrust were aimed at specific political elites. The voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed similar levels of distrust in political elites, but also surrounding ethnic groups and were very interested in discussing the political and the electoral. The noted low trust in representatives, the candidates and political parties, as well as governments, burdens the electoral communication and persuasive messaging. Findings also show that these levels of distrust shape the strategies of political actors. As already acknowledged earlier, voters’ distrust forces the campaigns to engage in emotion work in order to influence the change in public sentiments into different emotions and states rather than distrust and cynicism. The change is intended to provoke emotional states that can mobilise support. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, campaigns used fear appeals to provoke (ethnic) mobilisation in 2006 and 2010, while in Serbia in 2008 and 2012, the campaigns relied on enthusiasm appeals to inspire their voters.

Second, this study revealed that it is not only the current context that influences campaign production and reception, but also past experiences which have a significant impact on the matter. This study ended up describing a great number of stories from the past of these societies and the power of these stories to mobilise voters. The campaign materials studied here, as well as the voters’ and professionals’ testimonies, show that the (recent) powerful experiences and memories have the emotive capacity to sway voters. The two countries also
show differences in their uses of the past in campaigns. For example, findings show that the memories that have the biggest influence on the electorate are the memories of the communist past and the memories of the wars, in both countries. The campaigns in the two countries had different strategies for invoking these memories and gave very different accounts of the past events while also taking different positions towards it. The goal always was to motivate the groups that would react to the memory appeals, but in the process, the memories get retold, renegotiated and changed, and identities were constituted. Further, the study shows that the communist and socialist times in Serbia were reminisced about during campaigns to accommodate for the nostalgia recorded among the voters, and suggest the probability of the return of the good times, the way ‘we’ were in the golden era. But in Bosnia and Herzegovina the times were revoked by references to the World War II and the ethnic aspects of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mobilising ethnic groups.

On the other hand, in relation to the memories of the 1990s and the wars fought in the region, parties in Serbia took different positions, more or less explicit, towards the role of Serbia in these wars and the nature of the Milosevic rule. By promoting their positions, describing and arguing, narrating the past identity, the parties help constitute political identities that are then mobilised for the elections. Unlike Serbia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the memory appeals promoted by the campaigns have followed the official memory narratives of the groups focusing their mobilising efforts on their respective ethnic groups. And while the choice of collective memories and the ways they are used were limited by the official memory policies of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Serbia where there are no contested memory policies, the parties and candidates were free to use the memories in line with their strategies.

Another question this study was interested in was the role different institutional arrangements play in the design and execution of election campaigns. Given the selection of the countries, with their very
different arrangements at this point in time, the question merits examination here. As established earlier, the two selected cases are countries in transition towards democracies that have started their transitions from a similar background and historical experience in different arrangements. As already described, Serbia is a relatively centralised and ethnically homogeneous country, a semi-presidential political system with a popularly elected president and a unicameral parliament, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country with two separate entities (with their own governments and parliaments), a bicameral parliament, with the House of People consisted of representatives of the two entities, and the House of Representatives elected by popular vote, a collective presidency, a multiethnic society and international oversight. These arrangements further influence the electoral rules and campaigning and targeting practices, as discussed in previous chapters. In focusing on the rules and patterns of the electoral and public communication and the role they play in social processes, this study also provided an overview of the developments of these different systems. Nevertheless, one of the main findings of this study is that in both countries, regardless of the differences in their constitutions, campaigns designed their strategies around very similar concepts, national and ethnic identities. Why are the national and ethnic identities the most effective in two societies that are so different institutionally? It would seem that recent experiences, especially traumas of the war and regime change, helped to constitute collective identities which are ingrained deeply in the electorate and are still capable of inspiring powerful passionate mobilisation for the voters. Much more powerful than the official rules and institutional arrangements.

In conclusion, in comparison to the focus on methods and techniques the literature on campaigning offers, what this study observes is the consideration of the overwhelming importance of the contexts of the societies in which the elections are taking part. And not just of the current context but also of the collective past and memories and the
role they might have in mobilising electorates. This study finds that campaigns align their persuasive attempts with the understandings, knowledge and culture of their voters and therefore incorporate many contextual elements in the production of messages. Further, it reveals the immense power of the memories of the past, especially the traumatic ones, to move voters and motivate them. The study shows campaigns often rely on that power and utilise the memories and stories of the past in their appeals.

*Multi-method approach and communication*

The main questions asked in this study cover different directions of the communication processes. Some of these questions could have been examined by looking at the campaign materials themselves alone. For instance, this study could have provided insightful new knowledge on question of which collective identities were most commonly appealed to during the particular campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia solely by examining the messages. On the other hand, questions such as how strategic these recorded identity appeals are or why they motivate people to vote are better investigated through additional methods of inquiry, such as interviews with those who designed the messages and those who are on the receiving end of these appeals and narratives. The different methods applied in this study attempt to account for all of these segments of campaign communication process, the message itself, its production and its reception. The entire communication process was particularly linked together through the implementation of the reconstruction method (Reich, 2006). Following Reich (2006), this study used a piece of the interviewee’s campaign work to learn the story behind the creation of that specific piece. The same item was then used for discussion in the focus group to understand the reception of the audiences. In this way, the story of the design of the specific message was compared with the voters’ reaction to that same message. This granted an opportunity to learn about the entire communication process using a particular message and also to assess the symmetry of communication codes,
the understanding and misunderstanding between the encoder (producer) and the decoder (receiver) (Hall, 1973).

To illustrate this method and how it adds to the study of campaign communication, let us consider one of the slogans, used by the PDA in the election in 2010 in Bosnia and Herzegovina - ‘The people know’. Analysis done by a researcher would dismiss this slogan as simply a populist appeal, pronouncing an imaginary ‘people’ as the sovereign decision maker. But then, the slogan was investigated from both the production and reception side as well. As part of the design, the same slogan was discussed in interviews with communicators that created it and with voters that explained their reading of it in focus groups. In the case of this slogan, ‘The People Know’, the interviewee involved in its design, testified that the intention was to remind people that life was generally better when the party in question (PDA) was in power (2006 - 2010).

We wanted to remind people what it looks like when we are in charge of the processes. And that is how we got that nice story. To an extent, that story got us back (in power). But that was what we wanted, to remind people what healthcare was like, education, European integration, our position towards EU, NATO, when we ran these processes, what was the average salary, investments. According to all the criteria, it was better than it is now. That was our message, the people know what it is like when we are here.

This explanation given by one of its creators that the slogan ‘The People Know’ was intended to remind people of recent times of economic prosperity and successful social and political reforms was, however, contrasted with the answers of voters in the Bosniak-dominated focus group (Bosniaks being the main constituency of the party in this case). The voters read the slogan as a reminder of the role of the PDA in the war of the 1990s.

They probably wanted to draw attention to their war merits (Professional, Sarajevo). And that they led the defence (Student, Sarajevo). The armed fight (Pensioner, Sarajevo). When it was hard, they were with the people. And just by looking at their name, you know who the people is (Professional, Sarajevo). The Bosniaks (Student, Sarajevo). I think it is that organisation in the war, right before the war
(...) they prepared some sort of defence on the streets, guards in the buildings. That was launched by the PDA (Pensioner, Sarajevo). They were the first to organise the resistance (...) Hence, ‘The People Know’ (Professional, Sarajevo).

The interview and the discussion in focus group show a discrepancy between the intended meaning of the producers and the decoding of the receivers (voters) about the tested message. While the producers wanted to emit a message about the economy and the standard of living, the voters understood it as a reminder of the party’s war credits. The designed research instrument (content analysis - elite interviews - focus groups) allowed for this discrepancy to be acknowledged and analysed. And having exposed this, it was possible then to go back to the other materials of the party and assess the use of the message and different contexts it was given in different settings. The method proved to be a valuable tool for studying the entire process of campaign communication and the interplay between the actors involved and the message itself.

This methodological approach was designed with the task of answering the questions in this research. But the research design with its three main elements linked to the key research questions is not case specific, it is not specific to the contexts or the nature of the two countries or the specific campaigns. It is not even specific to the questions on collective identities this study is most interested. Instead, it could be applied to any question within the discipline which can benefit from the parallel and integrated analysis of the message itself combined with the perspectives of its producers and recipients. Hence, this study also serves the purpose of providing a verified methodology for this type of investigation.

**The normative value of election campaigns**

Concluding the contributions and insights offered by this study, discussion turns to the value of election campaigns and the role that they have in societies. Political actors and communication professionals seek to mobilise the electorate and win their votes with their
campaign messages and are rarely concerned with any consequences beyond the result of the election. Nevertheless, regardless of the intent with which they are produced, election campaigns serve a very important democratic function. In addition to providing an arena for the election of the future leadership, campaigns provide legitimacy for the ruling elites and the political system, but also more general direction, orientation, information, and knowledge about the world. Further, they mobilise activities and participation, as well as managing sentiments.

For their part, voters mainly want to be included in the electoral process as participants, or they want different amounts of information or cues about the candidates and their policies, or as the focus groups in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina show, they expect to hear something they can trust or hope for, something to make them feel safe or proud. By meeting these expectations, as argued in this study, campaigns further influence the political realities of the societies they serve; offer meanings and an understanding of that reality; provoke emotions and make collective identities salient; and suggest what it means to share these identities. In an attempt to direct the choices of the electorate, campaigns contextualise the past, frame the present, project the future, re-imagine the borders of the national body, and promote national values. They offer voters an understanding of who ‘we’ are and narrate what is our nature and character. One of the functions of narratives is the adjustment of the meanings of identities to global, economic, ideological shifts, and mass conversions (Price, 2012). That is, campaigns influence identities by adjusting the context and meaning of identities to the surrounding, changing environments, as well as internal, national circumstances.

From this perspective, election campaigns help modernise national and ethnic identities and that might be seen as progressive. Under normal circumstances, every couple of years, election campaigns narrate the meaning of these identities, acknowledging the changes that
have happened; they update the position of the group within a larger frame; and they explain the surroundings. Voters may learn and internalise new circumstances and the group’s standing within them. Campaigns would then be serving the purpose of prolonging the legitimacy of the entire system (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). Furthermore, the effects of the information learned during campaigns may not even be rational, but they may inspire emotional changes and attachments instead. For example, such may be the case of promoted foreign policies in the two countries, and consequential attachments to Russia or the EU (in Serbia) and Turkey, Russia, the EU, the US and the neighbouring motherlands (in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Admittedly, the duration and permanence of these campaign effects remain debated in the literature, but they are still important.

Even though a first glance suggests that adjusting national and ethnic narratives might be a needed and progressive reconciliation of the old and new, looking deeper, election campaigns have been observed to leave negative consequences as well. Even looking beyond the region, the recent campaigning practices of Western democracies, in the US, UK and all over Europe, we find very similar patterns of strategies based on fear of immigration, nationalism and isolationism as evidence that campaign communication can also be divisive and destructive. However, the role of political communication and the media in ethnic mobilisation in the recent history of the region during the era of wars and nationalism in the two countries studied here was always deemed important. It suggests that strategic communications and campaigns can be damaging and regressive, rather than modernising and progressive. In the eve of ethnic conflicts, the ethnic divisions in the region were advanced by mobilisation attempts of the elites trying to consolidate political power. Now they seem to continue to strive, heavily reinforced by the similar mobilisation attempts and communication processes, even during campaigns.
These considerations on the negative side of campaign communication open up questions of accountability of the actors involved in the campaign communication processes, political parties and candidates, voters and external communication professionals hired during campaigns. Expectedly, we could argue that political parties and candidates, as the leaders of this process, have a greater role and hence greater responsibility. Even more so, the big parties that dominate the electoral sphere, and also the ruling parties that later transform their electoral promises into governmental policies after the elections, also retain crucial responsibility in this process.

However, as was argued in this research, citizens and voters also have their own role in campaign communication, even on the production side. Voters’ identities and demands play a part in the processes of designing campaign messages. As already argued, their background, knowledge, values and beliefs also guide campaign communication processes, to a smaller extent. Although that makes their role in creating divisions and enforcing exclusions less significant, it would still be overly simplistic to only accuse the political actors of spreading fear and encouraging divisions during campaigns and manipulating the electorate towards nationalism and isolation.

But what is especially interesting is the role of hired campaign professionals, managers, and consultants in these processes: their role seems to be significant and their performance surprisingly autonomous at times. They are the ones that poll, aggregate the voters’ demands, make strategy recommendations, and argue for directions and policy signals. With input from voters and decisions of their clients (political actors), hired campaign professionals execute campaigns, design messages and invest in promoting them heavily. Findings in this study confirm that not all messages are polled or tested in focus groups. Sometimes they are thought of by the candidates on the scene or the campaign professionals themselves, suggesting that they were not endorsed in any way by the voters.
For instance, a good example of when messages were not tested is in the selection of past events and occasions that were employed during campaigns in order to contextualise the electoral moment and mobilise voters. The choice of certain episodes over others has particular consequences for the collective identities that they address. They often become a story pertaining to that identity, a part of its narrative, and stay with the people who share that identity. Notably, as testimonies from the campaign professionals show, many of the episodes used in these campaigns were selected based on the party, candidate or communication professionals’ own beliefs and inclinations, or simply spur of the moment decisions and flashes of inspiration. This practice suggests a great amount of freedom to construct electoral messages for the campaigns and professionals who design them, especially considering their further significance in constructing the narratives of the targeted identities. Interestingly, but also worryingly, apart from the candidates themselves, none of the external campaign designers share any responsibility or accountability for the consequences of the messages and narratives they help construct. As this study reveals, campaign professionals rarely consider the question of their own accountability, a lack of consideration that is shared with academic literature on campaigning.

On a smaller scale, the study of campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina observed that the practice of election campaigns appeals to the most powerful and mobilising identities people share, without considering the potential consequences that promoting these identities can have in countries that have been through ethnic wars and conflicts. Campaign producers fail to consider the post-election consequences of the passions that are generated in motivating the electorate during the campaign. Looking beyond these two countries and the region to recent developments in campaigning, it seems important for the study of election campaigns everywhere to move beyond the methods and tactics of modern campaigning. Instead, it
seems appropriate for the discipline to focus more of its attention on
the question of the practice of professional political communicators
and the culture of political consultancy that shapes it, and engage in
normative assessments of it.
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Appendix 1: Interview guide

The interview guide contains 11 questions - 8 are universal and are to be discussed with all interviewees. The remaining 3 are examples of questions that changed with every interviewee. These questions were dependent on the reconstruction materials used for the specific interview. The guide also contains additional questions if the interviewee needed further prompting on the subject. The questions were designed to cover the process of designing campaign strategy and related materials summarised in the Methodology Chapter. They also reflect the theoretical considerations concerning identity appeals and targeting practices of campaigns.

The questions are divided alongside 4 topics:

- Designing campaign strategy
- Designing specific campaign messages
- Segmentation of voters and targeting practices
- The Practice of ‘Othering’
Introductory note for the interviewees:

The purpose of this research project is to examine closely the strategy of election campaigns. The idea is to see how voters are targeted in campaigns and how successful the campaigns are in appealing to voters in the manner they have been appealing. This research is part of the research being done with the aim of writing a PhD thesis and will be used solely for this purpose.

The participants were selected according to their roles in campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008/2010. The research is expected to include 20 – 30 interviews with campaign officials at different levels in the two countries. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still withdraw at any time. You do not have to give a reason.

If you choose to take part in the research you will be asked to answer questions about previous elections campaigns, reflect on the messages from the campaigns, and explain the designing process of the messages and the rationale behind it. For the purpose of a more detailed discussion, you might be shown videos, ads, and recordings of speeches from the previous campaigns and ask to reflect on it. The interview should take about an hour and a half and will be recorded for the purpose of transcribing them later. The audio of your activities made during this research will be used only for analysis and for illustration in conference presentations and lectures. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings. An honest effort to keep your identity anonymous will be made. The data collected will be kept in a secure file for the period of 3 years, until the PhD thesis is completed.
- **Introductory question about the process of designing strategies:**

1. Looking back at the campaigns of 2008 and 2012 (2006 and 2010), could you describe the process - how the strategy for the campaigns were designed?
   - Who was involved?
   - Did it change the campaign?

- **Questions about the processes of creating campaign materials:**

2. And the slogan, (name the slogans) how was the slogan created? Were these slogans directed at some specific group, were they supposed to motivate some-one specific?

3. How is the manifesto created?

4. Who were the targets of the campaign? How were they seen by the campaign?

5. Why were these voters selected?

6. Are specific appeals designed for these targets? How? Which ones? Were they effective?

7. Who are manifestos targeted at? What is their point/aim?

*(Example:)*

For instance, in the manifesto of 2012, there is a section on traffic infrastructure:
How were the promises in this section decided upon (I will have the actual manifesto with me)?

The section on new jobs precisely mentions young and middle aged people, the poor and PhDs, why?

How about the section on the exports and the new state-sponsored bank that was proposed? Why is this here in the manifesto?

New moms were also targeted and offered benefits, how did this come to be an election promise?

Why mention the athletes and the need to invest in them?)

- Optional questions with reconstruction materials:

(Example)

8. In the 2008 and 2012 campaign, the presidential candidate/party leader spoke a lot about the region.

Serbia needs to be a leader in the region.

We need to take care about our people living in the western parts, they have the right to cultivate our national identity.

(Prominent figures from the region were present in the campaign.)

Was there a strategic decision behind this? Why is the region so important in campaigns? Are some countries in the region more important than others?

9. Especially in the 2008 campaign, there was a lot of talk from the campaign about Djokovic and our other tennis players and then Tesla and
Milankovic, Stojkovic (scientists) were brought in. Why was this part of the campaign narrative?

10. In one of the TV debates, the presidential candidate/party leader said: At the beginning of this century, we were a country that had a very interesting and dynamic technological development. We were not the largest economy (...), but we were, for example, a nation that had the courage to start an aviation industry.

Who decides on these ‘stories’ to be told? Why are they told, how are they selected?

- **Question about the Other:**

11. Can you think of any groups/persons/ideas that serve the purpose of contrasting the candidate/party against? Is this ‘reverse-targeting’ helpful for positioning?
Appendix 2: Focus Groups Guide

The interview guide for focus groups contains 7 questions, - 1 general question, with the aim of breaking the ice and setting the conversation. Next one relies on voters’ memory about the campaigns under study and lets the participants guide the conversation revealing their own impressions and memories. The remaining 4 questions are asked in pair with the visual aid (the very campaign materials in question). The guide also contains additional questions if the participants needed further prompting on that particular question. The questions were designed to reveal the processes of receiving campaign messages by the audiences.

- Ice-breaker question:

How do you feel about pre-election times, do you enjoy following campaigns?

1. What do you remember most from the 2006/2008/2010/2012 campaign?

2. What do you think about the parties’ slogans in these elections?

(List the slogans and circulate the materials containing the slogans used in studied campaigns)

3. In their manifestos in these elections, parties are ad-dressing specific issues and promising particular solutions. Let us look at them.

(Read out all the major sections – in most manifestos these are On unemployment, On Pensioners, On Foreign Policy positions... Go quickly over the identities mentioned in the manifestos).
Are any of these related to you? Are they addressing your issues? Which ones?

4. Can we look at the two sections from the TV debates that were held in these elections?

Why were they saying this?

Whose votes were they trying to win?

5. Can we look at a few inserts from rally speeches now?

Why were they saying this?

Whose votes were they trying to win?

6. Do you feel that politicians were talking to the citizens in the right way? Do you think they could have addressed people differently?
Appendix 3: Information sheet - Elite Interviews

Research Project ‘The Efficacy of Election Campaign Appeals in the Election Campaigns’

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Feel free to ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

The purpose of the research project:

The purpose of this research project is to examine closely the strategy of election campaigns. The idea is to see how voters are targeted in campaigns and how successful the campaigns are in appealing to voters in the manner they have been appealing. This research is part of the research being done with the aim of writing a PhD thesis and will be used solely for this purpose.

The participants were selected according to their roles in campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008/2012 and 2006/2010. The research is expected to include 20 – 30 interviews with campaign officials at different levels in the two countries. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still withdraw at any time. You do not have to give a reason.

If you choose to take part in the research you will be asked to answer questions about previous elections campaigns, reflect on the messages from the campaigns, explain the designing process of the messages and the rationale behind it. For the purpose of a more detailed discussion, you might be shown videos, ads, recordings of speeches from the previous campaigns and ask to reflect on it. The interview should take about 45 minutes and will be recorded for the purpose of transcribing them later. The audio of your activities made during this research will be used only for analysis and for illustration in conference presentations and lectures. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project
will be allowed access to the original recordings. An honest effort to keep your identity anonymous will be made. The data collected will be kept in a secure file for the period of 3 years, until the PhD thesis is completed.

The overall benefits of participating in this research is to enable the knowledge of political communication and election campaigns and to shed light on strategies used in election campaigns and how they are perceived by the voters themselves. There are no risks foreseen related to the participation in this project.

**Organization and Funding**

This research is organised and conducted for the purpose of qualifying for a PhD title at the Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds. The research is funded by the researcher.

**Contact for further information:**

Ana Stojiljkovic  
[csast@leeds.ac.uk / ana.stojiljkovic@gmail.com](mailto:csast@leeds.ac.uk)

Institute of Communications Studies  
The University of Leeds  
Leeds  
LS2 9JT  
UK  
M: +447711092152 / +381643515535

Thank you for taking the time to read the information sheet. You are welcome to keep this copy of the information sheet. In addition, you will be supplied with a written consent form, should you decide to take part in the research.
Institute of Communications Studies

Ovaj dokument sadrži potreban informacije o istraživanju u kome ste pozvani da učestvujete. Pre nego što odlučite da li ćete uzeti učešća u istraživanju, slobodni ste da proučite razloge sprovođenja ovog istraživanja i šta ono sve podrazumeva. Odvojite dovoljno vremena da proučite ove informacije, možete ih i raspraviti sa drugim licima. Stojim Vam na raspolaganju za dodatne informacije i pojašnjenja.

Cilj istraživanja:
Tema ovog istraživanja su strategije izbornih kampanja. Cilj je znanje o načinima kako se izborne kampanje obraćaju biračima. Ovo istraživanje se sprovodi kao deo istraživanja za potrebe pisanja doktorata i informacije dobijene na ovaj način neće biti korišćene u druge svrhe.


Ako se odlučite da učestvujete u istraživanju, biće Vam postavljena pitanja o prethodnim izbornim kampanjama, izbornim porukama, načinima i razlozima njihovog kreiranja. Sa ciljem konkretnijeg razgovora, mogu Vam biti prikazani snimci ili drugi materijali iz kampanja. Intervju bi trebalo da traje oko sat vremena i bio bi snimljen za potrebe kasnijeg prepisa. Intervju će biti korišćen samo za potrebe analize i pisanja doktorata i niko van projekta neće imati pristup snimku. Za svaku drugu svrhu, od Vas će biti tražena pisma saglasnost. Anonimnost učesnika u istraživanju će biti zaštićena. Informacije prikupljene tokom istraživanja biće čuvane do 3 godina po završetku doktorata, posle čega će biti uništene.

Cilj ovog istraživanja je dalji razvoj naučne discipline političkih komunikacija i izbornih kampanja, očekuje se da ovo istraživanje omogući bolje
razumevanje strategija izbornih kampanja u Srbiji i načina na koji birači razumeju izborne poruke. Pretpostavka je da ovo istraživanje ne prate nikakvi rizici.

**Organizacija i Finansiranje**

Ovo istraživanje je organizovano u svrhu ispunjenja uslova za kvalifikaciju doktora nauka na Institutu za studije komunikacija Univerziteta u Lidsu, Velika Britanija. Finansirano je od strane istraživača i univerziteta.

**Kontakt:**

Ana Stojiljkovic

csast@leeds.ac.uk / ana.stojiljkovic@gmail.com

Institute of Communications Studies The University of Leeds

Leeds

LS2 9JT

UK

M: +447711092152 / +381643515535

Hvala što ste pročitali ovu informaciju. Ukoliko se odlučite da učestvujete u istraživanju, biće Vam dostavljen i formular za pismeni pristanak.
Appendix 4: Information sheet - Focus Groups

Research Project: *The Efficacy of Campaign Appeals in Election Campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina*

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Feel free to ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

**The purpose of the research project:**

The purpose of this research project is to examine closely the strategy of election campaigns. The idea is to see how voters are targeted in campaigns and how successful the campaigns are in appealing to voters in the manner they have been appealing. This research is part of the research being done with the aim of writing a PhD thesis and will be used solely for this purpose.

The participants for this research were chosen randomly in 3 major cities in the country. Every group in each city will be consisting of 4-5 participants. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still withdraw at any time, until the data is anonymised. You do not have to give a reason.

If you choose to take part in the research you will be asked to answer questions about previous elections campaigns, how you perceived the messages and what you made of them. You will also be shown videos, ads, and recordings of speeches from the previous campaign and ask to reflect on them. These interviews will be conducted as a group discussion and will last for about an hour and a half. Snacks and refreshments will be provided. Discussions will be recorded for the purpose of transcribing them later. Transcripts of these discussions will be used only for analysis and for illustration in conference presentations and lectures. No other use will be made of them.
without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings.

All the answers will be anonymised by separating personal data (names and contact information) and keeping them in different files. If someone is to be addressed by name during the discussions, the name will be replaced during the transcribing process. The data collected will be kept in a secure file for the period of 3 years, until the PhD thesis is completed.

The overall benefits of participating in this research is to enable the knowledge of political communication and election campaigns and to shed light on strategies used in election campaigns and how they are perceived by the voters themselves. There are no risks foreseen related to the participation in this project.

**Organisation and Funding**

This research is organised and conducted for the purpose of qualifying for a PhD title at the Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds. The research is funded by the researcher.

**Contact for further information:**

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Institute of Communications Studies

The University of Leeds

Leeds

LS2 9JT

UK

M: +447711092152 / +381643515535

Thank you for taking the time to read the information sheet. You are welcome to keep this copy of the information sheet. In addition, you will be supplied with a written consent form, should you decide to take part in the research.
Appendix 5: Consent Form

Consent to take part in the research project ‘The Efficacy of Election Campaign Appeals in campaigns in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Add your initials next to the statement if you agree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated xx/xx/xx explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact for further information: Ana Stojiljkovic <a href="mailto:csast@leeds.ac.uk">csast@leeds.ac.uk</a> / <a href="mailto:ana.stojiljkovic@gmail.com">ana.stojiljkovic@gmail.com</a> Institute of Communications Studies University of Leeds Leeds LS2 9JT UK M: +447711092152 / +381643515535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I give permission for the researcher to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant future research in an anonymised form.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the researcher should my contact details change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of participant</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant’s signature</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>Name of lead researcher</td>
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<tr>
<td>Signature</td>
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*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant.