

The Memory of Text – the Text of Memory:

A Study of Selected Works by James Joyce

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds
School of English

May 2007

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
I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr Richard Brown, for sharing his extensive knowledge, his time, and for providing invaluable advice. I must also express my gratitude to the School of English for granting me a Full Fee Scholarship from 2003 until 2006.

A special note of thanks goes to Professor Hans Walter Gabler, who, in the early stages of my work, kindly agreed to read some drafts, and whose encouragement and expertise has always been much appreciated.

I am particularly grateful to my colleagues at the Brotherton Library who have all played a part in keeping me sane and fed, especially to Bill, Les, and Mick, for putting up with me during the more difficult times. I am indebted to my parents and to my mother-in-law for their constant support and their willingness to listen.

And of course I owe a special debt of gratitude to my wife Elaine. She has always supported me with immense patience, persistence, and serenity. This thesis is dedicated to her.

To E-C-



Abstract

This study focuses on the development of memory with regard to the textual evolution of Joyce's works from *Dubliners* to *Ulysses*. My hypothesis is centered on the idea that in the Joycean narrative, structures of memory are fabricated as much through aspects relating to textual organisation as to the narrative representation of character consciousness.

The basis of my analysis is formed by close readings of a selection of Joyce's works. A critical framework against which to read Joyce's engagement with the "textualisation" of memory processes is provided by some key works associated with the "cultural climate" within which Joyce worked, such as texts by Freud and Bergson. In reviewing the recent critical debate, this study sets out to establish the theoretical setting of the topic and relates it to the practice of textual analysis.

My approach throughout chapters two to seven delineates a conceptual framework which differentiates between character memory and textual memory. I consider Joyce's works in terms of various paradigms of remembering and forgetting through a series of critical readings. The objective is to trace the poetics of memory in Joyce, and to show how processes of recollection and forgetting can be read in terms of writing and of textual production.

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations, editions, and methods of reference have been used:

- D* Joyce, James, *Dubliners*, ed. by Hans Walter Gabler with Walter Hettche (New York: Garland, 1993). References to page numbers.
- SH* Joyce, James, *Stephen Hero*, ed. by John J. Slocum and Herbert Cahoon (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1963). References to page numbers. Chapter numbers based on this edition are given in Roman numerals.
- P* Joyce, James, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, ed. by Hans Walter Gabler with Walter Hettche (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). References in the form chapter.line number (e.g. *P* III.135 for Chapter Three, line number 135).
- U* Joyce, James, *Ulysses*, ed. by Hans Walter Gabler with Wolfhard Steppe and Claus Melchior (New York: Vintage Books, 1986). References in the form episode.line number (e.g. *U* 3.315 for episode three, line number 315).
- JJA* *The James Joyce Archive*, 63 Vols., ed. by Michael Groden and others (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1977-1979). Volume numbers, as provided by Michael Groden in *James Joyce's Manuscripts: An Index* (New York: Garland, 1980), are given in square brackets. For full publication details, see Bibliography.

Publications from this thesis

An edited extract from Section 4.3. was published in *ecloga*, issue 5 (autumn 2006), 46-61.

An early version of Chapter 6 was delivered as a paper at the University of St Andrews, as part of a conference entitled “Sound Effects: The Oral/Aural Dimensions of Literatures in English”, 5-8 July 2006.

Preface

“Pen something. Pendennis? My memory is getting. Pen ...? Of course it's years ago.” (*U* 8.178-179)

“So it returns. Think you're escaping and run into yourself.” (*U* 13.1101)

“My memory's not so bad.” (*U* 13.1142)

“Mnemo. Confused light confuses memory.” (*U* 15.2737)

In the light of these quotations from *Ulysses*, Leopold Bloom could conceivably be considered the character in Joyce's works who engages most explicitly with questions relating to the stability of time and identity, and who appears most acutely aware of memory's complexity and its ambiguities. Of all of Joyce's works, *Ulysses* has perhaps been read most often with respect to manifestations of memory, their philosophical and psychological contexts, and their significance for character representation. Criticism has frequently limited itself to a rather narrowly defined discussion of memory, often purely with regard to one particular character, or to one particular context. Rarely, however, have Joyce's works been considered in terms the relationship between memory and textuality. My aim, therefore, is to trace the development of this relationship within a specific framework of selected texts.

This study focuses on the development of memory in relation to the textual evolution of Joyce's works from *Dubliners* to *Ulysses*. I explore the hypothesis that the representation of memory undergoes a number of modifications, in the course of which the interplay between memory as experienced by a character on one hand, and memory as a textual construct on the other hand, is rendered increasingly complex. The reader's awareness as regards memory-events within a written text has rarely

been touched upon in criticism, and this study aims to highlight the significance of memory not purely on the level of character representation, but to interrelate the question of characters' recollections with issues concerning authorial memory, the reader's memory, and memory as a textual construct, as an artefact in which recollection becomes quite literally "imprinted".

Some key works associated with the "cultural climate" within which Joyce wrote, such as texts by Freud and Bergson, provide a critical background against which to read Joyce's engagement with the "textualisation" of memory processes. In reviewing the recent critical debate, Chapter One establishes the theoretical setting of the topic and relates it to the practice of textual analysis in this thesis. This is followed by some examples of close readings from *A Portrait* which help to illustrate predominant strategies for the fabrication of networks of memory and anticipation in Joyce.

Four stories from *Dubliners* shape the discussion in Chapter Two. By investigating memory-events in relation to characters' moments of crisis, I attempt to broaden my approach to an investigation of narrative absences and their role in the text. The hypothesis that memory in *Dubliners* functions as a source of insight for the characters is considered, and the idea is followed up by relating it to questions concerning the dynamics of gender, power, and authority. Ultimately, I propose that memory in *Dubliners* is often experienced by the characters as a compulsive condition. As such, it tends to signal a breakdown of communication, thus generating a sense of isolation for the individual rather than providing release from a troubled present.

Chapter Three introduces the suggestion that *Stephen Hero*, a text that has often been neglected by literary criticism, occupies an important position in the

development of Joyce's representation of character consciousness, and may therefore be considered a more unconventional piece of writing than has previously been conceded. The focus in this discussion lies on the textual representation of memory in *Stephen Hero*, and on Stephen Daedalus' resistance against habitual engagement with his own past. This is complemented by an analysis of the concept of epiphany in relation to the representation of memory.

How the workings of memory act and re-act in relation to character consciousness, textual structure, and style is highlighted in Chapter Four, with particular emphasis on repetition and its relation to Stephen's memory in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. My reading engages with the function of key-words and sound-patterns, and I use the term "textual memory" to illustrate a mode of memory located within the dynamics of the text, distinct from the recollections experienced by Stephen. Furthermore, I attempt to read *A Portrait* in terms of the psychologically motivated act of telling, and I examine and compare Joyce's narrative construction of Stephen Dedalus with Sigmund Freud's psychobiographical treatment of Leonardo da Vinci.

My reading of *Ulysses* is based around the three main characters of the novel, and Chapter Five evolves from an analysis of Stephen's problematic relationship with his past and its disguised and "ghosted" reappearance in the present. The discussion situates Stephen within a conflict between two contradictory conceptions of selfhood: The protean principle of flux and of continual transformation, and the permanence associated with the notion of entelechy and the timelessness of the soul.

Leopold Bloom, the "Sirens" episode, and the theme of auditory memory form the centre of Chapter Six. My analysis links Bloom's relationship with memory to the chapter's play with sound-effects. I argue that the narrative representation of

time and of consciousness intersects with textually generated “sound-recordings” to create a new mechanics of memory, a textual “gramophony”.

Finally, Chapter Seven unravels the “Penelope” episode as a metaphor for the workings of memory. The focus lies on Molly Bloom’s role in relation to *Ulysses*’ self-referentiality. Molly Bloom’s extensive “monologue” has most frequently been read in terms of the representation of “the female”, an approach which fails to address an important aspect of the episode: its status as a “perpetual motion machine” of textually engineered memory-work. I propose that in recalling, rewriting, and revising the web of textual creation, the “Penelope” episode mirrors the work of its author, in a process which refers back to the written word as a location of memory.

The challenge of this thesis lies in revealing the manner in which concepts of memory, time, identity, and text production intertwine in the textual setting. I shall explore the interplay between these issues with particular emphasis on memory as textual construct. Memory, then, is not only operative within the temporal dimension, but can be positioned (and can be “read”) within a purely textual dimension as well. Its visual and aural elements are conveyed in the printed word in such a manner that past, present, and future constitute an associative network in which the text is forever rewriting itself. In the words of Leopold Bloom:

“Past was is today. What now is will then morrow as now was be past yester.” (*U* 15.2409-2410)

**Part I: *Dubliners*, *Stephen Hero*, and *A Portrait of the Artist*
as a *Young Man***

Chapter 1: Modes of memory and narratability

1.1. The critical context

Towards the end of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* we come upon the following statement: “The past is consumed in the present and the present is living only because it brings forth the future” (P V.2718-2720). For Stephen Dedalus, time and experience are in a state of flux or even of oscillation between threat and reassurance, and thus what the text enacts is an incessant re-rehearsal of itself. The opening paragraphs of *A Portrait* have been described as a microcosm containing the essence of the novel in compressed form.¹ Joyce incorporates meditations on time into his works, and the text becomes the site of tension between diverse modes of remembering. Udaya Kumar has pointed out that in *A Portrait*, “[t]here is no single past, but a series of pasts, various ways of articulating a world and a self”.² Giving voices to present, past and future, Joyce’s texts make use of linguistic and stylistic devices such as rhyme, allusion, and repetition. As readers, our apprehension depends to some extent on the recognition of these elements. Just as Stephen grapples with the articulation of “his” song in the opening section of *A Portrait*, we must constantly re-interpret the allusive and fragmentary prose that makes up *Ulysses*.

The dynamics at work is thus quite clearly a twofold one. In a sense, Joyce’s works may well be constructed around retrospective arrangements of his own past,³ but simultaneously, they engage the reader in such a way that the notion of retrospection

alternates with the quest for a solution, for the final words: “the end”. Discussing the implications of such an oscillating temporal perspective in narrative texts, Peter Brooks brings forward the following argument:

Repetition, remembering, reenactment are the ways in which we replay time, so that it may not be lost. We are thus always trying to work back through time to that transcendent home, knowing, of course, that we cannot. All we can do is subvert or, perhaps better, pervert time: which is what narrative does.⁴

The subversion, or perversion, of time as a function or symptom of narrative: This concept provokes an array of questions. In the light of the above quotation, how does memory play a part in narrative texts? How does a text construct its own past, and how does it assume the temporal dimension which Brooks attributes to it? What forms the relation between memory and narrative? “Working back through time”: Is that really the way in which narrative works? After all, memory is an element intrinsic to the narrative act: “the Latin word for the verb ‘to narrate’, ‘to report’, is *memorare*”.⁵

The crucial question, I believe, concerns the interplay between the structure of narrative and the processes of memory embodied within the text. In this study, I wish to examine how narrative shapes or constructs a sense of its own past in the light of different modes of recollection. Through the activities of writing and reading, the text itself becomes, in my view, a site of memory. This thesis analyses the manner in which characters’ pasts are constructed and presented in the text, and it looks into the processes and textual devices by which the text itself assumes the function of a memorial. As Brooks has observed, narrative repeats, remembers, reenacts. It is my objective to demonstrate precisely how this is achieved in relation to the works by James Joyce selected for this study.

“[M]emory”, asserts Walter Benjamin, “issues strict weaving regulations”.⁶ The question of how the processes of memory can be brought to bear on literary texts, or,

conversely, how those texts play with different notions of memory, has been the object of a whole host of theoretical and critical works. Approaches to the study of Joyce's works have shown substantial variations over time, from firmly psychoanalytic methods of interpretation to structuralism, from a deconstructionist view to a historicist perspective. The debate concerning memory in Joyce's works, although not a radically new consideration, has resurfaced in recent years with the publication of some interesting pieces of criticism aiming to shed further light on the mysteries of memory as a textual function.

One relatively recent example of these is John S. Rickard's *Joyce's Book of Memory*, a study of the different kinds of memory which manifest themselves in *Ulysses*. Rickard focuses on an analysis of the interrelation between notions of subjectivity and memory, showing how such figures as Leopold Bloom, Molly Bloom, and Stephen Dedalus are each markedly shaped by their own distinct pasts. The thorough examination undertaken by Rickard into different types of memory along with their effects on textual structure and the reader's mind is one which I would like to use as a stepping-stone for some preliminary hypotheses before delving further into the web of textual analysis.

Before I return to Rickard's extensive efforts to illuminate questions of memory in *Ulysses*, it may be useful to look into other, often somewhat more narrowly defined attempts at examining issues of subjectivity, identity, and memory in the works of James Joyce. For instance, Nicholas Andrew Miller has produced a book which attempts to integrate the wider implications of different perceptions of history. In his book *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory*, he states that the past can be transformed into an object which is then textualised and thus becomes "legible", as is the case with public memorials. The importance of visual perception is naturally

stressed in this context, since memorials are, in Miller's words, "textual markers", or "sites for the reading of history".⁷ But why "eroticise" memory? "To 'eroticize' as a historicizing operation", writes Miller, "suggests that one cede to the inexorable and paradoxical function of desire a certain process in one's readings of texts, and that one do so precisely with reference to textuality's historical dimension".⁸

The image here is one of exchange: The present is constantly engaged in interpreting and thereby creating the past, while history as a "spectacle"⁹ propels acts of memory in the present. So, in other words, memory is concerned with the *desire* to recover a past that cannot be brought back. History thus becomes a construct, a projection of the human longing for a structured world, in which the past somehow legitimises the present. Miller states that, likewise, psychoanalysis is not "about recovering the truth of a patient's past",¹⁰ but about the promise of a truth which remains fundamentally unattainable, a characteristic which it shares with the analysis of pieces of narrative. I would suggest that the notion of the present as an agent of exchange can be taken further, in fact, it can easily be introduced into the context of narrative. Here, too, interpretation takes place retrospectively, and thereby has the potential to question or even subvert and re-create received meaning. In this process, a story receives its past: it becomes a history.

Joyce's works seem to undermine the notion of the past as a fixed "body" that can be accessed by a certain hermeneutic of recovery. Instead of offering a predetermined path of discourse, Joyce's fiction subverts the integrity of any fixed readings of subjectivity or history, as will be demonstrated in this study. Generally speaking, the teleology of mnemotechnic may be illustrated by Miller's notion of an "economy of desire"¹¹ in which the quest for knowledge predetermines the final outcome. For Miller, memory is more than just a re-collection of things that happened in the past: it is "an

activity through which the rememberer locates his or her own 'self' [...] across all of history".¹² This is what he calls the "temporal anamorphosis", a kind of distortion by which the subject is simultaneously placed in every single instant of his or her own life-history, and in which memory records, using Joyce's own expression, "a fluid succession of presents".¹³ In the act of remembering, a subject is confronted with a self-image which "stretches out" across history in its desire for knowledge about itself. Ireland's relation to its past, Miller argues, is continually re-enacted in this quest for identity.

W.J. McCormack takes a similar view on Ireland in terms of an ongoing re-definition of national identity, but he arrives at a conclusion quite different from Miller's. In his attempt to historicise Joyce's fiction, he addresses the issue of temporality from a different perspective. He argues that, in the case of *Ulysses*, there was never a contemporary readership. The fictional events of the original "Bloomsday" could first be "read" in 1922, and "historical change", in other words, "events occurring between the conception and publication of the novel" had, according to McCormack, "rendered 16 June 1904 no longer contemporary".¹⁴ For him, *Ulysses* is historical in more than one sense. Its setting on a particular day anchors it firmly within a historical time frame, and stylistically, the novel historicises the process of its own composition. Early 20th century Ireland provides not one background to Joyce's works but many; for instance, the moral, economic and linguistic changes, while not strictly speaking confined to Irish culture alone, are seen as decisive not just in an Irish but in a British (domestic and imperial) context. McCormack identifies the Irish condition as one of "cultural trauma", experienced – uniquely perhaps – "through the medium of linguistic change".¹⁵

The “nightmare of history” which serves as the title of McCormack’s essay harbours a twofold meaning. History is an active agent, the *cause* or personification of a nightmare, experienced as a threatening force by individual or collective consciousness, or, alternatively, a nightmare to which history itself is subjected. In short, the ambiguity of language, and language use, relates closely to the colonial condition of Irish society, as well as to the potential of subversion, of temporarily reversing the relationship between the familiar and the foreign.

Christine van Boheemen takes up the terms trauma and memory when she addresses the discursive deadlock that she claims has affected literary expression in Irish culture. She strives to examine the condition behind Joyce’s literary productivity in the light of a postcolonial perspective on Irish writing and of Foucault’s statement of the “death” of the author. She believes that Joyce worked within a particular condition of Irish culture, a condition shaped by a traumatic past, characterised by what she calls a “deadlock of signification”.¹⁶ The matter of repression and traumatic repetition is mirrored by a discursive split of the self into elements of the familiar and of the foreign.¹⁷ The most important point in Van Boheemen’s argument appears to be centred around the traumatic past that is repressed, or omitted, from discourse, but which nevertheless inhabits Joyce’s consciousness to such a degree that the direct result is an obsession with infinite repetition of that which discourse is incapable of expressing: a “discursive deadlock”,¹⁸ a notion which will be one of the points examined in relation to *Dubliners*.

While she apparently agrees with Miller’s notion of the past as a shaping force for the production of objects of art, in particular of those consciously designed as “memorials”, the crucial point for Van Boheemen lies in the very *absence* of the past from these objects, absences that can be explained by the trauma which the omitted

event represents. She claims that, in the repetitiveness of acting out the traumatic moment, Joyce turns the text into an alternative body, in which memory may function as a material effect, a “cultural material-memory”.¹⁹ The text represses the very core around which it revolves: this seems to be the key concern of Van Boheemen’s investigation.

The notion of the unnameable, that which language strives in vain to articulate and express but which is only one of many symptoms of a traumatic inhibition of memory function, gains significance when applied to the textual construction of memory instances in Joyce’s works. The way in which language itself, in particular the language we associate with Stephen Dedalus, works incessantly in the attempt to rework and thereby liberate the present from the past, is not followed up in great detail in Van Boheemen’s study. However, the matter will be one of the key concerns in my reading of the three novels in this study, since it seems to me that it is primarily through his attempts to uncover the mysteries of language that Stephen Dedalus endeavours to place his own body within the condition of the narrative, a notion that criticism has frequently neglected. Van Boheemen does allow for the idea that one strategy of the subject is to find a grasp on language, and to transform the trauma into words – words which then establish their very own kind of poetry, as in patterns and rhyme. Through the very means of expression, a struggle is enacted between a reworking and a denial of trauma, or of what Van Boheemen refers to as “the dubious/dividual drama of a symbolic wound that can be neither denied nor articulated”.²⁰

The wound, or scar, is also part of the terminology used by Maud Ellmann in describing the structure of the text of *A Portrait*, the significance of which she locates in its “very blanks and repetitions”.²¹ A scar, like a trace of something experienced previously, is then a form of belated comprehension; like in an act of recollection, it can

only be read backwards, or “disremembered”. It takes a recurrence of some kind to “activate” the scar, in other words, a device or strategy is needed to recover it from the realms of the unconscious, and to place it in the larger context of human perception and recollection. What is more, the scar itself is invisible, it manifests itself only through its emissions. It belongs “not only to the subject but to the text itself”,²² and in assuming such a textual function, it gains a power similar to Van Boheemen’s unnameable absence (“*Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*”)²³ in the structural patterns of the text.

Evidently, there are elements in the “story” of Stephen Dedalus’ life which have been suppressed from the act of “telling” of that same story, but which are nevertheless hinted at by palpable “absences” in discourse. Ellmann’s examples for this include the passage which starts with the words “Stephen was once again seated beside his father in the corner of a railway carriage at Kingsbridge” (*P* II.946-947), where she points out that there is no prior instance of Stephen sharing a railway carriage with his father in the text. And yet the passage draws on a previous one, which is concerned with the dream of a train journey that Stephen has while lying sick in the infirmary. It is interesting in this context that Ellmann speaks of the *reader* undergoing a repetition, for this affirms the pure textuality of the experience. Stephen is not described as actively recalling his dream while on the night train to Cork. What provides the reader with a sense of repetition is the phrasing, for instance, the mention of the telegraph poles which appear to move past the train, an interesting notion in itself. According to Ellmann, the second episode is necessary “to activate the scar left by the first”.²⁴ Repetition, in other words, is a textual device for the activation of a memory process which the reader experiences almost unawares.

Drawing upon Ellmann’s line of thought, I think it is important to distinguish between acts of memory which are closely tied to the level of character consciousness

and those which work in a more independent manner, especially those that seem to directly address and play on the reader's capability for recollection. It could be argued that Ellmann's process of "disremembering", of reading backwards and thereby "not developing but devolving",²⁵ is not the only momentum that the text imposes. For what is it that makes the reader carry on reading? What makes the text continue? It is the desire to know, the search for elucidation and for meaning that pursues its own logic just as naturally as the desire to finish a broken-off sentence.

The mechanics of memory, I suspect, have the power to work forwards as well as backwards. The object of memory frequently lies on another plane of being, but not necessarily far removed in time. Its recapturing often calls forth not just the *thing* but, importantly, the *circumstances* under which the particular piece of information was originally committed to memory, for instance, the place, the presence of certain persons, or the initial sensation, mood or feeling which accompanied it. As such, the process appears to represent the exact opposite of some ancient memory systems, by which the recollection of things is occasioned by calling forth a symbol deliberately "placed" for recovery. Although perhaps not totally congruent, the way Stephen's mind works has a Proustian quality to it: sudden, involuntary "bursts" of memory, the experience of which brings back fragments of past sensations and feelings, temporarily recovering a small part of the past. In this way, the past, rather than lying in wait to be "recovered", appears to "ambush" the present, an active power in the formation of Stephen's "story".

1.2. Keywords, patterns, and textual structure: the example of Stephen Dedalus

The process which we can trace at multiple levels in *A Portrait* seems to involve a deliberate "placing" not of symbols in the conventional sense but of signifiers. This

strategy may become clearer when viewed alongside the Saussurean model, since it is the arbitrariness of the connection between signifier and signified that deeply troubles Stephen. In Chapter One of *A Portrait*, we find Stephen on the playing field during games class. As he puts his freezing hands in his pockets he makes a mental remark on the suit he is wearing: "That was a belt round his jacket" (*P* I.71). The word "belt" immediately calls up another association: Stephen remembers the expression "to give a fellow a belt" (*P* I.71-72) because "one day" (*P* I.72) another boy had used that phrase, and its very oddness has made the expression memorable.

Stephen feels compelled to commit such "queer words" to memory. His preparation for the future, for the "great part which he felt awaited him" (*P* II.88), involves amassing a hoard of signifiers: "Words which he did not understand he said over and over to himself till he had learned them by heart: and through them he had glimpses of the real world about him" (*P* II.85-86). Those glimpses can involve cataclysmic experiences, as becomes more and more evident towards the close of the chapter.

Memory provides a frame of reference not only for the past but for the future by way of a sort of anticipatory spiral on the textual level, a claim which will be illustrated through my analysis of the following incident in Chapter Two of *A Portrait*. As the Dedalus family sit down to their ominous Christmas Dinner, one of the things that occupy Stephen's mind is another verbal enigma: "Why did Mr Barrett in Clongowes call his pandybat a turkey? It was not like a turkey" (*P* I.801-802). This riddle, like the one Athy sets Stephen to be asked "another way" (*P* I.658), remains unsolved. But the image of the pandybat/turkey, which is soon displaced by the rising argument over Parnell, clearly anticipates an episode which will take place upon Stephen's return to Clongowes after the holidays, when he is unjustly pandied by the prefect of studies for having broken his glasses. This is not the only example of a kind of textual premonition.

The references to “flogging” in connection with the “smuggling in the square” incident also point in that direction, and the Christmas Dinner incident itself is foreshadowed by the strange and unexplained dream Stephen has in the infirmary (*P* I.700-715).

The sound of the cricket bats (“pock”, *P* I.1331) heard from a distance leads Stephen to ponder on sounds and their association with pain. He is already familiar with the sound of the pandybat, which is unlike that of the cricket bats hitting the ball. But he does not yet know the pain that corresponds to the sound: “[...] and he wondered what was the pain like. [...] There were different kinds of pain for all the different kinds of sounds” (*P* I.1334-1335).

The impending trauma of the pandying incident is likewise anticipated, again not by Stephen himself, but through the very mechanics of the text. The words and phrases which describe Stephen’s bodily sensation as he thinks about the different kinds of pain are strikingly similar to those used to express his recollection of the cold water of the ditch (another traumatic incident to which I will return later): “It made him shivery to think of it and cold [...] It made him shivery [...] you always felt a shiver when you let down your trousers” (*P* I.1339-1441). He temporarily manages to shake off these thoughts, but his attention then focuses on Athy’s hands. This generates another unsettling series of contemplations. Athy’s ink-stained hands are replaced in his imagination by Mr Gleeson’s white fattish hands with the long cruel nails, and Stephen’s bodily reaction is once again composed of the symptoms of dread and fear: “[...] he trembled with cold and fright to think of the cruel long nails and of the high whistling sound of the cane and of the chill you felt at the end of your shirt [...]” (*P* I.1352-1355).

What I have demonstrated above is an example of one of the more unsettling effects of recognition and recollection. In a similar manner, it functions as an

illustration for the forward motion of the text. Stephen's desire to grasp the meaning of "queer words", or the significance of "queer things", necessitates a look into his future self. When it comes to the question of what repetition "means" on a textual level, we are faced not just with past experience, "built up" and somehow "stored" in consciousness, but the sense of impetus created by way of the process of repetition: the preparation of a recollection that will happen later. What we can observe here is "the interplay of the past and the present, or of a genesis that was experienced by the hero and of a structure that the hero only finds at the end".²⁶ The words, or signifiers, thus attain their own histories; they become suffused with multiple and potentially conflicting meanings. Stephen's "turkey" is primarily an emblem for home, for his first Christmas at the actual Dinner Table, and for the excitement and impatience with which he awaits his return home after the first term at Clongowes. The word, however, becomes then charged with a number of subtexts. It is the symbolic "centre" of the political argument which arises over political issues and which leaves Stephen thoroughly confused and insecure. What is more, the word ultimately assumes a dynamic that leads from Stephen's ponderings on the mysteries of the pandybat/turkey to his actual punishment by the means of the same instrument. The word, with all its veiled associations, assumes a life of its own.

Repetition comes in many shapes and forms. Adam Piette's study, *Remembering and the Sound of Words*, concerns itself with sound patterns and the way their structure is interrelated with the mechanics of memory. Piette employs phonolinguistic principles in outlining the various kinds of devices which have the potential to function as "alerting-devices" to what he calls "the reader's textual acoustic memory".²⁷ It is his conviction that prose rhymes (defined as "key-word sound-clusters in complex modern

prose”)²⁸ are miniature acts of memory, and that as such they can be studied in relation to the question of how memory is constituted in narrative.

One of the merits of Piette’s approach is that he does not look upon language in isolation from other factors, but takes into account issues of personal and cultural memory. For Stephen Dedalus, words gradually become associated not so much with treasure as with treachery: as key-words from the past find their way into his present consciousness, they bring with them echoes not only of his personal past but whole realms of associative contexts. No matter how original his choice of words may be, he cannot escape their burden, “the half-forgotten past of one’s own culture”.²⁹ This entails the loss of a means of individual expression – all available words have already been “borrowed”. Stephen first appears to become conscious of this dilemma in *A Portrait*, when discussing the word “tundish” with the dean:

—The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words *home, Christ, ale, master*, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in the shadow of his language. (*P* V.553-559, original emphasis)

The awareness of the past inevitably invading the present through language is clearly an unsettling one. In this manner, language appears effectively to cause a split between the “voice” and the “soul”: expression by means of the voice becomes by necessity a hollow act which the soul despises for its artificiality. If, as Van Boheemen believes, the trauma of history is behind the condition that has shaped Stephen Dedalus as well as James Joyce, then it becomes clear in this manner that the individual’s desperate need for a language which has preserved the capacity to fuse the desires of the body (the “voice”) and the soul is a symptom of past trauma. The “discursive deadlock”

that emerges can perhaps be best described by its consequences: there can be either paralysis and stagnation, or the search for new circuitous paths, a re-styling of language.

Some critics have regarded the question of reworking the already familiar in psychological rather than linguistic terms. Piette's work, while mainly concerned with form and structure, positions itself nevertheless at the edge of psychoanalytical thought. "Past key-words" are treated like threads swathed in "resisted memories", "half consciously recall[ed]".³⁰ Significant lapses of speech are here considered to be vehicles for personal and cultural memories, "and their mode of recall seems to cross Freudian slips with Jungian race-memory".³¹

Sheldon Brivic has taken the matter even further: In his book *Joyce Between Freud and Jung*, he investigates "the development of Joyce's mind"³² as mirrored in his works. In other words, he attempts to define the Joycean unconscious, using the literary text as analogy to the narrative techniques by which psychoanalysis operates. An obvious danger of this approach is the misreading of passages of text which are ironic in tone – this could potentially reverse the way any "textual evidence" and any interpretative conclusions are to be treated. Furthermore, any simplistic reading of imagery, symbolism and, in Piette's terms, prose rhymes, is constantly at risk of generating an undue reduction of the text's complexities.

While the presence of Freud's theories in relation to Brivic's endeavour at locating the personal unconscious in the mind of Joyce as represented in his writings is rather obvious, it is considerably more difficult to place Carl Gustav Jung within an interpretative analysis of Joyce's works. It would appear here that Jung's theories serve mainly as a background, ascertaining the significance of the "cultural unconscious" as opposed to the Freudian notion of the unconscious as an intensely personal manifestation of repression. The crucial point here seems to me the duality of

interpretative frameworks: the use of “a psychology of the body” complemented by “a psychology of the spirit”.³³ These two paradigms, which mirror the Aristotelian notion of a division between the body and the mind, may be useful for illustrating the vacillation between realistic and visionary elements in Joyce’s prose.

However, the question of memory surprisingly fails to attract much attention in Brivic’s book (indeed, the index includes neither “memory” nor “repression”). Recurring images are mainly categorised as representing threats to the self (e.g. the “turfcoloured bogwater”), while words for Stephen Dedalus “serve as pretext for exercising feelings whose origins cannot be admitted to consciousness”.³⁴ But why, we may ask, would an emotion set off by the smell of sluggish water be felt as challenging the notion of identity in any way? More importantly, what is here the significance of emotive repression from the text itself? What effect does it have on textual structure, and on the reader? Contrary to Brivic, I do not wish to gain an insight into the workings of Joyce’s mind through an in-depth (psycho-)analysis of his texts. My goal lies in determining how acts of memory are generated, represented, and ultimately selected, by the text itself – be it through gaps, elisions, Piette’s “prose rhymes”, verbatim repetitions or the recurrence of imagery.

I would like to return at this point to a study mentioned earlier, *Joyce’s Book of Memory* by John S. Rickard, which will help me to identify some of the central questions around which this thesis revolves. According to Rickard, memory is the thread of personal and cultural consciousness, and as such it represents the seemingly irresolvable tension between the instability of personal identity and the desire for a unified subjectivity. It is in these terms that he describes the central characters and events in *Ulysses*. The currents at work within the text, termed *centrifugal* and *centripetal*, stand for the dissolution of self “in linguistic and stylistic

experimentation”³⁵ on a “conscious” textual level, as opposed to a desire for wholeness or closure, epitomised in the notion of a textual or cultural unconscious. In essence, then, the reader of *Ulysses* is confronted with various conflicting perspectives on the relation between the self and the world. Rickard tentatively suggests that this also applies to *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: “The formation of identity in *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*, then, occurs within a tension between the ‘disremembering’ or dissolution of the self and the re-membering that seeks continually to shore up fragments of experience into a coherent and purposive narrative.”³⁶ But how can we define the conscious and unconscious textual levels, and identify the ways in which they interact? What is the effect of these two conflicting “drives”, one fragmentary, the other working towards an integration of all levels of experience?

It appears that, for Stephen, the recollection of events is structured primarily according to emotive and perceptive powers. This would explain the way in which originally separate perceptions are fused through recollection, the whiteness and the coolness in Chapter One of *A Portrait* being the more obvious examples. However, the process of recollection gets more opaque as it becomes more abstract, as in the repetition of “queer” words or sounds. Some of the most striking cases of this type of repetition and recollection involve signifiers with multiple meanings, or onomatopoeic words, such as “suck”. What I have demonstrated above with regard to the word “turkey” could likewise serve as an example of this type of memory. As John Paul Riquelme has pointed out, it is instances like these that depend “on the reader’s remembering, connecting, and anticipating”.³⁷ These are instances of remembering which appear removed from character consciousness. In fact, they often lack any direct verbal reference to the activation of a memory process in a character. Rickard calls this mode of recollection “textual memory”, and proceeds to define it as follows: “[a]

textual repository of words, phrases, objects, and sounds charged with power by the associations they carry on a number of levels of memory”,³⁸ and he suggests that this particular manifestation of memory through the text’s own referentiality may have been Joyce’s way of dealing with a whole host of different memory types which sometimes complement but more often contradict each other. Since the notion of textual memory will be referred to at various points throughout this study, I will adopt Rickard’s definition for the purposes of my analysis, expanding and clarifying certain aspects if necessary.

The concept of textual memory proves useful in a number of ways. For instance, as Peter Brooks has remarked, if the reading process involves retrospective as well as anticipatory aspects, a “reading-backwards” as well as forwards in terms of the recognition of familiar elements, then it follows that textual devices such as repetition and omission are part of a formula which is illustrative of textual structure. My study attempts to follow a similar principle of reading forwards as well as backwards. Starting with Joyce’s earliest published works, *Dubliners*, and moving forward in a roughly chronological order in my readings of *Stephen Hero*, *A Portrait*, and *Ulysses*, I shall undertake an investigation of how memory features in these texts, and, in turn, how these texts are shaped by the memories which they contain. This analysis is based on the assumption that, as an author, Joyce’s experiments as regards the representation of memory-effects within his works rely on a textual mnemotechnic which undergoes continual expansion with every word composed by its creator, and every word with which the reader of Joyce is confronted. Finally, arriving at “Penelope”, the last chapter of *Ulysses*, it will become evident that memory in its textual forms constitutes not so much a return *to* in a teleological sense, but a dialogically structured exchange *with* the past in a perpetual reweaving of memory and memory’s textuality.

Chapter 2: Memory and crises of the self in *Dubliners*

In criticism, *Dubliners* is most frequently introduced through the notion of stagnation, of an engagement with Joyce's desire to "betray the soul of that hemiplegia or paralysis"¹ which Joyce himself regarded as the predominant affliction to beset Ireland and its citizens. This chapter will examine four *Dubliners* stories in terms of their characters' problematical relationship to memory, and the implications for Joyce's engagement with questions of consciousness and personal identity. An early appraisal of *Dubliners* provides a suitable starting-point for my discussion, as it sums up Joyce's narrative technique in just a few words: "[Joyce] dares to let people speak for themselves with the awkward meticulousness, the persistent incompetent repetition, of actual human intercourse".² Indeed, *Dubliners* could almost be described as a study in human relationships, encompassing the dynamics of gender and power, but above all, in the subtle assimilation into everyday life of the more mysterious aspects of memory.

"The first thing that most strikes us when reading *Dubliners*", writes Amar Acheraïou, "is the constant recurrence of the same structural, thematic and symbolic patterns".³ With these repetitive elements, the stories revolve around imaginary centres in a manner not dissimilar from the repetition compulsion exhibited by some of the characters,⁴ the most threatening of these perhaps being the old man with the bottle-green eyes in "An Encounter". Verbal and thematic repetitions and recurrence serve as a unifying principle in *Dubliners*, but at the same time they conceal buried disclosures about the characters and their environment, deeper truths which render the plight of *Dubliners* simultaneously specific and universal.

Discussing the problem of narrative unreliability and interpretative dilemma, Margot Norris cautions that "[i]n reading *Dubliners*, it is as important to attend to

everything that is outside the narration”.⁵ From this point of view, the problem with *Dubliners* would be that it has frequently been defined in terms of its cast of characters: Sometimes, as little more than a location for Joyce’s notion of the paralysis which for him had become the essence of Dublin life. These characters have been criticised for not being able to leave the past behind, for remembering too much or for not remembering enough, and for not being able to integrate their memories into a coherent story of the self. But the characters only follow the pattern which is inherent in the narration itself, a pattern of gaps, elisions, and ambiguous words and phrases. Interpretation and analysis is rendered problematical as the elusiveness of characters, narrators, and narrative structures pose a challenge to readers’ attempts at interpretation. Garry Leonard points out that “[f]rom the first story in *Dubliners*, Joyce’s prose attacks [the] ideology of the ‘self’, thus undermining at the same time the commonplace assumption that consciousness equals ‘truth’”.⁶ In *Dubliners*, Joyce effectively exposes the variety of possibilities an individual has to confront in dealing with memory. In the process, he highlights the power of “the unmentionable”,⁷ emotions and experiences ordinarily locked away in the subconscious, which can resurface, unexpectedly and often uncannily, in moments of crisis.

Dubliners has been regarded by many as the most accessible of Joyce’s texts and thus tends to be considered as the best possible introduction to his works, “easy” reading when contrasted with later works like *Ulysses* or *Finnegans Wake*. However, the realism and relative simplicity of the stories can be deceptive. Not much actually seems to “happen” on the surface of the text, and yet for some readers each of the stories contains a significant moment, sometimes static, sometimes inducing a form of transition from one state of being to another. For readers of *Dubliners* since Norris, the main challenge would lie in recognising the immensity of that which remains untold,

since rarely in *Dubliners* do we get to hear the whole story. Instead, we struggle to see the significance behind seemingly ordinary expressions, calling into question the motivation and reliability of the characters' as well as the narrator's voices.

The fascination of *Dubliners*, it could be argued, lies to some extent within the words which remain unwritten or unsaid, in other words, fragments which are *absent* from the text. I would suggest that the elements which serve to mask these absences often possess a power far greater than the sum of words actually present. In essence, the reader is faced with two stories: the one which is told by the words on the page, and an alternative one which is simultaneously shielded behind and stirred up by them. Margot Norris speaks of a "silent counter-discourse" which characterises *Dubliners*, produced by the gaps and elisions in the text. A silent discourse, Norris argues, consists of the things which the narrator fails or refuses to tell, but which are nevertheless "there" as a hidden subtext. This alternative discourse is significant with regard to the individual reading of a story, because it "presses the possibility of an interpretation in opposition to that prompted by the narrative voice".⁸ Other critics have made similar observations. Borrowing from Gérard Genette, Gerald Prince, and Stephanie Bronson, Harold F. Mosher presents some ideas for a terminology to describe and name the narrative absences in *Dubliners*. He points out the quasi-psychological aspects of the suppression of information by intimating a kind of complicit understanding between narrator and character:

[T]he text's strategy of not naming, its withholding of words, its defection from a conventional responsibility to tell all, may actually be seen as a strategy of economy imitating defects in the characters' perceptions or their policy of covering up by not naming what is wrong.⁹

It is perhaps worth noting that the inability, or indeed refusal, to wholly articulate oneself in the present and to face up to the past is shared by most (perhaps all)

characters and narrating voices in *Dubliners*, even where narration occurs in the first person, and therefore in an overtly retrospective manner (as, for example, in “Araby”). It is as though merging the story and its underlying “negative” (Mosher’s “nonnarrated” and “disnarrated”) might bring about the collapse of that which constitutes the essence of narration in the first place. In other words, so much in *Dubliners* is about evasion, refusal and postponement, that to articulate these elements would negate the narration itself. As we shall see, every story in *Dubliners* is made up of a multitude of contradictory and ambiguous narratives. In many respects, the text’s refusal to “tell all” amounts to a strategy which, in outlining the limits of individual knowledge and understanding, calls particular attention to memory’s preventive or restrictive function. Even though for Joyce’s *Dubliners*, remembering is often inseparable from experiencing a strong sense of isolation and failure of communication, my aim is to investigate in this chapter whether the resulting crises may have the potential to effect a momentary release from a theme of paralysis and repetition. In my reading, the text offers a journey into mechanisms of the mind, while at the same time calling into question the prevailing nature of the relation between the individual and the environment which has shaped his or her mode of thinking and remembering.

2.1. “Eveline”: two versions of the self

In “Eveline” the reader encounters a character who appears indecisive almost to the point of dissolution or disintegration of identity. The young woman Eveline, Rickard affirms, is faced with two conflicting versions of her personal past. On the one hand, she remembers her father’s threats against herself and his brutality towards her siblings, on the other hand, she tries hard to fictionalise her past, picking out some of its brighter

moments, “in order to rationalize passivity”.¹⁰ It seems as though Eveline has become a slave to some isolated moments of her past life, moments that have long since ceased to offer any true consolation or justification for the present but which have come to dominate all aspects of her existence. The anecdotal events she recalls, such as two instances of her father acting decently towards her and her mother and siblings, do not amount to nostalgia as they fail to paint a convincing picture of a better past.

Clearly, on the narrative level, Eveline’s alliances are simply split between her agreement with Frank to elope with him on the night boat to Buenos Aires, and the promise given at the side of her mother’s deathbed to “keep the home together as long as she could” (*D* 197), and it is this inner division which causes her to be emotionally unstable. Whether Eveline decides to stay or to leave, she appears to be vaguely aware of the looming sense of dissolution and collapse: fall from grace in her father’s eyes, followed perhaps by even more violent behaviour, or possibly a descent into madness (echoing her mother’s final hours) should she choose to stay; an unhappy marriage (or worse) in her “new home”, perhaps even abandonment in a faraway country if she leaves her old home. Ostensibly the choice Eveline has to make is between loyalty to her mother and commitment to Frank, between home (Ireland) and exile (South America). But the conflict goes much deeper than this, as I hope to outline in the pages that follow.

There are many things which can be read into the six pages of “Eveline” which are not actually *in* it, an idea which has led many critics to engage in speculation as regards Eveline’s, but also Frank’s, “true” dispositions. I wish to raise some questions about Norris’ readings of *Dubliners* while confining my discussion to just four stories: “Eveline”, “The Boarding House”, “A Painful Case”, and “The Dead”. Furthermore, I hope to address some questions arising from Norris’ approach, such as the role of gaps,

elisions and allusions, and the authority of the third-person narrator, which in turn raises the issue of self-censorship.

Many critics have remarked on the sense of paralysis that pervades the atmosphere of *Dubliners*. Frequently, paralysis has been regarded as a deficiency inherent in the characters, but there have been shifts away from the level of *histoire* towards that of *discours*. Bernard Tadié discusses the tension between what he calls “macro- and micro-narratives”, in other words, the framework of a story in contrast to the reflections and recollections of narrators or characters embedded within. Tadié speaks specifically about the problem of “narrative deadlock” which, in his view, arises out of this “opposition between the main plots and the flash-backs which intrude upon them”.¹¹ These flashbacks constitute memories or even “counter-presents” powerful enough to absorb any sense of forward progression and development in terms of plot in stories such as “Eveline” and “The Boarding House”, where an integral part of the central conflict has been moulded in the past, thus demanding an oscillation between past events and their consequences for the present. The resulting tension serves to foreground that human capability which has frequently been regarded as a deficiency: forgetting. Joseph Buttigieg has argued that voluntary memory in *Dubliners* tends to have the effect of “a protective screen that keeps reality at bay”, and which lends itself to an unhealthy propensity for deferral. “Through its agency”, Buttigieg writes, “one can postpone almost indefinitely the unpleasantness of facing the real world and defer for as long as possible the necessity to act”.¹² This last sentence seems particularly apt for a characterisation of Eveline. The same is true on the narrative level: the narrative which frames these flashbacks will be delayed in its progression, the present becomes suspended in favour of the obligation to integrate the past in the form of interconnected memories. The recollection of past moments thus gains significance not just on a

psychological but on a structural level, as a force powerful enough to shape the way a story is narrated.

From Buttigieg's perspective, remembering is a kind of shelter from reality, a timeless zone in which a character can exercise full control. However, as Carle Bonafous-Murat has pointed out with regard to "Eveline", "the reader can never be sure that the process of remembrance is a fully autonomous one".¹³ In other words, recollection is not necessarily a voluntary process, but an invasion originating outside the self, and therefore a potential source of uneasiness and agitation. We do not know if Eveline might not be happier were she not compelled to remember the constraints of the past so much, but we are led to suspect that at least her thoughts might be of a different kind.

David Gross states in his book *Lost Time* that there exists one type of "rememberer" who is driven to recollect the past "because it contained everything valuable or meaningful". "In this instance", he continues, "the rememberer would feel compelled to cling resolutely to the past in order to maintain his or her very being".¹⁴ Eveline may be an example of this compulsion to remember. For her, the past offers relative calm and security,¹⁵ thereby dispelling the need to contemplate the future. Any change which the future might bring, it seems, is little more than a hypothetical possibility, as far removed in time as Buenos Aires is in space. This future, however, gets dangerously close to Eveline as the moment of her scheduled departure with Frank approaches. As time passes, voices from the past press upon her more and more forcefully, throwing her into turmoil. Importantly, however, Eveline's deliberation starts out by her wilfully trying to summon up incidents from the past which might persuade her to make a decision in favour of staying at home, fulfilling the promise

given to her mother. She tries to convince herself that her father, whose violence and jealousy she has come to fear, is not so bad that she must escape from him.

This effort of voluntary memory, however, proves rather weak compared to the sudden involuntary recollection set off by an external stimulus, the organ grinder's music outside in the street. Here, memory is like an eruption, triggered by some external stimulus, and as such, it is akin to elements of the Proustian concept of memory. David Gross has suggested that this type of involuntary, spontaneous recollection can "overwhelm, confound, alienate, and un-prepare an individual for successful adaptation to life", and that it can even lead to a "feeling of 'dizziness' or 'oscillation' between an earlier moment re-experienced and an existing one".¹⁶ Eveline's involuntary memory, emerging from an impulse outside her control, creates a gridlock between her sense of self in the present and her position in the past. This, I would argue, happens twice in the story: At the moment outlined above, through the organ grinder's music; and again at the dock, as Frank talks to her while holding her hand.

As has been hinted above, the voice of Eveline's dead mother, repeatedly uttering the apparently nonsensical words "Derevaun Seraun!" (*D* 197),¹⁷ brings about a transformation. These words initiate the only physical motion that Eveline displays: She stands up, "in a sudden impulse of terror" (*D* 197). It is crucial here to note that Eveline does not merely remember these words spoken by her mother in her final delirium – she re-experiences them ("She trembled as she *heard again* her mother's voice", *D* 197, emphasis added). This doubling of perception (a past – and therefore absent – voice becoming a present voice) is mirrored by the strange recurrence of the organ grinder's tune. While Bonafous-Murat's suggestion that the sentence "Down far in the avenue she *could hear* a street organ playing" (*D* 197, emphasis added) is phrased in such a way as to imply that the music somehow isn't there at all, "as though Eveline were the victim

of an auditory hallucination”¹⁸ seems somewhat far-fetched, it provides a reading which, in my view, neatly characterises the interpretative predicament which the reader has to negotiate: The question of seeing memory *either* as offering the potential for revelation *or* as carrying a veil which prevents any insight. The disparity between Eveline’s calm exterior and her emotional confusion is particularly marked as the music from the street triggers a memory which shatters her composure. The psychological strain relating to the inevitability of making a decision comes to life as the sound invades the room.

The music reminds her of her promise to her dying mother, and it brings with it an intense memory-experience: “[S]he was again in the close dark room at the other end of the hall and outside she heard a melancholy air of Italy” (*D* 197). Not only has the past created a link with the present, but it has besieged it, turning Eveline into a receptacle for a scene which culminates in the voice of her father, his cursing as he enters the sickroom. This completes the image of a life which attempts to withdraw from the vivid and painful images of the past as well as from any future dangers, and coincides with Eveline’s motionless position near the window and the dusty odour she inhales from the curtains, thinking about her duties in the house and “wondering where on earth all the dust came from” (*D* 193). Dust surrounds her, discarded particles of past life which have stopped circulating and have become inert. For all its lifelessness, dust at least offers some permanence, and provides her with a sense of purpose in the shape of methodical housework. When Eveline thinks “[Frank] would save her” (*D* 197), she may be referring not so much to an escape from the dull weekly duty of dusting the room but to the danger of eventually becoming lifeless like the dust which surrounds her. Eveline’s primary desire is not romance or ideal love, but something altogether more fundamental, which is to take part in life: “[S]he wanted to live” (*D* 197).

Significantly, however, the voices which tell us about who Eveline is and what she wants originate outside her. Strictly speaking, Eveline does not utter a single word, but her mind is full of echoes. Direct speech appears in “Eveline” as though it were a present activity, but none of these voices is hers. At the quay in the moment of crisis, she is capable only of “moving her lips in silent fervent prayer” (*D* 198), and then utters “a cry of anguish” (*D* 198). Language is incapable of expressing satisfactorily who Eveline is and what she feels, so the reader is left with echoes or memories filtered through a language which may or may not be Eveline’s, and other voices expressing things about her. Eveline remains an abstract, a construction made up from empty signifiers, just like her mother’s dying words.

In “Eveline”, two distinct types of memory vie for attention. On the one hand, there are those recollections which seem to derive from Eveline’s own efforts to rationalise her perception of the situation she is in,¹⁹ on the other hand, we come across spontaneous and sometimes unwanted memories which undermine her attempts at rational reflection. This demarcation into two separate processes corresponds to a redefinition of memory and its role in a person’s life which is evident in the works of Henri Bergson and Marcel Proust, among others. Both writers distinguish between conscious recollection (“voluntary memory” or “habit-memory”, in other words, a deliberate or conditioned reminiscence), and spontaneous (“involuntary”) memory which is experienced like an unexpected eruption from the subconscious. Rickard, examining the writings of Bergson and Proust in relation to memory and its function for the individual, points out that both writers “privilege the more vibrant, explosive, and dangerous (because essentially uncontrollable) involuntary or spontaneous memory”, and that “both view the two types of memory as essentially exclusive of each other”.²⁰

I believe that, in sitting immobile and inhaling the odour of the curtains, Eveline is struggling to achieve a synthesis between these conflicting types of memory, a synthesis which proves impossible to attain. If she is looking for inspiration by letting the past invade her body through her nostrils, she is failing to take into account the odour's anaesthetic effect. It is both Eveline's habit and her duty to eliminate the dust, but the struggle is pointless. Dust forms her past *and* her present. From this point of view, the trepidation which builds up in her thoughts is exacerbated by the tension between the two irreconcilable types of memory. The text indicates that Eveline perceives some deceptiveness in the images of the past she wills herself to remember as she is looking down the avenue: "Still they *seemed* to have been rather happy then" (*D* 193, emphasis added). In trying "to weigh each side of the question" (*D* 194), she appears to be superimposing two versions of the past, one in which she thinks there may have been happiness, and another one consisting of events that "had given her the palpitations" (*D* 194). In other words, Eveline's difficulty lies not so much in indecision relating to her future but in her inability to decide which memories to trust.

As I have indicated above, the crisis begins with Eveline's perception of the street organ music, invested with the weight of uncanny recurrence, which induces a spontaneous recollection of the events surrounding her mother's death. It is this involuntary memory, the sudden emergence of her mother's voice, which succeeds in profoundly unsettling Eveline's composure, first making her tremble (thus giving her "the palpitations" once more), and then making her stand up "in a sudden impulse of terror" (*D* 197). The calming effect of the dusty cretonne odour, a reassuring mark of permanence just as the dust is a permanent feature in the house, is forgotten. Eveline's self-control is shattered by uncontrollable memory, laying "its spell on the very quick of her being" (*D* 197). A close reading of the passage reveals that Eveline's memory of her

mother's final hours in fact leads to an even more unsettling vision: Not of her mother's death, as might be expected, but of her life. From this perspective, it becomes evident that for Eveline, life may be felt to be a more remote possibility than death.²¹ But life is what she desires, a life in which she has "a right to happiness" (*D* 197). So if spontaneous memory allows Eveline to see her mother's life as it really was, and to affirm her sense of a need for change, why can she not bring herself to travel with Frank?

Garry Leonard suggests that the conflict lies partly within the nonsensical mutterings "Derevaun Seraun", which, in his view, contain authority and warning at the same time, two contradictory impulses as it were: "to keep the home together" *and* to save herself from a "life of commonplace sacrifices closing in final craziness" (*D* 197).²² But perhaps there is more to Eveline's resistance. The words "Derevaun Seraun" were uttered by her mother "constantly with foolish insistence", as Eveline recalls with terror. The following paragraph brings us the scene at the quay, with imagery such as "a swaying crowd", "soldiers with brown baggages", and "the black mass of the boat" (*D* 197). All the while, Frank is holding her hand and talking to her, and I believe this is where the second crisis arises. Frank was "saying something about the passage *over and over again*" (*D* 197, emphasis added), something which either makes no sense or which remains incomprehensible to Eveline. In any case, in engaging in this seemingly compulsive repetition (the content of which is withheld from the reader), Frank unwittingly throws her back into the turmoil of thoughts she had experienced while sitting by the window. Eveline's will to life and happiness is ousted by the question of duty. Frank's words are a twofold reminder, for the duty towards herself and her own pursuit of happiness on the one hand, and towards her customary domestic responsibilities on the other. Frank repeats his words again and again, and in doing so,

he replicates Eveline's experience in her mother's sickroom, and the acuity of the conflict that has been left unresolved. Paradoxically, it is Frank (the man who "would save her", *D* 197) who consigns Eveline back into a situation where terror reigns, and where the incompatibility of memories generates a deadlock that literally paralyzes and alienates.

2.2. "We cannot give ourselves...": Memory and selfhood in "A Painful Case"

The question of the relation between habit, memory, and (narrative) control forms some of the material at the centre of "A Painful Case". Mr Duffy strives to become the voice of his own third-person narrator: "He had an odd autobiographical habit which led him to compose in his mind from time to time a short sentence about himself containing a subject in the third person and a predicate in the past tense" (*D* 267). But not only does he actively change his words into words not his own, he may even turn into the potential narrator of the story by virtue of his strange removal from himself: "He lived at a little distance from his body, regarding his own acts with doubtful sideglances" (*D* 267).²³ This distancing effect in relation to a main character is at work throughout "A Painful Case" and most of *Dubliners*. Memory plays a major part in this process, as Raffaella Baccolini observes: "[A]s revelation and as oppression, memory unsettles Joyce's characters, leads them to displacement, and makes them exiled from themselves".²⁴ It is of course true that the characters in *Dubliners* have a troubled relationship with their memories. I am not entirely convinced, however, by Baccolini's claim that memory in *Dubliners* always guides the characters towards moments of recognition and insight, or that it "promotes their own understanding of their identity".²⁵

It is interesting to note that in Mr Duffy's third-person narration of himself, he uses "a predicate in the past tense" (*D* 267), as though he never conceives of himself as actually living in the present. What is more, the text highlights Mr Duffy's relation to routine and memory by integrating the mention of his "autobiographical habit" into a descriptive passage most concerned with his physical features and the furnishings of his lodgings. Mr Duffy's life is thus above all a perpetual monologue, fuelled by a habit through which he strives to situate himself in a position of control over what little social interaction he has with others.²⁶ When he addresses Mrs Sinico and shares his thoughts with her, he appears to be again at a distance from himself, his own Other or mirror image: "Sometimes he caught himself listening to the sound of his own voice [...] he heard the strange impersonal voice, which he recognised as his own" (*D* 270). Mr Duffy keeps Nietzsche's *Gay Science* and *Thus Spake Zarathustra* on his bookshelves, and it has been argued that, in lacking companions and friends, church and creed (*D* 268), Duffy in fact considers himself a small-scale Nietzschean superman.²⁷

Garry Leonard offers some enlightening ideas as regards Mr Duffy's condition from a Lacanian perspective. He suggests that Mr Duffy suffers from the conviction that "who he is remains under his conscious control".²⁸ Indeed, Mr Duffy appears exceedingly distrustful towards anything unconscious, or impulse-driven. It could be argued that the sentences he composes about himself in the third person are primarily devices of control, since they effectively preclude his story being written by someone else. This, as he later realises, invests his words with a terrible responsibility: "Why had he *sentenced* her to death?" (*D* 276, emphasis added). Mrs Sinico's death has turned from a "narrative" (*D* 274), a newspaper story, into a story of Mr Duffy's own making. His sudden realisation at the end of "A Painful Case" that he himself has played some part in the narrative of Mrs Sinico's life and death occurs after memories of their shared

life have come to haunt him. Like Eveline, Mr Duffy becomes prey to a hallucinatory sensation: “As the light failed and his memory began to wander he thought her hand touched his” (*D* 275). It seems that here memory weakens the controlling device of self-narration, undermining with emotional turmoil the factual content of Mr Duffy’s calculated sentences.

Mr Duffy methodically evokes “alternatively the two images in which he now conceived her” (*D* 275) – but what images are these? Presumably, there is the early image of her created by his own narration, of Mrs Sinico as his transitory soul companion, an intelligent and cultured but perhaps overly impulsive woman; and the image which he senses behind the newspaper story, of an intemperate, lonely and emotionally abandoned woman who had become “an easy prey to habits” (*D* 275) by which she has brought about her own end. Significantly, Mr Duffy distrusts “the cautious words of a reporter won over to conceal the details of a commonplace vulgar death” (*D* 274), instead constructing his own narrative of a woman who has not only disgraced herself, but who has even degraded him (*D* 274), possibly through the circumstances of her death.²⁹ He recognises the newspaper article as a piece of narrative which screens an alternative “silent discourse”, an example of divergence between what is narrated and what is remembered,³⁰ and the discrepancy makes him feel “ill at ease” (*D* 275). “Throughout *Dubliners*”, observes Garry Leonard, “Joyce shows a special fondness for using meaningless phrases to reveal precisely what the phrase was intended to obscure”.³¹ Mrs Sinico’s death may seem vulgar and commonplace to Mr Duffy at first, an ugly story that had better not be told but consigned to narrative oblivion, until he sees himself as having a leading role in it. As a result, he becomes unable to dissociate himself wholly from it. Mr Duffy persuades himself that death has turned his former companion into a memory (*D* 275), but this is evidently untrue. He

himself had already consigned Mrs Sinico to an impersonal slot in his disused store of memories four years previously, when he had arranged to meet her at the park and they “agreed to break off their intercourse” (*D* 271). We may suspect that this phrase, too, is of Mr Duffy’s making, for there are textual indicators suggesting that it is only he who wants to end their relationship, and end with it the threat it poses to the “orderliness of his mind” (*D* 271). In using his own words to narrate what can only be *his* version of events, Mr Duffy effectively overwrites the story that lies behind, the true nature of their final meeting.

It could be suspected that Mr Duffy’s autobiographical habit is also a device of censorship, whereby unwanted or unpleasant thoughts and memories are displaced simultaneously from his mind and from the narrative. This would perhaps be indicative of some of the aspects of the story which are left to speculation. Words like “confessor” (*D* 269) and “intercourse” (*D* 271) mix sexual, social and spiritual elements in such a way that it becomes impossible to attribute a specific denotation to them.³² Mr Duffy’s own thoughts on the “intercourse” question are closely linked to the composition of an aphorism, “written two months after his last interview with Mrs Sinico” (*D* 271), and seem to point towards a sexual meaning of the word: “Love between man and man is impossible because there must not be sexual intercourse and friendship between man and woman is impossible because there must be sexual intercourse” (*D* 271). In this sentence, Margot Norris perceives the clue to Mr Duffy’s condition: his homosexuality, which precludes him from having “normal” friendships with other men (because he experiences sexual desire in these circumstances), and from having a socially sanctioned relationship with a woman (because he is unable to feel the kind of desire which is demanded by social convention).

However, Norris' reading raises some problems. If Mrs Sinico "urged him to let his nature open to the full", "listen[ing] to all", ultimately becoming "his confessor" (*D* 269), then why does such a powerful crisis arise from the moment when "[she] caught up his hand passionately and pressed it to her cheek" (*D* 271)? By then, he would surely have given her some insinuation as regards his inclination towards men, perhaps he would even have confessed his secret desires to her. Hence, there is a sense of a fundamental misunderstanding taking place. Continuing Norris' train of thought, I would suggest it seems more likely that Mr Duffy felt himself to be fully understood prior to the critical moment of touch, and that this particular moment brought him the realisation that, in spite of his careful intimation, Mrs Sinico sees in him a potential sexual partner.³³ This situation, he feels, could only turn into "a comedy of deception" (*D* 275). In other words, the reason behind the decision to "break off their intercourse" (*D* 271) lies not (as Norris proposes) in Mr Duffy's homosexuality, but quite simply in their conflicting suppositions surrounding the question: what kind of intercourse should there be between them?

In view of this question, we may recall the presumed subjects of Mr Duffy's reading, in particular his perusal of Nietzsche. The aphorism which Duffy jots down on his papers ("[...] friendship between man and woman is impossible [...]") reads like a free interpretation of Nietzsche: "Far too long hath there been a slave and a tyrant concealed in woman. On that account woman is not yet capable of friendship: she knoweth only love."³⁴ Spending his evenings alone again, has Duffy taken to re-reading Nietzsche? Or has his friendship with Emily Sinico been an echo of his reading from the very start, has he treated *Thus Spake Zarathustra* as his personal prophecy? Zarathustra's words include the prediction "Thou wilt one day cry: 'I am alone!'",³⁵ and "A Painful Case" ends with the sentence "[h]e felt that he was alone" (*D* 277).

The sexual angle, which has been discussed at some length by Norris and others,³⁶ provides some important guidance to the reading of *Dubliners* as a whole, highlighting the requirement to read closely in order to pick up textual markers, to pay attention to verbal oddities and to the peculiarities of the narrative voice. In rejecting a sexual dimension and subsequently breaking off their relationship, Mr Duffy effectively attempts a return to his former state of “splendid isolation”. There appears to be no reminder that life, for him, had ever been different. He makes a point of returning to his habitual schedule, a life which seems to revolve exclusively around repetitive activities such as going to work, having a meal, and then returning home and going to bed.

The four years following their final meeting are summed up in just one paragraph, and there is no mention of Mr Duffy contemplating the past he shared with Mrs Sinico. However, we are told that “[h]e kept away from concerts lest he should meet her” (*D* 271), and this indicates at least an awareness of her absence from his life. In order to avoid meeting her, he needs to *remind* himself of her, or to *be reminded* of her existence. The most powerful reminder comes, belatedly and unexpectedly, one night in the middle of his evening meal, in the form of the newspaper article reporting her “accident” and subsequent death. After four years of non-communication between them, what is the nature of his reaction when he finds out about her death? Firstly, it should be noted that the narrative of Mrs Sinico’s death invades Mr Duffy’s life precisely *through* the vehicle of habit: at a point where he is engaged in the habitual reading of the evening newspaper while eating his customary meal, in the usual place. All of a sudden, habit ceases to have a sheltering function, with the word becoming suggestive of unpredictability, excess, and loss of control.³⁷ Duffy’s immediate reaction to the newspaper article is a methodical one: He puts his fork down, drinks a glass of water, pushes his plate away, props up the paper before him, and “read[s] the paragraph over

and over again" (*D* 272). The narrative is devoid of words which could betray Duffy's emotional upheaval, but the fact that he finds himself unable to finish his meal indicates his disturbance.

Having reread the newspaper article again in his bedroom, Mr Duffy breaks with his own habits, becoming, by his standards, intemperate by consuming some hot punch at a public-house. But not only is Mr Duffy's sense of control shattered by the alternative authority of the newspaper's "voice". Garry Leonard suggests that "what initially shocks him as he reads of her death is that in the four-year interval since he broke off his intercourse with her, she continued to exist".³⁸ In being merely absent, she has not yet exposed the fictional, and therefore illusory, nature of the third-person narrative of himself. He succeeds in upholding the illusion of having a listener, of having to say something significant, as long as he manages to *imagine* Mrs Sinico as his ideal audience. With Mrs Sinico's death (or more precisely, with the story of her death which originates outside of his control), Mr Duffy's real-life "third person", the Other which provides the validation of his narrative, has ceased to exist. "Now that she is dead", writes Leonard, "she is fully a memory and, therefore, no longer *his* memory".³⁹ We can read this as a dual statement of loss. Firstly, the memory of Mrs Sinico ceases to be a private one as the story of her death enters the public domain, so Mr Duffy effectively loses control over the way in which she is remembered. Secondly, in confessing to her, Mr Duffy has consigned part of himself to her custody, perhaps even displaced his own private memories, causing them to perish along with their keeper.

At this point in my discussion, I would like to invoke a particularly ironic passage from the story: Mr Duffy's reflections on Emily Sinico's death:

Just God, what an end! Evidently she had been unfit to live, without any strength of purpose, an easy prey to habits, one of the wrecks on which

civilisation had been reared. But that she could have sunk so low! (*D* 274-275)

At first glimpse, Mr Duffy's revulsion at what he refers to as "the narrative of her death" (*D* 274) seems to stem purely from his reading of the newspaper article and its euphemistic rendering of Mrs Sinico's alcoholism and suicide. He sees himself implicated in her story, and this amounts to a threat to his narrative autonomy. Mr Duffy himself is very much attached to his own habits. His life, an "adventureless tale" (*D* 268), is equally devoid of any real purpose, his main activities revolving around maintaining his own sense of self-sufficiency. Therefore, the irony of the above quotation lies in his severe judgement and revulsion at Mrs Sinico's condition and the circumstances of her death, remarks which may, at least in part, serve as a characterisation of Mr Duffy's state of mind, as well as eliciting a possible judgement from the reader in similar terms. (Later on, Mr Duffy may even briefly change his mind, and apply the same judgement to himself: But that he could have sunk so low...) Wolfgang Wicht observes a peculiar effect in "A Painful Case" in relation to the question of irony and textual duplicity. Discounting the suggestion that Mr Duffy may be regarded as the gravitational centre of the narration, Wicht argues: "[...] the 'story' represents a person who constructs himself as subject of his ego, whereas the 'text' deconstructs this self-reflexive construct of the 'I'".⁴⁰ It is only with his own version of the Other that Mr Duffy feels able to achieve any meaningful communion. An exchange of words, for him, can only ever be a simulation, since he has constructed his Other himself, and exerts almost total control over it. In transposing his Other onto Mrs Sinico, he prepares the way for his eventual disappointment, for ultimately she will not be able to confirm his sense of self in the manner that he desires.⁴¹

Ordinarily, precisely because of his self-reflexivity, Mr Duffy has no use for memory. Perhaps Mr Duffy would have made an ideal specimen for Samuel Beckett, who wrote:

[t]he man with a good memory does not remember anything because he does not forget anything. His memory is uniform, a creature of routine, at once a condition and function of his impeccable habit, an instrument of reference instead of an instrument of discovery.⁴²

It appears that Mr Duffy needs to break with his habits in order to start remembering, to proceed from mere referencing to discovering. As I have pointed out above, from the moment he reads about Mrs Sinico's death, his evening becomes remarkably different from his usual routine. Having had two tumblers of punch, he is able to evoke her image and recollect "his life with her" (*D* 275), and it is only at this point that his revulsion gives way to the sudden realisation that she is dead. Perhaps for the first time, he conceives of her not as a mirror of himself but as a separate human being, living a lonely life, "sitting night after night alone in that room" (*D* 275). Following this brief insight, he revisits the park where they used to walk together, and it is there that the crisis deepens. "She seemed to be near him", "he seemed to feel her voice touch his ear, her hand touch his" (*D* 276) – these are memories and sensations over which, for once, he has no control, and, as a consequence of this, he feels "his moral nature falling to pieces" (*D* 276).

But as he turns back to return to his lodgings, he becomes his usual sceptical self again: "He began to doubt the reality of what memory told him" (*D* 276). His brief insight is beginning to evaporate, and he feels himself alone again, with silence all around him (*D* 277). Mr Duffy prefers the authority of his own narration to the emotionally charged awareness of the instability and elusiveness of his unconscious (to which his memories have briefly exposed him). He is ready to return to his customary

way of life, in the words of Nietzsche, “a life neither bored nor painful”.⁴³ Rather than reading “A Painful Case” as a narrative of homosexual denial, it may well be regarded as an exemplary study of self-deceit, of the failure to use memory as a tool for self-recognition and knowledge in the present. If Mr Duffy imagines himself as a creature of supreme significance, simultaneously a creator and destroyer, then his sudden insight may be considered worthless. “Emily’s pain”, Suzette Henke writes, “has become his own, her despair a visible sign of masochistic recrimination”.⁴⁴ Realising that he has finally lost his mirror-image for good, Mr Duffy recreates for himself an image of her plight: “No-one wanted him; he was outcast from life’s feast” (*D* 276). He craftily turns Emily Sinico’s “painful case” into his own, making himself simultaneously into hero, villain, and victim. Thus he attempts to regain control over his story, and to silence all the voices which may have told him otherwise. His memories are wrenched from a personal world of pain and grief, and transformed and distorted into just another “strange impersonal voice” (*D* 270), telling him precisely what he wants to hear.

2.3. “The Boarding House”: Confession as a mode of memory

If, as Wolfgang Streit maintains, one of the central themes of *Dubliners* is “the obligation to confess one’s sex”,⁴⁵ then issues of (veiled) desire and its (equally veiled) discourse are tied to memory and its order and articulation. In “The Boarding House”, everything revolves around a discourse of the unspoken and the supposed need for confession and reparation. Memory plays a dual role in this context: The act of confession first necessitates a recollection of one’s actions and activities, and then a sanctioned articulation of the otherwise unutterable in a prescribed environment. In the

context of confession as a speech act, it may be seen as paradoxical that the prevalent silence constitutes quite a striking aspect of the text.

Garry Leonard observes that, in “The Boarding House”, “it is the context in which a conversation is conducted that is presented to the reader, not the actual words that are exchanged”.⁴⁶ The reader, in other words, remains excluded from a first-hand experience or witnessing of the crucial events.⁴⁷ If we stay for the moment with the idea of the text as representing a confessional, the reader’s situation is somewhat similar to watching a person entering the confession box, and then leaving it some time later, without any clear indication of the precise words spoken inside.

Every character in “The Boarding House” knows something he or she refuses to say, or abstains from saying. Thus, the following two sentences can be regarded as neatly summing up the text’s own strategy:

Polly *knew* she was being watched but still her mother’s *persistent silence* could not be misunderstood. There had been *no open complicity* between mother and daughter, *no open understanding* but, though people in the house began to talk of the affair, still Mrs Mooney *did not intervene*. (D 221, emphasis added)

Silence, hidden understanding and complicity create a discursive sphere in which the reader struggles in a search for textual markers, for any indicators pointing towards a “true” or “valid” story behind all the allusions. Margot Norris, in what may be an overly harsh-sounding assessment of “The Boarding House”, calls the story’s mode of narration “dull and uninteresting”, a “narrative bread pudding”, made from (semantic) rinds or crusts with the centre missing.⁴⁸ And Fritz Senn locates the text’s strategy of separation, dislocation and reconstruction in the breaking up and subsequent collecting and re-using of bread from the dinner table.⁴⁹ James Joyce himself was quite possibly referring to the same idea of the text as meticulously enacting a distance (between the

story and its readers) when he described the style of *Dubliners* as one of “scrupulous meanness”.⁵⁰

There are several types of confession in “The Boarding House”. Polly confesses her involvement with Doran to her mother, and this necessitates her subsequent disclosure of this conversation (the “frank” questions and answers, *D* 222) to her lover. Doran has been to church the previous night to make his dutiful confession and to take his penance. As we encounter him in the story, he is about to be summoned by Mrs Mooney for another open conversation in which the question of reparation (i.e. marriage; his worldly penance) is to be discussed. In any case, Doran’s confession to the priest has evidently been an unsettling experience which has “softened him up” and made him more vulnerable as the time comes for his interview with Mrs Mooney:

The recollection of his confession of the night before was a cause of acute pain to him: the priest had drawn out every ridiculous detail of the affair and in the end so magnified his sin that he was almost thankful at being afforded a loophole of reparation. The harm was done. (*D* 224)

The phrase “[t]he harm was done” serves a dual purpose. It is, of course, part of the rendering of Doran’s bitter thoughts, contemplating whatever deed it was he now regrets. At the same time, however, they provide an ironic comment on Doran’s predicament: Confession, as a social convention and an act of symbolic exchange (an offer of reparation for the details of one’s sins) causes actual harm to Doran by making him susceptible to Mrs Mooney’s well-prepared words. Contrary to Garry Leonard, who argues that many of Joyce’s characters “confess in order to feel alive”,⁵¹ I believe that, in Doran’s case at least, confession imposes a temporary retreat from life, a kind of sanctioned passivity in which he becomes particularly vulnerable to memories and repressed thoughts, such as the question of Polly’s social standing (*D* 224).

Doran shows all the signs of extreme anxiety: his hands tremble so violently he finds it impossible to shave, and his glasses appear to be catching the moisture from his face, dulling his vision every so often. If there had been any doubt concerning the severity of his situation, his confessing to a priest has clearly made him aware, possibly for the first time, of the possible consequences of what is now plainly an immoral and sinful (sexual) act: loss of his job and prospects, loss of reputation. Even before the interview with Mrs Mooney, Doran feels he has little choice: "What could he do now but marry her or run away?" (*D* 224).

At this point, about two-thirds into the text, we have only just encountered Bob Doran in his room, and the scene offers a powerful sense of entrapment and inevitability. However, as Polly enters the room, her physical presence fills him with the awareness that "[i]t was not altogether his fault that it had happened" (*D* 225). The memories that follow of their first, seemingly inadvertent physical contact are introduced by a particularly enigmatic phrase: "He remembered well, with the *curious patient memory of the celibate*, the first casual caresses her dress, her breath, her fingers had given him" (*D* 225, emphasis added). In view of the strong sexual subtext established by the story so far, the combination of the words *patient* and *celibate* in the context in which they occur here poses a fundamental problem of interpretation. If there has been an affair between Polly Mooney and Bob Doran which has involved sexual acts, then how can the word "celibate" possibly relate to Doran's recollection of their intimacy? The words are more suggestive of reserve, of actual inhibition which could have prevented sexual relations between Polly and Bob Doran from developing. They may even point towards an act of self-censorship, with Doran quite possibly remembering himself as a passive "victim" of Polly's advances in order to quell his troubled conscience.

The word “celibate” appears again on the next page in a similarly unusual phrase, as he asks himself the question which has previously been uttered by Polly: “*What am I to do?* The instinct of the celibate warned him to hold back. But the sin was there” (*D* 226, emphasis in the original). Is it the same instinct which tells him that “delirium passes” (*D* 226), which already foresees an end to passion and desire? Does Doran censor his own memories, eliminating from them any conscious reference to his own sexuality? Perhaps here the text is self-consciously enacting a sham through the strategy of juxtaposition and evasion, just like in the song Polly likes to sing:

I’m a ... naughty girl.
 You needn’t sham:
 You know I am. (*D* 221)

Fritz Senn has noted that the rhymes of “sham” with “am” serve as pointers in two different directions, “towards appearance or towards a reality beneath it”.⁵² In his view, this ties in with the text’s curiously ambivalent phrasing in relation to Polly, her “wise innocence” (*D* 222) and her habit of glancing upwards when conversing, making her look “like a little perverse madonna” (*D* 221), perversely incorporating elements of sin, sensuality, and religion into the image of the mother (the “Madam” Mrs Mooney, proprietor of the Boarding House). The text provides these series of allusions without actually referring directly to its central event, thereby leaving the extent of Doran’s “sin” open to conjecture.⁵³ Many critics have failed to take into account the text’s cunning withholding of specific information when unthinkingly subscribing to a “worst-case scenario” in which Polly is assumed to be pregnant.⁵⁴ Allusions to some unmentionable “harm” or “sin”, like the magnifying glass of ritual confession, are evidently powerful enough to entrap the reader in the same way as they do Bob Doran. Fritz Senn, drawing attention to the text’s very own strategy of scheming, cautions against such an unquestioning postulation and points out that

[a]ll known things considered, Mr. Doran might have to pay for much less than what we almost automatically charge him with: this would make the reparation more cruel, less contingent on deed than on mere social attitudes [...].⁵⁵

It could be argued that the text imitates Mrs Mooney's view of the circumstances as a kind of gamble, a game where the goalposts are those of convention and in which "[s]he felt sure she would win" (*D* 223). Doran, the man in his thirties with "a good screw [...]" and a bit of stuff put by"⁵⁶ (*D* 223) (in other words, with a regular income and savings too) is an ideal opponent for her precisely because he is old and experienced enough to assess the situation from a socially acceptable point of view, as one in which something (namely a young girl's honour) has been lost and can only be restored through marriage. Mrs Mooney has previously recognised that a girl like Polly makes for ideal bait in the environment of the boarding house, and now she sees Doran, conditioned by religion, tradition, and moral duty, as the perfect candidate to walk into her trap and get her daughter "off her hands" (*D* 224). Both Mrs Mooney and Bob Doran know that neither youth nor ignorance could amount to a valid excuse on his part, since he is both old enough and experienced enough to know better than to start an affair with his landlady's daughter.

Sitting "helplessly" (*D* 225) on his bed, Doran is presented as reflecting on the possible consequences of the "affair" as well as on his early involvement with Polly. He imagines his friends laughing and his family looking down on Polly, but above all, he is terrified of losing his job and his reputation as an industrious and diligent man. His helplessness may be of a mental as well as a physical kind, as he tries to argue for himself: "It was not altogether his fault that it had happened" (*D* 225). At this moment, Doran's recollections appear to function for him as an attempt at justification while highlighting his moral weakness. The memories he has of Polly could be grouped under two different headings. On the one hand, he remembers, "with the curious patient

memory of the celibate" (*D* 225), the sensual delights that Polly radiated when, wearing only a bathrobe-like garment and slippers, she knocked on his door to relight her candle. Here, we clearly have an image of Polly as temptress, a young woman well versed in the art of seduction. The next paragraph, however, brings memories of a different kind. Polly appears in a much more domestic role, warming up his dinner whenever he returned home late, and making him punch "[i]f the night was anyway cold or wet or windy" (*D* 225). In this passage, Polly becomes a motherly figure, thoughtfully and kindly providing all kinds of domestic comforts. From this arises again the image of sensual delights, as Doran recalls how, on these late nights,

[t]hey used to go upstairs together on tiptoe, each with a candle, and on the third landing exchange reluctant goodnights. They used to kiss. He remembered well her eyes, the touch of her hand and his delirium

Revelling in the sensual delights her body has to offer, he quickly checks himself, preventing his recollection from going into any more detail and leaving it to the reader to fill the gap, before assuring himself: "But delirium passes" (*D* 226).⁵⁷

While Doran's memories, celibate and censored as they may or may not be, ultimately trigger in him anxiety and nervousness, Polly experiences a sense of calm recollection and recognition as she sits on Doran's bed while he has gone downstairs to be talked to by Mrs Mooney. It may be of some significance that it is the sight of the pillows which awakens in her "secret amiable memories" (*D* 227). What these memories comprise we do not know, but Polly's posture indicates a relaxed state: "She rested the nape of her neck against the cool iron bedrail and fell into a revery. There was no longer any perturbation visible on her face" (*D* 227). It is in this dreamlike state that she becomes effectively removed from the present, losing track not only of what she is waiting for, but of the fact that she is waiting for something in the first place. In her

mind, the past gives way to a perception of the future in a manner not seen anywhere else in *Dubliners*:

She waited on patiently, almost cheerfully, without alarm, her memories gradually giving place to hopes and visions of the future. Her hopes and visions were so intricate that she no longer saw the white pillows on which her gaze was fixed or remembered that she was waiting for anything. (*D* 227)

In this passage, Polly has moved on into the future, temporarily turning her reverie from reminiscence into imagination and anticipation. Drawing on Garry Leonard's suggestion as regards Eveline's state of mind at the docks,⁵⁸ Polly may be another female in *Dubliners* who experiences moments of *jouissance*. She is removed from present reality so completely that her identity becomes fluid, transcending the passage of time, and dissolving for a brief moment all trace of fear and anticipation. At no other point in the narrative does the fundamental difference between Bob Doran and Polly Mooney as separate subjectivities become clearer than here. They plainly follow two divergent patterns of thought, as Kierkegaard has remarked: "Now there are some individuals who live in hope, and others who live in memory".⁵⁹

Doran, perhaps trapped by the after-effects of his confession the previous night in which his "sin" had been very effectively "magnified" by the priest's rhetoric (*D* 224), appears strikingly helpless in contrast with Polly. Even her somewhat melodramatic weeping shows her to be in control of herself, and conscious of her looks: having cried a little in Doran's room, she goes to the mirror, refreshes her eyes and readjusts her hairpin (*D* 227). Doran's condition is quite the reverse: he cannot see properly because his glasses continually mist over, he is not looking his best since he has been physically unable to shave due to his nervous trembling, and even when dressed in his coat and waistcoat, he remains "more helpless than ever" (*D* 226). As he finally descends the stairs for his interview with Mrs Mooney and happens to meet Polly's brutal-looking

and coarse-mannered brother Jack on the way, he is assailed by a memory which for him invests the situation with an even stronger sense of menace and entrapment. On passing Jack on the stairs, Doran suddenly recalls a night when fighting had nearly broken out between Jack and one of the boarders over “a rather free allusion” (*D* 226) made to Polly, and Jack had uttered a very explicit threat of violence against the man. Through his association with Polly, Doran has effectively become the man against whom such threats are to be legitimately directed – unless, of course, he were to do the decent thing and commit himself to marriage. He has, perhaps half-consciously, positioned himself in such a way that his own voice, the instinct telling him “to remain free, not to marry”, to “run away” (*D* 224, 225) inevitably fades out, overcome by fear.

Among the four stories I am discussing in this chapter, “The Boarding House” offers the most potent comment on the social aspects of Dublin life, such as gender and economic relations and the authority of the Church. While Mrs Mooney has provided a suitable background to his personal weaknesses and exploited some simple (culturally sanctioned) psychological operations, Doran has inadvertently manoeuvred himself into a moralistic and emotional gridlock. While his memory provides him with limited powers for reasoning, it fails to provide him with any proper sense of self, or desire beyond the self. He remains bound to a mode of remembering irresistibly tied to the question of repentance and moral judgement.

2.4. Memory, gender, and authority in “The Dead”

“The Dead”, written in Rome in 1906/1907, is by far the longest of the *Dubliners* stories. It sums up some of the moods of the earlier stories, the tragic and the ironic, in the character of Gabriel Conroy and the interaction with his wife Gretta and the other

guests at the party.⁶⁰ The final story in the *Dubliners* collection, it has generated a considerable amount of critical readings over the years. Robert Spoo has referred to “The Dead” as “Joyce’s first sustained fictional enigma”, a story full of “persistent unassimilated strangeness”.⁶¹ Harold F. Mosher has observed the mechanism by which the sequence of the stories influences the reader’s perception, urging him or her to construct or invent a plausible background for the events related in the stories. As in his discussion of “Eveline”, he describes the narrative strategy of “The Dead” as hovering on a fine line between repression (what the text fails to tell, the “nonnarrated”) and imaginative recreation (the reader’s responsibility for invention).⁶²

Absence and displacement are powerful themes in “The Dead”. The story’s characters are, as Garry Leonard has pointed out, ruled by “absent thoughts that they cannot afford to remember”.⁶³ They most certainly cannot afford to confront thoughts originating from outside their own selves, and thus the atmosphere in “The Dead” is almost claustrophobic. Awkward or uncomfortable thoughts and utterances are swiftly swept under a verbal carpet. Gabriel himself has clearly perfected this strategy. For instance, he is profoundly unsettled by Lily’s bitter remark that “[t]he men that is now is only all palaver and what they can get out of you” (*D* 339), and, having first attended to his appearance (his shoes, his waistcoat), he quickly changes the subject: “O Lily, he said, thrusting [a coin] into her hand, it’s Christmas time, isn’t it?” (*D* 339), thereby effectively transferring his own embarrassment onto the girl.

It is perhaps in “The Dead” that the disruptive and transformative quality of memory is at its most potent. Although the events of the evening have already instigated in him a feeling of nervousness, Gabriel Conroy is utterly unprepared for the impact of a memory which is not his own, and therefore cannot be contained by means of reason or repression. The memory, and the past to which it relates, belongs wholly to his wife

Gretta, and until the night of the Christmas Party, Gabriel does not even know of its existence. With shock he realises that, for all the long years of their marriage, his wife's past has remained elusive. Gretta's memory of Michael Furey is a thread which contains the sum of Gabriel's unease and nervousness, forming an absence that only emerges at the moment it becomes a ghostly presence.

Gabriel's crisis occurs precisely because he has yet to realise how deeply he has been mistaken in taking the past to be a fixed tableau with no mysteries or secrets. In his after-dinner speech he emphasises the traditional Irish hospitality and acknowledges the power of the past in his somewhat pompous mention of "our forefathers" (*D* 363). The past is everywhere in "The Dead", and it is remembered mostly as a static background that lends an illusion of life, and a *raison d'être*, to the characters in the present.

While many critics have acknowledged memory as a climactic element in "The Dead", there has been a debate among critics whether or not the final epiphanic scene constitutes a genuine moment of insight or merely another occasion of self-delusion for Gabriel. For instance, at the core of Raffaella Baccolini's discussion of *Dubliners* lies the juxtaposition of male and female characters. In male characters, she argues, memory tends to have an unsettling effect, but it also brings about insight and understanding, while for female characters, it remains superficial with no sense of transformation or illumination.⁶⁴ Gretta features in Baccolini's reading of "The Dead" only as "an object of male gaze"⁶⁵ and a trigger for Gabriel's emotional upheaval which culminates in a moment of epiphany. This view of the text is problematical not only because it disregards any ironic undertones which may exist, but also because it fails to perceive those elements in the text which resist or question ideological assumptions, thus undermining the narrator's authority. In short, this approach focuses on Gabriel in the same way that the narrator of "The Dead" does by making Gabriel the focalizer, the

eyes and thoughts through which the story is allowed to unfold. Margot Norris proposes a sceptical reading of “The Dead”, a careful dismantling of the narrator’s romantic lyricism as a form of conceit. For example, in the scene that has Gretta standing half-hidden and listening to the song *The Lass of Aughrim*, Norris sees an echo of Ibsen’s *A Doll’s House*:

That Gabriel appears, or pretends, not to recognize his wife immediately as she stands at the top of the stair, that he is excited by her in her guise as a beautiful and mysterious stranger, recalls Torvald Helmer’s strange seduction fantasy of his wife Nora.⁶⁶

Of course, the irony is that, by the closing paragraph of “The Dead”, Gretta has indeed become a stranger to Gabriel. Both Torvald’s and Gabriel’s desires are directed precisely towards the hidden presence, the elusive “real” woman of whom they know nothing. For Torvald as for Gabriel, what renders a woman attractive is *imagined*, not *real*, mystery. On leaving the Morkans’ Christmas party with Gretta, Gabriel’s temper becomes once again reminiscent of Torvald’s in *A Doll’s House*: “She seemed to him so frail that he longed to defend her against something and then to be alone with her” (D 374). Interestingly, Gabriel’s thoughts and recollections that follow this passage seem focussed on the early days of their relationship, a relationship which then failed to meet the approval of Gabriel’s late mother. Therefore it may be the memory of the past which offers a sense of transgression and excitement, to such an extent that Gabriel feels sexually aroused. It is to their past “secret life” that he wishes to return so as to relive the thrill:

Moments of their secret life together burst like stars upon his memory. [...] Like the tender fire of stars moments of their life together, that no one knew of or would ever know of, broke upon and illuminated his memory. *He longed to recall to her those moments, to make her forget the years of their dull existence together and remember only their moments of ecstasy.* (D 374, emphasis added)

What Gabriel desires most is power over his wife's memories ("He longed to be master of her strange mood", *D* 377), thinking that a return to their "secret" past will renew her passion and desire for him. Remembering for him, here, becomes a means to an end: the defusing of his own desire, perhaps the renewal of their sexual relationship. He does not realise at this point how little he is in command of Gretta's memories. Not only does he wish her to remember the passionate moments – he also wants to *make her forget* the monotony that followed these moments. In his fantasy of romantic and verbal empowerment, he has already arrived at his goal, leading him to narrate the story of his anticipation in which he imagines their arrival at the Gresham Hotel: "[...] when he and she were in their room in the hotel, then they would be alone together. He would call her softly [...]" (*D* 374).

While memories of the couple's early life carry for Gabriel a (fictitious) promise of freedom, he is entirely unaware of Gretta's thoughts and emotions at this point, simply assuming her to share his mood. He has, as Leonard writes, "been fantasizing about the intimacy of their relationship with specific reference to the way the relationship produced secrets he now takes to be constitutional of his own subjectivity".⁶⁷ There is a profound sense of irony in Gabriel's thoughts of escape from everyday duties in that he, and the reader, has no idea about the significance of the song and its relation to Gretta's state of mind. Gabriel simply feels elated:

"[...] he felt that they had escaped from their lives and duties, escaped from home and friends and run away together with wild and radiant hearts to a new adventure" (*D* 376).

His vision of the immediate future, mingled with his nostalgic memories, turns out to be formulaic and misdirected.⁶⁸ He feels pride at Gretta's "grace and wifely carriage" (*D* 375), and his reminiscences have made him responsive to physical contact:

But now after the kindling of so many memories, the first touch of her body [leaning on Gabriel's arm], musical and strange and perfumed, sent through him a keen pang of lust. (*D* 375)

Overwhelmed by erotic desire, and bewildered by Gretta's unresponsiveness, Gabriel attempts some meaningless conversation. Assuming that they are sharing the same set of intimate memories of courtship, and close to losing control of himself, Gabriel now craves power over Gretta's body: "He longed [...] to crush her body against his, to overmaster her" (*D* 378).⁶⁹ But he cannot do this while he does not know "what is the matter" (*D* 378). Briefly, there is an illusion of control as Gretta kisses him, restoring his confidence in a presumed harmony of thought. Gabriel's wishful thinking runs as follows:

Just when he was wishing for it she had come to him of her own accord. Perhaps her thoughts had been running with his. Perhaps she had felt the impetuous desire that was in him and then the yielding mood had come upon her. (*D* 378)

He realises the extent of his misinterpretation as Gretta reveals the reason behind her agitation: her memories of her young lover in Galway, Michael Furey, who died aged seventeen, and who "used to sing that song, *The Lass of Aughrim*" (*D* 379). Gabriel feigns indifference, but, as Buttigieg observes, he

is defeated; his defenses collapse as his memories can no longer keep out the reality of Gretta's otherness, of his own great limitations. The past, no longer held in check by memory, unleashes in Gabriel's mind a number of unpleasant recognitions.⁷⁰

The most unpleasant of these recognitions for Gabriel appears to be not so much the matter of thwarted desire or of emotional and physical faithfulness, but quite simply the realisation that his wife has a past and corresponding memories which exist independently from his, in short, that she is an autonomous being who has her own secrets:⁷¹ "While he had been full of memories of their secret life together, full of tenderness and joy and desire, she had been comparing him in her mind with another"

(*D* 380). He needs to make this harsh judgement so as to rehabilitate himself, but again his strategy fails. Asking Gretta about the cause of Michael Furey's death, her answer "I think he died for me" (*D* 380) overthrows the last traces of Gabriel's command: "[...] at that hour when he had hoped to triumph, some impalpable and vindictive being was coming against him, gathering forces against him in its vague world" (*D* 381). Little does he realise that what he perceives to be Gretta's secrecy is in fact a prerequisite to their marriage,⁷² and that through his interrogation of Gretta, he himself is playing a substantial part in the "creation" of Michael Furey as a ghostly presence from the past. By sheer effort of will, outwardly he manages to remain calm and composed, but Gretta's utterance unsettles him profoundly. The effect of this, and the role of the final two paragraphs of the story, have been objects of debate for many critics. Essentially, the end of "The Dead" has generated two different sets of opinions in relation to the quality of Gabriel's insight. Critics such as Joseph Buttigieg and Raffaella Baccolini acknowledge that, by the end of the story, Gabriel is to some extent a changed man. In this view, even if the insight or vision is only a momentary one facilitated by curious circumstances, the text allows for a transformation, or discovery, of an aspect of the self which had previously been buried or forgotten.⁷³ The strong imagery of the final paragraph, the unusual presence of snow ("we haven't had snow like it for thirty years", says Mary Jane as the guests are preparing to leave the party, *D* 372), the vision of the Connemara graveyard, may suggest that something has indeed changed, and Richard Ellmann goes so far as to describe Gabriel's humility in the face of a sudden understanding of the connection that exists between all humankind, between the living and the dead.⁷⁴

On the other hand, a number of critics have proposed that the insight gained by Gabriel is only another version of his tactic of self-assertion, a means of circumventing

his insecurity.⁷⁵ Vincent Pecora provides what is probably one of the strongest readings in terms of the text's exposure of a flawed ideology. He argues that Gabriel merely switches from one illusion to another in his quest for stability and reassurance, finding at last a gallant stance of generosity and heroism. Something may well have changed in "The Dead", but in Pecora's view, Gabriel's transformation is prompted solely by his own needs:

What appears to be a great alteration in an individual's perception and understanding of self – a movement from blind egotism to moral selflessness and sympathetic humility – becomes instead the ideologically supported transformation of one set of illusions into another to enable the individual to cope with a new and threatening social environment.⁷⁶

Gabriel is certainly the sort of person for whom stability remains an ideal, and for most of "The Dead", he succeeds in glorifying a past which, he seems to think, can be fully known and understood. The party at the Morkans' is an annual event, thus offering regularity and predictability in the repetition of rituals such as the dancing and the carving of the goose. Pecora's reading considers in particular Gabriel's preoccupation with an image of himself as a man of self-sacrifice thinly disguised as "generosity", a tactic by which he seeks to elevate and contrast himself against the "vulgarity" of the other guests, and to redeem his self-assurance when faced with Gretta's "strange mood". Since the final scene in "The Dead" gives us Gabriel's point of view, the words "generous" and "generosity" appear closely associated with his mental and emotional state, and, as Blake Bailey observes, may connote Gabriel's way of keeping the lurking sense of his own sentimentality at bay.⁷⁷

Bailey locates the precise moment of Gabriel's "moment of epiphany" in the sentence which reads: "The time had come for him to set out on his journey westward" (*D* 384). In line with the ambiguity of the text up to this point, it is virtually impossible

the first time, she realises the implication of his last speech – he did not want to live *without her*.

Secondly, I would suggest that in Gabriel's habitual passivity, he has literally forgotten that there may be aspects of life of which he is ignorant, and that there may well be gaps and twists in what he considers to be his (accurate) memory. Garry Leonard provides an elegant summary of this notion: "What Gabriel really longs to restore to his conscious story are the missing pages still legible in his unconscious and also indirectly operative in his subjective consciousness". He continues by quoting Lacan: "The unconscious [...] is that chapter of my history which is marked by a blank or occupied by a falsehood: it is the censored chapter. But the Truth can be found again; it is most often already written down elsewhere".⁸¹

Gabriel's affirmation to set out on a journey westward could be read as a resolution to explore precisely this elsewhere-ness, to recognise and work through the question marks between his perception of Gretta and of himself, and the pasts which have produced them. He will need to overcome his "vague terror" (*D* 381) when encountering "the primacy of the 'dead' past, the passionate west, [which] looms over his previously well-ordered sense of reality".⁸² The journey westward would thus entail an immersion in the "censored chapter" of Gabriel's and Gretta's past, where the question "She's from Connacht, isn't she?" would evoke more than the evasive reply "Her people are" (*D* 349).

The name Furey, of course, is itself evocative of emotional and physical passion, and it is worth recalling Gabriel's initial reluctance to discuss a journey to Galway and the Aran Islands. He conceives of himself as too sensible to engage his mind in things he deems disagreeable (as when he tries "to banish from his mind all memory of the unpleasant incident with Mrs Ivors", *D* 351). Furthermore, he is clearly unsure of how

to decide whether this journey is to be of a real or symbolic nature. Has Gabriel finally decided to accompany Molly Ivors on her trip to the Aran Islands? What can we assume the connotations of “westward” for Gabriel to be? Bailey points out that “Gabriel’s fall begins fittingly enough with a reminder of the dreaded west” in the guise of the song *The Lass of Aughrim* to which Gretta listens at the top of the stairs.⁷⁸

There are two points I would like to make in this context. Firstly, the uncanny powers of the past only reach Gabriel via Gretta. Hence, I would propose a reading in which Gretta, and not Gabriel (or Michael Furey), represents the agent of transformation and recognition. The tune she listens to, sung by the cold-stricken tenor Mr Bartell D’Arcy, resurrects in her a memory satiated with emotions long forgotten. It is only through her openness (she tells Gabriel what she is really thinking about, why she is deeply upset, while he never speaks his mind) that Gabriel gets to question his own assumptions about himself and their relationship. In fact, it may not be Gretta’s role to generate an epiphany or insight in Gabriel but vice versa: Gabriel’s near-obsessive questions may have pushed Gretta’s recollections of her *own* past into realms never consciously explored before. Gretta’s weeping could thus be regarded as a re-living of the past, in contrast with Gabriel’s somewhat sentimental reminiscing.⁷⁹ The emotional aspects of hearing a long-forgotten song⁸⁰ and Gabriel’s probing questions may well provide Gretta with the first opportunity for true recognition, and for actual mourning. For it was when she “was only a week in the convent [that] he died” (*D* 382), creating a sense of a twofold separation between the lovers: first an abrupt farewell, and then death. Gretta remembers that, standing at the end of the garden in the dark and wet night on their last meeting, Michael Furey had said that “he did not want to live” (*D* 382). In finally uttering the fateful words which hold such terror for Gabriel, “I think he died for me” (*D* 380), Gretta completes her own story as well as Michael Furey’s. For

to refer to Molly Ivors in his thoughts, reducing her simply to a crudely phrased “the girl or woman or whatever she was” (*D* 351), in effect casting doubt on the validity of her womanhood. Thus, one of the elements which remains “below the threshold of textual consciousness”⁸³ is the question of sexual passion. “Fury” is suggestive of a hot-blooded and visceral encounter, and it may be noted here that this was the surname Joyce originally had in mind.⁸⁴ Interestingly, Gabriel appears to be increasingly aware of the divide between hot and cold as the evening progresses. He manages to respond “coldly” to his wife’s excited cry, and he contemplates the coolness outside the window as he touches the pane with “warm trembling fingers” (*D* 352). Then, of course, there are Gabriel’s curiously disjointed memories, experienced on the way to the Gresham Hotel, which are suffused with the contrast between hot and cold:

A heliotrope envelope was lying beside his breakfast cup and he was caressing it with his hand. Birds were twittering in the ivy and the sunny web of the curtain was shimmering along the floor: he could not eat for happiness. They were standing on the crowded platform and he was placing a ticket inside the warm palm of her glove. He was standing with her in the cold, looking in through a grated window at a man making bottles in a roaring furnace. It was very cold. Her face, fragrant in the cold air, was quite close to his and suddenly she called out to the man in the furnace:

– Is the fire hot, sir?

But the man could not hear her with the noise of the furnace. It was just as well. He might have answered rudely. (*D* 374)

Starting in a light domestic setting, the series of impressions gains distinctly hellish overtones with the image of the roaring furnace. As he recalls the scene, Gabriel literally feels the heat enter his body: “A wave of yet more tender joy escaped from his heart and went coursing in warm flood along his arteries” (*D* 374). It is unclear whether Gretta calls out to the man in the furnace in a fit of recklessness or out of pure naivety, but Gabriel seems acutely aware that the threat of a rude retort from the stranger hangs in the air. Arguably, his joy and the warm flood that follows is of a sexual nature, but

his failure to integrate the image of Gretta as a passionate woman into his memory means he can envisage sexual desire only for himself, reserving for his wife a mere “yielding mood” (*D* 378). I would suggest that, in the same way that “the visceral” remains below the threshold of textual consciousness, Gabriel’s unconscious is in conflict with his conscious mind. He desires his wife but fears her past. In the attempt to unlock from his wife’s heart its most passionate secret, he unwittingly releases his own most potent anxiety.

The journey contemplated by Gabriel at the end of “The Dead”, in a metaphorical sense, is one on which his wife has already embarked: an absorption into one’s own past selves, a re-living of deeply buried emotions rather than a conscious and carefully measured reminiscing. Other characters in *Dubliners* are stalled when reaching the brink of actual departure, most notably Eveline, who experiences a sudden physical paralysis at a critical moment. But Bob Doran also ineffectually contemplates escape: “He longed to ascend through the roof and fly away to another country [...]” (*D* 226). Even Mr Duffy, although largely in command of his thoughts, is curiously affected when watching a train depart Kingsbridge Station and listening to the noise of the engine, “reiterating the syllables of her name” (*D* 276). However, he never considers going away, instead turning back “the way he had come” (*D* 276), back into his own self-centred universe.

Gabriel can only afford to be “generous” because he is literally “full of himself”. For most of the time, he clings to his self-assured role as a husband, protector and provider. Towards the story’s conclusion, however, the abyss of his imagination briefly opens up, bringing with it a faint sense of his own insignificance when compared to a lover’s image, “locked in [Gretta’s] heart for so many years” (*D* 383). In experiencing the feeling of dissolution of identity and temporal existence, he may finally reach the

point where, like Michael Furey, he can accept that only death can bring true forgetting, that existence, in the words of Nietzsche, “is only an uninterrupted has-been, a thing that lives by negating, consuming and contradicting itself”.⁸⁵ With the help of Gretta and her ghostly lover, he may even overthrow the paradigm governing so many other characters in *Dubliners*: “We cannot give ourselves [...]: we are our own” (*D* 270).

Chapter 3: *Stephen Hero*

As far as criticism is concerned, *Stephen Hero* has been largely ignored, and those scholars who have attempted critical readings have mostly concentrated on the book's more obvious shortcomings and its status as a kind of apprentice work by a great master of literature. The general opinion seems to be that *Stephen Hero* is set firmly within the tradition of conventional realistic-naturalistic narrative, while *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* is seen as a decisive step towards modernism, with the narrative's more experimental mode paving the way for *Ulysses*. But perhaps this view oversimplifies Joyce's development as a writer. As we will see, the ten "detached" chapters of *Stephen Hero* which still exist are much more than mere writing exercises, or the "schoolboy's production" by which Joyce himself referred to the work. Upon the posthumous publication of the *Stephen Hero* manuscript in 1944, the critical response varied considerably. Read in direct comparison with *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, the text has been derided as "crude and rough and arrogant and ugly".¹ Other contemporary critics have praised the work for its less stylised portrayal of Stephen, and highlighted the text's status as an insightful example of the genesis of *A Portrait*, and thus into the workings of Joyce's mind.² It is my conviction that in the predominant currents of literary criticism the more unconventional characteristics of *Stephen Hero* have been consistently overlooked. These include the use of different styles in various sections of the narrative as well as the textual representation of associative memory and the unconscious. I would like to show that memory is subverted in a number of ways in *Stephen Hero*, and although instances of recollection may at first glance appear scarce and much less elaborately crafted in comparison with *A Portrait*, it is on a detailed analysis of these occurrences that my study focuses.

Contrary to most critics' approaches, I would like to outline the fundamental difference between the two works not simply in terms of general questions of style, but instead attempt to analyse more specifically the manner in which the style of remembering and the representation of consciousness differentiates and shapes the perception of the two novels. John Paul Riquelme writes that in both texts "Stephen alternates between allegiances to the visionary and the material, between internal fantasy and external reality".³ He points out that in *Stephen Hero*, the analytical and the visionary are mainly presented in terms of Stephen's character, while in *A Portrait* the two aspects are enacted through the medium of style, becoming "elements in a style that emphasizes memory".⁴ I would like to show that *Stephen Hero*, by contrast, is situated between the forces of habit and habitual remembering, and the instinctive urge to cast off these forces in an attempt at spiritual renewal.

Consequently, my reading of *Stephen Hero* will analyse instances of memory not purely as elements of style and narrative position, but rather as examples of Stephen's stance towards personal or cultural history. Habit as memory, and memory as habit: This, in my view, forms the basis of the anti-intellectual and life-negating climate from which Stephen wishes to escape. Although *Stephen Hero* may at first glance appear to be a relatively unoriginal piece of work in the tradition of the *Bildungsroman*, the portrayal of Stephen Daedalus may cause us to reconsider this position by foregrounding his endeavours to subvert the forces that bind him: nationality, religion, and, above all, the impact of an undigested past, which exerts a profound influence on Stephen's way of thinking. For instance, while there has been some research into the epiphanies in relation to Stephen Dedalus' aesthetic theory, an examination of the concept of the epiphany in terms of the representation of memory has, to my knowledge, not been attempted so far.

In this chapter, I attempt to challenge the predominant view of *Stephen Hero* as a conventional piece of writing with little or no innovative momentum. An analysis of the representation of memory in relation to the character of Stephen reveals that Joyce's experiments concerning the rendering of individual consciousness and of patterns of associative memory start with *Stephen Hero* – or possibly even earlier. In order to clearly define the context of my argument, it will be necessary to compare and contrast instances of recollection in *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait*, bearing in mind that many passages or events of the earlier text were harvested from the former for inclusion in the latter. The first part of this chapter focuses on one such occasion.

At first sight, Stephen Daedalus may seem to lack the sensitiveness that characterises the Stephen of *A Portrait*. Francis Harvey points out that *Stephen Hero* “reproduces the *texture* of life as one imagines it at the time in a hard clear light and not as if through a glass dimly – which is what occurs in *A Portrait* [...]”.⁵ He regards the style of *A Portrait* as overwrought and full of self-conscious mannerisms whereas he praises the “natural human warmth” and “spontaneity” of *Stephen Hero*.⁶ Here Stephen's consciousness is clearly not accentuated in the manner that we find in the later text, yet I suggest that his portrayal deviates in a number of instances from the kind of realistic mode which tends to define a character solely through interaction with and perception of his immediate surroundings (this is, I believe, what Harvey means by “hard clear light”). Patrick Parrinder, on the other hand, argues that “[t]he meaning of *Stephen Hero* – insofar as this fragment of a manuscript can be said to possess a unity – is to be found in those passages in which Stephen braces himself to escape from an overwhelming condition of social pathology”.⁷ For Parrinder, the reaction to Irish Catholicism and its paralytic effect is the decisive piece of social pathology that incites Stephen's sense of rebellion in *Stephen Hero*. He strives to subvert that which has given

shape to his being (the “Catholic infection”, *SH* 206), and in doing so he wants to “live his own life according to what he recognised as the voice of a new humanity, *active, unafraid and unashamed*” (*SH* 194, my emphasis). This, of course, reverses the stipulation upheld by the teachings of the Church: *passivity, fear, and shame*.

I agree with Parrinder as far as the conflict experienced by Stephen can be seen as a clash between the Catholic upbringing which forms his past and the future he envisages for himself. However, the notion of a kind of pathologic curse may be taken further to include not just social but personal aspects of Stephen’s sense of self. It is my conviction that Stephen Daedalus is haunted as much by his personal past as he is by the nightmarish spectre of a history that has laid the fate of early twentieth-century Ireland at the mercy of the Church. The passages I would like to examine in this context are those that relate to the powers of recollection, since they provide a particularly interesting background to a comparative reading of *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*.

3.1. Instances of recollection: Passivity, fear, and shame

—Yes, yes, I remember, said Stephen who hated Cranly’s method of remembering the past [...] (*SH* 141)

Here, Stephen impatiently interrupts Cranly’s attempt at evoking a recollection: “[D]o you remember the evening we were standing at the top of the staircase talking about...” (*SH* 141). This example may serve to stress the different ways in which the two young men venture to recall the event of an earlier discussion, but in addition to this, it may be regarded as indicative of Stephen’s ambiguous feelings towards the recollection of personal and cultural history. Cranly expects Stephen to pick up the conversation at the point where it ceased in the past and to elaborate his opinion further while Stephen

resists this type of commitment. At this point he strongly appears to resent recalling his past ideas and opinions, it seems, either because he is conscious of the fact that they have been only of a transitional nature, or because Stephen's sense of selfhood itself has changed. Stephen is reluctant to remember, and by his reaction he makes it very clear that he hates not just "Cranly's way of remembering", but the very action of reminiscing and thus bringing the past back into the present. Nostalgia, we feel, is something he despises as weakness. There are instances which seem to refer back to the lost chapters one to fifteen, like for example the following sentence:

But the episode of religious fervour which was fast becoming a memory had resulted in a certain outward self-control which was now found to be very useful. (*SH* 29)

There is no "episode" of that kind in the chapters that remain of *Stephen Hero*, but the above quotation may hint at events close in theme and content to those described in *A Portrait*: a sudden urge to lead a pious and disciplined life following the spiritually devastating retreat sermons, which take up a considerable part of Chapter Three. It also evokes Joyce's 1904 essay "A Portrait of the Artist", which describes a boy praying fervently in an outdoor setting in "an ecstasy of oriental posture" (*JJA* [7], 98). But this "fever-fit of holiness" (*SH* 29) is already fading, and the Stephen we perceive in *Stephen Hero* sees himself as having – at least to a certain extent – conquered the domination of the Catholic Church. Joyce's 1904 essay gives us a glimpse of a very different young man, whose education has nearly succeeded in erasing his common sense in favour of "a very lively sense of spiritual obligations" (*JJA* [7], 98), and who consequently develops his peculiar "enigma of a manner" (*JJA* [7], 99) which culminates in his notion of heroic isolation designed to detach him from his past: the form of "outward self-control" that we find in the above passage from *Stephen Hero*.

While the words of that passage, referring as they do to another part of the text to which we have no access, seem perfectly in tune with the narrative situation of *Stephen Hero*, one cannot but remark on the casualness of the reference to the notion of past and memory. The past becomes an “episode”, implying a fixed period of time with a proper beginning and end. If this episode is “fast becoming a memory”, does that mean it is slipping out of consciousness, while its effects on the self still linger? Who is the object this memory belongs to? Stephen is not described as actively remembering his past religious devotion; it is the narrator who evokes the past in this highly depersonalised manner. Has Stephen simply forgotten his youthful and rather short-lived enthusiasm, or does he actively resist any reminder of his past? A closer look at some other instances of memory will show to what extent Stephen is in control of his powers of recollection.

The reader’s view of the adolescent Stephen, whose consciousness appears for the most part to be oriented firmly towards the present and the future, provides little insight into his childhood, neither in scenes of explicit remembrances nor in veiled allusions to past incidents. There is, however, one exception: a brief scene which is set off quite distinctly in style and content from the rest of the book, and which clearly anticipates the narrative style of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Significantly, this passage of text has its own history. Not only does it reappear with only small modifications in *A Portrait*, but it also figures in the shape of an epiphany in one of Joyce’s early notebooks, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.

The scene starts with Stephen standing in front of the National Library, leaning against a pillar and observing two groups of young people: a group of male students, and a group of girls, which apparently includes Emma. In these circumstances, Stephen experiences a “sudden reminiscence, a sympathy towards a protected seminarist life”

(*SH* 183), a sentiment brought about by a memory of a visit to Clonliffe College, a training college for the priesthood. This fact itself is noteworthy, and the implications will be examined later in this chapter.

All other scenes of recollection in *Stephen Hero* break off once the object of memory has been mentioned, and give the impression of being down-to-earth events which remain firmly under the control of the narrating consciousness, with little impact on the present. But this event clearly has a different quality. It is not just an isolated instance of remembrance, for it is constructed in a highly associative manner, and continues in a reverie which reads unlike any other passage in *Stephen Hero*. As is frequently the case with Stephen, reminiscences and sensations are associated for him with the presence of moisture (in a literal or a figurative sense), and here, too, a quick shower of rain descends on the city ("the rain brought him charity", *SH* 183). The students' conversation carries over to Stephen but is perceived as no more than a muffled noise:

The babble of the young students reached him as if from a distance, in broken pulsations, and lifting his eyes he saw the high rain-clouds retreating across the rain-swept country. The quick light shower was over, tarrying, a cluster of diamonds, among the shrubs of the quadrangle where an exhalation ascended from the blackened earth. The company in the colonnade was leaving shelter, with many a doubting glance, with a prattle of trim boots, a pretty rescue of petticoats, under umbrellas, a light armoury, upheld at cunning angles. He saw them returning to the convent – demure corridors and simple dormitories, a quiet rosary of hours – while the rain-clouds retreated towards the west and the babble of the young men reached him in regular pulsations. (*SH* 183-184)

Still Stephen perceives the sound of the voices, but in his mind, a different picture assembles itself:

He saw far away amid a flat rain-swept country a high plain building with windows that filtered the obscure daylight. Three hundred boys, noisy and hungry, sat at long tables eating beef fringed with green fat like blubber and junks of white damp bread, and one young boy, leaning

upon his elbows, opened and closed the flaps of his ears while the noise of the diners reached him rhythmically as the wild gabble of animals. (SH 184)

The above passage is abruptly followed by an apparently unconnected dialogue between Stephen and Cranly. The conversation takes place “one night” (SH 184), and contains Stephen’s idea of an “art of gesture”. Though outwardly unrelated and seemingly arbitrary, the discussion between Stephen and Cranly takes up the theme of rhythm, thereby integrating albeit not explaining the scene. On closer examination, however, there is another aspect which provides an associative link between the passages and which may also serve as an illustration of Stephen’s character. It is precisely the notion of an “art of gesture” that cunningly establishes a connection between the young boy in the refectory who is blocking out sound from his ears by pressing their “flaps” down over the auditory canal. Covering one’s ears is clearly a gesture of refusal and resistance; furthermore, it is an expression of withdrawal and isolation. But why does this recollection of the young boy (presumably a version of his younger self) impose itself on Stephen precisely as he stands outside the National Library?

It could be argued that it is the presence of the girls, and of Emma in particular, which plays a crucial part in Stephen’s receptiveness to a recollection of this kind. Stephen appears to detach himself on purpose from the other young men (and women) in the library porch. He has evidently been in the library with Cranly, who has shown him the “new review”, a University magazine set up by McCann. Stephen abhors all the articles in it which Cranly urges him to read, and his anger begins to abate only as he watches Emma and her companions. The scene is set in a curious mood which seems to be made up of two conflicting impulses: physical restraint and imaginative liberation. Stephen makes no attempt to join either group of students. Instead, “he chose to

contemplate the spectacle which she and her companions offered him” (*SH* 183). Contemplation here takes the form of melancholic reflection. Stephen visualises the protected life of the girls in their convent school, a life which can only preserve its virtue by “walls and watchdogs” (*SH* 183) shutting out the bold advances of the outside world’s hunger for life – including Stephen’s own longing for physical contact with Emma. He senses that she has become part of this protected world, the “seminarist life” in which passion is precluded by submissiveness, and in the face of this realisation, Stephen appears for the moment utterly powerless in his own passivity.

But what about the image of the young boy in Stephen’s recollection? With a view to interpreting the passage and to locating its proper context, one has to turn to *A Portrait*. This is, in my opinion, the only portion of text in *Stephen Hero* to which Connolly’s statement unreservedly applies that in order to fully appreciate the text it is necessary to be familiar with Joyce’s later works.⁸ Stephen is clearly remembering a period of time some ten years in the past, an incident from his first year at Clongowes Wood College. Contrary to the predominant view of *Stephen Hero* as the more conventionally “novelistic” text of the two, the above scene has a much more fragmentary character here than it does in *A Portrait*, where it serves (through its context) to place Stephen in a clearly defined emotional relation to Emma (“E-C-“ in *A Portrait*, or, in the words of Lynch, Stephen’s “beloved” (*P* V.1484). There is no mention of the “new review” in the corresponding portion of text in *A Portrait*; instead, Stephen, remembering that he last saw Emma “flirting” with a priest called Mahon, feels a pang of jealousy and bitterness. In *A Portrait* she, too, is removed from her companions through silence, yet Stephen makes no attempt to approach her. His mind is “emptied of theory and courage” (*P* V.1490), in other words, his habitual passivity takes the upper hand. Although he imagines his silence to be a form of rebellion, it adheres to

the teaching he has received, and only serves to reinforce his submissiveness. The picture in his mind appears more real than life itself.

In *A Portrait*, we can see even more clearly the double image which Emma presents to Stephen. On the one hand, she is his beloved, pure yet distant, an alternative kind of temptress and the source of inspiration which leads him to compose his villanelle. But on the other hand, she is a traitor and conspirator, “a figure of the womanhood of her country” (*P* V.1667), prepared to “flirt with her priest, to toy with a church which was the scullerymaid of Christendom” (*P* V.1643-1644).

Stephen’s reverie about the young boy in the refectory which in *Stephen Hero* follows the observation of the girls leaving their shelter clearly corresponds to a scene in Chapter One of *A Portrait*, which has Stephen doing precisely the same thing: “He leaned his elbows on the table and shut and opened the flaps of his ears” (*P* I.223-224). Even the dampness of the bread figures in the description. But what is especially remarkable is that here we are witnessing the scene from within Stephen’s consciousness. In *A Portrait*, it is the evening prior to Stephen’s illness and therefore carries a sense of foreboding, but in *Stephen Hero* the scene is markedly isolated from its context. Unfortunately, we cannot know with any certainty whether the events at Clongowes which take such an important part of the first chapter of *A Portrait* were already included at any point in the first fifteen chapters of *Stephen Hero*. As it is, we have to treat Stephen’s sudden bout of remembering himself as a small boy as a passage of text which is distinct in style and narrative technique from the remainder of the known text.

An approach to the psychology of memory and “mental association” which presumably enjoyed some popularity in the learned circles of Dublin in Joyce’s time is exemplified by a work entitled simply *Psychology*. Its author is the Jesuit Michael

Maher, “Professor of Mental Philosophy at Stonyhurst College, Examiner for the Diploma of Teaching of the Royal University of Ireland”.⁹ John S. Rickard points out that Joyce evidently studied Maher’s book in some detail, and he draws attention to the fact that there exists a copy of *Psychology* which is “marked and annotated in Joyce’s hand”.¹⁰ Whether or not Joyce himself was influenced by Maher’s teachings: Maher’s position concerning memory, habit and moral discipline does, I believe, impinge very strongly on Joyce’s portrayal of Stephen. In relying to some extent on the ideas of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, and thus representing a rather orthodox view of mnemonic processes, Maher may well represent the kind of institutional Jesuit position regarding the discussion of rationality, perception, and memory which forms the crux of Stephen’s rebellion.

As has been demonstrated earlier, Stephen’s awareness of Emma’s presence outside the library elicits a vision of the sheltered life of convent girls, followed by a memory in which Stephen sees himself as a vulnerable young boy. In his discussion on the psychology of mental association, Maher states that “present mental states tend to awaken representations of their *like* in past life”, and that, more specifically, “an experience – a sensation, an intellectual cognition, or an emotion – often recalls a similar state that occurred amid completely different surroundings at a very distant period”.¹¹ This effect forms the essence of Maher’s first law of association: the law of similarity. Applied to Stephen’s experience on seeing Emma, it would follow that there must be an affective parallel between the image he has of himself in the past, and his present emotional state. Thus the mechanics of memory surreptitiously place Stephen in a familiar position: one of helpless passivity and attempted emotional detachment.

One must, however, take into account not only the somewhat restrictive and, in the above example, speculative conception whereby emotional impact leaves its trace.

Maher's more general approach on contiguous association proves useful here, for it includes the more broadly accepted notion of cognitive acts as a preliminary for associative memory. In the above example from *Stephen Hero*, it would follow that Stephen's auditory perceptions play a decisive part: "[T]he babble of the young men [which] reached him in regular pulsations" (*SH* 184) thus forms the kind of perception which corresponds to the noise of the boys in the refectory, perceived by Stephen "rhythmically as the wild gabble of animals" (*SH* 184) as he covers and uncovers his ears. Whether an emotion or a sense perception (or a combination of the two) evokes the memory of a previous incident – the above example clearly illustrates that one of the principles at work is that of mental association.

It is not only in its imperceptible shift between present and past that the scene stands apart to some extent from the rest of *Stephen Hero*. The prose style itself is lyrically removed from the more factual tone of the greater part of the text. Stephen's reverie is shaped around the repetitive use of certain key-words. According to Harvey, this stylistic feature is only evident in *A Portrait*; for him, it represents an example of the mode of narrative which "obtrude[s] itself between writer and reader".¹² What is so noteworthy about the passage is the fact that, through the obscure pathways of association, it appears to mark not just a swift and unparalleled venture into the depths of Stephen's unconscious, but also into a highly experimental mode of textual representation. The passage is characterised by the use of repetition, assonance and alliteration: "he saw the high *rain-clouds*" – "across the *rain-swept* country" – "the *rain-clouds* retreated" – "amid a flat *rain-swept* country"; "a prattle of trim boots, a pretty rescue of *petticoats*", the repetition of "babble" and "pulsations" and of the words "he saw". These are only some of the more obvious textual devices which characterise this particular scene, and they plainly illustrate that in more than one respect *Stephen*

Hero is more than just a crude draft of a masterpiece. As a glimpse of the unconscious, of an event believed to be buried by the passage of time, it represents a particular state of mind, an almost trancelike condition, induced by muffled and rhythmical noise and, perhaps, the presence of moisture, all of which help to sharpen Stephen's sense of introspection. As an example of an allusive and associative style, it marks a decisive shift in narrative technique, one of the determining factors of the originality of narrative composition in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. The scene's profound significance for this new departure in literary representation can be inferred from its inclusion in *A Portrait*:

Their voices reached his ears as if from a distance in interrupted pulsation. She was preparing to go away with her companions.

The quick light shower had drawn off, tarrying in clusters of diamonds among the shrubs of the quadrangle where an exhalation was breathed forth by the blackened earth. Their trim boots prattled as they stood on the steps of the colonnade talking quietly and gaily, glancing at the clouds, holding their umbrellas at cunning angles against the few last raindrops, closing them again, holding their skirts demurely. (P V.1509-1518)

But this is not how the passage ends. Subsequently in *A Portrait*, Stephen is tormented by feelings of self-doubt and guilt towards Emma:

And if he had judged her harshly? If her life were a simple rosary of hours, her life simple and strange as a bird's life, gay in the morning, restless all day, tired at sundown? Her heart simple and wilful as a bird's heart? (P V.1519-1522)

Once again, Stephen is tormented by his insecurity and indecision. The intensity of his attachment to Emma varies according to his own unstable moods; he is drawn between empathy (implying acceptance of the Church's status quo) and rejection of her as personification of the forces against which he wishes to rebel.

The memory incident examined above has a dual effect. As we have seen, it recalls the feeling of isolation experienced in Clongowes many years previously. In a less

explicit way however, it refers back to another highly significant event in *Stephen Hero* which forms part of the surviving text. In chapter eighteen, Stephen is depicted walking the streets of Dublin while composing an essay in his head. A “tall young man” (*SH* 70) approaches him, grabs his arm and calls him by name. Turning and looking the man in the face, Stephen still fails to recognise him: “He stared for a few moments, trying to recall the face” (*SH* 70). Upon this, the stranger says: “Don’t you remember me? I knew you at once” (*SH* 70). It is Wells, one of Stephen’s classmates during his time in Clongowes. In fact, in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* Wells appears as the boy who pushes Stephen into the water of the square ditch, bringing on a bout of fever which results in Stephen’s confinement in the school’s infirmary, and ultimately leads to his somewhat prophetic dream about Parnell’s death. Here, Wells is dressed all in black, which prompts Stephen to ask whether Wells is in mourning. But, ironically and to Stephen’s astonishment, it transpires that Wells has in fact joined the Christian Brothers.

Wells receives his training at Clonliffe College, and Stephen chooses to accompany him on his way back to the college. As they enter the grounds and walk towards “the big square block of masonry looming before them through the faint daylight” (*SH* 72-73), Stephen’s train of thought leads him to ponder on the peculiarities of his own childhood “seminarist life” (*SH* 73) in Clongowes. He feels very intensely his estrangement from this type of existence, “the narrow activities of which he could now in a moment bring the spirit of an acute sympathetic alien” (*SH* 73). Stephen’s alienation extends to every single manifestation of piety and humbleness. He is keenly aware of his nature in opposition to the ideals of the church, “trained to repressive enforcement of a creed” (*SH* 73-74). The meeting with Wells has Stephen feel acutely

the opposition between the memories of his own past, and the aspirations he holds for the future.

3.2. Habit, nature, and desire

“The laws of memory are subject to the more general laws of habit.”¹³
– Samuel Beckett

Apart from the example of a recollection examined above, which emerges involuntary and spontaneous as in a dream, Stephen is shown very much as a creature of habit. The narration of his actions frequently involves an element of routine: “every morning” (SH 30), “every evening” (SH 36), “usual”, “always” (SH 37), “very often” (SH 42), “every Wednesday night” (SH 59) – these are just a few examples. Furthermore, the voice of the narrator employs expressions referring to unspecified points in a vague temporal succession, such as “one day” (SH 34, 38), “one night” (SH 39), “once” (SH 65, 70), which refuse to situate Stephen in any confirmed circumstance and emphasise the outward aimlessness of his life, contrasting sharply with the uniqueness of experience evident in the memory-event on the steps of the National Library. Other descriptions of Stephen in the act of remembering are scarce in *Stephen Hero*, and we generally do not get a strong sense of the spiritual or visionary powers of such an experience.

Does it follow, then, that Stephen Daedalus is merely the product of his learning? Is the representation of the habitual as we find it in *Stephen Hero* a form of depersonalised memory? And if that is indeed the case, what are the consequences of, and reasons for, Stephen’s apparent lack of past life? What is Stephen’s own attitude towards his memories and his past, and what implications does his position have with regard to his portrayal, and to the structure of the text?

Perhaps, we might argue, memory for Stephen in *Stephen Hero* is frequently tinged by habit (with the possible exception of the Clongowes memory, as shown above), with little or none of the transforming powers which are discernible in *A Portrait*. Rickard has pointed out that the lives of many of Joyce's characters revolve around the problem of habit, "the great enemy of change and the great enforcer of stagnation and paralysis".¹⁴ But how does habit relate to memory? Henri Bergson regarded habit as a form of unconscious memory. In *Matter and Memory*, he writes that habits are formed by repetition, or more concisely, "by repeated actions [...] amassed in the body".¹⁵ They correspond to a certain type of memory which does not represent the past but merely acts it out; it is therefore a purely mechanical process which is oriented not towards the past but towards the future, suppressing the otherwise indispensable selection of a route of action determined by the individual's free will and desire. Habit is thus a way of simplifying life by eliminating the necessity for a conscious evaluation of everyday situations.

Bergson locates habit at the extreme end of the range of memory phenomena, which comprises everything from memory *par excellence*¹⁶ or "pure memory"¹⁷ to "habit interpreted by memory"¹⁸ or "motor mechanisms".¹⁹ For him, the former is superior to the latter, for it is "entirely spontaneous [and] as capricious in reproducing as it is faithful in preserving".²⁰ However, motor-memory, through its repetitiveness and its responsiveness to external stimuli, frequently inhibits "pure" memory by restricting its impulsive nature. According to Bergson, memory in its purest form is therefore located in the imagination. It is concerned not with repetition but with the uniqueness of an image.²¹ The example given in *Matter and Memory* is that of learning a lesson: after a number of repetitions, the content of the lesson can readily be recalled by voluntary effort, it has been committed to memory. But what about every single instance of

repetition? Each of them is unique, each has occupied a separate period of time, “each reading stands out before my mind as a definitive event in my history”.²² Learning by heart is therefore the creation of a mechanism, “a habit of the body”.²³ The lesson learnt in its entirety becomes timeless knowledge, but at the same time, “it becomes more and more *impersonal*, more and more foreign to our past life”.²⁴

The Rev. Maher, in *Psychology*, defines habit as the direct opposite of impulse. Habit, he says, can be understood as “an acquired aptitude for some particular mode of action”, whereas impulse, or instinct, is “an inherited tendency”.²⁵ Interestingly, the brief discussion of habit (in which he acknowledges that habit is a psychological manifestation of the law of contiguity, or mental association) does not form a part of the chapter on memory. Instead, it is included in his treatment of “Rational Appetency”, which also includes such subdivisions as “Self-control” and “Moral Discipline”. The quintessence of Maher’s stance towards the question of habit can be inferred along the lines of its position in *Psychology*. Like Bergson, Maher claims that habit is a product of repetition, and can therefore be subject to modification through effort of willpower and discipline. Impulse thus corresponds to the notion of instinct: something for which not the individual, but only nature can be held responsible. The human character, Maher concludes in his discussion of “Rational Appetency” under the heading “Temperaments”, is determined partly by nature, partly by nurture.²⁶ However, as becomes evident in the case of Stephen, it can occasionally be difficult to tell these two sides apart. Nature has equipped Stephen with an intellectually gifted mind, capable of countermanding the automatism which has been imposed on him by nurture. His natural temperament is to guide him in his rejection of common values, something he regards as his innate fate:

He wished to express his *nature* freely and fully for the benefit of a society which he would enrich and also for his own benefit, seeing that it was part of his life to do so. [...] he was determined no conventions of a society, however plausibly mingling pity with its tyranny, should be allowed to stand in his way [...]. (*SH* 146-147, emphasis added)

It would follow, then, that Stephen's instinct guards him against an unquestioning acceptance of society's values, and his expression of rebellion manifests "an urgent need" (*SH* 147) to bypass "a life of spiritual paralysis" (*SH* 146). He cannot understand how Irish women, including Emma, can accept the bonds of religion so readily, and we are told that "his *nature* was incapable of achieving such an attitude of insincerity or stupidity" (*SH* 210, emphasis added). Here we get a glimpse of Stephen's dilemma regarding his relation to the female sex: He feels a keen desire for physical contact with Emma, yet every time he sees her, she reminds him of many of the elements of Irish life which he despises. The only way of satisfying his desires would be to propose marriage to her²⁷ – but marriage, Stephen says, "is a mark of ordinariness" (*SH* 201). A discussion of Stephen's peculiar relation to women would clearly merit a chapter of its own. For the moment, however, I would like to return to some examples of Stephen's interaction with his male companions.

Having been accosted by Wells in the manner described earlier in this chapter, Stephen tries hard to recall the face, but cannot come up with a name. The narrator intervenes a few lines later, stating briefly: "Wells laughed" (*SH* 70), thus supplying a name for the reader's benefit while allowing Stephen to get away without directly addressing his companion by name. Almost immediately, Wells brings up the matter of their shared past at Clongowes, asking whether Stephen has any contact with other former classmates (*SH* 71). But Stephen has not seen anyone else from Clongowes, and Wells does not show any surprise. Instead, he asks Stephen another question: "You remember Roth?", to which Stephen replies with a short "Yes" (*SH* 71). Wells, we feel,

is at one with his sense of the past: Having attended Clongowes College, one of the best Catholic boarding schools in Ireland, his education has made him an ideal candidate for the priesthood. The only discernible shift in his outlook can be located in the fact that he has not chosen the Jesuit order because the thought of “[s]ixteen years of noviciate and no chance of ever settling down” (*SH* 72) has proved too much of a challenge for him. This attitude is very much unlike James Joyce’s: On being offered free board and tuition at a college run by the Dominicans, he is reported to have answered: “I began with the Jesuits, and I want to end with them”.²⁸

Stephen exercises polite restraint when it comes to Wells’ involvement with the Christian Brothers. A hint of irritability becomes evident, however, as Stephen wonders “how far this loud-voiced student intended to accompany him” (*SH* 71). Wells makes a few attempts to invoke a picture of himself as an outsider within the ranks of the church, presumably to gain Stephen’s trust. Stephen, however, is not so easily deceived. He refuses to take an active part in the exchange, and this gives a distinct impression of disinterest and even boredom. As he waits outside while Wells enters the building in order to speak to the Dean, he ponders the fundamental difference between himself and Wells, “the incompatibility of two natures” (*SH* 73): one essentially passive, the other active, the former shaped by habit, the latter by power of impulse. At this point, “the slow fine rain” (*SH* 74) evokes a memory in Stephen. Standing next to some bushes, he watches

[...] at the end of a leaf a tiny point of rain form and twinkle and hesitate and finally take the plunge into the sodden clay beneath. He wondered was it raining in Westmeath [...]. He remembered seeing the cattle standing together patiently in the hedges and reeking in the rain. (*SH* 74)

Here, Stephen has evidently retained the image of the animals, as well as a sense of himself as a spectator. But why would one remember looking at a herd of cattle? Is it

the “slow fine rain” of the present moment, perhaps also the “sodden clay” associated with tillage, which momentarily remove Stephen’s thoughts and evoke a scene from the past? Possibly, the image of the cattle is not so much a memory but an alternative vision, an image, perhaps, which typifies the stagnant intellectual climate which surrounds and threatens to confine him, mentally and physically, inside “the martial mind of the Irish Church in the style of this ecclesiastical barracks” (*SH* 73) that is not only Clonliffe or University College,²⁹ but the spirit of Ireland. The sense of imprisonment is highlighted as Stephen leaves the college grounds through a side door which is otherwise kept locked. Wells glances out “almost enviously” before returning to the building, looking like “a strange, almost criminal, fugitive in the dreary dusk” (*SH* 75). Prior to Stephen’s departure, Wells presses him to come back some other time (*SH* 71). There appears to be no answer from Stephen, but we get a strong feeling that he will resist making such a promise. Here, we sense rather clearly the danger that lies in repetition, for repetition, as we have seen, is the basis of the formation of habit.

In his discussion of *Dubliners*, Rickard points out that

[a]n obsession with the past becomes in Dublin a form of habit, a way of habitually or reflexively turning to the past to avoid the present, a habit of forming monumental centers of paralysis in the past that impede involvement in the present.³⁰

Rather than limiting the observation of Stephen’s rebelliousness to manifestations of Catholic Ireland, I would suggest placing it within the larger context of habit and memory. The notion of a “social pathology” outlined by Parrinder (see first section of this chapter) provides a useful background for discussion, as does Miller’s idea of a “cultural pathology”.³¹ Miller says that “Irish history gains its nightmare quality in its apparent tendency inevitably to recur”, and he sees the motor behind this pattern of repetition not in history itself but in “a modality of memory that is deeply invested in

the past's figurative burial".³² This argument can be taken even further in a combination with Parrinder's "social pathology": History, then, repeats itself precisely *because* of the Irish people's inability to cease to dwell on a bitter past. Thus the mode of endless repetition which results in paralysis has its source not so much in an inability or failure to remember, but in an excess of memory itself. The compulsion to remember, it seems, is itself habit-forming, and its symptoms include an overly nostalgic attachment to or a romantic transfiguration of the past. In this manner, history alone determines the fate of the individual, and memory no longer offers any insight into the condition of the present. The effect is self-fulfilling: If memory leads to an endless spiral of habitually acting out the past, then habit becomes almost equivalent to memory. "Habit", states William James, "is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent".³³

Stephen makes frequent attempts to counteract established principles of morality by acting according to impulse. The most striking example can be found in Chapter XXIV, which shows him leaving his Italian lesson rather hastily, claiming to have an urgent appointment, only to run after Emma whom he has seen walking past the college. Having reached her, they talk a little, and ultimately Stephen makes a suggestion which profoundly changes their relationship: He proposes that they spend the night together, thereafter "never to see each other again" (*SH* 198). The result of this attempted subversion of convention and morality, however, proves devastating. Emma calls him mad, then walks away in tears, and Stephen "seemed to feel her soul and his falling asunder swiftly and for ever after an instant of all but union" (*SH* 199). Stephen's attempt to make Emma his ally fails miserably as he recognises that she is too "sensible" (*SH* 197) to let herself be persuaded by the outrageous ideas of a young student who, on one occasion, refers to himself not as a man but as a "hobbledehoy"

(*SH* 189). At the beginning of Chapter XXV, even Lynch comments on the absurdity of Stephen's proposal: "—To the ordinary intelligence it looks as if you had taken leave of your senses for the time being" (*SH* 200).

I would suggest that, in Chapters XXIV and XXV in particular, Stephen Daedalus tries out various strategies in his endeavour to challenge the narrow morality and ideology, the "hemiplegia of the will" (*SH* 194) which he considers to be emotionally and spiritually paralysing. Cranly, Wells, and Lynch all stay firmly within the boundaries of the intellectual familiar, using memory only to re-enforce the habitual and to legitimise the authorities, but Stephen resists their commitment to prefabricated memories which leave no room for imagination and transformation. He distances himself from his own past allegiances in order to break with the customary way of remembering, and his attempts to subvert memory consists in part of a resistance toward the habitual and a tendency to follow his impulses. Unless memory offers true insight, Stephen chooses to forget rather than to remember, "[f]or if memory is a gift, forgetting is a kind of grace".³⁴

3.3. The epiphanies

In the first entry (dating from 1903) of his *Dublin Diary*, Stanislaus Joyce tells of his admiration for his brother's epigrammatic prose compositions:

His 'epiphanies' – his prose pieces (which I almost prefer to his lyrics) and his dialogues – are again subtle. He has put himself into these with singular courage, singular *memory*, and scientific minuteness; he has proved himself capable of taking very great pains to create a very little thing of prose or verse.³⁵

James Joyce adapts the term "epiphany" from classical and Christian myth, where it denotes "the revelation of the spiritual in the actual"³⁶ or, more specifically, a sudden

manifestation of divine presence, for his recording of seemingly trivial incidents or visions. Hans Walter Gabler has pointed out that these short prose vignettes represent the earliest literary compositions in Joyce's hand still in existence (*JJA* [7], xxiii). Only forty out of an original total of over seventy of these short sketches – each written on a separate sheet – have survived. They provide some crucial insight not only into Joyce's mind at a time when he was yet to find his artistic voice, but also into the mnemonic thought-processes at work in the composition of his novels. It becomes clear in the above quotation from Stanislaus Joyce's diary that the epiphanies constitute more than just examples of erratic note-taking of events perceived as being "special" in one way or another: the prerequisites for their composition include courage (presumably, courage to depict the mean and trivial aspects of life), scientific minuteness (supplying detail in a concise manner whilst withholding judgement), and, most crucially, ardour and intensity of memory. The latter quality applies in more than one respect, because, as we shall see, Joyce's epiphanies offer an insight into a dual process of memory and mnemonic re-production that is, in many ways, radical in its own right. While Rickard argues that "Joyce's epiphanies are more properly part of a theory of perception than a theory of memory",³⁷ I believe that, in fact, for Joyce the writer, the two aspects are inseparable, and definable only in terms of their reciprocal impact.

The term "epiphany" has, perhaps, occasionally been overused in literary criticism. However, in a study of Joyce's early works, up to and including *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, the concept of epiphany is arguably a useful one, for it draws attention to the suddenness with which spontaneous memory-events occur, as well as to processes of their recording and "making-memorable". Nonetheless, I believe that, as Morris Beja has suggested, there is a danger in defining Stephen Daedalus's theory of the epiphany purely in terms of his aesthetics.³⁸ In Beja's view, the epiphany is not

necessarily associated with a position emphasising reality and objectivity. Rather, it illustrates a kind of uncertainty principle by which the true condition of knowledge and truth reveals itself in a sudden and unpredictable manner. Where an imaginative manifestation occurs whenever the sensitivity of the individual mind is heightened, we are no longer in the realms of classical philosophy alone. Instead, our understanding of “the most delicate and evanescent of moments” (*SH* 211) may also be read in terms of the psychology of perception and memory. Joyce’s works thus transcend the pre-Freudian paradigm which regards psychology as no more than a branch of philosophy.³⁹ Indeed, Stanislaus Joyce writes that James Joyce consciously sought to subvert this hierarchy:

He regarded psychology, which he was then studying, as the basis of philosophy, and words in the hands of an artist as the medium of paramount importance for a right understanding of the inmost life of the soul. The revelation of that inmost life was, my brother firmly believed, the poet’s high office, and to traffic in words was a kind of literary simony.⁴⁰

As becomes evident from Joyce’s own use of the term “epiphany” and from the above quotation, the terminology of faith and religion never ceased to influence Joyce in his artistic production.

What, then, constitutes the relation between epiphany and memory? Epiphany, in *Stephen Hero*, is tantamount to the revelation of the “soul” of an object, the “soul” being closely associated with *quidditas*, or “whatness”.⁴¹ This is what makes an object suddenly appear in its singularity, like in the example given by Stephen himself when he talks to Cranly about the Ballast Office clock. Even the most common things, items “in the catalogue of Dublin’s street furniture” (*SH* 211), possess this kind of “soul” or essence which is capable of revealing itself to the individual’s “spiritual eye” (*SH* 211). The notion of “epiphany” is linked inextricably to Stephen’s aesthetic theory, which is

in turn heavily influenced by Aquinas. The classical terms *integritas*, *claritas*, and *consonantia* present a theory which relies on the initial perception of an object as detached (or potentially detachable) from its setting, guaranteeing an illusion of boundary and meaning⁴² in discerning “that it is that thing which it is and no other thing” (*P V.1393*). The object is then analysed in its structural components, and finally, its essence becomes manifest in a kind of spiritual revelation. Stephen calls this essence “whatness” or *quidditas*, and the moment of appreciation “epiphany”. He feels triumphant in having “solved” the intricacies of Aquinas: “*Claritas is quidditas*” (*SH 213*).

Epiphany is thus clearly a momentary event, a fleeting instant in which an insight occurs in a sudden, unexpected, and involuntary manner. Interestingly, in *Psychology*, the Rev. Maher uses the term *quidditas* in his discussion of the phenomenon of intellectual attention. Defining the characteristics of attention, he asserts that, once attention has been roused, an attitude of inquiry and expectation takes over.⁴³ He quotes from a work entitled *Analytic Psychology*, asserting that this interrogative attitude “corresponds to the question: What is that? or simply, What?”.⁴⁴ In Stephen’s words: the intellectual enquiry which culminates in the recognition of the “whatness” of a thing. A prerequisite for experiencing an epiphany is thus an acute heightening of attention – an extraordinary sensitivity – in relation to a particular object (i.e. the Ballast Office clock) or situation (for instance, fragments of an overheard conversation, see below). Bergson touches upon the crucial link between depths of consciousness and attention when he states that “[t]here are [...] divers *tones* of mental life, or, in other words, our psychic life may be lived at different heights, now nearer to action, now further removed from it, according to the degree of our *attention to life*”.⁴⁵ Stephen’s

aim, it seems, is to make these tones of life traceable, and *memorable*, through his recording of epiphanies.

Significantly, however, the incidents and impressions we find in Joyce's own collection of epiphanies⁴⁶ rarely, if ever, have that "objective" quality which is implied by Aquinas' theory of the appreciation of beauty. They seem, on the contrary, to be made up of a mixture of highly personal, emotionally affecting material and seemingly chance encounters, visions, or dreams. Many take the form of fragmentary dialogues, others are brief passages of descriptive narration. In *Stephen Hero*, we get an acute sense of Stephen's surroundings as he witnesses the trivial incident which leaves an impression so keen that it leads him to compose his villanelle. As readers, we cannot help but wonder what it is that makes the scene so remarkable when, after all, it consists of a mere piece of largely inaudible conversation:

The Young Lady — (drawing discreetly) . . . O, yes . . . I was . . . at
the . . . cha . . . pel . . .

The Young Gentleman — (inaudibly) . . . I . . . (again inaudibly) . . .
I . . .

The Young Lady — (softly) . . . O . . . but you're . . . ve . . . ry . . .
wick . . . ed . . . (SH 211)

This fragment touches Stephen strongly. Its meaning, it seems, lies not so much in its dramatic value as in the state of mind that its very triviality impinges on. If the incident which prompts an epiphanic moment is in itself of no consequence, then its significance must lie in the observer's heightened sensitivity. In fact, as Stephen witnesses the above colloquy he is walking the streets of Dublin (significantly passing through Eccles Street, thereby foreshadowing the encounter with Leopold Bloom in *Ulysses*) and is tormented by "thoughts dancing the dance of unrest in his brain" (SH 211), a condition which becomes even more pronounced in *A Portrait*. Joyce's own epiphanies themselves are remarkable not so much for the insight they offer to today's reader, but for their very absurdity.

So far, we have considered the term “epiphany” in the sense in which it is most commonly applied, as signifying some sort of fundamental revelation experienced through an incident which is not particularly significant in itself. However, applied to Joyce’s writing, the above use of “epiphany” appears to be overly restrictive in that it disregards the process of recording the experience. In order to be able to collect, as Stephen suggests, “many such moments together in a book of epiphanies” (*SH* 211), accounts of such incidents or experiences must first be committed to paper. Thus, a revelation that is experienced as an epiphany can, ideally, be embodied in language and hence “become a revelation in the mode of language”,⁴⁷ a unique moment aspiring to timelessness. In the very act of writing, the experience is not only committed to paper – it is made memorable through a conscious act of linguistic reworking. In this way, Joyce’s own collection of epiphanies (accessible in a facsimile edition in the *James Joyce Archive*) illustrates the principles at work behind the conscious recording of perception through the medium of language. Udaya Kumar writes that the Joycean epiphany unites the science of aesthetics and the science of perception⁴⁸ – but I would feel inclined to add a third element: the science of memory.

Considering the characteristics of the epiphanic moments as described above leads me to suggest that, perhaps, the epiphany is similar in effect, if not in kind, to the type of memory that has not yet been subjected to the forces of habit. Its meaning lies less in its overt content than in its sublime quality, and it is precisely because of this that the epiphany must be recorded with extreme care. Discussing memory in Proust, Samuel Beckett writes that in the rare moments when the habitual is abandoned, “the cruelties and enchantments of reality”⁴⁹ are brought to the fore. Habit, it seems, is no more than a haze which prevents true perception. Beckett’s term “enchantment” is, I believe, closely related to Joyce’s “epiphany”, as may be illustrated by the following quotation:

[...] when the object is perceived as particular and unique and not merely the member of a family, when it appears independent of any general notion and detached from the sanity of a cause, isolated and inexplicable in the light of ignorance, then and then only may it be a source of enchantment.⁵⁰

In Stephen's words, this would mirror the moment in which "[t]he soul of the commonest object [...] seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany" (*SH* 213). For Beckett, the essence of an object remains hidden to those whose actions are guided by habit only, for they simply turn away from anything that does not fit their intellectual predisposition. Stephen, as I have tried to show earlier in this chapter, makes every attempt in *Stephen Hero* to eschew the forces of habit in order to remain intellectually and emotionally susceptible to the essence of momentary observations and chance impressions. If involuntary or "spontaneous" memory succeeds in bypassing habitual channels of consciousness in reviving the past, then Joyce's/Stephen's "epiphany", or Beckett's "enchantment", are examples of a similar acute awareness directed towards the present moment.

Among the most frequently quoted passages from *Stephen Hero* are precisely those relating to Stephen's idea of the epiphany: "By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech and gesture or in a *memorable* phase of the mind itself" (*SH* 211, emphasis added). Stephen believes that certain impressions, "the most delicate and evanescent of moments" (*SH* 211), are worth collecting, and, therefore, worth *remembering*. One such "prose miniature" (*JJA* [7], xxv), noted down on paper by Joyce himself prior to the composition of *Stephen Hero*, contains the essence of the scene which has formed the focus of this chapter: The passage describing the "memory-event" experienced by Stephen on the library steps. The inclusion of the epiphany in *Stephen Hero* and in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* confirms the extent to which Joyce's own memory processes determined the shape of the two novels,

and it reveals how experimentation with modes of narrative style and subtleties of expression came to be one of the central themes in his works. In order to illustrate this idea, it may be worth quoting the text of the epiphany in its entirety:

The quick light shower is over but tarries, a cluster of diamonds, among the shrubs of the quadrangle where an exhalation arises from the black earth. In the colonnade are the girls, an April company. They are leaving shelter, with many a doubtful glance, with the prattle of trim boots and the pretty rescue of petticoats, under umbrellas, a light armoury, upheld at cunning angles. They are returning to the convent – demure corridors and simple dormitories, a white rosary of hours – having heard the fair promises of spring, that well-graced ambassador...

Amid a flat rain-swept country stands a high plain building with windows that filter the obscure daylight. Three hundred boys, noisy and hungry, sit at long tables eating beef fringed with green fat and vegetables that are still rank of the earth.⁵¹

The inclusion of different versions of this epiphany in *Stephen Hero* as well as in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* enables us to examine and analyse precisely how and to what effect Joyce has reused and modified his “notebook” materials. In both novels, the impersonal descriptiveness of the epiphany subtly gives way to an affective colouring through the consciousness of Stephen. The passage becomes embedded in a highly introspective scene (now set in the past tense), introduced by the fall of rain and the monotonous sound of voices. A close reading of all three versions of this epiphany leads to an observation which defies the popular opinion of *Stephen Hero* as a comparatively conventional text when read alongside *A Portrait*. For instance, the sentence which originally reads

They are leaving shelter, with many a doubtful glance, with the prattle of trim boots and the pretty rescue of petticoats, under umbrellas, a light armoury, upheld at cunning angles.⁵²

becomes, in *Stephen Hero*,

The company in the colonnade was leaving shelter, with many a doubting glance, with a prattle of trim boots, a pretty rescue of petticoats, under umbrellas, a light armoury, upheld at cunning angles. (*SH* 183-184)

and, finally, in *A Portrait*:

Their trim boots prattled as they stood on the steps of the colonnade talking quietly and gaily, glancing at the clouds, holding their umbrellas at cunning angles against the few last raindrops, closing them again, holding their skirts demurely. (*P* V.1514-1518)

Although these examples are instantly recognisable as referring to the same event, there is an evident transition of focus, and of style. The expression “pretty rescue of petticoats” is markedly absent from the section in *A Portrait*, as is the “doubting glance”. The present participle construction in the latter example indicates a subtle shift in the mode of the narrative, from a haphazard and sketchy descriptiveness suggested by the indefinite article “a” to a composition which foregrounds the narrative aspect of the scene by giving the impression of activity in terms of order and sequence. The unusual image of a “light armoury” of umbrellas is disposed of completely in the third example. Perhaps most significantly, the prose style itself is transformed from a somewhat fragmented sentence structure in which elements are joined by a sense of rhythm to one which abides first and foremost by the rules of grammar. Thus it becomes evident that by reworking portions of text for inclusion in *A Portrait*, Joyce has in fact purged certain passages of their loose and sometimes unfocused angle and incorporated them in a way which reads, surprisingly, more like a “conventional” piece of prose in the manner of realist narrative than the corresponding scene in *Stephen Hero*.

In *A Portrait*, the memory scene on the library steps constitutes the preliminary mindset for the composition of the villanelle, a piece of poetry rendered in a style which foregrounds the mystery of creative conception through multiple references to fluids and moisture, and to fluid motion. The sensation of hearing rhythmical variations in

sound appears distinct from the emotional response to that experience. Yet there is that crucial link between the remembering subject and the subject of memory. Stephen in *Stephen Hero* is removed from his peers, and as the rain pours down this affects his perception, so the noise of people talking is no more than a babble which reaches him “as if from a distance, in broken pulsations” (SH 183). But even after the rain has stopped and the clouds have dispersed, still “the babble of the young men reached him in regular pulsations” (SH 184). The “regular pulsations” correspond to the noise in the refectory: a similar rhythmic sound, a white noise, like “the wild gabble of animals” (SH 184). The quick shower of rain has produced something extraordinary, for Stephen seems suddenly acutely aware of the effect it has on him and on his immediate environment, with raindrops like diamonds in the shrubbery and “an exhalation” ascending “from blackened earth” (SH 183). A few pages earlier, Stephen is already displaying signs of awareness of coming rain: “—I feel rain, said Stephen stopping under a branch and waiting for the fall of raindrops” (SH 176). A little later, there are further clues as regards the relationship between moisture and creative or visionary thinking. Stephen is described as wandering the streets of Dublin at night in the “damp and gloomy weather” (SH 178) of winter, “intoning phrases to himself” (SH 178). The outlaws of his thoughts, sparked by Yeats’ *The Tables of the Law* and the *Adoration of the Magi*, clearly hold considerable fascination for him, and he imagines them “[...] like vapours, desirous of sin, remembering the pride of their origin, calling to others to come to them” (SH 178), the kind of visionary language which foreshadows the temptress of Stephen’s villanelle in Chapter Five of *A Portrait*. Vapours, exhalations of the spiritual world: these accompany most of the decisive moments, both in *A Portrait* and in *Stephen Hero*.

An alternative approach to “reading” (i.e. interpreting) epiphanies is, once again, provided by Stanislaus Joyce. In *My Brother’s Keeper*, he writes:

Jim always had a contempt for secrecy, and these notes were in the beginning ironical observations of slips, and little errors and gestures – mere straws in the wind – by which people betrayed the very things they were most careful to conceal.⁵³

In touching upon the notion of slips, errors and gestures as manifestations of the subconscious realms of the mind, one cannot help but think of Sigmund Freud’s *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. “[T]he very things they were most careful to conceal” – this expression seems to correspond closely to the factors Freud sees at work behind what he calls “symptomatic and chance actions”.⁵⁴ These actions, Freud says, usually lack any conscious intention, and in accordance with this, they “must be *unobtrusive* and their effects must be slight”.⁵⁵ These actions may include a particular element of clumsiness, forgetfulness, or the inadvertent replication of long-rehearsed behaviour. Most significantly, however, they reveal an aspect of an individual’s psyche which otherwise remains obscured. Symptomatic acts of this type, Freud states, “give expression to something which the agent himself does not suspect in them, and which he does not as a rule intend to impart to other people but to keep to himself”.⁵⁶ Generally speaking, this is certainly true of the Joycean epiphanies. The agent, in other words, remains firmly within the bounds of the habitual or at least the unremarkable, whereas the observer becomes suddenly aware of a “spiritual manifestation” (*SH* 211).

It is at this point that we must refer back to our original discussion of habit. If habit rules over perception as well as over memory, then only an interruption of habit will allow true recollection to occur. Possessing what is commonly called “good memory”: is this an indication of a superior ability to recall, or an inability to forget? Samuel Beckett argues that when memory ceases to be a source of inspiration it has become a

habit, “an instrument of reference instead of an instrument of discovery”.⁵⁷ For the aspiring artist Stephen Daedalus, the danger which lies in succumbing to a habitual mode of perception and of memory is tantamount to a loss of creative and imaginative artistic voice. Stephen’s idea of collecting epiphanies in a book is not only an expression of his wish to create - more crucially, for him it is a vital exercise, designed to keep his “spiritual eye” (*SH* 211) open.

Psychologically speaking, habit and recollection appear to be situated at opposing ends of a spectrum in relation to action. Psychologists Hay and Jacoby have described two types of “errors” that occur when there is tension between habit and recollection. Their definition reads as follows:

An action slip is an error in performance that results when an automatic basis for responding (e.g., habit) dominates the intention to perform a specific behavior. These errors arise in situations that place habit and current intentions in opposition, each leading to different outcomes. Similarly, a memory slip can be viewed as a type of action slip that emerges when habit dominates recollection for a specific event.⁵⁸

These “slips”, it seems, are no errors in the conventional sense – instead, they represent the individual’s reliance on automatism, interfering only when a person engages in thoughts or actions that threaten to subvert habit. If, as Beckett puts it, “habit paralyses our attention”,⁵⁹ then one of the aims Stephen Daedalus follows in his proposal to collect epiphanies is precisely to preserve and to exercise his attention. For while habit tends to ignore the challenge of the extraordinary, attention is, inevitably, capricious and selective – just like memory.

Stephen Hero situates Stephen between the forces of habit and the urge to cast off these forces in an attempt at spiritual renewal. Habit, in the context of Dublin life, frequently equals nostalgia, a condition which makes it possible for stagnation and paralysis to enter the life of an individual. In proposing to record “epiphanies” on paper,

Stephen devises his own method for rendering memorable those everyday moments of intensely felt emotion or strong perceptual impact which would otherwise be transitory. The notion of the epiphany as “writing memory”, and the beginnings of stylistic experimentation with sound-patterns, anticipate *A Portrait*'s engagement with questions relating to the linearity and authority of the narrative which ultimately results in a blurring of boundaries between the past, present, and future.

Chapter 4: *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*

This chapter begins with an enquiry into the relationship between memory and verbal repetition, particularly the repetition of words which Stephen perceives as “queer”. One of the features which distinguish *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* from its “predecessor” *Stephen Hero* is Stephen’s fascination with words, especially with the mysterious relationship between their meanings and their sounds. Stephen likes to repeat these words in order to familiarise himself with the world which they represent, to memorise them in a quest for understanding. However, the text itself generates its own network of repetitions, separate from Stephen’s consciousness. These repetitions will be traced in terms of their potential within a wholly “textual” realm of memory, in which a word recalls the context of its prior usage without necessarily evoking any associative connections within a character’s consciousness. The tension between these two paradigms of memory in *A Portrait* will be sketched out in this chapter with regard to the text’s cyclical structure, which is characterised by Stephen’s alternating feelings of elation and despondency, and by the corresponding changeability of stylistic expression. In the final section of the chapter, I analyse Joyce’s narrative construction of Stephen Dedalus within the framework used by Freud in the production of “Case Histories”, specifically, in this context, of the psychobiography which deals in great length with the childhood memory of a great artist: Leonardo da Vinci.

4.1. Repetition and Stephen’s memory

The opening page of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* introduces the reader to a young Stephen who is not yet in possession of his own story. My reading of the

novel sees *A Portrait* as more closely related to the model of the *Bildungsroman*, outlining the growth and development of a distinct individual mind, than it is to the paradigm of the *Künstlerroman*. It might be said, then, that *A Portrait of the Artist* confirms narrative's potential as commanding the "curve of an emotion", contrasted by Joyce in his 1904 essay with the notion of "an identificative paper".¹ Arguably, the opening scene of the novel enacts not just the story but the whole structural conflict of the narrative, "[o]nce upon a time" (*P* I.1) being a classic beginning for nursery-stories and fairytales which are objects of repetition and, at the same time, of narration from memory.² In beginning with a story embedded in another story, Joyce momentarily leaves the identity of his protagonist undetermined. The reader does not get a clear sense of a perceiving consciousness or selfhood until his mother addresses the infant Stephen by name, in the third person: "—O, Stephen will apologise" (*P* I.31). Ultimately, the development starting with Stephen's childish imitations of songs ("*O, the geen wothe botheth*", *P* I.12) culminates in the diary entries of Chapter Five, in which Stephen's voice is presented without any intervention by a narrating agent.

I would suggest, then, that Joyce does not so much present Stephen's process of becoming-artist as that of becoming-Stephen through the process of developing a unique style or voice, and that he does so through Stephen's increasing mastery of language. Shiv Kumar attributes Joyce's success in "render[ing] personality as a ceaseless process of becoming"³ to his engagement with the stream of consciousness technique that presents thoughts and perceptions in a kind of interior monologue, mediated but not commented upon by the narrator. Bergson's belief in a concept of existence which is like a single long sentence, "continued since the first awakening of consciousness",⁴ prefigures, in its most radical realisation, both Molly Bloom's monologue in *Ulysses* and the converging temporal and linguistic spheres which

Stephen Dedalus has to negotiate. Where Bergson demonstrates the fluidity of consciousness and experience, Joyce takes this even further in transposing this ambiguity towards language in a manner that seems to merge the pasts and presents of perception. The narrative voice in *A Portrait* is characterised by the rejection of time and memory as absolute values; instead, these elements constitute variable currents dependent on the character's state of mind. Thus it could be argued that, at the beginning of the novel, Stephen does not yet remember anything. We might say instead that he immerses himself in the activity of "recollecting forwards",⁵ laying down the building-blocks for the two interrelated activities of recollection and repetition. In order to articulate himself, Stephen observes and to some extent internalises the mechanisms of language. Accordingly, the narrative moves along a trail of overlapping circles of remembering and repeating wherein Stephen's personality, and his "story", is allowed to unfold. This cyclic pattern is characterised by two types of repetition: those of which Stephen is aware – for instance, insofar as he engages in recollections of earlier occurrences, and repeats them in his mind – and those which register with the reader, while leaving no apparent imprint on Stephen himself. The question, therefore, may be asked: Do these two kinds of repetition create a paradigm of memory which is as much concerned with forgetting as it is with remembering? What effect does this have on the structure of the text?

In order to illustrate these ideas in relation to *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, it is useful to look at the retreat sermons in Chapter Three. Stephen's voice is purged almost entirely from the 30-odd pages, but the voice of Father Arnall, lecturing the schoolboys on the pains and horrors of hell, appears tortuous and interminable. The temporal gaps which separate the sermons evaporate into just two words: "Time passed" (*P* III.880). The monstrousness of the speech becomes tangible not just through

its verbatim representation, but through the sheer volume of its address. Confronted with the crushing discourse of the church, Stephen's consciousness appears to shrink into itself, forsaking its bond with reality. Time becomes an intensely personal experience for the reader just as it does for Stephen, with the rector's talk appearing not only endless in terms of the number of pages it covers, but also repetitive both in content and structure, like the vision of hell it tries to evoke:

The ticking [of the great clock] went on unceasingly; and it seemed to this saint that the sound of the ticking was like ceaseless repetition of the words: ever, never; ever, never. (*P* III.1091-1093)

Repetition of words and phrases is one of the striking features of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. One of Stephen's preoccupations consists of repeating to himself new or unusual words:

Words which he did not understand he said over and over to himself till he had learnt them by heart: and through them he had glimpses of the real world about him. (*P* II.83)

Stephen tries to make sense of language by rendering familiar those elements which appear strange and incomprehensible to him. The phrase "till he had learnt them by heart" also implies that Stephen specifically wishes to commit these words to memory through repetitive articulation.

In the sermons of Chapter Three, repetition and time are themselves presented as instruments of torture. Passages like "Eternity! O dread and dire word", "An eternity of endless agony, of endless bodily and spiritual torment [...] an eternity, every instant of which is itself an eternity" (*P* III.1048; 1106-1113) derive their powerful rhetoric from the repeated use of key words. Structure echoes content in the very intense description of the ceaseless agonies, embodied in the repetition of "ever, never; ever never" (*P* III.1093 and 1105-1106). That the principle of achieving intensity of expression (and the corresponding impression this makes on the reader) through sheer repetitiveness is

highly effective can be seen from Stephen's reaction to the first part of the sermon, which leaves him dizzy and hot, and with the sound of voices in his head: "- Hell! Hell! Hell! Hell! Hell! Hell!" (P III.822). The sermon as text-within-text is exemplary of the build-up of textual references in a circularly structured narrative. The insinuation of hell and its torments revolves around certain words and phrases, and the effectiveness of this technique becomes evident from an exchange overheard by Stephen as he sits at his desk in the classroom, upset and terrified:

—I suppose he rubbed it into you well.
 —You bet he did. He put us all into a blue funk. (P III.825-826)

The terrifying details of eternal pain and torture are internalised by Stephen in a manner which turns the suffering into a combination of physical and emotional sensations. The notion of an ever-repeating principle is internalised quite easily by Stephen, as becomes apparent from his physical and emotional state which verges on sheer panic:

He had died. Yes. He was judged. A wave of fire swept through his body: the first. Again a wave. His brain began to glow. Another. (P III.817-819)

As has been indicated above, apart from being considered in terms of style, repetition can also be seen as a textual device for the activation of a memory process. But whose memory, and what type of repetition? Gilles Deleuze points out that "every sign is a sign of the present, from the point of view of a passive synthesis in which past and future are precisely only dimensions of the present itself".⁶ The text, according to this view, knows only one temporal layer in which past and future are mere non-figurative constructions. Its only present belongs to the reader. This idea ties in with Maud Ellmann's concept of the *scar*, briefly presented in Chapter 1 of this study. Ellmann links the autobiographical aspect of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* to Wordsworth's *The Prelude; or, the Growth of a Poet's Mind* (1805), where the author

uses his memory to trace backwards and then reconstruct his own story from the beginning. The past, however, remains elusive. All that can be evoked are fragments, moments or “spots of time”, and such a spot “can mean a point in space or time, but it can also mean a blemish, mark, or scar”.⁷ The scar marks an absence, something that has been taken away and suppressed from the story, or that which has been hidden from view and from consciousness. But wherever the scar appears, “[l]inear progression suddenly gives way to cycles of remembering and dismembering”.⁸ The scar evokes the story of what it conceals, but it always remains situated in the present.⁹ Ellmann derives her concept of the scar from the story of Odysseus, where it is precisely the lack of name in conjunction with the presence of a bodily mark which leads to the emergence of numerous sub-stories.

A Portrait, however, is not so much the story of an Odysseus figure. Its primary mythical association rests with Daedalus and Icarus, the “fabulous artificer” (*P* V.2791), as well as with mythical flight and the potentially fatal fall which may follow. Nevertheless, the idea of the scar as an element which possesses the power to accelerate or slow the pace of narrative, or to alter its direction, has certain implications for narrative theory, and for *A Portrait* in particular. The scar calls into question the paradigm of narrative as the unfolding of a story. Instead, narrative folds into itself, not expanding but contracting, circling its own imaginative centre which contains those elements which cannot be articulated. Here we touch once again on Van Boheemen’s suggestion that behind the scar lies an unnameable absence (“*Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*”, see my discussion in Chapter 1). However, while for Van Boheemen this signifies the impossibility to articulate past trauma in a psychologically representative sense, in Ellmann’s concept it has more of a structural function, calling attention to any form of disruption (e.g. gaps, repetition) of the narrative progression or

unfolding. Instead of articulating the past, the narrative sets off in a different direction, circling, drifting. Similarly, as with any past trauma, the individual resists any attempt to engage with a problematic and unresolved past, and there is always the temptation to re-invent one's own story *without* any reference to traumatic events. The scar can be regarded as the absent signifier of these thoughts or events.

Ellmann claims that the scar emerges during Stephen's visit to Cork with his father, and points out that it takes the shape of a literal scar, a cut or carving in the wooden desks of the university's anatomy theatre. Stephen is unexpectedly confronted with the word *foetus* while looking for his father's initials, and the immediate vision this evokes is of a "broadshouldered student with a moustache" (*P* II.1055). For Stephen, this represents an image of physical masculinity which, in his mind, makes for a deeply unsettling pairing with the word and its sexual associations. The emotional turmoil which ensues has a peculiar effect on Stephen: he cannot help remembering "[h]is recent monstrous reveries" (*P* II.1067), and even while walking through the city with his father a short time later,

[t]he letters cut in the stained wood of the desk stared upon him, mocking his bodily weakness and futile enthusiasms and making him loathe himself for his own mad and filthy orgies. (*P* II.1099-1102)

The narrative becomes suffused with words such as "darkness" and "sickness". Simultaneously, the repeated use of the word "stained" calls to mind some sort of spillage, intensifying the sexual connotations of *foetus*. Stephen subsequently descends into a spiral of guilt which wipes out his sense of self for a brief period of time. Words which reappear in these paragraphs are "monstrous", "sick", "sickened", and "sickness", "faint", "dark" and "darkness". He tries to listen to his father's voice, but external reality has become meaningless for him at this point:

Nothing moved him or spoke to him from the real world unless he heard in it an echo of the infuriated cries within him. He could respond to no earthly or human appeal, dumb and insensible to the call of summer and gladness and companionship, wearied and dejected by his father's voice. (*P* II.1145-1150)

The self-circling voice with which Stephen situates himself in a narrative context sounds strangely fictional (“—I am Stephen Dedalus. I am walking beside my father [...]”, *P* II.1152), and it shows the extent of estrangement from his selfhood. The passage culminates in the perceived obliteration of his childhood memories: “The memory of his childhood suddenly grew dim. He tried to call forth some of its vivid moments but could not” (*P* II.1156-1157). Interestingly, the passage which follows appears to represent precisely the kind of spontaneously experienced recollection of childhood which Stephen sees himself unable to conjure:

A little boy had been taught geography by an old woman who kept two brushes in her wardrobe. Then he had been sent away from home to a college. In the college he had made his first communion and eaten slim jim out of his cricket cap and watched the firelight leaping and dancing on the wall of a little bedroom in the infirmary and dreamed of being dead, of mass being said for him by the rector in a black and gold cope, of being buried then in the little graveyard of the community off the main avenue of limes. (*P* II.1158-1167)

As the paragraph continues, Stephen's voice seems to merge with that of his younger self. Sentences like “[h]ow strange to think of him passing out of existence in such a way [...]! It was strange to see his small body appear again for a moment: a little boy in a grey belted suit” (*P* II.1171-1175) recall Stephen's language in Chapter One of *A Portrait*. The word “strange” in particular is repeated in an almost compulsive manner by the young boy during his first term at Clongowes, for instance as he reflects on the more uncanny aspects of Clongowes Castle before drifting off to sleep:

O how cold and strange it was to think of that! All the dark was cold and strange. There were pale strange faces there [...]. What did they wish to say that their faces were so strange? (*P* I.443-448)

It seems that, in his perceived inability to return to the past, the past moves one step closer towards Stephen. Although he feels he cannot remember, the thoughts and feelings of the “little boy in a grey belted suit” are so vivid that it appears as if the inexperienced and scared young boy has temporarily surmounted the older, more confident Stephen.

The rhythm of *A Portrait* follows a rising and falling motion, a wave-like pattern of repetition-with-variation. The first four chapters end on a triumphant note. In Chapter One, Stephen has complained to the rector after having been unjustly beaten. The tone and rhythm of the story accelerate along with Stephen, who

began to walk faster and faster. Faster and faster he hurried on through the gloom, excitedly. [...] hurrying down the staircase, [he] walked quickly through the two corridors [...]. He broke into a run and, running quicker and quicker, ran across the cinderpath [...]. (*P* I.1801-1809)

The end of Chapter One presents Stephen in a quiet state of elation after a double triumph. In approaching the rector to make his complaint, he has proven his courage and left behind the self-image of physical weakness; but in addition, the cheering he receives from the other boys indicates that he has finally been accepted as one of them.

In Chapter Two, we learn that Stephen is no longer attending Clongowes College. It emerges that he has not been sent back after the holidays because his father is now unable to afford the fees. Perhaps as a consequence of this denial of intellectual stimulation Stephen’s vision of the future has become dulled, and “[t]he ambition which he felt astir in the darkness of his soul sought no outlet” (*P* II.160-162). Any hint of previous euphoria has disappeared, and Stephen’s mind has become obscured “by a dusk like that of the outer world” (*P* II.162). The triumph of Chapter One has dissipated into nervous agitation, and with the removal to lodgings in the city, the situation of the Dedalus family continues to deteriorate. Dublin, that “new and complex sensation” (*P*

II.219), does nothing to counter Stephen's sense of restlessness. Indeed, the structure of the narrative implies a repetition of the already familiar in which Stephen is unable to partake emotionally. Within the space of just two pages, we come across the following paragraph openings, which emphasise the perceived repetitiveness of Stephen's existence: "He was sitting on the backless chair in his aunt's kitchen [...]" (P II.253), "He was sitting in the narrow breakfast room high up in the old darkwindowed house" (P II.275-276), "He was sitting in the midst of a children's party at Harold's Cross" (P II.303-304). The uniformity of the phrasing suggests a sense of monotony and lifelessness, and the word "sitting" with its implications of passivity and stillness contrasts sharply with the various descriptions of Stephen's rambles in the streets of Dublin. In this environment, repetition also manifests itself in the speech of some of the characters. Stephen's aunt, for instance, twice repeats the phrase "—The beautiful Mabel Hunter!" (P II.258; 265), and old Ellen, who has initially mistaken Stephen for a girl, says, "—I thought it was Josephine. I thought you were Josephine, Stephen" (P II.300-301). The paragraph ends: "And, *repeating this several times*, she fell to laughing feebly" (P II.302, emphasis added).

Patrick Parrinder points out that in *A Portrait*, "each chapter roughly exhibits the same pattern of development": disillusionment followed by a sense of euphoria and triumph, a pattern which he calls a "repeated rhythm".¹⁰ As a sustained rhythm, repetition can easily become a paralysing force. Following the sermons, the boys, including Stephen, answer the priest "phrase by phrase" (P III.1174-1175) as he goes through the act of contrition:

—O my God! -
 —O my God! -
 —I am heartily sorry -
 —I am heartily sorry -
 —for having offended Thee -
 —for having offended Thee -

(P III.1178-1183)

The sense of repetitiveness echoes in the passages that follow. After dinner, Stephen goes to his room “in order to be alone with his *soul*: and *at every step his soul* seemed to *sigh: at every step his soul* mounted with his feet, *sighing* [...]” (*P* III.1202-1204, emphasis added). Stephen’s soul feels to him literally laden with sin, and the circular movements of the narrative indicate the profound effect Father Arnall’s words have had on him. As Stephen kneels beside the bed, attempting to recall the “times and manners and circumstances” (*P* III.1232-1233) of his sins, excess of emotion gives way to numbness, and memory succumbs to repetition:

He could not weep. *He could not summon [his sins] to his memory*. He felt only an ache of soul and body, his whole being, *memory*, will, understanding, flesh, benumbed and weary. (*P* III.1233-1236, emphasis added)

This lapse of memory is short-lived, for only two paragraphs later, “[t]he leprous company of his sins closed about him [...] He *strove to forget* them in an act of prayer [...]” (*P* III.1251-1253, emphasis added). With the memory of his deeds now bearing down on him, Stephen becomes hopelessly entangled in a rhetoric of revulsion, culminating in a vision of horror which springs forth from his own mind. This vision, which he perceives with “the senses of his soul” (*P* III.1254), follows a circular pattern in more than one respect. There are verbal repetitions, most notably words like “evil” (*P* III.1265; 1271), “stiff” (*P* III.1261; 1262), and expressions referring to the movement of the “goatish creatures” (*P* III.1269) creeping up on him, inducing a sense of claustrophobia and dread: “hither and thither” (*P* III.1269; 1272; 1278), “they swished in slow circles round and round” (*P* III.1277), “[t]hey moved in slow circles, circling closer and closer, to enclose, to enclose” (*P* III.1279-1280). This is a vision of Stephen’s hell, and it may be argued that repetition has a powerful part to play within his indoctrination into a paralysing guilt.

Towards Chapters Four and Five, the text becomes governed more and more by the repetition of motif-like structures. Conversely, Stephen, who has at the beginning of Chapter Four immersed himself entirely in practiced routines of piety (no doubt an after-effect of the terror instilled in him through the retreat sermons), finds it increasingly difficult to comply with the demands of his self-styled godliness. For him, the theme of recurrence looms large in the context of religion: “[H]e would confess and repent and be absolved, confess and repent again and be absolved again, fruitlessly” (*P* IV.227-228). In doubting the validity of his “hasty” (*P* IV.229) confession, he has spun himself a web of self-deceit. If the initial confession has not saved him, then all following confessions, and all exercises of piety and mortification, have been in vain. But his piety is real, he tells himself, and so his confession must have been good and valid in the eyes of God. In the second section of the chapter, Stephen is tempted for a brief moment to join the priesthood, as the director of his college elaborates on the power and authority that would lie in store for him. The rhetoric is clearly a familiar one:

No king or emperor on this earth has the *power* of the priest of God. No angel or archangel in heaven, no saint, not even the Blessed Virgin herself has the *power* of a priest of God: the *power* of the keys, the *power* to bind and to loose from sin, the *power* of exorcism, the *power* to cast out from the creatures of God the evil spirits that have *power* over them, the *power*, the authority, to make the great God of Heaven come down upon the altar and take the form of bread and wine. What an awful *power*, Stephen! (*P* IV.382-391, emphasis added)

If the retreat sermons were steeped in the language of terror, this has to be its counterpart, at least as far as enticement goes. Stephen, however, feels less tempted by these versions of power than by the notion of a superior and secret knowledge to which he would be admitted:

He would know obscure things, hidden from others [...]. He would know the sins, the sinful longings and sinful thoughts and sinful acts, of others, hearing them murmured under the shame of a darkened chapel by the lips of women and of girls [...] (*P* IV.434-439)

The main attraction of the priestly office for Stephen appears to lie in the paradox of living in celibacy, yet being required to listen to confessions of the most intimate kind, uttered by women and girls. We can perhaps interpret this as an indication of remarkable self-awareness on Stephen's part. He does not contemplate the special relationship with the divine or the power to absolve, instead he faces up to the demands and ambiguities associated with the role of priest and his own sinful past. However, his brief flirtation with the idea of becoming a priest has already been overshadowed by small textual indicators which prefigure Stephen's ultimate decision. "[T]he swish of a soutane" (*P* IV.260-261) which announces the director's arrival recalls – on a purely textual level, for there is no indication of Stephen remembering – the unjust punishment received in Chapter One. Here, Stephen hears "the swish of the sleeve of the soutane" (*P* I.1531) as the first blow is dealt, before the pain rushes in. Then "[t]he soutane sleeve swished again" (*P* I.1543) as the pandybat is lifted again to administer the beating on Stephen's other hand.¹¹ Stephen's failure to make the connection between injustice and power becomes evident from his own awareness that something is missing from his musings:

Masked memories passed quickly before him: he recognized scenes and persons yet he was conscious that he had failed to perceive some vital circumstance in them. [...] The echoes of certain expressions used in Clongowes sounded in remote caves of his mind. (*P* IV.348-354)

The memory which finally rouses his doubts has nothing to do with the pandying incident. It is the near-physical recollection of the bath in Clongowes which fills him with dread: "[H]e smelt again the warm moist air which hung in the bath in Clongowes above the sluggish turfcoloured water" (*P* IV.490-492). The memory-link is finally

established, and it carries a different kind of resolution: to withstand any social or religious orders (*P* IV.530-531), Stephen's own *non serviam*. Later, he cannot quite recall his own reason for his refusal¹² as he is heading towards another moment of self-discovery, but the image of the brownish bathwater appears again at the beginning of Chapter Five, where the raided breakfast table carries a variety of water- and bog-related associations.

John Paul Riquelme has undertaken an analysis of the relation between the end of Chapter Four and the first section of Chapter Five, focussing on the tension between styles of realism and fantasy. I believe that the apparent opposition between the visionary and the realistic modes of representation is closely related to the issue of Stephen's memory as opposed to the memory which is not properly Stephen's but is tied to the text itself. The following quotation from Riquelme's work will illustrate this idea:

The overlap between the two scenes [the bird-girl on the beach followed by the details of a squalid kitchen] creates a double helix, in which the experience of visionary intensity with its elevated language and the experience of a grimy reality with its material details mutually frame one another. They have become styles of memory, and part of what they recollect, or help us recollect, is one another.¹³

The "dark pool of the jar", the "yellow dripping", the "boghole" and other images from Stephen's breakfast belong to elements of past experiences. On the one hand, they clearly recall the beach scene with its dark water (*P* IV.838-839) and the strong contrast between the sea and the sky (the sky being the realm of birds), inducing "an ecstasy of flight" (*P* IV.788). On the other hand, they are closely associated with the unpleasant aspects of Stephen's life at Clongowes, an episode well in the past but nevertheless very much alive in Stephen's memory.

The diary section, which has rarely been considered in criticism even though it forms the critical closing pages of the novel, could also be considered a manifestation of the “style” of Stephen’s memory. What he commits to paper is a collection of small insights, dreams, ideas, and experiences, many of them taken from an everyday context. But the diary offers more than just an intimate insight into the thoughts that shape Stephen’s mind. In engaging with the question of temporality, it embraces all that has been experienced, while imposing a momentum measurable in terms of days and hours (the whole of the diary covers a period of about five weeks, from 20th March until 27th April, in a little over four pages). The concern of the diary lies as much with actual events as with narrative progression, as Michael Levenson writes: “In elaborate, though submerged, patterns the diary reinterprets the narrative that it will soon conclude”.¹⁴ The patterns he refers to are superimposed on one another. On the one hand, the diary form confirms the forward movement in time through its recording of dates and the corresponding thoughts and events. On the other hand, Stephen’s diary is very much concerned with repetition and echoes of the past. For instance, the entry for 5th April appears to imply a sequence, while really denoting a particularly arcane form of recurrence, recalling and modifying the final section of Chapter Four. “Oh life!” (*P* V. 2711) recalls Stephen’s inward cry on the beach (“Heavenly God!”, *P* IV.876), and phrases like “[d]ark stream”, “swirling bogwater”, “[s]cudding clouds”, and of course the blushing girls (*P* V.2711-2715), refer back to Stephen’s ecstatic vision of the bird-girl on the beach. But there are other connotations, too. The “dark stream” of bogwater takes us (and Stephen?) back to Clongowes. Through the powers of association between separate textual moments, this type of water imagery remains tied to the smell of stale water, or even to the odour of the oil sheet which his mother puts on the infant Stephen’s bed.

While Stephen in the diary shows a preoccupation with flight and departure, the build-up of repetitions undermines the sense of progression which Stephen fancies himself in. "Instead of a successful conclusion, a true escape", Van Boheemen writes, "the final words of the diary entry – a discourse written by the self, for the self, in order not to forget the self – may indicate Stephen's perpetual settling into the groove of traumatic repetition",¹⁵ an idea which can be traced into the opening chapters of *Ulysses*. It seems that the first three episodes of *Ulysses* have been treated as the real close of *A Portrait* more frequently than has Stephen's diary in Chapter Five, perhaps because those echoes of the past, combined with the intimation of an unknown future-as-departure, make it difficult to think of it as "the end" in a proper sense. This may be due to a diary's specific resistance to closure, but also to the fact that the diary itself does not tell us anything definitive about Stephen's future (other than his perpetual affirmation of exile). Then again, the diary form constitutes a very clear breaking away from the conventional narrative of the novel. The narrator has withdrawn, in much the same way as Stephen himself puts it in a conversation with Lynch, "like the God of creation, [the artist] remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails" (*P* V.1467-1469). If we take Joyce to be the artist, he indeed looks to it that "narrative [...] impersonalises itself" (*P* V.1463-1464), empowering his protagonist by turning him into the sole custodian of his story. The story, then, resists closure precisely because recollection, for Stephen, frequently coincides with repetition. Stephen alone finally becomes responsible for the continuation of his "styles of memory".

4.2. The concept of textual memory

The previous section has given some indication of how repetition features in relation to Stephen Dedalus' consciousness and the structure of the text as a whole. This section will expand the findings of the previous one, arguing that the conception of memory in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* is defined by a build-up of tension between patterns of recurrences which are perceived by Stephen, and others which are anchored purely in the text, seemingly bypassing Stephen's consciousness entirely. This tension, and the effects it generates, will form the focus of this discussion.

As has already been suggested, there are numerous words and phrases which the text repeats time after time, although the actions or circumstances to which they refer are seemingly unconnected. Parrinder has described the phenomenon as follows:

Portrait is unified not only by the workings of its protagonist's memory, but by an unconscious textual memory or series of repetitions, which are most easily traced at the level of imagery.¹⁶

This statement has powerful implications; however, Parrinder does not follow up the idea in any great detail, nor does he provide his reader with examples. The oppositions he traces (the hot – cold and red – white symbolism, for instance) may be valid as examples of how imagery is structured in *A Portrait*, but they do little to illustrate the original idea. Since the notion of an “unconscious textual memory” clearly transcends some of the more conventional readings of Joyce's works, I believe it is necessary to conceptualise this idea of text as a form of memory, possibly to expand it towards a view of narrative as “storage body” of words and phrases. Surely, there must be more to “textual memory” than Parrinder's phrase “series of repetitions [...] most easily traced at the level of imagery” implies. We have seen that repetition alone does not necessarily constitute an act of memory. For recollection to occur there needs to be a unifying

principle, a force which has the potential of creating a connection between elements such as sounds or imagery by way of associative links. In more traditional examples of narrative prose this unifying principle is situated in the mind, or consciousness, of the protagonist, where experiences and emotions are “collected” and put into relation with one another. The problem with Parrinder’s definition is also that he seems to disregard rhyme or any form of sound patterns which constitute the kind of repetition-with-variation pattern often associated with poetry. Although he does not label the phenomenon “textual memory”, Peter Brooks outlines the relationship between repetition and recollection in terms of “the ear, the eye, [and] the mind”:

Now, repetition is so basic to our experience of literary texts that one is simultaneously tempted to say all and to say nothing on the subject. To state the matter baldly: rhyme, alliteration, assonance, meter, refrain, all the mnemonic elements of literature and indeed of most of its tropes are in some manner repetitions that take us back in the text, that allow the ear, the eye, the mind to make connections, conscious or unconscious, between different textual moments, to see past and present as related and as establishing a future that will be noticeable as some variation in the pattern.¹⁷

It has already been suggested that, in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, it is commonly quite difficult to differentiate between language on the level of text and on the level of character consciousness. The repetition of words and phrases which characterise Stephen’s way of thinking is inextricably linked to his daydreams and fantasies, his sensations and perceptions, and occasions in which an earlier event is recalled. This is partly due to the position of the narrating agent, who for the most part chooses to see the world through Stephen-tinted glasses, and the implication this has on language. The words associated with the development of Stephen’s intellect are interwoven with those which, on the first reading, appear to refer purely to the outside world. This intersection of the inner and outer worlds in which Stephen moves makes

for a linguistic bipolarity which frequently merges fantasy and reality, inner and outer life, rendering the attribution of a word to a corresponding “origin” problematical.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Rickard has devised a useful definition for the concept of textual memory in his study of *Ulysses*, a definition which is worth recalling in the context of this discussion: “[a] textual repository of words, phrases, objects, and sounds charged with power by the associations they carry on a number of levels of memory”.¹⁸ The notion of a “textual repository” is itself an interesting one, implying as it does that the text has the potential to accumulate a kind of storehouse of words, much like Stephen, who, in repeating them, learns new words by heart so he can later “[draw] forth a phrase from his treasure” (*P* IV.688). As I have suggested earlier, this process is at work not only in relation to the symbols and images listed by Parrinder. Moreover, what we are looking at in terms of the idea of a textual memory is more than the mere repetition of words. This section will investigate how sound associations can represent a much more complex framework which may help to explain the significance of a form of memory which is “neither properly subjective nor objective”,¹⁹ therefore belonging not to the subject but to the text itself.

The key to both Parrinder’s and Rickard’s concepts appears to lie in the text’s potential to activate memory processes which remain distinct from both the protagonist’s (or any character’s) memory but which depend to a large extent on the reader’s ability to recognise patterns of repetition and sound-association. Quite frequently it is only on re-reading *A Portrait* that one discovers what Parrinder calls “linguistic accidents”²⁰ and repetitions of words, imagery, or sound imbedded and half-hidden in the flow of the narrative. Stephen himself, with his fascination for peculiarities of language, picks up some of them, like, for instance, the word “belt” (*P* I.70-75). Others go undetected, or at least unremarked. John Paul Riquelme has pointed

out that Stephen rarely remembers one single “item” (be it a word or an occurrence) but a group of items which relate simultaneously to several – often completely dissimilar – moments in time. Moreover, Riquelme highlights the role of an additional consciousness, set apart from Stephen’s, to facilitate an alternative kind of mnemonic link:

Joyce does not present Stephen explicitly remembering and linking the opposing moments. He depends instead on the reader’s remembering, connecting, and anticipating.²¹

Parrinder’s “linguistic accidents” are thus in fact textual occurrences which, structurally speaking, are in no way accidental or coincidental. In characterising the protagonist’s interaction with the world that shapes him, the network of references they provide make up the core rather than the periphery of Joyce’s work. Stephen feels as though he is walking, metaphorically, “in a lane among heaps of dead language” (*P* V.171) while stepping over the literal “heaps of wet rubbish” (*P* V.56) and the “mouldering offal” (*P* V.61) in his path. He is constantly moving between excess and lack of meaningful language, between piles of discarded and nameless memories. Every sound, every “casual word” (*P* V.167) printed on a shopfront, drags him deeper into a maze of unwanted associations which paralyse his mind in meaningless reflection. The memories and associations which Stephen manages to avoid are, however, not purged from the text. They occupy the portion of the narrative where character consciousness and the outside world intersect. In order to illustrate this idea in relation to a “textual unconscious” which may or may not overlap with Stephen’s unconscious, it is worth trying to make a distinction between recurrences of which Stephen is aware and those which he, at least seemingly, fails to perceive. By the time the reader gets to the diary section in Chapter Five, he or she has been confronted with the changing narrative styles, and the underlying euphoria and disillusionment in Stephen’s life. Hugh Kenner

has maintained that the theme of Chapters Two and Four is “the constant ironic clash of Dublin vs. the Dream”, while the odd-numbered Chapters revolve mainly around the conflict between ego and authority.²² One clearly perceptible shift of narrative authority is located in the diary section with which the novel terminates. In a manner of speaking, Stephen’s ego gains the fullness of expression, crossing, as Patrick Parrinder puts it, “the bridge between Stephen as protagonist and Stephen as autobiographer”.²³ In this sense, the true significance of the diary lies in its fictional authenticity. These, we are invited to believe, are the genuine notes of a fictional subject, embracing a development which started with Stephen’s imagination of himself as the “nicens little boy named baby tuckoo” (*P* I.3-4). In recording day-to-day thoughts, dreams and experiences, the ego is finally allowed to engage in the creative process of self-articulation.

But the diary has an additional function for Stephen. It allows him to analyse the interplay between language and representation as regards his own position (that of the self-styled artist), and it provides further evidence of his painfully and self-consciously acute awareness of the subtleties of language and of gesture. He records an incident with E-C-, in the course of which he had made “a sudden gesture of a revolutionary nature” (*P* V.2766-2767), a moment he describes vividly and somewhat self-ironically with the words “I must have looked like a fellow throwing a handful of peas up into the air” (*P* V.2767-2768). The discussion with the Dean of Studies regarding the word “tundish” is picked up again in the entry for 13th April: “That tundish has been on my mind for a long time. I looked it up and find it is English and good old blunt English too” (*P* V.2740-2742). This is a good example for a memory-incident of which Stephen is fully aware as a moment of recollection of an earlier event. Other entries are set in a different mood, like the one in which Stephen recalls his dreams (25th March). The content of these dreams seems somehow related to Stephen’s earlier visions,

particularly those concerned with his fantasy of hell and the rush to confession and repentance in which it culminates.²⁴

There are certain problems to be faced regarding the distinction between recurrences or memories perceived by Stephen and repetitions which seem to bypass his consciousness. For a demonstration of these difficulties and the ensuing questions, it may be helpful to contrast and compare several manifestations of either variety. For example, in Chapter Two, Stephen receives some playful blows across his leg from his friend Heron's cane. As Stephen mechanically takes up his part in the staging of the confession, reciting the *Confiteor* so as to please his companions' taste for banter, he is transported to another place and another time through a vivid recollection. The way this memory is introduced in the text merits a closer look:

The confession came only from Stephen's lips and, while they spoke the words, a sudden memory had carried him to another scene called up, as if by magic, at the moment when he had noted the faint cruel dimples at the corners of Heron's smiling lips and had felt the familiar stroke of the cane against his calf and had heard the familiar word of admonition:
—Admit! (P II.645-652)

The incident which is recalled by Stephen in considerable detail only appears in *A Portrait* as a memory, a reproduction, as it were, taken from Stephen's mind. As readers, we feel that it belongs wholly to Stephen – a chance encounter with a past moment which is not prepared or anticipated by any textual markers. Interestingly, Stephen is able to interpret it with a certain detachment, observing to himself that for all the cruelty inflicted upon him, “he bore no malice now to those who had tormented him” (P II.795-796). This is the type of recollection, centred mainly or wholly within the confines of a character's mind, which I would call character-memory. Some of the above expressions, such as “sudden memory”, “as if by magic”, are very closely related to Proustian manifestations of spontaneous or “involuntary” memory, in which sense

perceptions have the power to evoke clear and distinct recollections which otherwise remain buried and “forgotten”. This type of memory is essentially disruptive. It suspends the forward movement of time, bringing the narrative to a momentary halt while it retreats inwards. Textual memory, by comparison, imposes a contrary motion, an outward spiral of references which are not, or only partly or loosely, tied to character consciousness. In order to explain what I mean by this, let us return to some of the linguistic puzzles which trouble Stephen in Chapter One. “Suck” is a word which clearly bothers Stephen during his first term at Clongowes. On the playing field, he overhears one of his classmates saying to another: “—We all know why you speak. You are McGlade’s suck” (*P I.149*). Immediately, the expression sets Stephen’s mind racing: “Suck was a queer word” (*P I.150*). Stephen knows perfectly well what the word means in this context, explaining it to himself as follows:

The fellow called Simon Moonan that name because Simon Moonan used to tie the prefect’s false sleeves behind his back and the prefect used to let on to be angry. But the sound was ugly. (*P I.150-153*)

Of course, as Derek Attridge has observed in relation to this passage, “Stephen’s theorizing is obviously false: ugliness does not inhere in the sounds of a language”.²⁵ By classifying “suck” as a “queer word”, the expression gains a certain status – for Stephen, it stands out not so much because of its meaning in terms of any action or person involved in the incident, but because of the peculiar associations on a very different level. “Suck” becomes memorable purely for its sound quality, and what follows is a memory which revolves around a similar sound:

Once he had washed his hands in the lavatory of the Wicklow Hotel and his father pulled the stopper up by the chain after and the dirty water went down through a hole in the basin. And when it had all gone down slowly the hole in the basin had made a sound like that: suck. Only louder. (*P I.153-158*)

The curious thing about this memory, apart from its evocation through sound, is Stephen's intense physical reaction, which seems to hover between excitement and disgust: "To remember that and the white look of the lavatory made him feel cold and then hot" (*P* I.159-160). But this is not all. The washroom has another feature which somehow fascinates the boy:

There were two cocks that you turned and water came out: cold and hot. He felt cold and then a little hot: and he could see the names printed on the cocks. That was a very queer thing. (*P* I.160-163).

The move from "queer" to "very queer" involves the word "cock", a word with a similar short and "smacking" sound as "suck". The shift from "suck" to "cock" has sexual connotations of which Stephen seems to be vaguely conscious. Attridge grants Stephen "that partial degree of sexual knowledge whose lack of specific content can invest certain words with all the more erotic power", and he points out that the experiences surrounding "suck" and "cock" are linked by the fact that in both the sexual element remains below the surface.²⁶ It is not just the words which become invested with a sexual subtext. The sound association constitutes a connection just as powerful, as emerges in the course of Chapter One. "Suck" and "cock" are words which can be used innocently (as Stephen presumably does), but which can refer to the realms of sexual activity, one of the great taboos of Stephen's early education.

Later in Chapter One, the words "suck" and "cock" are echoed by the sounds drifting over from the playing fields – the noise of the cricket bats, which Stephen perceives as though they were voices: "They said: pick, pack, pock, puck: like drops of water in a fountain slowly falling in the brimming bowl" (*P* I.1212-1214). At this point, the boys are discussing the serious offence committed by a group of pupils: having drunk the altar wine from the sacristy, the culprits have attempted to run away from Clongowes but have been caught in the process. Significantly, however, the events

surrounding the sound of the bats prepare the way for another obscure allusion to sexuality, the report by Athy (the same boy who converses with Stephen in the infirmary, and sets him a riddle with a vaguely sexual undertone) that the same classmates have been caught “smuggling” in the square, and that this incident constitutes the real reason behind their running away. The “pock” sounds constitute a background for the entire last section of Chapter One, a section which correlates schoolboy sexuality and corporal punishment. As tension mounts and one of the boys suggests a rebellion, everybody goes quiet, so the sound becomes perceptible again: “The air was very silent and you could hear the cricket bats but more slowly than before: pick, pock” (*P* I.1299-1301). The boys then discuss the likely method of punishment. Only Corrigan, who is a favourite of Mr Gleeson, the teacher in charge of administering the punishment in this case, has chosen flogging over expulsion. All this talk about smuggling and flogging leaves Stephen in a slightly nervous state. His anxiety becomes acute when the noise of the bats emerges again after the boys have tried to laugh it off: “In the silence of the soft grey air he heard the cricket bats from here and from there: pock” (*P* I.1330-1331). At this point, the sound evokes a physical sensation, not dissimilar from Stephen’s shivering in the hotel lavatory:

[...] pock. That was a sound to hear but if you were hit then you would feel a pain. The pandybat made a sound too but not like that. The fellows said it was made of whalebone and leather with lead inside: and he wondered what was the pain like. There were different kinds of pains for all the different kinds of sounds. A long thin cane would have a high whistling sound and he wondered what was the pain like. It made him shivery to think of it and cold: and what Athy said too. But what was there to laugh at in it? It made him shivery: but that was because you always felt like a shiver when you let down your trousers. It was the same in the bath when you undressed yourself. He wondered who had to let them down, the master or the boy himself. O how could they laugh about it that way? (*P* I.1331-1344)

The long string of associations from sound to pain to sexual transgression (“what Athy said too”) to undressing for the purpose of punishment not only illuminates Stephen’s fixations and fears, it also serves to establish links between different portions of text. For instance, at several other points in the novel do we get a sense of Stephen’s dread of water, and his alienation from those who can freely enjoy it (for instance, the bathers in Chapter Four). The above passage also foreshadows the unfair and cruel beating which Stephen is about to experience, although at this point he is completely unaware of what is in store for him. The sense of foreboding is reinforced through the periodic re-emergence of the “pock” sound, which recalls the unease concerning the “suck” and “cock” connotations, as well as anticipating a highly disturbing event in Stephen’s life. He is already familiar with the sound of the pandybat, but what the corresponding pain feels like he does not yet know. The reverberation of “suck”, “cock”, “pock” and, finally, the noise of the pandybat “like the loud crack of a broken stick” (P I.1532-1533) constitute a series of repetitions not at the level of meaning but of sound. It is usually Stephen himself who engages in repetitive articulation, but here the build-up of echoes has nothing to do with his thoughts but with the stimulation of what Piette calls “the reader’s textual acoustic memory”.²⁷ Of course, at the beginning of this train of thought we have a well-defined memory. Hearing the phrase “[yo]u are McGlade’s suck” (P I.149) makes Stephen think of an incident some time ago when he had been puzzled by a *sound* curiously similar to the *word*. “Cock” and “suck” stand out because Stephen perceives of them as “queer” words or sounds or concepts which somehow transcend the limits of his knowledge. On the whole, however, the build-up of references and associations around the words and/or sounds “suck”, “cock”, “pock” do not constitute memory-incidents for Stephen. What we have here is a curious mixture of recurrences as perceived (but not explicitly remembered) by Stephen, and repetition imposing a

forward momentum which in turn anticipates further associations and indicates a high awareness of the interplay between sounds, such as that of rhythm and noise: “[...] their keys made a quick music: click, click: click, click” (*P* I.468-469), “[...] once or twice he was able to hear for an instant the little song of the gas” (*P* I.240-241).

At the same time, however, these sound-associations can be seen as constituting “prose rhymes”,²⁸ initiating “miniature acts of memory”²⁹ which recall their earlier context through the recurrence of certain phonetic elements. We have already seen how pure sound can evoke past connotations and contexts which can often be highly charged emotionally and psychologically. But as it happens, these prose rhymes do not possess a static meaning, for their significance fluctuates along with the narrative. Prose rhymes and repetition provide links which constitute an “impersonal” structural background to Stephen’s intensely personal musings and experiences. For instance, having made his complaint to the rector, Stephen runs out into the playground again, where he can hear

the bump of the balls: and from here and from there through the quiet air
the sound of the cricket bats: pick, pack, pock, puck: like drops of water
in a fountain falling softly in the brimming pool. (*P* I.1845-1848)

This passage, which, incidentally, constitutes the end of Chapter One, sets Stephen’s elation and euphoria and the cries of “Hurroo” of his classmates against the anguish of pain, the sense of which has been absorbed in the sharp hard sound of the bats which reverberates through the last section of the chapter. Yet Stephen’s perception has changed and the phrase “drops of water in a fountain falling softly in the brimming pool” has soothing qualities both in its imagery and in the smoothness of its deep vowels and soft consonants. The alert reader remembers the earlier usage of the water imagery and the context in which it occurred, while Stephen apparently does not. But the textual connection goes even further. In the above example, the water imagery notably recalls the incident involving the hand basin of the Wicklow Hotel which has

produced the word/sound “suck” in the first place, thus completing the circle of associative links. While the text appears structured along Stephen’s mental development, there is a tension between Stephen’s perception and the reader’s. Stephen senses the way in which words can have multiple meanings, but it is the recurrence of these coded words which is essential to the construction of Stephen as a fictional subject.

It is in fact Stephen himself who, unwittingly, introduces some of the most dramatic colour imagery which attains more and more significance as the text progresses. On the very first page of the novel, we are informed that “[t]he brush with the maroon velvet back was for Michael Davitt and the brush with the green velvet back was for Parnell” (*P* I.23-25). This observation, innocent if curious in kind, foreshadows not only other occasions where these colours will come into play. This type of colour imagery also marks a series of conflicts in Stephen’s life, the most significant one of which takes place in an environment adorned with the colours red and green, a background dreamt up by Stephen in his longing to be home:

There were holly and ivy round the pierglass and holly and ivy, green and red, twined round the chandeliers. There were red holly and green ivy round the old portraits on the walls. Holly and ivy for him and for Christmas. (*P* I.473-477)

At the Christmas dinner, however, the pleasure anticipated by Stephen through the combination of these colours (“the green ivy and red holly made you feel so happy”, *P* I.805-806) dissipates quickly with the eruption of a political argument about the Church’s role in Parnell’s downfall and death. The maroon and green brushes are stripped (the green one, physically and brutally, by Dante) of their innocence and loveliness as the argument becomes fiercer and fiercer.

From the preceding analysis it has become evident, I think, that the idea of textual memory is a highly complex one which links sound patterns with symbolism and aspects of character consciousness in a way that can be illustrated but not thoroughly explained. The sounds of words, just like noises of the outside world, assume a psychological significance which cannot be fully grasped by tracing them along the lines of Parrinder's pairs of images or by regarding them in isolation from other such occurrences. This leads us back to the idea of *A Portrait* as a stream-of-consciousness novel. "The past", states Shiv Kumar, "in a typical Bergsonian sense, has no separate identity as such; it forms an organic part of the ever swelling *durée*".³⁰ Similarly, any word, and indeed any sound in its verbal/linguistic representation, becomes suffused with a past which constitutes the body of pages that have already been turned. In this manner, the word *foetus* which Stephen stumbles upon in the anatomy theatre of Cork University in Chapter Two is steeped in the history not just of the science of clinical anatomy, but of prior textual occurrences like "suck" and "cock" which have sexual connotations on other levels of meaning. References to Stephen's "recent monstrous reveries" (*P* II.1067) and his "mad and filthy orgies" (*P* II.1101-1102) only emerge after the word *foetus* has set in motion an unstoppable associative sequence of memories. Yet a sense of Stephen's troubled sexuality has already emerged from the events of Chapter One, embodied in the "queer" words and peculiar sounds which permeate the text. The narrative thus resonates with the unarticulated depths of Stephen's mind. While the word *foetus* acts as a sudden trigger to Stephen's memory, the string of associations with "suck" has already anticipated the theme of sexual taboo and agitation. The reader, in other words, is much better prepared for the sudden intrusion of a memory which manages to catch Stephen unawares, affecting him deeply and throwing him into a crisis of identity which culminates in the peculiar third-person

recollection in which Stephen sees himself as “a little boy in a grey belted suit” (*P* II.1175). In this sense, Maud Ellmann’s claim that “[n]either Stephen, nor the reader, nor the text, can incorporate the word ‘Foetus’ which erupts so inexplicably”³¹ becomes somewhat unconvincing. It is true that the word functions as an intrusion, but it is an intrusion which has been anticipated in the configuration of a textual repository, or textual memory, through a foregrounding of the “queerness” of language (involving sets of imagery, sound patterns, and repetitions), all in relation to Stephen’s heightened sense of the mysteries of language and of the body. This process is at work throughout the text, and as early as in Chapter One, the text prepares the way for Stephen’s conflict with past, language, and authority.

The main point which, I believe, has emerged from the discussion in this section, can be summed up as follows: It is impossible to suppress from the idea of textual memory the presence of the text as a physical artefact and of the reader as an irreducible “third consciousness”,³² picking up and putting into relation the textual fragments, associative connections and allusions, and sound patterns. The phenomenon of making connections, by way of textual markers, between different moments in the text is what renders *A Portrait* (in spite or because of its fragmentedness) a more comprehensive portrait than the essentially linear narrative that is *Stephen Hero*.

4.3. Memory as narrative construction: Joyce and Freud

While the names Joyce and Freud have often appeared side by side in the context of literary interpretation, the connections supposedly unearthed by some critics have frequently remained hypothetical and vague. There has been a considerable amount of debate concerning the question of how Joyce was influenced by Freudian thinking and

the *New Psychology*, but not much of it has been based on concrete textual evidence.³³ The following discussion of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* in relation to some of Freud's works does not seek to be a study of influence. It will be limited to an examination of textual features and contextually relevant elements, some of which may provide a link between the texts in historical or psychological terms.

It has been argued that Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) is concerned chiefly with the "narratability" of life and the structural demands of this endeavour.³⁴ A piece of narrative is essentially a construction, an artefact which nevertheless becomes valid as an attempt at a representation of life. Hence we may regard psychoanalysis as engaging not so much in the quest for an origin as in the creation of an authoritative and plausible "story", a life-plot which follows its own rules of cause and effect, signals and symptoms. Peter Brooks proposes to view "modern" life histories in terms of "a search for patterns in the individual existence and understanding of self that might recover some of the explanatory force lost with the decline of the collective myth". He continues:

The case history brings this form of narrative explanation into the social and medical sciences, presenting the individual's story as exemplary of human stories in general, and the plotted form it assumes, or that one can detect in it, as a generalizable structure of narrative explanation and understanding. [...] And the Freudian case history, privileging the 'prehistoric' period of the individual's life, his early childhood, stands as a direct legacy from Rousseau's discovery of the indelible traces of childhood experience in the mature but never quite grown-up adult.³⁵

The approach of psychoanalysis to re-tracing the individual's past is characterised by the objective of constructing "from the beginning" a narrative with the power to link the layers of the past and present experience so as to arrive at an understanding of the symptom – in other words, to build links which help in circumscribing, and, ideally, explaining an individual's particular affliction.

The question of how to arrive at an understanding of the individual's present state has been the crux of Freud's own research. In "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through", published in 1914, Freud outlines the changes undergone by the psychoanalytic method in the period between the beginning of his career and the publication of the article. Essentially, Freud isolates three stages in the development of his analytic technique: The first, isolation of the particular moment when the symptom was formed, to be achieved through hypnosis, had its ultimate objective nothing more or less than a clear memory of the original situation which has played a key part in the development of the symptom. Thus informed, and able to remember, the patient would then be freed of the symptom (e.g. obsessive behaviour) through a process which Freud calls "abreaction", implying a re-channelling of the energies that have caused the disturbance in the patient's mental health. The second stage acknowledges the problem posed by the patient's resistance to remembering. Through the patient's free associations, the analyst aims to bring into focus the event or events which the patient so desperately strives to forget. The main intention lies no longer in abreaction but on making visible the patient's struggle with the free association method, by which the analyst again aims to isolate the situation behind the formation of the symptom. The third technique is significantly different from the first two in that the analyst no longer tries to bring a particular moment or situation into focus. Instead, the analyst studies whatever is present on the patient's mind at the time, interpreting the narrative experience and attempting to locate any resistances, any "no-go areas" of the mind, and making those conscious to the patient.

This last method seems oddly lax compared to the first two, but Freud takes care to point out its merits: "[T]he doctor uncovers the resistances which are unknown to the patient; when these have been got the better of, the patient often relates the forgotten

situations and connections without any difficulty.”³⁶ It seems that once remembering ceases to be a requirement of analysis, it can happen spontaneously and voluntarily, through the very process of narrating. Freud emphasises, however, that all these techniques follow the same intention: “Descriptively speaking, it is to fill in gaps in memory; dynamically speaking, it is to overcome resistances due to repression.”³⁷ The idea behind the Freudian concept of memory is unambiguously revealed in that sentence: the goal is to create a coherent narrative, integrating the patient’s past self (forgotten or repressed) into the present one, and thereby making the person “whole” again. Freud implies that what has been forgotten is never lost, merely misplaced or hidden away, and can be reinstated through analysis and interpretation. Analysis is therefore closely related to construction – not of actual events and situations, but of the links and causal connections between them that serve to explain both their origins and their effects. When Lacan writes that “[r]ecollection [...] comes to us from structural necessities”,³⁸ it becomes evident that it is precisely in these structural terms that both analysis and construction can and should be viewed.

The year 1916 saw the publication of Joyce’s *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* in its final shape. If one counts *Stephen Hero* and the 1904 “Portrait” essay as draft versions of the final work, the novel’s production took up roughly a decade of Joyce’s life. I wish to illustrate in this section how Joyce’s narrative technique in relation to memory went through an evolution similar to that of Freud’s analytic method during what is approximately the same period of time, the first one-and-a-half decades of the twentieth century. It is important to remember that by the time Joyce started to rewrite *Stephen Hero* into *A Portrait*, he had left Ireland behind for good and had come into contact with an intellectual circle for whom the questions of identity, nationality, and history were put into a perspective of a far more diverse kind than for the average

Dublin student. Influences in terms of the “climate of opinion”³⁹ are manifold, and although Freud is only one of a number of personalities shaping the intellectual climate in the early twentieth century, he is often considered to be of particular importance in relation to Joyce’s works. Rickard discusses psychoanalysis and Freudian notions of memory and the unconscious as just one of a variety of factors which combine to form the intellectual climate that constitutes the socio-historical and political background to Joyce’s work. The focus of Rickard’s work lies on *Ulysses*, and the reason he gives for this is that he sees it as a work which occupies a particular position between the traditional and the modern, between opposed philosophical positions, embodying a struggle between order and disruption.⁴⁰

Although *Ulysses* saw what is now regarded as the most decisive development in terms of style and modernist representation, it is in *A Portrait* that the most profound transformation in relation to the function and handling of memory and the conflict between past and present can be located. In certain ways, the Joycean “mnemotechnic” in *A Portrait* appears to reflect the advances in the Freudian notion of memory during the years 1895 to 1914, which Freud describes in “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” and which I have summed up above. Like Freud, Joyce’s work shows great concern with the *textual* representation and construction of memory, and the interweaving of past and present in the individual’s consciousness. Freud’s case histories and his psychobiographical⁴¹ studies give evidence of his preoccupation with “filling in gaps”, not just those localised in memory, but in the loosely connected fragments of a person’s life-history, particularly those located in infancy and childhood.

The relation between James Joyce and psychoanalysis has been the subject of a number of studies over the past forty years or so, and the question is still under debate. Writing in 1970, Rosa Maria Bosinelli Bollettieri pieced together evidence both for and

against Joyce's knowledge of Freud's work. She argues, for instance, that although it may appear

that in spite of the influence of an environment in which Freud's ideas had aroused great curiosity and of the opportunity this environment might have offered him for a study, Joyce had no direct contact with psycho-analysis, remaining, if anything, diffident of it throughout his life.⁴²

However, she points out that the intellectual environment in Trieste in the early years of the twentieth century gravitated towards Vienna, the capital of the Austro-Hungarian empire and home to a distinguished university (which Trieste was lacking at the time). The presence of an influential Jewish community in Trieste is listed as a second factor, a community which displayed little or none of the "rigid prejudices of the Catholics", and which enjoyed "greater political and cultural freedom than elsewhere".⁴³ Thus it seems unlikely that Joyce can possibly have remained ignorant of at least the most well-known Freudian ideas, even if Joyce's friend and pupil Italo Svevo is careful to point out in his own book that "Freud's thought did not reach Joyce in time to lead him to the conception of his work".⁴⁴ This remark clearly refers to Joyce's work prior to 1915, and accordingly rejects the idea of any contribution of Freudian concepts to the gestation of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. We must keep in mind, however, that this comment was made by Svevo in 1954, by which time psychoanalysis had been in and out of fashion, and it may therefore not accurately reflect either Svevo's or Joyce's true attitude at the time.

More importantly, Richard Ellmann has shown that Joyce acquired, during the Trieste years, a number of books by such influential thinkers as Carl Gustav Jung, Ernest Jones and Freud,⁴⁵ and there is reason to believe that Freud's work in particular was being actively discussed among Joyce's acquaintances in Trieste. As John McCourt points out,

[a]s early as 1911 Joyce heard about psychoanalysis from a variety of sources, including Ettore Schmitz [better known under the pseudonym Italo Svevo], who learnt of it in 1908 from his nephew Dr Edoardo Weiss, one of Freud's earliest pupils and the first to introduce the subject into Italy.⁴⁶

On the other hand, Bosinelli Bollettieri again cites Svevo's words which seem to indicate quite the contrary, for example that "[i]n 1915, when Joyce left us, he knew nothing of psychoanalysis", and that prior to leaving Trieste, "he had too poor a grasp of German"⁴⁷ to actually read Freud's works (of which an English translation had not yet become available). Again, the same reservations apply: roughly forty years had passed between Svevo's statement and the period during which Joyce lived in Trieste. It seems that some of the remarks made by Joyce, such as those in which he scoffs at psychoanalysis for being "neither more nor less than blackmail" and refers to Jung and Freud as the "Swiss Tweedledum" and the "Viennese Tweedledee"⁴⁸ can serve as an indication for Joyce's knowledge of at least some aspects of psychoanalysis. Lack of proficiency in the German language certainly played no part in Joyce's exposure to the *New Psychology*. In his Trieste days, Joyce acquired a number of texts in German, presumably (considering his tight budget at the time) with the intention of using them for supplementary reading and reference. For example, among Joyce's Trieste acquisitions we find the 1911 edition, translated into German, of Ernest Jones' work *Das Problem des Hamlet und der Ödipus-Komplex*,⁴⁹ a text which Joyce almost certainly could have arranged to read in English had he so wished.⁵⁰

Furthermore, Richard Ellmann gives an account of a conversation between Paolo Cuzzi, one of Joyce's pupils in Trieste, and Joyce about the significance of "slips of the tongue", discussed by Freud in *Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Joyce is reported to have remarked that Freud had been anticipated by Vico.⁵¹ Clearly, even if there was plain evidence that Joyce had, for example, read and discussed Freud's 1914 article

“Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through”, it could be argued that the publication date alone made it highly unlikely for the work to have influenced Joyce in writing and revising *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, which, as Hans Walter Gabler asserts, had “attained the shape and structure in which we now possess it during 1912 and 1913”.⁵² This, however, is beside the point. If the Freudian perception of memory and its function for both individual identity and (purely textual) narrativity and structure was itself subject to the influences of contemporary thought, then perhaps what we are witnessing as readers of Freud and Joyce is not so much an interchange of ideas as a transformation in the perception of memory as discourse that is open to interpretation. As I have described above, Freud’s position as regards the question of memory changed significantly in the period between 1905 to 1915, from a hermeneutic model that allowed for a rediscovery of a true but forgotten past, towards the narrative model which concerned itself mainly with the verbal reconstruction of a past that remains essentially inaccessible, with an emphasis on repetition as a symptom of repression.

One possible parallel text for reading *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* is a work by Freud in which he attempts a psychobiographical interpretation of a larger-than-life and somewhat mythical artist figure: that of Leonardo da Vinci. In *Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci*⁵³ (published in Germany in 1910 and featured among the books which constituted Joyce’s Trieste Library), memory and childhood sexuality form the focus of Freud’s investigation. It must be noted here that Freud’s study of Leonardo goes beyond other works which could superficially be regarded as similar (such as Pater’s well-known essay on Leonardo in *The Renaissance*) in that he expressly refuses to “silently pass over its subject’s sexual activity or sexual individuality”.⁵⁴ His aim is not pure description, but to isolate the significance of the

few available facts and details, allowing a glimpse into the artist's "mental life".⁵⁵ The same is certainly true for Joyce's portrayal of Stephen, which includes a number of experiences that are either overtly sexual or can be interpreted as such.

Pamela Thurschwell's view that "[c]haracters in novels do not have a store of traumatic memories to draw upon"⁵⁶ raises the question: How is Leonardo's childhood reconstructed by Freud, and what kind of technique is used by Joyce in the creation of Stephen Dedalus? If we can read Joyce through Freud, perhaps we should reverse the process and read Freud through Joyce? The danger which lies in a combined reading of Joyce and Freud, Stephen Dedalus and Leonardo, has been hinted at by Klaus Herding: "Most psychoanalysts today are more inclined to discuss the essay on Leonardo as a biographical pathology of Freud, than as a theory of Leonardo's life and work".⁵⁷ In essence, there is the need to maintain a distance, treating Freud's *Leonardo* as a work of literary and creative imagination based on a set of facts. In order to arrive at a theoretical base for discussion, it may therefore be helpful to sum up certain traits or models which are shared by Freud's depiction of Leonardo and Joyce's portrait of Stephen: 1. The growth of the artist's mind (in Stephen's case, the aspiring artist); 2. a concern with experiences of childhood and infant sexual development, and how this may have an effect on later life; 3. memories from infancy which may be centred on fabrications, as opposed to actual events; 4. problems of identity and selfhood; 5. psychological issues: repression, repetition (and repetition compulsion), sublimation.

Freud clearly attempts to reconstruct the essentials of Leonardo's childhood through an analysis of what little documentary evidence there is of the artist's early life. Joyce, by contrast, creates his hero complete with the kind of childhood episodes that help to turn him into an analysable subject. Thus we are confronted with the problem of having to compare two texts which, though similar in many respects, belong to different

genres. In order to overcome this particular difficulty, it helps to take a closer look at Freud's psychoanalytic method regarding his case studies and psychobiographies.

It must be pointed out that Freud's case studies do not constitute actual transcripts of the psychoanalytic treatment undertaken with certain patients. Out of six case histories published, two are concerned with patients to whom Freud had no direct access whatsoever. The Schreber case, for example, essentially equals a psychoanalytic reading of a text. It is thus an interpretation of a work of literature (even if this work incorporates substantial autobiographical elements on the part of Schreber himself: the book's title is *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness*). A "case study" of this kind is therefore not necessarily based on any direct interaction between Freud and his patient. The notion behind this provides a rather different concept of psychoanalytic practice, suggesting that an individual can "undergo" psychoanalysis at any time, either through a literary description of him- or herself, through an in-depth reading and interpretation of the person's artistic production, or a combination of the two. This serves to highlight the correspondence between literary and psychological dynamics, and it once more emphasises the fact that it is precisely the narrative act and its interpretation which forms the core of the psychoanalytic method.⁵⁸

From this perspective, almost any experience, even a "fictional" one such as a dream or a fantasy, can be the object of psychoanalysis. Analysis is thus not confined to real and living personalities, but can be applied to fictional characters, historical personalities, as well as to works of art. "The material at the disposal of a psychoanalytic enquiry", states Freud, "consists of the data of a person's life history: on the one hand the chance circumstances of events and background influences, and, on the other hand, the subject's reported reactions."⁵⁹ What matters here is that any data can be read, in the true sense of the word: Freud's psychoanalytic method is essentially one of

interpreting pieces of narrated experience, of endeavouring to expand the original narration and, through inclusion of a person's mental life, of providing a multi-layered portrait which aims to expand the patient's sense of selfhood through the inclusion of difficult, discomfiting or traumatic experiences.

The later lives of both the young Stephen and the infant Leonardo continually revolve around certain aspects of one or more childhood experiences which have left behind powerful memories. For Leonardo, the central one of these events is a highly peculiar one: it concerns the dream/memory of a large bird which visits him in his cradle, putting its tail in his mouth and moving it about. Freud has two comments to make on this: Firstly, that, for several reasons, this is unlikely to be a remembered event, but rather a fantasy transposed unto the suckling period. Secondly, he states that such an event, whether real or imagined, must have some meaning. This meaning is what the analyst strives to locate through a translation of the fantasy "from its own special language into words that are generally understood".⁶⁰ Interpretation takes place through this process of re-phrasing. In Freud's portrait of Leonardo, the "childhood memory" of the bird leads on to a discussion of infant sexuality. This forms the centre of the narrative from which a discussion of several other aspects of Leonardo's later development, such as the relationship to his mother and his sublimated homosexuality, branch out.⁶¹

Stephen Dedalus' pre-school childhood takes up no more than one and a half pages of Joyce's book, yet this brief passage sets the mood for much of what follows. It contains some distinct impressions, and revolves around the child's playful experience of language and sensuality, but it is impossible to say whether they constitute a "memory-event" of any kind. As has been pointed out in the first section of this chapter, the novel starts with a story which begins with the words "[o]nce upon a time" (*P* I.1), a

past-tense narration which nevertheless forms Stephen's present: "He was baby tuckoo" (*P* I.7). Clearly, the point of view is presented as that of a child and, although related in the past tense, it does not contain a sense of reminiscence through retrospection. It is difficult to decide whether free indirect discourse is used here as a means of delineating a child's stream of consciousness. Stephen's activity at the beginning of *A Portrait* is to define the boundaries of his identity, his body and his perceptions. He distinguishes between his father and his mother and their respective smells, Uncle Charles and Dante and their respective ages, and recognises the difference between his own family and the one next door (*P* I.27-29).

The "Pull out his eyes/Apologise" rhyme forms the close as well as the climax of this short section, and it conveys a profound change of atmosphere from playfulness to menace. Stephen must apologise for something he has said or done, but the reader can only speculate as to what the nature of his wrongdoing may be. Many critics have brought forward the hypothesis that it may be of a sexual or indecent nature (was it the fact that he said he wanted to marry Eileen, the Protestant girl next door?). Whatever the case may be, the consequences certainly seem daunting for the young boy:

His mother said:

—O, Stephen will apologise.

Dante said:

—O, if not, the eagles will come and pull out his eyes. (*P* I.30-33)

Leonardo's bird appears to be enticing the infant into some sort of fellatio-like sexual play, aimed at the child's reflex to suck at whatever is put in its mouth. Stephen's bird, prompted by the excessively devout Dante, threatens to do the opposite. According to Freud, loss of the power of sight, in an Oedipal fashion, equals castration. In Freud's terms, Stephen's manhood, or maleness, is in danger of being forever stunted by the two women who dominate his early life.

An important element in Freud's thought is the belief that every child around the age of three goes through a period of what he terms "infantile sexual researches".⁶² This phase usually follows an important event which leaves an impression on the child's mind (such as the birth of a brother or sister), and activates the child's curiosity regarding the physical facts of sexuality. Freud argues that even when a child has grown out of this period of intense curiosity (which is "terminated by a wave of energetic sexual repression"),⁶³ the instinct for research tends to become redirected to other activities either partly or wholly, or to be suppressed, and abandoned altogether. Artists or scientists of outstanding talent and energy fall into the most extreme category: stopping short of developing neurotic qualities, the instinct for research becomes compulsive, absorbing and sublimating all sexual energy into the quest for (purely non-sexual) knowledge and achievement. Thus Freud attributes the adult Leonardo's disinterest in sexual matters and his intellectual genius to the ability to redirect suppressed sexual energy into matters of purely scientific research.

For Stephen Dedalus, by contrast, the activities of sexual and intellectual instinct appear to merge in a rather different manner. In Freud's terms, suppressed sexual instincts can sexualise the act of thinking itself, colouring "intellectual operations with the pleasure and anxiety that belong to sexual processes proper".⁶⁴ Stephen's mind becomes preoccupied with language: the sound of words, peculiarities of meaning, and linguistic puzzles. If we accept that Leonardo directs his libido wholly towards scientific discovery, then for Stephen words themselves become sexualised, or at least sensualised. He repeats "queer words" to himself and broods over their mysterious meanings, experiencing them in an unusually intense and often physical manner. Once again, perhaps the most obvious example of this is the word "suck", which in Stephen's

mind is a “queer word” with an ugly sound (*P* I.150-153). But in addition, the word evokes a memory of a prior experience, which in turn leads to a physical sensation:

And when [the dirty water] had all gone down slowly the hole in the basin had made a sound like that: suck. [...] To remember that and the white look of the lavatory made him feel cold and then hot. (*P* I.156-160)

Attridge has pointed out that “Stephen’s vigorous response cannot be explained in terms of inherent aesthetic and onomatopoeic qualities”, and that the reason for this powerful bodily reaction lies buried in the unconscious realm of his mind. Stephen appears to sense the word’s association with some element of taboo sexual activity, and he does so with a mixture of fascination and mild disgust. There are other words which appear to trigger a similar type of unconsciously experienced recollection or association, and which induce a vague feeling of unease. “Kiss” is such a word, charged with physical notions of intimacy. But Stephen’s fascination extends to all kinds of linguistic puzzles, such as the perfectly reasonable question “Why did Mr Barrett in Clongowes call his pandybat a turkey? It was not like a turkey” (*P* I.801-802). In Freud’s terms, these kinds of questions referring to peculiarities of language have not replaced but incorporated the quest for knowledge about sexual matters. This would indicate that Stephen has clearly abandoned the phase of “infantile sexual researches” only to enter into the world of repressed desires where words have assumed a symbolic value that transcends their actual meaning. The young boy has turned his preoccupation with words into a sexual activity, so that for him “the feeling that comes from settling things in one’s own mind and explaining them replaces sexual satisfaction”,⁶⁵ and he does this precisely because “the thought of sexuality itself is not possible”.⁶⁶

This argument is reinforced when, in the infirmary, an older boy called Athy confronts Stephen with a set of actual linguistic puzzles. The first one seems

straightforward enough: “Why is the county Kildare like the leg of a fellow’s breeches?” (*P* I.646-647), but Stephen has to concede defeat. After a few moments, however, Athy adds: “Do you know the other way to ask it?” Again, Stephen says that he does not know. The other boy persists: “Can you not think of the other way? [...] There is another way but I won’t tell you what it is” (*P* I.666). Stephen cannot think of an explanation for Athy’s refusal, yet the reader senses that the “other way” to ask the riddle would have had a strong sexual subtext. For Stephen, however, this kind of thinking is unavailable, making him feel self-conscious and vaguely excluded. He occupies himself with thoughts of Athy’s father, who “must be a magistrate too” (*P* I.668), unlike Stephen’s own father, and the sense of exclusion is reinforced as he asks himself why he is being sent to “that place [Clongowes] with them [the sons of influential fathers]” (*P* I.673). It is only in hindsight, then, that a certain undertone can be ascribed to Athy’s initial question: “Are you good at riddles?” It appears to serve as a coded invitation into discussing sexual experiences, a discussion in which Stephen is unable to participate.

Freud goes to some length to explain how many childhood memories originate:

Quite unlike conscious memories from the time of maturity, they are not fixed at the moment of being experienced and afterwards repeated, but are only elicited at a later age when childhood is already past; in the process they are altered and falsified, and are put into the service of later trends, so that generally speaking they cannot be sharply distinguished from phantasies.⁶⁷

Importantly, however, these fantasies tend to be closely attached to real (but forgotten) childhood events, so that although the content of these memories is obscured, their significance remains.⁶⁸ The rationality of Leonardo’s scientific notebook entry becomes momentarily suspended at the sudden intrusion of the peculiar bird-image, while Stephen’s early childhood experience ends rather abruptly with the “Pull out his

eyes/Apologise” rhyme. According to Freud, Leonardo’s fantasy “conceals [...] merely a reminiscence of sucking – or being suckled – at his mother’s breast”,⁶⁹ in other words, an event which is in itself essentially trivial. However, this recollection has been transformed by Leonardo himself into something else: “a passive homosexual phantasy”,⁷⁰ (bird’s tail becomes breast becomes male genital organ), a fantasy which may or may not explain the origin of what Freud refers to as Leonardo’s sublimated homosexuality.

Evidently, the character Stephen does indeed possess his own store of memories (traumatic or otherwise). However, these are not readily accessible but are hidden within the deeper layers of meaning conveyed by the text. Leonardo has a vivid “memory” of the bird while he is engaging in his scientific research: a study about the flight of birds. As Stephen ponders his “queer words” he is not conscious of any sexual association or symbolism, and Leonardo, in writing his memory down in his notebook, seems likewise unconcerned. The “wave of energetic sexual repression” presumably experienced by Stephen Dedalus in connection with his childhood naughtiness and the “pull out his eyes” punishment explains the absence of any obvious contextual connection between sexualised thoughts or actions and the need to apologise.

In Kimball’s view, Joyce possessed such a profound sensitivity to the psychoanalytic concept of repression that, instead of spelling out “the most significant of Stephen’s researches and discoveries”,⁷¹ he chose to insert a set of screen memories, thus constructing Stephen’s mental development along the lines of psychoanalytic theory. This would indeed imply that Joyce was consciously imitating Freud – a notion which seems rather unlikely, given that there is no indication for an affinity of Joyce to Freudian ideas.

Stephen's shivering as he recalls the whiteness of the lavatory, the noise "suck" and the word "cock" indicates a deep but troublesome connection with some prior experience which remains obscured. The crucial element of Freud's analysis is to fill in any gaps to create a more coherent portrait of the individual.⁷² Joyce's method, paradoxically, involves precisely the opposite: the creation of gaps, in particular those in Stephen's memory. These gaps are essentially generated, and foregrounded, through the language that characterises Stephen. There is, strictly speaking, no need for a Freudian process of translation in order to get a sense of Stephen's personality. The memory concealed by "queer words" cannot be resurrected, not even through the Freudian approach, but the words themselves provide clues relating to Stephen's state of mind. Attridge argues that words are "made strange" for Stephen in order to attain their peculiar suggestiveness.⁷³ Their strangeness, however, remains unexplained, providing a sense of alienation and unease which is closely connected with Stephen's pre-sexual thoughts and sensations. Language takes up the burden of Stephen's instinctual physical reactions and recollections.

In ending the passage that covers Stephen's early childhood with the "Pull out his eyes/Apologise" rhyme, Joyce employs a similar strategy. There is no clear indication of the nature of Stephen's transgression, and the verses themselves cannot be attributed to any speaker. The reader's lack of knowledge presumably mirrors Stephen's. It may even be Stephen himself, enjoying the rhythm and rhyme of the verses, who adapts Dante's threat into a kind of nonsense-poem in his mind. Meanings which the boy cannot quite grasp remain a strong presence throughout the text, and it is not just the sexual associations of particular words, but also plain quality of sound (it has already been demonstrated in this chapter that there is a smooth transition from "sounds" such as "suck" and "cock" to the noise which results from the cricket bat connecting with the

ball: “pock”, *P* I.1331) that links different experiences and highlights their significance. Stephen’s early memories are therefore not constructed as acts of recollection, but as a network of subconscious connections and associations which the boy himself is incapable of understanding. His fascination with language colours and accentuates networks of future memories without offering any explanations regarding their origins. Consequently, what the reader witnesses in the opening paragraphs of *A Portrait* is not an act of reminiscence (by an older Stephen), but the very process of retention as a basis for a recollection in the future. This explains the presence of the song about the rose and the “Apologise” rhyme: The incident behind the apology may well be forgotten or repressed, but rhythm and rhyme of songs and poems nevertheless serve to anchor them as absences within the textual structure.

Freud concedes that very little is known about Leonardo’s childhood and youth, and he summarises the few available facts in just one paragraph. He argues that

[i]n the first three or four years of life certain impressions become fixed and ways of reacting to the outside world are established which can never be deprived of their importance by later experiences.⁷⁴

The unchangeable core of an individual’s personality, Freud asserts, lies hidden beneath suppressed memories of early childhood. Acknowledging the inaccessibility of most of these memories, the analyst turns instead to half-forgotten fantasies and attempts to reconstruct a sense of the emotional and mental developments which accompany them. It is because memories of early childhood experiences frequently become obscured, blurred and combined with dreams or fantasies, or “hidden” behind “screen memories”, that psychoanalysis acquires the function of an interpretative tool. Similarly, the language around which Stephen’s earliest experiences revolve cries out for some sort of interpretation or explanation. Joyce, however, withholds from his portrait of Stephen

precisely these tools, and the authority of a single voice, elements on which Freud rests his own psychobiographical study of Leonardo.

With Stephen, as with Leonardo, we sense the shortcomings of literature as an interpretative device. However, we are also one step closer to understanding the paradox that what is remembered may actually be less significant than that which has been forgotten, or, as Ian Hacking has reflected, the “implausibility [...] that what has been forgotten is what forms our character, our personality, our soul”.⁷⁵ This idea is, of course, central to Freud’s concept of interpretation: reconstructing that which is absent from that which is present. The Leonardo text thus serves as a theoretical testing ground for the representation of memory-material which, until then, has existed only in a symbolic form, an entry in an artist’s diary, telling about a curious memory. It appears that the Joycean use of memory in *A Portrait* actually evolves into something less representational and symbolically invested (but simultaneously more imaginative) than Freud’s notion of memory which holds that nothing is ever forgotten, only repressed, or sublimated. Paul Antze points out how a similar concept of memory is postulated by neuro-psychologists: “[...] an understanding of memory as something more like a faculty for imaginative reconstruction, one that relies heavily on contextual cues as it patches together an untidy collection of scenes”.⁷⁶ Where Freud tries to explain and to make explicit connections between cause and effect so as to create a narration that delineates Leonardo’s psyche, Joyce is more concerned with the deliberate arrangement of narrative gaps and textual recurrences, thus structuring artificially a text which ultimately evolves into a dynamic portrait-in-progress of the organic formation of selfhood.

Where Freud takes great care to establish a perception of narrative continuity and cohesion of an individual’s story, Joyce, in *Stephen Hero* and to a much greater degree

in *A Portrait*, emphasises the deceptiveness of this endeavour. On the one hand, Stephen's fascination with words and with their sounds and rhythm highlights his awareness of the associative and mnemonic powers of language. On the other hand, in making the text the site of these associations, Joyce may be said to employ the principle of textual memory to draw attention to the things which fail to make a consciously experienced imprint on Stephen's memory. The responsibility for remembering is thus transferred onto the reader, whose access to the printed page makes it possible to read memory not just as the narrative representation of an experiencing consciousness but also as a textual construct which develops, independently of the character, through the repetition of key words and sound patterns.

Part II: *Ulysses*

“Fabled by the daughters of memory. And yet it was in some way if not as memory fabled it” (*U* 2.7-8). These are Stephen’s thoughts while teaching history¹ to the pupils in Mr Deasy’s school. The boy Cochrane has forgotten the place of battle, but not the year. And he can recall “[t]hat phrase the world had remembered” (*U* 2.15), spoken after the battle: “*Another victory like that and we are done for*” (*U* 2.14, italics in the original). The world remembers, and what it remembers is a paradox. We could perhaps say that everything in *Ulysses* is to some extent “fabled”² by memory, and therefore *Ulysses* is a book that is as much about remembering as it is about invention and re-invention. On one level, as many critics have observed, *Ulysses* as a whole remembers the Dublin of 1904, a city already irrevocably changed by the events of Easter 1916 by the time Joyce was composing the novel. Joyce famously stated that in writing the book he was producing a blueprint of the city, claiming that if the city ever disappeared it would be possible to reconstruct it from the pages of *Ulysses*.³ But must we forget or destroy before we can remember or re-construct? “The material realities of life on June 16, 1904”, writes Anne Fogarty, “supply significant coordinates for our reading of *Ulysses* and yet seem also to be erased by the very processes of fictionalization and re-invention”.⁴ In essence, Joyce reconstructs Dublin not so much in his mapping of the city’s topography, the names of its streets, shops and landmarks, but through fictionalising the manner in which its individual inhabitants situate themselves within it, and in particular, how they are positioned in relation to questions of temporal sequence and linearity, of history, and of remembering. I shall therefore steer away from questions relating to the history of the city, and instead focus on the three main characters in *Ulysses*, who, I will argue, display within the narrative a series of diverse

“styles” of memory. Dublin (and its pasts and presents) emerges not primarily from the mind of James Joyce (or from an encyclopaedia of proper names), but from the minds of the individual characters he creates.

We have already seen how, in *A Portrait*, it is the text itself which is occupied with remembering itself, sometimes mirroring, but often transcending Stephen Dedalus’ individual power or willingness to recollect. In *A Portrait*, textual memory connects separate incidents (internal or external to a character, regardless of that character’s recognition of the event), whereas the picture becomes somewhat more complex with regard to the multiple characters in *Ulysses*. Arguably, with Stephen, Leopold and Molly Bloom all vanishing from view for a time, there is no single protagonist, no central character in *Ulysses*. Instead, the reader is required to inhabit the parallel wor(l)ds,⁵ as it were, of several characters, presented, of necessity, in a serial fashion, even where incidents happen simultaneously, or where thoughts and sensations are shared between two characters. If, as Anthony Rudolf has claimed, “[m]emory [...] can be characterised as a language with its own syntax and grammar, which must be learned before it can be exercised or trained”,⁶ then perhaps it would be legitimate to assume that throughout *Portrait* the rules of that language have been introduced to us, and that in reading *Ulysses*, we must not just apply, but constantly revise and expand them.

The following discussion aims to confront some of the difficulties encountered in circumscribing the question of memory in *Ulysses* which, through the relationship between the characters’ individual “language” of memory and the text that represents it, have a shaping effect on the narrative. Ireland’s past, Stephen’s education in a religious environment, Leopold and Molly’s courtship and their eleven-year marriage – all these are formative elements woven into the narrative of 16 June 1904. My aim is to show how the three primary characters in *Ulysses*, Stephen, Leopold, and Molly, negotiate

their respective memories, and how these memories emerge within the complexity conditioned by the text's stylistic experimentation.

What is so significant about the different ways in which Stephen, Leopold and Molly remember the past? Shiv Kumar has observed that both "Stephen and Bloom live under a perpetual shadow of the past; they are paragons of memory".⁷ While it is difficult to disagree with this statement, it nevertheless becomes paradoxical when applied to the workings of Stephen's and Bloom's individual efforts to remember – or, perhaps just as frequently, to forget. My reading of *Ulysses*, then, aims to show how both Stephen and Bloom are to some extent preoccupied with resisting memory.

Following on from my study of *A Portrait*, Stephen Dedalus will be the focus of the first section. But how do we know that the Stephen we encounter in *Ulysses* is the same Stephen as in *A Portrait*, only a little older? How does Stephen, and how the reader, negotiate a past which may or may not be contained, in part, in another book? *Ulysses*, it seems to me, is radically different from Joyce's earlier works in that it makes an effort to integrate them into its own textual present. Although characters from *Dubliners* also make some fleeting appearances, it is first and foremost the character of Stephen who renders memory in *Ulysses* not just a textual but an intertextual process. Rickard has pointed out that "*Ulysses* [...] demonstrates to the reader that the text itself is subtly dependent on the intertextual recollection of an earlier novel, a memory of Stephen's 'experiences' as they occurred in another text".⁸ *Ulysses*, then, is more than "a model of cultural processes and materials"⁹ because it incorporates the mind – the psychical processes – of its individual characters into the principle of the text itself.

Stephen in *Ulysses* is capable, as we shall see, of remembering across the boundaries of the text, an ability we assume him to share with the reader. But how much does Stephen remember? Is it his past, or merely his own interpretation of it? We shall

see that, on occasion, he seems curiously unsure of his identity. Does he perceive himself to be the same person as the boy at Clongowes? To what extent does he actually remember the formative events and experiences which have helped to shape the Stephen through whose eyes we perceive the world in *A Portrait*, such as the Christmas Dinner Scene, his infatuation first with Eileen Vance and then with E-C-, or the traumatic pandybat incident at Clongowes? Or has Stephen, perhaps, succeeded in leaving behind his former self so as to reinvent himself anew, perhaps “for the millionth time” (*P* V.2788-2789)?

Stephen, I argue, is poised between a fluid, “protean” notion of selfhood, and the much more static Christian concept of entelechy, centring on the idea of “oneness” of the soul which remains in essence unchangeable, untransformable through willpower or through shifts in time or space. In other words, Stephen is faced with a dilemma: If he embraces memory, then he must learn to weave a selfhood from it, a selfhood which will have him bound not only in the nets of a collective history but also of a personal past. If he rejects memory in the same way that he initially rejects any responsibility for his debt (“Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound”, *U* 9.205-206), then the past from which he attempts to dissociate himself will do its best to return by its own power to haunt him. Essentially, Stephen’s predicament is that he feels unable to identify with his old self which he thinks he has outgrown, but at the same time he cannot escape the feeling that Stephen the boy irrevocably makes up the core of Stephen the young man: “I am another I now and yet the same” (*U* 1.310-312). Essentially, then, he is drawn between two opposed concepts. The first one is the Aristotelian notion of the self as a continuous unity (“entelechy”), built upon the memory of the self through time. Accordingly, when Stephen argues that he is no longer the person who, in borrowing money from AE, incurred the debt of one pound, he effectively invalidates

his own argument, simply because he cannot help remembering having borrowed the sum. However, though recognising the memory of his debt for what it is, Stephen nevertheless feels irrevocably cut off from the boy/young man he once was: “Other fellow did it: other me” (*U* 3.182), “I, I and I. I.” (*U* 9.212). This discontinuous, essentially modernist notion of selfhood, in which there is not one self but an infinite number of selves spread out over time, cannot easily be reconciled with the concept of “entelechy”, which relies on the notion of the soul’s permanence within the paradigm of time as a linear and therefore stable dimension (“Hold on to the now, the here, through which all future plunges to the past”, *U* 9.89). Morris Beja has argued that, although Joyce plays with both these concepts of selfhood within time, the most pervading notion is in fact a much more radical one: “That relationship to time entails a sense of, as it were, transcendence, or perhaps pre-existence, a notion that our selves are indeed restricted to time, but not necessarily to this time, or this place”.¹⁰ How this conception of time as fluid and changeable and its relationship to the paradigm of memory as a textual construct is realised in *Ulysses*, and in what ways this affects Stephen, Leopold, and Molly, will be one of the questions examined in the following three chapters.

I would argue that, for Stephen, memory is rendered problematic above all because he suffers from feelings of guilt, and has not been able to complete the process of mourning after the death of his mother. In identifying with Hamlet, he posits himself not just in the role of the son, but inadvertently also in the role of the haunted, virtually inviting the ghosts of the past to have their say. For him, *Ulysses* is indeed, in many ways, a ghost story, but one in which ghosts often seem to be empowered through difficult or thwarted acts of recollection. Jeffrey A. Weinstock has hinted that Joyce himself may be regarded as “author function haunting the text”, cautiously adding that this “is not a ghost that exists independently of the reader”.¹¹ Of course it is not. The

ghost is a function of the text itself. It steps forward whenever a word or expression resonates in some form of repetition (with the potential of inducing recollection), and its significance becomes obvious only within the different layers of text by which it has been hidden.

There are several angles to the problem of ghosting in *Ulysses*, as literal ghosts make appearances in the narrative, too. With regard to Stephen Dedalus, I wish to explore the links between literal, metaphorical, and purely textual hauntings, and how they relate to his memories (or lack thereof), as well as to the manner in which Stephen's own "return" to the narrative (after *A Portrait*, and the gap that marks his voyage to Paris, his return and his mother's death) has been "scripted" by Joyce. Stephen, Leopold and Molly are textually constructed as entirely separate entities, each speaking and thinking in a characteristic manner, foregrounded by the novel's stylistic shifts and the lack of a unifying narrating agent. In the context of historical deconstruction, Anne Fogarty has mentioned what she calls "Joyce's memorializing textuality", which plays with and ultimately rearranges, or even obliterates "the history and geopolitical spaces that it also pretends to safeguard and salvage".¹² The main characters in *Ulysses* all display traces of their own separate pasts, and it is the interplay between them which informs a process in which the textual past and present merge, and in which memories become "fabled" and transformed into a narrative presence, propelling forward the "story" that is *Ulysses*. No matter how hard a character attempts to block out a memory or a thought – it will emerge at some point in the text, quite often in an unexpected manner, precisely through the dynamics of the narrative itself, as a sort of linguistic apparition. Rickard has emphasised this in relation to the presence in *Ulysses* of a "universal memory":

In Joyce's text, repressed memories, no matter how vehemently one denies them or attempts to ignore them, can be evoked instantly by 'a chance word' [...]. Just as no events or thoughts escape the mind but rather 'abide there and wait', Joyce's text in *Ulysses* represents a memory that – like the Theosophical Akasa – retains all that has happened in the course of the novel as well as wider cultural associations. This 'remembered' material is not static, however, but forms part of a textual dynamic.¹³

A textual dynamic, we might add, where neither the present nor the past function as fixed entities, and where, even though characters may be unaware of the past or actively resist any engagement with it, the narrative nevertheless becomes empowered by this past. As Rickard has hinted, the text never forgets, and it constantly reminds the reader that it does not.

In contrast with Stephen Dedalus, Leopold Bloom is, as many critics have pointed out, an "Everyman" – but this is just his symbolic value, and it does not preclude him from having his own unique outlook on life. The second section of this chapter engages with Bloom, focusing on an episode which simultaneously exposes and hides the event around which his thoughts continue to revolve on 16 June 1904, and which, in my reading, constitutes an important epicentre of the memorial in *Ulysses*. The episode is "Sirens", the time is around 4 p.m., and the event in question is Molly's adulterous encounter with Blazes Boylan. Leopold Bloom is highly conscious of his own position in relation to time: he does not want to be late for Paddy Dignam's funeral, and he feels he must occupy himself all day in order to stay away from home long enough to avoid meeting Blazes Boylan at Eccles Street. Bloom needs to remember the time, and to disremember it at the same time, because every time he checks the clock, it will remind him that the past is in the process of being written. I wish to show how the acoustic background in the "Sirens" episode relates to Bloom's unsuccessful attempts at banishing both memories of the past and, paradoxically, of the immediate future, a future which will place him in the role of cuckold.

Bloom takes in hand the problem of individual memory by transposing it onto the more abstract issue of mnemo-technology. The gramophone, he reflects, would make a good instrument for memory, for one could use it to listen to the pre-recorded voices of the dead, in order to remember the deceased. Like Stephen, Bloom is forced to engage with the problem of the return of, and the return to, the past. The poetics of sound, which can most readily be observed in the “Sirens” episode, will provide the point of departure for my discussion of Bloom’s memory. In “Sirens”, I suggest, psychological and technological representations of memory are linked in such a way that they transcend the capacity of the individual, placing Bloom in a highly unstable position in relation to the temporal and spatial organisation of the text. In creating the outline of an acoustically engineered “auditory imagination”,¹⁴ the narrative constructs its own prelude: in presenting the soundscape prior to the event, it mirrors Bloom’s predicament of what I would term textual phonography, the acoustic anticipation of a memory that has yet to be narratively inscribed. Bloom, in imagining the voice from beyond the grave emanating from a gramophone, has created a set of ghosts, of memories in the process of becoming. The threat of time passing is similarly engineered within the soundscape of “Sirens”: a series of “tap” sounds which becomes more and more rapid as the episode progresses and as Bloom’s apprehension mounts. Textually rendered sounds, I argue, frequently have the effect of destabilising the narrative’s temporal and spatial unity. Such sound effects draw on previous episodes and on settings other than the Ormond Hotel: they conflate the *nebeneinander* and the *nacheinander* and challenge the text’s linearity, while presenting Bloom in the vulnerable state of passivity and waiting. The past leaks into the present – and, in the text of *Ulysses*, so does the future.

The issues in “Penelope” are of a different nature. Molly, we might say, assembles and re-inscribes from memory her own various versions of *Ulysses* and of the text’s pre-

history. My reading of “Penelope” sets out from Joyce’s comment on the episode’s status as “the clou of the book”,¹⁵ and attempts to delineate the intersection between the text and the consciousness which “writes” it. I analyse what I perceive as a process of interaction between the representation of the individual mind and of textuality as the perpetual process of its inscription. With the textual weavings of the “Penelope” episode, Molly’s presence in the preceding seventeen episodes asserts itself retrospectively, thus mirroring Joyce’s own method of composition through repeated revising and rewriting. “Penelope” may be said to enact a performance which engages with the conventions of reading and writing, and with the interplay between revising and remembering. The episode, then, serves to highlight the historicity inherent in the memory-processes of textual production, and, in addition, underscores the desire for a mode of memory which functions as an instrument of imaginative creation.

Chapter 5: Stephen, memory, and identity

5.1. Memory and Protean selfhood

Walking along the seashore from the Martello Tower towards the centre of Dublin in “Proteus”, Stephen recalls the habits and ambitions of his own youthful self: “Reading two pages apiece of seven books every night, eh? I was young. You bowed to yourself in the mirror [...] Remember your epiphanies written on green oval leaves, deeply deep, copies to be sent if you died to all the great libraries of the world, including Alexandria? (*U* 3.136-143). With this critical and self-ironic view, Stephen establishes a distance between his present self in *Ulysses* and the schoolboy and student he once was. While Stephen takes the opportunity of self-reflection to dissociate himself from his past to some degree, this may be the source of difficulties for the reader of *Ulysses*. I would argue that the first three episodes of *Ulysses* show Stephen in the process of negotiating two contradictory concepts: his desire to resolve discrepancies of memory on a personal as opposed to a universal or transpersonal level, and the recognition of the divide arising from the decision either to embrace or to reject memory as a means for the making of an identity.

This tension between the need to remember and the desire to leave behind one’s past has, I would argue, become partially transposed onto Stephen’s own reminiscences as well as onto the relationship between *Ulysses* and the earlier Stephen texts. After all, in *A Portrait*, there is no mention of the word “epiphany”. To be sure, Stephen does write a poem, in *A Portrait* as well as in the “Proteus” episode, but he makes no mention of wanting to preserve it for posterity (unless one counts his writing it down on the tiniest scrap of paper). *Stephen Hero*, on the other hand, has Stephen formulating his

“theory of the epiphany”. We could say, then, that Stephen’s thoughts in *Ulysses* (which frequently contain comments on his earlier self) serve to establish an alternative continuity of his being, while filling some of the gaps left by the incompleteness of the surviving *Stephen Hero* manuscript and the selectiveness of narrative representation in *A Portrait*.

Throughout the first three episodes of *Ulysses*, Stephen’s consciousness is constructed in such a way as to render him recognisable as the young man whom readers have encountered before in stylistically very different texts. This is achieved by the creation of a continuous notion of selfhood and identity through the powers of what we perceive as Stephen’s memory. The function of the text in “Proteus” in particular, then, is to remember the “previous” Stephen, and attach his image to the present Stephen, working as a teacher in 1904 Dublin, while bringing us up to date on the issues that occupy Stephen’s thoughts. Consequently, there is no question that in the Stephen Dedalus of *Ulysses*, we encounter an older version of the Clongowes schoolboy and the University College student.

Hans Walter Gabler is one of the critics who have located in the “Proteus” episode significant echoes of Stephen’s earlier life as it manifests itself in his thoughts and memories. In “Proteus”, Gabler argues, Stephen’s consciousness is constructed “upon or around his actual itinerary along Sandymount strand”.¹ Gabler shows how the setting in itself is reminiscent of the epiphanic beach scene at the close of Chapter Four of *A Portrait*. In addition, the musings which occupy Stephen in “Proteus” recall those in chapter five of *A Portrait*: family, religion, and exile.² And death, we might add, considering that, in the meantime, all these three categories have been linked up through the death of Stephen’s mother. In the intervening time, i.e. the narrative “gap” between *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*, Stephen’s sojourn in Paris had been cut short by a telegram,

informing him of his mother's impending death. This has caused him to return home, if only for the purpose of seeing his mother suffer during her final weeks. "Hurrying to her squalid deathlair from gay Paris" (*U* 9.825): This is how Stephen recalls his return. When we encounter Stephen in *Ulysses*, his mother's death lies several months in the past. She has already been turned into one of the many shadows of absence in his native city, and her death has become the subject of his perturbing musings.

Perhaps paradoxically, the scarce moments we glimpse in *Ulysses* of Stephen's childhood and early youth appear more closely tied to his sense of selfhood than some of the more recent events in his life. Memories of his visit to Paris are scant, for instance, while conversely there are a number of occasions where Stephen's Clongowes College days resonate rather strongly in his mind. In "Proteus", he reprimands himself: "You told the Clongowes gentry you had an uncle a judge and an uncle in the army. Come out of them, Stephen" (*U* 3.105-3.107). This memory can possibly be said to draw on the memory of Stephen's days in the infirmary, where he feels socially inferior to Athy, the boy whose father "kept a lot of racehorses that were spiffing jumpers" (*P* I.627-628). In encapsulating some of the most traumatic events of Stephen's childhood, Clongowes has become, in more ways than one, an important site of memory for Stephen – even if he appears not to recognise this.

Not all of Stephen's thoughts are as easy to place within his past as it is contained in *A Portrait*. At times, the patterns of verbal arrangement alone appear to link a phrase to a particular moment in Stephen's past. In "Telemachus", we come across the following fragmented sentences: "Cranly's arm. His arm." (*U* 1.159), which, swapped around, make a reappearance later, in "Proteus": "His arm: Cranly's arm." (*U* 3.451). It is in repetitions like this that the text recalls itself, and in the process emphasises

Stephen as a remembering subject without even attempting to integrate his memories into a continuous image of selfhood.

Discussing the question of censorship in the context of Joyce's Modernism, Susan Stanford Friedman proposes an understanding of Joyce's works which sees *Ulysses* and the two prior texts featuring Stephen D(a)edalus as a series of textual repetitions, an approach which allows her to consider *Stephen Hero* "the textual and political unconscious of *Portrait* and *Ulysses*".³ This view is problematic insofar as it presupposes Joyce's dwelling on Stephen as the sole centre of consciousness throughout *Ulysses* while disregarding the complexities of the character Leopold Bloom, who, after all, takes centre stage in many major sections of the text. Furthermore, Friedman fails to address properly the issue of Joyce's experimentation with narrative technique in relation to the multi-layered "construction" of an unconscious, an issue which I would regard as central to the discussion of the relation between Joyce's works. In addition, her approach tends to conflate Stephen's trauma with Joyce's, thus turning the "Stephen sections" in *Ulysses* into an autobiographically informed "writing cure" in which Joyce the author makes use of the Stephen character to finally come to terms with his feelings about his own mother's death.

However, some of the points Friedman makes are surely worth considering. She argues that, "[i]n relation to all the prior Stephen texts, *Ulysses* appears to accomplish for Joyce what Stephen within the narrative of the novel could not. It 'remembers' what *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait* disguised and 'forgot'. It names the pattern of repetition and confronts head-on the medusa of longing, loathing, and guilt".⁴ The concept of memory behind this idea is surely a complex one. How can a text remember, and bridge the gaps left by discontinuities in other texts? While this question may at first glance be suggestive of a return to the notion of "textual memory", Friedman's concept entails

some rather more problematic ideas. Firstly, as Rickard has shown, *Ulysses* is built upon a network not only of textual but of inter-textual memory, featuring characters, events, and allusions not just from *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait* but also from *Dubliners*. So, for example, “Proteus” prompts the reader – along with Stephen – to recall Stephen’s formulation of the epiphany as an artistic concept in *Stephen Hero*. The text of *A Portrait* plays upon the notion of epiphanic moments in that it is itself structured by a succession of climactic scenes (euphoria followed by disillusionment), but it represses Stephen’s articulation of his proposal to “collect” epiphanies, along with the word “epiphany” itself. *A Portrait* embodies the principle without naming or conceptualising it, leaving it for Stephen in *Ulysses* to remember in terms of the adolescent ambitions he has outgrown. Similarly, in *Ulysses*, there is another direct echo of *Stephen Hero*’s Stephen Daedalus. For instance, Stephen declares in a conversation with Cranly that “[t]here should be an art of gesture [...] I mean a rhythm” (*SH* 184). In “Circe”, Stephen says to Lynch: “So that gesture, not music or odour, would be a universal language, the gift of tongues rendering visible not the lay sense but the first entelechy, the structural rhythm” (*U* 15.105-107). Here, although he makes the connection between the “art of gesture” and the concept of entelechy, Stephen does not seem to experience an act of recollection. As is frequently the case in the “Circe” episode, a passage of text appears to have been lifted out of its original context, and slotted into a new setting. As Cranly turns into Lynch, and Stephen turns to the notion of entelechy, the text revolves around its own (and Stephen’s) past, a past which emerges in the textual present in order to have Stephen utter again a phrase which he himself may well have forgotten. The text, then, initiates a dual memory, of Stephen’s “art of gesture” passage in *Stephen Hero*, and in addition, of his musings on identity and time in the “Scylla and Charybdis” episode: “But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by

memory because under everchanging forms” (*U* 9.208-209). Here, then, the reader’s memory asserts itself within an associative network constituted by prior texts. Where Stephen remains cut off from the past, the text’s essence derives from its own materialisation, from its historicity.

Rickard has investigated the manner in which various classical and modern notions of memory collide and intertwine in *Ulysses*. He sees two diametrically opposed forces at work in this opposition: The classical embodies the drive towards a unified subjectivity and a holistic continuity of being. In contrast, the modern represents an increasing sense of fragmentation of the self, of instability and flux, culminating in a crisis of identity.⁵ Stephen’s anxieties in *A Portrait* already stem partly from his conflicting position, poised between these conflicting paradigms of permanence and dissolution of selfhood. His religious doubts may be cast as a prime example here, as in the following passage, when he is asked by Cranly whether or not he used to be happier as a believer:

—Often happy, Stephen said, and often unhappy. *I was someone else then.*

—How someone else? What do you mean by that statement?

—I mean, said Stephen, that *I was not myself as I am now, as I had to become.* (*P* V.2341-2345, my italics)

Presumably what Stephen wants to say is that he is the same, and yet not the same, as the workings of his heart and mind have somehow advanced him to a different state of being – from being a believer to becoming a doubter of the faith. Yet, the words “as I had to become” are indicative of some kind of generative principle, of a continuity that has inevitably led him to become who he is now. I have already noted how, in *Ulysses*, Stephen remembers a series of former selves: “I that sinned and prayed and fasted. A child Conmee saved from pandies” (*U* 9.210-211). This principle of remembering himself as element in a succession or string of selves constitutes a model to which he is

drawn again and again and which is already evident in "Telemachus": "So I carried the boat of incense then at Clongowes. *I am another now and yet the same.* A servant too. A server of a servant" (*U* 1.310-312, my italics).

Joyce was evidently interested in placing Stephen within this tension between continuity and discontinuity of the self in time. The character Stephen becomes an experiment, a test case of emerging modernity, possibly motivated by Joyce's own reading. His 1903-1904 notebooks contain a number of quotations from Aristotle:

"The soul is the first entelechy of a naturally organic body."

"The intellectual soul is the form of forms."

"The soul is in a manner all that is."⁶

Stephen's thoughts, perhaps as a consequence of being no longer saturated in his cast-off faith to the degree remarked upon by Cranly in *A Portrait* (*P* V.2334-2336), seem to have found a new centre through references to philosophy, and to unifying principles like "soul", "form of forms" and "entelechy", as in his musings on the beach in "Proteus": "I throw this ended shadow from me, manshape ineluctable, call it back. Endless, would it be mine, form of my form?" (*U* 3.412-414). Endless in time or space or both, we may ask. Udaya Kumar contrasts the (finite and transient) shadow of the body with the idea of an infinite soul,⁷ but I would like to suggest a different view. The shadow extends away from the present self, while forming a distorted image of it, somewhat like an anamorphic mirror. Therefore, it can be said to be an image akin to the series of Stephen's past selves, a series not fixed but everchanging and self-renewing, like the molecules in his body. Stephen's memories, it appears, are not so much predetermined as a function of the soul but of the body and its capacity for sense perception. In the Aristotelian concept of memory, time is the feature that distinguishes mere perception, or consciousness, from recollection:

Whenever one actually remembers having seen or heard, or learned, something, he includes in this act (as we have already observed) the consciousness of 'formerly'; and the distinction of 'former' and 'latter' is a distinction in time.⁸

We shall see that it is precisely this "distinction in time" which does not always hold true for Stephen, bringing about the sense of distortion he sees in the shadow of his form stretching away from his body over the sand.

"You owe it", Stephen says to himself as he ponders his five-month-old debt to AE (the pseudonym used by George Russell). His argument goes as follows: "Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound" (*U* 9.205-206). This attempt at dissociation from his earlier self cannot, however, be sustained for long. Almost immediately, Stephen has to admit to himself: "But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I *by memory* because under everchanging forms" (*U* 9.208-209, emphasis added). He knows who he is, and what his debts are, precisely because he is able to remember the boy he once was: "I that sinned and prayed and fasted. A child Conmee saved from pandies" (*U* 9.210-211). Here, Stephen clearly has in mind one of the climactic events which shape the chapter closures in *Portrait*: his being unjustly punished for having broken his glasses by the prefect of studies, Father Dolan. Stephen, however, does not remember the name Dolan, nor the name Father Arnall, in whose class the incident took place. In fact, the rector of Clongowes College, whom Stephen approaches to make a complaint, remains unnamed in *Portrait* except for one occasion, Stephen being cheered by his fellows and feeling "happy and free" (*P* I.1834):

And they gave three groans for Baldyhead Dolan and three cheers for Conmee and they said he was the decentest rector that was ever in Clongowes. (*P* I.1830-1832)

Rickard has argued that through Stephen's memory of himself as a boy, sinning, praying, and fasting, he is able to assert "a fundamental link between the young boy at

Clongowes and the young man of *Ulysses*”,⁹ and that in doing so, he invokes an Aristotelian notion of identity and “soul” which goes beyond the memory concepts of Locke and Hume. But Stephen nevertheless has a complex and highly ambivalent relationship with memories of his past. As I have already hinted, what distinguishes him from Leopold Bloom is the fact that we can actually delve into his pre-*Ulysses* history – quite simply by picking up *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, or the remaining fragments of *Stephen Hero*, or arguably even the 1904 “Portrait” essay. It is therefore possible to make an attempt at retrospection, and investigate how Stephen relates to his younger self on the one hand, and to the various manifestations of his memories on the other hand. After all, Bloom’s thoughts are in themselves not radically different from Stephen’s when, in “Lestrygonians”, he recalls a time ten years ago, and asks himself: “I was happier then. Or was that I? Or am I now I?” (*U* 8.608-609). Leopold Bloom may frequently appear unsure of the limits of his present and past self, but in Stephen we have a character suitably endowed with memories not only of a past, but with a structured narrative past, textually inscribed in such a way as to allow the reader to return to it.

In “Telemachus”, standing on the top of the Martello tower where he has spent the night, Stephen picks up and holds for a while the shaving bowl left behind by Buck Mulligan, wondering whether to take it inside or leave it lying where it is. “So I carried the boat of incense then at Clongowes”, Stephen thinks to himself, and then: “I am another I now and yet the same” (*U* 1.310-312). In effect, this anticipates the conclusion he will reach as he contemplates his debt to AE in “Scylla and Charybdis”: that entelechy, the immortal soul, transcends the transformations wrought upon the body through time and provides the self with a sense of unity. In “Nestor”, the idea returns in a slightly different guise as Stephen’s thoughts drift from his pupil’s recitation back to

“the studious silence of the library of Saint Genevieve” (*U* 2.69) in Paris, where he had spent a lot of time reading. Stephen recalls the atmosphere of learning, the “[f]ed and feeding brains” (*U* 2.71), and arrives at Aristotle’s phrase: “The soul is in a manner all that is: the soul is the form of forms. Tranquility sudden, vast, candescent: form of forms” (*U* 2.75-76). But even the soul carries with it inescapably the weight of its lived past, making it impossible to say, with a conscience cleared through forgetfulness: “Other fellow did it: other me” (*U* 3.182), an excuse Stephen reflects on, once again in relation to his temporary exile in Paris. This, incidentally, is a technique which characters in *Ulysses* attempt, ineffectively, to master: Forget your past, or at least split it from the present, and you can become someone else, someone free from guilt and shame.

But Stephen cannot wholly escape the thoughts and memories of his own past. In *Portrait*, we have come to learn about his fear of water, his aquaphobia, as some critics have termed it with medical precision. His dread of water, and all thoughts connected to it, are for him still indelibly linked to Clongowes. On Sandymount beach he muses:

I am not a strong swimmer. Water cold soft. When I put my face into it in the basin at Clongowes. Can’t see! Who’s behind me? Out quickly, quickly! Do you see the tide flowing quickly in on all sides, sheeting the lows of sand quickly, shellcocoacoloured? If I had land under my feet.
(*U* 3.323-327)

Recalling the news of a man drowned nine days previously and not yet washed up, his thoughts become tangled: “I want his life still to be his, mine to be mine. [...] I ... With him together down I could not save her. Waters: bitter death: lost” (*U* 3.327-330). We are left in doubt as regards the pronoun “her”, but the pervading imagery of water in the paragraph, combined with the word “bitter”, may serve as a pointer here when we recall the phrases “a bowl of *bitter* waters” (*U* 1.249), “a dull *green* mass of liquid” (*U* 1.107-108) and Mulligan’s coinage of the colour “snotgreen” (*U* 1.73), which all link

up with “the *green* sluggish bile” (*U* 1.109, italics added in these quotations), a liquid that has a bitter taste, and which, to Stephen, has come signify illness and death.

Later on, Stephen sees one of his sisters drowning, metaphorically, in a sea of worry and hardship, and the image this evokes echoes his earlier thoughts on water and death: “She is drowning. Agenbite. Save her. Agenbite. All against us. She will drown me with her, eyes and hair. Lank coils of seaweed hair around me, my heart, my soul. Salt *green* death” (*U* 10.875-877, emphasis added). Again, there is a vagueness about the female pronouns “she” and “her”, but once again, the word “green” indicates the link to the mother’s demise – after all, her death is prefigured by her vomiting the green bitter water of her body, bile.¹⁰ Stephen perceives water as a threat, then, because, in his imagination, it both contains *and* issues from his dead mother.

We may, of course, just as easily see in Stephen’s dread of all things wet and watery an echo of the “turfcoloured bogwater” (*P* I.550; I.1670) in *A Portrait*. On a deeper level, the manifestations of Stephen’s aquaphobia take us back to the myth which he carries in his name: The myth of Daedalus and Icarus, the “soaring sunward” (*P* IV.783) which culminates in a fall into the ocean and death by drowning. Nearly all these reference to water, be it “turfcoloured”, “bitter” or “green”, play with memory,¹¹ but ultimately resist being tied to a specific moment from Stephen’s past. Their function is one of allusion or citation rather than of recollection in the conventional sense. Kumar has shown how, in *Ulysses*, allusions operate “within a movement of transformation and recontextualization of the original text”.¹² An allusion differs from what we understand as repetition, because it operates outside a stable system and within a process of differentiation and reinterpretation of meaning, thwarting the quest for a source as well as for an end or closure: “The origins of a textual fragment do not seem to control its later itinerary or destiny”.¹³ In essence, Kumar argues that allusions in

Ulysses cannot be subsumed into either repetition or memory, because both these terms are reliant on the notion of a traceable origin. Consequently, allusions as textual fragments do not recall anything – they only point towards the loosely woven fabric of their prior circulation.

In “Scylla and Charybdis”, Stephen remembers how, as a schoolboy, he placed himself inside his own myth of Daedalian flight and of exile: “Fabulous artificer. The hawklike man. You flew. Whereto? Newhaven-Dieppe, steerage passenger. Paris and back. Lapwing. Icarus. *Pater, ait.* Seabedabbled, fallen, weltering” (*U* 9.952-954, italics in the original). Stephen, it seems, has returned not so much to the country of his birth but has submitted to the inevitability of his fate, his fall into the green waters of the ocean. Perhaps he admits to only washing once a month because he already sees himself half-submerged, expecting to be pulled under. In attempting to make his escape, Stephen has failed to realise that he cannot wholly escape the weight of his previous selves, as Bloom philosophically notes in “Nausicaa”: “Think you’re escaping and run into yourself. Longest way round is the shortest way home” (*U* 13.1110-1111). The net that Stephen will forever fail to shake off, presumably, is that of the accumulated experience that ties him to his past – his identity, even if this is built upon memories which he disavows.

One perplexing aspect of Stephen’s recollections is that his memory frequently appears to work in a very selective, perhaps even self-censoring, fashion. While he recalls some impressions of Paris, and continues to experience dread in relation to all things watery, he does not seem to remember any of the decisive events (or, in Freud’s terms, primal scenes) from *A Portrait*. There is, for instance, no mention at all of the girl E-C-, whom Stephen considered himself to be madly in love with, nor of the climactic Christmas Dinner Scene which has such a profound effect on the boy in *A*

Portrait. Memories of Clongowes are mostly limited to some vague associations, such as the bathwater and the boat of incense, which rely on the reader's memory of the prior text.

In the "Telemachiad" as a whole, the continuity of Stephen's memory could hardly be said to be a pronounced feature. Indeed, we get a sense of Stephen trying *not* to remember certain things. Talking to Haines, Stephen explicates his notion of being "a servant of two masters" (*U* 1.638): of the imperial British state, and of the Roman Catholic church. His utterance is accompanied not only by the rising of his colour (*U* 1.643), but by a memory which overwhelms him before he can keep it in check: "The proud potent titles clanged over Stephen's memory the triumph of their brazen bells: *et unam sanctam catholicam et apostolicam ecclesiam*: the slow growth and change of rite and dogma like his own rare thoughts [...]" (*U* 1.650-652). The section continues for more than ten more lines of text with a chaotic blend of biblical references (in which the name Mulligan features twice). Arguably, this brief section tells us more about Stephen than his thoughts, experienced in solitude while he walks the beach. Memory, its metaphorical deafening bells suggestive of the church's authority, triumphs over Stephen, and both he and the reader must surely realise with some alarm to what a great extent his knowledge and education, shaped by Catholicism, have contributed to the making of his memories.

The seashore constitutes a setting which is evocative of the final pages of Chapter Four of *A Portrait*, the scene which has Stephen in a rapture while he gazes at the bird-girl in the water. It could be assumed that this experience in particular would make a prime example of an enduring memory in the manner of Proust, with the power to obliterate time and merge the experiencing consciousness with that which remembers. However, Stephen's thoughts and memories in relation to the seashore revolve largely

around the matter of death – death by drowning, “[a] corpse rising saltwhite from the undertow” (*U* 3.472), his mother’s slow and painful death, a dog’s carcass being sniffed by another dog. Paradoxically, Stephen imagines a visit to Aunt Sara’s, which he does not actually undertake. However, his imagination is articulated in such a manner as to blend seamlessly into the narrative, as though Stephen were recollecting in great detail an event from the past, complete with dialogue and all (*U* 3.61-103). This example of imagination disguised as memory could be read as an indication that, perhaps, Stephen has no desire to remember the past “as it was”, preferring to invent it as he goes along. As has already been hinted, Stephen’s immediate surroundings, particularly when he walks along the beach in “Nestor”, would easily lend themselves to taking the form of a memory theatre – but they do not. In the “Telemachiad”, there is no hint of the bird imagery which proved evocative enough in *A Portrait* to render Stephen’s name a prophecy and lets him imagine himself “flying sunward” (*P* IV.777).

In “Scylla and Charybdis”, however, the image of a bird inadvertently becomes a recurring element in Stephen’s thoughts: “Lapwing you are. Lapwing be” (*U* 9.954), and then again a few lines later, “Lapwing” (*U* 9.976, 9.980). The lapwing itself may have little in common with the bird-girl, or with the swallows Stephen tries to count and whose flight he contemplates in *A Portrait* (*P* V.1768-1826). But here, this particular bird denotes not just a link to the younger Stephen, in whom the flight of the birds has evoked words with “soft long vowels [which] hurtled noiselessly and fell away, *lapping* and flowing back [...]” (*P* V.1836-1838, my italics), but implies carelessness and impulsiveness, as the young birds are noted for running around with part of the eggshell still on their heads,¹⁴ as in a caricature come to life.¹⁵ In addition, the lapwing, known for its aerobatic displays (including a soaring into the sky followed by a tumbling down almost to ground level) establishes another associative connection to the Icarus myth.

The word “lap” also appears in other guises within Stephen’s musings when he remembers meeting the wild geese Kevin and Patrice Egan in Paris:

Patrice, home on furlough, lapped warm milk with me in the bar MacMahon. Son of the wild goose, Kevin Egan of Paris. My father's a bird, he lapped the sweet *lait chaud* with pink young tongue, plump bunny's face. Lap, *lapin*. He hopes to win in the *gros lots*. About the nature of women he read in Michelet. But he must send me *La Vie de Jésus* by M. Léo Taxil. Lent it to his friend. [...] *Schluss*. He laps. (U 3.163-173, italics in the original)

The above quotation demonstrates the performance of Stephen’s intellect, and thereby shows to what extent his memory has been trained through his education. Patrice Egan’s “bunny’s face” appears to cause the transition from “lapwing” via “lapping” to the French “lapin”, from the soaring bird to the bunny. Perhaps significantly, upon his return to Dublin, Stephen no longer sees himself as a “hawklike man” (*P* IV.777), born to fly in the vein of Daedalus. “What’s in a name?”, he asks Bloom in “Eumaeus” (16.364), thereby dissociating himself from the notion of his name containing some myth or prophecy which forms so central an element in *A Portrait*. He has instead taken to identifying with Hamlet, the troubled son, positioned at a fissure between an unresolved past and an indeterminate future. The final few lines of “Proteus” have Stephen walking out of the narrative for a while, giving way to Leopold Bloom’s morning activities in “Calypso”. It is in Stephen’s movement as he goes (“He turned his face over a shoulder, rere regardant”, *U* 3.503), that Hans Walter Gabler locates an echo of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*, for here Stephen “has adopted precisely the body pose and gesture with which Hamlet makes his final farewell to Ophelia”.¹⁶ And so, from the very outset, Stephen looks backwards, in a spatial as well as a temporal sense. In the library in “Scylla and Charybdis”, Stephen expounds his views on Shakespeare. His thoughts seem particularly absorbed by *Hamlet*, and in the discourse of his discussion we can begin to see subtle motifs emerge. “He will have it that *Hamlet* is a ghoststory”

(*U* 9.141), discloses John Eglinton even before Stephen has had a chance to start talking. And indeed, Stephen's Shakespeare theory revolves around death, absence, and ghostly returns. The following interpolation, which occurs within the *Hamlet* discussion but branches off somewhat from the main topic, serves to locate Stephen's frame of mind firmly within that of his discourse:

As we, or mother Dana, weave and unweave our bodies, Stephen said, from day to day, their molecules shuttled to and fro, so does the artist weave and unweave his image. And as the mole on my right breast is where it was when I was born, though all my body has been woven of new stuff time after time, so through the ghost of my unquiet father the image of the unloving son looks forth. In the intense instant of imagination, when the mind, Shelley says, is a fading coal, that which I was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be. So in the future, the sister of the past, I may see myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that which then I shall be. (*U* 9.376-385)

The mole on Stephen's chest, like Odysseus' scar, serves not just as a mark but as a reminder, as solid, physically manifest proof for the existence of memory itself. Stephen uses the concepts of permanence of the soul and of the instability of the body to rationalise his train of thought. Made from the ever-changing molecules of the body, the mark has nevertheless suffered the passage of time unchanged to the eye, and it will persist into the future. It is through Shelley's "imagination" that the past and future selves are capable of fusing, if only momentarily. In the phrase "I may see myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that which then I shall be", Stephen seems to acknowledge time's distorting effect: The past self he glimpses is a projection, twice removed, which originates not in the past at all, but in the future.

Stephen evidently identifies not only with Hamlet ("the ghost of my unquiet father" from the above quotation can certainly be considered to play on this), but also to some extent with the artist figure, enabling him to "weave and unweave his [own] image". Furthermore, as Rickard has observed, the "mole" that Stephen cites as emblem of the

continuity of his selfhood because it has remained unchanged since his birth, appears in *Hamlet* with more sinister connotations. Rickard cites a passage spoken by Hamlet just prior of the appearance of the father's ghost: "So, oft it chances in particular men, / That for some vicious mole of nature in them, / As in their birth – wherein they are not guilty, / Since nature cannot choose his origin" (I.4.23-25). And this is not all: The word "mole" makes another appearance from Hamlet's mouth just as the ghost disappears under the stage floor: "Well said, old mole! Canst work i' th' earth so fast?" (I.5.163). Rickard notes this, too, and concludes: "It is very appropriate [...] that Stephen should refer to his 'mole' in the midst of his discussing *Hamlet*",¹⁷ for in linking Stephen's plight to Hamlet's the word attains connotations of unresolved guilt and unfinished mourning. I would add here the poignant remark made by Haines (in Stephen's absence) to Buck Mulligan: "Shakespeare is the happy huntingground of all minds that have lost their balance" (*U* 10. 1061-1062), followed by the reply "You should see him [...] when his body loses its balance" (*U* 10.1066). Others, it seems, are also able to ironically relate Stephen to Hamlet, if only through the predicament of mental or physical instability. "They drove his wits astray [...] by visions of hell. [...] He can never be a poet", observes Mulligan (*U* 10.1072-1074). Curiously, here he appears to remember something that Stephen does not recall, namely, the retreat sermons in *A Portrait* which had such a profoundly disturbing effect on Stephen. What he seems to suggest is that Stephen's mental equilibrium has been irrevocably destroyed or weakened through the principles of fear and repression, introduced through his Jesuit education. Stephen appears to make every effort to eschew the bonds of religion both in private and in public. Nevertheless, he takes great care to wear black trousers to mark a year of mourning after his mother's death. "Dane or Dubliner", Stephen says, "sorrow for the dead is the only husband from whom they refuse to be divorced" (*U* 10.1036-

1038), and with this statement he effectively joins his own (the Dubliner's) predicament to Hamlet the Dane's. Bloom, in "Eumaeus", seems to appreciate the manifestation of the parents' blood in Stephen in a manner that Stephen continually refuses to acknowledge:

He looked sideways in a friendly fashion at the sideface of Stephen, image of his mother [...] Still, supposing he had his father's gift as he more than suspected [...] (*U* 16.8003-1807)

Here, Bloom's eyes see in Stephen the presence of both his mother and father: the face, the voice. Stephen himself has become ghosted: he cannot become someone else in Dublin because his looks and his voice will give him away. Far from providing a sense of home and belonging, his body plays a part in making him a drifting and still-exiled figure: "I will not sleep here tonight. Home also I cannot go" (1.739-40), Stephen decides towards the end of "Telemachus".

The *Hamlet* debate reaffirms the principle at work in Joyce's text: Where there is a manifest absence in the text we can expect repetition and re-emergence to take over, for thoughts and memories will refuse to remain buried for long. Stephen's preoccupation with the ghostly materialisation of Old Hamlet situates him at a junction between the literary and the supernatural, and serves to put him in the appropriate frame of mind for the (re-)apparitions in "Circe". Of course, the themes of disputed paternity and ghostly returns have more than just a theoretical significance for Stephen. I have already shown how his thoughts return in an almost obsessive manner to aspects connected to his mother's death, such as the green watery fluid that, for Stephen, is symbolic of both her fatal disease and his own personal dread (caused, perhaps, by the deeply traumatising submersion in the cold slimy ditch water in *A Portrait*). That Stephen himself does not seem to recall the incident arguably reinforces its power over him, in the same way that

his mother appears to dominate his mental and emotional state despite her manifest absence. I will continue by examining the significance of the ghost of the mother, both as a textual principle and as a manifestation of memory, in some more detail.

5.2. Memory, haunting, “Nothung!”

– “The ghost is a symptom of blocked memory.”¹⁸

A ghost, writes Marjorie Garber, is “a memory trace. It is the sign of something missing, something omitted, something undone”.¹⁹ In Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses*, the character Rosa Diamond asks: “What is a ghost? Unfinished business, is what”.²⁰ Stephen Dedalus, in *Ulysses*, has his own definition of a ghost: “One who has faded into impalpability through death, through absence, through change of manners” (*U* 9.147-149). What these three attempts at defining ghostliness have in common is that death is not a prerequisite for someone or something to turn into a ghost. Jeffrey A. Weinstock links Stephen’s definition with the notion of incompleteness, and with the condition of “almosting” (*U* 3.366), and concludes that “Joyce’s text is a story about and filled with ghosts”,²¹ while Maud Ellmann has called Stephen’s attempt at descriptive categorisation “curiously undefinitive”.²² One aspect of ghostliness which plays on the notion of “unfinished business” is that it has to do with the irrational transposition of the past into the present – a trace of something, or someone, emerging, so to speak, in an inappropriate way and an impossible time. “[H]aunting”, as Peter Buse and Andrew Stott maintain, “by its very structure, implies a deformation of linear temporality”,²³ and in this, I believe, it may be possible to see an allegory to memory which can help to illuminate the often puzzling ghosts, textual and otherwise, in *Ulysses*.

In the following section, I wish to examine the ghostliness of memory in relation to the operation of personal and textual past(s) in *Ulysses*, with particular reference to the “Circe” episode. I argue that ghostliness is a feature not so much of that which has faded into absence, be it through death or otherwise, but of that which is in the process of staging a re-emergence, an intrusion into present life, and that, within these parameters of definition, memory-functions provide the key to the significance of all the ghosts of *Ulysses*. Memory, I would suggest, in subverting the temporal succession of perception that is normally taken for granted, exerts a pressure on the present, and opens the “gap” which allows the ghost or “unfinished business” to enter.

Some of the most insidious “ghostings” in relation to Stephen in *Ulysses* revolve around his mother. She has not just faded but has died of cancer, and her death, it seems, has left behind an absence that demands to be filled. Jeffrey Weinstock argues that the reappearance of Stephen’s mother as “ghost” in his dreams, thoughts, and hallucinations is essentially a symptom of the unacknowledged awareness of his own inadequacies and weaknesses: she is “an agent of the past, of Stephen’s psyche, come to remind him of his failures of filial devotion and transgressions of cultural imperatives”.²⁴ Stephen needs to distance himself from his past but cannot, for this would jeopardise his already weakened sense of selfhood. The problem with the notion of the ghost as a mere symptom of psychological instability is that it would clearly render ghostly visitations of a similar kind almost inevitable for most of us, since the issues listed above are commonly regarded as lying at the heart of the human condition. What, then, is the true significance of the ghost for Stephen? How is the notion of “ghost” positioned in the text, and why?

In *A Portrait*, with Stephen on the brink of exile, his mother, May Goulding Dedalus, appears in little more than a background role, featuring mostly in Stephen’s

reflections on his home life and the squalid conditions in the house. There she appears overly protective, confronted with a son capable only of showing his hostility towards home and religion: She washes the adolescent Stephen's neck as though he were still a child, and puts his clothes in order prior to his anticipated departure for the Continent. Strangely, in *Stephen Hero*, we confront Stephen's mother as a stronger and more individualised presence than elsewhere (after all, Stephen gets involved in a real discussion with her, and he appears as anxious to make her read Ibsen as she is to see him go to church). In *A Portrait* she fades almost completely from the narrative, but behind her absence from much of the narrative an extremely permeating influence is hidden. The "true" and more complex picture of Stephen's relationship with his mother does not emerge until her ghostly reappearance in *Ulysses*. This may, of course, partly be due to the fact that by 16 June 1904, May Dedalus has been dead eleven months, and the dead tend to elicit a different set of feelings and reactions than the living. Moreover, there can be no doubt that Stephen is guilt-ridden, a condition unashamedly exploited by Buck Mulligan, who taunts him: "The aunt thinks you killed your mother" (*U* 1.88), to which Stephen, in a seemingly sober manner, replies: "Someone killed her" (*U* 1.90). Mulligan retorts: "But to think of your mother begging you with her last breath to kneel down and pray for her. And you refused. There is something sinister in you" (*U* 1.92-94).

Of course, it was not through Stephen's doing that his mother died, it was as a result of a fatal disease, as he himself recognises ("Cancer did it, not I", *U* 15.4187). But Stephen's refusal to kneel at her deathbed (which echoes Stephen's rebuttal of his mother's wish that he make his Easter duty in *A Portrait*) is an important aspect in relation to the manner in which his memories of her manifest themselves. The first instance, in "Telemachus", has Stephen recalling not his mother's person but a dream

featuring her ghostly image, an appearance which has been interpreted by critics in a variety of ways. For example, Riquelme suggests an imaginative link with the “Circe” and “Scylla and Charybdis” episodes, and sees the dream as “a metaphor for artistic creation, like the visitation of Hamlet’s father to Hamlet, or like Stephen’s repeating of his father’s tale of the moocow at the start of *A Portrait*”.²⁵ From this perspective, the dream not only prepares for the memories Stephen experiences later in the day, but also hints at the presence of the mother, his own creator in a physical sense, behind his artistic ambitions.

However, in the dream his mother has already turned into a ghost, she is, in other words, an apparition within a dream. As Maud Ellmann informs us with a glance at the OED, the word ghost is thought to be derived from the Teutonic word for “fury, anger”.²⁶ More contemporary meanings include “the soul of a deceased person, spoken of as appearing in a visible form, *or otherwise manifesting its presence*, to the living”,²⁷ a definition which sees the ghost as a self-generating spectacle, a manifestation of the immortal soul. Importantly, however, like many of the things that have a tendency to re-emerge in dreams and sometimes in memories, “fury” and “anger” point towards the idea that ghosts appear where there is “unfinished business”, where something needs to be rectified or resolved. Is Stephen haunted, then, by apparitions of his angry mother because he did not perform the rite which had been requested, the kneeling down to pray by the bedside? Is it this “omission”, and the “gap” that results (as termed by Lacan),²⁸ which leads to Stephen’s dream and his later vision of his mother as undead, a spectre? As far as Stephen’s consciousness is concerned, I do not believe that this sums up the real issue at stake here. I would propose that Stephen’s ghostly visions of the mother are to some degree incomplete substitutes for memorisation, that they emerge not from any incompleteness of ritual itself, but from a disjointed image which resists

being committed to memory and thus, in a sense, similarly resists being laid to rest and slowly “buried” by the impact of accumulating experiences. In order to succeed in doing this, Stephen would need to metaphorically “kill” his mother, that is, purge her most recent appearance as a dead or dying woman, and create afresh an image of her as a human being, a woman, a mother.

Maud Ellmann may have had in mind something similar when she writes “[Stephen] has not murdered his mother sufficiently to rid his mind of the tormenting image of her rotting flesh”.²⁹ The “something sinister” that Mulligan mocks is really Stephen’s inability to commit his mother to memory as a unified being, without breaking her up into mutating fragments. Stephen, we may note, does not seem to have access to a real memory of his mother *as a person*, while appearing to be perpetually haunted by vestiges relating to her demise. He is, for example, quick to associate the view from the top of the tower over the “snotgreen sea”, the “great sweet mother” (Mulligan’s words, *U* 1.77-78) with “a bowl of bitter waters” (*U* 1.249), Dublin Bay filled with “a dull green mass of liquid” (*U* 1.107-108). And even here, Stephen cannot resist making an immediate link to the death-chamber: “A bowl of white china had stood beside her deathbed holding the green sluggish bile which she had torn up from her rotting liver by fits of loud groaning vomiting” (*U* 1.107-110). The imagery is repulsive and terrifying, and succeeds in blocking out completely any possible prior recollection devoid of horror.

As “[m]emories beset his brooding brain” (*U* 1.265-1.266), all that is elicited is a short list of separate items (her bloodied fingernails, for example, the glass of tap water for her to drink, the roast apple to eat, *U* 1.266-1.269) which then prove impossible to reassemble into a totality. This series of distinct images then leads to Stephen remembering his dream:

In a dream, silently, she had come to him, her wasted body within its loose graveclothes giving off an odour of wax and rosewood, her breath, bent over him with mute secret words, a faint odour of wetted ashes. Her glazing eyes, staring out of death, to shake and bend my soul. On me alone. The ghostcandle to light her agony. Ghostly light on the tortured face. Her hoarse load breath rattling in horror, while all prayed on their knees. Her eyes on me to strike me down. *Liliata rutilantium te confessorum turma circumdet: iubilantium te virginum chorus excipiat.* (U 1.270-1.277, italics in the original)

The presence of the “ghostcandle”, “one of a number of candles kept burning round a corpse to scare away ghosts”,³⁰ seems somewhat ironic here, for now May Dedalus is in the process of turning into a ghost herself. In the dream, there is also a sense of fragmentation, with the breath, the smell, and the eyes the most prominent parts, but nothing to unite them into (even the graveclothes hang loose over the emaciated body).

Freud, of course, has made a point of interpreting dreams as containing secret and unarticulable (and often forbidden) wishes, but he has not offered much in the way of conceptual assistance in characterising ghostliness and apparitions, in dreams or elsewhere. Maud Ellmann, incidentally, has chosen to treat the “Circe” episode as “dream theater”, an imaginary space where “desires are replaced by their embodiments” and “unconscious impulses are acted out”,³¹ thus following firmly Freud’s footsteps.

“Circe” is an episode which remains difficult to characterise or interpret, as it dissolves meaning into farce and purges the boundaries between real and unreal, between dream, memory, and hallucination. For the most part, the episode centres on Bloom, who is confronted with his own set of strange (and often also rather entertaining) apparitions, but it also serves to link up Bloom’s consciousness with Stephen’s in a kind of telepathic exchange. The episode breaks with the mode of narrative itself in a radical way: What the reader encounters is in effect a drama, a set of speeches structured not by the ordering presence of a narrator or a character’s mind, but through stage directions. In addition to this, the categories of reality and fantasy are

constantly shifting, so there is no stable frame of reference. Extreme subjectivity collides with total objectivity, hallucination with stage directions, with the function of the latter being not interpretative or descriptive, but *prescriptive*.³² Keeping in mind that the episode's setting is "Nighttown" (the brothel district), and the time around midnight, it is no wonder that here ghostly apparitions are not the exception but the rule. Furthermore, the stage directions are suggestive, within the larger context of the novel, of a general sense of loss of control, of the defeat of free will and of logical reasoning. The episode, as Daniel Ferrer has outlined, elicits in the reader a strong sense of *déjà vu*, and he maintains that "the only way of advancing into "Circe" is by constantly retracing one's steps".³³ Of course, to retrace one's steps is also to remember and recognise characters, words, and the constellations in which they occur.

The frenzy of involuntary recollection in the form of hallucinations that constitute the "Circe" episode brings together such a baffling combination of characters, voices and events that far transcends the normal usage of the term "memory". Maud Ellmann has gone so far as to suggest that "Circe" sets off the nightmare of history by breaking "the barrier of the unrepeatable"³⁴ that normally protects the self from its past. For Stephen, memory commonly has a nightmarish aftertaste where it overlaps with the phantom presences of his imagination. In fact, Stephen may be referring to his own history, to reminiscences that take him back to his younger self, when he states "[h]istory is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake" (*U* 2.377), a remark that is promptly echoed in "Aeolus" – uncannily, without being attributed to any particular speaker (although Stephen is present): "Nightmare from which you will never awake" (*U* 7.678). Stephen, I would argue, is haunted by spectral versions of past events, images, perceptions, and words. His imagination and his memory intersect more and more, until they culminate in "Circe", where, fuelled by drink, they temporarily

eliminate his present sense of being. Interestingly, Joyce himself saw imagination and memory as two sides of the same coin, as Frank Budgen affirms: "I once broached the question of imagination with Joyce. He brushed it aside with the assertion that imagination was memory."³⁵ Here, Joyce is in line with the late nineteenth century frame of mind, represented by intellectuals such as Samuel Butler, who wrote, "[w]e can no more have an action than a creative effort of the imagination cut off from memory".³⁶

Richard Brown, writing on "Everything" in "Circe", has remarked that "the wild 'Circean' mental drama [is] an expression of the 'everything' that has been repressed".³⁷ Joyce achieves this through his technique of "hallucination", so that, impossible though this may be in normal life, Bloom meets again his grandfather and his father, as well as his son Rudy and fellow Dubliner Patrick Dignam (all deceased), in a chapter which confuses and dissolves time, as Bloom remarks: "Past was is today. What now is will then morrow as now was be past yester" (*U* 15.2409-2410). For Stephen, "Circe" brings a climactic confrontation with his mother. Seen from this angle, we could indeed read "Circe" as the quintessential "return of the repressed", as a resurrection of all that is painful, shameful, or unspeakable for Bloom and for Stephen: Stephen, as we have seen, has been implicated, however irrationally, in his mother's death. Bloom has lost his father, who committed suicide in an Ennis hotel room, and he has also lost his firstborn with Molly, his little son Rudy. R.G. Hampson argues that, since "Circe" occupies a crucial phase in Joyce's reworking of previous drafts of *Ulysses*, the episode not only engages in mnemotechnic but is *itself* a form of mnemotechnic:

If individual words and phrases are designed to send the reader back to the original episode in which they appeared - and if that original context is significant for the word or phrase used in 'Circe' - then we might say

that the implied reader constructed by 'Circe' has (or is obliged to acquire) a well-developed mnemotechnic: a mnemotechnic that can recover earlier passages of the text through one word or two word stimuli."³⁸

What the episode does, then, is this: It recirculates an assortment of associations, memories, characters, historic events, etc., but structures them in such a way that they remain significant for *Ulysses*' central characters, particularly for Stephen and Bloom. In a Freudian reading we could say that here we have an attempt to articulate the contents of the unconscious – but whose unconscious? Bloom's, Stephen's? The reader's? The text's? Or even Joyce's? Perhaps, rather than reading "Circe" as a dream theatre of acted-out desires, as in the approach pursued by Maud Elmann, we might treat the episode as a space where the state of characters, objects, and of course words, becomes blurred; where it is impossible to tell the difference between waking and sleeping, alive and dead, recollection and present perception, memorising and memorised. The text remembers itself, and in the very same process the characters are likewise exposed to an assemblage of "all that ever anywhere wherever was" (*U* 7.883).

We might say, then, that "Circe"'s mnemotechnic is destructive and creative at the same time: The "everything" of textual fragments and allusions that is brought back into circulation in "Circe" does not so much point towards an origin as destroy that origin, creating new and often confusing sets of meaning in the process. In his discussion of the episode, Richard Brown has used the term "self-cannibalisation" to emphasise his point "that there is nothing in 'Circe' that is not a recapitulation of something occurring in the earlier part of the book that does not get, in some way, re-cycled or re-cannibalised here".³⁹ The text effectively mimics the mnemotechnic involved in its creation, or, in other words, exposes and mirrors an important aspect of Joyce's own method of using trigger-words and phrases in his notebooks, which he would often use repeatedly, in several phases of his writing. In the notesheets, argues Hampson, "we can see how

‘Circe’ constructs its reader in the image of its creator – and requires the reader to produce a version of Joyce’s own mnemotechnic”.⁴⁰

Disputing claims by some critics that in “Circe” Stephen and Bloom work through their pasts for therapeutic purposes, Rickard maintains that “[m]emory is a force in ‘Circe’, not a tool”, and he argues that throughout *Ulysses*, repressed matter animates the environment.⁴¹ I would be inclined to add at this point that unresolved memories in *Ulysses* tend to generate the sort of energy that leads to their re-emergence as ghosts, or curiously animated textual objects. By midnight, Stephen has little substance left to fight off the past: he is intoxicated and has not had anything to eat since his breakfast. Thus he is confronted, once again, with “ghosts” which seem to emerge directly from the unacknowledged memory of events which have either “stayed with him” over time, or have suddenly returned, but which, in any case, have shaken the foundations of his sense of selfhood. The same could be said to apply to the text: Through the combination of its dramatic (and dialogic) arrangement with its peculiar content, “Circe” in effect destabilises, and to some degree undermines, the previous fourteen episodes. In recovering earlier passages of text, as Hampson suggests, the episode becomes a vehicle of ghostly returns. Perhaps this also serves to emphasise the fact that the text’s own past is by no means dead, that, on the contrary, words we have read at an earlier point exert their pressure on the meanings we, and the characters of *Ulysses*, attempt to extract. The textual past, then, is as real and inescapable a force in “Circe” as the fictive past of June 16, 1904.

It has frequently been overlooked in criticism that prior to the manifestation of his mother in “Circe” (which will be discussed in due course), Stephen suffers another painful stab which goes back in time to his childhood, although Stephen appears confused about this:

STEPHEN

(brings the match near his eye) Lynx eye. Must get glasses. Broke them yesterday. Sixteen years ago. Distance. The eye sees all flat. (*U* 15.3628-3629)

But this is only the prelude to the real drama. Less than forty lines of text later, Lynch opens Pandora's box: He gives Kitty two slaps on the backside, saying: "Like that. Pandybat". This is followed by the stage direction: "Twice loudly a pandybat cracks" (*U* 15.3666-3667). Immediately, Father Dolan's head pops out of the pianola coffin:

FATHER DOLAN

Any boy want flogging? Broke his glasses? Lazy idle little schemer. See it in your eyes. (*U* 15.3671-3672)

There can be no doubt that Father Dolan's literally disembodied appearance has been engineered by a mnemotechnic that is both farcical and exact. It is, of course, impossible to decide with any certainty whether Stephen remembers spontaneously (that is to say, involuntarily) or by his own volition, or indeed whether he can be said to remember at all. Father Dolan's head, we note, springs up as jack-in-the-box from inside a "coffin" (which is also the body, or lid, of a musical instrument). I would propose that the words uttered by the head are "replayed" rather than remembered in the conventional sense. In this case, they are recirculated not from anywhere within *Ulysses*, but from *A Portrait*, where Father Dolan appears in the classroom in a manner just as abrupt:

There was an instant of dead silence and then the loud crack of a pandybat on the last desk. [...]

—Any boys want flogging here, Father Arnall? (*P* I.1457-1459)

And the resemblance does not end here, for in *A Portrait* Father Dolan's utterances include the following: "An idler of course. I can see it in your eye" (*P* I.1468), "A born idler! I can see it in the corner of his eye" (*P* I.1473), "Lazy little schemer. I see schemer in your face" (*P* I.1511-15.1112), "—Lazy idle little loafer! cried the prefect of

studies. Broke my glasses!” (*P* 1.1525-1526). We can see here how “Circe” distils the drawn-out cruelty of Father Dolan’s punishment into four sentences, which form almost verbatim echoes from Chapter One of *A Portrait*. As a vision (which is also a memory engendered by repressed trauma), it is thus intensely personal, in particular when taken alongside Stephen’s earlier reminiscences of himself: “A child Conmee saved from pandies” (*U* 9.211).⁴² However, seen as an intertextually constructed recurrence this needs to be considered as being engineered through a form of verbatim recording or textual memory. In other words, either Stephen suddenly suffers a kind of flashback which temporarily takes him back to a traumatic scene from the past, or the words have literally been lifted from *A Portrait* to assail the still-shortsighted Stephen as though for the first – or the millionth – time. Questioned by Zoe “What day were you born?”, he replies: “Thursday. Today” (*U* 15.3683-3685). Stephen’s words (referring to his glasses) “[b]roke them yesterday. Sixteen years ago” likewise seem to imply that time has become immaterial, because memory as an act is always a process that originates in the present, but also because within the dynamics of memory, traces of the past have somehow persisted into the present, as Bloom says: “Past was is today” (*U* 15.2409).

The recirculation of the passage from *A Portrait* also reveals its function as a pre-narrative, an idea which Hans Walter Gabler has discussed in some detail, with particular attention to the “Proteus” and “Circe” episodes.⁴³ Within Father Dolan’s farcical appearance in *Ulysses* are thus implicated several processes: Firstly, Joyce’s almost obsessive reworking of his earlier writings, most thoroughly documented in Gabler’s extensive studies relating to textual genesis, in the light of which “Circe” can be seen as “the material result of Joyce’s rereading”.⁴⁴ Secondly, the establishment of a continuity of character in Stephen by way of narrative construction: As has been outlined above, the past event which “haunts” him takes a prominent place in *A Portrait*

and is thus, textually speaking, “verifiable” in a “pre-narrative” to “Circe”. Thirdly, we can detect an emphasis on the origins of a psychological process, a situation which, through a memory-event triggered by a word and sound (the pandybat), links the “present” Stephen of Bloomsday 1904 with in the “past” Stephen of Clongowes, circa 1888. It is quite obvious, then, that in the combination of these three processes there is scope for distortion: “Father Dolan” in “Circe” is not an image of the actual Father Dolan, but a jack-in-the-box head, much in the same way that May Dedalus makes an appearance not as herself, but as the ghost, a distorted image of her former being. The two figures are thus neither wholly memory nor fantasy, but signify a transposition from the realm of the literal into “that other wor(l)d”⁴⁵ where the textual past and present intersect with the mental condition of Stephen and of Bloom, engendering a fusion of past and present, real and unreal.

An aspect which appears deeply connected with Stephen’s failed attempts to “memorise” his mother is the recurring notion of *amor matris*, “subjective and objective genitive” (*U* 2.165-166). Helping the bespectacled Cyril Sargent with his sums, Stephen cannot help but ponder on the mystery of a mother’s love: “She had loved his weak watery blood drained from her own. Was that then real? The only true thing in life?” (*U* 2.142-143). Seamlessly, Stephen shifts from the pronoun “she”, denoting Sargent’s mother, to his own mother: “His mother’s prostrate body the fiery Columbanus in holy zeal bestrode. She was no more: the trembling skeleton of a twig burnt in the fire, an odour of rosewood and wetted ashes” (*U* 2.143-146). For a brief moment, Stephen appears to understand the transitoriness of being, and recognises his mother’s absence (“she [...] had gone, scarcely having been”, *U* 2.146-147). The boy Sargent momentarily becomes a mirror of the young Stephen: “Like him was I, these sloping shoulders, this gracelessness. My childhood bends beside me” (*U* 2.168-169). Already

in “Proteus”, procreation, childbirth and death fuse in the image of the candlelit bed: “Bridebed, childbed, bed of death, ghostcandle” (*U* 3.396). The hallucinatory apparitions and images of “Circe” could thus be said to have been foreshadowed, in particular through Stephen’s state of mind in the first three chapters.

“Death is the highest form of life” (*U* 15.2098), announces the voice of the cap in “Circe”. And indeed, “Circe” brings, for both Stephen and Bloom, confrontations with the “dead” past through the ghostly – and therefore inherently impossible – reappearance of dead family members. Near the beginning of the episode, Bloom has to confront both his deceased parents. Rudolph Bloom appears and chides him, even feeling his face “with feeble vulture talons” (*U* 15.259-260). From Emma Bloom’s petticoat pocket falls Bloom’s shrivelled potato talisman. The just-buried Paddy Dignam, with “mutilated ashen face” (*U* 15.1213), introduces the next phase of spectral return by addressing Bloom in a manner borrowed from Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*: “Bloom, I am Paddy Dignam’s spirit. List, list, O list!” (*U* 15.1218). A short while later, Stephen appears on the scene. With his declamation “To have or not to have that is the question” (which here refers to Bloom’s potato, *U* 15.3522), he takes on the role of Hamlet. Incidentally, Bloom sorely misses his potato talisman, the “relic of poor mamma” (*U* 15.3513) to which “[t]here is a memory attached” (*U* 15.3520). We might say that, in “Circe”, memories are *attached* to objects in a very physical manner, or perhaps conversely, that objects take over the function of memory. Stephen, however, has not yet experienced memory in the sense of recollection in relation to his dead mother. He has been assailed by dreams and hallucinations, incomplete and distorted images which spring from his mind and are therefore tied to Stephen’s present rather than to the past in which his mother’s life lies encapsuled. His mother, to him, is thus in

a sense no more real than the dream of Haroun al Raschid, the melon smell and the red carpet (*U* 3.366-369), which quite fittingly make a reappearance in “Circe”.

I would argue that, for all the references to death which are assembled in “Circe”, it is May Goulding Dedalus’ spectral emergence which brings about something akin to a transformation in *Ulysses*, at least as far as Stephen is concerned. His mother’s appearance directly follows a passage in which Stephen performs a “dance of death”, then “stops dead” (*U* 15.4139, 15.4153-4154). The “stage directions” have her rising up through the floor, while a choir sings the prayer previously evoked in Stephen’s recollection of his dream in “Telemachus”: “Liliata rutilantium confessorum ... / Iubilantium te virginum ...” (*U* 15.4164-4165).

However, in contrast to earlier ghostly occurrences, here Stephen’s mother finds her voice, which is grotesquely coupled with a smile. She identifies herself, and her condition: “I was once the beautiful May Goulding. I am dead” (*U* 15.4173-4174). Twice, she urges Stephen to repent (*U* 15.4198; 4212), and as she tries to touch him with her hand, “[a] green crab with malignant red eyes sticks deep its grinning claws in Stephen’s heart” (*U* 15.4220-4221). Stephen shows unmistakable signs of horror, causing him to make his exclamation: “*Non serviam!*” (*U* 15.4228). This, of course, building upon the earlier apparition of his Jesuit teachers, evokes the memory of the hell-fire sermons from *A Portrait*, where the preacher tells of Lucifer’s pride: “*non serviam: I will not serve*. That instant was his ruin” (*P* III.556-557, italics in the original). There is no indication of Stephen actually remembering the retreat sermons here, but the connection is firmly established in any case, through the words uttered by May Goulding Dedalus: “O Sacred Heart of Jesus, have mercy on him! *Save him from hell, O Divine Sacred Heart!*” (*U* 15.4232-4233, my italics).

I would suggest that, for Stephen, this sensory-hallicinatory onslaught ultimately brings forth a cathartic gesture. In a sudden rage he raises his ashplant and smashes the chandelier (which is promptly reduced to its “real” counterpart, a simple gas lamp), thereby deflating the hallucinatory elements of the scene and returning to the stark reality of Bella’s brothel. In my reading, Stephen’s shout, “*Nothing!*” (*U* 15.4242), brings about a transformation. Far from being a nihilistic outburst, the word itself encapsulates multiple layers of memory. Firstly, it evokes the telegram Stephen received while in Paris, announcing a death to come: “*Nother* dying come home father” (*U* 3.199, my italics), thus bridging the temporal gap between terminal illness and spectral, *post mortem* return. We see now how “Nother” has, from the very beginning, been the negation of the “Mother”, and, as such, Stephen’s condition of being “ghosted” could be said to stem from this failure to recognise the absence of the Mother for what it is: an absence by death, the impossibility of the return *to*, and the return *of*. Stephen cannot relate to the Mother, only to the “Nother” or “*Not her*” printed on a slip of telegram paper which announces her demise. Even more importantly, we should note that “Nothing” is not a nonsense expression. It is the name given to Siegfried’s sword⁴⁶ in the Saga of the Volsungs, the basis of Wagner’s *Ring*. Act One of *Siegfried* ends with the hero brandishing Nothing, striking and cleaving into two the anvil on which the weapon was originally made. Stephen’s Nothing is his ashplant, which he “lifts [...] high with both hands and smashes the chandelier” (*U* 15.4243-4244). The reign of the ghostly mother ends here, and, for a moment, in the disintegration of time and space, there appears to be complete freedom from recurrence and return: “Time’s livid final flame leaps and, in the following darkness, ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry” (*U* 15.4244-4245). But even these words are partially “ghosted” by a prior occurrence, in Stephen’s thoughts in “Proteus”: “Shattered glass and toppling

masonry" (*U* 3.249). The "Circe" episode, climactic though it is for Stephen, can thus be considered above all an example of the extensive network of the recirculation of textual moments. This recirculation, and the complex interplay between narrative presences and absences which it generates, is by no means limited to purely verbal markers. The next chapter will examine the acoustic dimension of textual memory in *Ulysses*.

Chapter 6: Bloom and the model of acoustic memory

– “The ‘Sirens’ chapter [...] is, above all, an event in sound.”¹

– Fritz Senn

Bloom, like Stephen, finds himself subjected to the emotional and psychological effects of absences and reappearances. In “Hades”, as Paddy Dignam is being laid to rest, Bloom considers the possibility of sound as memory-trigger when he suggests preserving the voices of the dead via the technology of sound recording. It is this idea that inspires my reading of an aspect of *Ulysses* which has hitherto gone largely unexplored. In this chapter, I draw on the notion of the gramophone as a form of memory-technology, and apply the idea of sound being preserved and later replayed (often as variation on a theme) to the mechanics of Joyce’s text. The focus of this section therefore lies on Bloom, and on the “Sirens” episode, where the narrative representation of individual consciousness and of memory intersects with the textual materialisation of acoustic events.

Joyce’s poetics of the audible does more than simply mirror the technological progress of the early twentieth century: in working against the limitations of the signified, of spatial and temporal “logic”, it transforms the medium of writing into one of innovation, where text recalls itself through the sounds which it preserves. This departure from more conventional modes of narration is what makes “Sirens”, in the words of Fritz Senn, “the first of the *overtly* self-reflective chapters”² of *Ulysses*. With Bloom in “Sirens”, the text of *Ulysses* acquires a new mechanics of memory – of *gramophony*, the textual equipment to inscribe, remember, and replay sound.³

True to its Homeric model (invoked by the Gilbert and Linati schemata), the “Sirens” episode has most frequently been discussed in terms of its “siren sounds”, the

fragments of music that entice the weary traveller into a condition of unashamed nostalgia. In taking place around four o'clock, the episode lies at the heart of Bloom's day, which lasts from about 8 a.m. until after midnight. Hugh Kenner has suggested that four o'clock on June 16, 1904 marks a watershed for Bloom: "Up to 'Wandering Rocks' he is moving through a day's routine, benumbed by impending cuckoldry, whereas after 'Sirens' he is in free fall [...], occupied chiefly with staying away from the house as long as he can, and evading the question how long that had better be".⁴ In my discussion of the episode, I will steer away from questions relating to the musical quality of "Sirens" and the role of the songs, and focus instead on the connection between non-musical sounds and the narrative construction of time, memory, and the textual representation of sound-effects in relation to Leopold Bloom. I propose to treat the "Sirens" episode as a major Joycean experiment: a complex interlinking of the psychological-emotional and material-technological aspects of memory, culminating in a reversal of the traditional paradigm in which memory is internal and sound external to the self. Instead, the boundaries of language and individual memory become distorted through the intrusion of sound effects functioning like (disembodied) memory-machines. The resulting effect makes it possible to read "Sirens" as the epicentre of the memorial in *Ulysses*.

6.1. Bloom and the poetics of sound and memory in "Sirens"

The initial question that will need to be asked in the context of this discussion is a fairly obvious one: What has sound got to do with memory? The answer, in the context of *Ulysses*, and particularly in relation to Leopold Bloom and examined within the focus on "Sirens", is: almost everything. The way towards the memory-sound question is

prepared by Leopold Bloom himself in an earlier episode, "Hades", when, following Paddy Dignam's funeral, he arrives at the conclusion that the act of remembering the dead can be helped not just by visual stimuli but also by acoustic ones:

Besides how could you remember everybody? Eyes, walk, voice. Well, the voice, yes: gramophone. Have a gramophone in every grave or keep it in the house. After dinner on a Sunday. Put on poor old greatgrandfather. Kraahraark! Hellohellohello amawfullyglad kraark awfullygladaseeagain hellohello amawf krpthsth. Remind you of the voice like the photograph reminds you of the face. Otherwise you couldn't remember the face after fifteen years, say. For instance who? For instance some fellow that died when I was in Wisdom Hely's. (U 6.962-969)

Bloom's proposition to make the same use of sound recordings as we commonly make of photographs to assist in remembering those who are dead or merely absent orchestrates, as it were, the paradigm of "the ineluctable modality of the audible"⁵ which five episodes later combines sound and memory in "Sirens". The passage quoted above also provides examples for the technique of orthographic oddities employed by Joyce for the representation of those sounds that do not, or only partly, originate in the human voice. Joyce, we shall see, overcomes the limits of voice by allowing sound-effects to become universal, to become *noise*, and ultimately, to turn into printed letters. The cat's voice cries "Mkgnao!" (U 4.16), "Mrkgnao!" (U 4.25), "Mrkrghnao!" (U 4.32). Bloom's voice, imitating the cat's voice but not quite succeeding in copying the subtleties of the cat's expression, merely says "Miaow!" (U 4.462). The printing press in "Aeolus" speaks in its own voice too, as Bloom notes (and apparently transforms into letters): "Sllt" (U 7.174-7). In *Ulysses*, the voice need not correspond to the presence of a larynx: Things speak, animals speak, even the organs of the body have a way of calling attention to themselves, for example when Bloom's digestive tract makes various rumbling noises in the build-up to a fart at the end of "Sirens".

Luigi Russolo, in his “The Art of Noises – Futurist Manifesto” of 1913, in which he introduces his *intonarumori* or noise instruments, argues that “the characteristic of noise is that of *reminding us brutally of life*”.⁶ Russolo envisages a music made up of the noises of life itself, imagining entire “symphonies composed of the sounds of urban life”,⁷ and in order to play these, he devises a series of instruments. Their use, as he points out, is not confined to the production of an imitation of the world’s noises. What Russolo wants is to select and coordinate and control noise in such a way, “through a fantastic association of the different timbres and rhythms”,⁸ that it can be experienced as “a new and unsuspected pleasure of the senses”,⁹ as “acoustical enjoyment”.¹⁰ Joyce’s play with the sounds of the body, of nature, and of urban life in particular, gives us a similar form of new and unsuspected enjoyment. He transforms the random manifestations of sounds into the space of the literary, where, nevertheless, they often remind us as brutally of life as Russolo’s *intonarumori*.

In order to play with sound, of course, the writer must find a way of rendering printable non-speech acoustic events. For the “sound creator” Russolo, consonants make up the noises of language.¹¹ It may be noted here that, for the critic Adam Piette, writing is itself an act of memory: He calls it an “act of imaginative remembering”. Furthermore, he maintains that sound-patterns in prose can be seen as constituting “miniature acts of memory”.¹² The problem with his approach is that it fails to take into account Joyce’s innovative use of sound-patterns which remain distinct from what could be termed “poetic language” (consider, for example, devices like rhyme and assonance in *A Portrait* in contrast with Joyce’s play with the “tap” sound). Nevertheless, Piette’s idea makes it possible to argue that linguistically reproduced sounds in a prose text speak to us in several ways, but, above all, that they evoke the possibility of joining the visual and the aural within a narrative context. By extension,

orthographical representation of sounds and noises would, in this reading, constitute at least two distinct acts of memory and imagination: The writer's orthographical realisation of sound, and the reader's imaginative re-creation when a sound effect is recognised as such (not always an easy task in Joyce). Joyce, however, does not merely write what we recognise as *words*: he transposes sounds into writing, and writing into sounds. The result is the obliteration of the boundaries between seeing, hearing, and remembering.

Acoustic stimuli beg for comprehension just like printed characters on a page do. There is nothing as disturbing as awaking in the middle of the night to unknown noises. "To understand is to remember",¹³ writes Jean-Marie Guyau, and in reading *Ulysses* it becomes necessary to develop one's own system of recording and replaying, an acoustic memory capable of translating *typed* sounds into *heard* sounds so as to interpret and comprehend the sounds with which Joyce likes to play. "The ear is uncanny", claims Jacques Derrida. It is "the most tendered and most open organ, the one that, as Freud reminds us, the infant cannot close".¹⁴ Similarly, as Joyce's readers, we cannot close our ears, or indeed eyes, to the "siren sounds" which speak to us from the pages of *Ulysses*.

Hugh Kenner's remark that "Sirens" is composed of "worn fragments of familiar acoustic junk", thereby reverting "to the barroom order of virtuosity",¹⁵ can be said to provide an apt characterisation of the chapter's style. The unusual technique of merging words, i.e. narrative units, with non-verbal sounds, with bits of music, songs, and noises emitted by the body or produced by objects, can be said to transform the text into an acoustic junkyard devoid of any clear semiotic boundaries. For instance, the reader is frequently left guessing as to the source of a sound; likewise, on many occasions in the

text it seems impossible to ascertain the identity of the listener or “receiver”. I will look at some examples of this effect in a moment.

In the absence of the controlling presence of a narrator, the situation is obscured for the reader by the impact of an unstable perspective. This could perhaps be best described in terms of an effect not unlike a combination of parallax and echo, a displacement in a temporal as well as a spatial sense, which generates an almost constant interpretative tension: How do we distinguish, in the spatial organisation of textual representation (i.e. words printed on paper), between the same sound heard many times over but perceived by a different consciousness or from a different point in space, and an echo or repetition generated from a moment in the past? Consider the recurring “tap” sound, for example, a sound with no apparent origin. A number of questions come to mind: What is the source of the sound, where does it come from? Is it vocal or nonvocal, human or mechanic? Does it repeat itself or is it the object of repeated recollection? Who is it perceived by? Perhaps its most profound effect lies in this indeterminacy. It conveys a sense of presence-in-absence, of the aural perception of words as marks on paper, made possible only by the peculiar and often neglected quality of acoustically-rendered textuality. “Sirens” offers an abundance of examples of mnemotechnic completely separate from the “memory theatre” that is the visual environment.

“Sirens” compiles its memory-references predominantly through sound which has been ingeniously transposed into written “words”. To some extent, the effect parallels that observed by Karen Lawrence, who states that “[s]omewhere in the middle of *Ulysses*, style goes ‘public’, as language is flooded by memory of its prior use”.¹⁶ Piette builds on the same idea when he applies this notion to “Circe”, arguing that “Joyce is demonstrating the extreme effects of remembering in language”.¹⁷ With regard to

“Sirens” in particular, it will be useful to take this idea a bit further. Piette notes T.S. Eliot’s criticism of Joyce’s *Work in Progress*, and includes a remark which may just as well be applied to “Sirens” and the later chapters of *Ulysses*. Above all else, Eliot regards as problematic in Joyce’s work the presence of “an auditory imagination abnormally shaped at the expense of the visual”,¹⁸ an element within the narrative technique which he sees developing through the second half of *Ulysses*. While language as a vehicle for memory probably plays as large a part in “Sirens” as in the other chapters of *Ulysses*, the development of an (often onomatopoeic) language of sonicity as a medium for both sound-representation and remembered events can clearly be considered one of the episode’s main achievements.

To return to Bloom’s idea of the memory-gramophone: I would maintain that in “Hades”, Bloom imagines what “Sirens” will then actualise: the invention of a new medium of representation, of a textual *phonography* or *sound-writing* that assumes the function of a memory-gramophone. This innovation brings together the different layers of the text, and results in a blurring of boundaries between the concepts which normally help us distinguish between listener and reader, sound and speech. Above all, however, the fusion which results can be read as an effect of the textual mechanism which, like the sounds emanating from Bloom’s imagined memory-gramophone, strives to produce a synthesis of the natural with its artificial double, the human voice with the scratchy mechanics of turntable and record. The product of this amalgamation is a noise and a series of letters (an inscription) printed on the page, like, for instance, the distortion of sound represented in writing by “amawf krpthsth” (*U* 6.966). Throughout *Ulysses*, Joyce plays with variations of similarly unpronounceable sounds emanating from the object world. For instance, the gramophone with its “speaking role” in the “Circe” episode succeeds in drowning out Elijah’s song, ending once again on a distorted note:

“Whorusalaminyourhighhohhhh ... (*the disc rasps gratingly against the needle*)” (U 15.2211-2212, italics in the original). In these distortions, the technology behind sound-reproduction becomes itself “ghostly”, as Steven Connor has observed: “the stuttering, squawking and syllabic collapse of the apparatus becom[es] the voice of an empty and ruined materiality [...] a deathrattle”.¹⁹

In my reading, the Joycean text (and “Sirens” in particular) functions as a device for the creation, storage and reproduction (and remembering) of sound effects. Within the resulting encyclopaedic assortment, memory comes into play as an organising principle imposed retrospectively by the reader in an effort to “make sense” of the textual present through considering its past and its future. I would argue that the Joycean text has a function parallel to that of the gramophone as an apparatus: preserving and conserving sound effects through the passage of time, a storage device capable of functioning both as an accumulating subconscious and an organising principle for memory-events. In Freudian discourse, the technology that allows a gramophone record to be made can also take over the function of a transmitter:

We speak of the structured groove of a gramophone record, for example, as containing information about sound. This, in turn, can be taken as information *bearing on either the past or the future* – as about a particular performance sounded, or again about how this record will sound, if played. This is because the record owes its structure to that of the events of the past performance, and in virtue of this structure can be used to shape events in a related way in the future.²⁰

The transmission in question is not so much interpersonal as intertemporal. The record as an artefact relates both to the past (in which the “original” performance is located), and to the act of putting the record on the turntable, eliciting anticipatory excitement. In *On the Essence of Language* under the heading “Sounding and script”, Heidegger has something to say on a similarly intriguing question, that of the relationship between recording, transmission, and script:

Script as *making-constant* the sounding that is simultaneously transformed and first ordered through 'grammata'. We take, also where we hear, mostly already in script that which is spoken and speaking. Script, however, never *recording* that copies the sounding; rather transformation.²¹

How, we may ask, does this relate to Heidegger's notion of *techne* as part of *poesis*? It would seem that it does, at least, provide a broader perspective on the technique of sound creation and re-creation in *Ulysses*. The moment in which a form of recollection occurs is revelatory in several respects. Theall draws on Walter Benjamin's work when he writes: "The moment in and out of time, in which memory encounters the future, associates memory with that special shock of the poetic through which it achieves its morphogenesis".²² The Joycean technopoetics in "Sirens" has the curious effect of confronting Bloom with memories of a past that is in the process of *becoming*. In "Sirens", Molly is becoming an adulteress "between the lines", as it were. Similarly, somewhere in the episode, Leopold transforms from husband into cuckold. In the play between memory and present moment, between consciously recalled and intruding sounds, the reader witnesses a transformation, recorded by the Joycean script.

In *Ulysses* as a whole, Joyce appears to have taken on the challenge of finding a way to represent the sounds of an increasingly mechanised world – and the effects these sounds have on human perception – and transmit these sounds within the semiotic confines of the literary text. Theall has usefully situated Joyce in the historical context of an age of technological progress which saw the invention or development of telegraphy, the telephone, photography, the typewriter, the rotary press, sound recording, electric light, the aeroplane, and a host of further inventions and innovations.²³ Taking these developments as a background against which to read Joyce, Theall argues for a discussion of the making of *Ulysses* in terms of a "new conception of a literary work as a semiotic machine designed for a world where verbal language is

being displaced by a growing multiplicity of communication machines”, and the term he proposes for this concept is “techno-poetics”. By extension of this terminology, the writer is turned into a “poetic engineer”.²⁴

What this terminology highlights is – apart from the historical circumstances in which Joyce worked – the difference between *hearing* sound, the act of writing as a device for either the *creation* or the *recording* of sound, and *reading* or *communicating* sound. The perceptual effects of the auditory have not been researched as thoroughly as those of the visual, and of imagery in particular. Besides, most of this research has been conducted within the confines of either psychology or musicology, and has not involved questions relating to narratology or to the larger field of literature and linguistics. Crucially, however, the world of sound can be said to relate to events while the world of sight can more readily be described as an object world.²⁵ Knowledge and recognition of sound are closely tied to our cultural background, especially where a noise occurs in the absence of any visible source or origin, leading to a search for meaning and significance, and frequently also to a redefinition concerning the understanding of spatial organisation. “Sirens”, then, not only plays with the reader’s assumptions regarding verbal markers as “meaningful” signifiers, but also draws attention to the mechanisms by which the text destabilises the relationship between spatial and temporal representation in *Ulysses*.

6.2. “Acoustic promnesia”

Even before Leopold Bloom enters the Ormond Hotel on the afternoon of June 16, 1904, the narrative has placed him as though by remote transmission within an enclosed space resonating with sound effects. Within this assortment of noises, however, his

arrival is clearly anticipated. As has often been noted, the episode starts with an “overture” of sixty-three lines, containing a puzzling and seemingly chaotic arrangement of snippets of sound, speech, and fragmented narration. Bloom has not yet arrived at the Ormond, but in reading through the sound-collection of the initial sixty-three lines we can sense his approach through the city: “A husky fifenote blew”, “Blew. Blue bloom is on the.” (*U* 11.5-6), “Jingle. Bloo.”, “Boomed crashing chords.” (*U* 11.19-20), “Bloom. Old Bloom.” (*U* 11.49). The overture thus presents a strong example of Joycean techno-poetics in its subversion of the logic of conventional narrative, by selecting seemingly random bits from a chapter which has yet to unfold and by presenting them in advance of the narration proper in which they are to feature. Daniel Ferrer has compared the contents of the overture in “Sirens” to a stream of data that is fed into the text like into a computer, to be incorporated into the narration by way of transformation.²⁶

Traditionally, memory occurs with a sense of belatedness; it comes *after* the event. Joyce, however, asserts his position as creator or “poetic engineer” by introducing “Sirens” with a passage which may be described as an acoustic prelude in its function of presenting an assortment of events that have yet to unfold within the episode, but of which traces have already been inscribed. Sounds start off as linguistically represented fragments of a disembodied and seemingly arbitrary cacophony, preparing for a transposition of the reader’s anticipation into retrospective comprehension and structure as the episode develops. At the beginning of “Sirens”, the search for meaning is therefore paradoxically oriented towards a past which is only then in the process of becoming, towards that which will have happened when we reach the episode’s final word: “*Done*” (*U* 11.1294). To draw on a phrase from Lacan, it is the chapter’s “future interieur” which can be glimpsed in the overture of sound-effects.²⁷

At the close of the overture, Bloom has not yet arrived at the Ormond. However, his presence is now foreshadowed more strongly by variations of his name, for example: “Bloowho went by Moulang’s pipes [...]” (*U* 11.86), a line composed of just one word, “Bloom.” (*U* 11.102), a question, “But Bloom?” (*U* 11.133), an observation “Bloowhose dark eyes read Aaron Figatner’s name” (*U* 11.149), and another play on the name: “Married to Bloom, to greaseabloom” (*U* 11.180). An expression which suggests itself with regard to the function of the overture is “remembering forward”, a form of repetition which can be considered, as Laurent Milesi has pointed out in a different context, “both iteration of the past and rehearsal of the future”.²⁸

Bloom continues to try and avoid any thoughts relating to the encounter between Molly and Boylan. In averting his mind from the consequences of the present situation (in which it is still theoretically possible for him to intervene and prevent his wife’s infidelity), he does little to resist the overture’s sound-generated “promnesia”-effect, and with this he resigns himself to a condition in which the four o’clock of the future will soon drift past, unchallenged, to become the four o’clock of the past. In fact, although he does so without any reference to the acoustics of the text, Hugh Kenner has argued that Molly’s adultery has somehow been anticipated long before “Sirens”: “Toward this event seven consecutive episodes have pointed: it is the consummation of Bloom’s role as cuckold, of Molly’s role as amateur of adultery”, and, “like the outrages in Greek tragedy, it happens offstage”.²⁹

The overture firmly establishes a new paradigm for the workings of memory in *Ulysses*. The contrast between voluntary and involuntary recollection is rendered immaterial as memory is transcribed onto the structural framework of recurring sounds, which need not be tied to a perceiving consciousness, relying instead on the recognition of the reader. The world of *Ulysses*, it seems, could not care less whether its sounds and

noises receive any attention from the characters. However, this notion regarding the question of character awareness allows only for a limited distinction between what we understand to be music, or musical allusions, in “Sirens”, and sound-references: Music and song allow the characters the nostalgic pursuit of collectively reminiscing about times past, as they build upon the underlying presence of a shared store of memories in which a song is recognised for its cultural or historic references. Sound (in this context essentially meaning *noise*, a distinction which momentarily occupies Bloom’s thoughts, *U* 11.965), in contrast, remains largely abstract and unspecific, and is often tied to nature rather than culture. It does not “speak” or engage in the fairly explicit way music does in “Sirens”, and as a textually generated effect, it remains separate from conventional character consciousness. Instead, it could be said to rely on the reader’s recognition of linguistic innovations, such as words-as-sounds and associated patterns, in the printed text – a device not unlike textual memory in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*.

Furthermore, music is generally perceived differently from sound. While music is understood in terms of its aesthetic qualities as a form of art, sound tends to elicit a response which is oriented towards the *source* of the noise in question. In short, what we hear when we perceive a sound (as opposed to music) is in fact an event taking place.³⁰ It is possible, then, as various critics³¹ have shown, to argue that the “jingle” sound stands for Boylan (“With patience Lenehan waited for Boylan with impatience, for jinglejaunty blazes boy”, *U* 11.289-290), thus linking him to Molly by way of pure sound, since the ancient quoits in the marital bed are represented as producing a very similar noise. We may note here that Molly, in “Penelope”, thinks “this damned old bed too jingling like the dickens” (*U* 18.1130-1131).³² And in “Circe”, the quoits come to life, saying “Jigjag. Jigajiga. Jigjag” (*U* 15.1138). Bloom, then, would be represented by

a variety of “oo”-sounds based on his name, such as those from the overture. With Bloom’s growing nervousness, the two sounds gradually move towards each other, and this implicit confrontation of characters through sounds becomes acute as Bloom catches sight of Boylan, or rather of Boylan’s highly visible straw hat (which, in “Hades”, has been used to greet the passing mourners, including Bloom, on their way to the cemetery: “the white disc of a straw hat flashed reply”, *U* 6.198-199). Boylan, incidentally, is now travelling towards the Ormond, just like Bloom: “Jingling on supple rubbers it jaunted from the bridge to Ormond quay. Follow. Risk it. Go quick. At four. Near now. Out.” (*U* 11.304-303). Then, four short lines later: “At four she. Winsomely she on Bloohimwhom smiled. Bloo smi qui go. Ternoon.” (*U* 11.309-310). Boylan’s car arrives: “Jingle jaunted by the curb and stopped” (*U* 11.330), then Bloom: “Between the car and window, warily walking, went Bloom [...]” (*U* 11.341). Bloom, sitting down in the room adjoining the bar with Richie Goulding (so as to “[s]ee, not be seen”, *U* 11.357-358), listens out for Boylan’s departure. And soon, at four, Boylan sets out to leave. Again, this forms an event which communicates itself through sound:

Jingle a tinkle jaunted.
 Bloom heard a jing, a little sound. He’s off. Light sob of breath Bloom
 sighed on the silent bluehued flowers. Jingling. He’s gone. Jingle. Hear.
 (*U* 11.456-458)

Bloom hears, and with the release of breath in a “sighed sob”, inadvertently becomes a producer of a sound which suddenly charges the sound-dialogue between the two men with intense emotion.

Throughout the episode, Bloom shows an obsession with time which reveals that, in spite of all his efforts, he is still anticipating and in fact *waiting*. In terms of its narrative construction, this consists not only of references to clocks but of the physical experience of the serial nature of sound, of time passing and finally running out. To a

certain extent, the same applies to Boylan, who is intent on hiding his interest in clock-time behind a leisurely question. Notably, just before four o'clock, there is a peculiar acoustic countdown, seemingly generated by the mechanical innards of a clock in conjunction with the cash register, for Boylan's and possibly also for Bloom's benefit:

Clock whirred. Miss Kennedy passed their way (flower, wonder who gave), bearing away teatray. Clock clacked.
Miss Douce took Boylan's coin, struck boldly the cashregister. It clanged. Clock clacked. [...] A clack. For me.
- What time is that? asked Blazes Boylan. Four?
O'clock. (U 11.380-386)

The above example may serve as an illustration of the merging of the mechanic and the psychological dimensions of sound. Time is measured mechanically, represented by the noise made by the clock – but within the context of Boylan's anticipation and Bloom's apprehension, any *clang* or *clack* is enough to reinforce each man's emotional and psychological condition.

In a psychoanalytical reading we would perhaps be tempted to reduce recurring sounds in "Sirens" to a symptom, representing, for instance, a manifestation of emotional distress buried deep in the unconscious and therefore inaccessible for the individual. However, to reduce sound to the level of character would be to miss the universality of its effect on the different categories of "listeners" as well as its subtle effect on textual dynamics. Also, Bloom may be thinking "Pat", but there is no indication of his hearing "tap", or of him recalling his encounter with the piano tuner earlier in the day. Bloom's predicament, even though it occupies the centre as regards the episode's plot, cannot necessarily be considered the sole significance of the sound effects.

It should be noted here that many readers are probably capable of guessing that it may well be the blind piano tuner's cane which produces the recurring "tap" sounds,

although we may wonder why the text produces “tap” in the absence of a source, and with no localisation in spatial terms. And perhaps the man at the source of “tap” possesses as a mirror image someone who is indeed present at the Ormond, in the person of Pat the deaf waiter. We hear Pat<->taP: the deaf and the blind, the deaf waiter carrying a fork and the blind tuner who has left behind his tuning-fork. As an element in a sound-pattern and in terms of rhythm, “pat” is as valid a noise as “tap”: “To the door of the bar and diningroom came bald *Pat*, came bothered *Pat*, came *Pat*, waiter of Ormond” (*U* 11.286-288, emphasis added), “And by the door deaf *Pat*, bald *Pat*, tipped *Pat*, listened” (*U* 11.1028-1129, emphasis added).

Considering the episode’s veiled or offstage content, that of Bloom’s cuckolding, it could be argued that the drama of emotions here becomes increasingly transcribed into the sound effects of the episode. “Pat” prepares for “tap” in advance of any mention of the piano tuner or of the critical time of four o’clock, and as “Pat” subsides into the background, “tap” takes over, accelerating the rhythm towards the episode’s conclusion: “Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap.” (*U* 11.1208), “Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap.” (*U* 11.1218), “Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap. Tap.” (*U* 11.1223). The final series of tapping occurs as the piano tuner finally comes into view: “Tap. Tap. A stripling, blind, with a tapping cane came taptaptapping by Daly’s window [...]” (*U* 11.1234-1235). “Pat” and “tap” become part of the same resonating series of staccato sound effects, merging name, noise, and (reversible) printed letters. Arguably, the series could also be read as a play on the concept of time: firstly, the slowness with which time passes as one is waiting (and there is a lot of waiting going on in “Sirens”, in two senses of the word: waiting *on* someone, as Pat does, and waiting *for* someone (waiting for Boylan to leave, or for the time to pass just as Bloom does), and secondly, time’s perceived acceleration when one is mentally and/or physically active. Consequently, the “tapping” is slower while Bloom

sits eating, and speeds up considerably when he gets up to leave. Time, we see here, is not a rigid but a relative concept, similar to the spatial organisation of the episode.

Of course here not every single “tap” represents a separate event in the strictest sense. But every single “tap” signifies a miniature act of memory, referring to the possible source of the sound (the blind stripling’s cane), and to its underlying proclamation of Bloom’s imminent cuckolding. Bloom has been placed within a “soundscape”, “an independent time/space geography of constant and continuous dynamic events”³³ which provides more information about the plot-line of *Ulysses* than the overt content of the episode offers. The notion of “soundscape” is an unusual device for the discussion of a literary text, but its relevance may already be significant in relation to the overture, in particular when considering the following description: Soundscapes “surround and unfold in complex symphonies or cacophonies of sound”.³⁴ While the visual tends to centre on verifiable presence, e.g. in the term “landscape”, soundscape may communicate events *in absentia*, removed in time or space, which is precisely what the overture does. The tapping has in a sense been “recorded” earlier, in “Lestrygonians”, and it is being replayed, both forwards and in reverse, within the name of Pat the waiter in “Sirens”. Some mechanism within the text is remembering “tap”, reproducing the sound made by the piano tuner’s tapping-cane while at the same time anticipating the man’s journey towards the Ormond and its deaf waiter. Like in the overture, acoustics here hint both at the text’s past *and* its future.

A further dimension of the “tap”/“pat” sound effect emerges from this notion: that of narrative innovation and (re-)creation. As Andreas Fischer has observed, this factor can be situated above all within the boundaries of Joyce’s play with linguistic conventions, which, in Fischer’s view, Joyce sets out to break. As a result, it becomes

necessary to return to the reader for the provision of narrative unity, and perhaps of logic, too:

Joyce's cutting and splicing results in severely weakened textual cohesion within the episode. Intermittent occurrences of the isolated word "Tap," for example, which are not explained in their immediate context, remain erratic blocks of language, *unless the reader pieces them together as parts of one continuum of sound and action* and connects them with what he already knows about the piano tuner and his forgotten tuning fork. *It is mainly the reader, then, who creates the coherence of the episode [...].*³⁵

The reader, it must be added, is solely responsible for recognising the piano tuner as the same man with whom Bloom's path has crossed earlier. We may easily fall prey to the illusion (engineered, again, by way of sound effects) that Bloom and the blind piano tuner eventually meet again, face-to-face, at the Ormond Hotel. But they do not; by the time the piano tuner returns for his tuning-fork, Bloom has left. It is in "Lestrygonians" that the following brief scene occurs, which involves Bloom offering a blind man with a tapping-cane assistance with crossing the street:

A blind stripling stood tapping the curbstone with his slender cane. No tram in sight. Wants to cross.
—Do you want to cross? Mr Bloom asked. (U 8.1075-1077)

Bloom leads the man safely across the street, after which "[t]he blind stripling tapped the curbstone and went on his way, drawing his cane back, feeling again" (U 8.1104-1105). For a little while after that, Bloom ponders the problem of not-seeing, of navigating the city purely by its sounds and textures: "Queer idea of Dublin he must have, tapping his way round by the stones. Could he walk in a beeline if he hadn't that cane?" (U 8.1110-1112). Here, Bloom has no idea whether the man is a piano-tuner or not, but his thoughts seem to turn instinctively away from the visual, to the tactile and in particular to the acoustic: "Look at all the things they can learn to do. Read with their fingers. Tune pianos" (U 8.1115-1116). "There he goes into Frederick street. Perhaps to

Levenston's dancing academy piano" (*U* 8.1138-1139). The conjunction of Bloom's thoughts, from the references to "tapping", "cane", and "tune pianos", prepares for a later recognition on the reader's part of the blind man as "the blind stripling", a recognition which necessarily takes place retrospectively and, it must be noted with reference to the above discussion, entirely outside Bloom's consciousness. Once again, the reader's memory is responsible for making a connection which serves narrative coherence. The "tap" sound in "Sirens" is a disembodied sound, a sound detached from its human origin within a cityscape. Remembering its prior occurrence creates a tension, but also a transformation. For "tap" in "Sirens" is the same, and yet not the same, as in "Lestrygonians". It has been inscribed within a network of *poesis*, and is transmitted "forward", i.e. into the future of the text, through the Joycean inscription of sound. The reader, then, remembers the prior occurrence of the sound/inscription, and in doing so, creates its relevance for the present moment, for Bloom's anxious waiting, and Boylan's impatient anticipation.

Returning to the question of the relationship between sound and memory, it has now become clear that a sound does not remember by itself – it is either repeated or remembered, either a product of or a trigger for memory. In "Sirens", the reader's position effectively reverses that of the blind man's. To explain: There is no single or unifying point of view from which to view the events in "Sirens", since the sound-effects, whether generated in an apparently onomatopoeic manner or not, rarely help us demarcate where we are, what is happening, and what or who else is present. More frequently, sounds remind us (and Bloom) where we are not, or where we would rather be/not be (outside on the quays, at 7 Eccles St...), and as such, they become indicator of absence, not presence. Sounds, in "Sirens", ignore the distinction between indoors and outdoors, the distances between different locations, the sequential nature of passing

time. Interestingly, it is music, not sound *per se*, which gradually assumes a potential for reassurance and stability. For instance, the “tap”, in contrast to “Pat”, does not appear to register in Bloom’s mind at all, nor does it appear to evoke a memory – recognition and recollection here has become the sole responsibility of the reader.

The rhythm of the “tapping”, however, attains additional significance with the emotional effects Bloom experiences as Simon Dedalus starts singing (“[g]lorious tone he has still”, thinks Bloom, adding: “His hands and feet sing too” *U* 11.695 and 11.698). “Tenderness it welled: slow, swelling, full it throbbed” (*U* 11.701), and the mechanical and somewhat sterile sound “tap” finds its counterpart in more sensual and physical rhythmical noises. Of course, we may assume (and so might Bloom) that Boylan and Molly are simultaneously engaged in vigorous sexual intercourse. Bloom’s emotional state seems fragile in any case, it could be speculated whether he is emotionally stirred by the knowledge of his wife’s infidelity as well as by Simon Dedalus’ tremendous voice. The next paragraph effectively anticipates Molly’s memories, in “Penelope”, of the afternoon’s exploits (and in addition her awareness of her “monthly flow” setting in, as well as her urination into the chamber pot), but not without maintaining – chiefly through sound and rhythm – the link with Bloom’s immediate environment in “Sirens”:

Bloom. Flood of warm jamjam lickitup secretness flowed to flow in music out, in desire, dark to lick flow invading. *Tipping* her *tepping* her *tapping* her *topping* her. *Tup*. Pores to dilate dilating. *Tup*. The joy the feel the warm the. *Tup*. To pour o’er sluices pouring gushes. Flood, gush, flow, joygush, *tupthrob*. Now! Language of love. (*U* 11.705-709, italics added)

Here, music has become movement as well as pure sound, a flow and a rhythm. Molly, though absent, becomes a presence in “Sirens” not only because Bloom remains preoccupied by thoughts of Boylan’s visit to 7 Eccles Street, but because, like Simon, Molly is a singer, and knows how to operate the rules of sound and of emotion. As the

singing continues in the background, Bloom remembers, and appears to conflate, thoughts of Martha and of Molly: “*Martha* it is. Coincidence. Just going to write [...] First night when first I saw her at Mat Dillon’s in Terenure [...] Singing. *Waiting* she sang. I turned her music [...] Bosom I saw, both full, throat warbling. First I saw. She thanked me. Why did she me? Fate. Spanish eyes. [...]” (*U* 11.725-11.733, italics in the original). Throughout the music, Bloom remains set apart from the rest: “But Bloom sang dumb” (*U* 11.776).

Kenner points out that the principle of uncertainty in relation to the sources and origins of sounds results in a distortion of the often-praised spatial clarity of *Ulysses*, a playful suspension of the rules of geography. He also mentions what he fears many readers may fail to realise, namely that Bloom is in fact *not* in the same room with the music.³⁶ Bloom is thus in effect twice-removed: “offstage”, so to speak, in relation to the action in the bar in the same manner as he is to the goings-on in his home bedroom. The curious effect of this narrative isolation is that, as readers, we *hear him think while he is listening*, and clearly that is one reason why at this point we feel literally more attuned to his state of mind than to the other characters. The peculiar position in which we encounter Bloom reflects the narrative situation (others talk and sing while he listens, but most of the time his vision is limited, even though he asks Pat to set ajar the door leading to the bar, *U* 11.670), a condition which makes it possible to read sound effects as both generating and expressing his emotional state.

Furthermore, I would suggest that by making possible a reading that lends psychological significance to various sounds, the episode subverts not just the sense of spatial organisation but also destabilises the apparent consistency of temporal arrangement which we otherwise find in *Ulysses*. As Susan Mooney has pointed out, “[s]ound is contained within time and space in ways different from the visual. From the

point of view of traditional phenomenology, the visual is predominantly a spatial form and the acoustic temporal".³⁷ We may perhaps note that, consequently, the nature of the acoustic could be described as loosely related to the mnemonic insofar as it is bound predominantly to time and the notion of sequence, or *nacheinander*. Arguably, one of Joyce's main achievements in "Sirens" is the creation of the acoustic-temporal within the necessarily visual framework of essentially linear textuality: another example of techno-poetics. The narrative succeeds in transposing the fleetingness of sound-waves into print, thereby generating a textually engineered storage facility in which sounds may be kept for reference purposes. In this way, Joyce's writing assumes the function of a recorded disc. If in *A Portrait* Joyce endeavoured to overcome writing's "blindness" through the device of textual memory, then in *Ulysses* he may be said to challenge its "deafness".³⁸

6.3. The "Sirens" gramophone

We have already seen how sounds of various descriptions occupy Bloom's mind. In the following discussion, I intend to examine Leopold Bloom's memory-activities in the light of sound-effects produced artificially, by machines such as the phonograph and the gramophone. In "Sirens", Bloom's mind is especially sensitive to impressions transmitted via sound waves alone, and as such his memory may be said to be shaped by aural rather than visual perceptions. In fact, the discourse which we associate with Bloom produces its own version of a collection on the subject of sound, a collection which itself amounts to gramophony:

Instruments. A blade of grass, shell of her hands, then blow. Even comb and tissuepaper you can knock a tune out of. Molly in her shift in Lombard street west, hair down. I suppose each kind of trade made its

own, don't you see? Hunter with a horn. Haw. Have you the? *Cloche*. *Sonnez la*. Shepherd his pipe. Pwee little wee. Policeman a whistle. Locks and keys! Sweep! Four o'clock's all's well! Sleep! All is lost now. Drum? Pompedy. Wait. I know. Towncrier, bumbailiff. Long John. Waken the dead. Pom. Dignam. Poor little *nominedomine*. Pom. It is music. I mean of course it's all pom pom pom very much what they call *da capo*. Still you can hear. As we march, we march along, march along. Pom. (*U* 11.1237-460, italics in the original)

Here, Bloom reshuffles the tracks stored, as it were, on his own private gramophone. These “tracks” could be described as a version of mostly acoustic memory traces, as they consist of fragments of sound, speech, music etc. from earlier in the narration. Bloom’s mind, it seems, is in possession of sound recorded at random and replayed involuntarily and spontaneously. Kittler, writing on the Lacanian distinction between the categories of the *imaginary*, the *symbolic*, and the *real*, emphasises precisely this aspect of sound recording technology when he states that phonography,

regardless of meaning or content, records all the voices and utterances produced by bodies, thus separating the signifying function of words (the domain of the imaginary in the discourse network of 1800) as well as their materiality (the graphic traces corresponding to the symbolic) from unseeable and unwritable noises.³⁹

In “Sirens”, we find reproduced not just voices and utterances as well as *unvoiced* thoughts, but a transcription of those unseeable and unwritable noises into the structural pattern of the text and, to some degree, into the consciousness of Bloom. While today the technology that allows sounds to be inscribed and stored on a disc has become primarily associated with music recordings, it may be noted that the original invention was thought of as a somewhat different “instrument”. The following section gives a brief description of the technological development of the “talking machine”.

The invention of a machine capable of making and then replaying sound recordings is most frequently set in 1877, the year in which Edison developed the first phonograph, an apparatus that used cylinders and not flat discs. As early as 1875, however, “sound-

writing” had been invented in the form of Edouard-Léon Scott’s *phonautograph*, a machine capable of actually marking or *writing* sound waves onto a cylinder, thus creating a visualization of sound, but without the means to re-create or replay it. Nevertheless, Scott claimed that his invention made it possible to “preserve a representation of the voices of the great for the future”⁴⁰ – a bold statement to make, since all that was preserved was a curvy line marked on blacked paper. The phonautograph did, however, prove useful in laboratory conditions where research into sound waves was concerned.

Through processes of experimentation, Edison and subsequent inventors succeeded in improving the quality of recordings enormously. By 1907, double-sided shellac-based records were widely available.⁴¹ As hinted above, the technology behind the phonograph/gramophone was not at first applied to music recordings. This was mainly due to the limits of the technology used in the early days, which did not allow for a recording of the wide range of frequencies contained in the complexities of orchestral music. Edison originally envisaged a wide range of uses for his machine, but significantly, only one of these was concerned with the reproduction of music. Bloom’s *gramophone-from-the-grave* idea is not as unusual as it may seem to us today: The uses suggested by Edison for his invention related chiefly to the spoken word, as is evident from an article for the *North American Review* in 1878, which lists, among other usages, that of making a “‘Family Record’ – a registry of sayings, reminiscences, etc., by members of a family in their own voices, and of the last words of dying persons”.⁴² An important aspect of this is preservation: of making repeatable what in itself is fleeting, of rendering timeless (and repeatable at will) the personal experience of remembering. As Edison himself stated: “We will be able to preserve and hear again [...] a memorable speech, a worthy singer [...] the last words of a dying man [...] of a

distant parent, a lover, a mistress".⁴³ We can, in Bloom's words, "[p]ut on poor old greatgrandfather" (*U* 6.964), after dinner on a Sunday, or whenever we wish, and with this we can resurrect a part of him that will let us remember the person. The original voice becomes forever separated from the body of the mortal individual. Temporal distance is rendered as immaterial as spatial distance (which had already been conquered with the invention of telegraphy and the telephone) when confronted with technology capable of delivering speech and sounds in innumerable repetitions.

In the late 19th century, the first recordings were made of the voices of famous men – monuments made from sound-waves, as it were. Jed Rasula provides an example of this:

[I]n 1890 [Edison's] agent, Colonel Gouraud, prevailed upon certain public figures in England to deposit their voices for posterity in the new medium, Browning and Tennyson among them. These recordings mark a watershed in the history of poetry. Dim as Tennyson's voice now sounds (in the acoustic equivalent of photocopies of photocopies, in which the ratio of grain to image exponentially increases), it is still possible to make out the cadence and the bardic resolve.⁴⁴

The recording, when played, will endow the listener with the ability not only to remember lines of poetry, but the poet as a person – even if the poet himself happens to suffer from inadequacies of memory, as related by Rasula in the following anecdote:

In a postmortem rehearsal that defines the precinct of a poetic Necropolis, Robert Browning's friends gather to hear the dead poet's voice reanimated from wax cylinder recorded by George Gouraud in April 1889. Partway into his recitation Browning stops apologetically, unable to remember his own lines. 'I am exceedingly sorry that I can't remember my own verses: but one thing that I shall remember all my life is the astonishing sensation produced by your wonderful invention'.

Rasula continues:

The uncanny alliance registered by the survival of the voice endows memory with a funereal commemoration that even Plato had not suspected when he denounced writing as a blight on memory. If writing – as aid to memory – impairs even as it benefits, orality too has its

liability, acceding to the sheer flow of words as they occur, swept along by a pace that may or may not be coincident with understanding.⁴⁵

Leopold Bloom's idea of using the gramophone to remember the voice of the departed is of course closely related to Rasula's "funereal commemoration". When we fail to remember a face, we dig out a photograph (and not the corpse); when we fail to remember a voice, we put on a recording of that voice which will "renew" our recollections. That the technology of sound recording may team up with the human faculties of imagination and memory to bring back the past is suggested by an early writer on the subject, the German Alfred Parzer-Mühlbacher, who wrote in 1902:

Cherished loved ones, dear friends, and famous individuals who have long since passed away will years later talk to us again with the same vividness and warmth; the wax cylinders *transport us back in time* to the happy days of youth – we hear the speech of those who lived countless years before us, whom we never knew, and whose names were only handed down by history.⁴⁶

The implication here is clearly that the original event can be preserved in a window of timelessness, to which sounds played by a machine can temporarily return us; it could even be said that technology here plays a part in challenging the finality of death. Significantly, the primary benefits of Emile Berliner's gramophone include, in the inventor's own words, holding "communion with immortality" in preserving "the voices of dear relatives and friends long departed".⁴⁷ The record then becomes an artefact entirely devoted to memory, and memory, in turn, is transformed from an art into a technology – a technology with the potential to subsist independently outside the realm of the human mind.⁴⁸

Interestingly, some of the technology used to make the phonograph was adapted for research into memory phenomena. The early twentieth century saw the development of "psychological instruments" such as the *Gedächtnisapparat* or *Mnemometer*, which used rotating cylinders to display pairs of words to be memorised by the test subject.

These machines were driven by precise clockwork mechanisms which allowed stimuli to be presented in a scientifically measurable way, a technique which helped memory psychology gain the reputation of a precise discipline able to produce mathematically verifiable sets of data.⁴⁹ Machines of this kind could perhaps be best described as making use of a mechanical innovation to investigate the psychological mechanisms and structures of memory.

When the spoken word can be “frozen” and “canned” (in the sense of engraved on the surface of a disc), to be consumed again and again, the distinction between orality and writing becomes more and more unstable. As with writing, orally produced content becomes separated from its producer, taking on a life of its own. As Freud observes: “Writing was in its origin the voice of an absent person”.⁵⁰ In principle, then, there is little difference between preserving the voice as writing and preserving it as sound-writing, or *phonography*. Freud further remarks on the parallels of photography and sound recording, declaring that in the photographic camera, we find “an instrument which retains the fleeting visual impressions [of our eyes], just as the gramophone disc retains the equally fleeting auditory ones”, adding that it is possible to regard both methods of representation as materialisations of the power of memory.⁵¹ To my knowledge, Freud himself never attempted to use recording technology to preserve the words and voices of his patients. When it came to psychoanalytic sessions, he relied completely on the accuracy of his memory, not even taking so much as brief shorthand notes while the patient was present.⁵² Instead, all activity of writing was postponed until after the patient had left the room.

What Bloom is thinking about in “Hades”, the gramophone-from-the-grave, may notionally be the perfect memory-machine, capable of infinitely replaying the voices of the dead.⁵³ Once immortalised, the individual surrenders all influence and authority

pertaining to his or her voice, since this voice can now be reproduced, as Thomas Edison so pointedly wrote in 1878, “without the presence or consent of the original source”.⁵⁴ Bloom, however, has evidently ignored a crucial restriction: Emile Berliner’s gramophone, using flat discs as a medium, had quickly developed the potential for mass-production and commercial distribution of recordings. The gramophone itself, in the form in which it became available to buy, was a machine capable of playback only, of reproducing something made commercially, and therefore essentially alien to the self. Nevertheless, Berliner’s views on the usage of his invention were very similar to Edison’s. “Bloom”, writes Steven Connor, “seems to regard the gramophone as much as a means of communication as of reproduction”, and he proposes that behind this lies “the conventional associations between gramophones and the departed”.⁵⁵ Here he probably has in mind the well-known marketing logo of HMV, “His Master’s Voice”, in which a little dog called Nipper⁵⁶ listens faithfully to the voice of his dead master emanating from the sound-trumpet of a gramophone/phonograph. The “gramophone-in the grave” would thus allow for “routine relations between the dead and the living”,⁵⁷ much in the way the telephone does between those still alive. Bloom, incidentally, thinks of all sorts of eventualities, even of the possibility of installing telephones in coffins as a safeguard against premature burial: “And if he was alive all the time? Whew! By jingo, that would be awful! No, no: he is dead, of course. Of course he is dead. Monday he died. They ought to have some law to pierce the heart and make sure or an electric clock or a telephone in the coffin and some kind of a canvas airhole. Flag of distress.” (U 6.865-6.869).⁵⁸

From the point of view of psychology, Edison’s original *phonograph* (“voice-writer”), with its emphasis on home-made recordings, lends itself much better to the memory paradigm, since it was devised for both recording and playback (it was also

commonly referred to as the “Talking Machine”).⁵⁹ With the tin-foil or wax-covered cylinder of the phonograph, however, every recording was an original, and reproduction remained a major difficulty.⁶⁰ Owing to the materials from which they were made, the cylinders were also prone to wearing out over time, with sound quality beginning to deteriorate after a certain amount of replaying. Tin-foil cylinders were destroyed when removed from the cylinder, in much the same manner as the inscription of Freud’s *Wunderblock*, the “mystic writing-pad”, could be made to vanish in a second by lifting off the clear celluloid cover sheet from the paper covering the wax surface.

The cylinder phonograph had, for the reasons described above, gone out of fashion by the time of Bloom’s musings on sound recordings, while gramophones had become more popular, and inexpensive versions of the machine were easy to come by. Record companies, however, showed little concern with preserving the voices of the great for posterity in the manner of sound archives.⁶¹ Records quickly became synonymous with popular music and with entertainment, and phonography became an industry where the potential for mass production counted for more than the individual’s amusement with homemade voice recordings.

One wonders what Joyce made of the new technology. After all, he eventually agreed to have his voice recorded and immortalised in the manner of Browning and Tennyson. In an essay which examines Joyce’s response to the technology of sound reproduction, Thomas J. Rice observes a number of parallels between the development of Joyce’s career as a writer, and technological progress in relation to sound recording:

Edison’s phonograph was born less than five years before Joyce, in the autumn of 1877, commercially developed in the late 1880s, and reached maturity, like Joyce, at the turn of the century, commonly to be found in places of public entertainment like the brothels of Dublin’s nighttown, also like Joyce, in 1904. By the early 1920s, about the same time that James Joyce’s name and his novel *Ulysses* became household words, the

gramophone was the popular domestic form of entertainment that it remains, in its various current incarnations, today.⁶²

It is quite fitting, in this socio-cultural context, that in *Ulysses* we find a gramophone in a brothel window (“[f]rom a bulge of window curtains a gramophone rears a battered brazen trunk”, *U* 15.605-606), a gramophone which later assumes a role in the phantasmagorical play that is “Circe”, singing a bizarre song:

Jerusalem!
Open your gates and sing
Hosanna ... (*U* 15. 2171-2173)

In 1924, Sylvia Beach approached the Paris office of HMV (His Master’s Voice) to arrange for a recording of Joyce reading from *Ulysses*. In *Shakespeare and Company*, she stresses that at the time there was a demand only for recordings of music.⁶³ HMV’s representatives were therefore able to dictate the terms under which the recording was to be made. Ultimately, Sylvia Beach agreed to have thirty copies of the record pressed at her own expense. It is obvious from her remarks that HMV showed little interest in being associated with Joyce’s voice, so apart from making use of the technology provided by HMV, the recording was very much an independent venture: “The record would not have their label on it, nor would it be listed in their catalogue.” Since there was no “audience” to the reading (apart from the recording engineer), and since it never gained entry into HMV’s archives, it was almost as though Joyce’s performance, once completed, existed only in a kind of virtual space.

Joyce had decided on reading an excerpt from “Aeolus”, a short passage of oratory which, according to Beach, “expressed something he wanted said and preserved in his own voice”.⁶⁴ When the record was ready, Beach writes, she handed over nearly all the copies to Joyce, so he could give them away to family and friends. The recording of *Ulysses* was thus, in a fashion, the making of a “family record” – precisely the usage

originally proposed by Thomas Edison, and echoed by Bloom's idea of using recording technology to preserve the voice of one's ancestors from oblivion. John Durham Peters, in his study *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication*, calls this effect of evaporating temporal distance "time-binding", and goes on to claim that, with the rapid development of technologies in the nineteenth century, "writing lost its monopoly as the chief record of human events and intelligence".⁶⁵

Roy Gottfried, in *Joyce's Iritis and the Irritated Text*, proposes that, with the continuing deterioration of his eyesight, Joyce became increasingly interested in the properties of sound.⁶⁶ There is certain evidence to suggest that this was indeed the case. For example, as Tim Armstrong writes in *Modernism, Technology and the Body*, a fellow writer, Ezra Pound, "[...] increasingly found in Joyce's focus on the word as a remembered music and the text as texture a precise reflection of his worsening eyesight – as if he were too close to the surface of the artwork to gain perspective".⁶⁷ This, of course, echoes Eliot's remark that within his writing, Joyce's imagination was increasingly moving towards the auditory, "at the expense of the visual".⁶⁸ We could perhaps say that in Joyce, the myopic effect, the narrowing of vision inherent in the reduction of distance, increasingly leads to a new pressure, one which, from a writer's point of view, can only be negotiated by adapting and widening the narrative technique: the necessity for inclusion of those sense impressions capable of bypassing the eye, while ensuring that the same are reproducible – for the benefit of the (reader's) eye. In addition, we can assume that the production of a work like *Ulysses* by a writer suffering from severely impaired eyesight is a memory-work in itself.

So it may be said that in creating the sound-effects of "Sirens", Joyce built upon Thomas Edison's conviction "that the phonograph and the poet's voice would be mutual beneficiaries"⁶⁹ – however Joyce chose to stick to his own craft, adapting the written

word so as to function both as inscription and as “replaying” of sound-effects. Writing and reading are made to assume the responsibilities of speaking and listening. Joyce turns himself into a composer, an author of a complex array of sounds which must be decoded (through the act of reading, ideally of reading aloud) before they can be heard. As Forrester points out, the process of writing in the context of sound and music (as opposed to narration) is primarily one of encoding and preserving: “[...] it seems that only when sounds are inscribed as ‘text’ (phonetically, musical scores, sound-wave patterns or whatever) do we find it easy to formalize the language of sound as a semiotic enterprise.”⁷⁰

Where in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* the workings of textual memory, a memory of pure words which relies to a large extent on the reader’s attention, functions as a catalyst for the tension between remembering and forgetting, *Ulysses* provides signifiers for pure noise. Leopold Bloom’s activities in “Sirens”, for example, include various examples of mental sound-transcription:

Sea, wind, leaves, thunder, waters, cows lowing, the cattlemarket, cocks, hens don’t crow, snakes hissss. There’s music everywhere. Rutledge’s door: ee creaking. No, that’s noise. (*U* 11.963-965)

The phrase “ee creaking” brings about a peculiar effect on several different levels: Firstly, it recalls, both visually and acoustically, Bloom’s fixation on the letter he has written only a short while earlier, hurriedly and secretly, to Martha Clifford. “Remember write Greek ees” (*U* 11.860), Bloom reminds himself as he starts writing. “No, change that ee” (*U* 11.865), he tells himself. Finally, he signs, remembering the desired manner: “Henry. Greek ee” (*U* 11.889). Secondly, even with this important visual finishing touch to the letter, the “ee” refuses to leave him alone. It has become absorbed by the “soundscape”, in this case, the music spilling over from the next room (the echo of the door’s “ee creaking” is still at work here): “La la la ree. Trails off there

sad in minor. Why minor sad? [...] P.P.S. La la la ree. I feel so sad today. La ree. So lonely. Dee" (*U* 11.892-894, emphasis added). A gramophone effect can be observed here, one that is capable of preserving both letters *and* sounds. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the combination of "ee" and "creaking" recalls a previous occurrence of the noise (although Bloom seems unaware of this), in the "Aeolus" episode: "The door of Rutledge's office whispered: ee: cree" (*U* 7.50). Bloom makes the connection, which happens purely in his memory, through the medium of sound. Presumably, Bloom first heard the noise of the quietly creaking door in "Aeolus" – but the sound has stayed with him somehow, just as it has become inscribed in the text in the form of the letters "ee", ready to be remembered as a signifier that is both visual and acoustic.

If we see Bloom's thoughts shaped by the experience of sound perception (both of music and of sheer noise), then it must be added at this point that the converse effect can be observed, too. In his mind Bloom transforms sounds into a private music, as when he contemplates Molly's urination on the chamber pot:

O, look we are so! Chamber music. Could make a kind of pun on that. It is a kind of music I often thought when she. Acoustics that is. Tinkling. Empty vessels make most noise. Because the acoustics, the resonance changes according as the weight of the water is equal to the law of falling water. Like those rhapsodies of Liszt's, Hungarian, gipsyeyed. Pearls. Drops. Rain. Diddleiddle addleaddle ooddleodddle. Hissss. Now. Maybe now. Before. (*U* 11.979-985)

"Chamber music" recalls, of course, Joyce's own work of that title. But Bloom's pseudo-scientific reflections also point forwards, to Molly squatting on the chamber pot to pass water late that night in "Penelope", with Leopold finally home and asleep in bed. The passage quoted above has been anticipated in the overture: "Pearls: when she. Liszt's rhapsodies. Hissss" (*U* 11.36). It may even be said to recall Stephen's hurried urination on the beach in "Proteus", although here the falling water produces a slightly different sound: "Listen: a fourworded wavespeech: seesoo, hrss, rsseeiss, oooos" (*U*

3.456-457). Above all else, however, Bloom's musings indicate his awareness of the soundscape that surrounds him: "Sea, wind, leaves, thunder, waters, cows lowing, the cattlemarket, cocks, hens don't crow, snakes hissss. There's music everywhere" (*U* 11.963-964).

Kenner has argued that "Sirens" marks the beginning of our confrontation with "screens of language"⁷¹ in *Ulysses*, but I would maintain that the word "language" alone is insufficient in the context of this discussion. It is through providing even the minutest sound-effects with the privilege of a signifier, however obscure, that Joyce compiles his own transcription not only of the *language* but of the *acoustics* of Dublin and its inhabitants. We see here, or rather see/hear, not so much what Derrida has termed "a gramophony which records writing in the liveliest voice",⁷² but conversely, a writing which uses gramophony as a means to actualise and even to perform the memory of its textuality.

Chapter 7: "Penelope" and the writing of memory

It is remarkable to what extent criticism has in the past focussed on issues concerning the memories of Stephen and of Bloom, and relegated Molly's substantial memory experience in "Penelope" into an afterthought. Rickard, for instance, who writes so exhaustively about memory in *Ulysses*, has surprisingly little to say about "Penelope". He touches on the question of Leopold and Molly's mourning for little Rudy¹ and on the notion of "Penelope" as a direct precursor of the narrative's elaborately executed resistance to closure which, in his opinion, characterises *Finnegans Wake*.² Considering that the "Penelope" episode engages with so many aspects of memory and its textual configuration, the absence of any detailed discussion of the chapter in Rickard's book seems somewhat perplexing. After all, what "Penelope" is concerned with is above all the act of narrating *from memory*, in a style which is linked to the consciousness of Molly Bloom. To claim that aspects of "style" alone allow the text to be read, metaphorically, as consciousness, as Riquelme suggests,³ appears to me to be limiting the text to its function of representing a form of fictional reality. My suggestion is, conversely, that in "Penelope", we may read the consciousness of Molly Bloom as a textual pattern signifying an exchange between the narrator and the narrative, between writing and reading.

Katie Wales has proposed that *Ulysses* as a whole represents "a well-illustrated treatise on the relationship between subjectivity and 'objective' reality, between language and reality and art and reality".⁴ I would be inclined to rephrase this statement, and suggest that *Ulysses* plays with our assumptions regarding its own creation, the interplay between language as art and language as articulation, and, most importantly, with questions relating to the historicity of the text itself. Within *Ulysses*, "Penelope"

has been variously thought of as end-point and beginning, closure and dis-closure, female voice and phallic centre, totality and fragmented (w)hole(s). But in addition, the episode engages with memory in a manner which challenges the concept of reality itself, specifically of the reality of writing and the historicity of the written word. Does “Penelope” present the reader with the reality of Molly’s past and present life as a counterpoint to the seventeen chapters that precede it? Or does the episode offer an insight into the technique of narration as an alternative and much more flexible mode of memory, with the potential to weave and unweave reality through or in language, or even through a mode of writing?

7.1. Text/*textum* as artefact

Walter Benjamin, writing on Proust, remarked that “all great works of literature found a genre or dissolve one – that they are, in other words, special cases”.⁵ If we take this observation at face value, then “Penelope” must take the credit of founding the most radically new genre of memory-representation within *Ulysses* by creating a polylogue between the epic of the individual mind and the historicity of Joyce’s textual universe. Benjamin refers to “the syntax of endless sentences” in Proust, “the Nile of language”, where “everything transcends the norm”.⁶ Many critics of Joyce have similarly remarked upon the flow of language in *Ulysses*, and some have found the metaphor of “flow” or “stream”, or even, like Benjamin, “the Nile of language” particularly apt for a characterisation of “Penelope”. The term “flow” can be read as implying Molly’s rapid associative leaps between perception and memory and her conflation of pronouns, and the corresponding effect on the reader may simply be to slow down and reread, imposing mental full stops so as to subdivide Molly’s thoughts

into semantically and/or syntactically “meaningful” sections. Kumar suggests that within this concept, “the significance of an event becomes inseparable from its linguistic embodiment”,⁷ in other words, Kumar points out that discourse is never neutral but shaped by the idiom of the character who experiences or remembers. Since in *Ulysses*, different characters sometimes remember the same event, these recollections which surface in various discourses constitute series of repetitions which are not necessarily immediately recognisable as such. Kumar proposes that, in a layering of discourses the text engages in a “process of relativization”,⁸ a dialogue of meaning quite distinct from the purely stylistic experiments which can also be observed in *Ulysses*.

Riquelme refers to the need for “a more supple theory of mind, one that includes some recognition of the unconscious, of memory, of imagination, of what is sometimes called the imaginary than any empiricist view can muster”⁹ to achieve a proper and more comprehensive appreciation of the textual mechanics in Joyce’s works. I would add that we may also require a fresh view on textuality, and see the text as fusion of memory-effects which render it flexible as well as self-reflexive. Therefore, my view differs from Lawrence’s opinion that “Penelope” somehow counteracts or even falsifies the notion of “the story of a writing” because this view presupposes a reduction of narrative possibilities, associated with the assumed “nonliterariness” of Molly Bloom.¹⁰

Mahaffey offers an interesting perspective on the idea of a textually generated exchange between past and present, the presence of the reader and the absence of the writer, an idea which I consider extremely relevant to “Penelope”, and to *Ulysses* as a whole: “The reciprocity of past and present, living and dead, is best illustrated by the processes of reading and writing: a present reader and an absent author are asked to exchange places, so that the author becomes imaginatively present and the reader absent”.¹¹ In a related approach to the problem of the materialisation of past and present

within the matrix of the Joycean text, Hans Walter Gabler has suggested treating “Penelope” as “a comprehensive rereading of the 17 episodes of *Ulysses* that precede it”, a notion which sees both the links of the episode with the previous text *and* allows it to be regarded, in Gabler’s words, as “a narrative independently new”.¹² A complication of this approach lies in the frequently-used description of the “Penelope” episode simply as Molly’s “monologue” or “soliloquy”. Both terms imply the presence of a speech act: an oral rendition of thoughts. A monologue may, of course, constitute a form of active remembering, but at the same time, it remains bound to its articulating consciousness and its position in the framework of space and time. Perry Meisel has argued that the term “monologue” falls short in reflecting the complications which the representation of Molly’s thoughts raises for many readers: “‘Penelope’ is instead a polylogue, the swathed tissues of prior discourses that find their locus in Molly, and among the ‘offal’ of which Molly in turn tries to narrate memories in order to lend coherence to her own subjectivity”.¹³

As mentioned above, Gabler proposes a view of “Penelope” as a model of a narrative rereading, conditioned by the pre-narrative of the previous seventeen chapters or episodes. This narrative rereading requires a twofold effort of memory, by the producer of a text as well as by the reader, so that, ultimately, fragmented threads connect up to form an interlinked whole. In a modification of Gabler’s argument, I would propose an additional hypothesis, namely, that what we perceive in the text of “Penelope” is not so much a rereading as a rewriting, a rewriting which may be said to function dialogically, and which continually foregrounds the text’s exchange with its past and the reliance on mnemonic techniques within the process of its creation. “Through reuse”, writes Riquelme, “Joyce treats his own writing as part of the tradition

out of which it emerges".¹⁴ It follows then, that every rereading precedes a rewriting, which will again be the object of a rereading, and so on.

Derek Attridge, challenging the notion of "Penelope" as inherently a style representing the "female flow" of thoughts, was probably the first critic to observe in the episode's text visual effects suggestive not so much of processes of thought but of writing: unconventional orthography which ignores the rules of punctuation, usage of figures instead of verbally-presented numerals, and errors that are redolent of a text derived from a transcription of speech.¹⁵ Attridge points out that Molly would likely engage in little writing activity apart from occasional personal correspondence through letters, and at no point does he suggest that "Penelope" may actually be representative of Molly's writing¹⁶ in the way that we, for example, perceive the diary section in *A Portrait* as the writing of Stephen Dedalus. He argues instead that, in fusing elements of speech and writing in innovative and unexpected ways, the episode exposes the reader's habitual patterns of (me)mor(i)alising and anticipation. After seventeen episodes of following the narrated "mental life" of Leopold Bloom and of Stephen, there is nothing to prepare the reader for the seemingly unstructured, albeit highly personal, language of "Penelope". However, when Attridge takes a passage of text from the episode and inserts elements of punctuation where it is deemed appropriate,¹⁷ then Molly's monologue appears rather orthodox in its syntactical structure, in fact, frequently more so than the representation of Leopold's train of thought.

John Smurthwaite (expanding on Attridge's analysis of the visual characteristics of the text of "Penelope") has recently challenged the conception of "Penelope" as a "mentally spoken" monologue. What he proposes instead is the notion of a "mentally visualized written text",¹⁸ a text which relies heavily on purely textual markers such as numerical figures and idiosyncracies of spelling. Smurthwaite sees in Molly Bloom an

example of a visualizer (*visuel* as opposed to *auditif* and *moteur*) who conjures up in her mind pictures derived from her own personal past “as if they were yesterday”.¹⁹ Molly visualises herself in a variety of past situations, but in addition, the text itself employs visual markers, many of which Smurthwaite lists in his essay, usefully contrasting them with the manner in which the thoughts originating in Stephen’s or Bloom’s mind are represented. As I have outlined in my discussion of *A Portrait*, focalisation plays a major role in the book’s engagement with language, specifically with words and the articulation of their sound-patterns which fascinate Stephen. Where *A Portrait* engages with “alerting-devices”²⁰ pertinent to the ear, such as rhyme and rhythm, in “Penelope” we find that in reading, we are constantly reminded of the visual dimension of verbal representation, of the self-correcting and creative reworking processes of the mind made visible through the written word.

Molly’s monologue contains a number of purely textual oddities which cannot be conveyed orally, such as using homophones: “place” for “plaice” (*U* 18.939), “neumonia” for “pneumonia” (*U* 18.727), “carrot” for “carat” (*U* 18.870); or corrections in the form of crossed-out letters: “symp~~h~~athy I always make that mistake and newp~~w~~hew with 2 double yous in” (*U* 18.730-731). The text here clearly foregrounds its status as writing, thereby undermining the widespread perception of “Penelope” both as a spoken monologue, as a “homecoming” to the beginning of the story, or as a return to the interiority of character consciousness. Molly is in the habit of creating new words and expressions from old ones, like the aurally conceived “translation” from the Greek of “metempsychosis” into “met him pike hoses”, a neologism to which Bloom’s thoughts return a few times during the day. This links her to Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses, sometimes referred to not only as Goddess of memory but as inventor of words.

Smurthwaite's argument clearly undermines some of the most widespread notions in *Ulysses* criticism: Firstly, that Molly's monologue is conceived purely orally, and secondly, that her memory is imprecise and, consequently, flawed. My view here contrasts sharply with Sternlieb's, who argues: "Molly has no text to which to refer. Nor is her project the creation of text, but the preservation of memory through the use of an increasingly faltering one".²¹ The graphic marks of textual representation, and particularly any errors in spelling, the use of homophones and numerals (but also the lack of any structuring punctuation), draw attention to the limits encountered in representing thought as language. Not unlike miniature images in the margins of medieval manuscripts which serve as comment or pointers, these elements unravel and diffuse the power of textuality, and draw attention to the hand of its producer.²² Textual markers within the language which characterises Molly may be said to provide a comment on the text's shifting status, its organisation within the substance and the structure of language on the one hand, and the representation of a fluctuating, non-linear reality on the other.

The visual markers in "Penelope", I would suggest, highlight the complexity between Molly's bodily self and her textual self. Textual markers lay emphasis on the ambiguity of the written word and the prospect of its articulation (such as the homophones cited above) precisely by drawing attention to the fact that Molly's monologue may be read as a dialogue, an exchange between the text-as-consciousness and the text-as-writing, between a drive to represent convincingly the volatile and instinctive aspects of Molly's "personality" and the practical demands of textuality as an essentially impersonal and fixed mode of representation. Thus "Penelope" functions as a representation of Molly's mind from where her past unfolds, but in addition, it looks out over the expanse of a textual past which reaches across the previous seventeen

chapters of *Ulysses* and beyond. The “weaving” metaphor seems appropriate here to describe this interplay between the personal past and the textual present this engenders. In his study of the methods and processes associated directly with Joyce’s writing activity, Attridge touches on the same issue when he notes:

To read ‘Penelope’ with an awareness of the physical process that produced its simulation of a physical process – the body writing the body writing – in addition to an awareness of the mind thinking the mind thinking is, I believe, to add a further dimension to the already multidimensional experience of the star turn of *Ulysses*.²³

The physical process which Attridge refers to is predominantly Joyce’s own method of working: note-taking, drafting, revising, rereading, rewriting, annotating, and so on. Arguably, in this manner, re-readings of a body of text can rely on and simultaneously create an entirely new body: In the case of *Ulysses*, the body of Molly Bloom, and the body of the whole of the *Ulysses* text as recreated through Molly’s polylogue. McGee suggests that the “Penelope” episode “is neither a conclusion nor a return but an opening”, an opening of the void of temporality and “of the backward glance with its endless retrospective rearranging”.²⁴ In these terms, the activity of rearranging and reweaving can be located on the level of a remembering individual consciousness and on the level of textual mnemotechnic.

Even though “Penelope” appears, with its virtually complete lack of punctuation, to evolve organically like a stream, an unstoppable flow of interconnected thoughts, it is worth considering Joyce’s method of composition, which Van Dick Card has likened to the assemblage of a mosaic.²⁵ Alyssa O’Brien has similarly examined the “Penelope” episode in terms of the stages of its textual production, and she sees in the episode “a carefully constructed text that did not spring whole from Joyce’s head but rather was skilfully woven into its final form with linguistic threads”,²⁶ with, for example, additions scribbled into the margins of typescript sheets and page proofs, thereby

expanding the text into multiple directions, lengthening and broadening it all at once. Joyce, it seems, actively resisted bringing his work on *Ulysses* to an end despite working towards a self-imposed deadline (his fortieth birthday, on 2nd February 1922), and a letter to Robert McAlmon in October 1921 reads like a comment on the sheer intensity of his method of composition: "Have sent the first part of 'Ithaca' to the typist and am working like a lunatic, trying to revise and improve and connect and continue and create all at the one time".²⁷ It may be assumed, then, that for Joyce, the more material he had produced, the greater the challenge became to refrain from constantly returning to this material and to resist an urge to incorporate it into fresh production, thus making for a never-ending text. In the same vein, Arnold Goldman has declared that, "by its fifteenth chapter, *Ulysses* [had] begun to provide its author enough in the way of material to become self-perpetuating".²⁸ This technique of "self-perpetuation", of almost constant adding and revising, links Joyce's production to the works of Marcel Proust, another great "re-writer", whose proofreading habits, as Walter Benjamin declares, "were the despair of the typesetters. The galleys always went back covered with marginal notes [...]".²⁹

In my view, this desire to modify, to rewrite one's words, links Joyce's proclivity for perpetual modification and re-creation to Molly Bloom's mode of recollecting and re-inscribing the text with her narrated presence. In "Penelope", Molly finds herself unable to leave her story as it has been written, returning again and again, like Joyce, in order to revise, improve, connect, continue, and create. As O'Brien has outlined, the typescript and the proofs of the "Penelope" episode, extensively annotated in Joyce's hand, attest to Joyce's compulsion to revise, to defer the end of the writing process. In her opinion, the episode can be said to adhere to what she calls an "aesthetic of mobility":³⁰ a resistance against stability and closure which may be thought of as

corresponding to Joyce's preferred working methods, i.e. of annotating the margins of proof sheets in a continual transformation and expansion of his literary production.

The insertions made by Joyce occasionally work to expand the scope of "Penelope" in a manner which comes to represent Molly's rambling associative memories. For instance, the passage which has Molly remembering a series of Dublin addresses at which she and Leopold have previously lived constitutes such an addition:

[...] Raymond terrace and Ontario terrace and Lombard street and Holles street and he goes about whistling every time we were on the run again his Huguenots or the frogs march pretending to help the men with our 4 sticks of furniture and then the City Arms hotel worse and worse says Warden Daly that charming place on the landing always somebody inside praying then leaving all their stinks after them [...] (*U* 18.1216-1222; *JJA* [21], 340)

Similarly, the brief passage in which Molly recalls how she knitted "that little woollen thing" (*U* 18.92; *JJA* [16], 302), the piece of textile in which little Rudy was buried, forms part of a later insertion, and so does the reference to Leopold's penchant for explaining etymology, "[...] if I asked him hed say its from the Greek leave us as wise as we were before [...]", (*U* 18.241-242, and *JJA* [16], 306), which in turn anticipates yet another Molly-esque recollection: "[...] I asked him about her and that word met something with hoses in it and he came out with some jawbreaker about the incarnation he never can explain a thing simply the way a body can understand [...]" (*U* 18.565-567). This, of course, links back to breakfast time with Molly and Leopold, the scene in "Calypso" where the word "metempsychosis" first made an appearance:

—Show here, she said. I put a mark in it. There's a word I want to ask you.

She swallowed a draught of tea from her cup held by nothandle and, having wiped her fingertips smartly on the blanket, began to search the text with the hairpin till she reached the word.

—Met him what? he asked.

—Here, she said. What does that mean?

He leaned downward and read near her polished thumbnail.

—Metempsychosis?

—Yes. Who's he when he's at home?

—Metempsychosis, he said, frowning. It's Greek: from the Greek. That means the transmigration of souls.

—O rocks! she said. Tell us in plain words. (*U* 4.331-343)

Like Stephen Dedalus in *A Portrait*, Molly is fascinated by words, but unlike for Stephen, their sound associations and “queer” meanings evoke in her less of a response than their status as artefacts, as things or objects, to be put into circulation and sent backwards and forwards, like the letters she recalls sending and receiving. In musing about Leopold's penchant for strange expressions and the occasional bout of unusual behaviour, she feels the desire to be able to *remember* and then to *record* such incidents in writing:

[...] if I only could remember the 1 half of the things and write a book out of it the works of Master Poldy yes [...] (*U* 18.579-580)

Here, Molly's thoughts touch upon what I perceive to be the most remarkable element in “Penelope”, the concept of an intersection between remembering, forgetting, imagination, and ultimately, of word-creation and writing as the process of creating a web (*textum*). Molly, like her creator, is preoccupied with problems to do with writing, reading, and re-writing a text. The book containing “Master Poldy” has, of course, already been written, without her authority, over the course of the preceding fourteen episodes of *Ulysses*. It has been suggested that, in his composition of “Penelope”, Joyce may have drawn upon some aspects of his wife Nora's writing, as exemplified in her letters.³¹ In any case, I would propose that the “Penelope” episode has as its task a rewriting of *Ulysses'* textual history (with additions and “emissions”/“omissions” of Molly's making), mirroring Joyce's own method. Here, its elements are reinvented through the textual inscription of Molly's memories.

7.2. Writing, the *histos* and memory

In a letter to Frank Budgen in 1921, James Joyce used the phrase “the clou of the book”³² to describe the “Penelope” episode. This remark, as Patrick McGee has pointed out, may be read as a comment on the episode’s relationship to *Ulysses*. “The French *clou*”, writes McGee, “literally means ‘nail’, ‘spike’, or ‘stud’”, or, in a more figurative sense, “the point of the greatest interest, the chief attraction, or even the central idea”.³³ He suggests that the function of the “Penelope” episode may be to unify the entire book “as performance”.³⁴ A related conception has been proposed by Lisa Sternlieb, who locates in Molly’s monologue “the textual performance of Penelope’s back-stage activity of weaving in order to unweave”.³⁵

I will touch upon and develop this idea, and argue that “Penelope” merges memory and imaginative inscription. If we return for a moment to the notion of memory as a key element within the art form of the written text, for the subject and also, on the reader’s level, for the mode of representation and perception, then “Penelope” may be regarded as a major experiment in relation to the interplay between the creation of subjectivity and textuality. For the discussion of this experiment I suggest the term *histos*, a term which will help to illustrate the idea of textuality as process since it can denote the *textum* or web and also the tool for its creation, the loom.³⁶ The paradigm of memory being strung by the *histos* will allow for the creation of a conceptual framework to illuminate the relationship between writing as manifested in character memory and in textual memory.

To disregard the implicit connection between Homer’s *Odyssey* and Joyce’s *Ulysses* would be to overlook an important element that contributes to the significance of the “Penelope” episode. In drawing on Western cultural memory and in thus positioning Molly Bloom as a counterpart to Homer’s Penelope, Joyce not only plays

with his readers' assumptions regarding the role of the female in epic tradition, he also constructs a framework wherein *Ulysses* consciously or unconsciously remembers the structure, plot, and *dramatis personae* of the *Odyssey*. It is important to bear in mind, however, that this happens unbeknownst to Molly. She remains aware of the limitations of human consciousness and memory (for example, when she has trouble remembering Mulvey's Christian name, struggles to recall the Spanish word for hairpin, or speculates about her husband's daytime activities), whereas the reader will easily make the connection between Molly the woman and the epic context evoked by "Penelope".

In associating Molly with the Penelope figure of Homer's *Odyssey*, Joyce creates an implicit set of expectations and associations which place her in a particular position within the text. From the point of view of plot, Penelope's role is plain and simple, since she is the one who stays at home (thus forming a static background presence), dealing with the complications which arise while the menfolk busy themselves elsewhere. But from a narratological perspective, she has her own tale to tell, a story which differs markedly from that of her husband.³⁷ Penelope, it seems, is perfectly capable of spinning her own yarn, of weaving her own story with her own choice of materials, not only metaphorically (through making a cloth) but literally as well. R.J. Schork has suggested that her name might be derived from a combination of the Greek *pēnē* (thread on the shuttle, woof of the web on a loom) and the verb *oloptein* (to pluck out). This, as he remarks, makes her "both literally and narratively a 'Weaver-Unraveller'".³⁸ When Molly thinks about recording "the works of Master Poldy", she anticipates her own textual function as the agency behind the memory-work, the gathering and re-arranging of threads, which emerges as the "Penelope" episode.

The Greek noun *histos* has a very interesting set of meanings in English, which run as follows: 1. (ship's) mast, pole, staff, yarn-beam. 2. loom. 3. warp (fixed to the beam).

4. web, tissue. 5. Penelope's pall or shroud.³⁹ We can see how meanings intertwine, and sometimes become interchangeable, denoting many aspects to do with the activity of spinning or weaving, as well as with sea-faring. The beam of the loom stood upright in ancient Greece, instead of being fixed horizontally, thus linking it in appearance and in function with a ship's mast. Moreover, the words "history" and "story" are evocative of the Greek noun *historia*, meaning "inquiry, narration, history". Although etymologically unrelated, the two terms *histos* and *historia* suggest each other conceptually, as we have already seen with regard to the Latin *textum*.

"Penelope", I would like to argue, draws on all of the above meanings. Molly, in the "Penelope" chapter, is the maker of a text. She creates the *histos*, the web that constitutes the story which in turn contains herself, as well as Leopold, Stephen, and her former and present lovers and admirers. At the same time, she is the *histos*: she is the loom, the vehicle for creation and imagination, and the words in which she clothes her memories are the fabric. Arguably, Penelope's weaving and unravelling of the shroud follows two opposed sets of motivations: to *delay* her wedding, and to *prolong* the period of courtship, during which she receives multiple gifts.⁴⁰ And, it may be added, her work may also be a strategy of memory, an affirmation of remembrance of her absent husband through the persistent physical handling of the same threads, over and over again.

Molly's presence (in the bedroom at 7 Eccles Street) lies, silently but palpably, behind all the other events of the day. Although lying in bed, she may be said to be metaphorically upright (i.e. libidinous and unashamed) at the beginning as well as at the end of the day. In her memories, she is the object of desire, a Lacanian *phallus*, to a number of male admirers past and present. If Penelope is the drive behind Odysseus, the symbolic mast which keeps him moving, making him overcome other temptations so

that he may eventually make his way home again, then Molly fulfils a similar function in relation to Leopold. A crucial decision with regard to her future life (and Leopold's) lies with her. She furnishes her husband with the tiniest of markers concerning her planned afternoon activities, thereby paradoxically prolonging his absence as he puts off his homeward journey while simultaneously trying to avoid crossing paths with Boylan. Consequently, the artful un/display of her breakfast letter from Boylan, coupled with her devious distraction by way of asking about the word "metempsychosis", constitute one of Leopold's preoccupations during the day.

A fabric that is being woven and unwoven from day to day has indeed, as Joyce said about the "Penelope" chapter, "no beginning, middle or end".⁴¹ The woven fabric, the *textum*, has become reversible in what Vicki Mahaffey has called "[t]he process of shuttling between a constructed reality and a deconstructed nothingness", underscoring not just the reversibility of the artefact but of time itself.⁴² The textual past, then, gains the potential to become the present, and vice versa, within the threads spun by Molly. For her, as for Benjamin, "a remembered event is infinite, because it is only a key to everything that happened before it and after it".⁴³

Although Molly Bloom is generally associated first and foremost with the "Penelope" episode, her presence in *Ulysses* pervades the text much earlier than that. We get inadvertent glimpses of her, but these tend to involve mere fragments and not the "whole" Molly. Valérie Bénéjam notes "a double strategy of dissimulation and replacement of Molly's body" through the techniques of "synecdochic fragmentation" and "metonymic fetishism" in *Ulysses*.⁴⁴ Apart from the "Calypso" episode, where Leopold Bloom prepares Molly's breakfast and takes it upstairs for her to eat in bed, Molly makes only one fleeting appearance which, importantly, can only be recognised as such retrospectively. This principle of retrospective recognition, which Joyce

arguably employs throughout *Ulysses*, relies heavily on memory and on the mode of its inscription in the text. Here is how it works with regard to one particular scene in which Molly is only identified after she has momentarily become an acting subject.⁴⁵ It is in “Wandering Rocks” that the lame sailor is wandering the streets, shouting “for England home and beauty” and holding out his hand for money, whereupon “a generous white arm from a window in Eccles street flung a coin” (*U* 10.222-223). Eccles Street is of course where the Blooms live, but other than that the arm, which will later turn out to have been Molly’s, remains completely anonymous.

We get further glimpses of the arm a few lines on: “The blind of the window was drawn aside. A card *Unfurnished Apartments* slipped from the sash and fell. A plump bare generous arm shone, was seen, held forth from a white petticoatbodice and taut shiftstraps. A woman’s hand flung forth a coin over the area railings” (*U* 10.250-253, italics in the original). A little later the picture becomes clearer still: “A card *Unfurnished Apartments* reappeared on the windowsash of number 7 Eccles street” (*U* 10.542-543, italics in the original). The plumpness of the arm and the specific address hint at Molly’s presence, but it is not until we reach Molly’s own recollection in “Penelope” that we can positively identify as hers the “generous arm” that flung the coin: “[...] when I threw the penny to that lame sailor for England home and beauty when I was whistling there is a charming girl I love and I hadnt even put on my clean shift or powdered myself or a thing [...]” (*U* 18.346-348). Molly here remembers something which has taken place eight episodes earlier, and it is through this and other memories that her presence asserts itself retrospectively through the text, and allows her to write herself into it retrospectively. Significantly, the phrase “for England home and beauty” constitutes another example of Joyce’s addition to the typescript, (*JJA* [16],

309), with the sailor's cry rendering more powerful the connection with Molly's bare arm, and her presence behind the scenes, in the "Wandering Rocks" episode.

Bénéjam takes great care to distinguish between the two separate concepts "Molly Bloom" (the fictional character) and "Penelope" (the chapter in which she features), a distinction which in my view is of crucial importance for a balanced discussion of the workings of memory within the episode. Bénéjam writes: "Critics have too often posed an equivalence between the two, between the textual and the fleshly body, whereas Molly's arrival in the book takes place a long time before the final episode itself".⁴⁶ As I have shown above, Molly's fleshly body crops up only twice in the first seventeen chapters. However, her textual body, which allows her to exert a degree of narrative authorisation and authority, only manifests itself in the pages of the "Penelope" episode.

Molly has a "body" (as in "a body can understand", *U* 18.567) that is both fleshly and textual, and which may thus represent much more than just "the female" character, the "Other" in *Ulysses*, or an accumulation of character, reflector and speaker in "Penelope". Homer's Penelope, waiting for the return of Odysseus, occupies herself with weaving, and Molly can be likewise associated with the generative principle. I would suggest that what happens in "Penelope" is the final step in the radicalisation of memory's (textual) function: Where Stephen Dedalus, in *A Portrait* and in *Ulysses*, shows the ability to remember his previous self (or selves) in a manner that makes him recognisable and convincing *as a character* within the confines of the text, Molly's purpose is twofold: to create an image of herself (unstable as it may be) which is powerful enough to be retrospectively inscribed into the preceding seventeen episodes, and to produce a reflection of the textual past of *Ulysses* in "Penelope". This combination allows her to transform and re-write the text of *Ulysses* retrospectively, through memory-work.

From “Calypso” onwards, Molly has established herself as the invisible centre or perhaps even the generator of *Ulysses*’ plot and structure, as the motivation behind Bloom’s wanderings as well as the narrator’s, while, somewhere in the background, unseen but never completely forgotten, there is Molly in her bed, and Boylan making his way towards it. From the very start, Molly has been posited as the *Other*, the object of thought and of memory rather than their origin. In a study of Joyce’s earlier works, Raffaella Baccolini has argued that, with regard to the function and authority of memory, “[Joyce’s] female characters are denied subjectivity”.⁴⁷ For instance, she argues, women in *Dubliners* tend to be envisaged in a particular role: typically, as symbols for something else, as mirrors for the male imagination, rather than as autonomous individuals.

Molly, in her role as character and focaliser, and “Penelope”, the textual manifestation of her consciousness, counteract not just the overwhelming male presence in *Ulysses*, but also the restrictive and restricting function of memory. Unlike Stephen, Molly does not occupy herself with “learned” or “literary” memory, and, unlike Bloom, she seems unconcerned with evasion as a strategy for avoiding potentially troubling thoughts of the past and the future. Above all, then, the “Penelope” episode instigates a poetics of memory which engages with questions of narrative authority. Molly does not fit into the Freudian paradigm which assumes that there is a level of repressed content (often connected to traumatic experiences) which is buried in an individual’s unconscious, but which nevertheless exerts some unrecognised control over the individual. The strategy of avoiding unpleasant, painful or embarrassing memories by diverting one’s own attention from them is one used by both Stephen and Bloom in dealing with incidents which could lead to the sudden emergence of their respective pasts. Molly, however, remains untroubled by contradictions, does not appear to fear

forgetfulness, and even remembers events which could perhaps be subsumed under the term “primal scene”: the moment Rudy was conceived (memorable because she watched the dogs “at it” in the street) and, through association, his funeral (U.18.1446-1449). In addition, unlike Stephen Dedalus, she seems to be able to freely negotiate the past in her mind, “free of the constraints of a history that must be refused or denied”.⁴⁸

I would propose that the originality of “Penelope” can be positioned within the parameters of memory and narrative authority, and, more specifically, of memory’s textual production. “Penelope”, in short, dispenses with the requirement of ratification through the agency of the Other (and, we might add, of the author). Molly embraces instead a mode of memory which does not rely on “reality” as background for its inscription, thus transposing language and the written word into the realms of invention and imagination. It will be helpful at this point to return briefly to some of the central ideas and methods of Freudian psychoanalysis. As I have discussed earlier, Freud’s case histories have as their object the narrated memories of the patient or analysand. The analyst’s task is collecting and reassembling this narration to make a coherent story, but also the translation of the symbolic elements into language and meaning, and, ultimately, its inscription into textuality. I have shown earlier how aspects of Stephen’s memory-representation in *A Portrait* are related to Freud’s technique of integrating fragments from a narration of the self into a larger framework of representation. Such a Freudian narration of the self’s story requires a mediator or translator, an analyst in Freudian terms, who ultimately assumes the authority to decide on the significance (or otherwise) of a memory or fantasy with regard to present reality. Molly, I would argue, has no regard or need for this sort of intervention. Her creativity appears to materialise out of a compulsion for articulation. Derrida, discussing Freud’s methods in terms of the physicality of the written text, argues that psychological content will eventually emerge

in textual, and therefore “irreducibly graphic”, form. Consequently, a “writing machine” embodies the structural representation of processes of the mind.⁴⁹

In presenting his “Case Histories”, Freud spends a great many words on explanations and on the justification of his method. With regard to one of his female patients, he writes (quite tellingly making frequent use of male pronouns):

In the second phase the patient himself gets hold of the material put before him; he works on it, recollects what he can of the apparently repressed memories, and tries to repeat the rest as if he were in some way living it over again. [...] It is only during this work that he experiences, through overcoming resistances, the inner change aimed at, and acquires for himself the convictions that make him independent of the physician’s authority.⁵⁰

It is interesting to note here how Molly’s rapid associations between present sensations, memories of past occurrences and her opinions or observations seamlessly intertwine. She does not appear to have screen memories in the Freudian sense, i.e. fabricated or imagined “recollections” which serve to prevent unpleasant or traumatic memories from intruding into consciousness, and she does not appear to repress anything in particular. In fact, her uninterrupted “stream” of verbalised thought has some elements in common with the psychoanalytic method of “free association” as advocated by Freud. In order to help his patients overcome the symptoms of resistance and repression, both of which may be said to resemble “blockages” of memory, Freud gives the following guidelines:

We instruct the patient to put himself into a state of quiet, unreflecting self-observation, and to report to us whatever internal perceptions he is able to make – feelings, thoughts, memories – in the order in which they occur to him. At the same time we warn him expressly against giving way to any motive which would lead him to make a selection among these associations or to exclude any of them, whether on the ground that it is too *disagreeable* or too *indiscreet* to say, or that it is too *unimportant* or *irrelevant*, or that it is *nonsensical* and need not be said.⁵¹

Freud, then, would certainly not have regarded Molly as a typical female hysteric patient, or as a classical case of obsessive neuroticism. Whereas, for Freud, the ideal is

to disengage from one's inhibitions so that "'to say everything' really does mean 'to say everything'"⁵² in order to gain insight into one's unconscious, Molly seems not even remotely interested in self-discovery. She does not engage in the neurotic displacement strategies which tend to characterise the female patients in Freud's work. For Freud, repressed sexual desire forms a core element within the unconscious, and it is in this unresolved desire in which he tends to locate the basis of his female patients' symptoms. By contrast, Molly appears to engage freely in sexual play along with the associated fantasies, and she gives every indication of being at ease with her body and its functions. In her self-sufficiency as far as her processes of thought and free association are concerned, Molly arguably enters into a post-Freudian world of articulation which is not reliant on a permanent quest for hidden meaning or for a buried past. I would suggest that Molly subverts a major hypothesis within Freud's work, namely, that it requires a special effort, and the help of an analyst, to articulate and "(re-)write" the contents of the unconscious so as to resolve the divide between conscious and unconscious layers of the mind. The absence of repressed content beyond the level of narrated character consciousness sets her apart from the other characters in *Ulysses*, and in particular from Stephen Dedalus as we have encountered him in *A Portrait*, whose relationship to language is characterised by alternating bouts of memory and the failure to remember. By contrast, "Penelope", in being composed solely of verbalised and "mentally written" thoughts, merges the mind and the instrument of its representation, thereby highlighting the tension revealed by mnemotechnic ambiguities between the levels of character and text within the whole of *Ulysses*.

At first glance, it may appear to many readers that "Penelope" brings about a reduction of narrative possibilities after the stylistic excesses of the earlier episodes, a

return to the stream-of-consciousness technique with just one single character as a focaliser. Lawrence has argued along these lines, suggesting that “in reforging the link between character and style in ‘Penelope’, Joyce returned to one of the stylistic conceptions that dominates the early chapters of the book”.⁵³ However, the voice we perceive to be Molly’s comes to us from the intimacy of the darkened bedroom, and therefore in many respects represents discourse of a highly private nature. The interplay between personal and textual elements of memory in “Penelope” render the episode’s content and structure far more complex. It is my conviction that “Penelope” combines character memory and textual memory in such a way that what we read on the page is not one “voice” but many, a polylogue between character, text, and the authority of its origins, between the mimesis of an individual consciousness and the textual universe that has been created in the unfolding of the preceding seventeen episodes of *Ulysses*.⁵⁴ Consequently, “Penelope” can be read as a distillate of several modes of memory, a mnemotechnic that is perpetually engaged in processes of writing and re-writing, reading and re-reading, weaving and un-weaving, in a creative exchange with the textual presence of the narrative itself.

It must be pointed out that criticism over the years has found it difficult to resist the temptation to treat “Penelope” as a separate text, an appendix, as it were, to the rest of *Ulysses*. Several critics have hit upon this problem, prompted perhaps by Joyce’s own remark in a letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver that “[t]he Ithaca episode [...] is in reality the end as Penelope has no beginning, middle or end”.⁵⁵ It may be that Joyce felt *Ulysses* to have two different ends, for it is a fascinating feature of Joyce’s methods in composition that the “Ithaca” and “Penelope” episodes had already been sketched at a very early stage, in 1916 or possibly even earlier, in 1914,⁵⁶ and probably received their finishing touches simultaneously as well, in 1922. In this, the gestation of the novel resembles

that of *A Portrait*: a process of revising and rewriting over many years which has as its result a narrative of multiple levels, styles, and techniques in which every word is carefully placed. In addition, we may note that *Ulysses* can be said to have not just two end-points, but two departure-points as well: the “Telemachus” episode, which tells of Stephen’s morning activities, setting out from the Martello tower, from about 8 a.m. onwards, and “Calypso”, in which we meet the Blooms for the first time and which takes place simultaneously, at 8 a.m. on 16th June.

Maud Ellmann, referring to Joyce’s remark to Weaver quoted above, bases her discussion of the episode on the suggestion that “Penelope” may be regarded as “a postscript or appendix rather than a termination”, and she suggests that it functions as a supplement to “the atonement or at-one-ment of the two male heroes in ‘Ithaca’”. She seems cautious, however, of taking her own theory too far, and immediately concedes: “But ‘Penelope’ is a dangerous supplement in that it undermines the sense of an ending; an opening rather than a closure, it opens up a chink in the armour of the patriarchal plot”.⁵⁷ Ellmann thus appears to locate one of the main disparities between the first seventeen episodes and “Penelope” within the framework of gender oppositions, positing “Penelope” as the female counterpart to everything from “Telemachus” to “Ithaca”, and Molly as the “natural” female complement to the dominating male presence (i.e. Stephen’s and Bloom’s) in these episodes. Richard Brown complements this view of “Penelope” as counter-balancing the first seventeen chapters of *Ulysses* when he refers to the episode as “an ‘everything’ of freely-associating human memory, of the previously-excluded female unsaid”.⁵⁸ This is disputed to some extent by McGee, who sees in Molly’s words a playful experiment with conventions relating to gender and its articulation rather than the essence of the feminine.⁵⁹

At its most basic level, “Penelope” is, of course, constructed as a “monologue” (by a female character), and this is also the technique assigned to the chapter by Joyce in the Linati schema. Raffaella Baccolini has observed that, in Joyce’s works prior to *Ulysses*, women “tend to be important not as much for what they do, but, rather, for what they stand for or what they stimulate”,⁶⁰ in other words, the female is limited to the status of object for male desire, which may encompass imagination and memory. “Penelope” subverts this principle, and in Molly Bloom Joyce creates a locus for the representation of female desire and memory that can only be read as separate, stylistically and functionally, from the repressed and repressive narrative of other Joycean females, most notably Eveline in *Dubliners*. When we “read” Molly we are directly confronted with her subjectivity, with no narrative device such as the voice of a narrator, or an external focaliser, to cushion the blow.

Many of Molly’s memories transcend the limits of 16 June 1904. She recalls the “Glencree dinner”, an event which is also remembered by several other characters in *Ulysses*, and her memories even extend to references which the reader may trace back to other Joyce texts. For example, a host of characters from *Dubliners* make a return in Molly’s reflective musings. Examples are Bartell D’Arcy (*U* 18.1295), the singer in “The Dead”, Tom Kernan, “that drunken little barrelly man that bit his tongue off falling down the mens W C drunk in some place or other” (*U* 18.1264-1266) from the story “Grace”, “Kathleen Kearney and her lot of squealers” (*U* 18.878) from “A Mother”. In addition, Molly also weaves into the text her very own memories of growing up in Gibraltar, memories of events even further removed in time and space.

Almost everything that happens in the final episode of *Ulysses* takes place first and foremost inside Molly Bloom’s mind – thoughts and musings, sensations and recollections. As a centre of consciousness, it may be said that Molly is constructed by

the narrative in a manner comparable with Stephen and Bloom.⁶¹ Riquelme sees similarities between Stephen's creative work in *A Portrait* (the composition of the villanelle and the diary section which ends Chapter Five) and the narrative mode in "Penelope", where he locates "both *post scriptum* and [...] origin of writing".⁶²

Yet, to appreciate fully the scope and mode of representation in "Penelope", the reader is nevertheless required to resist a return to the initial narrative contract of *Ulysses*.⁶³ While all this may at first glance be regarded as a limiting effect on the scope of the narrative, I would suggest that the opposite is in fact the case. "In 'Penelope'", notes Michael Stanier,

the reader can be seduced into thinking that Molly's monologue is somehow unmediated: that tacked on to the real stuff of the topic is the 'natural', mind-speech of the excluded 'Other'. It is, for instance, the only chapter that is fully in the present tense and stands seemingly free-form, away from the ministrations of the arranger.⁶⁴

As Stanier recognises, one overt function of "Penelope" may be to close some of the gaps left behind by "omissions",⁶⁵ but suggestively hinted at by "emissions", in the previous seventeen chapters. From this point of view, Molly's personal reminiscences could be said to complete and unify the references and allusions from the previous seventeen chapters.

The concept of an omniscient and unifying presence in *Ulysses* (not manifested through a defined narrating agent) has been the focus of criticism in the 1970s with the introduction of the term "Arranger" to replace the conventional "narrator" (the idea was first introduced by David Hayman⁶⁶ and adopted by Hugh Kenner). This Arranger, capable of being everywhere and seeing/reporting everything, recollects and repeats sometimes with, sometimes without recourse to a character's consciousness. Hugh Kenner sees in the Arranger's "ordering presence" a kind of archival power, an ability

to access multiple fragments of text simultaneously and thus capable of plotting the most subtle and intricate interconnections between them.

It is important to note that, for Kenner, this does not amount to a supreme and total effort of memory, but rather to the superior encyclopaedic effort of precisely this Arranger (“with access such as ours to a printed book”)⁶⁷ who manages the superhuman task of surveying the vast expanse of names, places, thoughts and spoken words that is *Ulysses*. It could be argued that the Arranger takes over the function of a selector rather than that of a conventional narrator, limiting and shaping the amount of information which is transmitted to the reader. In Hayman’s concept, the Arranger is always present, albeit often in the background, inscribing several consciousnesses simultaneously. It may be reasonable to ask, then, what the Arranger’s function is with regard to “Penelope”, or indeed, whether there is an Arranger in the episode at all. Hans Walter Gabler has disputed this, noting that, in “Penelope”, the Arranger “is conspicuously absent”,⁶⁸ and as a consequence (to borrow the terms used by Gabler), the reader leaves behind the level of *histoire* so carefully woven over the course of seventeen episodes, to plunge rather abruptly into a stream of *discours* where the line between the teller and the tale becomes indistinct.

7.3. The (r)evolving text

It has commonly been assumed that, in “Penelope”, Joyce has primarily undertaken a supreme effort to construct what the reader perceives to be the manifestation of an individual consciousness. Moreover, this task is executed in such a way that there is a temptation to treat this narrative artifice as a form of unmediated “natural” discourse, as the “pure” voice of the mind which in turn contains the source of consciousness and

selfhood. As readers, we may easily fall prey to the illusion that this is the only function of the “Penelope” episode: to close the circle by effecting a return to the beginnings through the consciousness of Molly, a consciousness which we tend to perceive as inevitably limited by its very individuality and subjectivity. I have already mentioned how, with “Penelope”, Joyce appears to devise a return to the interiority of character representation. To some degree, as a number of critics have argued, the episode is a recapitulation: it “repeats and completes the entire book’s circular movement”,⁶⁹ and it “presents a new consciousness directly confronting many of the facts, pseudofacts, and the misrepresentations that we already have in our possession with a series of facts, pseudofacts, and misrepresentations of its own”.⁷⁰ Some critics, notably Zack Bowen and Michael Patrick Gillespie,⁷¹ have suggested that “Penelope” functions mainly as a recapitulation of prior events, a sort of coda which reinforces the conclusion, the *nostos*, which has already been reached with the previous episode, in Leopold Bloom’s physical return home. Rickard goes so far as suggesting that “[t]he odyssey of memory in *Ulysses* ends in some senses at the end of ‘Ithaca’, for Molly Bloom is for the most part excluded from the sharing of mind and the intimations of destiny that link Stephen and Bloom”.⁷² But perhaps we should not just consider Molly’s mind-narration in terms of its position in the narrative, although it serves to make her words, structurally speaking, the last (and perhaps the most lasting) words of the novel. To say that the odyssey of memory ends with “Ithaca” would be to deny Molly any authority over and involvement in the previous seventeen episodes of the novel.

Molly’s personal memories encompass a vast array of elements, intimate details relating to former lovers, growing up in Gibraltar, as well as snippets of eleven years of married life with Leopold. Moreover, the most decisive event of 16th June, Molly’s infidelity, is only present in her memory (apart from its staging in Bloom’s fantasy in

the “Circe” episode). Molly’s seemingly random reflections take her back to Boylan in fairly regular intervals. Interestingly, there appears to be no constant, “true” version of events. The one item which remains stable in Molly’s recollections is that Boylan is the owner of a very large penis, “that tremendous big red brute of a thing he has” (*U* 18.144), although she is quick to observe that her own “Poldy has more spunk him” (*U* 18.168). In other respects, her memory appears to construct several different accounts, from the initial “he must have come 3 or 4 times” (*U* 18.143), via “when I made him pull out and do it on me” and “the last time I let him finish it in me” (*U* 18.154-18.157), to her own climax (“when he made me spend the 2nd time”, *U* 18.586) and the way Boylan slapped her backside (*U* 18.1369). Finally, she appears to return to the initial memory, in which the “3 or 4 times” are modified along with Boylan’s organ into near-legendary proportions: “5 or 6 times” (*U* 18.1511-1512).

Molly’s adultery lacks an independent witness, as the Arranger appears to be, like Leopold himself, otherwise engaged during the critical period of time. There is no authoritative version of events, which is why, as readers, we are forced to take Molly’s words at face value, and so we are tempted to marvel at Boylan’s stamina and Molly’s insatiable libido. We are led to believe that the function of Molly’s memories is to formulate an illusion: of the capacity to grasp a past which will in turn offer us a solution, and which will bring about a satisfactory conclusion to an essentially unreliable and stylistically unstable narrative. The significance of Molly’s recollections is clearly that they are of such a contradictory nature that they cannot possibly *all* count as a representation of a “real” or “true” past. Some events may be imagined and imaginary, or simply exaggerated, while others may have been forgotten.

Molly, it is quite clear, has less than perfect powers of memory. On the psychological level, “Penelope” foregrounds lapses of memory and, to a lesser degree,

lapses of speech, for example where Molly forgets or misremembers names (“what was his name Jack Joe Harry Mulvey was it yes”, *U* 18.818), substitutes “Aristocrat” for “Aristotle” (*U* 18.1238, 18.1240) and recalls “exotic” words by way of their phonetic units (“that word met something with hoses in it”, *U* 18.565). At times, these lapses form memory-events in themselves, as when she recalls the day she wanted a hairpin to open Mulvey’s letter: “I couldn’t think of the word a hairpin to open it with ah horquilla” (*U* 18.750-18.751). Arguably, then, in “Penelope”, memory cannot be seen as a phenomenon related purely to past events, since it can seldom be completely distinguished from what we might call “processes of thought”, which can be situated in all layers of time and space. William James’ definition of thought is suggestive in this context:

[It contains] sensation of our bodies and of the objects around us, memories of past experiences and thoughts of distant things, feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, desires and aversions, and other emotional conditions, together with determinations of the will, in every variety of permutation and combination.⁷³

Through the framework provided by the concepts of *histoire* and *discours* it becomes possible to make the distinction between “Penelope” as writing/chapter and Molly as originator of a monologue. This transformation from the personal to the textual, from the regressive to the regenerative (built on the notion of a textual memory as discussed previously) is the model behind the woven texture of “Penelope”. It follows that “Penelope” both contains and generates the mnemotechnic of *Ulysses*. Cheryl Herr is of course correct in stating that “*Ulysses* produces within the terms of its known artistry an illusion of unmediated mind, of unstructured consciousness”.⁷⁴ But her assumption misses a crucial point, that of the sense of a retrospective arrangement pervading the entire narrative of *Ulysses*. As Alyssa O’Brien points out, “few [readers] have encountered *Ulysses* without anticipating the final ‘Yes’”⁷⁵ – which in turn recalls

the “Yes” with which the episode begins. In this sense, “Penelope” does not so much reflect on the notion of return, but instead serves to highlight the process by which the episode (and, indeed, *Ulysses*) was composed. Once we consider what it is that Molly “remembers” and that the text evokes, we recognise, as Brook Thomas claims, “how *Ulysses* came to be more and more about its own creation”.⁷⁶ Molly’s “yes” can thus not just be read as a reliving of her “yes” to Leopold on Howth Hill, it may also be an affirmation of the unending possibilities of selfhood within story-writing.

The technique of uninterrupted internal monologue provides what some critics have regarded as the purest form of representation of (in Bergson’s terms) involuntary memory. Ewa Ziarek, for example, finds in “Penelope” the unity of language, experience, and erotic memory, which she subsumes into a “rhetoric of organicism”. “Molly’s memory”, she affirms, “is seen as faithful to the structure of experience insofar as it is posited as unreflective and involuntary, preserving and itself preserved by the immediacy of sensations”.⁷⁷ Ziarek thus links Molly’s memories firmly with the principle of nature, as opposed to those of mechanical reproduction or “mechanical articulation”⁷⁸ such as we find in the systematically structured “Ithaca” episode. Rickard similarly locates in “Penelope” a representation of the natural when he proposes that the episode has Molly simply drifting unconsciously into her memories⁷⁹ and into the timeless world of sleep.

While Ziarek has a valid argument, a closer look at the textual particularities of “Penelope” is warranted. All too often have Molly’s memories been regarded as mere repetitions, or a straightforward, “natural” mental re-enactment of, or supplement to, a story which centres on those characters which have been “on the move” all day, in other words, on Stephen and Bloom. It has even been suggested that Molly’s narration is purely the result of her own particular psychological state, of “an overly insistent

memory; what it remembers is forgetting".⁸⁰ What this assertion suggests is that for all the attempts she makes to remember, Molly ultimately fails. However, we must keep in mind that many of Molly's half-articulated memories (as well as the things she *knows* she has forgotten) still serve to expand the narrative scope of *Ulysses*, temporally as well as geographically. It is only through Molly that the reader is granted glimpses of life in Gibraltar, and of love affairs long past. Besides, her imagination is by no means sterile. Criticising Molly for her forgetfulness would mean to reduce her presence to consciousness alone.

Molly's initial astonishment at Bloom's request for breakfast slides seamlessly into considerations of his character, his peculiar habits, his sexual problems, before returning to the early stages of their relationship and to Bloom's marriage proposal, apparently almost forcefully extracted from him by Molly as they lay together on the grass at Howth. She weaves, unravels, and reweaves an ever-changing portrait of Leopold. Her thoughts in "Penelope" start and end with musings and reminiscences concerning her husband, but her feelings towards the end are somewhat different from those she experiences at the beginning. Leopold is transformed from "doing his highness" (*U* 18.3) in the presence of Mrs Riordan, from acting deceitful in covering his letter "up with the blottingpaper pretending to be thinking about business" (*U* 18.49) into a man who, sixteen years before, showed remarkable emotional perceptiveness, "he understood or felt what a woman is" (*U* 18.1578-1579).

Insofar as Molly's fond memories of the beginnings of their relationship form the conclusion of the episode, we can stipulate the idea of a return to the past – to the pre-history of *Ulysses*. However, the impulse of transformation aiming towards an as yet undetermined future is just as powerful. The further Molly's thoughts venture into the past, the gentler her view of Leopold becomes. In the continuum of her thoughts, she

transforms him from an impotent and self-absorbed ne'er-do-well into the caring and passionate man that he was when they were lovers on Ben Howth.⁸¹

It is through the journey of Molly's memories that a sense of possible renewal of their passion for each other asserts itself: "Ill just give him one more chance Ill get up early in the morning" (*U* 18.1547-1548). Having deconstructed and subsequently re-constructed her husband through the tale spun by her memories, Molly has asserted her independence from the agency that has shaped the previous seventeen episodes. Robert Newman suggests that "the circularity of Penelope suggests the abolition of time", and he continues with an even bolder claim: "Molly's half-conscious rambling monologue, though full of rational contradictions, established a protean character who resolves the psychological tensions of the novel and transforms personal fragmentation into collective unity".⁸² Molly can get away with these contradictions because they occur within the context of personal memory. Her views, although never ambivalent, are frequently changeable. One single event can be remembered three times, each one modifying or contradicting and thereby blocking out the previous one. As with her deconstruction and re-construction of Leopold, here she remembers, dis-remembers (without seeming to actually forget), and re-remembers from a new point of view. It is not her womanliness, her supposedly female alignment with nature which many critics have proposed, that turns time into a dimension fraught with irrelevance. Nor does she achieve the almost utopian conclusion which "Ithaca" failed to reach, that which Newman calls "collective unity". The sense of wholeness which Molly generates in "Penelope" is, like many other devices in *Ulysses*, a mere illusion created through a process of re-reading and re-writing the prior seventeen chapters. The weaving, unravelling, and weaving-anew of a *histos* (the teller and the tale) is therefore firmly situated in Molly's present.

In my reading of “Penelope”, Molly’s stream of consciousness does not, as Daniel R. Schwarz has suggested, form a “contrast to the self-consciousness of Stephen and fragmentation of Bloom”.⁸³ On the contrary: through the textual mechanics of weaving and unweaving, and offering a centre-post for the reader’s imagination, it embraces the fragmentedness and peculiarities of the earlier episodes and of other characters, but it does so without offering a conclusion, moral or otherwise. In these terms, “Penelope” nevertheless does what Schwarz proposes for Molly: completing “the metaphorical and formal patterns of the novel [...] expanding the novel spatially to include the prehuman, or at least pre-self-conscious world, that preceded modern man”.⁸⁴ On the level of textual memory-technology, we may say that the “Penelope” episode embraces the threads of the Joycean universe from *Dubliners* up and into the cyclic textuality of *Finnegans Wake*, and thus reaffirms a creative exchange with the text’s pre-history as well as with other important “weavers” of tales, most notably Shakespeare and Homer. My concept of *histos* as a framework for the interplay of memory and text does not preclude the awareness of gaps, of holes in the tapestry or the occasional feebleness or even collapse of the upright loom. On the contrary, it is the combination of the personal and the textual aspects of verbal representation, the amalgamation of mentally experienced words and printed signifiers, which helps to overcome the problem of “storing what is absent”.⁸⁵

Memory in *Ulysses* has the potential to cease to be a static reflection of the past, and to grow instead into a process of creative exchange in which past, present, and future moments are allowed to interconnect. Accordingly, memory here is regarded as an opening out of the notion of repository or storeroom towards a work-in-progress which includes erasure and renewal, or in Benjamin’s terms, the “Penelope work of forgetting”.⁸⁶ This view emphasises the dynamic aspects of memory in relation to time:

recollection as inducing, or being induced by, a strong sense of temporal anomaly which must be inferred since it cannot be represented directly. This notion connects to Jan Assmann's concept of "mnemohistory", in which "[t]he past is not simply 'received' by the present. The present is 'haunted' by the past and the past is modelled, invented, reinvented, and reconstructed by the present".⁸⁷ The mnemohistory of *Ulysses* can be read from both ends: starting with "Telemachus" and working through to "Penelope", or vice versa.⁸⁸ Cheryl Herr posits *Ulysses* as "a masterpiece of pseudo-comprehensiveness", "a model of cultural processes and materials".⁸⁹ Building on Herr's notion of a "cultural unconscious" which "remains an inaccessible force"⁹⁰ in *Ulysses*, I would suggest a broadening of this notion to incorporate the impact both of the unconscious and the conscious aspects of memory within textuality.

Molly's memories, then, need not have any significance, interpretative or otherwise, for or on her consciousness, thus opposing the Freudian paradigm of an essentially inaccessible unconscious. Her reminiscences may, however, be read in terms of the opacity of verbal signifiers when it comes to representing concepts such the reality of past experiences and events. In "Penelope", the past is as much in the process of being created (and re-created) as the present and the future. The episode begins and ends with an affirmation to the power of textuality, to the cyclic pattern of creation, destruction, and re-creation: "Yes." Her "yeses" embrace the past and present of textual creation, the associative evocation of reminiscence as well as the lapses and errors that delineate memory's limits within the individual consciousness.

In making "Penelope" the end of the novel, Joyce can thus be said to have made a momentous decision in relation to the construction of memory in *Ulysses*. Molly's mnemonic monologue is not a device for enforcing her identity in a teleological manner or a search for a fragment of the past which will provide some kind of illumination for

the present. The web which she spins in “Penelope” is fundamentally connected not just to her own past but to the past of previous discourses and mnemonic techniques, covering Joyce’s text from *Dubliners* up to what we may consider Molly’s own realisation of herself as a textual construct when she exclaims: “O Jamesy let me up out of this pooh” (*U* 18.1128). Molly does not “like books with a Molly in them like the one he brought me about the one from Flanders” (*U* 18.657-658), and yet she appears briefly to recognise herself as a “Molly within a book”. She has become the catalyst for the self-perpetuating *textum* of “Penelope”, a web which spins memory by linking it to its past and future. This web, naturally, is rendered increasingly complex with the expansion of the narrative. Consequently, in Joyce’s work, we might say it is memory as a textual phenomenon, and the complexity of structure bestowed through its operation, which provides a sense of unity.

Conclusion

This study has explored some of the numerous issues concerning the “texture” of memory, as well as the relationship between character representation and memory contained within the text. My research has been concerned with highlighting the complexities regarding the representation of time, consciousness, and memory processes within some of Joyce’s literary production. Joyce’s works lend themselves particularly well to an analysis of the textuality of memory – and the memory of the text. An acute awareness and command of language’s potential characterise Joyce’s works, and, as I have argued with regard to a selection from these works, this awareness employs and produces different uses and representations. When an author continually engages in processes of revision and rewriting, as Joyce did so extensively, the resultant text is inscribed with traces and residues of these previous writings and readings. In conceptualising the development of memory in terms of the production of a written text, my analysis traces and affirms the relation between memory and these processes of textuality and textual creation.

This study has not concerned itself in any great detail with questions of a historical or socio-political nature. An effort has been made instead to analyse the workings of memory within the framework of textuality, and to map out the mechanics of (re)reading and (re)writing in order to examine how recollection, suppression and creativity relate to issues like repetition, gaps and omissions, and other significant mechanisms of the text. Nevertheless, psychoanalytical and philosophical concepts such as “history”, “the past”, and “consciousness” (to name but a few), which are all concerned with mechanisms of representation and readership, have repeatedly influenced my readings of Joyce’s works.

An overview of Joyce's works in relation to the workings of memory can offer insights into a historical dimension which might be considered inherent in textuality itself. Reading Joyce's works chronologically, as I have largely attempted to do in this study, has also highlighted the role of the reader's memory with its potential to refer back to earlier texts, and to come to terms with narrative indeterminacy, with gaps and elisions, but also with the problem of repetition and its functions, particularly in relation to questions of "textual memory". In turn, this approach illuminates the mnemotechnic processes which we can attribute to the author, to Joyce's role as creator of textuality.

I have structured my reading chronologically and thematically, illustrative of the different conceptions of mnemotechnic and narrative textuality which underlie the Joycean text from the very beginning. Starting with *Dubliners*, my analysis has focussed on the different discourses of memory with which Joyce plays in this collection of short stories. My discussion is built around close readings of four of these stories. All have at their core an unspeakable event, a psychological obstruction or barrier reflected by discursive deadlock, absences around which the characters revolve helplessly. Accordingly, each of the stories examined in this study can be classed as being structured along a cyclic pattern in which a crisis occurs, momentarily disturbing the mechanism of repetition. The crisis emerges when a character is suddenly overwhelmed by the power of individual memory, an awareness which cannot be communicated.

In *Dubliners*, Joyce's text reflects the characters' plight in relation to memory not by describing or imitating memory or the resistance against it. By leaving the centre of the stories "hollow", and by withholding from the narration an authoritative version of events and characters' pasts, the textual structure itself replicates the characters' psychological condition without ever spelling it out. The text is preoccupied more with

evasion and with absence of meaning than with acts of explanation or justification. It *tells* us little about the significance of memory but *shows* us one of its most deeply ingrained challenges: that of representation. My reading of *Dubliners* highlights the discrepancy between discourse and counter-discourse, memory and counter-memory. Memory as an instrument for the recovery of truth is rendered inoperative on the level of character through frustrated attempts at escaping the nets of habit and compulsive repetition, and on the level of text through narrative absences which preclude an interpretative resolution. In "The Dead", as Gabriel is forced to come to terms with the intrusion of a memory over which he has no power, we sense that it is only through such crises that memory may grant a momentary release from a theme of paralysis and repetition.

In discussing *Stephen Hero*, I have made the occasional leap forward in the chronology of Joyce's works. Since *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* share some important characteristics, not least Stephen D(a)edalus as the main protagonist, assessing the former novel in the light of the latter is almost unavoidable. However, even though the text of *Stephen Hero* has survived only as fragment of a much larger work, it is possible to locate within it some important developments as regards Joyce's technique of negotiating questions of memory, habit, and imagination in relation to a central character. Stephen is haunted by his own past as well as by a sense of history as oppressor. I have argued that his Catholic education has shaped him in such a way that he has become entangled in the concept of memory as reinforcing intellectual dependency, of remembering as an essentially passive activity which dwells on the past so as to disengage from the present with its possibilities of change. The notion of habit-memory is an important aspect of Bergson's *Matter and Memory*, and Stephen echoes Bergson in his rejection of passivist models of memory

which revolve around repetition and recurrence rather than imagination and renewal. My analysis has revealed the extent to which the modality of memory in *Stephen Hero* is poised between resistance against and captivation by the past.

Stephen Hero establishes Stephen's propensity to remember through the use of words, foregrounding textual and stylistic experimentation which paves the way to a preoccupation with words not just as signifiers but as objects, an aspect which is also characteristic of Stephen in *A Portrait*. This innovation in "narrating consciousness" is reinforced through Stephen's own attempts at a particular mode of "memory-writing": his epiphanies, recording the unremarkable or the absurd and making it significant – and memorable – precisely through the process of writing. The concept of the epiphany as model of memory exposes a break with the philosophical tradition, and introduces memory in terms of individual consciousness and of the new science of psychology.

In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, we find at work a new paradigm of memory which sets the book apart from Joyce's earlier writings. For the purpose of my discussion, textual memory is presented as a distinctive concept which allows for an examination of remembering as a function located within the parameters of textual representation itself. Where Stephen's memory fails or where he resists any commitment to his past, repetitions and recurrences of key words, along with other verbal patterns, take on the responsibility for recollection. The concept of textual memory is dependent on the reader's memory, on the recognition of absences within the narrative which can be "filled" by textual markers such as Stephen's "queer words". These "queer words" and Stephen's struggle to come to terms with language both as a means of articulation and of recording sensual perception compose his intellectual development. Verbal patterns also draw attention to the physical aspect of authorship, to that of the word as a printed signifier, and of the novel as an artefact.

Examined in these terms, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* shows a radical shift in Joyce's treatment of his protagonist, and of his engagement with questions of memory and consciousness in light of the emergence of psychoanalysis. It is possible, I suggest, to read Sigmund Freud's works, in particular his case histories and his study of Leonardo da Vinci, as a background against which to study *A Portrait*. Freud's approach to memory underwent a number of significant modifications in the period 1905 to 1915, away from the endeavour to uncover the forgotten or to return to the moment when a memory was formed, towards the creation of selfhood through a process of narrative integration, of analysis as a (re-)construction closely related to textual creation. Even though Joyce reportedly thought psychoanalysis a dubious practice, we can nevertheless situate *A Portrait of the Artist* at a point where memory transcends the limits of character, attaining a complexity which necessitates new modes of narrative and textual representation. These are even more prominent in *Ulysses*, which is the subject of my research in the second half of this thesis.

My research into *Ulysses* is subdivided into three chapters, each of which focuses on a different issue in relation to memory, character representation, and textuality. In the first section of my analysis of *Ulysses*, the focus remains on Stephen Dedalus. Drawing on my reading of *A Portrait*, I argue that Stephen's relationship with memory remains problematic and examine the anatomy of those moments in which the past intrudes into the present. Specifically, I situate Stephen within two opposed paradigms of selfhood as experienced through modes of memory: the Aristotelian concept of entelechy based on an individual's stable essence located in the soul, and a Protean notion presuming perpetual transformation and, consequently, the fragmentation of one's self. My reading resists the idea that Stephen in *Ulysses* may be the locus for an autobiographically informed rewriting of Joyce's own experiences, and puts forward

instead an interpretation which sees Stephen poised within the tension between embracing and rejecting the past as a formative element for the creation of personal identity. The reader of *A Portrait* may recollect some of the decisive and traumatic events in Stephen's childhood and adolescence, such as the "square ditch" incident and the ensuing illness, Stephen's infatuation with E-C-, the Christmas Dinner Scene, or the bird-girl epiphany. I propose that here the reader's memory is at odds with Stephen's own memories as he experiences them in *Ulysses*. The main enduring feature appears to be his aquaphobia: he remembers with dread the bath in Clongowes, and drowning plays a major part in the anxiety he experiences in connection with his mother's death. Stephen's strategies of memory fail him, as he cannot succeed in banishing the past he disavows. For example, in identifying with Hamlet, he has tied himself into various knots and positioned himself in an impasse, the role of the haunted son, cut off from the past yet required to remember in order to resolve the riddle of the present. The past returns, clad in the ghostly emergence of his mother's emaciated body. It is in the fantastical world of "Circe" that memory becomes empowered, and a panic-stricken Stephen has to realise that through his refusal to engage with memory he will become more and more entangled in a tormenting past.

My discussion of Leopold Bloom introduces the notion of gramophony, the concept of a textual technology enabling the "recording" and "replaying" of sound for the purpose of generating memory-incidents as well as "soundscapes" which render the temporal and spatial organisation of *Ulysses* increasingly complex. In the "Sirens" episode, which serves to conceal and simultaneously expose the most decisive event of 16 June 1904, I locate the epicentre of the memorial in *Ulysses*. From Bloom's idea of the gramophone as a memory-instrument I trace the technique of textual phonography, a poetics of sound which is paradoxically dependent on the reader's acoustic memory of

printed textual elements. While Bloom for the most part succeeds in resisting associations that might engender unpleasant memories for him, the text with its inscribed sound patterns undermines his determination.

Molly Bloom and her memories in the “Penelope” episode constitute the subject of the final chapter. The analysis has resulted in a framework based on the evaluation of the relationship between Molly the character and “Penelope” the text. My reading of “Penelope” aligns itself with those critics who have recently challenged the predominant view of the episode as representing verbalised thought. I draw attention to Molly’s interest in the written word, and develop the hypothesis that, in “Penelope”, Joyce has transposed his method of textual production onto Molly’s creation of her own story, the text that is being woven and unpicked as she adjusts and re-adjusts the words that clothe her memories. Through Molly’s narrated recollections, “Penelope” reflects on the textual production of *Ulysses* both as a work of memory and as a work of writing. My study associates Molly with what I have called the principle of *histos*: the amalgamation of material and the manner of its fabrication, or, more specifically, the text as artefact brought to life within the words that appear to originate purely in Molly’s mind.

The main objective of this thesis has been to trace the poetics of memory through a selection of Joyce’s works, and to highlight the relationship between concepts of memory, time, identity, and the *textum* within the framework of textual production. In exploring a variety of paradigms concerning memory and consciousness within a series of critical readings of Joyce’s works, this study has created a conceptual framework for a deeper understanding of the correlation between textuality and mnemotechnic.

Notes

Part I: *Dubliners*, *Stephen Hero*, and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*

Chapter 1

- ¹ Hugh Kenner, "The *Portrait* in Perspective", in *Joyce's 'Portrait': Criticisms and Critiques*, ed. by Thomas Connolly (London: Peter Owen, 1964), p. 29.
- ² Udaya Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in 'Ulysses'* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 13.
- ³ Shiv K. Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel* (London: Blackie & Son, 1962), p. 118.
- ⁴ Peter Brooks, *Reading for the Plot* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 111.
- ⁵ Carla Dente, and others, eds, *Proteus: The Language of Metamorphosis*, Studies in European Cultural Transition 26 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 28.
- ⁶ Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. by Harry Zohn, ed. by Hannah Arendt (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 205.
- ⁷ Nicholas Andrew Miller, *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 24.
- ⁸ Miller, *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory*, p. 61.
- ⁹ Miller, *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory*, p. 15.
- ¹⁰ Miller, *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory*, p. 60.
- ¹¹ Miller, *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory*, p. 156.
- ¹² Miller, *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory*, p. 157.
- ¹³ Robert Scholes and Richard M. Kain, eds, *The Workshop of Daedalus* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 60.
- ¹⁴ McCormack lists these as follows: "massive labour unrest in Dublin, the Rebellion, the murder of Joyce's friend Sheehy-Skeffington, the Great War, the internment of Stanislaus Joyce in Austria, revolution in Russia and Germany". W.J. McCormack, "Nightmares of History: James Joyce and the Phenomenon of Anglo-Irish Literature", in *James Joyce and Modern Literature*, ed. by W.J. McCormack and Alistair Stead (London: Routledge, 1982), p. 93.
- ¹⁵ W.J. McCormack, "Nightmares of History: James Joyce and the Phenomenon of Anglo-Irish Literature", pp. 84-85.

- ¹⁶ Christine van Boheemen, "The Trauma of Irishness; or, Literature as a Material Cultural Memory in Joyce", *Configurations* 7.2 (1999), p. 251.
- ¹⁷ Van Boheemen, "The Trauma of Irishness; or, Literature as a Material Cultural Memory in Joyce", p. 254.
- ¹⁸ Van Boheemen, "The Trauma of Irishness; or, Literature as a Material Cultural Memory in Joyce", p. 248.
- ¹⁹ Van Boheemen, "The Trauma of Irishness; or, Literature as a Material Cultural Memory in Joyce", p. 262.
- ²⁰ Van Boheemen, "The Trauma of Irishness; or, Literature as a Material Cultural Memory in Joyce", p. 258.
- ²¹ Maud Ellmann, "Disremembering Dedalus: *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", in *Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader*, ed. by Robert Young (New York: Routledge, 1981), p. 192.
- ²² Ellmann, "Disremembering Dedalus: *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", p. 192.
- ²³ Van Boheemen defines this term as follows: "a signifier that comes in the place of an excluded or repressed representation" (p. 249).
- ²⁴ Ellmann, "Disremembering Dedalus: *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", p. 196.
- ²⁵ Ellmann, "Disremembering Dedalus: *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", p. 189.
- ²⁶ Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in 'Ulysses'*, p. 12.
- ²⁷ Adam Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 25.
- ²⁸ Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 43.
- ²⁹ Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 195.
- ³⁰ Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 195.
- ³¹ Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 143.
- ³² Sheldon Brivic, *Joyce Between Freud and Jung* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1980), p. 5.
- ³³ Brivic, *Joyce Between Freud and Jung*, p. 13.
- ³⁴ Brivic, *Joyce Between Freud and Jung*, p. 28.
- ³⁵ John S. Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 21.
- ³⁶ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 20.

³⁷ John Paul Riquelme, “Stephen Hero, *Dubliners*, and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: styles of realism and fantasy”, in *The Cambridge Companion to James Joyce*, ed. by Derek Attridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 120.

³⁸ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 118.

Chapter 2

¹ *Letters of James Joyce*, Vol. I, ed. by Stuart Gilbert (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), p. 55.

² Gerald Gould in the *New Statesman*, iii (27 June 1914), p. 374. Quoted in *James Joyce: The Critical Heritage*, Vol. 1, ed. by Robert H. Deming (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 63.

³ Amar Acheraiou, “Echoes and Shadows”, in ‘*Dubliners*’, *James Joyce: 'The Dead', John Houston*, ed. by Pascal Bataillard and Dominique Sipièrè (Paris: ellipses, 2000), p. 43.

⁴ Robert Spoo suggests that Gabriel Conroy’s actions, in particular his interaction with women, may be guided by a repetition compulsion. Robert Spoo, “Uncanny Returns in ‘The Dead’: Ibsenian Intertexts and the Estranged Infant”, in *Joyce: The Return of the Repressed*, ed. by Susan Stanford Friedman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 99.

⁵ Margot Norris, *Suspicious Readings of Joyce's 'Dubliners'* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), p. 9.

⁶ Garry M. Leonard, *Reading 'Dubliners' Again* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993), p. 4.

⁷ As Gerald Gould pointed out in his 1914 review of *Dubliners*, “Mr. Joyce insists upon aspects of life which are ordinarily not mentioned. To do him justice, we do not think it is a pose with him: he simply includes the ‘unmentionable’ in his persistent regard”. Gerald Gould in the *New Statesman*, iii (27 June 1914), p. 374. Quoted in *James Joyce: The Critical Heritage*, p. 63.

⁸ Margot Norris, *Suspicious Readings of Joyce's 'Dubliners'*, p. 9.

⁹ Harold F. Mosher Jr., “The Narrated and Its Negatives: The Nonnarrated and the Disnarrated in Joyce’s *Dubliners*”, *Style* 27.3 (Fall 1993), p. 409.

¹⁰ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 68.

¹¹ Benoit Tadié, “Memory and Narrative Deadlock in *Dubliners*”, in *Classic Joyce*, ed. by Franca Ruggieri (Rome: Bulzoni, 1999), p. 373.

¹² Joseph Buttigieg, *A Portrait of the Artist in Different Perspective* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987), p. 32.

- ¹³ Carle Bonafous-Murat, "Disposition and Pre-disposition: the Art of Involuntary Memory in *Dubliners*", in *Classic Joyce*, ed. by Franca Ruggieri (Rome: Bulzoni, 1999), p. 362.
- ¹⁴ David Gross, *Lost Time* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), p. 37.
- ¹⁵ "In her home anyway she had shelter and food" (*D* 194).
- ¹⁶ David Gross, "Bergson, Proust, and the Revaluation of Memory", *International Philosophical Quarterly* 25.4 (1985), p. 378.
- ¹⁷ Many critics, among them Walton Litz, Terence Brown, W.Y. Tindall and Don Gifford, have presented a variety of theories as regards the "true meaning" behind "Derevaun Seraun". Kiljoong Kim gives an overview of past interpretations of the phrase before offering his own opinion: He reads it as a manifestation of the "suppressed cultural subconscious" in Mrs Hill, a regression to a former state and with it to a language long lost. The words, such as he translates them from a variant of Irish, read: "The end of woman is so miserable!" Kiljoong Kim, "A World within a World: A Peep into Mrs. Hill's Buried Life", in *James Joyce Journal*, 10.2 (Winter 2004), pp. 95-96.
- ¹⁸ Carle Bonafous-Murat, "Disposition and Pre-disposition: the Art of Involuntary Memory in *Dubliners*", p. 363.
- ¹⁹ This type of deliberation is initiated by the central question Eveline poses herself: "Was that wise?" (*D* 193-194).
- ²⁰ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 63.
- ²¹ Margot Norris points out that "[n]ineteen-year-old Eveline counts at least two deaths among her contemporaries – those of her favorite brother Ernest and her playmate Tizzie Dunn". *Suspicious Readings of Joyce's 'Dubliners'*, p. 58. Bernard Benstock, too, lists these deaths, along with that of Eveline's mother. Bernard Benstock, *Narrative Con/Texts in 'Dubliners'* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 37.
- ²² "The dilemma Eveline is faced with is whether she should honour her mother's 'commonplace' request, which eventually will lead to a nervous breakdown of her own, or to heed the uninhibited tone of her mother's 'final craziness', which urges her to flee from the house at her first opportunity." Leonard, *Reading 'Dubliners' Again*, p. 98.
- ²³ Wolfgang Wicht points out that the text here deconstructs itself by exposing Mr Duffy's subjectivity as a fiction generated by narcissism. Wolfgang Wicht, "Eveline and/as 'A Painful Case': Paralysis, Desire, Signifiers", in *New Perspectives on 'Dubliners'*, ed. by Mary Power and Ulrich Schneider (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), p. 133.

- ²⁴ Raffaella Baccolini, "She Had Become a Memory: Women as Memory in James Joyce's *Dubliners*", in *ReJoycing: New Readings of 'Dubliners'*, ed. by Rosa M. Bolletieri Bosinelli and Harold F. Mosher Jr. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998), p. 147.
- ²⁵ Raffaella Baccolini, "She Had Become a Memory: Women as Memory in James Joyce's *Dubliners*", p. 147.
- ²⁶ Cynthia D. Wheatley-Lovoy suggests that through this monologue, Duffy "maintains order and control by spatializing and objectifying himself through narrative". Cynthia D. Wheatley-Lovoy, "The Rebirth of Tragedy: Nietzsche and Narcissus in 'A Painful Case' and 'The Dead'", *JJQ* 33.2 (1996), p. 181.
- ²⁷ See, for example, Suzette A. Henke, *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 36.
- ²⁸ Leonard, *Reading 'Dubliners' Again*, p. 216.
- ²⁹ Margot Norris proposes the term "body language" for a style of narration where two modes of expression become superimposed, where "the narrative voice is *doing* something rather than just *saying*" (p. 11). The extent to which readings of *Dubliners* differ among critics supports this notion. For example, Norris sees Eveline as having a panic attack at the dock (p. 60), while Leonard is convinced that Eveline is experiencing a moment of *jouissance* (p. 110).
- ³⁰ For example, the phrase "[Mrs Sinico] began to be rather intemperate in her habits" (*D* 274) can easily be read as a euphemistic description of Mrs Sinico's alcoholism.
- ³¹ Leonard, *Reading 'Dubliners' Again*, p. 319.
- ³² Wolfgang Wicht points out that the text comments ironically on Duffy's self-centredness by exposing his desire to be confessor and saint in one person, and suggests that the text fabricates a clash between sacramental terminology and biographical impulse. Wolfgang Wicht, "Eveline and/as 'A Painful Case': Paralysis, Desire, Signifiers", p. 135.
- ³³ In her reading of "A Painful Case", Colleen Lamos has come to a similar conclusion: "Duffy's case is 'painful' to him primarily because, his narcissism notwithstanding, he fails to have the complete control that he wishes over the significance of his words and actions. Mrs. Sinico is, as it were, an errant reader of his gestures, temporarily disrupting the autoerotic circuit of his desires." Colleen Lamos, "Duffy's subjectivation: The Psychic Life of 'A Painful Case', in *Masculinities in Joyce: Postcolonial Constructions*, ed. by Christine van Boheemen-Saaf and Colleen Lamos (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001), p. 67.
- ³⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 3rd edn, trans. by Thomas Common, ed. by Dr Oscar Levy (Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis, 1914), p. 65. Duffy's recoil at Mrs Sinico's attempt at physical intimacy becomes even more resonant in relation to another quotation from

- Nietzsche, significantly under the heading “Chastity”: “Is it not better to fall into the hands of a murderer, than into the hands of a lustful woman?” (p. 61).
- ³⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 72.
- ³⁶ Colleen Lamos, for example, argues that Duffy can be neither a homo- nor a heterosexual, because he will never love or desire anyone but himself. Colleen Lamos, “Duffy’s subjectivation: The Psychic Life of ‘A Painful Case’”, pp. 66-67. Conversely, Edward Brandabur is convinced that Duffy recoils from what he perceives to be “a morally compromising situation”, that is, a sexual as opposed to a spiritual relationship with a married woman. Edward Brandabur, *A Scrupulous Meanness: A Study of Joyce’s Early Work* (Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 79. Bernard Benstock concurs with this view, citing “middle-class propriety” as a motive. Bernard Benstock, *Narrative Con/Texts in ‘Dubliners’*, p. 131.
- ³⁷ The newspaper article also relies on the euphemistic word “habit” to explain Mrs Sinico’s disposition: “The deceased had been in the habit of crossing the lines late at night” (D 273), “[...] his wife began to be rather intemperate in her habits” (D 274), “Miss Mary Sinico said that of late her mother had been in the habit of going out late at night to buy spirits” (D 274).
- ³⁸ Leonard, *Reading ‘Dubliners’ Again*, p. 223.
- ³⁹ Leonard, *Reading ‘Dubliners’ Again*, p. 224, emphasis Leonard’s.
- ⁴⁰ Wolfgang Wicht, “Eveline and/as ‘A Painful Case’: Paralysis, Desire, Signifiers”, in *New Perspectives on ‘Dubliners’*, p. 131.
- ⁴¹ Amar Acheraïou makes a general observation in relation to *Dubliners* which appears to be especially fitting for a discussion of “A Painful Case”: “Faced with the linguistic bankruptcy, [the characters] rely on the mode of repetition to find in the appropriated words of the Other a sort of communion, a means to get out of the perceptual prison of the self and transcend in the meantime the control of the linguistic medium.” Amar Acheraïou, “Echoes and Shadows”, p. 44.
- ⁴² Samuel Beckett, *Proust* (New York: Grove Press, 1957), p. 17.
- ⁴³ Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale, ed. by Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 60.
- ⁴⁴ Henke, *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire*, p. 37.
- ⁴⁵ Wolfgang Streit, *Joyce / Foucault: Sexual Confessions* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), p. 17.
- ⁴⁶ Leonard, *Reading ‘Dubliners’ Again*, p. 135.

- ⁴⁷ Fritz Senn refers to this phenomenon as “misdirection”, and to the story’s technique as “elsewhereness”: As readers, we cannot know for sure what happened between Mr Doran and Polly Mooney, but we are encouraged to imagine “every ridiculous detail” (*D* 224). The main events take place, or have already taken place, outside the text; and the main characters appear in separate locations. Senn, “‘The Boarding House’ Seen as a Tale of Misdirection”, *JJQ* 23.4 (1986), pp. 405–406. Margot Norris touches on the problem of moral judgement when she writes: “The narration leads or misleads the reader into positions from which an objective adjudication becomes virtually impossible”. Norris, *Suspicious Readings of Joyce’s ‘Dubliners’*, p. 96.
- ⁴⁸ Norris, *Suspicious Readings of Joyce’s ‘Dubliners’*, pp. 107 and 93. Streit observes that there is a clerical term, *scrupes*, which refers to individuals who suffer from a compulsion to go through the ritual of confession again and again; see Wolfgang Streit, *Joyce / Foucault: Sexual Confessions*, p. 17.
- ⁴⁹ Senn, “‘The Boarding House’ Seen as a Tale of Misdirection”, p. 407.
- ⁵⁰ *Selected Letters of James Joyce*, ed. by Richard Ellmann (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 75.
- ⁵¹ Garry M. Leonard, “The Nothing Place: Secrets and Sexual Orientation in Joyce”, in *Quare Joyce*, ed. by Joseph Valente (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 87.
- ⁵² Senn, “‘The Boarding House’ Seen as a Tale of Misdirection”, p. 409.
- ⁵³ Fritz Senn has a similar idea in mind when he writes: “In some sense, ‘The Boarding House’ puts several discordant, incomplete presentations of the affair against each other (including Polly’s own dreaming version). The affair itself, in the center, remains un verbalized.” Senn, “‘The Boarding House’ Seen as a Tale of Misdirection”, p. 410.
- ⁵⁴ For example, Florence L. Walzl mentions “a conniving mother and her pregnant daughter”. “Dubliners”, in *A Companion to Joyce Studies*, ed. by Zack Bowen and James F. Carens (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 176.
- ⁵⁵ Senn, “‘The Boarding House’ Seen as a Tale of Misdirection”, p. 406.
- ⁵⁶ Margot Norris points out that this phrase represents “an uncommon descent into low idiom that makes the respectable front of the narrative language conspicuously visible”, in particular when contrasted with Bob Doran’s much more formal diction (he “was very anxious indeed this Sunday morning”, *D* 224). *Suspicious Readings of Joyce’s ‘Dubliners’*, p. 102.
- ⁵⁷ That this will turn out to be a realistic conjecture is not only evident from Doran’s massive doubts as to Polly’s suitability as a companion for life (“But the family would look down on

- her”, “She was a little vulgar”, *D* 224), but shows itself as a fact in the “Cyclops” chapter of *Ulysses*.
- ⁵⁸ Leonard, *Reading ‘Dubliners’ Again*, p. 110.
- ⁵⁹ Søren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or*, transl. by David F. Swenson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 220. Perhaps significantly, the citation is from the section entitled “The Unhappiest Man”.
- ⁶⁰ Vincent Pecora has written that “The Dead” “recalls in one way or another every preceding story in *Dubliners*”, in particular as regards aspects such as the representation of physical aging, psychological repression, and emotional arrest. Vincent P. Pecora, “‘The Dead’ and the Generosity of the Word”, *PMLA* 101.1 (1986), p. 223.
- ⁶¹ Robert Spoo, “Uncanny Returns in ‘The Dead’: Ibsenian Intertexts and the Estranged Infant”, p. 89.
- ⁶² Harold F. Mosher Jr., “The Narrated and Its Negatives: The Nonnarrated and the Disnarrated in Joyce’s *Dubliners*”, pp. 413 and 423. Mosher argues that, towards the end of “The Dead”, “Gabriel has created a narrated out of a past that had remained so long nonnarrated and has prevented it from becoming a disnarrated, has prevented it from being forgotten, from dying” (p. 423). While the notion of latent absence being turned into a meaningful presence through an act of narration may provide some insight into the question of memory, Mosher’s terminology does little to illuminate Gabriel’s problematic interaction with women, and his preoccupation with orderliness and tradition.
- ⁶³ Leonard, *Reading ‘Dubliners’ Again*, p. 291.
- ⁶⁴ Baccolini’s conclusion of this gendered reading of *Dubliners* is that “[Joyce’s] use of memory, like that of his male contemporaries, reveals a traditional attitude towards women”, (p. 147) an inference which is highly problematical, as I will try to show in the course of my argument.
- ⁶⁵ Raffaella Baccolini, “She Had Become a Memory: Women as Memory in James Joyce’s *Dubliners*”, in *ReJoycing: New Readings of ‘Dubliners’*, p. 154.
- ⁶⁶ Norris, *Suspicious Readings of Joyce’s ‘Dubliners’*, p. 221.
- ⁶⁷ Leonard, “The Nothing Place: Secrets and Sexual Orientation in Joyce”, p. 90.
- ⁶⁸ Henke observes that “Gabriel’s surge of conjugal tenderness is entirely focused on private memories filtered through a nostalgic vision of himself as a fiery cavalier”. *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire*, p. 44.
- ⁶⁹ Several critics, among them Ruth Bauerle and Suzette Henke, have drawn attention to the threat of rape which hovers over the scene. Bauerle, “Mate Rape, Date Rape: A Liturgical

Interpretation of 'The Dead', in *New Alliances in Joyce Studies*, ed. by Bonnie Kime Scott (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1988), p. 118. Henke, *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire*, p. 45. Again, this recalls Ibsen's *A Doll's House*, where Torvald finds his erotic desire almost boiling over immediately after he and Nora have returned from a Christmas party.

- ⁷⁰ Buttigieg, *A Portrait of the Artist in Different Perspective*, p. 37.
- ⁷¹ This fits in with Leonard's notion that "the 'masculine' subject [...] must imagine all the secrets of his wife are secrets he shares". "The Nothing Place: Secrets and Sexual Orientation in Joyce", p. 91.
- ⁷² Robert Spoo points out that "Gretta has had to bury her past in order to become the wife of Gabriel Conroy, a man who feels ashamed of his wife's simple, rural origins and unconsciously agrees with his mother's class-based assessment as 'country cute'". "Uncanny Returns in 'The Dead': Ibsenian Intertexts and the Estranged Infant", p. 109.
- ⁷³ Buttigieg, for example, is convinced that Gabriel's feelings of generosity and sympathy towards Gretta are authentic, and that "the dead have given [him] a glimpse of life, real life". Buttigieg, *A Portrait of the Artist in Different Perspective*, p. 38.
- ⁷⁴ Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 252.
- ⁷⁵ Henke, for example, cautions the reader to "distrust swooning souls and self-deceptive epiphanies", suggesting that, towards the end of "The Dead", "Gabriel may well be trapped in a self-indulgent replication of romantic asceticism". *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire*, p. 47.
- ⁷⁶ Pecora, "'The Dead' and the Generosity of the Word", p. 237. In his essay, Pecora outlines the ambiguity of language and the power of mythmaking through which we encounter the story's characters. He proposes a view of Gabriel "as an ideological repository", a reflection of "what we most demand from him at the close of *Dubliners* – a detour, a shortcut, a way out" (p. 234).
- ⁷⁷ Blake Bailey, "His Journey Westward: Gabriel's Ambiguous Epiphany in 'The Dead'", *Short Story* 8.2 (2000), p. 84.
- ⁷⁸ Bailey, "His Journey Westward: Gabriel's Ambiguous Epiphany in 'The Dead'", p. 82.
- ⁷⁹ Buttigieg points out that Gretta "seems to be experiencing the events of her youth as if for the first time. This is, perhaps, a genuine repetition as opposed to a tranquil recollection of the past." *A Portrait of the Artist in Different Perspective*, p. 38.
- ⁸⁰ Gretta appears to have forgotten the tune's title: "I couldn't think of the name" (*D* 372).

- ⁸¹ Leonard, *Reading 'Dubliners' Again*, p. 292. Quotation from Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Wilden, 1981), p. 21.
- ⁸² Bailey, "His Journey Westward: Gabriel's Ambiguous Epiphany in 'The Dead'", p. 83.
- ⁸³ I have borrowed the expression, used in a different context, from Robert Spoo's essay "Uncanny Returns in 'The Dead': Ibsenian Intertexts and the Estranged Infant", p. 108.
- ⁸⁴ Garland critical edition of *Dubliners*, pp. 382-384.
- ⁸⁵ Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", p. 61.

Chapter 3

- ¹ Kate O'Brien, "Fiction", *The Spectator* 173 (4 August 1944), p. 112. Quoted in Thomas E. Connolly, "Stephen Hero", in *A Companion to Joyce Studies*, ed. by Zack Bowen and James F. Carens (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 246.
- ² For an overview of the critical reception, see Thomas E. Connolly, "Stephen Hero", pp. 244-248. There is also a list of published reviews (pp. 252-253).
- ³ Riquelme, "Stephen Hero, *Dubliners*, and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: styles of realism and fantasy", p. 104.
- ⁴ Riquelme, "Stephen Hero, *Dubliners*, and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: styles of realism and fantasy", p. 105.
- ⁵ Francis Harvey, "Stephen Hero and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: The Intervention of Style in a Work of Creative Imagination", in *A Bash in the Tunnel*, ed. by John Ryan (Brighton: Clifton Books, 1970), p. 204, italics in the original.
- ⁶ Harvey, "Stephen Hero and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: The Intervention of Style in a Work of Creative Imagination", p. 204.
- ⁷ Patrick Parrinder, *James Joyce* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 34.
- ⁸ See introductory paragraph of Connolly's article "Stephen Hero", p. 229.
- ⁹ See frontispiece of Michael Maher, S.J., *Psychology*, 4th edn (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1900).
- ¹⁰ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 24.
- ¹¹ Maher, S.J., *Psychology*, pp. 186-187, original emphasis.
- ¹² Harvey, "Stephen Hero and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: The Intervention of Style in a Work of Creative Imagination", p. 204.
- ¹³ Beckett, *Proust*, p. 7.
- ¹⁴ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 60.

- ¹⁵ Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: George Allen, 1912), p. 92.
- ¹⁶ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 95.
- ¹⁷ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 179.
- ¹⁸ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 95.
- ¹⁹ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 102.
- ²⁰ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 102.
- ²¹ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 93.
- ²² Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 89.
- ²³ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 90.
- ²⁴ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 95, emphasis added.
- ²⁵ Maher, S.J., *Psychology*, p. 388.
- ²⁶ Maher, S.J., *Psychology*, p. 393.
- ²⁷ "She wants a man and a little house to live in", Cranly reports in Chapter XXIII (*SH* 179).
- ²⁸ Stanislaus Joyce, *My Brother's Keeper* (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), p. 83.
- ²⁹ At University College, too, "[t]he mortifying atmosphere of the college crept about Stephen's heart" (*SH* 193), and, only a few lines later, "[t]he deadly chill of the atmosphere of the college paralysed Stephen's heart" (*SH* 194). His studies confuse rather than elevate his mind: "He followed his Italian lesson mechanically, feeling the unintermittent deadliness of the atmosphere of the college in his throat and lungs, obscuring his eyes and obfuscating the brain" (*SH* 194).
- ³⁰ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 69.
- ³¹ Miller, *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory*, p. 26.
- ³² Miller, *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory*, p. 26.
- ³³ William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 125.
- ³⁴ Philip Kuberski, *The Persistence of Memory: Organism, Myth, Text* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 133.
- ³⁵ Stanislaus Joyce, *The Dublin Diary of Stanislaus Joyce*, ed. by George Harris Healey (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), p. 14, emphasis added.
- ³⁶ Vicki Mahaffey, "Joyce's shorter works", in *The Cambridge Companion to James Joyce*, ed. by Derek Attridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 190.
- ³⁷ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 140.

- ³⁸ “All the most famous epiphanies in Joyce [...] are revelations of significance (or personal, sensed significance, or psychological, subjective significance); they are illuminations of character or of society... of life and of meaning, not necessarily of beauty.” Morris Beja, “Epiphany and the Epiphanies”, in *A Companion to Joyce Studies*, ed. by Zack Bowen and James F. Carens (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 720-721.
- ³⁹ This is made very clear in the introductory section of Maher’s *Psychology*, where we find the blunt statement: “Whether it wishes to or not, Psychology is inevitably a branch of Philosophy” (p. 3).
- ⁴⁰ Joyce, *My Brother’s Keeper*, p. 184.
- ⁴¹ Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in ‘Ulysses’*, p. 157.
- ⁴² Christine van Boheemen-Saaf, *Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 49.
- ⁴³ Maher, S.J., *Psychology*, p. 346.
- ⁴⁴ G. Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 184, quoted in Maher, S.J., *Psychology*, p. 346.
- ⁴⁵ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. xiv, original emphasis.
- ⁴⁶ These can be found in *JJA* [Vol. 7].
- ⁴⁷ Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in ‘Ulysses’*, p. 156.
- ⁴⁸ Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in ‘Ulysses’*, p. 156.
- ⁴⁹ Beckett, *Proust*, p. 11.
- ⁵⁰ Beckett, *Proust*, p. 11.
- ⁵¹ Scholes and Kain, eds, *The Workshop of Daedalus*, p. 35.
- ⁵² Scholes and Kain, eds, *The Workshop of Daedalus*, p. 35.
- ⁵³ Joyce, *My Brother’s Keeper*, p. 134.
- ⁵⁴ Sigmund Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, trans. and ed. by James Strachey (London: Ernest Benn, 1966), p. 191.
- ⁵⁵ Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, p. 191 (original emphasis).
- ⁵⁶ Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, p. 191.
- ⁵⁷ Beckett, *Proust*, p. 17.
- ⁵⁸ Janine F. Hay and Larry L. Jacoby, “Separating Habit and Recollection: Memory Slips, Process Dissociations, and Probability Matching”, *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 22.6 (1996), 1332.
- ⁵⁹ Beckett, *Proust*, p. 9.

Chapter 4

- ¹ James Joyce, *Poems and Shorter Writings*, ed. by Richard Ellmann, A. Walton Litz and John Whittier-Ferguson (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), p. 211.
- ² Incidentally, Brooks reads initiatory openings like “I sing of”, “I tell of”, (and, presumably, “Once upon a time”) as “claim[s] to an act of repetition”. *Reading for the Plot*, p. 97.
- ³ Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, p. 107.
- ⁴ Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, p. 111.
- ⁵ “[...] repetition properly so called is recollected forwards”, Kierkegaard argues, and continues: “Therefore repetition, if it is possible, makes a man happy, whereas recollection makes him unhappy [...]” Søren Kierkegaard, *Repetition* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1942), p. 4.
- ⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. by Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), p. 77.
- ⁷ Ellmann, “The Name and the Scar: Identity in *The Odyssey* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*”, p. 155.
- ⁸ Ellmann, “The Name and the Scar: Identity in *The Odyssey* and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*”, p. 152.
- ⁹ Gilles Deleuze affirms the scar’s potential to synthesise past and present: “A scar is the sign not of a past wound but of ‘the present fact of having been wounded’: we can say that it is the contemplation of the wound, that it contracts all the instants which separate us from it into a living present.” *Difference and Repetition*, p. 77.
- ¹⁰ Patrick Parrinder, “A Portrait of the Artist”, in *James Joyce’s ‘A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man’: A Casebook*, ed. by Mark Wollaeger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 100.
- ¹¹ This, incidentally and perhaps ironically, remains the only time he receives this form of punishment, see *P IV.313-314*.
- ¹² “He had refused. Why?” (*P IV.656*)
- ¹³ Riquelme, “*Stephen Hero*, *Dubliners*, and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: styles of realism and fantasy”, p. 119.
- ¹⁴ Michael Levenson, “Stephen’s Diary in Joyce’s *Portrait* – The Shape of Life”, in *James Joyce’s ‘A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man’: A Casebook*, ed. by Mark Wollaeger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 183.
- ¹⁵ Van Boheemen, “The Trauma of Irishness; or, Literature as Material Cultural Memory in Joyce”, p. 247.

- ¹⁶ Parrinder, "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 97.
- ¹⁷ Brooks, *Reading for the Plot*, p. 99.
- ¹⁸ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 118. In Rickard's work, the term "textual memory" is applied only in the context of a discussion of memory in *Ulysses*.
- ¹⁹ Ned Lukacher, *Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 30.
- ²⁰ Parrinder, "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 100.
- ²¹ Riquelme, "Stephen Hero, Dubliners, and *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: styles of realism and fantasy", p. 118.
- ²² Hugh Kenner, "The *Portrait* in Perspective", in *James Joyce's 'A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man'*, ed. by Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1988), pp. 20-21.
- ²³ Patrick Parrinder, "Joyce's *Portrait* and the Proof of the Oracle", in *James Joyce's 'A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man'*, ed. by Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1988), p. 145.
- ²⁴ For a discussion of this relation, see Michael Levenson, "Stephen's Diary in Joyce's *Portrait* – The Shape of Life", pp. 191-192.
- ²⁵ Derek Attridge, "Language, sexuality and the remainder in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", in *James Joyce and the Difference of Language*, ed. by Laurent Milesi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 128.
- ²⁶ Derek Attridge, "Language, sexuality and the remainder in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", p. 129.
- ²⁷ Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 24.
- ²⁸ Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 43. Piette explains the term as follows: "I call sound-repetitions clustering around key-terms 'prose rhymes' [...] because the acoustic alerting-devices in prose are often full or half-rhymes, in the technical sense, which order the preceding and subsequent sound-effects into initial- and vowel-rhymes. Hearing a dense sound-pattern in a prose passage often relies on the presence within it of a sound-coupling approaching classical verse-rhyme." (pp. 43-44.)
- ²⁹ Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 45.
- ³⁰ Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, p. 118-119.
- ³¹ Ellmann, "Disremembering Dedalus: *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", p. 203.
- ³² As opposed to that of the protagonist and that of the narrating agent.

- ³³ Wim van Mierlo, for instance, has discovered in Joyce's notebooks for *Finnegans Wake* entries which relate to Freud's so-called "President Schreber" case study, as well as to E. Boyd Barrett's *The New Psychology*. See "The Freudful Couchmare Revisited: Contextualizing Joyce and the New Psychology", in *Joyce Studies Annual* 8 (1997), 115-116.
- ³⁴ Brooks, *Reading for the Plot*, p. 97.
- ³⁵ Brooks, *Reading for the Plot*, pp. 268-269.
- ³⁶ Sigmund Freud, "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through", in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. XII (1911-1913), trans. and ed. by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1958), p. 147.
- ³⁷ Freud, "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through", p. 148.
- ³⁸ Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. by Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1981), p. 47. Quoted in Ned Lukacher, *Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis*, p. 43.
- ³⁹ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 8.
- ⁴⁰ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 3.
- ⁴¹ Kimball has used the term "psychobiography" to describe Freud's work on Leonardo. It seems a useful term for synthesising mental and physical life. "Growing Up Together: Joyce and Psychoanalysis, 1900-1922", in *Joyce Through the Ages: A Nonlinear View*, ed. by Michael Patrick Gillespie (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1999), p. 27.
- ⁴² Rosa Maria Bosinelli Bollettieri, "The Importance of Trieste in Joyce's Work, With Reference to His Knowledge of Psycho-Analysis", *JJQ* 7 (1970), p. 177.
- ⁴³ Bollettieri, "The Importance of Trieste in Joyce's Work, With Reference to His Knowledge of Psycho-Analysis", p. 179.
- ⁴⁴ Italo Svevo, "Scritti su Joyce", in *Saggi e pagine sparse* (Milan: Mondadori, 1954), p. 228. Quoted in Bosinelli Bollettieri, "The Importance of Trieste in Joyce's Work, With Reference to His Knowledge of Psycho-Analysis", p. 181.
- ⁴⁵ Richard Ellmann, *The Consciousness of Joyce* (London: Faber, 1977). A further useful compendium to Joyce's personal library is M.P. Gillespie and E.B. Stoker's *James Joyce's Trieste Library: A Catalogue* (Austin, Texas: The Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, 1986).
- ⁴⁶ John McCourt, *Years of Bloom: James Joyce in Trieste, 1904-1920* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 2000), pp. 227-228.

- ⁴⁷ Svevo, "Scritti su Joyce", p. 228. Quoted in Bosinelli Bollettieri, "The Importance of Trieste in Joyce's Work, With Reference to His Knowledge of Psycho-Analysis", pp. 179 and 181.
- ⁴⁸ Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce*, p. 525. Quoted in Bosinelli Bollettieri, "The Importance of Trieste in Joyce's Work, With Reference to His Knowledge of Psycho-Analysis", p. 182.
- ⁴⁹ Richard Ellmann, *The Consciousness of Joyce*, p. 114. However, Ellmann misspells the German title.
- ⁵⁰ "Das Problem des Hamlet und der Ödipus-Komplex" is the translation by Paul Tausig of Jones' essay entitled "The Oedipus complex as an explanation of Hamlet's mystery", first published in 1910 in the *American Journal of Psychology*. The essay was further revised and extended into Jones' *Hamlet and Oedipus* (1949).
- ⁵¹ Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce*, p. 351.
- ⁵² Hans Walter Gabler, "The Seven Lost Years of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", in *Approaches to Joyce's 'Portrait'. Ten Essays*, ed. by Thomas F. Staley and Bernard Benstock (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), p. 53.
- ⁵³ This title was translated as *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood* by James Strachey.
- ⁵⁴ Sigmund Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. XI (1910), trans. and ed. by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1960), p. 69.
- ⁵⁵ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 69.
- ⁵⁶ Pamela Thurschwell, *Sigmund Freud* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 116.
- ⁵⁷ Klaus Herding, "Freud's Leonardo: A Discussion of Recent Psychoanalytic Theories", *American Imago* 57.4 (2001), p. 341.
- ⁵⁸ Brooks, *Reading for the Plot*, p. xiv.
- ⁵⁹ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", pp. 134-135.
- ⁶⁰ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 85.
- ⁶¹ Those interpretations which rely on the fact that the bird in question was a vulture (a mistranslation in the sources used by Freud) will not be followed up in this study.
- ⁶² Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 78.
- ⁶³ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 79.
- ⁶⁴ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 80.
- ⁶⁵ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 80.
- ⁶⁶ Attridge, "Language, sexuality and the remainder in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", p. 134.

- ⁶⁷ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 83.
- ⁶⁸ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 83.
- ⁶⁹ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 87.
- ⁷⁰ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 87.
- ⁷¹ Jean Kimball, "Freud, Leonardo, and Joyce: The Dimensions of a Childhood Memory", *JJQ* 17 (1980), p. 171.
- ⁷² Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", p. 85.
- ⁷³ Attridge, "Language, sexuality and the remainder in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*", p. 137.
- ⁷⁴ Freud, "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood", pp. 91-92.
- ⁷⁵ Ian Hacking, "Memory Sciences, Memory Politics", in *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory*, ed. by P. Antze and M. Lambek (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 70.
- ⁷⁶ Paul Antze, "The Other Inside: Memory as Metaphor in Psychoanalysis", in *Regimes of Memory*, ed. by S. Radstone and K. Hodgkin (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 96-97.

Part II: *Ulysses*

- ¹ More specifically, the lesson revolves around Pyrrhus, "a Greek king who became famous for a victory against the Romans in 279 BC". Rainer Emig, "*Ulysses*' Small Universes", Introduction to '*Ulysses*': *Contemporary Critical Essays*, ed. by Rainer Emig (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 6.
- ² OED: "to fable: To say or talk about fictitiously; to relate as in a fable, fiction, or myth; to fabricate, invent (an incident, a personage, story, etc.)"
- ³ Frank Budgen, *James Joyce and the Making of 'Ulysses'* (London: Grayson & Grayson, 1937), p. 69.
- ⁴ Anne Fogarty, "States of Memory: Reading History in 'Wandering Rocks'", in *Twenty-First Joyce*, ed. by Ellen Carol Jones and Morris Beja (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2004), p. 56.
- ⁵ I mean by this the individual manner of thinking, remembering, and articulating which renders a character recognisable through interior monologue alone.
- ⁶ Anthony Rudolf, "Rescue Work: Memory and Text", *Stand* 5.3 (2004), p. 84.
- ⁷ Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, p. 119.
- ⁸ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 37.

- ⁹ Cheryl Herr, "Art and Life, Nature and Culture, *Ulysses*", in *Joyce's 'Ulysses': The Larger Perspective*, ed. by Robert D. Newman and Weldon Thornton (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987), p. 20.
- ¹⁰ Morris Beja, "The Seim Anew: Time, Memory, and Identity in Joyce and Modernist Literature", in *James Joyce Journal* 10.2 (Winter 2004), p. 33.
- ¹¹ Jeffrey A. Weinstock, "The Disappointed Bridge: Textual Hauntings in Joyce's *Ulysses*", in *'Ulysses': Contemporary Critical Essays*, ed. by Rainer Emig (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 75.
- ¹² Fogarty, "States of Memory: Reading History in 'Wandering Rocks'", p. 56.
- ¹³ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 127.
- ¹⁴ *Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*, ed. by Frank Kermode (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 262.
- ¹⁵ *Selected Letters of James Joyce*, ed. by Richard Ellmann (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 285.

Chapter 5

- ¹ Hans Walter Gabler, *The Rocky Road to Ulysses*, The National Library of Ireland Joyce Studies No. 15 (Dublin: The National Library of Ireland, 2005), p. 33.
- ² Gabler, *The Rocky Road to Ulysses*, p. 33.
- ³ Susan Stanford Friedman, "(Self)Censorship and the Making of Joyce's Modernism", in *Joyce: The Return of the Repressed*, ed. by Susan Stanford Friedman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 55.
- ⁴ Stanford Friedman, "(Self)Censorship and the Making of Joyce's Modernism", in *Joyce: The Return of the Repressed*, p. 53.
- ⁵ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, pp. 19-20.
- ⁶ These examples are quoted in Jacques Aubert, *The Aesthetics of James Joyce* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 131 and 134.
- ⁷ Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in 'Ulysses'*, p. 68.
- ⁸ Aristotle, "On Memory and Reminiscence", translated by J. I. Beare. The Internet Classics Archive, <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/memory.html>
- ⁹ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 23.
- ¹⁰ The OED informs us that "bile" can also be used figuratively to denote such emotional states as "anger" or "ill temper", a notion which will become of interest in relation to the mother's ghostly return, which I discuss below.

- ¹¹ Interestingly, there appears to be no mention in *Ulysses* of “slimy” water, which would point towards one important incident at Clongowes: Stephen falling ill after having been pushed into the cold water of the square ditch, an event which remains totally absent from Stephen’s memory.
- ¹² Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in ‘Ulysses’*, p. 30.
- ¹³ Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in ‘Ulysses’*, p. 30.
- ¹⁴ OED: “[...] the newly hatched lapwing runs about with its head in the shell”.
- ¹⁵ This image of the lapwing with the shell also evokes a line from Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*, where Horatio says to Hamlet (referring to Osric): “This Lapwing runs away with the shell on his head“ (v. ii. 192).
- ¹⁶ Gabler takes care to add that the scene is not actually staged in the play – we can picture it only because Shakespeare has Ophelia describe the scene to her father. *The Rocky Road to Ulysses*, p. 37.
- ¹⁷ Rickard, *Joyce’s Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of ‘Ulysses’*, p. 39.
- ¹⁸ Richard Kearney, *Strangers, Gods and Monsters* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 144.
- ¹⁹ Marjorie Garber, *Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers: Literature as Uncanny Causality* (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 129.
- ²⁰ Salman Rushdie, *The Satanic Verses* (London: Viking, 1988), p. 129.
- ²¹ Jeffrey A. Weinstock, “The Disappointed Bridge: Textual Hauntings in Joyce’s *Ulysses*”, in *‘Ulysses’: Contemporary Critical Essays*, ed. by Rainer Emig (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 62.
- ²² Maud Ellmann, “The Ghosts of *Ulysses*”, in *James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’: A Casebook*, ed. by Derek Attridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 85.
- ²³ Peter Buse and Andrew Stott, “Introduction: A Future for Haunting”, in *Ghosts: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History*, ed. by Peter Buse and Andrew Stott (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 1.
- ²⁴ Weinstock, “The Disappointed Bridge: Textual Hauntings in Joyce’s *Ulysses*”, p. 68.
- ²⁵ John Paul Riquelme, *Teller and Tale in Joyce’s Fiction: Oscillating Perspectives* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 162.
- ²⁶ Ellmann, “The Ghosts of *Ulysses*”, pp. 86 and 97. “Fury” and “anger” are, according to the OED, two of the oldest meanings of the probable root of the word ghost, the pre-Teutonic *ghoizdo-z*.
- ²⁷ The Oxford English Dictionary on CD Rom, Version 1.10, 1994. Emphasis added.

- ²⁸ Jacques Lacan, "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in *Hamlet*", in *Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise*, ed. by Shoshana Felman (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 39. Quoted in Ellmann, "The Ghosts of *Ulysses*", p. 89.
- ²⁹ Ellmann, "The Ghosts of *Ulysses*", p. 94.
- ³⁰ The Oxford English Dictionary on CD Rom, Version 1.10, 1994.
- ³¹ Ellmann, "The Ghosts of *Ulysses*", p. 87.
- ³² Daniel Ferrer, "Circe, regret and regression", in *Post-structuralist Joyce: Essays from the French*, ed. by Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 132.
- ³³ Ferrer, "Circe, regret and regression", p. 128.
- ³⁴ Ellmann, "The Ghosts of 'Ulysses'", p. 89.
- ³⁵ Frank Budgen, *Myselves When Young* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 187.
Budgen continues: "This puzzled me into silence. If Joyce was right then all the poet would have for his creations would be the chance-governed events of his own life, and that only to the extent that he could memorize them." Or, one may add, to the extent that they return to him whether he likes it or not.
- ³⁶ Samuel Butler, *Unconscious Memory*, chapter XII. Project Gutenberg etext, 10th ed., transcribed from the 1910 A. C. Fifield edition by David Price.
- ³⁷ Richard Brown, "'Everything' in 'Circe'", in *Reading Joyce's 'Circe'*, European Joyce Studies 3, ed. by Andrew Gibson (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), p. 223.
- ³⁸ R.G. Hampson, "'Toft's Cumbersome Whirligig': Hallucinations, Theatricality and Mnemotechnic in V.A.19 and the First Edition Text of 'Circe'", in *Reading Joyce's 'Circe'*, European Joyce Studies 3, ed. by Andrew Gibson (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), p. 174.
- ³⁹ Brown, "'Everything' in 'Circe'", p. 233.
- ⁴⁰ Hampson, "'Toft's Cumbersome Whirligig': Hallucinations, Theatricality and Mnemotechnic in V.A.19 and the First Edition Text of 'Circe'", p. 174.
- ⁴¹ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 131.
- ⁴² In "Circe", Conmee the rector promptly appears beside Dolan, looking "mild, rectorial, reproving" (*U* 15.3673), and ventures to put in a good word for Stephen.
- ⁴³ Hans Walter Gabler, "Narrative rereadings: some remarks on 'Proteus', 'Circe' and 'Penelope'", in *La Revue des Lettres Modernes: Histoire des Idées et des Litteratures* 834-839 (1988), p. 58.
- ⁴⁴ Gabler, "Narrative rereadings: some remarks on 'Proteus', 'Circe' and 'Penelope'", p. 65.

⁴⁵ Perhaps the counterpart to “the word known to all men”?

⁴⁶ Not many critics have remarked on the significance of the word “Nothung”. One reference I have been able to track down has is Robert Adams Day, “Joyce’s Gnomons, Lenihan, and the Persistence of an Image”, *NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction* 14.1 (Autumn, 1980), p. 11.

Chapter 6

¹ Fritz Senn, “The Narrative Dissimulation of Time”, in *Myriadminded Man: Jottings on Joyce*, ed. by Rosa Maria Bosinelli et al. (Bologna: Cooperativa Lib. Univ. Ed. Bologna, 1986), p. 153.

² Senn, “The Narrative Dissimulation of Time”, p. 163. Emphasis Senn’s.

³ The term “gramophony” is borrowed from, and loosely based on, Jacques Derrida’s concept as introduced in “Ulysses Gramophone”, in *Acts of Literature*, by Derek Attridge (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 253-309.

⁴ Hugh Kenner, *Ulysses* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 51.

⁵ Joseph E. Duncan, “The Modality of the Audible in Joyce’s *Ulysses*”, *PMLA* 72.1 (1957), p. 291. Stephen Dedalus uses the phrase in “Proteus”, *U* 3.13.

⁶ Luigi Russolo, *The Art of Noises*, trans. by Barclay Brown (New York: Pendragon Press, 1986), p. 27. Emphasis added.

⁷ Translator’s introduction, in Russolo, *The Art of Noises*, p. 1.

⁸ Russolo, *The Art of Noises*, p. 29.

⁹ Russolo, *The Art of Noises*, p. 27.

¹⁰ Russolo, *The Art of Noises*, p. 28.

¹¹ Russolo, *The Art of Noises*. See the chapter “The Noises of Language (Consonants)”, pp. 55-60.

¹² Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 45.

¹³ Jean-Marie Guyau, “Memory and Phonograph” (1880), in Friedrich A. Kittler, *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, trans. by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 30. Guyau compares the phonograph to the human brain, arguing that as a machine, it is “both receiver and motor in one”. His concluding remark defines the brain as an “infinitely perfected phonograph – a conscious phonograph” (p. 33).

¹⁴ Jacques Derrida, *The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation*, ed. by Christie McDonald, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), p. 33.

- ¹⁵ Kenner, *Ulysses*, p. 87.
- ¹⁶ Karen Lawrence, *The Odyssey of Style in 'Ulysses'* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 8.
- ¹⁷ Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 182.
- ¹⁸ *Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*, pp. 262-263.
- ¹⁹ Steven Connor, "‘Jigajiga... Yummyyum.. Pfuuiiiiiiii!...Bbbbllllllbbllblblobschb!’ ‘Circe’s’ Ventriloquy", in *Reading Joyce’s ‘Circe’*, *European Joyce Studies* 3 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), p. 131.
- ²⁰ James Hopkins, "The Interpretation of Dreams", in *The Cambridge Companion to Freud*, ed. by Jerome Neu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 93. Emphasis added.
- ²¹ Martin Heidegger, *On the Essence of Language: the Metaphysics of Language and the Essencing of the Word; Concerning Herder's Treatise On the Origin of Language*, trans. Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), p. 95.
- ²² Donald Theall, *Beyond the Word: Reconstructing Sense in the Joyce Era of Technology, Culture, and Communication* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p. 271.
- ²³ See Donald Theall, *James Joyce’s Techno-Poetics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), p. 6.
- ²⁴ Donald Theall, "Joyce’s Techno-Poetics of Artifice: Machines, Media, Memory, and Modes of Communication in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*", in *Joyce and Popular Culture*, ed. by R.B. Kershner (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), p. 139.
- ²⁵ Michael A. Forrester, "Auditory Perception and Sound as Event: Theorising Sound Imagery in Psychology", *The Sound-Journal at the University of Kent*, <<http://www.ukc.ac.uk/sdfva/sound-journal/forrester001.html>>
- ²⁶ Daniel Ferrer, "Echo or Narcissus?", in *James Joyce: The Centennial Symposium*, ed. by Morris Beja et al (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 70.
- ²⁷ Lacan’s turn of phrase is of course much more elaborate, and admittedly refers to the history of the "I" as opposed to that of a text: "What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what it was since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future antérieur of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming." Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), p. 86.
- ²⁸ Laurent Milesi, "‘Promnesia’ (Remembering Forward) in *Midnight’s Children*; or Rushdie’s Chutney versus Proust’s *Madeleine*", in *Sensual Reading*, ed. by Michael Syrotinski and Ian

- Maclachlan (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 2001), p. 195.
- ²⁹ Hugh Kenner, *Joyce's Voices* (London: Faber & Faber, 1978), p. 42.
- ³⁰ Michael A. Forrester, "Auditory Perception and Sound as Event: Theorising Sound Imagery in Psychology", <<http://www.ukc.ac.uk/sdfva/s/forrester001.html>>
- ³¹ See, for example, William Snyder Jr.'s article "Tap tap. Jingle. Tap. Form is content in 'The Sirens'", *A Quarterly Journal of Short Articles, Notes, and Reviews (ANQ)*, 11.1 (Winter 1998), pp. 24-27.
- ³² This doubling effect has been observed by Peter de Voogd, "Joycean Sonicities", in *Contextualized Stylistics*, ed. by Tony Bex et al (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 178-179. Duncan also remarks extensively on Boylan and the "jingle" sound in "The Modality of the Audible in Joyce's *Ulysses*", p. 292.
- ³³ Michael A. Forrester, "Auditory Perception and Sound as Event: Theorising Sound Imagery in Psychology" <<http://www.ukc.ac.uk/sdfva/sound-journal/forrester001.html>>
- ³⁴ R.M. Schafer, *The Tuning of the World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), p. 86. Quoted in Forrester, see above.
- ³⁵ Andreas Fischer, "Strange Words, Strange Music: The Verbal Music of 'Sirens'", in *Bronze by Gold: The Music of Joyce*, ed. by Sebastian D.G. Knowles (New York: Garland, 1999), p. 252. Emphases added.
- ³⁶ Kenner, *Ulysses*, p. 91.
- ³⁷ Susan Mooney, "Bronze by Gold by Bloom: Echo, the Invocatory Drive, and the 'Aurteur' in 'Sirens'", in *Bronze by Gold: The Music of Joyce*, ed. by Sebastian D.G. Knowles (New York: Garland, 1999), p. 229.
- ³⁸ John Durham Peters talks about deafness and blindness in terms of "writing's handicaps", which he proposes were only revealed when, with the advent of new technologies, writing lost its monopoly as the principal recording device of thoughts, events and experience. *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 138.
- ³⁹ "Translator's Introduction: Friedrich Kittler and Media Discourse Analysis", in Kittler, *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, p. xxviii.
- ⁴⁰ John Cain, *Talking Machines* (London: Methuen, 1961), p.15.
- ⁴¹ See, for example, V.K. Chew, *Talking Machines* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1981).

- ⁴² Quoted in Roland Gelatt, *The Fabulous Phonograph 1877-1977* (London: Cassell, 1977), p. 29.
- ⁴³ Quoted in Jacques Attali, *Noise* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p. 91.
- ⁴⁴ Jed Rasula, "Understanding the Sound of Not Understanding", in *Close Listening*, ed. by Charles Bernstein (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 234-235.
- ⁴⁵ Rasula, "Understanding the Sound of Not Understanding", p. 235.
- ⁴⁶ Alfred Parzer-Mühlbacher, *Die modernen Sprechmaschinen (Phonograph, Graphophon und Grammophon), deren Behandlung und Anwendung: Ratschläge für Interessenten* (Wien: A. Harthlebens-Verlag, 1902), p. 107. Quoted in Kittler, *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, p. 55. Emphasis added.
- ⁴⁷ Frederic William Wile, *Emile Berliner: Maker of the Microphone* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1926), pp. 173-174. Quoted in Thomas J. Rice, "His Master's Voice and Joyce", in *Cultural Studies of James Joyce*, European Joyce Studies 15, ed. by R. Brandon Kershner (Rodopi: Amsterdam and New York, 2003), p. 159.
- ⁴⁸ Peters discusses a fascinating aspect of this division between human and non-human, the living and the dead. In the chapter "Phantasms of the Living, Dialogues with the Dead" he examines recording technology as vehicle for the creation of ghosts, of "people's apparitions in sight and sound". *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication*, p. 139.
- ⁴⁹ See Douwe Draaisma, *Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas About the Mind*, trans. by Paul Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 96-99.
- ⁵⁰ Sigmund Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1969), p. 43. Quoted in Michael Chanan, *Repeated Takes: A Short History of Recording and Its Effects on Music* (London: Verso, 1995), pp. 161-162.
- ⁵¹ Sigmund Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1969), pp. 25, 27-28. Quoted in Chanan, *Repeated Takes: A Short History of Recording and Its Effects on Music*, p. 22.
- ⁵² See Kittler, *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, pp. 87-93.
- ⁵³ This, indeed, seemed to be of the merits initially recognised by those who praised the new invention. Peters quotes an early enthusiast of recording technology: "Death has lost some of its sting since we are able to forever retain the voices of the dead." "Voices of the Dead", *Phonoscope* 1 (1896). Quoted in *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication*, p. 142.
- ⁵⁴ Quoted in Peters, *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication*, p. 160.

- ⁵⁵ Steven Connor, *Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 391.
- ⁵⁶ A number of scholars, among them Steven Connor, have pointed out that the painting originally showed Nipper listening to a machine of the cylinder variety, in other words, a phonograph. On trying to sell his picture to The Gramophone Company, the painter Barraud was asked to paint over the original machine and substitute it with a gramophone. Connor, *Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism*, p. 387. See also Leonard Petts, *The Story of 'Nipper' and the 'His Master's Voice' Picture Painted by Francis Barraud*, 2nd ed. (Bournemouth: Talking Machine International, 1983).
- ⁵⁷ Steven Connor rightly argues that the phonograph “makes more sense in the picture, precisely because, unlike the gramophone, it allowed for a recording-session in the home”. Furthermore, he speculates whether or not the original painting depicts the dog sitting on a coffin. Connor, *Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism*, pp. 386-387.
- ⁵⁸ As Sara Danus points out, the story of telephony from the grave had already been written in 1898: Walter Rathenau’s “Die Resurrection Co.”, which describes “the most technologically advanced funeral ceremony in the United States”, with “electric wiring, telephones, and bells installed in each grave”, and in which the graves’ occupants actually make use of this technology. Danus, *The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 181.
- ⁵⁹ William Howland Kenney, *Recorded Music in American Life: The Phonograph and Popular Memory, 1890-1945* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. xvi.
- ⁶⁰ Chanan, *Repeated Takes: A Short History of Recording and Its Effects on Music*, p. 5.
- ⁶¹ Chanan, *Repeated Takes: A Short History of Recording and Its Effects on Music*, p. 139.
- ⁶² Rice, “His Master’s Voice and Joyce”, p. 155.
- ⁶³ This and the following paragraph summarise and quote from of Sylvia Beach, *Shakespeare and Company*, with an Introduction by James Laughlin (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press/Bison Books, 1991), pp. 170-173.
- ⁶⁴ The reading is of Professor MacHugh’s recital of a speech originally given by John F. Taylor at the College Historical Society in 1901, a piece of oratory which during its actual delivery had not been recorded and the contents of which had only been reported or re-created (in several differing versions) at a later date. See Eric D. Smith, “How a Great Daily Organ is Turned Out: ‘Aeolus’, *Techne*, and the Recording of *Ulysses*”, *JJQ* 41.3 (2004), pp. 465-466.
- ⁶⁵ Peters, *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication*, p. 138.

- ⁶⁶ Roy Gottfried, *Joyce's Iritis and the Irritated Text* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), pp. 131-141.
- ⁶⁷ Tim Armstrong, *Modernism, Technology and the Body: A Cultural Study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 88.
- ⁶⁸ Eliot, *Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*, pp. 262-263.
- ⁶⁹ Rasula, "Understanding the Sound of Not Understanding", p. 235.
- ⁷⁰ Michael A. Forrester, "Auditory Perception and Sound as Event: Theorising Sound Imagery in Psychology", <<http://www.ukc.ac.uk/sdfva/sound-journal/forrester001.html>>
- ⁷¹ Kenner, *Joyce's Voices*, p. 41.
- ⁷² Derrida, *Acts of Literature*, p. 276.

Chapter 7

- ¹ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 51.
- ² Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 195.
- ³ Riquelme, *Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fiction: Oscillating Perspectives*, p. 149.
- ⁴ Katie Wales, *The Language of James Joyce* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), p. 103.
- ⁵ Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 203.
- ⁶ Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 203.
- ⁷ Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in 'Ulysses'*, p. 39.
- ⁸ Kumar, *The Joycean Labyrinth: Repetition, Time, and Tradition in 'Ulysses'*, p. 39.
- ⁹ Riquelme, *Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fiction: Oscillating Perspectives*, p. 150.
- ¹⁰ Lawrence, *The Odyssey of Style in 'Ulysses'*, p. 207.
- ¹¹ Mahaffey, *Reauthorizing Joyce*, p. 192.
- ¹² Gabler, "Narrative rereadings: some remarks on 'Proteus', 'Circe' and 'Penelope'", p. 66.
- ¹³ Perry Meisel, *The Myth of the Modern. A Study in British Literature and Criticism after 1850* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 155-156.
- ¹⁴ Riquelme, *Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fiction: Oscillating Perspectives*, p. 149.
- ¹⁵ Derek Attridge, "Molly's Flow: The Writing of 'Penelope' and the Question of Women's Language", *MFS* 35.3 (1989), p. 550.
- ¹⁶ "[...] one should not hold Molly responsible for the way her mental processes have been visually realized". Attridge, "Molly's Flow: The Writing of 'Penelope' and the Question of Women's Language", p. 549.
- ¹⁷ Attridge, "Molly's Flow: The Writing of 'Penelope' and the Question of Women's Language", p. 545.

- ¹⁸ John Smurthwaite, "Verbal or visual?: 'Penelope' and Contemporary Psychology", in *Joyce, 'Penelope' and the Body*, European Joyce Studies 17, ed. by Richard Brown (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p. 75.
- ¹⁹ Smurthwaite, "Verbal or visual?: 'Penelope' and Contemporary Psychology", p. 78.
- ²⁰ Piette, *Remembering and the Sound of Words: Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Beckett*, p. 15
- ²¹ Lisa Sternlieb, "Molly Bloom: Acting Natural", *ELH* 65.3 (1998), p. 770.
- ²² Michael Camille, *Image on the Edge: The Margins of Medieval Art* (London: Reaktion Books, 1992), p. 42.
- ²³ Derek Attridge, "The Body Writing: Joyce's Pen", in *Joyce, 'Penelope' and the Body*, European Joyce Studies 17, ed. by Richard Brown (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p. 61.
- ²⁴ Patrick McGee, *Paperspace: Style as Ideology in Joyce's 'Ulysses'* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), p. 187.
- ²⁵ James Van Dick Card, *An Anatomy of 'Penelope'* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1984), p. 16.
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- ²⁸ Arnold Goldman, *The Joyce Paradox* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 99.
- ²⁹ Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 204.
- ³⁰ Alyssa O'Brien, "The Molly Blooms of 'Penelope': Reading Joyce Archivaly", p. 9.
- ³¹ Elisabetta Cecconi, "'Jotting Down On My Cuff What She Said': The Influence of Nora's Writing Style on Joyce's Construction Of Molly's Monologue", *Hypermedia Joyce Studies* 8.1 (2007) <<http://hjs.ff.cuni.cz/essays/cecconi.htm>>
- ³² *Selected Letters of James Joyce*, ed. by Richard Ellmann (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 285.
- ³³ McGee, *Paperspace: Style as Ideology in Joyce's 'Ulysses'*, p. 187.
- ³⁴ McGee, *Paperspace: Style as Ideology in Joyce's 'Ulysses'*, p.171.
- ³⁵ Sternlieb, "Molly Bloom: Acting Natural", p. 757.
- ³⁶ Jean Laplanche has outlined this idea in his essay "Time and the Other", however he refers to the related noun *histon* (ἵστον). *Essays on Otherness*, ed. by John Fletcher (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 251.
- ³⁷ This idea of the "story behind the story" has been transformed into many a retelling of the *Odyssey* from the perspective of Penelope, the most recent one being Margaret Atwood's *Penelopiad*. R.J. Schork cites the example of an anonymous Latin poem, *Priapea* 68, in

which the action is openly motivated by lust, and Penelope therefore rapidly abandons her chastity. He speculates whether Joyce might have known the text directly. R.J. Schork, *Greek and Hellenic Culture in Joyce* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), pp. 92-93.

- ³⁸ Schork, *Greek and Hellenic Culture in Joyce*, p. 92.
- ³⁹ The dictionaries consulted for this section include: *Greek-English Lexicon*, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, 9th ed., rev. by Henry Stuart Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). *Mega Helleno-Anglikon Lexikon*, ed. William Crighton (Athen: Eleutheroudakes, 1960). *Langenscheidt's Pocket Dictionary Classical Greek - English*, ed. by Karl Feyerabend (Berlin: Langenscheidt, [n.d.]).
- ⁴⁰ Samuel Butler, *The Authoress of the Odyssey* (Bristol: Phoenix Press, 2003), p. 131.
- ⁴¹ *Letters of James Joyce*, Vol. I, p. 172.
- ⁴² Vicki Mahaffey, *Reauthorizing Joyce* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 192.
- ⁴³ Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 204.
- ⁴⁴ Valérie Bénéjam, "Molly Inside and Outside 'Penelope'", in *Joyce, 'Penelope' and the Body*, European Joyce Studies 17, ed. by Richard Brown (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p. 64.
- ⁴⁵ Bénéjam examines the same scene in her essay, but she focuses on Molly's status as a fragmented subject, "fetishized" into parts of the body and of clothing. "Molly Inside and Outside 'Penelope'", p. 67.
- ⁴⁶ Bénéjam, "Molly Inside and Outside 'Penelope'", p. 65.
- ⁴⁷ Raffaella Baccolini, "Women as Memory in James Joyce's 'Portrait' and 'Stephen Hero'", in *Romantic Joyce*, Joyce Studies in Italy 8, ed. by Franca Ruggieri (Rome: Bulzoni, 2003), p. 193.
- ⁴⁸ Gregory Castle, "Ousted Possibilities: Critical Histories in James Joyce's *Ulysses*", *Twentieth Century Literature* 39.3 (Autumn 1993), p. 322.
- ⁴⁹ Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 250.
- ⁵⁰ Freud, "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman", in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. XVIII (1920-1922), trans. and ed. by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), p. 151.
- ⁵¹ Freud, "Resistance and Repression", in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. XVI (1916-1917), trans. and ed. by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1963), p. 287. Freud's italics.

- ⁵² Freud, "Resistance and Repression", p. 288.
- ⁵³ Lawrence, *The Odyssey of Style in 'Ulysses'*, p. 204.
- ⁵⁴ This suggestion is related to Hugh Kenner's claim that *Ulysses* "is a kind of hologram of language, creating a three-dimensional illusion out of the controlled interference between our experience of language and its arrangement of language". Kenner, *Ulysses*, p. 157.
- ⁵⁵ *Letters of James Joyce*, Vol. I, p. 172.
- ⁵⁶ Hugh Kenner, "The Arranger", in *James Joyce's 'Ulysses': A Casebook*, ed. by Derek Attridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 19. See also Michael Groden, '*Ulysses*' in *Progress* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 188-189, and p. 53, where he calls the "Ithaca" episode "*Ulysses*' other ending".
- ⁵⁷ Maud Ellmann, "'Penelope' Without the Body", in *Joyce, 'Penelope' and the Body*, European Joyce Studies 17, ed. by Richard Brown (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), pp. 98-99.
- ⁵⁸ Brown, "'Everything' in 'Circe'", p. 223.
- ⁵⁹ McGee, *Paperspace: Style as Ideology in Joyce's 'Ulysses'*, pp. 172-173.
- ⁶⁰ Raffaella Baccolini, "Women as Memory in James Joyce's 'Portrait' and 'Stephen Hero'", p. 193.
- ⁶¹ Gabler, "Narrative rereadings: some remarks on 'Proteus', 'Circe' and 'Penelope'", p. 67.
- ⁶² Riquelme, *Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fiction: Oscillating Perspectives*, p. 225.
- ⁶³ O'Brien, "The Molly Blooms of 'Penelope': Reading Joyce Archivaly", p. 21.
- ⁶⁴ Michael Stanier, "'The void awaits surely all them that weave the wind': 'Penelope' and 'Sirens' in *Ulysses*", in *'Ulysses': Contemporary Critical Essays*, ed. by Rainer Emig (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 92.
- ⁶⁵ As a counterpoint to these omissions or fissures, Molly can indeed be said to have sudden "emissions" or sudden eruptions of memory, the word she malaprops from her visit to the gynaecologist.
- ⁶⁶ Hayman uses the term "to designate a figure who can be identified neither with the author nor with his narrators, but who exercises an increasing degree of overt control over his increasingly challenging materials". David Hayman, *'Ulysses': The Mechanics of Meaning* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 70.
- ⁶⁷ Kenner, *Ulysses*, p. 65.
- ⁶⁸ Gabler, "Narrative rereadings: some remarks on 'Proteus', 'Circe' and 'Penelope'", p. 67.
- ⁶⁹ Diana E. Henderson, "Joyce's Modernist Woman: Whose Last Word?", *MFS* 35.3 (1989), p. 521.

- ⁷⁰ M.P. Gillespie, *Reading the Book of Himself: Narrative Strategies in the Works of James Joyce* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989), p. 170.
- ⁷¹ In *A Companion to Joyce Studies*, ed. by Zack Bowen and James F. Carens (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1984), p. 547. Gillespie, *Reading the Book of Himself: Narrative Strategies in the Works of James Joyce*, p. 170.
- ⁷² Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 186.
- ⁷³ William James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology; and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1921), p. 21. Quoted in Erwin R. Steinberg, *The Stream of Consciousness and Beyond in 'Ulysses'* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), p. 15.
- ⁷⁴ Herr, "Art and Life, Nature and Culture, *Ulysses*", p. 28.
- ⁷⁵ O'Brien, "The Molly Blooms of 'Penelope': Reading Joyce Archivaly", p. 20.
- ⁷⁶ Brook Thomas, *'Ulysses': A Book of Many Happy Returns* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), p. 138.
- ⁷⁷ Ewa Ziarek, "The Female Body, Technology, and Memory in 'Penelope'", in *James Joyce's 'Ulysses': A Casebook*, ed. by Derek Attridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 113-114.
- ⁷⁸ Gillespie, *Reading the Book of Himself: Narrative Strategies in the Works of James Joyce*, p. 170.
- ⁷⁹ Rickard, *Joyce's Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of 'Ulysses'*, p. 186.
- ⁸⁰ Sternlieb, "Molly Bloom: Acting Natural", p. 769.
- ⁸¹ In this context, Daniel R. Schwarz makes a connection with the "weaving as cunning" motif commonly associated with Homer's Penelope: "What Molly has woven by day is an affair with Blazes, but her reverie in bed reaffirms her commitment to Bloom." *Reading Joyce's 'Ulysses'* (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 260.
- ⁸² Robert D. Newman, "*Transformatio Coniunctionis*: Alchemy in *Ulysses*", in *Joyce's 'Ulysses': The Larger Perspective*, ed. by Robert D. Newman and Weldon Thornton (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987), p. 182.
- ⁸³ Schwarz, *Reading Joyce's 'Ulysses'*, p. 259.
- ⁸⁴ Schwarz, *Reading Joyce's 'Ulysses'*, p. 259.
- ⁸⁵ Draaisma, *Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas About the Mind*, p. 29.
- ⁸⁶ Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 204.

- ⁸⁷ Jan Assmann, *Moses the Egyptian* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 9. Quoted in Richard Armstrong, *A Compulsion for Antiquity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 3.
- ⁸⁸ It is a curious aspect of Joyce's work that makes endings turn into imaginary beginnings, and vice versa. "The Dead" is often regarded as a departure from the tight stylistic constraints of *Dubliners*, a move towards the mythical subtext of *A Portrait*. The latter, in turn, has often been treated as a "pre-text" for Stephen's plight, his continuing conflict with home and creed in *Ulysses*. In addition, the first episode of *Ulysses*, "Telemachus", has been perceived as an expansion to the character of Stephen in *A Portrait*.
- ⁸⁹ Herr, "Art and Life, Nature and Culture, *Ulysses*", p. 20.
- ⁹⁰ Herr, "Art and Life, Nature and Culture, *Ulysses*", p. 34.

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