Planetary Ideologies

Neoliberal, Cosmopolitan, and Alter-Globalist Discourse and the Challenge Posed by the Ongoing Shift from the National to the Global Imaginary

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

This thesis critically analyses claims to globality and universalism in the contemporary globalization ideologies; neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism. Employing a scale from nationalist, via internationalist, to planetarist, the conclusion is that neither of the ideological discourses have become notably engaged with a truly global conception of world politics. Instead they largely remain committed to internationalism understood as cooperation among nations. This is an important finding in light of the many claims to globality made both by participants in the diverse discourses and their scholarly critics. But crucially signs of an emerging planetarist mode of thinking is registered.
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Preface

Please note that this text has been written in American English. Citations have been reproduced in either American or British English true to the original source. Single quotes are used exclusively for indicating a citation, double quotes for indicating for instance nonstandard usage, a neologism, the use of quotation marks within a citation, and so forth.
Introduction: Towards a Planetarist Conception of Politics

In the past human beings conducted their lives in fairly narrow social and political frameworks, in nation states among a favored minority and in smaller units for the bulk of humanity. Now, and forever in the future, they are crowded together ever more densely in the global arena, a community of sorts but deeply divided.

The new era poses an immense challenge: how can the ever growing but highly diverse human multitudes learn to work peacefully together with due regard for the limited resources of their earthly habitat?

From their narrow perspectives people have to rise to a global overview; acting locally and thinking globally have to converge. In this inescapable but painfully protracted adjustment our sense of the future plays a crucial part. Toward what kind of world are we moving? What is in store for us? The future is always part of the present. In times of profound change, like ours, it is all the more important to shape a constructive and realistic image of the future – admittedly a risky venture, but part of every generation’s effort to assess its prospects (Laue 1994: 184).

This political theoretical inquiry into contemporary globalization ideologies begins here with an introduction explaining its research design. An integral part of that design is that the explicit normative assumptions of the work as a whole will be recognized. Firstly I commence with the ontological parameters of the inquiry, which principally serve to elucidate what the central categorical units are taken to be in this thesis, in short Earth and humanity – while these also indicate which categorical units we should probably view as an impediment to the future progress of our planetary civilization, and those are primarily the nation-state and the national people. Secondly I briefly present an account of the theoretical framework this ontological orientation lends itself to – which will later be fleshed out in greater detail in the first chapters – and which forms the backbone of the methodological apparatus applied throughout the whole thesis. Then thirdly I articulate the exact normative angle of approach taken in this thesis, which focuses its broader ontological orientation. Taken together with the more general ontological parameters
and the more specifically designed theoretical framework this forms the complete ontological-normative perspective utilized to place all the historical and textual material handled in the thesis in a greater narrative. Fourthly, after this has been established I will describe the methodological nature of the enquiry which is based on the assumption that new meaningful knowledge about historical and contemporary world politics in general, and political theories and ideological discourses in particular, can be inferred through the comprehensive study-, analysis-, and critique of relevant texts to the period being dealt with. The more specific technical considerations that come into play here are also dealt with in this section. All these steps together forms a method which is meant to bring to the surface enough critically evaluated information to facilitate an understanding of how the conceptual world that drives our political understanding has evolved along important ideological-ideational dimensions and in the process reveal dynamic patterns that we might reasonably expect to be reproduced in similar ways in the future. Fifthly, and finally, I will explain why I have chosen to exclude several contemporary or relatively recent globalization ideologies from the selection of ideologies studied in greater detail in the thesis and how this is motivated by the ontological-normative framework first presented here.

Since our present political world is not only the product of mere circumstance, but also a distilled result of earlier worldviews which with time have been weighed against each other, the methodological approach used in this thesis tells us something important about the world we live in now and the possibilities for changes to it in the future. The end result is a political narrative, but it is a story that stops mid-air, like a bridge half-built. It is a long time still before the ending to this story comes about, but the aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to raising awareness about the fact that we are living roughly in the middle of such a story and that the trajectory of this actually ongoing event will be shaped by whether or not we find a constructive way of handling our collective role as a species in the custody of a global civilization over the coming decades. The specific contribution of this thesis is not primarily in the creation of an new piece of theory, but in the creation of a theoretically and historically informed analytical framework that allows us to both excavate and evaluate the meaning behind conceptual notions used by earlier theorists, and explore the potentialities and limitations inherent in the ideologies that
currently more or less uncritically employ these or very closely related ideational constructs.

The desired result is to help bring about a more clearly defined conceptual vocabulary that hopefully can play a role in an urgently needed recalibration of our collective political perspective; because we need to agree on some basics if we want to maintain a progressive forward momentum in the politics of humanity; i.e. where we are, where we are going, and what is the purpose of acting in common, collectively speaking? If we get our bearings right through such a conceptual recalibration this should make it an easier choice to finish that bridge suspended in mid-air, and to resist the urge to take the easy option and rush back to the safety of the land from which we came no matter how depleted and lacking in nourishment that is likely to prove to be for the longer term. The latter is an option that appears to be increasingly tempting to many of our numbers, particularly pronounced in a time like ours where any real ideational forward momentum has stalled. Only through a reinvigorated effort by the rest of us will we potentially be able to reach the other shore. We cannot waver in our conviction because it is only there that we could possibly hope to find a new, lasting and better life for all of humanity. And not just momentarily for privileged enclaves thereof, as we presently have managed to do for a fair but dwindling part of the Western populace and for a substantially smaller part (typically amongst those closer to power) of the Earth’s population living elsewhere.

**The Ontological and Normative Elements of the Method**

Ontologically speaking we find ourselves on a planet daily spinning a full turn around its own axis while it annually circles a star a mere eight light minutes away. Together the Sun and the Earth forms part of our solar system which is located in one of the vastly more extensive spiral arms of the immense Milky Way galaxy. “Our” galaxy is at least one hundred thousand light-years across, and composed of hundreds of billions of stars, but this absolutely gargantuan conglomeration of stars and planets is just one of an estimated ‘hundred billion galaxies’ which together hold about ‘a billion trillion stars’ (Sagan 1981: 318). Carl Sagan was a particularly bright light of his generation; the generation born in the inter-war era who was one of the very first to realize the profound implications of our newfound existence as part of a much larger universe than had earlier been anticipated. Sagan pointed out perhaps the central finding of modern science ‘we are not the center and purpose of
the Universe, but rather live[ ] on a tiny and fragile world lost in immensity and eternity, drifting in a great cosmic ocean’ (Sagan 1981: 318).

Not that this humbling realization concerning our place in the universe renders human existence insignificant: ‘There are worlds that have been charred and ruined by cosmic catastrophes. We are fortunate: we are alive, we are powerful; the welfare of our species and our civilization is in our hands’ (Sagan 1981: 320). But our telescopes and missions into space have not revealed deities or their associates watching us from the vantage point of the clouds above as previously believed, further underlining how fully any belief system involving the physical existence of such creatures from polytheism to monotheism has now become examples of the most complete conjecture in scientific terms. Instead it has dawned on a substantial, but perhaps yet not sufficient, part of humanity that reality as we know it involves much greater wonders than the beastly and angelic visions of yore led our ancestors to contemplate: What Sagan alludes to when he states that the welfare of our civilization is in our hands is that today the fundamental truth of existence is not that there is a god or gods that “wills” things, but that we happen to exist on a specific planet where life can thrive which is surrounded by unfathomably vast tracts of what the naked eye perceives as empty space (see also: Krivine 2015). Science has vastly enlarged our horizon and revealed a world of splendor devoid of interference from supernatural creatures: ‘We were created not by a supernatural intelligence but by chance and necessity as one species out of millions of species in Earth’s biosphere’ which further means that: ‘We are, it seems, completely alone’ but there is no reason to despair, because this also allows us to realize that ‘we are completely free’ (Wilson 2014: 173). But our freedom to act without threat of divine retribution is for now confined to one planet, and our freedom to act on it appears to be rapidly becoming constrained by the impact of our actions as well: ‘We have not been seeing our Spaceship Earth as an integrally-designed machine which to be persistently successful must be comprehended and serviced in total’ as R. Buckminster Fuller’s famous metaphor has it (Fuller [1969] 2008/2013: 60). Luckily for us ‘designed into this Spaceship Earth’s total wealth was a big safety factor which allowed man to be very ignorant for a long time’ (Fuller [1969] 2008/2013: 61). But we cannot afford to be ignorant and incapable of action at the global level much longer, for if we destroy the ability ‘our spherical Spaceship Earth’ has ‘to
keep life regenerating on board’ we have nowhere else to relocate to (Fuller [1969] 2008/2013: 56 and 58).

There are no other self-sustaining “spaceships” with room for the entire species that we know of. Even if a ‘recent extrapolation [ ] predicts that a fifth of stars are orbited by Earth-sized planets’ (Wilson 2014: 107) it is an entirely different matter to say how many of these planets that would possibly have forms of life thriving on their surface capable of sustaining humanity indefinitely. But if we for the sake of argument are dealing with ‘an average distance between a habitable planet and its closest neighbour in our region of the Galaxy’ of ‘about 24 light-years’ as another speculative calculation has it – which coincidentally gives us altogether about ‘600 million planets in our Galaxy that could be habitable by human beings’ – then some people might think that this could offer us a way out of our present predicament (Michaud 2007: 60). However the distances involved makes sending even a small contingent of humanity to a “nearby” planet in galactic terms a seemingly insurmountable obstacle, and though theoretically interstellar travel might be possible in the distant future, facilitating any sort of large-scale migration to other planets is so far beyond our present technological abilities that any sort of escape from the confines of planet Earth is not a scenario that in any way can be seriously entertained now (see: Michaud 2007: 130-132). Already in 1959 Julian Huxley remarked that just keeping the world population level would involve ‘shipping off to Mars or Venus, every twenty-four hours, around 150,000 people’ (as cited in: Bashford 2014: 356). Today the daily increase of the world population is greater than it was then and we have also established that we must travel much farther, to other solar systems, if we are to find habitable planets other than our own.

Around us, in our own solar system, there is a smattering of neighboring globes whose local environments make the endless sands of the Sahara and the icy desolation of the Antarctic appear as exquisitely hospitable places for human life in comparison. The celestial bodies in our immediate vicinity can teach us much about the universe we live in, but they are not possible substitutes for Earth. We live on a uniquely hospitable planet for life which only amounts to an infinitely small part of a much larger “world” or universe. And we tend to forget how newfound this very realization is – especially how recently it is that this knowledge became commonplace to hold for the vast majority of the populace even in the most modernized parts of our global civilization. For as Sagan argues:
While almost everyone is taught that the Earth is a sphere with all of us somehow glued to it by gravity, the reality of our circumstance did not really begin to sink in until the famous frame-filling Apollo photograph of the whole Earth – the one taken by the Apollo 17 astronauts on the last journey of humans to the Moon (Sagan [1994] 1997: 3).

The photograph Sagan has in mind here, known as *The Blue Marble*, was taken in 1972. That image served to elucidate our singular planetary existence in space for the general population, together with other similar photographs – such as the equally iconic Earthrise (which views the Earth as it rises above the surface of the Moon while the latter was orbited by the Apollo 8 mission in 1968) that has been called ‘[arguably] the most important single political image ever to be “captured” on film’ (Douglas 1997: 170). Sagan’s was a pioneering voice who drew attention to the political, planetarist as I would term it, consequence following from this realization: ‘You spend even a little time contemplating the Earth from orbit and the most deeply engrained nationalisms begin to erode. They seem the squabbles of mites on a plum’ (Sagan [1994] 1997: 175). This distant ‘overview effect’ (Dickens & Ormrod 2007: 134) which aids in the creation of a nascent sense of planetary belonging has occurred at a crucial moment in human history as it broadly considered happened to coincide with the merging of the last remnants of all previous civilizations into one unitary technological human civilization global in scope (see: Iriye 2014).

Our civilization, which subsumes most of its predecessors, is a great ship steaming at speed into the future [ ] The vessel we are now aboard is not merely the biggest of all time; it is the only one left. The future of everything we have accomplished since our intelligence evolved will depend on the wisdom of our actions over the next few years. Like all creatures, humans have made their way in the world so far by trial and error; unlike other creatures, we have a presence so colossal that error is a luxury we can no longer afford. The world has grown too small to forgive us any big mistakes (Wright 2005: 3).

A new responsibility has been bestowed on humanity – since this realization means we have started to cross a threshold of collective self-awareness that puts human civilization on the verge of rising to an entirely new plateau of complexity – we are no longer simply the most dominant species on the planet, but an organism in need
of gaining a heightened measure of conscious self-control at the species level (see for instance: Morris 2010: 610-611). This daunting challenge is previously unheard of in the animal world from which we originate. Once our civilization became global in scope we should have realized that going with the ebb and flow of the available energy in our now biospheric system was simply no longer a viable option. Because we have basically incorporated everything there is on our planet into a singular systemic dimension overstepping its limits would at the same time be risking the elimination of the very foundation that all complex lifeforms on the planet, us included, rely on for their continued sustenance.

Our perception of a shrinking planet and the concomitant wider expansion of the universe which it is located in has been going on for some time: ‘The vision of a singular planet, spaceship Earth, is better understood as a new rendition of a planetary imagination that was already many generations old’ (Bashford 2014: 355-356). Two human induced drivers have greatly contributed to this change in worldview over the last couple of centuries. First in ‘the later part of the nineteenth century, the compression of space by technology – above all the steamship, the railway, and the telegraph – made new forms of political community imaginable over the expanses of empire and across the world’ (Armitage 2014: 242, added emphasis). This meant that ideationally: ‘The contexts for thinking expanded to encompass the entire globe. Modern intellectual historians accordingly have to track ideas on even-larger scales: continental, interregional, transoceanic, and ultimately planetary’ (Armitage 2014: 242). In short, to maintain a global political community suddenly became technologically plausible, and therefore far easier to imagine on a planetary scale. This in contrast to earlier when: ‘For what seemed like endless centuries the swiftest means of locomotion had been the horse and the high-road, the running man, the galley and the uncertain, weather-ruled sailing ship’ (Wells 1940: 31). H. G. Wells called the technological break with these past constraints ‘the abolition of distance’ (Wells 1940: 31). The former immensity of the globe shrunk to a potentially manageable size because of this. Since Wells made his observation we have added the commercial jetliner, the intercontinental ballistic missile, the space-rocket, the satellite, worldwide television coverage, and the internet to the expanding list of world interconnecting technologies, just to mention a selection of some of the more impactful innovations, that have all played a role in making the entire Earth visible to large swathes of humanity. The backside to all these
technological innovations is that they have all depended on industrially manufactured components to function, and that their creation demands a historically unprecedented use of the resources and energy that can be harvested from the Earth.

The second driver which has led us to increasingly think in planetary terms is the identification of the beginnings of ecological breakdown. This is a relatively recently acknowledged phenomenon (popularly ecologism started gaining traction in the 1970s) which has led to the dawning realization that the technological breakthroughs of the last two-hundred odd years and the attendant industrial world civilization we have created might have more or less inadvertently led us to destroy the fine tuned equilibrium of our planet. The knowledge that humanity is severely and negatively impacting the Earth’s natural carrying capacity have made some leading scientists suggest that we have in fact started a new ‘geological epoch’ they term ‘the Anthropocene’ (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007: 614).

Humanity has in this way for the better or the worse become ‘stewards of the Earth system’ and ‘will remain a major geological force for many millennia, maybe millions of years to come’ as these same scientists assume, not without a certain optimism (Steffen, et al 2007: 618). But this fairly optimistic long-term scenario hinges on whether or not we can weather the perfect storm, in ecologically harmful terms, that we can presently see brewing up on the horizon if we connect the rate of world population increase we now have with the extreme pressures this will force us to exert on the Earth’s ecosystem just to avoid mass starvation (see: Sachs 2015). The projected growth in our numbers over the next several decades is in all but the most optimistic of scenarios set to raise past 10 billion from the present baseline of ‘7.2 billion’ in the period between 2040 and 2060 (Sachs 2015: 209). There is precious little we can do to stop that, but it is clear that the environmental and social consequences of this accumulating trend will become more severe in the foreseeable future.

This raise in population, with an attendant heightened pressure on the yields we have to get from agriculture, fisheries, and so forth – will present us with a dynamic and potentially volatile environment, also politically speaking. The only humane and viable long-term solution is to get the aggregate birth rate down, and thus lower our collective numbers to a level more in tune with the carrying capacity of the Earth. But with the current trends in mind, and due to the intrinsically long-term nature of
the problem, that is going to be a project for later generations to undertake. Our challenge in the present is to halt the rising tendency and make sure that the living are fed and otherwise taken care of in a manner that neither leads to environmental nor societal breakdown. Both these kinds of breakdown should be seen as interlinked phenomena, where whichever happens first is likely to lead to the other, and this is something which serves to amplify the severity of the situation. A much cited example of this interlinkage did historically unfold on Easter Island, where environmental collapse was followed by societal collapse (see: Christian 2004: 472-474, and Diamond 2005: 79-119).

To recap, ontologically the main categories we have oriented ourselves by here are first taken from an astronomical perspective which allows us to infer the following outside viewpoint; focusing in from the universe, then to the Milky Way, so to the solar system, and finally to our planet Earth, from which there is no escape due to the barren nature of nearby planets and the absolutely massive leaps in technological innovation required before interstellar exploration could become a reality in some distant future. The Earth itself has a biosphere which we happen to both belong to and simultaneously threaten the wellbeing of. This is because technological advances over the last 200 years or so made it possible to develop a world encompassing industrial civilization, which while expending vastly more resources than any civilization before it also has led to an unprecedentedly rapid growth in world population, which further requires the use of exceedingly more resources to satisfy its needs and desires. This feedback loop has now led human civilization to a critical point in its development, where it either manages to constrain itself through prudence and self-control or it will at some point not too far off be existentially constrained by natural means such as the loss of lands suitable for agriculture through global warming or similar negative effects which we have provoked through our excesses.

The normative implications of this ontological take on our present reality are as follows: Even if the Earth is still a vast and bountiful planet in many respects, our use of its resources must be managed, controlled, and coordinated on a global level with previously unprecedented precision if we are to ensure that it will remain in that state for generations to come. Our collective security now hinges on finding a way to do this politically in a way that is not only sustainable for the biosphere we rely on, but that is also politically sustainable in terms of a prospective system’s
continuous ability to generate and secure the compliance of the vast majority of human beings it aims to exercise a measure of control over. The latter point is a necessity simply to save any prospective system from getting overturned by popular demand. Achieving a kind of near universal consent to start acting politically on behalf of the wellbeing of humanity and, by extension, also that of the biosphere is a must for amassing the authority required for a global political system to function with sufficient effectiveness at the level of planetary civilization. Basically this means that the prevailing nationalist mentality in world politics will have to be replaced by a planetarist one before there can be any chance of creating an effective global political entity capable of reigning in the excesses of our 21st Century civilization. Because this is ultimately what it means politically to exercise control over human civilization – we have to develop a planetary polity with sovereign characteristics that with authority can act legitimately in the interest of- and on behalf of humanity. But a planetary polity can only become a realistic prospect when the world populace has gotten accustomed to thinking in planetarist terms, rather than in terms of national or religious affiliation. That both nationalism and religion should be thought of as obstacles standing in the way for the political progress of human civilization is a conclusion both Sagan and other highly reflective observers reach on the basis of the present level of scientific knowledge. Our understanding of what exists beyond the confines of the Earth undermines all belief in a deity or deities that is preoccupied with human affairs, and the many ways human civilization is now discovered to be a complex interdependent network renders all kinds of nationalism into anachronisms which only serve to perpetuate a type of political organization that is both inherently inadequate for dealing with the most pressing problems of our times and an obstacle to start dealing with these in an effective manner.

Normatively speaking the ontological categories of an imperiled biosphere on Earth and a human civilization in distress brings on the need for a type of intensified global political integration that only seems feasible as a long-lasting construct if it is done democratically, i.e. through seeking the consent or the approval of the governed on a worldwide basis, and not by appealing to the national people as confined in a particular nation-state. That this human civilizational consent might at some point be forthcoming is made more likely by the spread of a global awareness
facilitated by for instance images of the whole Earth or the threat of global warming which is caused by the aggregated pollution created by human civilization.

Suggestions have been made to solve this present challenge by creating a ‘new democratic governance beyond the state’ that nonetheless is based on the present nation-state framework and the perfection of the type of international institution we already have experimented with for quite a while (Biermann 2014: 213, see also; 139 and 212). But this plan – like so many before it that are further addressed in the chapter on cosmopolitanism – puts an almost completely unwarranted faith in the competence of our current international institutions to solve global problems through international cooperation (for some highly informed criticisms of the way the United Nations operates see: Ross 2011: 136-149, Weiss 2013, and; Hale, Held and Young 2013).

We might very well instead need a state-like capacity at the global level for the task of solving the growing number of global problems, meaning an institution that replaces current “complex sovereignty” with actual world government (see: Grande & Pauly 2007, and Hurrell 2007: 95-117). If this is the solution, as for example Torbjörn Tännsjö has quite recently argued the case for (Tännsjö 2008), then ‘a central conflict of our times’ needs to be resolved first, namely ‘that between nationalism and internationalism, between the concept of many national sovereignties and one world sovereignty’ as Julian Huxley once understood this (Huxley [1946] 1991: 41). To fit contemporary parlance we have to employ another term than “internationalism” to convey the “one world sovereignty” Huxley thinks of here, and that is where planetarism comes in.

To create this level of one world sovereignty politically requires one or several political ideologies that can motivate enough people to act in concert and thereby turn it into reality, since ideologies in the most basic sense are collective cognitive schemata enabling group action (see: Billig 1991: 9-14). Without such shared schemata there is simply no way a group can be guided in the right direction, and therefore an articulated schema necessarily has to precede any form of meaningful group action. Individuals on their own might very well rely on a loose hunch or an instinctual feeling of some sort for their sense of direction, but the articulation of a common goal is key to group action. The realization of any such goal depends on it being sufficiently clearly communicated amongst a mass of individuals so that they
are able to consciously work towards reaching it together. World political plans or projects are articulated in the packages of concepts we refer to when we talk about political ideologies (Freeden 1996).

Political ideologies of a post-national, truly global, nature must necessarily predate the creation of a world polity no longer based on notions of the nation-state and the nationally defined people. So do these ideologies currently exist? People tend to think the current crop of globalization ideologies fits the bill, amongst these for example; neoliberalism or globalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism (see: Huntington 2004, Saul [2005] 2009, and Steger 2009a). This should not be thought of as very surprising, since it is only natural to assume that the names with universal connotations here being used should correctly describe the underlying ideological tendencies. It is however not a notion that will be substantiated in this thesis. Quite to the contrary these ideologies all appear to be chiefly conceptually grounded in the nation-state, and to be more aligned with a global political system of an internationalist rather than a planetarist character.

I make this discovery by way of addressing the research question in this thesis, which is: “Is there a planetarist ideology among the contemporary globalization ideologies?” To understand what this question entails requires some explanation. First “contemporary globalization ideologies” describes the range of ideologies that we presently can choose from to guide our global interactions. They tell us what it is we should focus on, such as trade, peace, or the preservation of nature, and which political arrangement their adherents see as the best for facilitating the pursuit of any such specific goal globally. They are in one sense “foreign policy ideologies” because they essentially deal with how we should interact across the world, not just domestically. But they are not the exclusive prerogative of diplomats, statesmen, and businessmen. Presently there is a global public that wants a say in these matters also, and rightly so because at many levels the world is in the process of becoming one interlinked community. This brings us to the salient component of this research question and that is the “planetarist” concept. This I have developed largely on my own as an ideal post-national political position that provides us with a scale to measure the distance an existing ideology has covered on an assumed trajectory moving away from an equally ideal-type autarkic nationalist position and towards the opposite interdependent universalist end of the scale. “Planetarist” is then meant to convey the diametrical opposite of a nationalist position.
What makes the planetarist concept useful is that it replaces the currently existing fuzzy concepts which can be used to signify a similar position, but which usually serves to obscure a position closer to the nationalist ideal type. “Globalism” (with its attendant “globalist” advocates) is one such example. To the uninitiated there is no way of telling the difference between a “globalist” and a “planetarist” political viewpoint, as the terms themselves are synonymous, but my argument is that these two terms should be understood as describing two very different concepts. On first sight “globalism” shares the same immediate universal connotation as “planetarism”, but a key finding in this thesis is that “globalism” in essence is little more than a rebranding of the earlier concept of “internationalism”, when the latter means ‘an interest in international cooperation’ (Goldmann, Hannerz and Westin 2000: 4). The same can be said about “cosmopolitanism”, a concept which in reality seems to cloak an internationalist position with universalist language. What this conceptual reconfiguration reveals is a scale where “internationalism” (as understood above) would fit square in the middle, together with nominally more universalist political conceptions such as globalism and cosmopolitanism, while there still is considerable distance left to travel before these rhetorically universalist ideological discourses become actually universalist or “planetarist” in the truly global sense meant here. Planetarism is a term meant to describe what potentially could be an ideology of world integration that takes on the features of an imaginary (the distinction is explored in Chapter 1).

The two drivers mentioned above – the technological developments and its deleterious environmental side-effects – both point beyond the present international framework towards the creation of a global political entity or world state that can manage a transition to a world economy based on principles that does not work against the long term prospects of humanity. Technological developments have made a globally inclusive polity a feasible prospect, while the environmental degradation these have inadvertently led to hints that a globally sovereign entity might be a necessity for our long-term survival. In other words, we are dealing with a self-reinforcing dynamic, where advances in the technological domain of human activity brings forth a demand for adjusting the now outmoded political techniques currently being employed to cope with the ruinous side-effects of these developments. We do however have to be extremely cautious when we enter this terrain – where the demand for change takes on a heightened acuteness – because
social and individual considerations must be taken into account to ensure that we do not inadvertently and severely impact the conditions for living a full life on the individual plane in order to save the long-term outlook for the species. This promises to be a delicate balancing act, and it is currently a problem that people tend to get the balance wrong at quite an early theoretical stage.

John Dryzek has pointed out the tendency among some scientists concerned with climate change to suggest that authoritarian measures will be needed to ensure species survival (Dryzek 2013: 38-39). This is exactly the juncture in the debate about the shape of a future world order where social and political theorists have the greatest responsibility to interfere. It is our task as I see it to remind the type of over-eager natural scientist which Dryzek has identified in his work about the counterproductive propensities that are inevitably inherent when a ruling faction takes “authoritarian measures”. All polities, even authoritarian ones, rely on a certain level of acquiescence between rulers and ruled, where the expressed intentions of the ruling class has to some extent to conform to the will of those being ruled, at the very least at the rhetorical level where ideology operates most readily as a binding force between the government and the governed (see: Geertz 1964: 47-76). A complete disconnect between the intentions of the rulers and the wishes of the ruled is a surefire sign of societal breakdown. In an authoritarian state an understanding of a society’s evolving political culture on the part of the political elite is needed to avoid such a moment of disconnect from occurring, while in a democracy a new government more closely responding to societal needs will most likely get elected into power long before a split of this magnitude happens. Richard Wilson’s definition of political culture here sheds light on the phenomenon:

> Political culture is a set of values that stabilize institutional forms and hierarchical social relationships in terms of ethical constructs; over time these values reflect developmental changes in individual psychology and in social norms of legitimation; they evolve as a consequence of the interaction between them (Wilson 1992: 6).

The more authoritarian measures are being taken without any form of consultation with the populace itself the wider the gap between the values of the governing stratum and the governed stratum in a polity will become, since they cease their political-cultural evolution in tandem because of the lack of any interaction between
the two strata (formal in democracies, informal in authoritarian systems). Authoritarian measures taken without proper consultation or legal avenues for feedback will result in the build-up of relational tension which further exacerbates the split between the public and its masters as both sides start fearing the others' intentions. As this tendency progresses the ethical constructs guiding one stratum will become steadily differentiated from the ethical constructs guiding the other. A rupture between the two will become more and more likely as the formerly shared political culture diverges into what then becomes two clashing ethical constructs, or competing political cultures. Having two political cultures instead of one leads to the destabilization of institutional forms and hierarchical social relationships rather than to their stabilization, and this state of affairs can only be put back in order by the less popular political culture yielding its place to the new culture being championed by the masses. The normative element of my approach to the material handled in this thesis is as a consequence of this way of understanding government-public relations heavily reliant on the notion that democracy – where the consent of the governed is key – ought to be preferred over other competing forms of government such as authoritarianism, theocracy, or a pure technocracy.

There is a limit to how much good a democratic framework can do all on its own. What makes it potentially a conduit for progressive politics is the fact that a democratic polity allows for the creation of novel political parties and/or ideologies that in time can rise peacefully to shift the course of the polity in a more favorable direction. Let us for the sake of argument say that a hypothetical twenty percent of the adult population in North America and Europe would fall into a category of people with a planetarist rather than a nationalist political inclination. We would then potentially be dealing with a support base of a few hundred million people for a future planetarist party to draw upon. Economies of scale tell us that this kind of venture could quickly become a politically influential organization at the global level, provided that it could actually harness the support of a substantial substratum of the electorate. Assuming that a party needs to follow an ideology to maintain a minimum of political cohesion for it to function properly, then a future development of this kind could only follow in the wake of the creation of a universal political ideology with a relatively wide popular appeal.

For a development as described above to be desirable and something we should welcome the prospects of, I argue that ideally a planetarist ideology would have to
be; not only; 1) universal, i.e. planetarist, and 2) emancipatory, i.e. democratic, but also, 3) enlightening. What this last criterion entails will be explained in detail in the first chapter, but it basically means that an ideology ideally should neither be deceptive nor misrepresent reality. If an ideology is deceptive one risks electing parties to power that do not represent what they publicly claim to represent and the whole representative function of modern day democracy is diminished as a result. The consent given to the government by the electorate is then simply given on false premises. If this should happen repeatedly democracy as an institution risks being undermined as a system of rule.

We have now reached a point where we are dealing with a set of normative assumptions; universalism should be preferred over particularism, democracy over competing forms of rule, and enlightening ideologies (which at a minimum would have to be both universalist and democratically inclined) are seen as better than deceptive ideologies. I think there is a rational argument for claiming that all these properties are superior to the alternatives, and this is founded in an ontology which sees both humanity and the Earth as being the two pillars of our present social scientific understanding of what constitutes “reality”. This differs markedly from the average ontological understanding which for example is still prevalent in International Relations where “states” are perceived as making up the core entity in world politics (see: Behr 2010). This view is mirrored in contemporary political theory where “the people” – where a particular people, more often than not, constitute a specific state – are generally still seen as the ontological base unit of the political world. This has the result, in Jürgen Habermas’s words, that we do not get ‘a law-governed, politically constituted world society, but [ ] an international order of formally independent liberal states’ (Habermas 2006: 183). This hegemonic form of liberalism has had many influential spokesmen and women in political theory over the last several decades (e.g. Rawls 2001). In contradiction to this theoretically prevalent view I see the true territory of humanity as being commensurate with the spherical globe we since before the dawn of history have found ourselves attached to. All other territorial identities stem from a combination of geographical happenstance, the accidental outcomes of historical species infighting, and more or less random migrations. This view can also be taken to be “liberal” (see: Vincent 2007: 172), which highlights how conceptually imprecise that distinction has become these days. If we instead conceive of nationalist and planetarist liberals, then
we might approach a meaningful distinction again. Though I think that only world integration under some form of world control can in theory ensure equitable resource distribution within the boundaries of sustainability, which comes close to sounding like the articulation of a planetarist socialist stance, I would hasten to add that a crucial dimension is that this has to be consented to by the governed, i.e. humanity, if it is going to work in practice. That latter point is what essentially makes my stance swing back towards liberalism, but clearly in an old fashioned sense of the word which emphasizes the ‘condemnation of despotic political power and the demand for self-government of civil society in the name of liberty and the rule of law’ (Losurdo 2011: 48). But who should be included in “civil society” would in this regard mean “the world populace” and not the community of free men, or the national people as it gradually came to denote for liberals in the 19th Century. This means that the explicit normative assumption driving this inquiry is neither socialist nor liberal, but that a partial furthering of both these traditions in their important democratic, solidaristic and individualistic aspects could still be desirable. Mainly then the ontological-normative angle of approach utilized in this thesis is therefore democratic and pluralist – albeit what differentiates it from most other accounts is that this mode of political organization ideally should be applied in a truly global and potentially post-national context. It recognizes that even though all current forms of liberalism and socialism appear to be outdated in respect to the latter concern, these two broad ideological traditions could conceivably be reinvigorated through not only incorporating the many lessons of the identity politics revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s inclusive of the ecologist tradition, but also through adopting a planetarist political stance and decisively abandoning the nationalist inclinations which have been a core conceptual element of these ideologies for the greater part of their existence.

We should not succumb to the temptation to think of humanity as inherently “evil” by nature (or “good” for that matter) and treat it as a bland mass of equally disposed individuals. Regardless of where we are born we are not by any means predisposed to entertain exactly the same political standpoints as everyone else in the population we happen to be embedded in. There are people with extreme propensities for altruism and people with extreme propensities for egotism. But in general we should probably assume that any sufficiently large sample of people will be dispersed in the manner of a bell-curve path, so that the overwhelming majority of individuals will
be found to belong somewhere in the middle-range between these two extremes. Here a propensity for solidarity with strangers might be found on the left side of the curve and a propensity for advocating a tax-free existence could be found on its right hand side, but the highest number of people would be found clustered around a more ambiguous middle position. It is an assumption here that this is a worldwide pattern that can be found in any developed or developing country, and though there is bound to be some cultural and experiential differences that alters people’s position along the scale somewhat, these will not be so consistent that we will find any society composed of only one or the other type of personality trait. We are in essence dealing with a transnational trait where all human beings are mentally predisposed (though one’s mental predisposition certainly can be altered in different directions by one’s experiences as a child) to fit at different points along this altruist-egotist scale. I do think that we can say, broadly speaking, that since the immediate postwar years and up to today we have experienced a shift from a world civilization dominated by those inclined towards solidarity to a world civilization dominated by those inclined towards egotistical thinking. This shift has perhaps counter-intuitively not necessarily been a bad thing, but the pendulum might now have reached its farthest point towards the egotistical side, which means that it should be in the process of swinging the other way again.

Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are historic examples of political cultures rife with solidaristic rhetoric, even though the solidarity on display predominantly happened to be rhetorically directed inward to the domestic community defined by its ethnicity or class and not outward to the rest of the world. A propensity towards solidarity can be abused and misdirected so that it only counts for people belonging to a certain preconceived category, for instance religiously, racially, nationally or economically defined. In those cases a society can improve and possibly become more open and tolerant if people suddenly start minding their own business instead of trying to keep everyone else in line with the collective mindset. But in the long run it should logically be easier to build a well functioning political culture through an appeal to solidarity rather than to egotism, since the former ought to be much more conducive to the creation of societal coherence than the latter individualist one which ultimately points the other way towards complete societal fragmentation. In the end it is really a false dichotomy to set up collectivist solidarity against individualistic freedom, for any polity wanting to function properly, i.e. better than
the arguably too individualistic present as well as the too collectivist past, needs to find a working balance somewhere between these two points on a much larger continuum.

This brings us to the present ideological conundrum, where an egotistically inclined neoliberalism, which has become dominant practically on a worldwide basis since the end of the Cold War, is only indecisively being countered by an appeal to former modes of national solidarity. Assuming that neoliberalism is too much dependent on appeals to individual egotism to be beneficial in the long run and that a regression to a “national socialism” of the past resembling either its left (e.g., social democratic or Stalinist) or right (e.g., conservative or fascist) manifestations will not help us properly deal with our novel range of global problems, but instead is liable to exaggerate these. Then we are presently left without recourse to a positive ideological path that humanity can follow out of this political wilderness. In theory there is a path available, as I see it different articulations of a planetarist worldview might be what we should be looking for. But any such ideology is a long while from being practically implemented since this way of thinking has not evolved into a political ideology proper at the present stage, i.e., an ideology a substantial number of people seek to promote politically.

Planetarism should be understood as a political vision of a prospective world order that goes far beyond the notion of intergovernmental cooperation, or internationalism in the internationalist sense which often these days is presented as being “globalist” or “cosmopolitan”. The lack of a clearly defined qualitative difference between these three terms; “internationalist”, “globalist”, and “cosmopolitan”, is what necessitates the invention of the new “planetarist” concept, which even though it sounds similar, conceptually points beyond what is currently meant when the other terms are used. Only this neologism makes it possible to communicate the idea of a truly global polity in an unambiguous manner in the present conceptual climate.

1 From the left with e.g. Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Jeremy Corbyn in the United Kingdom, and Bernie Sanders in the United States, and from the right with e.g. Golden Dawn in Greece, Front National in France, UKIP in the United Kingdom, and the Tea Party or presidential candidates such as Donald Trump in the United States.
The planetarist concept lends itself to the notion of an ideology of “planetarism” that in theory could have the potential to be for global civilization what nationalism at an earlier time was for the nation (state). “Globalism” when it predominantly means internationalism as international cooperation only signifies a half-way point between nationalism and planetarism thus conceived. This matters greatly for the world order perspective that comes with ideologies placed at different points along this scale. And, as I will go on to argue here, only the planetarist extreme appears to offer a genuinely progressive way out of the present interregnum (which Theodore von Laue aptly describes in the quotation at the start of this introduction). But moving beyond internationalism requires a revolution in the consciousness of substantial parts of the world populace. The findings of this thesis is a testament to the fact that this requisite planetarist ethos has been under development for quite some time, especially in the intellectual realm. But equally also to the fact that in its present form this planetarist perspective has yet to be transferred wholeheartedly into any of the leading contemporary globalisation ideologies of neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism. In short, the signs of the emergence of a planetarist ideological perspective exist, but it can by no means be said to have emerged fully as a clearly articulated ideological force at this moment in time.

During the course of this thesis I will show that a planetarist perspective was quite early on both entertained and dismissed within the neoliberal discourse. And that presently there is good reason to think that a planetarist perspective is being actively opposed by the contemporary neoliberals. Within the cosmopolitan discourse there is a slightly more ambiguous relationship to a planetarist perspective on world order – where a minority strain of the discourse has promoted it at various periods from the Enlightenment down to the present day – but overwhelmingly cosmopolitanism remains an internationalist endeavor. Finally, alter-globalism as a discourse entertains many planetarist notions, but instead of prescribing planetarist solutions, the tendency – when the issue of world order is given any thought at all – is to advocate a form of internationalism that comes close to being a socialistic equivalent of the liberal international world order the predominant strain of cosmopolitanism aims to promote.

It should here be acknowledged that Jan Otto Andersson has used both the terms ‘planetarism’ and ‘planetarist’ in a similar, albeit not identical, fashion to the way I use them here (Andersson 2008). Andersson also refers to Ele Alenius, whose work
Planetary means development of the World” (see: Andersson 2008: 87 and 89). According to Andersson, ‘Alenius is looking for a new civilization that would encompass the whole humanity and that would organize society in accordance with solidaristic and ecological principles’ (Andersson 2008: 87).

Andersson himself employs the concept to describe a ‘red-green planetarism’ apparently much in the same vein which would prioritize ‘global justice’ (red) and ‘ecological sustainability’ (green) over ‘mass consumption prosperity’ in a ‘global ethical trilemma’ of choices, where whichever two you pick will work to the detriment of the third (Andersson 2008: 85-89). He contrasts this ‘planetarist’ position with the two other ‘progressive alternatives’ that now exist, namely; ‘eco-efficient capitalism’ (which ignores global justice) and ‘global social democracy’ (which ignores ecological sustainability) and asserts that only a red-green planetarism ‘satisfies the conditions for a new “third” Left’ (Andersson 2008: 85-89). The reason red-green planetarism is considered the most progressive by Andersson is that he considers it ‘the most honest alternative since it [ ] openly asks for solutions that require deep changes in “Western” values and lifestyles’ (Andersson 2008: 89). Chief among these prospective and necessary deep changes would be to abandon today’s consumerism, preferably in favor of a focus on ‘quality of life’ that is measured in ‘fulfillment, not wealth’ (Andersson 2008: 88).

Andersson’s ideas are noteworthy, but the world political dimension which I focus on here remains undertheorized in this brief expose of his. The question whether any of these different ideological configurations would entail the construction of another kind of world order altogether is not posed. I find it hard to believe that any form of ecological ideology would be able to make a sufficient impact on the environmentally destructive behavior of humanity if it was paired with an adherence to nationalism. To counter the present ecological challenge with global coordination – provided this is done in a respectful, democratically authorized, manner – should

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2 Using Google Translate.

3 It would be interesting to someday find out exactly how close my conception of planetarism comes to Alenius’s but it has been beyond the timeframe and the financial constrains of this thesis to either learn Finnish or get Alenius’ book translated.
in theory be a much more effective approach. What I am going to do to address this deficiency is to employ the concept of planetarism in an ideologically less specific manner, where it comes closer to being an imaginary in the specific way theorized by Manfred B. Steger (see: Steger 2008, and Patomäki & Steger 2010). What this entails exactly will be explained in the first chapter. But one reason to get some distance between Andersson’s and my own conception of planetarism is that, as far as I can tell from his notion of “red-green planetarism” flanked by “global social democracy” and “eco-efficient capitalism”, this comes very close to resembling the ideology of ‘ecosocialism’ being contrasted with social-democratic and green-liberal ideologies (see: Kelly & Malone 2006, Foster, Clark and York 2010, Wall 2010, and Boggs 2012: 131-142). Ecosocialism is already an ideology with a name and it would not be much of a theoretical contribution on my part to aid Andersson in rechristening it “planetarism”.

This is not to say that I see the core insight of ecosocialism – which is that continuing with industrial capitalism and its attendant consumption patterns appear to be fundamentally incompatible with the goal of successfully making human civilization ecologically sustainable – as a prima facie faulty assumption. But if the mission seriously is to change the basic workings of capitalism on a global scale I would suggest getting a broader coalition behind the effort than what the ecosocialists currently conceivably could muster on their own. Crucially as a step to accomplishing any such feat one needs to create a global political architecture that has the capacity to regulate and tax legitimately and effectively on a worldwide basis, and that is where planetarism comes in as a necessary ideological prerequisite before for example ecosocialist policies could realistically be carried out at the appropriate scale. There is of course no preordained guarantee that ecosocialist policies would be the result of the creation of a democratically elected global political authority. If a completely unconstrained global one person-one vote election was carried out this instant the chance that an ecosocialist party would carry the day would have been rather miniscule. But given a proper political foundation and a world constitution where the advice of a strongly shared scientific consensus would have to be followed on such an important matter, we could quickly see the downgrading of the importance of capitalist imperatives on the one hand, and a prioritization of the long term interests of humanity and its worldly habitat on the other. This would be consistent with the ecosocialist insight, if not necessarily with
the ecosocialist ideology per se. There might be room for quite a wide span of ideological differences even in a political system tuned to ensure long term survival.

I would suggest that the polity has to be reshaped to fit the globe first, before policies that can alter the direction human civilization is headed can be expected to work effectively in practice. Therefore for instance green liberal and ecosocialist ideologies can be seen as symptomatic of a heightened global awareness of the planetary bounds of our existence, an awareness which at some point could lead to the formation of new ideological projects for uniting the world politically. Is it possible to identify any such project now in existence? That is the task I have set myself to find out in this thesis, and the answer I arrive at after looking into the contenders is essentially “no”. But at the same time there are numerous signs that indicate an ongoing ideational movement in the direction of planetarism and away from, not only nationalism, but also internationalism, which shows the usefulness of the concept. From a globally conscious viewpoint this could be cause for some optimism, though it is evident that a full-fledged planetarist ideology has yet to materialize.

The Methodological Assumptions and Specific Techniques Utilized

The methodological assumption followed here is that new meaningful knowledge about historical and contemporary world politics in general, and political theories and ideological discourses in particular, can be inferred through the comprehensive study-, analysis-, and critique of relevant texts to the period being dealt with. In this case this is handled as a completely qualitative endeavor. Later historical texts give us a unique overview not available to contemporaries, while a closer study of especially pertinent contemporary texts reveals crucial details about the way highly informed people of the era perceived the world politically. The technical part of the method employed here relies heavily on the analysis of texts written by political theorists or by scholars and authors from other disciplines (such as for instance economics) that have participated in debates of a political philosophical nature.

Ideally an undertaking such as this present thesis represents would have been able to go down to the same level of detail as the consummate intellectual historian does in his or hers work concerning individual theorists (for example: Porter 2011, Bevilacqua 2012, and Spieker 2014). That however, when dealing with the works of so many theorists as is done here, who in addition are spread over a series of more or
less distinct discourses, over the span of altogether several centuries, would have meant extending the timeframe for this project with considerable time if the same ideological breadth and diversity of individual viewpoints were to be covered in this manner.

Instead of devoting myself to what in earnest would have been an impossible task I have based several sections of the following work on trusting those academics that have already undertaken a meticulous study of for example the work of Anacharsis Cloots, or published texts presenting the essential arguments made in some of the more obscure works by Walter Lippmann or Friedrich Hayek (i.e. respectively; Bevilacqua 2012, Porter 2011, and Spieker 2014). Not that I uncritically accept everything the authors I rely on when using such secondary sources claim, but I do trust that their citations and their summaries of the material referred to are correct in their essentials. I do not think this is too much to ask from peer reviewed and edited texts either published in respectable academic journals or by well known university presses or the chief academic publishing houses. Even so, as a rule, I have always aimed to seek out the original source (or its equivalent English translation) and utilized this as far as that was practically possible.

In a world where we are exceedingly swamped by an overload of information I think this approach – where one essentially utilizes the hard work already done by other academics instead of replicating their effort in the hope of adding a level of nuance that perhaps would have been unnecessary for getting the overview over the broader picture sought here – makes sense. This should especially hold true when trying to cover lots of texts written by theorists participating in extensive discourses over long periods of time such as is being attempted here. This occasional reliance on secondary sources is debatably a weakness of this approach, but it has in any case been a necessary economizing step to make the work a feasible prospect given the resources at hand. I would nonetheless ultimately argue that this admittedly less-than-perfect approach is justified by the unique overview one gets over the larger whole that one in the end has pieced together by way of amassing an amount of information that would not have been individually obtainable through the ideal method of solely relying on original sources.

The basic method of textual analysis or interpretation described above undergirds an application of the method of discourse analysis (see: Gill 2000). I am not just
critically analyzing or commenting on singular texts, but I identify them as parts of broader debates or discourses which can be clustered together into different ideological constellations. Though “discourse” is often used to describe more complex phenomena (see: Dijk 1998: 191-199, and; Laclau 2005: 13), my interpretation of what constitutes a discourse is simplified to mean the texts produced by significant sympathetic intellectual contributors to the debate surrounding a specific ideology. For the purposes of this work the temporary manifestation of an ideology at a moment in time is seen as a reflection of the contemporaneously dominant tendency within a longer lasting and ideologically wider spanning political discourse. This work of interpretation or looking for meaning in texts is facilitated by engaging the text at hand with the ontological-normative theoretical framework explained earlier firmly in mind (see: Sayer 2010: 35-36).

I subject the discourses at hand to what I would term “conceptual excavation”, and it is primarily the relationship the different participants singled out as representative of these discourses have to the concepts of the nation, internationalism, and potentially planetarist conceptions of a post-national and post-international world politics, I have wanted to unearth by the application of this method. It is important in this regard to note that one ‘concept may be designated by more than one word or term’ and that it is possible that ‘an individual or group may possess a concept without having a word by which to express it’ (Richter 1995: 9). The latter is clearly the case when Huxley as previously mentioned uses the term “internationalism” to denote “one world sovereignty”. This approach has meant that I have had to sift through large amounts of material that often did not address what I was looking for in search for salient passages which reveals the conceptual thinking that can tell us more or less precisely where important individuals in these discourses can be located on the nationalist-planetarist continuum, even though that terminology is never explicitly applied by any of the authors in question. By extension the span these entire discourses covers (or covered at one point) is revealed as the number of observations pertinent to each discourse accumulates.

What I present here is a highly qualitative approach because it is not enough that someone employs the terms “internationalism” or “globalism” for instance to find their position in the debate, but one has to diligently check what exactly these terms means for the author that employs them on a deeper conceptual level – e.g. whether
“internationalism” is perceived as an extension of nationalism into the intergovernmental realm or is a term meant to convey the complete opposite of nationalism. Registering the number of instances a term crops up in a text or discourse in a quantitative manner is not part of the method employed here at all. A quantitative approach to the material could of course have been complementary and yielded interesting results, but it is a conscious methodological choice not to add that type of analysis to the already quite extensive and labor intensive qualitative analysis employed here.

Ideologies should be understood as ‘multi-conceptual constructs’ that evolve within the confines of broader ideational discourses (Freeden 1996: 88). Michael Freeden addresses this evolutionary attribute of ideologies in general by pointing out their tendency towards conceptual ‘morphology’ where the position of individual concepts that in combination make up an ideology tend to be given more or less weight as the groups utilizing the ideology alters its conceptual composition to fit changing circumstances (Freeden 1996: 75-91). In light of Freeden’s observation that ‘ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts’ I search for instances of concrete ideology formation (or reformation) before decontestation happens, i.e. periods of intra-ideological contestation (Freeden 1996: 76, emphasis in original). The basic assumption I work from here is that the participants during the period of contestation all take part in a discourse with greater ideological range than what a consolidated, coherent, ideology signified by decontested ‘core’ concepts could possibly cover (Freeden 1996: 77). For example in the instance of neoliberalism I discover that three different world order perspectives could be identified among the main contributors during the ideology’s first formative phase, namely; Atlanticism, federal internationalism, and universalism. Only the first of these three options existing in the larger neoliberal discourse became the decontested core part of the more narrow neoliberal ideology (or that is what I argue). But as we can infer from the range of the options listed here there were several alternative, more or less parochial – but most importantly readily available – versions of nationalism that were not seriously considered by prominent members participating in the neoliberal discourse at the time when the discourse underwent this instance of intra-ideological contestation. The point is that discourses that feed into ideologies are wider than the concrete form the ideology takes at any time, even if they in practice are only open to participants who share a somewhat
similar political outlook. This political commonality facilitates a certain level of mutual recognition and respect amongst the participants in the debate and it is this again which makes the ideational cross-fertilization necessary for the ideology’s further development possible. But once conceptual decontestation has been achieved regarding core issues formerly subject to contention, an ideology will take a more definite form for what is likely an extended period, and the participants whose views were discarded might go on to form splinter groups that (if they do not peter out into nothingness) could turn into competing ideological camps stemming from the same original discourse.

If we trace today’s major ideologies back to the early days of the French Revolution we can see that they were all roughly part of the same anti-absolutist discourse that united everyone from factions of the nobility wanting greater autonomy to the most radically minded of the Enlightenment thinkers in the struggle to diminish the dictatorial powers of contemporary monarchs. Today’s ideological span, from the conservative nationalists found on the right to the contemporary variations of anarchism which now occupies the opposite post-Stalinist left extreme, can all be thought of as the result of successive splits in this “all-encompassing” political discourse which initiated modernity over two centuries ago. The reason I am putting “all-encompassing” in quotation marks here is because the most fundamental result of this development has been to erase the possibility of a prospective return to the monarchical order from the public imagination. In this sense the political mega-discourse of post-revolutionary modernity encompasses all options except a return to the monarchical ancien regime order.

The contribution of this thesis lies predominantly in the excavation and exploration of the potentialities and limitations inherent in the views expressed by some of the core contributors to the major contemporary globalization ideologies. This thesis therefore does not deal expressively with the creation of a new piece of political theory, even though it employs and further develops a conceptual apparatus to underline the direction of potential movement from a world political past signified by nationalism to a future possibly signified by planetarism. A key piece of this “thin” theoretical framework – that nonetheless shares similarities with “grand” theory (see: Skinner 1985: 3-20, and; James 2006: 7) – is that internationalism is seen only as a temporary way-station along this nationalist-planetarist trajectory. Planetarism is therefore theorized as being “the true” conceptual opposite of
nationalism, in place of internationalism which traditionally has been seen as the furthest one could move away from a nationalist standpoint. It is however not the intention of this thesis to present a fully fledged theory of planetarism, only to work out the basics of such a position to use this as a measuring rod while analyzing the stance of contributors to real world ideologies such as neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism. Using this theoretical construction as a conceptual yardstick allows us more fully to understand the ideational range these different ideologies cover as well as better see what their inherent limitations are.

The observant reader might have noticed that I have not explicitly addressed the epistemological nature of the overall method set out here. The ontological basis of the inquiry here is taken to be of a fundamentally dualistic character. One the one side the natural scientific worldview that underpins the ontological framework belongs within the positivist camp where it is taken for granted that ‘the world exists independently of our knowledge of it’ (Furlong & Marsh 2010: 193). On the other the ontological categories we find in the social and political world particular to human beings are taken to be more or less fully consistent with a ‘world [that] is socially or discursively constructed’ which by itself would be consistent with an ‘interpretivist’ or ‘constructivist’ position (Furlong & Marsh 2010: 199). I claim that we are dealing with a real world which we in fundamental respects have no choice but to learn to live with, but that this natural scientific dimension to reality is overlaid with a political layer which is the product of historical circumstance and human creativity that crucially can be altered. This view is neither consistent with positivism nor with an interpretivist/constructivist position, but with ‘realism’, a position which underscores the ‘need to identify and understand both the external “reality” and the social construction of that “reality” if we are to explain the relationship between social phenomena’ (Furlong & Marsh 2010: 204-205).

**Why Some Globalization Ideologies Are Not Potentially Planetarist**

While the normative commitments undergirding the work on this thesis has been explained in more detail above, it should nonetheless be made explicitly clear that the selection criteria for the inclusion of the three ideological discourses analyzed in the chapters to follow are founded on the same normative assumptions: That a desirable planetarist ideology would have to be universalist, inclined to accept a polity with a plurality of democratic choices available to the electorate, and actively be seeking enlightenment (which in this context means to further the advancement
of the collective knowledge held by the human species). There are other ideological discourses that can be thought of as just as “global” in scope as the three ideologies selected for a more thorough analysis in this thesis, but I will now explain why some of the most obvious contenders do not possibly meet these criteria. I will also show how some other alternatives that could have been considered on their own are at least partially included in the analysis as implicit subcategories within the larger ideological discourses being analyzed in the thesis.

Manfred B. Steger, whose work is central to the argument presented in this thesis, did at one point suggest that ‘Jihadist Globalism versus Imperial Globalism’ could be ‘the great ideological struggle of the twenty-first century’ (Steger 2008: 213). Jihadist Globalism was Steger’s name for the ideology underpinning militant groupings such as Al Qaeda and more recently the self-proclaimed Islamic State, but later Steger has changed the name to ‘Islamist Globalism’ instead (Steger 2009b). This ideology is rightly understood as universalist in the same manner as religions such as Christianity and Buddhism are seen as universalist. The ideational construct Steger calls Imperial Globalism on the other hand comes very close to describing the ideology which first was called “globalism” historically, namely the ideology of furthering American world hegemony that arose with victory in World War II (see: Brands 1997, Ambrose & Brinkley [1971] 2011, and Fousek 2000). While those in favor of Islamic jihad would probably welcome converts from all over the world to their cause with open arms, it is not so that the United States openly welcomes all and sundry who would like to be an American citizen. Though both creeds would ideally like to dominate the globe, only the Islamists are universally inclusive of those that happen to accept their terms of affiliation. This potential universal inclusiveness though is the only thing Steger’s Jihadist Globalism has going for it in planetarist terms.

Whether Jihadist Globalism can be said to completely stumble on the democratic pluralist criteria is debatable, since the Muslim Brotherhood which is moderate enough to play by democratic tenets when it suits their goals (see: Achcar 2013: 124-125) and the Islamic State who at the time of writing is attempting to establish ‘a theocratic Sunni state under sharia law’ in what used to be the hinterlands of Syria and Iraq and does not tolerate any competition of a religious, cultural, or political kind (Cockburn 2015: 84) may both fit this ideological label. But it is quite clear that this ideology fails most spectacularly on the issue of enlightenment intentions.
Jihadist Globalism in all its variations eventually comes down to espousing pure religious dogma, in its ideal polity there is no separation between religion and state, no possibility to challenge the truthfulness of scripture, and no recourse for ordinary people to question the validity of the moral codes upheld by the leading community of high-priests. It is both anti-humanist and anti-science and it replaces everything but the most basic aspects of education with the rote learning of sacred texts and the repetition of rituals.

The Islamic fundamentalism Steger calls “Jihadist Globalism” is so deeply reactionary that it is possible that observers such as Steger confuse its medieval mono-universalist aspects (well known from the era of Christendom) with the Space Age concept of planetary allegiance that have given rise to notions such as “globalism” and the planetarism I argue the case for in this thesis. There are obviously certain similarities between the two, which the following proclamation by the leader of Islamic State (also known by the acronym ISIS) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sheds light on: ‘[The Islamic State is meant to be] a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and the black man, the easterner and the westerner are all brothers [ ] Syria is not for the Syrians. Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The Earth is Allah’s’ (as cited in; Cockburn 2015: xi). Here we see an appeal to all humanity using the image of the Earth, which one could say employs hyper-modern or perhaps even planetarist elements in its imagery, but at its bottom there lurks a command to submit to the one true God that instantly indicates that we are dealing with an essentially pre-modern worldview. Its adherents are clearly intent on turning the political clock back to an age when a religious caste of clergy in cohorts with an aristocratic class of warriors together made up a patriarchic governing structure which forced the general population to keep in line with their superstitious interpretation of reality. They do not really want harmony between diverse groups and instead they aim for the complete homogenization of world society. But they derive part of their allure exactly from not being principally racist, which in combination with their apparent readiness to welcome anyone from wherever who are willing to fight for their cause gives them a potential strength in numbers that from the outset is denied to more particularist political ventures such as singular nation-states with exclusive citizenships.

Imperial Globalism, understood as an ideology of American exceptionalism geared toward ensuring that “indispensable” nation’s continued world domination, has
exactly the noninclusive weakness ISIS has made an effort to exploit. If the US had been imperial in the traditional sense it could theoretically have conquered the world through military and diplomatic means and thus created a singular global empire, but after the United States did so much by itself to end the age of empire through insisting on the self-determination of peoples it would seem positively anachronistic to suggest such a project. The Imperial Globalism we are dealing with here is simply a peculiar variety of Chauvinistic nationalism amplified to a superpower scale. Irving Kristol has described the nationalism of the United States as ‘the nationalism of a world power’ which seems to neatly describe Imperial Globalism (as cited in; Lieven 2012: 7). It cannot be a possible contender for being a planetarist ideology, in the way that for example neoliberalism (when decoupled from American exceptionalism) would be, because Imperial Globalism excludes non-Americans from holding an equal position within its preferred political system. Neither are there any indications that the United States government has any intentions of turning the foreign part of the world population into American citizens. The foreign policies of the American “empire” does have global reach, hence the “globalist” moniker does certainly fit to an extent, but an ideology which purposefully excludes the more than 95 percent of the world population who are not American co-nationals does obviously not seriously entertain truly global aspirations. American Globalism was nonetheless an important influence during the crucial formative stage for neoliberalism, and to an extent still is, as I will make the argument for in Chapter 3.

Another possible contender for inclusion as a planetary ideology could have been communism, or more specifically the Marxist-Leninism that supposedly held sway over much of the Earth’s population during the 20th Century. The ending of The Communist Manifesto admonishing ‘Working men of all countries unite!’ is certainly universalist in intent (Marx & Engels [1848] 1992: 39). But the reason this ideology is excluded is twofold; first Marxist-Leninism, or communism as it was put into practice during the 20th Century, quite quickly developed into Stalinism. Stalinism’s commanding feature is a mixture of communist economic thinking and nationalism captured in the enduring phrase “socialism in one country” (see: Ree 1998). This was in large part the model that was employed by communist rulers that subsequently came to power in Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and so on, even if their idea of “the nation” included the whole territory of the state and did not necessarily exclude ethnicities other than the dominant one from positions of power.
The second reason is that Marxism-Leninism/Stalinism has largely lost sway over the imagination of people worldwide.

The closest one would get to a communist planetarist ideology in the 20th Century was probably the version of communism articulated by Leon Trotsky, outspoken opponent to Stalin in the years following the death of Lenin. Trotsky in opposition to Stalin saw ‘the idea of a nationally self-sufficient socialism [socialism in one country/Stalinism] as incompatible with Leninist tradition and Marxist principle’ (Deutscher [1954-1963] 2015: 827). Trotsky refused ‘to abandon the prospect of international revolution’ which had been so central to Marx and Engel’s original plan for a world communist takeover (Deutscher [1954-1963] 2015: 828). Trotsky’s position was based on the following rationale:

…although socialist revolution might for a time be confined to the boundaries of a single state, socialism could not be achieved within the framework of any nation-state, not even one as vast as the Soviet Union or the United States. Marxism had always envisaged socialism in terms of an international community, because it held that historically society tended towards integration on an ever larger scale (Deutscher [1954-1963] 2015: 835).

Trotsky stayed true to Marxist teachings while Stalin was more interested in pragmatic ‘myth-creation’ in an effort ‘to conceal the gulf between Bolshevik promise and fulfillment’ as a means to consolidate his grip on power (Deutscher [1954-1963] 2015: 836). In this way Trotskyism became the term for the kind of communism that continued to advocate international (i.e. world) revolution. This split between Stalin on one side and Trotsky on the other happened in 1926-1927 (see: Deutscher [1954-1963] 2015: 821-946). Though Trotskyism experienced something of an upsurge beginning in the late 1960, both this and Stalinism appear to have lost much of what limited popular appeal it had in the West during the aftermath of the Soviet implosion in 1989-1991. I therefore consider these two strains of communist ideology as being mostly outdated historical tendencies that only in part inform the contemporary Western Marxist tendency found with the wider alter-globalist discourse addressed in Chapter 5.

The Stalinist and Trotskyist varieties of communism are nonetheless important tendencies to be aware of, because despite the evidence to the contrary offered by
the split between Trotsky (who had no further influence over policy) and Stalin (one of the greatest dictators of all time who personally commanded Soviet policy), the internationalist and potentially planetarist aspects of communism were hugely exaggerated in the popular Western imagination during the Cold War. This to the point that any serious attempt at contemplating political world organization risked the accusation of being an example of fifth column socialist agitation (see: Schuman 1952: 465, and Goodman 1960: 415-418).

In addition to Islamist Globalism, Imperial Globalism, and communism in its Marxist-Leninist guise, other potentially planetarist ideologies not specifically analyzed in this thesis include several varieties of ecologism, anarchism, and feminism. In a sense ideologies such as deep-ecology and social ecology are part of what is referred to here as the “alter-globalist” discourse, but my discussion of that discourse could not possibly do justice to the rich variety of ideological viewpoints this term ultimately covers. This, together with the lack of a fuller treatment of in particular Islamist Globalism and Imperial Globalism (even if it is clear they could not possibly become planetarist ideologies proper, enough people seem to think they are to make the endeavor worthwhile) are some of the limitations of my approach that could be addressed by either making the thesis longer or a lot more compact. In the end the time to do either of these things has not been available.

If I were to start the thesis again I would look for a possible early contender for a planetarist ideology in Scientific Humanism (see: Reiser 1940), perhaps looked deeper into the most recent articulations of cosmopolitanism (e.g. Ingram 2013), and mined Murray Bookchin’s complete oeuvre to see whether his solutions were anything less than completely utopian (e.g. Bookchin 1982). It would also have been of great interest to see if any of the neoliberal authors primarily active in the second half of last century had fully developed ideas about internationalism being favorable over a fully global political system (as suggested in: Harmes 2014). But these shortcomings would not have been quite so obvious if it was not for the work laid down in the pages ahead. I hope there is something to learn here for all who ventures forth.
Chapter 1. Ideologies and Imaginaries

Introduction: A Conceptual History of Ideology

The aim of this chapter is to present the conceptual apparatus and analytical framework which will be used in this thesis. This, in addition to the historical contextual framework presented in the following chapter, forms the theoretical basis for the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters. The focus here will first be on the concept of ideology and how it has been understood since the term itself was coined in the late 18th Century. It will show that Antoine Destutt de Tracy’s original conceptual understanding of “ideology” was the complete opposite of Karl Marx’s later use of the term. Destutt de Tracy was concerned with striving for ideals and Marx with idol worship. Karl Mannheim’s later contribution was pioneering in the respect that it incorporated both these views of ideology, and that he identified ideologies as a phenomena that could exist side by side in the same society.

But Mannheim somewhat confusingly terms Marx’s concept “ideology” and Destutt de Tracy’s “relative utopian” thinking. The Behavioralists added the notion that one can measure a person’s ideological predispositions on a “liberal-conservative” continuum, but also had a tendency to relegate ideologies that were not part of the post-McCarthyite American mainstream political debate off their charts, and thereby portrayed a politically sanitized and inaccurate picture of the complete ideological landscape.

Noteworthy recent developments in the study of political ideologies include Michael Freeden’s “conceptual approach”, John Schwarzmantel’s identification of an “embryonic counter-hegemonic ideology”, and Manfred B. Steger’s work concerning “the dawning global imaginary”, all of which will help shape the analytical and conceptual framework employed in this thesis. Near the end of this chapter I will add my own take on the study of contemporary global ideologies by introducing the concept of a “planetary” ideology. Finally I explain why I find it useful to refine the units of analysis (i.e. the potential planetarist ideologies) in contrast to the different “globalisms” which Steger has primarily used in his influential studies.
From Destutt de Tracy’s Enlightening “Ideology” to the Delusional “Idology” of Karl Marx

What is ideology? The concept has gone through several phases where its meaning has been altered from one to the other. The word “ideology” was coined by Comte (i.e. Count) Antoine Destutt de Tracy ‘in a “Mémoire sur la faculté de penser” read in installments before the Institute⁴ from 1796 to 1798’ (Kennedy 1979: 354). Ideology meant “science of ideas” in Greek, and the new word was introduced in the first lecture of the series at the Institute on the 21st of April 1796 (Kennedy 1979: 355). Destutt de Tracy published his *Eléments d’Idéologie* in five volumes from ‘1801-1815’ and here ‘for Destutt [ ] the study of “ideology” is part of zoology’ by which he meant according to Lichtheim ‘that human psychology should be analyzed in biological terms; that is, without paying attention to religion’ (1965: 167).

The true foundation of the sciences is [ ] to be found in a “Science des idées” which will describe the natural history of the mind, that is, the manner in which thoughts are formed. There is no supersensible reality behind the individuals and their several “ideas”… (Lichtheim 1965: 167).

In light of this paragraph one might be tempted to interpret Destutt’s notion of ideology as a purely ‘materialist’ conception, but this materialist ‘theme is crossed with a normative purpose’ where ‘[t]he reduction of individual ideas to generally held notions is intended to lay bare a common ground of human needs and aspirations, thus providing the lawgiver with the means of furthering the common good’ (Lichtheim 1965: 167). Despite his aristocratic heritage, Destutt de Tracy was a true Enlightenment revolutionary who believed that ‘[r]eason progressively discloses a true picture of humanity which constitutes the foundation of civic virtue’ and that ‘[t]he best social order is that which corresponds to the permanent needs of man’ (Lichtheim 1965: 168). This was a criticism of the ‘idols’ which distorted the truth, as earlier identified by Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and for Destutt de Tracy Christian metaphysics was clearly the main manifestation of such idols (Lichtheim 1965: 168).

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⁴ “The Institute” Kennedy here is referring to is ‘Institut de France’ founded ‘in 1795’ (Lichtheim 1965: 165).
To paraphrase Lichtheim: The principal aim of the Enlightenment was the reformation of consciousness through the removal of popular superstition by the means of education and the relentless application of critical reasoning (Lichtheim 1965: 168-169). Thereby ‘the place of religion’ was to be ‘taken by a secular morality inherently social because man is a social being’ (Lichtheim 1965: 169). Or, as summarized by Kennedy: ‘Ideology, not religion, was [to be] the basis of morality’ (1979: 356). So the project of Destutt de Tracy’s “Science des idées” was to supplant the religious basis for morality with a scientific one, and his particular version of scientific objectivity was highly influenced by the scientific rationalism and political liberalism of the Enlightenment period in which he lived.

Destutt de Tracy and the other ‘idéologues’ of the Institute were liberals and ‘headed the liberal opposition’ during ‘the Bourbon Restauration’ which followed the end of Napoleon’s rule (Lichtman 1965: 165-166). Theirs was a ‘political ideology of free thought, free press, individual liberties, the integrity of representative assemblies, and secularization’ (Kennedy 1979: 358). But at the time this was not recognized as an “ideology” among several others by its proponents. Though ‘the defrocked abbé Lemare’ ‘[a]s early as 1812’ recognized that Destutt de Tracy’s ‘idéologue Republicanism’ was in itself one ideology confronting another ideology of ‘royalism’ this was not Destutt de Tracy’s viewpoint, since he saw his ideology as a singular ‘solid and well linked system’ of thought confronting the superstition that signified prior modes of thought (Kennedy 1979: 363).

The meaning of ideology went through a reversal, aptly described by Kennedy (1979: 358-368), thanks to Napoleon’s attack on the ideologues beginning in the year 1800 where he ‘adopted the tactic of ridiculing Ideology as metaphysical revery’ (Kennedy 1979: 358). For a time prior to Napoleon’s turn on the ideologues they had ‘firmly expected Bonaparte to inaugurate the enlightened commonwealth of their dreams’ and ‘in 1797’ Napoleon had even become an ‘honorary member of the Institute’ (Lichtheim 1965: 165). Subsequently ‘in 1799, at the time of the coup d’état de Brumaire’ the members of the Institute actually ‘helped to promote [Napoleon’s] accession to power’ through ‘their influence over the educated middle class’(Lichtheim 1965: 165). Napoleon’s attack had no explicit basis in the writings of Destutt the Tracy or the other liberals since: ‘The Idéologues were being vilified [ ] for propounding metaphysics (which they actually wished to bury)” (Kennedy 1979: 358).
The reason for Napoleon’s animosity towards Destutt de Tracy and his companions was twofold; first that their efforts promoted republicanism, which clearly was a threat to his rule as it became more despotic, and secondly that they actively undermined Napoleon’s use of Christianity as a means of popular control. For these reasons Napoleon proclaimed the following in a warning against the Idéologues to the Prussians in September 1808:

…philosophers torment themselves to create systems; they will search in vain for a better one than Christianity, which in reconciling man with himself assures both public order and the peace of states. [ ] ideologues destroy all illusions, and the age of illusions is for individuals as for peoples the age of happiness (from Talleyrand Mémoires [1891], as cited in Kennedy 1979: 359).

By the time Marx wrote his The German Ideology in 1845 Destutt de Tracy’s enlightening meaning given to the word ideology had been turned on its head. Ideologues were now for Marx (with Engels) ‘the jurists [and] politicians (including the practical statesmen)’ who through their ‘illusions’ sought to perpetuate ‘the dogmatic dreamings and distortions’ serving ‘the ruling class’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 68-70). We can here see how successful Napoleon Bonaparte had been with reversing the connotation of the word ideology, a meaning he himself had obviously been aware of, but which was completely subverted in common parlance by the time of Marx about forty years later. We can see that Marx’s use of the concept was in complete opposition to the original meaning.

Marx’s idea of ideology was more complex than just the stereotypical denunciation of bourgeoisie ideology as leading to “false consciousness”, a phrase ‘Marx himself never used’ (Eagleton 1991: 89). Though Marx certainly did not think of the communism he propounded as ideological (Marx [1845] 1998: 57), he saw ideology as a recurrent historical phenomenon where ‘[t]he first form of ideologists, priests, is coincident’ with the original ‘division of material and mental labour’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 50). Following Marx’s description of preceding historical epochs as ‘tribal, ancient, feudal’ in the order mentioned, his loose dating of the first occurrences of

5 This ‘distinction [ ] must be accorded instead to his collaborator Frederick Engels’ who demonstrably used the phrase ‘in a letter [ ] of 1893’ i.e. a decade after Marx had died (Eagleton 1991: 89, the relevant passage is also cited in Lichtheim 1965: 173, footnote 33).
ideological practice would thereby at the latest have appeared in the ancient epoch (Marx [1845] 1998: 38-41).

What has become known as Marxist false consciousness was for Marx the symptom of an age old praxis where historically contingent dominant ruling classes reflexively substituted a metaphysical falsehood (i.e. Marx’s concept of ideology), presented as eternally true, for the real ‘logic of the “material” process itself’, a process which went through epochal changes (Lichtheim 1965: 175). To hide this logic was perhaps an understandable operation by any given ruling class, since the alternative of publicly admitting the true basis of societal power-relations (something in the order of “we are in command of the means of production, therefore we rule”) clearly would have been a poorer rhetorical device for maintaining their hegemonic hold over an accommodating populace.

This was especially true in ‘the age of revolution’ coinciding with the lives of both de Tracy and Marx, when popular uprisings against ‘absolute monarchy, church and aristocracy’ showed itself capable of toppling ancien régimes (see Hobsbawm [1962] 2007: 138-143). The solution for the threatened rulers was to make the populace acquiescent through a mixture of coercion, cunning and bribery, a package where the application of ideology in the Marxist sense would seem to fit under the rubric of “cunning”. However, that might be giving the rulers of the time more credit than Marx was willing to concede.

First: ‘The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 67). Second: ‘The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 67). Third: ‘The ruling class itself on the whole imagines’ that the dominant ideas and concepts of their time can be attributed an existence independent of ‘the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas’, even when the producers – or ‘its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of the illusions of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood’ – are themselves a specialized branch of the ruling class (Marx [1845] 1998: 68).

Members of the ruling classes are thereby largely (e.g. Napoleon Bonaparte could have been one notable exception) unconscious of the fact that the superstructure of ideas and concepts (i.e. the ideology) follows from the material base (or the mode of
production), and rather think it is the other way around. Thinking for instance that God’s providence has made sure they were born noblemen and that therefore they are naturally entitled to be wealthy. This is why Marx’s understanding of ideology is ‘characterized by the abstraction and inversion of the real’ (Balibar [1995] 2007: 55). For Marx ideology is in short a process which maintains existing societal relations, and not something used for their overturning. But this is also not necessarily a process the ruling class themselves are conscious of, since they too can suffer from a “false consciousness” as Engels had it. Ideology in this sense is then a delusion perpetuated by the ruling class which the lower classes buy into contrary to their own interests.

Whereas for the French idéologues their ideology was an attempt to replace metaphysical mystification with “true” knowledge of the world, for Marx ideology was metaphysical mystification which needed to be replaced with ‘communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 57). And the present state of things was for Marx signified by the capitalist mode of production which was ideologically obfuscated by ‘the politico-ideological superstructure’ (Balibar [1995] 2007: 93).

Now after having presented the two founding notions of ideology in the modern era, a glance further back in time is needed for some clarification. Balibar mentions that:

> Beyond [these] immediate sources [i.e. de Tracy and Marx], the term has a whole philosophical genealogy which, via Locke and Bacon, takes us back to two opposing ancient sources: the Platonic forms (eidè) and the ‘simulacra’ (eidôla) of Epicurean philosophy (Balibar [1995] 2007: 125).

To avoid getting caught up in a long-winded philosophical discussion, allow me to put it as simply as possible; the Platonic forms can be said to be ideals or the ultimate standards of perfection (which are also ultimately unattainable in real life, but still worth striving for), while the simulacra of Epicurean philosophy can be described as idols, meaning objects of worship which are (falsely) thought to be divine (i.e. a false representation of reality wrongly accepted as truth).6 It is clear

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6 The eidôla of Epicurean philosophy is by modern experts translated as ‘images’ resulting from ‘streams of atoms constantly thrown off of the surfaces of objects that cause visual sensations when they strike our eyes’ (O’Keefe 2010: 100-101, 159, and 175). But ‘What sensation does not report is the status of the real object’ which means the eidôla can give rise to perceptions
that de Tracy and the other Ideologues were talking about the former when they referred to “ideology”, while Marx was referring to the latter with his use of the concept. Marx was no stranger to the former notion, but he meant communism\(^7\) would be the perfected political system (i.e. what logically would follow his conception of socialism and the transitory dictatorship of the proletariat). In the same way de Tracy was clearly aware of the existence of the latter, but this for him was commensurate with metaphysics. In this sense we can say that Marx was attacking idology, while de Tracy was defending idealogy, in other words when juxtaposed these are diametrically contrasted conceptual positions.

Ironically de Tracy’s positive notion of ideology was twisted into idology before Marx took up the concept, and Marx himself was in the 20\(^{th}\) Century turned into an idol of worship for the Marxist-Leninism of the Soviet Union. But, to return to the core of the matter at hand, this is a very important conceptual distinction: idology – or what we can call delusional ideology – and idealogy – which we can call enlightening ideology – can be used not just to distinguish between different ideologies altogether, but also to separate the conceptual make-up of a single ideology. This is potentially very useful since it is highly likely that many ideologies (understood broadly) contain elements of both types.

It is not unusual in Western Marxism, for an example, to still maintain a somewhat rigid focus on class-relations (e.g. Therborn 2012) – when today people have started to choose their political affiliation on the basis of other guiding perceptions so that ‘of all the political identifications available, class seems to have receded drastically’ (Carver 2009: 467). Class relations are therefore arguably a conceptual part of Western Marxism that has become a delusional ideology (or idology) where these have turned into an idol which instead of clarifying the real conditions might actually be masking them. Not that knowing about for instance economic differences between groups cannot tell us many important things, but in certain cases key differences that are not easily attributed to class might get overlooked because a bias

\(^7\) Marx explicitly denies that communism is a representation of idealized politics: ‘Communism is not for us a state of affairs which is to be established, and ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 57, brackets in the original), but that notion is contrary to some of the most crucial insights of later scholars of ideology.
towards class-based differences could overdetermine the analysis. While to the contrary the tendency to advocate ‘a project of universal emancipation’ amongst most Western Marxists is undoubtedly an imprint of *enlightening* ideology within Western Marxism which aspires to a closer perfection of human society on the basis of the actual existence of humanity as a singular species, instead of focusing on the often unhelpful divisions of humanity into nationalities (Therborn 2012: 15).

Together these different conceptions of ideology – acceptance or even use of *idols* on the one side and the unending search for *ideals* and their attainment on the other – supply us with two very important strategic coordinates as we get deeper into the domain of ideological discourse. As the Chinese sage Sun Tzu famously advised, ‘know the enemy, know yourself’ (Tzu [c.400-320 BCE] 1971: 129). When it comes to ideology the unthinking devotion to idols, or the superstition connected to imaginary notions, is for the scientist “the enemy” and in opposition to this dimming of human faculties the scientist, or any inquisitive mind, should support the quest for knowledge and the systematic application of that knowledge to the politics of human self-governance so that they can improve dialectically together. The problem is of course to separate the wheat from the chaff, since “truth” and “reality” are ‘essentially contested concepts’ (Gallie 1956). However, that should not hinder us from broadly delineating elements of ideological discourse that are more intellectually persuasive than others, in light of both pertinent historical and empirical evidence available in the scholarly literature and the overall desire to enlighten, rather than perpetuate ignorance, that should drive all forms of scientific inquiry.

In short, this thesis follows the modern scientific tradition of not only seeking to reveal superstitious notions, which both Marx and de Tracy were attempting, but also to come up with an alternative to these which is securely anchored in our empirical understanding of the world, as it currently is understood to exist through the approximation of an objective viewpoint (which they also sought to do in their own idiosyncratic ways).

The idol/ideal distinction clearly presupposes a claim to objective knowledge of reality which is far from uncontentious, but that controversy will not be dealt with at any length in this thesis, since the aim here is to compare ideologies along a normative scale stretching from what is good for particular groups to what is
interpreted as the optimal holistic planetary solution. Here the “objective” or “universally true” logically follow from a hypothetical holistic conception of “the planetary good” constructed on the basis of available information and scholarly opinion (thus it will be rooted in arguably imperfect, but still expert, measurements and interpretations of empirical reality and the possibilities inherent therein), and not on an (obviously unattainable) insight into truly objective or universally true reality unmitigated by our socially laden and time-dependent perceptions. For as Karl Mannheim stated:

The nature of “reality” or “existence as such” is a problem which belongs to philosophy, and is of no concern here. However, what is to be regarded as “real” historically or sociologically at a given time is of importance to us and fortunately can be definitively ascertained. Inasmuch as man is a creature living primarily in history and society, the “existence” that surrounds him is never “existence as such”, but is always a concrete historical form of social existence. For the sociologist “existence” is that which is “concretely effective”, i.e. a functioning social order, which does not exist only in the imagination of certain individuals, but according to which people really act (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 174).

How the concrete form of social existence and the functioning social order can currently be described will be addressed in the next chapter, and the immediate concern here is going to be a closer examination of Mannheim’s conceptual apparatus.

**Mannheim: Ideologies vs. Relative Utopian Thought**

Mannheim was the author of the next major contribution to the study of ideology after Marx, originally published in German in 1929 as *Ideologie und Utopie*. In this work Mannheim made a further distinction to the idol/ideal dichotomy where he divides ideology into two different conceptions, ‘the particular conception of ideology’ and ‘the total conception of ideology’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 49). Of these the particular conception are mere ‘distortions’ which ‘range all the way from conscious lies to half-conscious and unwitting disguises’ operating on a ‘purely psychological level’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 49-50). The total conception, on the other hand, is an all encompassing ‘Weltanschauung’, a perception of the world described as ‘the whole outlook of a social group’ i.e. the prevailing worldview
which steers a group’s political engagement (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 52). In addition Mannheim puts forward the idea that utopian thought is the ideal which confronts the idolatry of the present, or what I have here called ideology in the enlightening respect (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 173-184).

Mannheim’s concept of utopian thought is also divided into two separate categories. First you have the ‘absolutely utopian’ ideas of paradise and in particular the ideas concerning its earthly realization (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 179). These ideas, in contrast to the milder versions found in e.g. mediaeval Christianity with its promise of a pleasant afterlife for its faithful adherents, actually poses a threat to the existing order. In connection to this strain Mannheim mentions ‘the Utopia of Thomas More’ from 1517 and other tracts ‘which in a somewhat broader historical sense concerns themselves with “ideal commonwealths” ’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 180-181). To explain Mannheim’s intention in more detail I would add that these are usually socially fantastical and often somewhat naïve political visions. What they share in common is not just a desire to transcend the present political order, but also to radically rearrange family and social life along communal lines, so as to facilitate a novel and complete regimentation of society in accordance with the wishes of its author.

This is for example what Plato offers in his The Republic (Plato [c. BCE 375] 2003), which is the earliest of ‘the agreed core of utopias’ for students of that particular phenomenon, which also includes, in addition to ‘Thomas More’s Utopia’, ‘Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis, Tomasso Campanella’s City of the Sun, and Etienne Cabet’s Voyage en Icarie’ (Levitas [1990] 2011: 14).8 These utopian visions all have interesting elements to them. Bacon, for example, provides a promising vision for the future of science and the position of universities in society which has to a certain extent been realized since, and Cabet’s ideas concerning a communal society made a mark on subsequent socialist thinking. But when considered as an interconnected set of ideas absolutely utopian ideas end up being somewhat overtly specific and idiosyncratic in their prescriptions, so that they could seemingly only be realistically transposed whole-scale from theory to reality by way of small, and extremely devoted, sects.

8 Of these latter three, New Atlantis and City of the Sun were written in the early seventeenth century, while Voyage en Icarie was published in 1840.
Later “absolutely utopian” ideas, such as those frequently found in the science fiction genre, usually presuppose some kind of technical innovation beyond the reach of contemporary science. From Jules Verne’s visionary 19th Century submarines, aircrafts, and moon-travels, via H.G. Wells’ time-machine, to the “space operas” staple of modern science fiction (which is dependent on rapid interstellar travel very far beyond the means of contemporary science), these future visions clearly lack a grounding in the presently existing conditions. That is not to say that science fiction (or other absolutely utopian ideas) cannot help us ‘restructure our experience of our own present’ and help us imagine politically alternative futures, as Frederic Jameson argues (Jameson 2007: 286). But this is more of a mildly subversive function than the more hard-line overt presentation of a politically, culturally, and technologically viable alternative vision. These viable visions are phenomena we have historical experience of, with both for instance classical liberal and socialist ideas in the modern epoch. The potentially viable ideas that liberalism and socialism once represented are the most interesting for the present inquiry (though the absolutely utopian will be kept as a potential category for dismissal of extremely unrealistic ideas). This brings us to Mannheim’s second utopian category, that of relative utopian ideas, which in its relationship to the empirically existing immanent possibilities within the really existing political world distinguishes itself from absolutely utopian ideas.

In the context of the preceding political orders, both the liberalism that rose to prominence in the 18th and 19th Century, and the socialism (in both social-democratic and communist varieties) which had such an influence on politics from the late 19th Century to the late 1980s, where once what Mannheim describes as ‘relatively utopian’ ideas (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 177, 179, and 184). This means that the utopian aspect of these ideas were only utopian in the sense that they appear impossible in the eyes of the upholders of the established order: ‘The representatives of a given order will label as utopian all conceptions of existence which from their point of view can in principle never be realized’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 176-177). This means that certain utopian ideas are not intrinsically unrealizable from a more objective viewpoint. But in Mannheim’s view the only way to really tell the difference between an absolutely utopian and a relatively utopian idea is through applying a ‘retroactive standard’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 184).
example, which was influential earlier on, is that one was realizable on a large scale (albeit in a Marxist-Leninist sense) while the other was not. Thus we can see that the former was “relatively utopian” and the latter “absolutely utopian” in retrospect.

...if we look into the past, it seems possible to find a fairly adequate criterion of what is to be regarded as ideological and what as utopian. This criterion is their realization. Ideas which later turn out to have been only distorted representations of a past or potential social order were ideological, while those which were adequately realized in the succeeding social order were relative utopias. The actualized realities of the past put an end to the conflict of mere opinions about what in earlier situationally transcendent ideas was relatively utopian bursting asunder the bonds of the existing order, and what was an ideology which merely served to conceal reality (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 184).

What we can clearly discern from the citation above is that Mannheim uses the word “ideology” to mean what I have here called Marx’s delusional ideology, while he uses the word utopian (in the relative and not the absolute sense) as a concept close to identical to what I call the enlightening ideology of Destutt de Tracy. What is important to keep in mind is that these labels are not necessarily appropriate as eternal signifiers to any specific form of political thought. If we again use the example of Marxism, and in particular the Marxist-Leninist variety which became doctrine in the lands of “real-existing socialism” under Soviet influence in the 20th Century, it arguably went through an early “absolutely utopian” phase (i.e. the writings which influenced Marx). It then became “relatively utopian” as the proletariat had been identified as a presently historically existing agent which subsequently started acting consciously in line with their perceived “class-interest”, while the revolutions and the leaders it inspired quickly turned it into an ideology (in the delusional sense) for maintaining their grip on power.

After the implosion of the Soviet-Union it in hindsight appears like Marxist-Leninism was built on ultimately unrealizable absolute utopian ideas (which shows this particular ideology’s circular move through the different categories). Today other interpretations of Marxism which ‘typically abjure state control’ of the Leninist kind are being suggested, and this is debatably another incarnation of the Marxist strain of utopian thought which we only with historical hindsight might be
able to judge as either relatively or absolutely utopian in Mannheim’s sense (Harvey 2010: 225).

Mannheim’s concepts are much clearer than his labeling, since “absolutely utopian” is identical to how most people understand “utopian” today: ‘the contemporary connotation of the term “utopian” is predominantly that of an idea which is in principle unrealizable’ as Mannheim stated ‘[a]nd this meaning of utopian remains common; to call something “utopian” is often a means of dismissing it without further consideration’ as a contemporary expert on utopianism adds (Sargent 2008: 266, Mannheim as cited ibid.). This is why I will stick with my “delusional/enlightening” dichotomy even though it conveys almost exactly the distinction Mannheim attributes to his “ideological/relatively utopian” dichotomy. Another problem with Mannheim’s dichotomy is of course that he assigns “ideological” solely to the realm of my understanding of “delusional ideology” following Marx’s usage. As we will see later on, this does not fit well with the contemporary scholarly understanding of the term, even though Mannheim has been credited with pioneering one of the major contributions to it, that is, the understanding of ideology as plural simultaneously occurring political phenomena.

What Mannheim is usually mentioned for today, particularly by scholars of ideology, is for introducing the notion that ideologies are simultaneously occurring plural phenomena, and not just a singular phenomenon associated with perpetuating the domination of the ruling class as Marx would have it (e.g. Freeden 1996: 26). Mannheim stated that ‘the thought of all parties in all epochs is of an ideological character’ a character which is socially founded and changes over time, where ‘Marxism, too, has taken on many diverse appearances’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 69). As we have seen, abbé Lemare had already pioneered this notion in the early 19th Century.

Lenin (more than a decade before Mannheim wrote his contribution) interpreted the work of Marx and Engels in a peculiar fashion whereby he ended up arguing that an ideology, when it was founded on the class bias of the proletariat, would be commensurate with scientific truth (Carver 2009: 466). From this we can gather that Lenin saw a liberating potential in his proletarian ideology which could be usefully employed in the struggle against the prevailing ideology of the ruling class in its bourgeoisie appearance (or arguably ancien régime in Tsarist Russia), which is
necessarily also a plural conception of ideology. However, Mannheim is remembered as the primary respectable scholar to have made the connection, and he thus ‘paved the way towards generalizing ideology as a omnipresent social phenomenon as well as a group product, to include Marxism itself’ (Freeden 1996: 26).

The Behavioralists Cold-War Intermezzo

Mannheim’s crucial insights had the misfortune of fairly rapidly being followed by World War II and shortly thereafter the ensuing Cold War. The McCarthy era, and its subsequent impact, was not conducive to the creation of a political climate open for unbiased academic debate concerning ideologies.

Ideology in the first couple of decades following the Second World War was for the main bulk of political scientists a concept bound up with the ideologies of communism and fascism (Knight 2006: 621-622). This means that ideology during the post-war period came to be almost exclusively associated with the totalitarian ideologies of communism, Nazism, and fascism, which Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini had been the dictatorial advocates of. In contrast the notion that liberal democracies also happened to contain several ideologies (of a less “totalitarian” nature) was given less attention.

Daniel Bell’s now infamous The End of Ideology, published in 1960, announced the demise of ideology altogether, but his interpretation of ideology was decidedly only concerned with its “leftist” variants ‘variously embodied in notions of communism, socialism, and “social welfare liberalism’ the latter presumably of the sort Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” initiated (Knight 2006: 622). We in this era see a tendency amongst scholars to equate centrist or center-right ideologies with “science” or ‘the ideology of science’, whilst all the other views were ‘isms’ or ‘vulgar ideologies’ (Knight 2006: 622). Knight’s summation of the prevalent scholarly view in the United States around 1960 is as follows: “We” knew “the truth” and had not been misled by ideology the way “they” had (Knight 2006: 622).

In this setting the Behavioralists ‘further domesticated the concept’ of ideology and created a ‘liberal/conservative continuum’ where the most extreme left was commensurate with the position held by the most liberal members of the Democratic Party and the extreme right was held by the most conservative Republicans (Knight 2006: 622). In this sense the ‘Emphasis on the coherence of behavior along an
underlying spatial dimension (or dimensions) purged ideology of its pejorative connotations’ (Knight 2006: 622). This was useful for studying the range of opinions held by ‘legislators, judges, and other political practitioners’ (Knight 2006: 622). But it also purged any political viewpoints not already shared by a portion of the sitting political elite completely from these quantitative studies. Because the alternatives offered on the Behavioralists questionnaires were usually within the limited mainstream range on the assumption that all other viewpoints by definition necessarily must be extremist or occupying the (hidden) totalitarian terrain outside the continuum’s extremes.

Ideology was thereby practically divided into two categories: one accepted “liberal-conservative” range and one “totalitarian fringe” on each side of these which was so completely unacceptable that it was not worth mentioning. One result of this was that new ideological currents which arose to the surface in the late 1960s – even if they were attempting to be the anti-thesis of totalitarianism (as aspects of New Left ideology, exemplified by the writings of Marcuse, arguably were) – could only be dealt with by a relegation to the extreme left’s unsavory realm permanently outside accepted political discourse (for a discussion of this point see: Parenti 2006). It is almost as if the concept of ideology had been brought back to the status Marx gave it, but with one important caveat: There was now a range of acceptable ideological positions, fit for pluralistic democracy, as well as a group of essentially ideologies so unsavory that they were not worthy of engagement in a non-totalitarian society.

During the last forty years, and particularly after the fall of the Soviet-Union, this dichotomous partition has been loosened up. When Fukuyama asked the question ‘The End of History?’ in the title of his famous and contentious article, the following discussion and endorsement of the view that liberal democracy was now triumphant in its struggle against the ideologies of its contenders was probably the high-point of the Behavioralists worldview (Fukuyama 1989). Since it was they who had depicted the ideological range of the political status quo as the only viable option in the long run. However, the article still maintained the Behaviouralism blind-spot regarding the non-totalitarian nature of New Left and other ideological tendencies stemming from the 1960s (also including ecologism), and these would surface again by the end of the 1990s through unprecedented worldwide demonstrations against the undemocratic workings of ad hoc global governance constellations. The victory of liberal democracy over totalitarian ideology was never
complete to begin with, as China’s communist elite successfully quelled its internal opposition to state doctrine in Tiananmen Square in 1989. In another twist, totalitarian ideology resurfaced again on 9/11 2001, but now in the guise of Islamist extremism. It is within this turbulent ideological climate the contemporary debate about ideology has developed its own complex and nuanced understanding of a still highly pertinent phenomenon.

The Contemporary Scholarly Discourse Concerning Ideology

Three of the most prominent scholars on ideology since the late 1990s, Michael Freeden (e.g. 1996 and 2001), John Schwarzmantel (e.g. 1998 and 2008), and Manfred B. Steger (e.g. 2001, 2004 and 2008), all share a more nuanced understanding of ideology than that of either Destutt de Tracy, Marx, Mannheim, or the Behaviorists. First they recognize that; ideologies are ‘systems of broadly held political beliefs, speaking in languages familiar, or accessible to, most members of society’ (Freeden 1996: 552). That one ideology is a ‘system of widely shared ideas, patterned beliefs, guiding norms and values, and ideals accepted as truth by some group’ (Steger 2007: 367) Or that they represent ‘a set of ideas which is normative, setting out an ideal, aiming at arousing support on a mass basis for those ideas, seeking to agitate in their favour’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 26). Second, they all see ideologies as something which can be used for both facilitating elite domination and popular emancipation:

Ideologies may be power structures that manipulate human action, but they are also ideational systems that enable us to choose to become what we want to become (Freeden 1996: 553).

There has to be a plurality of political ideologies in order for the members of society to be able to act to improve or transform existing reality beyond the framework of the present structure. Therefore political ideologies are necessary elements in a democratic society, and should not be viewed simplistically as instruments of totalitarian power or tools used by leaders to manipulate credulous masses. It is not to be denied that these phenomena have been features of modern politics, but they do not warrant the conclusion that political ideologies are merely tools of elite domination (Schwarzmantel 2008: 28-29).

Its pejorative connotations notwithstanding, ideology deserves a more balanced hearing – one that acknowledges its integrative
role of providing social stability as much as its propensity to contribute to fragmentation and alienation; its ability to supply standards of normative evaluation as much as its tendency to oversimplify social complexity; its role as guide and compass for political action as much as its potential to legitimize tyranny and terror in the name of noble ideas (Steger 2008: 4).

In sharing this ‘neutral conception’ of ideology, the authors cited above allows for the complete inclusion of all manifestations of ideology in their analysis, and this is an effort which will be emulated here (Steger 2008: 4). What also can be discerned from these excerpts is that the dichotomy between the delusional, the manipulative, and the shrewdly dominating ideological tendency on the one side, and the enlightening, the guiding, and the positively transformative ideological tendency on the other, is something that all these scholars acknowledge. That that the former is condemnable and the latter is commendable, even within the framework of a “neutral” or “objective” perspective on ideologies in general, adds a value basis to the study of ideologies. In the words of Freeden: ‘certain ways of enlightened discourse may provide better ideological solutions than others’ (Freeden 1996: 554). Or as Steger puts it: ‘to opt for “neutrality” does not necessarily imply withholding value judgments from what the analyst might consider harmful or beneficial commitments of various political ideologies’ (Steger 2008: 4).

It is important in this context to be aware of that a ‘critical’ conception of ideology can mean to ‘approach ideology as systems of ideas which are necessarily misleading, illusory, or one-sided’ i.e. to regard ideology solely in Marx’s sense, except for now seeing them as being co-existent phenomena (Steger 2008: 4). In that sense this thesis will not be critical, since that would be counter to the contemporary scholarly consensus regarding how the study of ideology should proceed. However, in the sense that a critical perspective allows for criticism on the basis of what would be the most beneficial course of (ideological) action taken for humanity as a whole – and not just for privileged parts of it – this thesis will be critical.

In his magisterial work on ideologies, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (1996), Freeden argues that an ideology should be understood as a constellation consisting of several concepts holding different weight, so that: ‘Central to any analysis of ideologies is the proposition that they are characterized by a morphology that displays core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts’ (Freeden
1996: 77). Here the “core” concepts are the most crucial to the meaning of an ideology, but the morphological characteristic Freeden emphasizes implies that (in particular) adjacent and peripheral concepts can be altered, or even replaced or discarded, to adjust an ideology to changing circumstances. Because ‘[s]ometimes the retention of a marginal concept or idea may be dysfunctional to the survival of an ideology’ (Freeden 1996: 79). Freeden provides an example of how one can understand a specific ideology as a cluster of concepts:

For instance, an examination of observed liberalisms might establish that liberty is situated within their core, that human rights, democracy, and equality are adjacent to liberty, and that nationalism is to be found on the periphery (Freeden 1996: 77).

As we can see from this example it is seemingly rather contestable concepts, such as liberty, democracy, and equality, that together can constitute an ideology, but as Freeden argues: ‘Ultimately, ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts’ (1996: 76, emphasis in the original). This means that for instance “equality” in this case means “equality for the law”, so that no one should be treated unfairly by the courts on the basis of social standing. And not that everyone should have the right to an equal share of the surplus created in a community for example, which a socialist conception of equality could perhaps be interpreted, or decontested, as in its own ideological configuration. This view of decontested meaning as one of the central attributes of ideologies stems from the realization that ‘political language is employed to convey specific sets of meanings out of wider ranges’ (Freeden 1996: 77).

Yet again we have an important point for the study of the particular ideologies dealt with in this thesis, since this kind of deconstruction of ideologies into configurations of specific decontested concepts is crucial to both analyzing and comparing the different potentially planetary ideologies scrutinized here.

In concrete terms, an ideology will link together a particular conception of human nature, a particular conception of social structure, of justice, of liberty, of authority, etc. ‘This is what liberty means, and that is what justice means’, it asserts. Ideologies need, after all, to straddle the worlds of political thought and political action, for one of their central functions is to link the two (Freeden 1996: 76).
We here touch upon one the main features of political ideologies in the modern age; that their fortunes rise or descend in conjunction with their ability to garner public support for their political agenda. Schwarzmantel puts emphasis on this point and, following Gramsci, ‘see ideologies as links between abstract philosophical concepts and the political world of the mass of the people’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 27). Though agreeing with Freeden that ideologies ‘are indeed assemblages of concepts, which seek to ‘deconstruct’ political concepts and organize them in certain configurations’ Schwarzmantel also maintains that ‘they are much more than that. Political ideologies are essentially practical forces, which are used to mobilise citizens to action’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 27).

While this mobilizing potential is certainly an important aspect of ideologies, the way it is presented here can give way to the presumption that an ideology is always a top-down product, which in the hands of an intellectual elite – be it a proletarian vanguard or a conservative clique – can be used to mobilize citizens. In addition the mobilizing potential of an ideology should also be considered as a potential bottom-up occurrence, whereby a popular desire grips the polity and creates a political momentum for a cause (e.g. movements for democracy, nationhood, proletarian, indigenous, or religious representation), without this necessarily being in the interest of any existing elite. Ideological movements such as these are often partially founded on anti-elitist sentiments held by considerable parts of the populace. For example Bottomore argued that ‘modern revolutions cannot be explained by the activities of small elite groups – they are brought about by the actions of whole classes’ (Bottomore [1964] 1979: 66). And in a similar manner Rocker claimed that: ‘Culture is not created by command. It creates itself, arising spontaneously from the necessities of men and their social cooperative activity’ (Rocker [1937] 1998: 82).

In a similar manner a desire for a planetarist ideology could for instance be the result of a mass-media culture which constantly confronts the average citizen with images, text, and video that familiarize them with the idea of ‘a small, fragile and finite place, one planet among others with strictly limited resources that are allocated unequally’ (see: Gilroy 2004: 83).

When these essentially culturally based ideological challenges to state authority occurs the only thing politically savvy members of the elite can do is to co-opt essential aspects of these ideologies by popular demand as their own. Through the seeming acceptance of the thereby altered ideological parameter they can maintain
their position as elite members in a changed political climate. This process, as both Rocker and Marcuse has argued, entails the elite assimilation and appropriation of the cultural framework the elites in all practicality have been forced to adopt from the mass of the people (Rocker [1937] 1998: 81-86, Marcuse [1964] 2002: 66-69).

Through elite appropriation the intentions of the originators (e.g. the proletarian masses) will in all probability be perverted, or turned on its head even. But as I would like to add; this process has a dialectical dimension to it where the elites also adjust to the demands of the more numerous, but usually much less powerful, bulk of ordinary men and women. This does not mean that the demands of the oppressed are actually met, but that a new modus vivendi is found, whereby their grievances are addressed sufficiently to quell the popularly voiced demands for the time being. Whether these grievances are first voiced through popular campaigns reported in the media, or through revolutionary uprisings in the streets, is not of particular importance. Revolutionary cadres, once successfully in power, often enough become an elite in themselves, separated from the masses. In some instances this process of essentially bottom-up ideology dissemination can tear asunder empires (such as the Austro-Hungarian one) and in others it can reinforce their strength (such as in the shift from Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union).

The ideology of national self-determination, or nationalism, rearranged the political landscape of the globe over the course of the last couple of centuries, often in opposition to the desire of entrenched elites, which tells us something about the bottom-up power inherent in the wide dissemination of popularly appealing political ideologies. Of course, ‘the national community’ can in a sense rightfully be viewed as an ‘elite-engineered construction’ (Steger 2008: 8). But the elite behind it often operated in a counter-hegemonic fashion where they confronted the real holders of power in extra-national capitals (this is the founding story of as diverse nation-states as e.g. the United States, Norway, Algeria and Vietnam). In these and similar instances the ideology of nationalism, with its belief in the principle of a people’s right to self-determination, worked as a unifying devise that once it had taken root amongst the majority of the population could not be deviated from by the elites (as that would amount to treason within the new national framework).

The elites, once the specter of nationalism had become unleashed, became hostage to its logic, and whether they saw this as personally beneficial or not they simply had to accept the new political parameters once they had become embedded in
society as the prevailing cultural belief-system. Therefore some mostly ascending elites (e.g. the bourgeoisie) could take advantage of nationalism and use it to their advantage at the expense of other and often descending elites (e.g. the ancien régime) that were more strongly wedded to the old ways of rule. But if they had not done so, another ascending elite (e.g. radical revolutionaries) would certainly seek to direct the nationalist sentiments of the populace to their advantage. The point here is that elites either catch the prevailing wave of popular, culturally grounded (but intellectually identified and articulated), ideological sentiment and rule within its confines, or they do not rule at all (at least not by any meaningful popular acclaim, thus leaving tyrannical rule the only option left). This relationship between rulers and ruled in modern states indicates that when a mismatch between the cultural understanding of the populace and the way rule is conducted becomes too glaring, the political establishment will experience a crisis of legitimacy and the maintenance of rule by coercive means will increase significantly during such critical periods. Though a new ideological understanding of reality seldom washes away the existing elites completely, they often force the elites to make adjustments to their views of the scope of the political (who is included in the polity/treated as proper citizens), and its practical application (who gets what, when, and how⁹), which they would otherwise not have considered. In this sense political elites are often bearers of ideologies which originally stems from a popular desire for some kind of liberation, and it is first when they start using that inheritance as an instrument to dismiss all criticism, counter to the force for e.g. individual freedom or egalitarian politics that it originally was perceived to be in the eyes of the masses, that the ideology becomes a tool for elite domination in the Marxian sense. Then the continued ideological “mobilization of citizens” has lost its emancipatory potential and has become a pure top-down propaganda exercise in the name of the narrow interests of the ruling establishment. At this stage ideology has ceased to operate in any enlightening capacity, and gone over to functioning purely as the perpetuation of elite delusions.

In short an elite faces the dilemma of whether to continue with an ideology which has lost its ability to keep it in a position of hegemony through the application of more coercive means (i.e. through pure domination) or to adopt a new ideological

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framework (or more often parts thereof) to reinforce rather than diminish their hegemonic hold on power. When the latter option is chosen it can be interpreted as a sophisticated maneuver on the part of the elite, but in reality they have also conceded to a popularly expressed desire for political change.

I will argue here that these popularly expressed desires often emanates from changes in cultural perceptions amongst mass-society which the elites have failed to accommodate their politics to. Throughout modern history this is a recurring phenomenon, most markedly through the bourgeoisie revolution of the late 18th Century and through the proletarian awakening beginning in the mid-19th Century. Intellectuals play an obvious role here, but mostly through pointing out the evidently newfound societal conditions and disseminating their insights:

But while great revolutions are always fueled by pre-existing social grievances, to create genuine revolution these grievances must be articulated in new, forthright, and much broader terms than previously such as were actually propounded in the 1770s and 1780s through a veritable deluge of subversive literature in continental Europe, Britain, and the New World alike (Israel 2010: 87).

As we will see Steger pointing out in the next section, we are arguably experiencing a similar pre-revolutionary stage to that of the mid-18th and mid-19th Century at the moment. Whether the contemporary elites will fail to accommodate to the present grievances and concerns expressed by the mass of the population or not is a question which we can only speculate about at the moment. But how far the recent crop of intellectuals have gotten towards sufficiently articulating the novelty and possibilities inherent in the present societal conditions is on the other hand a pertinent problematic this thesis seeks to explore in-depth. Because if people’s cultural understanding does indeed happen to be moving large-scale from a national to a global frame, this should in theory at some future saturation point precipitate political change in accordance with this new collective cultural mindset, and that could possibly spell the end of the nation-state’s legitimate existence.
Ideologies as Particularistic Political Articulations of Wider Social Imaginaries

Steger’s *The Rise of the Global Imaginary* is the central work for the argument presented here (Steger 2008). In it Steger argues that *social imaginaries* play a conducive role in framing the shape of all practically applicable ideologies in a given historical period. The social imaginary is a concept most famously used by Charles Taylor (see: Taylor 2004, and; 2007) who explains the meaning of this concept as follows:

> There are important differences between social imaginary and social theory. I adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is on the way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends. It is also the case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society. Which leads to the third difference: (iii) the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy (Taylor 2004: 23, this passage is also repeated close to verbatim in; Taylor 2007: 171-172).

Taylor has identified the major shift in social imaginaries historically as that from the pre-modern ‘enchanted world’ (Taylor 2007: 25) where religious beliefs were considered as descriptions of actual lived reality (which included an afterlife where God’s judgment would be meted out on an individual basis) to the modern ‘secular age’ where ‘the difference would [ ] consist in this, that whereas the political organization of all pre-modern societies was in some way connected to, based on, guaranteed by some faith in, or adherence to God, or some notion of ultimate reality, the Western modern state is free from this connection’ (Taylor 2007: 1).

Steger employs Taylor’s insight but refocuses it and argues that it is not so much secularity that defines the modern era as the predominant belief in the nation-state as the only appropriate container for political life. Steger’s claim is that ‘we ought to treat the national not as a separate ideology but as the background to our communal existence that emerged in the Northern Hemisphere with the American and French Revolutions’ (Steger 2008: 9). Monarchs had prior to this considered the state and its inhabitants as their personal property, but with this shift which first took hold in the 18th Century, the monarch (if he or she was to be allowed to continue to have a
position at all) was re-conceptualized as the foremost servant of the nation and its people. This was because suddenly ‘political communities, in order to count as “legitimate,” had to be nation-states’ (Steger 2008: 9).

It was within this national framework, Steger argues, that modern ideologies such as liberalism and conservatism developed, where: ‘Liberals [ ] spoke of “freedom” as applying to autonomous individuals belonging to the same national community’ and ‘[t]he conservative fondness for “law and order” received its highest expression in the notion of national security’ (Steger 2008: 10). In addition ‘even the ostensibly internationalist creed of socialists and communists achieved its concrete political formulation only as German social democracy or Soviet Russia’s “socialism in one country” ’ (Steger 2008: 10).

The most important part of Steger’s argument is that ‘the rise of the countercultural “new social movements” in the 1960s and 1970s’ and ‘the ideas of the New Right’ which developed fully during the 1970s and ‘gained the upper hand across the globe’ ‘after the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union’ had their ‘most fundamental novelty’ ‘in their sensitivity toward the rising global imaginary’ (Steger 2008: 11). The global imaginary springs from the perception that the world is now compressed into a single and intimately interconnected place which ‘increasingly makes the global the frame of reference for human thought and action’ (Steger 2008: 11-12). It is for example the neoliberal or New Right’s focus on global trade and finance that shows its global orientation, while the new social movements tendency to advocate for instance human rights and fairness in global trade relations that indicates their global awareness. This tendency amongst a range of political actors thereby empirically grounds Steger’s assertion that: ‘The ideologies dominating the world today are no longer exclusively articulations of the national imaginary but reconfigured ideational systems that constitute potent translations of the dawning global imaginary’ (Steger 2008: 12). This is the point where Steger’s argument starts to become a bit imprecise. Because is the ideologies we have today really “potent translations of the dawning global imaginary”? My argument is to the contrary that the present ideologies in the system have not adjusted properly to the global imaginary yet, and the present imaginary for these ideologies is closer to being an international imaginary than a truly global one, at least in terms of the world order these ideologies are looking to uphold or institute.
Within this newfound global imaginary Steger identifies three major particularistic ideological articulations, ‘market globalism’, ‘justice globalism’ and ‘jihadist globalism’ (Steger 2008: 12-13). While I find Steger’s differentiation between the national and the global imaginary a theoretically very useful distinction to make, as it contains quite a lot of potential explanatory power, I disagree somewhat with Steger’s categorization of the major ideological players ostensibly working within the confines of this global imaginary. Therefore I have developed a theoretical device of my own to better differentiate between the diverse contenders in this ideological battle which, because of its global character, ultimately is a struggle for worldwide (and not national) ideological hegemony. This is why I use the terms “planetary or planetarist ideologies” instead of Steger’s “globalisms”. The reason for creating a new concept is because Steger’s globalisms bundles together too many completely different ideological visions of global politics.

Refining the Conceptual Apparatus and the Units of Analysis

With the term planetarist ideology I want to convey an image of what Mannheim might have called a relatively utopian ideational discourse, or an enlightening ideology as I have chosen to call it in this thesis, that adopts the global imaginary to its full extent, resulting in the possibility of the complete transcendence of the national imaginary and its accompanying grip on humanity’s political institutions.

Such an ideology, to be enlightening, would for instance incorporate a view of humanity as fully dependent on the wellbeing of the Earth and the sustainable preservation of the other species we share this habitat with, because this could be argued to be one of the fundamental facets of our existence. In addition, as established in the introduction, an ideal planetarist ideology would also have to be universal, or planetarist, and emancipatory, or democratic. Being “universal” means that an ideal planetarist ideology in principle would seek to promote the equal treatment of all human beings in legal terms, regardless of birth-place, economic status, race, gender, and so forth, which also means that discrimination based on nationality and the maintenance of borders stopping the movement of certain people would not be ideologically acceptable.

When one couples universality and emancipation the result is an ideological stance favoring global democracy over other institutions. Particularly international institutions are not emancipatory in this sense, since because of their
intergovernmental nature they tend to disenfranchise the part of the national electorate who did not vote for the winning party. This mechanism functions as a global “first-past-the-post” system that sometimes results in a close to mono-ideological representation at the international level. And this is one of the reasons why for instance neoliberalism has been allowed to shape international legislation practically without internal ideological opposition in international institutions the last couple of decades. Democracy also means that other ideological viewpoints would need to be allowed a fair hearing in an atmosphere of pluralistic competition at all levels, not just at the local one. Competition would in theory only strengthen a genuinely enlightening ideology, because it would reveal the ignorance of its competition.

On this basis it is clear that not all of Steger’s globalisms would qualify as potential planetarist ideologies. Steger’s jihadist globalism with its Christian corollary in certain versions of Evangelicalism should for instance be considered as belonging in Mannheim’s category of the absolutely utopian. These religious worldviews do unite people across borders and continents, but if we take into account the early attempts to define ideology, these are the arch-examples of ideology in its negative delusional “idology” sense. In fact religion is nothing other than the *original example of the superstitious notions* the first advocates of enlightening ideology defined themselves in opposition of. To see where the other globalism categories belong they need to be further unpacked to allow for a deeper level of analysis, as they are not as straightforwardly dismissible as examples of pure delusional ideologies at this early stage. This is the task of most of the coming chapters.

Of Steger’s main categories the only one it seems relatively unproblematic to include wholesale as a potential planetary ideology is his market globalism, and I will save a more penetrating analysis of this ideology and its contradictory tendencies to the chapter devoted to neoliberalism (a term which in my reading describes almost exactly the same ideological phenomenon). However the issues I have with the justice globalism category needs to be addressed straight away, since I have decided to separate this into two different ideological discourses for my upcoming analysis: cosmopolitanism and alter-globalism.

As one commentator has pointed out, Steger’s ‘justice globalism’ contains an excessive diversity of currents – radical and reformist, Marxist and social
democratic, unequivocally globalist as well as more protectionist – that do not add up to a coherent category’ (Soborski 2012: 338). Yet this is the closest we get to an articulated, potentially globally aware, alternative to the ‘ideas of neo-liberalism which provide the dominant framework for thought and political action in the contemporary world’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 146). As Schwarzmantel argues, this incoherent mass of diffusive arguably left-leaning ideas, seemingly only united in protest against neoliberalism, does anyway have the markings of ‘a counter [-hegemonic] ideology which exists at the moment in embryonic form’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 171). This is an insight which makes it a most promising path to follow in the search for a potential planetarist ideology.

It seems as if Steger has played down the significance of cosmopolitanism, which I would consider perhaps the most fully developed global ideological alternative to neoliberalism. Steger has been accused of ‘slighting the cosmopolitan debate [ ] which appears as one aspect of global justice ideology, but not as a comprehensive alternative’ (Brys 2010: 18). Raffaele Marchetti used cosmopolitanism as a unit of analysis when he identified ‘four alternative interpretations of the notion of global politics: namely Neo-liberalism, Cosmopolitanism, Alter-globalism, and Dialog among Civilizations’ (Marchetti 2009: 134-135). Marchetti calls these four positions ‘ideal models of global politics’ and excepting the last one which again seems to be grounded in religious proliferation done in mediaeval times his is a reasonable approach to the global political discourse and essentially the framework I will follow here (Marchetti 2009: 136). Taking into account the criticism that Steger mixes radical and reformist views in his justice globalism category, I will here separate this category into one (more) reformist cosmopolitan discourse and one (more) radical alter-globalist discourse.

**Conclusion**

In the framework that has been set out in this chapter I have first identified two major political manifestations of ideological phenomena, *delusional* ideology and *enlightening* ideology. Whereas for example nationalism, especially when it was bound up with liberal democratic notions, once was an enlightening ideology facing the delusional ideology of absolute monarchism (and other ancien regime variations

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10 I.e. ”alternative-globalist”.
based on aristocratic and clerical privilege), I have argued that today it mainly\footnote{Some nationalisms, such as the Palestinian, Kurdish and Tibetan varieties, might still have enlightening aspects to them, as they seek to emancipate populations that practically live under occupation by domineering nation-states.} works as a delusional ideology hindering functional global governance at the level of humanity. In my experience people tend to think that internationalism is the pinnacle of progressive thinking, but I argue that this is not true. Internationalism is still a notion tied up with a view of national sovereignty as a sacred principle, which is a fundamentally reactionary viewpoint in light of the enlightening quest for human unity on planet Earth. It has its roots in the kind of Romantic era ethnocentrism that was taken to its extreme by the rulers of Nazi-Germany, and though the internationalism that has been developed as a governing principle in the aftermath of World War II is a very progressive force in comparison, it represents only a partial dislodgment from the idea of the nation-state as the supreme force in world affairs. If Steger’s global imaginary were to be fully adopted as the Weltanschauung of a majority of the populace, this would in my reading be logically followed by an eventually irresistible desire for world sovereignty and institutions for ensuring the wellbeing of both humanity as a whole and the diverse ecosystems of the planet that our species finds itself intimately embedded in. The purpose of this thesis is to, through an analysis of the major globalization ideologies, see how far these have developed towards being actual post-national planetary ideologies.

Since ideologies become forces for change through both bottom-up and top-down processes, by more or less reciprocal relationships between societal conditions, popular cultural identification, intellectual articulations, and political elite behavior, ideologies in this sense are extremely complex phenomena. But since they also need to be relatively easily communicable to ‘move masses of people to political action’ it should make sense to approach them as bundles of fairly simply identifiable concepts which will allow for their deconstruction, and this should facilitate a critical analysis of what is in essence different discourses concerning ‘the good society’ at the global level (Schwarzmantel 2008: 28). By applying a planetarist normative vision as a guiding principle the intention is to see if there really does exist an enlightening ideology (or indications of one or several) with actual global
scope, or whether that is a major gap in the contemporary and supposedly “globalist” ideological discourse.
Chapter 2. Nationalism – Internationalism/Globalism – Planetarism

Introduction

Ideologies begin to falter and decline in their political usefulness when they cease to authorize the hold on power of those that employ it as an instrument of rule in the eyes of the masses, or what was the case in the pre-modern era; amongst the aristocracy. This happens as irreconcilable contradictions at an ideology’s very core become revealed. Once an undeniable and persistent mismatch between the rhetoric ideologues use to justify their political supremacy and their actual deeds unmasks them as irredeemable hypocrites the period of that ideology’s hegemony is done for. Rulers might still be able to hold on to power, but from then on they have to rely more and more on forms of domination of a less subtle kind – such as through economic and military means – coarse instruments whose constant use are likely to further grind down the reigning elite’s position of political primacy. In the end rulers relying on ideologies which have long since passed their prime heighten their chances for becoming perceived as tyrants, i.e. leaders with no legitimacy whatsoever to back up their rule, and the prospect of their popularly supported removal from power appears as an imminent possibility. The soundness of this theory of spiraling political degeneration – which in the last instance can only be reversed by adopting a new ideology – is something I will seek to both illustrate and validate through a series of historical examples in this chapter. The aim of this exercise is to argue that current forms of ideological hegemony is equally beholden to the same dynamics as found in the historical examples and later to be able to pinpoint possible irreconcilable contradictions inherent in these contemporary ideologies.

For example I will in this chapter seek to show that the universalism inherent in Christianity authorized the amassing of temporal power by the papacy during a period of princely weakness in the 11th and 12th Century. When European kingdoms regained their strength there then followed a period of ideational interregnum which by way of the Reformation resulted in the birth of the sovereign state system. The dynastic state managed to territorially compartmentalize the universalism which had
made the Church such a challenge to their authority earlier through the nascent development of a national imaginary that would eventually completely replace the mediaeval hegemony of Christendom and the enchanted worldview it had inherited from earlier. That a fragmentation of power following the breakdown of the Western Roman Empire should lead to a fragmentation of authority might sound logical, but how to rhetorically justify this, which pragmatically speaking was a needed turn away from universal authority, took many centuries to figure out in practice. An understanding of the long and winding road from the European ‘Christian-imperial style of thought’ to the nation-state worldview, which in the course of the twentieth century would become applied universally, is crucial to the argument here presented (Heater 1996: 57). My contention is that it is only through grasping the dynamics at work in the rare historical occasions when fundamental ideational change has actually happened that we will be able to understand the gravity of the ideological challenges presently facing humanity.

Another aim in this chapter is to criticize and elaborate on Steger’s conceptualization of ‘the rising global imaginary’ and how it relates to contemporary ideologies (Steger 2008). I will do this on the basis that even though the notion of a global imaginary represents a very important advance in ideology studies which is worth building on, it is too imprecise in the way it is currently used to be able to convey what I here will argue should be viewed as a crucial theoretical difference between *faux global* ideologies, which I will call “international ideologies”, and *true global* ideologies, which I here will use the term “planetary ideologies” to denote. The point of this is to be able to properly delineate between ostensibly “global” ideologies that employ the term “global” as a rhetorical device to simply advance older internationalist ideas in new guises and those ideas which actually indicate a theoretical novelty pointing towards a true democratic polity of planetary proportions. I would therefore like to advance the argument that instead of viewing the historical progression of the ‘background’ setting for ideologies as now moving from a national frame to a global frame or ‘social imaginary’, as Steger does (Steger 2008: 6-15), we can amplify the explanatory power of Steger’s theory by adding a middle category I here call “the international imaginary”. I will also argue that Steger’s examples of ideologies employing a supposed “global” imaginary ought to be predominantly categorized as using this “international” imaginary on the
basis that their proponents are not taking part in a project aiming to replace the international system which is anchored in the sovereign nation-state.

The existence of strands of ideological thought that does aim to replace the international system with a planetary polity, which we for example find in a radical version of cosmopolitanism (and which is a strain that differs from the better known reformist Kantian internationalist version of cosmopolitanism) enunciates the applicability of a theoretical global imaginary for categorizing ideological thought. But since it now has become commonplace to use the word “global” to describe all kinds of international and transnational forums and phenomena, I view it as a necessary clarification measure to abandon the term “global” when describing a universalism grounded in human civilization (versus a parochialism grounded in the nation-state, which intergovernmental internationalism to some extent continues to legitimate) and instead use the term “planetary” for this purpose. This latter operation brings us to the final aim of this chapter, which is to formulate the minimal requirements of an ideal planetary ideology on the basis of relatively recent theory concerned with the phenomenon of globalization in its wider understanding, i.e. where globalization denotes the long ongoing creation of a civilization encompassing the whole globe and not solely the creation of a global economic sphere since the end of the Cold War. The purpose of this is to create a Weberian ‘ideal type’ (i.e. ‘Idealtypus’) which is a ‘conceptual tool with which to approach reality’ by means of ‘an attempt to capture what is essential about a social phenomenon through the analytical exaggeration’ or ‘accentuation’ ‘of some of its aspects’ (Swedberg 2005: 119-120). The main utility of creating an ideal type is that this makes it possible ‘to order several phenomena’ which in this particular case means that it will aid in creating a scale which stretches beyond contemporary phenomena such as actually existing globalization ideologies, and thereby facilitate the analysis and criticism of current claims to universality within these discourses in light of this ideal type (Swedberg 2005: 120).

Viewing the ideational frames for a range of different ideologies through this “national – international/global – planetary” continuum which the inclusion of the ideal type allows for then guides me to the inference that only the latter category ought to be considered a properly developed theoretical background framework for the present articulation of enlightening ideologies and to advance the hypothesis that current globalization ideologies (i.e. neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-
globalism) are not fully planetary ideologies in this ideal sense. This is the hypothesis I will then seek to test in the following chapters:

- Because they fail to deal with the irreconcilable contradiction between the current nation-state political framework and the rising “people-planet” imaginary (which now more and more authorizes political action in the eyes of significant portions of humanity and which in theory foreshadows a truly global political framework) contemporary globalization ideologies are not planetary ideologies.

The crucial question in the analysis to follow in later chapters then becomes how severely (given that the hypothesis should not be rejected instead) these ideological discourses fail to take this contradiction into account.

My conclusion to this chapter is that both the national and the international/global imaginaries at the foundational level now fit the category delusional ideologies as prospective enlightening ideologies would necessarily have to utilize the planetary imaginary as their ontological grounding. Crucially “enlightening” now also implies advocating a change from a nation-centric to a planetary centric polity, which potentially foreshadows a radical institutional reordering at the global level. The arguments presented in this chapter forms the categorical framework for the critique and analysis of contemporary globalization ideologies that follows in later chapters.

The normative foundation for my argument is also laid bare, as the desirable ideological progression through time as I understand it ought to be the step-wise abandonment of delusional forms of ideology in favor of enlightening types, but with the added caveat that “enlightening” ideologies come with a limited shelf-life of their own which necessitates continuous ideological innovation and contestation. In a social and physical universe whose main characteristics happens to be the perpetuity of impermanence this is the only realistic assumption in regards to ideology if we want a polity able to adjust its bearings when encountering what earlier generations could not have expected.

The conceptual framework described here hinges on an understanding of a broad-brushed politico-historical trajectory where the sovereign nation-state is seen as only a contingent stage on the path towards a theorized future sovereign planetary polity, where today’s ‘complex sovereignty’ embodied in international institutions is thought of as a logical half-way point between the historical national polity and the
recurrently theoretically anticipated world civilizational polity (Grande & Pauly 2007). To explain how such a wide-ranging historical interpretation makes sense in relation to contemporary ideological developments I have to start with a narration which accentuates how historically contingent the modern nation-state actually is. Importantly it took shape during more than a millennia of struggle with a universal form of authority (and at times also power) which took the unity of the Church and the Roman Empire during the reign of Constantine the Great as its ideal type.

**Universal Authority versus Territorial Power**

Created in the aftermath of the wars of religion, the idol of the “nation” haunts a world that now needs more *adaptive* ways to meet its human needs (Toulmin 1992: 195, emphasis in the original).

Before Toulmin’s “idol of the nation” fully entered the world political scene with the French Revolution – which is a pivotal event in the process of creating what Steger terms the national imaginary (Steger 2008: 19) – there had for quite some time been an uneasy relationship between ‘secular and religious authority’ (Strayer [1970] 2005: 20). This relationship, between what is more accurately called *authority* derived from conceptions of the sacred (right) and *power* derived from the capability to project coercive force (might) is a distinction which for example Frank Furedi recently have argued a persuasive case for the theoretical importance of (Furedi 2013: 1-2). In the European context this relationship had from the days of Constantine, the first Christian Roman emperor who ‘between 331 and 334 [...] closed down all pagan temples in the Empire’, taken the form of collaboration between Christian clergy in different guises and the political leadership embodied for the most part in kings and emperors (Norwich 1999: 16). Pope Gelasius described it succinctly ‘in AD 494’: ‘There are two principles which chiefly serve to order this world: the hallowed authority of pontiffs and the power of kings’ (cited in; Holland 2008: xv). A befitting example of this form of collaboration is St Augustine’s ‘powerful, and Christian, justification for [...] ungodly or unchristian behaviour by Christian emperors and kings’ (Wood 2008: 161).

Initially the religious dimension was very much subsumed to the will of the king: ‘over the centuries, while no emperor had clung to the protection of a pope, many a pope had clung to an emperor’ so ‘partners they might have been – but there had
never been any question, in brute practice, of who was the junior’ (Holland 2008: xv). This relationship was importantly put to the test after the year 1000 AD:

Kings had been considered semi-religious personages and had had extensive influence in Church affairs. They appointed abbots, bishops, and often popes; they even intervened (as Charlemagne did) in matters of doctrine. Leading churchmen, on the other hand, played an important role in secular affairs, as advisers to kings, as administrators, as rulers of ecclesiastical principalities. The new leadership which grew up in the Church in the eleventh century at first sought only reform of the clergy. But it gradually became apparent that to reform the clergy the Church needed to be more independent of lay authority, and that to gain and preserve its independence the Church had to be centralized under the headship of the pope (Strayer [1970] 2005: 20-21).

These reforms strengthened the position of the Church vis-à-vis the holders of secular power, but ‘this program, most forcefully expressed by Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085), destroyed essential parts of the earlier political structure of Europe’ and the ‘Investiture Conflict’ that followed resulted in that ‘the Church gained leadership, if not complete control, of European society’ (Strayer [1970] 2005: 21-22). This development, where the Church to a certain degree appropriated secular power from the kings in Europe and turned the earlier balance on its head, was made possible by the decentralization of secular power on the one hand (see; Wood 2008: 170-171) and the centralization of religious authority on the other. The pan-European organization of the Church was key in this respect. Whereas the kings and princes in search of new territory quickly came up against stern opposition from local lords or other competitors for wider territorial dominance, the Catholic Church had by the early 12th Century a network of bishoprics spanning all of Western Europe (including parts of Central Europe and Scandinavia that was never included in the territory of the original Western Roman Empire). As Michael Mann puts it: ‘The church provided normative regulation over an area wider than the lord’s sword could defend, than his law could order, than market and production relations could spontaneously cover’ (Mann [1986] 2012: 337).

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries Augustine’s notion of a ‘heavenly fatherland’ or ‘patria communis’, though articulated by him much earlier ‘in the early fifth
century AD’, for a time replaced the classic pagan Roman patriotism\textsuperscript{12} which had been connected to the earthly fatherland, and which had been expressed in ‘Horace’s famous verse: It is beautiful and honorable to die for the fatherland (*dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*)’ (Hirschi 2012: 64-66). The Gregorian era was a period when the pope basically sought to act as priest-king, employing the immense authority of the prevailing Christian worldview at the time in an effort to gain earthly power at the expense of the kings who at this stage had no comparable ideational-authoritarian basis for their claim to power other than acting according to the will of God. This happened to be a guiding principle ‘ecclesiastical powers’ were in a supreme position to interpret ‘on the grounds of their privileged access to the spiritual domain’ especially in times when the earthly princes’ coercive capabilities were too weak to allow them superior influence over the body politic (Wood 2012: 67). But as Papal command over the affairs of Europe reached its historical peak it set in motion a counter-balancing trend since ‘the Gregorian concept of the Church almost demanded the invention of the concept of the state’ (Strayer [1970] 2005: 22). What happened was that ‘by separating itself so clearly from lay governments, the Church unwittingly sharpened concepts about the nature of secular authority’ (Strayer [1970] 2005: 22). This ‘led to a renewed approach to classical patriotism, though under markedly different terms [than those existing in ancient Rome]. The decisive steps happened from the twelfth century onwards, during the long and often critical consolidation period of Western monarchies’ (Hirschi 2012: 65). This late medieval ‘rise of royal patriotism’ would eventually significantly diminish the temporal power of the Church (Hirschi 2012: 71). By the early fifteenth century, as ‘the Great Western Schism’ internal to Roman Catholicism came to a head, the kings had so decisively gained the upper hand that ‘three popes were simultaneously claiming to be the only one, and all were backed by different secular powers’ (Hirschi 2012: 81-82).

\textsuperscript{12} What distinguished Roman patriotism from its modern equivalent is that for the Romans the ‘common fatherland had constituted a city and not a territory; it was Rome, not the Empire, which held the title *patria communis*’ (Hirschi 2012: 70). Hence St Augustine’s “city” in the *City of God* might perhaps be literally construed as actual Rome’s heavenly opposite instead of being a metaphor.
That the kings of Europe were so eager to have the backing of a (preferably impressionable) pope indicates that they were acutely aware of the authority this connection bestowed on their rule. That they were not going to accept just any pope also goes to show that they had few qualms with using papal authority instrumentally as part of a wider calculus for amassing political capital and staying in power almost whatever the cost incurred in a supposed afterlife. We can assume by their actions that these were not political leaders easily blindsided by the papacy’s claim to be Christ’s appointed stand in on earth (i.e. Vicar of Christ, or officially; *Vicarius Iesu Christi*), but they also knew the risk it carried to be perceived by the populace and the nobles to be acting completely without ecclesiastical cover, since this was an era when both ‘revolt and repression alike were cloaked in the fervor of Christian justification’ (Mann [1986] 2012: 338). In the heavily religiously saturated climate of the late Middle Ages having God on one’s side could only be a boon for one’s future prospects as a successful regent. The point is that there are ways to power where the backing of authority, or what we in modern language could call employing an *ideology*, does not play a crucial role: having a superior fighting force and the will to use it (as e.g. the Vikings and Mongols had at different times during this era) is the most obvious of these, but also being excessively wealthy and thereby in a position to create an extensive network of economic dependants can accomplish the same goal of political dominance only through different means. But when rivalry for power grows fiercer even being in a position where one can utilize *both* coercive and economic instruments of rule is not necessarily going to be enough to maintain an edge over the competition. An aspiring conqueror therefore also ought to desire to be able to mobilize all the people potentially under his or her command into a *normative community*, which is one of the major political selling points for the different world religions, or in this context Christianity (Mann [1986] 2012: 369). As Michael Mann argues about the role religion played earlier, referring back to the work of Durkheim:

…stable social relationships require prior normative understandings among the participants. Neither force nor mutual self-interest offered a stable basis for stability. Thus society depended on a normative, and ritual level, somewhat removed from the “secular” world of force, interests, exchanges, and calculations. Society in the sense of social cooperation was sacred (Mann [1986] 2012: 369).
It is this “sacred” normative layer provided by Christianity which both enables and constrains the actions available to the rulers of the mediaeval period. On one hand they are often able to utilize Christianity for their own gain, primarily by letting monarchs claim that their rule is divinely sanctioned, but on the other hand rival rulers with privileged access to the incumbent pope, or alternatively the pope on his own accord, can turn this religious authority against them – through ecclesiastical censure like an interdict or excommunication – and potentially undermine the popular foundation of their power, thereby suddenly turning a ruler’s claim to supremacy within their own realm into a venture purely based on their coercive and/or economic capabilities. Because these latter cases occurred with relative frequency it is easy to see what benefits it ought to bring to a monarch’s endeavors to have one’s exclusive supplicant pope and why it was possible that when ‘the Council of Constance’ started in ‘1414’ there were ‘three Popes simultaneously claiming to be the only [legitimate] one’ (Hirschi 2012: 81-82).

The royal infighting that resulted in the historic ‘Western Schism’ of the early fifteenth century undermined the authority of the Church which the different royal dynasties themselves depended on for the proper functioning of their own rule, as the schism ‘helped to generate a climate of reform and outright heresy’ (Wood 2012: 58). Since there was already a Patriarch in the east following ‘the lasting separation of the Eastern and Western Churches’ which occurred in ‘1054’, then in 1414 the office that was supposed to be the physical link between God and mankind was for a short time embodied in not only two, but four conflicting personages, something which could only give the office a lesser distinction than originally intended (Norwich 1999: 229-230). The political machinations of the earthly princes and the ecclesiastical elites themselves had by the early 1400s repeatedly put the sacred unity of Christendom at stake, keeping in mind that this was originally a Church that had derived its claim to universal authority from the formulaic early Byzantine idea that ‘the single king on earth corresponds to the single king in heaven’ with the pope as the exclusive mediator between these two (Peterson 1994 cited in; Agamben 2011: 10, emphasis in original). At the time of the Western Schism a new pan-European emperor of Constantinian caliber was evidently not forthcoming since early 15th Century Europe had the following ‘big secular players: France, England, Castile, Aragon and the Holy Roman Empire’ – where no player could securely
attempt to eliminate *one* of the others,¹³ and even less found themselves in a position where it could have been feasible to subdue *all* of them – and this disparity between the ideal religious unity and the actual political fragmentation posed both a political and a religious conundrum only unwittingly helped solved by Martin Luther about a century later (Hirschi 2012: 83).

Luther is perhaps most widely known for his criticism of ‘the mediaeval Church’s practice of indulgences’ and its monopoly on the interpretation of scripture, but as Ellen Meiksins Wood argues: ‘Inextricably connected with his attacks on the Church, not only its corruptions but its very claim to jurisdiction, are his views on secular government [ ] there hardly exists in the Western canon a more uncompromising case for strict obedience to secular authority’ (Wood 2012: 59).

The essence of Luther’s intervention was that he challenged ‘the Church’s claim to temporal power and its usurpation of secular authority’ on the basis that ‘the spiritual realm is the domain of the Word, with no business in the sphere of jurisdiction or coercion’ and therefore the latter ‘is the preserve of secular government’ (Wood 2012: 64 and 70). Luther also gave ‘secular government an unambiguous claim to divine ordination’ since he maintained that both ‘temporal and spiritual realms’ should be understood as ‘divine’ and that they ‘reflected the dual nature of humanity, the simultaneous unity of sin and justification that characterizes Christians, whose human sinfulness requires the temporal sword’ (Wood 2012: 70). In short it is because humans ‘are at once sinners by nature and saints by faith’ that ‘humanity requires temporal authorities to whom all Christians owe obedience’ (Wood 2012: 63). The role of secular or temporal authority is then not to administer God’s punishment as the Catholic Church saw itself fit to do, since this is an abomination for Luther who thought it an act of sacrilege to place oneself in God’s stead and claim to know “His” ultimate intentions, and this led Luther to understand the role of temporal authority in the following terms:

> Since all human beings and all human institutions are tainted by unholiness and sin, no truly just and rightful order is possible in this world; and they must all subject themselves, by divine ordination, to the earthly powers whose purpose is not to achieve some higher principle of holiness or justice on this earth but

¹³ Castile and Aragon united through the marriage of Isabella I and Ferdinand II in 1469.
simply to maintain peace, order and a degree of physical comfort (Wood 2012: 66).

Luther’s logic helped reinforce two already existing trends. Firstly it further weakened the centralized structure of the Roman Catholic Church and its claim to universal jurisdiction by turning “the Word” against it in a manner that could only have been accomplished from within the ranks of the clergy. But in a gradual process beginning while Luther was still a small child ‘the Spanish monarchy’ for example ‘had extended its control over many church appointments, from newly conquered Granada, to its lands in the New World and finally to the historic Spanish territories’ (Breuilly 1982: 46). Secondly it strengthened the position of secular rulers by tasking them, instead of the Church, exclusively with the maintenance of earthly order. Initially the ‘major beneficiaries of [Luther’s] attack upon Rome were the princely states of Northern and Central Germany’ (Breuilly 1982: 46). The English king Henry VIII’s historically well-known ‘divorce proceedings begun in 1527’ is another example of the impact of Luther providing an alternative Christian legitimation for going against papal authority, since these ‘were not just about the separation of husband and wife, but a divorce between king and Pope’ (Furedi 2013: 162). The end result in the parts of Europe that one way or the other severed their formal ties to the papacy was ‘to produce national churches whose leaders were loyal to the monarchy’ (Breuilly 1982: 46). The mismatch between a universal religion and a plurality of secular realms is thereby solved, not explicitly by Luther, but by the princes taking advantage of his attack on the papacy to achieve autonomy over their territorial affairs through the gradual creation of a plurality of *churches* congruent with early modern states. However, it took more than a century of war (the European wars of religion, from about 1524 to 1648) before this state of affairs reached the point of institutional permanence in the Peace of Westphalia (see; Philpott 2001: 80-89).

Machiavelli (1469-1527) with his ‘separation of the pursuit of political interest from morality’ which ‘represented a clear argument in favor of the autonomy of the political’ had foreshadowed this occurrence, but as Frank Furedi argues it ‘would take more than a century for Machiavelli’s separation of politics from morality to become clarified as a separation between power and authority’ (Furedi 2013: 167-168). It is not coincidental that modern realist international relations theory takes 1648 as its historical starting point, because what happens is that medieval religious
authority is undermined to the point that this initiates an era of more or less naked societal power relations. A replacement for the religious authorization of power is in this period of ideological interregnum still only in the process of being articulated (e.g. with the work of Bodin and then by Hobbes), and once this is resolved – which is only properly achieved with the invention of nationalism in the late 18th Century – it almost immediately backfires on the monarchs which have been basing their rule in the intermediary period primarily on a coercion founded mode of governance (i.e. pure power) while lacking the firm authority that justifies the exercise of power and provides it with a meaning grander than mere royal self-indulgence. Simply put the authorizing function Christianity once fulfilled for the secular rulers ceased to do the required work for them. In the sense that Christianity operated as a political ideology – which grounds or more explicitly authorizes the exercise of power in the consent of the governed and functions as an instrument or technique for linking authority and power – it had provided a common meaning for a normative European community with the pope as its figurehead. This had given the pope a status above that of the secular regents. To counter this status the monarchs, in many instances by way of Lutheranism, appropriated the temporal power wielded by the pope earlier for themselves. This strengthened the regents and opened up for the creation of a nascent national normative community or ‘the Adelsnation, the nation of the nobility’ (Habermas [1996] 2012: 283). But it also weakened the hold Christianity had over the population more generally and thus also its capacity to provide a needed measure of authority to the actions of the rulers.

The unquestioned moral foundation of medieval authority could not survive the loss of Christian unity in the post-Reformation era. It is likely that, at least in part, the loss of moral authority of the Church encouraged reliance on more explicit forms of absolutist coercion. It also led to the clarification of the secular distinction between the moral and the political and between authority and power. The process of clarification occurred in a roundabout way through the unconscious convergence of advocates of religious reform and secular rulers seeking to consolidate national sovereignty. Through this convergence, churches became increasingly territorially differentiated and subordinated to the imperatives of national sovereignty. But the cumulative outcome of the convergence of church and state was to establish the precondition for the crystallisation of political
autonomy and the detachment of the moral from political authority (Furedi 2013: 167).

While Europe in the thirteenth century, as Charles Tilly argues, could have gone in the direction of both ‘a political federation or Empire controlled, if only loosely from a single center’ or ‘a theocratic federation – a commonwealth – held together by the structure of the Catholic Church’\(^{14}\) instead of ‘the form of nation-state which actually emerged’ the two former options were no longer a possibility after the Reformation and the Peace of Westphalia that followed in its wake (Tilly 2005: xiv). Universalism was practically shut down as a historical contingency for a period as multiple instances of ‘absolutist sovereignty’ asserted its dominance throughout various parts of Europe in the 17\(^{th}\) - and early 18\(^{th}\) Century (Teschke 2003: 171). But by the late 18\(^{th}\) Century ideas of a universalist tint again momentarily came into vogue as the Enlightenment experienced its high-point.

The ideologies which saw their incipient formulation during the Enlightenment such as ‘liberalism and socialism’ were part of a ‘universal assault on privilege and prejudice’ of the kind associated with Habermas’s nation of the nobility found in early modern Europe (Bronner 2004: xii). It was also at this time ‘the idea of the nation as an organic cultural unit’ came to the fore (Schwarzmantel 1991: 35). ‘The democratic transformation of the Adelsnation \[\] into a Volksnation, the nation of the people, required a deep mental change on the part of the general population’ and this was a change which was set in motion first by ‘the work of academics and intellectuals’ that inspired ‘the urban educated middle-classes’ and later went on to seize ‘the imagination of the masses’ (Habermas [1996] 2012: 283).\(^{15}\) Once this ideational transformation has reached the societal outer rung of the masses, which it did for the most part in the European context ‘during the course of the nineteenth century’ (Habermas [1996] 2012: 283), the ancien regimes’ grasp on power got seriously imperiled, especially when those regimes existed in the form of absolute monarchy.

\(^{14}\) Tilly also adds ‘an intensive trading network, without large-scale, central political organization’ presumably on the model of the Hanseatic League and ‘the persistence of the “feudal” structure which prevailed in the thirteenth century’ as other potential routes available at the time (Tilly 2004: xiv).

\(^{15}\) This is a description which relates to Gramsci’s ideas concerning the role of counter-hegemonic intellectuals.
The change from one hegemonic idea to another happened so fast in the early French case that when in ‘the France of the 1750s, [even] constitutional monarchy was perceived as a radical and subversive idea’ (Toulmin 1992: 141), by the end of 1792 the newly minted French nation had established itself as a republic and abolished royalty altogether, albeit after a short and completely unsuccessful attempt at creating a much less radical reformist constitutional monarchy in the first years of the revolution. Marcel Gauchet points out what the foundation for this sudden political change could be when he suggests that ‘the historical effectiveness of religion was no longer operational from the moment the ‘reality of the sovereign State permits the new conception of a society carrying its constitutive principle within itself’ (Gauchet 1997: 58-59). What Gauchet is getting at here is the inherent tension created between authority and power when the regents of the post-Reformation, a time when a process of ‘disenchantment’ had begun to set in, sought to distance their budding states from papal interference while simultaneously clinging to the pre-Reformation notion of a Great ‘Chain of Being’, which belongs to an ‘enchanted’ worldview, to justify their dominant position (Taylor 2007: 25-26 and 192). The kings of Europe had momentarily gained in power at the expense of what would ultimately be a fatal loss in authority for their kind:

…the more administrative authority develops and the more any imposition from above loses legitimacy, the more the logic of representation gains credibility. The legitimate organization of the collective body can only result in the explicit cooperation and instituting operation of its members. This idea and its practical development is given credence and disseminated by the action of a State which, while attempting to renew previous forms of hierarchical constraint, definitively undermines them. This State, in an almost suicidal manner, creates individual independence while continuing to presuppose the primacy of the social order (Gauchet 1997: 58).

It is an established historical fact that the French Revolution (together with its less radical American counter-part) represent a pivotal event in world history, but just as Tilly argues that there were multiple optional routes open for Europe in the thirteenth century, the eventual success of the nation-state model was far from preordained in the early 19th Century. Though the ‘final collapse of the ideals of Christian and Imperial unity in Europe in the sixteenth century soon led to a search for other methods of ensuring some cohesion’ it was not a given that this search
would lead to a coalescence around the idea of the nation even if representation becomes a logical next step as Gauchet argues (Heater 1996: 74). In the French Revolution the ‘forces of cosmopolitanism and nationalism struggled for supremacy’ and Robespierre in one instance at least saw ‘the human race’ as ‘the sovereign of the earth’ and not the people of France as the sovereign of the nation (Heater 1996: 76-77). It was not Enlightenment ideals per se that led to the formation of the territorially delimited nation-state, but a series of coincidences, not least amongst these the counter-revolutionary war imposed on the revolutionary government in France by the royal leadership of e.g. England, Austria, and Prussia (Bell 2001: 100-101). For a short time in the early 1790s the course of history again found itself at a fork in the road where going down the path towards political universalism was a possible outcome, but when this did not happen and eventually ‘the nation-state had been reified as an inescapable fact of human life’ instead ‘the idea of world community’ retreated into the background like never before in European history: ‘What had been an indispensable part of the background understanding of political reflection from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment had now finally been relegated to the status of an unattainable utopia’ (Bartelson 2009a: 170).

**The Enlightenment, Nationalism and Class**

Nationalism boils down to the idea that the rational or natural container for political life is the territorially delimited nation-state (Hutchinson 1994: 122). For Christianity, as we have seen, the container was an empire commensurate with the Christian ecumene. And as I will try to show in the last section of this chapter, for those that do not agree with the rationality of subdividing the human-race into national peoples the appropriate container for political life is the planet Earth.

‘Rousseau established the political importance of “the people” and of their cultural homogeneity and identity’ and this was a ‘democratic concept of the nation’ where ‘the people were the nation’ (Schwarzmantel 1991: 28). But who specifically constituted the people has been a recurring problem ever since:

But who were the people? How ‘inclusive’ was the nation? The history of this strand of nationalism, and in a sense the history of democracy as such, can be seen as the history of the attempt to widen the number of those participating in politics and hence in the life of the nation (Schwarzmantel 1991: 28).
The nation-state ideology initially had many progressive credentials, especially against the privileged position of the aristocracy, and it was because of the connection to the French Revolution that nationalists were perceived as the new “radicals” in the mid Nineteenth Century. ‘Nationalism’ was ‘at its beginning a great inspiration, widening and deepening the understanding of man, the feeling of solidarity, the autonomous dignity of the masses’ and it widened the conception of the people to include less privileged members of society, albeit universal suffrage was to come much later (Kohn [1944] 1967: 22).

An ideology is here seen fundamentally as being a political technique which in itself carries no normative content. The normative content is added to it the first moment an ideology is infused with the needed specificity to operate in a given setting. Crucially the normative basis of an ideology cannot be the peculiar worldview of some eccentric ideologue. Political ideologies of any consequence need to have the ‘power to move masses of people to political action’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 28). The creation of an ideology with the potential for gaining a mass following usually means the utilization of some widely shared preconceived identity. This is because ‘ideology always has the function of preserving an identity, whether of a group or individual’ (Ricoeur 1986: 182).

One can throw an identity into sharper relief, like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels did with their conceptions of ‘Bourgeoisie and Proletariat’ as ‘two great hostile camps’ or ‘two great classes directly facing each other’ and then present one’s ideology, in this case communism, as the cause of the latter (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 3). It is interesting to note that the empirical basis for seeing the proletariat as an agent of historical change did not really exist at the time they made this argument ‘Marx and Engels must have been projecting the future tendencies that they saw at work in the present. In Germany at the time the proletariat in fact comprised less than 5 per cent of the population, and even in England the rule of the bourgeoisie was far from being “universal” ’ like they had claimed in support of their above statement (David McLellan in his introduction to The Communist Manifesto, Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: xvii). This discrepancy between reality and the main premise of their theory is somewhat ironic considering how much emphasis Marx puts on understanding the underlying empirical conditions as the real drivers of change with his influential ‘materialist conception of history’ (e.g. Marx & Engels [1845] 1998: 36-62). But as McLellan points out; in 1848 Marx and Engels managed to identify a trend, and with time the variables identified as the drivers of this trend turned out to make a major political impact as the importance of both the industrial working class
and the influence of capitalists rose in political significance over the following century.

Marx and Engels did however in their influential analysis miss out on a crucial variable which is of essential importance for the present argument. They assumed that the economic homogenization of human civilization would result in its political homogenization as well, and in this assessment they did not foresee the resilience of the third and still mightiest class at the time they launched their theory. This was the conservative faction in European society that in 1848 was largely the same ancien régime that had been temporarily overthrown in France during the revolution that began in 1789 (see: Mazower 2012: 4-9). This theoretical blind-spot continued later as a property of Marxism in general:

Many Marxists have stumbled over the problem of the nation. To them the nation is merely an ideology produced by the modern capitalist economic structure, and hence it can and should be easily dissolved through enlightenment. In reality, however, Marxist movements that downplayed the importance of the nation found themselves unable to resist fascism, which rose under the banner of nationalism. Moreover, even socialist states resorted to nationalism, to the point that armed conflicts broke out among them (Karatani 2014: 213).

There was a new liberal order in the making in 1848 that Marx and Engels could barely conceive the contours of when they penned The Communist Manifesto. The shape it took was not what they had expected. The bourgeoisie, understood mainly as the capitalist section of society which operates with an exclusively economic rationale (see: Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 4-10), had not decisively beaten the enemies within its own ranks or those from the old aristocratic upper class. These enemies were described by Marx and Engels as ‘the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie’ and together with other parts of society referred to as ‘the middle estates’ which included ‘the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant’ they formed a political tendency that was not just conservative, but ‘reactionary’, as these groups ‘try to roll back the wheel of history’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 11 and 13). In addition there is a class beneath the proletariat, ‘the lumpenproletariat’, which because ‘of its conditions of

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16 The latest of the texts here used as a basis to criticize the analysis of Marx and Engels is The Communist Manifesto and from the various prefaces that accompany its more recent editions we can see that it was either completed in ‘December 1847’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 42 and 51) or in ‘January, 1848’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 45). In any case the work was finished prior to what Marx and Engels in 1882 described as ‘the Revolution of 1848-49’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 52).
life’ is liable to play ‘the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 14). Aware of this array of conservative forces aligned against the universal interests of both the bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat it is quite surprising that Marx and Engels go on to remove these variables from their analysis and instead premise it solely on the existence of two world historical classes; the bourgeoisie, which they bizarrely given the historical circumstances claim have ruled for ‘scarce one hundred years’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 7) and the proletariat, whose future victory over the bourgeoisie they deem ‘inevitable’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 16).

As the European wide revolution of 1848 came to its final stages there were widespread concerns that the radicals – the ones Marx and Engels put their hopes on for the future and whose strength had helped the liberals to overthrow the conservatives, at least momentarily – ‘would seek to exploit the widespread distress and kill the new liberal order at the very moment of its birth, by pushing for a second social revolution’ (Rapport 2008: 261). The conservative faction Marx and Engels had given so little importance to in their theoretical forecast managed to stoke fears ‘that the workers were intent on destroying the social order, or even civilization itself’ and this made ‘liberals and middle-class people [ ] willing to sacrifice some of their hard-won political freedoms if that would ensure a return to social order’ (Rapport 2008: 261-262). And so ‘the liberals [fell] in line with the forces of authority’ with the result that an accommodation between the conservatives of the ancien regime and the bourgeoisie liberals became the immediate result of the 1848 revolutions (Rapport 2008: 262). Not surprisingly, and in line with Marx and Engels assessment of the situation (but in the end not with their prediction) ‘it was the rural population that in 1848 lent its considerable support to the counter-revolution’ (Rapport 2008: 262).

With the exception of France, which experienced a short-lived Second Republic due to the revolution of 1848, all the countries affected made reforms that instituted a constitutional monarchy, with a constitution, a legislature, and limited suffrage in an effort to end arbitrary dynastic rule (Rapport 2008: 411). The revolutions of 1848, instead of representing the triumph of the bourgeoisie and the fulfillment of its ruling class destiny, does instead represent an accommodation between the interests of the bourgeoisie with those of the more conservative faction of society. The ideational nostrum that ties the liberal bourgeoisie together with the conservative remnants of the old order is nationalism. This by Marx and Engels unforeseen event serves to severely diminish the cosmopolitan character of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie does not cease ‘to nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, [and] establish connexions everywhere’ because of its ‘need of a constantly expanding market for
its products’ as Marx and Engels had observed, but it cements its foundation in its nation-state of origin in a way that did not fit as well with the universal nature of their enterprise. A political imperative, i.e. the need to share power to gain some of it, comes in the way of a purely economic rational.

We can see this development through the transformation of nationalism, which as already noted in the beginning had very liberal characteristics: ‘Between 1789 and 1848 nationalism was generally associated with republicanism and liberal reform movements seeking to overthrow the ancien regime’ (Delanty 2013: 173). As a result of the liberal-conservative accommodation after 1848, there were conservative elements of society that realized that the ancien regime worldview needed modification if they wanted to keep their position in power. Crucially this entailed not provoking the sensibilities of the mass of the populace to the point of rebellion. The solution the ancien regime moderates came up with was to appropriate the formerly liberal concept of nationalism to their own ends. In the process they removed nationalism’s progressive potential and made into a force with reactionary potential:

By the late 1870s nationalism manifested itself as a doctrine aspiring more to territorial aggrandizement than to linguistic or communal self-determination. This transformation of an ideology that had accompanied liberal and revolutionary aspirations into a set of xenophobic attitudes by which antiliberal leaders sought to organize mass constituencies was a fundamental development of the late nineteenth century (Maier 2012: 178).

The conservative right’s embrace of ‘a populist nationalism’ that ‘could win them votes’ showed not only that they had come to accept living ‘in an age of mass suffrage’, but also that they could do this on their own terms (Maier 2012: 178). The conservatives this way managed to acquiesce to the liberal worldview, and that is arguably a more important ideological development coming out of the nineteenth century for the present than the supposedly predetermined clash between workers and capitalists as foreseen by Marx and Engels. Both developments were highly consequential of course, but the liberal-conservative accommodation – because it resulted in two of the three major classes being programmatically opposed to a further internationalization of politics instead of two of them being in support of it, which was what Marx and Engels had predicted – meant that nationalism solidified its cultural hold over the populace despite the countervailing economic trend which was towards the creation of a global system. In short, a conservative irrationality based on the elevation of cultural constructs to a sacred status (in this case the
nation) trumped a Marxist rationality founded on economic imperatives. That this
was what happened can be further defended with a glimpse into the theory of
perhaps the foremost liberal nationalist of all time; the Italian contemporary of Marx
and Engels; Giuseppe Mazzini.

Mazzini, famous for being a ‘proponent of Italian unification and independence’ in
the first half of the nineteenth century, was also a great proponent of ‘modern
republican nationalism’ which was a ‘liberal nationalism’ inspired by ‘the French
Revolution and modern liberalism’ (Delanty 2013: 172-173). Mazzini also had a
vision of ‘a united Europe based on democratic nation-states’ which meant that he
was an inspiration to liberal nationalists all over Europe (Delanty 2013: 173).
Mazzini offered one of the most influential liberal visions of peaceful co-existence
among nations produced during the 1800s. But Mazzini’s was importantly a vision
more inspired by Romanticism than by a desire to promote the economic concerns
of the bourgeoisie.

The Nation, for Mazzini, imposed a sense of obligation and duty. Its
cause was altruistic and therefore ethical. Old-fashioned
cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, idealized the self-centered
individual and was thus egotistical. Mazzini despised Bentham
and the utilitarians for this as well as for their materialism.
Nationalism was for him above all about the spiritual elevation
achieved through mutual aid and collective action, and as such
rose above individual self-interest. Just as the family as a unit
existed above the interest of any of its members, so did the
Nation – and beyond the Nation, Europe itself, embracing all its
constituent peoples (Mazower 2012: 49).

It is evident that Mazzini thought mainly in terms of peoples, not classes, and that
his concern was with the defense of ‘the sacredness of Nationality’ (Mazower 2012:
53, and as cited on: 60). Mazzini’s pseudo-religious elevation of the idea of the
nation was noted by the later anarchist critic of nationalism Rudolf Rocker who
described Mazzini’s ‘whole philosophy’ as ‘a curious mixture of religious ethics and
national-political aspirations which, in spite of their democratic exterior, were of a
thoroughly autocratic nature’ (Rocker [1937] 1998: 60) Rocker further remarked
that Mazzini’s ‘slogan, “God and the People,”’ was strikingly characteristic of his
aim, for the nation was to him a religious concept which he strove to confine within
the frame of a political church’ (Rocker [1937] 1998: 60). We can see now that
liberal nationalism as it stood in the mid-nineteenth century really did not need that
much corrupting before it could be made to suit a remodeled conservative agenda. It
certainly had a side to it that had very little to do with economic rationality. In
hindsight Marx and Engels overestimated the rationality of the liberals while they also underestimated the cunning and resilience of the conservatives.

When the irrational inclinations of the liberals melded with the conservatives’ willingness to accept reform on terms that could be favorable to themselves, a new ruling elite with a wide enough base to stay in power in the age of mass suffrage had been created. What is important to take away from this experience is that one ideology seldom rules alone, they often operate in partnerships, such as the one established between liberals and conservatives in the latter half of the nineteenth century, which means that a society often in reality is ruled by a hybrid ideology that no one has properly articulated in theory beforehand. These are much easier to discern after the fact, but possible alternatives can be theorized if one is careful to include the relevant variables in one’s analysis. Though a lesson we can draw from Marx and Engels’ theory is that it is impossible to know which variables we can observe in the present it is that are going to be most relevant for future developments. Marx and Engels’ failure to see what was coming should be taken as a methodological warning; one should not try too hard to distinguish between one ideology who the present conditions indicate will rise at the expense of ignoring one that is perceived to be on the decline, because some kind of balancing act between all the ideologies operating in society at a given time is the more likely outcome.

The impossible part to indicate with any confidence is what shape the balance of ideological forces will take more specifically. Any number of collaborative outcomes could result in one otherwise serious contender being excluded from having much influence. The radical socialists were the ones that were immediately excluded after 1848, not the ancien regime conservatives as was implicit in Marx and Engels’ analysis.

And for instance in the aftermath of World War II it was the conservatives’ turn to suffer politically due to their failure to oppose Nazism and fascism in a convincing manner. This change was partially reversed in the late 1940s when:

…the new anticommunist consensus and a growing fear of the Soviet threat helped the traditional bourgeois ruling elites, discredited either by their collaboration with the National Socialists or by their defeat in the face of Nazi expansion, rehabilitate themselves and resume their positions of power (Loth 2014: 37).

After 1989, when the Iron Curtain was dismantled by the Eastern Europeans, the social democrats who had as their raison d’être the balancing of capitalist demands from the top and communist demands from the bottom of society (see e.g. Negri
(2003: 246-247) had to give way to a reinvigorated neoliberal and conservative right and the ideological center moved further to the right again.

The progressive notion of nationalism, where the association between ‘the nationalist idea’ and ‘the revolutionary ideas of democracy, implying national self-determination’ had in the aftermath of the Second World War ‘been preserved in the form of anti-colonial or “Third World” nationalism’ (Schwarzmantel 1991: 33). In this ‘liberationist’ respect ‘secessionist anti-colonial nationalisms’ continued to work as an “enlightening” ideology for the oppressed throughout the latter half of the 20th Century (Vincent 2007: 172). But the anti-colonial liberation struggles were largely provoked by the more sinister type of nationalism developed in Europe by the late 1800s where ‘nationalism assumed the aggressive and expansionist form of imperialism, concerned not with the self-determination of nations, but with colonialism and national rivalry, leading to the domination of some nations over others’ (Schwarzmantel 1991: 34).

This is the mixed heritage of the Enlightenment; firstly it initiated modern democracy and gave us a crop of ideas which still ‘retain their radical character’ in ‘political liberty, social justice, and cosmopolitanism’ (Bronner 2004: 1). But secondly, if we agree that ‘the French Revolution marked the political triumph of the principles of the Enlightenment’, it also bestowed to us nationalism, an ideology whose enlightening aspects today only apply to a handful of nations under various degree of control by foreign states (Schwarzmantel 1991: 34). These nations (e.g. Palestine, Kurdistan, and Tibet) can be considered mere statistical outliers in the context of the larger international system. Meanwhile in a Western post-war context ‘the ideological practices of national socialism and fascism marked out nationalism for especial odium’ which proved to be an association that led to ‘both liberal and democratic socialist theories, particularly, developing more internationalist stances’ (Vincent 2007: 171-172). This form of internationalism is still in many circles considered the most advanced and progressive form of world political thinking, a point which will get particular elucidation in the later chapter on cosmopolitanism.

Globalism (i.e. Global Internationalism)

Internationalism has been defined by Akira Iriye as ‘the idea that nations and peoples should cooperate instead of preoccupying themselves with their respective national interests or pursuing uncoordinated approaches to promote them’ (Iriye
According to Iriye there have historically been two main modes of international cooperation a) ‘cooperation and interchange between [ ] sovereign states’ or ‘what is meant by “diplomacy” ’ which typically takes the form of ‘a military alliance, a security treaty, or the like that does not alter the geopolitical character of a given world order’ (Iriye 1997: 3). And b) ‘an internationalism of a different sort, one that aspires to a more peaceful and stable world order through transnational efforts’ (Iriye 1997: 3). The first mode (a) I would call *intergovernmental internationalism*, while the second mode (b) can be termed *transnational internationalism*. Furthermore Iriye points out that there are three main strains of transnational internationalism:

[i] legal internationalism, with a stress on international law and arbitration; [ii] economic internationalism, envisaging a global network of economic exchanges; and [iii] socialist internationalism, promoted by those who believed that world peace must be built upon the solidarity of workers everywhere (Iriye 1997: 3).

This typology of transnational internationalisms could have been used to describe the core Western political ideas concerning how to ease tensions in the international realm around the end of the 19th Century, because it respectively fits the designs for world peace associated with the works of: i) Immanuel Kant, ii) Adam Smith, and iii) Karl Marx. Interestingly there is also another conception of a mode of internationalism in addition to Iriye’s intergovernmental and transnational modes:

Internationalism can be defined in two ways, either as a supranational organization of society which includes, preserves, and at the same time controls and limits nation-states, or as a state of mind which tries to visualize mankind as a whole, as a unit transcending all parochial (national or otherwise) groupings (Kohn 1971: 119).

Hans Kohn’s first definition is not identical to Iriye’s (a) intergovernmental internationalism, but it describes the institutionalization it started to take in the aftermath of World War I when supra-national organization was gradually and partly turned into reality with ‘an imperfect institutionalization in the League of Nations and a more perfect yet still very inadequate one in the United Nations’ (Kohn 1971: 119). The other of Kohn’s internationalisms he describes as ‘a vision of the unity of mankind, frequently called cosmopolitanism or universalism’ which ‘is
a concept much older than nationalism is’ (Kohn 1971: 119). I will tentatively call this third mode (c) universal internationalism.

Kohn’s universal internationalism is problematic primarily in two ways: firstly it equates universalism and cosmopolitanism, but what Marchetti calls ‘global cosmopolitans’ do nowadays not argue for universal internationalism of this sort:

“Global governance cosmopolitans” tend to recommend a multi-layered, decentralized and fuzzy governance structure characterized by multiple decision-making centres in which states still retain a certain degree of national autonomy and, most importantly, only those agents who are part of a given socio-political interaction are entitled to join in the decision-making process (Marchetti 2006: 295-296).

This kind of cosmopolitanism is closer to (i) legal internationalism, which if we follow Iriye’s scheme is a subgroup of (b) the transnational mode, i.e. it functions in a cross-border capacity, where legislation is promoted as a tool to “control and limit” nation-states through intergovernmental institutions like the United Nations, so in the last instance it is states that agree on limiting their own scope for action. This is not a transcendence of the nation-state framework as such.

Nation-states, and in particular the most powerful of these, are still the final arbiters on any question concerning the implementation of an intergovernmental legal framework. However, the moment a considerable proportion of states have ratified a law agreed on through negotiations at e.g. the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, it becomes supranational in a sense, but only if the most powerful states allow it to be enforced, which keeps the dominant states constantly in the loop. Kohn means another, earlier, form of cosmopolitanism here, which is primarily distinguished from legal internationalism by its advocates’ tendency to propagate the institution of a world-state. But as we will see later the now dominant form of cosmopolitanism do not seek to fully transcend the state-system or “parochial groupings” as he describes it. Secondly: Kohn’s universal internationalism is also problematic because if it is a vision of ‘mankind as a whole, as a unit transcending all parochial (national or otherwise) groupings’ the word

17 Exemplary scholars fitting this designation are ‘global cosmopolitans such as Archibugi, Held, and Linklater’ (Marchetti 2006: 295, footnote no. 13).
“international” in its literal sense meaning “between nations” does no longer relate
to the concept as described (Kohn 1971: 119). This discrepancy is primarily a sign
of a limited political vocabulary, not particular to Kohn, but in the scholarly
community in general when it comes to dealing with novel phenomena through the
use of now antiquated terms which were originally almost exclusively employed in a
nation-centric context where everything on the outside of one’s own nation-state
was in the “international sphere”.

What Kohn alludes to with universal internationalism is the quest for a global polity
which incorporates all of humanity into one all-embracing governing structure no
longer centered on nations, or nation-states, as its constitutive units. The goal is, as
Herder once described it, ‘to educate all peoples to become one people’ (as cited in
Kohn 1971: 120). This is a political vision that properly transcends nationalism in
the same manner as nationalism once transcended the absolutist monarchical state,
but with the added bonus of also ending the distinction between inside and outside –
‘friend and enemy’ in Carl Schmitt’s well known phrase (Schmitt [1932] 2007: 26)
– which the nationalists inherited when they adopted sovereign statism from the
former dynastic modus of political world ordering:

The external sovereignty of the state is compatible with a variety
of holders of internal sovereignty. A monarch, the people, a
constitution, a dictatorship, a theocracy, can each represent the
state within borders and be immune from external intervention.
Compared with internal sovereignty, external sovereignty has
remained relatively constant (Philpott 2001: 18).

It is implicit that the sovereignty of the nation-state is sought replaced with a
sovereign humanity in Kohn’s ‘internationalism as [ ] the unity of mankind’ (Kohn
1971: 119). I therefore interpret it to be only “international” in the same way that the
word “international” can be used to connote “worldwide” or “global”, lest it would
be no purpose to make the initial distinction between the ‘supra-national
organization’ he finds fairly developed in the United Nations of his day on the one
hand and ‘mankind as a whole’ on the other (Kohn 1971: 119). This is an
interpretation which is supported by a brief glance in the index of Hans Kohn’s work
The Idea of Nationalism, where following the heading ‘Internationalism’, it simply
says ‘See Universalism’ (Kohn [1944] 1967: 729). Quite clearly these terms were
considered synonymous by the author.
Kohn’s universal internationalism is in other words a political concept so far removed from Iriye’s definition of “internationalism” and its political connotations – i.e. cooperation between peoples and nations – that we need a better word to describe it to avoid unnecessary confusion. Cosmopolitanism, as already discussed, does not fit perfectly since that is an essentially contested concept which often, now arguably predominantly, is taken to mean legal internationalism. Universalism is a term usually reserved for describing religions who will let any person convert to it regardless of ethnic or social background, and it is also somewhat archaic in its political usage, for example, introducing “universal” education means having a “nation-wide” educational system for children of all classes. Globalism could perhaps once have been a faultless match, but here we encounter a term with a very troubling conceptual connotation, especially in light of the contemporary usage of the word “global” which it is derived from. So here we end up on “planetarism” as an alternative with the same connotation that at least for the moment is less sullied by everyday use and abuse.

The main problem with the term “global” is that it in the last couple of decades has in large part replaced the word “international” in popular, political and academic discourse. Often for no other apparent reason than it simply being in vogue or the fashionable thing to do. For instance, this is what “global” governance today means according to Ian Goldin:

> By global governance, I mean the institutions and processes which seek to manage global problems. Global implies they transcend national and regional borders and involve many countries. This definition captures traditional global governance structures, including [ ] the UN, WTO, IMF, and WHO. It also refers to the different players that participate and influence global governance and the management of global issues including regional alliances, the nation-state, and private-public partnerships at the global level as well as civil-society engagement in global affairs (Goldin 2013: 4).

Here we can see that what Goldin means by “global” is at heart the involvement of many countries. His examples are intergovernmental institutions (the UN and so on), regional alliances which again are intergovernmental (the main regional military alliance involving Western Europe since World War II has been NATO, but the most important regional body has by far been the European Union), the nation-state
(which is the pivotal governmental unit), private-public-partnerships (read corporate-governmental), and civil-society. Civil society ‘is a much contested concept’ but it can be described as a term for any ‘formal or informal associations’ one can find ‘organizing around shared interests that is distinct from the state and the market, though in practice these spheres are often blurred and interwoven to varying degrees’ (Howell & Lind 2010: 280). Typical examples of the larger, most prominent, civil society actors (the type Goldin likely refers to in the global affairs context) would be what are known as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International, Oxfam International, or CARE International.

“Global” is here then used by Goldin to describe what is essentially all the main actors in the international sphere of politics. All the above mentioned examples are either fully or partly integrated parts of the current nation-state based world political matrix. They work with the foundational status quo in world politics, i.e. they revolve around nation-states, and none of them works towards transcending that basic structure. At best these overwhelmingly pragmatist entities advocate better functioning international organizations and internationally binding legal frameworks. Since Goldin evidently writes mainly about (a) intergovernmental internationalism and otherwise only includes the sub-category of (b) transnational internationalism, that INGOs like Amnesty International belongs to, namely; [i] legal internationalism, why not stick to the perfectly descriptive word “international” instead? The answer can only be that “global” has overtaken the meaning “international” used to connote in the professional discourse concerning what we could with more precision still call “international” and not “global” politics. If it was not for this semantic fad we would have a nicely descriptive term for (c) universal internationalism with “global” or “globalism” but contemporary usage has muddied these terms and made them too unrefined conceptually to get across that distinct meaning.

There is one instance where Goldin gets it completely right with his use of the term global: properly global problems or global issues do exist, even though there are no “global” governance structures as such to deal with these, since these structures to be precise are still highly international or intergovernmental in character. If we
collectively as a species abandoned the nation-state and the attendant conception of
tergovernmental internationalism tomorrow and replaced it with true global
government structures for a unitary planetary polity, the truly global problems of
climate-change, bio-diversity loss, financial-crisis, pandemics, and intractable
poverty, to list some of Goldin’s examples, would not go away, but they would
ideally become more manageable than they are now (Goldin 2013: 5-9). These are
human-civilizational problems and to a large degree exist independently of the
current international system. We are currently attempting to deal with them by
employing an international governance system which Goldin himself argues have
become outdated, though again in muddled language: ‘Global institutions which
may have had some success in the 20th Century are now unfit for purpose’ (Goldin
2013: 2). The reason these are so useless is precisely because these institutions are
international, and not global as Goldin claims, to begin with. Calling the
contemporary political system “global” as is currently fashionable is nothing short
of a category mistake. This conceptual conflation of “global” with “international” is
making it impossible to fully address the core problems with the current system
properly without further conceptual clarification.

Martin Shaw argues that the national idea cannot be seen separately from the idea of
the international, since: ‘Each idea presumes and is constituted in relation to the
other’ (Shaw 2000: 28). Shaw observes that ‘it is a national and international
principle, or nationality-internationality, that is pervasive’ in the present
‘institutionally defined order of national-international relations’ (Shaw 2000: 27,
emphasis in original). International relations, and here under also the prospect of
international cooperation, follows from the existence of the national. Even if the
result is cooperation between nations this does not lead to the transcendence of the
national dimension of politics as some uses of internationalism imply (such as
Kohn’s). Internationalism understood from this perspective then means cooperation
between states, which still is what the closest form of international organization we
have today in the European Union is about. Cooperation between nations does not
inexorably lead to universalism, but it leads to a usually much more limited
internationalism. The national-international system would be transcended in internal
European affairs if the states in the union agreed to be incorporated into a singular
sovereign entity and dropped the current intergovernmental practice, but that is not
the present reality. Had a similar fusion of political sovereignty happened worldwide a global state would have been founded and we would have decisively transcended today’s national-international system. This universal or – if we acknowledge that no member of our species has ever been outside the gravitational bounds of the Earth – planetary polity is what represents the opposite of the nation-state. Shaw explains why nationality and internationality are more closely related concepts than what many people think:

Internationality is [ ] not, as sometimes supposed, the general opposite of nationality. The idea of internationality understands relations between and beyond nations in terms of the national principle. However, in a national-international world, antagonistic international relations reinforce separated nationalities. Cooperative international relations, in contrast, internationalize and partially transcend nationality. In a national-international order the tension between universal and particular can only be expressed in terms of inter-nationality. In this sense, in some circumstances, internationality is opposed to nationality (Shaw 2000: 28, added emphasis).

What Shaw here calls “the national principle” is pretty much the same as Steger’s “national imaginary”. Shaw nonetheless argues that the relationship between the national and the international is so intimately connected that he calls the present era ‘the national-international era’ (Shaw 2000: 29). Shaw’s insistence that we are dealing with two interlinked phenomena with the national and the international spheres, and not two poles in contention, raises an objection to Steger’s use of the terms the national- and the global imaginary. Because if one is not careful to distinguish between international ideological varieties and truly global ones, one could inadvertently be categorizing ideologies that represent two sides of the same “national-international” coin into camps that are supposedly much more starkly differentiated.

My contention is that the concept of planetarism can be employed to more fully identify the qualitative ‘rupture’ Steger’s concept of the global imaginary really is aiming to denote (Steger 2013: 221). The categorization system Steger operates with therefore needs to be supplemented for the purpose of conceptual clarification. So that instead of operating with articulations of the national and the global imaginary, it would add a middle category with an “international imaginary” which as Shaw
puts it could be a category for the kind of internationalism that ‘partially transcend nationality’ – but not fully – and which ‘in some circumstances’ – but not always – ‘is opposed to nationality’ (Shaw 2000: 28). That would leave the global imaginary as a category for ideologies that completely transcend the national imaginary, because at present it is mostly used in the capacity here reserved for the proposed international imaginary (see: Steger 2005a, Steger 2008, and Steger 2013).

**Planetarism (i.e. Planetary Polity-ism)**

Since “Globalism”, “global”, and “globalist” now are used to describe what in essence are still international projects, phenomena, and actors, we need a more precise term for describing (c) universal internationalism, because that is itself a far too imprecise term because its nominal connection to internationalism confuses its diametrical conceptual difference to internationalism proper when this is ultimately grounded in the nation-state. Since universal internationalism is grounded in a holistic conception of humanity, whose species habitat is broadly co-extensive with the planet, I therefore employ the terms “planetarism”, with the attendant terms “planetary”, and “planetarist”, to more accurately convey the exact meaning of what once was sought described with the imprecise term “universal internationalism” which nonetheless was used by Kohn as a signifier for a concept of monumental theoretical significance.

These terms derived from “planetary” are semantically synonymous to the family of global terms, but they are conceptually linked to (c) universal internationalism, which seeks to transcend the nation-state system completely and replace its international/global governance matrix with a planetary polity of ultimately worldwide geographical proportions and all-inclusive membership, and not to (a) intergovernmental internationalism or (b) transnational internationalism, which only seeks to either ensure the existence of institutional diplomatic channels or reform how the nation-state system operates in specific respects. That is not to claim that intergovernmental internationalism and transnational internationalism are so closely related to an older nationalist worldview as to make the proponents of these international strains ideationally indistinguishable from nationalists. There is a world of difference between Marx’s socialist internationalism or Smith’s economic internationalism and the autarchic nationalism/statism it distances itself from, but the ideas relating to international free-trade and the international proletarian class
should be interpreted as signposts of a move from Steger’s theorized national imaginary to a global imaginary that indicates the arrival at a half-way point between these, namely the international imaginary I argued for above (Steger 2008).

My theory hinges here on the application of the planetary terms to indicate how the painstaking evolution from the Westphalian “year zero” of the sovereign state-system in 1648 has now led to a discernible trend towards novel planetarist ideologies, whose existence, as I also will argue, is a necessary precondition or formative step on the way towards the institution of a novel post-national planetary polity.

It took the national imaginary roughly 200 years to replace the “dynastic imaginary” that initially resulted from the Peace of Westphalia in Europe. The national imaginary had substantially been replaced by an international imaginary by the mid-twentieth century (with World War II being the crucial event which hastened its descent from ideational predominance). The international imaginary began to be challenged already by the late 1960s when Keynesianism, embedded liberalism, communism, social democracy, and all the winning political formulas adopted worldwide at the end of the Second World War began to lose their hegemonic position in the minds of significant parts of the populace, with 1968 as the pivotal year in this respect (see: Katsiaficas 1987).

Steger has then argued that ‘the global imaginary’ started its rise to prominence around this time, particularly in economic globalist form, and this essentially capitalist ideational mode received a tremendous boost with the implosion of the Soviet-led communist Eastern-bloc in 1989-1991 (Steger 2008). But as I argued above, there is no clear conceptual demarcation between what I have here chosen to call “the international imaginary” half-way point and Steger’s presentation of the global imaginary. I therefore think these better could be understood as two different stages of the international imaginary, where the first co-exists with the Cold War era (late 1940s to late 1980s) and the other with what we can call “the era of Globalization” (early 1990s to the present). In this manner you get the international imaginary mark one and mark two, with the latter being informed the most by what Steger calls the global imaginary (which paradoxically is still internationalist).
The global imaginary I suggest – that would be a conceptual category capable of separating planetarist ideologies from internationalist ideologies – would then be different from the global imaginary the way Steger so far has chosen to employ it in the same way that the term “global” in regular usage equals *international* while “planetary” could be one alternative employed if you want to denote a *pan-global* political phenomenon. Bluntly put one could say that internationalism is far from dead, since today it continues to exist under the alias of globalism. This might be an exaggeration though, because even if there is not a difference in kind between the post-war hey-day of internationalism and the internationalism that still exists in our supposedly “globalized” present, there is a difference in degree. The internationalism we observe today is vastly more complex and integrated than the internationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, and it is also farther removed from the foundational unit of the nation-state. But the point is that it has by no means yet transcended the old internationalism completely and reached the planetary stage here theorized, where human civilization and the polity in charge of its political course is commensurate entities. For that to become a theoretical possibility we first need planetarist ideologies which I will claim currently are non-existent in popular politics. I write “in popular politics” because the development of diverse planetarist ideologies has been attempted theoretically numerous times already. What follows are some of the more pertinent examples.

**Approximations of Planetarist Thought**

Ernesto Balducci, a Catholic priest, argued for a new understanding of ‘planetary man’ as the basis for a necessary paradigmatic shift away from ‘the domination paradigm of modernity’ because now (Malucchi 2011: 522):

…at last man understands that [ ] the biosphere is not the space under his dominion, but the organism in which his spiritual life throbs. His love of water, fire, the sun, the moon, plants and animals is a condition of his love for himself: if he is the master that all creatures must obey, he is also the servant that must obey all creatures (Balducci 1989: 176, as cited in; Malucchi 2011: 522).

Balducci’s argument, perhaps not surprisingly when we take his vocational training into account, shares a universalist streak with the erstwhile rhetoric of medieval
But the important realization here is based on the relatively novel understanding that the interdependence between our own species and life on planet Earth in general forms an organic unity, which humanity has no choice but to serve in the future if it desires to perpetuate its existence. This builds on a whole range of authors which, particularly from the 1960s on, began to theorize about the adverse effects of the increasing industrialization of human civilization with its concomitant pollution of the natural world (prominent examples are; Carson 1962, and; Meadows, et al. 1972). According to Malucchi ‘this planetary interdependence was affirmed on a scientific level by Lovelock’ and I therefore infer that Lovelock’s famous Gaia theory also helped influence Balducci’s thought (Malucchi 2011: 524, see also: Lovelock [1979] 2000).

This heightened awareness of humanity’s place in a larger more or less fine-tuned ecological system – which we thanks to the industriousness and inventiveness of our species in recent centuries have gained the collective power to alter negatively – has led to a novel change in ethics: ‘While the old ethics were anthropocentric, founded on the supremacy of humankind over the world and nature, the new ethics are planetary, meaning that humankind must no longer be used as the parameter, but instead the global horizon over which the effects of his action extend’ (Malucchi 2011: 524). Others who agree with Balducci’s tenets have reached the conclusion that this ‘community of planetary destiny imposes a civilization policy of the Earth on all humanity’ (Bocchi & Ceruti 2004: 145, as cited in Malucchi 2011: 524). Another important theorist with a planetarist inclination, Edgar Morin, is also associated with ideas similar to Balducci’s (Malucchi 2011: 524).

Edgar Morin’s work *Homeland Earth* (1999) is one of the most lucid explications of the planetary imaginary to date. In this work Morin sets out most of the important hallmarks of ‘the Planetary Era’ which he claims starts already with the European’s discovery of the Americas which thus united ‘the Old and the New Worlds’ into a nascent planetary system (Morin & Kern 1999: 6). Though it has been 500 years in the making, humanity still finds itself in what Morin call’s ‘the Planetary Iron Age’ (Morin & Kern 1999: 8).

Morin recognizes that ‘economic globalization’ and ‘the global economy is increasingly manifesting the nature of an interdependent world’ (Morin & Kern 1999: 17). But his most interesting contribution is his focus on ideational aspects of
this interdependence such as his claim that ‘there now exist [ ] indications of a planetary consciousness’ (Morin & Kern 1999: 19). This embryonic planetary consciousness is according to Morin evident in: 1) the threat still posed to all humanity by nuclear weapons, 2) ‘the emergence of a planetary ecological consciousness’, 3) the inclusion of ‘the Third World’ with ‘the process of decolonization’ whereby problems specific to the Third World, relating to ‘demography, nutrition, development’ are ‘being recognized as problems of the entire world as such’, 4) ‘for better or worse, the development of a global civilization’, 5) a burgeoning ‘cosmopolitan culture – the culture of the Planetary Era’, 6) ‘the formation of a planetary folklore’ mainly ongoing since the 1920s through movies, television, and music, 7) ‘planetary teleparticipation’ beginning in the 1950s when televised images of wars and disasters made possible ‘fleeting transports of compassion and the feeling of belonging to the same community of destiny, which henceforth is the community of planet Earth’, 8) and finally images of the whole Earth captured from space which have made ‘the sense that there is a planetary entity to which we all belong, and that there are problems of a global nature [ ] more concrete’ (Morin & Kern 1999: 19-24). Taking into account this whole array of factors Morin concludes that:

To the ancient bioanthropological substrate that constitutes the unity of the human species is henceforth added a communicational, civilizational, cultural, economic, technological, intellectual, and ideological fabric. The human species henceforth takes the form of humanity. From now on humanity and the Earth can manifest themselves in their unity, which is not only a physical and biospheric, but a historical unity: that of the Planetary Era (Morin & Kern 1999: 24).

Morin is well aware that ‘there is not yet a common consciousness’ of this ‘community of destiny’, and his claim is therefore qualified to that ‘Globalism is on the rise, but we are just waking up to the fact’ (Morin & Kern 1999: 24-25). When one notes Morin’s use of the word “Globalism” here, it is conceptually speaking “Planetarism” he is talking about.

Another advocate for a change away from a nation-centric mindset to a planetary-centric one is Kennedy Graham who defined and elaborated on ‘the planetary interest’ as follows:
…the interest of the planet, comprising: (1) the survival and viability of humanity, contingent on maintenance of the physical integrity of the Earth and the protection of its ecological systems and biosphere from major anthropogenic change; and (2) the universal improvement in the human condition in terms of basic human needs and fundamental human rights. Use of the word “planet” here signifies more than the physical properties of the Earth. It denotes a political construct comparable in kind to, but different in scale from, the nation-state. No institutional reality currently reflects this; that is the problem [ ]. But the absence of the institutional reality does not preclude the introduction of the political construct - indeed it necessitates it (Graham 1999: 7).

Graham, who is a prominent member of New Zealand’s Green Party, here goes to the core of the problem, the mismatch between institutional reality and the ideal political construct which I would call a planetary polity commensurate with our human civilization, which now is manifestly planetary in scope (as opposed to the chauvinistic notion that civilization was something that only existed in Europe or for example if human civilization were to settle other planets in the solar-system in the distant future and become “interplanetary”).

Karl-Otto Apel is also aware of this contradiction at the heart of contemporary politics. Apel argues that ‘the development of social institutions itself has passed that stage where the regulation of human interaction can find its most integrative and its highest moral authority in the (national) state, as had been suggested by Hegel’ (Apel 1991: 263, added emphasis). One of the reasons this stage is now passed is for Apel that ‘there is a new relationship between humankind and nature, or, rather, between us and our ecosphere’ thanks to the recently acquired knowledge that nature, with its bounty and its resources, is not ‘inexhaustible, as people have thought it to be throughout history’ (Apel 1991: 264). Seen in relation to the simultaneously occurring globalization of ‘the international economy’ this leads Apel to conclude that we are in the process of developing ‘a planetary macroethics for humankind’ (Apel 1991: 261 and 263).

…each of us is now expected to share at least some responsibility for the emissions of industrial plants [ ] or for the preservation of forests on a global scale, for the very climate and the atmosphere of the entire planet, and at the same time each of us must feel responsible as a citizen – [ ] as the reader of a newspaper or a voter – for the politics, say, of the World Bank
with regard to Third World debt. Thus it appears that in both dimensions of cultural evolution, namely that of technological interventions in nature and in social interaction, a global situation has been brought about in our time that calls for a new ethics of shared responsibility [ ] for a type of ethics that in contradistinction to the traditional or conventional forms of ethics, may be designated a (planetary) macroethics (Apel 1991: 264).

A planetary macroethics of the kind Apel here argues for comes about through a change in empirical circumstances, just like national ‘mesoethics’\(^{18}\) once developed as a consequence of the centralization of dynastic power in budding states (Apel 1991: 261). Similar to how Marx viewed the idea of communism, this macroethics is for Apel not the expression of some fantasist utopian desire – where one seeks to mould the world into an idealized image – but rather the other way around; it is an ethics that is in the process of being adjusted to fit the presently existing conditions. According to Apel: ‘We are living today, for the first time in history, in a planetary civilization that at least in some vital respects – culture, science, technology, and economy – has been unified to such an extent that we have become members of a real communicating community’ (Apel 1991: 269, added emphasis).

Apel’s assertion that there is a really existing global community is controversial. Jens Bartelson for example argues that: ‘If democratic governance presupposes a community in order to be legitimate, global governance cannot be democratically legitimate since there is no corresponding community at the global level that could bestow it with legitimacy’ (Bartelson 2009b: 36). I think both Apel and Bartelson are partly right here, because what is going on can be described with greater precision as ‘now we are beginning to live in a global community’ (Singer 2004: 196, added emphasis). And that is a global community which at present is just organized in the most rudimentary and haphazard fashion.

It is this just emergent property which makes it currently possible to wonder what ‘the political institutions serving the self-constitution of the planet-wide human community’ will be like as Zygmunt Bauman does (Bauman 2011: 25). At the same time one ‘may ponder, in a worried way, whether the presently available frames of “international politics” can accommodate the practices of the emergent global

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\(^{18}\) Apel’s ‘microethics’ is confined to ‘small groups’ (Apel 1991: 261).
polity’ especially in light of the countervailing rationale of organizations like ‘the United Nations’ which was ‘briefed at its birth to guard and defend the undivided and unassailable sovereignty of the state over its territory’ (Bauman 2011: 25). We can here with Bauman see the contours of an irreconcilable contradiction at the heart of the dominant ideology (in this case nationalism or the national imaginary), with the existence of fragmented power – unevenly divided as it is amongst modern-states – and a newfound source of universal authority grounded in what is perceived to be the interests of the human species and life on Earth. The last time a similar ideational discrepancy occurred at the threshold where authority is meant to fuse with power the universal authority of the Church lost out in the end to the particular power of the monarchs. The monarchs then went on to create their own mini-versions of the early Byzantine Empire, which in their own territorial bubbles fit the neat formula of “the single king on earth” that mirrored “the single king in heaven”. This time around the victory of the challenger to the status quo would imply a reversal of that outcome, where particularity again has to give way to universality.

Theoretically a turn to universality would accord a planetary polity with unprecedented legitimacy since, as Bartelson argues: ‘the only prima facie legitimate demos must be coextensive with mankind as a whole’ (Bartelson 2009b: 37). But as Gallopin and Ruskin reminds us: ‘In the absence of a widely shared awareness of the necessity for change and a positive alternative vision of the future, the inertia of complacency and vested interest restrains social transition’ (Gallopin & Ruskin 2002: 8). One way this awareness can be raised and a positive alternative vision of the future can become widely shared is through the articulation of a single or several enlightening planetary or planetarist ideologies.
Chapter 3. Why Neoliberalism is Not a Planetary Ideology

Introduction

The argument I will present here is that in its earliest phase when neoliberalism was still being formed the different proponents of the ideology had widely differing views on which kind of world order it was that was going to be preferential to the furthering of the neoliberal project. Global universalism or globalism in its original form was still an option very much on the table in the late 1930s, but by the late 1940s the neoliberals had abandoned the idea in favor of a more pragmatic Atlanticism which still lingers at its ideological core to the present day.

As will be explained in greater detail the notion of which world order was the best had after a period of contestation become “decontested” or fixed. Since the 1940s the internal ideological development of neoliberalism has seen it move even further away from globalism in its universalist meaning, to the point that contemporary neoliberalism actively opposes any attempts at politically controlling globalization or the workings of the world economy other than facilitating cross-border flows of capital. I therefore conclude that it is misleading to use the term “globalism” to describe neoliberalism in any of the forms it has taken since its first phase. Because the first formative phase concluded with the consolidation of a different Atlanticist view on world order at the ideology’s core.

Because neoliberalism is found to be an ideology that does not promote political globalization or global democratization, but instead actively opposes these civilizational developments, it is clearly not an example of a planetarist ideology. A more fitting description of neoliberalism in its present state would be to call it an ideology of elitist internationalism which still retains much of its Atlanticist roots. In short neoliberalism is an ideological obstacle on the road to the kind of world integration that would be beneficial to humanity in aggregate and for enhancing the conditions for life on this planet. Opponents and supporters alike are misrepresenting the ideology by referring to it as “globalism”, since the neoliberals are not here to dominate the world politically but rather to ensure the absence of any
properly dominating force. This state of affairs ensures that the corporations and the super-rich who profit the most from these overwhelmingly anarchic conditions as concerns the world economy are left alone to maneuver economically and that they remain unrestrained by any global political apparatus of any consequence.

Crucial aspects of the neoliberal ideology were cemented during its first formative phase which ‘lasted from the 1920s until about 1950’ (Steadman Jones 2012: 6). The effort to consciously shape an ideology that could compete as a coherent alternative in the battle of ideas, where the different individual strands of proto-neoliberal thought were sought combined into a collective ideological body, only began in earnest in the late 1930s. In this respect the first major event was the Colloque Walter Lippmann which was held in 1938 where many of the key neoliberal theorists were introduced to each other (Turner 2008: 63-64, Denord 2009: 46-49, Steadman Jones 2012: 31, and; Fawcett 2014: 276-277).

The second and more pivotal event in the history of neoliberalism was the founding of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 (Turner 2008: 71-74, Phillips-Fein 2009: 41-46, Mirowski & Plehwe 2009, Burgin 2012: 101-108). If the Colloque Walter Lippmann was the event where all the theorists who took part in the formation of neoliberalism in its first phase initially met, then the Mont Pelerin Society was the event where the theorists who shaped its second phase were to be congregated for the first time. In that latter group were economists that would prove to be influential for the further development of neoliberalism such as Milton Friedman and Frank Knight, but their ideas are of little import to the present argument (Phillips-Fein 2009: 44). I will here focus on the first cohort of neoliberals whose ideas concerning what would be the ideal world order for the neoliberal project were not yet fixed.

It was the Mont Pelerin Society which was going to propel neoliberalism slowly but steadily into the political limelight where we find it today. Philip Mirowski suggests ‘that the Mont Pèlerin Society evolved into an exceptionally successful structure for the incubation of integrated political theory and political action outside of the more conventional structures of academic disciplines and political parties in the second half of the twentieth century’ (Mirowski 2013: 42-43). What will be the focus here is the period up to and including the formation of the Mont Pelerin Society. The argument is that by the time the Mont Pelerin Society was founded neoliberalism had fixed its position on what would be the ideology’s preferred world order and it
was not “globalism” of a conventional universalist nature it settled on, though this alternative had been entertained as part of the process. It was instead an Atlanticism that fit the novel version of ‘American nationalist globalism’ that grew out of victory in World War II (Fousek 2000: 7). This particular ‘American globalism or internationalism’ became the decontested neoliberal world order perspective, which with slight modifications managed to accommodate new elites around the capitalist world as the portfolios they held became too large to ignore (Fousek 2000: 7).

This internationalism with the American national interest at the center was partly articulated by Walter Lippmann as the realist alternative to the utopianism he meant plagued many of his contemporaries (see: Steel 1980: 410). But at the end of the Second World War Lippmann was much more interested in the national interest of the United States than in any ‘Wilsonian universalism’ which he saw as ‘delusory and dangerous’ and ‘he eschewed the globalism central to it’ (Steel 1980: 410). Lippmann ‘attempt[ed] to steer between’ the competing visions of ‘sentimental one-worldism, missionary imperialism, and Fortress America’ and find a ‘pragmatic realist’ alternative (Jackson Lears 2012: 106-107). What made Lippmann internationalist rather than isolationist was more the need for ‘spheres of influence’ since this ‘would give the great powers a sense of security’ (Steel 1980: 410). In other words, the main point of maintaining an alliance across the Atlantic was to ensure that there was a buffer zone in place in case the Soviets attempted to expand in the direction of America. Lippmann clearly differs from the other early neoliberals in being primarily concerned with foreign policy over economics. For the other early neoliberals it was mainly the other way around.

The neoliberal view on which kind of world order would be the most conducive for the promotion of their ideology in 1947 were heavily influenced by the tectonic shifts the geopolitical landscape had just gone through. Prior to the outbreak of World War II neoliberalism’s major advocate at this time (and for much of the duration of the century), Friedrich von Hayek, had actively supported designs for world federalism put forward by an overwhelmingly British cohort of international theorists and concerned intellectuals (Spieker 2014). Ludwig von Mises, Hayek’s mentor and arguably the second most influential theorist in neoliberalism’s formative phase, had as early as 1927 advocated instituting a borderless world polity as the only way to create a properly functioning free market economy (Mises [1962] 1985). By the end of World War II the neoliberals de-emphasized such notions of
political unity at the global level, though this has to be inferred since it simply no longer figures with any prominence on the neoliberal agenda (see: Plehwe 2009: 238). What had happened?

The argument I put forward here is that the influence of what possibly was the third most influential neoliberal in this period, Walter Lippmann, infused the neoliberal discourse with a realist bent that – no doubt in combination with the way world events unfolded at the time – resulted in neoliberalism adopting the novel American creed of ‘globalism’ (Ambrose & Brinkley [1971] 2011: xiv-xv, and; Fousek 2000: 7). Instead of focusing on political unity worldwide this was a version of American nationalism that emphasized the primacy of the United States in world affairs and the creation and maintenance of an economic world order that above all would be beneficial to its domestic economy. It was internationalist in the sense that allies of the United States were also set to benefit, provided that their interests did not clash with those of the United States itself, or that of its elites to be more precise.

In the context of the immediate post-war period this meant that the neoliberals adopted an Atlanticist form of internationalism that primarily served the American elite and its capitalist partners on the opposite European side of the North Atlantic. This was a direct negation of an actual globalism that perhaps uniquely in the history of modern politics was considered as an ideological alternative in the 1940s (see: Jonas 2001, Frankman 2004: 77-78, Baratta 2004, 2 Vols.). But as Kees van der Pijl has argued the interest the capitalist class had in taming the ambitions of labor had too much to profit from nurturing a hostile posture towards the Soviet Union for their interest to be aligned with projects for world peace and the harmonization of foreign policies (Pijl [1984] 2012: 133-134). And in such ‘circumstances a more restricted concept of Atlantic unity could again reassert itself over the global universalism [i.e. true globalism] still espoused by Wallace19 and other New Deal veterans’ (Pijl [1984] 2012: 134).

The leading neoliberal of the time, Hayek, could not afford to go against the interests of the right-wing American businessmen he and the whole neoliberal venture were by then dependent on for support. Immediately before the founding

19 Henry A. Wallace had been Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Vice-President during the latter’s third term and Wallace was perceived as both a naïve idealist and one of the foremost of the “One Worlders” by Lippmann (Steel 1980: 410-412).
meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society ‘The Volker Fund’ one of Hayek’s main backers ‘had successfully leveraged their financial support to narrow the ideological horizons of the society Hayek was hoping to fund’ (Burgin 2012: 101). The next year ‘in October 1948’ when ‘the University of Chicago agreed to hire’ Hayek ‘his salary of $15,000 a year for ten years [were] to be fully covered by the Volker Fund’ (Phillips-Fein 2009: 42). And the Volker Fund was just one of several influential sources of funding that expected some measure of ideological compliance in return for their investments (see: Phillips-Fein 2009: 46-51). We do not know exactly how neoliberalism was shaped by these efforts to lean on Hayek at a crucial moment in the ideology’s development, but we can infer from the political climate in the United States at the time that Hayek’s rather conservative businessmen backers would be more interested in promoting a new kind of economic thinking conducive to further their business interests than in backing the introduction of a world order that was set to diminish the scope for unilateral American action in foreign affairs.

With isolationism being the foreign policy equivalent of economic protectionism and the routes to both a globally inclusive internationalism and a truly global universalism blocked by Cold War rhetoric the only option left to adopt for the time being was Lippmann’s Atlanticism. The historical circumstances of the world, and especially in the United States, in the late 1940s made the early neoliberals shirk away from globalism at this crucial moment in the ideology’s development, but once that decision was made it turned out to be a rather fortuitous coincidence for its financial backers.

The Critical Assessment of Contemporary Neoliberalism

The comingling of neoliberal ideas and business interests that started for full when Hayek set out to launch the Mont Pelerin Society has now reached a level where it is almost impossible to discern the contemporary tenets of neoliberal theory from that of the interests of the corporate lobby. Colin Crouch has expressed this observation in the following terms: ‘At every point we find that democratic market societies under the influence of neoliberal ideas throw more and more power, influence and privilege at the extremely wealthy, especially the wielders of large corporate resources’ (Crouch 2011: 168-169). This is exactly what one would expect as a result from the political employment of a neoliberal ideology which has been given over half a century to further and perfect its symbiotic relationship with the corporate world.
Neoliberal ideological domination is an ongoing event that according to the theorist Wendy Brown has led to the end of ‘individual or collective mastery of existence’ and replaced it with the idea that ‘letting markets decide our present and future’ is a better course of action, and this is a development which has revealed neoliberalism’s ‘deep antihumanism’ (Brown 2015: 221-222). If we take Brown’s criticism at face value this makes contemporary neoliberalism seem as less than a conducive ideological vehicle for the project of bringing democracy into the global realm. But is the ideology in its current form at least globalist, in the sense that it would advocate the establishment of institutions with planetary jurisdiction even if they were not democratically controlled?

Colin Crouch accords to neoliberalism the quality that the transnational corporations that benefit the most from it are at least ‘refreshingly cosmopolitan forces, responding flexibly to the post-national geography appropriate to a globalized economy’ in comparison to the ‘political parties and governments’ that ‘continue to try to define interests in national terms’ (Crouch 2011: 173-174). If we combine Crouch’s claim with Adam Harmes’ argument that the benefactors of neoliberalism thrive on the lack of a properly global legal framework, then the cosmopolitan aspect Crouch identifies is stringently limited to the creation of a functionalist structure that facilitates international capital mobility, the opening of markets, and their liberalization (Harmes 2014). This makes even the supposed cosmopolitan strength of neoliberalism a hindrance to global political integration rather than a facilitator for it.

Harmes calls the global legal framework contemporary neoliberals support a ‘competitive or market-preserving federalism’ and again this makes perfect sense from a self-serving corporate standpoint (Harmes 2014: 148). This is a type of federalism that has been promoted in the writings of such influential neoliberal theorists as the aforementioned Hayek, but also by Milton Friedman, and perhaps most notably by James Buchanan (Harmes 2014: 149-151). It revolves around two principles, the first ‘is to centralize those policy capabilities that relate to protecting property rights, enforcing contracts and creating/maintaining markets’ (Harmes 2014: 148). The second is ‘to decentralize the policy capabilities the neoliberals do not support’ such as those relating to ‘taxing powers’ and ‘public education, healthcare and social security’ (Harmes 2014: 148). The whole ‘intent is to prevent national policies on issues related to wealth redistribution and market failures and to
confine as many of the undesired tax and regulatory powers as possible to the subnational level’ since there ‘they will be constrained by inter-jurisdictional policy competition and the need of governments to compete for mobile citizens and firms’ (Harmes 2014: 148). This federalism is modeled on the United States (Harmes 2014: 148). But the states that are the most obvious subnational units in the US are interchangeable with nation-states in a federation at e.g a European or a global level.

Because of this contemporary neoliberalism is extremely ambivalent to the creation of international regimes. On the one hand international regimes are indispensable for the facilitation of e.g. the free movement of capital, but on the other hand ‘the creation of supranational institutions’ with ‘policy capabilities that relate to wealth redistribution and the correction of market failures’ is one of the worst scenarios contemporary neoliberals can imagine (Harmes 2014: 153). This is because global political institutions exercising globally sovereign power would potentially ruin the leverage capital has built up over the current state-form because it always (in theory at least) is in a position to move to another jurisdiction ready to better cater to its demands. This also ‘means that, while we can expect neo-liberal social forces to support economic globalization, we can also expect them to oppose any forms of political globalization that undermine policy competition’ (Harmes 2014: 155, emphasis added). Political globalization, even in an internationally construed fashion, is therefore not in the neoliberal interest. This underlines the notion that contemporary neoliberalism is not a planetarist ideology.

Neoliberalism had by the end of the twentieth century evolved into an elitist ideology of global scope which was less centered on the United States. It nonetheless retains its commitment to an elitist internationalism that is far removed from the globally inclusive polity once envisioned by its first generation of supporters. “Globalism”, in the sense of a universal ideology, is therefore a misleading term for the contemporary ideology of neoliberalism because it fails two of the basic requirements for a properly planetarist ideology. First neoliberalism is not an ideology meant to emancipate humanity as a whole, but instead an exclusive elite situated primarily in the Western world and to a lesser extent in the economic centers of the rest of it. Second neoliberalism does not advocate political globalization or political universalism in the planetarist sense, because doing so would essentially allow for the regulatory control of the world economy at the global level. This could in turn seriously jeopardize both the neoliberal elite’s
politically dominant status and the lucrative economic position they find themselves in after having been able to shape the rules for economic conduct unopposed. Neoliberalism was meant to ensure the free reign of this economic elite early on, as I will now go on to show in greater detail.

**Decontested Neoliberal Concepts**

For this argument it is important to note that neoliberalism is more than a narrow, neatly confined, and easily identifiable ideology. The phenomenon which contemporary critics associate with the word “neoliberalism” should be understood as only a relatively momentary ideological crystallization of a broader discourse which operates with both a wider temporality and spatiality than that suitable at any one time if a given political ideology is to be perceived as both coherent and easily communicable. If we follow Michael Freeden’s insight that ‘ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts’ then there will be a process of conceptual contestation at some point before an ideology takes this more mature form where meanings have become decontested, and this stage we can call an ideology’s formative phase (Freeden 1996: 76, emphasis in original). Ideologies are constantly undergoing processes of conceptual contestation or ‘ideological morphoogy’ to use Freeden’s term (Freeden 1996: 75-91). Neoliberalism experienced such a period of contestation concerning what kind of ideal world order it was meant to advocate during its first phase. And as I argue here, this topic had by the late 1940s been settled in favor of a specific kind of Atlanticist internationalism which meant that this from then on became part of neoliberalism’s core of decontested concepts. With the exception of some slight variations that with the economic rise of Western Europe and Japan in particular at first, and the fall of the Soviet Union and the communist alternative later, ended up turning neoliberalism into an economically elitist internationalism of more worldwide scope, the ideology has retained this part of its core to the present day.

Whether or not the nation-state was the ideal container for the political life of humanity was a notion that was being contested in the inter-war era (see: Carr [1939] 2001, and; Long & Wilson 1995). This question is however one signified by a high level of political abstraction and speculation in this regard can draw attention away from more pragmatic and immediate concerns. If an ideology is going to present itself as a challenge to the existing order tout court or alternatively just to certain aspects of its functioning is something that needs to be “decontested” at
some point during an ideology’s formative phase. Obviously the level of confrontation being envisaged vis-à-vis the present political authorities will affect the potential mass appeal of an ideology. If the level is too low it will attract fewer followers at critical moments, since it might appear as too reformist or lenient compared to a more radical alternative, but if the level of confrontation is too high it might scare away potential followers worried that it has taken on an unnecessarily aggressive stance.

During an ideology’s formative phase how it aligns itself with radical or conformist positions on a variety of issues has not yet been fixed. It is especially at times like this that it is helpful to think of a budding ideology as being just elements of a wider discourse. A discourse which for the time being incorporates such a range of positions that what shape a hardened ideological end-state coming out of it would take is an impossibility to predict. The term “discourse” is here used for the purpose of conveying the notion of a long-ongoing debate involving conflicting viewpoints (i.e. juxtaposed positions on specific issues which it would be illogical to include in an ideology that is meant to potentially inform policy), but which nonetheless shares a basic level of commonality that makes the participants in it relatively close political affiliates in the broader picture.\(^{20}\)

In this sense one could state that contemporary neoliberalism is the result of a discourse of the political right, but it would be a mistake to claim that it involves the whole right side of the political spectrum, which ranges from social liberalism – an ideology which is nowadays barely distinguishable from the social democratic one found immediately on the left side of the divide (though the latter emphasizes equality more than liberty and the former vice versa) – and which further right reaches ‘a reactionary, right-wing tradition which is religious’ that ‘includes De Maistre, Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt’ before it ends with the Fascist and Nazi extreme right positions (Bobbio 1996: 43). But neoliberalism also draws on ideas

\(^{20}\) On a related note Terry Eagleton has stated the following: ‘It may help to view ideology less as a particular set of discourses, than as a particular set of effects within discourses’ (Eagleton 2007: 194, emphasis in original). It would however be too much of a digression to go into detail about the intricacies of how discourse is used in the literature, exemplified by Eagleton’s position here, and it must therefore suffice to say that my conception of discourse as it is employed here differs in the sense that I am only using the term to denote a “macro” discourse (spanning years, decades, even centuries, and primarily advanced through published works), while discourse is amongst other things often used to denote everyday ‘semiotics’, or “micro” discourse as well, which also can be mined for ideological content (Eagleton 2007: 210).
emanating from the left side of the political spectrum (Turner 2008: 69-70, and; Davies 2014: 130). And it is therefore to a limited degree also an ideology influenced by left discourse. For the most part however, one finds that the neoliberal debate is situated somewhere between the social-liberal and conservative-reactionary points on the right side of the left-right spectrum as it is commonly portrayed (see: Heywood 2007: 16).

Certain conflicting neoliberal positions can be separated on the basis of where they can be situated along a statist - libertarian dimension that does not fit as neatly within the one-dimensional portrayal of politics we tend towards when identifying at what point on the left-right axis some idea belongs. Though if we concentrate on the particular ideological shape neoliberalism has ended up taking in its present capacity as ‘the dominant ideology’ (Schwarzmantel 2008) – where neoliberalism is understood as having been ‘the only game in town’ for the last several decades (PATOMÄKI 2008: 144) that predominantly informs the policies of governments around the world as well as international governmental organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (Brenner, et al. 2010) – then this specific shape is primarily owed to the participants in the neoliberal debate with a more statist, rather than anti-statist or libertarian, inclination (see: MIROWSKI 2013: 39-41). This means that the statist - libertarian dimension is no longer a key area of contestation.

What is of more contemporary relevance is instead to follow the debates pertaining to both the democratic - elitist and the international - planetary dimensions within neoliberal debate and see how these developed during the formative phase of neoliberal thinking. Because it seems that the neoliberal discourse early on ended up on an elitist and internationalist trajectory that have not significantly been altered in the time since. This development is traced here through the work of the three central theorists during neoliberalism’s formative phase already mentioned; Walter Lippmann, Friedrich von Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises. The conclusion is that neoliberalism is elitist and not democratic, and internationalist bordering on Atlanticist as opposed to planetarist, and that this appears to have been a constant and decontested part of neoliberalism’s ideological core since the late 1940s.

**Origins**

When neoliberalism was articulated beginning in the 1930s it was as a counter-movement to the main strain of liberalism that was then prevalent within Western
politics, namely social liberalism. Social liberalism, especially when the designation
“new liberalism” is used in its place ‘refers to the late Victorian and Edwardian
development in British liberalism’ in a social direction (Leopold 2012: 11). This was
a form of liberalism developed in particular by T. H. Green, L.T. Hobhouse and
John A. Hobson (Schwarzmantel 2008: 51, Jackson 2012: 36, and Soborski 2013:
44). Theirs was a liberalism which took a cue from the work John Stuart Mill
produced later in his life, wherein ‘Mill’s liberalism’ can arguably be seen ‘as
blending into a form of socialism’ (Jackson 2012: 38).

What made this new liberalism “social” was that its theorists ‘argued that the
intervention of the state was necessary in order to establish an equal starting point
from which individuals could develop their capacities’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 51).
The distinguishing trait between the new liberals of the early 20th Century and the
social democratic socialists of the same era can be rather hard to pin down, as for
example the former did not even see ‘the private ownership of productive property’
as ‘a fundamental liberal principle’ (Jackson 2012: 51). But it is more common to
‘define [this form of] liberalism as located within the liberal domain but spilling
over to the socialist area’ (Soborski 2013: 44). Socialism, i.e. as expounded by
social-democrats, and social liberalism should therefore not be seen as
commensurate or largely overlapping entities, but instead as bordering on each
other: ‘Mill went no further’ in a socialist direction ‘than adopt a type of cooperation
and issue a plea for social (and economic) reconstruction’ as Hobson, for one, had
‘rightly realised’ (Freeden 2005: 96). It was this social strain of ‘left liberalism’
(Jackson 2010: 136) which inspired President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal in
the aftermath of the Great Depression and which came to its fullest development
when liberals such as John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge laid a
substantial part of the theoretical foundation for the post-war British welfare-state in
the 1930s and early 1940s (see: Keynes 1936, and Beveridge 1942).

The early neoliberals on the other hand found inspiration for the alternative they
sought to left liberalism in the works of the neo-classical liberals of the late 19th
Century such as the ‘uncompromising defender of the free market’ and author of
‘Man versus the state (1884)’ Herbert Spencer (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2014:
59, and Jackson 2010: 132, see also: Steger 2005: 9-10). Spencer had for example
claimed that: ‘Social reform would inevitably lead to national degeneration because
it would punish the respectable classes while rewarding the profligate poor and their hordes of children’ (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2014: 59-60).

Spencer and other neo-classical liberals were theoretically closer to such classical liberals as; John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo, than to the older J. S. Mill – i.e. once Mill had reached the point of his career where he had become ‘increasingly critical of his father’s laissez faire certainties’ (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2014: 56). When Herbert Spencer died in 1903 he had – because of his political stance one is led to assume – come to be viewed ‘as a callous eccentric’ by contemporaries (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2014: 60).

Social-liberalism, or left-liberalism, would rise to prominence in the Anglo-American world over the ensuing decades, while the neo-classical liberal ideas Herbert Spencer had stood for at the end of the 19th Century would lay largely dormant until they were revived by a small group of theorists beginning in the 1930s. The neoliberals of that era would go on and see their form of thought as a further development of liberal ideas originally aired during the Enlightenment, especially by Adam Smith, but they also found support for an Enlightenment heritage in the writings of for example David Hume (Steadman Jones 2012: 100-101).

The Formative Phase

Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973), Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992), and Walter Lippmann (1889-1974), were key figures during the first formative phase of the neoliberal discourse in the 1930s and 1940s. Mises and Hayek ‘in many ways [ ] represent the founding fathers of neoliberalism, providing the theoretical backbone for the political and ideological claims made by others’ (Birch & Mykhnenko 2010: 3). Lippmann is not given nearly as much credit for influencing the subsequent shape of neoliberalism, but the argument put forward here is that he in his own unique way plays a central role in defining the parameters of neoliberal discourse.

First Lippmann is interesting because his position in the debates that initially shaped neoliberalism has been seen as occupying ‘the left-most flank’ (Jackson 2010: 142). Secondly Lippmann’s participation in neoliberal discourse in its formative phase embodies a direct link to the vast repository of near Machiavellian knowledge concerning the practical workings of modern day politics which Lippmann had acquired through being engaged in high level politics and the formulation of
wartime propaganda in the First World War (Steel 1980). Thirdly, and this is something not many scholars analyzing early neoliberalism has made a note of, Lippmann’s realist views on foreign policy puts him at the rightmost extreme within neoliberal discourse, while this is also a position that comes much closer to the mainstream neoliberal position in the second half of the 20th Century than Mises’ and Hayek’s own idealist positions do (see: Porter 2011).

Mises especially holds a contrasting position within neoliberal discourse compared to that of Lippmann. Mises, at one point Hayek’s tutor (Steadman Jones 2012: 3), is generally referred to as ‘a free market libertarian’ (Steadman Jones 2012: 53). Mises has been characterized as holding ‘the rightmost flank of the discussion’ in neoliberalism (Jackson 2010: 140-141). Economically speaking this is probably correct, for reasons that will be explained below. But Mises also occupies what might very well be the leftmost flank within neoliberal discourse when it comes to his idealist or “utopian” views on foreign policy and world order (for Mises’ view see: Mises [1962] 1985: 105-151). Though Hayek can be positioned to the right of Lippmann economically, but not nearly as far right as Mises, Hayek’s opinions on foreign policy and world order are found to be very much closer to Mises’ idealism than to Lippmann’s realism (for Hayek’s views see: Hayek [1944] 2007: 223-236, Hayek 1948: 255-272, Turner 2008: 133, and 187-188, and Spieker 2014).

In an effort to delineate the ideological parameters of neoliberalism at its inception I will therefore now aim to substantiate the claims I have made here about the relative positions of these proto-neoliberals vis-à-vis each other and try to figure out how they relate to the wider left-right continuum taken as a whole. I will focus on Lippmann, Hayek and Mises as global political theorists rather than the more typical approach which is treating them as more or less accomplished economists. Due to this rearranged focus Lippmann’s more philosophical contribution to the debate takes precedence, while Mises’ and Hayek’s economic ideas shrink in relevance. I will limit the analysis to the initial phase in the formation of neoliberal discourse and therefore texts authored by either of these three after about 1950 are excluded, save for a few rare exceptions.
Walter Lippmann: The Realist Proto-Neoliberal

To put more emphasis on Lippmann’s political views and how these were shaped should be useful primarily for three reasons; first it is my contention that Lippmann’s contribution to the formation of neoliberalism in the ideology’s budding phase is underrated in comparison to that of Hayek and Mises (e.g. in; Jackson 2010, and Steadman Jones 2012: 30-84). Second I will argue that Lippmann, contrary to the more commonly held opinion, helped pull neoliberalism rightward in several respects. This is a pronounced tendency in particular when it came to articulating a realist view of world order that countered the utopian or idealist leanings of Mises and Hayek. Third, Lippmann appears to be the neoliberal worldview personified. I cannot prove decisively that Hayek based his long term plans for neoliberalism on the works Lippmann wrote in the 1920s and 1930s, but that conclusion could be inferred from it.

Generally Lippmann is dismissed as someone who made economic policy proposals in the 1930s that in comparison to certain later libertarian strains of neoliberal thinking makes it seem as if he harbored ‘a socialist agenda’ (Denord 2009: 62). This description of Lippmann’s position as the furthest to the left of all neoliberals is based on for instance Lippmann’s expressed concern that ‘liberalism have to take into account the provision of social security’ at the neoliberals’ first colloquium (Denord 2009: 48). But Lippmann did in no way need to be a bona fide socialist to hold this view, and in any case this rather progressive position was not representative of the rest of his political views. One prominent historical figure who also held a similar position without being a socialist was the arch-conservative first chancellor of the German Empire, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck’s drive to provision social security in the 1880s was done with an aim to ‘cripple the growing Social Democratic movement’ that was then starting to become a counter-hegemonic force in Germany (Clark 2007: 617). In other words, Lippmann’s position on that particular issue could likewise have been pragmatically motivated by the urge to undermine an opposing political contingent. Lippmann’s professional output in the decades before the Second World War, which reveals his own political trajectory, further underscores an interpretation of this kind.

Lippmann’s ideological viewpoint as it stood in the late 1930s and the 1940s was the result of years spent variously at the center of high politics and in the midst of
theoretical debates, though his primary means of income was as a journalist and public philosopher. Lippmann had his own ideas honed through contact with a remarkable array of eminent thinkers and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. The fact that the tensions feeding into the broader ideological developments of the first half of the twentieth century is here concentrated in one man, who on top of that came to distill his personal ideational solution to this conundrum into a proto neoliberal formula, makes a look into the way his work developed relevant here.

In 1914 the young Lippmann began writing for the newly established *The New Republic*, a publication staffed by ‘progressives in the [Theodore] Roosevelt mold – believers in strong leadership, civic responsibility, regulation of Big Business, and greater sympathy toward labor and the poor’ (Steel 1980: 62). Though the publication in the words of one of its founders aimed to ‘be radical without being socialistic’ it in reality promoted reform as a ‘way of heading off more disruptive change’ (Steel 1980: 62). Trough his engagement at *The New Republic* Lippmann was introduced to a whole range of influential people and among these ‘very few were radical’ and instead ‘[t]hey were progressive in a patrician way, with a sense, like Theodore Roosevelt’s, of noblesse oblige’ (Steel 1980: 63). It was at this juncture of his career that Lippmann had a crucial realization that would come to bear on his later worldview: ‘Influence, he now believed, rested not on trying to convert the masses, but on reaching the people whose opinions mattered’ (Steel 1980: 63). This was an insight that later was to become an integral part of neoliberal strategy, though it was Hayek who officially entered this position into the annals of neoliberalism more than three decades later in 1947 (Turner 2008: 69-70).

Lippmann had a socialist inclination while he was a young student at Harvard. There he: ‘In search of reform without revolution’ had ‘found what he wanted in the British Fabians’ (Steel 1980: 23). This was an elitist form of socialism that fit with Lippmann’s ‘questioning of equality’ (Steel 1980: 24). The Fabian Society’s mode of organization would later also inspire Hayek’s designs for a neoliberal equivalent (Davies 2014: 130). Bearing in mind that Lippmann’s conversion happened in 1908 (Steel 1980: 23-24), almost a decade before the Russian Revolution, “socialism” was a rather unrefined and broad category at the time and would only later – after the experience of communists in power in the Soviet Union, the anarchists losing out in the Spanish Civil War, the conquest of Nazi-Germany, and post-war social-democratic hegemony, to name just some of the pivotal events yet to occur –
become as sharply defined as we are now accustomed to. Reading Lippmann’s biography one gets the impression that the younger Lippmann appears to have needed some time to realize that his political allegiance really always had laid a bit farther to the right:\footnote{Assuming that “right” indicates a propensity towards hierarchy and egoism while “left” means the same towards societal levelling and equality (as argued for example by: Bobbio [1996], and Dunn [2006]).}

What attracted Lippmann to socialism was not a fiery passion for justice and equality, but an impatience with how badly society was managed. The Fabians, with their statistics, their elaborately detailed programs, and their emphasis on leadership from the top, were far more in key with his own temperament than the well-meaning [good government liberal] reformers or the bomb-throwing labor militants. Society had to be organized, plans drawn up, the “scientific method” invoked (Steel 1980: 40).

Lippmann’s attraction towards the technocratic tendencies of the Fabians and dislike of what he called the ‘cult of democracy’ was something which put Lippmann’s views ‘more in line with big-city Progressives than with [ ] American socialists, who [ ] exalted the masses’ (Steel 1980: 40). This dissonance with the position Lippmann claimed to hold and the position he actually held lessened at the age of twenty-four when he ‘switched from a loose socialism to a left-wing progressivism’ which in practice meant moving a step rightward on the ideological spectrum (Steel 1980: 66).

Lippmann was going to strike a tone that squarely put him on a divergent “realist” course away from the more idealistic thinking of the Fabians and their associates (McClay 1993: xlii). Lippmann was in no way a parochial isolationist, to the contrary it has been claimed that his cosmopolitan outlook was one of its defining characteristics (see: Blum 1984). But if Lippmann was a cosmopolitan – and since he was a secular member of a wealthy Jewish family from New York he fits an old stereotype of that distinction (Steel 1980: 3-11, and 186-196) – his “cosmopolitanism” was one barely reaching beyond American shores and across the Atlantic. This middle-position, between more globally inclusive internationalists than he and those adhering to a completely myopic nationalism, where Lippmann was a “realist” placing himself between “idealists” and “parochials”, was a position
he appears to have held consistently from the First World War to the aftermath of World War Two.

Lippmann had by 1914 replaced the socialist conviction he had harbored since late adolescence ‘with a Wellsian vision of an elite of enlightened managers who would run society along scientific grounds for the public good’ (Steel 1980: 79, and also; 23-24). This was an elitist aspect of Wells’ thought which fit with the Fabian program Lippmann (who had been a member of the Fabian Society since 1909) had earlier been a supporter of (Steel 1980: 43). But it was also a view he could hold on to as he moved to the right politically. Lippmann’s short infatuation with socialism appears to never have centered on the sort of ideas that made up what Iriye have termed ‘socialist internationalism’ which emphasized the unification of the proletarian classes into a worldwide movement for world revolution (Iriye 1997: 3). Lippmann did not even hold a more conventional liberal internationalist outlook – which was quite common amongst the social-democrats and left-liberals of the era, who advocated various forms of international organization and diverse globally binding legal frameworks (see: Long & Wilson 1995).

In contradistinction to for example Norman Angell, ‘the British internationalist’ and ‘well-known anti-imperialist’ who on occasion wrote for The New Republic and ‘saw the war [i.e. the First World War] as an opportunity to achieve world government’, Lippmann took a ‘less utopian’ approach to foreign policy (Steel 1980: 110-111). Lippmann opted instead for an approach of more limited scope, where he replaced what he perceived to be the unrealistic grand schemes of Angell and others, with the institution of an Atlantic community (Steel 1980: 111). This was a notion of a closer-knit North America and Western Europe, which amounted to a conception of Western Civilization that did not even include Germany in its ranks (Steel 1980: 111). This latter point makes sense in light of Germany’s antagonistic role as the “Atlantic” nations’ primary rival at the time, but it also illustrates Lippmann’s extreme focus on the near abroad compared with that of most of the idealists.

22 There is a debate over whether or not Wells’ view is misrepresented when it is labeled elitist or anti-democratic. Some experts argue that Wells was not anti-democratic (Partington 2003: 11), while others seem convinced that ‘Wells’s World State was to be dependent on a special caste’ thereby attributing to him a sentiment which might be interpreted as anti-democratic (Heater 1996:137).
Lippmann, even though he ‘predicted that the old nationalism would be replaced by a new internationalism’, did not endorse an internationalism of global scope and therefore adopted a stance more in line with a conservative politics acquiescing to the demands of new 20th Century realities. ‘America, he argued, was an integral part of the community of nations bordering the Atlantic’ or what he called ‘the Atlantic community’ (Steel 1980: 114 and 111). Lippmann insisted that an ‘attack on that community was a threat to America’s own security’ and that ‘Germany’s war against Britain and France’ therefore should be considered an attack ‘against the civilization of which we are part’ (Steel 1980: 111). This made Lippmann more of an Atlanticist than a full-fledged internationalist (see: Pijl [1984] 2012). Lippmann during World War I, on the merit that he had advocated this Atlantic community, got to play a central role in working out a policy proposal for president Wilson as an answer to the Bolsheviks’ recent calls for world revolution (Pijl 2014: 69).

Lippmann landed a job with an outfit created as the US entered World War I that was meant to advise on strategic options for postwar order which was ‘Woodrow Wilson’s forerunner to the National Security Council’ (Jackson Lears 2012: 97). Lippmann in this capacity became ‘a trusted presidential advisor’ to Woodrow Wilson ‘and the author, in part at least, of the document that was to serve as the basis for the peace settlement’ known as ‘the Fourteen Points’ (Steel 1980: 134). Of Wilson’s Fourteen Points ‘the president’s Points 6 to 13 of January 1918 on national self-determination’ were used almost to the letter as they were presented to him by Lippmann’s ‘own outfit’ (Pijl 2014: 69). By November of the same year ‘the armistice was concluded on the basis of [these] Fourteen Points’ (Manela 2007: 17).

At this point Lippmann was clearly an influential person at the highest level of foreign policy formulation. Lippmann had before the war’s end taken in the lesson that government is steered by a mighty few, responsive to good council if this was offered to them persuasively, as he had experienced being one of these ‘evidently well placed’ councilors himself (Steel 1980: 139).

Another lesson Lippmann would learn before the cessation of hostilities was how to conduct propaganda. He ended his job at the Inquiry in favor of beginning work as the ‘American representative to the Inter-Allied Propaganda Board in London’ (Steel 1980: 142, see also 141-152). The propaganda effort Lippmann started working with was not by definition about misinformation – Lippmann aimed to ‘avoid all the tricky and sinister aspects of what is usually called propaganda’ (Steel
1980: 142) – but the propagation of ideas (and ideally truthful ones) for a desired end. Propaganda, just like ideology, can be seen as a political technique, and can neutrally be ‘defined as a deliberate attempt to persuade people, by any available media, to think and then behave in a manner desired by the source’ (Taylor 2003: 7).

When Lippmann entered the Propaganda Board the Bolsheviks had just recently risen to power and turned ‘propaganda’ into ‘a fact of everyday life’ propagating a worldview that was in direct competition with the one used as the basis for Wilson’s plans for peace, which Lippmann had helped formulate earlier in the war and which he now was tasked with promoting to the enemy (Taylor 2003: 198). This conducive climate to learning about propaganda’s different intricacies gave Lippmann a springboard to become an authority on the phenomenon, and that was a position he cemented for posterity with the publication of his 1922 book *Public Opinion* (see: Taylor 2003: 325-326).

In *Public Opinion* Lippmann states that since public opinion had essentially become a construct – rather than a naturally formulated Rousseauan general will – it should be possible to manufacture democratic consent (Lippmann 1922, summary paraphrasing; Freedman 2013: 338). This meant a return to top-down rather than bottom-up management of politics in other words, with the added difference that now the populace would be under the illusion that they were running things. Unlike in for instance an absolutist monarchy where the inhabitants of the realm are fully aware of their subject status in society and where this conscious subordination can accumulate into a veritable powder keg of grievances, Lippmann suggested a more devious approach. Once the possibility of manufacturing consent fully arose – which according to Lippmann it had done ‘within the life of a generation now in control of affairs’ – it was ‘no longer possible [ ] to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes spontaneously from the human heart’ and instead by believing in this fallacy ‘we’ would ‘expose ourselves to self-deception, and to forms of persuasion that we cannot verify’ (as cited in; Taylor 2003: 320-321). In other words, following Lippmann, what is the prevailing popular opinion at a given time ought, by the end of the First World War, to be viewed as the result of the most successful propaganda effort. Lippmann in *Public Opinion* used the notion of “stereotypes” in its modern psychological meaning:
For the most part we do not first see, and then decide, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture (Lippmann 1922: 81).

Therefore people do not perceive reality as such, and what they ‘assume to be “facts” are often really judgments’ or older preconceptions passed on from preceding generations (Steel 1980: 181). In this way stereotypes aid in the perpetuation of traditional worldviews no matter how loosely these happen to be grounded in physically existing conditions. But eventually ‘the day of reckoning comes, and the stereotype is shattered’ (Lippmann 1922: 112).

Implicit in this insight into human cognition is the notion that new stereotypes can be instilled in the public through a successful propaganda effort. Though certain older stereotypes can by their nature be hard to get rid of, these can be replaced more easily if they can be convincingly argued to be false, because – as a more recent student of propaganda has asserted – the ‘substance and myth’ propaganda and stereotypes are based on ‘needs to be rooted in some reality if [it] is to succeed’ (Taylor 2003: 4).

Truth, or at least a selective rendering of the truth, is an important element of effective propaganda. But it is also of the essence to not “cloud the message” by reporting all the minute details or by delving into the deeper complexities of every position: ‘An essential characteristic of propaganda’ or ‘the manipulation of opinion’ is the holding back of certain elements of the truth (outright lying should ideally be avoided, though it is of course always an option the propagandist can choose to employ) so ‘that it rarely tells the whole truth’ (Taylor 2003: 10). As Lippmann was to put it in his follow up work; ‘a public [ ] discerns only gross distinctions [ ] and is interested only when events have been melodramatized as a conflict’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 55). Jo-Anne Pemberton has argued that Lippmann in Public Opinion calls for ‘a period of expertocracy’ which ‘could save democracy from itself’ (Pemberton 2001: 78). This is a call for the elite to get back in control after they were momentarily caught unprepared by the burgeoning development of mass-democracy. But it requires a silver-tongued elite versed in the arts of mass-communication and clever deception, not a return of the decorated aristocrat who publicly scoffs at the common man. Brainy men like Lippmann in
other words should form the new ruling class of capable individuals, in a decisive break with the predominant elitist mentality in much of Europe and Asia that saw military prowess as the main marker of distinction, a view which had its wellspring in the daring warrior-class of medieval times.

The public might be the final arbiter in contests for political power in modern democracies, but there is a whole lot that can be done to frame the debate favorably for either side before it reaches the stage where it is actually paid attention to by the masses. The appearance of objectivity is central for getting the public to support one’s side in such contests, but it can be feigned for rhetorical purposes if necessary, since it only has an instrumental function and is not sought as a goal in and of itself. After all propaganda is not to be confused with education; the former ‘tells people what to think’ while the latter ‘teaches people how to think’ (Taylor 2003: 14, emphasis in original). One of the primary uses of propaganda historically has been to convey an ideology (Taylor 2003: 7). It is in this connection that it is important to take note of the fact that Lippmann was one of the earliest experts on the topic.

Lippmann did not only possess knowledge of how to shape public opinion and what constituted the building blocks of ideologies, he could also see how real executive power is actually distributed within a modern democracy, i.e. primarily in relatively small elite networks. Or as he put it; ‘a kind of professional public consisting of more or less eminent persons’ who function as ‘proxies’ for ‘the random collection of bystanders who constitute a [lay] public’ but which cannot ‘intervene in all the problems of the day’ and therefore: ‘Most issues are never carried beyond this ruling group’ despite all rhetorical flourishes commonly espoused to the contrary (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 115). This again is an insight made by Lippmann that is later adopted as an essential element of neoliberal strategy by Hayek at the founding meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 (see: Turner 2007: 69-70). It also follows from this that there is no need for forming an explicitly neoliberal party. Because as long as one is able to gain access to the inner circle of decision makers it is conceivably possible to exert influence on any party that is elected to power, provided that said party is not too strongly committed to an opposed economic program. As we can see today this strategy has allowed the core economic part of the neoliberal program to stand virtually unopposed in many an election.
Lippmann followed up *Public Opinion* with *The Phantom Public* in 1925, a work in which he continued his argument that the notion of the commanding public is a modern myth or fiction and proposed that, as he put it concisely: ‘We must abandon the notion that the people govern’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 51). Instead Lippmann argues that in the modern polity the ‘fundamental difference which matters is that between insiders and outsiders’, or leaders and led, and that it is only the former who are in a position to take ‘executive action’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 140 and 134). Public opinion only plays an auxiliary role at certain crucial moments when it can be ‘a reserve of force brought into action during a crisis in public affairs’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 59). Otherwise the insiders are in a position to do nearly as they please, as long as they do not govern so badly that they provoke a crisis on their own accord:

Public opinion in its highest ideal will defend those who are prepared to act on their reason against the interrupting force of those who merely assert their will. The action of public opinion at its best would not, let it be noted, be a continual crusade on behalf of reason. When power, however absolute and unaccountable, reigns without provoking a crisis, public opinion does not challenge it. Somebody must challenge arbitrary power first. The public can only come to his assistance (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 59-60).

This is interpreted as Lippmann taking an elitist stance, as in the introduction to the 1993 edition of *The Phantom Public* by Wilfred M. McClay where he describes Lippmann’s position as ‘fundamentally conservative’ (McClay 1993: xxxi). But it can also be seen to be meant more as a descriptive statement of fact – a revelation of the actual conditions one must be aware of to successfully operate in this environment – than as prescriptive and normative. Lippmann was (to a certain extent) an insider himself and was able to draw on his own experience. It is particularly evident in *The Phantom Public* that Lippmann possessed a

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23 Lippmann’s argument appears to owe a great debt to ‘the founding fathers of elite theory’ Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1848-1941), in addition to Robert Michels’ (1876-1936) theory concerning “the iron law of oligarchy” (Bellamy 1987: 34, see also: Bottomore 1966). Michels is the only one of these theorists Lippmann makes a reference to (see: Lippmann 1922: 225, and Lippmann [1925] 1993: 9, and 12-13).
Machiavellian\textsuperscript{24} streak, and because of this quality it is said to be one of the original works that ‘exemplified and pioneered’ ‘the “realist” approach to political analysis’ as this term was to be understood in the twentieth century (McClay 1993: xlii).

Lippmann has been criticized widely for having displayed anti-democratic sentiments in his works on the public and on foreign policy (e.g. Porter 2011: 572), but this is arguably a distortion of his position (Schudson 2008). Lippmann might instead have been looking for a way ‘to harness experts to a legitimately democratic function’ (Schudson 2008: 1041). It does in any case appear to be the consensus that Lippmann’s work displayed ‘overtones of elitism’ (Schudson 2008: 1031), and that this makes his an ‘elitist philosophy’ (Porter 2011: 570). The nuances separating “anti-democratic” from merely “elitist” become important when one wants to find the exact political position of proto-neoliberals such as Lippmann. The importance of that distinction becomes even more pronounced in the context of an analysis of neoliberalism in the early 21\textsuperscript{st} Century.

Lippmann was not against democracy \textit{per se}, his was an ‘alternative – elitist – vision of democracy’ (Rogers 2012: 17), and as he puts it in \textit{The Phantom Public} ‘an election based on the principle of majority rule is historically and practically a sublimated and denatured civil war’ so Lippmann clearly sees that periodic democratic elections are beneficial to society because the alternative would be to go through irregular episodes of revolutionary convulsion instead (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 48). Lippmann’s elitism went as far right as was possible \textit{within} democratic, meritocratic and secular confines. It had nothing to do with reverence for aristocracy, monarchy, or a religiously founded order (which separates it from typical 19\textsuperscript{th} Century European conservatism). Neither was it explicitly authoritarian (i.e. where a single faction rules the state without legitimate opposition), the reason being that Lippmann could see the utility in having both competing political groups – or more to the point ‘competing elites’ (McClay 1993: xliv) – within the polity and

\textsuperscript{24} Lippmann both expressed admiration for, and showed his insight into, Machiavelli’s works in \textit{Public Opinion} (See: Lippmann 1922: 264-266). E. H. Carr, whose work \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis} did much to define “realism” in international relations theory, sees Machiavelli as ‘the first important political realist’ and approvingly quotes his dictum that ‘it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it’ (Carr [1939] 2001: 62, and Machiavelli as quoted on the same page). Lippmann endeavors to make a similar effort to Machiavelli’s, and this McClay finds especially pronounced in \textit{The Phantom Public} (McClay 1993: xlii).
regular elections, where the public chooses which of these groups to lead them: ‘It is the function of public opinion to check the use of force in a crisis, so that men, driven to make terms, may live and let live’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 64).

The aspect of democracy Lippmann had an issue with was the tendency, as he perceived it, of a crude majoritarianism to exert power over policy makers – forcing experts to bow to the wishes of an incompetent public – and that this was getting in the way of formulating sound policies in key areas such as in economic and foreign policy. Note that Lippmann did not perceive experts as in any way superhuman; Lippmann assumed ‘only that they might know better than the common folk’ (Steel 1980: 214). And since ‘competence exists only in relation to function’ so ‘that men are not good, but good for something’ theirs was an expertise that was only valid when it came to making decisions within the fields they mastered (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 140).

What Lippmann apparently did not realize was that if a sufficiently detached technocratic elite becomes too insulated from pressures exerted by public opinion, they will be able to formulate any policy essentially unchallenged, whether sound or not. And in the event that propaganda is actually successful in manufacturing consent among the public at large there might not be enough independent thought among the public to check an elites’ excesses. Lippmann viewed democracy more as a handy tool than a principle worth defending on its own merits. This is a slippery slope which for Lippmann in practice culminates in a defense of the pretense to democracy more than anything else. John Dewey was one of the contemporary observers of Lippmann’s work that picked up on this.

When John Dewey wrote his The Public and Its Problems, published in 1927, Dewey acknowledged his ‘indebtedness’ for ‘ideas involved in my entire discussion’ to both Lippmann’s Public Opinion and The Phantom Public (Dewey [1927] 2012: 104, footnote). Dewey was ‘unquestionably the leading progressive intellectual, before, during, and after World War I’ and he ‘wrote frequently for The New Republic in this period and was clearly its leading theoretician’ or so Murray Rothbard asserts, thereby ranking Dewey above Lippmann in what arguably appears to be a fair assessment by a leading libertarian who was no fan of either (Rothbard 1989: 96). Dewey was in contradistinction to Lippmann consistently a progressive in
the 20th Century, and he had for example early in his career been influenced by T. H. Green (Weinstein 2012: 157, footnote 34). Ideologically Dewey therefore belongs to the same social liberal category as the new liberals.

What came to be known as the ‘Lippmann-Dewey debate’ about half a century after it was supposed to have been conducted was in reality not a debate, as this assumes a certain back and forth dialogue, and can more accurately be described as Dewey being inspired by Lippmann’s two works on the public to produce a work of his own in response to these (Schudson 2008: 1031-1032). In parts of this response Dewey castigates Lippmann for making the case for expanding already present elitist aspects of democracy: ‘No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few’ (Dewey [1927] 2012: 154). But Dewey simultaneously gives away how such an oligarchy, if it should become a political fact, can be best preserved:

Representative government must at least *seem to be* founded on public interests as they are revealed to the public belief. The days are past when government can be carried on *without any pretense* of ascertaining the wishes of the governed. *In theory*, their assent must be secured. Under the older forms, there was no need to muddy the sources of public opinion on political matters. No current of energy flowed from them. To-day the judgments popularly formed on political matters are so important, in spite of all factors to the contrary, that there is an enormous premium upon all methods which affect their formation (Dewey [1927] 2012: 140, added emphasis).

What is a warning from Dewey, who goes on to state that ‘The smoothest road to control of political conduct is by control of opinion’, can be seen as an opportunity for how to instigate the rule of experts Lippmann recently had advocated (Dewey [1927] 2012: 140). It is as if Dewey reminds Lippmann that a project for rule by experts, if it is to succeed in its goal, must necessarily have to be a two-faced exercise to work sufficiently well in a democratic context. First it has to present itself as outward looking through propaganda aimed at the masses, claiming that

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25 According to Rothbard, Dewey promoted ‘postmillennial progressive Christian statism’ up to 1900 and then changed to promoting a ‘secular progressive statism’ from then on (Rothbard 1989: 96).
governance is a collective endeavor and that the public are the ones ultimately in charge of how its affairs will be conducted. Here the aim is to keep “the outsiders”, to employ Lippmann’s terminology, onboard. Then there is another inward looking part of the same campaign, clandestinely operating but more earnest, informing “the insiders” what is actually going on (presumably on a “need to know” basis to limit the damages from potential leakage) so that nobody in a leading position works in contradiction of the real goals.

Though the first, publicly disseminated, line is in and of itself true, it is as Lippmann conceded in *The Phantom Public* only true on the rarest of occasions when ‘Public opinion’ acts as ‘a reserve of force brought into action during a crisis’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 59). Otherwise politics is a matter handled through institutions steered by the ‘Ins’ currently in power, sometimes in conjunction with the ‘Outs’ awaiting their chance to get their turn at the helm, because in Lippmann’s words: ‘To support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they seem to be going badly, this, in spite of all that is said about tweedledum and tweedledee, is the essence of popular government’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 116). It is first the moment institutions fail that the public becomes momentarily significant, ‘The hardest problems are those which institutions cannot handle. They are the public’s problems’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 121). But in most instances the public’s influence on politics ‘in stable and mature societies’ is limited to choosing between ‘very small’ ‘differing tendencies [ ] compared to the immense area of agreement, established habit, and unavoidable necessity’ as they elect this or that elite faction (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 117-118).

Lippmann’s insights coupled with what can in addition be derived from Dewey’s “words of advice” gives us three lessons that should be applied if an oligarchic rule by experts is viewed as preferable to a more democratic rule which – as we can see by definition – would be conducted in liaison with a better informed electorate. These principled lessons are:

1) Make the public believe its interests are being served and they will reciprocate with providing vital support, and if it is necessary to curry the public’s favor then a sustained propaganda campaign of deceitful misinformation ought to be applied, because having the most substantial part of the public on ones’ side is of the essence
when it comes to both gaining and holding on to power, and especially so in a democracy.

2) Keep the original project of elite rule a secret and do not under any circumstances admit to this publicly (because it would undermine the effort for securing public acquiescence and also expose the project to much more damning attacks from countervailing forces and thereby strengthen these).

3) The moment one is in a position to create an institutional framework which supports said program then do so immediately, because nothing short of something akin to a revolution\textsuperscript{26} is likely to be able to overturn a fully institutionalized agenda, as both Inns and Outs (the latter might otherwise have constituted a threat) will now be operating within a structure created with the expressed purpose of upholding and furthering that very same program or project or ideology.

In short the watchwords relating to Lippmann’s Machiavellian understanding of how one can succeed in modern politics should therefore be; public deception, operational secrecy, and enthusiastic institutionalization (at opportune moments). There are, to say the least, interesting corollaries between these insights made by Lippmann in the 1920s and the methods by which the ideology of neoliberalism have become dominant later on.

If we go back to the notion that Lippmann represented early neoliberalism’s leftmost side, there is very little remaining room within neoliberal discourse for any overlap with social-liberalism as exemplified by John Dewey. It is also quite clear that even early- or proto- neoliberalism on its most leftward side, as exemplified by Lippmann’s writings, in some respects at least, teeters on the edge of an anti-democratic authoritarian conservatism. We must take into account that Lippmann promoted a common conservative stance; the belief that since the ruling class is (supposedly) at any time also in a position to be the best informed segment of

\textsuperscript{26} I here use “revolution” in a broad sense where the creation and successful rise of a contender party which manages to displace both the establishment “Inns” and the “Outs” and gain power can be viewed as the slow implementation of a revolutionary agenda, though one which results in significantly less of the mass-uprisings and the bloodletting in the streets which accompanied the revolutions that toppled the ancien regimes in France and Russia. The social-democratic parties’ gradual displacement of the reigning conservative and liberal parties in much of Western Europe in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century was in this sense a fairly pacific (with exceptions to how this transition worked out in countries such as Spain, Germany and Italy) “revolution” in politics.
society, there is little to be gained for society as a whole by “outsider” interference with the insiders’ executive decision-making. The conclusion, thus far based on Lippmann’s purported left-most position within early neoliberal discourse, is therefore that the early neoliberal spectrum did not really overlap with the social liberal domain on its left. But this does not indicate that the other early neoliberals, whom ostensibly are to be found further to the right of Lippmann, are reactionary-conservatives of the old school with a belief in God-given order and aristocratic privilege. This is because neoliberal discourse operates with a different left-right spectrum than the more commonly applied one that moves between egalitarianism on the left and authoritarianism on the right which was the framework which first incorporated Republicans versus Monarchists on the eve of the French Revolution.

**Neoliberalism’s Peculiar Ideological Orientations**

The early neoliberals viewed the political spectrum as moving between full government interference on the far left and complete freedom from government interference on the far right, in an operation which first of all served to jumble Nazis, Fascists, Communists, social-democrats, and social liberals into a statist category of “collectivists”. But in addition this also served to obfuscate any connections or similarities between their own socially and economically rightward positions and those of preceding conservative-authoritarian regimes, who especially by the end of World War II had lost considerable public standing in many Western countries.

The early neoliberals’ counter-posed freedom from government as the alternative to the authoritarian tendencies they argued existed within all the competitor creeds. Ludwig von Mises for example, who as we can recall is said to represent the rightmost Neoliberal viewpoint during this period, defended a libertarian view in texts such as “Laissez Faire or Dictatorship” originally published in 1949, a work whose title pretty much gives away the content (Mises [1952] 1974: 36-49). It is this libertarian stance against state interference in the economy that makes Mises a hard-right neoliberal and Lippmann’s apparent lack of sharing in it which makes him a leftist within neoliberal discourse.

Lippmann’s reputation as being furthest to the left within neoliberal discourse stems mainly from his inconsistent advocacy of a free enterprise system in his 1937 book *The Good Society*. In this work Lippmann tries to reconcile his adaptation of
Hayek’s stance against collectivism with what is still his own lingering eagerness to promote social progress and, as his biographer Ronald Steel observes, this is not a task Lippmann is particularly successful at finding a solution to:

[Lippmann’s] second half of The Good Society [ ] was designed to show that opposition to collectivism did not make him an enemy of social progress. There he drew up a blueprint – including public works, social insurance, income equalization through taxation, counter cyclical spending, and the abolition of monopolies – that was not very different from what FDR had been trying to achieve with the New Deal. The result was perplexing. The book seemed intellectually split down the middle: half classic laissez-faire, half welfare state liberalism (Steel 1980: 323).

Lippmann did not go as far as advocating complete state ownership of the means of production, but that he in many respects leaned towards the social liberal John Maynard Keynes’ economic ideas is not just evident from the regulative measures Lippmann recommends (see also: Jackson 2010: 141-142), but in addition from his introduction to the same work, where Lippmann praises Keynes because he ‘has done so much to demonstrate to the free peoples that the modern economy can be regulated without dictatorship’ (as cited in: Jackson 2010: 142). Lippmann was however no clear-cut Keynesian because of this. In the same work he gives Hayek ‘a sweeping bow’ and makes it clear they share the notion ‘that political and economic liberalism [goes] hand in hand’ (Steel 1980: 323).

In certain segments of The Good Society Lippmann’s preferred arrangement of the economy appears to mirror Hayek’s prescriptions, at least in crucial respects. Lippmann harbored deep concerns about “collectivism”, the catch-all term that for Lippmann and the other early neoliberals applied to basically every non-liberal or anti-free market ideological variants. These antagonistic ideologies to the neoliberal project, Lippmann argued, were found in two basic forms; the ‘gradual collectivism’ present in Western democracies and the ‘total collectivism’ primarily found in Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Nazi-Germany (Lippmann 1937: 173). Hayek meant that centralized planning was the hallmark of collectivism/socialism in all its variations, and in this category he included Roosevelt’s New Deal liberalism, Western European social-democracy, communism, and fascism (Hayek [1944] 2007: 84-85 and 100). When it came to Nazism it was evidently ‘short for National
Socialism, [as] Hayek never tired of reminding his readers’ (Phillips-Fein 2009: 40, emphasis in original). That socialism was nominally a part of Nazism was one point which ‘these liberals always emphasized’ (Gamble 2013: 409).

Mises also uses a similar distinction in an address he delivered in 1945. There Mises sees two kinds of planned economy he identifies as ‘interventionism’ and ‘socialism’ (Mises [1952] 1974: 1-2). The first “interventionist” category Mises subdivides further into the American New Deal model and the social-democratic model exemplified by ‘Lord Keynes’ and ‘Sir William Beveridge’ and Mises sees both these as a furthering of ‘the Bismarck orthodoxy’ (Mises [1952] 1974: 1-5). In the second “socialist” category he sees socialism following a Russian pattern which ‘is purely bureaucratic’ as one variety with socialism following a (Nazi-) German pattern where ‘[t]he authority, not the consumers, directs production’ while maintaining ‘the outward appearance of capitalism’ as another (Mises [1952] 1974: 1-5). For Mises the latter “socialist” category is ‘the antithesis of free enterprise, private initiative, private ownership of the means of production, market economy, and the price system’ while the “interventionist” solution is ultimately ‘a method for the transformation of capitalism into socialism by a series of successive steps’ which therefore makes it only a different ‘tactic to be resorted to for the attainment of an end that both groups are aiming at’ (Mises [1952] 1974: 1 and 28).27 This designation of collectivism as the primary enemy which had to be fought in any ideological guise it reared its head appears to have united the whole neoliberal spectrum at its early stages, from Lippmann on the left to Mises on the right.

Curiously the positioning of Lippmann to the left of both Hayek and Mises based on economic disposition becomes the inverse on a scale measuring their political beliefs on an internationalist (or globalist) to nationalist scale. When it comes to their views on foreign policy and world order Lippmann, by taking a position that can be defined as realist, distinctly distinguishes himself from the idealists Hayek and Mises. But Lippmann does this in a way that corresponds to a much higher degree with the view that has come to dominate not just the neoliberal debate, but all mainstream political debate, since the Cold War hardened to in the late 1940s. In

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27 The undesirability of ‘collectivist ideas’ was something Milton Friedman would also address later in his seminal 1951 paper “Neoliberalism and Its Prospects” where Friedman ‘like Hayek and Mises before him, conflated [collectivism] with socialism and New Deal liberalism’ (Stedman Jones 2012: 97).
this sense Lippmann can be viewed as a progenitor of what by default came to be the neoliberal view, or in the least an exemplary proponent of it. Meanwhile the views of Mises and Hayek on the matter appear to have been largely neglected, perhaps since these can be viewed as byproducts of ‘the monopoly of international studies between the two wars by the utopian school’ (Carr [1939] 2001: 135). But far from being naively idealistic Mises and Hayek were instead aware that the boundless logic of capital identified by Marx much earlier, if it was not to be haphazardly constrained, would sooner rather than later require a form of political accommodation at the global level.

**Mises’ and Hayek’s “One Worldism” vs. Lippmann’s Realism**

Foreign policy was for Lippmann one of his primary areas of expertise, something that cannot be said of either Hayek or Mises. Lippmann had, in addition to his practical experience of the conduct of foreign policy during the Great War, also as an author published several influential books on the topic. Amongst these are two works he produced during World War II – *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (1943) and *U.S. War Aims* (1944). Lippmann is partially because of these said to be ‘a central figure in American diplomatic history’ (Porter 2011: 557). The fact that Lippmann ‘is often given credit for’ coining ‘the phrase’ “The Cold War” and that he was ‘on close terms’ with George F. Kennan (Steel 1980: 445) – the US diplomat behind the doctrine of containment that came to be adopted by successive US administrations as The Cold War progressed (Ambrose & Brinkley 2011: 95-96) – also gives further credence to his position as a specialist on foreign policy.

In *U.S. Foreign Policy* Lippmann argued that American attitudes to the rest of the world had been distorted by Wilsonianism for too long. Though Lippmann was ‘a lapsed Wilsonian himself’ he claimed that ‘Wilsonianism is a conflicted protean concept’ and that it had come to be represented by ‘not the muscular crusading version of 1917, but the pacific “one world” idealism that followed the war’ (Porter 2011: 561). Lippmann further argued that ways ‘to peace that lost sight of tough-minded considerations of power could not work, whether insulation from the world or excessive faith in international institutions’ (Porter 2011: 561).

In other words Lippmann maneuvered to find a middle-way between an isolationist ‘withdrawal to Fortress America’ and pursuing ‘world federalism’ (Steel 1980: 406).
With these extremes in mind Lippmann recommended a more prudent course. ‘America’s war aims should not be a universalist effort to transform world politics, but to work with Great Powers to achieve a long period of security from “world conquerors”’ (Porter 2011: 562). Lippmann meant that American policy towards the rest of the world in the inter-war years had seen itself ‘lapsing into utopian naivety’ as too much wishful thinking had made its way up from the general population and into national politics and he therefore ‘urged restraint in domestic political competition, imploring elites to guide the democracy’ (Porter 2011: 566). Taking on a familiar refrain ‘Lippmann argued that because the democratic mass was incompetent to judge foreign affairs, it was best to leave it to seasoned elites’ and as a consequence he admonished ‘The political class’ to ‘close ranks and protect foreign policy and public opinion from each other’ (Porter 2011: 566). It is hard to interpret this stance as anything else than that the same public opinion which otherwise secures a polity from arbitrary rule should count for naught when it comes to the conduct of foreign policy.

Lippmann tried to warn the United States of the imminent ‘overstretch’ that he could see happening thanks to ‘the idealistic masses’ and their notion ‘that America could re-order the world away from power politics towards permanent peace’ (Porter 2011: 562 and 567). Lippmann stood firm to his earlier belief that America should only see itself as tied to the Atlantic nations of Europe, and even ‘opposed the expansion of America’s formal alliances and the creation in April 1949 of a greater North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) beyond the Atlantic area’ though NATO at that date (with the inclusion of Italy) only had one member without an Atlantic coastline (Porter 2011: 570). Lippmann did not appreciate the fact that ‘America’s conception of its outer defences’ which had once been ‘continental and hemispheric’ had now become ‘extra-regional and global’ (Porter 2011: 560).

Lippmann in the end not only opposed what he saw as the public’s naïve belief in creating world peace through international institutions, but he also thought that the elites’ who pursued ‘America’s rise to globalism’ through military means needed to realize the futility of that particular cause as well (Ambrose & Brinkley 2011: xiv, see also: Steel 1980: 408). For Lippmann the world was simply too large and the forces arrayed against the success of such adventurist ventures too manifold for the United States to stand a realistic chance at accomplishing such efforts even at the pinnacle of its national power immediately after World War II. ‘Deliberately
rejecting the idealists’ belief in world law and international parliaments, Lippmann grounded his policy in national interest and alliances’ (Steel 1980: 405). As he put it in *U.S. Policy: Shield of the Republic* ‘If it is to be peace in our time [ ] it will have to be peace among sovereign national states’ (as cited in; Steel 1980: 405). This idea, that ‘great power cooperation’ was going be the commanding principle once the war was over turned out to be ‘an instant success’ because it ‘seemed a realistic alternative both to bankrupt isolationism and to wishful universalism’ (Steel 1980: 406). Lippmann expected that there would be ‘spheres of influence’ and that these ‘would give the great powers a sense of security and prevent a scramble for control of fringe areas’ but this arrangement was threatened by ‘Wilsonian universalism’ and ‘the globalism central to it’ (Steel 1980: 410). Lippmann contended that ‘the danger of the universalism preached by the One Worlders was that it invited intervention in the name of self-determination’ and that ‘the results of such meddling, however well-intentioned, could be disastrous’ (Steel 1980: 410).

In a world where an ‘attempt to enforce peace against’ any of the great powers in the newly minted Security Council of the United Nations ‘would simply be a polite introduction to another world war’ Lippmann thought that those who saw a budding universal society in the United Nations organization were getting things in the wrong order (as cited in: Steel 1980: 411). These people had ‘failed to grasp that’, as Lippmann wrote; ‘pacification must precede the establishment of a reign of law’ and the ‘major premise that [the United Nations] organization can and should be a universal society to pacify the world’ was therefore ‘false’ since ‘the truth is that only in a reasonably pacified world can there be a universal society’ (as cited in: Steel 1980: 411). This last Hobbesian insight by Lippmann is noteworthy, as his realist inclination not only made him argue that world government was a futile venture in the international political climate that existed at the end of World War II, but also to identify what had to be a precondition for it to become a possibility at some future point – the military pacification of all opposing factions by one universally victorious force.

The United States might have been the strongest state in the history of the world at the end of World War II, in light of its short-lived monopoly on nuclear weapons, but it was not even close to being the equivalent in the global realm to the monarch who had subjugated all competing noble pretenders within the borders of the budding absolute state at an earlier juncture for the constitution of world order. The
Soviet Union, with its more numerous conventional forces, was only the most massive obstacle in this regard. Lippmann, very aware of this momentous limitation to American power even in its moment of victory, instead ‘fashioned an “imagined community” of Atlantic nations that was both strategically and ideologically coherent’ which basically was the same he had argued that the United States had to protect during the First World War (Porter 2011: 571). That was also to a lesser extent what came to pass as the West united in an alliance under American auspices mounted against the gravely perceived Soviet threat.

What makes Lippmann’s prophetic realism so interesting in relation to the development of neoliberalism is that his position was so far to the right of Hayek and Mises, provided that one assumes that this can be measured on an internationalist/cosmopolitan to nationalist/parochial continuum where the former “left” position is less conservative than the latter which therefore ought to be considered “right” in this scale. I am not claiming that Lippmann was not at all an internationalist or that he did not exhibit cosmopolitan qualities, but that his opinions were closer to the right than to the left at a point along this scale because what he advocated was only a severely limited Western-centric Atlanticist internationalism. In contrast Mises’ attitudes shows just how much further it is possible to move to the left on this ideological dimension.

**Ludwig von Mises the Ultra-Cosmopolitan**

Mises’ views on foreign policy and world order can be found in his book *Liberalismus* originally published in German in 1927, published in English first as *The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth* in 1962 to avoid using the term “liberalism” which by then had become associated with heavy government interference in the United States. The same work is called *Liberalism: In the Classical Tradition* in more recent editions. In his Preface to the English Language Edition Mises informs that he ‘has not changed anything’ from the original text of the book (Mises [1962] 1985: xviii). More specifically it is from his chapter entitled ‘Liberal Foreign Policy’ that I will now relate Mises views form the inter-war years (Mises [1962] 1985: 105-154). Mises maintains that liberalism is a universal creed; ‘liberalism is, from the very outset a world-embracing political concept, and the same ideas that it seeks to realize within a limited area it holds to be valid also for the larger sphere of world politics’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 105). Further: ‘Its thinking is cosmopolitan and ecumenical: it takes in all men and the whole world. Liberalism
is, in this sense, humanism; and the liberal, a citizen of the world, a cosmopolite’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 106). So far Mises is entirely in line with a pre-national Enlightenment ideal, and being aware of this he elaborates:

It is thought that an irreconcilable conflict exists between the interests of the nation and those of mankind and that one who directs his aspirations and endeavors toward the welfare of the whole of humanity thereby disregards the interests of his own nation. No belief could be more deeply mistaken. The German who works for the good of all mankind no more injures the particular interests of his compatriots – i.e., those of his fellow men with whom he shares a common land and language and with whom he often forms an ethnic and spiritual community as well – than one who works for the good of the whole German nation injures the interests of his own home town. For the individual has just as much of an interest in the prosperity of the whole world as he has in the blooming and flourishing of the local community where he lives (Mises [1962] 1985: 106).

When Mises wrote these words in 1927 he contrasted his own views with those of ‘chauvinistic nationalists’ but also saw their concerted efforts at creating ‘domestic unity’ as not only analogous to the liberal hope for the world as a whole, but also as an achievement the liberals had started out working for that when accomplished ought to be repeated at the level of world politics (Mises [1962] 1985: 106). This argument also reveals that Mises cannot be fairly described as an anti-democrat; ‘a country can enjoy domestic peace only when a democratic constitution provides the guarantee that the adjustment of government to the will of the citizens can take place without friction’ and for Mises the recipe for world peace follows neatly from this realization: ‘Nothing else is required than the consistent application of the same principle in order to assure international peace as well’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 108).

Mises is no simple internationalist, he also wants to see the application of ‘The right to self-determination’ so broadly that any territory ‘large enough to count as territorial units in the administration of the country’ can elect to ‘form an independent state or to attach themselves to some other state’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 109-110). Mises here goes beyond mere internationalism and makes it clear that ‘the right of self-determination of which we speak is not the right of self-determination of nations, but rather the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of every territory large enough to form an independent administrative unit’ a view which puts
him very far from the conservative defenders of the nation-state and into the ranks of only the most radical cosmopolitans (Mises [1962] 1985: 109). But Mises is no Kropotkin-like figure that thinks complete decentralization into largely self-sufficient villages could be the solution, because he sees the technical imperatives that have arisen in the age of modernity. Mises, in the more well-known economist version, argues that there is ‘an international division of labor’ because ‘the division of labor has for a long time now gone beyond the boundaries of any one nation’ and as a consequence ‘anything that would have the effect of preventing or stopping the international exchange of goods would do immense damage to the whole of human civilization’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 107).

Mises’ primary motivation for arguing the liberal cause appears to be ‘the necessity of perpetual peace’ as he expresses it in Kantian terms and not for example profit or the freedom of the individual (Mises [1962] 1985: 109). But the means to accomplish this peace is through universalizing liberal principles, and first of all that ‘private ownership of the means of production prevails everywhere’ since this is for Mises seen as the foundational principle necessary ‘to create the social conditions that will eliminate the causes of war’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 112 and 111). Since Mises intellectually was so alien to what is now called “methodological nationalism” (see: Beck 2000: 22-26, and; Chernilo 2006) he could follow a universal liberal logic to its conclusion: ‘A capitalist world organized on liberal principles knows no separate “economic zones”. In such a world, the whole of the Earth’s surface forms a single economic territory’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 113). In this single economic territory there can be no restrictions on the freedom of movement, such as on immigration, without this being a violation against liberal principle comparable to raising protective tariffs (Mises [1962] 1985: 137-138).

Mises is essentially arguing for a completely borderless world, even to the point that he argues against what is still today by many viewed as the realization of a properly cosmopolitan polity – the then only theoretical ‘idea of a Pan-European union’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 143). A European union would according to Mises only serve to create conditions where: ‘A European chauvinism is to take the place of the French, the German, or the Hungarian variety; a united front formed of all European nations is to be directed against “foreigners”: Britons, Americans, Russians, Chinese, and Japanese’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 145). This scaling up, without universalizing the polity completely, would not get at the root problem of
chauvinism, whether national or otherwise, but only recreate it in inflated form; ‘what is needed is not the replacement of national chauvinism by a chauvinism that would have some larger, supranational entity for its object, but rather the recognition that every sort of chauvinism is mistaken’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 144).

For Mises the only theoretical way to end discord between nations is to unite them ‘on an equal basis’ ‘in a world state’ which follows from the fact that:

…for the liberal, the world does not end at the borders of the [nation] state. In his eyes, whatever significance national boundaries have is only incidental and subordinate. His political thinking encompasses the whole of mankind (Mises [1962] 1985: 148).

Mises, who did not look favorably upon the League of Nations, did however ‘hope that from these extremely inadequate beginnings a world superstate really deserving of the name may some day be able to develop’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 150). For Mises ‘the problem involved’ in creating a world superstate to supplant the League ‘is not at all a matter of organization or of the technique of international government, but the greatest ideological question that mankind has ever faced’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 150, added emphasis). Mises here seems to be in agreement with both Julian Huxley and the Anthropocene authors mentioned previously about the need for a world control. This also goes completely against contemporary neoliberal intentions as these are understood at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The solution Mises offers is that ‘the unqualified, unconditional acceptance of liberalism’ is necessary on a global scale if ‘the prerequisites of peace are to be created and the causes of war eliminated’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 150). Through accepting Mises’ version of liberalism the world populace would self-pacify and create the necessary conditions – the same conditions which Lippmann realized were lacking when the United Nations was formed – through becoming the “universal society” which they both thought had to precede the formation of a worldwide polity.

Even though Mises can be placed far to the left on the cosmopolitan-national continuum, it has to be taken into account that this is an ideological dimension that does not operate with a clear position on social class, except the inherent inclination
of cosmopolitans to treat foreigners and co-nationals equally. At the extreme end of the nationalist side there is of course also the tendency to perceive outside groups as being composed of inferior beings. Mises’ thoughts as these are expressed in *Liberalismus* shows that he can be placed far over on the cosmopolitan side of this dimension. This indicates that in this particular sense Mises’ thought is actually extremely progressive (i.e. we can see that he is working towards realizing the Enlightenment goal of instituting the universal republic of mankind and he has identified national chauvinism as the main obstacle to this). The catch, which in any case makes it wrong to categorize Mises as belonging to the progressive side of politics, is that his universalism as expressed in the stance he has on the ideal world order configuration is sharply countered by his even more pronounced leaning towards ‘philosophical conservatism’ on another relevant ideological dimension (Müller 2006: 363). If we assume that the most progressive placement one could have on an egalitarian-hierarchical dimension – stretching from advocating for a complete classlessness at the left end and then towards defending a complete social stratification at the right end – it is clear from much of Mises’ work that his views often were aligned with the right side of this dimension, albeit closer to the center right than the far right position.

Mises took an extreme position against government intervention in the economy, which is how he earned his reputation as a libertarian, such as when he argued that: ‘Mankind has a choice only between the unhampered market economy, democracy, and freedom on the one side, and socialism and dictatorship on the other side’ while he simultaneously claimed to have proved that: ‘A third alternative, an interventionist compromise, is not feasible’ (Mises [1940] 1998: 92). The practical implication of this is that one for example must accept; great disparities of wealth amongst individuals, very low levels of taxation of the more well to do, that the minimum wage and the amount of the working age population that are under employment at any one time will be set by “the market”, and that the funds available for redistribution to people that cannot cope within the economic framework dictated by unhampered market mechanisms will be minimal (see: Mises [1940] 1998: 91-93).

Mises argues that it is ‘in the interest of the masses of the people’ with minimal state interference in the economy and not just that of ‘the entrepreneurs and capitalists’ (Mises [1940] 1998: 79). But if we assume that a typical state intervention is the
imposition of a progressive tax rate – where the rich pay a higher percentage of their earnings in tax than the poor do – then it is very likely that removing this form of intervention would result in lowering the amount of funds that are being redistributed from the top echelons of society to its lower ranks. When it has been tried in the real world it has, not surprisingly, made the rich richer; ‘the spectacular decrease in the progressivity of the income tax in the United States and Britain since 1980, even though both countries had been the leaders in progressive taxation after World War II, probably explains much of the increase in the very highest earned incomes’ (Piketty 2014: 495-496).

Mises willingness to advocate economic solutions that would give more predictability for the rich in exchange for more insecurity for the rest makes Mises a conservative in the sense that he is ‘invested in the importance of hierarchical relationships, or some more or less natural conception of inequality’, ‘attribute differential value to particular sets of human beings’ and ‘emphasize that certain social arrangements distributing power unequally are unalterable’ (Müller 2006: 363). Mises only to a certain degree fulfill these criteria for being a conservative, for instance he was not the kind of conservative that is against ‘change’ since he wanted a liberal post-national world order and neither was he ‘committed to “particularism”’ as he to the contrary was for a rather pronounced universalism (Müller 2006: 362 and 360). But it is primarily because Mises evidently takes the side of capital against labor, or that of the rich against the rest of society (though this is not a stance he makes explicit), which makes Mises closer to being a conservative than he is to being a progressive. Mises nonetheless articulates a close to planetarist version of conservatism which is further removed from nationalism than most ideologies found to the left of neoliberalism. Mises worldview shows us that conservatism can be accommodated to work within the confines of a planetary polity.

Mises did not see any purpose in “attributing differential value” to specific groups purely based on their nationality or religion, as many conservatives have done in the past, but he was very open to do so on the basis of their individual economic position in society, a view which made him defend the social stratification of a universal polity in a similar manner as a standard conservative would defend the same in domestic affairs. To put it simply; Mises accepted a central part of the communist worldview – that the modern world is composed of ‘two great classes [ ] Bourgeoisie and Proletariat’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1992: 3) – but as a liberal
member of the upper middle class he identifies with the former class and not the latter.

While Mises did argue that: ‘A world order must be established in which nations and national groups are so satisfied with living conditions that they will not feel compelled to resort to the expedient of war’ and acknowledged that ‘we cannot do without the apparatus of government in protecting and preserving the life, liberty, property, and health of the individual’ he also pointed out David Ricardo’s early 19th Century insight that ‘in the world economy’ it is bound to be that ‘the countries with comparatively favorable conditions of production will be richer than the others’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 111, 116 and 132). Mises did not believe in inherent racial capacities and he deplored colonialism (see: Mises [1962] 1985: 125). What he saw as a potential redeeming factor for the imperialists was that they (generalizing broadly) had introduced capitalism to the colonies, and that this could act as a freeing agent in the phase of colonial liberation to come:

As capitalism has penetrated these territories, the natives have become self-reliant; there is no longer any cultural disparity between their upper classes and the officers and officials who are in charge of the administration on behalf of the mother country (Mises [1962] 1985: 129).

This quotation gives us a glimpse into an essential element of early neoliberal thought, it can be portrayed as emancipatory in its desire for universal participation on theoretically more or less equal terms, regardless of one’s national, religious, or racial category, but it is less emancipatory in its tendency to see the world through class-tinted spectacles.

Early neoliberal thought is horizontally egalitarian as it sees few if any excuses for national, religious or racial exceptionalism, but it is vertically hierarchical because it thinks in terms of exceptional individuals who by their contribution to the economy makes such a valuable service for the material well-being of the rest of society that they deserve to be able to accumulate as much capital as they desire. There is no purpose in the early neoliberal mind to objecting to this arrangement, because everyone will ultimately benefit from the allocation of as much profit as possible into the hands of this uniquely able entrepreneurial elite. It is the economic elite, the meritocratic part of the upper classes, or the bourgeoisie capitalists, that is
the driving force behind progress and it is only natural that they accrue the largest portion of the fruits it yields.

The solidarity that matters is the one that leads to the cohesion of this elite across borders, not the one that strives to even out the differences between all segments of society domestically or internationally. Their inclination is therefore close to conservative, but of a much less nationalistic kind than earlier versions and more distant from the far right than a typical conservative stance would be in these respects. Their inclination can also be said to be liberal with their focus on meritocracy rather than inherited status, but it is a liberalism purged of the more progressive and socialist aspects that characterized the earlier social-liberals. Neoliberalism in the end takes liberalism a bit to the right economically and conservatism a bit to the left culturally and becomes “right-liberal” or “left-conservative”. What really distances the early neoliberals from the conservatives, not in the case of Lippmann, but definitively so in the case of Mises, and also Hayek as we will now see, is their willingness to assert that the world political system centering on the nation-state ought to be considered dangerously outmoded.

**Friedrich von Hayek and Right-Wing World Federalism**

Hayek, like Mises, had a much more idealistic notion of what kind of world order one should aim for than the view Lippmann harbored. But here again Hayek does not move as far towards the extreme position as Mises does. ‘For Hayek’, as Jorg Spieker points out, ‘international liberalism meant federalism’ and that presumably on a worldwide scale (Spieker 2014: 7). This entailed ‘not an association of sovereign states, but a federation held together by an international governmental authority’ or more than ‘the mere association of sovereign states’ that was the League of Nations, while it was less than a full proposal ‘for a centralised world state’ (Spieker 2014: 7 and 19).

Hayek did not say anything about the possible dismantling of contemporary states into smaller units that then could make up a world federation of administrative units comparable in size to those many modern states are composed of at the sub-national level, like the more radical proposal Mises had dared to venture in *Liberalismus*. It is in this sense that Mises theoretically went further beyond a simple integration of the nation-state system than Hayek did. But Hayek did share ‘a predilection for states which are both small and multinational’ with classical theorists he admired such as
‘Tocqueville’ (Gamble 1996: 130). Liberal world federation would for Hayek nonetheless mean the creation of a supra-national authority or ‘an international government’ sufficiently equipped ‘to prevent states from interfering with the global market’ and where ‘the scope for the independent economic policy-making of member states must be strictly limited’ (Spieker 2014: 10 and 9).

Hayek’s ‘basic argument was that an inter-state federation would be necessary, desirable, and feasible if and only if it is built on the basis of an essentially liberal economic regime’ (Spieker 2014: 12). In reality this meant for Hayek that an inter-state federation where approximately half of the members would be advocating socialism in one form or another was not worth pursuing. Here Hayek differed markedly from other prominent inter-war idealists advocating world federalism, such as Lord Lothian and Olaf Stapledon, who both thought that the major issue at hand was ending the anarchical structure of the world political system, and not for example agreeing once and for all on the degree of state interference that was acceptable in the economy (Spieker 2014: 8). Hayek was adamant that a common economic policy was the necessary foundational first step that later moves towards world integration had to proceed from (Spieker 2014: 9).

Here Hayek was in line with Wendell L. Willkie, the author of One World or the book that had given rise to Lippmann’s use of the expression ‘One Worldism’ to mockingly describe the idealist conception of world order and the ‘one-world euphoria’ that he saw as part of it (Steel 1980: 404-407). Willkie’s claim was that ‘political internationalism without economic internationalism is a house built upon sand’ (Willkie 1943: 160-161).

When it came to the creation of a world state Hayek meant that a liberal constitution must be seen as a necessary prerequisite since, as he put it after the Cold War had started, without that ‘the creation of a world state probably would be a greater danger to the future of civilization than even war’ (as cited in: Spieker 2014: 15). Hayek ‘envisaged a constitution which preserves liberal order by ensuring that democratic government remains within the bounds of the rule of law’ (Spieker 2014: 16). It is so important to Hayek that successive governments should not be able to significantly alter the way the economy operates that he is in essence willing to sacrifice an important part of the democratic process. This is the legislative function elected representatives have which gives them the power to – ideally within the
bounds of what the governed would consent to – both create new and rescind older legislation. Here Hayek betrays similar elitist inclinations as those entertained by Lippmann and Mises:

Hayek’s model constitution reflects his insistence on the priority of individual liberty over democracy: democratic decisions are binding if and only if they produce liberal outcomes. Hayek’s views on the relationship between liberalism and democracy also bear the controversial implication that an authoritarian regime committed to liberal principles could be preferable to a non-liberal, democratic one. In effect, his constitutional framework limits democratic control over economic policy (Spieker 2014: 16).

This brings us back to Lippmann’s insistence that there should be an elite of experts freely deciding foreign policy, or in the instance of Hayek, economic policy. The experts should be insulated from democratic pressures so that they instead can concentrate fully on their task of creating an optimally functional order. But what the early neoliberals appear to be forgetting in the process is that an optimally functioning order might not be able to ignore public opinion for long and still remain optimally functional. This because the very act of ignoring public opinion undermines the authority the rulers have, based on the understanding that the rulers of modern mass society have what amounts to a contractual obligation to exercise the will of the governed. Any circumspection of this arrangement is tantamount to declaring a Schmittian ‘state of exception’ whereby the modern “social contract” is momentarily suspended – thereby replacing democracy with arbitrary rule for the time being (Agamben 2005, see also Davies 2014: 172-177).

Spieker concludes that ‘Hayek’s conception of international government was radical in its insistence on the a priori isolation of a free-market capitalist economy from democratic politics’ (Spieker 2014: 20). Combined with Lippmann’s insistence that foreign policy should be treated in the same manner, the conclusion is that the early neoliberals – for all their rhetoric to the contrary – set out on a campaign to dismantle democratic influence in key areas; economic and foreign policy, and to put in its stead a rule by the elite in the elite interest. It is hard to see what it is left for the public to influence once these areas are insulated from electoral pressures, as any cultural and social policy for example will ultimately hinge on what kind of economic policy priorities a government makes.
In the mid-nineteenth century both Marx and Bakunin had reached the conclusion that the overturn of the capitalist system required a ‘simultaneous world revolution’ by which was meant that ‘the dominant peoples’ would have to act in concert ‘all at once’ as Marx put it, a feat that, as Bakunin added ‘could only be achieved by a union of all the national and international associations into a single universal association’ (Karatani 2014: 292, citations ibid.). For this reason ‘Marx and Bakunin, among others, organized the First International in 1863: it was supposed to provide the foundation for a simultaneous world revolution’ because as they had realized: ‘Without an alliance among revolutionary movements around the world established beforehand, simultaneous world revolution is impossible’ (Karatani 2014: 292). As late as the 1930s Trotsky’s Fourth International was established on a similar pretense (Karatani 2014: 294).

For the first generation of neoliberals the emulation of socialist ideas included the creation of what they envisioned as a liberal “International”28 in 1947 with the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), where: ‘Liberal scholars of all nationalities were drawn together by a sense of crisis, to discuss the intellectual revival of liberalism’ (Turner 2008: 71). The expressed aim of the thinkers that comprised the MPS was ‘to construct a “liberal utopia” based on the principles of free trade and freedom of opportunity, regardless of how small its prospects of early realisation may be, so as to challenge the present socialist one’ (Turner 2008: 70). At the end of World War II Hayek, who was the principal architect behind the MPS, wrote:

That there is little hope of international order or lasting peace so long as every country is free to employ whatever measures it thinks desirable in its own immediate interest, however damaging they may be to others, needs little emphasis now. Many kinds of economic planning are indeed practicable only if the planning authority can effectively shut out all extraneous influences; the result of such planning is therefore inevitably the piling-up of restrictions on the movements of men and goods (Hayek [1944] 2007: 223).

28 Not to be confused with the actual Liberal International founded in Oxford in 1947, which is an international organization for national parties still in existence with uniting principles in the social-liberal vein. This is a self-styled “World Federation of Liberalism” of which for example the UK’s Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) are members as well as the ALDE group led by Guy Verhofstadt in the European Parliament (see: Liberal International 2014).
We can here see that Hayek had knowledge of the flaw in socialist planning Marx and Bakunin had realized earlier: it is only practicable if one can “effectively shut out all extraneous influences” ideally both politically and economically. This aspect of Hayek’s liberal utopia, which is that it cannot be based on a system of economically autonomous nation-states, but needs a global rule based order with ‘a true system of law which guarantees both that certain rules are invariably enforced and that the authority which has the power to enforce these cannot use it for any other purpose’ shows that his political ideas had characteristics that can be described as universalist in a limited respect (Hayek [1944] 2007: 224). It also indicates that Hayek was not against upholding a legal framework which made economic transactions feasible and their results predictable – i.e. which makes “planning” outcomes possible to a certain extent – and that what he really was against was the micro-management of economic activity in all spheres by the state and not its overall macro-management through facilitating the economy’s broader functioning.

But Hayek’s vision was not of a liberal world state either: ‘While for its task of enforcing the common law the supranational authority must be very powerful, its constitution must at the same time be so designed that it prevents the international as well as the national authorities from becoming tyrannical’ (Hayek [1944] 2007: 224-225). For Hayek ‘[a]n international authority which effectively limits the powers of the state over the individual will be one of the best safeguards for peace’ and the ‘international Rule of Law [note the capitalization] must become a safeguard as much against the tyranny of the state over the individual as against the tyranny of the new superstate over the national communities’ for what should be sought is ‘[n]either an omnipotent superstate nor a loose association of “free nations” but a community of nations of free men must be our goal’ (Hayek [1944] 2007: 235). This is internationalism understood as international cooperation.

Hayek was aware that “the Rule of Law” necessarily implies a coercive apparatus that enforces it, and his concern was how this apparatus could be upheld at the same time that it should not impinge on the freedom of individuals. As he put it to at the founding meeting of the MPS: ‘It is the first general thesis which we shall have to consider that competition can be made more effective and more beneficent by certain activities of government than it would be without them’ and that ‘the interpretation of the fundamental principle of liberalism as the absence of state activity’ ought to be reconsidered in this light (Hayek 1948: 110).
What Hayek wanted was a ‘competitive order’ maintained by a state which instead of using ‘progressive income taxation’ for ‘extreme egalitarian ends’ protected ‘that most important element in any free society – the man of independent means, a figure whose essential role in maintaining a free opinion and generally the atmosphere of independence from government control we only begin to realize as he is disappearing from the stage’ (Hayek 1948: 111 and 118, added emphasis). We can here sense which “individuals” it is exactly that Hayek alludes to when he is talking about the importance of “freedom for individuals” and it certainly is not the working poor he has foremost in mind, though they are not entirely forgotten either:

…in modern society we must take it for granted that some sort of provision will be made for the unemployed and the unemployable poor. All that we can usefully consider in this connection is not whether such provision is desirable or not but merely in what form it will least interfere with the functioning of the market (Hayek 1948: 112).

Here Hayek’s progressive credentials break down, though he might be inclined towards both cosmopolitanism and liberty, the latter is primarily the liberty of the relatively wealthy, and, as can be seen elsewhere, his egalitarianism stretches only to one single aspect: ‘Equality of the general rules of law and conduct [ ] is the only kind of equality conducive to liberty and the only equality which we can secure without destroying liberty’ (Hayek 1960: 85). This aversion towards egalitarian policies does not affect his cosmopolitanism, in his “The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism” originally published in 1939 Hayek maintains that an international economic union, or ‘interstate federation’, would be preferable to economically independent nation-states, as this would remove ‘communities of interest’ formed on a national basis and remove ‘severe frictions’ between nations (Hayek 1948: 255-258). Still, ‘[t]hat there will always be communities of interest which will be similarly affected by a particular event or a particular measure is unavoidable’ such as when it comes to classes existing within all the states in the union as one can here assume, but it would for Hayek solve one of the greatest impediments to lasting peace; the existence of antagonistic nations. For ‘it is clearly in the interest of unity of the larger whole that these groupings should not be permanent and, more particularly, that the various communities of interest should overlap territorially and never become lastingly identified with the inhabitants of a
particular region’ (Hayek 1948: 258). Hayek here comes very close to articulating the same argument for maintaining transnational classes that Mises had developed earlier. Nationality does not matter, and only your economic stature does.

Conclusion

Some recent exponents of neoliberalism have made the following claim: ‘What unites the pro-globalization [read “neoliberal”] literature is the way in which its authors appeal explicitly to an established philosophy of liberal cosmopolitanism’ (Steil & Hinds 2009: 35).29 More critical observers have also identified a form of universality in ‘neoliberal cosmopolitanism’ (Gowan 2001: 79). In a similar manner neoliberalism has also been called ‘globalism’ (Steger 2005). And it is certainly true that both Mises and Hayek could be described as exponents of some form of liberal cosmopolitanism in the 1930s and early 1940s. But if we remove Mises’ conservative planetarist stance from the equation, which continues to exist purely in the theoretical realm, there is little to indicate that neoliberalism in its globally applicable guise is anything more than another internationalist ideology.

From its early beginnings in the 1930s and 1940s the core supporters of neoliberalism have ‘maintained a [ ] transnational agora for debating solutions to perceived problems’ and a focus that ‘was never parochial, and was globally oriented before “globalization” became a buzzword’ (Mirowski 2013: 47). But though early neoliberals thought in terms of ‘the whole wide world’ (Lippmann 1937: 175), the shape the neoliberal community first took in the late 1940s – if we use membership in the Mont Pelerin Society as a proxy – was exclusively Western and very much in line with Lippmann’s Atlanticist thinking (see: Mirowski 2013: 47). Using the international membership of the Mont Pelerin Society as a proxy again we can see that only much later, by the end of the Cold War in 1991, had the neoliberal community reached properly global proportions (see: Mirowski 2013: 48). The underlying concentration of economic power (which translates quite readily to political power in a neoliberal world) still remains North Atlantic (Carroll & Carson 2006: 63).

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29 One good reason for claiming that this work is an example of exoteric neoliberalism is that according to the front-cover of the paperback version it was the ‘Winner of the Manhattan Institute’s 2010 Hayek Prize’ (Steil & Hinds 2009).
Politically neoliberals have had to ally themselves with conservatives exhibiting ‘cultural nationalism’ to gain power (Desai 2006: 230-231). This does not bode well for a neoliberal turn towards the world state configuration Mises had in mind, and in combination with Harmes observation that contemporary neoliberals are principally against any form of political globalization (as opposed to economic globalization), it to the contrary appears as if neoliberal ideology these days have become anti-planetarist rather than planetarist. In addition ‘national competitiveness’ or the idea that nation-states should see themselves as brands in competition for entrepreneurial investments lends further support to the fragmentation of the world’s neoliberal politicians into national factions (Davies 2014: 110-116).

If neoliberalism is actually turning against the advice of its progenitors towards ‘a post-liberal, more mercantilist neoliberalism’ as William Davies suggests, then this probably would have profoundly disturbed Mises and Hayek (Davies 2014: 152). Is that the case, then conservatism has got the better of neoliberalism, not just by replacing its politically liberal aspects – which was something Lippmann, Mises and Hayek appears to have been less concerned with from the start – but also through replacing the vital economically liberal-cosmopolitan component that was the sine qua non of the original ideology. The neoliberals would then have become victims of their own social-conservative outlook, which made the conservatives their closest allies instead of the social-liberals.

Though the neoliberal project ‘may have been about the restoration of class power’ or ‘the power of economic elites’ as David Harvey argues (Harvey 2007: 31 and 19), it was also for Hayek about diminishing the scope for “severe friction” internationally, if not domestically. Another side-effect of economic union Hayek foresees is that ‘[o]nce frontiers cease to be closed and free movement is secured, all national organizations, whether trade-unions, cartels, or professional associations, will lose their monopolistic position and thus, qua national organizations, their power to control the supply of their services or products’ which (unless they manage to unite internationally to recreate e.g. trade-unions or cartels in that dimension one can add) will spell the end of the privileged positions of certain groups nationally. Far from all privilege is upheld in Hayek’s vision, only that which survives economic restructuring in the international sphere, and as Harvey observes, subsequently as neoliberal policy has been put into practice; ‘restoration of class power [ ] has not necessarily meant the restoration of economic power to the same
people’ (Harvey 2007: 31). Hayek is in this sense truly of the bourgeoisie, there is little indication that he wants to restore power to the nobility save for as far as their economic position coincides with that of “the man of independent means”, Hayek’s is more of a program for the rise of the global upper-middle class, and not coincidentally would he receive the bulk of the funding for the promotion of his ideas from wealthy American (non-aristocratic) donors (see: Phillips-Fein 2009: 34-52).

The counter-revolution the neoliberal program sought to initiate was only “counter” or “reactionary” in respect to its anti-egalitarian stance and its admiration for the liberalism found in Europe after 1848 but before the socialists managed to start influencing policy by the end of that century. In its cosmopolitan outlook in regards to both nationalism and the international economy the neoliberal program represented a revolution, not a counter-revolution, of the right, because ‘[t]he great innovation of Hayek and Mises was to create a defense of the free market using the language of freedom and revolutionary change’ where they in tactical and strategic respects, but not in substance, sought to mirror the rise of international socialism (Phillips-Fein 2009: 39). This was bourgeoisie conservatism with a revolutionary twist, far from the reactionary ancien regime conservatism prevalent in the 19th Century. It also differed in two important respect from the 1920s and 1930s center-right; it had adopted the internationalism of the proletariat and put the petty-bourgeoisie nationalism that aided the rise of the Nazi-party on the scrap-heap. To their advantage the neoliberals would find themselves in a much better economic and technological position to exploit the channels opened by internationalism than the workers of the world had done previously.

It would however be intellectually dishonest, on the basis of the material discussed in this chapter, not to conclude that neoliberalism appears to have been stripped of the progressive world order features Mises and Hayek once brought into the discourse. In the first formative phase neoliberalism included a planetarist option as shown with Mises’ work, but once its world order perspective became decontested it was Atlanticism that was the result. Neoliberalism would still have been elitist, but now it is elitist in a way that conforms with the national-international conception of politics. Present claims that neoliberalism amounts to “globalism” – if this is meant to convey a post-national universalism or planetarism – are therefore completely left without support by this particular assessment of the ideology. To the contrary, it
appears that present day neoliberals would actively work against any such fully global or planetarist ideological tendency, since proper political globalization is seemingly anathema to the goals of the neoliberal ideological project.
Chapter 4. Why Cosmopolitanism is Presently an Internationalist and not a Planetarist Ideology

Introduction

Cosmopolitanism is an ideology that has been around for much longer than neoliberalism. My argument here is that while neoliberalism experienced its formative phase in the period 1920 to 1950, cosmopolitanism for its part had already entered its second round of contestation on the theme of world order in the modern epoch. The first had been experienced during the initial years of the French Revolution. The second began at the tail end of the First World War. Both these rounds of contestation ended with internationalism being the decontested preferred option. Cosmopolitanism has in the aftermath of the Cold War entered a third round of world order contestation which we have yet to see the outcome of. The old guard and its supporters are overwhelmingly defenders of internationalism as I will go on to show in this chapter. But it is being confronted by an identifiable grouping of global universalists and this supports the notion that there is now a third round of intra-ideological contestation currently going on between internationalists and planetarists. The interesting aspect in this regard with cosmopolitanism compared to neoliberalism is that while the issue of world order appears as an afterthought in the largely economic neoliberal literature – even though it really should be seen as a central part of the neoliberal project as I argued in the preceding chapter – for cosmopolitanism the question of world order is much closer to the core of the ideology.

What Cosmopolitanism is About

‘Cosmopolitanism’ as recently argued ‘is generally regarded as a body of thought consisting of elaborations on the idea that all human beings belong to a single community and that such a community should be cultivated’ (Helliwell & Hindess 2015: 26). This could be taken as a loose description of cosmopolitanism in all its varieties since its first early articulations in the ancient world (see: Heater 1996: 1-26). Politically it might perhaps be hard to imagine cultivating a unitary human community without recourse to global universalism or planetarism ‘since a
community cannot be fully inclusive and still have boundaries’, provided of course that we subscribe to the notion ‘that communities need to be bounded’ (Bartelson 2009: 19). But twentieth century cosmopolitans have largely spent their energies on finding ways to stitch the current multifarious political landscape together institutionally, in an effort not to erase boundaries or national borders, but to facilitate cross-border cooperation and in the process make the presence of borders a less repressive factor. This institutionalization of international cooperation can be seen as a stepping stone on the path to ‘one world sovereignty’ as UNESCO’s first Director-General Julian Huxley argued it should be (Huxley [1946] 1991: 41). Or it can be viewed as an end in itself on grounds similar to the argument here presented by Cristina Lafont; ‘a heterarchical political structure for the world order is in principle more desirable than a world government, since it minimizes the risks of an excessive concentration of political power’ (Lafont 2008: 43). Both Huxley’s and Lafont’s positions can be traced back to the late eighteenth century.³⁰ Huxley’s to the theory of Anacharsis Cloots and Lafont’s to Immanuel Kant’s.

Cosmopolitanism in the 1790s: Immanuel Kant contra Anacharsis Cloots

Stephen Toulmin has argued that: ‘The years from the 1690s to 1914 saw the high tide of sovereign “nationhood” in Europe’ and in this period ‘few people seriously questioned that the nation-state was the central political unit, in either theory or practice’ (Toulmin 1992: 139). Toulmin’s assessment exaggerates the import the notion of “nation-state” had before the French Revolution, even possibly the mid nineteenth century, because many thinkers particularly during the Enlightenment era were willing to see things in more global terms, for instance Condorcet ‘who believed a universal state to be desirable’ (Bartelson 2009: 159). Anacharsis Cloots’ (1755-1794) advocacy of world-state cosmopolitanism during the first years of the French Revolution likely represents this Enlightenment tendency’s peak moment (Kleingeld 2012: 40, and; Bevilacqua 2012).³¹ Cloots argued ‘that the only

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³⁰ Both these positions can be traced further back in time, but for the present argument it is here considered sufficient to go back to the French Revolution.

³¹ The relevant works by Cloots are not to my knowledge available in English translation, so I therefore have to rely on secondary literature.
consistent political theory requires that there be only one state, a “universal republic” in which all humans would be citizens’ (Kleingeld 2012: 40). Cloots’ came to his position by expanding on Rousseau’s understanding of sovereignty which he then took it to its logical extreme:

[ Cloots] imagined a universal will of mankind, which replicated, on a larger scale, Rousseau’s notion of a republican sovereignty constituted by the general will of its citizenry. Sovereignty was necessarily despotic he wrote, but since mankind’s sovereignty would unite interests and create no artificial oppositions, it would not have the same deleterious effects as a clash of multiple national sovereignties. He theorized the sovereign unity of mankind on logical grounds by arguing that sovereignty, a property inherent in people rather than institutions, was by its nature indivisible, and therefore could not be plural. All divisions and distinctions between individuals were arbitrary and irrelevant to the purposes of sovereignty, which inhered in mankind collectively as the only indivisible and therefore relevant category. In other words, Cloots derived human unity from the concept of sovereignty. The only true natural barrier was the one “between the Earth and the firmament”. As long as there was no bridge to other planets – and presumably intelligent life there – sovereignty resided in the entirety of mankind (Bevilacqua 2012: 555).

Cloots not only extended the concept of sovereignty to an ideal unitary global form, but he also extended the concept of the nation to global proportions, the universal republic of mankind he proposed would therefore preside over the unitary nation of man and not a conglomeration of distinct peoples (Bevilacqua 2012: 563). This kind of thinking was quite novel for the time and Cloots’ work was ‘the first to envisage a world state that was not monarchical in constitutional form’ (Heater 1996: 79). Cloots was also so far ahead of his time that what he proposes comes closer to having the transcendental quality of the earliest form of cosmopolitanism – describing a spiritual, if not religious, yearning for oneness – than it does to being even a relatively utopian political project for the era it was expressed in.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is by far the better known of these two cosmopolitan thinkers from the Enlightenment period. Amongst Kant’s works two in particular can be seen as crucial to understanding the development of his cosmopolitan thought; first his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784)
which is representative of Kant’s early cosmopolitan thought, and second his
*Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795) which is representative of Kant’s
later thought on cosmopolitanism (Kant 1970: 15, 41-53 and 93-130). Between the
former and the latter there is what can be considered a substantial change to the
renowned philosopher’s sketch for world peace, because in the *Idea for a Universal
History* Kant shows some ambivalent support for the idea of a universally sovereign
political entity, while in *Perpetual Peace* he appears to reject any such notion.32 In
the 1784 text Kant makes several proposals which are hard to reconcile with the
ideal of state sovereignty at the national level, for example that ‘every state’ ought:

> ...to take the step which reason could have suggested to them
> without so many sad experiences – that of abandoning a lawless
> state of savagery [between states] and entering a federation of
> peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to
derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own
> legal judgement, but solely from this great federation [ ], from a
> united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will
> (Kant 1970: 47).

This is a proposal that comes close to advocating a global sovereign political entity.
Kant also maintains that ‘the depredations caused by war’ inevitably must ‘have a
beneficial effect’ since ‘they compel our species to discover a law of equilibrium to
regulate the essentially healthy hostility which prevails among states and is
produced by their freedom’ (Kant 1970: 49). It is this “law of equilibrium” which
compels men to introduce ‘a system of united power, hence a cosmopolitan system
of general political security’ which Kant also calls ‘the union of states’ (Kant 1970:
49). Since Kant seemingly interchangeably employs the terms “federation of
peoples” and “union of states” he apparently in 1784 saw a federation of what we
would today call nation-states as the ideal. Albeit that federation would in its
executive power vis-à-vis its constituent parts closer resemble the at the time soon to
be independent United States of America writ global than it would the much later

32 Kant seems to waver between two different lines of argument in both these texts, first; what the
desirable endpoint ought to be down the road (what “providence” has in store for humanity, eventually), and second; what it is realistic to expect to achieve given the present political
conditions (what “peoples” might go along with now). Kleingeld points out that Kant, in
*Perpetual Peace*, ‘does not mean [ ] that one should reject the ideal of a federative world
republic’ and that Kant considered a league the next logical step in the process of ‘leaving the
state of nature and moving toward peace’ rather than a conclusive ideal in itself (Kleingeld
2012: 51, first emphasis in original, the second added).
League of Nations, yet the units themselves would have been closer to the “peoples” that the latter was ideally perceived to be composed of.

To make political-institutional sense of Kant’s cosmopolitan vision as of 1784, one could say that he envisions the delegation of the ‘external’ aspects of the different states’ sovereignty to one overarching federation that would facilitate ‘a law-governed external relationship’ among states (Habermas 1997: 118, Kant 1970: 47). The peoples that in essence constitute these states will nonetheless continue to live within their borders and be free to establish perfect civil constitutions (Kant 1970: 45–47) – through upholding the ‘internal’ aspect of their sovereignty (Habermas 1997: 118).33

Kant in this manner ends up advocating a two-tiered approach to world-governance; 1) an international association of states where member-states are to conduct their external affairs without recourse to war, and 2) a plurality of states governing their own respective domestic affairs. States (or peoples) would thus be heavily dependent on cooperation between all parties in international affairs, but largely independent from any external interference in domestic affairs. This is not a world state, at least not one resembling any modern state, but Kant several times over repeats that the logical end point, ‘the highest purpose of nature’ or ‘a plan of nature’ is ‘aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind’ or ‘a universal cosmopolitan existence’ (Kant 1970: 51). Statements like these coupled with Kant’s already mentioned insistence that the human race sooner or later will be forced by circumstance to introduce ‘a system of united power’ makes it entirely possible to interpret the Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose as a tract which at least partially advocates the institution of a world federation capable of exercising global sovereignty. Kleingeld’s interpretation is representative of this view when she asserts that ‘the federation mentioned in the “Idea for a Universal History” is not a loose league’ and instead ‘has the same features as a state’ (Kleingeld 2012: 46).

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33 This reading presupposes that Kant, together with many other political theorists such as e.g. John Rawls, when discussing to e.g. ‘administer justice universally’ does not mean “globally” but amongst all the members of a territorially delimited society of lesser scope (Kant 1970: 45, see also; 46).
Kant does not explicitly write that he would like to see the development of a world state in his early cosmopolitan essay, though one can arguably see the presence of a rudimentary version of that particular idea in it. What makes his more mature work *Perpetual Peace* remarkable, in this respect, is that there Kant distances himself considerably further away from the idea of a world republic – through ‘expressly excluding form [his] contract among states the constitution of a new political entity’ (Lutz-Bachmann 1997: 68). Even though a closer reading would reveal that Kant does not entirely reject it in a longer perspective (see: Kleingeld 2012: 51). But if we put this latter, arguably important, but oft overlooked, nuance aside; it is with seemingly explicitly going against the idea of a globally sovereign political entity in the name of ‘a league of free republics’ that Kant creates the foundation for what can be called the Kantian strain of cosmopolitan thought which dominates cosmopolitan discourse today (Lutz-Bachmann 1997: 61, see also; Kant 1970: 102-105).

Kant’s work of 1795 *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* is completed after the French Revolution finished its most open phase. The title of this work is usually translated into *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (e.g. Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann 1997, and Kleingeld 2012: xi) or *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (e.g. Kant 1970). It revolves around the ‘Preliminary’ and ‘Definitive Articles of a Perpetual Peace Between States’ as Kant has articulated these (Kant 1970: 93-108). For our purposes it is worth mentioning the following articles; the fifth preliminary article is ‘No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state’, the first definitive article is ‘The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican’, and the second definitive article is that ‘The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States’ (Kant 1970: 93, 99, and 102). Kant here puts forward a distinctly international and intergovernmental set of articles; his explicit goal is “perpetual peace between states”, and he upholds the Westphalian ideal of noninterference in the internal workings of other states, neither of which appears to be very original for the period.

As both Kant himself and later commentators have pointed out, Charles-Irenée Castel (1658-1743), who is best known as Abbé de Saint-Pierre, his clerical title, had made a similar suggestion earlier (Kant 1970: 47, Archibugi 1992: 297, and Spoltore 1994). Saint-Pierre wanted ‘an Everlasting Peace amongst all Christian states’ (cited in Spoltore 1994: 227) and to this purpose he suggested ‘to draw up a
Treaty of European Union which provided for the submission of kings, and hence of the States, to a superior law’ (Spoltore 1994: 223). Saint-Pierre is again following ideas already presented by Emeric Crucé in his *The New Cyneas* published in 1623 (Archibugi 1992: 298). Crucé is in one respect actually closer to Kant than to Saint-Pierre, because he wanted to include all nations, while the latter diminished his project ‘in restricting the proposed Union to the single continent of Europe and the sole religion of Christianity’ (Archibugi 1992: 298). But importantly both Crucé and Saint-Pierre differs from Kant in respect to the preferred internal system of government to each state, since whereas they still thought within the confines of dynastic sovereignty (Archibugi 1992: 299), Kant wrote in a political climate where republican ideas had started to make a substantial imprint on the politics of the day. This explains why it was possible for Kant to insist that every state ought to be republican for his scheme to work in practice.

If we take Kant’s promotion of a republican government to mean that he favored ‘parliamentary democracy’ within the confines of each state, which is considered a permissible interpretation (Reiss 1970: 25), then that would be a sufficient condition to make Kant a liberal in his age, but not to make him a cosmopolitan of the kind that genuinely works towards realizing the conditions where bestowing formal world citizenship on all human beings is possible. What makes it defensible to call Kant a cosmopolitan after he penned *Perpetual Peace* is not so much the internationalist political model for the organization of states he presents there as the fact that he maintains a moral cosmopolitan outlook in describing the details of his third definitive article: ‘Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality’ (Kant 1970: 105-108). It is in his discussion of this third and final definitive article that Kant offers up the following much repeated passage:

The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity (Kant 1970: 107-108, emphasis in original).

Martha Nussbaum employs this quote to show how cosmopolitan Kant’s thinking was, though she herself quite sensibly translates Kant’s original German “Recht”
into “law” instead of “right”” (Nussbaum 1997: 1). If Kant wanted to aid in the formulation of “a universal law of humanity” one which supersedes “international law“, as Nussbaum’s translation renders Kant’s text, why has Kant just spent the preceding part of his treatise on perpetual peace ‘considering the right of nations in relation to one another in so far as they are a group of separate states which are not to be welded together as a unit’ (Kant 1970: 102)?

What Kant appears to want is not a universal law of humanity, but one universal law governing the relations between states, while the states (insofar as these are republics) can go about their internal affairs in peace from externally imposed laws impacting on their domestic affairs, i.e. there are to be no external legal/executive constraints affecting the relationship between the state and the individuals making up the populace living on its territory (see: Kant 1970: 104). This appears to be an oversight of Kant’s, where he abandons the different peoples (who invariably must collectively constitute “humanity” for Kant) to their singular fates. It is probable that Kant saw this move as freeing the peoples for their own benefit – to allow for them to govern themselves. In this Kant follows ‘the fundamental political ideal’ which during the French Revolution\(^{34}\) ‘define[d] revolutionary experience to an almost obsessive degree’ which was that ‘in deliberation all opinions were to be strictly individual, for there was no other way to arrive at the authentic general interest’ or the people’s unitary will (Gauchet 1996: 244).

Kant ignores the existence of political differences within nations, but in this he does not distinguish himself from the prevailing revolutionary theory of the age where internal political rifts were not taken account of in any substantial way as supposedly ‘there were to be no “parties” or “factions”,’ because ‘the unity and universality of collective representation would emerge naturally, it was believed, from the diversity of individual points of view’ (Gauchet 1996: 244). In this revolutionary theory, heavily indebted to Rousseau\(^{35}\) – who was a ‘patent influence’ on Kant (Reiss 1970: 11) – government would simply be grounded in the consent of

\(^{34}\) On the historical timeline the writing and publication of Perpetual Peace (1795) coincides with the French Revolution (1789-1799), and the argument Kant puts forward must necessarily be evaluated in that context.

\(^{35}\) Rousseau’s original theory was more nuanced than the simplified version of it the revolutionaries employed.
the governed people and therefore a republic would never be governed contrary to the people’s will.

That there is such a thing as “the people” sharing one collective political will that also is commensurate with the better part of a population living on a vast territory and that this ought to be the natural basis for the formation of a state is a new idea that had not yet occurred when earlier cosmopolitan works were authored. This presupposed territorial/cultural/political unity was suddenly of immense importance when Kant wrote his Perpetual Peace, even though the notion is an immense over-generalization when dealing with culturally and politically complex countries like 18th Century France. The theory received what could have been a debilitating blow from actual events almost the instant the revolutionary French assembly was constituted, since ‘from late August 1789, revolutionary assemblies would always be divided’ along the lines – of what we today would recognize to be – ideological positions (Gauchet 1996: 44). But nonetheless this idea of the politically singular people is one of the pillars Kant employs in support of his theory for achieving eternal concord amongst mankind. It is not that Kant is blind to ideological difference, he perceives a dichotomous ideological divide with defenders of ‘despotic’ absolute monarchy on one side and supporters of ‘Republicanism’ on the other – clearly a political cleavage of great import in his time – but in Perpetual Peace he pays little attention to the fact that the republicans in France happen to be spread into what we today could call ideological factions as well (Kant 1970: 101).

Kant’s political ideal on the nation-state level is not that a republican assembly should abolish monarchy (which is what eventually happened in France, and the reason why Kant’s native Prussia from 1792 to 1795 participated in the War of the First Coalition against Revolutionary France), but rather that it should act as the legislative branch of the state so that ‘the will of the people’ which was reflected by the assembly could restrain the executive branch – which would still be headed by the monarch – from acting ‘arbitrarily’ (Kant 1970: 101). This ideal is basically a description of the ‘constitutional monarchy’ that ‘France was effectively’ from late 1789 to ‘August 1792’, but Kant’s description also allows for a stronger monarchical presence than what was found in France in those years, and in this respect it resembles more the mode of governance which already existed in the United Kingdom of the time (Hanson 2009: 70).
It is perhaps because Kant does not operate with the more nuanced view of the national body politic we are now used to – for him there are no classes or political affiliations other than the almost wholly interchangeable units of particular “nations”, “states” and “peoples” – that he finds it rational to use these as the autonomous base units for his proposed federation of nations. In this view of politics particular to the late 18th Century, representatives of the state negotiating at the international level would directly represent the political view of the people as a whole, and not just indirectly do so in their capacity as being in the service of the party that is legally presiding over the state after having won that privilege through e.g. an election in competition with other political factions. In this manner no grouping within the state, since the state equals the politically indivisible people following the view Kant adopts, will have to lose its direct political representation on the journey from the domestic to the international level. In this way no-one is disenfranchised at the international level through being nationally represented there. This mode of thinking introduces us to a paradox, because this way of reasoning does not really square with the way Kant is portrayed as the cosmopolitan thinker par excellence by contemporary cosmopolitans such as Nussbaum.

Nussbaum has claimed that ‘Kant, more influentially than any other Enlightenment thinker, defended a politics based upon reason rather than patriotism or group sentiment, a politics that was truly universal rather than communitarian’ (Nussbaum 1997: 3). But how can Kant be said to be a spokesperson for “a politics that was truly universal rather than communitarian” when he puts this much faith in the politically indivisible nature of the different “peoples”? Kant’s incessant employment of “people” as the core political unit might not make Kant a communitarian, but it is hardly a concept that can be said to represent the anti-thesis of communitarian sentiment either. “The people” nationally defined is at best a concept that describes an approximate half-way point between the extremes of a conceivably sub-national communitarian ideal and the universal concept of humanity. One possible answer to the question is that Nussbaum overemphasizes some of Kant’s passages and completely ignore others to reach the conclusion that ‘Kant’s Perpetual Peace is a profound defense of cosmopolitan values’ (Nussbaum 1997: 4). There is reason to believe that this is actually what has happened as Nussbaum admits ‘leaving aside the “superficial” aspects of “institutional and practical goals”’ (Dallmayr 2003: 435, and as cited ibid.).
A more correct assessment, if one to the contrary also does include the aspects Nussbaum set aside, would perhaps be that *Perpetual Peace* should be viewed as the result of a co-mingling of cosmopolitan and national-international ideas – which both were only at a very early stage of theoretical refinement before Kant grappled with them. Kant’s text therefore represents a snapshot of ongoing developments in political thought that were very specific to the late eighteenth century, and not an articulation of the cosmopolitan ideal that is especially well fit for posterity. Kant’s writing from 1795 should then perhaps instead be seen as an attempt at bridging two distinct ontologies; an Enlightenment universalism that is seen as ‘culminating in Kant’ which by the time he wrote *Perpetual Peace* was rapidly losing its momentum as a political force and in the process of being replaced by ‘the advent of the nineteenth century and its oncoming force of nationalism’ (Dallmayr 2003: 423, and; Behr 2010: 138). This is not to claim that Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* does not include the expression of several truly universal sentiments, but rather to insist that these ought to be firmly demarcated by way of separating Kant’s truly cosmopolitan (i.e. universal/planetary) ethics from his accompanying international (i.e. less than universal) political design.

Fred Dallmayr uses the term ‘moral globalism’ to describe the kind of ‘universal ethic’ Kant shares in common not only with ‘Cynics and Stoics’ but also with ‘medieval Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers’ (Dallmayr 2003: 428, 424 and 423). One could here make the case that rationally underpinned cosmopolitan thought should be separated from the religiously grounded universalism one finds in for example the Abrahamic religions Dallmayr mentions, because there is a fundamental distinction between an *ethic* propped up by an inner conviction about what is the right thing to do for the betterment of humanity and religions founded on a belief in a monotheistic deity that employs the promise of divine retribution for the transgression of societal norms as an external motivation to keep the faithful morally in line. But putting that argument aside, the more important thing is that Dallmayr argues that this moral globalism or alternatively ‘moral cosmopolitanism’ should be viewed as a corresponding to what ‘theory’ is contra ‘praxis’, where the ‘notion of praxis’ brings to the fore a domain usually shunned or sidelined by universalist morality: the domain of politics’ (Dallmayr 2003: 421 and 434).

It is to Kant’s credit that he attempts to create a viable bridge between theory and praxis in *Perpetual Peace*, but the end result is that he ends up undermining the
prospects for turning the cosmopolitan ethic into the founding ethos for a universal polity with his attempt to reconcile that ethic with the concept of what later came to be known as “the self-determination of peoples”. This is because Kant, even though he in places provide us with a very well thought out cosmopolitan ethic grounded in the universal species that is humanity, goes on to portray what he argues would be a workable international political system, which on the other hand is grounded in the indivisible nature of peoples. Kant therefore displays a hybridized form of “cosmopolitan-nationalist” thought that I think should be more precisely described as an early form of internationalism.

As Perry Anderson remarks; ‘universalism’ was ‘one of the most striking features’ of the ‘Enlightenment patriotism’ that fuelled the revolutionary struggles in America and France (Anderson 2002: 7-8). Kant was writing during an ‘era’ when ‘the ideals of patriotism and cosmopolitanism marched together; on the plane of values there was no contradiction between them’ (Anderson 2002: 8). This all changed over the course of the succeeding century, when the ‘rationalist patriotism’ which Kant had based his design for world peace on was replaced by a ‘romantic nationalism’ whose ‘essential definition of the nation was no longer political but cultural’ (Anderson 2002: 9). The latter would in turn evolve into a chauvinistic form of nationalism that by the Belle Époque, 1871-1914, increasingly defined the nation in ethnic terms (Anderson 2002: 11-12).

The leap from a cosmopolitan ethos to a defense of a loose organization composed of sovereign peoples was not a breach of logic that came lightly to Kant. As we have seen, Kant both in his earlier writings and in passages in Perpetual Peace asserts what that the political result of following a cosmopolitan ethic ought to be. Kant writes as late as ‘1792’ in Theory and Practice36 that ‘the principle of right [ ] recommends to us earthly gods the maxim that we should proceed in our disputes in such a way that a universal federal state might be inaugurated’ (Kant 1970: 15 and 92). Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann have written a convenient digest of how Kant’s standpoint evolved:

36 Full title: On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’ (Kant 1970: 61).
Kant had argued that “a world state” would represent the perfection of a republican constitution, but later he came to fear it as a potentially “soulless despotism.” In “Toward Perpetual Peace” Kant admits that a world republic is “the one rational way to achieve peace,” but he maintains that peace will be attained through the inevitable spread of the institutional and legal structure of “a peaceable federation” among independent republican states, each of which represent the basic right of its citizens and establishes a public sphere in which people can regard themselves and others as free and equal “citizens of the world” (Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann 1997: 3).

Kant in other words stops to promote the logical political consequence of the ideal and begins to argue for a more pragmatic approach, making the final leap sometime in the two intervening years between *Theory and Practice* and *Perpetual Peace*, i.e. sometime between 1792 and 1795. Of the events that might have provoked Kant to rethink his position which occurred in the meantime, two stand out for their world historical significance; firstly the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793, and secondly the subsequent Reign of Terror, perpetrated under the Jacobin leader Robespierre from September 1793 to July 1794 (Hanson 2009). The latter would dampen anyone’s enthusiasm for what kind of desirable political changes the French Revolution could possibly bring in its wake, while the former could be seen as a direct provocation against the Prussian monarch, who the year before, together with his Austrian counterpart, had threatened nothing less than the ‘complete destruction’ of Paris in retaliation if any of the French royals were hurt by the revolutionaries (Clark 2007: 287-288). Kant due to ‘his admiration for the French Revolution’ would have taken notice of these events, and he certainly was well aware at the time that ‘the Prussian government’, of which he was a subject, ‘would not have tolerated an overt attack on the government and the laws’ so this ‘Kant carefully avoided’ (Reiss 1991: 269). The overhanging threat of government sanction in the form of censorship and/or punishment might help explain the presence of several apparently contradictory passages in *Perpetual Peace* and particularly Kant’s sudden insistence on the inviolable nature of national sovereignty.

Given the circumstances Kant’s work is already enough of a covert attack on the form of government in Prussia, which at the time could be described as ‘benevolent dynastic despotism’ which was quite far away from the type of ‘republican government’ Kant sees as ‘rightful government’ (Reiss 1970: 29 and 11, see also:
Kant 1970: 101). If Kant had in clear terms also questioned the reasonableness of the concept of state sovereignty, which he would have done by arguing overtly for a sovereign world republic to replace it, then that line of argument could have turned him into a pariah for the whole governing class, and not just those among it that personally favored absolute monarchy – which was a perilous exercise in itself – and thus possibly gotten Kant intractably into trouble. It is worth taking into account at least the possibility that considerations like this could have swayed Kant as he penned *Perpetual Peace*. Kant was clearly aware that there were limits to how much one could ‘disobey the powers that be’ before grave consequences were to be expected, and this at one point led him to come to the conclusion ‘that it was not necessary to tell the public all that one knew’ (Reiss 1991: 268).

Even with all the above considerations taken into account Kant still does not write that any “world state” is bound to lead to a “soulless despotism” in *Perpetual Peace* as Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann claims in the passage quoted above. It is actually Hans Reiss, the editor of *Kant. Political Writings* which makes that particular interpretation in his introduction to the collection (Reiss 1970: 34). When Kant first raises a similar objection, in *Theory and Practice*, he writes that ‘a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single ruler’ ‘may lead to the most fearful despotism’, which is why he favors ‘a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international right’ (Kant 1970: 90, emphasis in original). It is at the end of that very same text, two pages later, that Kant adds his recommendation that we should always aspire consciously to work towards the goal of ‘a universal federal state’ (Kant 1970: 92).

The next and only other time the subject of world government leading to despotism comes up is in *Perpetual Peace* when Kant states that what we today call international anarchy ought to be ‘preferred to an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created universal

37 'Whereas men of independent means or free-lance writers played an important role in contemporary French letters, the dominant group within the Prussian enlightenment was that of civil servants. A study of the *Berlin Monthly* [*Berlinische Monatsschrift*, where e.g. Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History’ was first published (Kant 1991: 273)] has shown that [ ] over the thirteen years of its existence (1783-96) [ ] more than half of the contributors were in paid state employment’ (Clark 2007: 251). In other words, Kant, provided that he did not take his theories too far, was partially protected by ‘the social location of the Prussian intelligentsia’ of which he was part (Clark 2007: 251).

38 At least in the texts by Kant included in *Political Writings* (Second Enlarged Edition, 1991).
monarchy’ (Kant 1970: 113). This ‘universal monarchy’ is what Kant equals to a ‘soulless despotism’ which, because of its inherent centralized nature, is bound to ‘lapse into anarchy’ ‘after crushing the germs of goodness’ (Kant 1970: 113). We can here see that Kant’s notion of “universal monarchy” is simply a projection of Hobbes’ sovereign on the globe – though it is a caricature even of this, with all coercive capability and no legitimizing authority (see: Hobbes [1651] 1998).

In light of these passages it seems that the pertinent point Kant is making is not that he warns against the dangers of a “world state” without reservations, but that a world state is only ever desirable in the form of “a universal federal state”, because the for him conceivable alternative; a world state “under a single ruler” – which he in Perpetual Peace calls “a universal monarchy” – is what would be “the most fearful despotism”. The hallmark of ‘despotism’ is for Kant the lack of a ‘representative system’, and it is the latter that ‘alone makes possible a republican state’ because ‘without it, despotism and violence will result, no matter what kind of constitution is in force’ (Kant 1970: 102). To sum up; Kant rules out “universal monarchy” as a despotic abomination, but he does not rule out an equivalent universal polity with a representative political system. Instead he sees the ideal of the universal republican state as valid in theory, and as he earlier had put it; ‘it [ ] remains true to say that whatever reason shows to be valid in theory, is also valid in practice’ (Kant 1970: 92).

The most interesting aspect of Kant’s thought for the present purposes is that in these texts just dealt with he manages to present a cause for i) moral cosmopolitanism, e.g. with his concept of “Cosmopolitan Right”, and for iii) institutional planetarism, i.e. with his allusions to a world republic, but the main thrust of his argument is nonetheless most often interpreted as being in favor of ii) institutional internationalism, which I have here aimed to argue has basis in his grounding of the whole argument in the presumed existence of “peoples” to the detriment of a grounding in “humanity” which would have been more consistent with the institutional planetarist position Kant ultimately ends up rejecting.

One view representative of present day cosmopolitans is that ‘Kant sustained a very consistent critique of world government and clearly sought to provide an alternative to both Westphalian and world state archetypes’ (Brown 2009: 110). As we have seen I have disputed that Kant’s was “a very consistent critique of world
government” as it should rather be seen as more specifically a critique of his own conception of despotic universal monarchy, but the claim that Kant was looking for a middle of the road approach to world order is indisputably correct. Kant in the end seeks to reconcile a plurality of peoples’ right to freedom with that of the need for some kind of universally recognized rules of right conduct. This way Kant ends up on an institutional internationalist position that fits more or less squarely in the middle between the anarchic Westphalian international relations that already existed and the global domestic relations of a true global polity or world state that Anacharsis Cloots was so much in favor of.

To sum up, what Cloots did was to posit an ideal unitary polity, which for the first time was severed from both religious superstition and the potentially tyrannical rule of one strongman in the form of a monarch or emperor. Cloots thereby describes a distinctly modern version of a political ideal that in theory would forge a stronger peace amongst mankind than what is offered through Kant’s international compromise. Kant’s suggestion basically follows Rousseau in elevating national differences to an ordering principle. Cloots, meanwhile, wanted all humanity to become one global nation, not constituted along national lines (i.e. being international), where all humans occupy the same territorial entity – or post-territorial polity – which ideally ought to be coextensive with the Earth. This makes Cloots’ model planetarist or truly global in contrast to Kant’s whose model ends up being one of international political organization.

**Cosmopolitanism in the First Half of the Twentieth Century:**

*Angell, et al versus H. G. Wells*

Kant’s cosmopolitan model of international organization was partially put into practice once the League of Nations was founded after the First World War had come to an end. At this time key authors of the liberal internationalist tradition ‘drew on Kant’s reflections in *Perpetual Peace*, where Kant emphasized the importance of republican constitutional government and what came to be understood as a confederation of states for the future peace of international relations’ (Long 1995: 313). Representatives of this liberal internationalist view were thinkers such as ‘Norman Angell, Leonard Woolf, and Alfred Zimmern’ who nowadays are often referred to as ‘Idealist writers’, particularly in International Relations theory (Osiander 1998: 409). The theories of Angell, Woolf, and Zimmern all played a role

In *International Government* Woolf’s ‘main prescription was that organization along cosmopolitan lines should be extended, especially in the political sphere’ (Wilson 1995: 133). But crucially this notion, in line with Kant’s earlier argument, was tempered by the fact that all these liberal internationalists ‘supported the development of national self-determination’ (Long 1995: 313). This tendency becomes more pronounced when we see that Woolf for example feared;

…being labeled ‘utopian’ and consequently steered clear of suggestions he felt states would not accept. This is clearly evident in the Fabian plan, drawn up by Leonard Woolf and Sidney Webb, for ‘A Supranational Authority that will Prevent War’. Despite the bold title, the plan does not advocate the merging of independent units in a ‘world state’ or the creation of a ‘world government’ or a ‘world parliament’. Woolf maintained that such ideas were impracticable since they did not have the slightest chance of being accepted by the world’s statesmen (Wilson 1995: 126).

Because of this inclination Woolf instead ‘recommended the establishment of machinery and procedures whereby states could settle their differences short of war’ (Wilson 1995: 126). In short, the liberal internationalists recommended *international* organization. This was the view which prevailed when the League of Nations was founded since no one in power ‘sought a superstate or world government’ but instead looked into establishing ‘some kind of post-war security pact’ (Mazower 2012: 134).

That the League of Nations was set to become a monumental failure was not obvious at this point since a Kantian scheme along international lines had never really been attempted in practice (and it has not yet been attempted globally if one takes into account Kant’s proviso for a functioning international organization that “The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican”). It appears that for a time the ideas of H. G. Wells were aligned with those of the aforementioned liberal internationalists (see: Deudney 2007: 204-208). Wells even suggested during the
First World War that a ‘League of Free Nations’ should be established at its end (Partington 2003: 73). But what makes Wells ideas important for this period in the development of cosmopolitan thought was that he came to abandon internationalism and put in its stead what Wells himself called cosmopolitanism (see: Partington 2003: 82). Wells’ version of cosmopolitanism was planetarist – like Cloots’ model had been earlier – in contrast to Woolf’s international cosmopolitanism which followed Kant’s model.

By cosmopolitan Wells meant a condition where the ‘competing sovereignties’ of different nations were a thing of the past and where a ‘world government’ had taken over which is ‘managed by suitably equipped groups of the most interested, intelligent, and devoted people’ but whose ‘activities should be subjected to a free, open, watchful criticism’ (Wells [1928] 2002: 71). Wells stopped thinking in internationalist terms when he realized that the League of Nations that was actually established at the end of the war ‘was for all practical purposes a league of victors and a diplomatic rendezvous for the foreign offices of the world’ which on top of this was doomed to be ineffective even at this narrow task since it ‘excluded Germany, Russia, and Turkey and was deserted by the USA’ (Partington 2003: 82). Wells was provoked to articulate his own ‘image of a desirable cosmopolis’ in greater detail by ‘the evident refusal of the statesmen to cast the League of Nations in the form of an embryonic world government’ (Heater 1996: 128).

It has been noted that Wells never produced a ‘classic’ outlining all his ideas concerning the ideal cosmopolis, but instead ‘habitually produced’ numerous ‘slight, slipshod volumes’ (Wagar 1961: 267). But what can be drawn from his numerous and diverse literary output is that Wells ‘preached the world state as early as 1902’ and that by the time the First World War was over his only reason to extol the virtues of ‘the idea of a European federation’ or ‘an Anglo-American federation’ was because either of these schemes would represent ‘the first step in the building of a world state’ or ‘a bridge to the world state’ (Wagar 1961: 203-204). When the Second World War had just started Wells had the following to say about international organization: ‘It is the system of nationalist individualism and uncoordinated [sic] enterprise that is the world’s disease, and it is the whole system that has to go. It has to be reconditioned down to its foundations or replaced. It cannot hope to “muddle through” amiably, wastefully and dangerously, a second time’ (Wells 1940: 17).
Wells saw ‘the only sane objective’ as ‘a planetary Utopia, a unified human community’ and he expressed his position in the following unambiguous terms: ‘I am for the super-state [ ] and not for any League. Cosmopolis is my city, and I shall die cut off from it’ (Wagar 1961: 205, and as cited ibid.). Wells had ‘the worried conviction that the nation-state is dangerously obsolete’ (Heater 1996: 128). And after seeing how little effort the statesmen of the world were willing to put into the creation of anything resembling an international federation Wells thought that ideas along these lines ‘might even prove entirely irrelevant to the cause of world order’ if all they accomplished with for instance a ‘union of the Atlantic communities’ were a ‘simple reduction of the competing states in the state-system’ (Wagar 1961: 205).

Any such project ‘that did not see itself as a small way station along the high road to world integration would scarcely matter’ (Wagar 1961: 205, see also; Partington 2003: 164). Wells here comes much closer to advocating a planetarist position of global universalism than he does to siding with the liberal internationalists.

The only debatable objection to thinking Wells a full-fledged planetarist is that he was scarcely consistently committed to pluralism or democracy. According to W. W. Wagar’s account Wells thought that there would no longer be a need for politics in the conventional sense once his vision of the world state had been realized, because there would only be one ideology of ‘progressive world-socialism’ and that ‘the collective human intelligence, as it evolved, could have only one generally acceptable worldview, based on the only one possible existing state of all scientific knowledge’ (Wagar 1961: 221). Derek Heater has made a similar conclusion that Wells’ vision was of ‘a world state withering to an administrative essence, but formed by the benevolent enlightenment of technocracy’ (Heater 1996: 138). In contrast comes statements by Wells, such as in his suggested “Declaration of the Rights of Man” written in 1940 that ‘There is no source of law but the people’ (Wells 1940: 145). John Partington argues that Wells waged a campaign for human rights which lasted from 1939 to 1944 where Wells was not acting as an elitist against democracy, but rather tried to promote alternative modes of democratic governance instead of parliamentarianism (Partington 2003: 11). The above quotation from Wells’ The New World Order published in 1940 fits this observation.

It is however not too difficult to understand that Wells has ended up being represented as a thinker who ‘rejected democracy and supported elite rule’ as Partington puts it (Partington 2003: 11), considering that he held on to this notion at
least from his first ideas of world order were published in *Anticipations* in 1902 and up until the late 1930s, i.e. not consistently throughout the duration of his career as a writer, but for most of it (see: Wagar 1961: 165-174).

Wells died in 1946, just a few years before the whole idea of international association was completely sidelined by the Cold War (see: Jonas 2001: 115-133, and; Mazower 2012: 214-243). The Cold War put a lid on speculations concerning cosmopolitanism. First of all there was the general belief in the West that the Soviet Union was intent on establishing a communist world state through the fomenting of a genuine world revolution. This plan had admittedly figured in the minds of leading Bolsheviks such as Lenin, Trotsky, and Nikolai Bukharin at the time of the Russian Revolution (Goodman 1960: 25-36, and; Mazower 2012: 176-177). But this fear also ignored that the Kremlin’s designs for world domination had been toned down considerably by Stalin over the decades that followed those initial years of world revolutionary fervor.

Stalin’s doctrine of “socialism in one country” worked out after a debate that peaked in 1925 to 1926, where Trotsky as the defender of “world revolution” lost out, pointed in this direction (see: Ree 1998). And so did Stalin’s deliberate dismantling of the Third, or Communist, International in 1943, which was also known as “the Comintern”: ‘On May 15, 1943, Stalin dissolved the Comintern, a move most likely designed as a further encouragement to the Allies to give all-out aid in the common fight against the Axis’ (Goodman 1960: 44). This was at the time interpreted by one leading American newspaper as not ‘merely a gesture’ but as ‘the climax of the process that began when Stalin won his duel with Trotsky for leadership in Russia – the organization of that country into a national state, run on Communist lines, rather than a center of world revolution’ (as cited in; Goodman 1960: 44). This could also be interpreted as a strategy to appease the capitalist enemy until a more opportune moment arrived, but it seems like Stalin was more interested in holding territory already occupied as a consequence of the Soviet defense against Nazi aggression than in furthering schemes that could be interpreted as extreme provocations by the United States. The latter’s troops were by the end of the Second World War amassed at the territorial edges of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, armed with nuclear weapons that nullified the Red Army’s numerical advantages in terms of tanks and troops.
This relative parity of force between the new superpowers made Western designs for a world federalism expressed through ‘the World Movement for World Federal Government’ from ‘1947’ into a stillborn attempt at political world integration (Goodman 1960: 415). The world federalists were initially dismissed by the Soviets as ‘a mob of reactionaries’ that ‘do not have any influence among the masses’ and that ‘exist and function chiefly on the dollars that Wall Street sends them’ (as cited in; Goodman 1960: 415-416). But the Soviets changed tack and supported a similar communist ‘Partisans of Peace’ movement which in 1950 held a congress ‘in Warsaw where a resolution was adopted advocating “cooperation” with world government groups’ (Goodman 1960: 416). In the end however, when ‘the Executive Council of the World Movement for World Federal Government’ had invited ‘the Partisans of Peace to send observers’ to their conference in Rome the year after this ‘threatened to wreck the World Movement’ (Goodman 1960: 417). This was because the ‘largest American world government organization, the United World Federalists’ threatened their resignation ‘unless the invitation was immediately withdrawn and the congress was held without the presence of any Communist group’ (Goodman 1960: 417). After ‘this mild flirtation with the world government movement, Moscow reverted to its generic hostility toward Western federalists’ (Goodman 1960: 417-418). The lessons from this, where the creation of what could have been a useful back-channel to wind down Cold War hostility was being aborted by the Americans supposedly most inclined to institute world peace at the time, were plain to see:

Groups like the United World Federalists must face the fact that they are pursuing two incompatible goals. On the one hand, they claim to seek a world government, that is, a government that would include the Communists and necessarily accord them a conspicuous role. On the other hand, they dare not deal with the Communists for fear of having a Red label pasted on them, a stigma which they know would promptly ruin the standing of the organization in the West (Goodman 1960: 418, emphasis in original).

The conclusion Goodman reaches in this regard is quite damning: ‘If it is held dangerous or even impossible to deal with Communists, then it must be concluded that campaigning for a world government can no longer be a meaningful activity’ (Goodman 1960: 418, emphasis in original). In short, the ideological stalemate
where liberal capitalists occupied one half of the Earth’s northern hemisphere and the communist the other half was not conducive to the furthering of real-life cosmopolitan ventures. This was particularly true in the circumstances of McCarthyism, when a climate of communist paranoia had successfully been generated in the United States of such severity that anything else than a hostile inclination towards the enemy camp would appear as treason. But what happens once the ideological hostilities wind down at the end of the 1980s and the liberal camp is free to exert its influence globally?

**Cosmopolitanism after the Cold War: Internationalists against Planetarists?**

The contemporary variety of cosmopolitanism has been described as ‘a form of radicalism that has flourished since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and goes by the name of the new or actually existing cosmopolitanism’ (Fine 2003: 452). According to Robert Fine it is not only ‘a way of thinking that declares its opposition to all forms of ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism’ but also ‘to the economic imperatives of global capitalism’ (Fine 2003: 452). It has been expressed in ‘the field of political philosophy’ as a series of deliberations on Kant’s late 18th Century cosmopolitan thought, it sees ‘cosmopolitanism as the fulfillment of the Enlightenment project’, and places ‘its faith [ ] in the attainment of a postnational, transnational or global democracy’ (Fine 2003: 453-454).

At first sight the way cosmopolitan thought is described by Fine can give the impression that cosmopolitanism should constitute an ideal planetary ideology; it is presented as diametrically opposed to nationalist parochialism and irrational religious beliefs – but with an idea of human brotherhood that would take the best social aspects of these formerly regionally unifying ideologies to new heights – and as coming with a promise to fulfill the Enlightenment project through the attainment of some form of rational polity, ideally global in scope. In other words, if this describes cosmopolitanism correctly, then it appears to be an ideology which is prospectively synchronous with the notion that everything now ‘has to be placed in the context of transnational, human interests’ and that the ensuing ‘task’ of the coming generations will be the facilitation of ‘the world’s further transnationalization’ (Iriye 2014: 847). However, the conclusion I will arrive at here
is that this planetarian, or truly global, quality should only be ascribed to one particular, half-neglected, subdivision of the wider cosmopolitan discourse; the institutional planetarists. The majority position within contemporary cosmopolitan discourse lies squarely with the internationalist cosmopolitans or what I here call the institutional internationalists. Here I will use Richard Falk, Jürgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, and Ulrich Beck as representatives of this institutional internationalist strain that is now dominant in current cosmopolitan thought.

The Internationalist Cosmopolitans

Fine’s informative account overemphasizes the universalistic aspects of contemporary cosmopolitanism and neglects the tendency, shared by many of its central advocates such as Falk, Habermas, Nussbaum, and Beck, to be only halfway distanced from the national imaginary. This is instead of being diametrically opposed to it as one would assume them to be if one took the idealized account first presented here at face value. In short there is an identifiably reformist streak within the contemporary discourse which is far from ‘a form of radicalism’ as Fine boldly asserted (Fine 2003: 452). In light of this empirical observation I will argue that there are prominent parts of cosmopolitan discourse which practically, and contrary to popular belief, work against “the world’s further transnationalization” because of its proponents’ tacit tendency to reify the conceptual ‘relational triad: people, nation, state’ which as we can recall from earlier represent the conceptual core of the national imaginary (Jewsiewicki & Mudimbe 1995: 195, see also; Hobsbawm 1990). This part of cosmopolitan discourse could therefore at worst serve to perpetuate and legitimate the nation-state system, putting it in stark contrast to what originally appears to have been the aim of cosmopolitan discourse: To unite humanity at the expense of the kinds of parochial loyalties that are currently being nurtured and perpetuated within the nation-state system.

What is a perplexing tendency in light of the original aim is that many contemporary cosmopolitan scholars end up arguing for a sort of “nationalism lite” approach that – even though this position at first appears to be less of a contradiction to the aim of cultivating a single community of human beings than Chauvinistic nationalism represents – ends up creating what in reality might actually be a more insidious obstacle to achieving the goal of unifying humanity politically. This is a tension found within cosmopolitan discourse which is particularly pronounced along a “soft moral” to “hard institutional” ideological dimension. It can be described as a
continuum where on one end we find promoters of a comparatively apolitical moral cosmopolitanism and at the other advocates of a unitary world state (Pogge 1992: 49; Lu 2000: 244, and; Kleingeld 2012: 38-39). In the middle between these two there is a reformist vision of a perfected (mostly) inter-governmental internationalism (largely) within the confines of presently existing institutions, whose proponents can be called institutional internationalists (see: Heater 1996: 186-187, for all three positions, and; Beardsworth 2011: 16-47, for a not too dissimilar division of ‘the Cosmopolitan Spectrum’ into seven categories, though without one for the world statists).

It is a common occurrence in critiques of cosmopolitan thought to inflate the universalizing properties of institutional internationalist thinkers, as when Danilo Zolo describes the elder cosmopolitan Richard Falk’s ideological thrust as one of ‘centralizing globalism’, when all Falk proposes is a relatively modest addition to the United Nations system with the creation of a ‘global parliament’ consisting of ‘the peoples of the world’ which for example might be ‘a subsidiary organ of the UN Assembly or take some more autonomous character within the UN system’ (Zolo 1997: 33, and; Falk 2009: 22-24, see also; Falk 1975, and 1995). To be fair to institutional internationalists like Falk, his suggestions could easily be viewed as an early steps in the direction of genuine post-national world government, but what he and those like him primarily concentrate on proposing – Falk is suggesting “peoples”, the ethno-nationalist concept par excellence, as base units in his global parliament – is a reform of the current international order and not its radical reordering along post-international, truly global or planetary lines.

In addition to the already mentioned Richard Falk, there is a range of contemporary scholars that share a predilection for Kant’s intergovernmental political design, such as; Habermas, Nussbaum, and Beck. My aim in this section is to substantiate the claim that these theorists share one particular thing in common which makes it meaningful to categorize them as institutional internationalist- cosmopolitans alongside Kant. This quality they share is their theoretical backing of a political world order which quintessentially bears resemblance – due to the international nature of its composition – to the organizational structure Kant ultimately recommends in his Perpetual Peace (e.g. Habermas 2006: 113-193; 2012: 53-70, Nussbaum 2011: 113-114, and Beck 2006: 176-177). I seek to show this by means
of an analysis of particularly salient statements they have made in texts of particular relevance (i.e. where discussions of cosmopolitan questions are central).

We see the same political institutional problem with Habermas, Nussbaum, and Beck as with Kant earlier, which is that the commendable *moral* cosmopolitanism which infuses all their work, just as with Kant’s defense of national sovereignty in *Perpetual Peace*, does not translate directly into adopting an equally universal *political* cosmopolitanism. This is because they all, together with Kant before them, end up grounding their notion of a cosmopolitan polity in a plurality of nations, and not in individuals or transnational phenomena. Theirs is therefore at heart an international and not a planetary conception of a future world polity.

Habermas makes his support of international institutional designs particularly evident in some of his most recent publications (Habermas 2006: 113-193, and; 2012: 53-70), but the essence of his preferred solution is basically found in the following:

The United Nations still clings to features of a “permanent congress of states.” If it is no longer to be a mere assembly of government delegations, the General Assembly must be transformed into a kind of parliament that shares its powers with a second chamber. In such a parliament, peoples will be represented not by their governments but by the elected representatives of the totality of world citizens (Habermas 1997: 134).

This is very similar to Falk’s suggestion, whereby through adding a democratic appendage to the UN framework it becomes a more legitimate institution for world governance. Habermas’ suggestion is again reformist, and it is vague on the details of how this improved United Nations General Assembly “Senate/House of Representatives” is going to be able to sway even the reformed Security Council Habermas would like to see accompany it into action (see: Habermas 1997: 135). Under the heading ‘From the international to the cosmopolitan community’ Habermas has much more recently rephrased what is essentially the same argument; where ‘the international community of states could be complemented by the community of world citizens so that it develops into a cosmopolitan community’ (Habermas 2012: 53 and 58, emphasis in original). This is not supposed to be accomplished through abolishing the nation-state, but through diminishing its
freedom of action: The cosmopolitan community ‘would not constitute itself as a world republic, however, but as a supranational association of citizens and peoples in such a way that the member states retain control over the means for a legitimate use of force, though not the right to use them as they please’ (Habermas 2012: 58).

In short Habermas suggests that a global parliament under the auspices of nation-states would be compelled to act against their interests when that would be required, though it has no other power than that derived from the supposed authority it would get from being elected by the “world citizens”. This is a way of saying that world opinion should trump political power, but that assumption ought to be considered politically unfeasible unless world opinion is formalized into a supreme political power – but in that scenario nations can no longer be politically in control of their own armies, because that would leave them as sovereign entities able to disregard world opinion. Which means that Habermas global parliament no longer would be a sovereign authority. This is not problematic for Habermas, who presupposes that ‘the world community is not supposed to assume the character of a state’ or that the ‘democratic federal state writ large – the global state of nations or the world republic – is the wrong model’ (Habermas 2012: 61, and; 2006: 134). Even though that model seems to be exactly what is required to get around this theoretical contradiction.

The reason Habermas thinks the world state is the wrong model is because organizations like the United Nations and the European Union can secure compliance from their members even though they lack ‘a monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ (Habermas 2006: 137). In this Habermas conveniently ignores that in the cases when the United Nations is capable of achieving compliance the organization tends to function as an instrument of US foreign policy, which is the state wielding the most military power on the planet. And that the chief reason the European Union is respected by the member states is because membership comes with a considerable economic advantage which in case it was withdrawn could spell disaster, in other words the EU is fully capable of wielding its own sort of coercive power. Provided that the above is a correct representation of Habermas’ views on the matter, and if we take his familiar defense of human rights also into account (e.g. Habermas 1998), I think it is safe to conclude that Habermas on a moral basis would like to see the present international paradigm stretched to its
limits, but that he is not willing to engage with a possible politics that would go beyond that paradigm.

Nussbaum stands out as especially focused on the moral dimension at the expense of the political. She is much more concerned with promoting a moral cosmopolitanism than with discussing the inevitable political consequences of founding a political ideology on the basis of that clearly spelled out ethos (see; Nussbaum 1996: 3-17, and 131-144). According to Nussbaum we should see beyond ‘the fact that there is no world state’ and try to work around ‘the fact that the nation-state is the fundamental political unit’ by acting morally as if we were genuine world citizens already:

The absence of a world state does not thwart cosmopolitan conduct, then, for those who are genuinely committed to it. But cosmopolitanism does not require, in any case, that we should give equal attention to all parts of the world. None of the major thinkers in the cosmopolitan tradition denied that we can and should give special attention to our own families and to our own ties of religion and national belonging. In obvious ways, we must do so, since the nation-state sets up the basic terms for most of our daily conduct, and since we are all born into a family of some sort. Cosmopolitans hold, moreover, that it is right to give the local an additional measure of concern. But the primary reason a cosmopolitan should have for this is not that the local is better per se, but rather that this is the only sensible way to do good (Nussbaum 1996: 135-136).

This way Nussbaum avoids the question of whether core cosmopolitan ideas should be seen as the fundamental ontological basis for a potential political ideology – something which would have serious potential consequences for the present nation-state centered structural mode of world politics – and instead treats pillars of cosmopolitan thought, such as the notion of world citizenship, as little more than moral maxims that should inform, not the political struggle for a universal state of mankind everyone could be an actual legally binding citizen of, but a comparatively apolitical mode ‘of action for the world citizen [ ] ranging from financial support for Human Rights Watch to thinking and writing to (where it is open to individuals) more direct participation in deliberations about the welfare of children and women’ (Nussbaum 1996: 135).
When Nussbaum states that ‘none of the major thinkers in the cosmopolitan tradition denied that we should give special attention to [ ] our own ties of religion and national belonging’ and that while we should adopt a cosmopolitan worldview: ‘We need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether ethnic or gender-based or religious’, it appears that she considers “cosmopolitanism” to be just another level one can add to an individual’s moral ambit (Nussbaum 1996: 135 and 9). This is a suspicion which appears to be confirmed when we note that Nussbaum base these claims on the Stoics’ suggestion ‘that we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by concentric circles’ where ‘the first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then, in order, neighbors or local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen – and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities’ before finally adding that: ‘Outside of all these circles is the largest one, humanity as a whole’ (Nussbaum 1996: 9).

Nussbaum then goes on to argue that: ‘Our task as citizens of the world will be to “draw the circles somehow towards the center” [citing the Stoic philosopher Hierocles] making all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers, and so on’ (Nussbaum 1996: 9). Superficially this argument seems reasonable enough, as the closer we can draw these circles together the better the chances of achieving lasting peace would be. But Nussbaum’s insistence on the point that morally embracing humanity does not entail giving up any other cherished identities cuts off the most logical way of “drawing the circles tighter together” which would be to simply abandon, or at least heavily de-emphasize, some of the exclusive loyalties extended towards e.g. fellow countrymen, ethnic-brethren, and co-religionists, which together make up so many extra confounding circles between the self and the ultimate human Other inhabiting the most peripheral circle. Most laws beneath the nation-state level were seen as detrimental to national cohesion earlier and were ether incorporated into state law or discarded, since as Jacques Ellul observed a while ago; in the modern nation-state ‘the law is no longer anything but an instrument of the state’ (Ellul 1964: 295).

As the foundational morality or ethos for a polity Nussbaum’s Stoic concentric circles approach is arguably theoretically infeasible. Historically there is the tendency to solely emphasize a single of these so-called circles at the expense of all the others, be it; the family (clans), the city-dwellers (the city-states of antiquity and
the renaissance, with a territorial corollary in medieval feudal society), the
countrymen (the vast majority of contemporary nation-states), ethnicity (e.g. the
Third Reich), or co-religionists (e.g. during the Reformation). The political history
of human civilization is a series of testaments to the fact that to ‘not give up our
special affections and identifications’, as Nussbaum recommends, at these levels
always serves to relegate any notions of a wider common humanity held among the
members of these respective polities to political obscurity (Nussbaum 1996: 9).

Ultimate loyalty has to rest somewhere politically, and in the modern nation-state
one therefore only enters the legal territory of treason if one deliberately works
against the interest of the state (i.e. the stand-in for Nussbaum’s “fellow
countrymen”). But one is not considered punishable for treason if one, in for
example the economic or the national interest, works against the interest of one’s;
family, city, ethnicity, religion, or – and this is the crucial point – one on purpose
works against the interest of humanity. On the contrary, within the current nation-
state framework one is actually expected to willingly work against the interest of
humanity, as far as the interest of humanity does not by happenstance coincide with
the national interest.39 So why does Nussbaum then view e.g. national and religious
belonging as intrinsically worthy forms of human morality, which only needs to be
supplemented with a sense of cosmopolitan belonging, and not replaced by it, for
everything to work out fine? The answer must be that Nussbaum, like Kant before
her, implicitly anchors her moral theory in the national people and not in humanity.
Nussbaum’s use of the pseudo organic “concentric circles” metaphor in combination
with her repeated defense of feelings of national and religious belonging indicates
that she actually holds these forms of allegiance in too high esteem (alternatively
sees these as held in too high esteem by those around her) for her to willingly point
out that these “circles” more closely resembles incompatible obstacles between a
nationally, and still to a degree religiously, defined present and a truly cosmopolitan
future.

I would argue that a good measure of pluralism and tolerance are essential features
without which a democratic polity, no matter its scope, cannot function properly, but

39 There is every indication that in intergovernmental reality these two, the national and the human
interest, only correspond at the very rarest of occasions (see: Ross 2011: 136-149, for a
revealing insider account of the nation-centric diplomatic workings of the present
intergovernmental system).
at the same time one cannot allow for an omni-pluralist or omni-tolerant political design of the order inherent in Nussbaum’s moral cosmopolitanism and expect it to turn into anything other than a hopeless muddle. Any state would in theory have to work within certain parameters of a constitutional nature, and every mode of expressing group-belonging cannot be elevated to a sacred status within it, because some of these have to be nurtured while others necessarily must be suppressed, simply for the sake of the maintenance of political cohesiveness, and by extension, peace within the polity. In an analogous manner regional fealty to the lord and religious subservience to the papacy had to give way to a heightened allegiance to the royal head of the burgeoning nation-state in its dynastic early stage, as these older forms of adherence were deemed to be incompatible with the desire for a more cohesive form of political organization. There is no reason to dispute that Nussbaum would prefer a new form of moral grounding for society, one of a decidedly post-national nature, but it does not appear like she is interested in discussing the accompanying institutional implications of this change in moral focus.

It is this shared ambiguity towards their own position, which is neither fully national nor fully cosmopolitan in its nominal universal sense, which makes it possible to conclude that Nussbaum, as Kant before her, have a fundamentally internationalist and not a planetary outlook. Internationalism, as I have argued elsewhere (see above Chapter 2), should not be understood as the opposite of nationalism, even though this was normally the way it was understood earlier (see: Anderson 2002: 5 and 23). Internationalism as I conceive of it should instead be understood as a point in the middle of a continuum, stretching from an ultra-nationalist (autarkic/Chauvinist) to an ultra-universalist (planetary/all-inclusive) position, where the first half is grounded in the nationally delimited people and the second half in humanity. Internationalism as I conceptualize it here is still grounded in the people, but it makes (politically more or less meaningless) gestures towards the acknowledged existence of a common humanity.

Both Nussbaum and Kant (in his later writings) seem to presuppose that what we today would call nation-states happen to be an unalterable fact of human existence. Cosmopolitan morality thereby becomes the best way for these scholars to moderate the excesses of states – since a world state is considered too utopian (or alternatively too risky to defend in the environment they operate in at the time of writing) it is therefore dismissed as a possibility not worthy of serious contemplation. What we
get from these authors is thereby not so much an ideology grounded in humanity (as that would correspond with a universal republic or a planetary polity), as an ideology grounded in the nation-state (which has since the end of World War II in 1945 corresponded with intergovernmental international organization). This is combined with the message that there is nothing structurally wrong with the nation-state per se, only the level of Enlightenment amongst its populace, and if only they could be led to see the light of reason everything would be fine. My contention is that there is something structurally wrong with the nation-state as the fundamental unit in world politics, because it is impossible to act “enlightened” in the human interest, as Kant and Nussbaum appears to think, and at the same time be the leader or representative of any of the contemporary nation-states for long.

The human interest the institutional internationalists presuppose would be defended with Kant’s international federation simply completely goes against the today still underlying governing principle of any nation-state, that of raison d’état or reason of state, which dictates that the primary objective is to ensure the continued existence of the state (Viroli 1992). “Reason” in this sense means ‘the capacity to calculate the appropriate means of preserving the state’ (Viroli 1992: 4). This is a highly conservative view of what reason is supposed to further, in the sense that it seeks above all else to preserve the status quo political arrangement. This is not compatible with Kant’s notion of reason as something which can solely be advanced if it is subject to unconstrained critique:

    Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. Now there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons. The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority (Kant [1781] 1998: 643).

Reason of state is founded on the notion that furthering the interests of the state necessarily must be viewed as a sacred objective beyond reproach. It was at first a progressive notion, as it replaced the arbitrary nature of decisions made by monarchs’, decisions which could be based on nothing other than their personal whims, and turned these monarchs primarily into heads of state rather than the
former lords of realms which they could, and often did, treat as their own private property. That this development was already in place also allowed for a fairly smooth transition from ancien regimes to constitutional monarchies in many countries, as monarchs had gradually gotten used to acting more as presidents than dictators in line with the logic inherent in the concept of reason of state. But that it was in place before e.g. the French Revolution made it possible for de Tocqueville to argue ‘that the most important contribution of the revolutionary era was to continue the centralizing and modernizing work that had begun in the French state under Louis XIV’ (Hanson 2009: 3). Likewise the notable group of Enlightenment thinkers in France known as ‘the Encyclopedists’ did not question ‘the national basis of the state’ but instead ‘challenged the autocracy of the French state’ (Toulmin 1992: 142). The reason of state overlaps the transition from monarchic to national rule exemplified by the French Revolution, and this signifies that this wider revolution experienced worldwide from the 18th to the 20th century does not at all represent a complete break with pre-modern political conceptions.

Ulrich Beck defends the very Kantian concept of ‘realistic cosmopolitanism’ or ‘cosmopolitan realism’ through coupling the furtherance of European integration to the benefit this gives to the individual states taking part in it (Beck 2006: 57-58, and; Beck & Grande 2007: 20-21). This means ‘that in the past European unification was less a product of idealistic enthusiasm than the result of rational calculations of interest’ by the different states (Beck & Grande 2007: 21). This “realistic cosmopolitanism” can therefore only go as far as is allowed by the reason of state, to which it appears to be completely beholden. Beck’s “cosmopolitan vision” is based on the idea of ‘the enlightened self-interest of transnational states’:

In order to consolidate and increase their power, states must (a) cooperate and (b) negotiate international rules and found corresponding international institutions. In other words, because states want to survive they have to cooperate. However, long term cooperation transforms the self-definition of states to their core. Their egoistic drive to survive and extend their power compels them to unite and reform themselves – not rivalry, but cooperation maximizes national interests. Anti-cosmopolitanism is at the same time anti-national, because it fails to understand that, in an age of global interdependencies and dangers, there is only one way to pursue and maximize national interests, namely the cosmopolitan way. We must make a distinction between a
self-destructive way (autarchy) and a power-maximizing way of interweaving national interests, the latter being the internalization of cosmopolitanism by the nation and the state (Beck 2006: 177).

In this way Beck manages to appeal to the reason of state logic in an effort to ameliorate the undesirable consequences resulting from states following that very same logic. He does this without going for the obvious target if putting an end to such consequences really was his goal, which would be the integrity and cohesiveness of the nation-state as such, which can be more specifically identified as the bonds holding the ‘relational triad: people-nation-state’ together, where I suggest one can think of each component of the triad as being one layer supporting the following one (Jewsiewicki & Mudimbe 1995: 195, see also; Hobsbawm 1990: 22-23). Or, to see it from another angle, aiming in on the cohesiveness of the nation-state is perhaps exactly what Beck is doing, except that he appears to have gotten the whole conceptual package the wrong way around, because he is appealing for the state to cut off its supporting structure, and not for the individuals that constitute the people to stop holding it up. The latter would arguably be more realistic to expect in real life than that the leaders of the state would risk surrendering their position of privilege voluntarily.

Perhaps because of the radical nature of any argument proposing the formation of a world state, the first and the second of these types of articulating the cosmopolitan ideal, the moral and the institutional internationalist, are sometimes presented in a way that makes it seem as if these two positions within cosmopolitan discourse were constitutive of its totality (e.g: Brown & Held 2010, Hooft 2009: 120-123, and; Brock & Brighouse 2005). This is a way of perceiving contemporary cosmopolitan discourse which turns it into a subdivision of liberal internationalism which can be called ‘normative liberal theories’ (Jahn 2013: 136-138). If cosmopolitanism were only to be seen in this light it would simply represent the conscientious side within an intra-liberal debate where neoliberalism would be the currently most prominent of the corresponding ‘economic liberal theories’ (Jahn 2013: 102-110). Habermas, Nussbaum, and Beck would all fit into a liberal international category, especially if we allow for the inclusion of social-democratic ideas into a wide, but still centrist, understanding of what it means to be a liberal nowadays.
While cosmopolitanism as liberal internationalism leans more towards politically centrist social liberal and social democratic views (e.g. Held 2004) and neoliberalism as liberal internationalism overwhelmingly tilts more towards a right-of-center moderate conservatism, there is nonetheless not much room left for articulating an independent political stance in the space between these two partly overlapping positions. Daniele Archibugi who, both through his own work and that done in collaboration with David Held, have been one of the central contributors to the contemporary cosmopolitan debate’s institutional internationalist faction (Archibugi 1992, 1993, 2003, 2008, and; Archibugi and Held 1995), have commented that Held’s explicit advocacy of ‘a cosmopolitan social-democratic program’ could easily be ‘opposed’ by ‘a cosmopolitan liberal-democratic program’ such as would have been found in ‘the neoliberal program’ if it was not for its ‘absence of democratic accountability’ (Archibugi 2008: 142, emphasis in original). So if present neoliberalism were to move incrementally to the left (and in the process gain better democratic credentials), it would quickly become very similar to institutional internationalist cosmopolitanism, especially since both forms of liberalism prefer (loose) global governance to (cohesive) global government. This observation points to an inherent ideological weakness found within current cosmopolitan thought, i.e. if we conceive of it solely as a manner of liberal internationalism. Even though a critique of current international institutions and suggestions for their improvement are essential elements of this part of the cosmopolitan discourse, it does give the impression of coming a bit too close to being a theory for the legitimation of international best practices as presently seen through a privileged Western gaze (see: Fine 2003: 466).

This means that cosmopolitanism when perceived as a variety of liberal internationalism ends up presenting a ‘project’ which can appear ‘liberal or even conservative, designed to make fine adjustments to international institutions in the hope that all will then be well with the world’ (Fine 2003: 466). In short it can easily be perceived as the propagandistic side of a broader liberal discourse, serving to perpetuate the structures that make neoliberal economic dominance possible, through presenting what is in essence a false alternative. Such a conclusion would perhaps be overly harsh, but what there is a basis for suggesting is at least that

40 See the preceding chapter on neoliberalism.
liberal internationalism cum cosmopolitanism should be thought of not as diametrically opposed to either the present world order or neoliberal capitalism, but instead as an ideological force aiming to assuage the worst excesses associated with each, through reforms that would pull the present center of politics incrementally leftwards so to speak. This can only be perceived as radical from a standpoint so conservative as to block out all political influences further away from theirs than what we find in institutional internationalist cosmopolitanism.

The Planetarist Cosmopolitans

But there is an alternative tendency within contemporary cosmopolitan discourse which follows in the footsteps of Cloots and Wells. The cosmopolitans of today that comes closer to being planetarists than the internationalist cosmopolitans discussed above argue for a type of global universalism that begins to resemble that of the historian and Wells enthusiast Walter Warren Wagar, the scholar who almost singlehandedly kept alive the planetarist cosmopolitan tradition during the Cold War (see; Wagar 1961, 1963, 1971, 1991, 1996, 1999 and 2002). There were a few others of course, Wagar himself mentions ‘the distinguished biologist Julian Huxley’ and ‘nuclear physicist Leo Szilard’ in addition to ‘the historian Arnold J. Toynbee, the humanist Lewis Mumford, the philosopher F. S. C. Northrop’ and ‘the sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin’, among others (Wagar 2002: 32-33). But many of these were not active for the duration of the Cold War and none were to my knowledge as explicit in their support of Wells’ earlier vision as Wagar himself was.

Wagar identifies his own position as ideologically cosmopolitan, albeit in a manner consistent with Cloots’ and not Kant’s conception: ‘As nationalism demands unqualified loyalty to the nation, Marxism to the working class, and Christianity to the Biblical God, so cosmopolitanism – the ideology of world integration – will demand unqualified loyalty to mankind’ (Wagar 1971: 52). Wagar then makes the explicitly political prescription that ‘to bring into being an authentic world government, we must first bring into being an authentic world political party’ (Wagar 1971: 59). This party’s ‘final goal [ ] in every country will be the mundialization [sic] of national power, the transfer of sovereign power intact and complete to the world republic’ (Wagar 1971: 66). One has thus instituted ‘the world state’ which ‘will be unitary, democratic, socialist, and liberal’ but since ‘any of these ideas, pushed to its logical conclusions, might accomplish the destruction of
the other three, the constitution of the world state must be finely balanced’ (Wagar 1971: 142).

The chief contributions to Wells’ earlier model for a world state made by Wagar was that Wagar in contrast to Wells insisted on the need for a democratic World Republic as the only feasible long-term solution (e.g. Wagar 2002: 37-39). It would have to be based on a relationship between the World Republic, the World Party, and the world populace, but it was not meant to be an unflagging global one party state:

…the Party will [ ] hold itself accountable to the world’s people and will compete democratically with any other political formations that arise to challenge it. In short, the coming of the World Republic spells not the end of politics, as Wells anticipated, but its ascent to a higher plane, freed from the malodorous manipulations of big capital. The World Republic will be ruled not by science or expertise, invaluable as these things might be, but by the minds of all humankind, by what Jean-Jacques Rousseau called more than two centuries ago the “General Will”. This great Will must remain at all times the only true sovereign power on earth (Wagar 2002: 39).

The latest cohort to take over the planetarist mantle have shown a bit more theoretical sophistication in terms of their models for the ideal world polity; Wagar here after all comes perilously close to arguing for one humanity, one party, and one state, in a manner that can be confused with the earlier totalitarian schemes for communist world domination. In Wagar’s futuristic novel A Short History of the Future (1999) he imagines that if the World Party were to come into power with the majority needed for it to implement its program then the question might arise whether the global polity it was in charge of was ‘a true democracy or a stage-managed dictatorship of the World party?’(Wagar 1999: 147). In comparison the contemporary cosmopolitan planetarists come into the debate with a heightened awareness that democratic governance of a global polity would necessarily be a bit more pluralistic than this.

Raffaele Marchetti’s concept of ‘cosmo-federalism’ is one case in point (Marchetti 2008: 153-167). Marchetti argues that: ‘Either democracy is global or it is not democracy’ (Marchetti 2008: 1). This assertion can only be made on the assumption that the only true demos in the global age is the theoretical one that is coextensive
with the entire adult population of our species. Marchetti does not argue for replacing all other layers of democracy with the proposed global one. He does advocate a reform of the United Nations that is consistent with most international cosmopolitan schemes as the most realistic pathway towards its realization. But in a manner not too different from the aforementioned Richard Falk he does end up advocating reforms of such magnitude that one has to start speculating if this would not actually amount to the introduction of a world government by stealth (Marchetti 2008: 161-162; and see Falk as cited on; Marchetti 2008: 163). In a later work Marchetti argues for the constitution of a ‘non-unitary world state’ that would make possible ‘joint action on a specific set of global issues’ (Marchetti 2012: 39). It is “non-unitary” in the sense that national units would still exist and the citizens would ‘be subject to two powers’ which implies that they would have ‘dual loyalty’ (Marchetti 2012: 40). This might have the appearance of the internationalism earlier advocated by Kant, but once one sees the legal framework Marchetti suggests, then it becomes apparent that the nation-state has been replaced with something resembling a subsidiary department: ‘A new covenant would be signed among individuals, states and a world organization, according to which states would delegate power to a superior institution in charge of both addressing global issues and allocating competences on the sub-levels’ (Marchetti 2012: 40). If this was not spelled out clearly enough Marchetti goes on to suggest that the resulting ‘institutional framework would comprise a world government, a world parliament, a world supreme court and a global constitution’ (Marchetti 2012: 40). Marchetti insists that the states would still retain ‘a portion of their sovereignty’ but he does in large part advocate the institution of a United States of the World where in the event ‘of conflict between the different institutional layers, the supranational authority must prevail over the lower ones’ (Marchetti 2012: 40-41).

Alexander Wendt is another contemporary theorist that has argued that ‘a world state is inevitable’ and who thinks that this outcome ‘would be desirable’ as well (Wendt 2011: 55). But Luis Cabrera is probably the theorist that has done the most to reinvigorate the debate on world or global government on this side of the millennium without uncritically adopting the internationalist doctrine that accept Kant’s ostensible premise that full political integration is bound to be the highroad to a world despotism (Cabrera 2004, 2005, 2010, 2011, and 2015). Cabrera argues that: ‘Ultimately, we should want to put in place an institutional framework where
the interests of all persons [i.e. every member of the human species] will be vigorously protected and promoted’ and that this institutional framework ‘would most likely be some form of democratic global government’ (Cabrera 2004: 141-142). But again the vision of a global government offered by Cabrera is a lot more complex than what for instance Wagar suggested:

The global system could be composed of partially sovereign, semi-autonomous units. I say units because, in the context of a more integrated system, we need not think only in terms of states and regional organizations composed of states. Substate regions and municipalities likely would have an important role to play, as they increasingly do in Europe. Above regions could be historic states, and above states, democratic supranational organizations. Above supranational regional organizations would be the global governing bodies, with representatives elected and public servants drawn from all regions (Cabrera 2004: 94-95).

What Cabrera suggests here is not that there should be a “dual loyalty” for citizens as we saw Marchetti doing previously, but that the sovereignty of the world state level would be diluted by the existence of in all four or five democratic levels (the municipality and/or provincial region, the nation-state, the supranational region, and then the global government). One earlier articulation of this notion of the world state as ideally a bundle of democratic layers in the post-Cold War era was made by Yael Tamir, who in 2000 presented the following vision of a global democratic state:

A democratic global state should aspire to delegate as much authority as possible to smaller units. It would want to allow cultural groups to preserve their uniqueness, voluntary associations to pursue their interests, religious groups to practice their religion, neighborhoods to determine their specific character and the like. It would also aspire that political, economic or ecological problems which could be solved at lower levels will be dealt with at these levels. Hence, a global state can foster at once both centralization and decentralization (Tamir 2000: 263-264).

This might sound as the eminently sensible way to arrange things, but then one discovers what the main point of retaining this loose structure is: ‘One might object that such a functionalist vision contradicts nationalist aspirations. I beg to differ. Even if a global state were ever to be formed, it is likely to be divided into a plurality of national units. Emphasizing a thin layer of common values need not
undermine the desire to retain national distinctiveness’ (Tamir 2000: 264). Tamir’s version of cosmopolitanism in other words does not seek to contradict nationalist aspirations. We are here squarely back to Kant’s insistence on internationalism as opposed to planetarism. This is not what Marchetti and Cabrera intended with their similar designs, but it appears to be a conundrum within the present cosmopolitan discourse that even those who are in favor of world government cannot remove themselves sufficiently from the national imaginary to realize that to continue to foster loyalty to the nation is not something that is likely to be compatible with the goal of political world integration.

Wells and Wagar had understood that nationalism was the enemy, and not the facilitator, of their designs for a world state. Even those that come closest to following on the course they set out today appear to be enthrall to the notion that a democratic cosmopolitan world must be so layered with complexity that it is hard to begin to understand how it is supposed to work. How can this be democratic in a world where the proper functioning of democracy requires that the layman understands what different political parties actually are meant to stand for? I think Marchetti’s solution comes closest to the planetarist solution promoted by Wells and Wagar, but for it to fit completely Marchetti would need to lower the local level of loyalty so close to the provincial or municipal level that we are in fact talking about a sovereign state of global proportions. This would in theory remove the confounding mid-levels which Nussbaum’s “concentric circles” argument makes a virtue of including and which Kant in the end elevated to prime importance. But in the end you cannot defend the special status of your own countrymen or co-religionists and at the same time maintain a planetarist outlook. When it comes to creating planetary political designs you either have to choose between being a communitarian or a global universalist, because you cannot be both and at the same time expect to come up with a logical polity.

**Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism as Two Distinct Political Ideologies**

There is an ideological contradiction at the heart of cosmopolitan discourse today. The national imaginary maintains its grip on the imagination of virtually all its current theorists to different degrees. This is especially pronounced for cosmopolitan theorists like Habermas, Nussbaum, and Beck, who have not moved very far from Kant’s international cosmopolitanism. The few theorists that has managed to see the contradiction; Cloots, Wells, and Wagar, amongst those presented here, have been
lonely voices in the wilderness in comparison to the mainstream of the cosmopolitan discourse which apparently cannot fathom that global institutions is something that in the realm of theory can be forged anew. A new generation of cosmopolitans have come closer to adopting a planetarist vision, scholars like Wendt, Marchetti, and Cabrera. But so far, as we have seen by example of the theory of Marchetti and Cabrera, there is a tendency even amongst these to accommodate their designs to the national imaginary. The nation-state they should instead, following Wells and Wagar, see as an obstacle that has to be removed rather than be retained, if their designs are going represent a meaningful advance away from the present state of anarchy in international affairs. Nonetheless, Marchetti and Cabrera in particular comes close to advocating a form of global democracy – that if a bit further developed – could become an improved variety of the planetarist cosmopolitanism put forward by Wells and Wagar in the twentieth century.

The crucial difference between the internationalist and the (approaching) planetarist side is a reformist promotion of ‘intergovernmentalism’ contra a radical advocacy of the institution of a ‘global polity’ where only the latter treat humanity as one potential ‘global demos’ and not as a group of separate demoi which the internationalists do, as indicated by for instance Falk’s use of the term “peoples”, and by their general insistence that meaningful change can be accomplished within the confines of the UN system (Marchetti 2012, see also; Bohman 2007).

Given this rather substantial internal difference the question needs to be posed whether cosmopolitanism as presented here can be considered to be a unitary ideology at all. We are in fact looking at one reformist and one radical political project that share a cosmopolitan morality, but which interprets the political consequences of holding that moral view in vastly different terms (see: Dufek 2013). I would suggest that the current crop of cosmopolitan theorists have to realize that they are taking part in the formulation of an ideology, and are not just participating in an academic discourse, which is what I get the impression that they perceive themselves mainly as doing. To spread this ideology so that it can become a real force for change it has to be possible to communicate it in no uncertain terms to a large number of people. If they want to become professional purveyors of a cosmopolitan ideology they would have to make a decision concerning what they actually are trying to do so their core message can be clarified for the masses; is it to preserve the nation-state within a loose framework which varies little from what we
already have today or is it to build a democratic world state that would be a qualitative improvement over today’s international institutions?

If it is the former then cosmopolitanism is internationalist and does not present much of a threat to neoliberalism, which as we saw in the last chapter is an ideology for a global elite that thrives economically on a multilayered legal framework. If it is the latter then cosmopolitanism is planetarist and it would represent a threat to neoliberalism like no other ideology, since a global institution able to tax and redistribute at the global level is the neoliberals’ biggest fear. The last option would also be an indication that the era of the national imaginary is on the wane. It is clear that the former option is the more realistic in the short term, but it also promises more of the same just slightly reformed, and this in an era when radical solutions might be worth going for even if they are harder to arrive at. To me it seems like cosmopolitanism, ironically given its name, at present is overwhelmingly a less than fully global ideology. But at its theoretical fringes there has always been the stubborn presence of what could be a burgeoning planetarist ideology which I have here traced from the French Revolution, via the interwar years, through the Cold War, and all the way to today’s cosmopolitan discourse. We therefore presently have two distinctly different cosmopolitanisms, one dominant internationalist one and the kernel of an aspiring planetarist one. Whether that difference will be resolved internally – as has happened previously several times in the favor of internationalism – or if cosmopolitanism might split into these two constituent parts before that happens and in the process make this qualitative disparity plain for all to see, is impossible to tell at this present juncture, but that seems to be the options.
Chapter 5. Alter-Globalism

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the ideological coherence of a political phenomenon widely perceived as both global in scope and leftist in political orientation. This is an ideological phenomenon whose essence has been attempted captured through the employment of terms such as the following; ‘the antiglobalization movement’ (Yuen, Burton-Rose, and Katsiaficas 2004, and; Held & McGrew 2007), ‘the anti-globalization movements’ (Bhagwati 2004: 29, added emphasis), ‘the antiglobalists’ (Steger 2005a, and 2005b, and; Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2000: 275), the ‘anti-globalizers’ and ‘the new millennium collectivists’ (Wolf 2004: 3-12), ‘the anti-capitalist movement’ (Callinicos 2003), ‘the new anarchists’ (Graeber 2002), ‘a global resistance movement’ (Korten 2006), ‘the global justice movement’ (Porta 2007), ‘the global left’ (Santos 2006), ‘the largest social movement in history’ (Hawken 2007), ‘alter-globalization’ (Pleyers 2010, and; West 2013), and ‘justice globalism’ (Steger 2008, and; Steger, Goodman, and Wilson 2013).

The above list of terms is by no means exhaustive, but it can serve as an indication of the political range this phenomenon is perceived as inclusive of. We also have to take into account that these are labels that have been employed by proponents, opponents, and scholarly observers over a period of many years. What is important to notice here is that there is a huge discrepancy between some of these terms. When David Graeber employs the term “the new anarchists” this is a much more ideologically restrictive term than for instance Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ term “the global left”. Santos’ latter term, when we understand Graeber’s use of the term anarchism to mean a libertarian socialist left position and not the right-wing libertarianism sometimes confused with neoliberalism, is the more precise one, albeit this term is still not entirely inclusive of all the aspects of the phenomenon at hand. What all the terms mentioned above, and not just those employed by Graeber or Santos, fail to communicate is the important role ‘the ecological movement’ plays in shaping the alter-globalist ideological discourse (Löwy 2006: 7). The political project of the alter-globalist discourse and the many ‘emancipatory social
movements’ that take part in it has been described succinctly as ‘to birth a new civilization that is more humane and respectful of nature’ (Löwy 2006: 9). Jorge Riechmann has argued that ideologically this project ought to be inclusive of the following range of political positions:

This project cannot reject any of the colors of the rainbow – neither the red of the anti-capitalist and egalitarian labor movement, nor the violet of the struggles for women’s liberation, nor the white of non-violent movements for peace, nor the anti-authoritarian black of the libertarians and anarchists, and even less of the green of the struggle for a just and free humanity on a habitable planet (as cited in Löwy 2006: 9).

To cover the whole range Riechmann could also have included the rainbow flag of the movement for LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights and the multicolored flag of the native population of the Andes (which notably has been used as the emblem of the Bolivian indigenous population) to serve as a stand-in for all the marginalized indigenous populations worldwide to complete his description. Not only is ‘the valorization of diversity’ when it comes to sexual, ethnic, and cultural identities a key feature of alter-globalist discourse (Pleyers 2010: 26-27). But an equally central feature is a focus on improving the life-conditions of people living in the global South, or what during the Cold War era was known as the Third World (see: Pleyers 2010: 25).

It has been argued that the alter globalist discourse has developed into a coherent ideology of ‘justice globalism’ (Steger, et al 2013: 147). The ideological coherence Steger et al argue for having identified is ‘reflected in seven core concepts’ (Steger, et al 2013: 148). These seven core concepts are; i) ‘participatory democracy’, ii) ‘equality of outcome and access’, iii) ‘social justice, restorative, and (re)distributive’, iv) ‘universal rights, including economic, social, and cultural’, v) ‘global solidarity in social movements’, vi) ‘sustainable ecologies and societies’, and vii) ‘transformative change from below’ (Steger, et al 2013: 148). What is conspicuously missing from this catalogue of justice- or alter-globalism’s core concepts is a decontested world order perspective. We will see later on in this chapter that the link between “participatory democracy” and global democracy is a rather weak one, and that for some leading participants in the alter-globalist discourse the first does not necessarily have to lead to the other. There seems to be
some confusion on this point as the term “global democracy” crops up repeatedly in academic treatments of alter-globalist discourse as its logical goal, but this claim might be less warranted if we look closer at the entire breadth of the contemporary discourse (see: Teivainen 2002, Smith 2008, and; 2015, Reitan 2012). Not that there is anything strange about the notion of global democracy rising to the fore in the cited treatments and others. If one notices such core concepts or programmatic goals within the discourse as “redistributive social justice”, “sustainable ecologies” and “universal rights” one might start pondering about what it would take to actually institute these politically.

Fulfilling the aspiration to for instance “social justice” at the global level would presumably have to involve the power to levy taxes, which further means a global legislative and executive political apparatus that all humanity can somehow participate in giving democratic input to if this power to tax and redistribute globally is to be legitimately exercised. In short we are talking about the creation of a global democratic polity. But this bridging of local aspirations with their logical political repercussions (if they were to become the universal norm) at the global level does apparently not come that easily to many of the participants in the alter-globalist discourse. Centralization in any form seems to be anathema to quite a number of the alter-globalist theorists, which in practice rules out global representative institutions. If this is the dominant tendency within the alter-globalist discourse it lacks the decisive features that would clearly make it a planetarist ideology: i.e. a refusal to see the world as naturally or rationally divided into nation-states, in combination with support for a universalist project of political globalization to replace the current international world order.

The decontested core concept I am looking for within the discourse that would counter this initial assumption would be to find a coherent set of viewpoints within the discourse that advocates a preferred world order that goes beyond promoting democratic participation at the local level. Ideologies in the final analysis are after all ‘projects, or at least encapsulate practical projects which give rise to political strategies and tactics, models of political action which seek to transform the world’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 26). Such world transformation must necessarily involve the implementation of a specific program, which in order to be set out to begin with, will require the existence of some clearly defined core objectives. The question I will seek to answer in this chapter is therefore; is there a core world order objective
present in the alternative globalization discourse? And if so, is the desired world order planetarist, internationalist, or something else entirely? To answer this we will have to see if there is a shared and specific position on what form a desired world order should take for the participants in the contemporary discourse. But first we have to see what makes alter-globalist thinking a distinct ideational tendency.

Emergence

Alter-globalism as a political movement emerged on the world scene, particularly in the eyes of the media, when protests were held against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in late 1999 (see: Yuen, et al 2004). The protests in Seattle ‘involved some thirteen hundred civic, social movement, and trade union organizations from over eighty countries’ (Katsiaficas 2004: 3). Because the protest in Seattle was directed against the neoliberal pattern of economic globalization promoted by institutions such as the WTO this kind of protest was named ‘antiglobalization protests’ (Katsiaficas 2004: 3). For the more seasoned observers signs of its emergence can be seen almost immediately after the Cold War ended. One of its earliest instantiations as a protest movement has been recognized as being in ‘Bangalore in 1993, when half a million Indian peasants pledged to resist the classification of seeds as private property’ thereby ensuring that ‘protests against the WTO began at its birth’ (Shiva 2005: 2, and; Collins 2004: xxxix, see also; Pleyers 2010: 3). And though there is little doubt that the ‘best known of Seattle’s precursors is the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico’ which was a direct response to the introduction of NAFTA in 1994, another important precedence was set about five years earlier by a ‘Venezuelan uprising in 1989’ where ‘thousands of people rose up against the imposition of IMF-ordered austerity measures’ (Katsiaficas 2004: 4).

In 2001 the World Social Forum (WSF) was initiated to get all the groups that shared the same political concerns about the dominant pattern of neoliberal globalization together. The forum was meant as ‘a space and process for those wanting another kind of global integration that emphasizes human needs over economic growth, environmental protection over corporate profits, and social inclusion over a competitive economic race to the bottom’ (Smith, et al 2008: xii). It was not meant to be a party or a movement of its own: ‘The WSF is not an organization with a common political platform for devising strategies’ but the most
important commonality of the organizations that made it up was that these ‘organisations must adhere to a charter saying they are opposed to neoliberalism’ albeit ‘not necessarily to capitalism’ (Amin 2008: 4).

The important thing to note here is that the source of the concerns that first led to protests and then to the formation of the WSF was top-down economical (de)regulation imposed by international institutions and through free trade agreements. Not just against those mentioned above; the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Other international institutions and high profile gatherings, such as the World Bank, the European Union, the World Economic Forum, the G7, G8, and G20, have also been targeted for the same reasons (Collins 2004: xxxiv-xlvi). The common denominator for all these institutions that became a target for the so called antiglobalization protesters in the 1990s and early 2000s was their promotion of economic measures associated with the neoliberal ideology. In time this realization has led observers to the conclusion that ‘Alter-globalization activists do not oppose globalization but an ideology: neoliberalism’ (Pleyers 2010: 16). This idea that alter-globalist discourse is not against globalization per se, is often presented as an essential property of the discourse:

The movement is not “anti” but internationalist and deeply engaged with the world as a whole and the fate of everyone that shares the planet. It also has plenty of concrete proposals to offer, making it easily more “pro-globalisation” than its adversaries. It all depends on what kind of globalisation one means, and for whom (George 2004: ix).

The notion that the participants in the alter-globalist discourse are generally in favor of globalization took some time to figure out, not only on the part of observers, but also for those participating in the discourse itself (see: Katsiaficas 2004). But it appears that ‘the phrase “antiglobalization” is a coinage of the U. S. media’ as David Graeber asserts (Graeber 2003: 326). And, Graeber continues, ‘if one takes “globalization” to mean the effacement of borders and the free movement of people, possessions, and ideas’ this means that ‘the groups involved’ should be seen as ‘more supportive of globalization in general than supporters of the IMF or World Trade Organization’ (Graeber 2003: 327).
From Anti-Globalization to Alternative Globalization

What does it mean to be against globalization if the term is not considered coterminous with following a neoliberal blueprint for the world economy? The term “globalization”, at least in academic usage, does not exclusively mean economic globalization following neoliberal tenets but more ambiguously often means ‘a set of social processes defined and described by various commentators in different, often contradictory ways’ (Steger 2005b: 23). It is only in one way “anti-globalization” correctly can be employed to signify the project of the alter-globalist discourse, and that is if globalization is taken to solely mean neoliberal globalization. In more advanced works on globalization it is often pointed out that globalization as a phenomenon should not be viewed as exclusively economic (and even less as exclusively neoliberal), because it denotes a long-term process whereby a web of global interconnections is spun denser and denser, though the temporary setback occurs from time to time (see: McNeill & McNeill 2003, Rosenberg 2012, and; Iriye 2014). The weaving of this net also happens in cultural, social, and political dimensions (e.g. Robertson 1990, and; Porta 2005). And in several of these dimensions the globalizing dynamic is not necessarily driven by particularly neoliberal notions. Or as put in one discussion of globalization particularly sensible to the political dimensions of it; ‘it is clear that globalization has several aspects to it that have had nothing much to do with neo-liberalism’ (Agnew 2009: 17). Following a similar multi-faceted understanding of the processes behind the phenomenon of globalization one of the leading authorities on the alter-globalization movement also arrives at the same fundamental realization: ‘Globalization cannot be identified with the ideology and practice of a global free market’ (Porta 2005: 676).

Before neoliberalism had made much of an impact on world politics globalization was described in the following terms: ‘The process by which a number of historical world societies were brought together into one global system might be referred to as globalization’ (Modelski 1972: 41). This process of becoming a global civilization is something we, both temporally and spatially speaking, are still very much in the midst of. Understanding globalization this way makes it an extensive phenomenon that is only tangentially related to for example capitalism. Being “against” globalization in this sense is also a rather futile position to take because it means being against ‘the large community’ that humanity already has become which ‘is here and can no longer be avoided’ – whether individual human beings on a personal
level approve of this fact or not (Modelski 1972: 56). Therefore ‘Globalization ultimately raises the problem of whether the large community, indeed the community of mankind, can be a good community’ rather than whether or not such a community is desirable (Modelski 1972: 56).

Globalization in this sense is a historical fact and not an ideological project that somehow can be undone. Neoliberalism has adapted to it in a limited and narrow way. Neoliberal successes stems mostly from going with the flow of the general globalization tendency, for instance through removing barriers to trade among equally developed countries, while its failings stem from ignoring other imperatives stemming from the same globalizing dynamic. One noteworthy failure related to the rise of alter-globalist discourse is for instance the elitist neoliberal stance which has led to efforts to stem the tide of political globalization through hindering the creation of working mechanisms for substantive democratic input at the global level. The only thing we can do when it comes to globalization, as George Modelski presciently argued already in the early 1970s, is to try to make the conditions for this large community which we are now inadvertently saddled with ‘better’ (Modelski 1972: 56). It is safe to say that one of the basic premises for the whole alter-globalist discourse is that following neoliberalism’s tenets has made the large community’s conditions worse. A similar multi-dimensional understanding of globalization as the one argued for by Modelski gradually came to replace an early one-dimensional understanding of globalization, as solely economic and neoliberal, within the alter-globalist discourse.

This general realization meant that it would be inconsistent for an ostensibly progressive ideology to be against globalization when understood multi-dimensionally as a much deeper and drawn out process – one which neoliberal actors have simply temporarily been able to exploit to their benefit. And it dawned on many of the intellectual contributors to the discourse (such as George) that they were only playing into the hands of their ideological opponents by allowing themselves to be called “antiglobalists” or similar monikers.

The point is that globalization – however much it is a process that currently is being shaped by neoliberal imperatives (see: Peck, et al 2009, and; Brenner, et al 2010) – is not exclusively the domain of neoliberalism. Globalization was for instance being handled within a left of center Keynesian and social democratic political framework
during the postwar era. And later this world-historical trend of world integration could come within the ambit of a more progressive form of global politics (as envisioned by for instance; Patomäki & Teivainen 2004). Whoever has the ideological upper hand globally can steer the institutions already present in new directions, or replace, de-emphasize, or even abandon the old ones to make way for new ones.

One apparent sign that the formal political power to manage the process of globalization lies completely with the neoliberals is the rise of a ‘new constitutionalism’ that currently ‘locks in the neoliberal pattern of global development’ and makes ‘it more difficult for alternative solutions to common global problems to emerge’ (Gill 2014: 43). Following Gill’s argument it would be harder to topple neoliberalism from its dominant position the longer it is left in power. This is a concern that seemingly only animates parts of the alter-globalist discourse. The “new constitutionalism” along neoliberal lines, which can be seen as an attempt to create a neoliberal world constitution with minimal democratic consultation, can for example be sought replaced through the formation of a global ideological alternative that can seize control of the institutions that sets the legal parameters for global social, economic, and political intercourse. But it is not really clear if that is the goal of all the participants in the alter-globalist discourse. They are far from united in an attempt to gather an institutional challenge to neoliberalism. The ideas that animate the protests go much deeper than just mounting a challenge to neoliberalism. At least one major faction wants to completely topple the system by growing a new more organic one that can replace it from the bottom up. This is a radical challenge, but not one that has anything to do with the radical right.

The Ideological Bounds of the Alter-Globalist Discourse

As mentioned the one unifying factor among those that turned up to protest in Seattle in 1999 was ‘frustrations with neoliberal capitalism’ (Rowe & Carroll 2014: 154). This sense of frustration could come from people situated both to the left and right of the center of the political spectrum. By the center I mean the parts occupied by e.g. the pro-business Republicans and Clinton democrats in the United States or Thatcherite conservatives and Third Way social-democrats in the United Kingdom, which are some of the political elite factions that have done the most to advance the neoliberal ideology up until now. A further source of confusion caused by the “anti-” terminology has been that it was not strictly incorrect as a way of describing some
of the groups which partook in for example the protests in Seattle. There has been
genuine antiglobalization demonstrators – opposing globalization in any form, not
just the neoliberal one – within the ranks of protestors at rallies directed at the
political elite – or globalism – as both ‘the political left (internationalist-egalitarians)
and the political right (nationalist-protectionists)’ can be equally opposed to e.g.
neoliberal trade practices without sharing the same motivational basis for the
opposition (Steger 2005b: 31, see also; Rupert 2000: 94-131).

It would also be a mistake to think that all “national-protectionists” necessarily
belong to the right, though the groups Steger refers to as national-protectionist are
most likely of the type that by now have coalesced into the Tea Party in the United
States. The Tea-Party which now compose the right wing of the Republican Party
(its left-wing is pro-business), with sympathizers so nationally inclined that
they are hostile to any kind of internationalism, irrespective of whether the
motivation for it is founded in an economic or solidaristic standpoint (see: Lieven
2012, and; Skocpol & Williamson 2012).

The empirical basis for claiming that the alter-globalist discourse involves right
wing elements is basically non-existent – even if there are elements within it that
above all emphasize the national setting for their struggle ‘against the state or the
dominant national civil society’ (Santos 2006: 115). There is no theory available in
the general literature – which constitutes the discourse in its most clearly articulated
sense – that in any way can be described as belonging further to the right on the
political spectrum than the neoliberals themselves do. But there is a marked
tendency amongst the neoliberals to present it differently. This (perhaps deliberate)
confusion about who participates in the alternative globalization discourse on the
neoliberal right could serve a propagandistic function, but it should in any case be
noted.

The defenders of (neoliberal) globalization see the neoliberal ideology as being
confronted by ‘a movement dedicated to self-sufficiency’ which includes such
varied fare as; ‘trade unions’, ‘farm lobbies’, ‘conservationists and
environmentalists’, ‘lobbies for development’, ‘consumer groups’, ‘human rights
groups’, ‘Church groups of all denominations’, ‘women’s groups’, ‘campaigners for
indigenous groups and traditional ways of life’, ‘old-fashioned socialists and neo-
Marxists’, ‘mercantilists, nationalists, and assorted anti-liberal groups of the right’,
the last group inclusive of those ‘supporting Patrick Buchanan in the United States or Jean-Marie Le Pen in France’ (Wolf 2004: 4-7). Or in a similar vein that ‘contemporary anti-globalist thinkers [ ] aim to elevate the moral status of the nation-state and to reclaim what is seen as its lost authority to impose law on commerce’ (Steil & Hinds 2009: 18). In both these cases we see that the sweep is so broad that it ends up tarring the whole discourse as basically nationalist in nature.

In addition the arguably least accurate (or most mean-spirited) presentation of the alternative globalization discourse due to its opposition to neoliberalism is accomplished in the work of Micklethwait and Wooldridge who, under the sub-heading ‘Rage Against the Machine’ and in the space of less than three pages, manages to weave together a narrative which equates the following ‘antiglobalist groups’; ‘nongovernmental organizations dedicated to halting, or at least emasculating, globalization’, ‘the left and its army of trade unionists, environmentalists and students’, ‘Timothy McVeigh’ and various other Christian fundamentalists and anti-Semites, ‘Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo [a group infamous for its sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995] and Mexico’s Zapatistas’, and, finally, ‘the most powerful antiglobalist group [which] is militant Islam’ (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2000: 274-276).

Let it suffice to say in response to these claims here that there is a faction within the alternative globalization discourse interested in regaining control of the nation-state so as to impose protectionist measures meant to save its population from the vagaries of neoliberal capitalism (for example; Bello 2013: 249-276). But those behind the claims that try to intimate an ideological affinity between the alternative globalization discourse and ‘anti liberal groups of the right’ up to and including fundamentalists of one or the other religious persuasion, have all failed to pick up on the discourse’s most cohesive feature – excepting its opposition to neoliberal practice and ideology – which is its generally leftist political orientation. It is certainly wrong to depict the discourse as encompassing any and all positions on the global ideological continuum excluding the center part of it where some contemporary neoliberals present themselves as residing in solitude.

It is typically claimed that the alternative globalization discourse is furthered by a ‘myriad [of] social movement organizations and networks that rebel, resist, petition, campaign, and create alternative practices’, but even though these constituent parts
are ‘incredibly diverse’, they are also ‘quite clearly of the “left” ’ (Reitan 2012: 324). That the alternative globalization discourse should be conceived of as located on the left side of the political spectrum is one of the major conclusions scholars studying this phenomenon have reached (see also: Porta 2007: 242-246). Another major finding that crops up repeatedly in the relevant literature is that the other aspect that truly unites the participants in this discourse is their ‘blanket opposition to neoliberal globalization’, which therefore unifies them in a common ‘struggle against the “neoliberal ideology” ’ (Funke 2012: 353, and; Pleyers 2010: 156). These are still fairly wide parameters for the alter-globalist discourse. Within the area thus encapsulated one can find basically every political position originating on the left, except for the single caveat that it also has to incorporate an oppositional stance towards neoliberal globalization/ideology.

This initial narrowing down of the ideological nature of the alternative globalization discourse leaves us with a rather wide conception of the “left”. Befittingly perhaps since the alter-globalist discourse has been described by Ruth Reitan as following from ‘the three broad traditions and fractious relations of the political left, namely liberalism, marxism, and anarcho-autonomism’ (Reitan 2012: 324). Reitan identifies the most recent articulations of these different strains as being, respectively; ‘social democratic reformism and liberal cosmopolitanism’, ‘neo-marxism’ and ‘neo-anarchism’ (Reitan 2012: 324). Reitan captures the scope of the alternative globalization discourse fairly well, but her categorization is certainly in need of some qualification. The border between anti-neoliberals and pro-neoliberals is much less clear cut than simply stating that more or less every political position found to the left of conservatism ought to belong in this category.

What most of all makes Reitan’s classification of the left untenable without further qualification is the explicit tendency among present day neoliberals to self-identify as “liberal cosmopolitans”, such as in the following excerpt: ‘What unites the pro-globalization [here meaning neoliberal] literature is the way in which its authors appeal explicitly to an established philosophy of liberal cosmopolitanism’ (Steil & Hinds 2009: 35, my emphasis). When we note this usage of the term liberal cosmopolitanism the distinction employed by Reitan becomes too imprecise to do the required categorical work. For logically the neoliberals should not be counted as making up part of a group opposed to the neoliberal ideology. It is not that Reitan’s classification is necessarily in the wrong with its inclusion of liberal
cosmopolitanism on the side of the alternative globalization discourse, but the existence of some liberal cosmopolitans that also can be categorized as alter-globalists does not in itself exclude the fact that certain other liberal cosmopolitans could also be neoliberals. In the latter case, as we can recall from the discussion of neoliberalism previously, the neoliberals are not entirely incorrect in using the term “liberal cosmopolitan” as a label for their own position, as it is certainly both more “liberal” and “cosmopolitan” than that held by the conservative nationalists they once struggled to distinguish themselves from. To be precise the terms which describe the difference in ideological position that we are looking for here, as argued earlier, would be “social-liberal internationalist” and “neoliberal internationalist”, where the group which is most commonly referred to as liberal cosmopolitans would be those of the former description and not those of the latter. Ideally, these groups should be quite easy to separate into center-left and center-right factions (see: Schwarzmantel 2008: 49-68, and; Freeden 2005: 137) as in principle the social liberals should, for example, be in favor of more democratic institutions instead of the more elitist ones favored by the more conservatively inclined neoliberals, but in the world of corresponding party politics the line between these two varieties is far harder to locate.

Contemporary cosmopolitans tend to distance themselves from neoliberalism (e.g. Held 2004), but they also acknowledge that the ‘cosmopolitan social-democratic program’ which they have a tendency to promulgate could be replaced with ‘a cosmopolitan liberal-democratic program’ that resembles the ‘neoliberal program’ within the same ‘institutional framework’ that they strive to realize (Archibugi 2008: 142). This makes the center-left cosmopolitan position at least potentially neutral in its relationship to neoliberalism, as this could be read as less than an expression of outright opposition. This somewhat tentative relation is further underlined if we take e.g. Held’s expressed support for a social democratic program as potentially translating into a support for the ideological course which present day social democratic parties have followed over the last couple of decades, such as Britain’s New Labour, Germany’s SPD, or Spain’s PSOE. Though in all fairness this is probably not exactly what Held aims to convey, it is in any case a connection allowed for when “social democracy” is the term he centers his argument around. This social democratic position, as enunciated by Held – albeit it is also demarcated from ‘neoconservatism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ – explicitly names ‘radical anti-
globalism’ as the last of its three ‘key political opponents’ (Held 2004: 17). This separates social-democratic aims from that of the alternative globalization discourse, at least when conceived of as a whole which includes a variety of radical positions. As we will now see, Held’s argument that social democracy and neoliberalism are different ideological positions can be seen as a rearguard defense of the kind of distinctions which supporters of the alter globalization discourse tend to dismiss not only as largely irrelevant, but by now as belonging to a bygone era.

Contemporary political parties associated with social democratic and liberal cosmopolitan thought have over the last decades also become associated with the implementation and furthering of the very same neoliberal policies that the different participants in the alternative globalization discourse ostensibly have united against. It might be a factor of some future significance that groupings negatively disposed towards neoliberalism continue to play a minority role within such party organizations – I am here thinking of social- or ‘left-liberals’ who are inspired by e.g. J. S. Mill and Keynes (Leopold 2012, and; Jackson 2012), and the kind of “old school” social democrats who strongly disliked the shift to Third Way politics in the 1990s (e.g: Martell 2012).

But it is immitigably of greater consequence for the present ideological landscape informing world politics that the parties that once represented these viewpoints now for a long time have accepted the market logic of neoliberal doctrine. For instance was ‘Labour’s [ ] acceptance of the neo-liberal status quo’ (Bastow and Martin 2003: 71) emblematic of the series of such party conversions that started happening ‘around 1980’ and which ‘led to social democratic parties contributing to the deregulation, privatization and attacks on public welfare services which we have experienced the last couple of decades – no matter if it has been under the name tag “the third way”, as in the United Kingdom, or “Die neue Mitte”, as it was called in Germany’ (Wahl 2011: 196). Wahl also points out that ‘this tendency’ eventually went so far ‘that when social democratic governments were in a large majority in the

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41 At the time of writing there is a slight resurgence for anti-neoliberal ideas on the parliamentarian left exemplified by Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Bernie Sanders’ bid for presidential nomination by the Democratic Party in the US, and Jeremy Corbyn becoming the leader of the Labour Party in the UK. A host of Latin American parties have led the way for this reappearance of socialist party politics (see: Burbach, Fox & Fuentes 2013).
European Union for the first and only time at the end of the 1990s, this did not lead to any change in its neoliberal policy’ (Wahl 2011: 196).

This move to the right by the established parties of the center-left (see also: Porta 2007: 243) have led to the rise of an antagonistic climate also within the left broadly construed where ‘protests against neoliberal globalization have been met with various levels of distrust by center-left parties that had undergone [ ] changes in their ideological standing’ and those supportive of the alternative globalization discourse have ‘expressed a strong criticism of the perceived neoliberal turn of the main parties of the Left’ even in instances where the main focus of their protests have been ‘right-wing governments’ (Porta 2007: 242 and 244). This loss of faith in ‘the moderate-left parties’ – the traditional supporters of the mass of the electorate with primarily social concerns – have created something of a vacuum on the left side of the representative political spectrum which have led to an upsurge in votes for certain marginal parties around Europe which have stayed firm in their leftist, or even social liberal convictions, such as for the ‘the Communists’ and ‘the Greens’, with related incidents such as when ‘the Trotskyite candidate’ in France ‘achieved 10 percent of votes in the 2003 presidential election’ (Porta 2007: 244). We can therefore conclude that neoliberalism has made considerable encroachments into what traditionally has been thought of as “the left” while in response, for a portion of the electorate that has noticed this and reacted negatively, there has been a tendency to shift their allegiance leftwards along the party-political spectrum that is available to them in order to make up for the political imbalance resulting from the established left’s perceived turn to the right.

If we accept Reitan’s broad conception of the “left” as actually delimiting the bounds for which ideological positions we should think of as making up the alternative globalization discourse, but at the same time accept that the discourse cannot possibly maintain its integrity while incorporating its neoliberal “other”, then this means that there is an anti-neoliberal/pro-neoliberal cleavage going through parliamentary politics (through social democratic, and possibly, liberal parties in e.g. Europe, as well as through the Democratic Party in the United States) that in all likelihood separates the ideological inclination of the leadership of e.g. social-democratic parties from that of an unspecified portion of their membership and voter base. In short, we have to imagine that there is a jagged fault-line across the middle of the political spectrum which crisscrosses through the midst of centrist parties,
creating a chasm with (what over the last decades have been) their overwhelmingly pro-neoliberal elite and e.g. those who aspire to be part of it, on its right side, and the part of their members and supporters who have maintained, or more recently acquired, an anti-neoliberal disposition, on its left. This operation does more work than one immediately realizes, for as we have seen the defenders of neoliberalism have a tendency to portray the opposition to their agenda as coming primarily from a reactionary standpoint somewhere to its right.

The selection criteria employed for investigating the positions on world order found within the alter-globalist discourse are based on a modification of the ideological range Reitan argues for. First, as I have now argued, Reitan goes a bit too far towards the right side of the classic left-right spectrum when she claims that liberal cosmopolitans and contemporary social democrats should be viewed as taking part in the discourse without further reservation. The cut-off point for inclusion has to be articulated a bit more precisely than that so that we do not end up mixing alter-globalists and neoliberals into the same, and therefore evidently too wide, category. In addition, as I have tried to show with the help of David Held’s self-proclaimed position as being both social-democratic and cosmopolitan, there should be room for a middle category here as well, where someone that is center-left, but neither pro-neoliberal or leaning towards the radical left, can be positioned. The full extent of this middle category and the argument that it fills the political space between the neoliberal right and the alter-globalist left was further elaborated in the previous chapter on cosmopolitanism. The fact that there is a perceived overlap between left-cosmopolitan and alter-globalist positions and right-cosmopolitan and neoliberal positions also indicate that cosmopolitanism belongs in the center between the two. What this means for the alter-globalist discourse is that socialists of the Old Left persuasion might be included into its ranks, but not the nominal social democratic parties that have changed their ideological core from socialist to neoliberal and moved decisively to the right in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disbandment.

Influences

The (Really) Old Left

The alternative globalization discourse follows in the political tradition with its wellspring in the Enlightenment which focuses on "political liberty, social justice,
and cosmopolitanism’ as Stephen Eric Bronner described it (Bronner 2004: 1). In a sense this is the ideological underpinnings of the discourse, but of these three concepts the emphasis is firmly on social justice for the alter-globalist discourse. But it would be wrong to think that the goal of social justice figures so prominently that political liberty is forgotten. We are dealing with a different phenomenon here than the twentieth century left which to various degrees in its social democratic and Marxist-Leninist incarnations tended to ignore individual freedoms in favor of the collective good – and today often is associated with national ownership of the means of production or a statist obsession with centralized bureaucratic control, which both were features shared by the Western (social democratic) and Eastern (communist) forms of socialism. But what makes the alternative globalization discourse fundamentally stand out from the left parties that were in power during the twentieth century is that it is the direct descendant of the social and cultural rebellion against both the Eastern communist and Western social democratic/social liberal left as it existed then. This rebellion occurred in the late 1960s when a qualitatively different ‘New Left’ took on the shape of a ‘world historical movement’ (Katsiaficas 1987: 3-28).

The New Left Roots of the Alter-Globalist Discourse

By the late 1960s there was ‘a sense in the air, especially among the young, that Marxism and liberalism have in good measure ceased to provide explanations of the world’ (Barrington Moore, Jr. as cited in; Roszak [1969] 1995: 103). Herbert Marcuse was one of the chief theorists that criticized both the Marxist-Leninism dominant in the communist world and the liberalism dominant in the West at this time (for a discussion of Marcuse’s views and the impact these had on the counter-culture see: Roszak [1969] 1995: 84-123). Marcuse’s criticism was founded on the assumption that neither ideological system could be said to be conducive to freedom in the sense that liberation from domination had yet to occur on either side (Marcuse [1964] 2002: 16-17). Marcuse identified both the Soviet and the American societies as part of a larger ‘advanced industrial society’ that was closed to new impulses and suggestions for improvement and ruled by ‘technocrats’ with little or no concern for the psychological welfare of those underneath them in the societal hierarchy (Marcuse [1964] 2002). There was no room in this enclosed conception of the modern world for either liberated individuals or a sensible relationship to nature since both co-existing systems are enthralled by the same ‘technological rationality
and the logic of domination’ which results in an unceasing effort to dominate both ‘man’ and ‘nature’ (Marcuse [1964] 2002: 147 and 162). ‘We know that destruction is the price of progress [ ], that renunciation and toil are the prerequisites for gratification and joy, that business must go on, and that the alternatives are Utopian’ as Marcuse sums up the ‘ideology’ of ‘the established societal apparatus’ which ‘is a requisite for its continuous functioning and part of its rationality’ (Marcuse [1964] 2002: 149). The similarities between Marcuse’s ‘ideology of advanced industrial society’ (Marcuse [1964] 2002: iii) and what many today think of when they refer to “neoliberalism” are here manifold (see: Bauman 1999, and; Boltanski 2011).

The status quo as Marcuse described it has in certain fundamental respects not changed since then, as we can infer from the contemporary British ‘Greens’ point of view’ which is that ‘Labour and the Conservatives share a “super-ideology” of industrialism which holds that people are best served by economic growth’ (Jackson 2015: 27). Already in 1964 Marcuse writes about ‘the overdeveloped countries’ where a change for the better or a ‘qualitative change seems to presuppose a quantitative change in the advanced standard of living, namely, reduction of overdevelopment’ which is yet another statement that fits with the program of (at least several of) today’s Green parties (Marcuse [1964] 2002: 246, emphasis in original).

But the aspect of Marcuse’s theory which is most important for the subsequent development of; first the New Left and the related Counter Culture in the late 1960s, and then a generation later; for the alternative globalization discourse, is not that Marcuse thought about the environment. The crucial thing is that Marcuse did so in combination with other weighty concerns which together makes him one of the first theorists to articulate three commanding features of all subsequent progressive opposition to what he identified as the technocratic/industrialist status quo: i) Disillusionment with the Old Left (both in its communist and social democratic/liberal varieties), ii) a concern with nature previously relegated much further back if pronounced at all (but present in earlier anarchist thought, see: Bookchin 1999: 58, and; Graham 2013: 563), and, iii) a desire for liberation from domination by societal structures that was mainly a concern for a marginalized

42 ‘I regard Kropotkin as the real pioneer in the eco-anarchist tradition’ (Bookchin 1999: 58).
anarchist ideological current earlier (but which were revived from 1968 on, see; Graham 2013: 563).

Marcuse did not see man’s use of nature as inherently evil; ‘there are two kinds of mastery, a repressive and a liberating one. The latter involves the reduction of misery, cruelty and violence’ (Marcuse [1964] 2002: 240), and by extension – also taking into account that Marcuse is considered a ‘Western Marxist’ (Keucheyan 2013: 11) – one can draw the conclusion that Marcuse could have imagined a liberating form of mastery to take over if the current repressive one was overcome in the political sphere. This brings the thought of Marcuse a bit closer to the classical Marxism that inspired Lenin than to anarchism, even if Marcuse forcefully rejected the authoritarian Marxist-Leninism that was practiced in the communist countries. Nonetheless, in his turn away from the state centrism of both the two major Marxist ideological currents of the day (social democratic and communist) and towards left-libertarian (anarchist) concerns about the need to achieve liberation from domination – not just its political and economic forms but also socially and culturally – Marcuse joins the ranks of the extra parliamentarian radical left.

There ‘left-wing Marxism’ meets ‘anarchism’ which by contemporaries of Marcuse such as Noam Chomsky were considered ‘libertarian socialist’ modes of thought that ‘are the natural extension of classical liberalism into the current era of advanced industrial society’ (Chomsky [1970] 2005: 8). The melding of these ideological viewpoints had been foreshadowed by such innovative theorists as ‘Anton Pannekoek’ whose ‘radical Marxism merges with anarchist currents’ and who early on after the Bolshevik revolution criticized state socialism for merely substituting one ruling class for another (Chomsky [1970] 2003: 379). Chomsky’s understanding of the ideological climate this radical left strain confronted in the 1960s echoes that of Marcuse: ‘In contrast [to the libertarian socialist modes of thought], it seems to me that the ideology of state socialism, that is what has become of Bolshevism and state capitalism – the modern welfare state – are regressive and highly inadequate social theories’ (Chomsky [1970] 2005: 8).

In the Western Marxist Marcuse and the libertarian socialist Chomsky we can see “left-Marxist” and anarchist ideas being accommodated from different sides and added together with attempts to show that this would further the ‘classical liberal ideals’ first set out in the Enlightenment era (Chomsky [1970] 2005: 67, se also; 22-
23). Though these two theorists are coming at the problem from what originally were starkly differentiated ideological positions\(^{43}\) they both suggest that genuine liberty and solidarity could be something completely different to that on offer from either of advanced industrial society’s superpowers, and that this in all likelihood would involve some kind of hybridization of the radical left ideologies (including the furthering of elements of the once radical classical liberalism). In the process they and the rest of the New Left (which both Marcuse and Chomsky can be considered part of) that emerged in the 1960s completely abandoned any notions of emulating the Old Left which they saw themselves as representing a break from (Katsiaficas 1987: 19). The novel ideational stream that the New Left signified therefore almost exclusively seemed ‘to develop out of two of the major streams of radicalism – Marxian socialism and anarchism’ (Sargent 1972: 154).

This had serious consequences for the development of a coherent political alternative politics at the time, as the anarchist theorist and activist veteran Murray Bookchin described it: ‘A movement was needed that was seriously concerned with changing society’ one with ‘stamina and staying power – very important traits of the much-despised Old Left’ but these traits ‘were clearly lacking in the New Left and was nonexistent in the counterculture’ (Bookchin 1999: 98). Bookchin’s might have been a perspective mostly influenced by what was going on in the United States at the time, and the assessment appears to be less valid in the Western European context where a lot of the energy from ‘the revolutionary left’ went into support for more typical Old Left parties such as François Mitterrand’s Socialist Party in France – who presided over a left turn for the party after it received a disastrous ‘6 percent of the vote in the 1969 presidential election’ (Harman 1998: 334). A certain amount of all this leftist agitation was also channeled into support for the Western communists in countries such as Italy, where the ‘second biggest vote winner, the Communist Party, was allowed a say in government policies for the first time in nearly 30 years’ (Harman 1998: 331). While perhaps the most unique development along Old Left lines, in terms of its reformist intent, was the creation of Green parties, most prominently the German Greens, a party which ‘grew out of’ the

\(^{43}\) There was a struggle in the First International with ‘Bakunin and his anarchists’ on one side and ‘the General Council, which was under the leadership of Marx’ on the other with the result that ‘Bakunin was expelled from the International’ (Engels and “Ed.” in; Marx [1891] 2008: 10-11, see also; Bakunin [1873] 1990: 181-189).
‘German New Left and new social movements such as feminism’, and first started gaining seats in the Bundestag in 1983 (Katsiaficas 2006: 196-199).

However, there were considerable organizational resources that one can say, in hindsight at least, were misdirected by those involved in the first wave of the political refusal of liberal/social democratic centrism in the West. The support for left-Marxism and/or libertarian socialism was far from the only features of the New Left – though they might have been the more significant parts for its later evolution – because some of the people involved preferred to back the currently existing Eastern version of the Old Left instead. This embrace of authoritarianism by factions of the New Left was one its greatest internal contradictions. In one sense it was perhaps inevitable as the movement both the New Left and the counter-culture were parts of converged on opposition to the war the United States was waging in Vietnam during this time (Roszak [1969] 1995: xxvii). In response to what many perceived as a war of aggression needlessly perpetrated by the United States a not insignificant number of young Westerners reacted by becoming ‘Maoists’ – and to a degree also ‘Trotskyists’ – that ‘identified Third World guerilla struggle, especially in China, Vietnam, and Kampuchea, with socialism’ (Harman 1998: 339).

As Bookchin put it: ‘White radicals, in effect, began to think in neo-Stalinist terms’ resulting in that ‘many SDS44 “Marxists” didn’t give a damn about freedom; they simply supported enemies of the United States’ such as ‘the Communist regime in North Vietnam, not to speak of their enthusiasm for Castro in Cuba and Mao in China’ not caring that for example ‘North Vietnam was a totalitarian state’ (Bookchin 1999: 78, 80-81). This tendency more or less died out when it became clear that ‘the Chinese backed the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea as it established a Stalinism even more horrific than the Russian original’ and ‘the final blow to any residual illusions came in 1978 when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea to overthrow Pol Pot by force and China went to war with Vietnam’ (Harman 1998: 339). But this was too late to have any bearing on the ideological configuration of the New Left in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The final factor that obscured the core ideational aspects of the New Left as these were articulated by e.g. Marcuse and Chomsky – possibly not only for those experiencing its peak back then, but perhaps also for

44 Students for a Democratic Society, the main New Left organization in the United States in the late 1960s.
those wanting to follow its lead in the present – was the tendency amongst the attendant ‘hippie’ counter-culture to circle in on ‘mysticism and withdrawal’ (Sargent 1972: 119-120).

Observed from a distance then, the New Left of the late 1960s (especially when more mixed up with the counter-culture than what might be warranted) is likely to appear as a muddle of ideas, a lot of them of little contemporary relevance (Maoism, Stalinism, mysticism, etc.) but when more sharply focused in on some of the exemplary radical theoretical literature of the era we can see the beginnings of a discourse grappling with how to achieve human liberation and a society at peace with nature, all the while seeing not just capitalism, but as a whole the hierarchies of advanced industrial society, as the main obstacle for our future advancement as a species. In the process progress was redefined, so that it no longer would denote a process towards a more advanced stage of material accumulation but indicate the advancement towards ever greater forms of individual fulfillment and communal well-being instead. In a sense the alternative globalization discourse is simply a continuation of this earlier New Left discourse. Though the tendency to idealize the Old Left’s Eastern variations is now longer a significant part of its composition, this only accentuates the continued influence of the Western Marxist and libertarian-socialist ideas that Marcuse and Chomsky were exemplary promoters of within the New Left discourse in the 1960s and 1970s.

The Theories Constituting the Contemporary Discourse

To make sense of the contemporary alter-globalist discourse it is important to note that it follows from the earlier New Left discourse. But it in no way follows from the whole of it, since the alter-globalist discourse comes on the coattails of the Old Left’s collective demise on both sides of the former Iron Curtain in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This context means that the old Stalinist or Maoist tendencies that there was some room for in the New Left in the early 1970s are more or less

\[\text{\footnotesize{45 In certain respects it is quite obvious that the alternative globalization discourse of today is an extension of the New Left one from the late 1960s. Some of its most profiled intellectual voices are the same ones as took part in the first discourse; Noam Chomsky, Antonio Negri, Susan George, and Tariq Ali, for example were all active either in the late 1960s (Ali and Chomsky), or started to participate in its still ongoing discourse in the 1970s (Negri and George).}}\]
completely absent from the alter-globalist discourse. This does not mean that Marxism in total is abandoned because ‘Western Marxism’ continues being one of the main wellsprings of inspiration for ‘the new critical theories’ that makes a considerable contribution to the alter-globalist discourse (Keucheyan 2013: 12). Not all of those identified as ‘contemporary critical theorists’ are necessarily profiled contributors to the alter-globalist discourse, but some of them wield considerable influence within it, such as; ‘David Harvey’, ‘Slavoj Žižek’, ‘Michael Hardt’ and ‘Antonio Negri’ (Keucheyan 2013: 13, 20-21, 24, and; 28). The kind of Marxist-Leninism which was used to justify the dictatorship of the proletariat, or in reality the rule of communist apparatchiks, no longer plays a role other than as a prime example of what – at almost any cost – is to be avoided. The Marxism that continues to be part of the alter-globalist discourse is the kind of Western Marxism that for instance Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School were representative of, whose goal was the liberation of individuals from structures of domination, not their subsumption to these as Marxist-Leninism had led to.

**What Are the Alter-Globalists Aspirations?**

We agree wholeheartedly, of course, that governments have to stop the destruction of the planet and that it would be just and beneficial to redistribute wealth equitably across the globe (Hardt & Negri 2009: 273).

There is a broad consensus within the alter-globalist discourse as regards the main challenges that has to be countered if the present condition of humanity taken as a whole and the planet that sustains its existence is to improve. The general perception is that capitalism in its latest neoliberal garb threatens to destroy nature beyond repair all the while ruining the livelihoods and dignity of vast numbers of people. And that the system it has produced operates for the short term economic benefit of a comparatively tiny elite. The anarchists, Marxists, and socialists participating in the alter-globalist debate all agree on this point, and it has infused the whole discourse with an ecological frame (see for instance: Kelly & Malone 2006, Davidson 2009, Foster, Clark, & York 2010, George 2010, and Klein 2014).

The problem is that the general recognition of this malaise only defines the tendency that has to be countered and not *how* this is to be done. There is at least a shared semi-global mindset at work in this discourse, since it focuses on the ideology of neoliberalism as a global phenomenon and sees it as for instance the key current
driver of global environmental degradation. But it has by no means led to the wholesale adaptation of a fully global or planetary ideology meant to replace neoliberalism globally. There is only a handful of theorists operating within the discourse that has really seen the need for such a paramount development thus far, and they do not appear to be winning the internal argument. Up until now the general perception is that alter-globalist discourse is ideologically incoherent:

...for decades the opponents of capitalism have revelled in their own incoherence. From the anti-globalization movement of the 1990s through to Occupy and beyond, the movement for social justice has rejected the idea of a coherent programme in favour of ‘One No, Many Yes-es’. The incoherence is logical, if you think the only alternative is what the twentieth century left called ‘socialism’. Why fight for a big change if it’s only a regression – towards state control and economic nationalism, to economies that work only if everyone behaves the same way or submits to a brutal hierarchy? In turn, the absence of any clear alternative explains why most protest movements never win: in their hearts they don’t want to. There’s even a term for it in the protest movement: ‘refusal to win’46 (Mason 2015: xii).

Journalist and theorist Paul Mason’s allegations are based on years of observing the alter-globalist movement in the field, also in its more recent instantiations in the protests against austerity in Greece and in the worldwide Occupy movement (see: Mason 2012, and; 2013). Like most well informed commentators Mason clearly sees the alter-globalists as a movement of the left. But it is a left in complete disarray: ‘What is striking about the revolutions of 2009-11 [e.g. Greece, the Arab Spring, and Occupy] is the absence of a coherent left’ (Mason 2011: 187). The whole left side of the political spectrum is by Mason perceived to be ideologically adrift: ‘Leninism is looking shrunken and disoriented; horizontalism [i.e. anarchism/participatory democracy] can stage a great demo, but does not know what it wants’ (Mason 2011: 187). The lack of coherence stretches all the way to the political center; ‘the mainstream left –Labourism, social democracy, the US democrats and left-liberalism generally – appears politically confused’ (Mason 2011: 187). When it comes to the latter it is unclear whether more than a tiny

46 Here Paul Mason cites Laurence Cox and Alf Gunvald Nilsen’s work We Make Our Own History: Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism which was published by the London based Pluto Press in 2014.
minority of the politicians active in today’s center-left even perceives neoliberalism as a rightwing phenomenon that they should seek to counter.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos made the same general observation as Mason almost a decade earlier, only in regards to the World Social Forum, when he claimed ‘[the WSF] holds no clearly defined ideology, in defining either what it rejects or what it asserts’ (Santos 2006: 7). The exception being that ‘the WSF conceives of itself as a struggle against neo-liberal globalization’ but it has notably not taken a stand on whether that struggle is ‘against a form of capitalism or against capitalism in general’ (Santos 2006: 7). This latter (lack of a) stance was of course necessary to create as broad a coalition as possible in the anti-neoliberal struggle, but it has not been conducive to the creation of an ideological platform that could stand as an alternative to neoliberalism in the global political arena. In short the concern is that even though the alter-globalists have clearly identified the enemy in “neoliberalism”, they have yet to work out a strategy for confronting it on its own institutional turf. And there is even less of a vision for a post-neoliberal society that would be anything but a return to a social democratic internationalism signified by ‘state control and economic nationalism’ as Paul Mason puts it in the passage quoted above (Mason 2015: xii).

Even though alter-globalism is a discourse of considerable breadth it was in a recent study claimed that ‘the fundamental utopia’ this ‘global-radical discourse’ promotes ‘is a localized world where production and consumption are democratized (in participatory terms) and the principle of subsidiarity determines that power is always located at the lowest relevant level’ (Corry 2013: 111 and 121). But is there any contributors to the alter-globalist discourse that go beyond ‘critiquing global governance’ of the neoliberal variety ‘and promoting local governance’ (Corry 2013: 134) and instead advocates a more globally integrated perspective? Or is it true as Olaf Corry claims that ‘This discourse in effect propagates a global governmentality of the local more than a fully pastoral worldwide governmentality’ (Corry 2013: 134)? To answer these questions I now turn to a representative selection of the whole alter-globalist discourse, from the most moderate, via the more reformist, to the steadily more radical.

The theorists I have chosen for this task are the following; first, Susan George, as an exemplary figure from the least radical part of the alter-globalist discourse. Second,
the Western Marxists who are in favor of the creation of a counter-hegemonic party, such as for instance David Harvey. Third, Michael Albert and associated theorists, as representative of the anarchist faction who sees the implementation of participatory democracy as imperative to the creation of a just world. And fourth and finally, the most consistently radical faction, mainly represented by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who together have articulated one of the most influential and comprehensive theories found within the alter-globalist discourse. These theorists have all been selected because they have presented theories which broadly fill out the entire part of the ideological continuum the alter-globalist discourse occupies. Seeing as we are here dealing with a global left discourse which in theory stretches from left-liberalism to anarchism of the socialist (as opposed to capitalist) variety there is no shortage of exemplary theorists along this axis. But I have aimed to employ the most useful and representative sample by carefully selecting both relevant and diverse texts written by relatively profiled participants in the alter-globalist discourse (see: Fisher & Ponniah 2003, Sen & Waterman 2009, and; Lilley 2011a).

Neither Mason nor Santos is entirely correct in claiming that the alter globalist discourse is ideologically incoherent, there is some coherence as I aim to show in this section. Mason and Santos are right that the strategy and vision of the alter-globalists are not very clearly articulated at this point. But in the end the inference I draw from this is that both the beginnings of an alter-globalist strategy and a vision can be discerned from the present discourse. We begin by looking into the theoretical contribution of Susan George who essentially argues that the alter-globalists should be content with being a strong pressure group aiming to pull the political center leftwards.

A Pressure Group in Support of Social-Democratic Internationalism

Susan George has been the Vice President of ATTAC France and is an active and profiled participant in the alter-globalist discourse (see: George 2004, and; 2010). George has what appears to be a democratic socialist/social democratic political orientation. Explicitly remarking hers goes against the anarchist position as she understands it George admits that ‘we need the state (although a far more democratic one) in order to attain many of our goals’ (George 2004: 102). Not because George sees the state as inherently good; ‘I am well aware that states
represent and defend class interests [ ] but I am also making a plea for using whatever tools we may have at our disposal’ (George 2004: 103). George continues:

Democratic freedoms are such tools, not to be neglected and despised but cherished and kept in good working order. Let’s not forget that people gave their lives to establish these freedoms. The least we can do is respect their struggles and their memory by using all the rights so painfully acquired. Someone once said, “democracy is not something we have but something we do.” People who, for example, refuse to vote on the grounds that “they’re all the same” seem to me God’s gift to the neo-liberals (George 2004: 103).

In a realist manner George thinks the only way to effectuate progressive change would be through convincing states that this is needed: ‘If you want to change the mandate of the EU Trade Commissioner, or any other Commissioner, you have to make the member states insist on it. There simply is no other agency’ (George 2004: 103). This is according to George the same for intergovernmental institutions of global scope ‘To affect durably the WTO or other international institutions, you must also reach the member governments’ (George 2004: 103). This awareness of the political limitations and possibilities inherent in the current international system could possibly have aligned George with those in the alter-globalist discourse that thinks creating a party would be a good idea, but George stops clear of endorsing this obvious vehicle for getting governments to change their policies. When George is asked ‘if we [the alter-globalists] shouldn’t become a political party’ her answer is ‘emphatically “No!”’ (George 2004: 257, se also: 178-185).

George explains her reason for this negative stance towards parties in the following terms: ‘We are deeply political and we must therefore work partly through politicians and parties but do our politics differently from them. I don’t mean this as an insult, but traditional politics is the place of compromise’ (George 2004: 257). In this George’s strategy is not too different from that of the neoliberal theorists, who also sought to influence members of existing political parties to take up their cause, not to create a genuine political party from scratch. George relatively early realized that the neoliberal strategy might be worth emulating (see: George 1997). It becomes evident that George sees the role of the alter-globalists to back the already existing left parties when we see how she practically endorses the (now former) president of Brazil for the Workers Party, Lula da Silva, with the following
sentence; ‘when one of our own, like Lula, takes power, he still needs an independent movement to push his government’ (George 2004: 257). She also argues that: ‘Forging alliances and dealing with political parties doesn’t mean trampling on your principles or losing your credibility, it means you’re serious’ (George 2004: 178). George can also imagine collaborating with for example ‘the French Socialist Party’ but she admits to still being ‘furious with some French Socialists because they tried to block our [ATTAC’s] campaign on GATS in the European and national parliaments saying “we have to support our Commissioner, Pascal Lamy,” whom I consider a card-carrying neo-liberal’ (George 2004: 182).

This illustrates how the right-most part of the alter-globalist discourse stops just short of the neoliberal wing of the social democratic parties. This is a fine line indeed where Lula da Silva is considered an ally, but Pascal Lamy is considered an adversary, as they are both members of center-left parties participating in the same international alliance (Progressive Alliance 2015).

Lula and his heir, current Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, have admittedly had ‘Internationalism’ high up on their foreign policy agendas (Burbach, Fox & Fuentes 2013: 122). But as with George’s own ideas as expressed in the title of one of her most recent books We the Peoples of Europe (George 2008), where we should take notice of “the peoples” in the plural, this is not much of an advance from the previously unquestioned national-international mindset which stays closer to the national than the global imaginary. George represents the least ambitious ideological strain in the alter-globalist discourse, the reformist social democrats. It supports the democratic Old Left parties already in existence and hopes that these can make the existing institutional landscape more benevolent. The strain George represents has no aspirations about creating a Fifth International that could be an instrument for radically altering the world polity, but it is progressive in its views on the environment, gender, and many of the other general issues that animate the alter-globalist discourse as a whole. George certainly has no qualms going after the people benefitting most from the present neoliberal arrangement:

For perhaps the first time in history, the world really could afford to provide access to a decent life for every person on the earth – enough food, clean water, adequate housing, basic education, health care and public services, as set out in the Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Where would the money be found? Where most of it already is – in the international sphere, in the
profits of mega-corporations and on financial markets; in the
cancellation of poor countries’ debts; in closing down tax havens
and making corporate taxes mandatory; in making so-called
“free trade” fair trade. Another world has to begin with a new,
worldwide Keynesian type programme of taxation and
redistribution (George 2004: 137).

We can see from her insistence on a ‘worldwide Marshall Plan’ as laid out above
that George has impeccable progressive credentials (George 2004: 138, see also;
George 2010), but just like many other participants in the alter-globalist discourse
she takes the national level of politics for granted and in no way perceives of this as
an impediment to realizing her global vision: ‘Going green requires more equality
and more trust, as well as institutions that contribute to both [ ] For me, hope lies in
identifying all the ways we can find to scale up the local so that it becomes regional,
national and global’ (George 2010: 267). We can take George’s notion of the local,
the regional, the national, and then the global, as expressed here as an indication that
she would have no trouble agreeing to Nussbaum’s concentric circles approach to
seeing the world politically (as discussed in the previous chapter on
cosmopolitanism). It is for George (as for Nussbaum) a neutral scale, not a political
construct that weighs heavily on the options available for how effectively a world
polity could possibly function.

There is a mismatch between George’s seeming acceptance of the national
imaginary and the goals she puts forth; a worldwide Keynesian program would
require a globally sovereign entity capable of for instance closing down tax-havens,
overruling the protestations of mega-corporations, and forcing financial markets to
lower their profit margins. George claims that her worldwide Keynesian program
‘would need to be administered democratically so that citizens would share the
responsibility for choosing priorities and overseeing programmes for each country’
(George 2004: 138). George’s idea to get money through abolishing tax-havens is
not a bad one, especially when one takes into account that: ‘The loss of taxation
from this offshoring world of finance is minimally calculated as hundreds of billions
of dollars per annum’ (Orry 2014: 71). This lower estimate is, for the sake of
comparison, a description that could also be used for the annual defense budget of
the United States. But George ignores the fact that the majority of tax havens also
happen to be countries, and not just a few of them, since about ‘a quarter of
contemporary states’ can be defined as tax havens ‘in one way or another’ (Orry
2014: 46). In short, yielding to the principle of national sovereignty is not going to set a stop to tax haven practice any time soon, unless the populations of for example Switzerland or Singapore saw it as a good thing that “their” banks were partially stripped of their assets of course. George’s plans is therefore a good example of what happens when one starts wanting to act globally, but is not willing to contemplate getting rid of the principle of national sovereignty – the danger here is that one can end up with a strong moral posture that is nonetheless devoid of any real political substance.

**Party Organization**

…the idea that somehow you can actually change the world without dealing with state power right now, and occupying certain key aspects of it, seems to me to be a bit la-la (David Harvey, interviewed in; Lilley 2011b: 77)

David Harvey is one of the theorists who have realized that the present incoherence is an obstacle hindering the advance of the alter-globalist discourse’s goals. Harvey states in an interview that ‘you don’t build a movement based on the divisions, you try to build a movement which incorporates difference, at the same time that it tries to recognize that in order to get something to happen, we have to transcend those divisions’ (Lilley 2011: 60). To get something done and institute change Harvey contends ‘you would need a [] political party that is going to advocate it in some way’ (Lilley 2011: 60). Harvey says this is ‘that kind of transcendence of the particularities and the willingness to move to the universal level which seems to me to be absolutely crucial in politics right now, which a lot of the left is reluctant to do’ (Lilley 2011: 60-61). That Harvey includes the whole alter-globalist discourse in his conception of “the left” is obvious here since the parliamentary remnants of the Old Left cannot be said to have a problem with this type of instrumental party politics. Samir Amin, another important contributor to the alter-globalist discourse – who shares what one can call a Western Marxist outlook with Harvey – has in a similar vein also endorsed the creation of a party to further the interests articulated in the alter-globalist discourse: ‘I would like to see [] a party that could respond to the challenge of our era’ (Amin 2008: 40).

Movements, including progressive ones, want to maintain their independence. This is obviously not only their right, but it is desirable because independence is precisely the origin of the
effectiveness of their actions. Such independence in no way excludes the crystallization of new left parties that propose to integrate the different dimensions of responses to the challenge in a strategy of building a coherent alternative. Although there is no contradiction between these two propositions, the prospect of a revival of partisan organizations frightens some actors in the World Social Forums (Amin 2008: 40).

Others on the Marxist side of the discourse, such as Michael Löwy, wondered if the time had come to launch ‘a new international’, but Amin more explicitly advocates the founding of a ‘Fifth International’ (Löwy 2009, and; Amin 2007, and; 2008). This is not just the employment of “international” as a synonymous term for truly global or planetary, but is meant in its classical interpretation as a way of representing diverse culturally homogenous groups; because Amin is clearly looking for ‘a new internationalism of the peoples’ which is as true to the national-international imaginary as one gets (Amin 2006: 163).

We can say that this is the faction within the alter-globalist discourse that comes closest to advocating the seizure of power by means of the centralized party. The creation of a party is potentially a risky proposition, because if it is done in the wrong manner it could represent a setback of unknown proportions for the alter-globalist discourse as a whole. If on the other hand the transition to becoming a coherent ideology fit for party-political employment was skillfully done it could take the alter-globalist discourse to the level of real political influence. This means that if such a party started gaining a substantial following, it could in turn lead to victory in national elections in different countries. This is the view argued for by Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, whose theory is yet another example from this Western Marxist tendency within the alter-globalist discourse (see: Keucheyan 2013: 96-99).

Referring to ‘Occupy Wall Street in October 2011’, or the latest major instantiation of the alter-globalist movement as a global protest movement at the time of writing, Panitch and Gindin observes there is a ‘gap that exists between the stubborn realities of capitalism and the revolutionary spirit so manifest in public squares around the world’ (Panitch & Gindin 2012: 340). This leads them to assert that:

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47 ‘Panitch edits an important publication in the contemporary Marxist constellation, Socialist Register, founded in the 1960s by Ralph Miliband [ ] and the labour historian John Saville’ (Keucheyan 2013: 96).
It is not in fact possible to change the world without taking power. It is precisely because the aspiration for a world beyond capitalism is once again so broadly extant today that it is especially useful to recall that secular struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the political—not at the economic or cultural–level. Whether called socialism or not, today’s revived demands for social justice and genuine democracy could only be realized through such a fundamental shift of political power, entailing fundamental changes in state as well as class structures (Panitch & Gindin 2012: 340, emphasis in original).

Achieving this fundamental political shift would according to Panitch and Gindin require another approach than that pioneered by the Old Left; ‘very different movements and parties from those that carried the socialist impulse in the previous century would be necessary to see this through’ as they put it (Panitch & Gindin 2012: 340). If this plan succeeds an alter-globalist ideology could eventually confront neoliberalism head on from the inside of the institutions the neoliberals currently more or less monopolizes to their own advantage. This means that turning into a novel type of party, but a party at least in the sense that it competes with neoliberals for power institutionally, could in time lead to alter-globalism becoming the next hegemonic ideology at the global level. But this is, as we will see further on, without a doubt a problematic step to contemplate for many of the participants in the discourse.

The worry is that achieving the ideological coherence it would take to become a party would mean that the discourse will have to purge itself of some contradictory standpoints and with this lose some of the diversity that seemingly is cherished above all else by a substantial part of its participants. Winning at the expense of losing a core value might not be an appealing option for this strong anti-party faction within the alter-globalist discourse. There is simply a rather pronounced cleavage in the alter-globalist discourse between those who would like to work for ‘the seizure of power’ and those who stand for ‘the total rejection of the concept of power’ (Santos 2006: 164). This cleavage is paralleled in the internal debate about the preferred mode of organization ‘between the centralized organization in the party, and the total absence of centralism and even organization, beyond what emerges spontaneously in the course of the collective action, by the initiative of the actors themselves as a whole’ (Santos 2006: 164). We have seen here that (Western) Marxists such as David Harvey, Samir Amin, Leo Panitch, and Sam Gindin favors
some kind of party creation (that ideally goes beyond the Old Left’s mode of organization, and not just repeats it) so neoliberalism can be confronted in political institutions.

The First Attempt at World Order Decontestation

If we do consider the contemporary ‘global-radical discourse’ (Corry 2013: 111) to be a budding ideology of alter-globalism, it is still an ideology at an early stage of development when it comes to the decontestation of many things – as Paul Mason’s passage cited above reveals – including its position on world order.

If we compare the alter-globalist discourse to the first phase of neoliberalism’s development discussed earlier then we can perhaps agree that the alter-global discourse already has gone through its equivalent to the neoliberals’ Colloque Walter Lippmann – where all the main contributors during the ideology’s formative phase meet each other and start exchanging ideas – with the analogous development for alter-globalism being the institution of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001 (see: Fisher & Ponniah 2003, Mertes 2004, and; Waterman 2009).

But as we will see in the following section it seems evident that the alter-globalist discourse still has not yet experienced the corresponding “Mont Pèlerin Society moment” which neoliberalism went through in 1947. We can recall from the earlier chapter on neoliberalism that this represents a decisive event in the development of neoliberalism where crucial parts of the discourse were crystallized or decontested, and the discourse properly started taking on the shape of a fully articulated political program which aimed to replace the reigning dominant ideology (which at the time was an amalgam of social liberal/social democratic thought) and become the next dominant ideological force itself.

Walden Bello has been an active participant in the alter-globalist discourse since its inception in the 1990s (see: Bello 2003, and; 2004). He has argued that the World Social Forum (WSF) should move from being ‘a site and space for the [alter-globalist] movement to elaborate, discuss, and debate the vision, values, and institutions of an alternative world order built on a real community of interest’ and move towards developing ‘a strategy of counter-power or counter-hegemony’ (Bello 2013: 244 and 247). What Bello argues for here is, in a similar manner to Harvey and Amin, to advance from an incipient ideological stage (such as the one neoliberalism experienced in the years between the Colloque Walter Lippmann and
the founding of the Mont Pelerin Society) and the start of a more politically active stage.

In ideological terms this would for the alter-globalist discourse mean a commitment to the decontestation of core aspects of its ideational structure. Alter-globalist discourse is currently so loose that it can accommodate a very diverse range of positions, and this has been seen as one of its core strengths. But some positions within such a loose discourse are bound to be contradictory. Coherence is after all steadily more pronounced within a discourse the closer you get to the absence of contradictory tendencies. Too much incoherence within the discourse is a state of affairs that is untenable if the alter-globalists want ‘to move into spaces of power at the local, national, and regional levels’ as the Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez advised World Social Forum delegates in 2006 to do (as cited in Bello 2013: 247).

We can note here that for the alter-globalists to start following advice from someone like Chávez would be tantamount to the acceptance of certain Old Left principles when it comes to political organization. But for Bello the question Chávez’ suggestion gives rise to is nonetheless whether or not:

…the WSF still [is] the most appropriate vehicle for the new stage in the struggle of the global justice and peace movement? Or having fulfilled its historic function of aggregating and linking the diverse counter-movements spawned by global capitalism, is it time for the WSF to fold up its tent and give way to new modes of global organization of resistance and transformation (Bello 2013: 248)?

Bello, as we have seen is not alone in wondering if the step towards a more cohesive organization should be taken. Bello comes close to the Western Marxists here, but this is not the only faction within the alter-globalist discourse which has started thinking about how to achieve a more coherent organization.

**Participatory Democracy (Local)**

On the anarchist side of the alter-globalist discourse Michael Albert has argued that the World Social Forum, to fulfill its main function as being exactly a forum, should strive ‘to be as broad and diverse as possible’ (Albert 2009: 369). But this did not for Albert preclude the creation of other ‘networks or movements of movements’ that ‘share sufficiently their political aspirations to work closely together’ provided that they ‘exist alongside rather than instead of the Forum phenomenon’ (Albert
Clearly the forum approach initiated with the creation of the World Social Forum had both its uses and limitations. Aware of both, Albert on Valentine’s Day 2012 launched the International Organization for a Participatory Society, or IOPS for short (IOPS 2015a). Albert apparently did not do this in an effort to replace the WSF, but to harness some of the energies within it and direct them towards a common goal or “political aspiration” as he put it.

Albert has been one of the more inventive theoretical contributors to the alter-globalism discourse over the years (see: Albert 2003, and; 2014), but his attempt at creating a “Mont Pèlerin Society moment” for the alter-globalist discourse appears at the time of writing to have failed. The effort is nonetheless noteworthy because it indicates that the alter-globalist discourse is influenced by the same ideological dynamics as have been described above. That it failed also tells us something about the theoretical shortcomings alter-globalist discourse perhaps has to own up to before it possibly might form a sound basis for creating a global ideology with mass appeal.

Anyone on the planet with access to the internet could become a member of the IOPS as long as they were willing to create a profile on the organization’s website, and presently the still operative IOPS has 3,684 members from all over the world (its easily navigable membership list is also open to everyone, see: IOPS 2015b). Within two months of the launch of the IOPS in 2012 it had attracted the support – and membership – of the following influential alter-globalist thinkers and activists; Noam Chomsky, David Harvey, Vijay Prashad, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Chris Spannos, John Pilger, David Graeber, and Saul Landau (see: IOPS 2015b). In September the same year Vandana Shiva, another notable alter-globalist theorist, also joined the organization (IOPS 2015c).

IOPS was styled as ‘interim’ and was supposed to exist until ‘a founding convention when the membership will determine the organization’s definition in more detail’ (IOPS 2015a). The 14th of September 2014 Albert disappointedly conceded that the IOPS did not ‘grow sufficiently to achieve enough weight, or even to achieve enough diversity or resources to have a founding convention’ (IOPS 2015d). The organization was not disbanded, but the by then ‘3,500 tangentially involved members’ were not considered enough of a basis for ‘having a convention in a participatory or effective manner’ (IOPS 2015d). The organization still to this day
has a trickle of new members added to it every month, but it has obviously failed to take off and it did not turn into the collaborative, worldwide, mass-movement Albert probably had hoped to initiate (see: IOPS 2015b). Since the IOPS website is still up and running this might change at some future point, but here I assume that the reason it failed was because of some inherent inadequacies to the way the organization was presented.

The reasons why Albert’s IOPS initiative did not turn into an ideological world party or force and failed to emulate a similar organizational trajectory to that of the neoliberals’ Mont Pelerin Society are likely numerous. IOPS had initially been supported by quite a few theorists central to the alter-globalist discourse who had agreed to be on the organization’s ‘Interim Consultative Committee’, abbreviated ICC (see: IOPS 2015e). One thing is that it takes a certain kind of individual to openly enlist as a member of a radical party on the internet. But mainly I suspect that this lack of general enthusiasm derives from several other sources. First hardly anyone except a core of very engaged activists had gotten word about the existence of the IOPS.

One illustrative suggestion made by a commenter calling himself “Max H” – in regards to Albert’s announcement that there would be no founding convention anytime soon – was that the several profiled ICC members, such as ‘Chomsky, Shiva, Graeber, Pilger’, could try to ‘plug [i.e. promote] IOPS here and there as an example of a positive movement’ (IOPS 2015d). To this suggestion Albert responded: ‘I don’t think being on the [ICC] is actually all that relevant. I guess anybody that has any connection to them could ask about it. I haven’t succeeded. Noam [Chomsky] and Pilger related to queries for preferences [presumably regarding the founding convention], but not [G]raeber or [S]hiva’ (IOPS 2015d). Albert also admits that several theorists or persons central to the alter-globalist discourse, such as ‘Arundhati Roy’ and ‘Naomi Klein’, ‘were asked to be on the [ICC] but didn’t want to’48 (IOPS 2015d).

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48 Other theorists that have been central to alter-globalist discourse besides Arundhati Roy and Naomi Klein who are not listed as members of the IOPS are for instance; Susan George, Alex Callinicos, Immanuel Wallerstein, Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri (see: IOPS 2015b, and; 2015e).
Clearly Albert’s efforts to get the IOPS on a sound footing was both a more divisive and less successful undertaking than Hayek’s instigation of the Mont Pèlerin Society was for the neoliberals. The second and more important reason the IOPS did not work out very well is probably that Albert – apparently almost singlehandedly – had articulated a political program that in certain respects was very specific in its ideological orientation, and this one would need to sign up to if one would like to become a member (see: IOPS 2015f, 2015g, 2015h and 2015i).

Albert’s big idea – and by extension that of the IOPS – is to replace capitalism with something he calls “participatory economics” or “parecon” for short (see: Albert & Hahnel 1991a, Albert & Hahnel 1991b, and; Albert 2003). Albert informs in an interview with Chris Spannos that the idea of parecon is built on ‘the anarchist and libertarian socialist heritage’ and ‘the most recent experiences of the New Left of the Sixties’ (Spannos 2008: 14). ‘Parecon’ means ‘most broadly classlessness’ but more specifically the term is meant to signify ‘a classless economy’ (Spannos 2008: 14). Parecon ‘is not capitalism, but it is also not an economy ruled by roughly a fifth of the population that monopolizes empowering conditions’ as Albert puts it with an obvious hint to the real existing communism of the 20th century (Spannos 2008: 14). Albert goes on to explain that:

The central features of the model called parecon are workers’ and consumers’ self-managed councils, balanced job complexes, remuneration for duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor, and participatory planning. I think these institutional features are to the parecon model what private ownership, corporate divisions of labor, remuneration for property, power, and output, and market allocation are to capitalism. You can’t have a classless economy without these features (Spannos 2008: 15).

This typically anarchist idea of self-management was as Albert acknowledges first articulated by well known theorists of the libertarian socialist canon such as ‘[Peter] Kropotkin and [Rudolf] Rocker’ whose ideas of ‘mutual aid’ and ‘anarchosyndicalism’ prefigures those of parecon (Spannos 2008: 14 and 16, see also; Kropotkin [1902] 2006, and; Rocker [1938] 2004). Chomsky has been an advocate of a kind of anarchism which follows closely in the footsteps of both Kropotkin and Rocker more or less his entire life (e.g. Lilley 2011c: 237). So in an extreme simplification of the anarchist canon we could say that there is a line that goes from
Kropotkin to Rocker, via Chomsky, and to Albert. Albert’s theory should also be seen in connection with Carole Pateman’s classic study *Participation and Democratic Theory* where she not only notes the difference between ‘contemporary and participatory theories of democracy’ but also at length discusses G. D. H. Cole’s ‘theory of Guild Socialism’ which shares similarities with e.g. Rocker’s and Albert’s theories (Pateman 1970: 43 and 35). What all these theoretical precedents to parecon have in common is that they idealize the smaller scale of the pre-modern era. Kropotkin saw the self-government of the village community, the medieval guilds, and federated cities, as the kind of close-knit organization we should try to emulate in the modern world (Kropotkin [1902] 2006: 204-205). This was because these forms of political organization were much more inclined to come to the aid of its members than ‘the centralized State’ was considered to be by Kropotkin (Kropotkin [1902] 2006: 206). Kropotkin argued that when the modern state first started to develop it saw guilds and similar forms of organization as competing forms of political organization and because of this the state sought to sever the strong, pre-existing, bonds that kept these together, which in the end meant that the state successfully replaced such organizations based on ‘mutual aid’ with ‘loose aggregations of individuals’ that could be more easily controlled (Kropotkin [1902] 2006: 204-206). This Kropotkin and those that followed in his footsteps has wanted to reverse.

What distinguishes these participatory theories of democracy from contemporary state centric theories of democracy is according to Pateman that for participatory theory the ‘existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for democracy’ because this does not come close enough to self-governance to properly emancipate the individual (Pateman 1970: 42). The requirement for emancipation to happen is that ‘democracy must take place in other spheres’ so ‘that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed’ (Pateman 1970: 42). The most important “other sphere” than the national one extolled by contemporary democratic theory is according to participatory theory at one’s place of work; ‘most individuals spend a great deal of their lifetime at work and the business of the workplace provides an education in the management of collective affairs that is difficult to parallel elsewhere’ (Pateman 1970: 43). In this way ‘spheres such as industry [i.e. the site of work] should be seen as political systems in their own right, offering areas of participation additional to the national
level’ (Pateman 1970: 43). And it is only if a polity is democratic from bottom to top that it should be considered properly democratic for participatory theory, ‘for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory society to exist, i.e. a society where all political systems have been democratized and socialisation through participation can take place in all areas’ (Pateman 1970: 43).

This bottom-up democracy seeks a reorientation away from the national to the local level, but unlike Kropotkin and some of his closer followers contemporary advocates such as Albert does not appear to have fully the same animosity towards the state or the national level (see: Albert 2014: 60). Contrary to the earlier anarchists Albert takes much of his inspiration from, he apparently thinks this form of democratic devolution to the local level easily can coexist with the national, or nation-state, level. The state or the state-system does not figure high on Albert’s list of obstacles to introducing ‘global justice instead of capitalist globalization’ since ‘the problem isn’t international relations per se’ it is rather ‘that capitalist globalization alters international relations to further benefit the rich and powerful’ (Albert 2014: 60).

The problem as Albert sees it is that ‘capitalist globalizers try to disempower the poor and already weak and to further empower the rich and already strong’ (Albert 2014: 55). They have succeeded in ‘reduc[ing] the influence of whole populations, and even of state leaderships, save for the most powerful elements of Western corporate and political rule’ (Albert 2014: 56). Albert proposes that the currently troublesome international organizations that impose capitalist globalization on the world – i.e. the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization so often singled out in alter-globalist discourse – should be replaced by a range of similar organizations which Albert calls ‘an International Asset Agency, a Global Investment Assistance Agency, and a World Trade Agency’ (Albert [2006] 2014: 58). The main difference being that their mandate would not be to promote capitalist globalization, but instead to promote something along the lines of ‘the equity, diversity, solidarity, self-management, and ecological balance that activists favor’ (Albert 2014: 56).

Albert’s suggestion resembles Nussbaum’s concentric circles idea of a world polity because these organizations would all ‘gain their credibility and power from an array of arrangements, structures, and ties enacted at the level of citizens, neighborhoods,
states, nations and groups of nations on which they rest’ (Albert 2014: 60). We can see that the national-international imaginary weighs heavily on Albert’s thinking here with his mention of “nations and groups of nations” as central constitutive units of his ideologically different (anti-capitalist and participatory democratic) but imaginary close to identical vision (the focus on the lower levels differ, but in the global sphere Albert still expounds a national-international worldview) of what a world ruled according to the tenets of alter-globalism should look like. Nations and international organizations prefigure in Albert’s ideal world order, but they would be ideologically anti-capitalist and cease to be the handmaidens of capital which they are presently recognized as being in the discourse. Economically Albert’s suggestion is a (very) radical one, but world politically speaking it is important to note that it is a reformist international rather than a planetarist radical vision he offers. Albert and the IOPS’s continued reliance on the national imaginary is further evident by the part of the IOPS’s organizational vision entitled “International” reproduced here:

The organization seeks new international relations such that:

- international institutions put an end to imperialism in all its forms including colonialism, neo colonialism, neo liberalism, etc.
- international institutions are internationalist in that they diminish economic disparities in countries’ relative wealth.
- international institutions protect cultural and social patterns interior to each country from external violation.
- international relations facilitate international entwinement and ties as people desire, and thus internationalist globalization in place of corporate globalization (IOPS 2015g).

It is clear that Albert (and the IOPS) does not see internationalism as a problem that in any substantial way explains neoliberal domination, to the contrary the idea is that the international state-system is an ideologically neutral background that on its own is unproblematic, but which has been momentarily hijacked by the neoliberals. Albert does not entertain the thought that neoliberalism has been allowed to become dominant thanks to the democratic deficiency that is a core characteristic of the
nation-state system at the international level. With this uncritical view of the national imaginary as a natural and perhaps unavoidable concentric circle it is not surprising that Albert apparently had no qualms with calling his organization the International Organization for a Participatory Society. Strangely for someone this preoccupied with democracy at the lowest levels there is no mention of global democracy replacing international relations in Albert’s vision. The closest you get is this: ‘If the whole world has participatory economics, then nothing structural prevents treating countries like one might treat locales – neighborhoods, counties, [US] states – within countries’ and from this it follows that ‘there is no structural obstacle to approaching the production side similarly, seeing the world as one entwined international system’ (Albert 2014: 64, added emphasis). Vandana Shiva, who as mentioned above became a member of the IOPS in September 2012, has a similar notion of the ideal political arrangement to Albert’s even though she calls it ‘Earth Democracy’ (Shiva 2005). Characteristically for this strain of the alter-globalist discourse Shiva’s envisioned Earth Democracy is also economically radical, but at best world politically reformist. Earth Democracy is an idea that by the name of it appears to be a planetarist notion, so it is worth looking into if this differs in any substantial way from Albert’s on the issue of world order.

Shiva’s Earth Democracy is founded on a localized economy paired with an equally local democratic political setting: ‘Earth Democracy is based on vibrant local economies, which support national and global economies’ and ‘Earth Democracy is based on local democracy, with local communities – organized on principles of inclusion, diversity, and ecological and social responsibility – having the highest authority on decisions related to the environment and natural resources and to the sustenance and livelihoods of people’ (Shiva 2005: 10). The mention of “national and global economies” is an indication that Shiva does not really think in terms of a planetary democratic polity when she employs her concept of “Earth Democracy”. It is closer aligned to Albert’s notion of a localized democracy that is freed from centralized control in many respects, but which does not entirely dismiss the need for maintaining the national and international level for addressing certain issues. Shiva writes that: ‘Authority is delegated to more distant levels of governments on the principle of subsidiarity’ (Shiva 2005: 10-11). This Shiva asserts simultaneously as she claims to be in support of a: ‘Living democracy that grows like a tree, from the bottom up’ that is typical of the participatory position and this stance she
apparently cements with claiming that ‘the foundation of Earth Democracy’ is ‘self-
rule and self-governance’ presumably on the community level (Shiva 2005: 11).

The problem is that once Shiva introduces the idea of subsidiarity the whole Earth Democracy program she elucidates is in danger of being turned upside down. Following the principle of subsidiarity means that a political issue ought to be addressed at the lowest level where it can be solved and no higher than that (see: Føllesdal 1998). As Shiva puts it; ‘things are most effectively done at the level closest to where the impact is felt’ (Shiva 2005: 64). But Shiva does not point out that following the principle of subsidiarity for the solution of problems might only lead to local empowerment ‘unless allocating them to a higher-level central unit would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in [solving] them’ (Føllesdal 1998: 190). With this in mind one could imagine how quickly such things as economic and environmental decisions – whose repercussions easily can be portrayed as being ultimately and in aggregate global in scope – could fall out of local hands, and that the locals would in the end be left with much more mundane matters to decide on. Subsidiarity in this sense can fast become a two-way street. But for Shiva ‘the principle of subsidiarity’ is seen as ‘an ecological imperative’ that when employed to empower the local level would lead to a better world:

Devaluing the role of natural resources – in ecological processes and in people’s sustenance economy – and the diverting and destroying of these resources for commodity production and capital accumulation are the main reasons for the ecological crisis and the crisis of survival of the Third World. The solution lies in giving local communities control over local resources so that they have the right, responsibility, and ability to rebuild nature’s economy, and through it their own sustainability (Shiva 2005: 164).

How this process is supposed to work is worth discussing. Shiva presupposes a whole range of occurrences here, with probably the chief one being that some larger political entity such as the state must first relent on its claim to rule in many matters that affect the local level so that these local communities can gain the level of control that will allow them to become the kind of effective units needed to solve the whole ecological conundrum. It is also implicit in Shiva’s argument that there will be no transnational corporations operating in this environment with promises of vast earthly riches in exchange for industrially extracting the resources the local
community happen to be in control of. It would certainly empower local communities to have the sort of private funds allocated to them that now are mostly reserved for larger political units, but it would do very little to the overall environmental impact those very same company operations has if these are allowed to continue under the auspices of a local rather than a national level of government. Shiva does also not assume that the empowered local communities can be allowed complete autonomy in economic matters even though she envisions ‘living economies’ that ‘are primarily local and decentralized, in contrast to the dominant model, which is global and centralized’ (Shiva 2005: 64). The local and decentralized political units Shiva argues for are in fact only semi-autonomous. This we can see because Shiva’s living economies are supposed to be ‘grounded by two ecological principles necessary to protect and restore nature and society that free market economists have resisted implementing’ (Shiva 2005: 65).

The two ecological principles are the ‘precautionary principle’ and the ‘polluter pays principle’ and according to Shiva the first ‘calls for not undertaking activities that could cause ecological harm’ while the second ‘requires that the polluter must pay for any harm done to nature and society and for the costs of cleanup’ (Shiva 2005: 65). If these principles were enshrined in law and diligently enforced globally it would probably mean the end for the vast majority of the world’s industrial conglomerates, for not many modern products can be produced without for instance using raw materials whose sourcing caused some level of ecological harm. This however is not the main issue with Shiva’s Earth Democracy which is not exactly focused on saving capitalism, the main issue is that the local democracy she puts in prime position would clearly not be the autonomous participatory democratic units Shiva argues for in any proper sense, but would likely have to stringently follow what amounts to global constitutional principles.

Global constitutional principles are not by themselves necessarily a Bad Thing, quite to the contrary they might be essential devices if one wants to pursue the creation of a functioning global polity, but there is something a bit disingenuous about emphasizing localized democracy to the degree Shiva does when she in the same text in practice ends up allocating the core responsibilities to the global plane after all. Earth Democracy for Shiva does not even mean that the present roles of corporations and intergovernmental institutions would be replaced by a global democratic structure, it just means that they would have to take environmental
concerns fully into account: ‘In Earth Democracy the responsibility of resolving the climate change problems would be on the companies – and their CEOs’ and; ‘The responsibility of governments and intergovernmental agreements would be to ensure that production and consumption patterns operate within sustainable cycles’ (Shiva 2005: 65-66). Why there still would be companies with CEOs in a world of localized economies Shiva does not get into, and why the central control by governments and intergovernmental institutions is necessary when you have responsible local units is not something she properly explains either. Shiva is clearly aware that she elevates the role of the local community over that of the state and the corporations with her theory. But even if Shiva would like to see local communities take over the role of the state in an effort to regain some of the power people lost to corporations when these started dictating policy instead, she has not followed through fully on the consequences this might have for the constitution of a world order aligned with her new political base units (see Shiva 2005: 85-87). For one thing, in a hypothetical scenario where every human community on the planet becomes a local participatory democracy following the tenets of Earth Democracy, both states and corporations would have become redundant and any higher centralized political or economic control would be unnecessary. This utopian endpoint is at present absolutely rather than relatively utopian, at least as presented by Shiva since she does not explain how you get from the present to the desired goal. Why for instance would the state(s) and the corporations accept this new arrangement, which obviously would weaken these organizations’ status dramatically? How is the relatively tiny base units Shiva along with Albert promotes supposed to keep the state and the corporations from doing what the people in charge of these comparatively much more resourceful organizations desire? I think it is safe to say that the world political dimension has not been given nearly as much thought here as the local dimension.

In conclusion; Albert, Shiva, and other associates on this side of the alter-globalist discourse, such as notably Noam Chomsky, have expressed a desire for participatory democracy and participatory economics that follows the ethos of liberation from domineering structures; especially as a means of countering the undesirable structural imperatives that arise from close cooperation between the state and capitalist enterprise. This comes straight from the New Left of the late 1960s that made “participatory democracy” one of its core tenets when it rearticulated what
was primarily earlier anarchist or libertarian socialist thought (see: Sargent 1972: 97-114). Michael Albert tried to build something close to an alter-globalist party on this participatory basis. But it seems like Albert’s attempt at creating a participatory version of the neoliberals’ Mont Pelerin Society for the internet age with IOPS failed to accomplish the decontestation of alter-globalism’s view on world order. If that task on the other hand had been solved successfully it appears like that decontestation would have gone in favor of a kind of internationalism that is in line with the national imaginary and not a planetarism which is in line with the global imaginary.

Albert’s parecon is a radical suggestion aimed at changing capitalism from the bottom up and Shiva presents a similar idea with her Earth Democracy, but in both instances as the theory is sought applied further up in the system it becomes exceedingly less radical until it ends up almost completely mirroring the present structural arrangement at the international level, just that the ideological content differs. This is probably not the best ideational foundation to base a counter-hegemonic ideology on, since as we saw in the chapter on neoliberalism the corporate core supporters of that ideology thrive economically on the maintenance of the present international framework with its multiple jurisdictions. If the alter-globalists in time were to end up gathering for the founding convention proposed by Albert, it might be preferable to do so with a less specific ideological take as its basis for discussions. The economic radicalism of Albert and Shiva’s proposals might be overcomplicating things by presuming that one should start with changing the economy from the bottom up, and then expecting the political apparatus to somehow adjust to this. This follows Marx’ idea that political ideologies are a direct results of a society’s at any time prevalent economic arrangements, but the lesson of both the neoliberals’ success and the Soviet Union’s demise have been that if you change the political parameters then the economy will adjust to the overarching ideological direction by either expanding or contracting. But it is arguably an irony of ironies that in a movement with such pronounced ideological diversity it has come to the anarchist wing – who in principle abhor hierarchical organization – to try to arrange a worldwide party. Let us now see what alternative ideological bases other than participatory democracy/economics there is to be found within the alter-globalist discourse, if any. In theory just about any other political tendency than the anarchist one should come with an improved ideological basis for the creation of a
political organization capable of working within the legal framework of the present political system.

**Participatory Democracy (Federal)**

The last of the ideological sub-strains making up the alter-globalist discourse is a rearticulated version of communism that has been most fully developed in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s trilogy *Empire* (2000), *Multitude* (2004), and *Commonwealth* (2009). What they themselves have chosen to call their ideological strain is not that important here, but let it suffice to say that Hardt & Negri’s version of communism does not have much in common with the real existing socialism that was practiced in the twentieth century. It follows more closely in the New Left tradition where both Leninism and Old Left tendencies towards centralization were perceived as anathema to its way of rearticulating left politics. The argument as set out in the theoretical behemoth their trilogy is when taken in combination, which then totals out at nearly 1,500 pages, cannot be done justice to here — although I try to briefly summarize some central elements below. Instead I will focus on Hardt and Negri’s suggestions for how to advance the alter-globalist cause at the global level and what exactly they see this as being. Marxists with ideas more inspired by the ways of the Old Left, such as the aforementioned Samir Amin and Michael Löwy, have suggested that the time might be ripe for the creation of a Fifth International. Hardt and Negri in contrast want the alter-globalists to start thinking beyond the confines of twentieth century left politics. But before we can address Hardt and Negri’s proposal, we have to get a grip on how these two theorists conceive of the present global political terrain.

Throughout their theoretical trilogy Hardt and Negri argue that we can make sense of current world politics in the following manner; the global realm is ruled by a ‘network power’ they term ‘Empire’ which is composed of ‘an oligarchy of diverse political and economic bodies, including international institutions, the dominant nation-states, multinational corporations, continental and regional alliances, and so forth, which collaborate to create an open, constituent process’ (Hardt & Negri 2000, 2004: xii, and; 2009: 226). “Constituent process” here means that these diverse forces together create an ad hoc world constitution (see: Hardt & Negri

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49 In addition there is the almost pamphlet sized book *Declaration* (Hardt & Negri 2012) that functions as an addendum to this trilogy.
2003: 118). There is a minimum of democratic input to this process since ‘Empire is also democratic in the sense that it claims to represent the global people, although [ ] this claim is largely illusory’ (Hardt & Negri 2003: 110). This Empire is not in any conspiratorial manner in complete control of the world polity: ‘Capitalist globalization – the world market, the distribution networks, the linked productive structures, and so forth – has advanced far ahead of the structures of capitalist power’ so we can infer that Empire rather is symptomatic of the fact ‘that there is no global state to regulate global capital the way the nation-states regulated national capital’ (Hardt & Negri 2009: 274-275). There is instead a broad assemblage of forces that participate in regulating the terms of exchange and so on in the global realm, where everyone with something substantial to offer can take part. If you are not part of the regulatory process, you are not in a position to allocate any preferential treatment that follows from it your way either, so this relatively open process attracts all and sundry of the world’s global players who wants “a piece of the action”. There is no pretense to equality in this ad hoc constellation, Hardt and Negri’s conception of Empire is power politics pure and simple – provided that we recognize “power” as something that can come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes (e.g. Mann 2013). Together these groups form a hierarchy where the most powerful naturally occupy the upper echelons.

The hierarchy goes as follows; first there is the level of ‘monarchical control’ where the United States as the world’s most formidable power overall holds prime position, but where crucially ‘Washington cannot exert monarchical control over the global order, without the collaboration of other dominant powers’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 61). So the “monarch” or executive part of the arrangement Hardt and Negri call Empire is largely the United States, but it is not strong enough to act with impunity, or without for instance some level of support from NATO or other regional allies: ‘If the United States is conceived as the monarchical power on the world scene, then [ ] the monarch must constantly negotiate and work with the various global aristocracies (such as political, economic and financial forces)” (Hardt & Negri 2004: 61).

The aristocratic level is then the second tier in this hierarchy, and it includes basically every powerful faction on the planet from the ‘transnational or global capitalist class’ to the ruling classes of e.g. Russia and China that also includes those with ‘bureaucratic and party privilege’ (Hardt & Negri 2009: 276-277). Underneath
them all is a nether class without much formal power: ‘ultimately this entire power structure most confront the productive global multitude, which is the real basis of the network’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 61). This aspect of Hardt and Negri’s model developed from the second to the third installment of their theory centering on the Empire, as they had realized that the Empire does not actually confront the multitude itself as we will see below.

Just as the ‘aristocracy’ continuously tries to ‘negotiate a more advantageous relationship’ with ‘the monarch’ in an effort aimed at ‘ensuring for itself a large share of the profits’ (Hardt & Negri 2009: 278) it also has to address the level beneath or the third tier, but that is not where the actual multitude resides, since “the aristocracy” deals with:

…those organisms and institutions that claim to represent “the people” on the third, lowest level of the imperial pyramid. In some instances the political elites of subordinated nation-states masquerade as representatives of the global people, as do the various popes and imams of the major religions, but most often they are poor cousins of the aristocracy trying to get their share of the loot; in others the various NGOs and aid organizations are cast as representing the people (or at least their interests); and the dominant media, of course, are always happy to don the cloak of the voice of the people. This level of the imperial system is all smoke and mirrors, because in the end there is no adequate means of representation and no global people to represent. But the claims of representation nonetheless play an essential role. Specifically, with respect to the aristocracy, this third level affords mechanisms of mediation to contain the seething multitude (Hardt & Negri 2009: 278).

We can read into this description that the multitude is not, in fact, part of the hierarchy of the Empire at all. It is merely falsely represented by the kind of organization that profits from occupying the role of the global people vis-à-vis the aristocracy, and beyond that also to the monarchical level, with it all being described as a shadow play to keep the multitude in check. ‘The three levels of the imperial constitution need one another and cannot function on their own’ as Hardt and Negri asserts, but this opens up the question of whether the multitude, or the fourth tier, is recognized by the Empire at all. This Hardt and Negri answers with a quotation from Spinoza: ‘So the reason why in practice [aristocratic] government is not absolute [ ] can only be this, that the multitude is an object of fear to the rulers, thereby
maintaining some degree of freedom for itself, which it asserts and preserves, if not by express law, by tacit understanding’ (as cited in Hardt & Negri 2009: 279, first set of brackets in original). This age old understanding between ruler and ruled, or the ruling class and its subjects, predates democracy but is nonetheless based upon an implicit minimal consent of the governed. Here Hardt and Negri might be accused of understating the multitude’s capacity for agency, since at least in the democratic countries whose elites take part in forming Empire there is a distinct possibility that someone outside of the aristocratic circle could get elected into power by the multitude itself. Power in numbers is after all formalized in today’s democracies in a way it was not during the reign of the ancien régime. But for Hardt and Negri we are currently witnessing ‘the collapse of the structures of representation’ due to ‘lobbies’, ‘the deafening imbecility of the media circus’, ‘capitalist financing campaigns’, ‘the extinction of civil society’ and so forth (Hardt & Negri 2012: 25-27). All these are valid points, but the case might be a bit overstated nonetheless.

Hardt and Negri registers that there is now an ‘enormous desire for global democracy’, and argues that the ‘global scale seems increasingly like the only imaginable horizon for change’ and ‘real democracy [seems] the only feasible solution’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 289 and 312). But at the same time they also point out that it is ‘illusory to repropose national models of democracy and representative institutions on a global scale’ which they claim that most contemporary proposals do (Hardt & Negri 2004: 307). The main problem with such proposals for a global representative body is for Hardt and Negri ‘the concept of representation itself’ where in one example they claim that ‘the representative function is clearly reduced to a miniscule level when one delegate represents 10 million voters’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 294-295). This would have been a sensible argument if the representative was given the task of representing 10 million people on a personal rather than on an ideological level, since an arbitrarily selected 10 million people would of course altogether represent the widest possible spectrum of diverse ideologies. But Hardt and Negri’s objection does not make as much sense if they all share the same ideology and voted for their representative on the basis that she or he shared theirs – since their political intentions are then collectively a close approximation to that of the representative (provided that the representative was being honest when standing for election). But Hardt and Negri’s main point is nonetheless that ‘the modern
concept of representation’ can be seen as outdated and that present conditions ‘makes new forms’ of democracy ‘possible’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 295). On a skeptical note they also point out ‘the gigantism of such proposals. Global commissions, global institutions, and global agencies are not necessarily adequate solutions to global problems’ with the implication that these could perhaps be better tackled at lower levels in a similar vein to Shiva’s conception of subsidiarity noted above (Hardt & Negri 2004: 298, emphasis in original).

When ‘traditional political thinkers and organizers on the left’ point out that ‘there is little ideology or centralized political leadership’ in the alter-globalist movement and that ‘until there is a party and an ideology to direct [it] there will be no revolution’ Hardt and Negri answers that ‘it’s exactly the opposite!’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 107). Their point is that: ‘These movements are powerful not despite their lack of leaders but because of it. They are organized horizontally as multitudes, and their insistence on democracy at all levels is more than a virtue but a key to their power’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 107). Again we see the argument that there is strength in diversity:

Furthermore, their slogans and arguments have spread so widely not despite but because the positions they express cannot be summarized or disciplined in a fixed ideological line. There are no party cadres telling people what to think, but instead there exist discussions that are open to a wide variety of views that sometimes may even contradict each other but nonetheless, often slowly, develop a coherent perspective (Hardt & Negri 2012: 107).

There might in other words be a consensus developing within the alter-globalist discourse, and according to Hardt and Negri it is not congregating on a coherent ideological alternative to neoliberalism. What they argue for is instead a convergence on notions ‘of a participatory democracy of the common’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 84). “The common” is for Hardt and Negri a key concept that has at least certain global connotations; ‘we recognize the centrality of the common, that is, the earth and its ecosystem – the forest, the seas, soil, air, water, and so forth – as well as the products of social labor, including ideas, images codes, information, affects, and much more’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 95). What Hardt and Negri then mean when they call themselves “communists” is that they support a project of ‘reappropriating the common’ for the multitude’s responsible use in common (Hardt & Negri 2009: 164).
Hardt and Negri point to the tendency amongst participants in the alter-globalist movement to organize into ‘assemblies’ where the ‘assembly form […] serves as a tool for creating a democratic legislative power in these movements among hundreds and sometimes thousands of participants’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 90). They also point to a similar historical precedent to that mentioned by Albert: ‘Workers’ councils constituted the central proposition of all streams of socialism that, contrary to the authoritarian currents, consider the primary objective of revolution to be democracy, that is the rule of all by all’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 90-91). And on a note very similar to Pateman’s description of participatory democracy Hardt and Negri assume that the ‘surest and most powerful way to generate democratic political affects is by practicing democracy’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 93). They are not entirely sure however, how these localized assemblies are going to cooperate at higher levels, and therefore argue that: ‘The key task of generating a new legislative power remains that of inventing a federalist form to extend political participation in decision making across the entire social terrain’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 92). Hardt and Negri’s concept of “federalism” is quite different from the usual one:

By federal here we do not mean a central authority ruling over smaller political units such as states or provinces. Instead we understand federal in a more basic sense as an open, extensive relation among diverse political forces spread across the social terrain and not subsumed under an abstract, centralized unity. The shape of federalist organization as we intend it, in other words, is not pyramidal but horizontal and extensive. Such a federalism fosters the plural and process-oriented dimensions of politics (Hardt & Negri 2012: 89).

Hardt and Negri claims that the ‘assemblies established in the encampments and occupied squares of 2011 spread power in such a federalist fashion’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 89). Hardt and Negri have been heavily influenced by the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (see: Hardt & Negri 2000: 415). Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of rhizomatic structure is relevant here, i.e. a biological term which originally describes an extensive root structure covering a large area connecting many individual plants or fungi who are nonetheless parts of that larger specimen. Hardt and Negri, using the internet with its ‘interconnected nodes’ and ‘no central point of control’ as an example of a rhizome, sees this as a ‘democratic model’ resembling ‘what Deleuze and Guattari call a rhizome, a nonhierarchical and
noncentered network structure’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 299). If we imagine that the Occupy congregations that blossomed up in hundreds of cities all over the world, instead of occupying squares, had managed to take over the city halls of all the world’s metropolitan centers and started to run the cities as if they were part of a larger chain. Then we could in theory have had a horizontal global system of networked cities practicing participatory democracy up and running pretty quickly, assuming that each of the cities themselves were composed of a network of assemblies so that everyone could participate. But of course, Hardt and Negri means to say that the Occupy participants “spread [decision-making] power” amongst themselves, not that they had appropriated power over society and then started sharing it out evenly to everyone. Pacifist protests in the squares of the West might be a nuisance to Empire or whatever one calls the powers that be, but it is not a like for like challenge for political power that conceivably could end with the existing hierarchy being overturned. The problem with relying solely on a bottom up strategy, as we will now see, is acknowledged by Hardt and Negri in an almost underhanded fashion.

First of all Hardt and Negri realize that if assemblies of the manageable size idealized by participatory theory are going to be in charge of important decisions this ‘raises immediately an objection regarding expertise’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 96). There is no doubt that ‘the common’ has to ‘be managed in order to be sustained for the future’ and that this ‘requires planning’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 95). The solution seems obvious: ‘knowledge and expertise of our social world have to be cultivated on the broadest scale’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 96). Hardt and Negri point out that: ‘The politicians and financial moguls who today make decisions are not geniuses delivered to us from heaven’ and that therefore there should be ‘no reason to think that through education we cannot all become at least as expert as they are regarding our natural, social, and economic worlds in order to make informed, intelligent decisions’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 96). This might be true, at least to a certain extent, but in any case this makes the grassroots project of responsible bottom-up participatory democracy a long-term project. Perhaps long enough in duration for the neoliberal Empire to consolidate its position in yet unimaginable ways and finish off the last bits of pristine nature left on the planet.

This concern with expediency brings us to the crux of the matter; because these ‘patient constituent processes’ that gradually can become participatory democratic
assemblies capable of autonomous informed decision making in all matters they have to or ‘must be complemented by immediately acting counterpowers’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 59). Hardt and Negri here almost completely changes tack from their more sustained argument and state that ‘what is clear are the urgent needs of humanity and the earth, and the incapacity of all existing powers to fulfill those needs’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 59). Someone have to step in and reverse the process before it is too late, but Hardt and Negri have absolutely no trust in the traditional parties of the left that more moderate alter-globalists such as George thinks it might be helpful to engage with and argue for a more radical change than parties following the Old Left tradition could conceivably lend themselves to (see: Hardt & Negri 2012: 86-88). But this insistence on the need for a more immediate and active construction of a “counterpower” nonetheless opens the theoretical possibility for a strategic coalition of Marxists looking to institute a Fifth International or a similar party organization that could deal with party politics and the anarchists in the movement more concerned with achieving durable emancipation from the bottom up.

Conclusion: Towards Alter-Globalist Ideological Coherence?

The anarchist David Graeber has suggested that one of the main differences between the Marxist and the anarchist approach to thinking about politics is that ‘Marxism has tended to be a theoretical or analytical discourse about revolutionary strategy’ while ‘Anarchism has tended to be an ethical discourse about revolutionary practice’ (Graeber 2009: 373, added emphasis). Here anarchism, which ‘is primarily an ethics of practice’, insists that ‘one must embody the society one wishes to create’ while among the Marxists there seems to be a tendency to think that one can ‘create freedom through authoritarian means’ (Graeber 2009: 373). Importantly, as Graeber mentions elsewhere, the anarchists insist on building ‘networks based on principles of decentralized, nonhierarchical consensus democracy’ and as Graeber explains these ‘new forms of organization are its ideology’ (Graeber 2003: 332). This means that the anarchists’ ‘ideology, then, is immanent in the antiauthoritarian principles that underlie their practice’ (Graeber 2003: 333).

The caricature of the contemporary Marxists as being all insistent on the creation of a Leninist ‘vanguard party’ is getting tiresome for that faction of the alter-globalist
discourse; for instance Samir Amin thinks this ‘a destructive description’ (Amin 2008: 40). The novelty of the present day radical left discourse, as compared to the Really Old Left (i.e. the 1st International composition of anarchists, communists, and socialists) it harkens from, is that it no longer sees itself as existing solely for the promotion of the interest of the working class: ‘Capitalism has reached a stage in its development where its victim (its opponent) is no longer formed exclusively by the proletariat, whose labor it exploits, but by humanity as a whole, whose survival it threatens’ (Amin 2008: 33). This comingling of promoting; liberation from hierarchy, decentralization, and bottom-up democracy (primarily by the anarchists), and the notion that one of the worst aspects of contemporary capitalism, which is now going through its neoliberal phase, is that it is destroying the Earth (a notion shared by all participants in the discourse), makes a prospective return to Old Left politics in support of political centralization and industrialism seem very unlikely. This development was foreshadowed by the rise of the New Left in the 1960s, who pioneered so much of the political thinking we now find in the alter-globalist discourse that it is no wonder that the alter-globalists have been called ‘the “new new left” ’ (Graeber 2003: 334).

One of the biggest differences between the New Left and the alter-globalist discourse is that the latter is truly global in a sense that was not accomplished by the New Left, which despite being a worldwide movement had much less direct input from the Third World or what is now similarly construed as the global South (see: Graber 2003: 328-329). The focus on the need for sound ecological living within the boundaries of the planet’s capacities for natural regeneration has also intensified from the New Left to the alter-globalist discourse. This is if anything the most promising indication that the alter-globalist discourse represents a budding planetarist ideology – the global imaginary has here completely set aside the Old Left’s glorification of industrialism – but this planetary ecological awareness is hardly mirrored by any plans for global political structures.

What we get instead is a series of vague and underdeveloped ideas about what could follow in the international sphere if for instance participatory democracy or a sustainable community based economy were to be implemented at the local level. Albert’s theory of “parecon” and Shiva’s theory of “Earth Democracy” are both not really able to bridge the aspirations for the local or community level with a convincing attendant projection of what consequences these plans would have for
the global level of politics. This they strangely assume would structurally remain more or less the same as it is today even if the scaffolding that currently supports it is removed, which is essentially what they suggest should happen at the local level.

In a similar manner, albeit a bit more attuned to how international politics works in the present, Susan George also assumes that one could implement a Keynesian program of taxation and redistribution at the global level while simultaneously respecting the democratic autonomy of the nations it would affect, without taking into account that this compartmentalization of the world polity would make it likely that negatively affected affluent places would reject her proposed plan democratically. George’s plan probably requires a world state like entity for its implementation, but this she does not acknowledge, and instead she continues to support the concept of national sovereignty as exemplified in the title of her book *We the Peoples of Europe* (George 2008). Again we see a mixture of having an ethos aligned with the global imaginary being combined with the intellectual refusal to think politically beyond the confines of the national imaginary. This is very much a repetition of the cosmopolitan discourse where Kant and those inclined to follow in his footsteps had a tendency to display a universalistic morality combined with a defense of communitarian politics without seeing how this made their ostensibly universalistic ethos a form of posturing devoid of real political substance. It is a pretense to universalism that turns out to be specious. Their ethos is not universalistic, but in fact remains at the level of political loyalty nationalistic. This is not to say the democratic socialist/social democratic internationalist grouping Susan George’s theory is representative of is in the same political camp as the Chauvinistic nationalists one could find in for example the French party Front National. But this section presumably has yet to grasp what it would mean politically to follow through politically on moral universalistic aspirations. The alter-globalists in this position are therefore not as diametrically opposed to the nationalistic right as they might prefer to think they are. I am here taking into account that the alter-globalists are still positioned much further from the anti-liberal right than what the neoliberals assume.

The Marxists are here both prescient and backwards at the same time. They at least have the political wherewithal to assume that mounting a counter-hegemonic political challenge might be a necessary step in the direction of achieving the goal of a world no longer ruled by neoliberal tenets. However, the suggested method for this, the instituting of a new or fifth International shows that they have not taken to
heart all the lessons provided by the fall of the Old Left and the rise of the New Left. The advocacy for the institution of a Fifth International among some of them show that they are completely beholden to the national-international imaginary, as for instance when Samir Amin suggests ‘a new internationalism of the peoples’ (Amin 2006: 163). Other participants in this side of the debate such as Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin seem to have realized that one has to move beyond this tired old formula, but they are not sure exactly what that means except a break with the Old Left mode of doing things that in various ways is supported by other Marxists such as Löwy and Amin.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri reluctantly argues for what amounts to a synthesis between the Marxist and the anarchist (or participatory democratic) positions. Clearly they see the participatory democratic part of the alter-globalist discourse as the ethically superior one. But perhaps in tacit acknowledgment of their own position as the movement’s arguably foremost theorists, they see no other option than making it clear that creating a functioning participatory society is bound to be a time-consuming exercise. As a consequence of this the alter-globalists should also entertain the prospect of launching a more traditionally organized challenge to neoliberalism, because if time is of the essence then it will take too long to unseat the neoliberals purely by a long-term bottom-up challenge. They seem torn between the ethos of democratic participation, which animates the anarchistic side of the discourse, and the perception of impending social and ecological doom if the neoliberals are left in power, the latter a notion which overshadows much of, if not all of, the alter-globalist debate.

The likelihood that we might be living the doomsday scenario already – since it is common knowledge within the discourse that the temperature of the planet is on the rise and that inequality between the richest and the poorest in society is widening – necessitates a course of action with a shorter time horizon: ‘You can’t create a democratic society in a world where the few hold all the wealth and the weapons. You can’t repair the health of the planet when those who continue to destroy it still make the decisions’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 101). But Hardt and Negri are very careful to advice caution, because one has to ‘recogniz[e] the brutality of state socialist planning’ in the past as well as that the ‘traditional left’ which remain today has little to offer (Hardt & Negri 2012: 86-88, and; 93). Another piece of advice, which it would seem Albert had taken to heart when he put plans for turning the
IOPS into a more solid organization on hold, was that: ‘The subject who prepares’ or tries to shape the discourse towards coherence ‘cannot be a vanguard or a cabal like the Chicago boys [i.e. the neoliberals] but must instead be a multitude’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 103). The major problem is the following: ‘The rich won’t just give away their money and property, and tyrants won’t just lay down their arms and let fall the reins of power. Eventually we will have to take them – but let’s go slowly. It’s not so simple’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 101).

This ambivalence is typical of the alter-globalist discourse. John Holloway has famously stated that the alter-globalist movement should seek to ‘change the world without taking power’ (Holloway 2002). This succinctly sums up the position of the participatory democrats of an anarchist persuasion. The Marxist faction is understandably skeptical whether that slogan makes any sense at all, but it is nonetheless a truism in the wider alter-globalist discourse that the Old Left methods some of them still subscribe to must be abandoned once and for all.

Hardt and Negri, who are some of the most reflective thinkers in the discourse dealt with here agonizes about whether to stay ideologically true to their conviction (which is participatory democratic more than anything else) or to support some of the Marxist initiatives that would require some kind of ideological consolidation just so that possibly the advance of neoliberal thinking could be halted and a more conducive climate for democratic experimentation could be created. In the end they do not want to either stop it or endorse it fully, but this might be the beginnings of a dual-track understanding between the anarchists and the Marxist/socialists in the discourse, where the former lay the cultural groundwork for the long-term and the latter starts the political fight in the institutional arena. Their utopian end-points do not differ significantly after all, but reaching them only requires that the Marxists yields to the anarchists at some future point when the maintenance of a state-like structure is no longer seen as a necessity. In the meantime the Marxist, or perhaps more properly, the political faction could create conditions more suitable for anarchist experimentation in exchange for support against right wing parties and tendencies. This is of course a projection of current tendencies, and the only thing that is safe to say regarding the alter-globalist discourse when it comes to its planetarist credentials is that it at the moment clearly is not planetarist in the way I have portrayed that ideal earlier.
Many of the Marxists and the socialists (such as e.g. Susan George) are outspoken internationalists and still think in terms of “peoples” like Kant once did. The participatory democrats or (eco) anarchists clearly have trouble thinking beyond internationalism in the global sphere as well. But even though the analysis of the discourse here undertaken confirms the thesis that the national-international imaginary still holds sway over most of the participants also here, there are clear indications that the global imaginary is on the rise – which again furthers the notion that we are in the midst of a turn from a national conception of our core community to a global one. More precisely this should be thought of as an awkward half-way point between the two where the general tendency is to think in global terms, but at the same time another general tendency is to see no other potential political solutions available than those that were prescribed by the national-international mindset much earlier.

A democracy modeled on the rhizomatic structure earlier theorized by Deleuze and Guattari might be the desired end point, but it is unclear to say the least if this structure lends itself to unseating the powerful and then keeping them away from power until the world has been educated sufficiently to accept participatory democracy in full. It seems like there is one internal contradiction within the discourse that has to be resolved before it can decide in which direction to develop, and that is to decide what is most important; is it to effectively oppose neoliberalism or is it to try out new modes of organization?

If it is to effectively oppose neoliberalism the creation of a party centered around an ideology could be the most efficient strategy. But yet suggesting that an ideology might be a necessary tool for realizing the alter-globalist project (presumably a rhizomatic democratic world society) is dismissed by Hardt and Negri as an undesirable centralizing tendency. Centralized authoritarian structures, especially with a Hitler or Stalin in charge of them, obviously have their pitfalls. But who says that the alter-globalists would need an extremely rigid hierarchical structure along the lines of for instance the former communist parties to function effectively as a political collective? Albert’s IOPS, despite its obvious faults, indicates that the internet might facilitate the creation of a global party, and perhaps also intra-party deliberation and consensus making, without the need for strict leadership. This is not the place to go into detail about how the IOPS idea could be improved; but clearly in this day and age most of the functions of a party headquarters could be moved
online. Not to say that the experimental, more genuinely anarchist part of the alter-
globalist discourse, would need to suffer as a consequence. This is where a dual 
track approach where experimentation is encouraged locally comes in, but alongside 
a somewhat more traditional approach at for instance the global level. Ultimately 
this approach is halfheartedly endorsed by Hardt and Negri. Such a synthesis of the 
alter-globalist discourse could potentially result in a planetarist ideology. But 
presently we are witnessing a wider discourse which has yet to crystallize around a 
common world order project. It perhaps never will, due to the widespread aversion 
among its participants to any centralizing measures.
Conclusion: What the Planetarist Distinction Reveals About Contemporary Globalization Ideologies

The globalizing trends are moving so rapidly in integrative directions, especially with respect to economic, environmental, and cognitive dimensions of reality, that it seems almost inevitable that some form of geogovernance will take shape (Falk 1995: 13).

What is generated concretely will depend on the outcome of the three-cornered complex and interactive struggle to control the transition to geogovernance being waged by statist, global market, and transnational democratic forces (Falk 1995: 36).

Is there a planetarist ideology among the contemporary globalization ideologies? The conclusion has to be no, because at present none of the contemporary globalization ideologies are sufficiently developed to deserve to be designated a fully developed planetarist ideology. Within the different discourses there is insufficient awareness of or attention paid to which ideological aspects would fit a global polity and which ones would not. The current crop of “global” ideologies analysed here, namely; neoliberalism (also called globalism), cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism, have not reached the development necessary – as identified in the theoretical discourses that constitute the backbone of these ideologies – for any of them to pose a serious challenge to the principle of national sovereignty that underlies the international (and by no means fully global) constitution of the present world order. These are in other words not consistently global ideologies in their current form. This is the study’s major finding.

Taken together they do however have the resemblance of an emergent and coherent left-right continuum operating on the global plane. The coherence stops when it comes to world order perspectives however, unless one counts a commitment to current international institutions by the neoliberals, the liberal cosmopolitans, and the rightmost parts of the alter-globalist discourse. The neoliberals seems to support internationalism because they want weak organizations at the global level, while the cosmopolitans appear to have unrealistically high hopes about what such institutions can achieve given the history of such institutions. Here the alter-globalists that think
in terms of internationalism are pretty much in the same camp as the cosmopolitans. The different theoretical discourses that shape all of these ideologies have not properly figured out if they should promote *a planetary polity, internationalism*, or even a *localism* that in time could render global political rule superfluous. If anything it is only neoliberalism that has solved this ideological tension by seeking to avoid political globalization due to the regulatory potential inherent in a sovereign global polity.

Of all the theories taken into account in this study as potentially planetarist only four seemed to fit the universalist criteria fully; Mises’ global universalism, Wells’ cosmopolitan utopia, Wagar’s elaboration of Wells’ designs, and Hardt and Negri’s rhizomatic network of participatory democratic “nodes”, and the latter is only universalist if we assume Hardt and Negri imagine that this structure would work on a global scale. In addition there were other approximations towards a universalist planetarist position in the cosmopolitan camp. This was most pronounced in the works of Marchetti and Cabrera.

Mises global universalism only fits at the level of structure, since he advocates a global polity. It is debatable how emancipatory and enlightening his scheme could possibly be since Mises does not seem to want neither taxation nor any redistribution of wealth or anything else that could be perceived as socialist. Nonetheless Mises’ articulates a position that could be held by an economically right wing libertarian-capitalist planetarist party, but it would most likely have to be a party in opposition if the world polity was to have enough funds to function properly as a global political organ.

Wells’ cosmopolitan utopia comes close to being the gold standard in planetarist thought in the twentieth century. Wagar builds on this and it is probably that strain of Wellsian theory we will need to further elaborate if a planetary polity is to come to fruition within the parameters of a modern world state in this or a later century. Both Wells and Wagar have a tendency to downplay the democratic scope of their ideal polities, but all told Wells is far worse than Wagar in this respect. Because of this it is doubtful if we can tick the box fulfilling the emancipatory criteria when it comes to their vision. But they both show a commitment to science that comes very close to appearing enlightening.
Hardt and Negri’s rhizomatic network of participatory democratic “nodes” which builds on the work of Deleuze and Guattari is by far the most contemporary planetarist vision put forward in the discourses discussed here. It brings forward images of a planet of independent neighbourhoods assembled together in autonomous cities interlinked in a global network without a center. Hardt and Negri shares a predilection for participatory democracy harking back to for example “guild socialism” at an earlier time with the more explicitly anarchist faction of the alter-globalist discourse, and they do not really emphasize the global dimension this could have very much. But Hardt and Negri do put some more thought into it than the anarchists who for their part ended up imagining an international structure on top of the local councils they had envisioned.

It is obvious that for the side of the alter-globalist debate Hardt and Negri has aligned themselves with there is no particular concern with overcoming present obstacles to realizing their long-term plans. Great powers, multinational corporations, and armed criminal organizations do not figure prominently in their plans. But if we take these figurative alpha males in the human community into account it appears as if the rhizomatic network might be an absolutely utopian idea for the time being. Perhaps after a general period of world pacification under a more centralized cosmopolitan political apparatus could the conditions become ripe for attempting something more anarchic like this. If anything this world order project gets full score for its envisioned level of emancipation. But taking into account the refusal to acknowledge that presently very powerful countervailing organizations work heavily against the realization of their plans, there is a close to delusional aspect to this world order perspective that should make it fail the enlightening criteria.

The fault-line, with internationalism (grounded in nationalism) on one side and a true global universalism I here call planetarism on the other, has been the principal concern in this study. The red thread throughout this work is that this dichotomy, which is seldom grasped, has nonetheless been dealt with by a select number of theorists in each camp. The cleavage exists, but it is hardly being constructively dealt with at the moment. This can be inferred from what is in this context a confusing mixture of the terms “global”, “international”, and “cosmopolitan” which are broadly taken to mean the same. That confounding is a signifying trait of our present age and it erases from our vocabulary terms that otherwise could have been
used for describing a very substantial ideological difference between visions of a world built on nation-states (i.e. the current international world) and visions of a world that would transcend the world of nation-states and take the political organization of humanity to the next level (i.e. a future global or unitary planetary level).

The problem with these discourses (excepting cosmopolitanism) is that I have been searching for an answer to a question they hardly address in the literature they are composed of, namely what is neoliberalism or alter-globalism’s world order perspective? For the cosmopolitans this is a central or core part of what the ideology is about, so discussions of this topic can be located frequently enough. The neoliberal discourse really puts its focus on economics or it addresses “societal” issues in so vague terms that it could be conceived of as meant globally, though it probably is not. This was the chief reason that I ended up concentrating on a period in the development of neoliberal discourse when the participants in it actually addressed the issue. Alter-globalism is more a band of ideologies than an ideology, but it has temporarily at least worked as a discourse where the participants take each other’s views into account from time to time. Its focus has been on local emancipation, but the contours of a radical world order perspective can nonetheless be discerned in it.

**Summary of the Argument**

I have argued that a planetarist conception of politics that in theory would point towards a future planetary polity should now be under development due to the heightened global awareness of the threat of climate change, ecological degradation, and the fact that we have most likely caused a new geological epoch recently christened the Anthropocene with our industrialism. Coupled with a rise in the human population these converging trends spell, if not disaster, then a real challenge that perhaps is best met with a novel form of species government authorized democratically by the human populace. I set out three criteria for an ideal planetarist ideology, which was that it would have to be; 1) universalist or globally inclusive, i.e. planetary, 2) emancipatory or democratic, and 3) enlightening rather than delusional or deceptive. It is conceivable that ideologies of both a capitalist, socialist, and ecologist nature could fit within this relatively broad framework, but it would not have much room for nationalist, authoritarian, or religiously fundamentalist varieties. In addition the first universalist criteria removes what earlier was perceived to be the most progressive ideologies, such as socialist
internationalism or liberal cosmopolitanism (in the internationalist variety) from the equation. This is a deliberate operation to find out how consistently global (in the planetarist sense) the contemporary globalization ideologies currently are.

Using the work of Martin Shaw and Manfred B. Steger I aimed to show that Shaw’s national-internationalism and Steger’s global imaginary came too close to describing the same phenomena to make Steger’s conception of the global imaginary particularly useful for this task, since global for Steger still comes too close to meaning international – even though the global imaginary is a concept which with some modification can do the job. But after modification the global imaginary no longer applies to the ideologies Steger identified as belonging to this category, so to make up for this shortfall I suggested adding a category of “international imaginary”. The modified global imaginary could then be applied to explain where an ideal planetarist ideology ought to belong, but not, as I was to find out, any other articulated ideologies except for a few theoretical outliers in a sea of primarily internationalist ideological conceptions. This then pretty much proved that globalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism largely are “old internationalist wine poured into a new set of bottles with shiny new labels” to paraphrase the old chestnut.

There is no substantial ideological change behind the application of terms that can be associated with a universalist or “planetarist” stance. There are a few exceptions, or anomalies, to use the Kuhnian expression, that were identified along the way. But there were not nearly enough of these to declare that a paradigm shift had taken place. The most promising versions were mostly quite old too, so that is a further indication that we are not about to witness a planetarist movement take control of the Earth.

**The Main Findings and Claims to Originality**

The main finding is that at the present time there are no planetarist ideologies available for the part of the world populace that have started to see the world in global rather than national terms. The global imaginary theorized by Steger has yet to result in the formation of a truly global or planetarist ideology. I have here argued that neoliberalism, rather than being a planetarist ideology, actually appears to work against political globalization because its adherents fear economic regulation at the global level. Instead the neoliberals, who in the interwar years were in favour of world order perspectives ranging from global universalism to international federalism, early after the Second World War seems to have settled on a limited
internationalism. This privileged the elites in the United States and their Western European partners and can be properly described as Atlanticism. In time this elitist internationalism expanded to include elites from other parts of the world, from for example Japan and Latin America, and later with the fall of communism, also the rest of the world. But crucially, except for a drive to penetrate markets around the world with the help of the creation of a global legal framework that does not threaten capital in any way, there are few signs that the neoliberal ideology promotes anything else than a limited economic internationalism that benefits (modern capitalist) elites worldwide.

A realist worldview which I have claimed was primarily brought into the neoliberal discourse by Walter Lippmann in the late 1930s and early 1940s appears to have influenced the decontestation of the neoliberal world order perspective that happened around this time. A closer reading of Lippmann’s oeuvre indicates that this was far from the only influence his thought had on the formation of neoliberalism. If Lippmann’s work heavily influenced Hayek and other neoliberals in the ideology’s formative phase, which there is some reason to believe, the lesson one can take from Lippmann’s work is positively Machiavellian (in the negative sense of that word). For Lippmann recommended a program of public deception, operational secrecy, and enthusiastic institutionalization to ensure rule by the elite he saw as best equipped to rule well. The neoliberals appear to have followed this advice, especially (as can be most easily proved) when it comes to enthusiastic institutionalization. Further research is needed to find out exactly what Lippmann’s level of influence was in the early formative period, but this contribution does indicate that Lippmann’s work well could be considered one means to lift the veil on the neoliberal enigma. If deception really is a core part of the neoliberal ideology as my reading of Lippmann seems to make possible, then the ideology is most clearly not enlightening, but it is certainly substantial reason to claim that it is neither emancipatory nor truly global, or planetarist, in the form it took after its world order perspective was decontested in the latter half of the 1940s. The coupling of Lippmann to the (theorized) decontestation of neoliberalism’s world order perspective in the late 1940s is an original contribution (to my knowledge).

The cosmopolitan discourse appears to be almost overwhelmingly a discourse centered on a specious coupling of moral universalism and political national–internationalism grounded in the national imaginary rather than the global. This is a
strong claim, but one I have done my utmost to substantiate in the chapter. This critique of cosmopolitanism, in the manner it is done, could be an original contribution to both ideology studies and the cosmopolitan debate.

A critique of the alter-globalist discourse’s world order perspective that includes this breadth has never been done before, and the findings concerning Albert’s IOPS have perhaps never been reported before, so this might be an original research contribution.

Moreover, the three discourses of neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism appears to overlap considerably when it comes to the issue of world order. Cosmopolitans arguing for a multilayered governance structure instead of world government are doing the neoliberals’ bidding when it comes to undermining attempts to create world law or sovereignty at the global level. Cosmopolitans that do favor an internationalism that amounts to the institution of world government by stealth come closer to sharing the same goals as the social democratic and Western Marxist factions of the alter-globalist discourse that would like to see global institutions capable of regulation of capitalism or even facilitating a transition away from capitalism. These groups together represent the most pressing challenge to the neoliberal ideological architecture today, but they have yet to realize this to any extent and unite in a left, but not radical, party. The radicals that form the third fragment of the world order perspective debate one can find in the most radical half of the alter-globalist discourse. Their project of participatory democracy and bottom up change is so long term that it does not really represent a political challenge as much as a cultural change that might grow in importance in the long run. On the basis of this I would predict that a fusion of right-cosmopolitan and neoliberal perspectives on the one side and left-cosmopolitan and socialist/Marxist perspectives of the other is the more likely outcome of a maturing of the ideological debate on world order perspectives. The long term goals of the radical alter-globalists would most likely be best served by a tacit support of the latter grouping, so here we have a potential united left-liberal, social democratic/democratic socialist, ecologist, and libertarian anarchist alliance in global politics. But that requires that the anarchist faction and the socialistic one realize that they have different objectives that do not necessarily compete in the present global sphere of politics. It also means that the left-liberal cosmopolitans have to distance themselves from the neoliberal project which appears to be more elitist and authoritarian and
less globalist and democratic than the terms “neoliberalism” and “globalism” implies. This all means that the “planetarist” concept can be used to show fault-lines within all three ideological discourses, but in the case of neoliberalism the tension appears to have been resolved in the past. In the case of cosmopolitanism and alter-globalism this “planetarist” and “nationalist/localist” cleavage indicates a future ideological split, and interestingly a fusion of the left cosmopolitan and socialistic sides of the two different discourses. To develop in this direction cosmopolitans must unload their neoliberal leanings and alter-globalists should stop thinking that participatory democracy is an idea that can compete in the global political sphere as it is presently constituted where corporations and nation-states currently operate with impunity and would have to be confronted by coherent alternative projects for a better kind of democratic world integration, that ideally is emancipatory and enlightening.

Lastly, the whole idea of using a nationalist-via internationalist- to planetarist scale to measure the relative ideological positions on world order in the neoliberal, the cosmopolitan, and the alter-globalist discourse has not been attempted before. Vaguely similar attempts have been made to discuss these ideologies or theorists in the sense that they are part of global discourses by; Gary Browning (2011), Olaf Corry (2013), and Rafal Soborski (2013). But they do not employ the same theoretical framework I have created here or go nearly as in depth into the full range of theorists as I have done here. Their work can be useful companions to this for anyone interested in seeing how the contemporary debate on the global ideological discourse is developing, and whether or not I have developed it further or in other directions than they have.

In sum this thesis has both contributed with the creation of new knowledge and it demonstrates the application of existing knowledge in a novel way.

**Future Prospects**

This work can be utilized as a foundation for further articulations of ideal global ideologies. It can also be seen as a preliminary theoretical investigation for a normative work on planetarism as the opposite imaginary background to nationalism, since this work only begins to develop the concept so it can be applied to measure existing globalization ideologies.
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List of Abbreviations

AD – *Anno Domini*

ATTAC – Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and Citizen’s Action (originally *Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financières et pour l'Action Citoyenne*)

BCE – Before the Common Era

EU – The European Union

IMF – The International Monetary Fund

IOPS – International Organization for a Participatory Society

ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

LGBT – Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender

MPS – Mont Pelerin Society

NAFTA – The North American Free Trade Agreement

NATO – The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PSOE – *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*

SPD – *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*

UN – The United Nations

US/USA – The United States of America

WHO – The World Health Organization

WSF – The World Social Forum

WTO – The World Trade Organization